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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

President Kennedy Receives Representatives of Belgrade Conference, Explains U.S. Position on Current World Situation

On September 12 and 13 President Kennedy met with President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia and President Modibo Keita of the Republic of Mali, who were acting as representatives of the states represented at the Conference of Nonaligned Nations which met at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, September 1-6.¹ Following is an exchange of remarks between President Kennedy and Presidents Sukarno and Keita upon their arrival September 12, a statement by President Kennedy issued at the close of their talks on September 13, and the text of identical letters delivered to Presidents Sukarno and Keita personally by the President at the White House on September 13, together with the text of a message to President Kennedy from the Belgrade conference.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS

White House press release dated September 12

President Kennedy

I take great pleasure in welcoming once again to the United States President Sukarno. We appreciated the opportunity of your visit with us last spring, and we are delighted that you have come to visit us again.

It is a great pleasure and satisfaction to welcome President Keita to the United States for the first time, and we hope that though his visit may not be long he will come to understand our country and our people better for his visit with us.

On behalf of the people of the United States and the Government of the United States, I extend a warm welcome to our two distinguished visitors, who come representing the leaders, the

¹ For text of President Kennedy's message to the conference, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 478; for a White House statement announcing the visit of Presidents Sukarno and Keita, see *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 518.

states, and the people who were assembled at the recent conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

We realize that they come on a mission of peace, and we want them to know that the people of this country share their great desire that the problems which disturb the tranquillity of the world be settled in a peaceful manner, in a manner which represents the desires of the people who are involved to live their own lives in freedom, a peace which is real, which permits an orderly settlement of difficult problems, a peace which represents the basic aspirations of people everywhere—a matter of such great importance, quite rightly, to the people who met in Yugoslavia—to live out their own lives in the way they choose.

So we are delighted, Mr. President, to welcome you. We are grateful to you for making the long voyage. We recognize that in coming, as you have, around the world to visit us here in the United States, your objectives are those which you share with us: a desire that the world may continue to move forward and that the people of the world may live out their lives in the way they wish and in the peace they want.

Mr. President.

President Sukarno

My dear President Kennedy, today I am again in Washington, and for the fourth time. It was indeed, as you said, a long voyage from Belgrade to Washington, but it was a very pleasant one.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the kind reception and for your kind words. We both—President Keita and I—have come here as, as you said, emissaries of the Belgrade conference of unaligned nations. The previous times I came here as a representative of the Indonesian Republic, a representative of 92 million people. But today I have come here, together with President Keita, as an envoy of the Belgrade conference, representing about 750 million people.

Our task is not a task of mediation. No, our task is to communicate the thoughts and concerns of the Belgrade conference to you, Mr. President—our thoughts and concerns about the present situation in the world.

The world in which we are living now is a world in transition, and a world in transition to a new world is always full of conflicts—minor conflicts, medium conflicts, big conflicts—big conflicts especially when big powers are involved.

I spoke about our thoughts and our concerns of the Belgrade conference about the present situation. We members of the Belgrade conference, 25 nations—we do not command physical power, we do not command military power, we do not command big economic power. But we nonaligned nations are the least inhibited in developing our thoughts and conceptions for the formation of a new world, a new world of freedom, of prosperity, of friendship and cooperation and brotherhood amongst nations.

I am sure that, as you said, Mr. President, also the American people and you—yourself, Mr. President, you also—are very concerned about the world situation. And that is why I express the hope that our talks will bear fruit, in order to save this world from calamity and catastrophe. Thank you.

President Keita²

Mr. President, I come here as representative of the Belgrade conference with my friend President Sukarno. I come here for my first contact with this great country and the great people of the United States, people and country about whom I have heard so much for so many years.

And yet I come here at a moment which is extremely serious. I come here to bring to you, Mr. President, and to the American people the greetings not only of the 25 nations of the Belgrade conference but also of the people which I represent myself, the people of Mali.

And we are bringing to you a grave burden, Mr. President. We are bringing to you a message of trust, because we are quite certain that the people of the United States wish to live in peace and only in peace.

We bring to you also a message of brotherhood, because we know that man, whichever be the color

of his skin, wants to live together and work together in this common civilization, the civilization of the universe.

We bring to you also, Mr. President, a message of peace. We bring to you this message because the young countries need peace. We need peace even more than the great countries and the great powers need it, because, as President Sukarno said, we have neither military nor economic power. And, moreover, we have the need of the help of the great nations to build up our own countries, to build up our own economies.

However, as I said, we need more than anything peace, and that is why we need the peace and peace alone even more than the great powers need it.

I would take advantage of my presence here, Mr. President, to establish a contact with the great people of the United States, the people whose struggle for its own development we have followed. Thank you.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated September 13

We have welcomed the visit of President Sukarno and President Keita on behalf of the nations which recently met in Belgrade, because we have viewed with growing concern the heightening tension in world affairs. Statesmen everywhere have an urgent responsibility to make every effort to preserve the peace and to solve their differences by peaceful means. This can be done if all approach these differences with full understanding of the rights, obligations, and vital interests of others.

The situation in Berlin is filled with danger. I have made it clear that the position of the West and of the West Berliners will be defended. I have also made it clear that we are ready to discuss these matters with other governments, including the Government of the Soviet Union, and to search for the means to preserve an honorable peace.³ If that is the purpose on all sides, there is no need for resort to force.

The Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers are meeting in Washington tomorrow [September 14].⁴ Next week the Secretary of State will

³ For President Kennedy's report to the Nation on the Berlin crisis, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

⁴ See p. 545.

² As translated from the French.

head the United States delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. We understand that Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko will also be present. This will provide an opportunity for serious talks about Germany and other problems if the Soviet side proves willing. The channels of diplomacy are open for the exploration of constructive steps toward a reduction of tension. Other means are available when they can serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, it is clearly of the utmost importance that there be no unilateral acts which will make peaceful progress impossible.

TEXT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S LETTERS

White House press release dated September 15

SEPTEMBER 13, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have studied with care the message from the Conference of Nonaligned Nations which you were good enough to present in person. The United States Government is aware that the nonaligned powers assembled at Belgrade represent an important segment of world opinion, and, especially, that their peoples share with ours a vital stake in the maintenance of the peace. In our continuing deliberations within the United States Government and with our Allies, we will give the message from the conference most careful consideration.

As regards the proposal that I enter into direct negotiations with Premier Khrushchev, we are prepared to use existing and appropriate channels to establish the possibility of surmounting the present impasse. It has been and continues to be our policy to seek to settle our problems with others by peaceful means. We have not attempted to create crises, and we believe it is incumbent upon all responsible governments to explore all possible avenues, including negotiations at the highest levels, for mutually acceptable solutions of current international problems. However, unless such negotiations are carefully prepared beforehand they risk failure and may lead to deterioration of the situation. We therefore feel that at a time of great tension it is particularly necessary that negotiations of the kind proposed by the Belgrade Conference not only have careful preparation but also a reasonable chance of success.

The Foreign Ministers of the Western powers are meeting in Washington tomorrow. Next week

the Secretary of State will head the United States delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. We understand that Foreign Minister Gromyko will also be present. This will provide an opportunity for serious talks about Germany and other problems if the Soviet side proves willing. The channels of diplomacy are open for the exploration of constructive steps toward a reduction of tension. Other means are available when they can serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, it is clearly of the utmost importance that there be no unilateral acts which will make peaceful progress impossible.

Given a realistic approach and a sincere desire on the other side as well as ours to reach a mutually acceptable solution, we see no reason why eventual negotiations should not be successful in coping with the present crisis. However, we do not intend to enter into negotiations under ultimata or threats. It is also clear that we do not propose to discuss either abdication of our responsibility or renunciation of the modalities for carrying out those responsibilities.

Nevertheless, we believe it possible to find a solution which can accommodate vital interests on both sides of the crisis.

The United States has carefully noted the statements in the Belgrade Declaration recognizing that the Berlin and German situations are of vital importance to future developments in international relations. It has consistently been, and will continue to be, our policy to settle differences with realism and responsibility. We would note that this crisis has been initiated by Soviet not by American action. We endorse the Declaration's reference to the rights of all nations to unity, self-determination, and independence, and its condemnation of intimidation, intervention, and interference in the exercise of the right of self-determination. We presume that these principles apply equally to the people of Germany and Berlin.

Our policies in this area have sought to respect these principles. We have absolutely no intention of resorting to force or threats of force to solve the Berlin and Germany problems, but we are determined to honor our commitments and are prepared to meet force with force if it is used against us. While the United States and its Allies are all agreed there must be negotiations on the problem, the Soviet Union must give indication of a readi-

ness to engage in discussion based on mutual respect. The only conditions it has yet exhibited any willingness to consider are conditions which involve the surrender of Western rights.

The United States continues to believe that conclusion of an adequately controlled test ban agreement is a matter of greatest urgency. We wish to reaffirm, however, our belief that test ban negotiations should be resumed separately from negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing has increased the urgency which attaches to the signature of a complete treaty test ban. Complex negotiation on general disarmament should not be permitted to delay the achievement of this significant step forward.

I would emphasize again my regret that the Soviet Union has rejected the offer of the United Kingdom and the United States Government to halt atmospheric tests creating fallout.⁵

Only after a searching review of vital U.S. security interests and after the utmost provocation did we announce our intent to resume underground tests.⁶ The non-aligned nations may be assured of our continued willingness to negotiate an effective treaty; but, meanwhile, the national security interests of our country and of our Allies in the Free World must be protected. The United States looks forward to full consideration of the test ban issue in the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly which we hope will move the Soviet Union to abandon its opposition to effective controls and toward acceptance of a test ban agreement.

The United States is pleased to note that the participants in the recent conference in Belgrade mentioned the importance of an effective system of inspection and control. This is the crux of the matter. It is clear from United States proposals in the nuclear test negotiations that the United States contemplates inspection and control procedures in the disarmament field in which the non-aligned countries, as well as others, would participate.

For some months the United States has been conducting an intensive study of the problem of

general disarmament which resulted in a request to Congress to create a disarmament agency.⁷ The study has also resulted in the development of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament which is in the final stage of preparations for public presentation. This plan provides for a program which will insure that the disarmament is general and complete; that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes; and that disarmament is accompanied by the creation of reliable procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes and maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The American commitment to these objectives goes deep. Our colleagues in the world community will not find us faint-hearted in this cause.

Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed September 6 in New York in a further effort to bring the two sides closer together and to work out a satisfactory disarmament forum. The proposals put forth by the United States by these talks provide for participation of non-aligned countries in future broad disarmament negotiations. They also provide for negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations if the Soviet Union will agree. The United States believes the General Assembly will have an opportunity to go into the matter since a Committee of the Whole exists in the form of the Disarmament Commission, which can be convened at any time.

In conclusion, let me say, Mr. President, that we found elements in the message and in the Declaration which reflected a genuine desire to bring about a relaxation of tensions and which, if applied in a truly neutral and objective manner, could be of positive benefit in easing world tensions.

We respect, as always, the desire of other nations to remain non-aligned. We understand with sympathy and share their passion for peace. We are, as always, prepared to cooperate with all initiatives to bring about an improvement in the

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475, and Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515.

⁶ See p. 543.

⁷ For text of a letter from President Kennedy transmitting a draft of legislation to establish a disarmament agency, together with a letter to the President from John J. McCloy, Adviser to the President on Disarmament, and text of a draft bill, see BULLETIN of July 17, 1961, p. 99; for statements by Secretary Rusk and Mr. McCloy in support of the bill, see *ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1961, p. 412, and Sept. 18, 1961, p. 492.

world situation. We look forward to continued friendly relations with the governments and peoples participating in the Belgrade meeting.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency DR. SOEKARNO, <i>President of the Republic of Indonesia</i>	His Excellency MODIBO KEITA, <i>President of the Republic of Mali</i>
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TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM BELGRADE CONFERENCE

We, the Heads of States and Government of our respective countries attending the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade from September 1 to September 6, venture to address Your Excellency on a subject of vital and immediate importance to all of us and to the world as a whole. We do so not only on our own behalf, but at the unanimous desire of the Conference and of our peoples.

We are distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in the international situation and the prospect of war which now threatens humanity. Your Excellency has often pointed to the terrible nature of modern war and the use of nuclear weapons, which may well destroy humanity, and has pleaded for the maintenance of world peace.

Yet we are at the brink of this very danger that menaces the world and humanity. We are fully aware that Your Excellency is as anxious as any of us to avoid this dreadful development which will not only end the hopes that we all have cherished for the advancement of our peoples but is a challenge to human survival. We are certain that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to avert such a calamity.

Having regard, however, to the gravity of the crisis that menaces the world and the urgent need to avert the developments that may precipitate it, we take the liberty of urging on the Great Powers concerned that negotiations should be resumed and pursued so that the danger of war might be removed from the world and mankind adopt ways of peace. In particular, we earnestly request for direct negotiations between Your Excellency and the President of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., who represent the two most powerful nations today and in whose hands lies the key to peace or war. We feel convinced that, devoted as both of you are to world peace, your efforts through persistent negotiations will lead to a way out of the present impasse and enable the world and humanity to work and live for prosperity and peace. We feel sure that Your Excellency will appreciate that this letter is written because of our love of peace and our horror of war and the compelling desire that a way out must be found before mankind is faced with a terrible disaster.

President Announces Resumption of Nuclear Tests

White House Statement

White House press release dated September 15

President John F. Kennedy announced [on September 15] that the United States conducted an underground nuclear weapons development test of low yield at the Nevada test site at 1 p.m. The detonation has produced no fallout. This is in marked contrast to Soviet nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

The United States was forced reluctantly to make the decision to resume testing after years of attempting to reach a nuclear test ban with the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union without warning but after a great deal of preparation resumed testing in the atmosphere. We have announced 10 such Soviet tests—3 of them in the megaton range.

Today's test was the first in the joint Atomic Energy Commission-Department of Defense program to strengthen the defense of the free world. The resumption of extensive Soviet testing has made this action necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of the U.S. Government to its own citizens and to the security of other free nations.

In addition, as the program progresses, tests will be utilized to provide information in support of the U.S. programs to improve means of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions for possible use in an international nuclear test control system (Vela),¹ and to study the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes (Plowshare).

The United States once again affirms its readiness to negotiate a controlled test ban agreement of the widest possible scope.

Letters of Credence

Portugal

The newly appointed Ambassador of Portugal, Pedro Theotónio Pereira, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on September 15. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 635 dated September 15.

¹ For a statement by Arthur H. Dean on the Vela program, see BULLETIN of Aug. 28, 1961, p. 375.

United States and Japan Exchange Notes on Nuclear Tests

UNITED STATES NOTE¹

Press release 630 dated September 13

SEPTEMBER 13, 1961

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note of September 6, 1961, with regard to the statement made by the President of the United States of America on September 5, 1961,² concerning the resumption of nuclear weapon tests in the laboratory and underground.

The United States Government desires, as a matter of the greatest urgency, to conclude an effectively controlled treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, and is therefore entirely sympathetic with the relevant considerations set forth in the note of the Japanese Government. The United States Government particularly shares the earnest wish of the Japanese Government, expressed in the final paragraph of its note:

... that agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as proposed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments to the Soviet Government on September 3, will be realized; and that furthermore, an international agreement to suspend all nuclear tests which will be accompanied by effective inspection and control measures will be established without delay.

The United States Government and the United Kingdom Government, beginning on March 21, 1961, when negotiations were resumed at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests at Geneva, presented the Soviet Government with a series of new compromise proposals designed to reach agreement on all major outstanding issues in these negotiations.³ The Soviet reply to these proposals offered by the Western

¹ Handed to Japanese Ambassador Koichiro Asakai by Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Walter P. McConaughy at the Department of State on Sept. 13.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

³ For the text of a draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests introduced in the conference on Apr. 18, 1961, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870; for texts of a U.S. note of June 17 to the Soviet Government and a Soviet aide memoire of June 2, see *ibid.*, July 3, 1961, p. 18.

Governments was to refuse to negotiate, to make radical retrograde proposals on several important issues already agreed upon at the conference table, and finally to demand that either all Soviet proposals be accepted or that the question of the nuclear test ban be merged with the future complex negotiations over general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the United States and the United Kingdom persisted in their attempts to reach early agreement. As recently as August 29, 1961, the United States and the United Kingdom introduced new proposals designed to meet, as far as possible, Soviet positions on vital issues of the conference.

The developments in these negotiations are well known to the Japanese Government which has kept itself currently informed on their progress through consultations with the United States Government and which, in addition, has made substantial and valuable contributions to the discussions of this subject during past meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Soviet resumption of nuclear weapon tests and refusal to negotiate an agreement was greeted with shock and regret by the United States Government⁴ and by the whole world. With the hope of sparing mankind from the potential dangers of nuclear fallout, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom urged the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to record promptly agreement on their proposal not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and which produce radioactive fallout.⁵ Their aim was to protect mankind from the hazards of atmosphere pollution engendered by such testing and to contribute to the reduction of international tensions. Regrettably the Soviet Union has now rejected this further initiative of the United States and the United Kingdom to halt nuclear testing.⁶

The Soviet Union's program of testing is progressing rapidly, suggesting that extensive secret preparations for test resumption were undertaken during a major portion of this year's session of the Geneva conference. In addition, the Soviet Union has announced its testing program is designed to develop a super terror weapon—a 100

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁵ For text of the U.S.-U.K. proposal, see *ibid.*, p. 476.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515.

megaton bomb. It was in the face of these threats, and only after a rigorous and thorough review of vital security interests, that the President of the United States announced the intention of this government to begin a program of underground nuclear testing which would cause no fallout.

The United States Government shares the regret of the Japanese people and the Japanese Government that the Soviet Union has refused to conclude a nuclear test ban agreement and that it has also rejected the proposal that nuclear tests not be conducted in the atmosphere. It sees in this action a disdain for the security and well-being of all mankind. Unfortunately, these actions of the Soviet Union have inevitably forced the United States to undertake the necessary measures for the protection of the security interests of the United States and of the free world.

The United States Government, like the Japanese Government, reaffirms its earnest desire that an international agreement to suspend nuclear tests under effective international inspection and control will be concluded without delay. To this end, the United States has asked for full and complete consideration of the urgent need for an effectively controlled treaty banning nuclear weapon tests at the forthcoming Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.⁷

The United States Government expresses the hope that the Government of Japan will lend its support to this objective as it has in the past.

JAPANESE NOTE ⁸

SEPTEMBER 6, 1961

The Ambassador of Japan presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and, with regard to the statement made by the President of the United States of America on September 5th last concerning the resumption of nuclear tests in the laboratory and underground, has the honor, under instructions from the Japanese Government, to state as follows :

Having the misfortune of being the first and only country to have experienced the physical effects of dreadful nuclear explosions, Japan has consistently addressed to any country conducting nuclear tests vigorous protests demanding the suspension of such tests in the hope that such misfortune shall never again befall mankind. Moreover, Japan has always exerted great efforts for the

⁷ *Ibid.*, July 31, 1961, p. 184.

⁸ Handed to Assistant Secretary McConaughy by Ambassador Asakai at the Department of State on Sept. 6.

passing by the United Nations General Assembly of resolutions for suspension of nuclear tests and prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons. Through these efforts Japan has hoped that those countries concerned would suspend all nuclear testing and that an international agreement accompanied by an effective control system be reached at the earliest possible date.

The Japanese Government deeply regrets that the Soviet Union has announced its unilateral decision to resume nuclear testing on August 30th, despite the fact that negotiations on the suspension of nuclear testing among the countries concerned were still being continued at Geneva and that tests have already been carried out in the atmosphere on three occasions. The Japanese Government, therefore, immediately filed a strong protest with the Soviet Government.

Regardless of the presence or otherwise of any fallout, the decision taken by the U.S. Government to resume nuclear tests in the laboratory and underground is a matter of regret for the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government reiterates the deep concern of the Japanese people concerning the resumption of nuclear testing by the U.S. Government and hereby submits its protest.

The Japanese Government earnestly requests the U.S. Government to respond to the fervent and sustained wish of the Japanese people for the suspension of nuclear tests and to reconsider the decision and to suspend its execution.

In the interest of the peace and welfare of all mankind, it is the earnest wish of the Japanese Government that agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as proposed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments to the Soviet Government on September 3, will be realized; and that furthermore, an international agreement to suspend all nuclear tests which will be accompanied by effective inspection and control measures will be established without delay.

Western Foreign Ministers Discuss Measures To Meet Soviet Threats

Communique

Press release 637 dated September 16

The Foreign Ministers of France [Maurice Couve de Murville], the United Kingdom [Lord Home], the United States [Secretary Rusk] and the Federal Republic of Germany [Heinrich von Brentano] met in Washington September 15 and 16. This meeting represents a further step in the process of continuing consultation among the Four Powers, designed to coordinate policies and actions to meet Soviet threats.

The Ministers discussed the dangerous heightening of world tension brought about since their last

meeting by Soviet unilateral actions in Berlin, such as those of August 13, and by the Soviet decision to resume extensive nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The Ministers reviewed the progress reports submitted to them on the political, economic and military measures which the Four Powers are undertaking to meet the situation.

The Ministers agreed that a peaceful solution to the problem of Germany and Berlin can be

achieved if both sides are prepared to undertake discussions which take account of the rights and interests of all concerned. They agreed that an effort should be made to ascertain if there exists a reasonable basis for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

This meeting will be followed by the normal process of consultation in the North Atlantic Council.

The Current World Scene

*by Ernest K. Lindley*¹

Your invitation to speak here complimented me highly. When you first extended it, I believe that you and your associates were under the impression that I was still a journalist. When I told you that I had gone into the State Department, you cheerfully assured me, after a few hours of hesitation, that I would be welcome nevertheless.

I understood the hesitation. I had hesitated a good deal longer before I put aside, even temporarily, an occupation in which I had been engaged for more than 37 years, not counting part-time journalism during my school and college years. For more than 23 of those years I was a signed columnist and, at intervals, a commentator on radio and TV, not badly paid for giving free advice not only to Secretaries of State but to other Cabinet members and even to Presidents. On occasion I even ventured to commend or chide the Supreme Court. The advice was given freely—in two senses. It was generous in quantity. And it cost the recipients only the nominal cost of a newspaper or magazine or, when broadcast, only the price of listening to the commercial.

When some old friends, led by George C. McGhee, Counselor of the State Department and

Chairman of its Policy Planning Council, invited me to come into the Department, I demurred, as I had done in the cases of similar invitations in the past. I couldn't see why the Government should pay me for giving the advice it was already getting for nothing. And I didn't see why I should take a pay cut and confine my advice to one department when I could earn a good deal more by continuing to advise the whole United States Government—and a good many foreign governments as well.

I am afraid I succumbed to flattery. My friends in the State Department reminded me that these are parlous times and that they were wrestling with some rather perplexing problems. They pointed out that for years I had been solving complex problems neatly and quickly—usually in not more than 800 words per problem, at the rate of at least one a week and sometimes as often as one a day. They said it was my patriotic duty to teach the secret of this streamlined method to the policymaking officials of the State Department.

So, for 3 months now, I have been in the State Department. I regret to say that its backlog of problems doesn't seem to be appreciably smaller now than it was in mid-June. I have discovered that it takes a little longer to solve problems on the inside than on the outside. That isn't due in any large measure to red tape or other traditional bureaucratic obstacles. Certainly it is not due to

¹ Address made before the national convention of the Federal Bar Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 15 (press release 634). Mr. Lindley is a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State.

lack of effort or to short hours of work. Nor is it due to lack of brainpower. I have never seen any group of men work harder, faster, or longer hours than do the top 30 or 40 people in the State Department and many on their staffs. Few of them work less than 6 days a week, and some of them usually work 7. Last Sunday was the first day off since May for the Secretary of State, and it was not altogether a day of rest, as he had to deal with some important dispatches and read some of the official papers he took home with him.

As a journalist taking a first look from the inside, I am impressed also with the high level of intelligence, knowledge, and general competence in the upper reaches of the State Department—and indeed in the middle and many of the lower reaches. I had known some of these men previously, from slightly to moderately well. In more than 28 years of “covering” Washington I had seen the State Department grow in quality as well as in size. I had seen brilliant young Foreign Service officers, such as “Chip” Bohlen and Alexis Johnson, develop into seasoned professional diplomats, second to none in the world. In journalist surveys abroad during the postwar years I had noticed and written of the progressive improvement of our representation in many areas of the world. I knew also many of the so-called “fresh faces”—the Presidential appointees and others in the Department. Actually, most of them are “retreads”—men with extensive prior experience in world affairs. Indeed, I wrote last spring, before I had the remotest thought of going into the State Department myself, that there had been assembled there and in related agencies concerned with international affairs, including the Treasury, the most impressive array of brains and experience within my years of observation as a Washington correspondent. After watching them at close range for 3 months, I find no reason to amend that conclusion. On the contrary, I have learned that many of the officials and officers I had not known before have the same order of superior talent as those I had in mind when I wrote in the spring. Among them I emphatically include my colleagues, most of them unknown to the public, in that inner recess, or think-cell, the Policy Planning Council. I consider it a high privilege to be associated with them. They have given me three of the most stimulating months of my life.

Communist Strategy for Worldwide Victory

When we review the current world scene, it is evident that our most serious problems spring from the existence of lawless forces which are determined to destroy the free way of life. When Khrushchev boasts that he will “bury” us, he is not merely a philosophical Marxist putting his faith in an historical inevitability. He is also a Leninist, alert and eager to expedite that allegedly inexorable process. And let us not forget that Lenin taught, and all true Leninists believe, that any means, any trickery, any deceit, is justifiable if it promotes the ultimate worldwide victory of communism.

Khrushchev outlined his global strategy with relative candor in his speech of January 6 of this year to a group of high Soviet Communist theoreticians. That speech was a report on conclusions of the Moscow conference of Communist leaders from 81 nations in November and December 1960. Khrushchev’s address was entitled “For New Victories of the World Communist Movement.” It set forth a program of action.

Of central interest was Khrushchev’s explanation of the meaning of “peaceful coexistence.” He said it meant, first of all, competition in production and living standards. (So far, fair enough. We welcome that sort of competition.) But, he explained, “peaceful competition” means much more. It means the spread of communism by all means short of a great war. I quote from him:

Thus, the policy of peaceful coexistence, as regards its social content, is a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena.

From “peaceful coexistence,” Khrushchev did not exclude the use of force. He specifically included “wars of liberation” and “popular uprisings.” The only kind of war he said by all means must be avoided is a global thermonuclear war. (Such a war would of course inflict mortal damage on the Soviet Union.) But, as we have seen again in recent weeks, Khrushchev does not shrink from terroristic threats of nuclear onslaught on nations which resist Soviet aggression.

The focal point of gravest danger now, of course, is Berlin. The Berlin crisis is a manufactured crisis—100 percent a Communist product.

It probably stems in part from the failures of the Communist regime in the Soviet Zone of Germany, a regime imposed and maintained by force and undoubtedly hated by a vast majority of the people it rules. One continual proof of its unpopularity was the flow of refugees from the Soviet Zone to West Berlin and the Federal German Republic. From 1949, when records began to be kept, until August of this year they numbered more than 2,600,000—in addition to those who had fled earlier. Contrary to Communist propaganda, this exodus was not encouraged by the Western Powers, the Federal Republic, or the Government of West Berlin. In fact high officials of the Federal Republic often appealed to Germans in the Soviet Zone to remain there. They did not want to see East Germany depleted of its most stalwart elements. Over the years the East German authorities resorted to increasingly stringent measures to halt the exodus. But they were unable to, especially by the escape route through Berlin. Finally last month they took the desperate step of sealing the border between East and West Berlin. The concrete wall which they have erected along the sector line is a confession of dismal failure and visible proof that the Soviet Zone is in fact a prison—as indeed are all the Soviet satellites.

Communist objectives in regard to Berlin unquestionably go far beyond closing the main escape hatch from East Germany. The contrast between the prosperity and freedom of West Berlin and conditions in East Berlin and East Germany is a standing indictment of the Communist system. The Communists prate of “peaceful competition.” For more than a decade Berlin has been a test tube of peaceful competition, with results which the Communists obviously find extremely distasteful, if not fatal to their claims that their system is superior. Undoubtedly the Communists would like either to take over or strangle West Berlin.

Beyond that, Khrushchev unquestionably would like to humiliate the West. One of his constant objectives is to disrupt the defensive alliances of the free world and expel American military power from the Eurasian continent and adjacent islands. To cause the United States, France, Britain, and their NATO allies to shrink away from their solemn commitments to preserve the

freedom of West Berlin would be a giant stride toward that objective.

Issues Regarding West Berlin

For the Western allies the “gut” issues in regard to West Berlin are the viability of West Berlin, the Western presence in the city, and access to and from it. These are the interlocking essentials which we are determined to defend. Khrushchev accuses the West of threatening war because he intends to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Zone regime. Nobody can prevent him from signing a treaty or any other piece of paper with that or any other of his puppets. That, as has often been said, would be only an exercise in ventriloquism. The threat of conflict arises from his contention that such a “peace treaty” would annul Western rights in regard to Berlin. Those rights were not conferred by the Soviet Union but derive from the defeat of the Nazi regime. They were confirmed by many agreements to which the Soviet Union pledged its word.

The Soviet Union has violated many of its solemn agreements with regard not only to Berlin and Germany but to Eastern Europe. In fact it has violated most of them where it could impose its will by force. The stationing of East German troops in Berlin, the sealing of the sector border, and related actions are further violations of Soviet pledges. One must hope that the Soviet success in violating so many agreements with impunity has not deceived Khrushchev into thinking that the Communists can, with impunity, actually wipe out or whittle away Western rights regarding Berlin.

Khrushchev has spoken of negotiations. But, as usual, he seems to rest on the assumption that “What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is negotiable.” His statements to President Kennedy at Vienna² and to others since then have not afforded much hope of useful negotiations.

Nevertheless, as President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk have declared, we are prepared to enter into “meaningful” negotiations. The channels of communication between Moscow and the West are open. Secretary Rusk and other Western foreign ministers will be in New York next week for the United Nations General Assembly. Soviet For-

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 991.

eign Minister Gromyko also will be there. Perhaps we shall soon begin to find out whether there are possibilities of meaningful negotiations.

Other Theaters in the Global Struggle

The Berlin crisis should not cause us to forget or neglect other theaters in the global struggle. While the Soviets continue to try to divide and weaken the West, they persistently pursue also their grand strategy of trying to separate the West from the underdeveloped nations, of trying to win the friendship and eventually the allegiance and control of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their purpose is, in short, to encircle and eventually to strangle us.

The old imperialist systems have all but completely vanished from Asia and are rapidly disappearing from Africa too. The Asian and African peoples have rejected totally and finally the notion that the white man is entitled to any special privileges, as have the young, educated leaders of racial minorities in our country. They are liberating themselves also from their traditional societies—tribal, patriarchal, or feudal. They are determined to liberate themselves from ignorance and poverty. They know that man need not live like an animal at the bare level of subsistence.

Most of these nations are weak. Some have been beset by chaos from war or civil disturbance, often of Communist origin. In most the educated people capable of governing and of building modern economies are only a thin crust. All need technical aid, and nearly all need capital.

In the struggle for Asia and Africa the West suffered initially from the fact that most of the former imperial masters were Western. But it had one great initial advantage—that the Asian and African revolutions were inspired chiefly by Western ideas. More than that, they have been led, for the most part, by men educated in Western universities or in schools and universities in Asia and Africa where Western ideas were inculcated. I know many of these men. Most of them think as we do about political democracy and the rights of man.

The Communists have tried hard to gain control of the Asian and African nationalist movements, so far with little success. Undoubtedly they will keep on trying, using all the weapons in their

arsenal from propaganda through economic seduction to force.

As a journalist I long supported a bigger foreign aid program and more money for educational and cultural exchanges. I found myself continually perplexed by the persistence of the notion that these programs were not accomplishing anything. I had traveled enough to be sure in my own mind that they had accomplished a great deal. Indeed, as a taxpayer I have never begrudged a dollar of my money spent on foreign aid and educational exchanges. I don't think much of my share of the tax load has been more usefully spent in the past or could be more usefully spent in the future.

The central issue in this global struggle is the right of self-determination. It is, in the words of Secretary Rusk,³ “. . . the announced determination to impose a world of coercion upon those not already subjected to it At stake is the survival and growth of the world of free choice . . . and free cooperation” That central issue, he pointed out, “is posed between the Sino-Soviet empire and all the rest, whether allied or neutral; and it is now posed in every continent.”

Regrettably, quite a few leaders of non-Communist nations don't realize this, and others, while realizing it, find it inexpedient to say so publicly. They want self-determination for Asians and Africans but don't show much concern about self-determination for the people of Berlin or for the peoples under Communist tyranny in Europe and Asia.

Increased Realism About Communism

But I don't think we should be too discouraged by these manifestations of parochialism or indifference. In 1955 I attended the Asian-African conference at Bandung and visited some 15 Asian countries en route. Two years ago I revisited nearly all of those same countries. On that second survey I found much heartening evidence of increased realism about communism—a wider realization that communism is the enemy, not the friend it professes to be, of Asian nationalism. I found a wider understanding of Communist tactics. For this shift in attitude, Communist actions were partly responsible—especially the

³ For an address by Secretary Rusk before the National Press Club on July 10, 1961, see *ibid.*, July 31, 1961, p. 175.

rough tactics of the Chinese Communists and of local Communists. But I found also a better understanding of American purposes. Time and experience had convinced many doubting Asians that American policy is really anti-imperialist and that it seeks only to help free people to preserve their independence and achieve a better life.

Experience is a great teacher. As time passes, more and more leaders in non-Communist nations will come to realize, I believe, that communism is as much their enemy as it is ours.

Personally I should like to see the label "neutralist" abolished, not just because most of the non-Communist nations which are not allied with us object to it but because there are several kinds of "neutralism."

The label "nonaligned," which many of them prefer, also conceals diverse attitudes. One self-proclaimed "nonaligned" government is a voluntary Soviet satellite. A few others tend more to the Soviet side than to the free world's. Some lurch back and forth hoping to gain a momentary advantage or a little more economic or military aid. Some are just scared. Some are naive. Some, although not allied with the West, know that their freedom and hopes of economic development depend on the strength and help of the West. Some, although technically neutral for various specific reasons, are as staunch as we are in their devotion to the principles of freedom. Very few are not determined to preserve their own independence. (Were I still a journalist, I would cite examples in each of these categories.)

Although we hope that, in time and with more experience, more of the "nonaligned" nations will see the true nature of this global struggle, we don't expect them always to agree with us. The world community of free peoples which we seek will be a world of diversity. We hope that it will be a world governed by law and faithful adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Our ultimate hopes ride with the ideas and examples of political freedom, of individual rights, of law, and with their power to transform the Communist tyrannies. Personally I have never doubted that we can win this struggle if we make and unflinchingly sustain a greater effort. In talking as a journalist with leaders of other nations I sometimes asked what, in a few words, they would most like to say to the American

people. The response I am about to repeat was made by a devout Moslem about halfway around the world. It was more eloquent than some, but contained the gist of many. He said this: "God has given it to the United States of America, at this juncture in the history of mankind, to be able to save civilization. We are with you. All men who love freedom are with you. Together we can win this struggle, provided you never forget that it has to be won, provided you never falter, never flinch, never yield."

U.S. Hopes for Cease-Fire in Katanga, Supports Integrity of Congo Nation

Department Statement

Press release 638 dated September 16

The United States is deeply concerned at the fighting in Katanga. Reports about the number of casualties and the local military situation are still fragmentary. The United States strongly hopes that these hostilities will be brought to a speedy conclusion.

The aim of the United Nations in the Congo is established in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Under these resolutions the U.N. executive has helped provide the internal security and external support which was necessary to enable the Congolese to arrange their own political destiny in their own way. The United States has supported and continues to support the integrity of the Congolese nation, which is called for by U.N. resolutions.

We understand that the Secretary-General, who is now in the Congo, is making every effort to achieve a cease-fire and get talks about reconciliation started again. It is essential that moves to this end be pushed to a rapid conclusion so that the Katanga can play a constructive role in the life and government of the Congo.

Restoration of order and the effective presence of the United Nations in all sections of the Congo would open the way for peaceful processes to give effect to the policy of the United Nations, adopted by the Security Council on February 21, 1961,¹ ". . . that the solution of the problem of

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1961, p. 368.

the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside and that there can be no solution without conciliation.”

Chairman of Council for National Reconstruction of Korea To Visit U.S.

White House Announcement

White House press release dated September 12

President Kennedy has extended an invitation to Lt. Gen. Pak Chung Hee, the Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea, to pay a visit to Washington on November 14 and 15. President Kennedy is looking forward with great pleasure to meeting Chairman Pak. President Kennedy and Chairman Pak will discuss subjects which are currently engaging the attention of both Governments.

Department Urges Maryland To Pass Public Accommodations Bill

Statement by Pedro Sanjuan Assistant Chief of Protocol¹

I have had the honor to be asked to come before you as a representative of the Department of State to acquaint you with a most serious situation affecting the lives of all Americans.

The key to the solution of this problem is largely in the hands of the Legislature of the State of Maryland. Before some of you start wondering why the Department of State is interested in what may appear to some to be an internal matter within the State of Maryland, let me beg you to consider this rather as a request by the Department of State for the assistance of the State of Maryland in insuring the success of the foreign policy of the United States.

I have come to inform you that the Department of State strongly supports the public accommodations bill which is up for your consideration and to explain to you why the Department of State supports such legislation.

¹Made before the Legislative Council of the General Assembly of Maryland at Baltimore, Md., on Sept. 13 (press release 629).

Since World War II and the creation of the United Nations, the face of the earth has been changing rapidly. The nations of the Western World, which in previous decades were colonial powers, have adopted the policy of granting independence to their former colonies and protectorates. What was once considered the Dark Continent of Africa is today made up of a large number of young nations, growing with vitality and vigor and torn between their cultural ties with Western institutions and their apprehensions about the good intentions of their former colonial masters.

As you know, most of these nations are represented in the United Nations General Assembly, where most are part of a considerable and influential uncommitted bloc. In alliance with the nonaligned nations of Asia, these new African nations are the deciding factor in almost any issue that is brought before the United Nations—and almost any international issue can be brought for consideration by the United Nations.

The United States is anxious to see that these nations which have recently come onto the world scene maintain their independence and preserve their neutrality. We ask no more than that they should be impartial observers and just critics of the two ways of life which are fighting for survival in what has so far remained a cold war. We believe that democracy, which respects the rights of the individual and jealously guards the dignity of all men, will in the long run outlast a system of government which sacrifices individual dignity in order to attain arbitrary goals determined by a tyrannical minority in the name of the welfare of the state.

No force of propaganda, no scheme or plan of subversion, no pack of lies, however clever and deceptive, can withstand the overwhelming force of honesty, sincerity, and good will. In winning the confidence of these uncommitted nations we must rely on our two best weapons, which are honesty and sincerity. We believe in human dignity, in the equality of all men, and in the inalienable basic rights of the individual. How effective, how persuasive can these arguments be if in our own country, and in plain view of the rest of the world, we fail to practice what we preach?

How can we persuade these Africans and these Asians, whose skins range from dark to black, that we believe in human dignity when we deny our

own citizens the right to this basic dignity on the basis of skin color? How can we expect the respect and friendship of new nonwhite nations when we humiliate the representatives of these nations by denying them the right to be served in a highway restaurant or in a city cafe? How can we expect these diplomats, on whom their governments have placed the full responsibility to make decisions in the name of their country and whose duty it is to see that their national prestige is not tarnished during their tour of duty here—how can we expect these diplomats not to notice when the proprietor of a roadside cafe on Route 40 or a waitress in a Howard Johnson's restaurant informs them that they cannot be served because they are automatically presumed to be inferior to the average white American citizen?

Since Khrushchev brought it up in September 1960, the Communist countries at the United Nations have been pressing this point in order to win the support of the large bloc of uncommitted nations represented at the United Nations. The Communists have been making headway, and each day we come closer and closer to the vote which will move the United Nations out of New York and out of the United States because the United States does not uniformly recognize the equality and the dignity of all nations and all peoples, as is guaranteed by the charter of the United Nations.

Recently during a period of 2 weeks four African ambassadors were humiliated by private restaurant owners on Route 40 in Maryland. One of them was refused a cup of coffee while he was en route to present his credentials to the President of the United States. I would like to put this in the clearest terms possible—that when an American citizen humiliates a foreign representative or another American citizen for racial reasons, the results can be just as damaging to his country as the passing of secret information to the enemy.

Why does the Federal Government at this time seek the assistance of every loyal American in the State of Maryland? The State of Maryland has come a long way in recognizing civil rights and in insuring equal opportunities to all its citizens regardless of color. But the much-traveled route between the United Nations in New York and the White House in Washington is through the State of Maryland, and it is here, as statistics prove, that the majority of these incidents are likely to take place in spite of your desegregated schools or the

Governor's Mansion, where visitors are welcome regardless of their color.

We are told many individual proprietors would willingly seat all customers, provided that all other proprietors did likewise. This is then the very simple issue which the Department of State has to present before you today for your consideration. The Government needs your help in selling democracy to the world. It needs your help in eliminating a source of embarrassment to the Government of the United States and to the government of the State of Maryland. Your State is getting an undeserved reputation for backwardness because the law in Maryland permits discrimination in places of public accommodation.

The issue before the world today is whether democracy works better than tyranny or tyranny better than democracy. Your aid and support in passing the public accommodations bill will eliminate a source of embarrassment that greatly damages our relations with not only the neutral nations of the world but many nations which are stoutly with us in the fight for freedom. This bill, if passed, will prove that democracy *does* work, that in a democracy the rights and privileges of the individual *are* protected in accordance with the will of the people.

At the beginning of World War II the Federal Government went to private industry and asked for better weapons to fight the war. The Government got these weapons, and we won the war. The Department of State comes to you now with a similar request: Give us the weapons to conduct this war of human dignity. The fight for decency against communism is everyone's war in America.

State Advisory Committee Holds Third Conference

The Department of State announced on September 12 (press release 627) that the third conference of the State Advisory Committee to the Department of State was held on that day under the chairmanship of the Chief of Protocol, Angier Biddle Duke.¹ It was agreed by representatives of 30 States who attended the conference and by representatives of the White House and the De-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 15, 1961, p. 732, and July 3, 1961, p. 32.

partment of State that a definite program to encourage and expand the travel of foreign diplomats and foreign visitors in the United States would be developed and coordinated by the Special Protocol Service Section under Pedro A. Sanjuan, Assistant Chief of Protocol. Liaison is to be maintained by this section with different departments and agencies of the Federal Government bringing foreign visitors to the United States and with the representatives of the different State Governors in order to insure a more effective method of increasing and improving all means of facilitating travel for foreign diplomats and visitors in this country.

The State representatives, who expressed eagerness to take part in the successful implementation of U.S. foreign policy, have agreed to send to the Special Protocol Service Section an inventory of the cultural, historical, and scenic assets of each State best suited to convey to foreign visitors a broad and inclusive picture of American culture.

One of the chief subjects of discussion was "Operation Weekend," the Department's plan for encouraging, planning, and coordinating the travel of high-level delegates to the U.N. General Assembly session scheduled to begin on September 19.²

President Sends Message to Conference on Science and World Affairs

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the Conference on Science and World Affairs which convened at Stowe, Vt., on September 5.

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated September 4

I had looked forward to sending my best wishes to the Conference on Science and World Affairs under happier and more optimistic conditions than now prevail. The somber turn of events within the past week, a course against which your past Conferences have strongly counseled, makes all the more urgent the matters you meet to discuss. As you take up the problems of scientific cooperation and disarmament, I urge that you search with renewed diligence and imagination for practical

² For an agenda and a list of the names of the participants, see Department of State press release 627.

ways in which to set forth on both these paths to peace.

Science remains universal, and the fruits of science, if wisely chosen, provide a means by which humanity can realize a full and abundant life. Yet the vitality of science, its ability to enrich our culture and our understanding, and the material benefits it promises all depend in large measure upon international pooling of knowledge and effort. National leaders who share this view must look to scientists such as yourselves for the initiative and guidance to transform the desire to cooperate into actual achievement. We hope that out of the suggestions and proposals that you make, new ways can be found to extend the benefits of science, and to foster the trust and mutual understanding that is essential to a prospering world.

In the other area of your discussions, you will have an opportunity to advance the world-wide search for a solution to the central threat of our time, nuclear war. Your past Conferences have revealed that special knowledge and concern make you particularly sensitive to the meaning of this threat. The task of disarmament is not easy, and progress, the world has found, is not inevitable. But, when men of good will meet in such frankness as your discussions typify, the door to peace is open, reason can guide us forward, and all nations can begin to face their full responsibilities to mankind.

I am hopeful that your deliberations, in their quiet and beautiful Vermont setting, will be informed by the objectivity of your science and inspired by the desire of men everywhere for peace. Despite setbacks, there is no more noble or urgent cause than the development of practical ways to bring closer the goal of reliable disarmament.

Claims May Be Filed Under Austria's Property Restoration Fund

Press release 633 dated September 14

The Department of State has been informed that claims may now be filed under the Fund for the Settlement of Certain Property Losses of Political Persecutees (Fonds zur Abgeltung von Vermoegensverlusten politisch Verfolgter), established under recent Austrian legislation¹ pursu-

¹ BULLETIN of May 8, 1961, p. 691.

ant to an agreement² between the United States and Austria implementing article 26 of the Austrian State Treaty. Claims may be filed by persons who were subject to racial, religious, or political persecution in Austria from March 13, 1938, to May 8, 1945, and whose bank accounts, securities, mortgages, or money were the subject of forced transfers or were confiscated by Nazi authorities. The Fund will also settle claims of the persecutees for payments of the discriminatory taxes known as "Reichsfluchtsteuer" and "Suehneleistung der Juden (JUVA)." The Fund, which will have a capital in the equivalent amount of \$6 million, will be exempt from Austrian taxes, and payments from the Fund will not constitute income on which the recipients are liable for Austrian taxes.

Awards are to be made from the Fund to claimants living on July 2, 1961, in the following order: (a) the former owner; (b) the spouse of the former owner; (c) the children of the first degree of the former owner, in equal parts; (d) if a child otherwise eligible for an award is deceased, the share of such child shall be distributed to his surviving children in equal parts; or (e) the parents or surviving parent of the former owner.

Claimants are entitled to apply to the Fund regardless of their present residence. Applications must be submitted by August 31, 1962, and should be addressed to the Fonds zur Abgeltung von Vermoegensverlusten politisch Verfolgter, Taborstrasse 2-6, Vienna II. Forms may be obtained from the above address or from the Austrian Embassy, 2343 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C., or at the nearest Austrian consulate. Austrian consulates are located in New York, New Orleans, Chicago, Detroit, Portland (Oreg.), San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, Miami, Atlanta, Cleveland, Boston, and Seattle, and inquiries for further information should be directed to Austrian representatives.

U.S. and Panama Open Air Talks

Press release 628 dated September 12

The United States and Panama opened civil aviation consultations in Washington on September 12. The talks, requested by the Government of Panama, concern the bilateral air transport

services agreement of 1949, as amended in 1952.¹ With a present route from Panama, via intermediate points in the Caribbean, to Miami, the Government of Panama seeks to obtain access for its airlines to additional points within the United States.

The chairman of the U.S. delegation is Henry T. Snowdon, chief, Aviation Division, Department of State. Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, represents that agency. Marco A. Robles, Minister of Government and Justice of the Republic of Panama, is the chairman of the Panamanian delegation.

U.S. To Aid Republic of the Congo in Agricultural Development

Press release 625 dated September 12

The Department of State announced on September 12 the signing of a contract between the International Cooperation Administration of the U.S. Government and the Agricultural Technical Assistance Foundation, Inc., for agricultural development in the Republic of the Congo. The new contract is in further implementation of the extensive educational program being carried out in the Congo by the United Nations.

The U.N. civilian operation in the Congo has been working, in consultation with the Congo Government and the Congo Polytechnic Institute (a private education institute), on the development of educational programs in the Congo not only in agriculture but also in medicine and public health, home economics, engineering and mechanics, business and secretarial training, and pre-university studies.

The Congo Polytechnic Institute envisions the establishment of these programs throughout the Congo in approximately 22 different centers in an effort, during the next 5 years, to give accelerated training to 17,000 Congolese. The total program will require a minimum of 150 qualified instructors. A recent report from Dr. Omar L. Harzler, coordinator in the Congo of C.P.I., indicates there are now 31 instructors who have been cleared by the personnel committee of the institute and who are either in the Congo already or who are soon to arrive to begin their work.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1932 and 2551.

Within 5 years European and American personnel will be replaced by competent Congolese personnel for the ongoing program of the Congo Polytechnic Institute.

The Agricultural Technical Assistance Foundation, with headquarters in Los Angeles, is an American nonprofit corporation developing agricultural education and extension in the Congo through the Congo Polytechnic Institute. ATAF's program of assistance to agricultural development in the Congo will be supported not only by ICA but by foundations, industries, individuals, and other private agencies. There will be a minimum of three technical agricultural schools established responding to the needs of the tropical, semitropical, and highland regions of the Congo. All instruction will be given in French. At least 5 of the proposed 22 centers will be in operation by October of this year. The ATAF looks upon this educational program as one of the significant efforts to bring greater stability to the Congo through the training of more competent leadership in education, agriculture, industry, and government.

Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Cotton Products

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture advised the President that he had reason to believe that certain cotton products produced in any stage preceding the spinning into yarn are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program and other programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to cotton or products thereof, or to reduce substantially the amount of cotton processed in the United States from cotton or products thereof with respect to which any such program or operation is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS, on January 18, 1961, under the authority of the said section 22, the President requested the United

States Tariff Commission to make an investigation with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS, in accordance with the said section 22, as implemented by Executive Order No. 7233 of November 23, 1935, the Tariff Commission has made such investigation and has reported to me its findings and recommendations made in connection therewith; and

WHEREAS, on the basis of the investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that the articles with respect to which import restrictions are hereinafter proclaimed are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program and other programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to cotton or products thereof; and


WHEREAS I find and declare that the import restrictions hereinafter proclaimed are shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of the said articles will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program and other programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to cotton or products thereof:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that the total aggregate quantity of cotton products produced in any stage preceding the spinning into yarn, except cotton wastes, which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any 12-month period, beginning September 11 in 1961 and in subsequent years shall not exceed 1,000 pounds, which permissible total quantity I find and declare to be proportionately not less than 50 per centum of the total quantity of such articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the representative period from January 1, 1940, to December 31, 1953, inclusive.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 11th day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-sixth.

By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.



¹ No. 3428; 26 *Fed. Reg.* 8535.

President Urges Approval of Atomic Cooperation Agreement With France

Following are texts of a message to the Congress from President Kennedy and accompanying documents concerning an agreement with France for cooperation in the operation of atomic weapons systems for mutual defense purposes, together with the text of the agreement.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

White House press release dated September 7

Letter of Transmittal

To the Congress of the United States: For some time members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been taking steps toward the introduction of the most modern weapons into NATO forces. Among these measures is the introduction into forces of our NATO Allies of weapons capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Such steps have been proceeding for some time following the considered judgment and agreement of the NATO Governments. The objective is to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength. In view of the well-known purely defensive purposes of the Alliance, the introduction of modern weapons into NATO forces to take account of technological developments is in no way a cause for legitimate concern on the part of other countries.

Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty calls upon the members of the Alliance to maintain their capacities to resist armed attack through effective self-help and mutual aid. As part of its contribution to the strength of the Alliance, the United States has entered into a number of agreements through which we cooperate with NATO Allies in the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. These agreements have been concluded pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended. All of these agreements are designed to implement the NATO objectives for maintaining the most modern weapons and techniques in NATO forces.

We have just concluded an agreement with the Government of France which is essentially the same as agreements previously concluded with a number of other NATO Allies for cooperation in the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. This agreement will make possible effective cooperation with France in NATO mutual defense planning and in the training of French NATO forces. Training of certain French NATO forces which play a significant role in European defense cannot proceed to conclusion until this agreement becomes effective. This agreement should be brought into effect as quickly as possible, in order that we can promptly and fully utilize the potential of French military forces in the development of our NATO defensive strength. In light of the probable time remaining for this session of the Congress and in view of the provisions of Sec. 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, it appears that normally it would not be possible to bring this agreement into effect until the next session of the Congress. Accordingly, I would appreciate action by the Congress during the current session which would permit the agreement to come into force promptly.

I understand and respect the importance of mature consideration in the Congress of agreements of this sort, but I believe that in the present case there are compelling reasons for rapid action. The gravity of the international situation, and in particular the Soviet threat to the freedom of West Berlin, have made it a matter of first importance that the unity of the North Atlantic nations should be sustained. The Government of France, in this crisis, has behaved with great firmness, and the staunch and determined position

of President de Gaulle, in particular, has reinforced the West. In these circumstances, I deem it of great importance that we should proceed promptly with such a joint undertaking as this one, carefully matured in prolonged negotiation. As has already been explained in informal discussions with interested Members of the Congress, the present agreement provides for a limited release of information to carefully selected personnel. Careful arrangements have been made to insure that all necessary security requirements are met, and the inclusion of France among NATO countries participating in this general undertaking is an important step forward at a moment in which such a step has a wider significance than usual. It is for these reasons that I urge upon the Congress appropriate special actions to permit the agreement to come into force.

In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, I am submitting to each House of the Congress an authoritative copy of the agreement with the Government of France. I am transmitting also a copy of the letter from the Secretary of State which forwarded to me an authoritative copy of the agreement, a copy of the joint letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission recommending my approval of the agreement, and a copy of my memorandum in reply thereto which contained my approval.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 7, 1961.*

Letter to President From Secretary Rusk

AUGUST 3, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to lay before you with a view to its transmission to the Congress, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, an authoritative copy of an Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic for Cooperation in the Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes, signed at Paris on July 27, 1961.

This agreement was signed on behalf of the United States pursuant to the authorization granted in your memorandum of July 21, 1961 to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. A copy of this

memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State.

Faithfully yours,

DEAN RUSK

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

Letter to President From Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission and Deputy Secretary of Defense

JULY 20, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is hereby submitted for your consideration and approval a proposed Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

The proposed Agreement will permit, under the authority of Sections 91c and 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the transfer of classified information and certain equipment necessary for the purpose of improving the state of training and operational readiness of the armed forces of France. The December 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting¹ established the concept of a stockpile of arms for the strengthening of NATO's defenses, and this present Agreement is an important part of the implementation of this concept. The carrying out of this Agreement should do much to advance our mutual defense interest, including the vital cause of strengthening the NATO defensive alliance, and will thereby aid materially in the defense of the United States.

Article II of the Agreement provides for the transfer of classified information, including "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data," necessary to the development of defense plans; the training of personnel in the employment of and the defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; the evaluation of the capability of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and the development of delivery systems capable of carrying atomic weapons.

Article III of the Agreement provides that the United States will transfer non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data (other than non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons) for the purpose of improving the state

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

of training and operational readiness of the armed forces of France. However, in view of Section 91c of the Atomic Energy Act, the applicability of which is reflected in Article IV of the Agreement, no transfer can be made if it would contribute significantly to the recipient nation's atomic weapon design, development or fabrication capability. It is not possible to determine at this time the types, quantities and conditions of transfer, whether by sale, lease or loan, of those parts which it will become necessary to transfer for our mutual defense during the period of the Agreement. Accordingly, under the terms and conditions of the Agreement, it will be necessary to determine from time to time the types, quantities and conditions of transfer and such determination shall be submitted for your approval.

The Agreement would remain in force until terminated by agreement of both parties, thus assuring continued protection for the information and equipment transferred in accordance with the provision of the Agreement. However, cooperation for the transfer of information and equipment under Articles II and III of the Agreement may be discontinued by either party in the event of the termination of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In accordance with the provisions of Sections 91c and 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Agreement specifically provides in Article I that all cooperation under the Agreement will be undertaken only when the communicating or transferring party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security. Article I of the Agreement also provides, in accordance with the Act, that all cooperation under the Agreement will be undertaken only while the United States and France are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making substantial and material contributions thereto. Cooperation under Articles II and III of the Agreement would be undertaken only when these conditions prevail.

Article IV of the Agreement stipulates that the cooperation under the Agreement will be carried out by each of the parties in accordance with its applicable laws. Article IV also makes clear that there will be no transfer under the Agreement of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons or special nuclear material.

In addition to the foregoing provisions on the

terms, conditions, duration, nature and scope of cooperation, the Agreement provides that the parties will maintain agreed security safeguards and standards. The Agreement also contains particular commitments that the recipient of any equipment or information that is obtained pursuant to the Agreement will not transfer it to unauthorized persons and will not transfer it beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party, except in limited circumstances specifically provided in the Agreement.

France is now participating with the United States in an international arrangement pursuant to which France is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. It is the view of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that this Agreement is entirely in accord with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. It is the considered opinion of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that the performance of the proposed Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States.

Accordingly, it is recommended that you

(a) approve the program for the transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapon systems involving Restricted Data under the terms and conditions provided in this letter and the proposed Agreement; however, types, quantities and conditions of transfer of such parts are subject to your later approval;

(b) determine that the performance of this Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States; and

(c) approve the proposed Agreement and authorize its execution for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.

Sincerely,

GLENN T. SEABORG
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy
Secretary of Defense

THE PRESIDENT
The White House

Memorandum From President for Secretary of Defense and Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission

JULY 21, 1961

In your joint letter to me of July 20, 1961, you recommended that I approve a proposed Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

France is participating with the United States in an international arrangement pursuant to which it is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The proposed Agreement will permit cooperation necessary to improve the state of training and operational readiness of the armed forces of France, subject to provisions, conditions, guarantees, terms and special determinations, which are most appropriate in this important area of mutual assistance, in accordance with the agreement in principle reached in December 1957.

Having considered your joint recommendations and the cooperation provided for in the Agreement, including security safeguards and other terms and conditions of the Agreement, I hereby

(1) approve the program for the transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapon systems involving Restricted Data under the terms and conditions provided in your joint letter and the proposed Agreement; however, types, quantities and conditions of transfer of such parts are subject to my further approval;

(2) determine that the performance of this Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States; and

(3) approve the proposed Agreement and authorize its execution for the Government of the United States in a manner designated by the Secretary of State.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC FOR COOPERATION IN THE OPERATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic,

Considering that they have concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, pursuant to which each Government will make available to the other equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed;

Considering that their mutual security and defense require that they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare;

Considering that they are participating together in an international arrangement pursuant to which they are making substantial and material contributions to their mutual defense and security;

Recognizing that their common defense and security will be advanced by the exchange of information concerning atomic energy and by the transfer of certain types of equipment;

Believing that such exchange and transfer can be undertaken without risk to the defense and security of either country; and

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and all applicable statutes of France, which were enacted or prepared with these purposes in mind;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

General Provisions

While the United States and France are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making substantial and material contributions thereto, each Party will communicate to and exchange with the other Party information and transfer non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data to the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that the communicating or transferring Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security.

ARTICLE II

Exchange of Information

Each Party will communicate to or exchange with the other Party such classified information as is jointly determined to be necessary to:

- A. the development of defense plans;
- B. the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;
- C. the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and
- D. the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry.

ARTICLE III

Transfer of Non-Nuclear Parts of Atomic Weapons Systems

The Government of the United States will transfer to the Government of the French Republic, subject to terms and conditions to be agreed, non-nuclear parts of atomic

weapons systems involving Restricted Data as such parts are jointly determined to be necessary for the purpose of improving the French state of training and operational readiness.

ARTICLE IV

Conditions

A. Cooperation under this Agreement will be carried out by each of the Parties in accordance with its applicable laws.

B. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by either Party of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, or special nuclear materials.

C. The information communicated or exchanged, or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems transferred, by either Party pursuant to this Agreement shall be used by the recipient Party exclusively for the preparation or implementation of defense plans in the mutual interests of the two countries.

D. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the communication or exchange of classified information which is transmissible under other arrangements between the Parties.

ARTICLE V

Guarantees

A. Classified information and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems communicated or transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded full security protection under applicable security arrangements between the Parties and applicable national legislation and regulations of the Parties. In no case shall either Party maintain security standards for safeguarding classified information and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems, made available pursuant to this Agreement, less restrictive than those set forth in the applicable security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.

B. Classified information communicated or exchanged pursuant to this Agreement will be made available through channels existing or hereafter agreed for the communication or exchange of such information between the Parties.

C. Classified information, communicated or exchanged, and any non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall not be communicated, exchanged or transferred by the recipient Party or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons or, except as provided in Article VI of this Agreement, beyond the jurisdiction of that Party. Each Party may stipulate the degree to which any of the information and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems communicated, exchanged or transferred by it or persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement may be disseminated or distributed; may specify the categories of persons who may have access to such information or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems; and may impose such other restrictions on the dissemination or distribution of such information or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems as it deems necessary.

ARTICLE VI

Dissemination

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted or operate as a bar or restriction to consultation or cooperation in any field of defense by either Party with other nations or international organizations. Neither Party, however, shall so communicate classified information or transfer or permit access to or use of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems made available by the other Party pursuant to this Agreement unless:

A. It is notified by the originating Party that all appropriate provisions and requirements of the originating Party's applicable laws, including authorization by competent bodies of the originating Party, have been complied with which would be necessary to authorize the originating Party directly so to communicate to, transfer to, permit access to or use by such other nation or international organization; and further that the originating Party authorizes the recipient Party so to communicate to, transfer to, permit access to or use by such other nation or international organization; or

B. The originating Party has informed the recipient Party that the originating Party has so communicated to, transferred to, permitted access to or use by such other nation or international organization.

ARTICLE VII

Classification Policies

Agreed classification policies shall be maintained with respect to all classified information and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems communicated, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

Responsibility for Use of Information and Non-Nuclear Parts of Atomic Weapons Systems

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems communicated, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not provide any indemnity or warranty with respect to such application or use.

ARTICLE IX

Patents

The recipient Party shall use the classified information communicated, or revealed by equipment transferred hereunder, for the purposes specified herein only. Any inventions or discoveries resulting from possession of such information on the part of the recipient Party or persons under its jurisdiction shall be made available to the other Party for all purposes without charge in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article V of this Agreement.

ARTICLE X

Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement:

A. "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

B. "Classified information" means information, data, materials, services, or any other matter with the security designation of "Confidential" or higher applied under the legislation or regulations of either the United States or France, including that designated by the Government of the United States as "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data," and that designated by the Government of the French Republic as "Atomic".

C. "Non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons" means parts of atomic weapons which are specially designed for them and are not in general use in other end products and which are not made of, in whole or in part, special nuclear material; and "non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data" means parts of atomic weapons systems, other than non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, which contain or reveal atomic information and which are not made of, in whole or in part, special nuclear material.

D. As used in this Agreement, the term "atomic information" means:

1. So far as concerns information provided by the Government of the United States, information which is designated "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data".

2. So far as concerns information provided by the Government of the French Republic, information which is designated "Atomic".

ARTICLE XI

Duration

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all legal requirements for the entry into force of this Agreement, and shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties except that either Party may terminate its cooperation under Articles II or III upon the expiration of the North Atlantic Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Paris, in duplicate, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, this 27th day of July 1961.

For the Government of the United States of America:
CECIL B. LYON

For the Government of the French Republic:
ERIC DE CARBONNEL

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled October 1 Through December 31, 1961

North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Working Party on High Seas Salmon Distribution of the Committee on Biology and Research.	Tokyo	Oct. 1-
UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies	Tokyo	Oct. 2-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 49th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Working Party on Rural Electrification.	Geneva	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Group of Experts for the Study of Hydroelectric Resources in Europe.	Geneva	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 19th Session	Geneva	Oct. 2-
PAHO Directing Council: 13th Meeting; Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas: 13th Meeting.	Washington	Oct. 3-
ILO Technical Meeting on Small-Scale and Handicraft Industries	New Delhi	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 4-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 15, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled October 1 Through December 31, 1961—Continued

FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 3d Session	Iraq	Oct. 7-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 9-
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 16th General Assembly	Munich	Oct. 9-
ITU CCITT Study Group A on Data Transmission	Geneva	Oct. 9-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport	Geneva	Oct. 9-
UNESCO Diplomatic Conference on the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasters	Rome	Oct. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Highway Transport	Madras	Oct. 9-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: Standing Committee	Vienna	Oct. 9-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Tariffs	Geneva	Oct. 11-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 2d Session of Special Working Group	Geneva	Oct. 12-
South Pacific Commission: 22d Session	Nouméa	Oct. 12-
Inter-American Children's Institute: 42d Meeting of Directing Council	Washington	Oct. 16-
ILO/ECE Seminar on Family Living Studies	Vienna	Oct. 16-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee	Geneva	Oct. 16-
ICEM Executive Committee: 18th Session	Geneva	Oct. 16-
SEATO Committee on Information, Cultural, Education, and Labor Activities	Bangkok	Oct. 16-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Oct. 16-
U.N. Pledging Conference	New York	Oct. 17-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 6th Session of Standing Committee	Geneva	Oct. 18-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 1st Session	Paris	Oct. 19-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Biology Committee	Tokyo	Oct. 23-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session	Rome	Oct. 23-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Electrical Accidents and Related Matters	Geneva	Oct. 23-
ICEM Council: 15th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group	Geneva	Oct. 23-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 13th Meeting	Kuala Lumpur	Oct. 30-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on the Problems of Young Workers	Geneva	Oct. 30-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 30-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	New York	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on River Law	Geneva	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Conditions of Sale for Cereals	Geneva	Oct. 30-
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee	Rome	October
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 8th Session of Committee on Statistics	Rome	October
UNESCO Executive Board: 60th Session	Paris	October or November
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Organization and Operation of Industrial Estates	Madras	Nov. 1-
FAO Council: 36th Session	Rome	Nov. 2-
FAO Conference: 11th Session	Rome	Nov. 4-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 8th Meeting	Tokyo	Nov. 6-
ILO Asian Advisory Committee: 11th Session	Geneva	Nov. 6-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport	Geneva	Nov. 6-
ILO Governing Body: 150th Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Nov. 13-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Transport Costs	Geneva	Nov. 13-
GATT Contracting Parties: 19th Session	Geneva	Nov. 13-
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Frequency Assignment (VIIF) Planning Meeting	Paris	Nov. 14-
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 4th Session	Bangkok	Nov. 14-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Inland Water Transport	Geneva	Nov. 15-
SEATO Committee of Economic Experts	Bangkok	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Training Seminar on Trade Promotion	New Delhi	Nov. 20-
International Wheat Council: 33d Session	London	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Transport of Dangerous Goods	Geneva	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group	Geneva	Nov. 20-
IMCO Expert Working Group on Pollution of the Sea by Oil	London	Nov. 21-
FAO Council: 37th Session	Rome	Nov. 24-
U.N. ECAFE/WMO Interregional Seminar on Hydrology	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Study Group on Projections for Agricultural Problems	Geneva	Nov. 27-
ICAO South American-South Atlantic Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services/Communications Meeting	Lima	November
IMCO Council: 6th Session	London	November
FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 4th Session	Trivandrum, India	Dec. 4-
FAO Technical Working Party on Coconut Production, Protection, and Processing: 1st Session	Trivandrum	Dec. 4-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 13th Session	Geneva	Dec. 4-

ILO Committee on Work on Plantations: 4th Session	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport .	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. Consultative Group on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders .	Geneva	Dec. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Energy Resources and Electric Power Development.	Bangkok	Dec. 6-
FAO International Rice Commission: 9th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Production and Protection.	New Delhi	Dec. 11-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Meeting of Working Party on Rice, Soil, Water, and Fertilizer Practices.	New Delhi	Dec. 11
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group	Geneva	Dec. 11-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics.	Geneva	Dec. 18-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power.	Bangkok	Dec. 18-
Joint OAS/UNESCO/ECLA Meeting on Education and Economic Development.	Santiago	December
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 5th Session	London.	December
NATO Ministerial Council.	Paris	December
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 32d Session (resumed).	New York	December

Secretary Rusk Greets International Navigation Congress

*Remarks by the Secretary*¹

The President of the United States has asked me to bring you his personal greetings and best wishes for a successful Congress. He hopes that those of you from other countries will thoroughly enjoy your visit in the United States. We are proud to be your hosts and are anxious to extend to you a full measure of our traditional hospitality.

President Kennedy is a keen advocate of increasing international exchange of information and of more and more productive scientific collaboration. He believes this is the true course toward greater international understanding and world peace.

All of us are aware of the issues which divide nations, and all are concerned about the sense of crisis which marks this present period. While efforts are being made to resolve these problems by peaceful means, it is of the utmost importance that we increase in every possible way those avenues of cooperation which exist below—or above—the political level. President Kennedy has referred to those great issues confronting man where nature itself makes allies of us all.² The struggle by man to make himself at home in his

physical universe, to harness its forces for his own benefit, to repel its attacks against his existence, and to multiply its resources for his own enrichment is a matter of deepest common interest to us all. Indeed, against the context of this great adventure of the human species, our manmade quarrels ought somehow to be brought under more rational control.

I am happy that your host city is the thriving port of Baltimore, which attracts some 6,000 ships each year from around the world. Here Fort McHenry, made immortal by the words of our "Star-Spangled Banner," stands as a symbol of America's heritage. I am glad that many of you plan to see our nation's Capital in Washington.

In your science, as in all sciences, vast changes have taken place since the first International Navigation Congress convened in Europe in 1885. I am told that during the Congress held at Paris in 1900 the principal question related to the "Application of Machinery to the Water Supply of Canals." I note that during the present Congress you are to consider "Measures To Be Adopted for the Accommodation of Nuclear-Powered Ships in Maritime Ports."

We can best find the solutions to problems common to all our countries and work effectively in promoting the welfare of all if nations can meet in good faith to consider them together, as you will undertake to do here.

Such an approach to maritime problems common to the world is particularly desirable, for the efficiency with which commerce can be carried on between nations is of basic importance to

¹Made before the 20th Congress of the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses at Baltimore, Md., on Sept. 11 (press release 623).

²For text of President Kennedy's state of the Union message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.

improving living standards in countries just now beginning to develop and maintaining the strength of other nations.

I recall certain thoughts in a report published about 3 years ago by the Rockefeller Foundation³ on the great importance of economic growth:

We are just beginning to understand the full potentials of international developments in a world in which distances are shrinking, barriers to trade are being reduced, and more than a billion people are living in newly-developing economies. We are inextricably a part of a free world economy striving for growth. That fact offers a major challenge and opens a great opportunity for our nation to work with the other free nations to promote economic growth and the broad use of its proceeds to support the maximum opportunity for the individual.

Commerce must expand among free nations if progress is to be made toward a world in which peace and human dignity will be the international way of life.

Stimulating increased commerce between nations poses challenges to the engineer and the builder which are just as important as those presented to leaders in political and economic affairs, for here ways must be found to reduce the cost of exchanging large quantities of bulk cargoes to barest minimum.

We must be able to move materials from areas of abundance to areas of shortage with utmost efficiency.

We must help countries now beginning to develop to realize the fullest benefits from their inland waterway potentials for internal economic expansion.

We must facilitate the distribution of essential material resources that will permit every country to combat poverty, sickness, and general unhappiness. These problems pose technical questions concerning the improvement of harbors and waterways for which we look to you, the world's leaders in navigation development, for some answers.

World history proves that commerce among nations does not bring the highest down to the level of the lowest but improves the lot of all.

Agencies such as the World Bank, the Development Loan Fund, and the International Cooperation Administration have been active in this field. Under the foreign aid program the United States

³ *The Challenge to America: Its Economic and Social Aspects*, Report of Panel IV of the Special Studies Project, Rockefeller Brothers Fund (Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1958).

has provided assistance to many countries for port development. This has been done on a grant basis ranging from short-term technical consultation for port management all the way to design and plans and even to the funding and overseeing of construction. Loans for similar projects have also been carried out under the Development Loan Fund.

Much of our foreign aid program is with underdeveloped countries lacking adequate port facilities. This affects the planning and execution of commodity import programs financed by the foreign aid agency, including emergency shipments of wheat and other foods to alleviate famine and distress. The lack of adequate ports in some cases becomes a limiting factor to the assistance we can provide through emergency food programs.

We have provided help to some countries in the field of engineering for dredging programs for channel and harbor development. We helped by providing technicians and in some cases we have provided dredges. In countries such as Korea and Viet-Nam we have assisted navigation in the restoration of lighthouses and aids to navigation.

May I mention a specific example to further illustrate developments in our program of international technical cooperation.

In 1956 in San José, Costa Rica, an Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference was sponsored by the Organization of American States. This conference set forth a declaration of principles stating desirable goals in the field of development, administration, and operation of ports in the Americas.

Out of this conference came a "Declaration of San José," a program of goals and a statement of actions necessary to reach these goals. As a member of the family of nations bound closer together by these resolutions to improve the efficiency of our ports and thus stimulate greater trade among the American states, the United States was proud to be a signatory to this declaration. We have since been represented as a member of the seven-nation Permanent Technical Committee on ports authorized by the conference to carry out its decisions.

The Alliance for Progress proposed by President Kennedy⁴ was established by the declaration to the peoples of America made by representatives

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

of the American Republics in Punta del Este last month,⁵ to which declaration the United States wholeheartedly subscribes. The declaration included a resolution entitled "Studies on Latin American Ports."⁶ This program involves "a technical study on the ports in Latin America, with a pertinent evaluation of necessary investments having as its objective a greater efficiency in operating those ports, with a view to lowering costs and promoting trade in Latin American products."

I confirm here that the collaboration requested of the Government of the United States in this resolution will be given warmly and without reserve.

Let me, in conclusion, remind you that this Congress is one of many international meetings now going on to get on with the world's work despite the clouds which appear on the political horizon. Today, for example, there are a dozen international meetings going on somewhere in the

⁵ For background and text of declaration, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

⁶ Not printed here; for text, see OAS doc. ES-RE-Doc. 145 (English) Rev. 3 Corr.

world at which the United States is officially represented. I happened to count them today, but I did not need to—because the same is true of every working day throughout the year. Today there are several meetings concerned with trade, one on the training of women in the South Pacific, another on development in the Caribbean, another on industrial statistics in the Far East. You will make good progress here, I have no doubt, on the special problems of navigation. But it occurs to me that your work takes on additional meaning as a part of a great human endeavor to bring men together to solve their common problems.

I look forward to the opportunity to meet you in person at the reception which is to follow. I hope that each of you, from my own country and from other nations, may carry home with you the knowledge that your work in behalf of improving the techniques of navigation development and their application will continue to have my fullest interest and support and that of our Government.

Again, may I extend to all of you a warm welcome on behalf of the President of the United States.

Pressures for Migration From Europe Slacken in 1961

14TH SESSION OF COUNCIL AND 17TH SESSION OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

by George L. Warren

The Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, on which 30 governments are represented, held its 14th session at Geneva between May 11 and 17, 1961. The Executive Committee of 9 member governments met between May 3 and 17, 1961. The Dominican Republic, Peru, Uruguay, the Holy See, the Republic of San Marino, and the Sovereign Order of Malta were represented in attendance as observers. The United Nations, the United Nations specialized agencies, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and nongovernmental organizations interested in migration were also represented.

The Intergovernmental Committee for Euro-

pean Migration was organized on the initiative of the United States at the Brussels Conference on Migration in 1951. Originally preoccupied with facilitating the movement of indigenous migrants and refugees out of overpopulated areas in Europe, the Migration Committee has in recent years devoted more attention to assisting Latin American governments to secure and place the skilled and semiskilled workers recruited from the emi-

• *Mr. Warren is Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State. He served as U.S. representative at the sessions of the Council and the Executive Committee.*

gration countries in Europe, particularly Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.

José Manuel Aniel-Quiroga of Spain was elected chairman of the Council for the 14th session. Afranio del Mello-Franco, Filho, of Brazil was elected first vice chairman; Eran Laor of Israel, second vice chairman; and Armand A. Kuijpers of Belgium, rapporteur. The Council held nine meetings. Ambassador Aniel-Quiroga presided also at the meetings of the Executive Committee.

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State, was the U.S. representative at the sessions of the Executive Committee and the Council. Representative Francis E. Walter was alternate U.S. representative at the Council sessions.

Director's Report on Operations and Finances in 1960

The Director reported total movements in 1960 of 99,759, of which 1,059 were refugees of European origin moved from mainland China through Hong Kong. Total expenditures in 1960 amounted to \$30,409,925, of which \$2,920,642 were for the account of the administrative budget. There were carryovers of funds for expenditure in 1961 of \$905,482 from operations in 1960 and of \$242,709 under the administrative budget. ICEM moved the millionth migrant under its auspices in April 1960. The election of Bolivia as a new member government in December 1960 compensated for the resignation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Because of the improved economic situation in Europe, pressures for emigration from Europe were reduced in 1960, although the movement of refugees overseas was maintained at the level of previous years. The higher volume of intra-European movements was considered to be a temporary development. There were insistent demands from the Latin American countries for assistance in securing more skilled and semiskilled workers in better balance in their immigration intakes.

Progress Report of Director for 1961

Movements in the first quarter of 1961 were apparently proceeding at the same approximate level as in 1960. The Director reported on his recent visit to Latin America and specifically on preliminary conferences with officials of Colombia and

Venezuela with respect to projects of technical assistance to be undertaken in those countries. Colombia has requested technical assistance in determining manpower requirements to be met through immigration, and Venezuela has asked for assistance in developing temporary immigration policies and programs and in drafting basic permanent immigration legislation.

Changing Economic Conditions in Europe

Following a private meeting of certain emigration countries in Europe in February 1961, the Federal Republic of Germany took the initiative in presenting a memorandum to the Council citing the growing demand for workers in the European countries and the consequent need for ICEM to review its migration policies and programs. The memorandum stated that pressures to emigrate from European countries had diminished and expressed the view that most of the refugees had either been resettled abroad or integrated in the economies of the countries of first or second asylum in Europe. The representative of Germany noted that his country had, in fact, become a country of immigration as well as a country of emigration and with this duality of interest would not be in a position to propose changes in direction which ICEM might take. He did, however, express the concern of his Government that in extending technical assistance ICEM should avoid overlapping and duplication of the activities of other international agencies providing technical assistance. His Government would continue to support ICEM but would look to other governments for practical proposals as to ways in which ICEM might adapt its activities in response to changing conditions in the emigration countries.

While all member governments agreed that conditions in the emigration countries had changed and that ICEM would need to seek adaptations of programs, the representatives of Greece and Spain particularly insisted that more, rather than less, emigration was needed from their countries and that the intra-European movement of workers was predominantly for temporary employment, did not constitute permanent migration, and in fact raised serious social problems, such as the separation of families. The representative of Italy, having first expressed sympathetic support for

the German intervention, later supported the positions of Greece and Spain and urged an expansion of ICEM's technical assistance activities on behalf of the Latin American countries.

The Latin American governments were quick to respond. Under the leadership of Brazil, they unanimously tabled a paper citing the contribution which they had made in previous years in receiving immigrants and refugees from Europe and stating their current urgent need for 10,000 skilled and semiskilled workers annually. These they confidently expected the emigration countries in Europe would help to supply through the medium of ICEM. The plea for workers was accompanied by a reminder that ICEM had failed to date to supply adequately the services and technical assistance which were so desperately needed in the Latin American countries if the needed workers were to be secured.

In the discussion which followed the request of the Latin American governments was frequently referred to as modest and achievable. But the U.S. representative pointed out that 10,000 workers with their families would mean approximately 35,000 persons and that this total of movement would be at least twice the annual movement under ICEM auspices to Latin America in recent years. Furthermore, to select, recruit, move, and place that number of workers would require greatly improved and expanded technical assistance by ICEM to the Latin American countries in establishing better planned immigration and more adequate immigration administrations.

Many representatives pointed out the necessity of better planning in the development of ICEM's technical assistance activities and of closer coordination with other projects of technical assistance, particularly those administered by the International Labor Office. It was recognized that ICEM had a role to play in assisting Latin American countries to add to their manpower resources through the skillful selection, recruitment, and placement of trained and semitrained immigrants from abroad.

As all the implications of the German and Latin American interventions and of the comments of the other governments could not be explored adequately during the session and many governments desired more time for consideration of the questions posed, the Council decided to refer the Ger-

man and Latin American papers and the record of the discussions on them to a working party to meet in September 1961 and to report to the next session of the Council. The governments were requested to submit their further comments in advance for consideration by the working party. The working party will consist of the five government members of the present Subcommittee on Budget and Finance (Australia, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States), who were authorized in turn to coopt a sixth member. It is expected that Canada will be invited to join the group.

Report of Subcommittee on Budget and Finance

The Subcommittee on Budget and Finance had met in its fourth session for 5 days at The Hague immediately preceding the Council session. Having reviewed the budget and plan of operations for 1961, the subcommittee recommended adoption of the budget as submitted by the Director and revised by the subcommittee. In response to suggestions by the subcommittee, the administration was now taking more frequent readings of actual movements and of their financial implications and was thus able to supply more precise and more timely estimates of movements, income, and expenditures. The work of the subcommittee had also assisted governments to secure earlier information on the firm requirements of contributions to operations in the financial year, with the result that the administration had been assured of funds actually in hand also earlier in the year.

In a previous report the subcommittee had expressed the hope that data requested of the administration on the trends of contributions to transport from the four sources of such contributions—the emigration countries, the immigration countries, the migrants, and ICEM's free funds (funds not allocated by the contributor to any particular movement)—would supply clues to improved methods of financing transport. The data had been received, but the subcommittee reported that its hopes for an immediate solution of the problem had not been realized. The subcommittee did report that the proportion which ICEM's free funds provided in meeting the costs of transport was dangerously high, considering that such funds were diminishing and that, unless there were increases in contributions to transport from the

other main sources, the emigration and immigration governments and the migrants, movements would be increasingly jeopardized. The subcommittee also found that it was not feasible to attempt to establish standards or formulas for the application of the free funds in specific amounts or percentages to particular routes of transport because the factors affecting different movements, at different times, are so variable and many are beyond the control of ICEM.

Four members of the subcommittee believed that the emigration and immigration countries should assume responsibility for bearing a larger share of transport costs by concluding bilateral agreements to this effect, calling upon ICEM's free or international funds for participation only when there is a need for supplementary assistance which can be clearly demonstrated. Australia dissented, however, and maintained the view that present methods of financing transport are adequate and sufficiently flexible to meet changing conditions.

On the recommendation of the Executive Committee, the Council expanded the subcommittee's terms of reference to include matters connected with the administrative budget in order to give the subcommittee greater freedom of action in exploring all of ICEM's financing problems and in recognition of the fact that the problems of the administrative and operational budgets are very closely related.

Budget and Plan of Operations for 1961

On the recommendation of the Executive Committee, the Council approved revised estimates of movements during 1961 totaling 101,950: 98,270 for the European program and 3,680 for the Far East program. The total of operational expenditures approved was \$25,271,000, of which \$3,046,857 would be required in lump-sum contributions from governments, in addition to the per capita contributions for transport. As of March 31, 1961, adequate income appeared in sight for most categories of expenditure with the exception of international operations, technical assistance, and the transport of refugees. Some \$100,000 in additional income remained to be raised to cover all requirements in these categories. Compared with previous years, the financial position of the Committee at the spring session in 1961 appeared to be rather favorable.

Resignation of Sweden

On instructions from his Government, the representative of Sweden announced the intention of his Government to resign from membership in the Committee in 1961. The reason given was that Sweden was interested solely in the settlement of refugees, as distinguished from indigenous migrants, and planned to recruit immediately an additional 1,000 refugees in Austria for settlement in Sweden, which would not involve overseas movements requiring the services of the Committee.

Membership of United Kingdom

On application by the United Kingdom and recommendation by the Executive Committee, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was unanimously admitted to membership and its representative invited to take his seat at the council table during the session.

Contributions to Administrative Budget

The entry of the United Kingdom into membership raised the question of a review of the scale of percentages of contributions to the administrative budget. This action would also be responsive to the requests of certain governments, notably Argentina and Brazil, that their percentages be revised downward. The basic scale of percentages of contributions had not, in fact, been revised since it was originally adopted in 1951, and many changes in relative economic positions, interests in ICEM activities, and the capacity to pay of member governments had taken place in the intervening 10 years. There was some support for an immediate adjustment in 1961 of the percentages of five governments whose percentages appeared to be unduly out of line, but in the face of objection to hasty action the revision of the scale for 1961, as well as for 1962, was referred to the Subcommittee on Budget and Finance to be considered at its meeting in September. For the purpose of this review only, the Council appointed the Government of Canada as a sixth temporary member of the subcommittee. The subcommittee was requested by the Council to take into account the factor of member government interest in the

activities of the Committee along with capacity to pay and other pertinent factors in recommending a revised scale of percentages.

Sessions of Executive Committee and Council

A formal proposal of the Director to hold one session of the Council and two sessions of the Executive Committee annually was rejected by the Council. The Director's contention that certain savings would result from the adoption of his proposal was not challenged. However, the Council considered that two sessions of the Council, as at present, would be required annually during the period in which ICEM is searching for adaptations of its program to the changing conditions in which its activities are conducted.

Appeal Board

The representative of Greece proposed the establishment of an appeal board to consider staff situations in which staff members might have reason to feel that their rights had been infringed by decisions of the administration. He pointed out that many international organizations had such appeal boards. After discussion of the suggestion, the Council established a working party consisting of the chairman of the Executive Committee, a representative of the administration, and a representative of the Staff Association to study the proposal and to report to the Council through the Executive Committee at the next session.

Speakers at Council Session

During the course of the session, the Council was addressed by the following speakers: Felix Schnyder, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; Francis E. Walter, alternate U.S. representative; Fermin Sanz Orrio, Minister of Labor of Spain; and Ferdinando Storchi, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Date of 15th Session

The Council adjourned its 14th session on May 17, 1961, in a spirit of optimism and agreed to convene the 15th session on or about October 23, 1961, at Geneva. The Executive Committee will convene on October 16, 1961.

October 2, 1961

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Sweden Sign Supplementary Tariff Agreement

Press release 636 dated September 15

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States on September 15 signed an agreement with Sweden supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The supplementary agreement provides for a tariff concession by the United States on certain types of boxes.

This concession compensates Sweden for the increase, on December 10, 1957, of the United States rate of duty on spring clothespins.¹ A concession on spring clothespins had been made in 1949 under the General Agreement. The increase in the U.S. import duty on spring clothespins in 1957 was made pursuant to the escape-clause provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 and to the terms of article XIX of the General Agreement. It was put into effect to prevent injury to the domestic spring clothespins industry. Article XIX provides that when a country raises the tariff on a product which is the subject of a concession under the General Agreement that country will consult with the affected countries. The supplementary agreement, resulting in the granting of a compensatory concession by the United States, is the product of these consultations with Sweden.

Following are a summary analysis of the new concession on boxes, which will be applied as part of the U.S. schedule to the General Agreement, and texts of the agreement and of notes exchanged with the Embassy of Sweden.

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

The supplementary agreement signed on September 15 provides for a reduction in the U.S.

¹ For text of Proclamation 3211 of Nov. 9, 1957, withdrawing a trade agreement concession on spring clothespins, see BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 959.

rate of duty on boxes of paper, papier mache, or wood, covered or lined; covered or lined with paper but not covered or lined with cotton or other vegetable fiber (Tariff paragraph 1405, Statistical class number 4785.200). As a result of this concession the ad valorem equivalent of the tariff rate on these boxes will be reduced from 7.4 percent to 5.4 percent. Sweden is the major foreign supplier of this product to the United States. In 1960 U.S. imports of these boxes were valued at \$1.3 million, of which Sweden shipped \$700,000. Other important suppliers are West Germany and Japan. United States production of this item is many times the volume of imports.

This concession was granted as compensation for the increase, effective December 10, 1957, of the U.S. rate of duty on spring clothespins (Tariff paragraph 412, Statistical class number 4280.150). The duty on clothespins was raised from 10 cents per gross to 20 cents per gross (the ad valorem equivalents of these rates are, respectively, 25 percent and 50 percent). Imports of spring clothespins from Sweden averaged \$287,000 in the 3 years before the 1957 escape-clause action which resulted in the increased duty. Since 1958 imports from Sweden have had an average annual value of \$252,000.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Sweden;

Considering the reciprocal concessions and advantages for the promotion of trade provided for in their respective Schedules annexed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as the General Agreement);

Taking cognizance of Proclamation No. 3211, issued by the President of the United States of America on November 9, 1957, under Article XIX of the General Agreement, with respect to the concession provided for in the first item 412 in Part I of Schedule XX to the Annecy Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX (Annecy-1949)");

Taking cognizance of the authorization by the Contracting Parties to the United States to proceed with negotiations to modify or withdraw such concessions under the terms of Article XXVIII:4;

Recognizing the desirability of maintaining the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions in the General Agreement;

Agree as follows:

(1) As a result of Article XXVIII negotiations, the concession provided for in the first item 412 in Part I of Schedule XX (Annecy-1949) may be withdrawn from said schedule;

(2) As complete compensatory adjustment for such action by the United States of America under Article XIX of the General Agreement, on and after October 18, 1961 and so long as such treatment under Article XIX continues, the United States, notwithstanding the second general note to Schedule XX to the Torquay Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement, shall apply to the products described in the attached Schedule treatment indicated therein, as though such treatment were provided for in the corresponding items in Part I of Schedule XX (Annecy-1949) and subject to the provisions of the Schedule attached hereto and of the General Agreement.

(3) Upon completion of such Article XXVIII negotiations with all contracting parties participating therein regarding compensatory adjustment for the withdrawal provided for in paragraph 1, the United States of America shall apply to the products described in the attached Schedule treatment no less favorable than the treatment indicated therein, as though such treatment were provided for in the corresponding items in Part I of Schedule XX (Annecy-1949) and subject to the provisions of the Schedule attached hereto and of the General Agreement, with the understanding that as soon as practicable such treatment will be specifically included in Schedule XX (Annecy-1949).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this September 15, 1961.

For the United States of America:

LEONARD WEISS
Acting Director,
Office of International Trade

For Sweden:

GUNNAR JARRING
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

SCHEDULE

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rates of Duty	
		A	B
1405	Boxes of paper or papier mache or wood provided for in paragraph 1405, Tariff Act of 1930:		
	Covered or lined with paper but not covered or lined with cotton or other vegetable fiber -----	2¼¢ per lb. and 4½% ad val.	2¢ per lb. and 4% ad val.

NOTE

Subject to the provisions of this agreement, to the pertinent provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and to the provisions of section 350(a)(4)(B) and (C) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as now amended, the rates specified in the rate-columns in this Schedule will become effective as follows:

(a) Rates in column A will become initially effective on October 18, 1961, and rates in column B will become initially effective in each case upon the expiration of a full period of one year after the related rate in column A became initially effective.

(b) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) above, the phrase "full period of one year" means a period or periods aggregating one year exclusive of the time, after a rate becomes initially effective, when, by reason of legislation of the United States or action thereunder a higher rate of duty is being applied.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES

United States

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington
September 15, 1961

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the supplementary trade agreement signed this date regarding compensation for the escape clause action on spring clothespins. During the interim period between the time the compensatory concession described in the said agreement is placed in effect by the United States and the time the Article XXVIII negotiations recited in said agreement are completed, the following conditions will be effective as to the said compensatory concession:

In the event that the action by the President of the United States of America, by Proclamation No. 3211 of November 9, 1957, is modified or terminated so as to result in lower rates of duty for any of the products described in the first item 412 in Part I of Schedule XX to the Ancey Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with respect to which the said action of November 9, 1957 was taken, the Government of the United States will consult promptly with the Government of Sweden regarding any appropriate measures to be taken with respect to the concessions in the Schedule attached to the agreement of this date between said parties. If agreement is not reached, the Government of the United States of America, on 90 days' written notice to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement, may increase rates provided for in the aforesaid Schedule to the agreement of this date to such extent as may be appropriate in the circumstances but in no case to a higher rate than the rate provided for the product involved in Schedule XX to the Torquay Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the date of the signature of the aforesaid agreement.

I propose that the present note, and a note from you in reply confirming and accepting the foregoing proposal, be considered as an agreement between our two Governments concerning the aforementioned supplementary trade agreement signed this date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

LEONARD WEISS

His Excellency
GUNNAR JARRING,
Ambassador of Sweden

Sweden

WASHINGTON, D.C.
September 15, 1961

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
No. 273

SIR, I have the honour to refer to your note of today's date which reads as follows:

[See U.S. note.]

I have the honour to confirm and accept the proposal as set forth in the above-quoted note. Accordingly your note and the present note is considered an agreement between our two Governments concerning the aforementioned supplementary trade agreement signed this date.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

GUNNAR JARRING

The Honourable
DEAN RUSK,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

**United States and Japan Conclude
Bilateral Textile Agreement**

Press release 631 dated September 13

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

On September 8, 1961, representatives of the United States and Japan concluded negotiations for a bilateral cotton textile agreement as permitted by the Geneva cotton textile arrangement dated July 21, 1961.¹ The final text of the draft agreement is now under review for approval by the two Governments. The draft agreement, which covers cotton textile exports from Japan

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 336.

to the United States for 1962, is to go into effect beginning January 1, 1962, replacing the arrangement existing between the two countries during the past 5 years.

The chairman of the U.S. delegation was Warren M. Christopher, Special Consultant to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State. Members of the delegation were: Avery F. Peterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs, Department of State; Hickman Price, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Domestic Affairs, Department of Commerce; Philip H. Trezise, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo; and Leo R. Werts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor.

TEXT OF DRAFT AGREEMENT

DRAFT

ARRANGEMENTS FOR 1962 BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE EXPORT OF COTTON TEXTILES FROM JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES

In accordance with the provision in the ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN COTTON TEXTILES done at Geneva and dated July 21, 1961 (Geneva ARRANGEMENTS), permitting "mutually acceptable bilateral arrangements on other terms," the Governments of Japan and the United States adopt the following arrangement for the twelve months beginning January 1, 1962.

1. The purpose of this arrangement is to maintain orderly marketing of Japanese cotton textiles in the United States by avoiding excessive concentration in any particular period or on any particular item and by continued efforts to achieve broader diversification of cotton textile exports from Japan to the United States.

2. To achieve this purpose, the Japanese Government shall maintain, for the period of twelve months beginning January 1, 1962, an aggregate limit on cotton textile exports to the United States, and limits on major groups and on certain categories within those groups.

3. (1) If Japan considers that, as a result of ceilings established under this arrangement, a third country is being afforded an inequitable opportunity to increase its exports of cotton textiles to the United States, the Japanese Government may call for consultation with the United States Government, and the United States Government will take appropriate remedial action such as (a) reasonable modifications of this arrangement, (b) a request, pursuant to Section I.A. of the Geneva ARRANGEMENTS, to the third country to restrain its exports to the United States, or (c) action against the third country to prevent circumvention or frustration of the Geneva ARRANGEMENTS or of this arrangement.

(2) The Japanese Government will take appropriate action to prevent the circumvention or frustration of this arrangement by transshipments of goods to the United States through third countries, by substitution of directly competitive textiles for cotton textiles, or by other means.

4. Wherever a specific ceiling has been established, the basis for control will be the number of units (e.g. square yards, dozens, pieces, pounds, etc.) established as a ceiling. The conversion into equivalent square yards is for the purpose of providing a common statistical basis for measurement of the overall program. Wherever pounds are mentioned, the conversion shall be at the rate of 4.6 square yards per pound. The parties will consult with each other to establish a basis for the conversion of other units to square yards, if necessary.

5. Exports from Japan to the United States of particular items shall be distributed equally by quarters as far as practicable and as necessary to meet seasonal demands.

6. The over-all limit for Japanese exports of cotton textiles to the United States shall be 275 million square yards in the twelve months beginning January 1, 1962.

7. The over-all limit shall be subdivided into 5 major groups as follows:

	<i>Million Square Yards</i>
Group I—Cotton Cloth.....	125.5
II—Made-up Goods, Usually Included in U.S. Cotton Broad Woven Goods Production	35
III—Woven Apparel.....	90.5
IV—Knit Goods.....	14
V—Miscellaneous Cotton Textiles....	10
Total	275

8. Within the over-all annual total, the ceilings for Groups I, II, III, IV, and V may be exceeded by not more than five percent, provided that this provision for "flexibility" shall permit an increase only in the "Other" categories referred to in Paragraphs 9, 11, 13 and 15, and in Group V.

9. The following limits shall be applicable within the total of 125.5 million square yards for Group I—"Cotton Cloth":

	<i>Million Square Yards</i>
1. Gingham (including Gingham Stripes) ..	46.2
2. Velveteens	2.75
3. All other Fabrics.....	76.55

Within the category of "All Other Fabrics", the total of which shall not exceed 76.55 million square yards, the following specific limits shall not be exceeded:

	<i>Million Square Yards</i>
a. Sheeting	30.0
b. Shirting (80x80 type).....	20.0
c. Other Shirting.....	32.0
d. Twill and Sateen.....	39.0
e. Poplin	30.0
f. Yarn Dyed Fabrics (except Gingham)....	29.0

10. The following additional provisions are applicable to the cloth distribution in paragraph 9:

(1) Within the overall limit for Group I, any shortfall with respect to gingham or velveteens may be transferred to category 3—"All Other Fabrics".

(2) Within the limit of 76.55 million square yards, for fabrics other than gingham or velveteens (i.e., fabrics a. through f.), the total exports of fabrics made from combed warp and filling shall not exceed 33 million square yards.

11. The following specific limits shall apply within the total for Group II—"Made-up Goods Usually Included in U.S. Cotton Broad Woven Production":

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
1. Pillowcases (plain).....	1,000 doz..	450
2. Dish Towels.....	1,000 doz..	840
3. All Other Made-up Goods..	1,000 lbs..	5, 573

Within the category of "All Other Made-up Goods," the total of which shall not exceed 5.573 million pounds, the following specific ceilings shall not be exceeded:

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
a. Handkerchiefs.....	1,000 doz..	1, 260
b. Table Damask.....	1,000 s.y..	11, 375

12. Within the over-all total for Group II, any shortfall in categories 1 and 2 may be transferred to category 3—"All Other Made-up Goods."

13. The following specific limits shall apply within the total for Group III—"Woven Apparel":

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
1. Blouses.....	1,000 doz..	1, 575
2. Sport Shirts.....	1,000 doz..	787. 5
3. Shorts and Trousers.....	1,000 doz..	1, 000
4. All Other Woven Apparel..	1,000 lbs..	6, 642

Within the category of "All Other Woven Apparel," the total of which shall not exceed 6.642 million pounds, the following specific ceilings shall not be exceeded:

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
a. Raincoats.....	1,000 doz..	60
b. Dress and Work Shirts....	1,000 doz..	315
c. Brassieres and Other Body Supporting Garments.	1,000 doz..	800
d. Dressing Gowns and Robes..	1,000 doz..	70

14. Within the over-all total for Group III, any shortfall in categories 1 through 3 may be transferred to category 4—"All Other Woven Apparel".

15. The following specific limits shall apply within the total for Group IV—"Knit Goods":

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
1. All Men's and Boys' T-Shirts.	1,000 doz..	643
2. Knit Shirts—Other than T-Shirts.	1,000 doz..	809
3. Gloves and mittens.....	1,000 doz..	472. 5
4. All Other Knit Goods.....	1,000 lbs..	397. 4

16. Within the over-all total for Group IV, any shortfall in categories 1 through 3 may be transferred to category 4—"All Other Knit Goods".

17. Within the over-all total for Group V are included, among others, such categories as cotton floor coverings, fish nets and netting, cotton thread, etc.

18. To avoid excessive concentration, it is understood that whenever there is excessive concentration of Japanese exports in any particular cotton textile items except those for which specific quotas and ceilings are established and such concentration is causing or threatening disruption of the United States domestic market (or if there are other problems, e.g. possible problems resulting from an excessive concentration of exports of end items made from a particular type of fabric, such as the use of gingham in the manufacture of an excessively large portion of exported blouses, sport shirts, etc.), the United States Government may call for consultation with the Japanese Government to determine an appropriate course of action. In determining such appropriate course of action, imports from third countries and the degree of impact of imports on the industries concerned at the time of consultation shall be taken into account. Pending agreement on further action, the Japanese Government shall hold the exports of the items in question at 110 percent of the exports of such items during the twelve months prior to consultation."

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Signature and acceptance: New Zealand, August 31, 1961.

Fisheries

Declaration of understanding regarding the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Done at Washington April 24, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Canada, September 15, 1961.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Enters into force for the United States December 8, 1961.

Signatures: Belgium, Canada, Ceylon,² Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,² Ireland, Italy,² Japan,² Liberia,² Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,² Norway, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,² United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.²

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, April 16, 1957; Canada, December 19, 1956; Denmark, November 26, 1956; Finland, December 30, 1958; France, July 26, 1957; Federal Republic of Germany (applicable to Land

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to acceptance or ratification.

Berlin), June 11, 1956; Ireland, February 13, 1957; Mexico, May 10, 1956; Netherlands (including Netherlands New Guinea), July 24, 1958; Norway, January 26, 1957; Poland, February 28, 1961; Sweden, May 24, 1956; United Kingdom, May 6, 1955; United States, September 8, 1961.³

Trade and Commerce

Declaration on provisional accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 29, 1959. Entered into force for the United States December 19, 1959. TIAS 4384.

Signature: Australia, July 24, 1961.

Statement confirming signature deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, June 16, 1961.

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

Signature: Turkey, June 23, 1961.

Statement confirming signature deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, July 10, 1961.

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960.⁴

Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), June 12, 1961; Australia, June 13, 1961; South Africa, June 20, 1961; Turkey, June 23, 1961; Indonesia, June 30, 1961; Italy, July 6, 1961.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Brussels February 21, 1961.⁴

Ratification advised by the Senate: September 11, 1961.

Canada

Agreement relating to the disposal of surplus U.S. property in Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa August 28 and September 1, 1961. Entered into force September 1, 1961.

Ceylon

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of June 18, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4042 and 4068). Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 13, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4211 and 4242). Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Chile

Agreement relating to the establishment of a weather facility in Punta Arenas. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago March 29 and August 12, 1961. Entered into force August 12, 1961.

Greece

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955 (TIAS 3310), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.

Entered into force: September 13, 1961; provisionally in force from August 4, 1960.

³ Subject to reservations and an understanding.

⁴ Not in force.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the establishment of a joint program of space research. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 8, 1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

Viet-Nam

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Saigon April 3, 1961.⁴

Ratification advised by the Senate: September 11, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Robert N. Margrave as Director, Office of Munitions Control, effective July 9.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 11-17

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*624	9/11	Program for visit of Presidents of Indonesia and Mali.
625	9/12	ICA helps finance school in Congo.
*626	9/12	Delegation to 16th U.N. General Assembly sworn in (biographic details).
627	9/12	State advisory committee (rewrite).
628	9/12	Air talks with Panama.
629	9/13	Sanjuan: Maryland Legislative Council.
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634	9/15	Lindley: "The Current World Scene."
635	9/15	Portugal credentials (rewrite).
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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
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FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Free-World Growth and Progress

The Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association held their annual meetings at Vienna September 18-22. Following are texts of statements made by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball at the Bank's meeting and by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon at the Fund's meeting.

STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, SEPTEMBER 19

Press release 646 dated September 19; as-delivered text

On behalf of the Government of the United States I should like to add a special word of our shock and sorrow at the death of Dag Hammarskjold and to express the hope that, through the efforts of the governments represented here, the deliberations and actions of the United Nations, and particularly those of the special agencies of the United Nations that are meeting here today, we may advance the cause of peace, for which Dag Hammarskjold devoted his untiring energies and for which he gave his life.

No one can study the annual report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, nor listen to the statement made to us this morning by its distinguished President [Eugene R. Black], nor observe its operations throughout the past few years, without the conviction that it has outgrown its name. The International Bank today is no longer merely a remarkable financial institution but a major instrument of human advancement. Under the perceptive and imaginative leadership of its President and other officers, its Executive Directors and its staff, it has provided not only material help but wise counsel to nations, both new and old, that are caught

up in the great ferment that is sweeping the world.

The nature of this ferment is still difficult to comprehend. Its elements are political, economic, social, cultural, and scientific. It affects more than half of the world's peoples. It involves the release of massive forces through a kind of seismic social convulsion—the crumbling of old systems and the creation, often in violence and blood, of new nations and institutions.

What we are experiencing today is distinct from the waves of political revolution we have known at earlier times. That half of the world's population embroiled in this ferment is asking for more than national independence. Most of the peoples involved in this surging movement have already secured the juridical right to rule themselves. But all too often this is only the beginning of the task of building the essential institutions of statehood.

The people in what we have come to call the less developed areas of the world are giving insistent voice to many and varied demands—demands which we should not, indeed which we cannot, ignore.

They are demanding access to the basic material requirements of life—food, clothing, and shelter—which previous generations have known so meagerly. They are demanding other material comforts and conveniences that are available to the peoples of the more developed societies. They are demanding personal freedom and dignity, better education for themselves and their children, and the opportunity for cultural and spiritual growth. Finally, they are demanding the right to live out their lives in peace and security.

Quite obviously, all these demands cannot be satisfied quickly even by the most far-reaching and successful programs of economic development. Yet economic development remains an indispensable element in their fulfillment. If the revolution which we are witnessing today is to

succeed—and its frustration could mean only catastrophe—then the more developed nations must provide, through public assistance and private investment (and I do not for a moment underestimate the importance of private investment), that measure of resources needed to transform and modernize at least half the globe.

All of this has been said before and much better. But today I want to emphasize two considerations that are not always adequately stressed.

First is the element of time and urgency. Most of the older industrial societies achieved their present levels of economic and technical development over a period of centuries, but the less developed nations of today will not wait. Two billion people are no longer prepared to accept the miserable conditions of life which their ancestors patiently endured. They are persuaded that the vaulting technology of the modern world offers the physical means by which centuries of stagnation can be overcome.

The second element that complicates our task is our lack of reliable insight into what we are doing and where we are going. We know very little about the anatomy of economic and social growth. An abundance of preconception masquerades as principle; an abundance of theory substitutes for experience. Yet the lessons implicit in the history of industrialized societies are largely irrelevant, for we are dealing with disparate cultures, with violent emotional impulses, and with explosive political pressures. We find ourselves constantly moving into new terrain. We must experiment, appraise, and try to learn by doing, without losing our forward momentum.

Special Contribution of IBRD

It is here that the IBRD and its affiliated institutions are making a special contribution—the contribution of experience patiently acquired, thoughtfully appraised, and incisively applied. In a real sense the Bank has been a pioneer, moving with firm purpose through the tangled forest of economic development.

It is because of its willingness to depart from precedent that the Bank has evolved from being merely a lender of money to an institution that is playing a part in shaping the world revolution of development. In this process the Bank, through its varied initiatives, has contributed to

our understanding of the process of development, and the means of encouraging that process, far more than most of us realize.

The Bank, for example, has not been bound by any doctrinaire commitment to the principle that the marketplace must be the sole arbiter of investment. Many less developed countries possess neither the institutional structure nor a sufficient entrepreneurial tradition to make this feasible. If resources are to be injected into the investment stream in such a manner as to contribute most efficiently to economic growth, then they must be employed systematically to build those basic elements of production—transportation, roads, power plants, and factories—that are indispensable to the growth process. And this obviously implies a considerable measure of planning at the national level in which the state must necessarily take the lead.

The recognition of this paradox—that intelligent planning for a less developed economy may be essential to the progressive achievement of economic freedom as the society moves toward a higher level—has been implicit in much that the Bank has done.

At the same time the Bank has come to understand that national planning is itself an esoteric art which most less developed societies cannot practice effectively without help and guidance. As an international organization bringing together the skills of many nations, the Bank has equipped itself to provide that guidance in ways that take into account the sensitivities of the developing countries.

Perhaps the most refined form of the Bank's activities in this connection has been the organization of consortia. In providing the leadership for consortia the Bank has had an extraordinary opportunity to encourage, review, and criticize national economic plans. I am sure that few of us are fully aware of the amount of painstaking effort that has been expended in the leadership of consortia or of the quantity or quality of useful advice which the Bank's technicians have provided to the developing countries.

But the perfection of the consortium is not the only contribution which the Bank has made to the art and practice of national planning. It has created an Economic Development Institute to train senior government officials, and the management of the Bank has recently proposed a

Development Advisory Service which the Executive Directors have approved. Through this Development Advisory Service the Bank may provide expert help in development planning on a continuous basis, through career-type personnel. It may establish resident missions, where requested, to assist in the preparation and execution of broad development programs. It may furnish technical advice and assistance in the actual administration of particular programs of lesser scope. This, it seems to me, is a useful extension of the Bank's activities and one which deserves our full support.

One reason why the Bank has succeeded in its diverse tasks is that it has perceived the need to adapt its tools to the requirements of the responsibilities it has undertaken.

The establishment of the International Development Association is, I think, a manifestation of this perception. The IDA is now an effective member of the community of international lending institutions. But, as we can see from its first annual report, the demands on the International Development Association are increasing. We may well need to face an enlargement of IDA funds in the near future.

U.S. Aid Program

With the facilities of IDA serving as a complement to its own, the IBRD should be able to increase its effectiveness. Yet action through international mechanisms such as the Bank and its affiliated institutions is, of course, only one phase of the massive effort that is needed to meet the demands confronting us.

The United States has long recognized that the economically advanced countries cannot fulfill their responsibility solely through their participation in the work of the Bank. During the last few months my Government has been engaged in a major renovation and strengthening of its own arrangements for bilateral assistance. President Kennedy's new program, which the Congress has just approved, rests on two major premises.

The first is the same premise which has animated much of the work of the Bank—that sustained economic and social progress under conditions of freedom can be achieved only by regarding the development process from the point of view of the recipient nation as a whole. Development programs can best succeed where there is a deter-

mination on the part of the peoples to mobilize their own resources for the purposes of working out overall country programs in which each project is related to all other projects. Human needs are too acute and capital resources too limited for money to be devoted to isolated projects which contribute little to the total national economy of an underdeveloped country.

The other major premise which played a part in the development of President Kennedy's new program has been the conviction that the task of raising the level of life in the less developed countries is one which the economically advanced nations must share. It is an undertaking far beyond the resources of any one nation.

It was with this in mind that my Government has welcomed the initiative taken by the IBRD in the sponsorship of consortia. It is with this in mind also that we have become an active participant in the Development Assistance Group, soon to become the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This group will provide a means for systematic consultation to increase the total volume of resources for development and to improve their utilization.

We have great hopes for the new Development Assistance Committee. We are convinced that, as it gains experience, it can play an even more useful role. Yet, here also, we are moving in an area of empiricism and only time and experience will show exactly how the work of the Committee will develop.

But I do want to make one point quite clear. The Development Assistance Committee is merely another tool for all of us to use in responding to the formidable demands imposed by the revolution of development. In helping to mobilize the resources of the industrialized countries through all appropriate mechanisms—including consortia under certain circumstances—it will be in no sense a competitor of the Bank. Its activities will be harmonized so as to supplement and complement the Bank's own most useful efforts.

The efforts of which I have spoken so far—bilateral, international, and national—offer hope and encouragement for the future. Primarily they are concerned, however, with only a single aspect of the development process, the provision of technical services and the investment of external capital resources to insure economic growth.

Yet we all know that economic development cannot be an end in itself. It is merely one means—albeit an indispensable one—of satisfying human aspirations. Economic development is aimed ultimately at the achievement of broad humanitarian goals. But if the goals are actually to be realized we must face up to the uncomfortable fact that economic development will have to be accompanied by other political, social, cultural, and economic processes—and this presents a major problem.

Issue of Uncontrolled Government

Economic development cannot serve its real purpose if its benefits are enjoyed exclusively by a wealthy elite, while the great masses remain in poverty. Nor can there be any assurance of lasting benefits from economic development in any nation where the government is the master of society and not its servant.

It is with respect to this point, I think, that the debate among the more advanced countries as to the most desirable system of economic and social organization is most often misunderstood, particularly in the less developed nations. All too frequently the controversy is regarded as merely a dispute concerning the merits of governmental intervention in the economic processes of society.

Nothing could be further from the truth; the argument is far more fundamental than that. Every modern society—however advanced or primitive—takes for granted a measure of governmental control over the economy. The critical issue of our times is not “government control” but uncontrolled government. Where the people of any nation lack the power to choose their rulers, can criticize them only at personal peril, and have no effective means of influencing their behavior, these people can easily be reduced to slavery and there is no guarantee that any degree of economic development will actually benefit anyone except the rulers themselves.

The Population Explosion

A second major problem stems from the fact that the successful achievement of our humanitarian objectives depends to a considerable extent upon the ability of economic growth to keep pace with demographic developments. The “popula-

tion explosion” has become a familiar term in recent years. Even so, its true dimensions are difficult to grasp. Some time this year, the three-billionth human being will be born. On the basis of a statistical average, 200 births occur every minute. It is also a stark fact of demography that the major portion of these births are taking place in the less developed regions of the world.

The prevailing rate of population growth affects not only the net rate of economic advancement but also the volume of resources and the nature of the national programs required to achieve rapid development. Even under the best of circumstances, the less developed nations will fight a losing battle unless they can obtain, and use with maximum efficiency, a huge volume of capital and technical skills. In this context, the population explosion, if continued, will place an ever-increasing burden on the more advanced countries and international lending institutions. It will place a burden as well on the developing countries, to achieve greater effectiveness in mobilizing internal resources for development.

The population problem must, of course, be taken into account in drafting national development programs. Areas with plentiful manpower may find it useful to stress development activities of a labor-intensive nature. Nations with small populations relative to resources may more appropriately consider labor-saving activities. And the rate of population growth will, of course, require close attention to the proper balance between increasing the production of basic foodstuffs and quickening the pace toward industrialization.

Rapid population growth, therefore, conditions the prospects for achieving the true objectives of economic development. It is a problem intimately bound up with the social and cultural traditions—and inhibitions—of each particular country. It is a problem which, in all its aspects, calls increasingly for the exercise of the most mature wisdom. But while we cannot solve this problem here today we can at least define our goal. We want a world in which every birth is accompanied by a birthright.

There is a third major problem which is too often neglected. In our preoccupation with the process of development at the national level we have given all too little thought, I fear, to the total economic impact of the development revolution on the world as a whole.

We can hardly expect the less developed nations to attain a level of self-sustaining growth if they are unable to earn a growing volume of convertible foreign exchange in world markets. Any program for economic development may become an absurdity unless it realistically takes account of world trading patterns and prospects.

World Trading Patterns

There are several facets to this complex problem. First, the less developed nations must be able to find reasonably stable markets for the raw materials they produce. The foreign aid provided under even the most ambitious assistance program for a developing nation can be totally negated if that nation suffers an abrupt cyclical decline in the world market price for a major raw material it exports. This is particularly true of those countries which are dependent upon one or two basic commodities for the bulk of their foreign exchange earnings.

Quite apart from these cyclical fluctuations, we know also that certain primary commodities show a continuous tendency toward increasing output. As a result, the aggregate supply of these products may come to exceed any conceivable future demand at reasonable prices. Obviously, any development program aimed at increasing a country's capacity for producing commodities in world surplus will be self-defeating. In persistent surplus situations we must face the hard necessity of devising mechanisms, within a worldwide framework, to stabilize prices and production.

This is a problem which is preoccupying the United States Government today. We are giving a great deal of thought and effort to its solution. But I must emphasize that it cannot be solved by the creation of special preferential systems between groups of primary producing countries and one or more industrialized countries. Such discriminatory solutions, in the long run, will only delay and complicate the working out of these problems on a worldwide basis.

Another aspect of this question which enters into the total equation of development planning is the impact of worldwide industrialization on world markets. As the less developed countries progress toward economic advancement they will begin to move progressively into the edges of industrialization. Initially they may concentrate

on the production of articles needed to meet the expanding demands of their own peoples. But if they are ever to be capable of continuing the development process through their own efforts, if they are to reach the beckoning goal of self-sustaining growth, then they must be able to sell their production on the world markets.

It goes without saying that in many of the developing nations the most valuable productive resource is low-cost labor. With a large reservoir of unskilled labor and a shortage of capital it is only natural that such countries should tend to concentrate their production in labor-intensive industries. In an ideal world one might expect the industrial nations to move consciously toward more sophisticated production, leaving to the developing nations an expanding field for simpler manufactures. But this is not an ideal world, and we all know well enough that the structural adjustments which this implies, even though marginal so far as most economies are concerned, cannot be easily or quickly accomplished.

I would expect, therefore, that we are only at the beginning of a process in which the governments of the industrialized nations must take the lead in providing an orderly opportunity for the expansion of markets for the production of the underdeveloped nations. In the absence of a great deal of will and effort and consultation among nations there is grave danger that the normal and necessary changes in trading patterns will be artificially distorted by restrictive reflexes on the part of major consuming nations. In that event the hope for a prosperous world in which resources are most effectively used would be cruelly delayed or frustrated.

Broad Approach to Development Planning

In my remarks this morning I have recited a catalog of problems. Economic development itself, the improvement of political and social organization, the population explosion, and the relationship of economic development to the world trading system—all of these are complex and difficult—formidable troubles for an already troubled world.

I would not suggest that the IBRD—nor any other national or international agency engaged in economic development—has the power to solve these problems. We cannot possibly assure a per-

fect adjustment between economic planning on the one hand and the relevant political, social, demographic, and commercial factors on the other. However, we must do our best to make certain that our plans and efforts in the field of economic development do not wholly ignore these vital problems—that we take account of them to the extent permitted by the dimensions of our knowledge and by the built-in limitations of the environment in which we work.

Development planning is complex, and those responsible for such planning may be forgiven a certain reluctance to accept the introduction of new complexities. But we shall do ourselves no service unless we make sure that those objectives are not frustrated by our indifference to forces and elements that are not included in the narrow definition of development planning. A great American philosopher once defined a fanatic as “a man who redoubles his efforts when he has forgotten his aim.” The field of economic development demands men of talent and dedication but men for whom the overall humanitarian aim is always clearly visible.

It is with confidence this morning that we can commend the work of the Bank and its related institutions. Its past achievements are solid and enduring. Its future prospects are encouraging indeed, and I want to welcome all the new and prospective members of the Bank and IDA represented here today.

I think we can say without qualification that the Bank has become a vital instrument for preserving a peaceful and orderly world and for promoting the advancement of mankind toward higher plateaus of material and spiritual well-being.

STATEMENT BY MR. DILLON, SEPTEMBER 20

First, let me say how delighted I am to be once again in the gracious and storied city of Vienna. Since my last visit a little more than a year ago, I have seen fresh evidence of growth and change—change that reflects the industry, the imagination, and the initiative of the Austrian people. The stability of the Austrian Government in postwar years, the extent of Austria's remarkable economic resurgence, the unswerving devotion of the Austrian people to democratic

principles—all are features of modern Austria that command our respect. This small nation, this revered cradle of thought and culture, this courageous outpost on the frontiers of freedom, has aroused the admiration of free men everywhere. On behalf of my Government—on behalf of the President of the United States, who recalls with pleasure the warm hospitality he received here last June¹—I wish to say that we consider Vienna to be a most auspicious setting for the important work upon which we are embarked.

During the past year the International Monetary Fund, under the distinguished leadership of Per Jacobsson, has again demonstrated its vital importance to world monetary stability and economic growth.

The role of the Fund is being further enhanced at this meeting, where we have the privilege of welcoming to our deliberations 10 new countries, the largest increase in a single year's operations since the Fund's inception. It is a particular pleasure for me to welcome to our midst our good friends from Cyprus, Laos, Liberia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Since we met a year ago in Washington,² \$2.4 billion has been drawn from the Fund. A major part of that was the recent drawing by the United Kingdom, but 21 other member countries made drawings totaling more than \$900 million. There are also 20 standby arrangements in effect, with unused drawing rights totaling \$1.2 billion.

Fund assistance in the past year has both strengthened the structure of currency convertibility in the industrialized countries and helped many of the developing countries to adopt or maintain programs of financial and monetary stabilization. The Fund has come to occupy a central position in international monetary affairs—a role I am confident will be of ever-increasing importance to all our member countries in the years ahead.

A few years ago almost all drawings from the Fund were in dollars. Since the advent of currency convertibility in Western Europe, however, the Fund has made great progress in using a larger number of the currencies it holds, thus increasing the percentage of drawings in currencies other

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 991.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 607.

than United States dollars. During the past year 11 different currencies were drawn from the Fund, and two-thirds of the total drawings were in currencies other than the dollar. This is an encouraging development. It has made a reality of the original concept of the Fund as a reserve pool of many currencies for the use of members.

Last year the Fund's advisory activities continued on a broad scale. Wherever member countries have sought to deal effectively with financial instability—by strengthening their fiscal resources, by controlling money and credit, or by otherwise improving their financial institutions—they have been able to rely on the staff of the Fund for expert and objective advice.

The stabilization programs many members of the Fund have worked out and put into operation, usually with Fund advice, have at times been criticized on the ground that they have supposedly imposed a choice between stagnation and economic growth. I do not believe that this is a correct appraisal of the role played by financial stabilization in economic development. I agree with the opinion expressed by Mr. Jacobsson in his brilliant opening statement: that the aim of a well-designed stabilization program is to eliminate inflation not only as a source of balance-of-payments disequilibrium but also as an obstacle to economic growth. Financial stability can thus assist economic growth which, together with social progress, must be the major objective of development policy.

Of course, financial stability cannot of itself cure all the problems of economic growth that beset the developing countries. Effective development planning, basic internal reforms, and adequate capital from both external and internal sources, all are necessary. This is well recognized by the Fund, which is, as it should be, the partner of economic development institutions, national and international, in coordinated efforts to increase the flow of external assistance and to help the developing countries make the best use of their own domestic resources.

The U.S. Economy

I turn now to the economy of the United States and the status of our international balance of payments.

The recovery of the United States economy, following the mildest of our postwar recessions, is

well under way and moving strongly. The low point in economic activity was reached in the first quarter of this year. In the second quarter, major economic indicators recorded new highs. Gross national product, personal income, and personal consumption expenditures all reached fresh peaks in the April-June period. Total industrial production recorded a new high in July and again in August. We estimate that gross national product, which jumped from an annual rate of just over \$500 billion at the beginning of the year to \$516 billion in the second quarter, will reach approximately \$540 billion during the fourth quarter. The course of our economic recovery has been particularly encouraging since prices have remained stable. Hence, almost the entire rise in our gross national product has been real. Moreover, our increased economic activity has not been accompanied by speculative buying or abnormal buildup of inventories.

During the past year the monetary and fiscal policies of the United States have been directed at limiting the extent of the decline in economic activity and at strengthening the forces of recovery. Prompt recognition by our monetary authorities of the impending downturn brought a quick shift of policy from monetary restraint to ease. As early as June of last year, the Federal Reserve relaxed credit restrictions by reducing discount rates and lowering the reserve requirements of commercial banks. Federal Reserve purchases of Government securities provided additional bank reserves to combat recession and finance expansion. Reflecting this Federal Reserve policy, total loans and investments of commercial banks have expanded by 7 percent, or \$14 billion, during the past 12 months. This large increase provided a major force which softened the strains of recession and stimulated recovery.

On the fiscal side, increased unemployment benefits and other Government outlays associated with the recession—in conjunction with reduced income-tax collections—have operated as in previous recessions to provide an automatic supporting influence. Largely as a result of these “built-in stabilizers,” the total value of all goods and services produced during the economic downturn never fell appreciably below the corresponding quarter of the previous year.

As I noted earlier, we are especially encouraged that our recovery and our attainment of record

new levels of production have been accompanied by price stability. Our index of wholesale prices has remained for 3 years at virtually the same level. Retail commodity prices have been stable, while the overall index of consumer prices has increased by less than 1 percent since last October.

Business Outlook Promising

The business outlook for the United States during the coming year is very promising. Excessive stocks have been liquidated. As a result of rising production and sales, inventories have once more begun to increase moderately, but they are not high in relation to either present or prospective needs. Consumers have reduced their debt and built up their savings, thus strengthening the outlook for retail trade. Net financial savings of individuals rose by \$7.7 billion in the first half of 1961 on top of a \$10 billion rise in 1960. In contrast to 1958-59, interest rates have remained remarkably constant during the initial recovery period.

We anticipate further vigorous growth. The substantial room in our economy for further expansion should avert any inflationary pressures that might otherwise develop. For we have no shortage of productive resources, nearly all of our industries are operating well below capacity, and the labor supply is ample. Continued rises in output should materially assist us in solving the persisting problem of relatively high unemployment. Nevertheless, we are developing worker retraining programs designed to attack this problem directly.

Federal budget expenditures remain well within our capacity. In fact the deficit for fiscal year 1961 and the projected deficit for 1962 are together much smaller than the deficits during the last comparable recession and recovery in 1958-59. After taking into account all presently scheduled expenditures, including the substantially increased outlays for defense requested by President Kennedy in July,³ our estimates point to a deficit this year (fiscal 1962) that will amount to about half the deficit for fiscal 1959. In addition, our gross national product will run some 17 percent higher than in fiscal year 1959, and our tax revenues will be about 21 percent greater.

Hence, the economic impact of the current deficit will be considerably less than half that of the 1959 deficit.

The deficits in fiscal 1961 and 1962 are essentially a reflection of the shortfall of revenues resulting from the recent recession. This is a characteristic of our tax system because it is heavily dependent upon direct taxation of personal and business income. For the same reason we may expect sharp increases in revenues as business improves and the economy grows. The calendar year 1962 gives every promise of being a very good year for business, and since our revenues are based upon earnings of the previous year, we can confidently look forward to a substantial increase in our income during the fiscal year 1963, which begins next July. Fiscal 1963 will be closely comparable in the business cycle to fiscal 1960, when Federal revenues jumped \$10 billion over the preceding year. Hence unless a need arises for further increases in defense outlays, the balanced budget which President Kennedy is determined to submit next January can be achieved without any increase in taxes. However, should additional defense expenditures become necessary, the President has stated clearly and unequivocally that he is prepared to request additional taxes should they be required to balance the budget.

I would like to emphasize the firmness of our decision to balance our budget in fiscal 1963. Indeed, had it not been for the increase in international tensions over Berlin, which forced us to increase our defense expenditures substantially above the levels previously planned, we could have looked forward confidently to a substantial budgetary surplus in fiscal 1963. We are resolute in our determination to maintain both a sound and an expanding economy so that the United States may play its full part in the defense and the development of the free world and, at the same time, meet the requirements of an increasing population at home.

U.S. Balance of Payments

I am glad to be able to report that the United States balance of payments has developed in a much more satisfactory manner this year than in 1960. The marked improvement in our merchandise account during 1960 continued into 1961, and the large speculative outflows of short-term capital, which swelled the volume of our out-

³ For a White House announcement, see *ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1961, p. 271.

payments in the second half of 1960, have ceased. Our merchandise trade surplus in 1960 amounted to \$4.7 billion, whereas in 1959 it had been less than \$1 billion. In the first half of 1961 our trade surplus was running at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of \$6 billion.

These developments are reflected both in our "basic" position comprising all of our recorded transactions exclusive of United States private short-term capital outflow and in our overall payments position. In 1960 the basic deficit amounted to \$1.9 billion, compared with \$4.3 billion in 1959 and \$3.6 billion in 1958. In the first half of 1961 the basic position continued the substantial improvement shown in 1960 and, without counting special prepayments of \$650 million on United States Government loans, was almost exactly in balance. Our overall deficit, which is measured by decreases in United States holdings of gold and convertible currencies plus increases in foreign liquid holdings of United States dollars—which together amounted to about \$4 billion in both 1959 and 1960—was running at a seasonally adjusted annual rate somewhat under \$1.7 billion in the first half of 1961. The figure of \$1.7 billion also does not count as a receipt the special debt prepayments of \$650 million. While this indicates continuation of substantial short-term capital outflows, these movements have represented, for the most part, a substantial enlargement of the financing of world trade by United States banking institutions and have not been speculative in character.

These are encouraging developments, but they do not mean that the United States can relax its efforts to achieve a satisfactory and durable equilibrium in its balance of payments. We must have a large and growing export surplus of goods and services to pay for military expenditures abroad, which we incur for the defense of the free world. We must have it as well for both that portion of our foreign aid program that is not covered by procurement in the United States and for our continuing large outflow of long-term private development capital.

The improvement in our trade surplus so far this year cannot be expected to continue in the months ahead, since it was accomplished more through a decrease in imports than through an increase in exports, and now as the United States economy moves toward reasonably full employ-

ment of resources, we must look to a corresponding expansion of our imports. Indeed they have already started to grow. While this tends to sharpen our payments problem, it also leads to larger world trade and greater prosperity for our trading partners.

Accordingly we must continue to make intensive efforts to expand our exports. This means for us, as it does for any nation, that we must constantly improve the productivity on which the ability of our producers to compete in world markets is based. It also requires that we prevent increases in money costs from canceling out improvements in productivity. At the same time, our producers must search out export opportunities with energy and imagination. The domestic market of the United States is a very large one, and many of our producers have traditionally thought almost exclusively in terms of that market rather than of opportunities overseas.

We believe this orientation can and must be shifted, for there are surely thousands of our producers who can be more successful in the export field than they have been in the past. It is for this reason that our Government is devoting considerable effort to bringing market opportunities abroad to the attention of our business community.

We are well aware that the position of the dollar as a strong reserve currency depends upon our success in maintaining a reasonable equilibrium over the years in our balance of payments. This we are determined to do. As we succeed, the upward trend in the accumulation of gold and dollars by other countries taken together will necessarily be slowed. The elimination of current payments imbalances can, of course, be greatly facilitated by the cooperation of surplus countries in pursuing liberal trade policies, in increasing long-term development assistance, and in sharing expenditures for the common defense in accordance with their capabilities.

Multilateral Borrowing Arrangements

During the past year, as Mr. Jacobsson has reminded us, there has been active discussion and examination in governmental circles, among economists, and in the financial press, of the adequacy of existing international monetary arrangements. These discussions have been very helpful. Mr. Jacobsson has now proposed that each of the principal industrial countries commit itself to lend its

currency to the Fund up to a stated amount. I strongly agree that an arrangement of this sort should be worked out to insure the Fund access to the additional amounts that would be needed should balance-of-payments pressures involving these countries ever impair or threaten to impair the smooth functioning of the world payments system.

At the same time, for its regular requirements the Fund can and should be expected to borrow from one or another of the participating countries under article VII whenever its supply of any of these particular currencies becomes low. It would also appear reasonable to consider the possibility that such loans be credited against any commitment which the lending country may have undertaken as its part of the multilateral arrangement. These special bilateral borrowings would thus replenish the Fund's supply of particular currencies in strong demand and, in this way, would help to avoid undue drains on its gold reserve.

I have no fixed opinions on the details of the multilateral borrowing arrangement. I am confident, on the basis of the encouraging views I have heard expressed in the past few days, that practical means can be found to give effect to the agreement in principle which so evidently exists. There are four important aspects which I do wish to emphasize:

First, the aggregate amount the participating countries should look forward to committing to the project should be large enough to add decisively to the Fund's capacity to play its essential role.

Second, to be effective, the additional resources must be promptly available in case of need.

Third, safeguards will be required to insure that there will be effective consultation between the Fund and the lenders and that the Fund will only actually borrow under the commitment arrangements after taking full account of the current reserve position of the lending country. In addition each country which actually lends to the Fund should, in case the need develops, be able automatically to obtain repayment from the Fund.

Fourth, I concur in Mr. Jacobsson's judgment that there must be no weakening of the policies that have guided the Fund in the use of its resources; nor should the new arrangement change in any way the existing rights and duties of members of the Fund, both as drawers of currencies and as providers of currencies.

This is an urgent project. The Fund should push ahead promptly in its current consultations with the prospective lending countries in order that the executive board may carry the project to completion so that the participating countries may obtain the necessary legislative authority from their parliaments early next year. With this done, the monetary system of the free world will be substantially strengthened. For the Fund will then clearly be in a position to meet the changing needs of the new world of convertible currencies.

Speaking for my country I want to say that the United States regards the work in which we are engaged here in Vienna as having a direct and important bearing upon the future course of free-world growth and progress. I have confidence in the ultimate outcome of our deliberations because I have confidence in the vitality of the free economies upon which the work of the Fund is founded. Our mutual goal is a world of expanding opportunities for every human being to pursue his legitimate aspirations in peace and freedom. The International Monetary Fund is playing an important role in helping us to achieve it.

United States and Kuwait Establish Diplomatic Relations

Press release 654 dated September 22

Effective immediately the United States Government has agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Government of Kuwait and, pending the assignment of an ambassador, has designated the present American consul in Kuwait, Dayton Mak, as Chargé d'Affaires.

United States and Soviet Union Agree on Statement of Principles for Disarmament Negotiations

Following are texts of two documents circulated to all members of the United Nations on September 20 following exchanges of views between the United States and the Soviet Union on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. REPORT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY

U.N. doc. A/4879

REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT AND TO THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN AN APPROPRIATE BODY, WHOSE COMPOSITION IS TO BE AGREED UPON

In accordance with their statements of 30 March 1961 at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly,¹ the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. wish to inform the Members of the General Assembly of their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body, whose composition is to be agreed upon.

1. The exchange of views took place in Washington, D.C. from 19 June to 30 June; in Moscow from 17 July to 29 July; and in New York from 6 September to 19 September 1961.

2. As a result of the exchange of views, the two Governments submit a joint statement of agreed principles which they recommend as guidance for

disarmament negotiations when such negotiations are resumed. The text of these agreed principles is attached hereto in the form of a joint statement of the two Governments.

3. The two Governments were not able to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body prior to the sixteenth General Assembly.

Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on 30 March 1961,

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959,²

Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,

The United States and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 568.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1959, p. 766.

no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for :

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any

State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

SUPPLEMENTARY U.S. DOCUMENTS

U.N. doc. A/4880

Memorandum on Composition of Forum

UNITED STATES

MEMORANDUM ON COMPOSITION OF THE DISARMAMENT FORUM

The objective of the United States is the resumption of multilateral disarmament negotiations. It has made, and now reaffirms, four alternative proposals for the composition of a disarmament forum:

(1) *Ten-Nation Committee*: The United States remains prepared to resume negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee, which was established by agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom in September 1959.³ The work of this Committee, which is composed of five NATO Powers (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy) and five Warsaw Pact Powers (the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania), was left unfinished by virtue of the Soviet Union's break-off of negotiations in Geneva on 27 June 1960.⁴ It was conceived that the deliberations of this Committee would provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations. In this way, a stage would be achieved, after a basis for agreement was reached by the members of this Committee, in which all Members of the United Nations would participate in an effective way in the disarmament negotiations, which are of concern to all the nations of the world. The United States continues to believe that this represents a sound and orderly approach, which has been approved by the United Nations and which should not be abandoned.

(2) *Ten-Nation Committee with Invited Presiding Officials*: The United States is fully prepared to join with the other three Powers which established the Ten-Nation Committee in extending an invitation to three other nations, not members of the NATO or Warsaw Treaty organizations, to designate a chairman and two vice-chairmen of the Ten-Nation Committee. These officers would preside over meetings of the Committee,

using their good offices as appropriate to facilitate the achievement of agreement, without bearing the additional responsibility of serving as official spokesmen of their Governments in the negotiations or attempting to act as formal "representatives" of a non-existent "neutral" bloc.

(3) *Twenty-Nation Committee*: The United States is fully prepared, considering its objective of reaching agreement on disarmament, to propose changing the original concept of the Ten-Nation Committee by an expansion of its membership so that countries not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact can participate at the initial negotiating level, as well as through the United Nations. Such an expansion should be consistent with normal principles of equitable representation of the different regions of the world and with the desirability of selecting countries on the basis of such relevant factors as population and military capabilities. Accordingly, the United States proposes that three countries be added to the Ten-Nation Committee from Asia, three from Latin America, three from the Middle East and Africa, and one from non-NATO, non-Soviet Bloc Europe. The United States has suggested that the following States might appropriately be added: Pakistan, India and Japan from Asia; Mexico, Brazil and Argentina from Latin America; the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Tunisia from Africa and the Middle East; and Sweden from Europe.

(4) *The United Nations Disarmament Commission*: If none of these alternatives is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States proposes that substantive negotiations be resumed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in which all United Nations Members are represented. The United Nations Disarmament Commission would be free to establish, if it so wished, smaller sub-committees in which detailed negotiations could be conducted.

Memorandum on Principles

UNITED STATES

MEMORANDUM ON PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN NEGOTIATIONS FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Government and the people of the United States have traditionally worked for the achievement of a peaceful world in which nations will no

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1959, p. 439.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

longer resort to war as an instrument for settling international problems. They remain dedicated to this goal.

In taking the initiative last March and suggesting a bilateral exchange of views with the Soviet Government on disarmament, the United States acted in the belief that a frank and informal discussion of issues of principle could make an important contribution to the appreciation by each side of the views and positions of the other and to effective progress along the road to a lasting peace. It also sought to meet repeated Soviet insistence that no multilateral negotiations could take place without an agreed framework for them. The United States hoped that this exchange of views would lead to a joint understanding of the guidelines for resumed multilateral negotiations—negotiations which the Soviet Union arbitrarily abandoned in 1960. Last March there appeared to be a common understanding with the Soviet Government that once these guidelines and an appropriate and representative forum were agreed upon and accepted by the other participants, multilateral negotiations would reopen on 31 July. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government took the view that such an understanding regarding both the nature of the bilateral talks and the resumption of multilateral negotiations on 31 July did not exist.

The Soviet Government stated that the bilateral talks should turn instead directly to a consideration of specific plans and that without a large measure of agreement on such specific plans there could be no multilateral negotiations. The United States believes on the other hand that negotiation of detailed disarmament plans is the concern of many States. Therefore, the United States cannot accept a procedure whereby these interested States would be excluded from participation in working out an agreement.

Consequently, the United States sought to achieve a meeting of minds on a set of principles to be submitted for approval to the other participants in multilateral negotiations. This, the United States believed, would prepare the ground for detailed and fruitful negotiations of specific measures and programmes. Such a procedure, if followed from the outset, as was the understanding reached by Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko last March, would have provided for the presentation and discussion of

a specific programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in the appropriate multilateral forum at any time after 31 July. The United States regretfully saw 31 July pass without such negotiations having been commenced.

To facilitate accomplishment of the task of the bilateral exchange of views the United States representative at the bilateral talks gave the Soviet representative on 19 June a draft statement of principles setting forth the purpose of the multilateral negotiations and the principles that should guide them. This statement closely conformed to the type of statements that had previously been the subject of an exchange of views between Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The United States several times made revisions of its draft statement of principles in order to meet points that had been raised in the course of the bilateral talks.

The United States representative did not, however, confine himself to the presentation of these documents. In accordance with our understanding of the purpose of the bilateral exchange of views, he sought to engage the Soviet representative in a productive discussion of the principles and considerations underlying the written documents.

As is clear from the United States documents submitted during the bilateral discussions, the United States objective is to implement a programme which ensures total disarmament with States retaining at their disposal only those minimal forces and non-nuclear armaments required for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens. Apart from these internal security forces, only an international peace force would exist. All other military force would be eliminated. The programme desired by the United States would include the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace, including the International Peace Force, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The United States also set forth its views on several important specific aspects of the search for agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

First, the United States stresses the importance of working out a total over-all programme

providing for complete disarmament. The United States is prepared to work out the whole programme. At the same time, the United States cannot accept a situation where nothing concrete can be done until the very last word has been agreed for the total programme. Consequently, it urges acceptance of the proposition that without prejudice to eventual development of the total programme an attempt must be made to find the widest possible area of agreement—including any individual measures or groups of measures—and to implement such measures just as soon as they are agreed. The United States believes that while the complete programme with its admittedly complex provisions is being worked out, no opportunity should be missed to make a start. Any beginning, even the most limited, will represent progress. Moreover, it would facilitate the work on, and indeed form part of, the total programme which is the stated goal. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will accept this practical approach. In disarmament, as elsewhere, the way to begin is to begin. This is why the United States particularly deplores the retreat of the Soviet Government for an effective agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests, which would have been a significant first step on the road to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Secondly, the United States stresses the inseparable relationship between the drastic scaling down of national armaments and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions. Any programme, even if it carries the title "General and Complete Disarmament", which does not embody this relationship is a programme for disorder and the perpetuation of disputes among nations. Nations which are expected to give up their means of self-protection must have available other effective means of safeguarding their legitimate interests. They must be protected against possible violators of a disarmament agreement by effective international enforcement measures. They must have available judicial and non-judicial procedures for the equitable settlement of disputes and for harmonizing conflicting interests and aspirations as they arise. They must be assured that change in the world will be orderly and progressive. And if necessary they must be assured of the protection of an international force capable of operating effectively for the common benefit of all

nations and not in the special interest of any one nation or group of nations.

The procedures and institutions envisaged by the United States would be within the framework of the United Nations as part of the programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. These procedures and institutions would not permit nations to invoke doctrines of sacred or just wars in behalf of unilateral military action since they would ensure that no one really seeking justice or the fulfillment of legitimate aspirations will need to have recourse to their own force. They would not permit arbitrary revisions of established international agreements and infringements of other nations' rights. The United States believes firmly that nations must be prepared to moderate gradually the exercise of unrestricted sovereignty and to abide by the decisions and judgements of tribunals and other bodies, even if such decisions at times may not meet with a particular nation's approval.

The Soviet Government, judging from the statements of its representative during the bilateral talks, does not appear as yet to recognize the essential requirement of the progressive development of effective peace-keeping machinery parallel to the implementation of measures leading to total disarmament.

Thirdly, the United States insists upon effective verification of all disarmament measures from beginning to end. The fundamental precept guiding the United States is that the implementation of every obligation entered into must be subject to effective verification in order to provide each participating State with confidence that every other State is fulfilling its commitments.

Verification only of the process of reducing or destroying particular elements of military strength, as proposed by the Soviet Union, does not meet the criterion of effective verification of all obligations entered into. What must be certain is not only that nations are removing certain numbers of forces and armaments from their military establishments, but also that they are not maintaining forces and armaments or engaging in activities in excess of those permitted at a given step or stage in the disarmament programme.

Any disarmament programme which professes to meet the criterion of effective verification must provide unambiguously for means of detecting

clandestine or other activities not authorized in the agreement. The absence of such provision would make any disarmament plan a sham.

It follows, further, that the verification system must be fully capable of exercising the functions necessary to ensure compliance with the agreement throughout the entire disarmament process and not just at the end of it. The phrase frequently used in Soviet statements that "under conditions of general and complete disarmament the most thorough control must be implemented" is ambiguous and does not adequately reflect the necessity for effective verification at every step and stage of the disarmament process. Indeed, it must be pointed out that if, as the Soviet Union suggests, control can be "most thorough" only "under conditions" of general and complete disarmament, but not during the process of implementing the measures leading to general and complete disarmament, it may never be possible to determine whether the "conditions" of general and complete disarmament have in fact arrived or to protect a complying party against the consequences of violation or evasion of a disarmament agreement by others.

The United States believes that effective verification requires smooth day-to-day functioning of the inspection machinery. The rights and functions of the verification system would be spelled out in detail in any agreement and in its annexes. There would of course be a political body composed as agreed by the parties, which would exercise policy supervision over the administrative arm of the control organ. But this administrative arm itself must be able to work as fast and efficiently as possible and without hindrance if it is to have the confidence of all parties. Sound administrative practice the world over and the requirement of effective verification demand efficient administration of the disarmament verification machinery. For this reason the United States rejects firmly the concept of some sort of multi-headed administrative machinery. The United States, moreover, does not agree with the effort of the Soviet Government to divide the world into three or any other number of blocs or "camps". As the United States representative indicated during the bilateral discussions, the agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world should include a mechanism providing States with recourse in the event they believe that

personnel of the administrative machinery are not properly discharging their functions.

The United States believes that the nature and extent of controls should depend strictly on the objective requirements for verification of each disarmament measure. The agreement and its annexes, based as they must be on adequate scientific and technical findings, should set forth in detail the verification requirements for each measure. No other consideration than assurance that each measure will be fully and punctually implemented should enter into the specification of verification requirements. This will ensure that no legitimate security interests of any State will be adversely affected by the application of disarmament controls.

The United States believes that the elaboration of the means of verification is the joint responsibility of all States interested in the achievement of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Soviet Union has for the past year suggested that, on the contrary, the West must carry the burden of elaborating a verification system. The United States urges the Soviet Government to join the United States in multilateral negotiations and in the conscientious and businesslike development of a verification system which would enable all parties to repose trust in a disarmament agreement.

The United States representative also dealt with numerous other aspects of principle in order to amplify the written documents tabled by the United States. He said the United States believes that time-limits must be worked out for the completion of all disarmament measures as well as for the completion of each stage. However, the problem of establishing these time-limits is complicated by the numerous technical problems involved in working out effective and reliable means of implementing disarmament measures. Moreover, an over-all time-limit would, of course, have to take into account the procedure for transition between stages. The United States will devote every effort toward solving these problems and hopes the Soviet Union is prepared to do likewise. Once the time-limits for the measures in each stage and for the stages themselves have been worked out, it will be possible to estimate the time-limit for the implementation of the total programme. The United States believes, however, that it would be unrealistic and dangerously misleading to pre-

tend that a specific over-all time-limit can be established in advance.

With regard to transition from one stage to the next, the United States believes that the underlying principle must be that States will at each stage be assured that all parties have fulfilled their obligations and that the next steps in the disarmament programme can then safely be taken. Without such assurance, there would be cause for suspicion and dispute, which might disrupt the entire disarmament process. Accordingly, the United States believes that transition from stage to stage should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have in fact been implemented as provided in the agreement. As soon as this decision has been taken, implementation of the next stage would commence forthwith. The Soviet position on this question remains obscure despite repeated United States attempts to obtain clarification.

The United States also attempted to resolve the issue of the composition of a multilateral negotiating forum. Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko had agreed previously that this would be one of the purposes of the bilateral discussions. Accordingly, the United States presented the Soviet Union with several alternative possibilities for a forum including: (1) the reconvening of the Ten-Nation Committee, which the U.S.S.R. abandoned in 1960; (2) the addition to that Committee of three officers selected from other countries; (3) an expansion of the Committee by ten members selected on an equitable geographical basis, and (4) the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Unfortunately, neither the oral statements of the Soviet representative nor a Soviet *aide-memoire* tabled on 28 July indicated a constructive Soviet response to these United States suggestions. Disarmament negotiations cannot, of course, take place without the Soviet Government. Since that Government still appears unwilling to accept a forum of workable size and equitable composition, the United States proposes that negotiations be resumed in the first instance in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. However, if the Soviet Government agrees, the United States remains willing to resume negotiations in a Committee composed of the original members of the Ten-Nation Committee, with the addition of the

following countries: from Asia—Pakistan, India and Japan; from Latin America—Mexico, Brazil and Argentina; from Africa and the Middle East—the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Tunisia; and from Europe—Sweden. Such a committee would ensure equitable and fair representation to all geographical regions of the world. The Soviet Government is already in possession of the United States memorandum of 29 July 1961 in which the United States position on the forum issue was set forth in detail.

The views and considerations presented in this memorandum, in conjunction with the draft Statements of Principles which have been given to the Soviet Government, provide a clear statement of the position of the United States on the principles which should govern the working out of an agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The United States Government has studied the Statement of the Soviet Government of 27 June 1961, the Soviet Government's *aide-memoire* of 19 July and 21 July, and the draft statement of principles which the Soviet representative submitted on 27 July. It has carefully taken into account the positions of the Soviet Government expressed in these documents as well as in the statements of the Soviet representative during the bilateral talks. The successive drafts of statements of principles submitted by the United States testify to its consistent effort to meet any constructive suggestion put forward by the Soviet Union. The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will similarly make a sincere effort to work out a mutually acceptable statement of principles which will permit the early resumption of multilateral negotiations.

New York City, N.Y.
14 September 1961

Letter From Mr. McCloy to Mr. Zorin

LETTER FROM JOHN J. MCCLOY, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.S.—U.S.S.R. EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT, TO V. A. ZORIN, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U.S.S.R.

20 SEPTEMBER 1961

DEAR MR. ZORIN: At the 18 September 1961 session of our bilateral discussions on disarmament you indicated that the draft of a joint statement

of agreed principles which I submitted to you on behalf of the United States Government on 14 September 1961 would be acceptable to the Government of the Soviet Union provided the following clause were omitted from paragraph 6:

Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

This sentence expresses a key element in the United States position which we believe is implicit in the entire joint statement of agreed principles that whenever an agreement stipulates that at a certain point certain levels of forces and armaments may be retained, the verification machinery must have all the rights and powers necessary to ensure that those levels are not exceeded.

It appears from your statements that the Soviet Union will be unwilling to agree to a joint statement of agreed principles unless the above-mentioned clause is omitted therefrom. My Government has authorized me to inform you that, in the interests of progress toward resuming disarmament negotiations, it is willing to remove the above-mentioned sentence from paragraph 6 of the joint statement of agreed principles since it is an item to which the Soviet Union has not agreed.

This is done upon the express understanding that the substantive position of the United States Government as outlined in the above-quoted sentence and in our memorandum of 14 September 1961 remains unchanged, and is in no sense prejudiced by the exclusion of this sentence from the joint statement of agreed principles.

The United States continues to adhere to and will continue to advance the principle contained in the omitted sentence as a necessary element in any comprehensive disarmament negotiations or agreement.

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. McCLOY

His Excellency
V. A. Zorin
Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.
Permanent Mission of the U.S.S.R.
to the United Nations
680 Park Avenue
New York 21, New York

President Expresses Sorrow of U.S. at Death of U.N. Secretary-General

Following are two statements by President Kennedy on the death of Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, released by the White House on September 18.

FIRST STATEMENT

White House press release dated September 18

I know I am speaking for all Americans when I express my profound sorrow at the tragic death of Secretary-General Hammarskjold and his associates. This sense of personal loss is shared by many millions of people of all nationalities.

Dag Hammarskjold's dedication to the cause of peace and world order through the United Nations was total. His capacity for work to bring this about already is legendary. His patience surpassed the endurance of all but the rarest of human beings. And his life is a tribute to the ability of civilized man to live by the principles of impartial justice.

Dag Hammarskjold died yesterday in the cause for which he lived. But the United Nations is a better and stronger organization—and a higher hope for mankind—because of his service to it. His name will be treasured high among the peacemakers of history.

I pray that his final sacrifice will inspire all members of the United Nations to complete the task for which he died.

SECOND STATEMENT¹

White House press release dated September 18

I know that I am speaking for all of my fellow Americans in expressing our deep sense of shock and loss in the untimely death of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold.

Dag Hammarskjold's dedication to the cause of peace, his untiring labors to achieve it, his courage under attack, his willingness to accept all responsibility in trying to strengthen the United Nations and make it a more effective instrument

¹ Read by the President for use on radio and TV.

for the aspirations of the hundreds of millions of people around the globe who desire to live out their lives—those efforts of his are well known.

It is tragic and ironic that his death came during a mission he was undertaking in order to bring about a cease-fire in Katanga.

I am hopeful that the members of the United Nations, recognizing his untiring labors, will at-

tempt in the coming sessions and in the years to come to try to build the United Nations into the effective instrument for peace which was Dag Hammarskjöld's great ambition.

I express my sympathy to his country, the Government of Sweden, and I hope that all of us will recognize the heavy burdens that his passing places upon us.

The U.N., a View of the Road Ahead

Remarks by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

You are very kind to let me say a word of greeting. I will not poach on the time of my able friend Harlan Cleveland, but I do want to tell all of you how much value we attach—we who speak for the United States in the U.N.—to the friendship and understanding support of good citizens like yourselves—and of none more than the members and leaders of the AAUN.

Not long ago a pleasant man I met said that he was in favor of the United Nations, although he didn't actually know anything about it. I congratulated him on having the right opinion and promised to supply him with some reasons for his position.

I am afraid there are also some people who are *against* the United Nations on the same grounds. If they will come and see me at the end of a bad day at the office, maybe I can supply them with some reasons too.

I confess that when I came here last January I was not too familiar with some of the details of procedure and so on at the United Nations. I felt like Rufus Choate at the opera, who didn't understand the language the performers were singing in; so he said to his educated daughter who was with him: "Interpret for me the libretto lest I dilate with the wrong emotion."

¹ Made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 3768).

So you can imagine how grateful I was to have about me an able and experienced staff who could tell me unhesitatingly what emotion I should dilate with. That staff has since been somewhat augmented—very little in numbers but greatly in talent—and that is a great source of confidence as we enter this 16th General Assembly. We have also, for the duration of this Assembly, a delegation whose professional qualifications, I think, are as good as any we have ever had in the history of the U.N., and I am very proud to be a part of this delegation.

Another great source of strength to me from the beginning has been the warmth of friendship and support from the public, and particularly from the AAUN. I will always remember the party you so kindly gave last winter, when I came here, and today all of us of the United States delegation are tremendously grateful to you for this reception and the confidence and encouragement which it expresses.

Of course, as you may remember, I am not entirely a newcomer to the U.N. In fact I am really an oldtimer who just took a long vacation! I know these receptions, such as you are giving today, are an annual affair. In fact I believe I heard General [George C.] Marshall give the address² at the very first reception you gave in Sep-

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1947, p. 539.

tember 1947, here in New York, when he was Secretary of State and I was a delegate. On looking up his speech I find it interesting to recall that he spoke with great emphasis of the need, if the United Nations was to succeed, for leadership, both in the Government and, as he put it, "the leadership of informed and discerning men and women in each community throughout the country." Of course that is still true today and always will be. Every one of you has a chance, and a duty, to contribute some portion of leadership in our common effort to make the United Nations succeed.

The "Little People" of the World

I realize I am by no means the only United Nations oldtimer in this room, and many of you probably remember as keenly as I do the spirit in which the United Nations was born. My friend Clark Eichelberger tells me Winston Churchill said to him, while the war was still going on, "The little people will have won the war and it will be their right to say what the future will be." That spirit prevailed still at San Francisco when the charter was written, and so instead of the charter beginning with the traditional phrases about "governments" or "states" or "high contracting parties" it was made to begin with those splendid words, "We the peoples of the United Nations."

There were plenty of tragic difficulties then which we couldn't foresee. Perhaps that is just as well, or we might never have had the courage to start the United Nations at all! About one-third of the "little people" of the world have no right to say what the future will be, either for the world or for themselves. They don't even have the elemental right to know the brute facts of what is happening from day to day. Megaton bombs are blown up in their own national backyard, but they aren't told about it. So that it is possible for the foreign relations of a great part, and a very powerful part, of the human race to be carried on to a very large extent on the basis of untruth.

And yet the United Nations has been faithful to its task of standing up for the little people, for the little nations, for those who don't have great military forces. It stood up for Greece and for Korea in the early years—but that was only a beginning. In 1945 we scarcely foresaw the possibility that the great colonial empires of the West-

ern nations would dissolve so quickly that, 16 years later, the United Nations would be double its original size and that in it the old rulers and the old subject peoples would be represented equally, sitting side by side in the General Assembly, each casting one vote, each with an equal right to the floor.

Inevitably that huge transition, affecting another third of the world's people, has had some tragic episodes, and none more tragic than the multiple conflict in the Congo. There the United Nations has had to act in a hurry, amidst untold confusion, like a field hospital in the midst of battle, to assuage suffering and confine tragedy within the least possible bounds. The story in the Congo hasn't all been told yet. But we have come a long, long way there since a year ago, and we have reason to hope that the United Nations action in the Congo will go down in history as one of the U.N.'s greatest actions and perhaps as the beginning of a new era in the endless effort of the community of nations to keep the peace.

Frustration of Communist Attacks on U.N.

Now this new lease on life for the U.N. is apparently not welcome in Moscow, which has other purposes in mind. And so we have had Mr. Khrushchev's attack on the U.N., which are still going on, and his attempts through the "troika" device, through introducing the veto into the Secretariat, to dominate the Organization and bend it to his purposes.

You remember what Lincoln said when General McClellan got a little too big for his breeches and tried to tell the President how to run the war. Lincoln was reminded of a rider whose horse kicked so hard that the horse's foot got caught in the stirrup. And the rider said to the horse: "If you are going to get on, I'm going to get off."

But of course the Communists are not going to "get on" at the U.N., and the law-abiding nations are certainly not going to "get off." As far as the United States is concerned, I think I can say that we have a considerable ability to absorb frustration and we intend to stay with the U.N. through fair weather and foul. Our security demands that we do this, for the U.N. is a great source of friends and friends are the best security any nation can have.

I confess it is very frustrating to us, who have to bear the brunt of the Soviet cold war, not to

be at the head of a nice solid bloc. You read in the papers sometimes about the "Soviet bloc" and the "Western bloc" and even the "neutralist bloc." Well, unfortunately there *is* a Soviet bloc, but the other "blocs" are not blocs at all—they are shifting alignments which vary from one issue to another, for the very simple reason that each of the governments has that priceless jewel, the right to think for itself. And, frustrating as it is, we who uphold the community against attack will always have to plead and argue and listen—above all to listen!—in our quest for common ground. So I trust we will never become "bloc heads" and start playing the game by the Communist rules. If we ever did that, the game would already be over and we would have lost.

We have great hopes of the U.N.:

We believe the U.N. can and will keep on standing fast against the attacks from Moscow, until it is obvious that those attacks have defeated their own purpose and are given up.

We believe the extraordinary Congo costs will be fairly shared.

We believe the U.N. can build on its great creative achievements in the Congo and better equip itself to keep the peace anywhere in the world.

We believe the U.N. can be a great educational force in the quest for real, practical, inspected, and controlled disarmament, which we intend to pursue without letup.

We believe the U.N. can be more than an emergency ward, that it has great creative and cooperative potential; and we intend to help build that potential for the sake of the community of nations, for the aspiring peoples and the emerging nations in that community.

Broad Vision of the Future

Events have moved in these days fast and dolorously. For us they accentuate the sense that behind the issue of "standing firm on Berlin," for example, we need a long-term picture of the Europe we want, of the Atlantic world we want, and, indeed, our whole vision of the future. Without a broad picture of the road we want to travel, how can we achieve the patience, the good sense, the fortitude, and the elan to deal with perpetual recurrence of local trouble and the perpetual risk of general war?

I sometimes think that we in the West still have a half-belief in a pattern of luck by which, without lasting commitment, free society will survive and flourish. But there is no place now for ease and rest and good fortune. Either we are going to build with pain and effort and dedication a world in which men can live and prosper and be brothers, or its antiworld is going to be built.

It is this sense of the society we have to try to create through the U.N. which I think needs accent. If we only improvise from crisis to crisis with no sober, fearless view of the way ahead, we can expect more and more people to say, "Better an end to the horror than a horror without end."

And we believe that, in the long and slow and tragic situations where just and peaceful changes are opposed by great power, the U.N. can keep on speaking up bravely for the right until the day comes when right can prevail in peace.

I don't want to mislead anybody. I am no utopian. I like that fine two-line epigram of Robert Frost:

But Islands of the Blessed, bless you, son,
I never came upon a blessed one.

We expect to continue to have emergencies and flaps, and we don't expect to score a touchdown on every play. We certainly don't plan to embark soon for the Islands of the Blessed. But we are deeply and permanently heartened by the knowledge that the cause to which we are committed, the cause of the decent and tolerant and open world portrayed in the charter, is worth all the sweat and tears it may cost us in the years ahead. And the fact that you, who are distinguished citizens and opinionmakers, share that belief is an immense encouragement to us through every day of the year.

Letters of Credence

India

The newly appointed Ambassador of India, Braj Kumar Nehru, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on September 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 652 dated September 21.

Basic United States Policy in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

It is a great pleasure and honor to be invited to address the Rhodesia National Affairs Association. This is our third and final day in Salisbury before going on to Blantyre, the Copperbelt, and Lusaka. We also slipped into your country about 10 days ago for a first glimpse of your magnificent Victoria Falls.

My wife and I have been tremendously impressed by this vital city of Salisbury. We have met and talked with a great many of your citizens and have noted many evidences of the progress you have been making in housing, education, and welfare. This morning it was a special pleasure to attend the greatest tobacco auction in the world, where we heard the familiar sounds of an American tobacco auctioneer. Later today we are looking forward to our visit to the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

This is my second visit to Africa since President Kennedy appointed me to the Department of State. My mission is, first of all, to become acquainted with the leaders and public of Africa and to convey to them renewed assurances of the keen interest and friendship of the United States. Second, and quite simply, I have come to learn of your aspirations and your problems so as to offer effective counsel to my Government in the formulation of its foreign policy.

The United States Government under the new administration of President Kennedy finds itself faced by a host of critical and fundamental problems of foreign affairs. Some of these are of grave

and immediate urgency. Others have a long-range but equally profound significance.

These problems manifest themselves in many ways and in many different parts of the world. Yet there seem to be ties that bind quite a number of them together. People the world over want governments of their own choosing. They want a better life for themselves and their children. And they want to enjoy the full recognition of their dignity as human beings. When the continued enjoyment of these conditions is threatened, or the prospect of achieving them is denied, the result is a restiveness which more often than not smolders or explodes into unpleasant problems.

The United States is concerned about these things because of our moral and political heritage but also because we believe that the denial of these values jeopardizes the world of peace and justice we want for ourselves and our children.

Berlin, a Symbol of Freedom

In these terms one of the most pressing challenges today is that of Berlin. Berlin is a vitally important symbol of freedom and self-determination to a large part of the world. It represents the desire and the determination of 2¼ million West Berliners to continue under a government of their own choosing, and it is a focus of the hopes of other millions now under the imperialist rule of the Kremlin. What West Berlin means has been demonstrated in recent weeks by the repressive measures taken by the Communists to stop the flow of refugees who streamed by the thousands and thousands into the West Berlin sanctuary of liberty and hope. I need only add that the Soviet Union maintains 22 divisions of occupation troops

¹Address made before the Rhodesia National Affairs Association at Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on Aug. 25.

in the countries of middle and eastern Europe to subjugate these aspirations for freedom.

President Kennedy has plainly told the American people that the Soviet threat to continued freedom and self-government in West Berlin has brought the unsought choice of war or peace dangerously close. You may be sure—and President Kennedy has stated it in so many words—that “the challenge is not to us alone” but “to all who want a world of free choice.”² Surely many of you here have known war. And all of you can read the omens of this shrinking planet in the trace of satellites whirling through the heavens overhead. My country, like yours, has known a time of isolation, but that time is gone with the wind.

We have made our pledges, with the support of the Atlantic Community, to meet the peril of Berlin. We hope, with God’s help, to preserve the peace and defend the human rights of the people of that city. At the same time, we look out upon another and broader field in which the future of countless millions of human beings will be determined—a future equally bound up with peace and security for all of us. I am speaking here of the less developed areas inhabited by some two-thirds of the world’s peoples.

Is the question of freedom any less vital here? Surely it is not, for we hold that freedom is indivisible. That is why President Kennedy has pledged the United States to assist the less developed countries to build up the strong and independent societies to which their peoples aspire. That is the underlying support for our policy toward Africa.

We recognize that the new nations of Africa do not wish to be involved in the cold war. And we believe that they need not be directly involved, provided they can work out solutions to the basic problems of misery and despair, of human rights and essential justice. The Communist aim of course is to aggravate the tensions and discontent that may be attendant on this process, but the problems themselves are inherent in the transitional process. Our purpose is to help these peoples and governments to help themselves, because in this ever more interdependent world what concerns all of you here in Africa sooner or later will concern us, if it does not affect us already.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

Africa’s Aspirations

On my visits to the newly independent countries of tropical Africa, I have been impressed by the sincerity and conviction with which national leaders have told me of their aspirations.

First among these aspirations is the desire to be free from any form of outside domination, to be independent in the fullest sense. The United States recognizes the dynamics of nationalism in Africa today. Coupled with this is an awareness and assertion of what is often referred to as the African personality. Also related is a fierce desire for racial equality and sensitivity to problems of color wherever they trouble the world.

Then there is the compelling, burning aspiration for education. To provide educational opportunities to millions of young Africans is a tremendous challenge to responsible governments and to those from outside who would help. Yet I submit we cannot evade this challenge.

Another basic aspiration is for economic development to raise living standards and assure political stability. The prevailing pattern is one of economic planning for rapid development in which there is a mixture of private and government-owned enterprise. Very little in this pattern is rigid or doctrinaire. And we must of course expect these new African states to develop governmental institutions which fit the values of their particular societies.

This may sometimes mean a greater reliance on some aspects of centralized authority than in the democracies of the Western World. The evidence suggests, however, that democratic forces will continue to make themselves felt. In the history of Europe and America there is much evidence that the early processes of nation-building are formidable and often turbulent. Yet, to date, the broad consensus of the peoples of the new African states has been responsive to their leadership.

Problems Facing the New Nations

The newly independent countries of Africa face a great many problems. They are short of capital, short of skills, short of broad experience in self-government. Their leaders seem to be in a great hurry, new and changing groupings among them appear to be developing, and there are a good many borders in dispute.

In our view it is not reasonable to expect to

find fully mature governments firmly in place in these new countries. What is striking, and reassuring, is that the great majority of the new leaders are conducting responsible independent governments, despite all their burdens. The Congo has been an important exception, but clearly it *is* an exception and not the rule. And let me add that the United States has steadfastly supported the United Nations in the Congo with one purpose: to allow the Congolese people to develop their own national destiny.

If all these leaders can keep abreast of the rising expectations of their peoples, responsible government will prosper and mature. That is why they deserve our help. For the alternatives are surely demagoguery, disorder, and subversion.

There has been an unprecedented transfer of power in Africa, and we must accept the plain facts that there are now 28 sovereign nations in Africa, of which 18 have attained their independence in the past 2 years. This represents an enormously significant transformation in our world community.

This new play of forces on the world stage may seem poorly rehearsed, and we are not very well acquainted with many of the actors. But this drama of change is a text for our times. It cannot be buried by angry men or hidden in the midst of the sea by those who dislike or fear its unrolling. It is inexorably written in the lifestream of our times.

Around this central theme there is, in Africa, much diversity in political and social development, and I do not suppose that what is true of one area is necessarily true everywhere. On the other hand, no part of Africa is set apart from this great process of transition, which is so much in your own thoughts today.

Whatever may be said of the tensions inherent in the colonial experience, it is striking that the great majority of the new African nations have emerged to freedom peacefully. A considerable degree of preparation, perhaps lacking in some respects but nevertheless vital, was extended to these dependent peoples in the field of economic development, education, political expression, and self-government. Confusion has resulted, and could result again on the continent, largely through failure to make this preparation or from undue delay in the political process which it is intended to facilitate.

Where preparations for inevitable change have not yet begun, the hour is dangerously late. But even in those areas determined reform coupled with genuine good will may in God's grace find success. Let us pray that this course will be chosen.

Resolving the Issues

Your own government institutions and your peoples are engaged in a vital process not only of constitutional transition but of accommodation between races. Certainly these problems of transition and accommodation must be resolved primarily by the peoples and governments concerned. It is our genuine hope that political, social, and economic progress will occur without reference to the race of individual citizens and certainly without the derogation of the full rights of any element of the population.

There are some who feel you are going too fast, and there are some who feel you are going too slow. But the important thing is that you have not set your face against the course of history. You are working toward the commendable goals of self-government by all the people and an interracial society. It is the speed with which you approach these goals which is the substance of your political dialog. We take it that it is your intention to get on with the job.

We in the United States are humbly aware that we have yet to achieve the full promise of racial equality. But it is the declared law of the land, it is the vigorous policy of our new national administration, and we shall attain it.

American foreign policy is based on a set of principles to which we hold most seriously. Self-determination is one of these principles. In fact it is a universally recognized principle which asserts the right of people to determine the kind of government under which they want to live. This is the very basis of the world order which makes possible the area of freedom and which, I am sure, is the goal of your own evolution.

From this basis the United States will seek to evaluate its policies toward Africa according to the merits of each individual case and problem. We do not propose to apply formulas, nor have we any desire to export any particular concepts of our own. We shall, instead, adhere to principle and try to use our influence judiciously and in concert with men of good will, of all races and

creeds, in whose hands the future of Africa rests.

In conclusion may I express again my appreciation for the opportunity to visit this part of Africa. I am gratified at the good will I find among so many and at the dedicated efforts being made, by people of all races, to create a society in which all can fully enjoy a good life in peace and harmony.

I think I can understand the disappointment of those who find things moving too slowly and even the concern of those who find things moving too fast. Certainly I would not minimize the tasks of transition which are yours to solve.

Speaking for the Government of the United States and on behalf of its people, I wish you Godspeed in bringing those tasks to a successful conclusion.

President Signs Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961

Remarks by President Kennedy

White House press release dated September 21

I am delighted to sign the new Fulbright-Hays Act.¹ This ceremony has historic significance because it marks full recognition by the Congress of the importance of a more comprehensive program of educational and cultural activities as a component of our foreign relations.

The varied pieces of legislation, beginning with the Fulbright Act of 1946, following through with the Smith-Mundt bill and others, have now been gathered together and expanded to form for the first time a solid base for more effective activity in this most essential field.

I want to congratulate and express my appreciation to Senator [J. William] Fulbright, whose name has long been a household symbol in the world for this great phase of our national and international life, and to Congressman Wayne Hays, who has so skillfully and conscientiously steered this legislation through the House.

¹ H.R. 8666.

Peace Corps Legislation Signed Into Law by President Kennedy

Statement by the President

White House press release dated September 22

With the enactment of this legislation,¹ an avenue is provided by which Americans can serve their country in the cause of world peace and understanding and simultaneously assist other nations toward their legitimate goals of freedom and opportunity.

I want particularly to express pleasure at the bipartisan effort and support in the shaping of this new agency.

Already more than 13,000 Americans have offered their services to the Peace Corps. By the end of the year almost 1,000 will be serving overseas or completing their training in the United States. By July of next year we hope to have 2,700 in training or abroad.

These men and women are going overseas at the request of the host nations. They will be doing specific, needed jobs. They will be working at a level and living at a level comparable to the citizens of the foreign nations. They will be farmers and teachers, craftsmen and nurses, doctors and technicians of all kinds. They will be a cross-section of the finest men and women that this nation has to offer.

The sure sign of a good idea is that you can follow it, and I am pleased that several other nations have decided to establish peace-corps agencies of their own.

Much credit for what has been done must go to congressional leaders like the men and women in this room, and the scores of other dedicated Americans who have given their advice and counsel.

Also I want to express my esteem for the most effective lobbyist on the Washington scene, Mr. Sargent Shriver.²

¹ H.R. 7500; for background, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1961, p. 980.

² Mr. Shriver is Director of the Peace Corps.

Forty Newly Independent States: Some Politicogeographic Observations

by *G. Etzel Percy*
The Geographer

Since the midpoint of World War II, 40 new sovereign states have come into being as members of the world community. Expressed mathematically, an average of slightly more than two dependencies per year have received their independence during this period. Actually, of course, the emergence of new states has not conformed to any pattern of timing. The years 1945, 1950, 1952-55, and 1959 saw the birth of no new states, but 1960 alone witnessed no less than 18. In fact, 34 of the new states can be identified as belonging to one of two major independence movements which in turn were geared to the contemporary international situation.

The first came about as a result of the realignment of power in World War II; 15 states, either directly or indirectly, can associate their newly found statehood with some phase of that great conflict. For example, Indonesia gathered momentum for independence through the weakening of Dutch prestige and influence during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945.

The second independence movement followed the close of the war by more than a decade—and still is in process. It can be traced to the waning of power among the maritime states of Europe and the awakening of political consciousness among the colonial peoples, particularly in Africa. Nineteen new states have so far resulted from this second wave, the momentum of which in some ways has had a snowballing effect—action in one political entity in Africa establishes the precedent for similar activity in another, and this in turn for still others. (The same trend, though on a less grandiose scale, can be noted in the political development of 19th century Latin America,

when 12 colonies gained their independence in the 20 years from 1821 to 1840.)

The recent surge of so many new states onto the world scene has brought the overall total to 111, a number unprecedented in history.¹ In 1913 only 63 countries were generally conceded to be sovereign states. Between the two world wars 11 states came into existence, largely as the result of a new alinement of countries within Europe. Especially noteworthy was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into all or parts of five new states: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Since World War II the new countries have in general been occasioned by completion of a centrifugal cycle which began with the establishment of dependent areas in Asia and Africa, the development of these areas into well-defined political entities with their own desires and ambitions for self-rule, and the breaking away from the metropole country and inauguration of national governments. In some cases this cycle from original settlement to statehood required centuries; in others only a few decades.

The 40 new states exert a powerful impact upon the world. In relation to all independent states they represent 36 percent of the total number. In area and population they represent 21 percent and 30 percent, respectively. In theory then, 3 out of each 10 persons living in one of the world's sovereign states has enjoyed complete autonomy for less than two decades. Since 30

¹This number is the one used in the Office of the Geographer to denote those states generally considered to be fully independent. It does not necessarily coincide with the number of states which the U.S. Government formally recognizes.

percent of these people (863,461,000) live on 21 percent of the area (9,790,000 square miles), the conclusion may be drawn that the newly independent states are, on the average, nearly 50 percent more densely populated than the older states.

Thus the new states have inherited a situation which introduces to the world community a double-headed problem of serious proportions. Newness itself, reflected in lack of time to establish locally oriented national economies, is coupled with environments already taxed beyond the world norm to support their inhabitants.

Qualifications for Statehood

Because of the varying shades of autonomy and its interpretation by legislative bodies with different traditions and philosophies, it is difficult to determine in all cases whether a political entity can be considered independent or not. As basic guidelines certain qualifications must be met:

1. There must be a people—a body of individuals;
2. There must be an area which the people occupy;
3. There must be an effective organized government;
4. There must be relationship with other political entities;
5. There must be a degree of civilization which allows the carrying out of international responsibilities.

Or as one geographer summarized the prerequisites:²

A modern sovereign state is a politically-organized area in which the people give their support to a government for the purpose of defending and fostering the development of a distinctive body of traditions and institutions.

Beyond the above guidelines various intangible factors within a political entity may influence its status relative to degree of autonomy. Further, outside recognition—or lack of recognition—of any political entity's independence is not only unpredictable but varies from state to state. For example, any given political entity may be recognized as independent by some but not by all states. In a world fractured with discord this factor of interrecognition can indeed become complicated.

² Preston E. James, *Latin America*, The Odyssey Press, New York, 1959, p. 49.

Some states, while widely recognized as independent, may be little more than puppets as far as autonomy in its true sense is concerned. A modern expression of the puppet state is the "satellite," as several countries of eastern Europe are labeled by the Western World. In contrast various regimes not recognized by the U.S. Government, including northern Korea, northern Viet-Nam, and the Soviet Zone of Germany, fail to qualify in this article as "newly independent."

Several microstates in Europe maintain status as independent states mainly by virtue of traditional recognition of their autonomy dating back to the petty kingdoms of feudal days. Not uncommonly a political entity is fully self-governing except for its external affairs. Several sheikdoms on the Arabian Peninsula fall into this category and may arbitrarily be classified as semi-independent. On the other hand the "self-governing colony" of Southern Rhodesia lacks the basis for semi-independence despite the purported internal autonomy. In this instance the United Kingdom has a direct line of authority into the colony through the governor.

Distinctions in Analyzing Sovereign Status

To arrive at 40 as the number of newly independent states since 1943 was achieved not without perplexing problems. Several examples may suffice to point up some of the distinctions required in analyzing sovereign status. In 1944 Syria, a French mandated territory, received its independence, yet does not appear among the "forty." Without doubt the Syrians now live in an independent state but did not prior to 1944. Should they not then be rated as living in a newly independent state? If Syria had continued to exist as a state it undoubtedly would have so qualified. In 1958, however, Syria amalgamated with Egypt to become the United Arab Republic, its citizens thereby losing their identity as sovereign subjects of the country which had attained independence 14 years previously.

A closely related problem concerns the United Arab Republic itself as a sovereign state. The political entities making it up, Egypt and Syria, were independent at the time of amalgamation; so it must be classed as a "new" rather than a "newly independent" country. On the other hand, the Syrian Region of the United Arab Republic was a dependent area at the beginning of the period



under consideration—1943 to the present. In this limited sense there might be some justification for considering the United Arab Republic as “newly independent in part.”

The reestablishment of Austria as a republic at the close of World War II from its *anschluss* with Germany in 1938 did not constitute the creation of a newly independent state. An Austria had previously existed as a sovereign state.

For 5 days, June 26–July 1, 1960, the protectorate of British Somaliland enjoyed the privilege of being an independent state. This short-lived autonomy, however, was part of the legal procedure to combine the area with the former Italian Trust Territory of Somaliland (Somalia) to create the Somali Republic. For all practical purposes British Somaliland gained its independence as a part of the new Somali Republic and cannot be counted separately as a state.

Another interim state with full sovereignty was the Federation of Mali, declared independent from France on June 20, 1960. It broke up into the present two republics of Senegal (August 20, 1960) and Mali (September 22, 1960), corresponding in area to the former autonomous states of Senegal and French Soudan within the French Community.

A current sovereignty change on the map of Africa involves the British Cameroons. The northern section of this small trust territory merged with Nigeria on June 1, 1961; the southern section on October 1 became a part of Cameroun. These shifts mean inhabitants of a dependent area are becoming inhabitants of an independent area but not that new independent states are being formed.

Kuwait stands among those states considered by the U.S. Government as independent, but just when this recognition began is almost impossible to determine. On June 19, 1961, an official note from the United Kingdom to the state of Kuwait set forth certain conclusions that indicate full independence:

1. The Agreement of the 23d of January, 1899, shall be terminated as being inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait.
2. The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship.
3. When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on matters which concern them both.
4. Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to assist

the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance.

The "Agreement" mentioned above spells out the protected-state nature of Kuwait in certain matters. Only a few words need be cited from the earlier document to bear out this fact:

. . . that the said Sheikh . . . does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government.

It is evident that the 1899 document was not in force when the 1961 note was written. But when between 1899 and 1961 did Kuwait become an independent state? No basis exists for placing it among the 40 states under discussion though conceivably its independence has in part at least materialized since World War II by force of a series of bilateral and unilateral actions, no one of which sharply defines the newly found autonomy.

Of the 40 new states under discussion all but 3 have membership in the United Nations. The newest state—Sierra Leone—became a member on September 27, 1961. The United Nations has rejected the applications of the republics of Korea, Mauritania, and Viet-Nam. As participants in the activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, however, these nonmember countries are not without some voice in world affairs.

Location

By continents the 40 newly independent states break down very unevenly: 24 in Africa, 15 in Asia, and 1 in Europe. This distribution explains in part the surging influence of the African and Asian nations in U.N. affairs. In addition to the 35 new members, there are 14 other nations in these two continental areas which are members of the United Nations; they therefore have a potential voting power of 49 out of 99 in total strength. It is well to bear in mind, however, that the differences between the nations of Africa and those of Asia are often as marked as the differences between members of any other group of nations.

A closer look at the distribution of newly independent states shows a meaningful regional concentration. One-half of the 40 states may be associated with Middle Africa, though 5 of them project northward into the dry northern part of


the continent. The northern segments of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan penetrate the Sahara Desert itself. Except for this dry periphery the 20 states of this broad region make up the major portion of tropical Africa. For purposes of classification the Malagasy Republic may be added to the group, although its inhabitants do not consider themselves as Africans. The popular American concept of Africa with its new states and political problems normally focuses upon that part of the continent south of the Sahara.

Another seven of the new states lie along the southern and eastern margins of the Mediterranean. Independence in this elongated area has strengthened the Moslem world by creating a chain of Arab states extending from its traditional center in the heart of the Near East to Morocco, which faces the Atlantic Ocean.

A third regional grouping encompasses 10 states which form the preponderant part of the two politicogeographic areas known as South Asia and Southeast Asia. Only Thailand breaks a continuous band of newly established sovereign lands stretching from West Pakistan to the open Pacific Ocean beyond the Philippine Islands. Especially noteworthy is the extremely heavy population of these 10, accounting for more than four-fifths of the inhabitants for all 40 newly independent states.

Thus 38 of the new states under consideration—all except Iceland and Korea—fall into three distinct regional groups.

One may also examine the location of the newly independent states from the standpoint of latitude. No less than 30 of the 40 lie wholly or mostly within the Tropics. In fact 5 of the states are astride the Equator, and another 13 lie within 500 miles of it. (In contrast, of all the independent states in the Eastern Hemisphere before 1943, only Ethiopia and Liberia were located less than 500 miles from the Equator.) Another 8 lie sufficiently close to the Tropics to be classed as subtropical. Among this group Libya and Pakistan extend southward across the Tropic of Cancer. Only two of the newly independent states, Iceland and Korea, have high latitude positions, although even southernmost Korea is no farther from the Equator than the city of Los Angeles. Thus 38 newly sovereign states, dominated by a tropical or subtropical environment, exert a heretofore unknown effect upon world relations.



There has long been a time-honored and widely accepted geographical concept which affirms that the great power centers are found at middle and high-middle latitudes within the so-called Temperate Zone and that at best the Tropics are no more than a source of food and raw materials. But now that sovereign status has moved into the lower latitudes this maxim is no longer true, for the outlook of tropical countries has suddenly been reversed. Generation of political force now comes from *within* rather than from *without* these areas. Some considerable voice in the world community is heard from these new states in contemporary international affairs, notwithstanding their remoteness from the more established political societies.

Previous Sovereignty

Before statehood all 40 of the newly independent countries were dependencies of one type or another—including associated political units—subject to the control of 8 different metropole states. From the French realm 21, or more than one-half, of the new countries came into existence. The British Commonwealth and Empire accounted for another 12. The remaining 7 were formerly Italian, Belgian, Danish, Dutch, Japanese, and American. The table on the following page identifies each of the states with its former colonial area.

Without doubt previous sovereignty has left an indelible imprint upon the political, economic, and social structures of each new state. Some characteristics are readily noticeable by even the most casual observer, such as the bookstalls on Indian railway platforms which are reminiscent of those in British railway stations. Other characteristics show a more subtle relationship to those of the metropole country. For example, parliamentary procedure in the ex-French areas has its roots in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. By their very nature such characteristics will remain long after the departure of the last French, English, Italian, or other official.

One can better understand the problems of the newly independent states and appreciate their efforts to attain political viability by reviewing colonial techniques. France deliberately spread its culture through the colonies, so that its impact reached deep into governmental procedure. Even in the 19th century French dependencies were given the privilege of representation in Paris, though the gesture may have been more token than realistically effective. In some of the new African states carved from the French Community the oratory of top echelon officials is quite impressive. These leaders served their apprenticeship among the best politicians and diplomats in France and were exposed to eloquence at the highest levels of parliamentary practice.

It is entirely possible that pride in French culture, including the language, has been possessed with sufficient centrifugal force to promote a cultural pattern in the states formerly French. Even in Haiti, which gained its independence from France over a century and a half ago, the French language and way of life have to a remarkable extent been preserved by the elite classes. The first-order administrative divisions of Haiti are *départements*, just as they are in France.

Britain made it a practice to use indirect rule in colonial government. For example, the indigenous ruler of a local territorial unit, such as a tribal chieftain, was accountable to the British Government for matters within his area of responsibility. But below this level no pressure was exerted toward instituting a British way of life. At the same time, officialdom in the various colonial areas established for itself a social structure in many ways resembling that back home. It followed naturally that local inhabitants often

FORMER SOVEREIGNTY
OF
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES³

<i>New states</i>	<i>Former dependencies</i>
Former French:	
Lebanon	Lebanon (mandate)
Viet-Nam	} French Indochina
Laos	
Cambodia	
Morocco	
Tunisia	Tunisia (protectorate)
Guinea	} French West Africa
Dahomey	
Niger	
Upper Volta	
Ivory Coast	
Senegal	
Mali	
Mauritania	
Cameroun	Trust Territory of (French) Camerouns, then State of Cameroun
Togo	Trust Territory of (French) Togoland
Malagasy Republic	Madagascar and dependencies
Chad	} French Equatorial Africa
Central African Republic	
Congo	
Gabon	
Former British:	
Jordan	} Palestine (mandate)
Israel	
Pakistan	} British India and Associated States
India	
Burma	
Ceylon	Ceylon (crown colony)
Sudan	Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (condominium)
Ghana	Gold Coast and Ashanti Colonies, Northern Territories Protectorate, Trust Territory of (British) Togoland
Malaya	Malayan Union, then Federation of Malaya
Cyprus	Cyprus (crown colony)
Nigeria	Nigeria (colony and protectorate)
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone (colony and protectorate)
Former Italian:	
Libya	Libya (Italian colony, then joint administration by United Kingdom and France)
Somali Republic	Trust Territory of Somaliland and British Somaliland
Former Danish:	
Iceland	(same King as Denmark)
Former American:	
Philippines	Philippine Islands (commonwealth)
Former Japanese:	
Korea	Korea or Chosen (annexed to Japan)
Former Dutch:	
Indonesia	Netherlands East Indies
Former Belgian:	
Republic of the Congo	Belgian Congo

took advantage of modern improvements and adopted the British way of doing things. Malaya became one of the best developed of all wet tropical areas, its heavy forest penetrated by a network of good highways. Bagpipe music and cricket matches continue in India and Pakistan. Burmese, Nigerians, Cameroonians, and other British colonials were never precluded on account of their race from attending universities in Britain or otherwise visiting that country.

The other metropole countries likewise left varying impressions on areas formerly under their sovereign control. For example, the Belgians tended to stress economic and social development rather than political. On the other hand, the democratic institutions remaining in the Philippine Islands serve as a reminder of American influence on that archipelago for nearly half a century. As a final illustration, one may look at the capital cities of Libya and the Somali Republic and see the Italian influence. Significant development of these areas as dependencies came during the fascist regime in Italy; when civic improvements assumed the lines and proportions of exhibition grounds and buildings. The present government quarters and their landscaping match the prewar style of architecture in Italian cities.

Patterns of Independence

Any attempt to account for the autonomy of the newly independent states by recognition of a consistent pattern from one to another is thwarted by the presence of countless variables. Each state possesses its own unique set of characteristics stemming from the past and tempered by its role in the contemporary world. Nevertheless, there are a few common denominators to be found in all or most of the 40 new countries. First, if a political entity once attains statehood, chances for survival are excellent. Other than the exceptions and irregularities discussed earlier, every state receiving independence since 1943 has remained intact as a sovereign entity and continues to function as such. It is to the advantage of the community of nations to uphold the integrity of its various members. Over a longer span of time the same story is to be told of the 20 Latin American countries which came into existence in the century between 1804 and 1903.

³In the preparation of the table some details of sovereignty have been omitted in favor of a more general overview.

Another characteristic common to all 40 states is their Western form of government. Parliamentary procedure from one new country to another fundamentally varies but little. There may be a range from strong central control to a loosely knit federation, or the role of single or multiple political parties may differ, but in no instance has any pre-European governmental system survived.⁴ Some states have gone back into their past for a state name (Mali, Ghana) or reverted to a former language (India, Ceylon), but none has been sufficiently nationalistic or sentimental to incorporate any tribal, clannish, or other early hierarchal elements into its overall governmental institutions.

Although the 40 new states by no means come from the same mold, trends or attitudes in international relations show a surprising uniformity. For one thing, nationalism shows up strongly but not to the degree that the new states sink into isolation. In addition, all seek a better way of life as measured in Western economic goods. Likewise, most of the states, even though they have dissenting minorities, have sufficient control and political viability to override the constant friction which would seem capable of eroding the government structure to the point of collapse. In fact, absence of disrupting influences capable of causing permanent or serious rifts undoubtedly proved to be a factor in facilitating independence. The presence of white minorities in the Rhodesias and Kenya has to date impeded the severance of ties between these dependencies and the United Kingdom.

Independence Equation

The effectiveness of any role which a young state may play in the world community hangs in delicate balance. Advantages favorable to statehood must be used prodigiously against negative factors which are always present to discourage and stifle growth and development. In the world as it exists today formidable obstacles continually harass any state experiencing for the first time its own sovereign control. Economic weakness, internal dissension, cultural diversity, outside pressure, and the frightening specters of violence

⁴ American rule in the Philippine Islands was preceded by that of the Spanish, thus the Philippines is included with the other 39 states under consideration in this article as having been under European sovereignty.

or war all unfortunately highlight the negative factors and handicap constructive measures to establish strength and stability in a state.

However, the viability of a people and its government is not always to be determined by physical environment or the equilibrium of its strengths and weaknesses. Pakistan began existence as a geographical anachronism, divided into two parts by 900 miles of Indian territory. It lacked the combination of resources assuring strong economic development, for the areas now making up East Pakistan and West Pakistan were peripheral to the subcontinental economic structure of British India. Soon after independence in the late 1940's economists wrote of the hopelessness facing Pakistan as a successfully functioning sovereign state. Yet now, little more than a decade later, that country stands as one of the strongest in Asia—a bulwark of Western defense in the south and southeast parts of the continent. The vitality of the Pakistani and the direction of their Government have been sufficient to meet the challenge of what appeared to be an equation top-heavy on the negative side.

We may look at the small states in Middle Africa—Dahomey, Gabon, Sierra Leone, or Togo—and see bleak futures if only the geographic realities are allowed to come into perspective. These countries in west Africa are basically strips of territory with ocean frontage, originally established by seafaring Europeans in search of routes to lands of fabulous riches. Individually each strip, or country, has a singularly small array of resources, and even the resources that have been developed are oriented primarily toward the former European metropole countries. Surface transportation in this part of Middle Africa conspicuously avoids crossing international boundaries.

In light of their physical and economic inheritances, these new states have little choice other than to reorient their activities and their outlooks to a new locus. Because of small size, especially in a competitive world strongly influenced by great powers, any advance of status must in part at least depend upon membership in supranational organizations. Alliances capable of generating sustained support and cooperation may also be of infinite benefit. Aid from foreign sources likewise may serve as a catalyst in providing a new state the means of extending its economic horizon.

On the diplomatic front, too, a new state's leaders may be on the tightrope, establishing the most advantageous accords and at the same time withstanding adverse pressures. It must be remembered that violence was associated with the independence of 7 of the 40 new states—testimony to an ever-potential danger of disrupted negotiations. A substantial proportion of the recent crises appearing in the headlines transpires in the new states under discussion: Laos, Congo, Tunisia. Unfortunately a new state, lacking traditions and long-established order, may be subject to a “shaking down” process that creates strife both internally and externally. The U.S. position in supporting the sovereign status of new countries encourages attitudes and action which may ease tensions and facilitate constructive progress.

New States To Come

Two dependent areas have definite dates for their entrance into statehood: Tanganyika on December 28, 1961, and The West Indies on May 31, 1962. The latter will be the first new state in the Americas since the Republic of Panama was established in 1903, if one excepts later stages of the transition of Canada from a British colony to a self-governing member of the Commonwealth.

Other political entities are also believed to be on the threshold of independence or working toward that end. The greatest concentration of potential states lies in Middle Africa. Ruanda-Urundi, now a trust territory of Belgium, may become independent in 1962, possibly as two countries—Ruanda and Barundi—based upon major tribal elements within the area. Nearby Uganda also has tribal problems to resolve prior to independence, while Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland find divisive interests between Africans and large white minorities the greatest obstacle in the path to final statehood.

In the Pacific area Western Samoa is being prepared for independence by New Zealand. (The eastern part of the island group, it may be recalled, comprises American Samoa, an unincorporated territory of the United States.) In the Western Hemisphere both British Guiana and British Honduras, following in the wake of The West Indies, have been scheduled for independence within the next 2 or 3 years.

In the present swing toward independence there is no way of knowing how small an area or a popu-

lation may be and still qualify for statehood. Of the newly independent states the smallest, Lebanon, has 3,400 square miles, or about two-thirds the area of Connecticut. Iceland has the fewest people, counting only 170,000 in 1958. Likewise, one can turn to the microstates of Europe for examples of diminutive sovereign states.

Only a relatively small proportion of the world remains as dependent areas; so there is a limit to the continuation of the great era of newly established states which we are now witnessing. Less than one-third of Africa is left, plus a number of scattered islands. Dependent areas on continental mainlands other than in Africa have nearly disappeared.

Assuming all dependencies of consequence receive full independence, are there other factors that might change the sovereignty pattern of the world? Might there be a swing in the other direction—consolidation of territory into larger states? Federation is a step in this direction, though in practice this procedure seems to be more applicable for integral parts within a state than for encompassing multiple sovereign states into a new sovereign entity. There is also the opposite alternative—might not existing states, especially large ones, be broken down into multiple states? Certainly this trend is not now evident. The one sure fact is that political entities over the earth are ever changing, as if composed of diverse viscous substances. New countries are constantly being built up or broken down. Stability—at least in this area of human affairs—is probably a condition that the world will never see.

Foreign Policy Briefings To Be Held at Dallas and Kansas City

Press release 651 dated September 21

The Department of State will hold regional foreign policy briefing conferences at Kansas City, Mo., on October 26 and at Dallas, Tex., on October 27. Representatives of the press, radio and television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy will be invited to participate.

The Kansas City conference, in which the Kansas City *Star* and the University of Kansas City are cooperating with the Department of State, will bring together participants from Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. The Dallas

meeting, to which media and organization representatives from Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas are being invited, is being organized in cooperation with the Dallas United Nations Association.

Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles and other principal officers of the Department of State will take part in both conferences.

These regional meetings continue the series which was inaugurated in July of this year at San Francisco and Denver.¹ Their purpose is to provide opportunity for discussion of international issues between those who inform the public on the issues and the senior officers of the Department of State who have the responsibility for dealing with them.

Invitations will be mailed shortly.

Cambodia Port Highway Project

Statement by Henry R. Labouisse²

Press release 659 dated September 23

The committee report deals with an aid project which was commenced in 1955 and completed in 1959. It is the constant aim of this administration to improve the operation of the foreign aid program, and we concur in the committee's recommendations, which have a similar objective. Actions along the lines recommended by the committee are already in progress and in most respects were initiated even prior to the committee's investigations of the Cambodia highway project this year. Many of these actions are being carried out in conjunction with the current reorganization of the foreign aid program and the establishment of the new Agency for International Development. We expect they will improve administrative procedures. We also expect that investigations now in progress by the Bureau of Public Roads in behalf of ICA and at ICA's request will identify the factors responsible for any deterioration in the Cambodia highway so that appropriate steps may be taken to protect the interests of the United States Government.

¹ BULLETIN of July 24, 1961, p. 165.

² Concerning a report of the House Committee on Government Operations, *Cambodia Port Highway: A Supplemental Report* (H.R. 1250). Mr. Labouisse is Director of the International Cooperation Administration.

United States Gives Aid to Flood Victims in Burma

Following is the text of a telegram from President Kennedy to Prime Minister U Nu of Burma.

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated September 16

16 SEPTEMBER 1961

His Excellency U NU: On behalf of the Government and the people of the United States I express deepest sympathy for losses suffered by victims of the severe floods which have devastated large areas of your country. Ambassador [John S.] Everton has already made certain funds available for relief and I have asked him to discuss with your government other emergency measures which the United States Government might be able to take to help relieve suffering.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency

U NU

*Prime Minister, Minister for Defense, for Home Affairs, for Democratization and Administration of Local Bodies, for Relief and Resettlement
Rangoon, Burma*

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Acceptance deposited: Dominican Republic, September 18, 1961.

Fisheries

Declaration of understanding regarding the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington April 24, 1961.¹

Acceptance deposited: Italy, September 14, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Procès-verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III, and the protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Declaration on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Done at Geneva May 25, 1959. Entered into force for the United States November 19, 1959. TIAS 4385.

Declaration on provisional accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 29, 1959. Entered into force for the United States December 19, 1959. TIAS 4384.

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force November 16, 1960. TIAS 4649.

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of United Kingdom: Sierra Leone, August 22, 1961.

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960.¹

Ratification deposited: Austria, August 22, 1961.

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Enters into force on the 30th day following day accepted by signature or otherwise by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.²

Signatures: France, November 19, 1960; Belgium, November 24, 1960; Norway, February 9, 1961; Luxembourg, February 24, 1961; Canada, April 14, 1961; Netherlands (for European Territory, Netherlands Antilles, and Netherlands New Guinea), April 25, 1961; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, May 9, 1961; New Zealand, May 30, 1961; United Kingdom (including all United Kingdom territories to which GATT provisionally applied, except Kenya), August 21, 1961; United States (with a statement), September 19, 1961.

Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 8, 1960 (TIAS 4663). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago August 30, 1961. Enters into force on date of notification that Chile has approved the agreement in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

Malaya

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in the Federation of Malaya. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur September 4, 1961. Entered into force September 4, 1961.

Sweden

Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to provide a concession as compensation to Sweden for spring clothespins escape-clause action, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington September 15, 1961. Entered into force September 15, 1961.

United Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Cairo September 2, 1961. Entered into force September 2, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. Humelsine Heads Study Group on Organization of Department

Press release 643 dated September 18

Acting Secretary Bowles announced on September 18 the appointment of Carlisle H. Humelsine, president of Colonial Williamsburg and a former Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, as a consultant to head a special study group to survey Department of State organizational problems. Establishment of the study group, which is expected to complete its work within 3 or 4 weeks, is one of a series of steps undertaken by Mr. Bowles in continuing administrative efforts to make the Department of State fully responsive to its constantly increasing duties and responsibilities.

In commenting on the study, prior to his departure for New York, Secretary Rusk said:

The demands upon the Department are exacting. They require all the initiative, imagination, operational skill, and executive competence we can provide.

¹ Not in force.

Mr. Humelsine and his associates will work not only within the Department but will also seek the advice and opinions of others now in private life who have had a long-time interest in the State Department and its operations. The perspective to be gained from such consultations will be invaluable in bringing a public point of view to bear upon the role of the Department.

Assisting Mr. Humelsine will be Arthur G. Stevens, a former Department of State official now in the banking field. Other members of the group will include Robert M. Macy, chief of the International Division, Bureau of the Budget, and top-level State Department personnel who will serve as time permits. Among these are Walter K. Scott, consul general at Munich and former Assistant Secretary for Administration; William O. Hall, deputy chief of mission at Karachi and former senior adviser on the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary and former Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of the Philippines. Staff support will be provided by the Department's Office of Management, Bureau of Administration, under Deputy Assistant Secretary Ralph S. Roberts.

The Humelsine group will work closely with the Under Secretary and his principal associates in the administrative and operational fields, Deputy Under Secretary Roger W. Jones and Assistant Secretary for Administration William J. Crockett.

State and Treasury Announce Personnel Exchange Program

Press release 640 dated September 18

The State and Treasury Departments on September 18 announced a personnel exchange program designed to increase understanding of the relationship between foreign and financial policies. The program was recommended in February of this year by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Com-

mittee on Government Operations. The recommendation was welcomed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury.

The first assignment of personnel by the two Departments began on September 18.

Robert S. Watson of the Treasury's Office of International Finance is assigned to the Economic Development Division of the State Department's Office of International Financial and Development Affairs. He will be concerned with the State Department's foreign policy guidance to the Export-Import Bank. He will also help coordinate the Department's position in the National Advisory Council in the area of loans, investments, services, and certain other activities.

Edwin C. Rendall of the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State will be assigned to the Latin American Division of the Office of International Finance of the Treasury. He will have responsibility for financial analysis of the economies of a selected group of Latin American countries. This will require the application of basic Treasury policy to foreign financial matters.

Project assignments and training have been planned to provide maximum knowledge and understanding in areas where foreign and financial policies coincide. Particular emphasis will be given to the continued development of the exchange personnel and their potential contribution to the purpose of the program following return to their parent organizations.

Further assignment of personnel to the State-Treasury exchange program will be made later this year. Assignments will be for 1 year.

Confirmations

The Senate on September 8 confirmed the following nominations:

Charles F. Darlington to be Ambassador to the Republic of Gabon. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 649 dated September 21.)

Lincoln Gordon to be Ambassador to Brazil. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 645 dated September 19.)

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Brazil. Gordon confirmed as Ambassador 614

Burma. United States Gives Aid to Flood Victims in Burma (Kennedy) 612

Cambodia. Cambodia Port Highway Project (Labouisse) 612

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640	9/18	State-Treasury personnel exchange.
†641	9/18	Williams: "Southern Africa in Transition."
†641A	9/18	Williams: death of Hammarskjold.
*642	9/18	U.S. participation in international conferences.
643	9/18	Humelsine study group to survey Department organization.
*644	9/19	Bowles: discrimination against foreign diplomats (excerpts).
*645	9/19	Gordon sworn in as Ambassador to Brazil (biographic details).
646	9/19	Ball: annual meeting of World Bank.
*647	9/19	Program for visit of President of Peru.
†648	9/20	Martin: Senate Finance Committee.
*649	9/21	Darlington sworn in as Ambassador to Gabon (biographic details).
†650	9/21	Williams: Women's Democratic Club, Arlington.
651	9/21	Foreign policy briefings at Kansas City and Dallas.
652	9/21	India credentials (rewrite).
*653	9/21	President signs 1961 educational and cultural exchange act.
654	9/22	Establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuwait.
*655	9/22	U.N. Day celebration.
†656	9/22	Martin: Senate Commerce Committee.
*657	9/22	Visit of President of Sudan.
*658	9/22	Rusk: Foreign Press Association.
659	9/23	Labouisse: Cambodia port highway.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Publication 7225

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FREEDOM FROM WAR

The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

President Kennedy, in his address before the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations, September 25, 1961, presented the U.S. new program for general and complete disarmament.

A summary of the principal provisions and the full text of the program are contained in this 19-page pamphlet.

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CHILE

Rebuilding for a Better Future

Immediately following the disastrous Chilean earthquake of May 1960, the United States under the Mutual Security Program mounted one of the largest emergency relief operations ever undertaken in peacetime.

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Bulletin

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Vol. XLV, No. 1164

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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLV, No. 1164 • PUBLICATION 7283

October 16, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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“Let Us Call a Truce to Terror”

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

We meet in an hour of grief and challenge. Dag Hammarskjold is dead. But the United Nations lives. His tragedy is deep in our hearts, but the task for which he died is at the top of our agenda. A noble servant of peace is gone. But the quest for peace lies before us.

The problem is not the death of one man; the problem is the life of this Organization. It will either grow to meet the challenge of our age, or it will be gone with the wind, without influence, without force, without respect. Were we to let it die, to enfeeble its vigor, to cripple its powers, we would condemn the future.

For in the development of this Organization rests the only true alternative to war, and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative. Unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer serve to settle disputes. It can no longer concern the great powers alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by winds and waters and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.

So let us here resolve that Dag Hammarskjold did not live—or die—in vain. Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And, as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war.

¹ Made before the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, N.Y., on Sept. 25 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

Dedication to U.N. Charter and World Law

This will require new strength and new roles for the United Nations. For disarmament without checks is but a shadow, and a community without law is but a shell. Already the United Nations has become both the measure and the vehicle of man's most generous impulses. Already it has provided—in the Middle East, in Asia, in Africa this year in the Congo—a means of holding violence within bounds.

But the great question which confronted this body in 1945 is still before us: whether man's cherished hopes for progress and peace are to be destroyed by terror and disruption, whether the “foul winds of war” can be tamed in time to free the cooling winds of reason, and whether the pledges of our charter are to be fulfilled or defied—pledges to secure peace, progress, human rights, and world law.

In this hall there are not three forces, but two. One is composed of those who are trying to build the kind of world described in articles 1 and 2 of the charter. The other, seeking a far different world, would undermine this Organization in the process.

Today of all days our dedication to the charter must be maintained. It must be strengthened, first of all, by the selection of an outstanding civil servant to carry forward the responsibilities of the Secretary-General—a man endowed with both the wisdom and the power to make meaningful the moral force of the world community. The late Secretary-General nurtured and sharpened the United Nations' obligation to act. But he did

not invent it. It was there in the charter. It is still there in the charter.

However difficult it may be to fill Mr. Hammarskjöld's place, it can better be filled by one man rather than by three. Even the three horses of the troika did not have three drivers, all going in different directions. They had only one, and so must the United Nations executive. To install a triumvirate, or any rotating authority, in the United Nations administrative offices would replace order with anarchy, action with paralysis, and confidence with confusion.

The Secretary-General, in a very real sense, is the servant of the General Assembly. Diminish his authority and you diminish the authority of the only body where all nations, regardless of power, are equal and sovereign. Until all the powerful are just, the weak will be secure only in the strength of this Assembly.

Effective and independent executive action is not the same question as balanced representation. In view of the enormous change in membership in this body since its founding, the American delegation will join in any effort for the prompt review and revision of the composition of United Nations bodies.

But to give this Organization three drivers, to permit each great power to decide its own case, would entrench the cold war in the headquarters of peace. Whatever advantages such a plan may hold out to my own country, as one of the great powers, we reject it. For we far prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war, in the age of mass extermination.

Plan for General and Complete Disarmament

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or a cause of tension. The mere existence of modern weapons—ten million times more powerful than anything the world has ever seen and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror and discord and distrust.

Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes, for disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness, for in a spiraling arms race a nation's security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.

For 15 years this Organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream; it is a practical matter of life or death. The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race.

It is in this spirit that the recent Belgrade conference,² recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet problem or an American problem but a human problem, endorsed a program of "general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament." It is in this same spirit that we in the United States have labored this year, with a new urgency and with a new, now-statutory agency fully endorsed by the Congress, to find an approach to disarmament which would be so far-reaching yet realistic, so mutually balanced and beneficial, that it could be accepted by every nation. And it is in this spirit that we have presented, with the agreement of the Soviet Union, under the label both nations now accept of "general and complete disarmament," a new statement of newly agreed principles for negotiation.³

But we are well aware that all issues of principle are not settled and that principles alone are not enough. It is therefore our intention to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race but to a peace race—to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved. We invite them now to go beyond agreement in principle to reach agreement on actual plans.

The program to be presented to this Assembly for general and complete disarmament under effective international control⁴ moves to bridge the gap between those who insist on a gradual approach and those who talk only of the final and total achievement. It would create machinery to keep the peace as it destroys the machines of war.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

⁴ See p. 650.

It would proceed through balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no state a military advantage over another. It would place the final responsibility for verification and control where it belongs—not with the big powers alone, not with one's adversary or one's self, but in an international organization within the framework of the United Nations. It would assure that indispensable condition of disarmament—true inspection—and apply it in stages proportionate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt their production as well as their testing, their transfer as well as their possession. It would achieve, under the eye of an international disarmament organization, a steady reduction in forces, both nuclear and conventional, until it has abolished all armies and all weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United Nations Peace Force. And it starts that process now, today, even as the talks begin.

In short, general and complete disarmament must no longer be a slogan, used to resist the first steps. It is no longer to be a goal without means of achieving it, without means of verifying its progress, without means of keeping the peace. It is now a realistic plan and a test—a test of those only willing to talk and a test of those willing to act.

Such a plan would not bring a world free from conflict or greed, but it would bring a world free from the terrors of mass destruction. It would not usher in the era of the super state, but it would usher in an era in which no state could annihilate or be annihilated by another.

In 1946, this nation proposed the Baruch plan to internationalize the atom before other nations even possessed the bomb or demilitarized their troops.⁵ We proposed with our allies the disarmament plan of 1951⁶ while still at war in Korea. And we make our proposals today, while building up our defenses over Berlin, not because we are inconsistent or insincere or intimidated but because we know the rights of free men will prevail—because, while we are compelled against our will to rearm, we look confidently beyond Berlin

⁵ For an address by Bernard M. Baruch at the opening session of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946, see BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 799.

to the kind of disarmed world we all prefer.

I therefore propose, on the basis of this plan, that disarmament negotiations resume promptly and continue without interruption until an entire program for general and complete disarmament has not only been agreed but has been actually achieved.

Proposals To Halt Testing and Nuclear Arms Race

The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds, in every environment, under workable controls. The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed such a treaty⁷ that is both reasonable, effective, and ready for signature. We are still prepared to sign that treaty today.

We also proposed a mutual ban on atmospheric testing,⁸ without inspection or controls, in order to save the human race from the poison of radioactive fallout. We regret that that offer was not accepted.⁹

For 15 years we have sought to make the atom an instrument of peaceful growth rather than of war. But for 15 years our concessions have been matched by obstruction, our patience by intransigence. And the pleas of mankind for peace have met with disregard.

Finally, as the explosions of others beclouded the skies, my country was left with no alternative but to act in the interests of its own and the free world's security.¹⁰ We cannot endanger that security by refraining from testing while others improve their arsenals. Nor can we endanger it by another long, uninspected ban on testing. For 3 years we accepted those risks in our open society while seeking agreement on inspection. But this year, while we were negotiating in good faith in Geneva, others were secretly preparing new experiments in destruction.

Our tests are not polluting the atmosphere. Our deterrent weapons are guarded against accidental explosion or use. Our doctors and scientists stand ready to help any nation measure and

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

⁹ For a U.S.-U.K. statement and text of a declaration of Premier Khrushchev, see *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515.

¹⁰ For a statement by the President on Sept. 5, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

meet the hazards to health which inevitably result from the tests in the atmosphere.

But to halt the spread of these terrible weapons, to halt the contamination of the air, to halt the spiraling nuclear arms race, we remain ready to seek new avenues of agreement. Our new disarmament program thus includes the following proposals:

- First, signing the test ban treaty by all nations. This can be done now. Test ban negotiations need not and should not await general disarmament.

- Second, stopping the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and preventing their transfer to any nation now lacking in nuclear weapons.

- Third, prohibiting the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to states that do not own them.

- Fourth, keeping nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space.

- Fifth, gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and converting their materials to peaceful uses; and

- Finally, halting the unlimited testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and gradually destroying them as well.

Worldwide Law and Law Enforcement

To destroy arms, however, is not enough. We must create even as we destroy—creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons. In the world we seek, the United Nations emergency forces which have been hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and inadequately financed will never be enough.

Therefore, the United States recommends that all member nations earmark special peacekeeping units in their armed forces, to be on call of the United Nations, to be specially trained and quickly available, and with advance provision for financial and logistic support.

In addition, the American delegation will suggest a series of steps to improve the United Nations' machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, for on-the-spot factfinding, mediation, and adjudication, for extending the rule of international law. For peace is not solely a matter of military or technical problems; it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man

can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control and, like the dinosaur, vanish from the earth.

Extending the Rule of Law to Outer Space

As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend it to man's new domain—outer space.

All of us salute the brave cosmonauts of the Soviet Union. The new horizons of outer space must not be riven by the old bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an even colder war.

To this end we shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter to the limits of man's exploration in the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation. We shall further propose cooperative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control. We shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the whole world in telegraph and telephone and radio and television. The day need not be far away when such a system will televise the proceedings of this body to every corner of the world for the benefit of peace.

United Nations Decade of Development

But the mysteries of outer space must not divert our eyes or our energies from the harsh realities that face our fellow men. Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope.

That is why my nation, which has freely shared its capital and its technology to help others help themselves, now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960's as the United Nations Decade of Development. Under the framework of that resolution, the United Nations' existing efforts in promoting economic growth can be expanded and coordinated. Regional surveys and training institutes can now pool the talents of many. New research, technical assistance, and

pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands and untapped waters. And development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise, to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations.

Colonialism and the Principle of Free Choice

My country favors a world of free and equal states. We agree with those who say that colonialism is a key issue in this Assembly. But let the full facts of that issue be discussed in full.

On the one hand is the fact that, since the close of World War II, a worldwide declaration of independence has transformed nearly 1 billion people and 9 million square miles into 42 free and independent states. Less than 2 percent of the world's population now lives in "dependent" territories.

I do not ignore the remaining problems of traditional colonialism which still confront this body. Those problems will be solved, with patience, good will, and determination. Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my country intends to be a participant and not merely an observer in the peaceful, expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals. That continuing tide of self-determination, which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support.

But colonialism in its harshest forms is not only the exploitation of new nations by old, of dark skins by light—or the subjugation of the poor by the rich. My nation was once a colony, and we know what colonialism means; the exploitation and subjugation of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their class, or their color.

And that is why there is no ignoring the fact that the tide of self-determination has not reached the Communist empire, where a population far larger than that officially termed "dependent" lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of free institutions, under a system which knows only one party and one belief, which suppresses free debate and free elections and free newspapers and free books and free trade unions, and which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners. Let us debate

colonialism in full and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscites in every corner of the globe.

Two Threats to the Peace

Finally, as President of the United States, I consider it my duty to report to this Assembly on two threats to the peace which are not on your crowded agenda but which cause us, and most of you, the deepest concern.

The first threat on which I wish to report is widely misunderstood: the smoldering coals of war in southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam is already under attack—sometimes by a single assassin, sometimes by a band of guerrillas, recently by full battalions. The peaceful borders of Burma, Cambodia, and India have been repeatedly violated. And the peaceful people of Laos are in danger of losing the independence they gained not so long ago.

No one can call these "wars of liberation." For these are free countries living under their own governments. Nor are these aggressions any less real because men are knifed in their homes and not shot in the fields of battle.

The very simple question confronting the world community is whether measures can be devised to protect the small and weak from such tactics. For if they are successful in Laos and south Viet-Nam, the gates will be opened wide.

The United States seeks for itself no base, no territory, no special position in this area of any kind. We support a truly neutral and independent Laos, its people free from outside interference, living at peace with themselves and with their neighbors, assured that their territory will not be used for attacks on others, and under a government comparable (as Mr. Khrushchev and I agreed at Vienna¹¹) to Cambodia and Burma.

But now the negotiations over Laos are reaching a crucial stage. The cease-fire is at best precarious. The rainy season is coming to an end. Laotian territory is being used to infiltrate south Viet-Nam. The world community must recognize—all those who are involved—that this potent threat to Laotian peace and freedom is indivisible from all other threats to their own.

Secondly, I wish to report to you on the crisis over Germany and Berlin. This is not the time or the place for immoderate tones, but the world

¹¹ For background, see *ibid.*, June 26, 1961, p. 991.

community is entitled to know the very simple issues as we see them. If there is a crisis it is because an existing peace is under threat, because an existing island of free people is under pressure, because solemn agreements are being treated with indifference. Established international rights are being threatened with unilateral usurpation. Peaceful circulation has been interrupted by barbed wire and concrete blocks.

One recalls the order of the Czar in Pushkin's *Boris Godunov*: "Take steps at this very hour that our frontiers be fenced in by barriers. . . . That not a single soul pass o'er the border, that not a hare be able to run or a crow to fly."

It is absurd to allege that we are threatening a war merely to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from signing a so-called "treaty of peace." The Western Allies are not concerned with any paper arrangement the Soviets may wish to make with a regime of their own creation, on territory occupied by their own troops and governed by their own agents. No such action can affect either our rights or our responsibilities.

If there is a dangerous crisis in Berlin—and there is—it is because of threats against the vital interests and the deep commitments of the Western Powers and the freedom of West Berlin. We cannot yield these interests. We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible. A "peace treaty" which carried with it the provisions which destroy the peace would be a fraud. A "free city" which was not genuinely free would suffocate freedom and would be an infamy.

For a city or a people to be truly free, they must have the secure right, without economic, political, or police pressure, to make their own choice and to live their own lives. And as I have said before, if anyone doubts the extent to which our presence is desired by the people of West Berlin, we are ready to have that question submitted to a free vote in all Berlin and, if possible, among all the German people.

The elementary fact about this crisis is that it is unnecessary. The elementary tools for a peaceful settlement are to be found in the charter. Under its law, agreements are to be kept, unless changed by all those who made them. Established rights are to be respected. The political disposition of peoples should rest upon their own wishes, freely expressed in plebiscites or free elections. If there are legal problems, they can

be solved by legal means. If there is a threat of force, it must be rejected. If there is desire for change, it must be a subject for negotiation, and if there is negotiation, it must be rooted in mutual respect and concern for the rights of others.

The Western Powers have calmly resolved to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin and the self-determination of those citizens. This generation learned from bitter experience that either brandishing or yielding to threats can only lead to war. But firmness and reason can lead to the kind of peaceful solution in which my country profoundly believes.

We are committed to no rigid formula. We see no perfect solution. We recognize that troops and tanks can, for a time, keep a nation divided against its will, however unwise that policy may seem to us. But we believe a peaceful agreement is possible which protects the freedom of West Berlin and Allied presence and access, while recognizing the historic and legitimate interests of others in assuring European security.

The possibilities of negotiation are now being explored; it is too early to report what the prospects may be. For our part, we would be glad to report at the appropriate time that a solution has been found. For there is no need for a crisis over Berlin, threatening the peace, and if those who created this crisis desire peace, there will be peace and freedom in Berlin.

Responsibilities of U.N. General Assembly

The events and decisions of the next 10 months may well decide the fate of man for the next 10,000 years. There will be no avoiding those events. There will be no appeal from these decisions. And we in this hall shall be remembered either as part of the generation that turned this planet into a flaming funeral pyre or the generation that met its vow "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

In the endeavor to meet that vow, I pledge you every effort this nation possesses. I pledge you that we shall neither commit nor provoke aggression, that we shall neither flee nor invoke the threat of force, that we shall never negotiate out of fear, we shall never fear to negotiate.

Terror is not a new weapon. Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example. But

inevitably they fail, either because men are not afraid to die for a life worth living or because the terrorists themselves come to realize that free men cannot be frightened by threats and that aggression would meet its own response. And it is in the light of that history that every nation today should know, be he friend or foe, that the United States has both the will and the weapons to join free men in standing up to their responsibilities.

But I come here today to look across this world of threats to the world of peace. In that search we cannot expect any final triumph, for new problems will always arise. We cannot expect that all nations will adopt like systems, for conformity is the jailer of freedom and the enemy of growth. Nor can we expect to reach our goal

by contrivance, by fiat, or even by the wishes of all.

But however close we sometimes seem to that dark and final abyss, let no man of peace and freedom despair. For he does not stand alone. If we all can persevere—if we can in every land and office look beyond our own shores and ambitions—then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

Ladies and gentlemen of this Assembly, the decision is ours. Never have the nations of the world had so much to lose—or so much to gain. Together we shall save our planet, or together we shall perish in its flames. Save it we can—and save it we must—and then shall we earn the eternal thanks of mankind and, as peacemakers, the eternal blessing of God.

Four Central Threads of U.S. Foreign Policy

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK¹

We meet today at the beginning of a General Assembly, which itself is meeting in a climactic period in world affairs. There will be some 96 or more items on its agenda. It is not my purpose today to try to comment on those items but to speak briefly on certain aspects of the problems of the United Nations—to speak briefly in order to prepare the way for your questions within the time which is available. I shall try not to filibuster in order to shut off your questions.

But these 96 items include some of the most far-reaching, complex, dangerous, important problems before mankind, such as the nuclear arms race, as well as administrative questions such as a staff pension plan.

Some of these items are hardy perennials. You have seen them before. You will undoubtedly see them again. They will remind us that not all

questions are solved promptly. Some questions are handled over time, and perhaps some issues can be improved and made less dangerous by applying the poultices or the processes of peaceful settlement represented in the United Nations. But I would suggest to you that no item on the agenda is really unimportant. Some of them will involve attempts to settle difficult and dangerous disputes, but others, and many others, will be involved with the process of building a decent world order.

And, if I might have the privilege of making a recommendation to my colleagues of the press, I would hope that you would help us bring to the attention of the peoples of your countries the great unseen, unsung work of the international community which is going on every day, every week, throughout the world, trying to bring into being a dream which man dared to dream at a time when he was chastened by the bitterest war of our history.

Today I should like to comment on four central

¹Made before the Foreign Press Association at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 3778).

threads of United States policy, which will help us and perhaps you in understanding some of our reactions to the almost hundred items on the agenda of the United Nations. Let me say at the beginning that I know that, when I speak of these central threads of United States policy, there will undoubtedly be some questioning, perhaps a trace of cynicism, some doubts, because one can think of instances where these policies do not appear to be carried fully into effect. May I remind you that—to use the language of the baseball field—at this period of history the United States by and large is expected to bat 1.000. The center of world attention, in a position of leadership at a time when influence on United States policy is a primary object of most foreign offices throughout the world, at a time when we inevitably find ourselves involved in problems throughout the world, therefore in the middle of many disputes, whether of our own making or not, it is not easy for a great power such as the United States to be always entirely simple, entirely clear, even in the application of its most profound commitments. What we can say is that we are determined to work hard, persistently, and in the best means available to us under the circumstances, to give effect to these commitments.

Commitment to the United Nations

I would suggest, if I may without presumption, that our first commitment with respect to an agenda such as we have in front of us is our commitment to the United Nations itself. If I were advising a foreign correspondent or a new ambassador reporting to Washington about how he could best predict the long-range, instinctive reactions of the American people to particular situations, I would suggest that he look first at the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, because I am deeply convinced that in those sections are accurately and succinctly reflected the long-range foreign policy of the American people. I believe that that charter describes the kind of world we should like to see come into being. I believe that charter was drawn to describe that kind of world when men's feelings were disciplined by a war, when their hopes were elevated by the prospects of peace, when men sat down quietly and with patience and dared to think about the kind of world we ought to have.

The most immediate matter in front of us in regard to our commitments to the United Nations is of course the problem of the Secretary-General, brought about by the death of the great man to whom we have just paid tribute, for the United Nations is at a critical crossroads as a result of the unexpected and tragic death of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. The United Nations is now engaged in urgent peacekeeping action in the Congo, in the Middle East, and elsewhere throughout the world. Its widespread activities—political, economic, social, and humanitarian—demand strong, uninterrupted executive leadership. The Secretariat must continue to be directed with vigor, confidence, and integrity.

It is unfortunately clear, however, that an immediate agreement cannot be expected on the naming of a permanent Secretary-General. The United States therefore believes that action must be taken now to assure that the functions of the office of the Secretary-General are performed effectively and fully while agreement is sought on the appointment of a new Secretary-General.

An outstanding world leader should be named immediately to perform the functions of the office of the Secretary-General for a temporary period, during which efforts to elect a permanent Secretary-General should proceed in accordance with article 97 of the charter.

The authority of the office of the Secretary-General must not be compromised. A "troika" or a panel in any form and at any level of the Secretariat would paralyze the executive of the United Nations and weaken it irreparably. Whoever is appointed should perform the full functions of the office.

The General Assembly, we believe, has full authority to make such a provisional appointment. By the terms of the charter the Assembly has the power to regulate appointments in the Secretariat. That power necessarily includes provisional arrangements for carrying on the functions of the Secretariat's chief officer in emergencies. It has used that power before on at least two important occasions.

The first of these was in 1946 prior to the formal election of a Secretary-General, when the General Assembly adopted the proposal of its President that the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Preparatory Commission be authorized to

carry on the duties of Secretary-General pending the appointment of the Secretary-General.

The second occasion was in 1950, when the Security Council was deadlocked in attempting to choose a successor to the first Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie. In November of that year, by a vote of 46 to 5 with 8 abstentions, the General Assembly decided that the present Secretary-General should be continued in office for a period of 3 years.²

The vital interests of the members of the United Nations are heavily involved in this question. The Assembly must move rapidly to fill the void. Events cannot permit drift and indecision in the leadership of the United Nations. We must not allow the prestige and authority of the Organization to be dissipated by delay or by diminution of the effectiveness of an office which has become one of the United Nations' unique contributions to the peace of the world.

Commitment to Growth of Law Among Nations

I have spoken of our commitment to the United Nations as the first of the central threads of American policy. I should think a second central thread would be our commitment to the growth of law in relations among nations. We believe that the history of man has shown that the development of law enlarges and does not restrict freedom. In our own personal affairs we understand that we as individuals pass in the course of a single day through hundreds and sometimes thousands of legal relationships, some of them active, many of them latent, some called into play by our own action, others called into play by the action of government or by the conduct of others. But in the mystery and majesty of the operations of law, each of us finds it possible to go through our eccentric orbits with a maximum amount of personal freedom.

That process of law is steadily going on in the international community. On every working day throughout the year, in meetings all over the world, on almost every imaginable subject, arrangements are being reached across national frontiers which make it possible for us to enlarge our respective areas of freedom and to get on with the world's work with harmony.

² U.N. doc. A/RES/492 (V); for text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 831.

Commitment to Freedom

The third commitment and central thread of American policy is our commitment to freedom. This commitment is a part of an ancient dialog of the human race, a discussion of the political consequences of the nature of man. In the late 18th century those who came before us articulated it in the proposition that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. I believe that the American people deeply believe that simple proposition. And we find it important that, when you look through the present membership of the United Nations, you find more than 60 independent members who have traveled the path of national independence—including the United States, of course—and that, looking back on the history of the independence of those 60 members, one can find the sympathy and the support, the influence and the help, of the American people expressed in many different ways.

This commitment to freedom causes complications because it is worldwide, because it has to do with the nature of man. It explains our instinctive reactions to certain issues in the colonial field. It explains our concern about what is going on in areas where the people live under dictatorships. It explains why we are more comfortable with close, democratic friends than with other forms of government. It explains why our consciences are disturbed when we are not able to perform within our own society in full accordance with our own deepest commitments.

Commitment to Economic and Social Advancement

Our fourth thread of policy is our commitment to economic and social advancement deeply written into the charter of the United Nations and drawn out of our own national experience. Indeed, we believe that there is an intimate link between economic and social advancement on the one side and freedom on the other. In our own history these two have come together. Indeed, the institutions of freedom were strengthened and enlarged to permit more rapid economic and social advancement. We believe that free institutions provide the machinery, the impetus, the inspiration, through which the resources of men can be mobilized for such advancement and that authoritarian forms cannot properly claim to have special advantage in the speed of development.

To us these are four important commitments. We shall be saying a great deal about them in the United Nations in the weeks and months ahead. When we come to the end of the Assembly, the right question to ask, it seems to me, will be: Has the 16th session of the General Assembly moved us a few steps further along the way toward the kind of world society to which we all are committed under the charter? These words—committed or noncommitted—come in for a great deal of discussion these days. As far as the United States is concerned, we do believe that there are basic common interests between us and all those governments and peoples who understand their own basic commitments to be to the charter and to the principles inscribed in that charter.

Man has lived through some rather dreadful events. He has been seeking his way up a rather slippery glacier for centuries. He has been trying to reach a level of civilized condition which accords with the dignity of man himself. He has chipped out fingerholds and toeholds, sometimes with extraordinary skill, and he can be proud of his accomplishments. But below there remains the abyss, and a few slips can plunge him back again to the jungle out of which he has tried to rise.

These are the issues that underlie the work of an Assembly such as the 16th Assembly. I believe myself that there is great strength in the charter, in the commitment of men to the charter, in the common interests which tie us together. I believe that we can move ahead with confidence and with courage and without fear of those particular storm clouds which are now on the horizon and which must, of course, be somehow dispersed. Thank you very much.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

Dr. Hans Steinitz (chairman): Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your inspiring and highly interesting and valuable address which, I suppose, will give an opportunity for a number of questions from the floor.

Dr. Otto Leichter (Deutsche Presse Agentur (dpa), Hamburg): Mr. Secretary, how do you judge the chances of an interim solution [to the problem of a Secretary-General] as indicated by you on the basis of your contacts in the recent

days, including your talk with Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister]? And do you think of any alternatives in the case of a complete deadlock?

THE SECRETARY: If I did not in my remarks earlier refer to my luncheon conversation of yesterday, it was not forgetfulness on my part. (Laughter.) Actually, we did not get into the question of a provisional or temporary solution to the present problem.

There are two quite different problems. The one is to elect a permanent Secretary-General as provided in the charter. The "troika" proposal indicates that there will be very great difficulty indeed in the election of a new Secretary-General, unless there is some modification on the part of those who have put the "troika" proposal forward.

That very fact makes it necessary for the United Nations—if it is to continue to function vigorously and actively during a troubled period—to turn to a temporary arrangement, a provisional arrangement.

We believe that, in the absence of the ability of the Security Council to come to a quick agreement on a new Secretary-General, the General Assembly has the power and must exercise it to move promptly with the interim arrangement. We believe this accords with the judgment and view of the vast majority of the United Nations, and we would hope that they could move promptly in this direction.

Paul F. Sanders (Het Parool, Amsterdam): Mr. Secretary, the question how to strengthen the free-world community has become more urgent than ever in the circumstances we live under. May we in Senator Fulbright's ideas on a concert of free nations, as stated in an article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, read some of the thinking of this administration? And, sir, in this respect, does the United States have any plans or new plans to use its influence on the establishment of European unity besides what already has been done in the economic field, as in the Common Market?

THE SECRETARY: I would not wish to comment in detail on Senator Fulbright's article. The general purpose, the general objective, which he discussed in his article is of course, I think, the objective of all of us in the free world. But the United States and its friends are acting in a num-

ber of relationships and circles. We attach the greatest possible importance to the strengthening of the community of interests which is represented, as I indicated earlier, in the charter of the United Nations and to work there for the building of a worldwide community of common interests and peaceful adjustment. We also believe that we must work intimately and closely to strengthen the North Atlantic community on the political side, on the economic side, and, to the extent necessary, on the military side. And this process of consultation is becoming all the time more intimate and, I think, more effective.

There are other communities, such as the Organization of American States, to which we are deeply committed and in other parts of the world associations which to us are very important.

I think that in time, in such agencies as these and through the United Nations, the free world will strengthen these ties which are fundamental to us all and that relationships across regional frontiers will be strengthened in the general direction of which Senator Fulbright was talking. I think his article was not an official administration point of view, but the general directions of policy are things shared very widely in this country and in other countries.

Levon Keshishian (Al Ahram, Cairo): Sir, I would like to ask you concerning the membership of Outer Mongolia. One, what is the position of the American Government? Two, is it correct that the American Government is putting pressure on Nationalist China not to veto in order not to anger the Brazzaville countries who will take a resolute position on the question of China?

THE SECRETARY: First, we have indicated that we would under some circumstances consider the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations.

Second, on the question of pressure, when governments consult among themselves in both directions, one sometimes wonders in which direction pressure is being applied. But in any vigorous consultation of a sort which goes on all the time among governments, I would not wish to characterize any particular consultation as pressure.

T. V. Parasuram (Press Trust of India): Could you clarify perhaps by mentioning some names in connection with your reference to an

outstanding world leader to perform the functions of the office of Secretary-General for a temporary period?

THE SECRETARY: Well, there are a number of names of such outstanding world leaders who are under discussion among delegates at the United Nations at the present time. You gentlemen know at least as many of those names as I do.

The United States does not itself have a specific candidate whom we are pressing because we feel this is a matter for very wide consultation. Our principal point is that we think we should settle upon this promptly and put that individual, whoever he is to be, to work fast.

Leo Sauvage (Figaro, Paris): Did the recent Belgrade conference³ of uncommitted nations change in any respect the attitude of the United States within or without the United Nations?

THE SECRETARY: The mere fact that a considerable number of countries shared with each other the attribute that they are not specifically aligned with, say, the Soviet bloc on the one side or with the NATO bloc on the other does not in itself mean that they have single views and that the group can be spoken of in group terms. So I would think that our attitude toward the policies and the position of those at Belgrade was mixed before they went there and it was mixed after they came home.

Zivko Milic (Borba, Belgrade): Mr. Secretary, do you think that the Belgrade conference, which was in many quarters interpreted as at least a partial failure—does it appear now in quite a different light, in a more positive light? I have in mind that countries participating in the Belgrade conference stressed the readiness to find and maybe offer a solution for the crisis caused by the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld.

THE SECRETARY: I would really wish to appeal to the attitude of the Belgrade participants themselves in not trying to answer a question of that sort about the group as a whole. Many of them made it very clear that they were not there to form a bloc, to establish a single point of view. We have not ourselves characterized that meeting in any way as it applies to the entire meeting. Ob-

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

viously they had some very profitable discussions and they held some talks there that were extremely important, some of them extremely helpful.

But insofar as members at Belgrade believe that the United Nations should not be allowed to become paralyzed by an absence in the office of the Secretary-General, I think they not only are expressing a view that is the general sentiment of the Assembly but are expressing a view with which we are in thorough accord.

Dr. P. G. Krishnayya (P. G. Krishnayya's News Service & Publications, Madras and Benares): Sir, a number of American papers and some Congressmen are carrying a campaign of criticism against India and our troops in the service of the United Nations in the Congo. Since the United States has declared support of the United Nations action, do you disassociate yourself from these attacks? Also, sir, I would like you to answer this question: There have been a number of reports in American papers that the administration will hereafter reduce economic aid to the so-called neutral countries which disagree with United States policies on major questions. Can you comment on this?

THE SECRETARY: Well, first on the question of the United States attitude toward the situation in the Congo, I of course would not wish to associate myself or to in any way become involved with the comments of individual American citizens on a matter of that sort. But let me simply make this statement: that we do welcome the cessation of hostilities in the Katanga and we hope that this current cease-fire agreement can lead to a resumption of efforts by the Government of the Congo and the Congolese leaders in southern Katanga assisted by the United Nations looking toward the peaceful reintegration of the Katanga with the rest of the Congo.⁴ The present cease-fire will permit the United Nations to resume its efforts without further bloodshed toward a full implementation of the United Nations mandate in the Congo. And the United States will continue to offer all appropriate support as requested by the United Nations for the discharge of its mandate in the Congo.

I would think the answer to the second question

⁴For a Department statement, see *ibid.*, p. 550.

is that we would not expect to withdraw economic aid from neutral countries.

A. Arnold Vas Dias (Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant): Do you believe, sir, that negotiations on the future of Berlin can soon be fruitfully started?

THE SECRETARY: Perhaps we shall be able to answer that question in a few days. I would not try to answer that question today, I am sorry.

The Obligation To Understand the American System of Government

Remarks by Secretary Rusk¹

Press release 661 dated September 25

I am happy to introduce today the fourth year of "Continental Classroom" and particularly so since the course which now begins is in American Government. And I may say that it adds to my pleasure that this course is being conducted by Dr. [Peter H.] Odegard, who is an old friend and colleague of mine as well as a distinguished political scientist, teacher, and public servant. I can conceive of few subjects more timely for study these days by a wide American audience than the character of our Government.

At this moment the philosophy upon which that Government rests is being challenged in many places around the world, yet it is still the most powerful influence in the world because men take seriously the simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Or, to put it more simply, men just do not like to be pushed around too much.

In such a time of continuing conflict, it is imperative that we Americans not merely recognize by name and by instinct the values which we are defending, but that we thoroughly understand them. These values find their expression in the nature of our Government as it has developed

¹Made on Sept. 25 on the opening program of the National Broadcasting Company's "Continental Classroom."

from our own revolutionary manifesto, the Declaration of Independence, and through the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and through many decisions in courts of law, so that we have a government of the people, by the people, and for the people which we believe we have succeeded in providing in ever greater degree.

Millions of people in other countries think of America as a place where no one need go hungry, where children have shoes, where workingmen own automobiles. It is sad but true that many of these people believe it is these material conditions that we have in mind, rather than any climate of political and social principle, when we speak of our way of life.

It is equally sad, but I think true, that we have ourselves in part to blame for this. We are very apt to fall into ways of thought and speech in which the values of our system are defined in terms of per capita income or tons of steel. How can other peoples understand if we ourselves forget that it is not our material welfare by itself but the fact that we have been able to achieve it alongside of and because of individual liberties which constitutes the glory of our American system?

No Soviet citizen who crosses the borders of the Communist world is unschooled in the dialectic of Marx and Lenin, of Stalin and Khrushchev. The Soviet student who comes to this country under our exchange program and finds himself pressed in argument by the Americans he meets is crammed to his fingertips with answers to the questions which challenge his Communist faith. They may be wrong answers to us, but he believes them. He has been schooled in these answers from the nursery. But sometimes our own students, and older travelers as well, find themselves at a loss under similar cross-questioning by a Soviet group.

How can this happen? It happens ironically because our own free system does not insist that every citizen be competent in political theory, even in the theory of the Government of his own country, because our own free citizens sometimes have not themselves thought through these basic questions. Such questions as what is it in this country that is really of enduring value? And why are we proud to be what we are—Americans? The fact is that we take for granted a great deal

which is taken for granted by few other people.

For example, we have recently come peacefully through a great national election which found the Nation divided in almost equal halves over issues on which millions on both sides had deep convictions. We take this peaceful outcome for granted, regardless of which candidate or party we voted for, and we know it will be just as orderly next time. But in many countries in the world no one knows when he will have an opportunity to make a free electoral choice, and in many others the next election when it does come will be the certain signal for much violence, for military plots and efforts to determine the outcome by force. Those who live as we do, secure in the expectation of peaceful political change, are a small minority among people.

Just as we take our elections for granted, so we are apt to take for granted other manifestations of those rights which we hold to be inalienable but which relatively few governments in any era, in any time, have had both the will and the power to assure. The ideas upon which our nation was founded and upon which it continues to grow are our most precious national resource; and ideas, like other resources, are valid only so long as men and women use them and live by them. Ideas need exercise if they are to continue strong.

To be an American today, more than ever, is to know the ideas that have made America what it is, to know what it is that we stand for in this time of worldwide conflict. Few of us can fail to gain from a study of our Government today, and I think that most of us can gain a great deal.

I hope that many Americans will avail themselves of the opportunity which this course with Dr. Odegard offers. I know Dr. Odegard to be a fine teacher and an exceptional man. He is not only a highly respected scholar but a man of broad practical experience in government in such capacities as assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, and member of the National Commission for UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. It is his belief, which I wholly share, that we Americans have an obligation to know our Government by consent, to understand how it functions, and to be able to defend its principles and to appraise its practice and performance both at home and abroad.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Complaint on Flight of West German Planes

Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning two aircraft of the Federal Republic of Germany which landed at Tegel Airport in Berlin on September 14.

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 26¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the latter's note No. 94/OSA of September 17, 1961, with regard to which the Embassy, upon the instructions of its government, is authorized to state the following.

In its note, the Ministry refers to the landing of two F-84 jet aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany at Tegel Airport in Berlin on September 14, 1961.

As soon as the Allied authorities were aware of this landing, the Soviet representative at the Berlin Air Safety Center was informed of the circumstances in which this regrettable incident occurred. The facts of the case prove, without any possibility of error, that the two planes lost their way. Finding themselves short of fuel, the planes sent out distress signals to which only the air control post at Tempelhof replied. Under these circumstances, the latter could take no other measure than to let these aircraft land on one of the closest airfields—that of the Berlin-Tegel. Furthermore, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, the French authorities immediately detained the pilots and the planes and proceeded to investigate the matter. The investigation confirmed the information stated above.

Under these circumstances, the United States Government is surprised that the Government of the U.S.S.R. finds it possible to talk of "provocations," "execution of warlike mission," including "the delivery of atomic bombs to their target."

The Government of the United States considers

it necessary to point out to the Soviet Government that, in recent weeks, numerous aerial incursions on the part of Soviet armed forces have taken place over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. These incursions were brought to the attention of the Soviet authorities by the responsible military authorities. No one thought of characterizing them as "provocations," or announcing retaliatory measures, which the Soviet Government threatens to take.

It appears to the Government of the United States that at the present time, more than ever, Governments should avoid complicating, by unfounded accusations, those incidents which inevitably occur. Only in this way will they be able to limit to proper proportions such difficulties as may arise from a crisis for which the Government of the United States is in no way responsible.

The tranquillity and security of peoples, to which the Soviet note refers, depend on the desire for peace of the Governments that lead them. The United States Government, like the Governments with which it is allied, has never deviated from this course. It hopes that the Government of the U.S.S.R. will devote itself to working in the same direction.

SOVIET NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 17²

Unofficial translation

On September 14, 1961, at 17 hours 08 minutes Moscow time, two military jet aircraft, model F-84, bearing recognition markings of the Federal Republic of Germany Bundeswehr, penetrated the territory of the German Democratic Republic in the area of the populated point of Elend (75 kilos southwest of Magdeburg).

Passing over the cities of Thale and Quedlinburg at an altitude of 6,000 meters, the aircraft then assumed an altitude of 9,000 meters, and, in the area south of the city of Stassfurt, entered the strip of the air corridor Berlin-Frankfurt-on-Main. The violator aircraft followed this corridor to the area west of Treuenbrietzen, where, sharply losing altitude, they turned northeast and, at 17 hours 29 minutes, landed at the French military airport of Tegel in West Berlin.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the occupation authorities of the Western Powers are trying to depict this brazen diversion as the consequence of "technical troubles". The French representative in the

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow on Sept. 26 (press release 663). Similar notes were delivered by the British and French Embassies at Moscow on the same date.

² Delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Moscow on Sept. 17 by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar notes were delivered to the British and French Embassies on the same date.

Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) stated that the Bundeswehr aircraft were in West Berlin because of "loss of orientation" and had landed at the French military airport with the permission of the occupation authorities. According to the version launched by official representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, the aircraft under reference, returning from NATO maneuvers in France, lost their way because of a "thunderstorm", "malfunctioning of cabin instruments", and "lack of experience of the pilots", and, "inasmuch as the fuel was low, descended to earth and coincidentally landed at the West Berlin airport of Tegel".

All these so-called "distracting statements" were designed to deceive public opinion and cover tracks. The question concerns nothing more than a previously prepared provocation, the purpose of which is plain: to strain the situation in the world to the limit and kill in embryo any possibility of agreement between interested states on mature international problems.

The flight plan and its fulfillment by the crews of the aircraft completely refute the assertion about malfunctioning of cabin instruments and other tales about the aviators from the Bundeswehr having gone astray. Two-way radio communication was maintained between the West German airplanes, which flew more than 200 kilos (including more than 150 kilos in the Berlin-Frankfurt-on-Main corridor) over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and the airport at Tegel. The complicated maneuvering in course and altitude, the coordination of movement of both aircraft, and their precise guidance to the Tegel airport, could not have been accomplished with malfunctioning radio-navigational equipment.

It was not the Bundeswehr pilots who "lost their orientation", but the highly placed military and political leaders of Western Germany and those who stand behind them. It was their hand, accomplished in every sort of subversive actions, which maliciously sent military aircraft, which are intended not for pleasure flights but for the accomplishment of military tasks, including the delivery of atomic bombs to their target, deep into the territory of a sovereign state.

The reckless adventure of sending two fighter bombers of the Bundeswehr through the airspace of the German Democratic Republic is one of the most dangerous provocations which have been committed on the routes of communication with West Berlin and in West Berlin

itself by militaristic circles of the Federal Republic of Germany with the support of the occupation authorities of the Western Powers. It is understandable that the Soviet Government cannot disregard these facts.

The Government of the United States of America has recently more than once made statements about the duty of all states to refrain from any acts which increase tension and the threat to international peace. However, unfortunately, there are not a few evidences of the fact that the Government of the United States of America does not attach great significance to its own appeals. American occupation authorities not only have not taken any steps to suppress the subversive activity of the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin, but, as is apparent, are ready to place the air corridors in West Berlin at the disposal of militarists and revanchists.

Even if it were granted that the American authorities might not have known of the provocation which had been prepared, which in and of itself is improbable, could that dispel the anxiety of the peoples of the fate of peace in Europe, with which the West German militarists are irresponsibly playing? The United States of America, France, and Britain, rearming the Federal Republic of Germany, frequently boast that they somehow are in complete control of the situation. Living in a world of such illusions, the Western Powers, however, could find themselves drawn into a devastating war against their own wills.

Declaring a most resolute protest to the Government of the United States of America in connection with the grossest aggressive act, violation of the airspace of the German Democratic Republic by military aircraft of the Bundeswehr and their flight through the air corridors to West Berlin, the Soviet Government warns that, in the future, in similar cases, military violator-warplanes, which do not submit to a demand to land at a designated place, will be destroyed by the use of all means, including rockets.

The intensifying provocative sallies of militarists and revanchists of the Federal Republic of Germany once more with all persuasiveness show how mature has become the necessity of the conclusion of a German peace treaty and normalization on that basis of the situation in West Berlin in order to protect the tranquillity and security of peoples.

Moscow, *September 17, 1961*

A Pacific Partnership

by *Walter P. McConaughy*
*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I consider it a great privilege to have been invited to address this sixth biennial Conference of Japan-American Mayors and Chamber of Commerce Presidents.

Ten years ago, when the first of these conferences was held in Tokyo, we did not hear much talk about people-to-people diplomacy. But a farsighted group of municipal officials on both sides of the Pacific realized, a short 6 years after the end of the Pacific war, that Japan and the United States were destined to become partners in progress for a better life for both peoples. Translating this thought to action, they started one of the most vital and most effective manifestations of people-to-people diplomacy among the many that have since grown up between our two countries. The impressive vitality of your organization is symbolic of the great vitality that today infuses all aspects of Japanese-American relations.

I should like to convey to you today my observations on the present state of this Pacific partnership. To understand this relationship, I should like first to view it against the panorama of eastern Asia as a whole, starting about a century ago. (You will recall that only last year we observed the centennial celebrations of Japanese-United States diplomatic relations.²) Nearly a century ago, then, a fundamental revolution began in Asia. It began, perhaps, as a defensive reaction against the impact of the West but soon became something much greater. It became, and is now, a popular revolution. The peoples of the Pacific are determined to win for themselves freedom—political

and social freedom, but equally important and necessary, freedom from grinding poverty, freedom from ignorance and illiteracy, freedom from disease, freedom from hunger.

The Challenge of Communism

Seen in the perspective of history, I believe it is fair to say that this revolution has entered into a critical phase. The people of Asia have become impatient for rapid fulfillment of their aspirations. At the same time a new challenge has been added to the tremendous political, economic, and social difficulties in the path of the fulfillment of the revolution. This challenge is the claim that only communism can meet the material aspirations of the world's peoples. What is not mentioned in this deceptive Communist propaganda is that it is predicated on the sacrifice of the aspirations for freedom and for the recognition of the dignity of the individual.

In this picture of Asia in ferment, Japan offers a focus of solid encouragement, a confirmation of faith that man, however impatient for the good things of life for his children, need not sacrifice his liberty.

Japan is in the vanguard of this revolution in Asia. Having achieved equality with the technologically advanced nations, and sharing the values of an open society, Japan is moving forward to a new stage of growth and progress. Japan is the equal partner, politically as well as economically, of the nations of the world sharing the same dedication to freedom, the same conviction as to the importance and dignity of the individual. Japan has established a firm base for democracy, for the exercise of the traditional liberties, and for the enjoyment of the opportunities that freedom yields. In particular, an entirely new kind

¹Address made before the Conference of Japan-American Mayors and Chamber of Commerce Presidents at Portland, Oreg., on Sept. 18 (press release 639).

²For background, see BULLETIN of May 9, 1960, p. 744; May 23, 1960, p. 826; and June 6, 1960, p. 909.

of relationship has developed between Japan and the United States, an across-the-board partnership in which the two countries are working in concert toward goals impossible for either country to achieve alone.

It is as significant as it is relevant that Japan has been singled out by the Communist powers for special attention, special threats, particularly in the recent period. The pace of Japan's progress in freedom is a vital challenge to the Communist system of life under coercion.

The sudden callous resumption by the Soviet Union of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere reminds us that this new type of relationship, this interdependence, has grown up in the era of the cold war. Some aspects of the relationship which has grown up between Japan and the United States are responsive to the threat posed by communism. We have, for instance, a special security relationship with Japan. Nevertheless, mutual security is only one part of the partnership between Japan and the United States. The United States-Japan partnership is based on common objectives in the unfinished revolution for a better world, a world of peace and a world of prosperity and tranquillity. It is not dependent on outside stimulus; it will last long after the worldwide Communist offensive has vanished.

Two-Way Street of Consultation

In the political field the concept of the partnership involves first and foremost the idea of the dialog, the two-way street of consultation between the leaders of our respective governments. The emphasis here, as in any true partnership, has to be placed upon the necessity, at all times, for a completely frank, uninhibited exchange of views. This is perhaps best illustrated by the recently concluded visit to Washington of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda.³ Mr. Ikeda did not come to the United States because there existed some urgent problem in relations between the two countries which could be settled only by a meeting of President and Prime Minister. Happily, there are no such problems in our relations with Japan. On the contrary, Mr. Ikeda came here at the invitation of President Kennedy so that the two might consult together not only on bilateral matters, such as trade and economic relations, but also on the

³ *Ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57.

major questions that face the world today, such as Berlin, the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, and disarmament. All of these issues were discussed in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, which is the hallmark of the United States-Japan partnership.

These talks were fruitful in many ways, and from them have emerged a series of new and potentially very useful institutions. Perhaps the most important of them is the new Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, a body which will consist of our Secretaries of State, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, and Labor and their Japanese ministerial counterparts, who will meet alternately in Japan and in the United States. Their first meeting will be held in Japan in November of this year. This Committee will be the senior coordinating group for all of the partnership's trade and economic affairs, including such matters as balance of payments between the two countries, the flow of investments and dividends, trade relationships with other countries, and assistance to newly emerging countries. This Committee will also be the forum for discussion of such matters as Japan's need to expand its trade abroad and its access to a reasonable share of the American market and also Japan's ability to liberalize conditions for entry into its own internal market for American and other products. You might sum up the role of the joint Economic Committee in these words: It will view the totality of Japanese-American trade and economic relations, will plan for their future, and will attempt to iron out any rough spots as they arise.

A second institution to emerge from the Ikeda-Kennedy talks was a joint committee on cultural matters, to be made up of outstanding figures from the academic and intellectual worlds of the two nations. Both our cultures are exceptionally rich and varied, and each has much to contribute to the other. We expect this committee to survey the entire field of cultural relations between the United States and Japan—the official exchange programs such as those established under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt acts, the programs of the various private foundations, and the more informal relationships which have grown up between Japanese and American universities and learned societies. The joint committee will explore all of these aspects of Japanese-American cultural rela-

tions. In this concept we have in mind no mere homogenization of the two cultures, for that would make each lose something of its own identity and vital spirit. Nor have we in mind a simple numerical increase in the number of scholars traveling between Japan and the United States. Instead, what we are aiming at is a joint venture to explore the values and wellsprings of our respective cultures, to examine their impact upon each other, and to enlarge the contribution each can make to the enrichment of the other.

Another outgrowth of the Washington talks is the establishment of a Joint United States-Japan Scientific Committee, which will meet later this year to mark out areas in the sciences in which Japanese and American scientists can fruitfully assist each other. This will involve not only the investigation of methods by which we can more profitably exchange information—perhaps through entities like an institute for the translation of scientific papers and literature—but also actual joint projects in which Japanese and American scientists can work side by side. We have already in the planning stage two joint Japanese-American ventures in outer space: one a communications satellite project, and the other a radiation measuring rocket probe. We expect the Scientific Committee will explore other areas on the frontier of man's knowledge in which our scientists can collaborate to our mutual benefit.

This, then, is a sketch of the kind of institutional framework which we have been creating for this new venture in interdependence. But what I have so far described is only the skeleton; muscle and sinew will have to be added. These committees, and the several other bodies created in the past, will achieve substance when the people of both countries, acting in bodies such as this conference, will lend their advice, assistance, and continuing support.

I think we have to recognize that this is not going to be an easy undertaking. Differences of language, culture, and customs present formidable obstacles to understanding. I am convinced, however, that there are enough men in both countries who are willing to take the trouble to cross the language barrier, who are willing to work and persevere to build a partnership, and who are willing to solve problems as they arise by joint action in a spirit of mutuality and cooperation. I believe that a partnership of this kind, actively

shared and nourished by citizens of both countries, can be fruitful beyond all expectations.

Japan's 10-Year Economic Plan

I note with great satisfaction that the Japanese Government has recently embarked upon a 10-year economic plan to double the national income and thus to raise the living standards of the Japanese people to a level among the very highest in the world. I cannot stress emphatically enough the tremendous significance of this plan, not only because whatever affects the economic health of one of our best customers will sooner or later affect our own but also because of the example which will be set for less developed nations to follow. The essential, harrowing question of our time is this: "Is individual freedom consistent with rapid economic growth?" I am confident that Japan, one of the four leading industrial complexes of the world, is already providing an affirmative answer to this central question.

Our stake in this bold venture undertaken by Japan is very nearly as great as that of Japan itself. We Americans understand that Japan cannot succeed in this undertaking unless she can achieve access on reasonable terms to a fair share of the market in the United States and elsewhere in the free world. I do not mean, of course, that we have any intention of driving American manufacturers out of business, and I do not mean that we intend to encourage any mass invasion of America by Japanese products. But I do mean that we have a real, a very great interest in seeing to it that Japan expands its market. In return our Japanese friends will surely recognize their obligation to dismantle as rapidly as possible the remaining quantitative controls over imports into Japan. If we continue to approach this problem in a spirit of good will and understanding on both sides, as I am sure we shall, there is every reason to expect that the results will be mutually satisfactory and in the general interest.

There is, finally, another highly significant area for future action by the Japanese-American partnership that I wish to call to your attention—the challenge posed by the large number of newly independent and economically less developed nations of the world. As we all know, the United States is vitally interested in assisting these nations and has devoted several tens of billions of dollars to this purpose. Japan, as an Asian na-

tion and as the only Asian nation which has thus far created a modern, industrialized economy, also has much to offer to these new nations. Japan's possession of the most vigorously expanding economy in the entire world gives her a position of considerable authority from which to speak. There is thus a vital and unique contribution which Japan can make, in terms of technical assistance and advice, as well as in terms of money and capital equipment. Operating in conjunction with one another, the efforts of each reinforcing and complementing those of the other, the partnership of Japan and the United States can effectively meet this great challenge of the decade in a manner which would be impossible for either acting alone.

Building Toward the World of Tomorrow

In the past 16 years many strong links have been forged between our two nations. This important conference is a shining example of such enduring, valuable, and far-reaching links. Our peoples and our cultures have their destinies so comingled that separation would only impoverish both nations. We share the same road to the future. Our journey along this road will not be without danger, hazard, or challenge. But I am certain that the combined strength, wisdom, and determination of your countrymen and mine will be worthy of any trials which we may face and that together we shall be able not only to surpass the demands of this troubled age but to contribute most significantly toward the transition to a safer and happier one.

Those developmental forces which over the past century have so insistently, precipitately, and perhaps prematurely juxtaposed the world's peoples have vastly exacerbated the problems of their relationships. Those same forces, however, have also afforded the most remarkable tools—in transportation and communication, in medicine, education, and pedagogy—for the solution of those

problems. The four industrial centers of the world possess these tools in great abundance, but the manner of their use will make all the difference in the nature of our future life on this planet.

The ideology of Communist countries was conceived and born in the early days of the industrial revolution which has presented mankind with both problem and promise in such overwhelming plenty. These Communist nations have for the most part clung to a dogmatic answer to both problem and promise, geared to limited understanding of the social dislocations which in those early days were attendant upon industrialization. Their achievements have been too much impelled by fear and hate, implemented by ruthless regimentation, and put to the services of a type of power politics which the world must rapidly outgrow if it is to survive in safety.

In this situation it is of crucial importance to all mankind that the other great industrial centers of the world, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, use the powerful tools of the modern world in the most enlightened manner and for the most constructive national and world purposes—and in as much concert as appears practicable—in building toward the world of tomorrow.

The United States-Japan partnership, therefore, important as it is intrinsically, is also important to the future of millions of people who may scarcely be aware of its reality. I am confident that our two peoples and their leaders will measure up to our responsibilities inherent in this larger context as well.

In conclusion I am very glad to convey to you, on behalf of the United States, the expression of our complete confidence that this partnership—a partnership of peoples as well as of governments—will grow and prosper in the years ahead and will become one of the most steadfast foundations of progress, friendship, and peace in the world.

Southern Africa in Transition

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

Ladies and gentlemen, before taking up the text of what I had prepared for you tonight, I must take note of a very great tragedy which has befallen us all in the death of Secretary-General [Dag] Hammarskjold of the United Nations. His plane, as you know, crashed in Northern Rhodesia as it was carrying him on a mission of peace and conciliation.

The United Nations and the Government of the Congo have for more than a year sought to maintain the integrity of the Congolese nation against separatist and secessionist movements. A crisis, unfortunately involving violence, has lately erupted over this issue in the Katanga province.² It was on his way to meet Mr. [Moishe] Tshombe, the leader of Katanga, that the Secretary-General met an untimely death.

Our grief is profound tonight. But if Mr. Hammarskjold is lost to the United Nations and the world, it is our hope that his mission of conciliation will be energetically pursued and the U.N. will succeed soon in restoring Congolese unity.

Just lately my wife and I have returned from an extensive trip in Africa, the second since President Kennedy appointed me to my present duties in the Department of State.³ I have now visited 14 of the independent countries of Africa and 12 of the dependent territories. Two more trips this

year will cover all the remaining nations and the principal territories, excepting the Republic of South Africa, where there wasn't a mutually convenient time for a visit.

Let me tell you something of my findings in this most recent trip.

Our point of departure was the Republic of the Ivory Coast, a country of 3 million people situated in the great rain-forest arc which extends along the western bulge of the continent. We were there to help celebrate the first anniversary of the independence of the Ivory Coast. It was my great privilege to join with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, with John H. Johnson, the distinguished Negro publisher from Chicago, and with our Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, R. Borden Reams, in representing the U.S. Government at these ceremonies. I wish time permitted my telling you of the tremendous spirit of these good people, about their beautiful and modern capital city, and about the example of progress they have set in their first year of independence. There is a lesson, too, in the now cordial and mutually beneficial relationship between the people of the Ivory Coast and of France. You will have to take my word for it that these things speak volumes about the promise of Africa's future.

Then we traveled to southern Africa. Here we visited two more of the 18 African countries which have come to independence since the beginning of 1960—the Republic of Gabon in west Africa and the Malagasy Republic on the island of Madagascar. Both are flourishing countries which are moving steadily forward under responsible governments. I think the world can expect much from both of them.

Tonight, however, I'd like to deal mainly with the dependent territories which lie to the south

¹ Address made before the Negro Trade Union Leadership Council at Philadelphia, Pa., on Sept. 18 (press releases 641 and 641A).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 550.

³ For an address made by Assistant Secretary Williams in Salisbury, Federation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on Aug. 25, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 600.

of the Republic of the Congo. Much of this area has been attractive to European settlement for some 400 years, and here we find the highest relative white population in sub-Saharan Africa, running up to about 25 percent in the Republic of South Africa. In the Congo and to the north the big question is the political and economic development of now-independent nations, whereas to the south the big question is the extension of the franchise to black Africans in areas with sizable white minorities. Two of these areas, Angola and Mozambique, are vast territories administered by Portugal. The other six are under British administration and reflect great contrasts. Let me begin by discussing these British areas.

Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland

Least developed are three territories which are only beginning to impinge on the preoccupied mind of America and much of the rest of the world. These are Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which lie along the borders of the Republic of South Africa, and Basutoland, which lies wholly within South Africa. Together they hold a population of 1¼ millions, of whom 11,000 are whites. Bechuanaland is larger than Texas but appears to be poorly favored in natural endowments. Basutoland has voted for its own self-government under British protection with all men having an equal vote. Swaziland is working on a new constitution giving more black African participation, and Bechuanaland, too, is moving forward. We shall certainly hear more about this trend, not least because of its contrast with the retrogressive political and social philosophy of *apartheid* being practiced in neighboring South Africa.

The Rhodesias and Nyasaland

The most developed, the most complex, and the most challenging territories we visited are Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. Here are three rather well defined territories, each in a different stage of political evolution, each affected by a different balance between the races and by varying degrees of economic progress, but all linked together in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The area is one of considerable economic potential, with great cities, mines, plantations, and factories already well developed. The combined populations total 8,330,000, of which 308,000 are of European stock.

A heated political dialog is taking place in these countries, between the black African majorities along with some white liberals on the one hand and the bulk of the white minority on the other. The British Government is presiding over the debate and tempering its passions. Let me say here that British administrators have done much to encourage African advancement, political education, and progressive evolution toward the goals of democratic self-government by all the people and an interracial society.

The goal of self-government by all the people is acknowledged to be right by all responsible elements in the three territories. The subject of the dialog, then, is the rate, the speed of transition to majority rule. The political party of Sir Roy Welensky, with strong white support particularly in Southern Rhodesia, believes in a gradual pace. Northern Rhodesia tends to be more progressive and is working on a new constitution. The African nationalist parties of Dr. Banda, Kenneth Kaunda, and Joshua Nkomo are pressing for constitutional changes which would give full voice, at the earliest date, to the black African majorities. Dr. Banda has of course now achieved self-government for the black majority in Nyasaland under British protection.

Inevitably tension has accompanied this great debate. Lately there has been sporadic violence in Northern Rhodesia, where many African nationalists feel they have been denied adequate progress under a proposed new constitution. Just last week the British Government announced at least a partial reopening of this question.

Racial Accommodation

In the Rhodesias and Nyasaland there is a problem *within* a problem. Besides constitutional transition there is the vital process of accommodation between races, of building a truly democratic interracial society. This goal is acknowledged by all responsible parties and has constitutional support. A good beginning and much progress has been achieved, but again the difficulty and the argument are about the pace of progress.

The success of an interracial society in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has tremendous bearing on what is going to happen in the way of black African participation in government in Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic of South Africa. Consequently America and the world have a great

interest in the successful development of what the Federation calls a partnership policy.

Here we are very close to a subject of intense concern to Americans, who know what is at stake in the question of racial equality. We too have long had the goal of a true interracial society. We have come a greater distance toward this goal, which is set forth in the law of the land and which our Government is pledged to realize. Yet we must be humbly aware how much must yet be done, how many acts of faith and courage will be necessary from our leaders and from all men of good will.

We have stated it as a cornerstone of our foreign policy that we hope for the peoples of Africa what we hope for ourselves in building and perfecting our own society. We must therefore expect those peoples, black and white alike, to observe with very great interest how we are getting on with the job, just as we observe their progress. Your effort here—and ours in Washington—are thus joined.

Let us, on our side, look with understanding on the problems which are being worked out by the peoples and governments of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Let us acknowledge that a promising start has been made. And let us wish, for all those concerned, two things: understanding and persistence in moving ahead. I should add that the U.S. Government hopes to be able to assist in a more rapid extension of educational opportunity in the three territories, helping thereby in the preparation for self-government.

Angola and Mozambique

This brings me to Angola and Mozambique. Located on the west coast of Africa, Angola extends south from the Congo border. In size it is larger than Texas and California together, and its population is about 4½ million. Of this number some 250,000 have held Portuguese citizenship. Mozambique, on the east coast, is larger than Texas and has a population of just over 6½ million.

The Portuguese have ruled Angola and Mozambique for more than four centuries, and until 1951 the two territories had the status of colonies. In that year the Government in Lisbon adopted laws under which these colonies became "overseas provinces," and the Portuguese firmly maintain that they are integral parts of Portugal.

This has become a point of controversy in the United Nations, where the last General Assembly adopted a resolution⁴ which includes Portugal among other nations having a responsibility under article 73 of the charter to report to the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Portuguese Government has declared its refusal to comply with this injunction.

This viewpoint of the Portuguese stands in sharp contrast to that of the other principal colonial powers. The British and the French have deliberately pursued a policy of preparing their dependent territories for self-government and eventual independence. That is why the great majority of new African nations have emerged to freedom peacefully. Only in the Congo, which did not enjoy this preparation, has independence been followed by turmoil.

Political self-expression has been possible for the African peoples of Angola and Mozambique only to an extremely limited degree. Until just last month, Portuguese law—the so-called *indigena* law—divided the overseas populations into two categories, "civilized" and "noncivilized." In Angola, for example, the 250,000 persons who were considered "civilized" included only about 30,000 Africans, who had achieved this status under the official policy of "assimilation." To become an *assimilado* an African had to become a Christian and fill certain strict requirements as to education and income. The "noncivilized" millions could not under any circumstances vote or hold office. They lived under state protection and control and were subject to a system of directed labor during part of each year.

Until March of this year Portuguese Africa remained outwardly calm. Then in northern Angola a rebellion broke out and led to great violence and the loss of thousands of lives, both Portuguese and African. Military reinforcements from Portugal have restored control of urban centers in the disputed area, but the end of the fighting is not in sight.

As you probably know, the U.N. General Assembly debated the question of Angola last April. On April 20 the Assembly adopted a resolution⁵ deploring the violence in Angola and calling on the Portuguese to effect reforms leading to self-

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/1542 (XV).

⁵ U.N. doc. A/RES/1603 (XV).

determination for the peoples of Angola. An Angola subcommittee was set up to report on the situation. On June 9 the Security Council reaffirmed these views.⁶ The United States voted for both resolutions, which were adopted by large majorities.

In our visit to Angola we saw much evidence of internal tension and we found considerable recognition among the Portuguese of the importance of reforms. Now at the end of August, as much in response to these Portuguese settler views as to the votes in the U.N., a series of reforms have been announced. Most notably, the *indigena* law has been abolished and all inhabitants of Portuguese Africa have been granted constitutional equality. The average African will still be unable to vote and will have little or no participation in government, however, because, as is true for all Portuguese citizens, he must pass a literacy test and comply with a tax proviso. Literacy in Portuguese Africa is well below 10 percent. From this it will be seen that rapid educational advancement is a requisite for full realization of political equality.

The new reforms are of course most welcome from our point of view, and we trust that they will be made politically and socially effective. How greatly they will resolve the issues in conflict I cannot say. Much will depend on the Portuguese estimate of the lateness of the hour in Africa and whether their response is timely and also sufficiently broad. Ambassador Stevenson, speaking in the Security Council last March 15, outlined a frame of reference which we believe is still pertinent, using these words:⁷

The United States would be remiss in its duties as a friend of Portugal if it failed to express honestly its conviction that step-by-step planning within Portuguese territories and its acceleration is now imperative for the successful political and economic and social advancement of all inhabitants under Portuguese administration—advancement, in brief, toward full self-determination.

Angola and Mozambique have real promise for all of their peoples under a progressive evolution, and I sincerely hope that we have now seen the beginning of such an evolution.

⁶ For a statement made by Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, and text of a resolution, see BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 88.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 497.

Attitudes Toward Change

Permit me now, before closing, to touch on one general impression gained in my trip.

In a speech in South Africa early in 1960 Prime Minister Macmillan said that "the wind of change is blowing through the continent." His words were intended to bring reluctant or fearful minds to face up to extending political and civil rights equally to all men.

Since he spoke, 17 new nations have been born to independence in Africa, but in the dependent territories I visited (as well as in the Republic of South Africa, which I have not visited) there are still many influential citizens who would like to believe they can isolate themselves and preserve political privileges with no change, or only very little change. In defense of this attitude they tend to look at the Congo as if what has happened there is typical, when clearly it is the exception to the rule among the newly independent countries.

Unfortunately there are some areas of white African opinion that believe every African nationalist is a Communist and subscribes to a program of exterminating the whites or driving them out. This is obviously untrue. Nationalist leaders by and large welcome white participation in their countries' affairs, recognizing the contribution they can make. It is true, however, that they believe that white Africans must ultimately be content with the same privileges as black Africans.

It is my hope that, increasingly, people will become better informed about and will take heart from the examples of successful independent governments elsewhere in Africa. I should add that our own policies for Africa are very much bound up in this question. To the extent we can help these new governments build up strong and stable societies, we shall be contributing to a relaxation of irrational and potentially dangerous fears. Meanwhile we must also recognize how important it is to see things through to a successful conclusion in the Congo. And always it is important to make our own multiracial society an outstanding success.

My friends, in closing let me say again how important it is that Americans take the kind of interest in Africa that you have shown in establishing this scholarship award. It is a credit to you, to Philadelphia, and to the United States.

If your example is repeated often enough, the future of African-American friendship will be virtually assured.

Assistant Secretary Williams Plans Two More Trips to Africa

The Department of State announced on September 26 (press release 666) that Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams would leave Washington September 29 for Rabat, Morocco. This will be the first stop in his third official trip to Africa since he was appointed by President Kennedy to the Department of State. In addition to Morocco, he will visit Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Tunisia, Libya, and the Sudan between October 1 and 24. Mr. Williams will be accompanied by Mrs. Williams, Department of State aides, and representatives of the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare and the International Cooperation Administration.

In two separate trips earlier this year, Assistant Secretary Williams visited 16 countries in central Africa as well as 2 independent states and 8 territories in southeast Africa.

Assistant Secretary Williams is making this trip in order to convey personally the good wishes and interest of the United States to the governments and peoples of the north and west African nations and to gain firsthand impressions of the area. He will also consult with members of our embassies and consulates.

A fourth trip is planned to begin on November 27 and continue to December 17, at which time Assistant Secretary Williams will visit west and central African nations which were not included in his previous visits.

CENTO Telecommunications Project Contract Signed

Press release 674 dated September 29

The Department of State announced on September 29 the signing of a telecommunications project contract between the Radio Corporation of

America (RCA) and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) on behalf of the U.S. Government. The project eventually will link the three regional members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The signing ceremony took place in the office of D. A. FitzGerald, Deputy Director of Operations for ICA, who signed for the United States. Douglas C. Lynch, vice president of RCA, signed for the company. Among those attending were representatives of the three regional countries and officials of RCA, ICA, and the Department of State.

This occasion marks the start of actual construction on an undertaking which has been the subject of cooperative effort by the United States, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan for over 3 years, under the sponsorship of CENTO. The project illustrates the peaceful objectives of CENTO as well as CENTO's usefulness as a vehicle for regional collaboration. Four sovereign nations, in partnership, have worked together from the outset in determining the major features of a modern telecommunications system. The system is designed not only to provide communications between Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi but to tie in many other communities. It is designed to take account of existing and future branch lines along the route. The equipment will be owned by the three host countries and operated integrally with their existing telecommunications systems.

The project is a partnership venture in the financial sense also in that the host countries are making large contributions which include providing all of the necessary buildings, several hundred miles of access roads, and cash contributions to cover the local-currency costs of construction. The \$16,490,000 construction contract is financed largely by the United States but also in part by the host countries. The United States is providing all foreign exchange costs for manufacturing the equipment, and for its installation and testing.

The 3,000-mile CENTO telecommunications system will be one of the longest microwave systems in the world. When completed it will contribute importantly to the realization of one of CENTO's principal economic objectives—the improvement of communications between the countries of the region.

Ambassador Harriman Visits Southeast Asia

Following are departure statements made by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman on September 18 at Rangoon and on September 20 at Vientiane. Ambassador Harriman was visiting southeast Asia to discuss further with Asian leaders matters relating to the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, which convened at Geneva May 16.¹

RANGOON

The talks which His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma and I have had during the past 3 days have been frank and useful and have given us an opportunity to discuss the wide range of subjects of mutual concern. We agreed that our common objective is a truly neutral and sovereign Laos, independent of all outside interferences, to be achieved by peaceful means.

We discussed the various issues being negotiated at the 14-nation conference at Geneva, and I found a considerable measure of understanding between us. There are a number of points now unresolved in Geneva which can only be settled after the arrival of a united delegation representing a government of national unity. Parallel of the conference in Geneva are the negotiations between the three princes for formation of such a government. We agreed on the need for an early successful outcome of these negotiations. In the meantime, both of us stressed the importance of strict observance of a cease-fire by all concerned.

I raised with His Highness the question of the Americans held in Xieng Khouang. He assured me they would be released as soon as the new government was formed and in the meantime could receive letters and packages.

His Highness and I have both expressed to Prime Minister U Nu and his Government our great appreciation for the hospitality and many courtesies which they have shown us during our stay here.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 15, 1961, p. 710; June 5, 1961, p. 844; June 26, 1961, p. 1023; and July 10, 1961, p. 85.

VIENTIANE

During my visit to Laos I have had the honor of being received by His Majesty the King. I had the opportunity to assure him of the President's deep interest in and concern for the future of Laos and of my Government's support for His Majesty and his Government. I expressed the unswerving determination of the United States to assist in the achievement of a truly independent and neutral Laos through peaceful means.

I have had fruitful discussions with His Highness the Prime Minister, Prince Boun Oum; the Deputy Prime Minister, General Phoumi Nosa-van; and members of the Royal Government.

In these meetings we discussed the negotiations going on at the 14-nation conference in Geneva and the parallel discussions among the three princes. We considered together the manner in which our common goal of a peaceful and independent Laos could be reached. I informed His Majesty and the Royal Government fully about my talks in Rangoon with Prince Souvanna Phouma, and I expressed the hope that the three princes could meet soon again to come to an agreement upon a government of national unity.

I am grateful to His Majesty for his graciousness in receiving me and for the warm hospitality and courtesies shown me by members of his Government.

U.S. Makes Additional Quantities of Uranium 235 Available

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 26

Progress in using atomic energy for peaceful purposes is evident in the numerous national and international programs for scientific research and for the development of nuclear power and other applications. Many of the current projects and those contemplated for the future are based on the use of enriched uranium. I am announcing today a further step by the United States to meet the prospective needs for this material.

I have determined under section 41 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that the amount of

enriched uranium to be made available for peaceful uses at home and abroad will be increased to a total of 165,000 kilograms of contained uranium 235. Of this total 100,000 kilograms is to be available for distribution within the United States under section 53 of the Atomic Energy Act and 65,000 kilograms for distribution to other countries under section 54. These amounts have been recommended by the Atomic Energy Commission with the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The material will be distributed as required over a period of years and will be subject to prudent safeguards against unauthorized use.

This action increases the amounts of uranium 235 made available by previous determination announced on February 22, 1956,¹ and July 3, 1957.² The new amounts are estimated to cover present commitments and those expected to be made during the next few years under domestic licenses and foreign agreements. The purpose of this announcement is to provide continuing assurance of the availability of enriched uranium for peaceful programs contemplated at home and abroad. As those programs develop in the future, it will undoubtedly be necessary to make further determinations to meet their requirements. The capacity of the United States for producing enriched uranium is sufficient to meet all foreseeable needs for peaceful uses in addition to our defense needs.

A discussion of the new determination is contained in the attached statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

STATEMENT BY GLENN T. SEABORG CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 26

The President's announcement today that the amount of enriched uranium to be made available for peaceful uses at home and abroad has been increased to a total of 165,000 kilograms of contained uranium 235 is an important step in the advancement of peaceful applications of atomic energy. Of this total, the 100,000 kilograms for distribution within the United States and the

65,000 kilograms for distribution to other countries were recommended by the Atomic Energy Commission to cover existing commitments and those expected to be made during the next few years under domestic licenses and foreign agreements, including materials for research, test, and power reactors. The availability of material for peaceful uses in AEC's own facilities is not part of this determination.

The last Presidential determination was announced on July 3, 1957, and brought the total of material available to 100,000 kilograms of uranium 235, divided equally between domestic and foreign uses. As explained by the AEC at that time, the 100,000-kilogram figure was in units of equivalent output of highly enriched uranium from United States production plants. However, most of the uranium to be made available will not be highly enriched in uranium 235, and the domestic licenses and foreign agreements are in terms of kilograms of uranium 235 actually contained in the material supplied. Therefore, for simplicity, the new determination is expressed in kilograms of *contained* uranium 235. The total of 165,000 kilograms of contained uranium 235 to be available is estimated as the production equivalent of about 140,000 kilograms of uranium 235 in highly enriched material, so that the new determination represents an increase of 40 percent over the previous total.

The Presidential determination of enriched uranium to be available for peaceful uses is based on anticipated needs for present projects and those expected to start during the next few years. On earlier occasions the foreign and domestic requirements were estimated to be about equal, and thus the quantities of material determined to be available for domestic and foreign distribution were identical or nearly so. The fact that more enriched uranium presently is being made available for domestic than foreign uses reflects, for the moment at least, a somewhat more rapid increase in the domestic needs of nuclear industry for enriched uranium than in the foreign needs but does not necessarily establish a precedent for future determinations. As new requirements for enriched uranium develop with expanded use of atomic energy at home and abroad, the quantity of material to be made available for distribution by the AEC will be reexamined periodically.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

² *Ibid.*, July 22, 1957, p. 146.

Allocation of enriched uranium to a reactor project includes material for the fuel loading, for fuel consumption over the period of the domestic license or foreign agreement, and for the "pipeline" associated with the manufacture and storage of fuel elements, cooling and shipment of irradiated fuel, and chemical processing of irradiated fuel to recover special nuclear material. The amount of uranium 235 contained in enriched uranium returned to the AEC is deducted from the amount supplied by the AEC in computing how much is available for further distribution. The material allocated to a reactor project may not be completely distributed for several decades.

As of June 30, 1961, there were in effect in the United States construction permits or operating licenses for 10 power reactors, 3 test reactors, 69 research reactors, and 14 critical-experiment facilities, in addition to 409 special nuclear material licenses for uses other than in reactors or critical-experiment facilities. Agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy are in effect between the United States and a large part of the free world, including 38 countries and West Berlin; 14 of these agreements provide for cooperation on power reactors. In addition, agreements are in effect with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Enriched uranium for peaceful purposes is distributed abroad only under agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy. These agreements are of two general types: those providing for the transfer of modest amounts of material for power as well as research and test reactors. All such agreements for cooperation contain a guarantee by the cooperating country that the material supplied will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Safeguard provisions allowing inspection of materials, facilities, and records by United States or international inspectors are also included, as appropriate.

The uranium 235 content of enriched uranium distributed abroad is normally limited to 20 percent. However, uranium containing up to 90 percent uranium 235 may be made available for research and test reactors and reactor experiments. Agreements providing for the transfer of such highly enriched uranium for these purposes or for the transfer of enriched uranium for power re-

actors contain comprehensive safeguard provisions. Agreements covering only the transfer of uranium containing up to 20 percent uranium 235 for research reactors contain more limited safeguard provisions.

Import Restrictions on Tung Oil and Tung Nuts To Be Studied

White House press release dated September 18

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to the Members of the U.S. Tariff Commission.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1961

DEAR SIRs: I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that there is reason to believe that the circumstances requiring the provisions of Proclamation No. 3378 of October 27, 1960,¹ issued pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which extends for three years commencing November 1, 1960, the import restrictions on tung oil and tung nuts, no longer exist and that such provisions may now be terminated.

It is requested that the Tariff Commission make a supplemental investigation under Section 22(d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, to determine whether the circumstances requiring said provisions of the aforementioned Proclamation no longer exist and such provisions may now be terminated.

The Commission's report of findings and recommendations should be submitted as soon as practicable.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

HONORABLE JOSEPH E. TALBOT
HONORABLE J. ALLEN OVERTON, JR.
HONORABLE WALTER F. SCHREIBER
HONORABLE GLENN W. SUTTON
HONORABLE WILLIAM E. DOWLING
*United States Tariff Commission
Washington, D.C.*

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1960, p. 835.

President Signs Bill Creating U.S. Disarmament Agency

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

With the signing of H.R. 9118 there is created the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.² This act symbolizes the importance the United States places on arms control and disarmament in its foreign policy.

The creation for the first time by act of Congress of a special organization to deal with arms control and disarmament matters emphasizes the high priority that attaches to our efforts in this direction. Our ultimate goal, as the act points out, is a world free from war and free from the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force is subordinated to the rule of law and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.

It is a complex and difficult task to reconcile through negotiation the many security interests of all nations to achieve disarmament, but the establishment of this Agency will provide new and better tools for this effort.

I am pleased and heartened by the bipartisan support this bill enjoyed in the Congress. The leaders of both political parties gave encouragement and assistance. The new Agency brings renewed hope for agreement and progress in the critical battle for the survival of mankind.

I want to express my thanks to the Members of the Congress—particularly who are here—who were specially interested. I am extremely sorry that Senator [Hubert H.] Humphrey, who was a particularly vigorous proponent of this legislation for many years in the Senate, is obliged to remain in Washington. And I want to add a special word of thanks to Mr. [John J.] McCloy, the disarmament adviser, who has given this entire matter his most constant attention.

I want to take this opportunity to announce that the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency set up by this legislation will be Mr. William Foster. He has been a consultant to Mr. McCloy in preparing the American plan which has been submitted to the United Nations General Assembly yesterday,³ and he and a group have been working for many months, full time, on this most important assignment.

I think that Mr. Salinger [Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary] can give this afternoon to any members of the press some of the biographical material. Mr. Foster has been a distinguished public servant for many years as a most active and leading official in the Marshall plan. He is a Republican, and I think his appointment indicates the bipartisan, national concern of both parties—and really, in a sense, all Americans—for this effort to disarm mankind with adequate safeguards.

So I want to express our appreciation to you, Mr. Foster, for taking on this assignment, and Mr. Salinger perhaps can fill in some of the details. Mr. Foster, as Director of this, has the rank of an Under Secretary of State, and his work will be most closely coordinated with the Secretary of State, with me and the White House, and with our representatives in the General Assembly.

Department Opposes Tariff on Lead and Zinc

Statement by Edwin M. Martin
*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

The subject of this statement is S. 1747, a bill to stabilize the mining of lead and zinc.

The Department of State testified before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Metals, and Fuels of

¹ Made at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 26 (White House (New York) press release).

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 17, 1961, p. 99; Sept. 4, 1961, p. 412; and Sept. 18, 1961, p. 492.

³ See p. 650.

¹ Read before the Senate Finance Committee by Sidney B. Jacques, Director, Office of International Resources, on Sept. 20 (press release 648).

the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee on one version of this bill.² Since that time the bill has been amended with respect to the subsidy provisions to reduce the price base for determining the subsidy but to increase the number of producers eligible for the stabilization payments, as well as the quantity upon which each may receive payments. The provisions which would raise the taxes on imported lead and zinc concentrates and metal and on numerous products are the same as originally proposed in S. 1747.

The Department of State, together with the other interested departments and agencies of this administration, recommended against the passage of this legislation and continues to be strongly opposed to its enactment. We believe that the program would prejudice the broader interests of the United States both in the development of its own economy and foreign trade and in its political relations with other countries.

The Department of State is keenly aware of the problems of this industry, especially in the areas where mines have declined, smelters have closed, and communities have experienced unemployment and business losses. The lead and zinc markets have been plagued by surpluses, caused primarily by reduced demand for these products, which has resulted in low prices. This condition of the industry has resulted from a number of different causes, including overexpansion induced by World War II, the Korean emergency, and the stockpiling program. In addition it is suffering from the difficulties that all mining industries experience when ore bodies that were once economic become marginal because the quality of the ore declines or markets shift or newer, lower cost supplies are developed. At the same time the markets for lead and zinc in the United States have declined from their 1955 peak due to inroads made by competitive materials and by changes in consumer taste—such as the development of the compact automobile.

Recognizing these problems, the administration was prepared to consider a subsidy to small miners to help them over this difficult period. The terms of such a subsidy were outlined by the Department of the Interior. It would provide stabilization payments for up to 750 tons each of lead and zinc the first year, 500 the second year, and 250 tons the third and last year. It would

contain proper safeguards against unwarranted windfall profits and was designed not to build up production that could not stand on its own feet in the future.

We believe the subsidy provisions in the bill before your committee to be too liberal. I leave to the Department of the Interior the assessment of the effect on the industry and the administrative difficulties. I understand, however, that such a subsidy could raise the production of lead and zinc by 40,000 tons or more for each metal. Such a volume would exert a downward pressure on prices, to the detriment of the unsubsidized sector of the industry. Such lower prices would cause concern to those friendly countries who depend on the U.S. market for a significant part of their sales of lead and zinc. Not only less developed countries such as Mexico and Peru depend on sales to the United States, but also Australia and Canada, which are important markets for American exports, need these earnings to help balance their accounts with us. Representatives of some of these countries have told us that the administration subsidy proposal would not injure them appreciably but that they were apprehensive of the proposal in S. 1747.

Tariff Provisions of S. 1747

Turning to the import tax provisions contained in title III of S. 1747, the Department of State earnestly hopes that they will not be approved. In the first place it would be inconsistent with the general policy of leaving adjustments in tariff rates to machinery set up in the Trade Agreements Act and other administrative arrangements and of not legislating directly on individual commodities. Such a change would discourage the countries with whom we must work to reduce barriers to our own trade.

When we imposed import quotas on lead and zinc concentrates and metal in 1958 under the escape-clause procedure of the Trade Agreements Act, the other countries who were members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and who suffered injury to their trade were entitled to ask us for compensation. They did not do so because they understood our problem and because they believed that our action was temporary and would be removed when conditions warranted. If we proceed to legislate increases in import duties there will be no reason why they should not ask

² BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 340.

for compensation. We would be obliged to offer reductions in some other tariff rates or perhaps to see these other countries raise barriers against us.

The tariff provisions of S. 1747 aim at the establishment of a domestic price for each of lead and zinc metal at between 13½ cents and 14½ cents per pound. There is good evidence that this is neither necessary nor wise from the point of view of the industry. Both metals have lost heavily from the impact of substitutes in the past decade. This process will be encouraged by the maintenance of a high price. While present prices may well be too low for a long-term balance between supply and demand, it will only compound the difficulty to aim at a price that is too high. The Department of State does not know the price level that will prove to be economically sound for lead and zinc, but the Department of the Interior has pointed out that economic forces probably would not let the prices for these metals reach 14½ cents per pound more than temporarily. We believe that the targets are too high and that other means should be used to achieve more modest goals.

The decline in the domestic market for lead and zinc has been the basic problem for the domestic industry. The quotas have not maintained the domestic price at acceptable levels because of this falloff in domestic demand. But this has been due to domestic factors and not to an increase in cheaper imports, since the quotas have limited imports to 80 percent of the 1953-57 average. If lead and zinc had maintained their markets over the past 5 years against domestic substitute materials, their sales would have been about 10 percent, or about 100,000 tons, higher. Few people would deny that the industry would have been prosperous under those conditions.

Symbolic Character of Lead and Zinc

Lead and zinc have been given a symbolic character by other countries which raises intense emotional and political reactions even in countries that are not substantially affected economically. This is especially true in Latin America but is remarkably present in other areas of the world. There is little doubt that more restrictive action on trade in these metals by the United States would be interpreted as a retreat from international cooperation as a means of solving economic problems. Coming at a time when we need the coop-

eration of others in reducing barriers to our trade, this would establish an unfavorable atmosphere.

The Department of State has been using its best efforts internationally to improve the position of lead and zinc and thus benefit the industry in this country. Through the International Lead and Zinc Study Group³ we regularly examine both the short-term and long-term problems in this field. Several actions have been tried to overcome the weak market prices in these metals. Sales were voluntarily restricted by some countries. Others cut their production. The United States has contracted to take 100,000 tons of surplus lead off the market through barter for our agricultural surpluses from producers who undertook to reduce their output. None of these actions have had the full effect desired. In the main, lack of success has been due to failure of demand in the United States to return to what has been normal levels in the past. The Study Group will meet again this October in Geneva. The clear intention on the part of the United States to continue attacking the problem multilaterally instead of taking unilateral action will contribute greatly to our international position in these times.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

- Disarmament Agency. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2180, a bill to establish a U.S. Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security. August 14-16, 1961. 352 pp.
- Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Testimony of Dr. Stefan T. Possony. June 16, 1961. S. Doc. 46. August 24, 1961. 100 pp.
- Promotion of United States Exports. Hearing before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 8381, a bill to amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, H.R. 7102 and H.R. 7103, bills to create an American Export Credits Guaranty Corporation, and H.R. 7266 and H.R. 8249, bills to encourage and promote the expansion through private enterprise of domestic exports in world markets. August 30, 1961. 156 pp.
- Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Report to accompany H.R. 8666. H. Rept. 1094. August 31, 1961. 42 pp.
- Amendments to the Budget Involving an Increase in Appropriations for the Agency for International Development. Communication from the President. H. Doc. 230. September 1, 1961. 2 pp.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, May 9, 1960, p. 758.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During September 1961

Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests	Geneva	Oct. 31, 1958- Sept. 9, 1961
22d International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 20-Sept. 3
15th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 20-Sept. 9
10th Pacific Science Congress	Honolulu	Aug. 21-Sept. 1
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Planning and Administration of National Community Development Programs.	Bangkok	Aug. 22-Sept. 16
South Pacific Commission: Women's Interests Training Seminar .	Apia, Western Samoa	Aug. 24-Sept. 22
U.N. ECOSOC Committee of Experts on Transportation of Dan- gerous Goods.	Geneva	Aug. 28-Sept. 1
GATT Working Party on the Review of Article XXXV	Geneva	Aug. 28-Sept. 6
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 10th Session.	New York	Aug. 28-Sept. 15
International Conference on Currency Counterfeiting	Copenhagen	Aug. 29-Sept. 1
ICAO Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other Than the Contracting Carrier.	Guadalajara, Mexico	Aug. 29-Sept. 18
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 12th Session . . .	Wellington	Aug. 31-Sept. 5
IA-ECOSOC First Inter-American Traffic Seminar	Washington	Sept. 4-8
U.N. ECAFE Asian Conference on Community Development. . . .	Bangkok	Sept. 4-8
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva	Sept. 4-8
International Criminal Police Organization: 30th General Assem- bly.	Copenhagen	Sept. 4-9
Caribbean Commission: 31st Meeting	San Juan	Sept. 5 (1 day)
International Seed Testing Association: Executive Committee . .	Wageningen, Netherlands. . . .	Sept. 5-7
Caribbean Organization: 1st Meeting	San Juan	Sept. 6-15
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 4th Session	Washington	Sept. 6-15
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 1st Session of Work- ing Party.	Washington	Sept. 6-15
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Industrial Statistics	Bangkok	Sept. 7-23
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport . .	Paris	Sept. 8-9
GATT Working Party on the Budget	Geneva	Sept. 11-15
U.N. ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs .	Geneva	Sept. 11-15
U.N. ECE Committee on Trade: 10th Session	Geneva	Sept. 11-18
Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses: 20th International Congress.	Baltimore	Sept. 11-19
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Sept. 11-22
Washington Foreign Ministers Conference	Washington	Sept. 14-16
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting . .	Long Beach, Calif.	Sept. 14-16
50th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union	Brussels	Sept. 14-22
UNESCO Executive Board Subcommittees	Paris	Sept. 14-22
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter- national Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Vienna	Sept. 18-22
ILO Tripartite Subcommittee of the Joint Maritime Commission on Seafarers' Welfare: 2d Session.	Geneva	Sept. 18-23
U.N. ECAFE Symposium on Dams and Reservoirs	Tokyo	Sept. 18-23
NATO Civil Defense Committee	Paris	Sept. 19-20
FAO International Conference on Fish in Nutrition	Washington	Sept. 19-27
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Sept. 22-25

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 28, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During September 1961—Continued

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 26th Session	Geneva	Sept. 25-26
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Road Traffic Accidents.	Geneva	Sept. 25-29
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 6th Session .	Madrid	Sept. 25-30
GATT Working Party on Swiss Accession	Geneva	Sept. 26-28
NATO Manpower Planning Committee	Paris	Sept. 27-28
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on General Conditions of Sale for Steel Products and Iron, Chromium, and Manganese Ores.	Geneva	Sept. 27-28

In Session as of September 30, 1961

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.	Geneva	May 16-
U.N. Sugar Conference	Geneva	Sept. 12-
4th ICAO North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Sept. 14-
WMO Commission for Aerology: 3d Session	Rome	Sept. 18-
U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session	New York	Sept. 19-
ILO Joint Maritime Commission: 19th Session	Geneva	Sept. 25-
GATT Council of Representatives to the Contracting Parties	Geneva	Sept. 25-
IAEA General Conference: 5th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 26-
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners	New Delhi	Sept. 26-

U.S. Submits Proposal for General and Complete Disarmament to U.N.

of the United Nations as a guide for the negotiation of a programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

U.N. doc. A/4891

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

SEPTEMBER 25, 1961

I have the honour to transmit the text of the proposal entitled "Declaration on Disarmament—The United States Programme for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", to which reference was made by President Kennedy in his address to the General Assembly today.¹

I would be grateful if this letter with its enclosure were circulated as soon as possible to all Members of the United Nations for the information of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

TEXT OF PROPOSED DECLARATION

The following is submitted by the United States of America as a proposed Declaration on Disarmament for consideration by the General Assembly

¹ See p. 619. For text of a U.S.—U.S.S.R. report to the General Assembly, with a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and supplementary U.S. documents, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 539.

DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT: A PROGRAMME FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD

The Nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfil their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent States adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a programme of

general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;

Call on the negotiating States:

(a) To develop the outline programme set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole programme has been achieved;

(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) Also to seek—without prejudice to progress on the disarmament programme—agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that programme;

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed

forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any State, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As States relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international co-operation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline programme for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament programme.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major Powers as permanent members and certain other States on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the States in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the programme and for such other expert study groups as may be

required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the United States and USSR and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant States. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the States party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any

such nation the information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other States, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear States shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating States and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating States and to the IDO of major military movements and manoeuvres, on a scale as

may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce counter-measures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centres, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the United Nations Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force—including nuclear, conventional, or CBR—contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations peace force.

(e) A United Nations peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the United States, USSR, and other militarily significant States shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, States shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations

will be able effectively to protect States against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The United Nations peace force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament programme, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behaviour, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the United Nations should have reached a point where the States of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III, progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no State would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened United Nations Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament programme would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force.

(b) The United Nations Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the United Nations Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all States under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

Security Council Debates Admission of New Members to U.N.

Following are two statements made on September 26 in the Security Council by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative, on the applications for U.N. membership of Mauritania, Outer Mongolia, and Sierra Leone.

MAURITANIA AND OUTER MONGOLIA

U.S./U.N. press release 3779

Let me first say that we are very happy to know that the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone, Dr. Karefa Smart, is here in the Council chamber this morning. And I would also like to express my pleasure that the Soviet Union has agreed to the prior consideration of the application for membership of Sierra Leone.

As to the order of our voting this morning, we would suggest that the Ceylonese motion on the application of Sierra Leone be considered first and then proceed to a vote on the Soviet motion.

As to the latter we are obliged to oppose the motion to take up Outer Mongolia before Mauritania, which is the effect of the Soviet proposal, as I understand it. Last fall the Republic of Mauritania was considered by the Security Council for membership in the United Nations, just as other new African states had been considered and promptly approved. But after the Security Council met last year, I remind you, the Soviet Union injected the question of Outer Mongolia into the discussion in an effort to create a so-called "package deal" and to justify thereby its decision to veto the application of Mauritania.¹ In short the application of Outer Mongolia was not even raised until after the Council had been, in fact, convened to consider Mauritania.

The present proposal to give priority to Outer Mongolia over Mauritania is another attempt to justify this opposition.

I do not think there is anyone here who can deny that Mauritania less than a year ago was unfairly and unjustly barred from membership for reasons that have nothing to do with Mauritania or with Africa. Mauritania, regrettably, is in-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1960, p. 976.

volved in an African controversy. We must face that fact with understanding. But to complicate it by artificially injecting disputes and disagreements entirely of a different nature and order of magnitude seems to us both unfair and unjust.

There is, I believe, a widespread and sincere desire among the great majority of countries in the United Nations to see Mauritania admitted to membership promptly. And we can see no justification for asking that the order of the agenda be revised in order to give Outer Mongolia a priority and thereby perhaps perpetuate the injustice to Mauritania. We hope that the Council will therefore reject the Soviet motion when we reach it in the course of the discussion this morning.²

SIERRA LEONE

U.S./U.N. press release 3781

The United States welcomes the application of Sierra Leone for membership in the United Nations. Sierra Leone has had a long and distinguished history filled with episodes of valor and of hardship. The purpose of its establishment, as we well know in this country, in 1787 was to assist in the abolition of slavery. For many years it was to Sierra Leone that captured slave ships were brought for trial and disposition. The part it played in the elimination of that abominable traffic was a very significant and vital one.

Over the years Sierra Leone progressed steadily toward independence. In 1863 it received separate executive and legislative councils. By 1925 it had a constitution which provided for election of African legislative councilors. By 1948 the number of elected members of the legislative council was made greater than the number of appointed members.

Meanwhile economic development was steadily pursued. The construction of a railroad from Freetown to the interior between 1896 and 1908 made it possible to develop an export trade. With the discovery of valuable iron ore and diamond deposits in the 1930's, the colony increased in economic importance.

On April 27, 1961, the green, white, and blue flag of independent Sierra Leone flew for the first

² The Soviet motion to consider the application of Outer Mongolia before that of Mauritania was rejected.

time at a moving ceremony which the United States was honored to attend. On that occasion the President of our country sent the good wishes of the people of the United States to the people of Sierra Leone, whom he described as "a people who cherish individual liberty and independence, and who have made great sacrifices so that these vital principles might endure."³

Mr. President, the Security Council again has the happy task of voting on the admission of a new African state for membership. There have been many in recent months and years, but the experience never fails to be moving or the occasion heartening. The United States welcomes the application of Sierra Leone to membership in the United Nations, as I have said. We voted with pleasure for the resolution sponsored by Ceylon and the United Kingdom and Liberia and we look forward with equal pleasure to working with the representatives of Sierra Leone during the coming months and years.⁴

U.S. Welcomes Inception of OECD

Following is the text of a message from Secretary Rusk to Thorvald Kristensen, Secretary General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, on the occasion of the entry into force on September 30 of the convention establishing the OECD.¹

Press release 675 dated September 29

SEPTEMBER 29, 1961

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: The Government of the United States is gratified by the entry into force of the Convention establishing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This historic event represents the beginning of a new era in the long and intimate relationship between Europe and North America.

The task of postwar reconstruction is behind

³ BULLETIN of May 15, 1961, p. 733.

⁴ The Council on Sept. 26 recommended without opposition that Sierra Leone be admitted to membership in the United Nations. On Sept. 27 the General Assembly admitted Sierra Leone by acclamation.

¹ For text of convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 11.

us. We have not only recovered from the ravages of World War II, but most of us have achieved new levels of prosperity and social well-being. This economic and social growth is all the more remarkable when we remember that many nations of the Atlantic Community have been compelled to devote substantial energies and resources to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The tasks that lie ahead are no less challenging. We must intensify cooperative activities designed to sustain and accelerate the economic growth of every member of the Atlantic Community. We must work together to encourage worldwide patterns of trade and investment that will not only be beneficial to our own peoples, but that will also meet the diverse needs of free peoples on every continent. Finally, we must cooperate to utilize more effectively our growing economic resources to promote economic, social and technical development in the less advanced regions of the world.

The United States Government is confident that the new instrumentalities of the OECD can greatly assist the performance of these tasks and can thereby bring the Atlantic partnership to a higher plateau of unity and vitality. The ultimate success of the OECD—its capacity to serve the far-reaching purposes for which it has been created—depends upon the full cooperation of every member. I want to assure you of the wholehearted support of the Government of the United States.

DEAN RUSK

U.S. Representatives Named to IAEA General Conference

The Senate on September 14 confirmed Glenn T. Seaborg to be the representative of the United States to the fifth session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The following-named persons were confirmed on the same date to be alternate representatives: Henry DeWolf Smyth, William I. Cargo, John S. Graham, and Leland J. Haworth.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Caribbean Commission

Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission. Signed at Washington October 30, 1946. Entered into force for the United States August 6, 1948. TIAS 1799.

Terminated: September 15, 1961 (replaced by the agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Organization, signed at Washington June 21, 1960).

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607. *Signatures and acceptances:* Panama, September 1, 1961; Peru, August 30, 1961.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202. *Adherence deposited:* Central African Republic, June 28, 1961.

Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2164). Signed at Paris May 4, 1910. Entered into force September 15, 1911. 37 Stat. 1511.

Assumed applicable obligations and responsibilities of the United Kingdom: Nigeria, June 26, 1961.

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.¹

Acceptance deposited: Italy, August 2, 1961.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961.²

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, February 8, 1961.

Acceptances deposited: Italy, August 2, 1961; United Kingdom, June 1, 1961.

Extension to: Antigua, Bahamas, Bailiwick of Guernsey, Barbados, Bermuda, British Guiana, British Solomon Islands Protectorate, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Grenada, Isle of Man, Jamaica, Jersey, Malta, Montserrat, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, State of Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, June 1, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961.²

Ratification advised by the Senate (with declarations): September 25, 1961.²

Accession deposited: Togo, September 14, 1961.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959, and additional protocol. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961.²

Ratification advised by the Senate: September 25, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom: Sierra Leone, August 22, 1961, with respect to the following:

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.¹

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.¹

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Procès-verbal containing schedules to be annexed to protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Brazil and United Kingdom). Done at Geneva May 13, 1959.¹

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1959, with annex. Opened for signature at Washington April 6 through 24, 1959. Entered into force July 16, 1959, for part I and parts III to VIII, and August 1, 1959, for part II. TIAS 4302.

Application to: Land Berlin, September 1, 1961.

BILATERAL

Ceylon

Agreement relating to the settlement of matters in connection with a purchase authorization under the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of March 13, 1959,

¹ Includes all territories of the United States.

as amended (TIAS 4211 and 4242). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 1 and 8, 1959. Entered into force December 8, 1959.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 5, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4616 and 4709). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta September 8, 1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the reopening of the weather station on Betio Island. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 26, 1961. Entered into force September 26, 1961.

Uruguay

Agreement relating to radio communications between radio amateurs on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo September 12, 1961. Enters into force on the date of notification that parliamentary approval has been obtained by Uruguay.

Agreement amending the agreement of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4375), supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of February 20, 1959, as supplemented (TIAS 4179, 4238, 4356, 4406, and 4641). Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo September 18, 1961. Entered into force September 18, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on September 21 confirmed the nomination of Charles W. Cole to be Ambassador to Chile. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 669 dated September 28.)

The Senate on September 23 confirmed Fowler Hamilton to be Administrator of the Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated September 20.)

Designations

Philip H. Burris as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and Guidance, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective September 1.

Appointments

John M. Patterson as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective August 28.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The Newly Independent Nations—

Dahomey. Pub. 7158. African Series 13. 12 pp. 15¢.
Ivory Coast. Pub. 7153. African Series 12. 7 pp. 10¢.
Niger. Pub. 7159. African Series 14. 11 pp. 15¢.

Leaflets, in a series of fact sheets, designed to give readers a few highlights on the peoples and lands of the newly independent nations.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States. Pub. 7177. Department and Foreign Service Series 100. 55 pp. 20¢.

A complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States, with their jurisdictions and recognized personnel, compiled with the full cooperation of the foreign missions in Washington.

How Foreign Policy is Made. Pub. 7179. General Foreign Policy Series 164. 19 pp. 25¢.

This pamphlet describes the role of the President, the Congress, and the people in the formulation of American foreign policy.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Pub. 7182. Commercial Policy Series 178. 74 pp. 25¢.

A reproduction of the General Agreement as amended by various protocols, including those parts of the Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III and the Procès-Verbal of Rectification concerning that Protocol which became effective for two-thirds of the contracting parties, including the United States, on Oct. 7, 1957, and Feb. 15, 1961 (Article XIV).

Fact Sheet—Mutual Security in Action—Jordan. Pub. 7184. Near and Middle Eastern Series 61. 9 pp. 10¢.

Some basic facts about Jordan and principal areas of U.S. assistance which help to maintain its stability are outlined in this fact sheet.

A Basic Bibliography, Disarmament, Arms Control and National Security. Pub. 7193. Disarmament Series 1. 29 pp. Limited distribution.

A brief annotated list of books, pamphlets, and articles on disarmament, arms control, and related topics prepared as a preliminary introductory guide to the increasing volume of scholarly and popular writing in this field.

U.S. Balance of Payments, Questions and Answers. Pub. 7194. General and Foreign Policy Series 166. 16 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet explaining the meaning of U.S. "balance of payments" and of the measures proposed to eliminate the remaining "basic" deficit.

Aid in Action—How U.S. Aid Lends a Hand Around the World. Pub. 7221. General Foreign Policy Series 172. 63 pp. 25¢.

This booklet cites many examples of the remarkable successes of the foreign aid program, achieved through U.S. technical and financial assistance over the past decade to the underdeveloped countries of the world.

Toward A National Effort in International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Pub. 7238. International Information and Cultural Series 78. 82 pp. 35¢.

Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange in the area of international and cultural affairs prepared by Walter H. C. Laves, chairman, Department of Government, Indiana University.

Foreign Aid—Facts and Fallacies. Pub. 7239. General Foreign Policy Series 176. 52 pp. Limited distribution.

This pamphlet presents the facts about some of the major criticisms of the foreign aid program and includes a supplement which outlines some of the benefits the United States derives from the program.

Educational and Cultural Exchange Opportunities (Revised). Pub. 7201. International Information and Cultural Series 77. 27 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet which sets forth the scope of the international educational and cultural program administered by the Department of State.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 25–October 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to September 25 are Nos. 639, 641, and 641A of September 18, 648 of September 20, and 650 of September 21.

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661	9/25	Rusk: "Continental Classroom."
†662	9/25	Sanjuan: public accommodations for diplomats.
663	9/26	Note to U.S.S.R. on landing of West German aircraft at Berlin.
*664	9/25	Bowles: death of Sumner Welles.
*665	9/26	MacPhail designated USOM director, Libya (biographic details).
666	9/26	Williams plans trips to Africa (re-write).
*667	9/27	Morris sworn in as ICA representative, Venezuela (biographic details).
*668	9/27	Moline sworn in as USOM director, United Arab Republic (biographic details).
*669	9/28	Cole sworn in as ambassador to Chile (biographic details).
*670	9/28	Cultural exchange (Sudan).
*671	9/29	Program for visit of President of Sudan.
*672	9/29	Rowan: NYU panel discussion on Government press relations.
674	9/29	CENTO telecommunications project.
675	9/29	Rusk: entry into force of OECD.
†676	9/30	Louchheim: D.C. Federation of BPW Clubs.
*677	9/30	Program for visit of President of Finland.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

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WEEKLY RECORD
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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October 23, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The American Image of Japan

by Walter P. McConaughy
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

I approach my topic historically. America's first conception of Japan was as an ideal state. In 1688, in a treatise on Japan by the American colonist, John Stalker warned the West against "any longer flattering themselves with the empty notions of having surpassed all the world. . . . The glory of one country, Japan alone, has exceeded in beauty and magnificence all the pride of the Vatican and Pantheon heretofore." Mr. Stalker was expressing the ancient European quest for the perfect state. He was motivated by the same forces that drove Thomas More to write his *Utopia* and Francis Bacon to write his *New Atlantis*. But I imagine that Mr. Stalker's injunction found ready response in the New World, for the American colonist was interested in the formulation of the ideal society.

In later years American whaling ships hunting in the north Pacific and American clipper ships trading with China were to bring back vague rumors and exaggerated reports on Japan, but their information was too scant to account for the complete reversal in American opinion about Japan by 1850. Japan was no longer an ideal state but had become an ancient and moribund society in the eyes of the American.

When President Fillmore decided to send an expedition to Japan, the American temper was in one of its most optimistic and self-assured phases. In the short period between 1846 and 1851 the United States established the Oregon Territory, defeated Mexico, discovered gold on the West Coast, started the great migration to the Western

seaboard, and admitted California to the Union. In short, America was approaching the fulfillment of her "manifest destiny" and was poised on the shores of the Pacific, looking further to the West.

If the Pacific role of the United States seemed assured so also did the spread of republican government seem a certainty. The European revolutions of 1848 and 1849 were evidence to the mid-century American that these nations were restless and desirous of following the American example. When Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian revolutionary, appealed to Americans to begin their crusade by coming to the aid of the revolutionary movements of Europe, it was not difficult for the Americans to imagine they heard a similar call from Japan. It was in this framework that many Americans viewed the dispatch of Commodore Perry and his Black Ships to Japan.

The Romantic Image of the 19th Century

If Commodore Perry imagined the Japanese to be eagerly awaiting the gifts of Western religion, science, and commerce, he was soon corrected by the Shogun's retainers. But the doors to Japan were finally open, and slowly Americans began passing through these doors to view a world they had imagined but never seen. Townsend Harris, the first American consul, was to send to the Department long reports of his lonely waiting at the consulate, a temple in Shimoda, for a chance to negotiate a treaty of commerce. Missionaries and teachers—David Murray, Dr. Hepburn, Guido Verbeck, William Griffis, Edward Warren Clark, for example—were to write careful observations of Japan.

¹ Address made before the Japan-America Society of Washington at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 2 (press release 680).

But the thoughtful reflection of these men did not become part of the mainstream of American thought. The Civil War in America had proved to be the catalyst for that final great surge of industrialization which was to make America a world power. The American vision was no longer directed outward to Europe and Asia but turned inward to the continent itself. Americans were concerned with the development of large-scale manufacturing, the rise of investment banking, the exploitation of natural resources. They were engaged in the construction of a railway and telegraph network across their vast continent. They were throwing open new areas to farming, developing new markets for produce, and establishing cattle kingdoms. They were inventing new machines. They had admitted over a dozen new States to the Union, were building new cities, were providing employment for the 15 million immigrants who poured into the New World. They were, in the span of one generation, to change a thinly populated rural republic into a great industrial nation.

These labors were exhausting. And when the American looked up from his tasks he was not prepared to try to comprehend the equally exciting political and economic changes that were taking place in Japan. When he thought of Japan, he was to look to it for escape in its exotic and artistic qualities. He appointed, as his interpreters of Japan, Hearn, the romantic novelist; Whistler, the expatriate artist; and Fenellosa, the cultural historian.

The American image of Japan was set for the next half century by the Japanese mission to the United States in 1860.² These men were on a serious political mission—the ratification of a treaty with a part of the world about which they knew little. But America, while honored to be the first nation to enter into a treaty with Japan, was more interested in the envoys themselves. The Congress, in a rare act of extravagance, appropriated \$50,000 for their entertainment. American citizens flocked to the hotels and the theaters to marvel over “their brocaded silks, their ornate swords, their grave and courteous mien.” Walt Whitman wrote a commemorative poem entitled “A Broadway Pageant.” The dictionary defines pageant as an elaborate and brilliant spec-

tacular display devised for the entertainment of the public. Walt Whitman’s word proved both prophetic and apt, for this was how the American regarded Japan as his nation came of age.

Post World War I Image

America still retains vestiges of her romantic image of Japan. Our magazines still publish photographs of the ancient temples of Nara, Nikko, and Kyoto. Kabuki and gagaku still arouse popular interest when shown in American theaters. Hearn still has his biographers, Whistler’s butterfly signature is still recognized, the Boston Museum still exhibits Fenellosa’s magnificent collection of Tokugawa art.

But a substantial change in the American image of Japan came with the close of the First World War. Europe had taught the United States that intercourse with foreign nations was not a grand adventure but a grave responsibility, that a call to end war could produce war, that a peace treaty could be an invitation to another holocaust. Faced with these challenges America’s answer was ambivalent. On the one hand she attempted to hide behind high tariff barriers and proclaim she was interested only in democracy at home. On the other hand she began to look with more realistic eyes at the countries which surrounded her.

Japan was one of these countries. If Japan’s attempt at Versailles to secure recognition of her special position in the Far East indicated dissatisfaction with the international order, the murder of Premier Hara in 1921 indicated dissatisfaction with the domestic order. The idyllic picture of Hiroshige’s sailboats was replaced by the awesome picture of Japan’s capital ships of the line. The Tokyo earthquake of 1923 brought realization that catastrophe as well as calligraphy was part of Japan, and America responded with funds for a program of modern reconstruction. The insane sequence of the Tsinan Incident followed by the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi was to be repeated over again in the Mukden Incident followed by the assassination of Premier Inukai. The constant pattern of external adventure and internal violence was to awake America to the realities of Japan. It was not fortuitous that the most popular book of the day on Japan was entitled *Realism in Romantic Japan*. It was not chance that led the American Institute of Pacific Affairs to publish in 1928 the first edition

² For an article on the first Japanese mission to the United States, see BULLETIN of May 9, 1960, p. 744.

of its biennial under the title *Problems of the Pacific*. American attention was also attracted to the acid pen of A. Morgan Young, the publisher of the *Japan Advertiser*. The New York Times correspondent, Hugh Byas, who later crystallized his views in the book *Government by Assassination*, was also reporting regularly on Japanese policies and developments. The Lytton Commission report became required reading.

Other men in other fields were moving to show the reality of Japan. John Embree lived a year in a Japanese farming hamlet and wrote a pioneering field study of Japanese village life. William Plomer attempted to explain Japanese personality through satires in the manner of Akutagawa and Mori Orai. Connie Mack brought the Tokyo Giants to the United States, and they, by winning 75 out of 110 games, were able to force on the Americans a realistic appraisal of Japanese baseball and physical prowess. Tsunoda Ryusaku was to come to Columbia University to lecture on Japanese thought and to establish the nucleus of her East Asian Library. American students like Edwin Reischauer,³ Hugh Borton, and Charles Fahs studied in Japanese universities. But America's slow progress in discovering Japanese realities was to be outdistanced by the rapid rush of events. One of fate's bitterest ironies was that America should find itself at war with Japan without really knowing who the Japanese were.

The Pacific war was brought finally to an end, and America was able to salvage a few constructive elements from the debris of this senseless and horrible destruction. First, there was a group of young officers trained in the Japanese language. With demobilization, many of them gravitated to the universities where they became instrumental in making Japanese studies a formal part of the university curriculum. They provided the intellectual underpinning for America's new image of Japan. Other of America's talented young men traveled to Japan to join in her reconstruction. Their long hours of work led them to feel that they, too, had a stake in Japan's future. They added idealism to the new image. Finally, the thousands of Americans who served in Japan during the occupation and during the Korean war added popularity and wider diffusion to the new image of Japan.

Today our universities are producing detailed

³ Mr. Reischauer is U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

studies of Japanese thought. Men in government are discussing Japanese politics. In towns throughout America Japanese custom is being discussed since, for better or worse, every American community has its authority on Japan.

Image of Japan Today

What, then, is the national consensus of Japan in today's America? I must answer broadly, for America has a broad view of Japan. I speak honestly, for America holds a realistic view of Japan. Lastly, I speak with hope, for the American believes he has a share in Japan's future. First of all, then—

The American regards Japan as a democracy. The American recognizes the extraordinary political progress that Japan has made in the postwar period. A vast new element of the population has been enfranchised. The right to political participation and to hold office has been broadened. Dissent and opposition have become legitimate political roles. The education system has been liberalized. New civil rights have been extended and are freely exercised. Local autonomy has been greatly increased. Tax burdens have been appreciably equalized. New elements have been given access to political power. The great divisions in the social structure have been noticeably narrowed, and the middle class has grown. Although these reforms were started in the Meiji period and made great strides in the 1920's, the greatest changes have taken place in the last short span of 16 years, and it is natural that the Japanese still do not have complete confidence in their new institutions or complete satisfaction in the way they are employed. The process of blending traditional pattern with new concepts requires time, but there is no longer any need to doubt that Japan has joined the ranks of the great democratic nations.

Americans regard Japan as an Asian leader. East Asia has no regional unity. The collapse of the Confucian state saw the dissolution of similar political ideals. The ties of religion and culture are no longer strong. Independence has fragmented the united opposition to colonialism. Modernization has dissolved similar social structures. Today two other concepts are at work in Asia. One of these forces wants to unite Asia by abolishing the state and imposing a class dictatorship. Coercion is regarded as a legitimate weapon

to achieve these ends. The free world poses an alternative way. We believe that the nation-state is still a viable form of international organization, that cooperation rather than coercion should be the governing principle, and that diversity should be welcomed. America looks to Japan to play an increasingly important role in this free association of states.

Americans regard Japan as a world power. Japan is one of the four major industrial complexes in the world, offering a model for other nations to follow in their course of modernization. Her people are highly literate and are capable of forming an independent national opinion. Japan's domestic decisions regarding patterns and modes of trade affect all nations of the world. Her culture has and will continue to have important effects on other national cultures. Her scientific community produces discoveries and techniques which alter mankind's course. Japan demonstrates daily that it is not land mass, natural resources, and armies that make a powerful nation but rather education, social organization, industrial capability, and a powerful sense of identity. America welcomes Japan's voice in the international forum.

America regards Japan as a center of culture. The present-day American has categorically denied Kipling's 19th century thesis that East is East and West is West and ne'er the twain shall meet. Americans have not only admired Japanese culture but have made it an integral part of their life. The Japanese influence in America is all-pervasive and extends from our architecture to our poetry, from our painting to our gardens, from our clothing to our language. The United States militarily occupied Japan during the late 1940's, but Japan began its cultural occupation of America in Whistler's day and there seems to be no prospect that this occupation will end.

Americans regard Japan as an industrial leader. There are few Americans who are not aware of the tremendous industrial growth that has taken place in Japan in the postwar period. Our economists tell us that the economic rate of growth of Japan exceeds that of any other nation. Our businessmen speak with wonder of the expansion of the industrial plant. Our press reports Japan's 10-year plan to us and confidently anticipates its success. Indeed, this concept of Japan as an in-

dustrial giant may be too strong, for not all Americans are aware that Japan must buy from us as well as sell to us. Those of us, both Japanese and Americans, who are familiar with the true facts of Japanese-American trade have a responsibility to acquaint the American people with the image of Japan as a good customer, a country that consistently buys more from us than she sells to us and has in recent years generally been our second best customer after Canada and our best customer for agricultural products.

America regards Japan as a partner. This image of Japan is perhaps the strongest image of all, for we have done more than simply honor this concept in speech and book. We have inscribed this concept in the language of a treaty.⁴ America proposes to devote many million dollars to educational exchange in furtherance of the cultural aspects of this partnership. She has proclaimed in official documents of state that she wishes to open new doors to educational and scientific cooperation. In recognition of the importance of the economic aspects of this partnership six United States Cabinet members are to go to Japan to conduct talks to further its development.⁵ This partnership is a real and vital part of the relations between Japan and the United States.

What, then, is the total image of Japan in America today? First, it is of a great nation which has arisen with astounding energy and vitality from the ashes of destruction to a position of thriving industrial, scientific, and cultural activity. Second, it is of a nation which has alined itself firmly on the side of the free world in the struggle to preserve the democratic way of life. Third, it is of a nation whose trade with the United States is of vital importance to both nations. Fourth, it is of a nation of unique and delightful cultural traditions which continue to exercise a strong hold over the imagination of Americans. Finally, it is of a nation with which Americans, notwithstanding the vast distances of the Pacific, have close feelings of kinship and an instinctive confidence that, whatever the trials ahead, our two nations will stand together.

⁴ For text of a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed on Jan. 19, 1960, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1960, p. 184.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57.

U.S. Survey Team To Review Problems of Ryukyu Islands

White House press release dated September 30

A United States Government survey team will be in Okinawa on October 5 to review the major economic and social welfare problems facing the people of the Ryukyus. The mission's major objective is to gather information needed in the formulation of U.S. policies and programs which would more effectively improve the islands' living conditions.

Carl Kaysen, a member of the President's White House staff, is chairman of the Government survey group. Members of the team include individuals from U.S. Government agencies having a responsibility to the Ryukyus and other experts in development and international problems. They are: John H. Kaufmann, economist and consultant to the chairman; Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Evans, Jr., Department of the Army; Kingdon W. Swayne, Department of State; L. Albert Wilson, Agency for International Development; James D. Hoover, Department of Labor; Col. Edward G. Allen and Lt. Col. John B. Sitterson, Department of the Army.

Mr. Kaysen will arrive in Okinawa 1 week after the rest of the group; Mr. Kaufmann will be acting chairman until he arrives.

This survey, which the High Commissioner has been urging, is part of the U.S. Government's activity in carrying out policy reaffirmed last summer following the conference between Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda of Japan and the President.¹ At the conclusion of this meeting a joint communique was issued stating,

The President affirmed that the United States would make further efforts to enhance the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and welcomed Japanese cooperation in these efforts; the Prime Minister affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate with the United States to this end.

In executing their mission the survey group

¹ For background and text of communique, see BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

anticipates the opportunity of discussing the problems of the Ryukyu Islands with various representative groups and individuals in and outside of the government of the Ryukyu Islands, as well as the High Commissioner and members of his staff. The group expects to remain in Okinawa for most of their stay of 2 or 3 weeks but also intends to travel to various points in the islands.

President Greet Nigerian People on Anniversary of Independence

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to Nnamdi Azikiwe, Governor General of Nigeria.

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated October 1

1 OCTOBER 1961

DEAR GOVERNOR GENERAL: It gives me the greatest pleasure to extend to you and the people of Nigeria cordial greetings and heartfelt congratulations on the first anniversary of your country's independence.

This first year of your nationhood has been a highly auspicious one. It has seen Nigeria take its place with distinction among the family of free nations. It has seen the emergence of wise and far-reaching plans for the social and economic betterment of the Nigerian people. In essence, it has been a period in which firm foundations have been laid for the future of a great nation. The people of the United States join me in the hope that the peace and prosperity of this first year will continue and that the succeeding anniversaries of Nigeria's independence will be equally happy and fruitful.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency
The Governor General
DR. NNAMDI AZIKIWE
Lagos, Nigeria

The Lessons of the Congo

by *G. Mennen Williams*
*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

Events of the last few days have brought us to a testing time for all that America stands for. Your President and your Government, and you as American citizens, are confronted with a formidable array of crises, each one challenging our national ingenuity, our strength and determination, our sense of purpose and dedication.

These perils press in on us because of our position of leadership, because of our power and responsibilities in the world.

The question of Berlin imperils the freedom of the 2¼ million West Berliners—and the United States is committed to their freedom. The hopes for freedom of other millions are bound up in this issue. The Soviet Union has chosen to multiply dangerously the tensions which are so visible in Berlin. The step of outright Soviet aggression here could plunge Europe and all the world into catastrophe.

A 3-year moratorium on atomic testing was cynically terminated by Moscow just 3 weeks ago.² With this act the hopes and sensibilities of humanity were bludgeoned aside. To this brandishing of arms the United States has had no choice but to resume its own tests underground.³ The Soviet Union has chosen not only to poison the atmosphere which envelops the earth but also that atmosphere of conciliation and construction and higher goals which is the breath of hope to all the peoples of the world.

¹ Address made before the Women's Democratic Club of the 10th Congressional District of Virginia at Arlington, Va., on Sept. 21 (press release 650).

² For a White House statement, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

³ *Ibid.*

Now, when it is most needed, one of the great institutions for keeping the peace is gravely threatened. Dag Hammarskjold is dead. As Secretary-General of the United Nations, he kept open the paths of peace and progress. His untimely death is mourned by all mankind, save only by the new imperialists of the Communist bloc.

Who can forget the tantrum of Khrushchev, the shoe pounding and the vitriolic language, when he found he could not thrust aside Dag Hammarskjold? Who can misread the frustration behind this tantrum brought on by the Soviets' failure to reap the whirlwind they had sown in the Congo? Who can forget the overwhelming verdict of the General Assembly, supporting the United Nations action in the Congo in the face of the Russian onslaught? And who can doubt the Communist intention, ever since, to undermine and disrupt this U.N. structure which orders so much of our political world?

There is something strangely morbid in the Communist reaction to the crisis which now affects the United Nations. To cripple the United Nations would be to smash the machinery through which disarmament, the control of outer space, and the development of emerging nations may be achieved. Such a blow would disintegrate the symbol and safeguard of peace and strike at the security of every nation.

In these circumstances the greatest jeopardy would fall not to the United States and the North Atlantic community, which have great powers to defend themselves and to smash aggression. The greatest jeopardy would be to the smaller nations, so many of them born to independence under the

liberating principles of the charter and the watchful protection of the United Nations Organization.

What is morbid in the Soviet attitude, it seems to me, is the antagonism it holds for the positive purposes which the United Nations serves. It is not hard to see that a powerful dictatorship can cause immense difficulties in the functioning of the U.N. But it is hard to believe that the yearnings and achievements of mankind—the positive purposes—will lose their force at this point in time, when unprecedented numbers of nations and peoples have come to share the blessings of freedom and independence.

Does the Soviet Union, obsessed with an ideology of total tyranny, fear the enlargement of freedom which has taken place in the last 16 years? Then it is alone in this. The United States welcomes and encourages and works for the enlargement of freedom, especially so in the United Nations. The newly independent nations, including those which proclaim their nonalignment, are eager to assert their freedom and build up their societies without outside intervention. In this they can count on the support of the United States.

So I believe that the Soviet Union, seeking to prey on the confusion and disorder it promotes, will find it has miscalculated again. The nations of the free world are not likely to submerge their personalities in constructing a single monolithic answer to the blusterings and threats of the Russians. But they *will* make common cause in asserting and defending their freedom. The United Nations, as Ambassador Stevenson has said, is mankind's sole common instrument of politics; it offers the best hope of holding the gains which new nations have made, of putting an end to outside imperial control, of preventing local disputes from spiraling into general war.

National leaders I have met on my trips to Africa, or during their visits here, are very well aware of these facts and have shown that they are by positive support of the U.N. They appreciate how greatly the United Nations can help to keep the cold war out of Africa.

The history of the Congo troubles offers eloquent testimony to this. Without question, the cold war would now have spread its virus dangerously in Africa but for the United Nations action in the Congo. Last summer the Russians were

pouring military equipment and advisers into the Congo, outside U.N. channels, and promoting disorder and civil war. They were expelled, and thereupon they attempted to censure the U.N. operation and weaken its capacity to act. A special emergency session of the General Assembly rebuffed this effort and reaffirmed full support for the U.N. operation by a 70-0 vote.⁴

U.N. Operation in the Congo

The Congo operation is the greatest peacekeeping effort ever undertaken by the U.N. Consider the problem which confronted the world community a year ago July.

The Congo Republic was less than 2 weeks old when its military forces went into open rebellion. The Belgians sent troops back into the country, and the richest province, Katanga, declared its secession. On July 12 the Congolese Government appealed to the United Nations for military aid "to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression." The Security Council met.⁵ Three days later, contingents of African troops under U.N. command were already on the scene in the troubled area.

Grave moments have since beset the U.N. mission to the Congo. Yet without any comparable experience in mounting an operation of this kind, the U.N. has maintained a multinational army of up to 20,000 men in the Congo. It has kept up essential services through a small army of technical experts and administrators. It has prevented outside intervention and forestalled civil war. It has made possible the formation of a new central government with parliamentary sanction.

Believing in self-determination, respecting the independence of African nations, we supported the U.N. action in the Congo to prevent unilateral intervention—from whatever quarter. We pledged to work only through the U.N., in support of its resolutions. These resolutions called for the restoration of order, the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country, the re-establishment of constitutional government, and the withdrawal of foreign military personnel.

The purpose of the U.N. operation, and of our

⁴ For text of a resolution adopted on Sept. 20, 1960, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 588.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159.

support, was and still is to permit the Congolese to work out their own solutions to their national problems. That solution has recently been brought closer than ever. Under President Kasavubu, and with the vital assistance of the U.N., the Congolese Parliament recently established a new government offering, at last, the prospect of a reunited Congo.

Present Congolese Government

Let me tell you something of the present government.

Mr. Adoula, whom I met on my latest trip to Africa, is both dynamic and able. I am confident he is particularly well qualified as Prime Minister. His cabinet is basically moderate and was installed following the unanimous vote of approval by the Congo Government. The present Government is fully determined to maintain the Congo's independence from all outside interference.

The formation of this government cut away the basis for the separatist and Communist-supported regime in Stanleyville. There remained the question of the secessionist regime in Katanga Province, headed by Moise Tshombe.

It is important to understand the relationship of Katanga to the rest of the country. The Congo has existed as a clearly defined and unified territory for three-quarters of a century. The Katanga never even had a provincial parliament but was only an administrative unit of the central administrative authority. The present boundaries of the Congo (including Katanga) were agreed to by all the Congolese leaders at the Brussels conference in January 1960 which established the basis for the Congo's independence.

Article 6 of the fundamental law of the Congo says: "The Congo constitutes, within its present frontiers, an indivisible and democratic state." Representatives from Katanga were at Brussels and agreed to this charter, although no one was there representing provinces as such but as members of political parties, some of which were local in nature. The people of Katanga, like their brothers in other sections of the Congo, participated in the national elections in May 1960 for the purpose of electing representatives to the central parliament in Léopoldville.

Importance of Political Unity

In short, there is no warrant whatsoever for the idea of Katanga separatism. The Congo needs all of its regions to remain economically viable. The Congo as a whole has always needed the income from the mineral production of Katanga, and Katanga in turn needs the labor force, the markets, and the transportation facilities of the rest of the Congo.

We, and the U.N. membership, also support maintenance of political unity. We have opposed separatism on the part of both the Stanleyville and Elisabethville regimes. Separatism on the part of one province could only encourage separatism on the part of others, or civil war, or both. Clearly the welfare of the Congo depends on active participation by all regions in the process of government. The U.N., therefore, has been encouraging Mr. Tshombe to join the central government.

The United Nations operations in Katanga in recent days were directed to carrying out the several U.N. Security Council resolutions, dating from July 13, 1960, and including that of February 21, 1961.⁶ Among other things, these called for a withdrawal from the Congo of foreign military personnel and political advisers. The U.N. force in the Katanga began rounding up these officers on August 28. As of that date, despite the above resolutions and repeated attempts to negotiate their withdrawal, some 500 foreign officers and noncommissioned officers remained with the Katanga army. To insure against resistance, the U.N. on the same day seized key communications points in Elisabethville and surrounded Katanga army units in their camps, without however making any attempt to disarm them. The operation met with no resistance, either from the Katanga population or the troops. The latter, in fact, were quite cooperative with the U.N. program. However, over 100 of these foreign military personnel went into hiding before they could be picked up by the U.N.

Since then, these individuals, plus an increasing number of European civilians and mercenaries in the city have participated in an active

⁶ For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 384; Jan. 9, 1961, p. 51; and Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359.

campaign of harassment and provocation against the U.N. Accordingly, the U.N. felt obliged to regain control of communications points, particularly the radio station, and to round up and remove the remaining foreign military personnel. But in the meantime these same individuals organized a resistance movement and incited military action against the United Nations forces. The fighting which resulted has been suspended, according to latest reports, by a cease-fire.

Katanga secessionism has obstructed the clear aims of the United Nations. It is, furthermore, viewed with alarm as promoting instability on the African Continent. In addition, substantial outside influence has been exerted in favor of continuing secession of the Katanga, again clearly in opposition to U.N. resolutions.

Efforts To Restore Peace in the Congo

As matters stand now, the U.N. will have to make renewed and perhaps redoubled efforts if civil war is to be avoided in the Congo. We are exerting all our efforts to support them in restoring peace and bringing about the reunification of the Congo. It was for this very purpose that Mr. Hammarskjold traveled to the Congo and then flew on his ill-fated mission to Rhodesia, where he was to meet with Mr. Tshombe.

We keenly regret that violence and loss of life have attended the United Nations actions in Katanga. We hope that the political dialog will now be resumed. We never envisaged the U.N. action in the Katanga as a means of destroying Tshombe; nor did the United Nations. The Secretary-General's effort to contact Mr. Tshombe and bring him back to active participation in the political life of the Congo is tragic evidence of that. We will therefore do everything appropriate to facilitate a peaceful reintegration of the Katanga, but we are convinced that for this purpose the U.N. must remain in a position of strength in order to fulfill its mandate.

It is in this delicate situation that the United Nations will find one of its severest tests, now that its dedicated leader has fallen. It is our strong hope and belief that the lessons of the Congo will at this time be clearly read by those most concerned.

The U.N. has shown, in the Congo, its capacity to act on behalf of these nations. That fact, that

barrier to Soviet ambitions, was the cause of the Communist onslaught on the office of the Secretary-General. I do not think the member states of the U.N. intend now to see the clock set back in the Congo. And if that is so, they will, I am convinced, see the United Nations through its present crisis.

The responsibilities of peace, the promise of what the U.N. has so far built for them and with them, are too evident to be mistaken in this hour. The principles which we uphold are widely shared, and I think we can draw great encouragement from this fact as we come to grips with our own broad responsibilities in the world at this time of crisis.

The Color Issue in the Crusade Against Tyranny

*Remarks by Pedro A. Sanjuan
Assistant Chief of Protocol¹*

It would be wrong, if it were merely for show, to ask for a guarantee of the individual's basic inalienable rights to equal treatment in our society merely because the world has its eyes glued upon us and we can no longer sin in secret. The guarantee of dignity and equality is the birthright of all American citizens and of all men as creatures of God.

But it is sometimes easier to understand what we do through the eyes of those who see us doing it. When visitors from other lands forcefully impress upon us the nature of our actions and advise us to mend our ways or face the consequences, there is perhaps no excuse for refusing to face the moral issue which we may have ignored.

This year there are over 55,000 foreign students in the United States. One hundred nations send their diplomatic representatives to Washington—and to New York City to represent their countries at an organization created to judge the actions of all nations. Hundreds of visitors—professors of universities, mayors, provincial governors, local government officials, cabinet ministers, technicians, prime ministers, and presidents of other

¹Made before a conference of Maryland officials at Aberdeen, Md., on Sept. 25 (press release 662).

lands—come to our country with an avid interest to learn new techniques and to learn about the way we live. Since we are the richest and technologically the most developed nation in the world and since our ideals of freedom and justice have inspired freedom-loving peoples everywhere for over 200 years, a great deal is expected of us. The technicians expect our machines to be well made, the professors expect our universities to be well equipped, the government officials expect our Government to be well run, the diplomats expect us to know how to treat diplomats, the students expect us to know how to teach students. All of them expect us to live according to the principles of justice and equality that we have been preaching for so long. In America, “the land of the free and the home of the brave,” they expect to find the free and the brave.

Therefore, when in Maryland, or in Virginia, or in New York, or in Georgia the 7-year-old son of one of these foreign dignitaries is refused a glass of water to quench his thirst in a public restaurant because the little boy’s skin is dark, or when a diplomat and his family are forced to travel 800 miles along our beautiful highways without finding a place where they are allowed to eat or rest, these visitors, many of them pilgrims, rightfully wonder about the “free” and the “brave.” They wonder what sort of people we are to deny a 7-year-old boy a glass of water, when even in the heat of battle soldiers have been known to share their canteens with the thirsty children of the enemy.

The issue in the world today, the vibrant and vital issue, is between personal freedom as guaranteed by democracy and that brand of mass slavery imposed by a tyrannical minority who claim they act in the name of the welfare of the state. The outcome of this struggle will not be settled by the devastating force of bombs but by the indomitable will of men. And to Khrushchev, who says he will bury us, we should say this: “Unless you blow up the whole world and yourself with it, wherever men survive the spirit of freedom that flows through the veins of blacks and whites and browns alike—and ‘blues’ if there were any—will outlast the forces of tyranny.”

Herein lies our overwhelming moral force. It is the force that has stirred men’s hearts since time immemorial in every corner of the world, even in Russia, and it justifies our conviction that tyranny

shall perish and that freedom and democracy shall finally prevail. The will to be free is the patrimony of all men at all times under any and all circumstances.

When freedom and democracy are recognized as our ideals and practiced as well, we form part of the overwhelming majority in this world and we can prevail in the end. But if some of us insist on looking at the color of men’s skins and preserving the vestiges of our own lingering tribal customs, the color issue puts us in the minority. And I am not speaking only of the ratio of three colored for every white man in the population of the world, because it is not only Africans and Asians who criticize our discriminatory practices, but Europeans as well. Existing race barriers in America cannot be dismissed just by explaining that they are merely local customs, because these barriers are sanctioned by law in some States.

The whole crusade the United States is waging against the forces of tyranny throughout the world is being betrayed by this wholly artificial and unnatural color issue. We pour millions into foreign aid—millions which come from your pockets and mine, millions which represent a sacrifice all Americans are making to strengthen the economies of struggling nations, to save lives, to free people from the shackles of poverty and starvation and assure them of a time when they will be fully able to enjoy the fruits of freedom and democracy. How senseless it is to ruin this tremendous effort by refusing to serve a cup of coffee to a customer whose skin is dark!

There are many public-spirited citizens in Maryland who have heard this plea and have acted to correct such unfortunate situations as the Hagerstown incident. Mayor Burlans and the entire city of Hagerstown showed the *Chargé d’Affaires* of Sierra Leone a few months ago that Africans were welcome guests in Maryland. The Department of State does not mean to single out this State. Similar unfortunate situations have occurred in northern and southern States alike. As a matter of fact, this plea today is part of a nationwide campaign which is being undertaken in more than 30 States with the cooperation of the Governors of these States.² At this very moment the Department’s message is being delivered at the Southern Governors’ Conference in Texas.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 552.

I know this message must mean something to you. You can assist your country in carrying out its world mission by doing something besides paying taxes. Through your influence in your community you can do a great deal to convince those who own segregated establishments that here in Maryland, for all the world to see, the ideals of freedom and democracy must be practiced. Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to add in closing that when a public accommodations bill is presented to the Maryland General Legislative Assembly in February,³ that Assembly will have the privilege of debating not just a local issue or a State issue or even a national issue but a much larger issue which will affect the future of all men everywhere who want to remain free as well as the future of those who do not wish to remain enslaved.

Posing Some Problems

*Remarks by Roger Tubby
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹*

I have been asked to outline some of the problems confronting our country, without suggesting solutions. It is, happily, for you later on this afternoon to discuss possible ways in which we may most effectively meet our present dangers—and opportunities.

First of all, it is of course most fitting that we should be honoring Mayor [Willy] Brandt who, with the people of West Berlin, has shown such courage, patience, and good sense during long years of trial.

Our President last week in New York in his address to the United Nations said,²

If there is a dangerous crisis in Berlin—and there is—it is because of threats against the vital interests and the deep commitments of the Western Powers and the freedom of West Berlin. We cannot yield these interests. We cannot fail these commitments. We cannot surrender the freedom of these people for whom we are responsible.

² For a statement by Mr. Sanjuan before the Legislative Council of the General Assembly of Maryland on Sept. 13, see *ibid.*, p. 551.

¹ Made before the Freedom House Assembly at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 6 (press release 689).

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

This afternoon in Washington he will make this clear once again to the Russians in his meeting with Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister].

The crisis in Berlin exists because there is a renewed threat to the continued free existence of West Berlin. But as we know, Berlin is but one of many grave problems confronting free men, several of them stemming from Russian pressures, some of them existing independently and which would be of concern to us even if there were no Russia or Red China or Communist drive to dominate all the world.

However, these other problems would be far more manageable if it were not necessary for the free world to maintain hundreds of thousands of young men in our armed forces and if it were not also necessary to contribute vast resources to our defenses. If only Russia and Red China, the last of the old-style imperialists, gave up their drive for conquest and added the great talents of their peoples, as well as their own resources, to ours in the free world, then, of course, they and we could make enormous strides forward in every field of human endeavor. Instead, problems of providing better education in the free world, more hospitals, improved working conditions, fuller and more fruitful understandings between peoples, difficult as they are, become more so because of Communist efforts to disrupt, intimidate, and destroy.

Communist deceit, terror, and outright aggression make the problems of growth and development especially acute in the nations of southeast Asia. But in many other lands efforts to build stable and prosperous societies are also thwarted or hobbled by Communist tactics. How to deal effectively with these no doubt will be of concern to you in your discussions. I hope you will bear in mind, however, free-world achievements since 1946 in successfully meeting Communist challenges in many areas, beginning with the turning back of the Communist effort to seize Greece. The Greek-Turkish aid program, the 3½ year economic pump-priming of the Marshall plan, which saved France and Italy and helped strengthen other free nations, the successes against the Communists in Malaya and the Philippines—on these programs and experiences we can build usefully not only to meet the Communist challenge but the insistent demand of millions for a better life.

Will we build well enough? Will we build

fast enough? Willy Brandt once said that we only really learn about life the hard way.

This he has done in Berlin. So have we.

We can mark with some satisfaction the work of NATO and other regional alliances created to check aggression. We can, especially, be thankful that the United Nations, despite Russian obstructionism, has been able to provide a measure of stability in troubled lands in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa and that it has helped promote economic growth in many countries. Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan—rising out of the rubble of war—these and many other countries of the free world, including our own, are prospering. The European Common Market, the cooperative effort in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], show promise of still further economic progress.

These are pluses on the side of the free world. They show how much we have already done and are worth considering when weighing the problems now before us.

How to avoid either war or surrender; how to achieve disarmament or a ban on nuclear testing with effective controls; how to strengthen the U.N.; how to check Communist aggression or subversion in southeast Asia or anywhere else; how to broaden the economic and social base in many countries still in an early stage of economic development; how to reach their intellectuals and win their respect and understanding; how to deal with satellite countries; what to do about U.S. economic aid to so-called neutrals which appear to support Moscow; how to reserve outer space for peaceful uses; how to end colonialism—under the Russians or Red Chinese or anyone else; how to make the new Alliance for Progress for Latin America a success.

Even a listing of problems indicates the complexity of our problems abroad. There are many others. They are related to many at home—to the widespread racial inequality still plaguing us; to the lack of understanding by many of our own people of foreign affairs problems or opportunities, with consequent indifference or complacency; to the need for still greater efforts in education.

No lack of problems! Yet I feel sure that by pooling our resources in the future, as we have in the past, we can do what's necessary to maintain and eventually expand the area of freedom through the choice of peoples now living in a

world of coercion. Nearly 4 million East Germans voted with their feet by fleeing through West Berlin. In time we hope self-determination, self-expression, will be possible even in Communist lands. Meanwhile, by our example, whether in West Berlin or elsewhere, we need to demonstrate convincingly that our free society is a far better society than exists under the Communists.

President Prado of Peru Makes Official Visit to United States

President Manuel Prado of Peru and Señora de Prado made an official visit to the United States September 18-29. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Kennedy and President Prado on September 19 and a joint communique issued on September 21, together with the text of President Prado's address to a joint session of Congress on September 21.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated September 19

President Kennedy

President and Señora Prado, I want to express my great pleasure on behalf of the people of the United States in welcoming you here.

History has a strange rhythm. History does repeat itself, even if sometimes in a slightly different form. And it is a striking fact that in 1942 President Prado was one of the first, if not the first, of the democratically elected leaders of the Latin American Republics to visit the United States on an official visit.

The United States was then engaged in war, and yet President Roosevelt wanted President Prado of Peru to come to our country in order to express our appreciation and esteem for him for the leadership which he had taken in this hemisphere in the fight against the Axis.

His strong support in many public forums, his willingness to commit his country to this great struggle, all of these facts are remembered now, as in 1961, nearly 20 years later, President Prado of Peru comes again to the United States on an official visit.

The Presidents are different. The times have

changed. The adversaries take a different form. But I believe in a very real sense that both Peru and the United States, still standing shoulder to shoulder, fight for the same things, and that is: a world at peace, a world of law, a world which permits us to develop in our respective countries a better life for our people, which uses the advantages of science to build life instead of to destroy it.

President Prado is the first leader of a Latin American Republic to come to this country in this new administration. The good-neighbor policy has passed into history. We have sought to replace it by a partnership, north and south, an alliance for the progress of our people.

We in this country esteem our friends. We have a long memory, Mr. President. And therefore, standing as I do where 20 years ago my distinguished predecessor stood, I extend to you a warm personal welcome, and I hope in extending this welcome to you that the people of your country will realize that we hold them in the strongest bonds of friendship.

Mr. President.

President Prado

I sincerely appreciate, Mr. President, the very warm greetings which you have just extended to me, in which you express the noble sentiments of the American people for Peru.

This is not the first time that I have had the privilege of visiting the United States as the President of my country. I came to Washington initially in 1942 as the guest of my friend President Roosevelt. I arrived here during the most difficult days of World War II, and I was pleased to bear a message of solidarity from my country.

I return today, almost 20 years later, under circumstances in which we are faced with a new crisis in history. I am here in the same spirit as before, with the same ideals of liberty and respect for human dignity. I am equally moved by a desire to fortify hemisphere solidarity and fraternal relations between the United States and Peru.

I also seek means of closing ground against aggression from abroad and against infiltration by foreign and disruptive ideologies.

Most of all I want my greeting to the people of the United States to contain a sense of faith in democratic institutions and an expression of con-

viction that through the cooperation of the free nations we shall succeed in defeating the attempt at Communist domination and in turn assure the world a future of peace, justice, and progress.

Mr. President, I want to thank you very much for your noble words about my international policies and my personal actions in my country, and the international support of your country and the Allies in the Second World War; and now in this moment you and your people can be sure that Peru is solidly on your side.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated September 21

Dr. Manuel Prado, President of the Republic of Peru, is making a state visit to the United States at the invitation of President Kennedy, with a view to strengthening the already friendly relations prevailing between the two countries. In keeping with this objective, the two Presidents have held conversations characterized by a spirit of cordiality, frankness and understanding. They discussed a number of matters of bilateral interest as well as other important problems in international relations.

The Presidents in their discussions affirmed their adherence to the principles of the Alliance for Progress.¹ They stressed the great importance of the economic and social development of Latin America in order to achieve growing economies, with effective and continuing improvement in living standards, and thus to satisfy the urgent aspirations of its peoples for a more equitable participation in the life of their countries. Each Latin American country must therefore concentrate increasing efforts and make greater sacrifice toward such basic development. The United States for its part is prepared to assist in the realization of this objective in accordance with the principles established in the Charter of Punta del Este.² With this in mind the Presidents considered various projects of importance to Peru's economic and social development. The United States will participate in emergency projects being initiated by the Peruvian Government in the critical Puno area.

The Presidents agreed that such development in

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

² For text, see *ibid.*, p. 463.

Latin America would be facilitated by the formulation by each country of a national development plan to establish its own goals, priorities and reforms.

They also agreed that only by instituting reforms in such fields as land tenure, tax structure and the utilization of national income can the objective of integrated social and economic development be achieved.

President Prado emphasized that one of the essential problems in the case of Peru is the integration of the Indian population into the life of the country.

The Presidents agreed to the need for stimulating private investment in Peru and in all of Latin America. President Prado emphasized that Peru, because of its raw materials, its advanced legislation, its policy of free trade, monetary stability and the absence of exchange controls, offers excellent opportunities for foreign capital interested in participating with Peruvian capital in the growth of its promising economy. In order to encourage such investment, he stressed the desirability of eliminating double taxation.

Following a review of the international situation, the Presidents agreed on the need for a firm policy to confront the unceasing conspiracy of international Communism against the peace of the hemisphere and of the world, recognizing that the successes or failures of Communism wherever they may occur have direct or indirect repercussion in each and every nation.

The Presidents emphasized the importance of hemispheric unity for the preservation of peace and the development of harmonious relations among nations. Because of their traditions of liberty, faith in the human being and encouragement of individual initiative in all aspects of life, the Americas must serve as a bastion of these principles and a force for harmony in the world. Such unity is firmly founded upon long historic ties and a community of purpose of the nations of the hemisphere and on recognition and respect for the distinctive national character of each member of the American family.

As guiding principles governing the peaceful relationship of nations, fundamental to the Inter-American system, the Presidents reiterated the importance of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states and the right of self-determination of peoples by means of periodic, free

and democratic elections to guarantee the rule of liberty, justice and individual social and human rights. They agreed that when an alien ideology establishes a foothold in the hemisphere or when its official and unofficial agents engage subversively in undermining constitutional order, this constitutes both a violation of the principle of nonintervention and a threat to all the nations of the hemisphere.

The Presidents reasserted their adherence to the principles of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, which are the embodiment of the fundamental precepts of the rule of law and justice, the faithful observance of international obligations and agreements, and the respect for national independence, identity and dignity. They call on all nations to reaffirm in their actions their adherence to the high principles of those two organizations.

The Presidents also discussed the similarity of the principles, particularly the principle of reciprocal assistance, which characterize the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They agreed that it is more than ever essential that these regional organizations be alert to maintain and defend the civilization that is common to their members.

In conclusion, the two Chiefs of State reiterated their unwavering determination to foster and perfect the close cooperation that exists between their nations in matters of common interest both of regional consequence and of world importance.

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS³

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives; distinguished members of the Cabinet, the judiciary, and the diplomatic corps—my friends, it is indeed a distinct honor to be invited to address this great Parliament and I deeply appreciate the generous words of introduction. It fills a visitor with a solemn sense of responsibility to meet with you at such a critical moment in the affairs of the world and more particularly in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

So I come before you grateful for your invitation and fully aware of the grave responsibilities which all of us share at this time. It is my high privilege to bring you the warm wishes of the people of the Republic of Peru.

And I bring you this further message: Peru stands with you in the struggle against communism in the world and in our hemisphere—whatever measures you may be

³ Reprinted from the *Congressional Record* of Sept. 21, 1961, p. 19296.

required to take to combat it, you will find my country at your side.

Twice it has fallen to my lot to make a state visit to the United States as President of my country, and twice I have come at a critical point in our history. In May 1942 when the thunder of Pearl Harbor still echoed around the world, I traveled to the United States as the guest of my illustrious friend, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to confer with him and his government on wartime problems.

At that time the Second World War had confronted the entire hemisphere with the grave decision of having to defend itself by the combined effort and sacrifice of every member nation in every field of activity—by the use of arms or through action in the domestic ideological struggle, by producing and delivering raw materials in unaccustomed quantities or through an intensive industrial effort.

From the very beginning of the conflict and in response to my own convictions and responsibilities of office, I placed my country formally at the side of the Allies on April 1, 1941. Consequently, when I arrived in Washington almost 20 years ago, I was received by President Roosevelt as a defender in the southern part of our hemisphere of the same cause as that of the United States.

Today the circumstances are certainly no less dramatic. While no general conflict now exists, no one is blinded to the fact that the cold war and the continuing conflicts at various points of the world have brought about a state of alarm which deeply disturbs the Western nations.

Thus, once again, on the state visit which I am now making during my second tenure of office as President, I come before you as an old friend and as one who is accustomed to speak with frankness. Since the times call for plain speaking among friends, just as they did in 1942, I would like to take this opportunity to discuss with you certain grave problems which are now before us in the Western Hemisphere. We are all hearing many unsound views on these issues on the part of certain people who do not understand them and on the part of other people who wish to misrepresent them. Since I believe that these arguments do not stand up under careful analysis, I wish to make my own position and my own views very clear.

I refer specifically to the classic principles of self-determination of peoples and nonintervention. Self-determination of peoples means to me, and I think to you, the right of each nation to conduct its own affairs in its own way in exercise of its own sovereignty—and it is indispensable to this principle that the will of the people must be able to express itself through free elections periodically held.

Now, with regard to nonintervention. This principle is being badly misrepresented by some who would invoke it to permit the destruction of the inter-American system of free republics by an outside power—namely international communism. The doctrine of nonintervention is designed to prevent interference by one nation in the foreign and domestic affairs of another, whether this interference be done through infiltration, through propaganda or through the abuse of diplomatic privileges.

I can report to you that such interference occurred in my country on the part of one American nation which we regard as an agent of foreign ideologies. When such interference was proved we promptly broke off relations with that government—and they will remain broken off until that country is once again able to conduct itself as a free and self-governing American Republic. May that day come soon.

A state which interferes in the internal affairs of another by subversion and by provoking uprisings and disturbances is in no position to claim for itself the benefits of the very principle of nonintervention which it is violating. Any other interpretation would be illogical and would destroy the true meaning of the sound American doctrine of nonintervention.

I say to you, therefore, Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, that the democratic, law-abiding republics of the Western Hemisphere have no obligation to submit to subversion, vicious antidemocratic propaganda, or other abuse from any nation of the Americas which for the time being may become the creature of a foreign ideology. You will forgive me for being blunt on this point but as I have said, the moment is dangerous and we as friends can and must speak openly to one another.

My ideological position from the time I first occupied the Presidency is positive, clear, and definitely anti-Communist. I have opposed and I now oppose this conception of the world which degrades man, deprives him of his liberty, submits him to the slavery of the state, robs him of a just wage, condemns him to the common and the anonymous, controls his thoughts, directs his culture and separates him from God. Communism is the negation of America, of its traditions and of its mission for the future. It must be driven out of the Americas.

I consider it an honor for me not to have accepted suggestions which I received in 1942 to exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union despite the fact that, at the time, that country and mine were part of the same war front. As a result Peru has no diplomatic relations with those governments behind the Iron Curtain. The reason for my refusal is obvious: I foresaw that once Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism was conquered, communism would employ all its resources in an attempt to dominate the world. Unfortunately the facts have given me good reason.

In addition to these considerations of a purely political nature to which I have referred, I believe that in order to combat communism successfully we must take into account the economic factor for the welfare of the people. The cooperation of the United States with the southern part of the hemisphere is necessary and it must be effective and prompt. Any delay is dangerous. Any limitation of the program can be an open door for the enemy.

In the alliance-for-progress program, that great campaign launched by President Kennedy, each nation should be encouraged to determine its own goals, its own priorities and procedures in accordance with its own aims and ambitions. With a frank understanding on this question a great deal can be done for the unity of the hemisphere in meeting the totalitarian attack. Let us bear in mind that the mandate of history is that America is and must

continue to be the bulwark of liberty and human dignity.

Senators and Representatives, before I take my leave of you let me add these words to the message I prepared to bring to you today. They are words which my conscience and my sense of the high responsibility of this hour prompt me to utter. The moment is of the most extreme gravity. Grave moments call for grave decisions—for bold action—for courage, and faith.

We learned this when we worked and fought and sacrificed together, through the crisis of 20 years ago. We did what had to be done to save Western civilization, and I do not need to recall it to you now. But I do say to you that in the present crisis we must follow the same hard course. We can do no less, and we may have to do more.

This is the supreme test of the moral force of free peoples. The totalitarian threat of atheistic communism calls for sacrifice—national sacrifice, economic sacrifice. It must be met with patriotism, with dedication and with all that is necessary to assure peace, freedom, and a decent way of life to our generation and to those who will follow us.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, in the name of my country may I conclude by paying a special tribute to the United States of America and to its exemplary democratic institutions among which the Senate and House of Representatives are outstanding.

Under Secretary Holds Regional Conferences in Latin America

The Department of State announced on October 6 (press release 690) that Under Secretary Chester Bowles will be chairman of two U.S. regional operations conferences to be held at Lima, Peru, October 9–11 for U.S. representatives in all the South American countries, and at San José, Costa Rica, October 16–18 for those in the Central American and Caribbean areas.

The two conferences will draw U.S. ambassadors and other top U.S. officials for 3 days of meetings to discuss U.S. foreign policy and operations in Latin America. They will be similar to the earlier conferences held by the Under Secretary during the summer in Lagos (Nigeria), Nicosia (Cyprus), and New Delhi (India), which were attended by senior U.S. representatives from 45 countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, respectively.¹

One of the main purposes of each conference will be to strengthen and coordinate U.S. opera-

tions overseas by stressing the “country team” concept of U.S. activities abroad. Each ambassador will be accompanied by the chiefs of the U.S. Information Service, the U.S. Operations Mission (the foreign aid mission), and the U.S. Military Assistance Group in the country to which he is accredited. Last May President Kennedy wrote to each ambassador emphasizing that, in addition to his traditional role as representative of the President, he must serve as coordinator of all U.S. Government activities in his country of assignment.

Accompanying Mr. Bowles to the meetings will be:

Edward R. Murrow, Director, United States Information Agency

deLesseps S. Morrison, Ambassador to the Organization of American States

Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

George L. P. Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs

George C. McGhee, Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of its Policy Planning Council

Tyler Thompson, Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State

Elmer B. Staats, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget

Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President

James Symington, Deputy Director, Food-for-Peace Program

John W. Johnston, Jr., Acting Regional Director for Latin America, International Cooperation Administration

Max Isenbergh, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs

Herman Pollack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel

Carl T. Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Haydn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Jay P. Cerf, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs

Other senior U.S. Government officials will also accompany Mr. Bowles.

The Under Secretary and his party will leave Washington on October 7. Between the two conferences Mr. Bowles will visit the Puno area of southeastern Peru, where he will officially open a school-lunch program supported by the U.S. Food-for-Peace Program. After the San José meeting he is expected to spend 2 days in Mexico for informal conversations with the Mexican Government, returning to Washington on October 21.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1961, p. 246.

President Makes Interim Delegation of Foreign Aid Authority

Following are texts of letters¹ from President Kennedy to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in which the President delegates to them authority under the foreign aid legislation pending the issuance of an Executive order on that subject.

LETTER TO SECRETARY OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 30, 1961.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Effective simultaneously with the taking effect of the provisions of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1962, I hereby delegate to you all functions conferred upon the President by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which are comparable to functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, now exercised by the Development Loan Fund and the Secretary of State, including such comparable functions which have been delegated by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the International Cooperation Administration. In addition, I delegate to you the authority conferred upon the President by section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

For carrying out such of the foregoing functions as may be appropriate, you are authorized to establish within the Department of State an agency to be known as the Agency for International Development and to be headed by the officer appointed pursuant to section 624(a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. You are also authorized to utilize, in connection with that Agency and to such extent as you may deem to be advantageous to the Government, the services of personnel employed, and the records, property, entities, offices and the funds used, existing, held, or available for use, by the Department of State (including the International Cooperation Administration) or the Development Loan Fund under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

¹ 26 Fed. Reg. 9375.

The purpose of the delegation made hereinabove is to facilitate the transition from the existing form of organization for foreign aid purposes to the form thereof contemplated under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The said delegation shall terminate upon issuance of an Executive order providing generally for the carrying out of the functions conferred upon me by that Act.

There are hereby allocated to the Department of State all funds now appropriated to the President for carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 except those appropriated for carrying out part II of that Act.

References in Executive Order No. 10784, as amended,² to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 or provisions thereof shall be deemed to refer also to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or corresponding provisions thereof.

It is requested that this letter be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 30, 1961.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Effective simultaneously with the taking effect of the provisions of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1962, I hereby delegate to you all functions conferred upon the President by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which are comparable to functions under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, now exercised by you.

The foregoing delegation shall terminate upon issuance of an Executive order providing generally for the carrying out of the functions conferred upon me by that Act.

There are hereby allocated to the Department of Defense all funds now appropriated to the

² BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1961, p. 653.

President for carrying out part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

It is requested that this letter be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington 25, D.C.

U.S. Grants University of Iceland \$198,000 on 50th Anniversary

Press release 691 dated October 6

The U.S. Government has awarded a grant of 5 million kronur (\$198,000) to the University of Iceland on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of that institution. Announcement of the grant was made by the rector of the university, Prof. Arnmann Snaevarr, at Reykjavik on October 6, during the course of ceremonies commemorating the anniversary.

The grant of 5 million kronur will be used to aid in the development of four technical institutes in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and geophysics. The grant was made possible under a special provision of a P.L. 480 agreement between the United States and Iceland.

The four institutes will contribute an expansion of teaching facilities in Iceland in the physical sciences, including mathematics, chemistry, and geophysics. They will provide opportunities for Icelandic scholars to pursue postgraduate and research studies at the university. The new institutes made possible by the grant will provide, in addition, facilities for advanced technical training which will assist Iceland in its efforts to diversify its economy.

The University of Iceland was founded at Reykjavik by an amalgamation of three independent faculties which had existed prior to 1911. These faculties had provided instruction in theology, medicine, and law. At the founding of the university a faculty of philosophy was established and was followed later by the addition of a faculty of engineering. In the half-century since its foundation the university has established an

outstanding scholastic record and has contributed in a unique way to the development of modern Iceland.

U.S.-Soviet Films Committee Reviews Progress in Exchange Program

Press release 682 dated October 2

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Cinematography began meetings October 2, 1961, at Washington to discuss progress in film exchanges between the two countries. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on scientific, technical, educational, and cultural exchanges of November 21, 1959,¹ includes in section VIII exchanges of commercial films, documentaries, film delegations, film premieres, and other types of cooperation in the field of cinematography. This meeting of the standing committee will review progress of exchanges in the field during the last 2 years.

Representing the United States are Turner B. Shelton, Director, Motion Picture Service, U.S. Information Agency, and Eric Johnston, president, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. Advisers to the U.S. delegation are Ralph Jones, Deputy Director, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Department of State, and Hans N. Tuch, Policy Officer for Eastern Europe, U.S. Information Agency. The Soviet Union is represented by A. N. Davydov, president of Sovexportfilm, the Soviet film export monopoly, and Boris Krylov, chief of the American Section, State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Adviser to the Soviet delegation is L. O. Arnshtam, Soviet film director.

U.S. Approves IJC Recommendations on St. Croix River Basin Development

Press release 678 dated October 2

The Department of State announced on October 2 that the Government of the United States has considered the report of the International

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951.

Joint Commission, United States and Canada, on the development of the water resources of the St. Croix River Basin, dated October 7, 1959, and has approved the recommendations contained in the report with the exception of number 2, which is still under study. A similar approval of the Commission's report was announced by the Government of Canada.

The International Joint Commission was established pursuant to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to provide for the settlement of questions and to make recommendations concerning the use of boundary waters between the United States and Canada. The Governments of Canada and the United States, pursuant to article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, on June 10, 1955, requested the International Joint Commission to investigate and report on the possibilities of further development of water resources of the St. Croix River Basin in Maine and New Brunswick.¹

To conduct the necessary investigations in the area, the Commission established the International St. Croix River Engineering Board with members from both countries. Interested parties were invited to present their views to the Commission at a public hearing in Calais, Maine, on June 27, 1958. As a result of its investigations and testimony at the public hearing, the Commission made a number of recommendations which were made public on November 10, 1959. These have been carefully studied by the Governments concerned.

The Governments have accepted the Commission's recommendations regarding steps to be taken to abate the pollution of the St. Croix River and recommendations that anadromous fish runs be restored. They have also approved recommendations that redevelopment of the Milltown, New Brunswick, site for power and other purposes should be carried out by Canadian interests, that an international gaging station be installed by appropriate agencies of the two countries downstream from the dam at Woodland, Maine, and that the Commission be authorized to continue studies of the possibilities for development of the water resources of the St. Croix River Ba-

sin. Recommendation number 2 of the report, which concerns water levels on East Grand and Spednik Lakes, is still under review by the Governments.

India and U.S. Exchange Views on Trade in Cotton Textiles

Joint Press Statement

Press release 687 dated October 5

Officials of the Indian and United States Governments, assisted by representatives from the textile industries of both countries, met in Washington October 2 through 4, 1961, for an informal exchange of views with regard to international trade in cotton textiles. These discussions, which were held in an atmosphere of understanding and cordiality, were concerned with matters of mutual interest in connection with the GATT Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles¹ and the forthcoming meeting of the Cotton Textile Committee, established in the GATT arrangements, which is scheduled to convene in Geneva on October 23. The Committee will initiate consideration of long-term solutions to problems in the field of cotton textiles.

The informal discussions between Indian and United States representatives enabled the participants to increase their understanding of the nature of the situation in the cotton textile industries of the two countries.

The desire of the two Governments to facilitate economic expansion and in particular to promote the development of the less developed countries by providing increasing access for their exports of manufactured products was reaffirmed. Both countries agreed to work toward increased access to world markets for cotton textile exports on a constructive and orderly basis.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the representatives of both countries expressed their desire for continued cooperation concerning matters of mutual interest with regard to international trade in cotton textiles.

¹ For background and text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 336; for an announcement of President Kennedy's acceptance of the agreement on Sept. 7, see *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 528.

¹ For text of the Reference sent by the Department of State to the Chairman of the U.S. Section of the Commission, see BULLETIN of July 4, 1955, p. 21.

Concession Granted To Compensate for Action on Spring Clothespins

A PROCLAMATION¹

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (48 Stat. (pt. 1) 943, 57 Stat. (pt. 1) 125, 59 Stat. (pt. 1) 410), the President, on October 30, 1947, entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries, which consists of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as the General Agreement), including a Schedule of United States Concessions and the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement, together with a Final Act (61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2051) ;

2. WHEREAS by Proclamation No. 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), the President proclaimed such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States of America as were then found to be required or appropriate to carry out the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation on and after January 1, 1948, which proclamation has been supplemented and amended by subsequent proclamations ;

3. WHEREAS, the period for the exercise of the authority to enter into foreign-trade agreements pursuant to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, having been extended (63 Stat. (pt. 1) 697), the President, on October 10, 1949, entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries providing for the accession to the General Agreement of these foreign countries, which trade agreement for accession consists of the Annex Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Annex-1949"), including the annexes thereto (64 Stat. (pt. 3) B141) ;

4. WHEREAS, by Proclamation No. 2867 of December 22, 1949 (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A380), the President proclaimed such modifications of existing duties and the other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States of America as were then found to be required or appropriate to carry out the trade agreement for accession on and after January 1, 1950, which proclamation has been supplemented and amended by subsequent proclamations, including Proclamation No. 2884 of April 27, 1950 (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A399) ;

5. WHEREAS, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (48 Stat. (pt. 1) 943, 57 Stat. (pt. 1) 125, 59 Stat. (pt. 1) 410, 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 698, 69 Stat. 162), and by section 7(c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 74), and in accordance with Article XIX of the General Agreement, the President, by Proclamation No. 3211 of November 9, 1957, proclaimed

the withdrawal of the duty concession granted by the United States with respect to spring clothespins described in the first item 412 in Part I of Schedule XX (Annex-1949), effective after the close of business December 9, 1957 ;

6. WHEREAS Article XIX of the General Agreement provides for consultation with those other contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of products with respect to which action has been taken under that Article with a view to agreement being reached among all interested contracting parties ;

7. WHEREAS reasonable public notice of the intention to conduct trade-agreement negotiations with the Government of Sweden, which is a contracting party to the General Agreement having a substantial interest as an exporter, was given, the views presented by persons interested in such negotiations were received and considered, and information and advice with respect to such negotiations were sought and obtained from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, and from other sources ;

8. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1360(a)), the President transmitted to the United States Tariff Commission for investigation and report a list of all articles imported into the United States of America to be considered for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or continuance of existing customs or excise treatment in the trade-agreement negotiations with the Government of Sweden, and the Tariff Commission made an investigation in accordance with section 3 of the said Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, and thereafter reported to him its determinations made pursuant to such section within the period specified therein ;

9. WHEREAS I have found as a fact that, in the circumstances recited above, existing duties or other import restrictions of the United States of America are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States of America ;

10. WHEREAS, the period for the exercise of the authority of the President to enter into foreign-trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, having been extended by section 2 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 673) until the close of June 30, 1962, as a result of the findings set forth in the ninth recital of this proclamation and for the purpose of restoring the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions in the General Agreement by the replacement therein of other concessions, I, through my duly authorized representative, on September 15, 1961, entered into a foreign trade agreement consisting of an agreement, including a schedule, between the Kingdom of Sweden and the United States of America supplementary to the General Agreement, a copy of which supplementary agreement is annexed to this proclamation ;²

11. WHEREAS the agreement specified in the tenth recital of this proclamation provides that the treatment

¹ No. 3431 ; 26 *Fed. Reg.* 8931.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 570.

provided for in the schedule annexed thereto shall be applied by the United States of America on and after October 18, 1961;

12. WHEREAS I find that the compensatory modifications provided for in the trade agreement specified in the tenth recital of this proclamation constitute an appropriate action toward maintaining the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions in the General Agreement, that the purpose set forth in the said section 350, as amended, will be promoted by such compensatory modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions and continuance of existing customs or excise treatment as are set forth and provided for in the trade agreement specified in the tenth recital of this proclamation and that such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles as are hereinafter proclaimed in this proclamation will be required or appropriate, on and after the date hereinafter specified, to carry out that trade agreement:


Now, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, to the end that the foreign-trade agreement supplementary to the General Agreement, specified in the tenth recital of this proclamation, may be carried out, do hereby proclaim that such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as are specified and provided for in that trade agreement, including the schedule annexed thereto, shall, subject to the provisions of that trade agreement, be applied as though such modifications and continuance were specified and provided for in Part I of Schedule XX (Annex-1949), as follows:

(1) The rates of duty specified in column A at the right of the description of products in the said schedule annexed to the said trade agreement supplementary to the General Agreement, on and after October 18, 1961.

(2) The rates of duty specified in column B at the right of the description of products, on and after the date determined in accordance with the provisions of the Note at the end of the schedule annexed to the said trade agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 18th day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-sixth.



By the President:
CHESTER BOWLES,
Acting Secretary of State.

President Takes Action in Two Escape-Clause Cases

WILTON AND VELVET RUGS

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated October 1

The President on October 1 announced that he had referred back to the Tariff Commission the escape-clause case involving Wilton and velvet rugs, with the request that the Commission furnish him with additional information dealing with: (1) the 1961 experience of the industry, and (2) the competitive effect upon the industry of domestic production of machine-tufted carpets and rugs. The President requested the Commission to report back by December 1, 1961.

The President's action was taken after consultation with the Trade Policy Committee.

The case was submitted to the President by the Tariff Commission on August 3, 1961. The Commission recommended that the duty be increased from 21 percent ad valorem to 40 percent ad valorem.

ALSIKE CLOVER SEED

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated October 1

The President on October 1 announced that he had accepted as the findings of the Tariff Commission in the case involving alsike clover seed the findings of the two Commissioners who decided that the imposition of additional restrictions on imports of alsike clover seed was not warranted under section 7, the escape-clause provision of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

The President's decision was taken after consultation with the Trade Policy Committee.

The case was submitted to the President by the Tariff Commission on August 7, 1961. The four members of the Commission who participated in the investigation divided two to two in their findings. Two Commissioners recommended no change in the tariff treatment accorded alsike clover seed; the other two Commissioners recommended a change in such treatment. In cases where the Commission is equally divided, the President is authorized to accept the findings of either group of Commissioners as the findings of the Commission.

Current International Air Transportation Problems

*Statement by Edwin M. Martin
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

You have requested the Department of State to present its views on current international air transportation problems. This is indeed a critical area at this time, and all evidence points to the fact that problems may become more acute in the near future. I believe you are interested in current problems and what may be done to resolve these problems over the next few years; so I will not spend a great deal of time on the historical background. However, we can provide you with supplementary material on the detailed history if the committee should so desire.

In its international air transport relations the United States since 1946 has been primarily guided by the so-called Bermuda Principles. These principles were established in the United States-United Kingdom Air Agreement of 1946² to provide rules for the orderly development of international air services. In the United States view these principles represented a flexible means to permit the healthy expansion and development of international airlines with reasonable control over excessive and unfair competition. The Bermuda Principles specify that the services offered by the designated airline should retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity for traffic between the homeland and countries of ultimate destination of the traffic with the pro-

vision that airlines might carry fill-up traffic between two foreign points.

Substantially all the international routes, established by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) as the United States goal in 1944, were successfully negotiated with the countries concerned during the early postwar years. United States air carriers in general were able to fly these routes unencumbered by arbitrary restrictions as to capacity, frequency, type of equipment, etc. The United States was aided in this international expansion by the unique position it occupied at the end of the war, having the greatest stock of air transport equipment in the world, the largest reserve of skilled personnel, worldwide experience in the operation of long-haul, transoceanic routes, and the economic potential to weld these advantages into an aggressive, expanding industry. On the other hand, most foreign countries were either at such a low level of economic development or so weakened by the ravages of World War II they were unable to bring to bear the amount of economic resources to the development of their air transport fleet and facilities to compete effectively with the United States operators.

However, in recent years the picture has changed considerably. National flag airlines have grown up and are vigorously seeking to expand their international activities. Many countries are now either directly challenging the value of the Bermuda Principles or attempting to establish interpretations of these principles inconsistent with the traditional United States view. I wish to outline some of these problems

¹ Made before the Senate Commerce Committee on Sept. 22 (press release 656) on S. Res. 167, a resolution authorizing an investigation of matters pertaining to international air transportation.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1946, p. 586.

and the steps the Department is supporting to establish guidelines for effective United States policies for their resolution.

Development of Recent Problems

The climate for the development and expansion of United States international transportation has become substantially and adversely altered over the last few years due to a growing number of disagreements with foreign countries on the interpretation and implementation of our bilateral air transport agreements. Most of these disagreements have been engendered in one form or another by the increasing desire of foreign countries to have their own airlines and to secure a larger share in the international air transport market. Difficulties have been experienced from two extreme and opposite groups—those seeking to restrict United States airlines and those advocating essentially freedom of the air. The Department has been fully aware of these problems and has vigorously prosecuted bilateral consultations within the context of existing Bermuda policies for the resolution of these difficulties. Unfortunately the United States has been at best only partially successful in achieving a satisfactory settlement of the difficulties within the Bermuda framework.

Foreign governments are tending more and more to integrate international air transport objectives into their overall foreign relations posture. This is due to two reasons. The first reason for foreign governments' extraordinary interest in international air transport is the desire to "show the flag" and to utilize the national airline as an instrument of national prestige and commerce. Once committed to this objective the foreign governments seek to protect and support their national airline even to the extent of relating their aviation objectives to nonaviation matters. In the face of these attempts to expand the context of aviation relations to include other aspects of foreign relations, the United States has constantly sought to deal with aviation matters within the framework of aviation considerations alone. Second, in some cases international air transport services represent a substantial economic asset whose ability to earn foreign exchange is considered essential to the national economy. The

role of KLM in Netherlands economy represents a typical example.

I will attempt to outline in general terms the major specific problems facing the United States at this time.

Excess Capacity

As national economies improved during the postwar reconstruction period there was an awakening on the part of foreign countries as to the desirability of having a national airline for the purpose not only of serving domestic routes but also to provide an instrument of national prestige on international routes. Not only countries at a reasonably high level of economic development but also newly developing countries felt it urgent to establish and support an international carrier. Many countries in the last few years have sought not only to exploit rights previously negotiated although not utilized but have progressively pursued a policy of expanding these rights. Since the United States represents the richest air market in the world, it has been a particular target of these efforts. Moreover, foreign efforts to obtain a greater share of existing markets have been actively directed against United States carriers as the predominant operators in many of these markets. In some cases countries have claimed a basic imbalance of benefits in favor of the United States under the original agreement which was negotiated at the time when the foreign country was not in a position to implement greater rights.

The net result of this drive by foreign countries to establish their own international airlines has been a proliferation of carriers in most international air markets. For example, the number of international carriers on the North Atlantic has increased from 9 in 1950 to 13 in 1955 and 17 in 1960. In other areas, particularly in Latin America and parts of the Near and Far East, the number of carriers now far exceeds the ability of the traffic to support them. These operations show a chronic condition of excess capacity.

The difficulties in these areas are that the general economic conditions in them have not kept pace with the increased capacity offered. Since many of these carriers are noncompetitive, they are experiencing great difficulty in obtaining what they consider to be a sufficient share of these markets.

Another and more dramatic development which has resulted in excess capacity has been the advent of the jets, which by matching piston schedules roughly triple the productive capacity of the piston equipment which they have replaced. Because of the appeal of the jets to the traveling public, most carriers feel they must also have jets in order to compete effectively for the available traffic. The experience in the North Atlantic during 1961 typifies the problem of the rapid introduction of jet equipment resulting in overcapacity and uneconomic load factors.

It has been alleged that the United States policy on multiple designation has in some cases resulted in an irritation of the capacity problems. Multiple designation refers to the authorization of more than one United States carrier to operate between the United States and a foreign country. The complaint is based on the thesis that American airlines in competition with one another tend to match one another's schedules. From the viewpoint of the foreign country the addition of a second United States carrier in the market offers a threat of a doubling of the offered United States airline capacity.

The gradually developing problem of excess capacity has resulted in a variety of actions by foreign countries to attempt to protect the interests of their own carriers. In most cases these countries base their actions on their own interpretation of the capacity provisions of the bilateral agreements with the United States.

There have evolved three general schools of philosophy in regard to the solution of the excess capacity problem. The advocates of "freedom of the air" such as the Dutch and Scandinavians, possessed with strong, aggressive, and competent airlines, argue that carriers operating on international routes should have full freedom to carry all the traffic that they can develop. Under this thesis the weaker carriers or those not in a position for one reason or another to compete effectively would have to either leave the market or curtail their operations.

A second school holds that many countries suffer from basic disadvantages in the fight for international air passengers and that in order to protect the national carrier these countries must be able to allocate or predetermine the volume of traffic carried in and out of their countries.

A third school, to which the United States belongs, maintains that airlines should have reason-

able freedom to carry traffic of primary interest (third- and fourth-freedom traffic) but that there should be sensible rules governing the carriage of secondary traffic (fifth-freedom traffic).

A special problem has arisen in the past few years with respect to the carriage of so-called sixth-freedom traffic, which the United States considers to be a special category of fifth freedom. This is traffic carried between foreign countries via the homeland. The United States interprets such traffic to be secondary-justification traffic which should represent only fill-up traffic after the requirements of primary-justification traffic are met. Certain countries such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries consider that the carriage of such traffic via the homeland, no matter how long the stopover, converts this traffic from secondary or fifth-freedom to primary traffic. They claim that the provisions of the agreement are not designed to cover this type of traffic and that the United States has no basis for taking issue with its carriage.

Rates

A second problem area has become critical in recent years where certain foreign carriers have indulged in various rate-cutting practices in order to secure a more favorable share of the market. Carriers which engage in rate-cutting practices are usually small regional carriers which offer rates well below the commonly accepted fare levels. These carriers usually claim they cannot compete with the major carriers and therefore require a lower rate structure. It is possible, due to local conditions, that the costs experienced by these carriers are in fact lower than many of the major carriers and they can make a profit at fare levels considerably below those of the IATA [International Air Transport Association] carriers.

The effect of these rate-cutting practices has been to divert passengers from the United States carriers. The precise extent of this diversion has not yet been determined, but the United States carriers claim it is substantial. Those bilateral agreements which include provisions on rates outline consultative machinery for the resolution of rate problems. In the event of disagreement after such consultation the complaining party may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the establishment of the proposed rate. However, this machinery has not proven of great value to

the United States because its aeronautical authority, the CAB, does not have powers to disapprove rates in international air transportation. A new rate article has been developed which represents a substantial improvement over the original rate article, but it still relies on the powers of each party to take steps under its own regulatory powers to disapprove the establishment of unreasonable rates. The CAB has periodically recommended legislation to Congress, which the Department has supported, which would give the Board ratemaking powers similar to those now exercised in domestic transportation. Such legislation has also been proposed in the current session of Congress.

Other Problems

Capacity and rate problems represent the most severe difficulties facing the United States Government in its international negotiations. There are a number of others. One of these is the matter of foreign airline pools and the exceedingly strong economic combination that such pools can represent in international markets. The increased financial resources, use of joint ticket offices, joint publicity efforts, maintenance facilities, and aircraft utilization result in substantial advantages to such combinations. In addition the governments concerned are more likely to act in concert in support of those pooled interests. It should be noted, however, that, while in some cases pooling arrangements may result in more effective competition, in other cases they may represent a highly necessary economic rationalization of the operations of a number of small uneconomic carriers.

Another difficulty, which is related to the capacity problem, is the matter of a common approach to the collection and use of air-traffic statistics. An intelligent bilateral analysis of capacity problems cannot be made in the absence of adequate traffic data the interpretation and use of which both sides agree. The lack of a mutually acceptable approach to statistics has represented one of the stickiest obstacles to a satisfactory resolution of capacity problems. The United States, in ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] and in bilateral discussions, has been attempting for the last several years to achieve a widely accepted multilateral understanding on the definition of traffic categories, means of collection, and use in capacity discussions. The

efforts have for the most part been unsuccessful due to the wide divergence of opinion on this subject and desire of some countries to avoid the use of statistics entirely.

United States international carriers may soon be confronted with special restrictions due to regional intergovernmental attempts to control the operations of nonregional airlines. Some countries of the Arab League have for some time been advancing the theory that routes within the Arab League area are cabotage routes, that is, routes on which traffic may be carried only by Arab League airlines. It is understood that these efforts have already been directed against certain non-United States carriers and could conceivably soon be aimed at United States airlines.

Similar efforts are being made by member countries in the Latin American Regional Civil Aviation Conference (CRAC). The objective here is to establish quotas for non-CRAC airlines so as to reserve a major share of the Latin American market for CRAC airlines. Peru and Chile have already initiated discussions with the United States on this matter although no action has yet been taken. These countries allege that efforts to protect regional carriers are consistent with the spirit of the bilateral agreements.

Other regional groups such as the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and Air Afrique, a regional airline to serve 11 former French colonies and Africa, have been formed. It is not known as yet what effect these regional groups will have on United States aviation interests.

International Air Transportation Study

The Department has become increasingly concerned that the resolution of the problems mentioned above cannot be achieved within the framework of United States traditional policies. It believes that the objective of the United States for enlightened leadership in the development of international civil air transport is being impaired by the current inability to implement United States international aviation policies and programs in the face of major new problems and issues, among them: the growing number of foreign airlines demanding traffic rights in the United States; the swift, technical revolution of the jet age resulting in vastly increased costs and excess capacity on major routes; and the great prestige

importance attached to the operation of national flag carriers, especially by newly emerging nations.

A comprehensive reappraisal of United States civil air transport policies and programs is urgently needed if continuing United States leadership is to be assured. Policies adopted as compromises in the mid-1940's remain substantially unchanged and may now be far outmoded by the dynamic progress of civil aviation in the intervening years. As a nation, the United States has a wide range of interrelated and often conflicting interests in international air transport—political, economic, psychological, and military. When conflicts arise, it becomes the task of government to balance and reconcile and to make a determination of relative importance to the Nation.

Issues now confronting the Government are numerous; they include a range of subjects relating to:

a. the importance of international aviation to the United States in terms of, *inter alia*, the employment it generates, its contribution to the gross national product, and its effect on the United States balance of payments; and

b. the consistency of aviation policies with foreign political, economic, and military policy principles and objectives.

The Department is therefore pleased that the President has recently announced that a study covering all facets of international air transportation would be carried out by a private research organization under contract to the Bureau of the Budget. In addition the Bureau of the Budget is undertaking a study of the role of the United States Government in the development of international air transportation policy and how it is organized to carry out its responsibilities in this area. This will involve a study of the responsibilities and activities of the various agencies involved in these policies.

The Department is hopeful that the results of these studies will provide guidelines for the more effective pursuit of United States objectives in this important area.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

- Cambodian Port Highway (Part I) and Afghanistan Highway Contracts (Part II). Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee. February 9–June 20, 1961. 123 pp.
- Organizing for National Security: The Budget and the Policy Process. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Government Operations Committee. Part VIII. July 24–August 1, 1961. 168 pp.
- United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Acting Secretary of State transmitting the ninth report on the extent and disposition of U.S. contributions for fiscal year 1960. H. Doc. 222. August 10, 1961. 122 pp.
- The 14th Semiannual Report on Activities of the Food-for-Peace Program Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as Amended. Message from the President transmitting the report for the period January 1 through June 30, 1961. H. Doc. 223. August 14, 1961. 107 pp.
- To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 7936 and H.R. 9118. August 24–September 7, 1961. 180 pp.
- Trade With Cuba. Hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on H.R. 8465 and H.R. 8866. August 29–September 1, 1961. 78 pp.
- Fourth Annual Report Covering U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency for 1960. H. Doc. 233. September 1, 1961. 39 pp.
- Fifth Annual Report on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Program. H. Doc. 234. September 1, 1961. 110 pp.
- U.S. Representation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Report to accompany S. 2323. S. Rept. 878. September 5, 1961. 3 pp.
- United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security. Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2180. S. Rept. 882. September 6, 1961. 10 pp.
- International Exposition for Southern California. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 132. S. Rept. 883. September 6, 1961. 6 pp.
- Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1961. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 8291, an act to enable the United States to participate in the assistance rendered to certain migrants and refugees. September 11, 1961. 27 pp.
- Inter-American Children's Institute. Report to accompany H.R. 8895. H. Rept. 1159. September 11, 1961. 3 pp.
- Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1962. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7371. H. Rept. 1163. September 11, 1961. 7 pp.
- To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency. Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 9118. H. Rept. 1165. September 12, 1961. 37 pp.
- Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1961. Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 8291. S. Rept. 989. September 12, 1961. 8 pp.
- Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1962. Report to accompany H.R. 9033. S. Rept. 991. September 13, 1961. 16 pp.

Agenda of the Sixteenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly ¹

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Ireland.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly :
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee ;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Opening of the general debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of the members of the International Law Commission.
18. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter.
19. Question of disarmament.
20. The Korean question : reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
21. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
22. Assistance to Africa :
 - (a) A United Nations programme for independence ;
 - (b) Economic development of Africa ;
 - (c) African educational development.
23. Question of Oman.
24. Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
25. Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
26. United Nations Emergency Force :
 - (a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force ;
 - (b) Report on the Force.
27. The situation in Angola : report of the Sub-Committee established by General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV).
28. Economic development of under-developed countries :
 - (a) Industrial development and activities of the organs of the United Nations in the field of industrialization ;
 - (b) Establishment of a United Nations capital development fund : report of the Committee established by General Assembly resolution 1521 (XV) ;
 - (c) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance to the developing countries : report of the Secretary-General ;
 - (d) Land reform : interim report of the Secretary-General ;
 - (e) Provision of food surpluses to food-deficient peoples through the United Nations system.
29. Questions relating to international trade and commodities :
 - (a) Strengthening and development of the world market and improvement of the trade conditions of the economically less developed countries : report of the Economic and Social Council ;
 - (b) Improvement of the terms of trade between the industrial and the under-developed countries : report of the Economic and Social Council.
30. Questions relating to science and technology :
 - (a) Development of scientific and technical co-operation and exchange of experience : report of the Secretary-General ;
 - (b) Main trends of inquiry in the natural sciences, dissemination of scientific knowledge and application of such knowledge for peaceful ends : report of the Economic and Social Council.
31. Progress and operations of the Special Fund.
32. United Nations programmes of technical co-operation :
 - (a) Report of the Economic and Social Council ;
 - (b) Use of volunteer workers in the operational pro-

¹ Adopted by the General Assembly on Sept. 25 (U.N. doc. A/4890).

- grammes of the United Nations and related agencies;
- (c) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.
33. Assistance to newly independent States: report of the Economic and Social Council.
 34. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
 35. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights.
 36. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information.
 37. Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
 38. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum.
 39. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:
 - (a) Information on social conditions;
 - (b) Information on other conditions;
 - (c) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information.
 40. Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
 41. Racial discrimination in Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
 42. Dissemination of information on the United Nations in the Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
 43. Participation of the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the work of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies: report of the Secretary-General.
 44. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
 45. Question of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
 46. Election, if required, to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
 47. Question of South West Africa:
 - (a) Report of the Committee on South West Africa;
 - (b) Assistance of the specialized agencies and of the United Nations Children's Fund in the economic, social and educational development of South West Africa: reports of the agencies and of the Fund;
 - (c) Election of three members of the Committee on South West Africa.
 48. Question of the future of Western Samoa: report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for Western Samoa and report of the Trusteeship Council thereon.
 49. Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi.
 50. Dissemination of information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in the Trust Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
 51. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
 52. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1960, and reports of the Board of Auditors:
 - (a) United Nations;
 - (b) United Nations Children's Fund;
 - (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
 - (d) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
 53. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1961.
 54. Budget estimates for the financial year 1962.
 55. United Nations operations in the Congo: cost estimates and financing.
 56. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
 - (b) Committee on Contributions;
 - (c) Board of Auditors;
 - (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
 - (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
 57. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
 58. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:
 - (a) Expenditure of technical assistance funds allocated from the Special Account of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;
 - (b) Expenditure as executing agencies for Special Fund projects.
 59. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and with the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
 60. Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds.
 61. Review of the activities and organization of the Secretariat: report of the Committee of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 1446 (XIV) and recommendations thereon by the Secretary-General.
 62. Administrative and budgetary procedures of the United Nations: report of the working group appointed under General Assembly resolution 1620 (XV).
 63. Public information activities of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General.
 64. Personnel questions:
 - (a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat;

- (b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;
- (c) Other personnel questions.

65. Base salary scales and post adjustments of the staff in the professional and higher categories of the international civil service: reports of the International Civil Service Advisory Board and of the Secretary-General.
66. Annual report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
67. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General.
68. United Nations Library: report of the Secretary-General.
69. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirteenth session.
70. Future work in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law.
71. Question of special missions.
72. The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control.
73. Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal.
74. The status of the German-speaking element in the Province of Bolzano (Bozen); implementation of General Assembly resolution 1497 (XV) of 31 October 1960.
75. Treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in the Republic of South Africa.
76. The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.
77. Enlargement of the International Law Commission.
78. Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.
79. Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, and resolution 1542 (XV) of the General Assembly.
80. Question of Algeria.
81. The prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.
82. Problem raised by the situation of Angolan refugees in the Congo.
83. Question of Tibet.
84. Population growth and economic development.
85. Draft Convention and Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages.
86. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance.
87. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
88. The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.
89. Question of Hungary.
90. Question of the representation of China in the United Nations.
91. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

U.S. Host to OECD Conference on Economic Growth and Education

Press release 686 dated October 5

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which came into being September 30, 1961, will hold a Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education at Washington, D.C., from October 16 to 20, 1961. Secretary Rusk will welcome delegates to the opening public session in the Department of State. Working sessions of the conference will be held at the Brookings Institution.

The OECD supplants the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was created in 1948. The new designation reflects the changes that have taken place in the world economic situation since the former organization was created to administer the Marshall plan aid and to restore the European economy on a cooperative basis. It also reflects the fact that two non-European countries—the United States and Canada—now have become full members, bringing the total to 20 countries, and that the organization will stress the need for major free-world industrial nations to consult closely on their economic policies.

Bringing together governmental delegations of top-level economists and educators from member countries, the conference reflects the growing interest for the role played by education as a key factor for economic growth. Thus the conferees will have an opportunity to exchange ideas and determine the needs in education and the most advanced methods and techniques for setting realistic goals geared to the rate of economic growth.

The conference will be chaired by Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Mr. Coombs, who also will head the U.S. delegation, will deliver the keynote address.

The special needs of the underdeveloped countries will be given emphasis at the conference. In this connection, a number of papers will be read and discussed concerning why and how targets for educational expansion in the advanced countries might be related to the needs of the underdeveloped countries, not only for education in general but in particular for scientific personnel and educational facilities, including teachers.

The Secretary General of OECD, Dr. Thorkil Kristensen of Denmark, will attend the opening session and will deliver a speech at an evening banquet offered by the Department of State in honor of the conference delegates.

Other main speakers at the conference will include Prof. Fred Harbison of Princeton University, Prof. J. Tinbergen of the Netherlands, and Prof. Ingvar Svennilson of Sweden.

Besides Mr. Coombs the U.S. delegation will be composed of David E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget; Sterling M. McMurrin, U.S. Commissioner of Education; Alan T. Waterman, Director, National Science Foundation; Kermit Gordon, Council of Economic Advisers; Manuel Abrams, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State; and James P. Grant, Deputy Director, Office of Program and Planning, Agency for International Development.

TREATY INFORMATION

Public Invited To Submit Comments on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol

Press release 679 dated October 2

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State draws attention to the attached self-explanatory letter regarding reconsideration of the Warsaw Convention¹ and The Hague Protocol,² which is being transmitted to certain persons and organizations by the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA).

The United States is a party to the Warsaw Convention, a treaty which regulates the responsibilities and liabilities of airlines toward passengers and shippers in international air transportation. A principal provision of this treaty (article 22) provides that "the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited" to \$8,300. Article 17 provides that "the carrier shall be liable for

damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger" from an aircraft accident. Article 20 provides that "the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." Further, article 25 provides that "the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct."

The Hague Protocol, which was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent in 1959 but has not yet been acted upon, is an amendment to the Warsaw Convention and, in general, would raise the limit of recovery from \$8,300 to \$16,600, and in addition would permit recovery of attorneys' fees and costs of litigation.

Persons and organizations, in addition to those to whom the letter has been addressed, are invited to submit to Interagency Group on International Aviation, % Federal Aviation Agency, Washington 25, D.C., by November 15, 1961, written comments and any requests to present oral statements.

TEXT OF LETTER

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY

Washington, D.C., September 22, 1961

DEAR ____: As part of the general review of pending international conventions before the Senate, and in the light of the controversial provision on limitation of liability with respect to passengers, the Department of State has asked the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) to undertake a consideration of the relationship of the United States to The Hague Protocol and the Warsaw Convention. More specifically, the Department desires the advice of the IGIA (1) whether or not the Department should recommend that the President withdraw the request to the Senate for advice and consent to The Hague Protocol; and (2) whether or not the United States should withdraw from participation in the Warsaw Convention by giving the required six-months' notice.

In order that member agencies of the IGIA (the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, the Federal Aviation Agency and the Civil Aeronautics Board) may be in a position to evaluate all aspects of the two questions, comments thereon

¹ 49 Stat. 3000.

² S. Ex. H, 86th Cong., 1st sess.

are being invited from interested persons and organizations. Comments should be directed to the legal, economic and international consequences, as appropriate, which should be taken into account by the Government in making its determination on these questions.

As background for your consideration of the many factors involved, please find enclosed, as Enclosure 1, a copy of the position taken by the Executive Branch of the Government as prepared by an interagency committee in 1957, and, as Enclosure 2, the composite text of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol. Persons and organizations desiring to comment may find it convenient to utilize the topical discussions contained in Enclosure 1 as a basis for reply to this inquiry. It is suggested that comments will have maximum usefulness and value if they are supported by established statistical data, decided case law or enacted statute, or other specific and existing evidence. In addition, opinions are invited as to the significance of any recent developments under the various topics.

Written comments should be received by the IGIA by November 15, 1961. Persons and organizations desiring to present an oral statement will be afforded an opportunity to do so December 4, 1961. A request therefor should be submitted with any written comments by November 15. Such persons and organizations will be separately advised as to the hour and place.

Sincerely yours,

W. C. HANNEMAN, *Staff Officer*

Interagency Group on International Aviation

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

Assumed applicable obligations and responsibilities of the United Kingdom: Nigeria, June 26, 1961.

Narcotics

Convention and final protocols relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912, and July 9, 1913. Entered into force for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Niger, August 25, 1961.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Niger, August 25, 1961.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Niger, August 25, 1961.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (including Land Berlin), July 28, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Enters into force on day it has been accepted, by signature or otherwise, by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.

Signature: Japan, May 1, 1961.

*Acceptances:*² Belgium, November 24, 1960; Canada, April 14, 1961; France, November 19, 1960; Luxembourg, February 24, 1961; Netherlands (including Netherlands Antilles and Netherlands New Guinea), April 25, 1961; New Zealand, May 30, 1961; Norway, February 9, 1961; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, May 9, 1961; United Kingdom (including all territories to which GATT provisionally applied with exception of Kenya), August 21, 1961; United States (with a statement), September 19, 1961.

Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into force October 1, 1961.

Acceptance: United States, September 7, 1961.

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom: Sierra Leone, August 25, 1961, with respect to the following:

Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS 1761.

Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948. TIAS 1763.

Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 19, 1948. TIAS 1764.

Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7, 1948. TIAS 1765.

Protocol replacing Schedule I (Australia) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2394.

¹ Not in force.

² By virtue of acceptance of declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of GATT.

Protocol replacing Schedule VI (Ceylon) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Ancey August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2746.

First protocol of modifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Ancey August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2745.

Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14, 1948. TIAS 1888.

Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2744.

Protocol modifying part II and article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force December 14, 1948. TIAS 1890.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to the addition of Cape Dyer to the annex of the agreement of May 1, 1959 (TIAS 4218), relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of short-range tactical air navigation (TACAN) facilities in Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa September 19 and 23, 1961. Entered into force September 23, 1961.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending agreement for lease of air navigation equipment of August 2, 1955, as extended (TIAS 3464, 4062, and 4490). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn August 14 and September 11, 1961. Entered into force September 11, 1961.

Mexico

Agreement for acceptance by United States of certificates of airworthiness for aircraft manufactured by Lockheed-Azcarate, S.A. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 26 and July 19, 1961. Entered into force July 19, 1961.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 17 and 30, 1961. Entered into force August 30, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Alfred M. Hurt as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Somali Republic, effective August 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 538 dated July 31.)

Donald B. MacPhail as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Libya, effective September 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 665 dated September 26.)

Edwin G. Moline as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, United Arab Republic, effective September 27. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 668 dated September 27.)

Patrick F. Morris as International Cooperation Administration representative in Venezuela, effective September 26. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 667 dated September 27.)

Belton O. Bryan as Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective October 2. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 683 dated October 2.)

Philip H. Trezise as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective October 3. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 685 dated October 4.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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*681	10/2	Cultural exchange (Somali Republic).
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*683	10/2	Bryan designated Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (biographic details).
†684	10/4	Cieplinski: American Immigration and Citizenship Conference.
*685	10/4	Trezise designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
686	10/5	OECD conference on economic growth and education.
687	10/5	U.S.-India textile-trade statement.
*688	10/5	Program for visit of President of Sudan.
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691	10/6	Grant to University of Iceland.
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†693	10/7	Visit of Panamanian economic mission.
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†695	10/7	Rusk: interview on "Prospects of Mankind."
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Bulletin

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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October 30, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Public Responsibility of Educated Men

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

Mr. Chancellor, Governor [Terry] Sanford, members of the faculty, ladies and gentlemen:

I am honored today to be admitted to the fellowship of this ancient and distinguished university, and I am pleased to receive in the short space of one or two minutes the honor for which you spend over 4 years of your lives. But whether the degree be honorary or earned, it is a proud symbol of this university and this State.

North Carolina has long been identified with enlightened and progressive leaders and people, and I can think of no more important reason for that reputation than this university, which year after year has sent out educated men and women who have had a recognition of their public responsibility as well as in private interests.

Distinguished presidents like President [Frank P.] Graham and [Gordon] Gray, distinguished leaders like the Secretary of Commerce, Governor [Luther H.] Hodges, distinguished Members of the congressional delegation, carry out a tradition which stretches back to the beginning of this school, and that is that the graduate of this university is a man of his nation as well as a man of his time. And it is my hope, in a changing world, when untold possibilities lie before North Carolina, and indeed the entire South and country, that this university will still hew to the old line of the responsibility that its graduates owe to the community at large—that in your time, too,

you will be willing to give to the State and country a portion of your lives and all of your knowledge and all of your loyalty.

Link Between Education and Political Leadership

I want to emphasize, in the great concentration which we now place upon scientists and engineers, how much we still need the men and women educated in the liberal traditions, willing to take the long look, undisturbed by prejudices and slogans of the moment, who attempt to make an honest judgment on difficult events.

This university has a more important function today than ever before, and therefore I am proud as President of the United States, and as a graduate of a small land-grant college in Massachusetts, Harvard University, to come to this center of education.

Those of you who regard my profession of political life with some disdain should remember that it made it possible for me to move from being an obscure lieutenant in the United States Navy to Commander in Chief in 14 years, with very little technical competence.

But more than that, I hope that you will realize that from the beginning of this country, and especially in North Carolina, there has been the closest link between educated men and women and politics and government. And also to remember that our nation's first great leaders were also our first great scholars.

A contemporary described Thomas Jefferson as "a gentleman of 32 who could calculate an eclipse, survey an estate, tie an artery, plan an edifice, try

¹Made at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Oct. 12 (White House (Chapel Hill) press release).

a cause, break a horse, dance the minuet, and play the violin." John Quincy Adams, after being summarily dismissed by the Massachusetts Legislature from the United States Senate for supporting Thomas Jefferson, could then become Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard University, and then become a great Secretary of State.

And Senator Daniel Webster could stroll down the corridors of Congress a few steps, after making some of the greatest speeches in the history of this country, and dominate the Supreme Court as the foremost lawyer of his day.

This versatility, this vitality, this intellectual energy, put to the service of our country, represents our great resource in these difficult days.

I would urge you, therefore, regardless of your specialty, and regardless of your chosen field or occupation, and regardless of whether you bear office or not, that you recognize the contribution which you can make as educated men and women to intellectual and political leadership in these difficult days, when the problems are infinitely more complicated and come with increasing speed, with increasing significance, in our lives than they were a century ago, when so many gifted men dominated our political life. The United States Senate had more able men serving in it, from the period of 1830 to 1850, than probably any time in our history, and yet they dealt with three or four problems which they had dealt with for over a generation.

Now they come day by day, from all parts of the world. Even the experts find themselves confused, and therefore in a free society such as this, where the people must make an educated judgment, they depend upon those of you who have had the advantage of the scholar's education.

The Role of the University

I ask you to give to the service of our country the critical faculties which society has helped develop in you here. I ask you to decide, as Goethe put it, "whether you will be an anvil or a hammer," whether you will give the United States, in which you were reared and educated, the broadest possible benefits of that education.

It is not enough to lend your talents to deploring present solutions. Most educated men and women on occasions prefer to discuss what is wrong, rather than to suggest alternative courses

of action. But, "Would you have counted him a friend of ancient Greece," as George William Curtis asked a body of educators a century ago—"Would you have counted him a friend of ancient Greece who quietly discussed the theory of patriotism on that hot summer day through whose hopeless and immortal hours Leonidas and the three hundred stood at Thermopylae for liberty? Was John Milton to conjugate Greek verbs in his library when the last Englishman was imperiled?"

This is a great institution with a great tradition, and with a devoted alumni, and with the support of the people of this State. Its establishment and continued functioning, like that of all great universities, has required great sacrifice by the people of North Carolina. I cannot believe that all of this is undertaken merely to give this school's graduates an economic advantage in the life struggle.

"A university," said Professor Woodrow Wilson, "should be an organ of memory for the State, for the transmission of its best traditions." And Prince Bismarck was even more specific. "One third of the students of German universities," he once said, "broke down from overwork, another third broke down from dissipation, and the other third ruled Germany." I leave it to each of you to decide into which category you will fall.

I do not suggest that our political and public life should be turned over to college-trained experts, nor would I give this university a seat in the Congress, as William and Mary was once represented in the Virginia House of Burgesses, nor would I adopt from the Belgian Constitution a provision giving three votes instead of one to college graduates—at least not until more Democrats go to college. But I do hope that you will join them.

This university produces trained men and women, and what this country needs are those who look, as the motto of your State says, at things as they are and not at things as they seem to be.

For this meeting is held at an extraordinary time. Angola or Algeria, Brazil or Bizerte, Syria or south Viet-Nam, Korea or Kuwait, the Dominican Republic, Berlin, the United Nations itself—all problems which 20 years ago we could not even dream of.

Our task in this country is to do our best, to serve our nation's interest as we see it, and not to be swayed from our course by the fainthearted or

the unknowing, or the threats of those who would make themselves our foes.

The Long View

This is not a simple task in a democracy. We cannot open all our books in advance to an adversary who operates in the night—the decisions we make, the weapons we possess, the bargains we will accept—nor can we always see reflected overnight the success or failure of the actions that we may take.

In times past, a simple slogan described our policy: "Fifty-four forty or fight." "To make the world safe for democracy." "No entangling alliances." But the times, issues, and the weapons, all have changed and complicated and endangered our lives. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that the policies of the United States, stretching as they do worldwide, under varying and different conditions, can be encompassed in one slogan or one adjective, hard or soft or otherwise—or to believe that we shall soon meet total victory or total defeat.

Peace and freedom do not come cheap, and we are destined, all of us here today, to live out most if not all of our lives in uncertainty and challenge and peril. Our policy must therefore blend whatever degree of firmness and flexibility which is necessary to protect our vital interests, by peaceful means if possible, by resolute action if necessary.

There is, of course, no place in America where reason and firmness are more clearly pointed out than here in North Carolina. All Americans can profit from what happened in this State a century ago. It was this State, firmly fixed in the traditions of the South, which sought a way of reason in a troubled and dangerous world. Yet when the war came, North Carolina provided a fourth of all of the Confederate soldiers who made the supreme sacrifice in those years. And it won the right to the slogan, "First in battle, farthest at Gettysburg, and last at Appomattox."

Its quest for a peaceful resolution of our problems was never identified in the minds of its people, of people today, with anything but a desire for peace and a preparation to meet their responsibilities.

We move for the first time in our history through an age in which two opposing powers have the capacity to destroy each other, and while we do not intend to see the free world give up, we

shall make every effort to prevent the world from being blown up.

The American eagle on our official seal emphasizes both peace and freedom, and as I said in the state of the Union address, we in this country give equal attention to its claws when in its left hand it holds the arrows and in its right the olive branch.

This is a time of national maturity, and understanding, and willingness to face issues as they are, not as we would like them to be. It is a test of our ability to be farseeing and calm, as well as resolute, to keep an eye on both our dangers and our opportunities, and not to be diverted by momentary gains, or setbacks, or pressures. And it is the long view of the educated citizen to which the graduates of this university can best contribute.

We must distinguish the real from the illusory, the long-range from the temporary, the significant from the petty, but if we can be purposeful, if we can face up to our risks and live up to our word, if we can do our duty undeterred by fanatics or frenzy at home or abroad, then surely peace and freedom can prevail. We shall be neither Red nor dead, but alive and free—and worthy of the traditions and responsibilities of North Carolina and the United States of America.

Chief Minister of Uganda Visits United States

The Department of State announced on October 13 (press release 706) that Benedicto Kiwanuka, Chief Minister of the Government of Uganda, would arrive at Friendship International Airport at Baltimore on October 15 to begin a week's visit in the United States as a guest of the U.S. Government. The Minister will be accompanied by E. B. Bhwambali and H. J. Obonyo, members of the Uganda Legislative Council.

While in Washington, Minister Kiwanuka will confer with Fowler Hamilton, Director of the Agency for International Development, on October 16 and Secretary Rusk on October 17. He will also meet with other leading officials of the Federal Government.

During his stay in the United States, Minister Kiwanuka will visit the United Nations in New York.

U.S. Foreign Policy: Four Major Issues

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a high privilege for me to be here. As a mere man, I have not been so outnumbered since I taught at a woman's college man years ago. But that experience caused me to treat your invitation as a command. I do not claim that, as a teacher of young women, I came to understand them. But I can confess that I was deeply impressed by them.

One reason was their disconcerting practicality about public affairs. I found that women students insisted upon moving rapidly from the general to the particular, from the abstract to the tangible, from the global to the personal implication. I found them skeptical about the artificial and dangerous games they suspected men were prone to play with words, concepts, myths, and pretense on such important matters as war and peace. And I found them deeply interested in how the story is going to come out in the end, in the building of a decent world order, in arrangements which could make life tolerable for individuals and families, homes and local communities.

Indeed, foreign policy is not a remote abstraction, having only to do with entities called "states," notions like "sovereignty," and formal arrangements called "protocol." In this climactic period of history foreign policy involves every citizen, lays its hand upon every home, and embraces our personal aspirations for the kind of world in which we hope our children can live.

We in the Department of State are deeply interested in what United Church Women think about the major issues of foreign policy. We follow your reports, appreciate your support when you feel you can give it, and pause to reflect if

policy fails to commend itself to you. I am grateful, therefore, for an opportunity to comment upon certain matters upon which you have passed resolutions at this meeting.

The United Nations

The first has to do with our support for the United Nations. The United Nations, of course, has its enemies—those who fear cooperation among nations, even though science has made this a world in which we must cooperate or die. The United Nations has its fair-weather friends, who cheer loudly when things go well but abandon ship if the sea gets rough.

Then there are those who have the patient courage to support the United Nations year in and year out as an indispensable instrument of peace. Your resolutions over the years have spoken for your steadfast support, and you represent, I believe, the great majority of the American public.

I happened to be present at the birth of the United Nations in San Francisco more than 16 years ago. Last month I was with it in New York during the crisis brought on by the tragic death of that hero of peace, Dag Hammarskjold.

The story of the United Nations during the intervening years tells us a great deal about the world in which we live. It also enables us to appraise realistically the present capabilities of the Organization. I think we should be quite clear about what the United Nations can do and cannot do, what it is and what it is not.

Obviously the United Nations has not fulfilled the hopes of some of its most devoted advocates in 1945. But it is more than a debating society, although debate, even when it does not lead to action, may serve as a safety valve for national

¹ Made before the United Church Women at Miami, Fla., on Oct. 11 (press release 701).

passions and helps to clarify issues. We must recognize also that many of the problems put before the United Nations are extremely difficult; they go there because they have not been solved somewhere else.

The United Nations has not banished war. But it has reduced and averted threats to peace—in Iran, Greece, Palestine, Suez, Lebanon, and the Congo.

The United Nations has not created unity in a divided world. But it has organized concerts of nations to do together the things upon which they can agree.

The United Nations has not bridged the gap between the world of coercion and the world of free choice. But it provides a bridge between the Northern Hemisphere and the Southern Hemisphere, where most of the new nations are found and where most of the peoples of the non-Communist world are struggling to throw off their burden of poverty.

The United Nations has not ushered in the millennium. But it has laid the foundations for a world community through a wide range of international institutions. Some, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have grown into powerful, mature organizations; others are still finding their way. Some do such undramatic but important tasks as working out common technical definitions and allocating frequencies for radio transmission. Some have such dramatically humanitarian tasks as the elimination of malaria and the inoculation of millions of children against the disfiguring and crippling disease of yaws. Others are pioneering in new fields, such as planning a world system of weather reporting. Over the years the United Nations has created the framework for doing more and more of the world's business on the basis of voluntary cooperation among sovereign states.

Within this family of United Nations organizations the United States cooperates with most of the non-Communist world—despite Soviet obstruction, despite the veto, despite threats to peace, despite severe budgetary problems, despite the passion of such subjects as colonialism, despite the inexperience of new members and the inertia of old ones, and despite the inclination of us all to look upon our own views with parochial attachment.

The United Nations is the symbol and the primary substance of the kind of world which the

United States seeks to build. Its charter contains an expression of our deepest ideals. We are committed firmly to supporting and strengthening the United Nations. We earnestly wish to extend its writ, its influence, its capacity to act. We look forward to a time when the Soviet Union will join the United Nations in spirit, as well as in name, when it, too, will abide by the principles of the charter and cooperate genuinely in strengthening the great international organization and its agencies.

Regional Organizations

The United Nations is not the only channel for United States foreign policy. We support various regional organizations. In Western Europe we have lent our encouragement to the formation of a great common market of nearly 300 million relatively prosperous and highly skilled peoples, the second greatest industrial complex in the world. We are working actively to create new institutions for economic cooperation throughout the North Atlantic community.

We take part enthusiastically in the maturing complex of Western Hemisphere institutions. We welcome the trend toward common markets and other forms of cooperation in South and Central America. We salute the new Alliance for Progress. We would like to see durable new forms of regional organization in southeast Asia. We would welcome progress toward regional cooperation in the Arab world and in tropical Africa.

These new institutions for regional cooperation are not alternatives to the United Nations. Indeed, they are specifically anticipated and authorized in the charter.

We have a vital interest in our system of defensive alliances against those who boast that they will make the world over in their own image. Against threats to freedom, the free must be firm and united.

Many aspects of our foreign policy must be handled on a bilateral basis.

Thus our foreign policy and overseas operations are conducted through a variety of United Nations, regional, and nation-to-nation arrangements. These instruments are not mutually exclusive. All are essential, and each complements the others. They must be used simultaneously. For our choice is not among standing firm in our direct confrontation with the Soviets, or building an Atlantic

Community, or working with the United Nations. All three, and many other lines of action, help to preserve and develop the kind of world in which free peoples can live in peace and can flourish.

Disarmament

I turn now to one of the most complex yet most urgent problems before the United Nations—disarmament. President Kennedy, in his recent speech before the United Nations General Assembly, put the matter simply and directly when he said:²

Today . . . every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

The United States had placed before the United Nations a new program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.³ Three cardinal principles underlie this program:

First, there should be an immediate and substantial start toward disarmament. Our program would bring promptly under control all basic elements of national military power—nuclear weapons, strategic delivery systems, conventional arms and forces. No nation has ever before put forward a program providing for such comprehensive restrictions in the first stage of disarmament.

Secondly, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls. As we shed our means of self-protection, we must be sure that others are doing so.

Thirdly, adequate international peacekeeping machinery must be erected. Otherwise disarmament would leave the world in disorder.

If these fundamental precepts were accepted, if the general approach to disarmament as set forth in our program were endorsed, we should be able to make real and rapid progress toward disarmament.

But it takes more than one to make an agreement. To date the Soviet Union has been, consistently, an unwilling party. It has said that it accepts the principle of control. But apparently it is willing to grant permission to look only at arms destroyed, not at those which remain. In-

spection, so limited, would be a sham. The Soviet Union professes also to recognize the need for developing effective peacekeeping machinery. But it seems bent on undermining the very organization created for this purpose: the United Nations.

These are not encouraging signs. Nor can we find encouragement in the Soviet Union's capricious and cynical attitude toward a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. The United States believes that such a treaty would be a good way to make a start in the direction of disarmament. For 3 years we, in conjunction with the United Kingdom, have sought to negotiate such a treaty with the Soviet Union. We thought we were making some progress toward that goal. In the hope of reaching it, we—the U.K. and ourselves—presented a complete treaty early this year.⁴ It went far to meet prior Soviet positions. We indicated our readiness to sign the treaty immediately or to use it as the basis for further serious negotiation.

What was the reaction of the Soviet Union? First, it repudiated its previous agreement to one of the basic points. Then it insisted that negotiations of a test ban should be merged with negotiations on general disarmament—a complete reversal of its earlier position. Finally, the Soviets resumed nuclear testing.⁵ The number, speed, and nature of their recent explosions shows that, while they were negotiating, the Soviets were making elaborate secret preparations for these tests.

Faced with the Soviet testing and the Soviets' disinterest in concluding an agreement, President Kennedy ordered the resumption of nuclear weapons testing in the laboratory and underground.⁶ He had to do so to protect our security and that of the free world. In his words: "We cannot endanger that security by refraining from testing while others improve their arsenals."⁷

The United States nevertheless remains prepared to conclude an agreement which would, with safety to all, put an end to nuclear weapons testing in all environments. The Geneva conference is not formally ended. It is in recess. The delegates now assembled at the United Nations have an opportunity and an obligation to consider the situation and act accordingly.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 650.

Further evidence of our national purpose to seek effective and reliable disarmament agreements may be found in creation by statute of a United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This legislation was signed into law by the President on September 26, 1961.⁸ Significantly, it had the overwhelming support of both political parties in Congress.

This is the first time we have had a permanent Government agency devoted to disarmament. Some of the earlier committees and agencies and other official groups which worked on the problem did excellent work. The Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan for international control of atomic energy, placed before the United Nations in 1946,⁹ was statesmanship of the highest order. We then had a monopoly on atomic weapons. But we were willing to put these weapons aside and share with the world our knowledge of the peacetime uses of atomic energy. Indeed, we proposed that all atomic energy enterprises throughout the world be owned or operated by an agency of the United Nations. That plan, in its basic features, commended itself to all the members of the United Nations except the Soviet bloc. But for Soviet obstructionism, there would have been no nuclear arms race.

Other efforts which we have made in the intervening years have foundered on the same rock of Soviet obstructionism. Whether our latest efforts bear result depends primarily on whether the Soviets change their attitude. But with our new permanent United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we can be sure that our own Government will work diligently to move the world along the road toward disarmament.

Foreign Aid

Among the other important problems in which your organization has taken a sympathetic interest are foreign aid and foreign trade.

I do not need to stress to you the necessity of our program of assistance to the underdeveloped nations of the free world. America owes what it

is today to our enduring support of freedom, justice and progress, here and abroad. This is the American message, which gives us national strength and purpose and causes other men to turn to us for hope and leadership.

Whenever an underdeveloped country makes economic, social, and political progress it expands the frontier of freedom. Wherever we cooperate in breaking down the barriers of ignorance, poverty, disease, and despair, we further not only the well-being of mankind but our own security.

We have had programs of aid to the underdeveloped nations for more than a decade. Without these the map of the world would be far different today. But, with experience, we have realized that our past programs, despite their very real accomplishments, were inadequate in various respects. The past year has witnessed the making of a new program, that for a Decade of Development, to which many of our best minds have contributed, regardless of party.

The paramount objective of our new program is to foster long-range social and economic development. Of course, there will continue to be need for emergency and special aid. We will continue to assist certain countries to maintain adequate military establishments or, in some cases, to save an economy from imminent collapse. But, wherever possible, we intend to move away from a "finger in the dike" operation. We intend to encourage and support long-range planning and development by the recipients of aid. Such planning should, of course, take account of local resources, necessary reforms, and priorities.

Human and social development is an integral part of the total development process. Many of the new countries urgently need help in the field of education—education of leaders, of administrators, of technicians, as well as of the population generally. This is an important phase of our new program. In Africa more than a third of our total aid bill will be devoted to human and social development. Meeting these needs is a major part of the new program for social progress in Latin America also.

Our new program emphasizes self-help. No amount of aid will save those who do not help themselves. And the assistance we can supply will be only a portion—often a small portion—of the total effort required. We regard it as our

⁸ For text of President Kennedy's remarks when he signed the bill creating the Agency, see *ibid.*, p. 646.

⁹ For an address by Bernard M. Baruch at the opening session of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946, see *ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

first duty to help those of the less developed friendly countries that try to help themselves. By self-help we mean not only mobilizing local resources, levying appropriate taxes, and other financial and economic measures. We mean willingness to undertake, where necessary, land reforms, other social reforms, and expansion and improvement of education. Our goal is not only overall economic growth but an increasing measure of social justice, to improve the lot of the great majorities who have so long suffered from poverty, illiteracy, and the lack of hope for anything better than bare subsistence.

There are encouraging indications from a number of countries that they are ready to undertake greater measures of self-help. When countries have demonstrated the will and capacity for self-help, they should not be allowed to fail in their efforts for lack of the margin of external aid which we can provide.

The recent Act for International Development made available an increased appropriation for development assistance. It also enables us to coordinate more effectively a wide range of Government activities and to increase cooperation between the Government and various private agencies.

In addition, other industrial nations—a majority of them rehabilitated in the past with our help—are able to provide increased aid to the underdeveloped countries. Most are furnishing extensive aid already. In sub-Sahara Africa their effort exceeds ours severalfold and is rising. We are going to try to coordinate our joint efforts more closely to assure the best use of increased amounts of assistance. This partnership has already started. A recent notable example was the consortium agreement for India, under which other developed nations and international agencies have promised to provide more than half of the \$2,300,000,000 in external aid which India needs for the next 2 years.

Another cardinal point in the new program is more efficient administration. Aid programs previously administered by separate agencies have been brought under one roof in AID, the Agency for International Development, under a single administrator, Mr. Fowler Hamilton. Aid is being reorganized primarily along geographic lines to achieve clearer lines of responsibility and authority. And we are seeking the best men and

women available in the United States to staff the key positions in this new agency.

Those are some of the principal new directions and improvements in our program of economic assistance. I share the judgment of Senator Fulbright that we now have "the best aid legislation in years."

Foreign Trade

Next year we shall have the problem of trying to obtain equally satisfactory legislation for our trade relations. The present trade policy law expires in June 1962. The Executive, the Congress, and the American people will have to consider anew the nature of our basic interest in the international exchange of goods. The choices and decisions that we make in this field will have far-reaching implications and consequences. What we do about trade policy will be a test of our ability to meet the test of leadership in the world of the 1960's.

National interest can be defined in a number of ways. By any definition, however, we have a national interest in an expanding total volume of world trade. Last year we sold to other countries almost \$20 billion worth of American goods. Our purchases from abroad were in the order of \$15 billion. As a nation we are stronger and richer because of these exchanges. Even on the most narrow grounds of material self-interest we need this trade.

Some sectors of our economy are peculiarly and particularly linked to exports. Foremost among these is agriculture. We are the world's largest exporter of agricultural products. About \$5 billion of American agricultural commodities will be sold abroad this year. We will export half our wheat and rice crops, more than 40 percent of our cotton, and 30 percent of our soybeans. For many other agricultural commodities, as well, export markets take a very substantial share of our production.

The figures for agricultural exports are dramatic, but our export trade as a whole is a significant factor in our employment picture. It is conservative to estimate that 4½ million American workers owe their livelihood to foreign trade. This is the side of the coin that is too rarely turned over when we look at the impact of international trade upon our domestic well-being.

We are now coming face to face with a radically new situation in the world economy. It is one that bears critically upon our choices for trade policy. The European Economic Community has not only come into being but is likely soon to be expanded by the addition of the United Kingdom and other European states. The resulting economic union will have a population at least 40 percent greater than the United States. It will be, potentially, the world's largest single market. No later than 1969, and probably much sooner, the expanded Common Market will have virtually no restrictions on trade among its members. And it will present a common tariff and trade policy to the rest of the world.

It is crucially important that we put ourselves in position to negotiate for fullest possible access to this Common Market. It is already abundantly clear that the dynamic new European grouping will afford very large opportunities for our exports. They will remain empty opportunities unless we can gain access to the market. And, in its present form, our trade policy law does not give us the authority we need for successful bargaining with the European Economic Community.

I could go on at some length to enumerate the specific material advantages that American industry, American agriculture, American labor, and the American consumer stand to gain from an effective trade policy. These advantages are part and parcel of the national interest.

There is another aspect of the matter, however. By virtue of our fabulous productivity we account for a huge portion, roughly 40 percent, of the world's output of goods and services. Because of our vast internal market international trade accounts for a smaller part of our total national income than is true in many other countries. Yet our imports and exports together comprise 30 percent of all the commerce of the world. What we do affects everybody. In trade, as in so many other matters, leadership has been placed upon us by our own capacities and accomplishments. We can exercise it wisely or badly, but exercise it we must.

Our trade policy will be a key factor in the success or failure of the new countries to build and improve their economies. It will determine our long-run relations with Japan, where recovery from war and devastation has furnished so spectacular and so heartening an example of the value of free institutions. It will be a critical element in

our political as well as our economic relationships within the Atlantic Community.

The particulars of next year's trade legislation, of course, must be developed with the Congress in the forthcoming session. In the executive branch we have focused thus far on the general principles that we shall need to embody into law if we are going to safeguard and advance our national interests. Two vital points have emerged.

First, we must have more flexible and adaptable rules to govern our tariff negotiations and trade relations with other countries. The trade agreements law now on the books has accumulated over the years a series of restrictive amendments, the net effect of which has been to curtail and limit our ability to negotiate realistically with friendly countries. A trade policy that continues to be weighted down with these kinds of restrictions is hopelessly inconsistent with the needs of the times. It requires us to act defensively and timidly when our true interests call for boldness. The trade policy law that will be submitted to the Congress must at a minimum include the necessary authority to enable our negotiators to bargain as representatives of the greatest trading nation and richest economy in the world.

The second main principle is that, so far as imports have an adverse effect on domestic industry or employment, the burden must be borne by the community as a whole. We must devise ways to assure that, if imports do cause injury, the injury will be effectively remedied. We must do this not by restrictions on trade, which only beget competitive restrictions, but usually and mainly by assistance, financed by all of us to those who are affected.

The concept, you know, is not new. The depressed areas law enacted by the Congress last summer embodied an identical principle in relation to regions that have suffered in the process of economic change. Indeed, the maximum conceivable dimensions of the import damage problem are so small, by comparison, that we have no reason to shrink from this elementary provision for making our national trade policy workable.

[Secretary Rusk closed with informal remarks.]

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Prospects of Mankind"

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk on the "Prospects of Mankind" program broadcast over WTTG-TV, Washington, D.C., on October 14.

Press release 695 dated October 7

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: Mr. Secretary, I can't tell you what a pleasure it is to have you with us today, nor how grateful I am that you would take the time to be here on this program with us today.

SECRETARY RUSK: Thank you.

Mrs. Roosevelt: There are a number of questions, of course, on this subject which we are to discuss, Berlin, which I think is perhaps one of the most important subjects at the moment in the minds of our own people and also in the minds of the world; so I would like, first of all, to ask you one which seems to be a peculiarly American dilemma. How are we to persuade Mr. Khrushchev that we really cannot be pushed beyond certain limits and build up military power to make him feel that we are in earnest, and, at the same time, try to persuade peoples of the world that we are not warmongering in doing this? This seems to me a dilemma, and I would like to have your answer, if you are willing to give it.

SECRETARY RUSK: Mrs. Roosevelt, first let me say what a pleasure it is for me to be here with you on "Prospects of Mankind." Actually, in regard to your question and based on talks that I have had with representatives of peoples all over the world, I don't think that this is as much of a dilemma as it might appear to some. I think there is general understanding throughout the world as to what the purposes of American power are. And I think people have not entirely forgotten the history of the last 15 or 16 years. The United States did demobilize drastically and promptly after World War II. We had an atomic monopoly. We tried to put that atomic weapon under international control. Our defense budget was about one-fourth or one-fifth of what it is these days. If we have increased our strength, it is because of a series of threats and challenges which developed after World War II, first in Europe and then in other

parts of the world, which forced the free world to bring its strength into good order.

I think that it is relevant that the American people after World War II committed themselves, and I think quite genuinely, with great determination, as you yourself will recall, to the charter of the United Nations and threw ourselves behind that effort. And I think that is generally understood in most countries. Even the neutrals, I think, understand, broadly speaking, what we are after as a people. And especially the neutrals understand that, for the most part, that neutrality is possible only if the power of the Sino-Soviet bloc is confronted by a countervailing power by those who are committed to the peaceful purposes to which we in the West are committed. So that, although we regret the necessity of an increase in our strength, we believe the purposes are well and generally understood. I don't believe there is anyone who is under any illusion about who has started the pressures involved in this Berlin crisis.

Mrs. Roosevelt: Of course, I think a great many people wish it were not necessary to build up strength because there are so many other things that need to be done.

SECRETARY RUSK: Yes. I think it could be fairly said that the American people bear arms reluctantly; they bear arms out of necessity.

Mrs. Roosevelt: Then there is another question that has been on my mind a good deal, and that is, I have some feeling that there is justification for the fears that the Soviets have had of the nuclear rearmament of Germany, because I think none of us can forget that two wars did start in Germany, two world wars. But it is something I think we have to take into consideration, and I have often wondered how much it is taken into consideration in the formulation of American policy.

SECRETARY RUSK: As a matter of fact, this is not just a question of Germany, but it ramifies into much broader problems. Germany does not have a national nuclear capability at the present time. It does not have nuclear weapons. Its forces are a part of NATO, and the nuclear capacity of NATO is a United States nuclear capacity. We have been opposed, we in the United States, to the further extension of national nuclear weapons capability. The problems of trying to keep these

frightening weapons under control when two, or three, or four might have them would be greatly multiplied if additional countries got these weapons in their hands.

We tried in 1945 to work out an international control for such weapons because we knew that nature would not withhold its secrets from other countries. And we wanted to get this under control before it became a matter of great controversy, contest, and arms race in this terrible field. This is why we have attached so much importance to the nuclear test ban treaty as a first step—perhaps a small step, but a first very significant step—in getting this entire modern weapons system under better control.¹ Had the Soviet Union been able to sit down and come to a satisfactory conclusion there, after the United States and the United Kingdom went to great lengths to meet what we thought were their positions in early negotiations, then perhaps we might have taken the first step. We hope it isn't too late to take that first step. But perhaps we can understand that the Soviets, in view of historical factors, might be especially sensitive about the situation in Germany, but this is a part of the broader problem. We must find some way to bring these weapons under control.

Mrs. Roosevelt: Still our original proposal would still have value, wouldn't it?

SECRETARY RUSK: If we could get an agreement along the lines of the original proposal, there would be great merit in it; but it is more difficult now that several governments have this capacity. But certainly a first step would be a nuclear test ban treaty under effective inspection control.

Mrs. Roosevelt: Is there any way that you believe that the United Nations can contribute in the settlement of these Berlin issues?

SECRETARY RUSK: I think there are two or three important influences brought to bear in the United Nations which have an effect. I do believe that the general body of opinion in the United Nations makes itself felt on both sides in a situation of this sort in the direction of moderation and reasonable-

ness, trying to emphasize in the traditions of the U.N. that full exploration should occur when crises begin to develop to consider whether or not there might be a peaceful solution. If this question were put into the United Nations today, I suppose that the United Nations would prefer that the parties principally involved should first attempt by negotiation to find some sort of solution, but if the crisis deepens I think it is almost certain that the Berlin issue would be before the United Nations for full consideration by the world community, and in that situation the U.N. can play a very decisive role.

Mrs. Roosevelt: That is something for us all to be thinking about, I think. And one short question: You have been holding conferences with the representative of the Soviet Foreign Office, Mr. Gromyko. Could you tell us what your general impressions in these conversations have been?

SECRETARY RUSK: These talks which have been going on for some little time now are not negotiations in the usual sense of the word. We have felt that the proposals of the Soviet Union and the framing of those proposals did not provide an adequate basis for negotiation. It is a little as the President put it: "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable."² What we have been doing is trying through exploratory talks to find out whether there is any reasonable basis for serious negotiations of any questions that are properly negotiable. I think I can say that these exploratory talks have been serious. I think the atmosphere and mood has been on the whole constructive, but as to the outcome we shall just have to wait and see.

Mrs. Roosevelt: I want to thank you so very much, Mr. Secretary. I think it is a wonderful thing that you were willing to come and give on this program of your knowledge for the American people, and we are very grateful to you.

SECRETARY RUSK: It has been a very great privilege for me. Thank you very much, Mrs. Roosevelt.

¹ For text of a U.S.-U.K. draft treaty introduced in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests at Geneva on Apr. 18, 1961, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 870.

² For President Kennedy's report to the Nation on the Berlin crisis, see *ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

International Investment and the Problems of Economic Growth

by Edwin M. Martin

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

The neighborly relationship that exists between the United States and Canada is not nearly so unique as it once was. Science and technology have made all the nations as close neighbors today as you and we were half a century ago. This is an enlargement of our opportunities but also of our responsibilities.

In many ways I think Canadians and Americans have a rather unique background for understanding the many ramifications of the social relationships which are described by the word "neighborliness." I have recently lived for 6 years in Europe and have, of course, been interested in hearing visitors to North America comment on their experiences and impressions. The one trait which seemed to have most impressed them was this quality of friendliness, of neighborliness. I should not be regretful if future historians should agree that this was an outstanding characteristic of our society.

Neighborliness on the block or in the farm community is probably more a matter of heart than head. I suspect that, while a similar spirit is vital to good relations between countries, there needs to be much more head in it. Living together in the intimacy of "next-door neighbors" inevitably requires the daily adjustment of many differences in points of view and in methods for dealing with situations. Between countries these potential points of friction will often be complex and thorny, requiring first-class brains and technical skills to resolve them, above and beyond mutual

understanding. And when one brings the whole free world somewhere within the circle of close and constant contact, the difficulty and frequency of the issues to be settled increase enormously.

It is for this reason that, while not wishing to deny any student with a bent for science the ability to secure the best educational training he can absorb, I personally object to an emphasis on science which would reduce the amount of brainpower devoted to human relations, to making scientific and technical progress contribute purposefully to man's advantage rather than destruction.

As neighbors I hope we shall never get in the position described vividly in a story I heard at the annual Shakespeare birthday festival at Stratford-on-Avon several years ago. It was told by the Bishop of Coventry, whose magnificent new cathedral, alongside the bombed-out shell of the old, is rapidly becoming a three-star attraction for visitors from North America. He told about a village in his diocese in which a feud had developed between church and state, represented by the vicar and the town clerk. There had been a gypsy troupe camping in a field next to the church. One morning the vicar noticed that they had departed during the night and went over to see how much of a mess they had made. He found a dead donkey. Immediately he rang the clerk on the phone and reported what he had found. The town clerk testily replied that he didn't know why he had been bothered; it was the duty of the clergy to bury the dead. The vicar smoothly replied that he had been misunderstood; he was not asking the clerk to do anything, he was merely notifying the next of kin.

Your chairman has asked me to say something about one particular aspect of neighborly rela-

¹ Address prepared for delivery before the Manitoba Institute of Chartered Accountants at Toronto on Sept. 26 and read for Mr. Martin by Willis C. Armstrong, U.S. Minister at Ottawa.

tions between countries, namely, international investment. One may note immediately that it can seldom take place except between countries which are in some real sense neighbors.

But it is currently taking place in unprecedented volumes. Because the causes of this upsurge, the nature of the flow of capital, and the problems raised are so different, I should like to divide what I have to say rather sharply into two parts. The first will deal with investment between industrialized countries, the second with the movement of capital from the industrialized countries to the less developed countries. You will observe that this division is more conceptual than real. Competition between the two sets of consumers is often direct.

Current Upsurge in Direct Private Investment

Between industrial countries, current capital movements are largely in the form of direct private investment. This contrasts with earlier periods when government bonds or corporate securities were the center of interest. This relatively recent urge of business firms to own plants abroad is the product of several factors, some new and some old, but all reflecting essentially competitive calculations.

It has, for example, always been useful to be able to jump a high tariff wall by having an internal source of supply. It has always been desirable to move production to locations with lower labor or transport costs. But these were drastic moves, requiring the solution of many kinds of problems: personal relations with strange government bureaucracies and unfamiliar labor attitudes and uncertain consumers, maintaining adequate control of operations from a distance, repatriation of earnings, political uncertainties.

During the past decade many of these worries have been lessened. Increased ease of travel and communication and increased contacts in the war and since have reduced the height of many of the hurdles, sometimes down to their real rather than imagined heights. Political and economic conditions have become relatively stable. Institutional arrangements and consumer tastes have become not only less strange but increasingly less different.

Perhaps even more important has been the development of strong, positive incentives. A general expansion in demand and rapid changes in technology have made it necessary to choose locations for many large new investments.

Exceptionally rapid rates of growth and the promise of an enlarged tariff-free market in the area of the Six² have not only stimulated investment among the Six but also from the United States and even somewhat from the United Kingdom. U.S. entrance since the war on the world stage has brought an increased awareness of the ease of tapping from plants in the United Kingdom the huge Commonwealth market, in addition to being close to European outlets. Increased competition in Europe and in third countries, as the recovery of European industry from the war has progressed, has persuaded many U.S. companies to seek to lower their costs, labor or otherwise, by tackling the problems of setting up foreign subsidiaries or making licensing arrangements. The desire to stabilize profits by product diversification has been accompanied by some interest in achieving the same end by country diversification, in the hope the business cycle will not affect all areas alike.

The result has been a wide variety of choices for companies planning new investment and a growing internationalization of business interests among the larger firms which may have a long-term political significance of some magnitude.

To illustrate what has happened, U.S. net direct investment abroad in 1960 was \$3 billion. Over the last 4 years it has averaged over \$2½ billion. This compares with \$1 billion 10 years ago. Canada has shared in this interest in investing abroad; recent estimates indicate a total overseas investment of Canadians of around \$225 per capita, compared with the U.S. figure of about \$260. Interestingly enough, only about \$90 of the U.S. figure is represented by investments in Canada, while Canada has a per capita investment in the United States of over \$175.

The pull of Western Europe is reflected in an increase from about \$500 million in 1957 to about \$1.3 billion in 1960. Despite the great pull of the Common Market, the United Kingdom alone got more than half of this 1960 total, nearly two and a half times as much as in 1957. The German figure, while growing rapidly, was still just around \$200 million in 1960. The Canadian take has remained fairly steady at around \$800 million a year, not too much above the U.K. 1960 figure.

²The European Economic Community, or Common Market, is composed of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

U.S. Balance-of-Payments Problem

This new emphasis on international investment has brought many benefits but also some problems. We are concerned at present, for example, with its impact on our current balance of payments. While the outward flow from the United States is of course of great help to the reserve position of the recipients, many of whom were earlier suffering from the postwar dollar shortage, most are now better off in this respect than we.

It is often suggested that these investments cost our balance of payments nothing since the net outflow from the United States after deducting reinvestment of overseas earnings has been more than covered by earnings received on prior investments. Moreover, the argument runs, current investments will expand future income. These are sound positions for the long run. But in the short run earnings will still accrue even if no new investments are made.

There has also been concern in some quarters that overseas investment often represented an attempt to escape the high wage rates in the United States. Feelings on this score are accentuated when companies transfer exports to third countries to new overseas subsidiaries or even look to them to supply part of their U.S. market. This has happened not just or even particularly from areas such as Japan but more largely from the United Kingdom. It is, of course, true that overseas investment usually goes to build new facilities and thus create new jobs, absorbing unemployment in a foreign country rather than our own, where we still have more than we like. But it also often creates jobs by providing a market for initial equipment and some components and industrial raw materials. More importantly, it permits sales in markets which would not be open to U.S.-produced goods. We have thus far resisted attempts to deny certain tax benefits to overseas subsidiaries who ship more than a stated percentage of their output back into the United States.

Despite these problems the present United States policy is to place no obstacles to new United States investment overseas in recognition of the importance of keeping open ourselves, and encouraging others to keep open, the normal channels of private trade and financial transactions. We have sought, though no action has yet been taken, to remove certain special incentives which our

tax laws were considered to give to overseas investment, though only as far as the industrialized countries are concerned. The low level of investment in the less developed areas and its political advantages made us unwilling to take similar action with respect to such investments.

Encouraging Foreign Investment in the U.S.

In addition to limiting the incentives to additional investment in the industrialized areas, we are also trying to counteract the adverse effects I have mentioned by a campaign to encourage and facilitate foreign investment in the United States. The past trend has not been entirely one-way. I have already referred to the volume of Canadian investment in the United States. While data are not complete, it would appear that, if corporate security holdings are included, United Kingdom private investments in the United States are about equal in value to United States holdings in the United Kingdom. But new investments in recent years have been small. We hope we can persuade the reserve-rich European countries that the United States market is one deserving their attention in the form of investments here. In cooperation with interested State governments we are working out various programs to relax inhibiting government controls, to bring investment opportunities to their attention, and to help them solve some of the adjustment problems we have faced abroad and know they will need help on here. As European labor costs rise and skilled labor becomes even scarcer, we feel more and more European industries will see competitive advantages in owning United States subsidiaries.

There is one other problem which has arisen from this great wave of international capital investments. There have been outbursts of nationalist feelings against foreign investment, either in general or in particular cases, on the grounds that either the society in general or a particular industry or a large group of employees were coming under the control, or at least heavy influence, of foreign citizens. I saw several short-lived cases of this during my tour of duty in our London Embassy.

This is, of course, not a new story for the United States. Over a hundred years ago President Andrew Jackson in vetoing a bill passed by the Congress said: "If we must have a bank with private stockholders, every consideration of sound

policy and every impulse of American feeling admonishes that it should be *purely American*. Its stockholders should be composed exclusively of our own citizens, who at least ought to be friendly to our Government and willing to support it in times of difficulty and danger."

Fifty years earlier our first great financial statesman, Alexander Hamilton, took, however, an opposite view: "It is at least evident that in a country situated like the United States, with an infinite fund of resources yet to be unfolded, every farthing of foreign capital which is laid out in internal meliorations, and in industrial establishments, of a permanent nature, is a precious acquisition."

Even more pungently an eloquent Senator from South Carolina put the case in the mid-19th century in these terms: "No man . . . can deny that foreign capital, ay, *British capital*, has been the pap on which we fed; the strong aliment which supported and stimulated our industry, even to the present day; the Southern people, although they have received the goods and sold their crops to British agents and British factors, whether in their own cities or those further north, are not the less republican, nor the less independent in their politics, nor the less free from foreign partialities."

I would suspect the realities of the situation, apart from passing natural emotional feelings, are largely influenced by whether or not the foreign subsidiary accepts and fully recognizes the advantages it receives from the government and people in whose midst it is operating. If it behaves in a responsible, public-spirited fashion toward its new government, its employees, and the community in which it operates—conducts itself as it would normally expect to do at home—there will be few real difficulties and the many advantages of the added facility will rapidly dominate public thought on the question.

Declining Flow of Capital to Less Developed Areas

Turning now to international investment in the less developed countries, we find a completely different picture. Instead of an expanding flow of capital across national boundaries, it appears to be declining. For example, the great increase in United States investment in Europe between 1957 and 1960 did not result in an increase in the

annual rate of United States overseas investment because it was accompanied by a sharp fall from \$1.8 billion to under \$600 million in investment in the less developed countries. Most of this fall was in one category, oil investment, which dropped from a Suez-swollen figure of \$1.2 billion to \$100 million. Investments in other industries also declined—by some \$100 million.

United States overseas interests are not only heavily concentrated in oil, but Latin America is heavily preferred for both oil and other types of investment. Of the total additional United States direct private investment overseas of nearly \$3 billion in 1960, only \$165 million was in Africa and Asia and the Middle East, and \$65 million of that was oil. A good bit of the remaining \$100 million was also in extractive enterprises, which, like oil, give the impression to natives of draining off their natural resources that God gave them without an adequate return or provision against the future when reserves are exhausted.

Business groups frequently ask us how United States subsidiaries in less developed countries can best support United States policy objectives. In general my answer is that there is too little of such investment to make much difference and the first thing needed is more interest in investing in these areas. For I am convinced that there are wide areas of their economic life which can best be handled by private enterprise. While each country must make up its own mind about the role it wishes to give private enterprise in the light of its circumstances and political philosophy, most of the free-world countries do recognize a significant role.

As one who has dealt with foreign aid problems ever since our program started, I am particularly impressed by the opportunities for direct people-to-people contact which are open to private enterprises, in contrast with foreign aid, which must necessarily all go through a government-to-government funnel.

But the contribution made will depend on how they behave. I finish up my answer to the business group question by suggesting that their best contribution to United States objectives is to behave as responsibly and with as much public spirit, within, of course, the framework of local customs and laws and needs, as they would expect to do in order to be a respectable member of the community in the United States.

Need for Favorable Climate for Investment

How can we get more private investment in these areas? There is no single or simple answer.

The developing country will usually recognize that its needs are so great that, in addition to public capital and technical assistance, private capital and managerial resources can be valuable means of meeting their serious shortages of resources. To secure the maximum benefits, it is necessary that a favorable climate for private enterprise be established. We are prepared to work with these countries on what this means in precise terms and how it can be provided without in any way impairing their full sovereign rights.

But it is still true that in many areas unfamiliarity with conditions, uncertainties about the local market, labor supplies, political stability, and other factors are serious and valid deterrents. We have been working for some years with various types of guarantee arrangements to diminish some of these risks. Our new aid legislation contains authority for an experimental \$100-million program of all-risk guarantees, to be used only where close collaboration between government and private capital is called for. It involves "share the loss" agreements, where the Government and the private investors would share any losses, from whatever causes, in agreed-upon ratios.

United States loan funds are also available in instances where this can, by reducing the amount of private funds exposed to risk, make the vital difference between having a private investment or not. The terms of such loans can be varied to suit the individual circumstance, and on certain high-priority projects departures from ordinary commercial and banking practices may be in order. Such departures are fully justified when private skills and management are in reality the most effective instruments of assistance.

"Feasibility Studies"

Help in locating investment opportunities through Government assistance in "feasibility studies," which involve the gathering of the basic data necessary for the decision on whether or not to make an investment, will also be available. To facilitate this process and stimulate greater private-enterprise participation, a new program will be undertaken under which the United States Government will provide partial financing of

feasibility studies by companies which are proposing to make investments.

Of course public investment has been the main source of outside capital for most of the developing areas of the world. Its wise use in providing basic economic and social infrastructure is a basic prerequisite for successful private investment. Without ports, roads and railroads, power, community facilities, an educated labor force, efficient public service, law and order—all benefiting from our aid programs—private investment is well-nigh impossible on any scale.

But foreign aid is a subject for several speeches all by itself. I should like to close with some brief observations on the importance to our civilization of success in the effort to which foreign aid—yours and ours—and our private enterprise activities in the developing countries are addressed.

Impact of Western Progress

As an economist I have had some experience with the risks of economic forecasting. I suspect forecasting what future historians will say about the present is even more risky. Nevertheless I shall be bold and predict that in the history books of 2500 A.D., if man is still dependent on such pedestrian things as books, the chapter on the 20th century will be quite a long one, recording it as a major turning point in the development of human society on this planet.

There will be many things to talk about, from the scientific revolution to the two most destructive wars up to that date. But I would suspect that the most significant feature of 20th century life will prove to have been the foundation laid in that era for the history of mankind during a good many ensuing centuries by the success with which our century handled the problems created by the final disintegration of many ancient societies and cultures under the impact of Western "progress" and the dissolution of such organizing forces as were represented by the world empires of the 19th century. The emergence of a multitude of new nations and their transformation, along with numerous independent but heretofore aloof countries, into active participants in the stream of modern world history will surely appear as a major event. Will it prove to have been a constructive influence or a destructive one? To do what we can to influence the answer to this question is our great responsibility.

I can think of no problem which the human race has faced in its past which has been more challenging, more difficult, or more important than this one.

For several generations the growing impact of Western ideas and standards has been undermining the traditional social and cultural and economic structures which, at their own levels, had provided a cohesive force for a majority of the world's population. With the advent of modern means of communication and transport, this destructive process has been enormously accelerated in the last 40 years.

Along with the disintegration of old standards the West has contributed two new ambitions, both, in their immediate impact, more destructive than constructive. The first is nationalism and the desire for political independence at almost all costs. The second is the urgent demand for a higher standard of living, for a society which in its materialistic splendor can hope someday, and sooner rather than later, to match the riches of the industrial countries of Europe and North America. Not only does this establish an enormously difficult goal to reach, but the very emphasis on material achievement, desperately needed as it is, runs the risk of obscuring the importance of nonmaterial values without which the discipline and sacrifices necessary to material success can hardly be expected to emerge.

The fact that the seriousness of this problem is recognized in ever-widening circles is a good omen for success. I sometimes get the impression that nearly all of my economic professorial friends who 10 years ago were busy on books about the dollar gap are now turning out books on economic development.

Political Maturity and Moral Values

We need help from all sources, and I think most of all from those so-called less scientific and less practical domains which deal with the relations between human beings in the realm of the mind and the spirit. But unless we Americans can, by our own actions and leadership, demonstrate and convince the peoples of the free world that there are important things in life besides the standard of living, that there are other objectives worth seeking and having, we shall, I fear, be faced with a real prospect of failure. Both our race against time for material prosperity itself

and the probable need to achieve political maturity despite less-than-hoped-for material progress, as well as success in our across-the-board competition with Soviet communism for men's loyalties, depend on the growth of a belief in moral values on which day-to-day discussions can be founded.

Perhaps our major problem in promoting economic growth is that we are not in command of the situation. We are better able to transmit the fruits of growth than the seed. The process we are trying to set in motion and help to sustain requires widespread transformations in attitudes, institutions, and structure. It requires leaders committed to economic and social progress and competent to organize, administer, and inspire their own people. We cannot bestow leadership. We can set some examples in behavior and attitudes, and we do command substantial resources that are important determinants of growth, in particular capital and technical skills. Where governments are making a determined effort to propel their economies forward, it is imperative that we help them in full measure. Where governing groups resist change in the interest of privilege or are weak, unstable, and ineffective in translating ideas into action, our problem is to try to fashion our assistance in such ways as to encourage the transformations that are needed. What is clear is that the process will be long-term and that it will require substantial and sustained effort on our part, guided by the wisest leadership we possess.

U.S. Recognizes Government of Syrian Arab Republic

Department Statement

Press release 700 dated October 10

The United States Government, having taken note of the declaration of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic that it intends to respect and observe its international obligations, has today [October 10] extended recognition to that Government. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has been apprised of the desire of the United States Government to raise to the status of an embassy the American consulate general in Damascus and to appoint Mr. Ridgway B. Knight Chargé d' Affaires.

U.S. States Policy on Recognition of a Cuban Government in Exile

Following is a statement made by Joseph W. Reap, Deputy Director of the Office of News, to news correspondents on October 7 and the text of a telegram from WyMBERLEY DeR. Coerr, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, to Julio Garceran.

STATEMENT BY MR. REAP¹

The recognition of a government of Cuba in exile at this time is not in the national interest of the United States because neither the Government of Switzerland nor any other government could then represent United States interests before the Castro regime.

United States citizens are imprisoned in Cuba and can only be offered such protection as is available in Cuba under the Castro regime by the continued ability of a foreign government to represent U.S. interests.

TEXT OF TELEGRAM

Press release 696 dated October 7

OCTOBER 7, 1961

DOCTOR JULIO GARCERAN DE VALL Y SOUZA
2128 Coral Way
Apartment #4
Miami, Florida

DEAR MR. GARCERAN: The Department of State has seen reports that you have been chosen by the Association of Cuban Magistrates in Exile, one of the Cuban exile organizations, as the provisional President of the Government of Cuba in Arms in Exile. It is regrettable that you or the Association did not consult with the Department of State before taking any such step within the territory of the United States.

While the United States sympathizes strongly with your motives and looks to the day when freedom will reign in Cuba, I must inform you that for

¹On Sept. 19 Mr. Reap made a similar statement to news correspondents:

"The Department of State does not believe that it would be in the United States national interest to recognize a Cuban government in exile at this time."

another government to establish itself within the territory of the United States, without the consent of the Government of the United States, would violate the sovereignty and territory of the United States under international law.

I should also mention that the consent of the Government of the United States to the establishment of a government in exile would imply recognition by the United States of such a government. The Government of the United States, of course, cannot permit itself to be forced into such a position.

I am constrained to inform you that the Government of the United States does not consent to the pretended or assumed existence of the Government of Cuba in Arms in Exile within its sovereign domain and, for that reason, I must suggest that whatever acts you or others associated with you have taken or may be taking looking to the establishment of such a government, without the invitation or consent of the United States, be dissolved and cease forthwith.

I wish at the same time to assure you that this statement of United States policy with respect to the establishment and maintenance of the Government of Cuba in Arms in Exile within the United States in no way affects the policy of the Government of the United States toward the present regime in Cuba. As stated by the President of the United States: We do not intend to abandon Cuba.

For the Secretary of State:

WYMBERLEY DeR. COERR
*Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Department of State*

Acts of Recognition Since 1953

The Department of State, in response to an inquiry, has compiled the following list of actions by the United States Government since 1953 involving the recognition of new states or new governments.

In 1953 the United States recognized a new Government of Colombia on June 18 and a new Government (Republic) of Egypt on June 22.

In 1954 the United States recognized a new Government of Paraguay on May 13; a new Gov-

ernment of Guatemala on July 13; and a new Government of Honduras on December 16.

In 1955 the United States recognized the Federal Republic of Germany on May 5; the reestablishment of Austria as a sovereign and independent state on May 15; a new Government of Argentina on September 25; a new Government of Viet-Nam on October 26; and a new Government of Argentina on November 17.

In 1956 the United States recognized the Republic of the Sudan on January 1; the Kingdom of Morocco on March 7; the Kingdom of Tunisia on March 22; a new Government of Honduras on October 27; and a new Government of Haiti on December 24.

In 1957 the United States recognized a new Government of Haiti on February 21; the Republic of Ghana on March 6; a new Government of Haiti on May 7; a new Government of Colombia on May 17; a new Government (Republic) of Tunisia on July 30; a new Government of Haiti on July 30; the Federation of Malaya on August 31; a new Government of Guatemala on October 29; and a new Government of Honduras on December 21.

In 1958 the United States recognized a new Government of Venezuela on January 28; the United Arab Republic, created from the union of Egypt and Syria, on February 25 (see below under 1961 for recognition of the Syrian Arab Republic as a separate state); the Arab Union, created from the union of the Kingdom of Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on May 28 (dissolved later the same year); a new Government (Republic) of Iraq on August 2; the Republic of Guinea on November 1; and a new Government of Sudan on November 22.

In 1959 the United States recognized a new Government of Cuba on January 7.

In 1960 the United States recognized the State (now Federal Republic) of Cameroon on January 1; the Republic of Togo on April 27; a new Government of Turkey on May 30; the Federation of Mali on June 20 (subsequently divided into Senegal and Mali, both listed below as recognized on September 24, 1960); the Malagasy Republic on June 26; the Republic of the Congo on June 30; the Somali Republic on July 1; the Republic of Dahomey on August 1; the Republic of Niger on August 3; the Republic of Upper Volta on August 5; the Republic of Ivory Coast on August 7; the

Republic of Chad on August 11; the Central African Republic on August 13; the Republic of Congo on August 15; the Republic of Cyprus on August 16; the Gabon Republic on August 17; the Republic of Senegal on September 24; the Republic of Mali on September 24; the Federation of Nigeria on October 1; the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on November 28; and a new Government of El Salvador on December 3.

In 1961 the United States recognized a new Government of El Salvador on February 15; Sierra Leone on April 27; and the Syrian Arab Republic on October 10.

U.S.S.R. Does Not Accede to Request on Distributing U.S. Views on Berlin

Press release 708 dated October 13

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 13

During the past few months the Crosscurrents Press, a firm chartered in the United States but registered with the Department of Justice as an agent of the state publications export monopoly of the U.S.S.R., has been distributing in substantial quantity Soviet propaganda material on Germany and Berlin. In view of the wide dissemination given this material in this country, the U.S. Government, in a note delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 22, 1961, asked the Soviet Government for the necessary facilities to distribute comparable materials in the Soviet Union presenting American views on the Berlin question. In this way, the U.S. Government note pointed out, the Soviet people would be given an opportunity, as the American people have had, to study in some depth both sides of this critical problem.

Yesterday the Soviet Government replied to this request. In essence the Soviet Government denied the facilities asked for, asserting that the Soviet Government could not agree to the distribution of materials which, in its view, are not "constructive."

The texts of the U.S. Government's note of September 22, 1961, and the Soviet reply of October 12, 1961, follow.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, upon the instructions of its Government, has the honor to set forth the following.

In view of the extreme seriousness of the question of Berlin, it is imperative that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States—and, indeed, all peoples—have the opportunity to read and study the governmental views that have been presented on this matter.

The people of the United States and their Government have traditionally maintained that the availability of differing views on all questions provides the basis and stimulus essential for the just resolution of problems. In this regard, the United States Government notes that the full texts of the major communications of the Government of the Soviet Union on the question of Berlin have been carried by major daily newspapers in the United States. Furthermore, Crosscurrents Press, which is a firm chartered in the United States, but registered with the Department of Justice as an agent of the Soviet state export monopoly for publications and thus a channel for the views of the Soviet Government, has recently published in the United States, as one of a series of pamphlets containing Soviet materials, a mass edition of a pamphlet entitled "The Soviet Stand on Germany". This contains a collection of documents presenting Soviet views on the Berlin question, with an introduction by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Nikita S. Khrushchev. Although the Soviet press has published some official statements of the United States Government on the Berlin problem, the Soviet people have had no opportunity to study the American viewpoint on the Berlin problem in a fashion similar to the opportunity given the American people to study the Soviet viewpoint as presented in the pamphlet published by Crosscurrents Press.

Since it is incumbent upon both Governments to take appropriate steps which seek to eliminate misunderstandings between the peoples of our two countries, the United States Government proposes that the Government of the Soviet Union make available to the United States Government facili-

ties for the distribution at this time of comparable material presenting American views on the Berlin question. In this way, the Soviet people will have an opportunity, as the American people have had, to study in some depth both sides of this question, which is of such great importance.

The Department of State is ready to proceed with this project, and it is hoped that the Government of the Soviet Union will give its immediate attention to making the requested facilities available.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Moscow, September 22, 1961

SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 12

[Complimentary opening paragraph omitted]

The Soviet Government has always believed that a broad exchange of truthful information plays an important role in assuring the best mutual understanding and the development of friendly relations between countries and peoples. There is not and cannot be any doubt that the exchange of such information serves the interest of strengthening peace. The Soviet Government supports precisely this position in its practical activity.

But there is another form of information, or more exactly false information, used by certain circles in order to sow mistrust between states and incite enmity among peoples. The Soviet Government has always opposed this sort of "information" and naturally cannot agree to its distribution in the Soviet Union. If any other path were taken, it would not only not contribute to mutual understanding among peoples, but, on the contrary, it would directly damage the cause of strengthening international ties and cooperation.

In the note of the Embassy of the United States of America there is reference to the publication, upon the initiative of the American private publishing company, "Crosscurrents Press", of a selection of certain Soviet documents on the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. In this connection, it must be noted that the competent Soviet organizations naturally do not object if this or that foreign publishing house approaches them with a request to publish any sort of official Soviet materials and documents or publishes such documents on its own initiative. This is the business of publishing companies.

Public opinion in the Soviet Union is widely informed on all questions of international life and not only has a full understanding of the positions of all states, including the position of the Government of the United States of America as well, on questions of the international situation, but also speaks its mind energetically on all questions, especially when these concern the preservation and strengthening of peace and friendship among nations.

In this connection: The statement contained in the note of the Embassy of the United States of America to the effect that Soviet public opinion may not be informed on the American point of view on the Berlin question evokes bewilderment at the very least. The Embassy cannot fail to note that all basic documents, notes and statements of the Government of the United States of America on the German problem as a whole, including the Berlin problem as well, are regularly published in the Soviet press. Incidentally, for justice's sake, it should be said that the notes of the Soviet Government, like a majority of its statements, are far from always published in the American press, and if they are published, it is sometimes in distorted form.

The Government of the United States of America can be sure that, if its leaders wish to address Soviet public opinion with constructive statements on the just solution of unsettled problems and the strengthening of peace, then materials of that sort, as has been the case earlier as well, will receive broadest elucidation in the Soviet Union.

United States Congratulates China on 50th Anniversary of Revolution

Following is a message from President Kennedy to Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated October 9

OCTOBER 5, 1961

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The people of the United States join me in offering congratulations on China's National Day which this year marks the 50th Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution. On this occasion we recall vividly the long, arduous struggle Free China has waged under your valiant leadership against foreign aggression and Communist tyranny and for the realization of the noble aspirations of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Our alliance, based on ties of historic friendship and unity of purpose, has withstood the tests of the past. May it grow ever stronger in the years ahead.

Your Excellency, the American people share your abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of justice over evil. We look confidently toward the day when all the great people of China will again take their place in the struggle for those principles of freedom and progress espoused by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

President Kennedy Holds Talks With President of Argentina

Following is the text of a joint communique released at the close of a meeting at New York City on September 26 between President Kennedy and President Arturo Frondizi of the Republic of Argentina.

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 26

The meeting between the Presidents of the United States and of the Republic of Argentina was held in the spirit of deep friendship and mutual respect which unites the two countries and which finds expression in the fruitful cooperation and close solidarity in ideals and aims that are common to the two nations.

On the basis of this spirit of understanding and common interest the two Presidents joined in conversation for four hours, during which time they considered subjects of the greatest relevance in the field of cooperation between the two countries—questions relating to political solidarity and the economic and social development of the American continent, as well as serious world problems.

This frank understanding has made it possible to reaffirm the deep and unchangeable identity of purpose of the two nations, which, being based on a common historic tradition, has reached an unprecedented level, thanks to the work and effort of the two governments.

President Frondizi expressed to President Kennedy the full adherence of Argentina to the untiring efforts on the part of the United States directed toward the maintenance of world peace, the preservation and broadening of the full exercise of freedom, representative democracy and the dignity of man, as well as toward the fuller development of the economically underdeveloped countries. President Frondizi made especially clear to President Kennedy the extent to which Argentina looks favorably upon President Kennedy's effort to give United States international cooperation policies a dynamic, far-reaching, realistic and effective content, which answers the pressing needs of the present serious situation.

President Kennedy, in turn, expressed to President Frondizi the importance that the United States gives to the firm and sincere adherence on the part of Argentina to those common ideals and

aims which, being characteristic of Western civilization, are the intrinsic and inherent values of the two nations. At the same time President Kennedy reiterated his firm decision to cooperate with President Frondizi, in the latter's effort to consolidate, once and for all, effective democratic institutions in Argentina, and to speed up, at an unprecedented rate, the economic development of his country. He expressed his assurance that these efforts contain a deep historic significance for this South American nation and constitute, by the same token, a decisive factor in the stabilization of democracy and the consolidation of social and economic progress in the entire Hemisphere.

President Frondizi informed President Kennedy of the progress attained by his country in transforming its economic structure and the solid foundation of a modern nation. He reiterated the gratitude of his government for the extensive aid received from the United States towards that end.

President Frondizi also explained his country's basic current problems and needs which require an immediate solution so that gains already achieved can be consolidated and national development can be carried out in a progressive manner. In this connection, he pointed out to President Kennedy the importance of United States cooperation, and emphasized the renewed determination derived from the formulation of the Alliance for Progress, as approved at Punta del Este.¹

President Kennedy reiterated to President Frondizi the terms of the declaration that was formulated at the White House on May 24 of this year.² He stated that the present experience in Argentina constitutes an essential part of the Free World's effort to demonstrate, in a practical fashion, the capacity of the democratic countries to work for rapid economic and social development while reaffirming human rights and denying those violent methods which are inconsistent with the way of life of either country and which destroy human dignity and individual freedom.

For all these reasons, the government of the United States will continue to collaborate with the efforts of Argentina.

President Frondizi and President Kennedy discussed various aspects of the Argentine develop-

ment plan which—in addition to projects already submitted for United States consideration—include the El Chocón-Los Colorados project, the modernization of the meat packing industry, development of the fishing industry, expansion of housing programs, and water development. The Presidents agreed that these programs were consistent with the basic aims of the Alliance for Progress. President Kennedy expressed his great admiration for the impressive efforts and sacrifices which Argentina has already made in order to speed up its economic and social development; and his recognition of the effort being made to mobilize domestic resources for future development. Therefore, President Kennedy welcomed the opportunity to reaffirm his government's firm commitment to assist the government of Argentina in its development program in order to help in bringing as rapidly as possible higher standards of living and increased social welfare to all the people of Argentina. He spoke of his government's intention to examine carefully the specific project applications for the above program and to consider them as rapidly as possible in view of their great importance for the people of Argentina.

President Kennedy was particularly impressed by the significance of the El Chocón-Complex project in view of its potential for the transformation of a vast region of the country. He noted that it was similar in concept to the highly successful TVA project in the United States.

President Kennedy stated that he would join with the Argentine government in seeking to expedite the completion of the survey of the project which is being undertaken by the Inter-American Development Bank. As sound plans are developed the United States government will consult with the Argentine government with respect to financing of the project. In this connection this large and important project, which can be of such widespread benefit for the Argentine people and which is receiving such a major impulse from the Argentine government, will clearly require for its successful execution the full cooperation of European countries as well as the United States government and major international financial institutions.

Among the problems of economic cooperation, special attention was given to those concerning commercial interchanges. There was full agreement concerning the need to continue joint efforts to promote the expansion of commerce between

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

² For a statement made by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, June 12, 1961, p. 920.

the two countries in which Argentina at present has an unfavorable balance. Likewise, it was agreed that it is necessary to press vigorously in international forums such as GATT to achieve our common purposes. This will require a more intense effort to reduce restrictions on international trade that are obstructing the expansion of commerce with other countries. The importance to both countries that the European regional agreements grant fair treatment to imports from third countries was noted in this connection.

The major issues in the present world political situation were thoroughly examined. During the exchange of views on problems such as the Berlin question, the resumption of nuclear tests, the maintenance of peace, the Cuban situation and other situations and threats emerging from the Cold War, the President of the United States and the President of Argentina evidenced agreement on fundamental goals and President Kennedy stressed during the discussion his awareness of the significance of the growing Argentine participation in world affairs.

The topics of political solidarity and economic cooperation in the American hemisphere received special attention. Both Presidents agreed as to the need for strengthening and revitalizing multi-lateral and bi-lateral machinery of the Inter-American system so as to guarantee, in a definitive manner, the prevalence of the principles of cooperation, the principle of non-intervention by foreign powers in the affairs of this hemisphere, the principle of self-determination and non-intervention, political solidarity, mutual respect, effective exercise of representative democracy and economic and social development in each and every one of the countries of this hemisphere.

Department To Support Visit of Governors to Japan

Press release 703 dated October 11

The Department of State on October 11 informed Governor Wesley Powell of New Hampshire, chairman of the Governors' Conference, of plans for support by the Department of the visit to Japan of 10 U.S. Governors and the bringing to this country of 10 Japanese Governors. This exchange was proposed by the Governors' Conference at its meeting in Hawaii earlier this year.

Besides Governor Powell, the others in the U.S.

delegation will be Governors Paul Fannin, Arizona; Edmund G. Brown, California; William F. Quinn, Hawaii; John B. Swainson, Michigan; Elmer L. Anderson, Minnesota; Edwin L. Mechem, New Mexico; David L. Lawrence, Pennsylvania; Buford Ellington, Tennessee; and Gaylord A. Nelson, Wisconsin. All except Governor Quinn of Hawaii are currently members of the executive committee of the Conference.

The State Department will facilitate the exchange, to take place in early 1962, by providing travel grants and also living costs not otherwise met.

President Abboud of Sudan Visits United States October 4-14

Ibrahim Abboud, President of the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Sudan, made an official visit to the United States October 4-14. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Kennedy and President Abboud on October 4 and a joint communique issued at the close of the Washington portion of President Abboud's visit on October 6.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated October 4

President Kennedy

Mr. President, members of your party, ladies and gentlemen: I wish to express on behalf of the people of the United States our great satisfaction in welcoming you to our country.

This is the first occasion in the history of the Sudan that a leader of your country has come to visit the United States, and we are particularly glad that this should happen in this most significant year of 1961.

Your flag, like the flag of the United States, tells us a good deal about your country. The blue for the Nile River, the yellow for the desert, the green for what you have been able to do with the combination of the desert and the Nile.

We welcome you also because you have set an example of a country with eight neighbors, all of whom live at peace with you and with each other. You have set a standard for your continent and indeed, in that sense, for the world.

So, Mr. President, we welcome you to Washington. We are extremely happy that you will visit the United States, that you will see something of our country and something of our people. We are a young country. You are the leader of a country which is even younger, but in a very real sense is perhaps the oldest part of the known world.

So for many reasons, Mr. President, we welcome you here. We value the fact that you have chosen to visit us. We want you to know that your ministers and yourself will be most welcome, and we hope that when you depart you will carry with you a very real appreciation of the warm feeling of friendship that our country feels for yours.

Mr. President.

President Abboud¹

Mr. President John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America: At this moment when we begin our visit to your great country to make direct contact with your friendly nation, we feel overwhelmed by a deep sense of joy and happiness. This joy is derived from your bright history, and on behalf of the Sudan I present to you and to the great American nation our most sincere congratulations on the occasion of the 183d anniversary of the memorable Valley Forge—that great event which marked a chapter in the book of heroism and the gospel of principles written by your great Revolution under that outstanding leader, George Washington. Then they scored the first victory for the cause of independence and freedom. Your people presented this historical achievement to the world, that inspired and still inspires many nations for all these years to follow suit and be guided by its principles.

It is a good omen, Mr. President, that our visit to the United States of America coincides with this dear occasion to you and to me. It enables us to couple our congratulations to you and to the American people with our sincere thanks and appreciation for your kind invitation which we were so fortunate to be able to accept on behalf of the Sudan. This invitation will further strengthen our friendship and cooperation. We shall always remember that you and the American people have readily shown to the Sudan, even before they achieved independence, sincere friendship and fraternity by sending missions of good

will, by supporting our candidacy for membership in the United Nations, of cooperation between the two nations on an exemplary and disinterested basis.

I have no doubt that this visit which we make on behalf of the Sudan will remain as a landmark in the history of our relations. The warm reception accorded me by you, Mr. President, and by the honorable members of your administration, demonstrates once more those kind feelings and sincere friendship extended toward the Sudan.

Indeed, this visit will be of great significance because it came at a time when many nations, particularly Africans, have achieved independence and become full members of the international family. They have awakened up to shoulder their responsibilities for the welfare of their people within a happy and peaceful world.

For all these considerations, Mr. President, we are happy to be able to accept your kind invitation, which is a good example of cooperation between members of the international family and the establishment of close relations on the basis of mutual respect and confidence, especially during this troubled period of human history.

It gives me great pleasure, Mr. President, to convey to you and to the great American people on this occasion a message from the Sudanese people, a message of good will and true friendship stemming out of the genuine desire to further these friendly relations and strengthen them on the basis on which they started: mutual confidence and respect for the interests of our countries and the world at large.

In spite of the long distances that separate our two countries, we have many things in common. The system of government derived from the principles of your revolution and our revolution. We now devote our efforts to establish a system of our own, based on our traditions and aiming at the fulfillment of the wishes of our people for freedom and social justice in the true Sudanese pattern—again similar to the situation of your great country in the American Continent. The Sudan stretches from the Arab world into the heart of Africa and is adjacent to no less than eight countries. We are fully aware that this situation imposes on us the declaration and application of a clearly cut policy based on sincerity and cooperation inside as well as outside the continent—that we have to stand for eradication of what remains of foreign domination and for de-

¹ As interpreted from the Arabic.

veloping the economic and social life of the Africans.

Thus we safeguard freedom in Africa and, hence, the peace of the world. In this spirit, which we feel is shared by the American people, we look forward, Mr. President, to the forthcoming meetings. I am confident from what we already know of your personal courage and frankness that our deliberations will have far-reaching results in the fulfillment of the objectives of our two nations and in strengthening world peace and prosperity.

Finally, to the captain and crew of this magnificent and efficient aircraft which the President has so kindly placed under our disposal, as an indication of honoring the Sudan, in my person, to them I wish to express my deep thanks and appreciation for all that they have done to make the journey most comfortable.

I wish also to congratulate them for the confidence of their people in charging them with the history-making feat, the landing of the first Boeing 707 at Khartoum Airport, a feat which in fact they have performed with distinguished success.

Thank you.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated October 6

President Abboud and President Kennedy have had a most cordial exchange of views on a variety of subjects of interest to the Sudan and to the United States. Their talks revealed that the two Presidents shared a common concern for the preservation of world peace, and a common reliance on the United Nations as the most effective instrument for maintaining peace.

The two Presidents considered that the current international situation underscored the importance of reaching through negotiation mutually acceptable solutions to existing disputes, especially when moral issues are involved, such as the right of self-determination, which belongs to the peoples of every continent. President Abboud stressed the importance of rapidly implementing the right of self-determination throughout the African continent. President Kennedy expressed satisfaction with the political gains which had been achieved by the African peoples and confirmed his hopes and expectations for further progress to this end.

President Abboud explained that the policy of non-alignment followed by the Republic of the

Sudan was designed to strengthen and consolidate the independence of the Sudan and to enable it to play a constructive role in the resolution of situations which are sources of international tensions. President Kennedy confirmed that the United States fully endorsed the determination of the newly-independent countries of Africa to maintain their independence. He noted that the support given by the Sudan to the mission of the United Nations in the Congo had contributed to an important extent to the maintenance of that country's independence and territorial integrity.

President Kennedy drew attention to the courageous struggle of the people of West Berlin to preserve their independence and to the determination of the United States to support them in their efforts to live in peace and freedom. President Abboud confirmed that the Republic of the Sudan also attached great importance to a peaceful resolution of the Berlin question on terms which are consistent with the legitimate expectations of the people of Berlin and of the German people as a whole.

The two Presidents were in complete agreement as to the importance of the early conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement based on an effective system of inspection and control. They also agreed that efforts should be continued in the field of general disarmament with a view to reducing international tensions and the increased application of the resources of the world to the task of economic and social development.

President Abboud explained to President Kennedy the steps the Sudan was taking to promote economic development and social justice. He confirmed the Sudan's intentions to mobilize its human and material resources in accordance with an integrated national plan to be executed by a planning organization with the requisite authority, and outlined the steps the Sudan was taking to achieve this goal.

The two Presidents agreed that talks would continue between their advisers with respect to expanding and expediting their cooperation in key areas in which the United States can most effectively assist the self-help efforts of the Republic of the Sudan.

President Abboud extended to President and Mrs. Kennedy a cordial invitation to visit the Sudan. President Kennedy said that he and Mrs. Kennedy look forward to such a visit whenever his presidential duties permit.

The U.N., a Forum for Reaffirming Man's Common Humanity

Remarks by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹

Here at Brandeis you are daily bringing to life the Justice's own ideal of a university. "To be great," he said, "a university must express the people and the community at their best. The aim must be high and the vision broad; the goal seemingly attainable but beyond immediate reach."

I am reminded of many of Justice Brandeis' words in my own work at the United Nations, for it is, above all else, a place in which men from many lands strive to bring into focus the two elements in our lives that concerned him most: law and social progress.

"America's fundamental law," he said, "seeks to make real the brotherhood of man." I know of no finer phrase to describe the purpose of the charter of the United Nations, although I am mindful that the performance falls far short of the purpose.

No Assembly in the United Nations' history has equaled the importance of our meetings in New York at this time. There is really only one item on our agenda—the survival of the human race. Mr. Khrushchev hardly needs to threaten us. We know he can fill the air with radioactive fallout. We know he can wipe out smaller countries as though they were summer flies. He is doing the former. And no one doubts his ability to do the latter.

Equally he must know that America's atomic arsenal is big enough to wipe out most—perhaps all—of what the Russian people have built up so painfully in the last 40 years. It is not the possibility of annihilation that we need to be reminded of. The only issue is whether the final atomic holocaust can be avoided.

And here I would like to express my belief that it can. One ugly obstacle to creative action which we must avoid is hopelessness—the feeling that nothing can be done. I agree with Sir Charles Snow's view that "when men believe events are too big for them, there is no hope."

¹Made at Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass., on Oct. 8 (U.S./U.N. press release 3787 dated Oct. 7). Ambassador Stevenson was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters.

These events we face are *not* too big for us. We must, we can, rise to the heights of statesmanship needed to bring our fearful forces of destruction under control. I say this not because of some desperate act of blind faith—although I confess that, like Winston Churchill, I do profoundly believe that "God has not despaired of his children."

My reasons for faith are simple and positive. They center on the fact that men have contrived over large areas and long epochs to live at peace with each other. Human history is not simply one long record of desperate fratricidal war. Beside man the angry pugnacious animal, we must set man the friend and neighbor. Human nature is capable of both peace and war. What we have to establish are the institutions and conditions under which his peaceful instincts are fostered and his tendency to violence held in check.

What are these preconditions? We can know them because we have them inside domestic society. Over long periods a quarter of the human race lived at peace inside the old Chinese Empire. The record of the United States has been to preserve the peace inside the country, with only one important breakdown in a hundred years, and in a territory of continental scale.

Keeping the peace is not, then, impossible. But it does demand the minimum conditions which give us peace *within* the state, and I would like to underline the fact that all the policies my Government seeks to put forward, all the resolutions it supports and initiatives it wants to follow, lead back in one way or another to this fundamental objective—to build for our world the institutions and habits of a common life, to create the kind of society from which atomic war can be banished forever.

Particular issues are far less important than this fundamental point. We can patch them up. We can even live with them, provided our society is geared to peace. But if our fundamental attitudes and institutions are faulty, no particular settlement will do more than stave off the day of holocaust. The risk of destruction will be renewed with each new conflict of interest, and since no human society is conceivable without such conflicts, we shall remain perpetually, wearily, despairingly exposed to the risk of planetary death.

It is insanely unsafe to accept such a possibility. There is a German phrase: "Better an end to the

horror than a horror without end." With each renewed crisis, tempers fray, nerves grow unsteadier, the temptation to seek violent conclusions grows more acute. Only a society that can mediate its conflicts peacefully—as do, on the whole, our domestic societies—has any hope of withstanding the wear and tear of differences and disputes.

My Government profoundly respects and welcomes the participation of *all* the United Nations in the pursuit of peaceful solutions for our troubled world. The old American cry of liberty has been amended today to read: "No extermination without representation," and it would indeed be intolerable if the great powers—in whose hands admittedly the instruments of destruction lie—were to disregard arrogantly and indifferently the right of all members of the human race to their share of life.

So in all the proposals which we may make for securing the peace, we seek the full participation of other governments. Nothing less than a shared and functioning world order will meet our needs; no power, however great, can build this alone. We must all be partners, all participants in the experiment of building a civic order for all mankind.

The concept of mankind *as a family* has begun, however shyly, to make a concrete appearance on the stage of the world. It is the hope and determination of my Government to give it a permanent and central part to play.

Yet again and again as one speaks of the policies and institutions which are needed in the world if man is to survive, one is haunted by the fear that the imagination, the warmth, the sheer human courage needed for such changes will not be available in time. It was another of our greatest jurists, Judge Learned Hand, who reminded us that freedom cannot be preserved in constitutions if it has already vanished from the hearts of citizens.

Let us then use this great forum of the United Nations to reaffirm our common humanity. The bombs that blast the West can destroy the East. The radiation that slays the white child will not spare the Indian or the Chinese. Faced with the risk of atomic war, we are all one in our total vulnerability. We can all suffer. We can all die. The masks we wear will not save us from blast and burn. Our deafness will not spare us when the rockets fall.

And if just once, even if only through fear, we can see each other as we really are, all of us frail, mortal, human, confused, culpable, yet sole heirs of a tremendous past and sole creators of a possible future—can we continue to look in each other's eyes, reading hatred and destruction?

I do not believe it. And here, in this community of scholars and students, in this repository of that tremendous past, among creators of that possible future, my confidence is restored, and I am proud and happy to become a member of this community where truth is enshrined in walls and hearts.

Interpreting and Extending the Dimensions of Democracy

*Remarks by Mrs. Katie Louchheim
Consultant on Women's Activities¹*

I am flattered to be asked to give you my interpretation of the part we as professional women must play in translating the dimensions of our democratic society. For all of us, I am certain, the spirit of democracy is evident in many different ways; we see it with our eyes, we make it tangible and believable in deeds, we feel it in our hearts. We value it highly, we accept it thankfully as our heritage, and above all we share in its blessings by listening to one another. We point with pride to our free institutions, to our right to worship and speak as we please. We praise our political freedoms, our freedom to debate and to differ.

All these things we know, we accept, and in our own way cherish. But what, we may well ask ourselves, are we doing about it?

What are the dimensions of our noblest dream, for democracy is a dream, the noblest dream ever dreamed by man. It is the dream of our forefathers, the dream of a free society, free to go forward, to progress and improve, and by means of its free institutions and associations to forge the future in which the greatest good for all may, by peaceful means, be achieved.

Today this dream, through no fault of ours, has new dimensions, dangerous dimensions. For as

¹ Made before the D.C. Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs on Oct. 1 (press release 676 dated Sept. 30).

President Kennedy said so eloquently in his address to the U.N.,² sometime in the next 10 months we must make decisions which will determine whether we all perish in a fiery holocaust or hopefully survive to progress in freedom and dignity.

These are awesome decisions. These decisions—on Berlin, on disarmament, on the use of atomic weapons—mercifully are not our responsibility. We are living in a desperately complicated world, and the best we can do is to know that the courageous, forthright, and farsighted men making these decisions deserve our sympathetic trust and our prayers.

But what we *can* do is interpret the dimensions of this democracy with which we are blessed, and that is what I should like to talk with you about. What are these dimensions, and which of them lie within our province? In what way can we participate in extending and articulating these dimensions?

Let us examine them in the light of our own experience. We are busy people. We are constantly consumed with our own concern, with the dilemmas of our daily experience. We are preoccupied with our productive occupations. We are immersed in appointments, meetings, gatherings, and in the many other obligations of an urban society. But one overwhelming fact immediately impresses itself upon this limited view: What we do, how we live, work, compete, how we relate to one another is no longer just our concern. For what we do is everyone's concern; how we live and relate, react, whatever and wherever it may be, is known everywhere. Democracy is on trial, and therefore we are on trial. All over the world there are eyes and ears, listening, watching, observing, evaluating, making judgments.

I have recently traveled halfway round the world. During the course of my travels I learned many valuable lessons. The most important of these can be simply stated: We are judged by our *deeds*, by whether we act according to the principles of our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, the intentions of our Founding Fathers.

The spirit of democracy in the eyes of the uncommitted nations—democracy and its dimensions—is only as true as it is viable. We are the children of revolution, the heirs of freedom. And yet, unless this spirit is made manifest here

and now, in our everyday life, it is but a promise given and not kept.

When we preach of liberty and freedom for all, we must not only mean it but live accordingly.

Do you know what the most striking evidence has been as far as the have-not nations, the watching nations, are concerned? I will tell you. For them the spirit of revolution, the spirit of freedom, has been reenacted and reborn in the sit-ins, in the peaceful demonstrations in lunch counters, in the Freedom Riders, the news that white and black men together have carried the torch of liberty high.

The quiet courage with which our Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, has ordered an end of segregation in interstate carriers is cheered in a thousand hamlets and marketplaces. The peaceful means by which the Department of Justice at Attorney General Kennedy's direction has insisted on safeguarding the voting rights of all our people has been applauded in every country where the right to self-government has been recently achieved. These are the shots that are heard around the world.

If we are to win this much-extended cold war, if we are to prove to all those who watch and wait for us to lead that democracy and not totalitarianism is the answer, these are the weapons we must use.

These then are the dimensions of our democracy. These matters are our concern. They do lie directly within our province. And these are the ways in which we can prove that in our enlarged role as women, women with many skills and talents, we can lead and make the force of our opinion felt.

By direct participation, by support, by making the force of our opinions felt, we can hasten these peaceful procedures, we can articulate them in our daily busy lives. By affirming that democracy alone of all the means of government devised by man permits of change, by admitting that we need to make progress by these means we can make our contribution count. By moving forward vigorously to remove all traces of discrimination, we can assume the leadership role as women we so rightfully claim.

Recently I attended a meeting at which officials of important national women's groups such as yours were present. One of these officials raised the question of how we might best combat communism. She suggested workshops, discussion

² For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

groups, study groups, conferences. My answer was quite a different one. The best way to combat communism is to act—to prove daily by *doing* that democracy is the only society in which the greatest good for the greatest number can be achieved.

Let us talk frequently about democracy, about its dimensions, about the greater opportunities for women, but let us also act. Let us prove that we as women can make an important contribution, that we have earned our place not only as skillful professionals, administrators, homemakers, organizers of community endeavor, but as leaders in the fight for freedom for all people regardless of race, creed, or color.

As business and professional women in the Nation's Capital, we have a unique opportunity, and a special obligation, to demonstrate democracy to our many foreign visitors and resident diplomats. Not only can we extend cordial hospitality to them, inviting them to our meetings and to our homes—as you do, of course, in your international programs. But we can also directly influence the conduct of community business life so that visitors, especially those from the newer nations, feel welcome in all neighborhoods and all public places and so that they realize all our citizens are equally welcome.

You are soon to take part in a hemispheric conference of business and professional women in Puerto Rico, and you have a special interest in Latin America; so you will be interested in the reaction of a visitor from Panama. Last spring my office sponsored the visit of 12 Latin American women whose special interest was social welfare. The Panamanian member of the group was of mixed African and Indian ancestry. She came to the United States with much hesitation, afraid that she might have unhappy experiences. Fortunately her experience was happy; she was warmly received wherever she went. At the end of her stay she said to me: "I know now that what matters in the United States is not the color of a person's skin, but the person himself." Let us make certain that all our visitors come to this conclusion.

We are fortunate. We are fortunate for many reasons, not only in our birthright but because we are taking our rightful part at that moment in history when what we do can tip the scales for our side and perhaps make the difference between defeat and victory.

Immigration and Refugee Problems

*Remarks by Michel Cieplinski*¹

You have invited me to speak to you on immigration and citizenship and the problems ahead. Our greatest challenge is to maintain an enlightened administration of our immigration and citizenship laws without losing sight of the ever-present danger of infiltration by those who wish to destroy our system of government and way of life. While we in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs will make every effort to facilitate and streamline passport and visa procedures within the framework of existing law, we must remain mindful of this danger.

During the coming year we will continue our past efforts to improve procedures in the visa and passport fields. The Passport Office, in cooperation with other Federal and State agencies, has recently developed improved methods of reporting and recording births of United States nationals abroad. It has also inaugurated on a worldwide basis a completely new and simplified procedure for handling passport and citizenship records at our posts abroad. The Passport Office also has underway extensive plans for increasing its efficiency in handling citizenship cases referred to its Washington headquarters. The Visa Office, which not long ago overhauled all its regulations and is in the process of completing installation of the new immigrant visa procedures, is making continued efforts to streamline its operations and methods of cooperation with visa officers in the field.

The immediate concern of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, another office within the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, is the plight of the world's homeless and stateless persons—the refugees. Let me first say that we can be proud of the record our Congress, our Government, and the American people have established since the end of World War II. Since then the United States has spent over \$1,200,000,000 on the refugee problem and we have admitted to our shores over 800,000 refugees.

¹Made before the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 6 (press release 684 dated Oct. 4). Mr. Cieplinski is Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Generous as has been the response of the free world to the plight of the unfortunate victims of totalitarian oppression, there still remains a job to be done. In looking at the problems ahead, we in the Government and the voluntary agencies must be alert to the remaining refugee problems and to those which are developing throughout the world. Our eyes must look beyond Europe and envisage the plight of new refugee groups in Asia, Africa, and here in the Western Hemisphere.

Another disturbing element is the increased recent activity of Communist governments in the refugee field. They try to copy the Western Powers by sending relatively smaller but much more publicized shipments of food and relief goods. They have already succeeded in moving refugee children back behind the Iron Curtain. The Communists who create the political upheavals which in turn spawn the refugees are now posing as their friends and benefactors. They are desperately trying to take away from the United States its historic role as champion of the oppressed and persecuted people.

It is our duty to uphold the true projection of America in the eyes of the world. So that the image of the Statue of Liberty does not fade in the eyes and in the minds of the peoples of the world, you and your members' work, contribution, and dedication are urgently needed. The problems ahead which involve both old and new refugees will require utmost vigilance and the widest generosity and deepest compassion of the free world.

Your organization and its many members are vitally interested in the revision of our immigration policies. The immigration policy of the United States is not only a matter of domestic concern; it is an important factor in our foreign relations. The Department therefore wholeheartedly supported and welcomed the recent amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act which eliminated the much-misunderstood requirement that a visa applicant state his race and ethnic classification. From a foreign policy point of view it was of equal importance that the Congress eliminated the ceiling on minimum quotas in the Asia-Pacific triangle and made it possible that new political entities do not lose any of the quotas held previously by their components. This latter change in our laws will meet the problems created by the formation of newly independent

nations, for example, the projected federation of The West Indies. From a long-range point of view, the Department recognizes the importance of placing all independent areas in the Western Hemisphere on an equal footing.

The recent legislation also relieved certain pressures on oversubscribed quotas for the benefit of close relatives of American citizens and permanent resident aliens. The Department is in favor of any legislation which permits the unification of families separated in migration. It is hoped that eventually this objective will be met by more permanent legislation, possibly following the approach proposed by Representative [Francis E.] Walter in H.R. 6300, which would permit the use of unused quotas for this purpose.

In summarizing the views of the Department on needed revisions of our immigration laws, I cannot do better than quote the President of the United States in his message to you when you met in March of this year.

"The tasks we face in revision of our immigration policy must be keyed to the tasks we face in connection with every aspect of our rapidly changing world. The emergence of new nations in Asia and Africa, the assumption of power by any totalitarian tyranny, the cries for assistance when disaster strikes, all call for the best in our American traditions. Our immigration programs must be free from any taint of racism or discrimination."

Panamanian Economic Mission Concludes Talks at Washington

Joint Statement

Press release 693 dated October 7, for release October 8

A special Panamanian Economic Mission headed by Dr. Gilberto Arias, Minister of Finance of Panama, has engaged in talks with high United States Government officials, which were concluded October 5, on Panama's plans for social and economic development. The discussions afforded an opportunity for a full exploration of Panama's development needs and joint consideration of how Panamanian and United States resources can best be used to meet those needs within the framework of the Alliance for Progress.

Members of the Mission included the Ambassador of Panama in Washington, A. Guillerno

Arango; Rudolfo A. Chiari and Ruben D. Carles, President and Director, respectively, of Panama's National Economic Council; Alejandro Remón, Comptroller General of the Republic; David Samudio A., Director General of the Bureau of Planning and Administration in the Office of the Presidency; and Jorge R. Riba and Rodrigo Núñez, Chief Technical Director and Economic Adviser, respectively, of the Bureau's Planning Department.

In the course of the talks, the Mission made a full presentation of Panama's economic situation and the goals and objectives of Panama's 5-year development plan (1962-66), the public investments for purposes of social and economic development proposed under that plan, and the external assistance required for financing these investments. The Mission confirmed the intention of the Government of Panama to request the panel of experts to be established under the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, to review the Panamanian long-range development plan in accordance with the procedures adopted in the Charter of Punta del Este.¹

The Mission emphasized the determination of the Government of Panama to exert its maximum efforts to institute reforms and improvement in its systems of fiscal management and taxation, public administration, and laws governing land tenure and use in order to mobilize domestic resources effectively in support of the development program. It described a series of measures already taken or planned toward this end consisting of a new and increased schedule of corporate and personal income taxes effective in May 1961, with provision for effective enforcement and collections; the extension of the Civil Service system to a larger proportion of Government employees; the more effective organization of Government departments to handle development tasks; and new legislation to be presented to the National Assembly in October to implement a program of agrarian reform.

The representatives of Panama stated the intention of their Government to make further progress in the equitable distribution of income, in improved utilization of resources, both human and material, in increasing the efficiency of production, in the creation of better agricultural credit systems and other institutions leading to increased productivity and better public administration, in

promoting individual home ownership and encouraging the establishment of family-size farms by transferring land titles to farmers at low cost and with long terms of payment, and to give increased attention to the social needs of the people of Panama.

The United States officials participating in the talks expressed to the Mission the desire of the United States Government to support the efforts of the Government of Panama to promote its economic progress and achieve a greater measure of social welfare for the Panamanian people. It was recognized that the realization of the objectives of Panama's development program would require financial assistance from various sources including the United States, other friendly countries, public international lending agencies, and private investment, both domestic and foreign.

It was recognized that some of the projects in the program need further study and review before they can be considered for external financial assistance. Both the Mission and United States officials agreed, however, that a number of projects in the Panamanian 5-year development plan lent themselves to immediate implementation. The United States Government therefore indicated its readiness, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory project agreements, to provide grants of \$9.9 million to assist in financing the costs of high priority projects such as school construction, agricultural extension services, housing, rural health centers and urban hospitals, training for road construction equipment, basic surveys of land and natural resources, and completion of studies of certain economic development projects included in the 5-year plan. The projects to be financed are integral elements of the Panamanian program and will contribute importantly to the achievement of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

This United States financial support of \$9.9 million will be in addition to loans totaling \$22.6 million recently extended to Panama by United States and international lending agencies. These comprise loans of \$7.8 million for housing and feeder roads made by the Development Loan Fund; a housing loan of \$7.6 million granted from the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank (established by the United States Government under the Act of Bogotá²); and a loan of \$7.2 million for feeder

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

roads extended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in conjunction with the loan for this project made by the Development Loan Fund.

The United States Government will also continue its already established program of technical assistance and training in Panama for which a preliminary allocation of approximately \$2.5 million has been made for the fiscal year 1962.

In the course of the talks the Mission requested the United States Government to examine the possibility of improving opportunities for the sale of certain Panamanian products in the American market and also to consider the adoption of measures to improve control of the movement of goods from the Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama. The United States Government expressed its willingness to do so and also agreed to explore the possibilities of including Panama in the Food for Peace program.

The Mission recognized that major segments of the external resources required for Panama's development program would have to be sought from the international lending agencies and from foreign private investment.

With the object of stimulating the flow of United States private investment into Panama, the Governments of Panama and the United States concluded an investment guaranty agreement in January 1961. The Mission stated that the Executive branch of the Panamanian Government will submit this agreement to the National Assembly for ratification during its current session.

President Concurs in Finding on Imports of Dried Figs

White House press release dated October 4

The President on October 4 concurred with the U.S. Tariff Commission's recent finding that no formal investigation should be instituted at this time to determine whether the tariff should be reduced on imports of dried figs. The President found, with the Tariff Commission, that there is not sufficient reason to reopen the escape-clause action of August 1952 which resulted in an increase in duty on dried figs.¹ Therefore the increased rate of duty established in 1952 will con-

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1952, p. 337.

tinue to apply, without reduction or modification.

The President's action was taken after consultation with the Trade Policy Committee. The Tariff Commission's study was made pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which requires periodic review of affirmative actions taken under the escape clause. The Commission's report was submitted to the President on August 30, 1961.

New Schedule for Depreciation of Textile Machinery Announced

White House press release dated October 11

The President on October 11 announced a new depreciation schedule for textile machinery. On May 2 the President requested that the depreciation deductions for textile machinery allowed under the income tax law be reviewed by the Treasury Department in the light of changing conditions.¹ This review has been completed. Because of the increasing rate of obsolescence, the old administrative standards for estimated depreciable lives of machinery are being adjusted. Specifically the estimated average useful lives suggested by the Internal Revenue Service for most textile machinery and equipment have been reduced from 25 years or longer to 15 years and in some cases 12 years. The resulting speeding up of depreciation deductions, which reflects current technological conditions, will be of significant help to the industry in enabling it to modernize, meet foreign competition, and provide jobs.

The Treasury's study of depreciation allowances is proceeding with respect to all industries, but in accordance with the President's directive the study of the depreciation rules for the textile industry was accelerated. The results of the depreciation study for other industries will depend upon their particular conditions and circumstances. The objective is to determine whether or not existing tax guides relating to depreciation provide a realistic measure of actual depreciation being sustained and if not to suggest adjustments that are appropriate to current conditions.

In the textile industry it has been clearly demonstrated that the administrative guidelines for the period of years over which depreciation should be spread are no longer appropriate in view of changing economic conditions. The industry is experi-

¹ BULLETIN of May 29, 1961, p. 825.

encing a major technological breakthrough in which advancing techniques engender further advances and make even recently developed equipment economically outmoded long before it is physically worn out. The pressure for the adoption of technological innovations is accentuated by competition of foreign producers who, in many cases, enjoy the advantages of very liberal depreciation allowances as well as low wage costs.

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES**

U.S. Replies to Cuban Charges in U.N. General Assembly

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

In the speech which the representative of Cuba [Raúl Roa] made here this afternoon, he has added another to the incessant attacks against the United States which have characterized the Castro regime from its inception. I would have preferred not to take up the Assembly's time with any renewal of this public argument, but the Cuban representative's remarks have obliged me to claim my right of reply at least to a few of his charges. The balance will be dealt with at the proper time and place.

First, Dr. Roa has charged that the United States was guilty of aggression against Cuba last April. The Cuban Foreign Minister seems to hold the Communist belief that repetition establishes validity. The General Assembly considered the same charge at its last session and adopted a resolution² exhorting "all Member States to take such peaceful action as is open to them to remove existing tensions." Has Cuba heeded this resolution? Or has American peaceful patience been answered by the same violent and continuous attacks?

In the next place the Cuban representative has declared that the United States is planning inter-

¹ Made in plenary session on Oct. 10 (U.S. delegation press release 3792).

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1616(XV); for text, see BULLETIN of May 8, 1961, p. 685.

vention and aggression against Cuba. The United States is not planning any intervention or aggression against Cuba. We have a deep and a legitimate interest in what goes on in Cuba in this country. Cuba is very near to us, and 60 years of close and friendly and beneficial relations bind the peoples of the two countries together. If there is any threat to the Cuban Government today, it comes not from the United States but from the Cuban people, who will not tolerate indefinitely the repressions to which they are now subjugated. But we have faith that the Cuban people in the normal, inexorable unfolding of history will themselves correct injustice in their country.

Another charge was that the United States is plotting to wipe out the leaders of the Castro government. As to this repulsive accusation, let me only say that it is ridiculous and that, little as the United States likes Fidel Castro and his associates, it abhors assassination as a means of accomplishing political objectives.

Then he made the familiar charge that Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States. The facts are that Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States who have freely chosen their present commonwealth. In 1953 the General Assembly approved a finding that Puerto Rico had ceased to be a non-self-governing territory. A year ago similar attacks prompted the Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz Marín, to send a message to the United Nations in which he said in part:³

The people of Puerto Rico are a self-governing people freely associated to the United States of America on the basis of mutual consent and respect.

He went on to say:

The United Nations General Assembly, by Resolution of November 1953, has solemnly recognized that the people of Puerto Rico effectively exercised their right to self-determination in establishing the Commonwealth as an autonomous political entity in a mutually agreed association with the United States. In further regard to the principle of self-determination, the Commonwealth Legislative Assembly has approved this very year a law authorizing another vote on Puerto Rico's status whenever 10 per cent of the electors request it.

I cannot conclude without mentioning that from Dr. Roa's remarks it might be inferred that the United States opposed the movement which brought Dr. Castro to power. Far from it. We

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1960, p. 656.

did our best to adhere to the same principle of non-intervention which Dr. Roa now so loudly invokes. At the same time, we followed our immemorial practice of granting political asylum in the United States to refugees from the Batista dictatorship. Among the refugees who enjoyed asylum here in this country was Dr. Castro himself. In fact, he organized and equipped his expeditionary force to a great extent on our shores. He was not such an ardent advocate of nonintervention in those days. But we are familiar with Dr. Roa's agility, and he has conveniently forgotten all of that.

When Dr. Castro and his comrades-in-arms came to power they had widespread support and good wishes from the American people and prompt recognition from the United States Government. Dr. Castro came to the United States 3 months later and was cordially received. Nevertheless, he chose to turn on this country, to appoint us as his chief enemy and whipping boy for all calamities, and to betray his promises to the Cuban people by stamping out political opposition, by stifling the free press, by delivering the economy and the military affairs of his country into the hands of the Soviet Union, by banning all political parties except the Communist, and by driving into exile every Cuban who criticized these steps.

It is small wonder that Cubans deprived of their elementary human rights continue to flee by thousands from their beautiful island to find refuge in the United States and other hospitable and free countries. And this exodus goes on despite Castro's efforts to make their departure more difficult. Only today the press reports that the Government in Cuba has ruled that any Cuban who leaves for the United States and remains abroad for 29 days automatically loses everything he owns.

Mr. President, here is a country whose new leaders after seizing power nearly 3 years ago set out to lead the whole Western Hemisphere to political, social, and economic reform. Instead they have led their own country into political and social reaction and economic chaos. Meanwhile the United States, which they have sought to portray as the chief enemy of their progress, has joined with the rest of the hemisphere in a mighty Alliance for Progress to build the social and economic foundation of democracy for all the peoples of the hemisphere.

We look to the day when the Republic of Cuba, with whose people we in the United States have so many enduring ties of friendship, can join the rest

of us in the hemispheric march to freedom and progress.

Generous American Support of UNICEF Urged by President Kennedy

Statement by the President

White House press release dated October 13

The world's children offer our greatest promise for the future. It gives me great pleasure to send a message of congratulations and support to UNICEF again this year.

The United Nations Children's Fund has worked tirelessly and effectively across national boundaries to help children escape the threat of hunger and disease. Their program of education in disease prevention, medical care and nutrition has already had a real impact upon today's children, and its benefits will be felt even more keenly by the millions of children to come. We can feel proud of the cooperative effort which has enabled UNICEF to carry out its work.

UNICEF has caught the imagination of our people—especially our nation's children whose Halloween collections have become a symbol of concern and an expression of tangible aid. I urge all my fellow citizens, young and old, to support UNICEF generously again this year.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Edward J. King Named to U.S.—Canada International Boundary Commission

The Department of State announced on October 13 (press release 705) that Edward J. King was sworn in on that date as U.S. Commissioner on the International Boundary Commission, United States and Canada. Mr. King will succeed Samuel L. Golan, whose resignation was recently accepted by President Kennedy.

The International Boundary Commission, United States and Canada, was created under the provisions of the treaties between the United States and Great Britain of April 21, 1906, April 11, 1908, and February 24, 1925.¹ The Commis-

¹ 34 Stat. 2948, 35 Stat. 2003, and 44 Stat. 2102.

sion consists of a U.S. Commissioner, a Canadian Commissioner, and their assistants. The Secretary of State exercises jurisdiction over the U.S. section of the Commission. Its purpose is to define, mark, and maintain the demarcation of the international boundary line between the United States and Canada.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.
Acceptance deposited: Congo (Léopoldville), October 10, 1961.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.
Accession deposited: Paraguay, October 11, 1961.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961.¹

Ratifications deposited: Spain, August 19, 1961; Tunisia, August 25, 1961; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, August 30, 1961.²

Accession deposited: Gabon, September 21, 1961.

Application to: Trust Territory of Western Samoa, August 22, 1961.

Ratified by President of the United States: October 4, 1961.²

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961.¹

Ratified by President of the United States: October 4, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom: Sierra Leone, August 25, 1961, with respect to the following:

Protocol modifying article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force March 28, 1950. TIAS 2300.

Third protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2393.

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy October 10, 1949. Entered into force for the United States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² With a declaration.

Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2747.

Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement, on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16, 1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764.

Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.

First protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into force October 21, 1953. TIAS 2885.

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4250.

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement approving the procedures for reciprocal filing of classified patent applications in the United States and Australia. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 13 and October 2, 1961. Entered into force October 2, 1961.

Belgium

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Brussels February 21, 1961.³

Ratified by President of the United States: September 26, 1961.

Canada

Agreement relating to the extension and strengthening of the continental air defense system. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa September 27, 1961. Entered into force September 27, 1961.

France

Agreement for cooperation in the operation of atomic systems for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Paris July 27, 1961.

Entered into force: October 9, 1961.

Iceland

Agreement concerning the closeout of the collection account of the agricultural commodities agreement of April 11, 1957 (TIAS 3792). Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik May 3 and September 14, 1961. Entered into force September 14, 1961.

Liberia

Agreement amending the agreement of August 8 and 15, 1960, relating to radio relay facilities in Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia July 11 and 24, 1961. Entered into force July 24, 1961.

Luxembourg

Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxembourg September 18 and 22, 1961. Entered into force September 22, 1961.

³ Not in force.

Paraguay

General agreement for economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at Asunción September 26, 1961. Entered into force September 26, 1961.

General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended (TIAS 2645). Signed at Asunción December 29, 1950. Entered into force December 29, 1950. TIAS 2176.

Terminated: September 26, 1961 (superseded by agreement of September 26, 1961, *supra*).

Uruguay

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo September 26, 1961. Enters into force on the date of the note by which Uruguay notifies the United States that the agreement has been approved in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

Viet-Nam

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Saigon April 3, 1961.³

Ratified by President of the United States: September 26, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Stanley L. McElroy as Special Assistant, Agency for International Development, effective October 4. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 694 dated October 7.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

United States Defense Areas in the Federation of The West Indies. TIAS 4734. 33 pp. 65¢.

Agreement, with annexes, with the Federation of The West Indies. Signed at Port of Spain February 10, 1961. Entered into force February 10, 1961. With memorandum of understanding and agreed minute; And related exchange of notes between the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Representative of the United States of America.

³ Not in force.

Settlement of United States Claim for Postwar Economic Assistance to Germany—Purchase by the Deutsche Bundesbank of Partial Amount of Claim. TIAS 4737. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg April 25, 1961. Entered into force April 25, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4743. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of April 11, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi April 22, 1961. Entered into force April 22, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4745. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Colombia, relating to article III of the agreement of April 16, 1957, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá April 20, 1961. Entered into force April 20, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4747. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Colombia, amending the agreement of October 6, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá April 26, 1961. Entered into force April 26, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 9–15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to October 9 are Nos. 676 of September 30; 684 of October 4; and 693, 695, and 696 of October 7.

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*697	10/9	Cultural exchange (Latin America).
*698	10/9	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*699	10/9	Black designated AID mission director, Senegal (biographic details).
700	10/10	Recognition of Syrian Arab Republic.
701	10/11	Rusk: United Church Women.
*702	10/11	Herder designated AID mission director, El Salvador (biographic details).
703	10/11	Exchange visits of U.S. and Japanese Governors.
*704	10/12	Program for visit of President of Finland.
705	10/13	King sworn in as U.S. Commissioner, U.S.-Canada International Boundary Commission (rewrote).
706	10/13	Chief Minister of Uganda visits U.S.
*707	10/14	Program for visit of President of Finland.
708	10/13	U.S. and Soviet notes on distribution of pamphlets on Berlin.
*709	10/14	Program for visit of President of Liberia.

*Not printed.

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The above quotation is from President Kennedy's address before the United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1961. The full text of his address, which is available in this 23-page pamphlet, covers the following subjects:

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Proposals To Halt Testing and Nuclear Arms Race
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLV, No. 1167 • PUBLICATION 7296

November 6, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Alliance for Progress, a Continuing Revolution

by Under Secretary Bowles¹

It is a great pleasure for me to meet with you here at the binational institute to discuss the problems and prospects of the Alliance for Progress.²

This great partnership is designed to strike at the roots of poverty and injustice throughout Latin America and to enable the people and governments of our 21 nations to strengthen their free institutions by peaceful, democratic means. If we are to succeed in this task, understanding and cooperation between our two great neighboring democracies is essential. Therefore let us briefly review the situation which confronts us.

We live at a sober moment in history. Our generation faces changes, dangers, and opportunities which are utterly without precedent. Everywhere the world which our fathers knew is being challenged by powerful new revolutionary forces. What are these forces?

In a little more than a decade we have seen nearly a billion people in Asia and Africa throw off colonial rule to reclaim their independence or to establish new nations. We have seen the march of science pave the way for technological developments which our grandparents could scarcely have imagined. We have seen the impact of this new technology reach into the most remote villages as people come suddenly to realize that illiteracy, ill health, and injustice are not part of God's plan for the unfortunate but evils to be met and mastered.

At the same time we have seen the quickening

pace of military science multiply the destructiveness of modern weapons to a point where a single miscalculation can now wipe out life on much of this earth.

This situation poses some hard questions: For instance, can the well-fed and comfortable minority of mankind participate as leaders and partners in the process of peaceful revolutionary change? Or is it fated by its own fears and inhibitions to stand uneasily on the sidelines, frustrated and ineffective?

These questions are relevant not only to individuals but also to nations. They are particularly relevant to my own country, the United States.

History records that some privileged societies have had the wisdom to adjust themselves successfully to rapidly changing political, economic, and social conditions beyond their borders. But I can remember no instance of a nation so favored as my own becoming a vigorous and effective *participant* in the process of such change.

The challenge to the people and the Government of the United States is clear: Can we become history's first great exception? I deeply believe that we can, and, because the success or failure of the Alliance for Progress depends in large measure on the attitudes and convictions which my country brings to it, I would like briefly to explain why.

Worldwide Significance of American Revolution

In spite of our mistakes and occasional departures from our democratic principles, we are deeply committed to the universal human values of justice and social responsibility, and this commitment has been reflected in many of our institutions and traditions.

¹ Address made before the Mexican-North American Cultural Institute at México, D.F., on Oct. 19 (press release 721).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471, and Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

In the first place, our American Revolution has been a *continuing* revolution through which generation after generation has dealt effectively and in great depth with changing economic and social, as well as political, forces. George Washington's Revolutionary armies gave us freedom from colonial rule. Yet this was not the climax of our Revolution; it was the beginning.

George Washington was closely followed by a great political revolutionary, Thomas Jefferson, author of our Declaration of Independence, who was determined that the new nation should be ruled by its people and not an elite of the fortunate and "well born." Jefferson, in turn, was succeeded by such dedicated exponents of peaceful economic and social change as Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Each of these leaders was opposed in his time by those who stood in the way of change. But through the democratic process each mustered decisive support behind policies designed to assure an increasing measure of economic and social justice for all of our people.

Moreover, from our earliest beginnings, we believed that the principles of our American Revolution had worldwide significance. It was Jefferson who said, "The American Revolution is intended for all mankind." The mass of mankind, he added, "was not born with saddles on their backs, for a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them by the grace of God."

Jefferson's vision of a democratic, peaceful revolution whose benefits were meant to be shared by all men has stayed with us throughout our history, and we have often supplied the words and acts that have kindled men's spirits. "The right of revolution," said Lincoln, "is a most sacred right; a right which we believe is to liberate the world." Our Revolution, he thought, would lead the way to ease the lot of peoples "over a great portion of the globe."

With Franklin D. Roosevelt, who outlined our good-neighbor policy in the 1930's, this peaceful revolutionary tradition was further reinforced. His four freedoms—freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship God in one's own way, freedom from want, and freedom from fear—were intended, in his own words, for "everywhere in the world."

American Tradition of Self-Help

A second factor which gives me confidence in the ability of my country to participate effectively in this great revolutionary adventure is our *tradition of self-help*, of working together with our neighbors in behalf of a common goal.

It was in this tradition that we built up the vast rural sections of our own developing country. Hard work and imagination were combined with a sense of neighborly cooperation in seeking the common good. And it was the village schoolhouse, which provided education free for every child, that invariably received first priority. The result was communities in which men, women, and children of all ages and occupations developed a sense of belonging, of participation, of individual dignity.

A strong contributing factor to this deeply rooted sense of individual dignity and security was our belief that each farmer has the right to own his own land and to devote his energies to improving its productivity. One of our first acts after winning our independence in 1783 was to repeal the British colonial laws which had protected large estates. In 1862 our Congress passed the Homestead Act, which provided 160 acres free to every family willing and able to farm them.

In the depression-ridden 1930's our national commitment to the farmer-owned, family-sized farm resulted in laws to provide long-term loans at very low interest rates to stop mortgage foreclosures and otherwise to protect the farmer's ability to work out his own future on his own land.

Since World War II our deeply rooted belief that private ownership of the land is the very foundation of stable, democratic societies has been reflected in American foreign policy.

Perhaps the most radical land reform in modern history was launched in Japan, immediately following the war, by General MacArthur. Before Pearl Harbor less than one-third of Japanese farmers were landowners. As a result of the reforms introduced by General MacArthur, 92 percent of all Japanese rural families now own their own land, on which they are producing more food and fiber per acre than anywhere in the world.

Nearly a half century ago we accepted another economic doctrine which in many parts of Latin America is still considered radical—the progressive income tax. This tax called upon each citizen

to contribute to the welfare and security of our country in proportion to his earnings.

Not only has this tax helped create a sense of economic justice in the United States; contrary to the predictions of its early opponents, it has helped foster rapid economic growth and increased capital investment. Indeed, the three nations with the highest per capita income and perhaps the fairest distribution of wealth in the world are those with the highest graduated income taxes, coupled with generous incentives for investment; they are the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

The corporation tax on annual business earnings above \$25,000 is now set at 52 percent. On top of that is a tax on *personal* income that rises rapidly as incomes rise to a top level of 90 percent. This means that a United States corporation earning a million dollars gross profit pays \$520,000 to the Federal Government. If the remaining \$480,000 is passed on as dividends to individual stockholders, it is taxed on a steeply graduated basis as personal income. I do not suggest that taxes as high as these are called for in a developing country. I mention them only to underscore the effort which we are making at home.

Lessons of Experience

This, then, is the experience, tradition, and spirit that we bring to economic development in other countries.

In our efforts to help other nations ease their poverty and expand their economies following World War II, we made many mistakes. Yet out of this experience has come a clearer understanding of the obstacles to rapid political, economic, and social growth and how these obstacles can best be overcome.

As we consider the possibilities and pitfalls of the challenging new Alliance for Progress, we should, I believe, face certain hard facts.

For instance, we have learned by experience that there is a strict limitation on what any foreign nation can do for others, regardless of the extent of its resources and good will. Neither prosperity nor freedom can be bestowed on one people by another. They must be earned by hard work, initiative, and often through sacrifice.

For instance, there must be a willingness among the educated, privileged minority to forgo some

immediate gains in a common effort to create free societies, which alone can assure political, social, and economic growth by peaceful means.

We have also learned that we cannot apply pat answers willy-nilly to widely varying situations.

In Africa, for instance, the greatest barrier to economic and political progress is the lack of well-trained men and women to lead the forward surge. Education and training on a mass basis are required to break this bottleneck and to provide the African nations with a new capacity to develop their capital and human resources.

In Asia a totally different situation exists. In most Asian countries the central fact is the pressure of a great and rapidly expanding population against a limited resource base. Here the requirements are not only for more trained people but for the outside capital which is essential to an industrial and agricultural breakthrough.

Latin America presents a different kind of challenge. Here we find a rich cultural heritage based on a common tradition. Here are nations which 150 years ago threw off the shackles of foreign domination. Here are peoples with vast, untapped natural resources.

In Mexico, as in the United States, an increasing measure of economic and social justice has gone hand in hand with political freedom. The revolution which began here a half century ago continues to influence the public life of your country. The Mexican people, therefore, have a special respect for and understanding of the dynamic power of the democratic process.

In many other Latin American nations, however, the revolutionary process petered out once the great liberators had broken the colonial ties. In spite of the courageous and dedicated efforts of many great democratic leaders, the economic and social reforms that alone can give depth and dignity to any society were often stifled or diverted. And because the essential economic and social changes have not been forthcoming in many Latin American nations, great wealth often exists side by side with abject poverty.

In particular, the cry for land has created deep-seated frustration and bitterness. The Spaniards and Portuguese who seized control of Latin America in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries introduced feudal institutions from Europe. When the colonial ties were broken in the early 19th century, the

dominant role of the large landlords was, in most parts of the continent, largely unchallenged. Today it is said that 1.5 percent of the people of Latin America—those with 15,000 or more acres each—own half of all agricultural land. As a result, a majority of Latin Americans are poor tenant farmers, often deeply in debt to their landlords.

If this antiquated rural system produced an adequate supply of food and fiber at reasonable prices, the social and economic injustices would be less apparent. However, because so much land has been set aside for cash crops and because farming methods are largely outdated, many Latin Americans continue to suffer diet deficiencies.

There is urgent need for greater productivity, through expanded savings, capital investment, and training; also the wiser use of existing resources, greater sensitivity to human needs, and a more just distribution of wealth which *already* exists.

Poverty must be recognized as a form of tyranny in itself; economic development as a liberating force. Yet economic development will fail in its purposes if its benefits go primarily to a wealthy elite.

Our task, therefore, is not only to bake a bigger economic pie but to take greater care in how the pie is sliced. Improved education and health, moreover, should be looked upon not only as the *fruits* of development but as a *means* to development. For this reason they are doubly important.

We in the United States deeply admire the efforts of the Government and people of Mexico to secure a more just economic and social balance. In the course of your revolution I understand that more than 50 million acres have been distributed to the peasants and that your net real income has been multiplied five times in the last 25 years—a record matched by few nations in the world.

Objectives of Alliance for Progress

The Alliance for Progress provides the basis for a partnership of nations designed to bring a fresh, democratic approach to the economic and social problems of the whole Western Hemisphere. How can such a partnership best be developed? How should the role of each partner be defined and understood?

In September 1960 the Act of Bogotá³ stressed that economic and social development can only succeed if it is a two-way street. "The success of a cooperative program of economic and social progress," it said, "will require maximum self-help efforts on the part of the American republics and, in many cases, the improvement of existing institutions and practices, particularly in the fields of taxation, the ownership and use of land, education and training, health and housing."

In August 1961, at Punta del Este, the Declaration to the Peoples of America⁴ on the Alliance for Progress was even more precise. "Unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use" were condemned. Programs of integrated agrarian reform in accordance with the characteristics of each country to assure that "the land will become for the man who works it . . . the foundation of his increasing welfare, and the guarantee of his freedom and dignity" were vigorously endorsed.

The declaration called for tax laws, demanding more from those who have most, to punish tax evasion severely, and to redistribute the national income "in order to benefit those who are most in need, while, at the same time, promoting savings and investment and reinvestment of capital."

The declaration finally expressed the conviction that "these profound economic, social, and cultural changes can come about only through the self-help efforts of each country."

In early September the Congress of the United States passed economic aid legislation⁵ which incorporated these principles and spelled out President Kennedy's responsibility in allocating the funds which were made available. For instance, this new legislation states that in making loans and grants to developing nations the President shall "take into account . . . the extent to which the recipient country is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people, and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures. . . ."

The legislation also stresses the need for comprehensive, well-thought-through plans which will guard against waste and corruption. It calls for special encouragement to integrated rural com-

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

⁵ Public Law 87-195.

munities to help assure greater opportunity and justice to those who till the soil. In its specific reference to Latin America, the new economic assistance program emphasizes that aid should be given "in accordance with the principles of the Act of Bogotá."

Essentials of Successful Development Program

These, then, are our clearly stated objectives. What about the program itself? Although techniques, standards, and specific programs are still in the development stage, a few general points may be considered.

A challenge which requires particularly prompt and careful consideration lies in the rural areas, where 60 to 70 percent of the people of Latin America now live. In dealing with this question we must look beyond the popular slogans which call vaguely for "land reform." Although individual or cooperative land ownership is essential to the development of dynamic rural communities, it is not enough in itself. If rural families are to achieve the increasing dignity and opportunity which they so urgently seek, government extension services must be created to promote modern farming methods and the more efficient use of resources. Moreover, such extension services should include carefully integrated programs for the development of health clinics, schools, and roads.

Low-interest loans must also be made available and cooperatives formed so that whole communities may learn to work together to lift themselves up by their bootstraps. Where feasible, streams must be dammed and tube wells dug to provide water for irrigation.

By encouraging all able-bodied people in the community to volunteer their labor in building these new facilities, the extension worker can further increase their sense of individual pride and participation. One overriding lesson has emerged from our recent experience in working with rural societies: Only when programs for rural betterment are carefully integrated are human energies fully released.

Let me suggest with particular emphasis that no country that aspires to economic development can say that it cannot afford to educate its children. It cannot afford *not* to educate its children. Nor can it afford not to conserve the health of its people.

Another essential form of self-help which was stressed in both the Act of Bogotá and the recent conference at Punta del Este is the graduated income tax. Such tax systems are needed to soak up idle profits, while offering dynamic incentives for capital investment in productive new enterprises.

Although we have no desire to interfere in the affairs of others, we know from hard experience that sharp and showy differences between rich and poor breed bitter unrest and frustration among the less privileged.

Another condition essential to increasing domestic investment and to successful development is a rational relationship between the currency of the developing nation and that of those with which it trades.

May I add that I do not see why my Government or any other capital contributor should be asked for loans or grants to replace runaway indigenous capital that could be kept at home by the same kind of curbs with which the British helped restore the soundness of their economy following the war.

Role of the United States

I have offered these views in a spirit of genuine humility. We do not pretend to know all the answers to the complex problems of economic and social development. Yet the lessons we have learned have been learned by the harsh process of trial and error and often have been learned at very great cost. It is in that spirit that I share them with you tonight.

Now what precisely is the United States prepared to do to help those nations which are taking the essential steps to help themselves in the spirit of the Act of Bogotá?

Each nation will present its own special needs and opportunities. However, substantial sums are available from a variety of agencies for loans and grants for development programs; also technical specialists for planning, operations, and development; agricultural products such as wheat, maize, powdered milk, and fats; and Peace Corps volunteers, largely recruited from our universities, to help in teaching, surveying, and other projects.

Studies are also under way which we hope may lead to agreements that will provide assured fair prices for various commodities which are vital to the prosperity of Latin American countries.

Working Partners in a Great International Effort

The issue before us can be bluntly stated: What we jointly pledged under the terms of the Act of Bogotá is no less than a continuing peaceful, democratic revolution calling in many cases for drastic change from the old ways.

How fully have we weighed the implications of this pronouncement? How clearly have we sensed the formidable difficulties which lie ahead? They stem from several sources: from a sense of hopelessness among millions of impoverished peasants and slum dwellers, from the conviction among many important political leaders that constructive, peaceful change is impossible, and from the opposition of economic interests which are unwilling to face the hard realities of today's revolutionary world.

It would be folly for us to underestimate these difficulties. Yet we should take heart at the growing support among influential leaders and groups for the programs which will be required to meet our stated objectives.

In April 1957, for instance, the Fourth International Catholic Congress on Rural Life Problems was held in Santiago, Chile. The conference concluded that the establishment of small, independently owned farms was the key to the freedom, stability, and progress of Latin America and of most of the underdeveloped world.

"All men have a right to live lives worthy of human beings," the charter adopted by the Catholic Congress said. "God does not will that some shall enjoy extravagant riches while others . . . lack even the barest necessities." The charter wisely observed that the necessary changes in the old pattern of society cannot be achieved merely by exhortation. "A certain measure of intervention," it stressed, "must be provided by the national governments."

To men of stout hearts and deep conviction, our age offers an exciting opportunity to lead and to participate in a great international effort for democratic development. The challenge is particularly great for younger men and women who have so much to gain by the success of this movement and so much to lose by its failure.

This is no task for the timid or the doctrinaire. We must steer a pragmatic middle course between the naive assumption that the world can be remade overnight and the panicky fear of ideological hobgoblins.

The Communists did not create the wave of revolutionary change which is now sweeping Latin America. What they are seeking to do is to ride this wave for their own destructive purposes. If every Communist turned in his card tomorrow, this so-called "revolution of rising expectations" with all its ferment and vast potential for chaos or improvement would still be with us.

Lenin proclaimed communism to be the wave of the future. More and more, however, it has emerged as a sterile doctrine which rejects both the universal moral values and the clear lessons of history.

We should never underestimate the achievements of Soviet industry and science. Nor should we allow our own military power ever to sag below the levels necessary for our mutual defense. However, when the record of our time is written, I believe it will be agreed that whatever the Soviet Union has accomplished in a material sense has been achieved not by communism but in spite of it.

For the last 16 years Communists have controlled every kindergarten, school, and college in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. From morning to night students in these schools have been exposed to Communist textbooks, Communist libraries, Communist teachers, Communist radios, and Communist speeches.

Precisely what has been achieved by this massive Communist indoctrination? In October 1956, the answer was spelled out in the streets of Budapest, when 25,000 young Hungarians were killed fighting Soviet tanks. It is reflected today in the bitter attitudes of the young students in Poland, Rumania, East Germany, and other satellite nations.

And what about that great "competition between two economic systems" that the Kremlin has been demanding since the war? Haven't we had precisely such a competition between East and West Germany—the former operating under a Communist totalitarian system and the latter free and independent? Does any objective man doubt the results?

In 10 years some 4 million East Germans, most of them under 25 years of age, left their homes to live in West Germany. In August, when the flow of refugees reached 3,000 daily, the Soviets were forced to establish a barbed wire and concrete

barrier and to block the escape routes with machineguns.

No, communism is not our greatest hurdle. The principal obstacle lies within ourselves.

The challenge for us and our generation is abundantly clear: Can we, the citizens of such free nations as Mexico and the United States, forget past differences and misunderstandings to become working partners in the extraordinary political, economic, and social revolution which now involves most of mankind? Can we put aside our own narrow, selfish interests to help build the dynamic democratic societies which alone can offer people of all races, religions, and creeds the opportunities and the justice which they seek?

We have all made mistakes, and there is much to be done in our countries. Yet over the years the record of the United States and Mexico in support of peaceful, democratic change both at home and abroad has been a proud record.

In the spirit of our own continuing revolutions, therefore, let us join with our 225 million neighbors to the south in this great adventure in international cooperation—the Alliance for Progress. There is no time to waste. As President Lopéz Mateos recently said, “At Punta del Este, the door was open to the hopes of the people. A delay or inefficiency in the action agreed upon will produce a bitterness of total despair.”

Your President has accurately stated the challenge. Let us accept it together boldly and with high hopes.

Letters of Credence

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 18. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 717 dated October 18.

Laos

The newly appointed Ambassador of Laos, Prince Khampan, presented his credentials to

President Kennedy on October 17. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 715 dated October 17.

Liberia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia, S. Edward Peal, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 722 dated October 19.

U.S. Commemorates 5th Anniversary of Hungarian National Uprising

Department Statement

Press release 727 dated October 20

Five years ago Hungarian patriots bravely struggled against tremendous odds in an effort to win national independence and the freedoms to which all mankind and all nations are entitled. In complete disregard of the principle of self-determination Soviet military forces brutally intervened to suppress this national uprising of the Hungarian people.

The United Nations has repeatedly condemned this Soviet intervention and the accompanying Soviet violations of human rights and freedoms. The Soviet Government stands in defiance of the United Nations by refusing to comply with its expressed will. It continues to hold subject not only the Hungarian nation but other peoples of Eastern Europe.

On this fifth anniversary of the Hungarian national uprising free men everywhere will pay tribute to the valor of the Hungarian people and reaffirm their respect for Hungary's struggle against Soviet imperialism. It is also fitting to assure the Hungarian people that they are not alone in their just aspirations for freedom and national independence. The free world, as well as the other Eastern European peoples, will not forget the sacrifices of the Hungarian patriots for the ideas we all share.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of October 18

Press release 720 dated October 18

Secretary Rusk: Before we start let me say that our meeting in this room is frankly experimental. As some of you know, we were not entirely satisfied with the large auditorium, where we were swallowed up. But if you have any reactions as to place after today's experience in this room, please pass them along to Mr. Tubby or Mr. White, and we will do our best to settle down in a place that is generally satisfactory.

I know that you will wish to know whether I have any comments on Chairman Khrushchev's speech of yesterday.¹ Let me say that I have not yet received the full text in translation and would not wish to characterize it in general terms. In a speech of this character the excerpts which are received early might be affected by additional material which would be in the complete text, and these matters in fine print sometimes are important. From the portions which I have seen it is clear that Chairman Khrushchev ranged widely over the field of foreign affairs and said a good many things which could not be supported by the record.

Today, however, I would comment on one statement he made. He said:

If the Western Powers show readiness to settle the German problem, then the question of the time of signing a German peace treaty will not be of such importance. We shall then not insist that the peace treaty be signed without fail by 31 December, 1961.

This confirms publicly what has been said in private talks, including our talks with Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs]. His public statement, indicating that he does not assert an ultimatum with respect to time, may serve to reduce tension somewhat. But his general observations about the

German and Berlin problems show little, if any, change from what has been said before. He did not go into details, but one would not expect him to in a general review of this character.

Our discussions in recent weeks with the Soviet Union are properly called exploratory talks. They have not been negotiations but an attempt to discover whether a basis for negotiation exists. In this process we have kept our allies fully informed, both through the ambassadorial group in Washington and in NATO.

When a serious and dangerous difference arises, there are various ways of dealing with it. One would be for the two sides to growl publicly at each other until something happens. Another is to establish contact in order to clarify the situation and to guard against a catastrophe which might be brought on by ignorance, miscalculation, or mistake. In the modern world I believe that it is important that great powers not lose contact with each other in the presence of a severe disagreement. Exploratory talks can clarify an understanding of vital issues and our determination to defend them. They can also discover whether there is any basis for negotiations which might lead to a peaceful conclusion. We believe that responsible statesmen must keep in touch with each other—not despite the difficulties and dangers but because of them.

If systematic negotiation can occur at some point, that does not insure that an agreement can be reached. The object would be to reach an agreement which fully protects the legitimate vital interests of both sides. But since governments have, not unexpectedly, different views as to what these interests are, negotiation does not always succeed.

There has been considerable speculation about differences among the Western Allies with respect to the handling of the problem of Germany and Berlin. I do not wish to pretend that there have not been differences, but it is important for us to

¹ Mr. Khrushchev addressed the 22d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party on Oct. 17.

know, and for Mr. Khrushchev to know, what these do and do not mean. There is complete agreement in the West on the nature of our vital interests in Germany and Berlin and on the necessity for defending those vital interests. There is general agreement on the need for preparations to meet a severe crisis if one develops. There has been some disagreement on the timing and nature of contacts with the Soviet Union; these have more to do with procedure than with substance. It would not be correct to believe that there is any crisis within the West with respect to Germany and Berlin. Consultations among the Four Powers most directly involved in Germany and Berlin continue on a daily basis, and on a regular basis in NATO. Whether a particular group of experts meets in a particular place, or whether tentative arrangements for such a meeting do not materialize, is not as important as the basic unity on which we are proceeding and the regular consultations which are going forward.

Peruvian Proposal to OAS on Cuba

I might also make a brief comment on the important subject raised yesterday in the Organization of American States by the Peruvian Ambassador.

We are giving active and thorough attention to the important Peruvian proposal of yesterday to the Council of the OAS that a committee be designated to investigate abuses of civil liberties and Cuban interventionist activities in other American countries. It is essential that the governments of the Americas review how they can best meet their responsibilities to protect the security of their peoples and that of the hemisphere as a whole, and how efforts being made or contemplated within the OAS to gain these objectives can be best handled.

Peruvian Ambassador [Juan Batista de] Lavalle, in his presentation to the Council of the OAS, eloquently described the causes for hemisphere-wide concern with developments in Cuba since the Castro government transformed that country into an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

We may be certain the world will be watching the OAS approach to the Cuban problem. The central question here, as it is in other parts of the world, is: Can people who are devoted to a world of free choice, opposed to a world of coer-

cion, keep Communist intervention from undermining and destroying independent nations?

Now I am ready for your questions.

Exploratory Talks on Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken of possible negotiations with Russia on Berlin. Would you spell out at all what the criteria are as to when we might enter that phase?

A. I would anticipate that what I referred to as exploratory talks would continue in order to discover whether there is a satisfactory basis for negotiation. Those talks may occur in a variety of ways. As you know, Ambassador [Llewellyn E.] Thompson is here for detailed briefing and consultation and will be returning shortly. I understand that the British Ambassador in Moscow is returning for similar consultation. Perhaps other Western ambassadors in Moscow may do the same. But that would give us a variety of channels and opportunities for pursuing these exploratory talks somewhat further.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a dispatch from Moscow a few moments ago reported that the Soviet Union had sent a new note to the Western Powers, and it is presumed to be on the question of access to Berlin. Could you tell us anything at all about this?

A. No, quite frankly, and this is another instance where the press is faster than diplomatic cables. I have not had information about that note.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is clear you handled this group of experts, what you called your "four wise men"—there has been some confusion—will these four wise men, or senior officers, meet, and if yes, where, and if not, why?

A. Well, you know, I quite frankly have been a little surprised at the importance that this particular meeting has assumed. I suppose this is partly because, with a matter that is being handled primarily through private talks of one sort or another, anything which becomes visible becomes news. But I have been surprised, for example, to have people suppose that the ambassadorial group here in Washington is supposed to be a low-level group and that this special meeting of experts is a higher level group.

We have the most responsible possible means of consultation here—they are meeting at this instant—through the ambassadors. Now if on occasion, as has occurred in the past, it is desirable for a particular group to get together for more intensive work in one of the other capitals on a particular aspect of its work, that may occur. But this particular arrangement did not seem to commend itself to all the governments involved, and so tentative plans did not fully materialize.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke, sir, of general Western agreement on substance but some difference on principles.

A. I beg your pardon—on procedure.

Q. Some differences on procedure. Do you feel, Mr. Secretary, that before there can be any agreement on procedure something more has to be developed in the exploratory talks, and if so, could you give us some indication of what?

A. I think that we have indicated publicly, as well as privately, that the framework of negotiation to which the Soviets most frequently refer is too narrow, that a discussion about a peace treaty with Germany and a solution of the problem of West Berlin on that basis is too restrictive an agenda for serious discussions of the problems of Germany and Berlin.

That certainly would be one of the points that would have to be further clarified, and there would be others. But I hope you will understand that I do not wish to get into the substantive points of negotiation at this stage, when it would not be helpful for me to do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the exploratory talks can get under way again before the Germans have formally established a new government?

A. I think that would not be an obstacle. The exploratory talks did occur before the new government was formed and announced. We have been in close touch with Bonn on these matters. I do not anticipate any change, any significant change, in German policy on the matter. We fully understand each other on these problems. So that I would think that this is not a major point there.

There will be, of course, a great deal of Allied consultation to review what the Gromyko talks came up with and of course to review carefully

the speech of Mr. Khrushchev before the Party Congress, and this will affect the nature and the timing of further exploratory talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is generally agreed that the differences between the Allies center around the U.S. and British desire to keep negotiations going, the French and West Germans' desire to stand pat and firm. In view of Khrushchev's postponing or calling off his ultimatum or postponing his deadline, is this a result of Allied firmness or a result of U.S. policy to continue negotiation? Who won?

A. Well, I would not wish, in the first place, to refer to these talks that have been going on as negotiations. Nor would I wish to pose two capitals against two capitals on matters of this sort. I think that is much too simplified.

But in answer to the main part of your question, I would think that it would be highly speculative to try to decide what is causing what and what influences are making themselves felt on one side or the other. I think that Mr. Khrushchev understands the seriousness of the Western position and the seriousness of Western determination. To what extent this is having an effect on him we shall have to see.

Q. May I ask you about Mr. Williams' [Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams] conversations in Tunis, which have aroused some speculation? Can you say whether we are giving any consideration to recognizing the provisional government of Algeria?

A. I should think that would be a premature question. The Algerian situation is one which we hope will be resolved shortly through the process of negotiation. We hope these negotiations will be successful and that that very troublesome and difficult question can be removed from the agenda. Mr. Williams did meet certain representatives of the Algerian side socially while visiting in Tunis, but I think that it did not change the situation in any way.

Soviet Nuclear Tests

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had any assurances either informally or formally about the Soviet Union's nuclear explosions to the effect that it will not harm the United States in any way, and have

you heard anything to the effect you think it will not take place?

A. No, we have had no assurances from the Soviet Union on that matter. Indeed, the information which we have comes from Mr. Khrushchev's speech, and, quite frankly, I have not had the official transcript of that portion of the speech in front of me yet. I have a copy of a broadcast in English to the United Kingdom, with which I think you are all familiar.

I will not elaborate unduly on the statement made at the White House last evening about this 50-megaton explosion. But we are quite sure that this will cause people all over the world to think a great deal about this event. It stands against the background of two Soviet votes for an unpoliced moratorium. One possibility, since the statement we have suggests that they might be concluding this series of tests by the end of October—and, as I say, we have no information other than that—one possibility is that they might conclude this series of tests, then support another unpoliced moratorium until they are ready for another series of tests. That would not be a very productive enterprise, I should think.

These problems help to explain why we believe that the path to a ban on nuclear tests lies through a treaty, a treaty such as that tabled by the United States and United Kingdom at Geneva this year,² a treaty which will give assurance to all of those who are directly interested that secret preparations are not going forward, that tests, if conducted, will be ascertained, and that violations will free the other signatories from obligations under the treaty.

We hope that the Soviet Union, if it has made a firm decision to conduct such an explosion, will think again about it. Such an explosion is not necessary from a technical point of view. The tests which have been conducted already in the ranges which have been used are fully adequate for any technical or scientific purpose.

Just why the Soviet Union would wish to detonate a 50-megaton explosion is something about which we can all speculate. But if they have in mind a demonstration, we hope that they will think very hard about all that it will demonstrate and not just a particular point that they wish to establish.

U.S. Calls on U.S.S.R. Not To Test 50-Megaton Nuclear Bomb

White House Statement

White House press release dated October 17

It is reported that the Soviet Union plans to explode a giant nuclear bomb—the equivalent to 50 million tons of TNT.

We call upon the Soviet Union to reconsider this decision, if in fact it has been made. We know about high-yield weapons. Since 1957 the United States has had the technical know-how and materials to produce bombs in the 50–100 megaton range and higher. But we also know that such weapons are not essential to our military needs. Furthermore, full-scale tests are not necessary to develop 50-megaton bombs. Such an explosion could only serve some unconfessed political purpose.

We believe the peoples throughout the world will join us in asking the Soviet Union not to proceed with a test which can serve no legitimate purpose and which adds a mass of additional radioactive fallout to that which has been unleashed in recent weeks.

We hope very much that we can move toward a test ban treaty just as promptly as possible.

Situation in Southeast Asia

Q. Would you give us an appraisal, sir, of the situation in southeast Asia, in Viet-Nam and Laos, and the effect that this is having on Thailand and Cambodia and the other neighboring countries?

A. The security of southeast Asia as a region is a matter of the greatest importance, and the most immediate concerns there at the moment are, of course, Laos and Viet-Nam. I believe that today Prince Souvanna Phouma [of Laos] may be meeting with the King at Luang Prabang to begin discussions on the constitution of a government.

The agreement among the three princes that Souvanna Phouma might be recommended as the Prime Minister is only the beginning of what could be a difficult negotiation, because the object would be to get a government which would be in fact neutral, and in fact independent, and would be able to lead Laos in that direction.

It is too early yet to say whether these negotiations can be successful. Meanwhile, the work in Geneva goes ahead. But the work at Geneva will

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 870.

be strongly influenced by what happens in these negotiations in Laos about a government.

As you know, General [Maxwell D.] Taylor is in Viet-Nam to review that situation for the President and the departments of Government concerned.

Although the armed forces of south Viet-Nam have improved considerably in strength and in initiative and in equipment and training, there has been a significant upsurge in guerrilla activity, guerrilla activity which has been supported by cadres and by supplies moving in from the north, some of it directly, some of it by way of Laos.

Of course, the threats to the security of Laos and Viet-Nam are matters of great concern to other countries in that area, such as Thailand, Cambodia, and indeed others. We are looking forward to General Taylor's report with the greatest possible interest. When we get it, we will consider what can be done to steady that situation in that part of the world.

U.S. Policy on Aid to Yugoslavia

Q. Will you state the objectives of our economic aid to Yugoslavia and whether it continues to serve those objectives?

A. First let me review the situation briefly. Yugoslavia is a Communist country and has been since World War II. And no one in any of the administrations which have considered this matter has overlooked this fact.

A more important fact, however, is that in 1948 Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet bloc and since that time has been not only independent of the Soviet bloc but also a divisive influence on world communism and a source of considerable dissension within the Communist bloc.

It has been a policy of three administrations to support Yugoslavia's determination to maintain its independence. As a part of our efforts to help Yugoslavia preserve that independence, we have furnished substantial economic and military assistance, including military grant aid from 1951 through 1957. There is no doubt that our aid did serve to strengthen Yugoslavia's efforts to maintain its independence. These developments have not been without effect on the Soviet bloc.

You may recall that last December, in the famous declaration issued by the Communist parties at the time of the Communist summit, there were some very severe criticisms of Yugoslavia

contained in that declaration, and you will observe that Yugoslav policies have again been criticized in the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is now taking place.

I think some of the criticism which this policy is now receiving stems to a certain degree from public disappointment that our aid to Yugoslavia has not led to full Yugoslav agreement with the foreign policy of the United States. But, as the President has stated, our aid programs are not designed to purchase agreement with us. In our view countries are entitled to national sovereignty and independence, and the basic purpose of our aid is to strengthen the efforts of recipient countries to maintain their national sovereignty and independence.

Some of the disappointment in this country has come from the Belgrade meeting.³ We do not believe that that Belgrade meeting indicated that Yugoslavia was in the process of losing its independence, even though some things were said there that we ourselves did not particularly approve. So that is the basis of our policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you spell out what we regard as our remaining rights in East Berlin and specifically whether or not we regard the continued circulation of Allied personnel into East Berlin as a vital right?

A. We have quadripartite rights with respect to East Berlin, which we are not abandoning, and these are matters which will be subject to conversations with all the powers interested. We do expect to have our personnel go into East Berlin as necessary, under our existing quadripartite rights, and we expect the Soviet Union to recognize those rights and protect them.

Hope for Agreement on New U.N. Secretary-General

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been some 4 weeks now that we have been arguing over a successor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Do you foresee more haggling over this, or do you think it has to come to a head fairly soon?

A. We do think that this ought to come to a head promptly. The time that has been spent thus far has been used to find out whether there was a basis for agreement, general agreement. Because, if such were possible, it would be in the broadest

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

sense better for the United Nations to proceed on that basis.

But this agreement cannot be achieved at the cost of crippling the United Nations or of inflicting deep injury on the arrangements anticipated by the charter.

We believe that there must be a Secretary-General who has the confidence of the United Nations and who has the full authority to act in accordance with the charter and whose responsibility for the Secretariat is unencumbered by diffuse and indefinite arrangements of any sort. We think that his principal assistants should be selected by him and on a geographical basis as intended in the charter and that these assistants should not be grouped in accordance with any doctrine of political forces, as has been advanced.

We would like to be able to proceed on the basis of agreement, but if that agreement is not possible, then it would be up to the General Assembly to determine to proceed without agreement because the fundamental interest of the U.N. and of the large membership of the U.N. in this question is overriding.

We think it possible that this might come to a head very shortly. Intensive consultations are testing, today or tomorrow, just what the possibilities might be.

Q. What is the present feeling within the administration on the necessity for resuming atmospheric tests?

A. That is a matter on which the President has commented. I would suppose that he would make his position on that public at the appropriate time. I would not wish to comment on that myself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been more privileged than any other man in the Western community to discuss both Berlin, Germany, and southeast Asia with the Russians directly. Can we have at least some of your estimates on what they are really up to, what their objectives are on both sides of the world?

A. I think that on that question I would have to refer to some remarks that I made at the National Press Club⁴ on the underlying crisis of our period, the type of crisis precipitated by the policies announced last December and on January 6th and,

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 31, 1961, p. 175.

from preliminary information, perhaps repeated in the speech of yesterday.

If the Communist world believes that its brand of revolution is historically inevitable, and pursues that belief in action, then we shall have recurrent problems so long as that is the case. Because the great struggle will be between those who want that kind of world and those who want the kind of world set forth in the United Nations Charter.

That does not mean that in a particular situation there may not be reasons for settling particular questions. But the settlement of particular issues is made vastly more difficult and complex by this underlying crisis of which I have spoken earlier.

This is not the same kind of negotiation that one would expect to get into where both sides can be confident that their basic objectives are the same. So this is the complicating factor.

West Berlin Trade Relations

Q. The recent reports released by the Department of Commerce have revealed that West Berlin trade with the Soviet bloc countries is at an alltime high. It is twice that of Great Britain and France with the Soviet bloc countries, and four times that of the United States. In view of present tensions over Berlin and West German demands of the West, how do you interpret burgeoning trade relations between West Germany and the Communist states?

A. I would not relate the level of trade at the particular moment with the Berlin issue as such. The West Germans have entered the world trade picture with great vigor and great skill, and it is not surprising that their trade with the Soviet bloc and other groups of countries would have increased, so that I would not wish to comment particularly on that point. As far as our own trade with the Soviet bloc is concerned, I shall have an opportunity next week to discuss that matter with the committee of the Congress, and I hope some of you will be there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back again, sir, on the question of Allied consultations on the matter of Berlin and Germany. Is the administration satisfied, sir, with the present scope and level of progress in these consultations, or is there some consideration being given to a possible meeting

between either yourself or the President and Chancellor Adenauer?

A. I would think that the channels for consultation which exist at the present time are entirely adequate for present purposes. I wouldn't wish to speculate on the possibility of a foreign ministers meeting or some other kind of meeting, but for the present we would like to make full use of existing channels.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has already been some criticism of the United States for having spent 4 weeks in discussing with Russia the possibility of agreement on the new Secretary-General. What do you say in answer to such criticism?

A. I indicated earlier that I thought that, if it were possible to proceed on the basis of an agreement without any compromise whatever with the basic necessities of the United Nations, this would be desirable. I think the Soviet Union ran into the fact that the troika proposals simply are not negotiable in the United Nations, that they were in effect stillborn as far as the U.N. is concerned—the Secretary-General's post is concerned. Now, if this period of time makes it possible for them to reconsider, to get the full flavor of the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the members of the General Assembly and to understand that troika, as they saw it, is not possible, then it might be possible to proceed on some other basis conforming to the charter, and that has been the purpose of the time spent.

No Future in Idea of Disengagement

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the German and Berlin issues, to what extent is the United States Government willing to consider any type of zonal arrangement affecting both sides of the East German—of the Iron Curtain under the context of European security?

A. I would not suppose that the idea of disengagement has any future in it, because disengagement implies the abandonment of responsibilities and implies the creation of perhaps a vacuum, which would not itself be conducive to stability and peace. On the other hand, if any progress at all can be made in the field of general disarmament which applies to all countries and not on a discriminatory basis and which itself could lead to the reduction of the scale of forces at present, say,

in Europe, as well as in other parts of the world, this in itself might not only be an evidence of reduction of tensions but might itself contribute to a reduction of tensions.

I do not want to get trapped into the use of such words as "consider" and "study." Some of you will recall some difficulties that we had with this many years ago. Any organization like the Department of State or Disarmament Agency is going to study almost any idea that comes down the track, including the proposals from those with whom we are in sharp disagreement and including proposals that we ourselves could not accept. So that I hope that we won't let those two words trick us here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection Senator [Hubert H.] Humphrey has been saying that this Government is seriously considering the so-called Rapacki proposal.⁵ Now, if this is true, would it be correct to assume that our policy had changed since 1959, when we had insisted that we would only consider disengagement in Germany?

A. I would say that, on the subject of disengagement and the way to achieve a reduction of force in Europe and the general field of disarmament, our policy has not changed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for clarification, in answer to Mr. Roberts' [Chalmers M. Roberts, Washington Post and Times Herald] question, did you mean to exclude the subject of zonal arrangements affecting both sides from U.S.-Soviet talks and apply them only to disarmament questions, or is it possible that, as an adjunct to the general effort of disarmament, there may still be possible some U.S.-Soviet arrangement toward this end?

A. I would not think that there would be a U.S.-Soviet arrangement on a matter of that sort. These are matters for all of the governments involved in a particular part of the world, and we are not negotiating ourselves with the Soviet Union on matters of vital interest to all of these other countries. But I would not suppose that zonal arrangements of the disengagement type are involved here. Under the disarmament plan which we have put forward⁶ it is possible that various regional arrangements might come into being in the field of disarmament not only in Europe but in other continents, so that this is a matter which

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 821.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

can be taken up in pace with and alongside of the general problems of disarmament.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the confusion over this seems to have arisen from the fact that the Western position seems to have broadened the Berlin talks to include European security problems in this problem of Germany. If you are talking about things like zonal arrangements and disengagement, what do you mean when you talk about broadening the problem to include European security? What are the elements there?

A. I said earlier that I was going to try to resist talking about the substance of negotiations in these matters because we haven't reached the point of negotiation yet and I quite frankly don't think that I should go into it, but these are not the only alternatives that might be taken up under a broader concept of improving the general security situation in Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, from what you have seen and studied in Mr. Khrushchev's speech, would you say that the chances for peace with honor are better, or worse, or the same?

A. In a 6½-hour speech I would think that much would depend on what part of the speech you have seen. I would be very reluctant, having seen as much of it as I have, to characterize the speech in any single, simple way. I am sure you will find many quotes there that will point in different directions, and some quotes that would support almost any point of view in terms of a general characterization of the situation. In some aspects it seems to be quite moderate in tone, and in some other aspects it was quite uncompromising in tone.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to attend the Tokyo meeting of the Cabinet members?

A. That is my present plan, particularly since this is the first one. This was worked out while Prime Minister Ikeda was here.⁷ It is patterned after a similar arrangement we have with Canada. If the situation permits it, I should like very much to go, and my schedule at the moment includes a quick turnaround trip to Tokyo.

Q. Would it include any other countries?

A. I might, since I have not been to Korea in a

very long time, and I would like to make a very brief visit there at the same time.

Outlook for Communist China's Membership in U.N.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the outlook for the issue of Communist China's membership in the United Nations at this session of the General Assembly?

A. I would think that Communist China would not be admitted to the United Nations at this session of the General Assembly. This is a matter which is seriously before the members of the U.N. I think that we understand the problems involved, that a very considerable number of the members of the U.N., far more than recognize Peiping, recognize and support the Government of the Republic of China, as do we, and I would not think that there would be any change in the General Assembly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it likely that the United States would introduce a resolution to resolve the problem of succession to the Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations? And, if so, how soon? We have been reading about a possible deadline at the end of the week.

A. There has been continuous consultation with representatives of many groups of nations on this point. I would suppose that a resolution would be more broadly representative than one we would ourselves introduce.

Q. We would support it? We would be one of the supporters?

A. Quite frankly I don't think that I can answer that question at the moment, because they are discussing this and other points this afternoon in New York.

Q. Sir, could you possibly elaborate a little more on your possible trip to Tokyo, this meeting in question? I am not familiar with it. And when?

A. This is a joint United States-Japanese committee at the Cabinet level to discuss trade and economic relations between the two countries. It is scheduled in Tokyo for early November. And the plan would be that next year our Japanese colleagues would join us here in the United States for a visit.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57.

The United Nations and the Western Hemisphere

by *Adlai E. Stevenson*

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

A la prensa libre de las Americas le traigo los mas cordiales saludos de la gente y del gobierno de los Estados Unidos.

I am very happy to have this chance to pay my respects and the respects of the Government and people of the United States to the Inter-American Press Association and its eminent leaders. We recognize you as a force for a free and enlightened press in this hemisphere and for friendship among the American Republics, and we welcome you most heartily to our shores.

At a dinner just as I was leaving for South America last spring,² as President Kennedy's representative, my friend Bob Hope said: "Adlai's going to South America to visit the friends of the United States—and he will be back the same day." Well, I was gone for 22 days, and if I had been so foolish as to try to meet all the friends of the United States in even one of the 10 countries I visited, it would have had to be more like 22 years. There was not always and everywhere a complete meeting of minds—nobody expects that—but there was always a meeting of friends; for that I am full of gratitude.

I will confess that this last trip was more strenuous than my other trip through Latin America, over a year ago, when I met many of you and traveled as a private citizen and as a working journalist. Since then my situation has changed. I haven't gone as far as my esteemed friend, Pedro Beltrán of Peru, who went from running a newspaper to running a country. But as a public offi-

cial on this last trip I had another direct experience with the enterprise of the reporters and editors of Latin America, and I can testify that there is plenty of it! And I have often remarked that there are more really great newspapers in South America than anywhere I've been—and that's just about everywhere.

Before I leave the subject of that trip, there is just one little incident on which I think I owe an explanation to television viewers, at least in this country.

It seems that the TV newsreels in the United States showed two brief scenes from my visit to Brazil, in rapid succession: first, President [Janio] Quadros, as he then was, driving himself to church in an old Volkswagen, and then a picture of me arriving for a meeting with President Quadros in the biggest, shiniest limousine I ever saw. Nor did the TV say that it belonged to the Governor of São Paulo.

Having come to South America as a messenger of progress for the common man, I felt a little like the poor fellow in Lincoln's story who, in the barbaric manner of the frontier, was being ridden out of town on a rail, and when somebody asked him how he liked it he said: "If it wasn't for the honor of the thing, I'd just as soon walk!"

Looking around this room, I see some friendly and familiar faces from the upper ranks of American journalism, and that makes me feel very much at home, especially as they are so much more friendly since I stopped running for President. But I have no reservations about the Latin American and Canadian press, who have always been most discerning and treated me with such charity and kindness. Indeed, thanks to you, I've often felt that I ran for President in the wrong country.

¹ Address made before the Inter-American Press Association at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 16 (U.S./U.N. press release 3796).

² For Ambassador Stevenson's report to the Secretary of State on his trip, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 311.

I feel at home, too, because I know that the Inter-American Press Association is a great force for freedom—not only for the freedom of the press, and the responsible self-discipline of the press, but for freedom in all its aspects.

Today the progress of freedom in our hemisphere gives us all cause to rejoice, for in the past 5 years the dictators who throttled the free press in the Americas have fallen one by one. That is one of the truly bright spots in the picture of our troubled age.

Let me add a word of gratitude to Jack Howard and the other distinguished representatives of the newspapers of New York who are our hosts today. They are helping me to repay the debt of gratitude which I owe for your kindness to me in Latin America.

Role of Latin American Countries in the U.N.

I would like to talk to you today about two great and interconnected communities: the worldwide community of the United Nations, in which I now have the honor to serve, and the community of the Western Hemisphere, which long antedates the United Nations and to which all of us in this room belong.

One of the great sources of confidence and reassurance to me on returning last January to the United Nations, where I had served in its earliest beginnings, was the continued importance of the Latin American countries in the work of the U.N. From the very beginning, when the United Nations had only 50 members, that membership included all the 20 countries of Latin America.

They were founders of the Organization. It was because of them that the link between regional organizations and the United Nations was written into chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.

They formed the first informal regional caucus at the U.N., the Latin American caucus, which still meets regularly to discuss U.N. business in a democratic spirit. That was the model and inspiration for all the other regional caucuses which have come into existence at the United Nations.

It would be hard to exaggerate the value of the services which Latin America has rendered to the United Nations in leadership and in ideas. Four of its statesmen have served as presidents of the General Assembly. Many of its representatives have headed important committees, such as the

Political Committee of the General Assembly, whose chairman this year is the very able permanent representative of Argentina, Ambassador [Mario] Amadeo.

Its statesmen have reported to the United Nations on far-off trouble spots. And many of them have performed distinguished services in the Secretariat.

Once the Latin American countries made up two-fifths of the membership of the United Nations. Today with 100 members, they are only one-fifth. But their influence remains, because it is more than a matter of arithmetic. They are not a bloc, though that term is sometimes carelessly applied to them. They are nobody's satellites—the Soviet Union to the contrary notwithstanding.

Their delegates are admired for their independence of thought, for their devotion to the rule of law in international affairs, for their parliamentary and oratorical powers, and for their inextinguishable faith in the future of the United Nations. The sum of their value to the work of the U.N. is truly beyond calculation.

Speaking of oratorical powers, I remember one story that is told about a particularly eloquent orator of the old school, a representative of his Latin American country in the United Nations for many years. One day after one of his most stirring addresses a member of the Secretariat found the text of his address on the lectern and noticed that the margins were all carefully marked in red to indicate where he should raise his arm in a dramatic gesture and where he should lift his eyes to the heavens, and so forth. Then on one page was the simple marginal note: "Weak Point. Shout!"

If I begin raising my voice during this speech I hope you won't misunderstand!

Selecting a New Secretary-General

And the first thing I want to raise my voice about is the selection of a successor to Dag Hammarskjöld—which is the gravest crisis the institution has faced. What we do now provisionally to meet this crisis may well be permanent, and any decisions now which compromise the efficiency and integrity of the Secretariat as an operating agency will be the first step on the slippery path downhill to a debating society without operational responsibilities or competence. And there are, as we know, some members of the U.N. who

want just that and who view with alarm the emergence of a strong international agency that may be and has been an obstacle to predatory self-interest.

During all of the negotiations over a temporary successor to Dag Hammarskjöld, the United States and many other delegations who perceive the grave implications have been guided by just one principle: They have sought to preserve the integrity of both the office of the Secretary-General and the charter of the United Nations.

That remains the sole United States objective. The charter prescribes that the Secretary-General shall be free to select his principal assistants and that he shall make these appointments on the basis of ability, with due regard to geographical considerations.

An equitable geographic distribution would in our view be the Secretary-General and five Under-Secretaries, who together with the Secretary-General cover the six main geographic areas of the world.

The Soviet Union wants to compromise this principle by forcing the new Secretary-General to select his assistants on a political basis. This is wholly contrary to the spirit of the charter. And to divide the Secretariat on ideological lines would, we think, import the cold war and destroy the concept of a truly international Secretariat owing its loyalty not to the countries of origin but to the Organization.

The Soviet Union has talked of having various numbers of Under-Secretaries, but in each case the political consideration remains uppermost. This is obviously the reason for insisting on a second Eastern European in addition to a Soviet national. The Soviet Union also insists that the Secretary-General shall, in advance of his election, make certain public declarations of his intent. Any attempt, prior to appointment, to bind or prescribe this official's relations with his subordinates is clearly contrary to the charter. For the Security Council and General Assembly to select in effect the top staff of the Secretary-General is of course a contradiction of the whole concept of the executive responsibility and authority of the Secretary-General.

The United States is willing to consider any plan that is consistent with the charter and which does not impair the effectiveness of the Secretary-General.

U.N. Issues of Importance to Latin America

May I say in parentheses, to you who represent the press of Latin America, that I have been surprised not to discover you represented in the world press corps that covers the United Nations. There I have found full-time correspondents from such countries as India, Germany, Egypt, Israel, Switzerland, Canada, Sweden, and Japan; but the only full-time correspondent from anywhere between the Rio Grande and the Straits of Magellan is one who represents an agency recently created in Habana under the somewhat presumptuous name of *Prensa Latina!*

Is that the best you can do?

You may ask what things of special interest a reporter from a Latin American newspaper would find if he came to cover the United Nations. I could begin with your particular interest, the freedom of the press. The United Nations has dealt with that issue from the beginning. In 1948 the Western Hemisphere voted solidly for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted that year by the General Assembly, article 19 of which declares "freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

We are still working on that issue in the United Nations today. This fall we will be urging the adoption of a Declaration on Freedom of Information. Latin America can take pride in that document because it had its origin last year in a meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council in Mexico City, where it was sponsored by the delegations of Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and the United States—what might be called an all-American delegation!

In fact all the great questions—whether of human rights, of peaceful settlement of disputes, or of bettering living standards—all the great questions which concern the Western Hemisphere also concern the whole world and find their place in the debates and resolutions and programs of the United Nations. In this shrunken world, if there is war anywhere, none of us can really be at peace; if any man is enslaved, none of us is entirely free; if any family goes hungry, none of us who are well fed can feel complacent.

Just 2 weeks ago President Kennedy spoke before the United Nations and said:³ "Political

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease." He proposed the launching of a United Nations Decade of Development to meet those evils which afflict at least half of the world's population. That too is one of the great themes at the United Nations which would be familiar to any visiting reporter from Latin America.

New Truths About Human Development

In fact this theme of economic and social development—I might even say of human development—has come more and more into the foreground of our thoughts in the years since the United Nations was founded.

The San Francisco charter, written in 1945, speaks in its famous preamble of "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." But in the first years of the United Nations we were so preoccupied with urgent matters of war and peace that only the smallest beginnings were made toward a United Nations effort to meet that hunger for development.

Then steadily the voices of the less developed countries, including those of Latin America, made themselves heard, and we realized that their problem too was hugely important. So the learning process began.

As we gained experience in this field we learned some new truths. We learned that industrial development and great public works by themselves, however important they are, are not enough. They may even cause new chaos and suffering unless there is a social conscience, decent wages, decent housing, education, and medical care.

We learned that economic development can court political disaster if it merely benefits the fortunate few while the gulf between rich and poor grows still more dangerously wide.

We learned that it was impossible to build a modern economy on foundations of massive poverty, illiteracy, feudalism, tax avoidance, and social injustice.

We learned, in short, that a social revolution in some cases is a precondition of political stability and economic growth.

We learned that a country's development program must be sustained over a long timespan—nearer a decade than a year.

We learned how vital it is for the developing countries and the great potential sources of pri-

vate investment to educate each other and get rid of their respective fears, so that responsible private capital can play its full part in the war against poverty and social injustice.

Finally, we learned that the decisions on these vital points can only be made by the government of the developing country. It takes political courage. And it takes still more courage to make the efforts and social changes necessary to support these expensive programs without ruinous inflation.

We first learned many of these truths right here in the Western Hemisphere. To a great extent Latin America has served as a laboratory for the economic and social advancement of the whole world.

But though we have learned some lessons, until this past year we had scarcely begun to apply them even in Latin America. Measured against the political awareness of the peoples of this hemisphere, and its widespread practice of political democracy, we realized that we were still dangerously short of the need in what we had been doing for the economic and social progress of Latin America's common man.

Indeed, we must honestly confess that not enough of us saw how great an effort was required until it was brought home to us by the tragedy of Cuba. Here was a people with many brave and talented leaders, shackled by a venal dictatorship and outraged by extremes of wealth and poverty. It had all the makings of violent revolution. And when the Cuban revolution happened, almost at once it betrayed its bright promises and gave itself to fanaticism, to revenge, and to that worldwide scavenger of ruined revolutions, communism directed from Moscow.

Now, of course, the new rulers of Cuba claim the right to lead the march of what they call "progress" throughout the Americas—and they seem to want to begin by lighting the fires of violence wherever they can.

What a tragedy it would be if we who speak for freedom and tolerance were to be asleep at this moment, when the forces of totalitarianism are so hard at work!

We might find that one country after another was succumbing to the violence of the extreme right or the extreme left, or, as has often happened, that the extreme right wing and the left wing

had joined together at the expense of the humane, moderate, progressive center.

If we don't want this to happen, we must get on with the business of freedom. We must indeed be "on the Lord's side," on the side of the golden rule, on the side of the extension of the blessings of freedom to the many millions among us who today are too poor to be free. It is really as simple as that, and as difficult, and as urgent.

An Alliance for Progress

I believe that realization has now sunk in, not only in the United States but in the whole hemisphere.

The trip I made last June showed me how widespread it was in South America. Almost everywhere I found that statesmen were more alert than ever to the basic issue: If political democracy is to prevail it must bring a better life for the common man. This issue had long been important but now it had clearly become urgent. And that is the spirit which underlies the document signed last August 17 at Punta del Este, the charter of the 10-year Alliance for Progress, which contains these words:⁴

It is our inescapable task . . . to demonstrate to the poor and forsaken of our countries, and of all lands, that the creative powers of free men hold the key to their progress and to the progress of future generations.

Thus for the next 10 years we in the West will be at work meeting the challenge of destructive revolution with a peaceful and creative evolution—an evolution more rapid, and more comprehensive, and touching the lives of more people, than any that our history has ever known. It will have many aspects:

Speeding up industrial development.

Diversifying one-commodity economies.

Creating a regional common market.

Stabilizing markets for major export commodities.

Reforming tax systems to relieve the low- and middle-income groups and ending the tax evasion which costs Latin American governments billions of dollars every year.

Dividing the land more equitably, making it more productive, and improving storage and transportation of crops.

Finally, and perhaps most important, direct expenditures for better education, better housing, and better health services, without which neither economic development nor stable government will be possible. Every child should have at least 6 years of schooling, and adult illiteracy must be wiped out.

It is a big program. Over 10 years Latin America will have to invest in its own progress, not counting outside help, the equivalent of more than \$80 billion. On top of this it will require at least \$20 billion from outside sources. That \$20 billion is much more than we in the United States spent on the Marshall plan. And it is a historic and heartening fact that the countries of Western Europe, which successfully completed the Marshall plan nearly a decade ago, are now in a position to furnish a significant part of the \$20 billion for the Alliance for Progress.

As for the United States, we have announced, and the declaration of Punta del Este confirmed, that we will provide a major part of the \$20 billion, including over \$1 billion in the first year. You may be interested to hear that we are already meeting this pace. In the 6 months since last March 13, when President Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress,⁵ our Government has made 82 loans to 16 of our 19 partners in the alliance, and these 82 loans total over \$700 million.

Another most encouraging step was taken by the United States Congress in authorizing long-term commitments for development loans and credits. This will greatly assist the leaders in Latin America to plan their long-range national efforts with some assurance of continuity.

I think we in the United States have come a long way. Those of us who can remember a generation back will perhaps recall the cartoon of the new President of the United States who went on a good-will tour in Latin America. Unfortunately, all he had to offer to the countries seeking aid from Washington was good will—nothing else.

So Roy Howard's great cartoonist, Talburt, pictured him standing beneath Miss South America's balcony, strumming on his guitar and singing romantically. As she leaned over expectantly, he serenaded her with that old popular song entitled "I can't give you anything but love, baby!"

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

Now we can give you something more than love. In fact the steps already taken by the United States Government are an assurance to our friends in Latin America that this country has now assigned to development and social progress in this hemisphere a higher priority than ever before in our history.

My impression from many different sources is that a new atmosphere of optimism and enthusiasm was generated at Punta del Este, and that atmosphere still prevails largely throughout the hemisphere.

But it would be foolish to ignore the difficulties that lie ahead. So many of the Latin American leaders I met in my last two trips have told me that real social and economic progress depends on self-help—on the ability of *their own governments* to make reforms in their land systems and tax systems, to prevent inflation, and to practice some degree of economic self-denial. Often these policies may cause tension and political strain. But they are now universally accepted as necessary by the governments that signed the Act of Bogotá⁶ in 1960 and the Charter of Punta del Este in 1961.

Practical Meaning of Self-Help

Self-help! That is the key to so much of our common concern. If it were lacking, no amount of money in outside aid will do much good. So it is worth exploring for a moment just what self-help means in this context.

A nation is helping itself when it contributes local labor, materials, and land to meet the costs of its programs; when it reforms its tax system to expand government revenues and distribute tax burdens more equitably; when it formulates a realistic long-range development plan for allocation of resources.

A nation is helping itself when it reforms and strengthens its educational system to provide wider opportunities to all the people of the country.

A nation helps itself when it puts into effect agrarian reforms to improve rural life and to feed its people better; when it improves credit facilities for the benefit of small savers, small farmers, and small business concerns; when it makes loans to build housing for low-income families; and

when it improves the efficiency and standards of integrity of government administration.

Not by any means least, a nation helps itself when it keeps prices stable to encourage investment and when it encourages private enterprise to stimulate the ingenuity and the efforts of individual citizens so that they contribute to the nation's productivity and prosperity.

That is the practical meaning of self-help, without which the Alliance for Progress would be bound to fail.

I do not expect it to fail. In fact I cannot remember a period of brighter hopes or more vigorous determination in the affairs of the American Republics. We are already on the move.

Right at this moment 60 tax experts from all of the participating nations are meeting in Buenos Aires to study ways of strengthening tax systems. This is a first major step by the Alliance for Progress. Already Uruguay and Panama have enacted new and more progressive tax laws. Venezuela has increased its income, gasoline, and inheritance taxes to speed up the land-reform program and resettle 350,000 rural families.

In the vital field of low-cost housing, progress is in the air in nearly every Latin American country. In education Colombia and Venezuela are moving ahead.

These are but straws in the wind, but we know the wind is blowing. The Alliance for Progress is alive and at work.

To keep it alive and to realize its magnificent promise of real and meaningful democracy for the 200 million people of Latin America, that will require 10 years of dedication by the governments of all the developing members to two great principles: basic reform and self-help.

All who practice these principles will find the United States a willing and eager partner. For in our hands is the chance to show, once and for all, that no people in search of material progress and social justice need to pay for these things by submitting to totalitarian rule. In our hands is the future of democracy in the Western Hemisphere—and the example of democracy for all the world.

Some of you may wonder why I, whose work is at the United Nations, have talked so long about the affairs of the American Republics. Partly it is my interest in this hemisphere, which goes back a long way. But partly it is my belief that what

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

strengthens the hemisphere and brings us closer to our democratic ideals also strengthens the United Nations itself.

The goals of the United Nations are not just for debate in those modernistic buildings on the East River. They are for application in the daily life of nations and in all our relations with one another.

Let me close with a plea to you, the leaders of the free inter-American press. We look to you to keep us faithful to our pledges. You, like Socrates, must always be the gadfly of the state and of the people, rousing us to greater efforts just when we most want to sink back into a comfortable slumber.

Then in another 10 years, when the door of real freedom and a decent life has opened at last for millions of the poorest people in the Americas, you through your great influence will have played a part in the success of that historic and liberating cause.

I wish you well.

President Kekkonen of Finland Visits United States

President Urho K. Kekkonen of Finland, accompanied by Mrs. Kekkonen and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahti Karjalainen, made an official visit to the United States October 16–November 2. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Kennedy and President Kekkonen on October 16 and the text of a joint communique based upon talks they held at the White House that day.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated October 16

President Kennedy

Mr. President and Minister, I want to express on behalf of the people of the United States our great satisfaction at your visit here. As President of your country, I think you must realize that Finland and the Finnish people are identified in the minds of the people of the United States with those qualities of courage and fortitude and perseverance which have made the reputation of

your country and people second to none here in the United States.

They are the qualities which we have found in those Finns who have come among us and raised their families, and it is a source of personal pleasure to us all that during your visit here you will, in Michigan, have a chance to visit one of those families who are related to you.

In addition, throughout the long history of the Finnish people, and especially today, we have come to recognize in the actions of her people her outlook on life, her determination to maintain her own freedom, her own integrity.

So, Mr. President, no visitor could be more welcome. We are delighted to have you here personally. Your last visit to the United States was when you led the Olympic team from Finland to Los Angeles in 1932. Much has changed in this country since then, and much has changed in your own country. But I am confident that the same warm ties which were in existence then, many years ago, in other days, are strengthened today.

Mr. President, though you have come from a far north country here to the United States, to Washington, you have come to a country which is warm in its welcome to you and in our admiration for your people.

President Kekkonen

Mr. President and Mrs. Kennedy, I wish to express my very sincere thanks for the friendly and warm welcome with which you have received me and my wife. The invitation you extended to us has been greatly appreciated in Finland as an expression of friendship toward the Finnish people.

We have both very much looked forward to this visit to the United States and to this opportunity of meeting you personally, Mr. President and Mrs. Kennedy. It is at the same time a great pleasure for us to be able to see your beautiful Capital and to visit also other parts of your great country and to meet with American people. Our attention will be directed especially to your powerful economy, your splendid scientific achievements, and the progress you have made in the social sphere.

This moment when I step on American soil gives me occasion to remember those hundreds of thousands of Finns who have settled in this coun-

try and who with their toil and labor have made themselves a place in the American community. They are a living bond between our two peoples.

Mr. President, we Finns are keenly aware of the friendship of the people of the United States toward the people of Finland. I hope that my visit to the United States will further develop and strengthen the good and friendly relations which have always existed between our two countries.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated October 17

The President of Finland and Mrs. Urho K. Kekkonen were guests yesterday of President and Mrs. Kennedy at a White House luncheon. Following the luncheon the two presidents exchanged views with regard to current international developments.

President Kennedy paid tribute to the many common ties between Finland and the United States and the democratic ideals the two nations share. Regarding Finland's position on the world scene the American President took account of Finland's treaty commitments and expressed American understanding for the reasons why Finland follows a policy of neutrality. He stated the United States will scrupulously respect Finland's chosen course. President Kennedy emphasized that all nations must avoid interference in the affairs of Finland.

President Kekkonen expressed his appreciation for the long-standing friendship between Finland and the United States, and for the understanding shown in the United States for Finland. Asserting that the purpose of Finland's foreign policy is to safeguard the security and independence of the nation, the Finnish President reaffirmed his country's intention to remain neutral while maintaining the confidence and friendship of all nations.

Presidents Kennedy and Kekkonen discussed recent world events. They agreed it was essential for both countries to support the United Nations as firmly as ever, since that body offers all men

their greatest hope for achievement of the noble causes envisioned in the Charter.

Presidents Kennedy and Kekkonen discussed economic and cultural relations. The outlook for European economic development and the implications for other countries of possible enlargement of the European Common Market were reviewed. There was agreement between the presidents that current exchanges of students, teachers, leaders in various fields, and cultural and artistic presentations should be fostered. Exchanges of this nature were commended as a fundamental aid in developing understanding of each other's problems as well as consolidating existing friendship between the peoples of the United States and Finland.

Presidents Kennedy and Kekkonen expressed their mutual hopes that peace and justice would prevail in the world. All nations, large and small, have a grave responsibility toward civilization in that they must constantly search for a formula to bring true and universal peace, said the two presidents. Only a sustained effort in pursuit of this great objective, using all available human talents and resources of nations, can assure progress toward realization of this goal, one of man's oldest and most basic desires.

President's Offer of Good Offices Accepted by Afghanistan and Pakistan

White House press release dated October 17

The President's offer of good offices to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to assist these Governments in arriving at a solution of the current transit trade difficulties has been accepted. The President has appointed Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant as his personal representative to visit the two countries and consult with appropriate officials. Ambassador and Mrs. Merchant will arrive in the area on October 19. The Ambassador, who formerly was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, is expected to resume his duties as Ambassador to Canada by early November.

Mr. McCloy Resigns as Adviser to President, Reports on U.S. Activities in Field of Disarmament and Arms Control

Following is an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and John J. McCloy, Adviser to the President on Disarmament, together with a series of documents enclosed in Mr. McCloy's letter.

White House press release dated October 6

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND MR. McCLOY

President Kennedy

OCTOBER 6, 1961

DEAR MR. McCLOY: I would like to extend my hearty thanks to you for the work you have done as my Adviser on disarmament and arms control. You have made a notable contribution to the country and to the world in this most important area.

Through your service the Government has been able to table at Geneva a workable, effective and understandable draft treaty for the banning of nuclear weapons tests.¹

In the field of general disarmament, your discussions with Mr. Zorin [Valerian A. Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.] concerning the principles which should guide future disarmament negotiations have cleared away many of the misunderstandings and misconceptions which have clouded this difficult subject.

At the same time, your development of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World has set forth clearly the proposals of the United States for an effective disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union and other countries.

You have also performed a valuable service in connection with the establishment of a permanent agency of the Government to deal with the problems of disarmament and arms control. After giving this matter the most thorough consideration, you arrived at a recommendation with respect to the organization of the Government in the field of arms control and disarmament which I transmitted to the Congress.² The substantial majority by which the Congress has recently enacted the Arms Control and Disarmament Act is a tribute to the soundness of your recommendations and the diligence and persuasiveness with which you presented them to the Congress.³

In all of these steps you have assisted in clarifying the position of the United States as a country which is seeking realistic, mutually balanced and beneficial steps to reduce the dangers of war and to obtain the kind of disarmed world we all prefer. These tasks have been carried out at a time when the intransigence of others, especially on the issue of control over nuclear testing, has brought disappointment to the world. But we must not be discouraged, and I am confident that in the longer view what you have done will be recorded as a major contribution to the great task of achieving disarmament.

In expressing my thanks, I know I am expressing the thanks of our country also. I am very

¹ For text of the draft legislation, see *ibid.*, July 17, 1961, p. 101.

² For a statement by Mr. McCloy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 14, see *ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1961, p. 415; for remarks made by President Kennedy on Sept. 26, when he signed legislation creating the Agency, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 646.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 870.

glad that we shall continue to have the benefit of your advice in this most important field.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Honorable JOHN J. McCLOY
Adviser to the President on Disarmament
Washington, D.C.

Mr. McCloy

OCTOBER 6, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At the commencement of your Administration, you requested me to undertake a special mission, later confirmed to me in writing by your letter of January 27, 1961, the essence of which was to act as your Adviser on problems of disarmament and arms control, including the nuclear test ban. In addition to the request to make recommendations regarding the formulation of the United States policy in these areas, you also requested me to make recommendations to you as to the type and nature of the organization within the Government which would be best designed to deal with the very important problems in this field.

In carrying out this mission, I have worked in very close association with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, as well as with other Agencies of the Government having an interest in these matters.

The first problem which demanded attention was the then impending resumption of the test ban negotiations at Geneva.⁴ Intensive efforts were made to present to that Conference a constructive position which could promptly serve as a basis for an agreement. This work was completed prior to the resumption of the negotiations and a comprehensive draft treaty was, in due course, presented to the Conference, which, if adopted, could have effected the banning of all nuclear testing, with reasonable assurance that the obligations undertaken were being fulfilled. Mr. Arthur H. Dean conducted these negotiations on behalf of the United States, ably assisted by Mr. Charles Stelle, and an experienced staff. The proposals put forth by the United States were designed to afford a

⁴For a history of the political and technical developments of the negotiations from Oct. 31, 1958, to Aug. 22, 1960, see *ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1960, p. 482.

reasonable basis for negotiation, if the Soviets wanted a workable agreement, or, if the Soviets did not want a workable agreement, to make that fact clear. We hoped for the former, but our hopes for the conclusion of an agreement were rudely shaken from the first day of the resumed negotiations by the new position taken by the Soviet Union in regard to the matter of controls and inspection. Subsequent events, particularly the breaking of the voluntary moratorium through the resumption of extensive and rapid nuclear testing, indicated that there had been no serious intent on the part of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement in the course of these negotiations. The Soviet testing is of such a character that preparations for it must have been actively undertaken from the outset of the resumed negotiations, if not before. In spite of the disappointing attitude of the Soviet Union, the United States continued to search for a basis for an agreement covering all tests and finally proposed an agreement without controls and inspection on Soviet territory which would ban testing in the atmosphere where fallout was a continuing threat to health.

In the light of the high potential that these negotiations possessed for constructive action on the one hand, and the apparent pre-determination on the part of the Soviet Union to avoid reaching any agreement on the other, I regret to say that this Geneva Conference constitutes the most discouraging exercise in disarmament negotiations since the close of the war. I enclose with this letter a brief resume of the Geneva negotiations (Tab A). More comprehensive reports are, of course, on file with the Secretary of State; and Mr. Dean has himself reported from time to time to you at considerable length on the negotiations.

Other negotiations, in the form of a follow-up of the conversations begun during the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Stevenson on the subject of comprehensive disarmament, were likewise impending. These negotiations were resumed during the months of June, July, August, and September, in Washington, Moscow and New York, between Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin and myself. The purpose of these negotiations was to develop a statement of principles which would serve as the framework for resumed negotiations on compre-

hensive disarmament as well as to agree upon the forum in which such negotiations could take place. A statement of agreed principles was reached containing what I believe to be some highly significant principles on which future negotiations might proceed. Though we were unable to agree on the composition of the forum, prior to the reconvening of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and we likewise disagreed on the desirability of including a certain sentence in the statement of principles which would have emphasized the necessity of verifying remaining force levels, the extent of our agreement was, as I say, impressive. As for the failure to agree on the composition of the forum, though we proffered four different proposals, I do not despair of our being able to reach a settlement of this issue in due course, assuming a real desire on the part of the Soviet Union to reach a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

I also enclose (in Tab B) a summary of my discussions with Mr. Zorin, as well as the joint statement of agreed principles dated September 20, 1961 filed with the United Nations on the same day, a letter from me to Mr. Zorin dated September 20, the reply of Mr. Zorin dated September 21, the United States memorandum dated September 14 setting forth the United States position with respect to general disarmament, also as filed with the United Nations on September 20, and the memorandum of July 29, 1961, setting forth the position of the United States in respect to the composition of the forum for the resumption of negotiations likewise filed in the United Nations on September 20, 1961.

Likewise, during the course of the spring and summer extensive work was undertaken leading to the preparation of a plan for general and complete disarmament. Panels of distinguished experts were convened and they worked industriously to make recommendations in the various aspects of disarmament and arms control. Numerous consultations with our Allies and the representatives of appropriate agencies of the Government took place and the result was the plan submitted to the United Nations on September 25th of this year. A report covering the development of this plan, including a copy of the plan itself, is enclosed herewith (Tab C).

As for the second aspect of my mission, namely, the matter of the character and position of the

Agency to deal with the problem of disarmament and arms control within the United States Government, I believe the passage of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act by both houses of Congress with such substantial majorities speaks for itself. I have, however, enclosed herewith a short summary of the adoption of the legislation (Tab D). I feel that you can take deep satisfaction in the seriousness with which the Congress dealt with this important problem in a very busy session and I know it must be particularly gratifying to you that the Bill had such wide bipartisan support. The authoritative position which the new Agency now holds by Statute in the Government is another earnest of the serious intent of the United States to seek a sound and constructive resolution of the tremendous hazards involved in a modern arms race.

With the passage of the legislation, the conclusion of my negotiations with Mr. Zorin, and the introduction of the United States plan for disarmament at the General Assembly, my mission, I believe, is concluded. I am happy to learn that you have already designated a man of such experience and capacity as William C. Foster to direct the Agency and to become your principal adviser on Disarmament as the Statute provides. He will be most effectively assisted by one of the finest and ablest public servants I have ever known—Mr. Adrian S. Fisher.

I remain deeply convinced that constructive steps must be taken in this field of disarmament and arms control if the World is to avoid disaster of a cataclysmic nature. I also believe that with the position which the United States maintained at the Geneva Conference on nuclear testing, with the acceptance of an agreed statement of principles under which negotiations for general and complete disarmament could be resumed, and, finally, with the impressive votes on the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, that the United States has shown what must appear to all a thoroughly convincing display of its sincerity and willingness to bring to an end the hazards of an indiscriminate arms race. If others will demonstrate a similar will and intent, real assurances could be felt that constructive progress in this all important field could now take place.

I have been greatly honored to have been selected by you for this mission and I am particularly appreciative of the unfailing support I have

received from you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense during the course of my work.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN J. McCLOY

TAB A

REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

held at Geneva, Switzerland
March-September, 1961

In January and February, 1961, all of the U.S. positions on the outstanding issues of the nuclear test ban conference were carefully reviewed. In this connection, a very distinguished panel of scientists and experts were convened under the Chairmanship of Dr. James B. Fisk, and the resulting report served as the basis for a reconsideration of the entire problem. Consultations with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission, and others, were conducted and frequent reports and discussions were held with the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress. Soviet statements on the issues on which they considered it necessary to reach agreement were also carefully examined. This review of U.S. positions resulted in the drafting of new proposals. Each proposal was designed to meet, as far as possible, the views of the Soviet Union on major outstanding issues. Each of the new U.S. positions was also thoroughly discussed with the United Kingdom and a joint position was reached.

On March 21, 1961, Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, who was asked to lead the U.S. Delegation at the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, presented these new compromise proposals to the Soviet Union. The Western proposals included provisions:

(1) to reduce the number of control posts on Soviet territory from 21 to 19 and in the United States from 17 to 16;

(2) to extend from 27 months to 3 years the proposed moratorium on small underground tests and the associated seismic research program;

(3) to institute the means to ban all nuclear weapons tests in space;

(4) to ask the Congress for legislative authority to permit Soviet internal inspection of the nuclear devices used in the seismic research and peaceful engineering programs;

(5) to accept a veto over the total annual budget;

(6) to organize the policy-making Control Commission so as to give the Soviet Union a voice in guiding the control system equal to that of the United States and the United Kingdom combined.

On May 29th, the UK and the US, in a further effort to induce agreement, also proposed to reduce the number of on-site inspections in the territory of each of the

negotiating states from 20 to a possible 12, depending on the number of suspicious seismic events.

The Soviet Union did not accept these attempts to resolve the outstanding differences. Instead, on March 21, 1961, it withdrew its previous agreement on a single Administrator to oversee the daily executive and administrative tasks of the control organization. In place of the single Administrator, the Soviet Union proposed to substitute a three-man directorate—the "troika"—with each member, Soviet, Western, and neutral, possessing a veto over every action of that body. The "troika" arrangement would, of course, have made a mockery of effective control by providing a possibility of completely paralyzing the executive arm of the control organization.

Subsequently, and throughout the remainder of the negotiations, the Soviet Union maintained a stance of unyielding obduracy. The Soviet Union also made clear in its *aide memoire* given to the President at Vienna on June 4⁵ that the only way agreement could be reached on the test ban was to merge consideration of it with the broader problem of general and complete disarmament. Finally, on July 15, the United States and the United Kingdom asked for urgent consideration of the problem at the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly.⁶

On August 28, in a last attempt to make progress before General Assembly consideration of the test ban issue, and as an indication of our willingness to go even further in order to induce agreement, Ambassador Dean returned to Geneva with additional new proposals. These proposals provided for:

(1) Removal of the single administrator by a decision of seven members of the Commission;

(2) Staffing of on-site inspection teams in the USSR, UK, and US so that up to one-half of the personnel could come from neutral nations;

(3) Methods to lower the threshold of the treaty by extending the control system so that all or practically all underground tests would be included in the treaty ban either immediately or at the end of the three-year moratorium on small underground weapon tests.

On August 31, 1961, the Soviet Union suddenly announced the resumption of nuclear weapon tests and on September 1, exploded its first device in the atmosphere. In the days immediately following, the President and Prime Minister Macmillan offered to ban all tests in the atmosphere without any additional controls. Subsequently, the Soviet Union stepped up the momentum of its rapid test program and on September 5, the intention of the United States to resume nuclear weapon tests underground was announced.⁷

The rapid progress of the Soviet Union's test program—fifteen shots of from small to intermediate yield over a period of twenty-two days—suggests that extensive secret preparations for test resumption were undertaken by the Soviet Union during a major portion of this year's session

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, July 3, 1961, p. 22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 31, 1961, pp. 184 and 190.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475; Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515; and Oct. 2, 1961, p. 543.

of the Geneva Conference. The first Soviet shot came within hours of the announcement of resumption and on at least one occasion two weapons were exploded within the period of a single day.

On September 9, Chairman Khrushchev delivered his rejection of the atmospheric test ban proposal to our Ambassador at Moscow.⁸ The same day, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests recessed.

It was proposed by the UK and the US that the recess last until after the completion of General Assembly debate on the nuclear test ban item. The Soviet representative agreed, but was unwilling to commit himself specifically to any resumption of the talks.

The United States and the United Kingdom have submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution urging that an agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests under effective control be concluded at the earliest possible time.⁹ This proposal remains the cornerstone of our policy. The test ban, as pointed out in the President's speech to the General Assembly on September 25, 1961,¹⁰ is the logical place to begin on a program of general and complete disarmament. It is a step which can be taken now to reverse the dangerous and burdensome arms race, to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons and the capability to manufacture them, to contribute to the reduction of international tensions and to eliminate any health hazard associated with nuclear testing. It is to be hoped that effective and forthright action by the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution proposed jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States will ensure that this first step is taken as soon as possible. However, it is clear that this objective can be achieved only if the Soviet Union reverses its present policy and agrees to participate in further negotiations at Geneva in good faith and with an intention to reach an accord with a willingness to accept whatever reasonable controls and inspection measures the situation demands to insure fulfillment of the objective.

OCTOBER 2, 1961.

TAB B

REPORT ON THE US/USSR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT

A. Background

As a result of an understanding reached between Ambassador Stevenson and Foreign Minister Gromyko during the second half of the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, there took place an exchange of views between the US and the USSR on questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations in an agreed body. At the Secretary of State's request, Mr.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.280.

¹⁰ BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

John J. McCloy served as United States spokesman during that exchange.

The exchange of views took place in Washington, D.C. from June 19 to June 30; in Moscow, from July 17 to July 29; and in New York, from September 6 to September 19, 1961. In the course of the talks, both sides introduced documents setting forth their respective views.

During the entire exchange, an effort was made on the part of the U.S. representative to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on a basis which would permit a speedy resumption of multilateral disarmament negotiations. The United States took the position that the objective of the exchange was to reach agreement between the US and the USSR on the framework for disarmament negotiations and on the composition of the negotiating body, such agreement to be submitted as recommendation to the other States concerned.

The United States set forth its views on what it regarded as the basic principles by which any comprehensive disarmament negotiations should be guided. In the first instance, it endeavored to impress upon the Soviet Union its conviction that:

(1) The disarmament process should go hand-in-hand with a gradual development of institutions designed to settle international disputes by peaceful means and effectively to maintain peace;

(2) Implementation of all obligations undertaken by States should be subject to effective verification so as to give assurance to all parties that all obligations are being fulfilled; and

(3) The implementation of any agreement that can be reached on a specific disarmament measure or group of measures should not await agreement on a full program of general and complete disarmament which might well involve a lengthy period of negotiations. At the same time, the US emphasized its readiness to negotiate without interruption until a total program of general and complete disarmament has been developed and agreed.

The United States also proposed four alternative formulae for the composition of the negotiating body, including a forum comprised of the members of the Ten-Nation Committee and additional ten States, including non-committed States, selected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.

At the outset of the talks, the Soviet Union took the position that no disarmament negotiations could take place unless and until a US/USSR understanding was reached on the basic provisions of a specific disarmament plan. In spite of the position taken by the United States that no specific disarmament plans, which of necessity affect the interests of many other States, should be discussed in the absence of such States, the Soviet Union sought to prove, on the basis of its plan, the merits of its own approach. The Soviet Union also refused to discuss the question of the composition of the negotiating body until a US-USSR understanding on the basic provisions of a disarmament plan was reached.

The USSR pursued this approach almost until the end of the Moscow phase of the talks. Two days before the end of that phase, the USSR altered its position and

agreed to discuss a statement of principles. It also expressed its views on the question of the negotiating forum, reiterating its past position which provides for addition to the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee of a component of neutral States, thus reflecting the Soviet concept of a World divided into three distinct blocs.

The final phase of the talks, which took place in New York, was devoted to efforts to arrive at an agreed statement of principles for future disarmament negotiations. As a result, on September 19, agreement was reached on a document that was acceptable to both sides and a report to that effect was submitted to the United Nations. The text of the US/USSR report and of the joint US/USSR statement of agreed principles is attached here as part of Tab B. The United States also submitted to the United Nations a memorandum on the principles which should govern negotiations for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world and a US memorandum on the composition of the negotiating forum which had been presented earlier in the course of the discussion. A text of these documents is also attached hereto as part of Tab B.

The question of the composition of the negotiating body remained unresolved.

B. Evaluation

The exchange of views was useful in the sense that both sides had an opportunity to expound their respective positions and thus gain a greater insight into each other's thinking. Although the main US objective—that of making possible the resumption of disarmament negotiations at an early date—could not be achieved, it is believed that the joint statement of agreed principles is an important step in that direction.

It should be recognized that while the joint statement is not a disarmament plan in itself, or an agreement as to specific measures, it does constitute recognition by both sides of certain fundamental concepts which the US believes to be essential if any progress in comprehensive disarmament is to be made.

Thus, both sides have recorded their readiness to negotiate a total program for general and complete disarmament without prejudice to such areas of agreement as could be reached and implemented, perhaps as part of the total program, even before such program has been developed and agreed.

Among the important principles which the Soviet Union has agreed to include in the statement are those of the need for a gradual development of international peace-keeping institutions and for a control system assuring all parties that the obligations undertaken are being faithfully fulfilled. The Soviet Union, however, still refuses to accept what the US believes to be inherent in this latter concept; namely, that there should be verified not only obligations with respect to reductions of forces or armaments, but also those relating to the maintenance of agreed levels of forces or armaments. The US understanding of this problem was expressed in the letter which Mr. McCloy sent to Mr. Zorin on September 20. This letter, together with Mr. Zorin's reply, is attached hereto as part of Tab B.

U.S.—U.S.S.R. Report to General Assembly, With Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations

[For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.]

Letter From Mr. McCloy to Mr. Zorin

[For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 595.]

Letter From Mr. Zorin to Mr. McCloy

SEPTEMBER 21, 1961

DEAR MR. MCCLOY: I have received your letter of September 20th in which you make a reservation with regard to the position which the United States intends to take in further negotiations on disarmament.

In accordance with the agreement reached between us during the bilateral exchange of views, the U.S. agreed not to include in the Joint Statement by the Government of the USSR and the USA on the principles for disarmament negotiations the clause which is known to you and the acceptance of which would represent agreement to the concept of establishing control over armament instead of control over disarmament. In your letter you indicate that the clause expresses "a key element in the U.S. position."

In this connection, I must state that, as you well know, the position of the USSR on the question of control over general and complete disarmament has been set forth sufficiently, fully and clearly in statements by the Soviet Government and its head, N. S. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union advocates the most thorough, the most strict international control over measures of general and complete disarmament. While being for effective control over disarmament and desiring to facilitate as much as possible the reaching of agreement on such control, the Soviet Union at the same time resolutely opposes establishment of control over armaments.

It follows from your letter that the U.S. seeks to establish control over armed forces and armaments which will be retained by states at the various stages of disarmament. However, such control, which in fact means control over armaments, would become an international system of legalized espionage, which, of course, cannot be accepted by any state which is interested in its security and in the maintenance of world peace. The U.S. position in this matter, if the U.S. continues to insist on the above mentioned clause, cannot but make more difficult agreement on a program of general and complete disarmament, the general principles of which have been agreed between us.

As to the Soviet Union, it will continue to exert every effort to develop as promptly as possible a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Sincerely yours,

V. A. ZORIN
*Permanent Representative
of the USSR to the UN*

U.S. Memorandum on Principles That Should Govern Negotiations for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

[For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 591.]

U.S. Memorandum on Composition of the Disarmament Forum

[For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 591.]

TAB C

DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT PLAN

With the completion in March of the review of the nuclear test policy, attention was directed next to the development of a comprehensive United States disarmament plan. The statements of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Stevenson concerning the bilateral discussions on the forum and framework of a resumed disarmament negotiation made it necessary for the United States to be prepared for the resumption of these negotiations by July 31, 1961. Given the shortness of time to prepare and then to coordinate within the U.S. Government and with the Allies a new, far-reaching disarmament plan, two decisions were made: first, to have the U.S. Disarmament Administration prepare a draft plan drawing on new ideas that had emerged from extensive work on arms control going on in the Universities and Research Foundations, on new ideas recently submitted by our Allies, and on a variety of proposals in previous negotiations; and, second, to assemble a number of panels composed of distinguished individuals considered experts in the various areas of arms control and disarmament to address themselves to the draft plan.

The following were the panels and their chairmen:

Conventional Arms and Armed Forces: Major Gen. John E. Hull

Nuclear Armaments: Professor Harvey Brooks, Dean of Engineering, Harvard University

Delivery Vehicles: Dr. Donald Ling, Bell Telephone Laboratories

Chemical, Biological, Radiological Warfare: Dr. Robert Cairns, Hercules Powder Company

War by Accident, Miscalculation, Surprise Attack: Professor Thomas C. Schelling, Harvard University

International Legal and Security Arrangements: Professor Louis Henkin, University of Pennsylvania Law School

Regional Disarmament: Mr. Gerard Smith, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Outer Space: Dr. Chalmers Sherwin, Aerospace Corporation

New Approaches: Mr. Richard Leghorn, President, ITEK Corporation

Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Dr. Emile Benoit, Columbia University

The work of these panels was completed by May 13 and the Policy Staff then prepared a revised draft of the

U.S. disarmament plan, taking into account the reports of these panels. This draft was circulated on May 31 for comment within the Government and as a staff draft given on June 1 to our Western partners for their comment. Agreement had been reached between the US and USSR to have bilateral disarmament discussions beginning June 19 in Washington with the hope—as the US understood it—of agreeing on the framework for future multilateral negotiations. Because the preambular part of the new draft plan dealing with the goal, the task, and the principles governing negotiations constituted the US recommendation for the framework of new negotiations, clearance on the substance of this part of the draft was sought and obtained from the Government and the Allies in time for the beginning of the US-USSR bilaterals on June 19.

Taking into account Departmental and Allied comment, another revision of the plan was produced and circulated on June 24 in preparation for a meeting of the heads of Departments and Agencies concerned on July 5. The principal issue remaining within the U.S. Government after this "Meeting of Principals" was the question of the relationship of the various measures to each other. After a week of extensive discussion in Washington beginning July 10 with representatives of Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (the other Western members of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee), a final meeting of the Principals was held on August 3. The final decision on the substance of the plan was made by you on August 18 and consultation with NATO was completed on August 31. Finally, on September 25, the product of these efforts—entitled "Declaration on Disarmament: A Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World"—was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations and publicly released in connection with your address to the General Assembly.¹¹

The proposals contained in this plan represent an imaginative yet realistic program to bring the present arms race to an end. The plan advances in many respects well beyond what has heretofore been put forward by the United States in the field of disarmament. The new features include a recognition of the fact that progress in disarmament must be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and for settlement of international disputes by peaceful means by including provisions for the establishment of a permanent United Nations Peace Force and peacekeeping machinery strong enough to cope with the threats or use of force by any nation or group of nations. These new features also include an increased emphasis on the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems at an early stage in the disarmament process, including measures designed to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons to nations not now owning them. The

¹¹ *Freedom From War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World* (Department of State publication 7277); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; price 15 cents.

plan also includes a commitment to seek and implement immediately as wide an area of agreement as possible and to continue this effort without interruption until general and complete disarmament has been achieved.

The last word, of course, has not been spoken on disarmament, and reasonable flexibility is essential if disarmament is to be achieved. However, if the Soviet Union and other Communist states are seriously interested in disarmament, the US proposals can afford a realistic basis for negotiation of a detailed disarmament plan.

Declaration on Disarmament: A Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

[For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.]

TAB D

REPORT ON THE ADOPTION OF THE LEGISLATION KNOWN AS THE "ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT"

In the President's letter to Mr. John J. McCloy of January 27, 1961, the latter was given the task of making recommendations to the President regarding the organization of the U.S. Disarmament Administration and related activities. The U.S. Disarmament Administration, which was then in existence as a part of the Department of State, had been established by Departmental order by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on September 9, 1960.¹² No Director had been appointed for the organization. It was headed by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, an able career Foreign Service Officer, who had been designated as Acting Deputy Director on October 12, 1960.

Because of the pressing and immediate problems in connection with preparation of the U.S. position of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, it was not possible to devote a great deal of personal attention to this problem until the formulation of the U.S. position for the Geneva discussions and Ambassador Dean had left for the Geneva Conference on March 15, 1961. In the spring of this year, as part of the study of this problem, consultations were conducted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as well as a number of other Government officials, including the President of the United States. Consultations also took place with a number of private persons whose experience and knowledge in the field of Government organization was impressive, including Professor Richard E. Neustadt of Columbia University, Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Mr. James A. Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation, and Mr. Don K. Price of the Ford Foundation.

As a result of these studies, the conclusion was reached that an Agency should be established by statute at an authoritative level in the Government with the exceptionally broad competence, functions, and resources required to work on the problems of arms control and disarmament, including the conduct of the research so essential to progress in this field. Though there was considerable support for an entirely independent Agency reporting only to the President, the conclusion was reached that those conducting this research should be in the same organization as those charged with conducting negotiations in the field, and that the organization should be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State, although distinct from the Department of State. Since the Director of the new Agency would have to deal with and coordinate the activities of many other agencies of Government which have direct access to the President, it was felt that the Director should serve as the principal adviser to the President as well as to the Secretary of State in the disarmament field, with direct access to the President upon notification to the Secretary of State.

A draft bill was prepared, which put these conclusions in the form of a statute. This bill was transmitted to the President of the United States for formal clearance throughout the Government on May 9, 1961, together with an explanatory letter of transmittal and an accompanying memorandum. As a result of the clearance process, the draft bill was slightly revised and was transmitted to the President by letter of June 23, 1961. The President, in turn, transmitted the draft bill to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House by letter of June 29, 1961.¹³

In the Senate, it was introduced as S. 2180 by Senator Humphrey and eight other Senators. In the House, it was initially introduced as H.R. 7936 by Congressman Morgan, and 70 other similar or identical bills were subsequently introduced in the House.

Hearings on these bills were held in the latter part of August and early September before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. At these hearings, the support for the bill was completely bipartisan in nature. Witnesses testifying in support of it included officials impressive in quality and number of both your Administration and the Administrations of Presidents Eisenhower and Truman. A letter, which President Eisenhower had written in support of the principles on which the bill was drafted, was introduced into the record of both Committees. Both Committees reported the bill favorably by unanimous vote.

The bill passed the Senate on September 8, 1961 by a vote of 73 to 14. A crucial amendment offered by Senator Goldwater which would have crippled the research program was defeated by a vote of 46 to 43. The bill passed the House of Representatives on September 19, 1961 by a vote of 290 to 54. A Conference Committee report was adopted by the House of Representatives on September 23, 1961, by a vote of 250 to 50 and in the Senate by unani-

¹² BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1960, p. 481.

¹³ *Ibid.*, July 17, 1961, p. 99.

mous consent. The President was able to report the passage of the bill to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 1961.

As finally passed by the Congress, the Act incorporated the general principles of the bill originally transmitted to you on June 29, 1961; although, in the process of legislative deliberation, the language was clarified in several important respects to express more accurately the concepts which underlay the original bill.

OCTOBER 2, 1961.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Review Motion Picture Exchanges

Press release 716 dated October 17

JOINT STATEMENT

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Cinematography, established under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Scientific, Technical, Educational and Cultural Exchange of November 21, 1959,¹ met in Washington from October 2 until October 17, 1961 to review progress of exchanges in the field of motion pictures during the last two years.

The Committee discussed matters which have arisen in connection with the purchase and sale of theatrical films; distribution and exhibition of theatrical films; exchange of documentary films; exchange of delegations of film specialists; (joint) co-production of films; and premieres and publicity in connection with the distribution of theatrical films. The Committee also discussed in general terms future cooperation in the field of motion pictures.

At the end of their discussions, the Committee issued a Memorandum of Agreement (attached).

The Committee was represented on the United States side by Turner B. Shelton, Director of the Motion Picture Service of the U.S. Information Agency, and Eric Johnston, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. Advisers to the U.S. delegation were Ralph A. Jones, Deputy Director of the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff of the Department of State; Harry G. Barnes of the Office of Soviet Union Af-

fairs in the Department of State; Hans N. Tuch, Policy Officer for Eastern Europe in the U.S. Information Agency; and Kenneth Clark, Vice President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. The Soviet Union was represented by A. N. Davydov, President of Sovexportfilm, and Boris Krylov, Chief of the American Section of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Advisers to the Soviet delegation were L. O. Arnshtam, Soviet film director, and Yuri Volsky, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

OCTOBER 17, 1961

MEMORANDUM ON THE MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE SECTION DEALING WITH COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CINEMATOGRAPHY OF THE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR.

The Standing Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Cinematography established under the Scientific, Technical, Educational and Cultural Exchange Agreements signed between the United States and the USSR on January 27, 1958² and November 21, 1959, met in Washington in October, 1961. During the course of the discussions, consideration was given to the problems which have arisen in connection with the purchase and sale of theatrical motion pictures; the matter of the distribution of theatrical films including the problem of exhibition; the exchange of documentary films; the exchange of delegations of specialists in the motion picture field; (joint) co-production of films as provided for under the Agreement; the matter of premieres and publicity in connection with the distribution of films; and in addition, the Standing Committee held a general discussion of future cooperation in the field of motion pictures.

The results of these considerations are as follows:

Purchase and Sale, Distribution and Exhibition of Theatrical Films

The Committee discussed fully the widest possible distribution and exhibition of appropriate films purchased and sold under the Agreement. A review of additional American and Soviet motion pictures was initiated with the view of selecting more motion pictures for purchase and sale under the present Agreement. It is understood that Sovexportfilm and American companies will carry on negotiations for the purchase and sale of films and conclude arrangements under provisions set forth in Section VIII of the present Agreement. The Committee

¹ For background and text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 7, 1959, p. 848, and Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

recommends that in using their best efforts to obtain maximum distribution and exhibition of mutually acceptable films, both parties shall strive to increase the number of prints to be distributed, the number of theaters and the number of communities in which the films are to be shown. Both parties have agreed to furnish each other with periodic reports concerning the distribution and exhibition of these films.

Publicity and Premieres

The Committee agreed that it was desirable to increase the scope of publicity and to hold appropriate premieres of the films purchased and sold under the present Agreement. Consideration will be given to inviting actors and other artistic personnel to the premieres arranged for these theatrical films.

Exchange of Documentary Films

After a full discussion of matters relating to the exchange of documentary films, the Committee agreed that both parties would use their best efforts to complete the selection and acceptance by the other side of 15 documentary films respectively which would serve to complete the exchange of documentary films envisioned for the exchange agreement through December 31, 1961.

Exchange of Delegations of Film Specialists

The Committee agreed that an exchange of film specialists will take place before December 31, 1961, with the Soviet delegation scheduled to come to the United States during the last week of November and the U.S. delegation to go to the Soviet Union after the Soviet delegation's return to the U.S.S.R.

(Joint) Co-Production of Films

The Committee recognized as desirable that both parties undertake specific negotiations looking toward the joint co-production of films provided for under the Agreement, taking into account the exchange of opinions on this subject which took place at the Committee meetings.

Prospects for Motion Picture Exchanges in 1962-1963

The Committee discussed in general terms the usefulness of cooperation in the field of motion pictures and took into account the positive experience of such cooperation in the past. The Committee recognized as desirable that both parties adopt all appropriate measures for expanding cooperation in the purchase and sale of films, distribution and exhibition of films, exchange of documentary films, exchange of delegations, conducting premieres, etc., with the understanding that this entire subject will be discussed during the forthcoming negotiations between the United States and the USSR regarding a new Exchange Agreement. The Committee further recommends that the drafts for a new Exchange Agreement contain provisions for the continued activity of the Standing Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Cinematography.

ERIC JOHNSTON
TURNER B. SHELTON

A. N. DAVYDOV
BORIS KRYLOV

Clarence B. Randall Heads Mission To Review Volta River Project

President Kennedy announced on October 20 (White House press release) that Clarence B. Randall has agreed to serve from time to time as a consultant to the U.S. Government on special foreign assistance projects. In this capacity Mr. Randall will lead a special mission to review U.S. participation in the Volta River project.

Mr. Randall will depart for Accra on October 24 for an on-the-spot examination and discussion with officials there regarding the project. While in Accra, Mr. Randall expects to meet with President Kwame Nkrumah for extensive conversations about conditions in Ghana and their relation to the project. It is expected that Mr. Randall will return to Washington early in November and report directly to the President.

The Volta River project is a large hydroelectric project being undertaken at Akosombo, Ghana, together with a privately owned aluminum smelter being erected at Tema. It involves financing through the World Bank, the United Kingdom, Ghana, and the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

In announcing the appointment, the President stated that he was delighted that Mr. Randall was willing to undertake this important assignment. "Mr. Randall," he said, "is a man of great experience at home and abroad. He has an extensive knowledge of the African Continent. I know that his report will be of great assistance to us."

Mr. Randall will be accompanied on his mission by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, Department of State, and Harry Shooshan, Assistant Deputy Managing Director for Operations of the Development Loan Fund.

AID Projects Announced for Chile, Nicaragua, and Paraguay

Press release 719 dated October 18

The United States Government, carrying forward President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program, announced on October 18 that it is contributing assistance funds for self-help projects in

Chile, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. These funds will be administered through the new Agency for International Development (AID), the successor agency to ICA (International Cooperation Administration).

This now brings the total number of countries receiving special assistance under the Alliance for Progress to 13 and the amount of funds earmarked thus far to approximately \$24 million. The idea of the Alliance for Progress is to foster social development in Latin America, and all three of the new projects will further this goal in the field of educational development.

The funds expended in Chile will be used in the initial phase of a program designed to strengthen and expand the Rural Education Institute (REI), an organization which provides the rural population with elementary courses in reading and writing, agriculture, personal hygiene, home industries, and community development. It also renders assistance to primary rural schools through its radio school network, which reaches approximately 80,000 pupils. From the original centers established by REI, the work now extends to additional rural communities by means of branch centers operated by extension workers.

The funds approved for Nicaragua, half as loan and half as grant, will be used in a self-help school construction program. This project is designed to help alleviate the critical shortage of classrooms in Nicaragua and is set up in a manner that will permit the local communities to participate in accomplishment of this goal by their contributions of land and labor, while the national Government of Nicaragua will assume responsibility for the loan.

In Paraguay the funds will be used to support two complementary phases of an education improvement program. As one part, assistance will be given to local communities which will make contributions of their own toward the construction of rural schools. In the other part, the funds will be used to help establish three teacher-training centers in order to meet the demands for a larger number of qualified teachers as the school construction phase of the program expands the school facilities.

Allocation of funds to individual countries for the initial projects will be made upon signing of the project agreements.

Bolivia Reassured on U.S. Disposal of Surplus Tin From Stockpile

Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and President Victor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRESIDENT PAZ

White House press release dated October 6

OCTOBER 6, 1961

EXCELLENCY: I wish to acknowledge your telegram of September 16, 1961, expressing your serious concern at the announcement that the United States Government had requested the Congress to grant authority to dispose of a part of its stockpile of tin.

Please be assured that my Government retains a deep interest and concern in the rapid development of the Bolivian nation and the economic and social progress of the Bolivian people. We are committed to assist you in carrying forward the historic aims of the Bolivian revolution; and we intend to continue to fulfill that commitment. I assure you that we will not take any action—in regard to tin or any other matter—which will tend to frustrate our mutual goal of a better life for the people of Bolivia.

We fully understand the great importance of tin to the Bolivian economy. Even now we are engaged in an effort of unparalleled vigor and dimension to help modernize your tin mines and increase their productivity. You can be sure, therefore, that we will sell no tin from our stockpile without first consulting with your government and the governments of other tin producing nations. In this way we can help ensure that the interests of all nations are protected.

The course of action which we have suggested is the sale of small lots of tin over a period of several years. This tin would come from the 50,000 tons which we now have in excess of our strategic requirements. We do not intend to depress the price of tin through these sales; they would be initiated at a time of world-wide shortage and would have the effect of discouraging tin consumers from substituting other materials for their normal tin consumption. In this way we can protect the long-run stability and continued prosperity of the tin market.

We have consulted continuously with officials of your government concerning this problem and such consultations will continue. We hope to work with Bolivia toward a long-term solution to the problem of tin prices. It is to further this aim that we are now studying the terms of our accession to the International Tin Agreement to which Bolivia belongs and which the United States has not previously joined.

I have taken, from the very beginning of my Administration, a deep personal interest in the development of Bolivia and in your own heroic efforts to raise the standard of living of the Bolivian people. It was this interest which led to our early exchange of letters,¹ the sending of a special economic mission to Bolivia,² the conclusion of several economic aid agreements including the triangular operation for the rehabilitation of COMIBOL,³ and the stationing of a special economic representative in your country.⁴ Therefore, I am certain that our proposal to dispose of small lots of tin over several years, only after prior consultation with your government, will not be counter to the interests of Bolivia or inconsistent with the abiding friendship of our two peoples.

With warmest personal regards,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

PRESIDENT PAZ TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Unofficial translation

SEPTEMBER 16, 1961

PRESIDENT KENNEDY
White House
Washington, D.C.

I wish to express to you, Mr. President, the deep concern and alarm caused in Bolivia by the announcement of the American Government that it will sell a part of its strategic stockpile of tin in the market as a measure to avoid a rise in its price. On this occasion I must recall reiterated promises made by your illustrious Government to bear in mind the interests of Bolivia in the tin problem. Throwing on the market large tonnages of metal by the United States will make the price descend to a level harmful particularly for Bolivia, which is a high-cost producer, annulling completely the favorable situation which the international market now presents. This does not coincide with the aims stated in the documents of

¹ For texts, see BULLETIN of June 12, 1961, p. 920.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 27, 1961, p. 454.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 10, 1961, p. 531.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 449.

Punta del Este⁵ nor with the plans of the Alliance for Progress nor with those expressed specifically for Bolivia in your esteemed letter of May. The leadership exercised by the United States in the Western World makes it necessary to consider not only the interests of the great nations consumers of tin but also the position of small nations which are producers. I trust your Government will be able to find a solution which takes into consideration Bolivian interests in harmony with the traditionally good relations which exist between our peoples. With my highest consideration.

VICTOR PAZ ESTENSSORO
President of Bolivia

President Establishes Machinery Implementing Textile Agreement

White House press release dated October 18

The President on October 18 sent the following memorandum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, establishing the machinery to implement the International Textile Agreement¹ reached at Geneva between the countries of: Australia, Austria, Canada, India, Japan, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (also representing Hong Kong), United States, and five member states of the European Economic Community—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

In view of the International Textile Agreement reached at referendum at Geneva on July 21, 1961, which I signed September 7, 1961:²

A.

I am asking the Secretary of Commerce, as Chairman of the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee, to convene that Committee for the purpose of creating an Interagency Textile Administrative Committee to carry out the rights and obligations of the United States under the "Short-Term Arrangement" provided for in the International Textile Agreement of July 21, 1961, at Geneva. The Interagency Textile Administrative Committee is to be established under the Chairmanship of a designee of the Secretary of

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 528.

Commerce; will be located, for administrative purposes, in the Department of Commerce; and will be composed of the Chairman and one representative each, from the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Labor. The President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee will, at the request of any member of the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, consider any question of policy relating to the administration of the "Short-Term Arrangement."

B.

I am asking the Secretary of State to undertake, in accordance with policies established by the President's Textile Advisory Committee, the negotiations contemplated by the International Textile Agreement of July 21, 1961, including bilateral textile agreements. The Secretary of State will request the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor to appoint representatives of these Departments to the delegation on the Provisional Cotton Textile Committee of GATT,³ contemplated under the International Textile Agreement of July 21, 1961, toward the end that the United States representation on this GATT Committee shall include designees of the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Labor, with the Chairman being the designee of the Secretary of State.

C.

I am asking the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee to form a Management-Labor Textile Advisory Committee to provide continuing advice on textile problems to it, the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee, the United States representation on the GATT Committee, and the United States negotiators on bilateral agreements.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

Agreement for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes With the Republic of France. Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. September 12, 1961. 27 pp.

³ See p. 776.

Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 569. H. Rept. 1183. September 14, 1961. 15 pp.

Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 135. S. Rept. 1035. September 14, 1961. 15 pp.

Paris Convention on Patents and Trademarks. Report to accompany H.R. 5754. S. Rept. 1019. September 14, 1961. 8 pp.

Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries and the Extension of Certain Loans Now in Existence. Report to accompany H.R. 7726. S. Rept. 1037. September 14, 1961. 7 pp.

Shipment in Interstate or Foreign Commerce of Articles Imported From Cuba. Report to accompany H.R. 8465. September 14, 1961. 5 pp.

Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Conference report to accompany H.R. 8666. H. Rept. 1197. September 15, 1961. 19 pp.

Amending the Trading With the Enemy Act, as Amended. Report to accompany S. 495. S. Rept. 1062. September 15, 1961. 21 pp.

Amending the Act of September 2, 1958, as Amended, Establishing a Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. Report to accompany H.R. 8490. S. Rept. 1063. September 15, 1961. 5 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee reviewing for the period December 1, 1959, through November 30, 1960, the operation of article VII, together with the other criminal jurisdictional arrangements throughout the world. S. Rept. 1041. September 15, 1961. 15 pp.

Peace Corps Act. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7500. H. Rept. 1239. September 19, 1961. 23 pp.

World Economic Progress Assembly and Exposition. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 41. S. Rept. 1088. September 20, 1961. 3 pp.

World Economic Progress Exposition. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 389. H. Rept. 1251. September 21, 1961. 4 pp.

Cambodian Port Highway: A Supplemental Report. Tenth report of the House Government Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1250. September 21, 1961. 16 pp.

Tariff Commission Studies on Metals. Report to accompany S. Res. 206. S. Rept. 1103. September 21, 1961. 2 pp.

Tariff Classification Description for Lightweight Bicycles. Report to accompany H.R. 8938. H. Rept. 1255. September 22, 1961. 5 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Conference report to accompany H.R. 9118. H. Rept. 1263. September 23, 1961. 15 pp.

Import Taxes on Lead and Zinc. Report to accompany H.R. 5193. H. Rept. 1269. September 26, 1961. 9 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1962. Conference report to accompany H.R. 9033. H. Rept. 1270. September 26, 1961. 7 pp.

Survival of the United Nations. Address of the President delivered to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961. S. Doc. 69. September 26, 1961. 9 pp.

Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations. An analysis prepared by the Department of State for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. September 27, 1961. 91 pp. [Committee print]

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled November 1, 1961, Through January 31, 1962

U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Organization and Operation of Industrial Estates.	Madras	Nov. 1-
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 2-
FAO Conference: 11th Session	Rome	Nov. 4-
CENTO Military Committee	Washington	Nov. 6-
ILO Asian Advisory Committee: 11th Session	Geneva	Nov. 6-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 6th Session.	Geneva	Nov. 6-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport.	Geneva	Nov. 6-
ILO Governing Body: 150th Session (and its committees)	Geneva	Nov. 13-
GATT Contracting Parties: 19th Session	Geneva	Nov. 13-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Transport Costs.	Geneva	Nov. 13-
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting.	Paris	Nov. 14-
ICAO South American-South Atlantic Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services/Communications Meeting.	Lima	Nov. 14-
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 14-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Inland Water Transport.	Geneva	Nov. 15-
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 16-
SEATO Committee of Economic Experts	Bangkok	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Training Seminar on Trade Promotion	New Delhi	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Nov. 20-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group.	Geneva	Nov. 20-
International Wheat Council: 33d Session	London	Nov. 20-
IMCO Expert Working Group on Pollution of the Sea by Oil.	London	Nov. 21-
U.N. ECAFE/WMO Interregional Seminar on Hydrology	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Problems of Methodology of Agricultural Production Projection.	Geneva	Nov. 27-
2d Inter-American Meeting on Illicit Traffic in Cocaine and Cocoa Leaves.	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 27-
FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 4th Session	Trivandrum, India	Dec. 4-
FAO Technical Working Party on Coconut Production, Protection, and Processing: 1st Session.	Trivandrum	Dec. 4-
ILO Committee on Work on Plantations: 4th Session	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 13th Session	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport.	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. Consultative Group on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.	Geneva	Dec. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Energy Resources and Electric Power Development.	Bangkok	Dec. 6-
FAO International Rice Commission: 9th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Production and Protection.	New Delhi	Dec. 11-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Meeting of Working Party on Rice, Soil, Water, and Fertilizer Practices.	New Delhi	Dec. 11-
ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching)	Geneva	Dec. 11-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group.	Geneva	Dec. 11-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: Subcommittee on Electric Power.	Bangkok	Dec. 18-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 21, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled November 1, 1961, Through January 31, 1962—Continued

U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	Dec. 18-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics.	Geneva	Dec. 18-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 5th Session	London	December
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	December
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 32d Session (resumed)	New York	December
CENTO Scientific Council	Lahore	Jan. 8-
CENTO Scientific Symposium on the Role of Science in the Development of Natural Resources With Particular Reference to Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.	Lahore	Jan. 8-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session of Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 8-
ICAO Communications Division: 7th Session	Montreal	Jan. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Intraregional Trade Promotion Talks	Bangkok	Jan. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Commercial Arbitration	Bangkok	Jan. 11-
CENTO Economic Experts	Ankara	Jan. 15-
IAEA Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law (including third-party liability for nuclear shipping).	Brussels	Jan. 22-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 5th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 22-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee	Ottawa	Jan. 29-
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: 3d Session.	New Delhi	Jan. 29-
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Seminar on the Participation of Women in Public Life.	Singapore	Jan. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 14th Session.	Bangkok	Jan. 31-
WHO Executive Board: 29th Session (and Standing Committee on Administration and Finance).	Geneva	January
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 7th Session	New York	January

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Provisional Cotton Textile Committee

The Department of State announced on October 20 (press release 724) that Warren M. Christopher, Special Consultant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, will serve as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting of the Provisional Cotton Textile Committee, scheduled to convene at Geneva on October 23. W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, will serve as deputy chairman.

Other members of the delegation are:

Delegates

- John W. Evans, U.S. Representative to the GATT Council, Geneva
- Daniel P. Moynihan, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor
- Hickman Price, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic Affairs

Advisers

- Thomas Jefferson Davis, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Edelen Fogarty, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Stanley Nehmer, Deputy Director, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Margaret Potter, Resident U.S. Delegation to International Organizations, Geneva

Jackson Spears, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic Affairs

The meeting is being held in accordance with the provisions of the Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles,¹ which were agreed upon on an *ad referendum* basis at a meeting in Geneva of major textile importing and exporting countries July 17-21, which was called by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the request of the United States. The request was based on point six of President Kennedy's seven-point program of assistance to the textile industry, announced May 2, 1961.²

The following 16 countries participated in the July meeting: Australia, Austria, Canada, India,

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

² *Ibid.*, May 29, 1961, p. 825.

Japan, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (also representing Hong Kong), United States, and 5 member states of the European Economic Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands). The Provisional Cotton Textile Committee was created at that time with the objective of undertaking work toward a long-term solution to the problems in the field of cotton textiles. It is anticipated that the forthcoming meeting will establish a formula for periodic meetings of the committee.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, New York.

Security Council

Exchange of letters dated September 10, 1961, between the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-General concerning an invitation to the Secretary-General to visit the Congo. S/4937. September 11, 1961. 2 pp.

Note verbale dated September 13, 1961, from the Belgian permanent representative to the Secretary-General transmitting a press communique issued by the Belgian Government. S/4939. September 13, 1961. 2 pp.

Report of the officer-in-charge of the U.N. operations in the Congo to the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of February 21, 1961. S/4940, September 14, 1961, 10 pp.; Add. 1, September 14, 1961, 5 pp.; Add. 2, September 14, 1961, 3 pp.; Add. 4, September 17, 1961, 6 pp.; Add. 5, September 19, 1961, 5 pp.; Add. 6, September 20, 1961, 3 pp.

General Assembly

Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its 13th session, May 1-July 7, 1961. A/CN.4/141. July 13, 1961. 106 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on participation of the non-self-governing territories in the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. A/4852. August 23, 1961. 10 pp.

Letter dated August 23, 1961, from the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General on the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control. A/4853. August 23, 1961. 18 pp.

Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in non-self-governing territories. A/4851. August 25, 1961. 41 pp.

Report of the Special Commission for Ruanda-Urundi on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi. A/4856. August 30, 1961. 44 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force. A/4857. August 30, 1961. 19 pp.

Note verbale dated September 5, 1961, from the permanent mission of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations

concerning Soviet resumption of nuclear weapons testing. A/4858. September 5, 1961. 6 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on offers by member states of study and training facilities for inhabitants of non-self-governing territories. A/4862. September 11, 1961. 19 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on dissemination of information on the United Nations in the non-self-governing territories. A/4863, September 11, 1961, 17 pp.; A/4864, September 11, 1961, 5 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Summary records of the 17th session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, March 8-20, 1961. E/CN.11/566. July 4, 1961. 291 pp.

Note by the Secretary-General on use of volunteer workers in the operational programs of the United Nations and related agencies designed to assist in the economic and social development of the less developed countries. E/TAC/109. July 12, 1961. 9 pp.

Report of the Social Committee on the world social situation. E/3542. July 28, 1961. 16 pp.

Report of the Economic Committee on economic development of underdeveloped countries and the financing of economic development. E/3549. August 2, 1961. 3 pp.

First report of the Coordination Committee on the general review of the development, coordination, and concentration of the economic, social, and human rights programs and activities of the United Nations and specialized agencies. E/3551. August 2, 1961. 17 pp.

Report of the Technical Assistance Committee on programs of technical cooperation. E/3547. August 9, 1961. 63 pp.

Report of the Technical Assistance Committee on the use of volunteer workers in the operational programs of the United Nations and related agencies designed to assist in the economic and social development of the less developed countries. E/3548. August 3, 1961. 8 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Niger, August 25, 1961.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, October 12, 1961.

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of in-

ventions relating to defense and for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, October 13, 1961.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Niger, August 25, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into force October 1, 1961.

Acceptance deposited: Canada, September 22, 1961.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Niger, August 25, 1961.

BILATERAL

France

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of nonmigrant visas for treaty traders and treaty investors. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris September 1 and 21, 1961. Entered into force September 21, 1961.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of January 7, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4401 and 4513). Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv September 22 and at Jerusalem October 9, 1961. Entered into force October 9, 1961.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 2, 1961 (TIAS 4844). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo October 7, 1961. Entered into force October 7, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate Established at Adana, Turkey

Press release 712 dated October 16

The Department of State announced on October 16 that effective October 3, 1961, an American consulate was established at Adana, Turkey. Howard J. Ashford, Jr., is the officer in charge.

With the opening of this consulate, the consulate at Iskenderun, Turkey, was closed, effective October 6, 1961. Mr. Ashford had been serving as the officer in charge at Iskenderun.

Designations

Robert B. Black as Director, American AID Mission, Senegal, effective October 9. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 699 dated October 9.)

William E. F. Conrad as Director, Office of Functional and External Research, effective October 1.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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†710	10/16	Coombs: OECD Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education.
*711	10/16	U.S. participation in international conferences.
712	10/16	Consulate established at Adana, Turkey.
†713	10/16	Rusk: OECD Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education.
*714	10/17	Cultural exchange (Sudan).
715	10/17	Laos credentials (rewrite).
716	10/17	U.S.-Soviet memorandum of agreement on films exchange.
717	10/18	Brazil credentials (rewrite).
†718	10/18	Miller: "The Role of the Department of State in Educational and Cultural Affairs."
719	10/18	Alliance for Progress projects.
720	10/18	Rusk: news conference.
721	10/19	Bowles: Mexican-North American Cultural Institute.
722	10/19	Liberia credentials (rewrite).
*723	10/20	Cultural exchange (Europe, Near East, Soviet Union).
724	10/20	Delegation to meeting of Provisional Cotton Textile Committee (rewrite).
*725	10/20	Cleveland: Broome County (N.Y.) World Affairs Council (excerpts).
†726	10/20	Chapman: American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.
727	10/20	Anniversary of Hungarian uprising.
†728	10/21	Cleveland: St. Louis University.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Sixteenth Anniversary of the United Nations

by *Adlai E. Stevenson*

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

In April 1945, toward the end of humanity's most terrible war, but before any man had seen the atomic age, the architects of peace met here in San Francisco to complete the design of a new dwelling house for the family of man. I was here during those golden weeks. And no one who was will ever forget them. It was a beginning. It was the morning—fresh with the hope of a new day.

In 2 months we finished our work and the charter of the United Nations was signed, with suitable pomp, on June 25th in the Opera House. By October 24th the necessary ratifications by two-thirds of the signatory states had been received. In war-weary London we celebrated—we who were assigned the job of transforming the charter of San Francisco into a working organization—just 16 years ago today!

On this 16th anniversary, what is the report? The house is crowded: 101 members; every room is full, and more are coming!

The house is battered. It resounds endlessly with family quarrels. There are cracks in the walls, and inside the cold winds of war and danger and strife from every quarter of the globe rattle the doors and windows. And, as is usual in such cases, quite a number of the tenants are behind on the rent.

But the house is still standing. Through the cold war it has stood, and the Korean war; through the communizing of mainland China; through the revolutionary surges of national independence;

through the terror of Hungary and the shock of Suez and the worse shock of the Congo; and through the ever-mounting perils of the race in nuclear arms.

Its collapse has been called imminent any number of times. It "couldn't survive" the Soviet abuse of the veto—but it did, and learned how to act by majority rule. It "couldn't survive" the strains of colonial struggles and the birth of new nations—but it did, and in the U.N.'s halls the old rulers and the old subjects sit side by side with equal privileges.

Then last year people said that Mr. Khrushchev's shoe-pounding and his attack on the office of Secretary-General would surely be the end—but that has been going on for 13 months, and though we have lost the brilliant and brave Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations is still there.

And those of us who attended the funeral of Dag Hammarskjold in that ancient cathedral in Uppsala and walked between the walls of reverent humanity through the crowded streets of that old town will never forget him, as we will never forget the San Francisco conference.

This may be no time for words of triumph, but it is most certainly a time for words and deeds of hope.

Recently I saw a news item about a medical scientist who was on the brink of an important breakthrough. According to the news story, when he described his experiments to a gathering of fellow specialists, "A wave of *guarded enthusiasm* swept through the audience." If I can sweep you with a wave of guarded enthusiasm about the United Nations, I will have achieved my aim—exactly!

¹ Address made before the San Francisco chapter of the American Association for the United Nations at San Francisco, Calif., on Oct. 24 (U.S./U.N. press release 3810 dated Oct. 23, for release Oct. 24).

There is no need for me to tell you that the United Nations has entered a period of severe strain. The great questions of our time—disarmament, the ending of the colonial era, economic growth, justice for the oppressed—all these are still high on the agenda of the General Assembly. But time and again these great issues, which the U.N. was built to deal with, must be laid aside long enough for the members to cope with the multiple crises which threaten the very existence of the Organization. There are fires all over town, but now there is fire in the firehouse.

This is no time for panic or dismay. It is a time for seeing with clear eyes what the crises are, what underlies them, and what must be done to meet them.

Choice of Interim Secretary-General

The first crisis of the U.N. is the one most in the headlines: the choice of a new interim Secretary-General. The shocking loss of Dag Hammarskjöld seemed to give Moscow a golden opportunity to carry out Mr. Khrushchev's troika scheme, replacing the single executive with a veto-bound committee of three. This would have been a clear violation of the United Nations Charter. It would have paralyzed the Organization's executive arm. And it would have required the free nations to yield to that morbid delusion of the totalitarian mind which classifies this world of infinite diversity into three "blocs."

All the members know how much is at stake. What we do provisionally to fill the office of Secretary-General may well be permanent. Any decisions now which would compromise the efficiency and integrity of the Secretariat as an operating agency would be the first step on the slippery path downhill to a debating society without operational responsibilities or competence.

Through all the discussions we have been guided by just one principle: to preserve the integrity of both the office of Secretary-General and the charter of the United Nations. The charter prescribes that the Secretary-General shall be free to select his principal assistants and that he—not the Security Council or the General Assembly, but he alone—shall make these appointments first and foremost on the basis of ability and integrity, with due regard to geographical considerations.

The Soviet Union soon discovered that it had virtually no support for its troika proposal. Since

then, I am happy to say, in the discussions in New York they have shown a growing disposition to solve this problem within the principles of the charter. They said they would agree to the appointment of a single man as acting Secretary-General, but they still wanted him to choose his principal assistants on a political basis and said that he was to work with them in what they called a "basis of agreement"—which seemed to be a sort of troika in disguise.

I believe it is now possible to reach a solution without compromising our principles, and we are doing all in our power to bring this about. As for equitable geographical distribution, we have suggested a pattern under which the Secretary-General and five Under-Secretaries would cover the six main geographic areas of the world. The Soviets, on their part, seem to have given up their insistence on any sort of veto, open or disguised, within the Secretariat. Thus the next occupant of the office of Secretary-General will carry the full powers conferred on that office by the charter. This brings us very close to the moment when the members can choose the successor to Dag Hammarskjöld.

It is none too soon. The Secretariat has been without its single head since that tragic day nearly 6 long weeks ago. This is our most acute crisis. Its solution must be found this week, and I believe it will.

U.N. Financial Crisis

The second crisis is financial—and scarcely less acute. The Organization is only beginning to face it. The United Nations military operation to save the Congo, with all that this means for the integrity of nations and the peace of the world, is the biggest and most expensive action in the U.N.'s history. The cost will add up to about \$160 million by the end of this month.

Of this total more than \$59 million is unpaid. There is another \$33 million unpaid on the bills of the United Nations Emergency Force, that 5,000-man international force which still guards the border between Israel and Egypt. That adds up to \$92 million in unpaid bills.

Nor is that the whole story. Neither of these two operations has reached the point where it can be reduced with safety. The bills will keep on coming in during 1962.

Who must pay to save the Congo? The United

United Nations Day 1961

*Message of Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations¹*

This is Adlai Stevenson. We are celebrating the 16th birthday of the United Nations. I wonder how many of you remember as vividly as I do that first year, 1945, when the Second World War was over at last and we had just founded this new world organization to keep the peace.

In those days of final triumph in the World War the United States was far and away the world's biggest military power. If ever there was a time when we could have imposed our terms of peace on the whole world by sheer armed power, that would have been the time.

But of course we never could have done that, not in 1945 or any other time. The peace we value is peace with freedom—and freedom cannot be imposed by force. So we chose to promote our national security not just by frightening off enemies but also by cultivating friends. That is where the real security lies, and that is what the United Nations is all about.

The great majority of nations share with us certain common purposes: to prevent the domination of the weak by the strong; to achieve material and social progress; and, above all, to prevent war. These were the aims on which the original 51 members of the United Nations drew together. The majority remained faithful to those aims through the shocks of the cold war, the Korean war, and fighting and violence in many places.

Then, as the great colonial empires of the West were dissolved, the U.N. began to grow. From 51 members it has grown to 100—nearly double. Soon it will be well over 100. Most of the new members are new nations, former colonies.

¹ Recorded for broadcast by the Columbia Broadcasting System on Oct. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 3788 dated Oct. 9, for release Oct. 21).

Such a thing has never happened before in all history. For the first time a great imperial system is coming to an end without major war. For the first time what takes the place of the old empires is not a new empire but the joining of the old rulers and the old subject peoples in a *community*—whose name is the United Nations.

For a year now, the United Nations has been under furious attack by the Soviet Union. The attack began just as it became clear that Soviet ambitions in the Congo were being blocked by the U.N. Because of that the Soviets tried to remove the Secretary-General and to paralyze the U.N.'s capacity to act for peace.

The United Nations has not given in to these attacks, and I do not believe it will. The great majority of its members, possessing no great power of their own, have understood very well that the U.N. is their shield, and they have stood up for it. That is a great sign for the future.

Mr. Khrushchev is fond of claiming that "history" is on his side. But of course history is many-sided. It doesn't take orders from one boss. If you want to know what history is up to these days, study the United Nations. In it you will find a method for settling conflicts with some measure of fairness and without war. And I think you will also find a slow but potent chemistry for dissolving the false and futile dogmas of hatred, the suspicion and secrecy, the intolerant closed minds, the fantastic fears and enmities from which war springs.

And finally, you will find in the U.N. a bridge of community, joining us of the industrial West with a billion aspiring people around the globe. This bridge is indispensable to our security, because it helps us to make and keep friends—and when danger threatens, there is no better security than a friend. On the 16th birthday of the United Nations, let's all remember that.

States, by assessment plus voluntary contributions, has already paid nearly half—much more than its assessed share. Twenty-nine others have paid about one-eighth. The Soviet bloc, France, and South Africa say they will not pay. Others say they cannot. Others simply do not.

It has been calculated that, if matters continue as they have gone thus far, the treasury of the United Nations will be empty and its credit exhausted by the end of March 1962—just 6 months from now. How the Soviet bloc, and the promoters of Katanga's secession, and any others who find in the United Nations an obstacle to their

dreams of empire—how they must be waiting and hoping for that moment!

What is the answer?

Shall the members allow their Organization to die by financial hemorrhage? Very few indeed would be willing to see that happen.

Or shall the United Nations, in the name of economy, strike its colors in the Congo and the Middle East and resign those areas to chaos? To do that would invite wars which would cost the community of nations many, many times what these operations cost.

Or do other nations perhaps think that the

United States, although we do not call the tune at the United Nations and do not wish to, can somehow be prevailed on to pay the piper? If this illusion exists, it will have to be dispelled as quickly as possible. It would certainly be unacceptable to our Congress, and just as certainly it would be fatal to the character of the United Nations as a servant of the whole community of nations.

The stark fact is that if the members will not pay for the United Nations they will not have it. When this is fully realized, I believe the crisis will be solved and the exact shares of the cost will be worked out.

Great Issues Before General Assembly

Such are the two immediate crises of the United Nations. There are other great issues which you have read about—the mounting challenge of the arms race; a hostile Red China knocking harder than ever at the door; the explosive moral and political issue of South African *apartheid*; the unsolved problems of Communist violence against Hungary and Tibet; and the urgent need to raise living standards all over the world.

All these fateful issues, and many others besides, must be dealt with by a General Assembly grown to 101 members, twice its original size. The new members, chiefly from Africa, seem more preoccupied with condemning Western colonialism, which is in its twilight but which they have known at first hand, than with the much greater danger of Communist imperialism, which very few of them have experienced at all.

These attitudes inevitably color the debates and the votes at the United Nations. They make our work of persuasion and of finding common ground with the majority that much more difficult.

I am far from downhearted. We will meet all these problems, and in time we will solve them in a way which is tolerable to the community of nations and to our own purposes. But it will be a slow business, and we are not going to score a touchdown on every play.

Misapprehensions About the U.N.

But there is another problem about which I am concerned, and which I would like to share with you. That is the problem of being sure that, through all the difficulties which we shall face,

America's essential role of leadership in the United Nations will have the indispensable and patient backing of public opinion.

I am not worried about the voices of all-out fanaticism in this country. There are always pitiful little groups of people among us, people with some inner compulsion to hate. To them the true meaning of democracy will forever be a closed book, and in their ears the voice of dissent will always sound like the voice of the enemy. The United Nations has nothing to hope from them.

I am thinking rather of the much broader range of Americans whose instincts are deeply democratic, who have been proud to help their country carry its worldwide burdens, but who now, after 16 years of cold war and frustration, are honestly worried lest the United Nations be turned against us and even, perhaps, be delivered into the hands of its Communist enemies.

To these Americans let me say with the greatest earnestness: I share your frustrations, but I do not share your fears. I believe we must be prepared for many troubles. But as long as we of the United States continue as active leaders in the United Nations, and continue to be faithful to our purposes, I have no fear that the Organization will be turned against us.

Still less do I fear that it will ever pass under the domination of communism, whose philosophy of power and intolerance is utterly alien to the United Nations spirit.

I must say it is not surprising that these fears about the U.N. should arise, considering the amount of alarming misinformation about what happens there. I still meet people, for instance, who insist that the United Nations action in support of a united, independent Congo fitted neatly into the plans of Soviet communism. Yet it was this same United Nations action which roused Mr. Khrushchev to such fury and caused him to bang his shoe in the General Assembly and to launch his all-out attack on the Secretary-General!

Then just recently I remember seeing in a magazine that with the death of Dag Hammarskjöld the United Nations had passed under the power of none other than Nikita Khrushchev. When I see a report like that I must admit I blink a little. Can this be the same United Nations where I work—the same place where, in the past 2 weeks, the members have stood fast against Mr. Khrush-

shchev's troika, have decided that Mr. Khrushchev's disarmament plan will have to wait its turn for debate, and have cried out in outrage against Mr. Khrushchev's 50-megaton terror explosion? Evidently this Mr. Khrushchev must be a man who likes to pass resolutions against himself!

I must say I admire the skill of those who, almost every day, concede anew to Moscow the final victory in the cold war. Evidently the United States is completely finished at the close of every working day, but somehow poor Uncle Sam manages to struggle to his feet by morning so that he can be finished off again the next day.

This confusion over who is doing what to whom makes me think of the schoolboy who came home with his face damaged and his clothes torn, and when his mother asked him how the fight had started he said, "It started when the other guy hit me back."

The "Illusion of Omnipotence"

Misapprehensions like these, I think, result partly from misinformation. But there is also something more fundamental which hinders many of us in our attempts to grasp the true meaning of the United Nations—and, indeed, the meaning of our situation in the modern world. I mean that pleasant illusion of omnipotence to which we Americans have clung for so long.

We Americans are not the first to have had this illusion, but I think we will get over it more safely than some of those who have gone before.

The Mongol Khans who exploded out of central Asia, all across Siberia and to the gates of Vienna—they certainly thought themselves all-powerful, but their huge empire, having lived by the sword, died by the sword even more swiftly than it rose.

Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo—all those Genghis Khans in modern dress nourished the same dream and, even more swiftly, met the same end.

The Russian Bolsheviks were not quite so foolish. At first, when Lenin took power in Petrograd in 1917, he thought the workers of the whole world would rise in flaming revolution to support him. The fuses sputtered briefly in Germany and Hungary and then went out. The Bolsheviks tried to set the world on fire, but it failed to ignite.

So Lenin, and then Stalin and Khrushchev after him, settled down to the building of the Soviet state power and to a long-term strategy of conquest by opportunity. Communism changed from a burning faith into a scavenger of lost revolutions and a camp follower of global war.

Even today that poisonous vision of omnipotence afflicts the Communist rulers. "History is on our side!" they still shout. And in the borrowed name of "history" they do their best to scare the defenders of freedom out of Berlin and every other vulnerable point.

Yet their fanaticism has been tempered by a canny calculation of the possible. Pray God it will remain so, until the poison finally works itself out of their minds!

We Americans, to be sure, had different grounds for thinking ourselves omnipotent. We forswore conquest by military force, but we made ourselves believe that, when the Second World War was over, our heritage of democratic ideals, by its own magic, would quickly sweep the world. There is no doubt that this illusion helped to sustain us in the war. Certainly it was present at the birth of the United Nations, for which, some of us thought, no exploits of peace would be impossible.

The "Myth of Impotence"

From the first Soviet veto in 1946, blow after blow of reality fell upon this precious illusion. By now it is gone beyond recall. But the danger is that we may now swing the other way and that we may go from disillusion to despair, from an illusion of omnipotence to a myth of impotence.

Let me illustrate from experience at the United Nations.

It is said that the Soviet Union, by its veto power in the Security Council and by its bullying tactics in the General Assembly, can prevent the United Nations from acting without its consent. This is not true at all. The fact is that the Soviet Union has not been an effective participant in a single one of the major international operations sponsored by the United Nations in the past 16 years.

They do not belong to the World Bank, the Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, or the International Civil Aviation Organization.

They take no part in the humanitarian work

which the United Nations does for refugees all over the world.

For 8 years they stayed away from the World Health Organization, which grew from strength to strength during their boycott.

They have contributed little but obstruction to the International Atomic Energy Agency and are now threatening to walk out of it altogether.

As for the world-famous United Nations Technical Assistance Program, and its new partner called the Special Fund, the Soviet contributions have been small, recent, and all in nonconvertible rubles.

In the field of United Nations peace and security operations the Soviet performance amounts to a good deal less than zero.

The United Nations action in Korea was taken without them, in spite of them, and in fact against the aggression which they had sponsored.

In the troubled Middle East they have paid nothing to maintain the Palestine refugees and nothing to the United Nations Emergency Force.

In the Congo they have paid not a ruble to the United Nations efforts; instead they financed a secession movement in Stanleyville which the United Nations successfully opposed and which has now collapsed.

All those things, then, have been done by the United Nations, on behalf of the community of nations, without the consent or cooperation of the Soviet Union—and in some cases against its best efforts.

The U.N. *has not been strangled by the veto*—and may it never be!

Calling the Soviets' Bluff

It is often said that the Soviet Union is inflexible in the United Nations and that once it has made up its mind all the rest of us have to do the adjusting. This is a long way from the truth. The Soviets do indeed try to convey this illusion of inflexibility, I suppose in the hope that this will improve their bargaining position. But their bluff has been called often and successfully.

After the fall of mainland China the Russians announced that they would boycott the Security Council until the seat of China was turned over to Peiping. But in August 1950, after the Security Council had acted on Korea without them, they came back—and they have stayed ever since.

In 1954 the Soviets announced in the U.N. that the United States proposal for an International Atomic Energy Agency was an imperialist plot to manufacture atomic bombs all over the world and they would have nothing to do with it. Three years later they joined it.

In 1955 the Soviets said that unless Outer Mongolia was admitted to the U.N. they would veto all 13 of the non-Communist applicants. They did, too, but the very next day they reversed themselves and voted to let in 12. A year later they relented and let in the remaining applicant, Japan.

Now the U.N. has 101 members, and many of them are new and, supposedly, "inexperienced." But they weren't born yesterday. When Mr. Khrushchev first turned his wrath on Dag Hammarskjold a year ago and put forward his troika scheme, the new African members recognized immediately that this was an attack on the U.N. itself, their protector.

The Soviets stuck for a solid year to their position, but today they have practically no support for it.

Fulfilling the Aims of the Charter

Finally, we hear it said that the United Nations has failed to fulfill the aims of the charter and that we must look elsewhere for a better vehicle of our hopes: to regional organizations, to military alliances, to an entirely new "concert of free nations," or to our worldwide information program, to "the war for the minds of men," to foreign aid and the improvement of the lot of man; or to the Peace Corps and people-to-people exchanges; to the opening of Soviet society through exchanging people and publications; to our own military defenses; or to our religious faith, or to higher standards of ethics here at home.

But to these I say: Where is the contradiction? Does not every one of these things have its necessary place in the strategy of peace and freedom? The United Nations is not, and has never sought to be, the sole channel for the pursuit of its own purposes. Indeed, it asks of all its members that they obey the charter in all that they do.

To an open and free society like our own, this plea is addressed to the people as well as to the Government. In the preamble to the United Nations Charter it is "we the peoples of the United

Nations" who pledge ourselves to peace, human rights, justice, social and economic progress, tolerance, and neighborliness. It is "we the peoples" who have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

To no people are these famous words addressed more than to the American people. You, the citizens, through your voluntary efforts to improve our life at home and to make life more abundant abroad and through your taxes and your support of our Government in all its responsibilities—you can and must do much to sustain the United Nations and its purposes in the world.

It is written in the Bible that "to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required." I think this applies to us, the American people. For surely much is given to us, and much will be required of us for many years to come.

We must put behind us the illusions born of impatience.

It used to be possible to speak of winning a quick war, but that is out of the question today. We know that the Soviet Union can inflict such destruction on the Atlantic world that survival itself is in doubt. Equally, the United States possesses the ability to destroy much, perhaps all, of what the Russian people have built up with such labor and sacrifice over the past 40 years.

This is the ugly vision from which humanity cannot awake because it is not a dream but a reality—a reality into which threats of violence only plunge us deeper still.

So, since we don't wish to die together, we must manage to live together. We may have had our fill of negotiation already, but there is a lot more to come.

But we must be just as strong to resist the opposite illusion. We shall not win any quick peace by negotiation. For nearly a generation a deep gulf of conflicting aims has split the political landscape of the earth: a gulf between the world of the free and the world of the coerced. It may be many, many years before that gulf is safely closed.

The stern fact is that we are in this struggle for life. As Senator Fulbright has so wisely pointed out, the ones who are "soft" are not those who refuse to rush into a suicidal war but those who lack the courage to face a grim, lifelong struggle for freedom.

Great Goals, Worthy of Sacrifice

It has been said that in this struggle it is vital to "know your enemy." So it is—both so that we may anticipate and frustrate his attacks and so that, ultimately and gradually, we may learn how to make him our friend.

But the struggle also lays upon us an even more difficult duty of knowledge. It is summed up in the motto of the Greek philosophers: "Know thyself." As never before in our history, we must study ourselves, our values, our institutions, our national style, and the goals for which we strive. For the great exertions which we face can only be justified by great goals.

Too often this world struggle has been carelessly caricatured as a mere battle of the giants—an agelong duel in which two nuclear colossi test by threat and counterthreat which shall dominate the globe.

It is no such thing. Power and dominion are not the aim of this country. If they were, if all we could offer were the crushing of Soviet tyranny by a tyranny of our own, then indeed we would have no title whatever to call for sacrifice from a single free man or woman.

But our aims *are* something worthy of sacrifice.

We seek, with all the determination and faith that repeated frustration demands, a complete and completely controlled program of world disarmament.

We seek a multiplication of free and friendly contacts with the Soviet people, until in the fullness of time they and their leaders decide to open their dangerously closed society and to become full members of the community of nations.

We seek worldwide cooperation, regardless of political beliefs, for the relief of human misery; the conquest of the deserts; the development of the riches of the oceans; the eradication of famine, gross poverty, illiteracy; and the peaceful conquest of outer space.

We seek the orderly transition of all subject peoples, whether of old-style colonial masters or of Communist empires, to full political equality and self-government.

And, in the disarmed world we strive for, we seek the logical counterpart of disarmament: the building of the minimum world institutions needed to keep peace among disarmed nations, to settle disputes between them, and to prevent one

nation from imposing its will on another by any weapons, be they rifle, club, or fist.

These are our goals. If they are not great enough, let us get greater ones; for the exertions demanded of us in this dark, uncertain time, and for many a difficult year to come, will be formidable. And the greatest will be the self-restraint, the patience, and the perception—to perceive and pursue our real interests.

I do not think we dare attempt anything less. The reality in which we live is much stronger, much more unpredictable, much more perilous than any that our prophets or our ideologues ever forecast for us. Which of us foresaw the unlocking of the atom? Which of us foresaw what instant communication all over the globe would do to man and his image of himself?

All these things are new, and unless they are faced with a new spirit and a new courage they lead in only one direction—to the destruction of humanity itself. Faced with this overriding risk, we must abandon the inherited fears and suspicions of our past and try to see behind each face the troubled soul and searching heart of a man like to ourselves—*mon semblable, mon frère*.

This may entail an overwhelming effort of imagination and as overwhelming an act of faith. But how can we stem the tide of hostility without great acts? And how can we check our hideous advance toward planetary suicide without some mobilization on a planetary scale of human trust and faith?

Let me remind you of something, before I close, about what is happening at the United Nations right now. In all its 16 years, this is perhaps its moment of greatest trouble and perplexity.

But at this very moment the United States has advanced at the United Nations the most comprehensive plan for world disarmament, and of world institutions to keep the peace, that we have ever presented.²

At this very moment we are pressing in the United Nations for a worldwide, cooperative ef-

fort, in which Russians and Americans can work together, for the peaceful exploration of outer space.

And at this very moment we are advancing a plan for a United Nations Decade of Development—the most massive international attack in history on human poverty and ignorance, designed, in President Kennedy's words to the General Assembly,³ "to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations."

How soon, or how well, these ideals will prevail, we do not know. But we have acted in the belief that, for those who are truly faithful to their ideals, the darkest hour is the time to light the brightest light.

I believe the cause of freedom and peace has a glorious future in this world. And in that future the United Nations will play a mighty part. Let none of us mock its weakness, for when we do we are mocking ourselves. It is the hope of the world, and our country's pride should be that we stood by the United Nations, the meetinghouse of the family of man, in its time of hardest trial.

Letters of Credence

Haiti

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Haiti, Louis Mars, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 26. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 738 dated October 26.

United Kingdom

The newly appointed Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Sir David Ormsby Gore, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on October 26. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 740 dated October 26.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

The United Nations and the Real World

by Under Secretary Bowles¹

Each year on United Nations Day in late October we meet together to rededicate ourselves to the vision of a world at peace, to a brave new world in which nations great and small will settle their differences in harmony.

This dream of a united world is an ancient and honorable one, the product of the best in the moral and ethical and religious heritage of every great civilization. This dream will never die. Eventually, I am sure, it will come true.

But on United Nations Day 1961, against the background of Berlin, Laos, the stepped-up armament race, and the conflicts over the future of the U.N. itself, cooperation and understanding between the great powers seem remote and unrealistic. The world has never appeared so overwhelmingly complex, so agonizingly insecure, and so desperately at odds.

Yet despite its aching conflicts, I believe that the real world of 1961 is no place for a Cassandra. Although the future is exceedingly dangerous, its hopeful possibilities are infinite. If we are to understand the prospects and problems of the United Nations in this world of conflicting danger and hope, we must understand the forces at work in it.

Tides of Conflict and Hope

We are contending with two mighty rival tides, running at crosscurrent. At times these two tides seem so contradictory that we are tempted to conclude that one is the reality and the other an illusion.

On the one hand, we have the massive tide of cold-war conflict. This is the world of barbed wire

and stone walls, of sneak raids in the jungle and threats of nuclear destruction, the world of violence, distrust, and fear, of standoff and fallout. This rampaging tide of cold-war conflict has dominated the headlines since Stalin first threatened Greece and Turkey in 1946.

And yet, parallel to the arms race, coexistent with tension, and largely obscured from public understanding, another tide has been running toward freedom, toward hope, toward increased understanding and justice among nations and men.

What are the components of this less dramatic but perhaps decisive tide of human effort?

First is the movement toward national independence through which 900 million Asians and Africans have thrown off the rule of the old European trading empires to create 42 new countries within 15 years. This wave of liberation may earn more pages in the history of our time than the cold war itself.

When World War II broke out in 1939, more than one-third of all mankind lived in dependent status under the rule of the European countries. Today, less than a generation later, the number is fewer than 2 percent. Moreover, in large measure this worldwide emancipation has been accomplished without bloodshed.

Today this anticolonial revolution is entering its final and most difficult stages. It would be folly to assume that the final act of colonial liquidation will be painless. Yet the progress in recent years has been extraordinary.

The *second* aspect of this hopeful tide is the worldwide determination to attack the hunger, disease, and despair which for centuries have been the lot of the vast majority of the people of the underdeveloped world. Although the needs are appalling, an impressive start has been made in

¹ Address made at a United Nations Day luncheon at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 24 (press release 731).

providing massive technical and capital aid for their economic and social development.

Until recently the United States was one of a handful of noncolonial nations engaged in overseas aid. Now some 15 industrialized nations are offering their capital and technical skills to help speed the progress of economic and social development in the less developed areas. Much of this assistance is now being coordinated through regional and international institutions.

So here we have more positive evidence that the countertide of hope is running strong in world affairs.

Emergence of New International Communities

A *third* hopeful phenomenon has been the rapid emergence of new international communities of sovereign states which are learning to work in free association for common purposes. Since the end of World War II there has been a great reaching out across national frontiers, a groping for new forms of international cooperation, and the sudden appearance of new institutions in what remains an unplanned and still embryonic world community.

In the confusion and hurly-burly of the cold war it is easy to forget that Western Europe, the cockpit of great wars since the days of the Romans, is now being regionally integrated into a great common market of 350 million skilled peoples, with high and rising standards of living, based on an industrial complex second only to that of the United States.

Moreover, as the United States and Canada reach across the North Atlantic to establish close economic and political cooperation with this vital new European development, we see the institutional framework of an Atlantic Community gradually taking shape.

Meanwhile the institutions of our own Western Hemisphere are expanding in size and becoming more versatile in purpose. The new Alliance for Progress² looks forward to hemispheric political, economic, and social cooperation on a scale that could scarcely have been imagined before World War II. In the Act of Bogotá³ and the declaration of Punta del Este,⁴ 19 Latin American nations have joined in partnership with the United States in all-out effort to hasten their development.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

The challenge posed by this alliance is an enormous one. The Act of Bogotá declared,

... the success of a cooperative program of economic and social progress will require maximum self-help efforts on the part of the American republics and, in many cases, the improvement of existing institutions and practices, particularly in the fields of taxation, the ownership and use of land, education and training, health and housing.

This calls for no less than a political, economic, and social revolution designed to modernize and invigorate old societies and to bring new opportunities and dignity to their people.

Seven of the Latin American nations are also exploring the possibilities of a common market. Similar economic integration is moving ahead in Central America.

In southeast Asia regional planning and regional projects, including the vast Mekong River development program, are also moving through the planning stages.

Here in the creation of international agencies and associations we see further evidence of progress toward human betterment and understanding which our grandfathers could scarcely have imagined.

Complexity of the Challenge to the U.N.

Now let us consider the United Nations. How does it relate to these twin tides of conflict and hope?

In our frustration with the complex and largely unfamiliar world around us there is a temptation even among the most thoughtful and informed observers to see the possibilities only in terms of the black and white contrasts. The task of dealing with varying shades of gray is unfamiliar, uncomfortable, and unsatisfactory to many Americans. Our experience in building this great nation has conditioned us to believe that there are only two sides to every question, one right and one wrong; that if there are problems, there must be solutions; that if there is struggle, there must be total victory for one and total defeat for the other.

This all-or-nothing attitude is a vital part of the American character and one which has given us much of the special energy and determination which has typified our country since its earliest days. However, the new world with which we must deal is one of infinite complexity in which simple solutions are rarely available. We repre-

sent only 6 percent of mankind, and even with all our great industries and military power there are strict limitations on what we can do.

It is inevitable that Americans who fail to understand the complexities with which the United Nations must deal should charge that this great world organization has failed to do what it was set up to do.

At the same time, however, another aspect of the American character is helping to move us toward the mature understanding of possibilities and limitations which is basic to an effective foreign policy. I refer to our traditional appreciation of variety, to our acceptance of the give-and-take of honest differences, to our belief that a healthy society thrives not on conformity but on diversity.

This is the spirit which we must bring to all we attempt to accomplish in our troubled world. To behave otherwise by creating our own rigid doctrinaire orthodoxy, as do the apostles of modern-day Marxism, would be gravely to weaken our capacity to bring our great influence effectively to bear on the agonizing questions which confront us all.

As President Kennedy said a month ago in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly,⁵

We cannot expect that all nations will adopt like systems, for conformity is the jailer of freedom and the enemy of growth.

An added dimension to the sheer complexity of the challenge is the often overlooked fact that there are not one but many threats to the peace. In the Middle East, in south Asia, in the Caribbean, even in Africa, there are stubborn and dangerous conflicts and belligerent confrontations which have nothing to do with the cold war.

If the superpowers were by some magic to settle their differences tomorrow, some half-dozen conflicts would remain which could produce a very sizable war at any moment. And while missiles which carry thermonuclear warheads are incredibly more destructive than World War II field artillery, their aggressive use to promote national ambitions is no easier to justify.

The new nations of Africa and Asia are properly alarmed by the dangerous implications of the big-power nuclear arms race. But they should not forget that they, too, may have contributions to

make to the peace of the world in their own backyards.

Some Accomplishments of the United Nations

Now what is the record of the United Nations judged against this complex and difficult background? Certainly its development has not followed the lines laid down in 1945. The hopes for unity among the world's great powers, so tenuously constructed during World War II, failed even to survive the first years of the postwar world.

But in considering the changes of function and emphasis which grew out of the cold-war situation, let us be frank.

If it had not been assumed that the United Nations would be dominated by the Security Council, in which we have the veto, the United States Senate never would have voted to join. Yet within a few years the United States and a majority of the members found ways around this veto power; and it was this that made it possible for the United Nations to develop its capacity for executive action.

The Soviet response to this movement to transform the United Nations into a functioning world organization, capable of united action in an emergency, is recorded in its 95 vetoes, in its efforts to cripple the Secretariat, and in Mr. Khrushchev's belligerent statement of last spring in which he said he would use armed force to prevent the U.N. from carrying out any decision with which the Soviet Union did not agree.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that much of what the U.N. has accomplished has been accomplished without the participation and frequently over the opposition of the Soviet Union. And yet in spite of the determined opposition of one of its most powerful members, the U.N., and its family of specialized agencies, has acted with increasing vigor and imagination. Let us briefly consider the remarkable accomplishments of some of these new agencies.

The World Health Organization, for example, is now conducting a worldwide campaign to eliminate malaria, a disease which has caused more deaths and more loss of work than any other in history. It also has launched a campaign to help bring clean water to every village on the globe.

Last year the United Nations Children's Fund, with 98 governments participating, brought better

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

care to 55 million expectant and nursing mothers. It also examined 75 million children for yaws, at an average cost of 15 cents a head.

The World Meteorological Organization is planning a worldwide weather reporting system. The International Telecommunication Union now allocates radio frequencies for the whole world.

In addition there is the equally effective work of the other specialized agencies, of the technical assistance program, of the Special Fund, and the new and promising program for recruiting expert personnel for the developing countries. Each of these U.N. agencies is handling tasks which were barely conceivable a generation ago.

Moreover, in every field the regional economic and social cooperation through the binational and multinational agreements of which I spoke earlier is matched by the development of vigorously creative U.N. regional agencies such as ECAFE—the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East—and ECLA—the Economic Commission for Latin America.

U.N.'s Capacity To Act

The capacity of the United Nations itself for positive political and economic action was brilliantly demonstrated in the Congo during the past year. Although the final record has not been written and much remains to be done, let us briefly review the progress so far.

When the Congo threatened to fall apart in the summer of 1960, many of the 9,000 European experts who had been managing the productive facilities, the public services, and the technical branches of the economy packed up and went home. A tiny corps of some 200 United Nations experts, most of them drawn hurriedly from the U.N. Secretariat and the specialized agencies, was organized to fill the gap. These international public servants faced a situation in which starvation was claiming scores of people every day, unemployment was rampant, government revenues and exports and reserves were falling, inflation was mounting, and public services were disrupted.

By late 1960 a semblance of order had begun to emerge from the chaos; epidemics were checked, and starvation ended. Somehow, under incredibly difficult circumstances, this United Nations team of technicians and advisers managed to get the wheels turning again.

Then began an even more important task: the

long-range job of helping the Congolese to train their own administrative and technical personnel and to create their own institutions. Although this process is in its beginning stages, the results appear promising.

Thus the entire Congo performance has been an extraordinary tribute to the U.N.'s capacity for direct executive action in the complex field of economic and social development.

The Congo also illustrates the U.N. capacity to act politically to create a more solid base for peace and security. There is no need to remind this audience of the remarkable performance of the United Nations in throwing together, under the most difficult and urgent circumstances, an emergency force of nearly 20,000 men drawn from 28 countries. The ability of this organization to mobilize, transport, supply, and command a major peacekeeping force on short notice exceeded almost everyone's expectations.

The challenge in the Congo is the latest and severest test of the U.N. as peacemaker. In addition there is the record of the U.N. peacekeeping roles in Iran, Greece, Palestine, Suez, and Korea.

Finally, in addition to promoting economic and social progress and to keeping the peace, the United Nations has served with considerable effectiveness as an international forum for the airing of disputes. Although its detractors refer to this function as a debating society, the debates which take place there, in spite of the bitterness and demagoguery with which they are often conducted, are of the utmost importance.

The issues that come before the United Nations are the oldest and most intractable issues of history, which cannot be effectively aired in any other arena. The annual agenda therefore is no less than the agenda of mankind's most pressing problems in the second half of the 20th century. To mention only a few:

How can we create machinery for keeping the peace?

How can we strengthen the concept of international law?

How can we secure outer space for peaceful use?

How can we wipe out the poverty that breeds hatred and upheaval?

How can we better protect human rights and promote a greater measure of justice?

It is true that answers so far have been few and far between. But isn't it a long step toward international sanity to be able to debate them in a worldwide forum in which every viewpoint is represented and where world opinion can be brought to bear?

Cynics deny even the existence of world opinion, and cynical nations do not hesitate to flout it. Yet whatever leader or nation consistently disregards the opinion of mankind will eventually pay, and, as time goes on, I believe that the price he pays will become higher.

And here I cannot refrain from replying to the one question which ranks above all others on the agenda of mankind: the question of world disarmament.

If I correctly recall the gospel according to Karl Marx, capitalist societies are kept economically afloat only by war or the prospect of war. If this is the Communist doctrine, and no good Marxist will deny it, why does the Kremlin not agree to a program of honest disarmament with suitable controls agreeable to all of us?

According to their monolithic creed, would not a sharp reduction of defense spending in the United States bring about the collapse of our economy? Would not millions of unemployed roam the land and grass grow in our streets? And, in due course, would this not result in the Communists' inheriting the earth without a shot being fired?

If this is what the Communists believe to be true, why does the Kremlin refuse to act in accordance with their doctrine? Why do they refuse to accept our challenge to a peaceful competition between their economic, political, and social system and our own?

The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that they know that our economy would not collapse and that in such a competition they would be the loser.

An Assessment of the United Nations

How then can we assess the United Nations in the real world of 1961?

Clearly we cannot say that it has abolished the threat of war or even that it has narrowed the gap of disagreement among the world's great powers.

Yet the record is in many ways extraordinary. Although sorely hampered by the vast ideological struggle which commands the unflagging energies of free men everywhere, the United Nations has

somehow grown and developed by associating itself ever more effectively with the powerful currents of hope.

Where great issues of justice have been raised, it has served as a meetinghouse for the opinion of all humanity.

Where violence has threatened, it has time and again proved its growing capacity to divert the pressures and to preserve the peace.

Where peoples have been striving for an end to the tyranny of poverty, it has opened new paths for the indispensable cooperation in the battle against human misery.

Measured Optimism About U.N.'s Future

We live in a raucous, restless, ill-mannered world in which a community of hope exists side by side with a community of fear. The cold-war conflict is paralleled by a growing partnership between the United States, the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is this evolving world which helps shape the United Nations and which, increasingly, may be shaped by it. Indeed, I believe there is solid basis for a measured optimism about the future of this great world organization.

The new and growing nations, which now form the majority of the United Nations, most urgently need its protection and its help. Why should these nations act to weaken or destroy the international institutional arrangements which are providing them security, economic aid, and the opportunity to make their views heard? For them the United Nations Charter is the best guarantee of their right to develop their own nations in their own way.

No, the United Nations is not likely to be destroyed by the majority of its members, however recklessly determined they may sometimes appear to do precisely that. Nor are we likely to destroy or weaken it by our failure to provide the necessary support and the leadership.

President Kennedy put it very simply and directly when he declared to the General Assembly: "Today of all days our dedication to the charter must be maintained."

One final word. I cannot close without paying tribute to the man who more than any other of our generation has helped to make the United Nations what we all know it must become.

In his final report to the organization whose

voice and conscience he became, Dag Hammarskjöld issued this quiet warning:

The effort through the Organization to find a way by which the world community might, step by step, grow into organized international co-operation within the Charter, must either progress or recede. Those whose reactions to the work of the Organization hamper its development, or reduce its possibilities of effective action, may have to shoulder the responsibility for a return to a state of affairs which Governments had already found too dangerous after the First World War.

In Dag Hammarskjöld was combined an inspiring idealism with the hard common sense of

the practical politician. The real world of 1961 was precisely the world with which he was concerned, and it was in that world that he enabled the United Nations to operate with growing effectiveness.

We who carry on can do no better than to follow in the course which he charted. We must continue to maintain the vision to which the United Nations has always aspired. Only by so doing can we make the United Nations the instrument of the worldwide community of hope which its founders intended it to be.

Four Popular Canards About the United Nations

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

In this curious, endlessly fascinating business called U.N. affairs, or parliamentary diplomacy, you find yourself constantly listening to flat statements by highly educated people who ought to know better. Sometimes it's hard to reply to them right away. The maker of flat and erroneous statements may be so sure of himself that a direct contradiction would be impolite; and in the State Department we are not supposed to be impolite, except on purpose, with malice aforethought, and after proper clearance. Also the flat statements sometimes come from Congressmen and—in my special bailiwick—from U.N. delegates of other countries of the U.N., two kinds of people to whom one is supposed to be especially polite.

You may well imagine that all this mandatory politeness induces a certain frustration. Nerves get on edge; pain mounts up; and even Anacin doesn't help a bit. So, finding myself here in

Missouri, where it is a matter of faith to doubt all flat statements, I am emboldened to say some of the things that occasionally have to be choked down at diplomatic receptions in New York and Government hearings in Washington.

Four things are being said about U.N. affairs that most particularly grate on my bureaucratic nerves these days. Two of them are general-purpose canards with a long and apparently inextinguishable history:

"Democracies are at a disadvantage in dealing with dictatorships."

"There is no such thing as 'world opinion.'"

The other two are special canards about the United Nations and its future; it's my present business to be especially sensitive to these:

"The United Nations," it is said, "can't do anything significant unless the great powers are in agreement."

Or again: "The goals of the United Nations are hopelessly abstract and utopian."

¹ Address made at St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo., on Oct. 22 (press release 728 dated Oct. 21).

Since joining the Kennedy administration I have heard each of these at least 25 times, from persons or publications generally regarded as either responsible or respectable—or occasionally both. Usually the moment doesn't call for a long debate; so my reaction has to be a fast swallow and an internalized Bronx cheer. But here at St. Louis University, warmed by this homecoming to academia, confident that if I am not among friends I am at least among strangers, I would like to try to explain why the hackles rise and the saliva flows.

These statements are all, I suppose, a product of skepticism about what we Americans have accomplished, and have it in us to accomplish, by conducting a foreign policy that reaches into every corner of the earth—and into space as well. The fact is, we're doing better than we think and we're capable of doing better than we know.

The First: "Democracies at a Disadvantage"

The first of these self-doubts, that a democracy is somehow unequal to the cruel world around it, traces back to arguments among the ancient Greeks. But in its American version we best remember the way it was put by Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote so much so well a century and a quarter ago that only the very best speechwriters, like Adlai Stevenson, manage to fashion speeches without some quote from de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*.

"Foreign politics," said de Tocqueville, "demands scarcely any of those qualifications which are peculiar to a Democracy. They require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient."

"A Democracy," he added, "can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience."

De Tocqueville's famous foresight failed him here. Who is to say that the United States, which is without any doubt a democracy, has not been able to regulate the details of important undertakings, persevere in fixed designs, and work out their execution in spite of serious obstacles?

It is true that it is hard "to combine [our] measures with secrecy."

The curiosity of the American people and of

their surrogates in the press, radio, and TV has seen to that. Yet in most aspects of foreign policy we don't need secrecy nearly as badly as we need an understanding public. The best answer to the stealthy Soviet practice of indirect aggression is often not reciprocal stealth but rather the klieg light of publicity. A dozen major U.N. "presences" have shown that, when an international organization is trying to prevent its own members from subverting the political independence of a weak country, its greatest ally is not an unattainable secrecy but the unrelenting attention of an international public.

De Tocqueville's most difficult challenge is the last one. Can we await the consequences of our measures with patience? There is no doubt that this is hard work and requires rigorous training. But I suggest to you two recent examples of the fact that we are learning.

In Geneva we outwaited the Soviets for 3 long years, patiently negotiating in good faith well past the time when they started planning to resume testing at the convenience of their military scientists. This monumental ordeal by conference might in easier times have been regarded as sufficient evidence of our patience. But when the Soviets resumed their atmospheric tests, both President Kennedy and the bulk of American opinion were content to wait for several days, in spite of the pressure to announce the resumption of our own tests, to let the big lesson sink in—that the Soviets broke the moratorium on tests without advance notice and are conducting the kinds of tests holding the greatest potential danger to the future of mankind.

I draw your attention to another example, the foreign aid bill, in this year's Congress. Ever since the war, the United States Government has been justly criticized for tackling 20-year development problems with 5-year plans manned by 2-year personnel working with 1-year appropriations. But this year, in a noble action obscured by a complicated legislative history, Congress has recognized that we should plan at least 5 years ahead and has authorized an aid program with even more long-range planning in it than we ever had in the Marshall plan.

So we are learning. But the problem of keeping our shirts on is serious. As the Berlin crisis develops, we will need to make defense preparations without succumbing to war fear. We will

need to approach the Berlin peace talks without the kind of impatience that wants to reveal the whole Western negotiating position publicly in advance, before private exploratory talks can find out what the Soviets will settle for.

In international operations like the Congo, we will have to learn not to flinch at the first bullet or the first criticism. We will even need to hold our patience and sometimes our tongue when neutrals say they don't like American policy. Each of you knows from your own experience how easy it is to be decisive when a matter is not yours to decide. As a nation we have only recently overcome our own desire to sit out every other dance in the ceaseless quadrille of international politics. It should not surprise us too much if some nations, with less excuse for taking leadership than we have, should go through a period of wanting to sit out *every* dance.

The Second: "No Such Thing as World Opinion"

A leading American theologian has just been quoted as saying, "World opinion doesn't really exist."

There is, as we all know, a mischievous and persistent myth in our folklore that portrays Americans as goodhearted dullards when it comes to world affairs and our diplomats as incompetents or worse. In the latest rerun of this myth, our international naivete results in a foolish and hopeless effort to please a will-o'-the-wisp of world opinion.

The relevance of public opinion to world affairs is rejected by "realists" who contend that the policies of certain nations are not hampered by any such sentimental considerations. By the same logic it can be argued that a man dying of thirst is not hampered by any sentimental interest in water. The policies of the Soviet Union are inimical to the interests of other nations. The U.S.S.R. can cow public opinion—briefly and at a price; it can confuse opinion and even seduce it. But even for those "realists" in the Kremlin public opinion is distinctly something not to ignore, something that has to be neutralized or overcome.

Without public support, as distinct from popularity, United States foreign policy would fall flat on its face. Western Europe is today being unified by a public opinion which is insisting on European institutions in spite of all the paradoxes of ancient national rivalries. It was world

opinion, mobilized in the General Assembly, that prevented the Soviet Union from destroying the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Public opinion is not always measurable, but it is always relevant.

You will remember that our own Founding Fathers put into this nation's first state paper that phrase about "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." They surely held no illusions that a poll of the world at the time (if they could have imagined such a thing) would have resulted in a landslide for revolution and republicanism. Their commitment was not to abide by a poll or even to flatter the world. Their commitment was self-generated, inner-directed. It was part and parcel of the universal values stressed in that first Declaration of Independence.

This is the kind of commitment contained in the United Nations Charter. If enough nations really accept that commitment *for their own reasons*, world opinion is readily plugged into power.

The United Nations is a machine designed precisely to transmute opinion into power. Because we think the opinion of mankind by and large coincides with our values, we want that alchemy performed.

Without "world opinion," even so eloquent a document as the charter is merely a noble aspiration, not a working peace system. What makes the United Nations work is the fact that most of the articulate people in the world want it to work. This is the mystery in the United Nations—a mystery that defies dialectics. No delegate can enter the halls of the United Nations without feeling the presence of this mystery. So long as it is present, those who believe the United Nations is no more than a forum for the powerful will continue to be mistaken—and surprised by how resilient, how tough, the U.N. turns out to be.

The Third: "Great Powers Must Agree"

We often hear it said, around the U.N. building in Manhattan, that the United Nations cannot accomplish anything unless the great powers are in agreement. It is a dangerous doctrine. If it were true, the United Nations would not have lasted more than a few months. But it has in fact endured for 16 years, enhancing year by year its capacity to take important executive actions.

When we speak of the United Nations' capacity to act, we are talking about an executive capability

that has grown in spite of great-power disagreements. The fact is that the Soviet Union has not been an effective participant in any of the major international operations sponsored by the United Nations in the last 16 years.

In the field of economic and social development, for example, the Soviets have not even joined some of the major international organizations that serve the less developed countries with technical help and investment capital. They do not belong to or contribute to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization. They are not helping in the humanitarian work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. All of these U.N. organizations have been thriving in their absence. For 8 years the Soviets stayed away from all meetings of the World Health Organization; it grew from strength to strength during their boycott. The Soviets have not been notably cooperative members of the International Atomic Energy Agency and are currently threatening to walk out of it altogether. They have been reluctant and foot-dragging members of the other specialized agencies, contributing little and complaining much.

At the United Nations itself, the Soviets boycotted the Expanded Technical Assistance Program for a number of years. They have only recently put up any money at all for technical aid through the United Nations. They have provided only a niggling share of the Special Fund, in rubles so thoroughly blocked that the United Nations has not yet found a way to use the Soviet contribution.

When it comes to peace and security operations, the record of Soviet participation is a story of absenteeism, boycott, and unwillingness to contribute—combined, of course, with the carping and ineffectual criticism of an embittered outsider, complaining about his own decision to stay out in the cold. They were boycotting the Security Council when the Korean operation got under way and opposed all efforts by the United Nations to reunify Korea. Their contribution to the United Nations' magnificent peacekeeping record in the Middle East has been less than nil; they do not contribute to the care and feeding of the Palestine refugees. They consistently fail to con-

tribute to the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force stationed on the Gaza Strip, along the Israeli-Egyptian border, and at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet contribution to the crisis in Lebanon was not a helping hand to United Nations efforts to keep the peace but an audible rattling of rockets just offstage.

When the Congo began to slip into the whirlpool of political chaos, the Soviet contribution was not to help finance the U.N. Operation in the Congo but to contribute instead to a secessionist regime in Stanleyville, trying to break it away from the unified Congo. They have yet to pay a penny toward the Congo operation; but they have made possible contributions of cash and of arms to the Stanleyville separatists—actions just as reprehensible as those of the outside elements that are contributing to those other secessionists in the Katanga.

In all these United Nations operations, most of the other major powers have done their part. The French, to be sure, have been unwilling to contribute to the Congo operation; but even with that exception, those operations have grown strong and useful.

In the face of this record, how can anyone say that our world organization requires unanimous consent among the great powers before it can take significant actions?

The Fourth: "U.N. Goals Hopelessly Hopeful"

Let us, finally, take a look at the fourth canard, the one about the goals of the United Nations Charter being hopelessly hopeful. (A "canard," by the way, is not a duck, as you students of French might suppose; Webster's calls it an extravagant or absurd report or story set afloat to delude the public.) It is a public delusion to mistake our goals—which are indeed such useful and compelling abstractions as "peace" and "freedom"—for the very practical actions we can take through the United Nations to bring these goals a little nearer.

Our goals are the eloquent ideals of the United Nations Charter: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war; to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person; to maintain justice and respect for international law; to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger

freedom. For these purposes we have what is described in the charter as "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." But this center, and the institutions of peace that have been laboriously built up around it, are far from abstractions; nor are they pious wishes. They are practical organizations, applying pragmatic techniques to concrete tasks. And in this fall's General Assembly we are quite deliberately and purposefully engaged in building these institutions stronger, enlarging their scope and their power.

Our goal, for example, is a world without arms. But the concrete method President Kennedy has proposed² is a program which would proceed through balanced, safeguarded stages with responsibility for verification and control vested in an international organization within the framework of the U.N. itself.

Our goal is the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. But the concrete method we are proposing is an expanded international police force system, with units of national forces specifically earmarked for service with the United Nations, especially trained for defined tasks, with practical logistical support available for prompt use and with known means of financial support.

Our goal is to prevent disputes from reaching the crisis stage that makes police action necessary. But the concrete method is the physical presence of the United Nations on the spot—to observe, to find facts, to conciliate, to mediate, to judge, and to publicize transgressions of international agreements and international law.

Our goal is to preserve peace in outer space and extend to all nations the benefits of exploring it. We will in this Assembly propose concrete methods to this end:

- explicit confirmation that the U.N. Charter applies to the outer limits of space exploration;
- a declaration that outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to claims of national sovereignty;
- an international system for registering of all objects launched into space;
- a specialized outer-space unit in the Secretariat of the United Nations;

²For text of a Declaration on Disarmament submitted to the U.N. General Assembly by the United States on Sept. 25, 1961, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

- a world weather watch using satellites and other advanced techniques;
- a cooperative search for ways by which man can start modifying the weather;
- a global system of communications satellites to link the whole world by telegraph, telephone, radio, and television.

As the President said in the General Assembly 3 weeks ago,³ the time should not be far off when the proceedings of the U.N. itself might be carried instantaneously wherever men have the urge to learn, the wisdom to listen, and the wit to criticize.

Our abstract goal is economic and social progress. But the concrete methods which we have proposed are:

- designation of the decade of the 1960's as a U.N. Development Decade;
- research and demonstration projects looking toward the desalting of water, cheap power sources, and better foods from land and sea;
- expanded aid to developing nations to plan their growth, survey their own resources, and train their own people;
- reorganization of the U.N. family of agencies to handle larger aid and focus it better on the priority needs of national development programs;
- and new U.N. services to help developing nations to plan and arrange for all kinds of external assistance.

Proposals in all these fields—peace and security, outer space, and economic development—are being presented in detail by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and his delegation in their daily dealings with 100 delegations from other lands.

All of our proposals are designed to build up the machinery of peace while dismantling the machinery of war. And all are fashioned to deal with specific subjects in concrete ways through operating organizations in which practical men apply known techniques to real problems. Hopeful, yes. But impractical, no.

In this first adolescent phase of what I hope will be its long life, the United Nations has done two main things: First, it has been building useful and important executive operations in spite of the lack of great-power agreement, and second, it has provided a forum for mobilizing world

³For text, see *ibid.*, p. 619.

opinion to moderate the great conflict itself and to provide a means for all powers, great or small, to settle their disputes under internationally agreed rules. At present nations can take this or leave it alone, but its very existence helps establish the rule that in foreign affairs each country is responsible to all others. Questions like Berlin, nuclear testing, and even disarmament must essentially be worked out by those who have the power to do something about them. That these great-power discussions on apocalyptic questions are carried on under the watchful eye of smaller, weaker nations is very good—but the watchful eye should not be mistaken for what is watched.

We all hope that the time will come, eventually if not sooner, that we can entrust the destiny of Americans as well as Russians to a world security organization under conditions of general and complete disarmament. To reach this objective clearly *does* require agreement among the great powers as well as the consensus of the rest of mankind. But meanwhile let us not get into the mood of believing nothing useful can be done along these lines because democracy is weak, world opinion feeble, the great powers are squabbling, and the goal is still far distant. A great deal that is useful has been done. More and larger operations—for economic development, for peace and security, perhaps in new fields like outer space—can be set in train by action of the overwhelming majority of United Nations members, backed by those larger nations who believe in making the world community operational.

But in order to develop the United Nations' capacity to act there is one priceless and essential ingredient—the United Nations executive must be run by a single, competent, and independent-minded official, heading a Secretariat dedicated to serving the charter, a Secretariat whose staff members are international civil servants and do not report daily to the foreign offices of the countries from which they come.

Dag Hammarskjöld said to Nikita Khrushchev, when he visited him by the Black Sea just after Sputnik I, that any Secretary-General must be launched from the nation of his birth but, once elected, was as free of his nationality as a sputnik in orbit is free of its launching pad. It is high time for the United Nations to get a Secretary-General into orbit again.

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk on an American Broadcasting Company television program, "Issues and Answers," on October 22.

Press release 730 dated October 23

Announcer: From Washington, D.C., the American Broadcasting Company brings you "Issues and Answers." Today, with the answers to the critical international issues facing the United States, the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk.

Secretary Rusk, here are the issues.

Mr. Scali: Are the allies ready to negotiate with Moscow on Berlin?

Mr. Rolfson: Does the Communist congress in Moscow mean new trouble for the West?

Mr. Scali: How long will we wait for Russian agreement on a Secretary-General?

Mr. Rolfson: Will world opinion keep Khrushchev from exploding his big bomb?

Announcer: You have heard the issues, and now for the answers from Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

To explore the issues are ABC Washington commentator John Rolfson and, with the first question, ABC State Department correspondent John Scali.

U.S. Military Strength

Mr. Scali: Roswell Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, said in his speech last night that our nuclear weapons are now numbered in the tens of thousands and that we are now powerful enough to crush the Soviet Union even if the Soviets were to be rash enough to strike the first blow. Do you agree with this?

Secretary Rusk: Yes indeed, Mr. Scali. Mr. Gilpatric was making an official statement; it was a well-considered statement, and it was based upon the facts. These are the facts in the present situation. We are not dealing in the world these days from a position of weakness.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, did you know in ad-

vance about this speech? I say this because the Pentagon stressed yesterday that this speech had been cleared at the highest level.

Secretary Rusk: Yes, I went over the speech with Mr. Gilpatric, and he and I discussed it before he made it.

Mr. Scali: Does it represent a new military estimate of our strength and capacity as compared to that of the Soviet Union?

Secretary Rusk: I don't think the emphasis should be on the new estimate. I think that it is important for our public and the rest of the world to know the essential facts in this situation, and I think from that point of view the speech served a very useful purpose.

Mr. Rolfson: Mr. Secretary, you are saying then that there is not either an increase in the estimate of American military strength or a decrease in the estimate of Soviet military strength?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to specify it as exactly as that. We are, of course, making estimates all the time of these and other related matters. I think the essence of the situation is that stated by Mr. Gilpatric.

Mr. Rolfson: This does not then represent a change in power but is an estimate of the situation that has existed all along?

Secretary Rusk: Well, when I say "all along" I wouldn't want to follow that back too far, but this is the statement of the situation as we see it today.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, what makes it possible for the administration now to speak out so confidently and positively on this very critical issue?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this is a point about which there ought to be more general public understanding, because when you are in problems of negotiation, the question inevitably comes up from time to time whether you are negotiating from a position of strength or of weakness or whether you have cause to be nervous or confident. The point is that the United States and its allies are strong. Mr. Khrushchev must know that we are strong, and he does know that we are strong and that, when we talk about exploratory

talks or we talk about contacts with the Soviet Government on one or another point, this is no problem that turns on whether we feel that we are weak or not. We are not weak.

Mr. Scali: Well, Mr. Secretary, has this estimate of our military advantage been made known to the Soviets in crystal-clear terms so that there would be no temptation for a miscalculation or a terrible mistake?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think Mr. Gilpatric's speech made this known publicly, but I have no doubt that the Soviet Government knows a good deal about our strength and has a very accurate assessment of it.

Mr. Rolfson: In his speech before the Communist Party congress in Moscow this week Mr. Khrushchev quoted American leaders as acknowledging that American and Russian military power were equal. Does this new statement then mean that we consider Mr. Khrushchev very much mistaken in that?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think when we use this word "equal" what is meant there is that in this confrontation of two great power blocs each side has a capacity to inflict very great damage upon the other. Therefore in terms of handling the relationships between the two power blocs, all responsible governments need to take that into account and not act irresponsibly or frivolously or not suppose that they can press in upon the vital interests of the other side without incurring very great risks. So there is an ability to inflict very great damage on both sides, but that does not necessarily mean that in the total situation the two situations are equal.

Mr. Rolfson: Do you see any reflection of our military strength in Mr. Khrushchev's withdrawing the deadline on a German treaty publicly this week?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that any desire or effort or indication that he is ready to sit down and have some serious talks about a matter of this sort cannot help but be tied into his estimate of comparative strengths. Again, I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev is under any illusion about the strength of the West, nor are we under any illusion about the strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

In that situation responsible governments must,

regardless of their views or their attitudes—I think must if they want to be responsible—find out whether their vital interests can be protected through peaceful means.

U.S. and Soviet Positions on Berlin and U.N.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in the past several days there have been reports that the Kennedy administration has hardened its diplomatic policy specifically on Berlin and the United Nations. Is this true, and could this be tied in at all to an additional appreciation of our military advantage?

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Scali, I don't believe it would be accurate to speak of the change in mood on a week-by-week basis on matters of this sort. You will recall that maybe 2 or 3 weeks ago there was reported a mood of optimism and then a mood of pessimism and this sort of thing. This is partly because the conversations that are going on are private conversations among governments in the West and with the Soviet Union, and in the absence of public news more importance is attached to some of these questions of mood than they deserve. I do not myself believe that our line has hardened, because if you go back to the July 25 speech of President Kennedy,¹ he made it very clear that we would do what was necessary to defend our vital interests in Berlin and in Germany and that has been their position straight along. So I would not think there has been any change in the basic position of the United States or of the West in these last few days.

Mr. Rolfson: And what of the Soviet position? From your study of the 13 hours of Mr. Khrushchev's speech at the party congress, do you see in his speech overall any more reasonable attitude on any of the major issues—Berlin, the United Nations?

Secretary Rusk: Well, a 13-hour speech takes a good deal of study, Mr. Rolfson. I would think that in some of the detailed questions to which he alluded, such as Berlin, or southeast Asia, or the Congo, or whatever it is, we should not attach too much importance to what was said about those questions because they were rather broad remarks and did not themselves attempt to go into detail, but I think his public indication that they did not consider that there was a necessary date by which

they would sign their peace treaty with the East Germans was plus rather than minus from the point of view of the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. But underlying his 13-hour speech was still the basic notion which is central and critical to the history of our times, and that is that he expects the world to embrace his brand of the world revolution. This has been said last December, it was said again in January, it has been repeated again now in the last few days. This means that there is a very great struggle of a climactic sort going on in the world between those who want to build that kind of world that he is talking about and those who are trying to build the kind of world that is set forth in the United Nations Charter.

Now this is not just a case of two blocs with a great many neutrals caught in between. This is an issue between those who are trying to build a world in which independent states can determine their own domestic affairs and work out their cooperation across national frontiers on an agreed basis. That is the U.N., the basic U.N. concept. The other notion, that the Communist world revolution is historically inevitable and that the Communist states will back it in action with the resources at their command, that sets the crisis of our times.

Mr. Scali: Well, Mr. Secretary, then from what has been said in Moscow by the Communist Party chiefs, you see no sign at this stage that the Soviets will be any less aggressive in exporting this communism to other countries?

Secretary Rusk: I could not myself read into the speech made to the party congress any relaxation or any decrease of interest in their brand of the world revolution. And this is something which we shall have with us for some time to come.

Mr. Rolfson: Taking the Khrushchev speech aside, the whole congress together, as much as is known of it now, do you see any signs of encouragement for the West in this? Communist weaknesses as demonstrated by the denunciations of Albania and of the antiparty group?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there are signs that things are not as prosperous, not as unified, within the Communist empire as some of them would hope, but I would not myself believe that these problems are of great importance as far as we are concerned. I mean, for example, there has been discussion in recent weeks about some sort of

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

disagreement within the West about the problem of Germany and Berlin. It would be a great mistake for Mr. Khrushchev to believe that these differences have any bearing upon the vital issues between the West and the Soviet Union. Similarly I suppose that we must assume that there are some differences within the Communist bloc, but as far as our interests are concerned and as far as this great underlying struggle is concerned, I am not sure that these differences are very fundamental. And I am not inclined myself to speculate about the relationships between, say, Peiping and Moscow because I am not sure that Peiping or Moscow understands just what these relationships are.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in that connection General de Gaulle is represented as believing in Paris, today, that the continuing evidence of the Sino-Soviet split as illustrated by what is happening in Moscow today is all the more reason why the West should not negotiate with the Soviets at this time on Berlin. Would you agree with this?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I saw those press reports, and I believe they were attributed to French sources who in turn attributed those views to General de Gaulle; so I don't feel I am replying to General de Gaulle at this point.

We do not see the prospect of immediate negotiations in the usual sense of that word with the Soviet Union over Germany and Berlin. What has been happening has been some exploratory talks, trying to find out whether there was in fact a satisfactory basis for negotiation. This means making clear your own position, that means clarifying the position of the other side, in order to see where any possible points of discussion might arise and which points are matters of direct confrontation upon which a little negotiation is possible.

I would not suppose that the public discussion of problems now going on in Moscow would throw too much light on the possibilities of discussions between the Soviet Union and the West.

Consultations Among Western Allies

Mr. Rolfson: What of the Allied differences that you mentioned. Do you foresee the need of a very high-level conference—Allied conference—to resolve them soon?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I would doubt that an Allied summit would be required for that purpose.

In the first place there is basic agreement on the essentials in the question of Germany and Berlin, and we are in daily consultation with them through the ambassadorial group here in Washington. It may be that meetings of one sort or another might in fact develop, but there are no present plans for such meetings; and this would not be necessary in order to get the four governments in very close touch with each other and indeed to get the NATO alliance unified through consultation in the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

Mr. Scali: Well, Mr. Secretary, how about a possible visit by Chancellor Adenauer of Germany? There have been reports that he is anxious to come to talk with President Kennedy and with you, to go into the whole business of what the next stage should be and how far we should go and what we should ask in return.

Secretary Rusk: I believe there have been press reports if I am not mistaken, out of Bonn, which attribute to the Chancellor's office the information that there are no such plans in mind at the present time and that we will just have to see. These are not things that you can talk about very much in advance one way or the other because these are for the future to decide.

Mr. Rolfson: Mr. Secretary, 2 weeks ago on this program West Germany's Ambassador, Mr. [Wilhelm G.] Grewe, said he considered the talks you and President Kennedy had with Mr. Gromyko as a step backward. Do you subscribe to this?

Secretary Rusk: I don't know from what point these talks were a step backward. I think myself that they did serve to clarify certain issues. I do not suggest that they resolved or settled issues, but I would not myself characterize them as a step backward and I don't think, if you look at the full text of what the Ambassador said—I wouldn't think that was the context in which he made that remark.

Mr. Scali: Well, I think he meant, Mr. Secretary, that in terms of the Soviet position as outlined by Mr. Gromyko there seemed to be a hardening over what had been said previously to you in New York. Would that fit in with an accurate appraisal?

Secretary Rusk: I think you can't really judge a question of that sort until you actually get into

negotiations. In exploratory talks what frequently happens is that you touch upon a variety of questions, you see what the general attitude of the other side is. But simply because you are not in specific negotiations you don't follow those points right down to the end, because that in fact would then be negotiation, in which all of your allies would become directly involved. So these talks were tentative and exploratory and did not really go to the end of the trail on very many specific issues.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in that area there have been reports that Mr. Gromyko sought to impose upon West Berlin in any new arrangement an understanding that it would have no more connection with the Bonn government than, for example, Switzerland would have with it, and that it would in effect become a little international island in a Communist sea. Is this the position approximately that the Soviets are seeking to impose?

Secretary Rusk: Well, that has not been completely clarified at this point, as to their own position. Certainly from our point of view we believe that this is a matter for the West Germans and for the West. After all, the Soviet Union brought the state of war with the East Germans to an end in 1955. We brought the state of war with the West Germans to an end I think in 1954.

Now when they talk these days about bringing a state of war to an end, it can only be targeted directly at the position of the West in West Berlin. Meanwhile they have absorbed East Berlin into East Germany. They say that is not negotiable, that is not discussible. What is mine is mine, and what is yours in West Berlin is negotiable.

This could only be, so far, an attempt to intrude upon basic rights of ours and the West and the West Berliners which is just not on—this is one of the vital interests we cannot make concessions about and which we cannot yield on.

The relations between West Berlin and the rest of the world from our point of view will be up to the West Berliners and the rest of the world.

Understanding Concept of Cold War

Mr. Rolfson: Mr. Secretary, one of your Assistant Secretaries, Harlan Cleveland, on Friday night made a speech expressing concern for what

he called the danger of a rising mood of national frustration which he said could lead only to defeatism or belligerence. Do you detect that mood?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there has been some temptation here and there—one reads occasional articles about it—to try to draw up some sort of scoreboard in this thing called the cold war. I think this tends to misinterpret just what this cold war is all about.

The cold war arose because of the pressures that came out of the Sino-Soviet bloc with respect to this historically inevitable world revolution of communism about which they talk so much. Anyone who resists or opposes the extension of that world revolution is caught up in something that is now called "the cold war."

The way to measure the cold war is to recognize it as being a contest between—again between those who are involved with the Communist revolutionary movement on the one side and those who are trying to build the kind of world set forth in the charter of the U.N. on the other. Wherever you see a country that is independent, secure, relaxed about managing its own affairs, there is a victory in the cold war. And I think that when you look around the world these days and you see the great constructive forces that are at work, there is plenty of room for confidence about this long-range future, because the effort of the Sino-Soviet bloc to impose their system upon other peoples is not going to be accepted by the peoples of the world.

Mr. Scali: Do you think at the moment they are having more trouble in pursuing their objectives than we are, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rusk: I think they are running into a good deal of trouble, and I think part of it is that they are inheriting—they are discovering that such techniques as economic assistance don't produce the political miracles that they thought. We could have told them of the limitations upon the political impact of economic assistance programs because we have had a lot of experience at such programs and have never supposed that you can buy people's policies with economic aid.

They are discovering they are not achieving the miracles they might have thought possible some years ago. They started the economic assistance programs about 1954, and you will find a number of countries where they have invested very substan-

tial amounts of money where their political influence now is not significantly stronger than it was 5 or 6 years ago.

Selecting a Secretary-General

Mr. Rolfson: If we could turn for a moment to the United Nations, Mr. Secretary, you have been negotiating patiently with the Russians now for 4 weeks on finding a successor to Secretary-General Hammarskjold. How long do you intend to wait before taking action without the Russian agreement?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think you perhaps put too much of a finger on the United States in your question, Mr. Rolfson. What is happening in the United Nations is that the great majority of the U.N. have determined that troika is not on—that troika cannot be accepted, that there must be a Secretary-General with full authority and with the full confidence of the entire U.N., and that his function should not be restricted by any kind of veto or compulsory advice from his own subordinates or anything of that sort.

Now obviously there would be some advantages if a Secretary-General could be elected with the consent of all the permanent members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union. So it has been worth taking some time to find out whether the Soviets would not meet the rest of the United Nations on this point.

We believe that this has gone on just about as long as it can go on in terms of the interests of the United Nations and that this matter ought to be brought to a head now very promptly. But this is not a deal between Moscow and Washington; this is a matter between Moscow and all the rest of the U.N., almost literally, who just aren't willing to take a troika in any form.

Mr. Rolfson: When you say it should be brought to a head very promptly, could you specify how soon and what you would intend to do?

Secretary Rusk: If the Soviet Union would agree to the election of a Secretary-General as provided in the charter, they might go to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly. But if the Soviet Union blocks that and threatens to use a veto in the Security Council on this matter, then we feel, and most members of the U.N. feel, that the General Assembly has full authority, if

necessary, to make interim arrangements for our Secretary-General and that the Assembly could proceed then to make those arrangements.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, when do you think this problem will be handed to the United Nations Assembly? Next week, perhaps?

Secretary Rusk: I think it is entirely possible this may come to a head during next week.

Mr. Rolfson: And can the Secretary-General selected by the Assembly over Russian opposition function effectively?

Secretary Rusk: Of course no Secretary-General can function fully effectively if he does not have at least a reasonable cooperation from all of the permanent members. But you will remember that Mr. Trygve Lie served out, I think, 2 years of a term beyond his normal term by action of the General Assembly, and it is possible for the Secretariat to function, even though one or another great power stands aside and doesn't participate in the decision of the Assembly on the election of a Secretary-General. But, Mr. Rolfson, if you were to go back to 1945 and review the history of the U.N. and ask where the U.N. would be if it only acted in those situations where the Soviet Union was in agreement, you would have a far different organization than you have today. I mean the U.N. could not have grown had it been held back by the readiness or the unreadiness of the Soviet Union to go along.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, most of the candidates that have been mentioned for the job of interim Secretary-General have said or implied that they would not accept if it meant going through the Assembly with the opposition of the Soviet Union. Do we think that we can find a candidate who, in the event we have to go to the Assembly, will accept the job and who will be effective and acceptable to most people?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think any candidate with whom this matter would be discussed would certainly much prefer to take office with the agreement of the great powers. But what their attitude would be if it becomes clear that the Soviet Union will not or cannot agree with the rest of the Assembly I think is another matter. But I do think that suitable candidates could be found who could serve.

Mr. Rolfson: Do you expect the Assembly to pass some kind of resolution urging the Russians not to set off their big bomb? If the Assembly does, do you think it will have any effect on Khrushchev?

Secretary Rusk: Such a resolution has, as you know, been introduced by six of the countries who are close neighbors to the Soviet Union.² I wouldn't want to predict exactly what the vote might be on that resolution, but I would suppose that it reflects an overwhelming majority of at least the views of the peoples of the world and perhaps also of the governments of the world.

Now what effect that would have on Mr. Khrushchev is for anyone to guess. We ourselves hope very much that he won't go ahead with it. It is a senseless kind of explosion. It isn't necessary from the scientific or technical point of view. It doesn't add anything to his knowledge about how you do these things if for any reason you ever wanted to do it. It is one of that pointless kind of demonstrations that I think would have—that he could well give up. Whether he will or not is of course for him to say.

Communism and Cuba

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, if we can turn to our own hemisphere for a moment, Peru, as you know, has requested a special meeting of the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere to consider common action against Cuba and its efforts to export its brand of communism. Do you think such a meeting would serve a useful purpose?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we think the Peruvian proposal ought to have the most urgent and serious attention of the inter-American governments. The problem of Cuba is a problem for the hemisphere. We have been greatly encouraged in the last several weeks to see that the governments throughout the hemisphere themselves are getting more and more concerned about the nature of this problem and its impact upon the hemisphere, so that we believe that the Organization of American States must give its concentrated attention to this problem and decide what to do. Whether in fact they will take the specific sort of action that is proposed by Peru is something for the various member governments to work out, but we think

² See p. 817.

this question deserves the immediate and urgent attention of the entire inter-American community.

Mr. Rolfson: The Castro regime has been proclaiming for the last several weeks that the United States is secretly training a new invasion army. Is the United States in any way involved in aiding or abetting—

Secretary Rusk: That has been repeatedly denied. This is not the case.

Mr. Scali: He keeps repeating this charge. Why do you think he just keeps bringing it up?

Secretary Rusk: Well, he probably wants to make some propaganda out of this and to keep us on edge, or perhaps he is contributing to a debate which may come up in a little while in the United Nations. But there is nothing to it.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, we wish to thank you very much for appearing with us on "Issues and Answers." Your answers have been most illuminating, and we deeply appreciate it.

Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much, Mr. Scali.

Announcer: You have seen another in ABC's headline-making series in which leading authorities bring you answers to the issues of today. Our guest was the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State.

President Approves Project Gnome Nuclear Test; Observers Welcomed

White House press release dated October 25

The President announced on October 25 that he had approved the conduct of a nuclear experiment known as Project Gnome, which is a part of the Atomic Energy Commission's Plowshare Program to develop peaceful uses for nuclear explosives. Preparations for this project, the first nuclear explosion in the Plowshare Program, have been under way since March 1960. This is a further example of this country's desire to turn the power of the atom to man's welfare rather than his destruction.

The project involves the detonation of a nuclear device about 1,200 feet underground in a salt formation near Carlsbad, N. Mex. The date for the experiment will be fixed by the Commission at

a later time; however, it now appears that it will occur in about 60 days.

The project is a multiple-purpose experiment designed to provide scientific and technical information on: (1) the possibility of recovering useful power from the heat generated by a nuclear explosion; (2) the feasibility of recovering commercially or scientifically valuable isotopes produced by such explosions; (3) neutron physics and other scientific theory; (4) effects of a nuclear explosion in salt; and (5) design principles useful in developing nuclear explosive devices specifically for peaceful purposes.

The United States will welcome observers from interested United Nations countries as well as news media and the scientific community.

President Tubman of Liberia Visits United States

President William V. S. Tubman of the Republic of Liberia made an official visit to the United States October 17-24. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Kennedy and President Tubman upon Mr. Tubman's arrival at Washington on October 19 and the text of a joint communique based upon talks they held at the White House that day.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated October 19

President Kennedy

Mr. President, it is a great honor to welcome you and the members of your Government here on a visit to Washington and the United States.

You have occupied a position of the highest responsibility in your country since 1943, a record unprecedented at this time any place in the world. You are the only surviving political leader of those days long ago during the days of the Second World War.

You have come on many occasions to the United States, and you have come again on this occasion at a time of great change in Africa, a time of great progress within your own country. You, Mr. President, are a symbol of stability and also of change, and it is a particular pleasure to welcome to this country the leader of a country with which

the United States has enjoyed the closest and most intimate relations stretching back over a century, who has been identified in his own life and in his own country with the great causes of freedom and progress and the well-being of his people. And therefore, Mr. President, I welcome you to the United States once again. I express particular pleasure in having you here at this time and in having an opportunity to discuss with you the great changes which are occurring in Africa and throughout the world. With your long view, your long experience, you are a most welcome guest.

Mr. President, the people of the United States once again wish to join in welcoming you to our country.

President Tubman

Mr. President, the fact that you have extended us an invitation to visit you and your great country at a time like this, a time of crisis, a time of tension, is reassuring and another manifestation of a century-old friendship and intimacy that has existed between our two countries from the time of our incipiency as a nation until the present.

Through the years we have identified ourselves with your system of government. Our own Constitution was patterned after that of the United States of America, and that immortal document was written and prepared by one of your fellow countrymen, Mr. Greenleaf, and I could go on for many hours showing the cordial and very friendly close ties that have existed between our countries.

I am very happy to be here. As you well said, I have come here on several occasions, and particularly now that I know the burdens and responsibilities that you carry, it is a great expression of affection, not for me so much as for my country, of which I am particularly proud and grateful.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated October 21

At the invitation of President Kennedy, President Tubman paid a visit to Washington beginning October 19th. The two Presidents exchanged views on the present international situation and on relations between the United States and Liberia. This visit afforded a timely opportunity for the two Presidents to establish a personal acquaintance.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the strong ties of friendship and heritage which bind the two countries.

They reviewed the international situation with emphasis on developments in the United Nations. The two leaders agreed African representation in the United Nations should be given greater opportunity of participation. The two Presidents are opposed to any proposal which would compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the United Nations Organization.

The two leaders reviewed recent developments in Africa. The President congratulated President Tubman and his delegation on their leadership and contribution to the success of the meetings of African and Malagasy States held in Monrovia last May.¹ The President expressed the hope that the second meeting to be convened in Lagos in January would be equally harmonious and productive.

On the subject of economic aid to Liberia, the President reiterated the desire of the United States government to assist Liberia in its social and economic development, pointing out that it was this sincere desire that prompted the sending of a special economic mission to Liberia earlier in October to consult with the Liberian government on its development program. The President expressed his gratification that the consultations in Monrovia revealed a determination on the part of the Liberian government to pursue a program for an accelerated expansion of the Liberian economy. It was agreed that top priority in United States assistance would be given to establishment of a strong central planning agency as the basis for more extensive assistance in all development areas.

The United States government will give serious consideration to participation in a long-term loan for the Mount Coffee hydro-electric project should further site engineering studies provided for in a pending Export-Import Bank loan confirm the project's feasibility.

The President also assured President Tubman that the United States government is prepared to give immediate increased assistance in the expansion of Liberia's educational program and the provision of additional health facilities with special reference to para-medical training facilities. The United States government will further give

prompt consideration to means for participating in Liberia's plan to build a new hospital and medical training center in the city of Monrovia.

The conversation confirmed to the two leaders the profound and intimate relations between the two countries and their common aspirations to maintain peace and security and freedom in the promotion of the welfare of the peoples of the world.

Premier of British Guiana Visits Washington

Cheddi Jagan, Premier of British Guiana, talked with President Kennedy and other U.S. Government officials at Washington during the period October 23-26. Following is the text of a Department statement released at the conclusion of the talks.

Press release 746 dated October 28

During talks with the President and other United States Government officials Dr. Cheddi Jagan, Premier of British Guiana, and his colleagues described at length his country's program and aspirations for economic and social development. These talks resulted in a fuller understanding of British Guiana's problems.

United States representatives expressed sympathy with the desire of the people of British Guiana to develop their economy and looked forward to closer association between a free and democratic British Guiana and the nations and organizations of the hemisphere. Premier Jagan reiterated his determination to uphold the political freedoms and defend the parliamentary democracy which is his country's fundamental heritage.

In response to Premier Jagan's request for aid, the United States undertook to take the following steps:

1. To provide as early as possible, in consultation with the British Guiana Government, and unilaterally or in cooperation with hemisphere organizations, economists, and other experts to assist the Government of British Guiana to bring the most modern economic experience to bear upon the reappraisal of its development program.

2. To provide technical assistance for feasibility

¹ BULLETIN of May 29, 1961, p. 802.

ity, engineering, and other studies concerning specific development projects.

3. To determine as soon as possible, after the steps mentioned in paragraphs one and two and on the submission of suitable projects within the context of the British Guiana development plan, what assistance the U.S. can give in financing such projects, taking into account other United States commitments, available financial resources, and the criteria established by applicable legislation.

4. To expand its existing technical assistance program.

President Sends Anniversary Greetings to Republic of Viet-Nam

White House press release dated October 26

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

OCTOBER 24, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the sixth anniversary of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States of America is proud to pay tribute to the courage of the Vietnamese people. We have seen and marked well the anguish—and the glory—of a nation that refuses to submit to Communist terror. From the people that twice defeated the hordes of Kublai Khan, we could expect no less. America, and indeed all free men, must be grateful for the example you have set.

Mr. President, in 1955 we observed the dangers and difficulties that surrounded the birth of your Republic. In the years that followed, we saw the dedication and vigor of your people rapidly overcoming those dangers and difficulties. We rejoiced with you in the new rice springing again from fields long abandoned, in the new hospitals and roads and schools that were built, and in the new hopes of a people who had found peace after a long and bitter war. The record you established in providing new hope, shelter and security to nearly a million fleeing from Communism in the North stands out as one of the most laudable and best administered efforts in modern times.

Your brave people scarcely tasted peace before they were forced again into war. The Communist response to the growing strength and prosperity of your people was to send terror into your villages, to burn your new schools and to make ambushes of your new roads. On this October 26, we in America can still rejoice in the courage of the Vietnamese people, but we must also sorrow for the suffering, destruction and death which Communism has brought to Viet-Nam, so tragically represented in the recent assassination of Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, one of your outstanding patriots.

Mr. President, America is well aware of the increased intensity which in recent months has marked the war against your people, and of the expanding scale and frequency of the Communist attacks. I have read your speech to the Vietnamese National Assembly in which you outline so clearly the threat of Communism to Viet-Nam. And I have taken note of the stream of threats and vituperation, directed at your government and mine, that flows day and night from Hanoi. Let me assure you again that the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth.

I am awaiting with great interest the report of General Maxwell Taylor based on his recent talks and observations in Viet-Nam, supplementing reports I have received from our Embassy there over many months. I will then be in a better position to consider with you additional measures that we might take to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the Communist aggressors.

Mr. President, we look forward in these perilous days to a future October 26, when Viet-Nam will again know freedom and peace. We know that day is coming, and we pray that it may be soon. I speak for the American people when I say that we are confident of the success of the Vietnamese nation, that we have faith in its strength and valor, and that we know that the future of the Vietnamese people is not Communist slavery but the freedom and prosperity which they have defended and pursued throughout their history.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Role of the Department of State in Educational and Cultural Affairs

*by Francis Pickens Miller*¹

I want you to know how very much indeed I appreciate your invitation to meet with you today to discuss the role of the Department of State in educational and cultural affairs. I am particularly glad to have the opportunity to meet with men and women who are directing the policies of our colleges responsible for training teachers. If in America we make any genuine progress during the next few years in the fields of general education and culture, you are the people who will be mainly responsible for that progress.

As all of you know, the current administration attaches immense importance to the educational and cultural contribution which we as a nation can make to the rest of the world and also to the educational and cultural contribution that the rest of the world can make to us. On February 27 last, the President said:²

As our own history demonstrates so well, education is in the long run the chief means by which a young nation can develop its economy, its political and social institutions, and individual freedom and opportunity. There is no better way of helping the new nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in their present pursuit of freedom and better living conditions than by assisting

them to develop their human resources through education. Likewise there is no better way to strengthen our bonds of understanding and friendship with older nations than through educational and cultural interchange.

But as recent task force reports have emphasized, this whole field is urgently in need of imaginative policy development, unification, and vigorous direction. These activities are presently scattered among many agencies of the Federal Government. Only by centering responsibility for leadership and direction at an appropriate place in the governmental structure can we hope to achieve the required results. I shall therefore look to the Secretary of State to exercise primary responsibility for policy guidance and program direction of governmental activities in this field.

I am pleased that in carrying these responsibilities the Secretary of State will have the assistance of Philip H. Coombs [Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs]. His experience in education, government, and philanthropy at home and overseas qualifies him well for the position to which he is being appointed.

I have quoted the President at length because the role of the State Department in educational and cultural matters during the years ahead has been defined in general terms by this statement. We know what he expects from us, and we know the criteria by which we will be judged.

Barbarism vs. Civilization

However, in order to understand what the role of the State Department should be in days to come in the field of educational and cultural affairs, that role must be seen against the broad background of the world crisis through which we are passing. This crisis is unlike any previous crisis in the history of the human race because in previous times only a portion of the world and a

¹ Address made at the Fourth International Relations Conference of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education at Lincoln, Nebr., on Oct. 19 (press release 718 dated Oct. 18, as corrected). Mr. Miller is Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

² For an announcement of a meeting of President Kennedy with the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the U.S. Advisory Committee on Educational Exchange, see White House press release dated Feb. 27.

portion of the human race were involved in any one war or any one catastrophe. Now the entire human race is involved, and its fate is at stake. Terrible as the danger is, there is one great advantage in the nature of the crisis. The advantage is that some of us are forced for the first time to face the ultimate basic realities and values of human existence.

As I face these realities, I have become increasingly convinced that many current slogans tend to obscure for us the real nature of the crisis. Because of our proper and natural abhorrence of communism, we tend to think of the main issue before us as being that between the system of society envisioned by Karl Marx and the system which we call "the American way of life." Obviously that is one of the principal issues. But there is a more profound issue with which men have been struggling through the centuries and out of which struggle our way of life has developed. This more profound issue is between the rule of barbarians and the rule of civilized men. A barbarian is any man who uses coercion, force, and terror as the normal means of making his views prevail. A civilized man, on the contrary, is one who trusts primarily in reason and persuasion as the means of attaining his goals. He prefers to appeal to the better instincts in people rather than to the worse, and he believes that government based on the consent of free men should be the goal of all peoples in every part of the world.

At this point I should like to mention in passing that there is great confusion in our thinking about the connection between scientific knowledge and civilized living. There is no necessary correlation between the two. A great scientist may have the instincts of a barbarian or at any rate may be willing to put his services at the disposal of barbarians. And a great scientist may also be a thoroughly civilized person dedicated to the service of civilized society. Science is good or bad depending upon the uses to which it is put.

Barbarians are not confined to any one nation. If my definition were adopted, it would appear that we even have some of them in the United States. But fortunately they constitute, for the time being at any rate, a tiny minority in this country, and at present they exercise no political power. The tragedy of the present hour is that there are countries composed of civilized people

where the men who have gained control of government use the methods of barbarians.

The struggle between civilized men and barbarians is being waged on every continent, in every nation, and in every aspect of life. Private citizens are engaged in this warfare as well as governments, private industry as well as government-controlled economies, private institutions of education and culture as well as government-controlled institutions of education and culture.

Increasing the Number of Civilized Men

As I envisage the role of the State Department in this field, it is to help create conditions conducive to increasing the number of civilized men in every land where we have any influence. As the number increases we would also hope that there would be a corresponding increase in their political influence.

The Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs is the officer responsible for seeing that the role of the State Department is well planned and well executed. He has two major responsibilities. First, he has an overall responsibility for providing policy guidance and coordination for Government-wide activities in the field of international educational and cultural affairs. Where, for instance, two different Government agencies are providing competing classes in the English language in the same African village, it is his business to see that the competing agencies use their resources more wisely.

The other major responsibility of the Assistant Secretary is for the activities of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in its planning and direction of exchange programs, including programs for professors and students as well as for leaders and specialists in many different fields of creative activity.

The role of any organization is of course limited to some extent by finances available to it and the personnel at its disposal, and this is true of the bureau. In spite of these limitations, one of the things that has impressed me most, as a relative newcomer to the State Department, is the infinite variety in types of exchanges which are currently taking place. It would require a whole morning to describe fully the Government-sponsored flow of people between the United States and other nations. If we were to stand on the bank and watch the flow, we would see Helen Hayes and her

repertory company, Indian and Midwest farmers, a University of Michigan band, industrial and financial leaders, representatives of International Farm Youth organized by 4-H Clubs, women's groups from Latin America, youth and social workers from 30 different lands, and countless others. As far as those who come to the United States are concerned, some stay only a few weeks, some stay a full year, some several years. They visit every part of the country; they are received as guests in our homes; they meet Americans of all walks of life. Surely out of this intercourse much good will come. It is essential for us to become intimately acquainted with the people of other cultures, and let us hope that it will be equally beneficial for them to get to know us and our way of life.

What an opportunity is ours, for example, in the number of foreign students who are now coming to this country! There are more than 55,000 students from other lands at work this winter in our colleges and universities. Regardless of what some of their political leaders may think about us or say about us, young men and women in increasing numbers want to come to the United States from every other continent to secure an education. The other day in one of the African countries it was announced on the radio that two Americans would be at a certain place the following morning to interview students who might want to come to America. Between 700 and 800 young men turned up, some of them having walked all night to get there.

This passion for education is rising like a tide throughout the newly developing nations of Africa. Education in the United States is now more or less taken for granted. But we can understand and sympathize with the growing desire of African youth to know, because it is like a page out of our own past history. This rising tide is a force which we have to take into account and guide into constructive channels as best we can. You know from your own experience that, if a boy comes to this country unprepared and without funds, he may meet tragedy during his stay here and return to his own country a bitter enemy rather than a trusted friend. On the other hand, these thousands of students could function as a peace corps in reverse, if we give them here the educational experience they seek.

Coordination of Work With Foreign Students

In view of the steadily growing number of students from other lands who have come here to complete their university work, it has become increasingly apparent that the role of the State Department in relation to foreign students had to be reconsidered. Until last month there was no office in the Government of the United States concerned with the welfare of all foreign students. The responsibility of the Student Division of our Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was limited to students who came here on Government programs. The welfare of other students was the concern of the colleges where they were studying, of the communities in which they resided, and of a large number of voluntary agencies working both nationally and locally. However, it had become clear that there was need for some central policy guidance and coordination of effort. There was need, for example, for more careful screening in the field to insure that those who came were properly qualified and had sufficient means. There was need for more imaginative placement. Further, it seemed desirable for some Government agency to encourage the organization of more complete counseling services in the colleges and also to enlist the support of citizens generally in providing the kind of hospitality which would insure a more normal life for these young men and women far from their homes in other lands. With all this in mind the State Department announced last August the appointment of a Director of Foreign Student Affairs, responsible for organizing an office in the bureau to develop the Government's proper role in relation to all foreign students resident in this country. I am sure you will agree with me that this is an encouraging step forward.

Among other heartening things which have recently happened was also the passage by the Congress of the new Fulbright-Hays Act,³ which at one and the same time is a compilation of existing legislation and also broadens the scope of our program.

While many of the fundamental features of the act are reenactments of existing authority, there are several important innovations. All foreign students in the United States, for example, are eligible for the first time to receive orientation

³ H.R. 8666.

and counseling services supported by the Federal Government, whether or not they are receiving any other form of assistance. The Federal Government is authorized for the first time to cooperate with other countries by contributing to the cost of sending their artistic performers and athletes here on nonprofit tours. An authority to support participation by foreigners in international competitions, festivals, and similar assemblies in the United States is also provided.

The authority to support research and development pertaining to international educational and cultural affairs is amplified. Greater flexibility is permitted in making use of either dollars or foreign currencies to provide funds for the program. The authority is enlarged to use commissions abroad made up of Americans and representatives of other countries in connection with all aspects of the program, and this authority is extended to the establishment of such commissions on a regional basis. Finally, there is some liberalization of tax and immigration provisions for the benefit of exchange visitors.

With the authority provided by this new legislation, we are confident that we can move forward effectively to meet the opportunities that await us in Latin America and Africa. At the special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on August 17, 1961, the delegates expressed their purpose:⁴

To wipe out illiteracy; to extend, as quickly as possible, the benefits of primary education to all Latin Americans; and to provide broader facilities, on a vast scale, for secondary and technical training and for higher education. . . .

This declaration expresses the conviction of the nations of Latin America that these profound economic, social, and cultural changes can come about only through the self-help efforts of each country.

The Challenge and Opportunities

We dare not let this challenge go unmet. If we do, we will prove ourselves unworthy of our heritage. One of the most exciting suggestions which have come to my attention recently has been the proposal that 250 teachers of Spanish in American schools spend a year in Latin America teaching English, while 250 teachers of English whom they

replace there come to the United States and teach Spanish in their posts here. This kind of exchange would cost very little and would accomplish many different things at the same time. Our teachers of Spanish would bring back with them greater speaking skill and also deeper understanding of our neighbors to the south. And while the Latin American teachers were perfecting their American English as teachers of Spanish in our schools, they would also have an opportunity to get to know that Yankees have some good qualities, too.

The door is open in Latin America.

It is wide open in Africa for anything and everything that we have to give in the educational field. Speaking in Addis Ababa on May the 23d, 1961, the Assistant Secretary said:

President Kennedy's new foreign assistance program will place even greater stress upon the development of human resources as a prerequisite for national development. It will embrace a concept of development broad enough to include the whole process of nation-building, not simply economic growth but social and educational development as well.

The opportunities in Africa for developing human resources are simply unlimited. Our help is wanted everywhere, whether it be in finding a vice chancellor for a new university, or in providing financial support for universities that are requesting millions, or in taking care of students who have no university to attend in their own country. One of the most interesting things we have done recently is to encourage the organization at Lincoln University near Philadelphia of a Center for African Students from countries where opportunities for educational advancement are currently limited.

You may well ask, "How am I related to the State Department's role?" The answer is that every one of you is related to the extent of your interest and ability. Your relationship may consist in offering hospitality in your home to a foreign student. Your relationship, on the other hand, may consist in participating in one of the exchange programs or in offering your services to one of the new educational institutions being organized in the newer nations. Even if you never participate yourself in one of the Government's programs, you can make a direct contribution to the struggle that is going on for the control of the

⁴ BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

world between civilized men and barbarians. You can do this through the kind of teachers you train—teachers dedicated to excellence in every walk of life; teachers dedicated to freedom and who understand what freedom means; teachers dedicated to government based on the consent of the governed and who are aware as citizens of a free society what is involved in securing the consent of the people. You may not yourself be able to participate in building the civilization of the future, but you can make the men and women who are going to make the new civilization.

There is another contribution of very great importance which you can make. This is a contribution which could be made through your American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. The State Department is anxious to work out with your association some special exchange projects under the P.L. 480 program. I was amazed to be told that no such exchange projects exist at present. With your unique relationship with nearly 600 schools and colleges of education, it would appear that you are ideally constituted to engage in a program of this kind, and I sincerely trust that before many weeks have passed we may be able to work out a mutually acceptable plan with you.

As we face the future, we can go forward with confidence because we know that the moral forces of the universe are on the side of free men. The wall in Berlin is an admission that a system which has to rely on a wall to keep its people in is contrary to human nature. How else can you explain it? If the rulers of a nation have to prevent their people from leaving by barbed wire, machinegun nests, and walls, they must feel rather insecure about the future. They would not build walls unless they were afraid. And the thing that they fear most is that the human beings who are supposed to benefit by their system will just walk out on them. It has been well said that the thousands who rushed over the border this summer voted with their feet, and there are no doubt many thousands left behind who would get out if they could.

The wall in Berlin is a symbol of tremendous significance. It is a symbol of immense tragedy, but it is also a symbol of hope. The barbarians can destroy the world with their nuclear weapons, but they cannot quench the free spirit of man. It is our responsibility to encourage that spirit wherever we find it.

Two U.S. Research Firms To Study International Aviation Problems

N. E. Halaby, chairman of a committee appointed last month by President Kennedy to review U.S. international aviation policy, announced on October 25 (White House press release) that Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., and Systems Analysis and Research Corp. have been jointly awarded a contract to conduct a broad study of international aviation problems. The study is designed to aid the committee in developing new U.S. international air transport policies.¹

The two economic research firms, both with offices in Washington, have selected Franz B. Wolf of the Nathan organization to be project director of the study. Key figures from the two firms working on the study will include Robert R. Nathan, and Nat S. Simat and Sam I. Aldock, president and vice president of SARC.

Among the items the two firms will consider is the present system of granting international routes by bilateral agreements between the two countries whose airlines are involved. Whether these agreements have operated, or will continue to operate, to the best interest of the United States will be one of the major questions investigated.

The committee conducting the study was appointed by the President in response to a recommendation in the recent Project Horizon report.² It is composed of:

N. E. Halaby, Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency
Kenneth R. Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget
Alan S. Boyd, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
C. Daniel Martin, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation
Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
F. Haydn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
James P. Grant, Deputy Director for Program and Planning, Agency for International Development

¹ For a statement made on Sept. 22 before the Senate Commerce Committee by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning a resolution authorizing an investigation of international air transportation matters, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1961, p. 684.

² *Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals*, Federal Aviation Agency 1961; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; price \$1.50.

Committee I Considers Items on Nuclear Testing

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

This committee is now beginning the substantive discussion of the two agenda items on nuclear testing.

The United States delegation has asked to speak at this time in order to make a preliminary special statement. During the debate to follow, Ambassador [Arthur H.] Dean will present the United States position on the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing, and he will explain the United States views on this matter in full detail. He will make clear the purposes and objectives we have in mind.

But the preliminary special statement which my Government wishes to make at the very outset of this discussion concerns the emergency confronting this committee and the world. The Soviet Union is now nearing the conclusion of a massive series of nuclear weapon tests. Unless something is done quickly, the Soviet testing will necessarily result in further testing by my country and perhaps by others.

There is still time to halt this drift toward the further refinement and multiplication of these weapons. Perhaps this will be the last clear chance to reverse this tragic trend. For if testing is stopped, the terrible pace of technological progress will be decisively retarded. A ban on tests is, of course, only the first step; and the control and destruction of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is the ultimate goal. But it is an indispensable first step.

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Oct. 19 (U.S. delegation press release 3807) during debate on agenda item 72—"The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control"—and item 73—"Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal." For a U.S.-U.K. draft resolution on item 72, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.280; for an Indian draft resolution on item 73, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.283/Rev. 2 and Rev. 2/Add. 1.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I must inform the committee that the United States is obliged in self-protection to reserve the right to make preparations to test in the atmosphere, as well as underground. But the United States stands ready to resume negotiations for a treaty tomorrow. We will devote all our energies to the quickest possible conclusion of these negotiations, either here or in Geneva. If the Soviet Union will do the same and stop its tests, there is no reason why a treaty with effective controls cannot be signed in 30 days and this suicidal business ended before it ends us.

But, I repeat, unless a treaty can be signed and signed promptly, the United States has no choice but to prepare and take the action necessary to protect its own security and that of the world community.

I trust that this expression of hope for the triumph of reason will convey some measure of the depth of our feeling about the subject and of our desire to do our share to save the human race from a greater menace than the plagues which once ravaged Europe. We believe we have done our share and more, ever since the United States proposals of 1946. I remind you that, if those proposals had been accepted by the Soviet Union, no state would now have nuclear weapons and we would now not be engaged in such a perilous crisis.

I have claimed the privilege of making this declaration for the United States because few delegates, I dare say, feel more deeply about this matter than I do, in part, perhaps, because I proposed that nuclear tests be stopped almost 6 years ago—and lost a great many votes in the 1956 presidential election as a result. Had the nuclear powers agreed even then, think how much safer and healthier the world would be today.

I pray we do not lose still another chance to meet the challenge of our time and stop this death dance.

Immensity of the Problems

I confess a feeling of futility when I consider the immensity of the problems which confront us and the feebleness of our efforts to deal properly with them. We have lived for 16 years in the atomic age. During these years we have in-

generously and steadily improved man's capacity to blow up the planet. But we have done little to improve man's control over the means of his own destruction. Instead we have worried and wrangled and talked and trifled while time trickles away and the hands of the clock creep toward midnight.

I would not imply that the problems of control are easy. Just as the nuclear bomb itself lays open the inner mysteries of science, so the attempt to control the nuclear bomb cuts to the core of our political ideas and mechanisms. As the bomb itself represented a revolution in science, so the control of the bomb may in the end mean a revolution in politics.

But we must not let the very immensity of the problem dwarf our minds and our calculations. We must act, and we must take hold of the problem where we can. One obvious way is to tackle the question of nuclear testing. No one would argue that the abolition of testing would itself solve all our problems. It would mean only a small beginning in the assault on the institution of war. But, in a world of no beginnings, a small beginning shines forth like the morning sun on the distant horizon. We have talked long enough about the horror which hangs over us. Now is the time for us to get down to business—to fight this horror, not with soft words and wistful hopes but with the hard weapon of effective international arrangements.

This view shapes our attitude toward the Indian resolution. As I have said, we share the hatred of the sponsors of this resolution for the whole wretched business of nuclear testing. We are just as determined to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spread of such weapons to countries not now possessing them, the contamination of the atmosphere, and the bellowing threat of nuclear war. We want to stop these things dead—before they stop us dead.

Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Tests

The world now knows from bitter experience that an uninspected moratorium will not secure the results which the sponsors of the resolution seek. For almost 3 years, representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met at Geneva to work out a plan to bring nuclear testing to a definitive end. Signifi-

General Assembly Urges Soviet Union Not To Test 50-Megaton Bomb

*Text of Eight-Power Resolution*¹

The General Assembly,

Seized with the question of halting nuclear weapons tests,

Solemnly appeals to the Government of the Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out their intention to explode in the atmosphere a 50 megaton bomb before the end of this month.

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1632(XVI) (A/C.1/L.288/Rev. 1) ; adopted in plenary session on Oct. 27 by a vote of 87-11 (Soviet bloc, Cuba, and Outer Mongolia), with 1 abstention (Mali).

cant progress was made. The conference adopted a preamble, 17 articles, and 2 annexes of a draft treaty.²

I have here a document which is a history and analysis of the conference, which my Government is issuing today as a white paper.³ This document will be distributed by the United States to all delegations.

When President Kennedy took office, he ordered an immediate review of United States policy in order to overcome the remaining obstacles to a final agreement. When Ambassador Dean went to Geneva in March, he brought with him a set of proposals designed to meet all the legitimate Soviet reservations. At Geneva, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted comprehensive treaty proposals⁴ aimed at ending the fear of nuclear tests and radioactive fallout through a pledge by all signatory nations to cease all tests of nuclear weapons—a pledge backed and secured by effective international inspection.

But the representatives of the Soviet Union re-

² For texts, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960* (Department of State publication 7172), pp. 376-387; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., price \$1.25.

³ *Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations* (Department of State publication 7258); limited supply available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

⁴ For text, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 870.

acted very oddly to this generous and determined attempt to reach an agreement last spring. They rejected positions they had already taken. They renounced agreements they had already made.

Soviet Resumption of Testing

The whole world familiar with this subject wondered at this Soviet performance. Experts pondered their tea leaves and produced laborious speculation to explain the Soviet change of heart. Alas, we understand today the brutal simplicity of the reasoning behind the Soviet reversal. We now know that the Soviet representatives at Geneva had long since ceased to negotiate in good faith. We now know that, while Mr. [Semyon K.] Tsarapkin was fighting his delaying action at Geneva, the Soviet scientists and engineers and generals were secretly laying plans for the resumption of nuclear testing—and worse than that, for the resumption of testing in the atmosphere.

Let us make no mistake about it. You cannot decide to resume testing on Monday and resume in effect on Tuesday. A sequence of tests of the sort with which the Soviet Union is currently edifying the world requires many, many months of preparation. In an open society, like that of the United States, such preparation simply could not be undertaken in secrecy. But in a closed society almost anything can be done without publicity or disclosure.

And so, while the Soviet representatives condemned nuclear testing at Geneva, the Soviet Government prepared for nuclear tests in Russia. Then they announced their decision to resume testing just 2 days before the unaligned nations gathered at Belgrade. With no apparent motives except intimidation and terror, Chairman Khrushchev boasted of 100-megaton bombs.

Today, 7 weeks after the Soviet Union began to test nuclear weapons again, and after it has tested more than a score, the Soviet Union has finally told its people that its nuclear explosions are actually under way. Cushioning the shock to its people, the Soviet leaders announced the end of the current series instead of the beginning. And Mr. Khrushchev has decided to bring the Soviet program to a crashing conclusion with a 50-megaton bomb.

Are we supposed to be grateful that Chairman Khrushchev has decided not to reach at a single

leap his announced goal of the 100-megaton weapon?

As everyone knows there is no military purpose whatever in such gigantic weapons. For years the United States has been able to build such weapons. But we are not interested in the business of intimidation or bigger blasts.

Now, in a single instant, the Soviet Union intends to poison the atmosphere by creating more radioactivity than that produced by any series since 1945. It may interest the members of this committee to know that from this one test the 30–60 degree north latitude band of the world, where 80 percent of all of the people of the world live, can expect to receive two-thirds as much new fallout as was produced by all of the fallout produced by all of the tests since 1945. Why must they insist on exploding a 50-megaton bomb? It is not a military necessity.

What an Uninspected Moratorium Means

And no doubt, when the present sequence of tests reaches its cataclysmic conclusion, the Soviet Union will piously join in the movement for an uninspected moratorium. Let us be absolutely clear what an uninspected moratorium means. A moratorium serves the cause neither of peace nor of international collaboration, nor of confidence among nations. We were all in this trap before. We cannot afford to enter it again. The United States will not do so.

We do not believe that nuclear testing will ever be abolished by exorcism. It will be abolished only by action. I would plead with the members of this Assembly, which has been called the conscience of the world, to demand not more words but more deeds.

Standing alone, a treaty banning nuclear weapons would be an immense leap forward toward sanity. It would bring about a number of tangible gains for humanity. It would slow down the arms race. It would eliminate all danger from poisonous materials cast off by nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. It would check the multiplication of new types of nuclear weapons and discourage their spread to additional nations, thereby reducing the hazard of accidental war. Above all, it would mark a great adventure in international collaboration for peace.

Out of our experience with a test ban treaty can come a mutual confidence, the tested procedures, and the concerted policies which will enable the world to mount a wider and deeper attack on war itself. If nations can set up a collective system which abolishes nuclear tests, surely they can hope to set up a collective system which abolishes all the diverse and manifold weapons of human self-destruction.

The world is asking for bread. Another moratorium resolution would offer it not even a stone. The United States stands ready today, as we have stood ready for many months, to sign a treaty outlawing nuclear tests. As I have said, until such a treaty is signed, we have no choice, as a responsible nation, but to reserve our freedom of action.

U.S. Eager To Resume Test Ban Negotiations

So, at the risk of repetition, let me state again the position of the United States. The Soviet nuclear test series which began September 1 is approaching its announced conclusion. While thorough analysis of the Soviet tests will require some time, it is already completely clear that the Soviet tests will intensify competition in the development of more and more deadly nuclear weapons. Thus these tests have increased the possibility of ultimate disaster for all of mankind.

There is only one safe and sure way to stop nuclear weapons tests and to stop them quickly. That is to conclude a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests under effective controls.

In the last 3 years the negotiations at Geneva made significant progress toward such a treaty. The United States is still willing and eager to resume these negotiations. If in this fateful moment all three countries involved will really devote their skills and ingenuity to achieve agreement, not evasion, deceit, and equivocation, there is, I say, no reason why a nuclear test ban treaty with effective controls cannot be signed within 30 days.

United States negotiators are ready to sit down at the table with Soviet and British representatives for this purpose. But until there is a treaty and tests can be stopped, the United States, as a

responsible nation, must prepare to take all steps necessary to protect its own security.

Mr. Chairman, an unsuspected moratorium will only lead the world once again into the morass of confusion and deceit. A test ban treaty is the path to peace.

If the Soviet Union really wants to stop nuclear testing, we challenge it to join us now in signing a test ban treaty.⁵

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimcographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

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- Letter dated September 9, 1961, from the Soviet permanent representative to the United Nations on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi. A/4865 and Corr. 1. September 11, 1961. 4 pp.
- Letter dated September 9, 1961, from the Netherlands permanent representative to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General on the election of the members of the International Law Commission. A/4866. September 13, 1961. 3 pp.
- Letter dated September 12, 1961, from the permanent representatives of the Commonwealth nations to the United Nations concerning disarmament. A/4868. September 14, 1961. 3 pp.
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- Report of the Secretary-General on supplementary estimates for the financial year 1961. A/4870. September 16, 1961. 36 pp.
- Report by the Secretary-General on offers by member states of study and training facilities for inhabitants of trust territories. A/4876. September 18, 1961. 22 pp.
- Report of the committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the charter. A/4877. September 18, 1961. 3 pp.

⁵ On Oct. 25 Committee I adopted a motion to adjourn temporarily the general debate on items 72 and 73 in order to undertake immediate consideration of the eight-power draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1) appealing to the Soviet Union not to explode a 50-megaton bomb in the atmosphere.

Economic Growth and Investment in Education

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development held a Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education at Washington, D.C., October 16-20. Following are texts of remarks made by Secretary Rusk and an address made by Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Philip H. Coombs before the opening session on October 16.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 713 dated October 16

It's a very great pleasure for me to take a few moments this morning to welcome you to this OECD Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education. I regret very much that after a very few minutes of remarks I must absent myself and not remain for the rest of the program. One of the prerequisites of my office is to appear at airports to receive distinguished guests (laughter), and I must go thither right away.

The combination of an interest in economic growth and education is something which strikes a particular responsive chord here in the United States. We are delighted that you come here as the first OECD-sponsored conference in the United States, one of your newest members. We hope it will not be the last.

We in this country have very great expectations about the possibilities of OECD. And we pledge that we shall give it our very strongest active support in these crucial years ahead.

It is somewhat encouraging at a time when there are so many crises, large and small, on the agenda to be with a group which is settling down to get some of the world's work done, despite these crises of the particular day.

The United States, the American people, have had from the beginning what some people have called an inordinate national interest in education.

From the very beginning we emphasized on these shores a strong attachment to the educational process. First it was to educate ministers and our other professional manpower. But something very important happened in the middle of the 19th century, which is directly related to our topic today. Because we then were a rapidly developing country, we had great potential of resources, great shortages of trained manpower. We had a continent to open up and develop.

Next year we shall be celebrating the hundredth anniversary of what we call our land-grant college system. Those land-grant colleges and universities were invented in essence to assist in the process of development. They did not phrase it that way at the time, but that in fact was the purpose which underlay our interest in agricultural, mechanical colleges, and that indeed has been the role played by these great institutions.

Alongside of them have been hundreds of private institutions and indeed tax-supported collateral-type universities, which have played more traditional roles. But for us in this country education is not something which is a luxury which can be afforded after development has occurred; it is an integral part, an inescapable and essential part of the developmental process itself.

U.S. Experience in Development

Many of you come from countries which reached a degree of economic and social development long before you were born. One thing you might bear in mind, as you think of some of the exuberance, some of the enthusiasm, some of the naivete, if you like, which you might find here in this country about the possibilities of development, is that the more spectacular development of the United States has occurred literally within the generation of people now living; that is, many Americans coming from different parts of the country grew up

in a predevelopment community or environment, on prescientific farms, in communities where there was no medical care, where doctors were relatively unknown, where science and technology had not begun to make their contribution to development.

So that whether you are talking about the Vice President of the United States or many of our citizens in the ordinary walks of life, you will be in touch with people who remember in their own experience what development can mean—and development under free institutions.

We are not ourselves willing to concede special advantages to totalitarian systems in this field of rapid development, because we believe that we have experienced personally and directly the transformation of the lives of people within one generation by the processes of economic growth under free institutions. And in that process education has played a most vital role. Indeed, I suspect that the Soviet Union today is getting a dividend of a lot of morale out of an aspect which has little to do with communism as such. For the first time in Russian history the sons of peasants, the sons of lowly workers, and their daughters, have an opportunity to study medicine, to study law, to turn to science, to teach in universities, to take hold of opportunities which their fathers could never have dreamed about.

We had some of this experience ourselves in the first half of this century in many parts of the country. And that produces a surge, an interest, a liveliness, a morale which is of very great importance in this process of development, because development depends upon people, their attitudes, their aspirations, their energies, and their willingness to do something about it directly themselves.

One of our problems today in this country is that so many of these things are just now beginning to be taken for granted. In families where the grandfather might have been the only one of 12 children who went to college, all of his grandchildren will go to college, because of the change in the educational opportunities that we find here in this country.

“People Are the Bottleneck”

I would suggest that the bottleneck in development today right around the world is not exclusively money or capital resources; a crucial bottleneck continues to be people.

During the years when I was working for the

Rockefeller Foundation, more often than you will imagine, funds were marking time because there was not the qualified manpower either on the giving side or on the receiving side to make those funds profitable on the other end.

I think if we look at the problems of development in country after country outside the West we shall find that people are the bottleneck, and this means that education has a crucial role to play. And this I suspect is the great difference between the possibilities of a program like the Marshall plan and the problems of the developmental programs in the non-Western parts of the world which we see at the present time.

So today in this country we recognize that education has a variety of roles to play. The democratic institutions cannot exist without education, for democracy functions only when the people are informed and are aware, thirsting for knowledge, and are exchanging ideas.

Education makes possible the economic democracy that raises a social mobility, for it is education that insures that classes are not frozen and that an elite of whatever kind does not perpetuate itself.

And in the underdeveloped economies education itself stimulates development by diplomatically demonstrating that tomorrow need not be the same as yesterday, that change can take place, that the outlook is hopeful.

Even in developed economies, education is a key to more rapid and more meaningful economic growth. The old adage has never been more true than today that there is plenty of room at the top. Advanced education is the base on which research and development rests, and the foundation of technological progress.

But it is through mass education that the discoveries of the laboratory are applied in the production process, insuring more rapid growth than could occur merely through interest in the acres of land or the number of machines and the total number of man-hours worked.

Knowledge can be found by the few, but it must be applied and distributed by the many. This conference will speak of education as investment rather than as expenditure. For education is an investment and a good one. It yields a high rate of return.

It is no secret that this administration believes in education in this country, and in our aid programs we shall devote increasing proportions to

educational development, not merely because education is a vitally important social service, as it is, but because education is a good investment, as it is.

This administration believes that educational systems and institutions make possible such increases in productivity that they merit support through loans and credits as a form of investment, not only through grants as a form of expenditure. We see clearly that a country's richest assets are not its factories, its roads, its bridges, but its people. We will do our share in aiding the development of this human capital, for this is the richest natural resource of all. And it is indeed fortunate that education, desirable in and of itself, makes sense in economic terms as well.

And so I extend to you my greetings and the welcome of my Government. As you enter your deliberations, you will be discussing that most important of subjects, the people. History indeed shows us that it is people, not things, that ultimately count. And it is only through educational development and the exchange of ideas that man will achieve and fulfill his finest purpose and that the fundamental of peace will be established.

I do hope that you have an excellent and productive meeting. Thank you very much.

ADDRESS BY MR. COOMBS¹

Press release 710 dated October 16

We are joined this week—guided by learned papers instead of crisis headlines—to look beyond today's great unresolved conflicts to a brighter set of goals for mankind a decade or more ahead.

Our business, briefly stated, is to seek ways to pursue these goals rapidly and effectively. Our primary focus is on education, viewed as a potent means available to society for promoting economic growth and social development, in both highly developed and less developed countries. Our aim is not simply to have stimulating talk but to clarify ideas which can shape policy and action, ideas with the power to make a beneficial difference in the course of human events.

A meeting on this subject would not have been held a generation ago. Only lately have signifi-

¹ Mr. Coombs was chairman of the U.S. delegation and also served as chairman of the conference. For an announcement of the meeting, see *BULLETIN* of Oct. 23, 1961, p. 691.

cant numbers of able economists and educators turned their attention to probing the vital links between a nation's educational effort and its economic and social advancement. Such relationships have long been assumed to exist, but often the assumption was insufficiently compelling to override more "practical" considerations, such as money.

It is perhaps not unfair to say that in all our countries we have tended to be schizophrenic about education. We praise education's virtues and count on it to help the new generation solve great problems which the older generation has failed to solve. But when it comes to spending more money for education, our deeds often fail to match our words. As a result, our rapidly expanding educational needs—quantitatively and qualitatively—have outstripped our national educational efforts, leaving a serious educational gap which now urgently requires closing.

Educators themselves, though chronically in need of funds and rarely reluctant to admit it, have shied away from stressing the practical contributions of education to economic growth because they feared, perhaps with good reason, that the emphasis on materialistic values in Western society had already become too dominant.

It is an encouraging sign that we can today talk candidly and openly about the practical economic contributions of education without seeming to betray, belittle, or ignore its other vital purposes. We can agree without difficulty at the outset of this conference, I feel sure, that the high importance of education lies in the very fact that it serves a variety of major purposes. It is both a means and an end. It satisfies consumer wants and national investment needs. It serves both material and non-material values. It profits individuals and at the same time all society. It is simultaneously a conservator and transmitter of past values and a powerful force for social change and improvement.

Joint Venture of Educators and Economists

It is surely an evidence of progress and a cause for rejoicing that educators and economists—long mutually mysterious and at times even hostile to one another—have lately embarked on the joint venture of discovering new insights into the economic aspects of education, external and internal. The progress they have made, though still limited, is sufficient to bring us together today.

That progress is symbolized, for example, by the fact that economists, who long treated education simply as a "consumer good"—a very fine one, to be sure, if you could afford it—have now begun to view educational expenditures as an "investment" as well. Not only is this a nobler term in the economists' lexicon, but strategically it is a far more effective term for getting increased budgets. Labeling education an "investment industry" implies that the development of people is as important as the development of things—which the educators have been hinting at all along. It helps place education in its quest for funds on a competitive parity with highways, steel mills, and fertilizer factories. We can now assert unblushingly and with good economic sense that the accumulation of intellectual capital is comparable in importance—and in the long run perhaps much more important—than the accumulation of physical capital, so long as we recognize that there is much more to education than this term alone implies. And even now we begin to hear bankers—the more daring, at least—speak of education and the development of human resources as a proper area for productive loans.

The educators have also come a long way. They now readily concede that resources are, after all, limited. Where this is the case, as every economics student knows, the relationship of output to available resource input depends on the state of technology and the efficiency of resource use. It follows logically that all of the ills and needs of education cannot be met simply by spending more money to do on a larger scale what our schools and universities are already doing. Along with much greater financial support from the outside, which unquestionably is required, education also needs far-reaching improvements on the inside, improvements in curriculum, in organization, and in techniques.

Many educators and economists are today agreed not only that organized education must make more effective use of its available resources but, to do so, educational developments must be well planned. Such educational development plans, moreover, must be rationally integrated with plans for general economic and social development. We shall give consideration in this conference, I hope, to the need for action to remedy the serious shortage of persons competent to advise less developed nations on the vital matter of educational develop-

ment planning. In the absence of well-conceived educational development plans, external assistance to underdeveloped countries cannot be as efficiently used.

The foregoing propositions are applicable to any kind of society which accepts progress and change as goals, whatever else may be its ideology. But these propositions are peculiarly applicable and urgent at this point in history for those nations, whether less developed or highly developed, whose concept of progress includes greater social justice and greater freedom, opportunity, and choice for each individual. The threats to human justice and freedom are obviously great, and the hour is late. The economists and educationalists of the free world have joined their endeavors none too soon.

It is important that their findings, incomplete as they yet are, be translated promptly into national policy and action. For what we do in the coming decade about education and the development of human resources, in all our lands and in helping the less developed countries, is sure to have a profound influence upon the future course of history.

Some "Plausible Assumptions"

In coming to grips with the important policy issues before this conference, we will have to make some assumptions about the economic, political, and social forces to which education must respond during the next 10 years and beyond. Recognizing the hazards of speculation and the differing application of any general proposition to the peculiar circumstances of each country, I venture to suggest a few "plausible assumptions" as a starting point for our discussions. Braver and wiser ones among us, I feel sure, can improve upon these initial propositions. With respect to the more developed countries of Europe and the Western Hemisphere, I suggest the following:

First, we may assume that national output, both in the aggregate and per capita, will continue to grow, though not necessarily at a steady pace. Likewise there will be continued and even accelerated advancement of scientific knowledge and applied technology in virtually all fields, which will spur economic growth. Given this assumption, it will be well within the financial means of Western European nations, Canada, and the United States to expand greatly their expenditures

on education without serious pain. If the combined national product of the OEEC countries of Europe rises to something like \$450 billion by 1970, as suggested in one of the expert papers before this conference, educational expenditures could be doubled in a decade with no greater sacrifice than diverting less than 6 percent of the increment in GNP into education. This is indeed a modest goal.

Second, the requirements for educated and trained manpower will rise more rapidly than total manpower requirements. In other words, the "mix" of manpower requirements will shift steadily toward greater emphasis upon higher skills and specialized knowledge in virtually all fields and levels, with unskilled labor shrinking in proportion. Accordingly members of the younger generation must, on the average, have considerably more education than any previous generation. Each nation's investment in education must therefore rise, per person and as a proportion of the gross national product, if it is to keep pace with its changing manpower requirements.

Third, the demand for highly specialized manpower, especially in the sciences and engineering but elsewhere as well, will rise with the greatest speed, and shortages of high talent will spread from one field to another rather unpredictably. Increasingly the market for high talent will become internationalized. Concerted efforts will be made to break these bottlenecks of specialized manpower as they appear, but basically they will be the product of an overall shortage of highly developed manpower which can only be relieved in the long run by a total expansion of the educational system aimed at developing more fully the human potential of the whole population, much of which now is wasted.

Fourth, the economic necessity to develop each nation's human resources will in most countries be reinforced by strong political pressures in the same direction. Educational opportunity is the hallmark of a democratic society, and people will insist upon it quite apart from its contributions to national growth. There will be mounting insistence that educational avenues of advancement be opened wide to all young people, regardless of their social and economic origins. Popular governments will ignore these demands at their peril and at the peril of free societies.

Fifth, despite the fact that the formal educational system, as we now know it, will have to provide each individual with more years of education, it will provide him with a smaller proportion of his total lifetime learning. This is because the rapid development of new knowledge and technology will quickly render obsolete and inadequate the education and training which many persons receive in their youth. Increasing provision will have to be made for people in a wide range of professions and occupations, not least of all teachers, to continue learning new knowledge and skills long after they have "completed" their formal education. Moreover, as personal incomes rise and working hours decrease, there will be more leisure time, and, if our schools and universities have succeeded in their work, much of this leisure will be used for learning as a means of individual self-fulfillment and pleasure. In short, education, to borrow a well-known British phrase, is fast becoming a cradle-to-grave proposition. This will require an even greater investment in education than our conference papers have forecast, along with radically new techniques of teaching and learning. If we are to become nations of teachers and learners, as seems essential, the old forms and rituals of education will not suffice. Nor will old concepts of educational finance.

Sixth, there will be no serious danger of "over-educating" the population; the greatest risks will lie in the opposite direction. Today's projections of future requirements for well-educated manpower are likely to prove low 10 years from now. If national economies maintain a relatively high level of employment and stability, the increased availability of well-educated manpower will stimulate the rate of economic growth and technological advance, thus enlarging more rapidly the capacity of these economies to absorb well-qualified manpower.

Seventh, the role of women, in education and in the whole economy, will increase in importance (and at the same time, no doubt, their political importance!). The undereducation and underutilization of women in the professions, in industry, and in government, constitutes the greatest untapped potential of human brainpower and energy in most of our nations. Educational institutions, if they will, can play a major role in breaking down the traditional barriers to a fuller and more productive life for women.

The Stake in Advancement of Less Developed Nations

The final premise in this list—and one of the most important—concerns the stake which developed countries have in the advancement of less developed nations. In addition to their heavy domestic obligations, the educational institutions of the more developed nations must assist the less developed ones in their crucial efforts to build their own educational systems and to develop their human resources as an essential ingredient of overall economic, social, and political development. Large and imaginative efforts in this direction can bring great benefits to education, not only in the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America but in the more developed countries as well, for educational assistance is a two-way street. To a considerable extent, and with important local variations, the fundamental problems of education in underdeveloped countries are the same as those confronting the more developed ones, but presented in bold relief. Cases in point are the problems of teacher shortage, the need for curriculum reform, the problem of finance, and the need for technological innovation.

Educational assistance to less developed countries, as the expert conference papers emphasize, is no mere matter of exporting a carbon copy of one's own curriculum, methods, and organization to nations with very different needs and cultures. Nor is it a simple matter of expanding by a factor of x the educational *status quo* which the underdeveloped country already happens to have, inherited usually from some other land. It is clear that such a strategy of educational expansion would fit neither their needs nor their pocket-books.

The same daring and ingenuity—the same research and development approach—which our educational institutions have helped to create and apply so fruitfully to such other fields as agriculture, industry, and communications, must now be applied to education itself, at home and abroad. The need for such an approach is perhaps most obvious in less developed countries, but it is perhaps equally needed in the more developed ones. If this need for imaginative change in education is viewed not with alarm but as an exciting challenge, it can be a rewarding decade for all concerned.

Within this framework of propositions—some

perhaps generally agreeable and others no doubt open to vigorous debate—and, more importantly, with a series of brilliant papers before us, we are ready to engage in a serious and enjoyable discussion.

In one final prognostication I offer with confidence the view that we will all take home from this conference new insights, new ideas for action, and new conviction which can profit our respective nations in future years and which can, beyond this, provide all mankind a larger measure of freedom and a greater opportunity to profit from such freedom.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Sweden Conclude Extradition Convention

Press release 732 dated October 24

An extradition convention and protocol between the United States and Sweden was concluded on October 24 at the Department of State. The convention was signed for the United States by Secretary Rusk and for Sweden by Ambassador Gunnar Jarring.

The convention, which contains 16 articles, generally follows the pattern of other extradition conventions to which the United States is a party. Article II contains a list of common crimes generally subject to extradition. Other articles specify the conditions which must be satisfied and the procedures which must be followed in order to obtain the extradition of a fugitive from justice.

The convention will enter into force upon exchange of ratifications by the two Governments.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defense and for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September

21, 1960. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.

Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 20, 1961.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900; at Washington June 2, 1911; at The Hague November 6, 1925; at London June 2, 1934; and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.¹
Ratification deposited: United States, October 26, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into force October 1, 1961.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan (with understanding and statement), Luxembourg, and Netherlands, October 13, 1961; Spain, October 16, 1961.

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement concerning the utilization, for permanent refugee housing construction, of counterpart generated from a grant of corn to Austria under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1721-1724). Effected by exchange of notes at Vienna August 9 and October 3, 1961. Entered into force October 3, 1961.

Iceland

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 3, 1958, as supplemented (TIAS 4027 and 4065). Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik October 3, 1961. Entered into force October 3, 1961.

Japan

Arrangement concerning the export of cotton textiles from Japan to the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo October 16, 1961. Enters into force January 1, 1962.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the loan of a floating drydock to the Republic of the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila September 28 and October 4, 1961. Entered into force October 4, 1961.

Sweden

Convention on extradition, and protocol. Signed at Washington October 24, 1961. Enters into force upon the exchange of ratifications.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 29, 1961 (TIAS 4819). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara September 6, 1961. Entered into force September 6, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Robert W. Herder as Director, American AID Mission, El Salvador, effective September 22. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 702 dated October 11.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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*729	10/23	U.S. participation in international conferences.
730	10/23	Rusk: interview on "Issues and Answers."
731	10/24	Bowles: "The United Nations and the Real World."
732	10/24	U.S.-Sweden extradition convention.
*733	10/24	Bowles: YWCA World Fellowship Meeting, Baltimore (excerpts).
*734	10/25	Visit of Indian Prime Minister.
†735	10/26	Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
†736	10/26	Bowles: regional foreign policy briefing conference, Kansas City.
†737	10/26	Williams: U.S. National Commission for UNESCO.
738	10/26	Haiti credentials (rewrite).
†739	10/26	NATO research fellowship program 1962-63.
740	10/26	U.K. credentials (rewrite).
†741	10/27	Bowles: regional foreign policy briefing conference, Dallas.
†742	10/27	U.S. aid to sub-Sahara African students.
†743	10/27	Ball: interview on "At the Source."
†744	10/27	AID investment guaranty program.
†745	10/28	Rusk: interview on "Problems and Policies."
746	10/28	U.S.-British Gulana talks.
*747	10/28	U.S. participation in international conferences.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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Bulletin



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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November 20, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign affairs issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President, the Secretary of State, and other officers of the Department. It also contains special articles on various aspects of international affairs and information of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States may become a party and on matters of general international interest.

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Threshold of a New Trading World

*by Under Secretary Ball*¹

I approach this gathering of foreign trade practitioners with a considerable diffidence. I learned many years ago that when any two experts in the field of foreign trade get together they will produce three opinions as to the proper course of our commercial policy. But lately I have been aware of a measure of agreement rarely found in these esoteric circles—agreement on the fact that we are coming to the close of a familiar era in our world trading relations and entering another that is not familiar at all.

Some see this new phase as filled with opportunity and challenge. Some, on the other hand, are apprehensive. But few question the proposition that pervasive change will be the dominant characteristic of the years that lie ahead.

The Sweep of History

To understand the forces of change at work in the world, it may be profitable to look backward a little—to examine the terrain over which we have marched to gain a better view of the direction in which we are headed.

From the Civil War to the Great Depression industrial America concentrated its energies on transforming the United States into a great continental power. The big challenges and the glittering opportunities lay within our own boundaries, between the Atlantic and the Pacific. We had vast national resources to develop, new ground to be broken, virgin forests to fell. Immigration provided us with a swiftly growing population to supply the labor force for this Gar-

gantuan task. It supplied us as well with customers for the products that came pouring from our fields and factories.

As our self-confident forefathers moved westward, forging their own early version of a common market, men and money followed in the wake of their wagons. Capital from England and the Atlantic seaboard flowed to the Midwest, then later to the Pacific coast. Railroads were built, settlements established. Old trading patterns were destroyed and new ones—richer ones—created.

Mobility was the order of the day—mobility not merely of manpower and finance but also mobility of thought. The challenge of the times produced a rugged group of free spirits: inventors, robber barons, empire builders—men who were not afraid of new ideas and who moved in an environment uncluttered by obsolete institutions.

It was only natural that the pioneer American industrialist was protectionist in his commercial policy, as he was isolationist in his international politics. He had a continent in which to spend his energies, a burgeoning population as his customers. He had little need for foreign markets; that need was confined largely to the farmers and the miners. The industrialist had his hands full with opportunities nearer home.

The First World War marked the first great change in all of this. It irrevocably altered America's world position. Yet we continued during the 1920's to pursue the course we had set. We adopted, in fact, an increasingly protectionist posture until, in the Great Depression, came a great awakening. We learned through painful experience that we could not insulate ourselves from economic forces elsewhere in the world.

¹ Address made before the 48th National Foreign Trade Convention at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 1 (press release 755).

By that time the United States had begun to gather its foodstuffs and minerals from distant places. We had begun to sell our manufactured products throughout the world. We were finding that we could compete effectively in foreign markets. We had discovered, to the surprise of the pessimists, that our rising wages were not a handicap to our international trading position but the contrary—the consequence of the great productive strength that formed the basis of our developing position in the markets of the world.

I do not need to remind you gentlemen that it was during the soul-searching that went on in the depths of the depression that we Americans made an abrupt about-face in our commercial policy. We put aside the strangling restrictionism of the Smoot-Hawley tariff for the trade agreements program of Cordell Hull. With that decisive act the United States achieved for the first time a trade policy appropriate to the times and to its new position in the world. In the next quarter century, with the aid of that policy, we played the role of leader in building a trade and payments system capable of supporting an unprecedented volume of international exchanges.

The great vindication of our liberal trade policies did not come, however, until the end of the Second World War. During the early postwar years we were the workshop of the world. The factories of Europe were in ruins and rubble. Japan's economy was a shambles. The world needed goods both to sustain itself and to begin the staggering task of reconstruction—goods that the United States alone could produce. Except for the general shortage of dollars—ameliorated in part by the Marshall plan—there was no serious problem of foreign competition, either in our own domestic market or abroad.

Using the powers provided by a succession of trade agreements acts, the Government negotiated for the reduction of tariffs and the dismantling of import license systems. As the barriers to trade between nations gradually moved lower, the United States expanded its exports in markets all over the world. For a decade—until 1957, in fact—as many of you will recall with nostalgia, we had an easy time of it. Except for a handful of products—the weak sisters of the American

economy—few economists and fewer businessmen worried much about the competitive position of our exports abroad. Almost no one foresaw the possibility of a balance-of-payments problem for the United States. Our brooding preoccupation was the dollar shortage. The fear was frequently heard that the American technological lead was so great that we might as well accept the dollar shortage as a permanent feature of the world economy.

A New Era

Those of us who thought about the economic future tended to underestimate one element and to overlook another. We did not appreciate the vitality of the forces latent in European industry. Nor did we comprehend the energy which these forces might achieve once they were let loose in the arena of a great new mass market.

We knew, when we thought about it, that the European nations were making hard choices. They were maintaining extraordinarily high investment rates at the price of a considerable self-denial. They were driving hard toward economic and political unification. But there were few, even among the enthusiastic and optimistic European advocates of an integrated Europe, who saw the spectacular consequences that would result as these two developments began to interact on one another.

By the 1960's the situation was clear enough. The Marshall plan had been wholly successful. A resurgent European industry had found a new concept of opportunity in the emergence of a Common Market.

The record of these developments is instructive for us. European industry, big and large, had not been eager for a common market. Most had resisted the early proposals for a unified Europe, and they had been skeptical of the Common Market when it was first conceived. But once they had accepted the Common Market as an inescapable fact they were forced to make their plans on the basis that it would continue. And in the process they discovered untapped resources of strength and energy.

Europe's businessmen took various steps to adapt their enterprises to the requirements and

Message From President Kennedy¹

The National Foreign Trade Convention brings together a group of American leaders who have a clear understanding of the current struggle between free civilization and regimented civilization, and who also have a unique appreciation of the relationship of international trade to the total strength and unity of the free world—economic, political, and military.

The struggle between civilizations is not primarily economic, but the economic factors loom large. The Soviet bloc is dedicated to a rigid view of how an economic system must organize the use of human and material resources. The Western World, by contrast, is tolerant of wide variations among individual states around a central principle of the free flow of economic resources in response to individual initiative and individual desires, subject to government responsibilities to assure that this flow is not restricted or allowed to run to waste and to channel it to meet common social purposes.

In recent months Americans have been pressed heavily by headlines announcing daily crises. In this circumstance it is possible for us to ignore both the magnitude of our economic strength and the challenges and opportunities which are before us.

Preoccupation with our balance of payments, for example, has caused some Americans to overlook the extraordinary strength of our export business as proven by our \$5-billion merchandise surplus. This is certainly not a sign of weakness nor a sign of our inability to compete in world markets. Moreover, our own strength is augmented by the political and economic dynamism of Western Europe, and particularly by the constructive implications of an enlarged common market for ourselves and the entire free world.

¹ Read to the convention by Under Secretary Ball.

Our supreme economic challenge at this moment in our history does not arise from the Sino-Soviet bloc itself. Our greatest immediate challenge is the task of achieving maximum interaction and cooperation between the expanding industrial societies of North America and Western Europe—for the purpose of assuring our mutual prosperity, of accelerating our rates of economic growth, in order that we may together promote the stability and progress of the less developed nations of the world. Our ability to meet this challenge depends in large measure upon the manner in which these two great industrial systems of the Atlantic develop and utilize their vast resources and upon the policies and practices which guide their trade with each and with the rest of the world.

We are determined that the United States shall adopt policies which will enable us to meet this challenge, and thereby to resume our proper role of leadership in the development of a dynamic and prosperous free-world economy. We first assumed this role of leadership under the inspiration of Cordell Hull. The ideas and techniques developed at that time have clearly served the interests of the United States. Our goals remain the same, but the world that Cordell Hull knew has changed beyond recognition.

It is essential that we have new tools to deal with the problems of international trade in a new and challenging world. The forging of these tools is a task that must be shared by all segments of American society—business, industry, agriculture, and labor, as well as the Government itself. I can assure you that we are prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary to protect and promote our national interests.

I extend to each of you my greetings and best wishes for a most successful convention.

the opportunities of a new mass market. They gained structural strength through mergers. They improved their operations through the rationalization of product lines, through investment, through modernization. And, having taken these difficult steps, many found to their great relief that the dreaded competition from other European producers was not so formidable after all.

To many of us it has come as a surprise that after an initial period of resistance the industrial leaders of Western Europe have become the strongest advocates for accelerating the Common Market schedule toward full integration. With

new-found self-confidence they are laying plans for expansion, for additional specialization and market penetration on a scale that has no precedents in European history.

Quite obviously the transformation of six nations of Europe into a Common Market has had a major effect on world trading patterns. Already this is clear enough in trade statistics. But that change is only a partial foreshadowing of what is yet to come if Great Britain succeeds in the negotiations she has now undertaken to become a member of the European Community.

Those negotiations will necessarily be complex. What is involved is not merely the extension of

the geographical scope of the present Common Market to include the United Kingdom. What is involved is a reconsideration of a complex network of trading relationships involving a considerable part of the free world.

Even as presently constituted, the European Common Market is more than a European arrangement; it is the center of a trading system whose ramifications spread into Africa and other continents. It has associated with it some 16 independent countries and a number of areas in varying degrees of dependency which constitute what is now known as the Associated Overseas States. These states have free access to the Common Market.

The United Kingdom, for its part, is the hub of another world trading system of more than 60 countries and territories with the total population of three-quarters of a billion people, a system built upon the tariff preferences in the sterling area.

Any arrangements that may result from the current negotiations will necessarily involve some modification and redefinition of the relationships involved in both the European and the British systems.

The British initiative is not the only proposal to extend the scope of the Common Market. The British application for membership has been followed by similar applications on the part of Denmark and Ireland, and it is possible that Norway will also apply. Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland have also announced that they intend to seek "association" with the Common Market, though on a basis less than full membership. And any arrangements that are ultimately worked out may also need to take account of Finland's trading requirements.

It would be unwise and quite improper for me to make any predictions as to the final outcome of these negotiations. But it is clear enough that the form and substance of the solutions ultimately arrived at will affect the vital interests not only of the United States but of other nations of the free world. Naturally enough the United States Government is following the course of the current discussions with great care. At the appropriate times and in appropriate ways we shall take steps to insure that the United States' position on various aspects of this negotiation is fully made known.

Two Great Trading Areas

I shall not attempt tonight to discuss the complex issues involved in these negotiations, but one needs no special insight to know that their successful outcome will necessarily bring about fundamental changes in world trading patterns and in the existing world political order.

Stated in its simplest terms, what we may well see emerge is the concentration of nearly 90 percent of total free-world exports of industrial products in two great common markets—the Common Market of Europe consisting of over 300 million people and an as yet undetermined number of states, and the common market of the United States consisting of 180 million people and 50 States. In each of these areas goods, labor, capital, and services will have something approaching complete mobility. And each of these areas will be surrounded by a common external tariff.

The manner in which American industry responds to the reality of this new trading world will, it seems to me, be a test not only of our business leadership but of the sincerity of our commitment to the economic principles which we are constantly advocating. After all, we have been the evangelists of the virtues of free competition. We have preached this gospel incessantly to our European friends. If they now practice what we preach, we should be neither surprised nor dismayed.

It seems to me a little odd, therefore, that there should be so much talk in business circles these days with overtones of defeatism. I hear it said again and again that we have priced ourselves out of the world markets; that our wages are too high and our capital plant obsolete; that our foreign competitors can offer more liberal credit terms than American manufacturers; that foreign producers, having learned the lessons of American technology, can now use their lower wages to drive us out of world markets.

I shall not continue this refrain. We all know both the words and the music well enough. Not only do these apprehensive citizens see no future in our exports, but they also see doom and menace in our imports. The very foreign competitors who are defeating us in world markets are, they say, beginning to invade our home markets. There is hardly a day when a representative of industry does not assert emphatically to us in Washington that his industry needs a system of

rigid quotas to keep out foreign imports or it will perish. At the very least it needs the protection of higher tariffs or some other restrictive arrangements.

No one can doubt that the need to keep United States goods competitive in world markets is crucial. To achieve that purpose we shall have to use every measure at hand to dampen inflationary forces and reduce the threat of a wage-price spiral. One of the most effective measures, as the Europeans have already learned, is to repudiate protectionism, to open the doors and windows of our economy to the competition we must face in world markets. This is one method of controlling inflation that is fully consistent with the ideals of free enterprise we all embrace.

An open competitive trading system in competitive goods will serve our interests in other ways as well. With all our present concern about the balance-of-payments position of the United States, it is easy to forget that the United States has a surplus, not a deficit, on merchandise account. That surplus amounted last year to \$4.9 billion, or \$2.8 billion if the foreign aid component is subtracted. If we look at industrial products alone, the relative strength of the surplus is even more striking, since our total exports of such goods last year were just about double our imports.

This surplus must be preserved and enlarged. Spent on overseas military installations and troop pay, it supports a critical part of the burden of financing the defense of the free world. But to strengthen this surplus we shall have to avoid any line of policy that calls for United States import restrictions. For in the wave of reaction that would follow the United States would stand to lose more than it could possibly gain in balance-of-payments terms.

In considering what moves the United States should now make in the field of trade policy, there is one other objective to which we would all subscribe. This is the aim of increasing American wages and expanding American living standards as speedily as our growing productivity will permit. Fortunately for us, America's most successful export industries are those in which wage rates are highest. It is fortunate, too, that the industries that claim to suffer most from import competition tend, on the whole, to pay low wages.

As far as wages are concerned, therefore, the

problem is to find a way of shifting American manpower, as swiftly and painlessly as possible, out of the industries which cannot stand up to foreign competition into those which have stood the test. If the United States can achieve that shift, it will have a labor force more fully devoted to pursuits with a future—pursuits on the forefront of the technological revolution which the United States must continue to lead.

In blunt terms, we dare not turn our backs on the logic of our own economic position. For almost 30 years we have led the world toward freer trade. If at this late date we should yield to the importunings of those who would shelter the low-wage industries in our economy and penalize the most efficient, let us be quite clear about the consequences. We would set off a chain reaction of retaliation and counterretaliation that would do irreparable harm to the whole free world but would hurt us most of all. We would give up any claim to a role of leadership in the free world. We would deny the strength and vitality of the economic system for which we stand.

The Road Ahead

But I am not content tonight merely to point out the roads we cannot take. We must lay a positive course that will lead to a stronger and more secure position at home and abroad. To me the general direction of this course seems evident.

As I pointed out earlier this evening, we have reached the end of an era in which the United States was the one dominant country of the trading world. In the next years the free-world commerce will depend to a very large degree upon two great trading areas—Europe and the United States.

So far the new Europe is exhibiting a rate of economic growth more than twice our own. Faced with the prospect of competing with local producers who will have free access to all Common Market customers, many American industrialists have concluded that, if they are to participate in the development of this new great trading area, they must develop sources of production within the encircling walls of the common external tariff.

It is, I think, only natural that American industry should seek to establish factories near their customers, just as they once built factories and assembly plants on the Pacific coast as the center of population moved westward. I expect, also,

that as European industry generates surplus capital it will find occasion to invest an increasing amount of it in the United States. But it would be wholly wrong if, by failing to pursue the proper commercial policies, we were to put our producers at such a disadvantage that they had no option in the matter, that they were compelled to invest their capital in Europe because their exports could not compete over a European tariff wall. We would be doing our own producers a disservice. We would be doing an even greater disservice to United States labor. And we would deprive our own economy of the good of competition, which is the incentive to innovation, to technological advance, to economic health and strength.

Yet if we are to bring about the kind of open trading world in which our most efficient export industries can share the potential of this new market, we shall need tools adapted to the task. I do not propose tonight to outline in any detail the kinds of tools that will be required. I can, however, suggest certain minimum specifications which seem to us quite clear.

1. The concept that we must protect every American industry against the adjustments required by competition is alien to the spirit of our economy. The genius of a dynamic industrial economy is after all its adaptability. Our economy has adjustments forced upon it every day by changes in public taste, by population shifts, by the application of new technology, by the refinement of automation techniques. Compared with these normal adjustments, those brought about by tariff reductions are marginal. The adjustments that would be required even if we were to eliminate industrial tariffs entirely would, in fact, be relatively small for the economy as a whole, although admittedly they would fall heavily on certain industries.

If we are to meet the demands of the new trading world, it seems to me imperative that we recognize that the process of tariff reduction involves the acceptance of some degree of structural adjustment by individual industries. European industry has already recognized this concept with startling effects upon investment and innovation. European companies have discovered that the adjustments required have, in fact, been far less painful than were anticipated. They have taken the form, for the most part, of a shift of resources from one type of production to another, of design changes, of the substitution of materials, of the

elimination of noncompetitive produce lines. Most of all, they have required managerial imagination and initiative.

Up to a certain limit of tolerance, individual industries and companies should, I think, be expected to assume the burden of such adjustments for the good of the economy as the whole. This is an assumption that runs through our whole body of legislation—taxes, regulatory arrangements, and safety standards.

There are always a limited number of exceptional cases which demand exceptional treatment in any general program such as we are now obliged to undertake. But our guiding principle should not be to spare American management or American labor from the need to meet the requirements of change. Instead it should be the concept that, when the impact of adjustment is so great as to create a temporary idling of American productive facilities, the Federal Government will provide assistance to speed the transfer of the labor and capital into the more productive channels which the American economy constantly provides.

For that purpose, as President Kennedy suggested several years ago, the Federal Government should be empowered to provide assistance to obtain and facilitate this transfer. Under such heading would come such aids as accelerated amortization of obsolescent machinery,² the availability of credits for modernization, and the provision of funds and facilities for the training and relocating of labor.

2. The President's authority to recommend tariff reductions in tariffs and other trade restrictions must be sufficiently broad in scope to meet the opportunity and the challenge of the European Economic Community. This means a minimum that we can no longer afford to limit our negotiators to trading on an ad hoc basis and must authorize them to seek broader and more ambitious bargains for the United States industry.

There are various reasons why this need exists. First of all, the structural changes in the European economy generated by the Common Market are likely to be so vast that no one can gage precisely where United States export opportunities may emerge. Familiar guides such as historical trade data and principal supplier rules will not be of much help in choosing the areas of future

² For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 30, 1961, p. 730.

opportunity in Europe. What we must seek is a broadside opening of the European market to our producers; and this is what we shall have to provide them in turn.

Apart from our own interests, however, there is also the compelling fact that the Common Market countries cannot conduct their negotiations on any basis other than across-the-board cuts. This negotiating method has been adopted not merely for convenience but also from necessity. There is no other practicable way in which agreement can be achieved by the six member governments on a common commercial policy.

3. In concentrating upon the paramount problem—the problem of the European Common Market—I do not wish to overlook the fact that our new legislation must also establish a basis for continuing an open trading world with other nations. Of course, to the extent that the United States and the Common Market lower their trade barriers as a result of the negotiations between them, they will also be expanding the opportunities of others. For any such reductions in trade barriers must, of course, be on a nondiscriminatory basis. Yet authority to negotiate directly with other countries also will be needed, to increase the mutual opportunities of all nations and to weld a close-knit trading system in the free world.

But I shall not attempt tonight to spell out in any more detail the form and substance of the authority which the President will require. I can only say that the program will represent a set of new proposals tailored to the unprecedented requirements of a radically altered trading world.

The Political Need

I have spoken so far this evening almost exclusively of economic and commercial problems and opportunities. But that is, of course, only part of the story and perhaps the less important part.

We are engaged at the moment, as all of us are constantly aware, in a struggle that can determine the future of mankind—or, indeed, if mankind has any future at all. In that struggle we must make certain not only that we are economically and industrially strong but that the free world is united as closely as possible in pursuit of our common purpose.

In his speech earlier this month at the 22d party congress Mr. Khrushchev again threw down the

gauntlet to our Western system of free capitalism. He did not say this time that he intended to bury us, but he did boast that the Soviet Union would surpass us industrially and even in the provision of consumer goods for the people.

This boastful challenge is one more reminder that in this turbulent world we must employ the resources of the free world with maximum efficiency if we are to survive. It is essential, I believe, not only that we say we have confidence in our system but that we deeply feel that confidence. If we earnestly believe in the efficacy of a competitive society, then we must not shrink from the consequences of competition. For the United States to do so, for us Americans to shut ourselves off in our own continent and give up the competitive struggle, would be slow stagnation.

In a world where we must all unite or perish there is no place for an inward-looking economic nationalism. We can no more retire into an economic Fortress America than we can retire into a political Fortress America. In the economic struggle that lies ahead, it would not even preserve us from fallout, much less a direct attack.

If the goals I have suggested seem ambitious, let me confess that they are ambitious indeed. They cannot be achieved without new policies that will give the Government substantially broader and more flexible bargaining power. Nor can they be achieved without enormous energy and imagination on the part of our private producers and traders.

But nothing less will suffice.

The essential question before us is whether or not we really believe in the vitality of a free competitive economy. The real challenge comes not from the Sino-Soviet bloc, not from the revolution in the lesser developed world, not from the integration of the industrial West, but from ourselves.

President Announces Two New Programs To Aid U.S. Exporters

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated October 27

In my message to the Congress on balance of payments and gold earlier this year,¹ I directed the President of the Export-Import Bank to ini-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

tiate measures designed to give American exporters full equality with their competitors in other countries in order to help boost the total volume of United States exports. I also asked the Secretary of the Treasury to undertake a study of methods through which private financial institutions could participate more broadly in providing export credit facilities.

These two studies have been closely coordinated and carried out under the immediate supervision of the Export-Import Bank, with policy guidance from the Secretary of the Treasury and the National Advisory Council. I am pleased to announce two fundamental and complementary steps to achieve the objectives of stimulating American exports, strengthening the balance of payments of our country, and enlisting maximum cooperation of private credit facilities.

The new programs are intended to be fully comparable with those offered abroad, particularly with respect to small and medium-sized export concerns and with respect to assistance in the financing of consumer goods exports.

The first new program consists of a system of export credit insurance to exporters. This will be operated through the newly organized Foreign Credit Insurance Association—a voluntary, unincorporated group of major United States insurance companies. The FCIA has entered into an agreement with the Export-Import Bank to issue coverage against commercial foreign credit risks in partnership with Eximbank, which will cover political risks.

The second program consists of a new system of guarantees to be issued by Eximbank directly to commercial banks and affiliated financial institutions undertaking the financing of exports. It is designed to encourage these banks to provide nonrecourse financing of medium-term credits and to speed up these transactions by permitting the exporter to deal with his bank rather than with Eximbank in Washington.

The objective of both programs is to assure that U.S. exporters will not lose sales because of a lack of credit facilities where the extension of credit is appropriate. I believe that American exporters will be more disposed to extend credit to their customers if they hold an export credit insurance policy issued through the FCIA and that commercial banks will be prepared to discount such insured paper. Accordingly, our exporters,

through use of the insurance and bank guarantee programs, will be better able to compete successfully with exporters in other countries on sales where credit is required by the customers overseas.

I am deeply appreciative of the splendid response of private industry in furthering the national interest in this area. Both the participating insurance companies and the commercial banks have rendered a public service through their cooperation in making these export credit facilities available as part of the national effort to improve the balance of payments of the United States.

Under Secretary Ball Interviewed on "At the Source" Program

Following is the transcript of an interview of Under Secretary Ball on a Columbia Broadcasting System television program, "At the Source," on October 26.

Press release 743 dated October 27

Announcer: You are "At the Source."

Appointed by President Kennedy shortly after his inauguration, veteran international lawyer George Ball is primarily responsible for the development and conduct of U.S. foreign economic policy. Yesterday, however, it was reported that Under Secretary Ball has risen to become the number-two man in the State Department. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the critical problems and objectives faced by Under Secretary of State Ball, he was interviewed by CBS News correspondents Howard K. Smith, Stuart Novins, and Bill Downs.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Ball, a columnist wrote about you and said, "George Ball, whose gift for decision and dispatch long ago commended him to President Kennedy, has become the number-two man in the State Department in all but name." Is that so?

Mr. Ball: Well, I'll tell you, Mr. Smith, I normally believe what I read in the newspapers, and I particularly believe what columnists write; but this story doesn't happen to be true. Mr. [Chester] Bowles is the number-two man in the State Department. He is the Under Secretary of State. I am the number-three man; I am the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Now I think, to the extent that there may have been some misconception of this, it arises from the fact that Mr. Bowles has been away a great deal. I am away from time to time. When one of us is away, the other pitches in. We all have so much work to do in the Department these days that, with the Secretary, Mr. Bowles and I consider ourselves as available for whatever task may come along. The result is that I haven't confined myself strictly to economic matters and he hasn't confined himself strictly to political matters.

Mr. Downs: Well, as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Ball, you are in charge of the New Frontier's revolution of rising expectations. That has almost become a cliché in this administration. Just what does the phrase mean, "revolution of rising expectations"?

Mr. Ball: Well, it is a rather vivid phrase, isn't it? It is a phrase that suggests a situation which is a very complex anatomy, I would suppose. After all, there are about 3 billion people in the world. One billion of those people live in countries that have per capita—where the per capita annual income is fifty to a hundred dollars, really fantastically low. Now in the last few years, as a result of the wars which have broken the old social and political fabrics, as a result of the increase in technology and communications, these people are breaking free from the old systems. Whether they have lived under colonial arrangements which have been shattered by events, whether they have lived in countries which have simply been dormant for hundreds of years, they are now beginning to want and to feel that they are entitled to enjoy the kind of rich life which the people in the industrialized, economically advanced countries enjoy, and they are going to get it. If we help them, they are going to get it faster and probably are going to get it in a way which will insure their freedom and independence. If we don't help them, they may get it in ways which will insure that the frustration of some of their expectations, their delivery into systems which will mean tyranny and oppression, and possibly that they will be swept into the vortex of the Communist orbit.

Commitment to U.N. Aid Programs

Mr. Novins: Mr. Ball, in that connection, you made a speech recently before the Foreign Press Association, and in it you emphasized our commit-

ment to the United Nations and our commitment to this revolution of rising expectations. Why is it that we don't use more than we do—the U.N. channels—for our assistance? Why don't we—

Mr. Ball: Well, to some extent it's done through the Special Fund, which Mr. Paul Hoffman administers, which does a great deal of predevelopment survey work, the technical assistance programs under the specialized agencies of the United Nations. It's a mixed arrangement which we have for the administration of aid. The great part of it goes directly on a bilateral basis from the United States, but there is also the World Bank, to which we subscribe, the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank—all kinds of different administration.

Mr. Novins: Well, are we concerned, Mr. Ball, that we are not going to be able to put strings on our aid if we do it through international bodies?

Mr. Ball: Oh, no, that's not the problem. Actually, in some ways international bodies can take tougher lines than when aid is provided bilaterally.

But it's simply a matter of the requirements of a given situation. In some countries, for political or other reasons it's much more desirable to provide aid on a bilateral basis. In some countries the multilateral provision of aid becomes more effective.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Ball, could you interpret for us the President's famous statement¹ to the effect that we will give attention and consideration to the needs of countries that share our view of the world crisis? Is that a new principle?

Mr. Ball: No, I think that that has been somewhat misinterpreted. Actually the President, I think, in his last press conference [October 11] clarified that phrase to a considerable extent.

What the President said in his last press conference, and what he said repeatedly, and what we've all said, because this is the view of the administration, is that we are interested in providing assistance to these countries and exporting capital to help them. Our interest is in seeing that they are able to reach a point of economic development in an atmosphere of freedom which will assure both their political and economic independence.

Now this doesn't mean that they have to copy

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 492.

our pattern of organization of their society or that they have to share our views. What we want them to do is to be independent, because we are convinced that a viable independent society will be a society which will resist the pressures from the—

Mr. Smith: Still, we are not happy about Mr. Tito's speech at that Belgrade conference of neutrals, are we?

Mr. Ball: We have always known that Mr. Tito was a Communist; there has never been any question about it. The only difference between Mr. Tito and some of the other satellite countries is that Yugoslavia is not a member of the bloc, that it pursues different means to the long Communist objective. But, at the same time, it maintains its independence, and this is the important thing.

Mr. Downs: Well, Mr. Secretary, you have also said that the free world and America are not providing enough of this aid. How much is enough?

Mr. Ball: There is no measure that is enough. I mean, this task that we face is a fantastically great task. Obviously the resources of any country, even a great country like ours, are finite. We can only provide a certain quantum of aid which we hope will enable countries, by self-help, by mobilizing their own energies and resources, to make ultimately a breakthrough to the point where they can be independent and self-sustaining.

Mr. Downs: Are you saying that this is a great big international gamble for civilization, or something like that?

Mr. Ball: It's a great gamble in which not only the United States but all the Western Powers are engaged. Actually this is a cooperative effort now, and we have made great strides in bringing this about.

Mr. Smith: Is it sufficiently cooperative? Your predecessor in this, in your job, who is now the Secretary of the Treasury [Douglas Dillon]—

Mr. Ball: I just had lunch with him.

Mr. Smith:—tried to get the other allies to share in—

Mr. Ball: We have been continuing this effort with some considerable success.

Mr. Smith: And you are satisfied with what they are doing?

Mr. Ball: We are never satisfied, Mr. Smith. But we are certainly aware of the fact that they are making a much larger effort, many of them—that we are now enabled to tie together the things we are doing in a cooperative effort and to eliminate duplication and to insure maximum effective use of resources in a way that we haven't done before.

Berlin

Mr. Novins: Mr. Secretary, let me take advantage of the fact that sometimes in the absence of others you slip into the political field. On August 13th the East Germans started to build a wall. Why didn't we knock it down then?

Mr. Ball: Well, you know, the wall in many ways, Mr. Novins, was the great symbol of the defeat of Soviet policy. If the Soviet policy had been successful, they wouldn't have needed a wall, they wouldn't have needed to engage in all these exercises which they are engaging in over the whole Berlin situation. But they haven't been successful. They couldn't stand the outpouring of thousands of people a month away from their system, escaping from it; so they had to build a wall. Now they built a wall in East Berlin. You can see the difficulties of trying to break the wall down. It stands a symbol of the defeat of their policies.

Mr. Novins: Well, we are told that in West Germany there is more concern about the fact that we did not break it down than there is about the fact that the East Germans built it.

Mr. Ball: Well, we have developed, with our allies—we are in the process of developing a whole strategy of meeting the problem of what we might call the kind of Berlin offensive which the Soviet Union has mounted. The wall is one aspect of that. This policy is an elaborate policy; it calls for response to particular moves. These are all well worked out.

Now, when the wall was built—this was something where you have to make a judgment—is this—do you want to move tanks through this wall and smash it down at the risk of a war which would be immediately exploited? We had to determine the point where we make the ultimate stand. And this was a case where in the long run I think the construction of the wall is going

to cost the Soviet Union a very great deal in terms of showing to the world—

Mr. Smith: Now, many people consider that the building of the wall was a blow to us. You consider in fact that it is a blow to the Russians?

Mr. Ball: Well, I think it has both effects. I mean it has certainly caused a good deal of concern and dismay. At the same time it symbolizes their defeat.

Soviet Aid Program

Mr. Downs: Well, George, doesn't this bring up the whole problem of—is aid the answer? When the Russians started testing and started throwing around these superbombs, immediately our neutral friends sort of allied us with raw power, although we have not used power as such in that way. Maybe if we took all of this foreign aid and put it into superbombs perhaps we could achieve our goals more rapidly. Do you think that that—

Mr. Ball: No, no. You know the policy of aid which we follow has been extremely successful. The fact is that the Soviet Union has made almost no gains in the past few years in the form of bringing within their orbit new nations. They have invested a great deal of money, they have spent a great deal of effort—

Mr. Downs: Cuba?

Mr. Ball: Cuba is one of the few exceptions I would think.

Mr. Downs: Laos?

Mr. Ball: Laos is undetermined as of now. But if you think of the magnitude of the effort they've made, they've also engaged in great foreign aid programs, many of which have been quite frustrating to them. But the significant thing that we have succeeded in doing is in giving these countries the ability to be independent.

Now, when they are independent they may adopt a course of neutralism, of being disengaged from the cold-war struggle itself; they are concerned with their development; they may say things which we don't wish them to say which—views that are unpopular with us; but they stay independent, which is the significant thing in the sense that they are not—do not become simple tools of the Soviet Union.

U.S. and European Common Market

Mr. Downs: We have been fostering and supporting the idea of a Common Market, which now is going to become a major competitor of the United States. Isn't our policy in this sense self-defeating?

Mr. Ball: Well, actually I think that the development of the European Common Market is one of the great successes of our policy, just as some of the things that the Soviet Union is doing now are symbols of the defeat of theirs.

After all, if you think of Western Europe as it existed for hundreds of years, states which were engaged in warfare, in always being at one another's throats—three times in 75 years France and Germany were at war. Now we have something which is a very old dream which has been brought into practical reality, the beginnings of a kind of United States of Europe. This is the way that many of the Europeans think about it. I think it is about to be enlarged if the present negotiations are carried on into a stage of modern dimensions. Now you say it will be competitive with us, it will be a great market for us. Of course we are not afraid of competition. If Western Europe becomes healthy, economically healthy, then the Western World is healthy and we will prosper by it.

Mr. Novins: Mr. Secretary, could we take that one step more. The NATO alliance as a military alliance is from an economic point of view negative. I mean it doesn't produce.

Mr. Ball: Well, it's not intended to be—

Mr. Novins: No, of course not. On the other hand the Common Market is something that is a positive factor. We belong to NATO. We don't belong to the Common Market. What would be the United States' attitude toward an expansion of the NATO alliance into something more like an Atlantic Community that would involve economic activities? Would we be part of that?

Mr. Ball: Well, the NATO alliance is specifically a defense alliance, is directed at defending—

Mr. Novins: But it's there.

Mr. Ball: —against exterior menace. The Common Market is not by definition a defensive arrangement. This is an arrangement where people living next to one another are joining together, pooling their economy, so to speak, in

order to become economically stronger. At the same time they are building a structure of institutions which gives them the beginning of a kind of political integration. Just as in our country we gathered together 50 States in a common market—if you think of the United States as a common market of 50 States, then you could think of Europe as a common market of what may become 15 or 16 or 17 states.

Mr. Novins: What I am reaching for, Mr. Secretary, is what the United States' attitude is, or is likely to be, toward something similar to what Senator Fulbright talked about, a concert of free nations, and I mention NATO only as something which exists and which—

Mr. Ball: Well, I think politically that we can go very far in strengthening the bonds that tie us to the nations on the other side of the Atlantic.

Mr. Novins: In what direction?

Mr. Ball: We can, and I think we must—we have already, through the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which has just come into being. It's an extension of the old Organization for European Economic Cooperation. We are a member of that, as Canada is, and we are working with the Europeans on developing common economic policies and on working together toward providing aid toward underdeveloped countries and working together to help solve some of the difficult market problems in the world.

Now this is practical cooperation in the Atlantic Community of a kind we haven't had before in the economic field.

Mr. Smith: In this connection, the *Congressional Quarterly*, which is much read in this Capital, had a piece recently which said that the Berlin crisis is hiding the fact that there is going to be a crisis over America's foreign trade policy. The powers wanting protectionism are getting so powerful in Congress that we are going to face a fight over whether we can continue the liberal trade policies of the past.

Mr. Ball: I have perfect confidence that in the face of the new trading world which is emerging, which is a world of marvelous opportunities for an America which is willing to seize them, while there may be the appearance of a great deal of protectionist sentiment, once the dimensions and the opportunities and the possibilities of this new

emerging world are understood, we will adopt a liberal policy, a liberal trading policy, as we must. After all, our country has a very large favorable trading balance in the world, and even though our total balance of accounts may be adverse, our trading balance, our merchandise balance, is favorable.

It would be the height of folly for us to turn in on ourselves and be fearful of trading with the world and become protectionist, and I don't think we ever will.

Aid to Latin America

Mr. Downs: Mr. Secretary, if we could look south of the border again, there is the Alliance for Progress, which is the Kennedy administration's most ambitious thing that they have initiated. Will this alliance, do you think, be able to meet the challenge of Castroism? It hasn't, so far.

You were talking about reforming not only economies but reforming governments, so that one junta or one dictatorship of a small family or group of companies does not run a nation. Is this the United States' business? Can we do anything about it? It's been the pattern there for centuries.

Mr. Ball: It's a very big concept, Mr. Downs, the Alliance for Progress, and it includes many different kinds of activities. But what it chiefly provides for is arrangements whereby we will help these countries to try to bring about the sort of reforms which are very long overdue, reforms which mean the breaking down of old rigid caste systems and their society, social structures, where a decent distribution of their resources can be obtained, where there could be such things as farm cooperatives developed, or there can be credit provided for self-help housing, where the poor worker in these countries can have a chance for the first time in his life.

Now there is bound to be a good deal of resistance to this, because we are undertaking something of very, very great importance.

Mr. Downs: A very touching thing, because this is exactly what Khrushchev is trying to do to the United States.

Mr. Ball: Well, this I would hardly admit. I mean, what we are trying to do in Latin America is with the great consent of the Latin American people, and this is the significant thing. There is enormous enthusiasm for the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, because the people feel that this

provides them with the opportunity that they have needed over the years, and what we are doing is providing them the chance, through their own efforts. The emphasis here is on self-help, as it is in the other efforts that we are making in that direction.

Mr. Downs: Well, what becomes of companies like the United Fruit Company, the banana republics, dollar diplomacy, the old oil cartels?

Mr. Ball: There will be no difficulty about a place for American private enterprise in the new Latin America. In fact there will be far more security in societies which themselves are secure than under dictatorship arrangements, where a few dominate the many and can be overthrown every other night.

Mr. Novins: Mr. Ball, if—assuming that you had an ideal economic regional plan for South America and assuming that it could be implemented under ideal circumstances, as an expert on economics how long would it take before we would see any results?

Mr. Ball: Well, you'd see some results from any kind of effort in a short time. Efforts are all—

Mr. Novins: Reckoning points—breakthrough points.

Mr. Ball: A breakthrough may take quite a long time in Latin America.

Mr. Novins: Is there that much time?

Mr. Ball: And it must be done on a monolithic basis; it will be done. One country after another will begin to emerge, to develop, to change its own structure toward a democratic tradition, to develop its institutions, to develop the base of a strong economy. We will have successes some places; we will have failures others. When I say "we," I'm not thinking just of the United States.

Mr. Novins: Oh, no.

Mr. Ball: I'm thinking of this working together of the United States and the Latin American states.

Mr. Novins: Is there time for that, Mr. Ball, in view of the threat of communism, the threat of Castroism, if that is separated from communism—is there time for this? Are we doing long-range planning that there is no time for?

Mr. Ball: The long range is always upon you

sooner or later, you know, and actually this is a situation which you don't solve by short-term measures. If you try to solve it by short-term measures you will defeat yourself. We have to work here over a period of time. We have to build soundly; we can't improvise. This can't be a jerry-built business. We throw our money away and nothing will come of it if we do, so that what we have to do is to work on the assumption that, with the understanding and new spirit of many of the Latin American people, we will be able to achieve these—

Mr. Novins: Are you satisfied that they are moving fast enough in the reforms you are talking about?

Mr. Ball: I'm never satisfied, Mr. Novins.

Mr. Downs: Well, you brought up at one point in one of your speeches, Mr. Secretary, the fact that one of the problems of instituting those reforms is that you have things like a population explosion where you barely keep even, that you don't achieve a revolution, or it's very difficult to. Now, it brought to my mind—is it possible and is this job really too big for us without regimenting whole societies, whole nations, down to the point of their breeding, how many children they can have.

Mr. Smith: I am sorry to have to interrupt. I'm afraid we have almost run out of time. I wonder if we can save your answer on that and cover that area in just a moment.

Mr. Downs: Mr. Ball, can you achieve these reforms without absolute regimentation of everything?

Mr. Ball: Well, if we were to regiment anything we would defeat our own ends, wouldn't we? The whole point of what we are attempting to do is to bring about a development and a transition or transformation, in effect, of the societies of many of these countries by their efforts. So we assist this, to bring this about in the conditions of freedom without regimentation.

Mr. Novins: What will we do with a country like Paraguay?

Mr. Ball: Well, Paraguay is an example of a country with very minimal resources, which is located rather disadvantageously, which suffers a great many problems.

Mr. Novins: Also a dictatorship.

Mr. Ball: At the moment it has a dictatorship.

Mr. Smith: Tell me, is it possible that Castro is a help rather than a hindrance in this, that his existence will frighten some conservative governments into reforms?

Mr. Ball: I would suppose that to some extent this is true, that certainly many of the governments are aware and disturbed—aware of the potential of Castroism and disturbed by it—and that they may be prepared to take actions which otherwise they would be reluctant to take.

Mr. Novins: I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you would feel that it's not entirely cynical, the comment that is made by some of the Latin Americans, that much of the foreign aid they are getting now they can thank Castro for.

Mr. Ball: No, I don't think that's a fair statement. As a matter of fact the attention that the United States is now giving to Latin America was overdue. And I am certain that, Castro or no Castro, when this administration came in we would have turned our attention and concentrated a great deal of it on Latin America.

Mr. Smith: Thank you very much, Mr. Ball.

Soviet Nuclear Test Called Political Act; President States U.S. Test Policy

Following is a White House statement of October 30 concerning the explosion of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union on that day and a statement made by President Kennedy on November 2 concerning the United States position on nuclear testing.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

White House press release dated October 30

At 3:30 this morning the Soviet Union detonated a very large nuclear device. Preliminary evidence indicates that its magnitude is on the order of 50 megatons. The explosion took place in the atmosphere. It will produce more radioactive fallout than any previous explosion.

The Soviet explosion was a political rather than a military act. The device exploded does not add in effectiveness against military targets to nuclear weapons now available both to the Soviet Union and the United States. It does not affect the basic

balance of nuclear power. Any such weapon would be primarily a mass killer of people in war, and the testing of this device primarily an incitement to fright and panic in the cold war.

In undertaking this test the Soviet Union has deliberately overridden the expressed hope of the world as stated in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 27.¹ It has done so because it intends through this display to spread such fear across the world that peaceloving men will accept any Soviet demand. Fear is the oldest weapon in history. Throughout the life of mankind it has been the resort of those who could not hope to prevail by reason and persuasion. It will be repelled today, as it has been repelled in the past, not only by the steadfastness of free men but by the power of the arms which men will use to defend their freedom.

There is no mystery about producing a 50-megaton bomb. Nor is there any technical need for testing such a weapon at full-scale detonation in order to confirm the basic design. The United States Government considered this matter carefully several years ago and concluded that such weapons would not provide an essential military capability. The existing United States nuclear arsenal is superior in quantity and quality to that of any other nation. The United States today has ample military power to destroy any nation which would unleash thermonuclear war.

We have no wish ever to use this military power. We are ready, now as ever, to sign the test ban treaty proposed at Geneva.² We are ready, now as ever, to negotiate a treaty for general and complete disarmament.³ In the meantime we will continue to take whatever measures are necessary to preserve the security of our country and of others who count on us.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated November 2

The United States is carefully assessing the current series of nuclear tests being conducted by the Soviet Union. I do not have to dwell on the irresponsible nature of these Soviet actions. The Soviet Union has shown its complete disregard

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1961, p. 817.

² For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

³ For text of a U.S. proposal, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

for the welfare of mankind, first, by breaking off the nuclear test cessation negotiations at Geneva, which had been under way since October 31, 1958, and second, by contemptuously exploding in the atmosphere a large number of nuclear weapons ranging into many megatons, including a device which, by their own admission, exceeded 50 megatons.

I do not suggest that we can dismiss these Soviet nuclear tests as mere bluff and bluster. To a certain extent this does enter into the Soviet campaign of fear, but these tests, are, no doubt, of importance to Soviet leaders and scientists in developing and improving nuclear weapons.

This much can be said with certainty now:

1. In terms of total military strength the United States would not trade places with any nation on earth. We have taken major steps in the past year to maintain our lead—and we do not propose to lose it.

2. The United States does not find it necessary to explode 50-megaton nuclear devices to confirm that we have many times more nuclear power than any other nation on earth and that these capabilities are deployed so as to survive any sneak attack and thus enable us to devastate any nation which initiates a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. It is essential to the defense of the free world that we maintain this relative position.

In view of the Soviet action it will be the policy of the United States to proceed in developing nuclear weapons to maintain this superior capability for the defense of the free world against any aggressor. No nuclear test in the atmosphere will be undertaken, as the Soviet Union has done, for so-called psychological or political reasons. But should such tests be deemed necessary to maintain our responsibilities for free-world security, in the light of our evaluation of Soviet tests, they will be undertaken only to the degree that the orderly and essential scientific development of new weapons has reached a point where effective progress is not possible without such tests—and only within limits that restrict the fallout from such tests to an absolute minimum.

In the meantime, as a matter of prudence, we shall make necessary preparations for such tests so as to be ready in case it becomes necessary to conduct them.

In spite of the evidence which shows very clearly that the Soviet Union was preparing its own tests

while pretending to negotiate their cessation at Geneva, the United States maintains its determination to achieve a world free from the fear of nuclear tests and a nuclear war. We will continue to be ready to sign the nuclear test treaty which provides for adequate inspection and control. The facts necessary for such a treaty are all evident, the arguments on both sides have all been made, a draft is on the table, and our negotiators are ready to meet.

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Voice of America

Press release 745 dated October 28

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk with Ronald Dunlavey of the Voice of America, taped on October 24 for broadcast October 29.

Mr. Dunlavey: Mr. Secretary, I would like to welcome you first of all to our program "Problems and Policies." This is our first broadcast, and we are very happy to have you initiating the program. I have been broadcasting news analyses for the Voice of America for something like 7 years now to our friends overseas, and from time to time I get letters or postcards asking about this or that aspect of United States policy. Very often what these people want is clarification of some point or other which perhaps we ourselves might take for granted. Now, on this series of programs I am asking responsible American officials to explain, or perhaps "reexplain" would be a better term, some of these points.

I know that you are probably sick and tired of talking about Berlin by now; you are being interviewed on television programs and by newspapers and so forth about it all the time. But I would like to take a chance and ask you some questions about Berlin because it is a subject of concern, certainly in Europe, a bit of a puzzle, perhaps, in some of the countries of Asia and Africa. And it would be well, I think, if we could perhaps go back and talk about some of the fundamental issues involved.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Dunlavey, I am very happy to be here on the first of your series on this new program, and I wish you well with it. It is true that I have had to talk a good deal about

Berlin in recent weeks and months and undoubtedly shall have to talk a great deal about it in the future. It is true that at the present time we are in the process of private discussions among governments and there is some limit on what can be said, but nevertheless I am at your disposal and I shall do my best to answer your questions.

Mr. Dunlavey: Well, first of all, Mr. Secretary, I would like to pose a question that we hear in one form or another from our friends abroad sometimes and sometimes even in this country. We hear doubts expressed about America's willingness to risk a possible nuclear war over the fate of 2 million Germans and part of a city. Now, what is your feeling on this subject?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the freedom and the fate of 2 million people are not themselves an insignificant matter. There are a number of independent nations now in the United Nations who have fewer people than that in their entire populations. The future of the people of West Berlin and their ability to determine that future by their own free choices are matters of the greatest possible concern to us here in the United States. But apart from their own particular position, we have—we, the United States, the United Kingdom, France—very fundamental commitments to the people of West Berlin. They arose at the end of the war. NATO has important commitments to those people. This issue is one which arises as a part of a total worldwide issue between the Sino-Soviet bloc on the one side and those who are trying to build a world such as that set forth in the charter of the United Nations. It is not just that the 2 million people of Berlin are important. It is that their importance is a part of a historical crisis of which that is only one example.

Mr. Dunlavey: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could enlarge on that just a little bit. I mean, why should the Berlin crisis be a matter of importance to a person in, say, Indonesia or Sierra Leone or Japan? I know that the Berlin issue is not an isolated problem; it cannot be separated from the German question. But do you think that this crisis provoked by the Soviets in Berlin is part of a larger plan to provoke a succession of crises wherever it seems possible?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it is not my purpose, Mr. Dunlavey, to present these matters in contentious terms. But when you sit back quietly and look at

the situation, there is an underlying struggle going on between two concepts of the world. The one is that which, as I indicated earlier, is set forth in the charter of the United Nations, whose members have committed themselves to a world in which independent nations can live peacefully with each other, respecting each other's rights and cooperating across national frontiers to get common tasks done by the most effective means. The other kind of world is the sort of world pictured last December at the time of the so-called Communist summit in Mr. Khrushchev's January 6 speech and more recently at the party congress in Moscow—a world of Communist countries under rigorous, monolithic leadership. They believe that that kind of world is historically inevitable. We do not. They apparently are prepared to use their energies and their resources to bring their kind of world into existence. We do not believe that the peoples of the world will accept that, or will want it, because we believe that the United Nations Charter represents the aspirations of the great majorities of the world's peoples.

Mr. Dunlavey: Well, Mr. Rusk, it has been said that in considering the Berlin problem we should look at it from Mr. Khrushchev's viewpoint, his public reputation, and possible problems that he faces at home and within the party. It has been said that the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev simply cannot permit an island of freedom to exist behind the Iron Curtain. Now, what do you think of this argument?

Secretary Rusk: I don't believe that there is any basis there for making concessions to the Soviet Union at the expense of the people of West Berlin or at the expense of basic Western commitments. In the first place, the Iron Curtain is not supposed to be where it is. It was the understanding at the end of the war that Germany would be reunited, that there would come into being a single German state representing the freely expressed wishes of the German people, and that a peace treaty would finally settle that situation on that basis. It may be that some of the Soviet leaders have problems at home within their own political system. I am not so sure of that. Or that in public discussions of these problems, they have built up problems of prestige for themselves which would make adjustments of their points of view difficult. But most of these problems are self-made, and they are not

the basis for any surrender of the vital interests of the peoples most directly concerned or of those of us who have those people under our protection.

Legal Rights of Western Powers in Berlin

Mr. Dunlavy: Mr. Secretary, you referred, I think, a few moments ago to the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin. These, perhaps, are the legal rights that we hear spoken of, and there may be some confusion perhaps in some minds about what these legal rights are. Could you tell us what is the basis for the legal rights of the Western Powers in Berlin?

Secretary Rusk: The most fundamental of these legal rights are those which derived directly from the surrender of Nazi Germany. Those were rights which we, as victorious powers, obtained directly from the defeated Germany. They came directly from that surrender to us and not through any intermediary along the way. But these rights have been acknowledged, planned for, by the Four Powers, including the Soviet Union, in other ways—for example, in the 1944 agreements with respect to the arrangements which would follow German surrender. And they have been confirmed in a variety of ways, some in written agreements such as those that were reached at the time of the first Berlin blockade and others by practice established over a period of 16 years. There is no question whatever about the legality of these rights. If anyone wishes to raise a question about legality, there are legal means for resolving such problems.

But I would not suppose that these legal rights are the only justification for the Western Powers' being in West Berlin. One of the best ways to answer troublesome political questions from the American point of view and our great tradition is to ask, what do the people concerned themselves think about it? And we believe that one of the reasons that we are in West Berlin is that the West Berliners want very much for us to be there in order that their freedoms and their choices can be freely safeguarded.

Mr. Dunlavy: Sir, it has been said that Berlin, from the military standpoint, is strategically untenable. And it might be argued that if a stand is going to be taken in Europe against Soviet territorial aggrandizement, wouldn't it be better to wait to take it perhaps later on at a different, stronger position than Berlin, and—who knows—perhaps this would never become necessary?

Secretary Rusk: I think President Kennedy answered that in one of his statements at the end of the summer.¹ Actually, the fact that West Berlin is physically separated from West Germany or from the NATO countries does not make it untenable or vulnerable in the usual sense. And it may be that this physical separation has led the other side into an illusion on this point. The very fact that the United States is there, as the President put it, the United Kingdom is there, that France is there, that the West Berliners are there—all these things mean that West Berlin is not a vulnerable city.

Idea of "Disengagement"

Mr. Dunlavy: Well, sir, there have been suggestions made from time to time of one kind or another that not only Germany but perhaps other parts of Europe, Poland, Czechoslovakia, be made into a neutral zone and that the Soviet Union and the United States would draw their troops back several hundred miles. A buffer zone, so to speak, would be set up, and there would be a general easing of tensions leading, perhaps, to peace in our times. Now, in general, does the United States—is it our policy to find—not our policy, but do we find fault with proposals of this sort, and, if so, why?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are both technical and broad political issues involved here on the straight military side, the security side. For the Soviet forces to withdraw to the boundaries of the Soviet Union and for United States forces to withdraw across the Atlantic is not an evenly balanced military arrangement. But quite apart from that, we are very doubtful about the idea of a buffer zone, about disengagement, about a neutralized zone, because these long-range commitments which the Communist world has publicly announced mean that neutral zones or buffer zones are for them areas of future exploitation, exploration, penetration. So that so long as the policy of the Sino-Soviet bloc is to press its notion of a world revolution, then the notion of long-term neutralized and buffer zones would become extremely difficult to accept or to bring to reality.

No, I think the better approach in this, Mr. Dunlavy, is not to talk in such terms but to give direct

¹ For text of a report to the Nation by President Kennedy on July 25, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

attention to the broader problems of disarmament, general disarmament, involving broad commitments on the part of all nations having substantial arms to bring those arms under effective control and to open the way for their progressive reduction. This would, in effect, move us toward a more peaceful structure and would deal with the question of the direct confrontation of important military forces not only in Western Europe but perhaps in other parts of the world.

Mr. Dunlavey: Mr. Rusk, getting away from central Europe and the Berlin problem just for a moment, Mr. Khrushchev seems confident in his recent speeches, as he has all along, that communism is the wave of the future. He says—I believe he said it when he was in this country a couple of years ago—that our grandchildren will be Communists. Now, the impression does exist, perhaps, in the minds of people in various parts of the world that communism is on the march, so to speak. After all, the Communists are forcing a crisis over Berlin, they are attempting to undermine the United Nations, they are causing trouble in Laos, threatening the established government in south Viet-Nam, and there is communism in Cuba although we are not sure how widely it is accepted there. But what do you think of the view that some people hold that the Communist movement seems to be going ahead, seems to be winning?

Secretary Rusk: I think that any large movement of this sort which is committed to, in effect, an aggressive policy, a policy which I have already been talking about, would leave the impression that it is energetic and active. But I don't believe that our grandchildren or any grandchildren will be Communists if they themselves have anything to say about it, because we have not yet seen an example of a country which has embraced communism by the free choice of its peoples at the polls. This is not the history of communism.

We in the United States are deeply committed to a very simple notion and that is that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Now, this may be debatable philosophically, but in terms of the practical, political arrangements which make it possible for people to live out their lives in freedom and with some assurance about what is going to happen to them, to give an opportunity for their grandchild-

dren to grow up with some prospective contentment. We believe that this notion is fundamental. It is one that affects us in our instinctive relations to such questions as the colonial questions; it is why we are so disturbed about the situation in Eastern Europe; it is why we prefer democracies to dictatorships; and it is why we are genuinely concerned about some of our own failures within the United States to live up in every respect to our own principles. And we believe this notion, this basic notion of freedom, is deeply rooted in the nature of man himself. We just don't believe that people like to be pushed around too much. We believe, therefore, that freedom is the winning revolution. And may I point out, Mr. Dunlavey, that it is the revolution of freedom that still is the most powerful force at work in the world even here in the latter part of the 20th century.

Long-Range Design of U.S. Foreign Policy

Mr. Dunlavey: Mr. Rusk, you have been in the position of Secretary of State for almost a year now, and I want to ask you a question that deals, perhaps, rather broadly and philosophically with American foreign policy. It has been said that it is difficult to rally support in this country or in other countries for a policy which is presented to the general public in bits and pieces which do not appear to fit into any previously announced larger scheme. Now, Communist strategy, or at least Soviet strategy, does appear to have—to be operating according to some sort of large master plan. Does the United States foreign policy have any similar large design, or do you think a democratic country ought to have such a design? In other words, do we have long-range objectives, do we have a large scheme?

Secretary Rusk: We do, Mr. Dunlavey, but I think there is a difference between what you have called our long-range design and what the Communists might call a master plan. Of course the American people have some very important views as to the kind of world we should like to see and in which we should like to live. These are set forth in many of our own basic, public declarations and statutes. But I would suppose that the most convenient and the most succinct statement of these larger designs are to be found in the preamble and in articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. This does not mean that this is our plan

from a strictly national American point of view. But this is an agreed plan among most of the nations of the world who designed this kind of world at the end of World War II, when we were tired of war and chastened by the experience and when we were hopeful for the future. We met under those conditions and said, now this is the kind of world toward which we ought to work. And I think these long-range purposes of the American people, to which you referred, are wholly congenial with the long-range purposes of the world community as set forth in that United Nations Charter. I don't pretend that we or any other single government or people would live up to each one of those principles in every detail in everything that we do. But it is a powerful influence on our policy, and it correctly expresses our hopes and aspirations.

I do think, Mr. Dunlavey, if this does not sound too presumptuous, that it is fair to point out that at the end of World War II the American people were in a position of unprecedented power. They cut their military forces down to the most extraordinary extent. They offered to put the atomic bomb, which they then had solely in their possession, under international control because they knew that if international control could not be achieved there would be an atomic arms race. But the American people turned away from the possibilities of exploiting that unparalleled power which they had at the end of World War II and committed themselves, I think quite genuinely, to the purposes of the United Nations Charter. I think this is a matter of some historical importance. We have not abandoned that hope; we are not abandoning that effort, because we believe that it is along this trail that the future of man can best be worked out.

U.S. Disappointed at Failure of Geneva Talks

Mr. Dunlavey: Mr. Secretary, I have been asking questions of you which are more or less designed to reflect the attitudes of some of our friends abroad. I would like to ask a question now which I think perhaps expresses certain concern which we have here, which at least some of us have here in America, about the attitude of some other countries. There has been considerable—perhaps “frustration” is the word—among some Americans about the fact that there has not been much

criticism by most of the governments represented at the Belgrade conference²—not much criticism by these countries of the recent Soviet nuclear testing in the atmosphere. I wonder if you would care to comment on this. Why do you think there hasn't been much criticism by most of these governments?

Secretary Rusk: I think that it would be important to recall that the Belgrade conference was made up of two dozen governments who differed among themselves on many important questions and that the official declaration that came out of that conference tended to represent only those things on which there could be agreement. So that, on a particular question such as the one you mention, I think you would have to look at the attitude of those governments one by one.

Of course, we ourselves would have been glad to see a stronger stand taken on the resumption of atmospheric testing because we have been very anxious—we and the United Kingdom have been very anxious—to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union which would ban nuclear tests of all types under conditions which would make it safe for all to eliminate nuclear testing and the further spread of nuclear weapons. We were disappointed, and I may say that puts it mildly, that, after several months of the most intensive negotiation, during which we and the United Kingdom tried in every possible way to meet the Soviet position as we had understood it, the negotiations in Geneva failed and a very large series of atmospheric tests were then conducted.

We hope that the neutrals, indeed all countries, will reflect upon their own obligations, their own commitments to their own national interests and to the United Nations Charter, and find a way to take the first steps toward disarmament under conditions which will leave no one, as Aristide Briand once put it, as dupes or victims in the process. We feel that the arms race itself is dangerous and creates its own tensions. We do not underestimate the difficulty of moving ahead with realistic disarmament arrangements. But we think it is of the utmost importance—and President Kennedy has emphasized this over and over again—we think it is of the utmost importance that we diligently work in that direction. This is one of the reasons

² For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

why the United States in these past few months has established by act of Congress a disarmament group in our own Government working full time on this difficult, highly complicated, but most urgent and vital problem.³

Mr. Dunlavy: Well, many thanks, Mr. Secre-

tary, for giving us your time in answering these questions not only about Berlin but two or three other topics as well. I am sure that our friends overseas join me in wishing you the best of luck in your search for solutions to these very difficult problems. Thank you, sir.

Under Secretary Bowles Addresses Regional Foreign Policy Briefing Conferences

Following are texts of addresses made by Under Secretary Bowles at regional foreign policy briefing conferences held at Kansas City, Mo., on October 26 and at Dallas, Tex., on October 27.¹

KANSAS CITY, OCTOBER 26

Press release 736 dated October 26

It is a pleasure and privilege to meet with you here today in the heartland of America. In the past 3 months I have visited a great many foreign countries, containing a wide variety of peoples, cultures, and political institutions. In five regional conferences I have met with our American ambassadors and their chief assistants from all the nations of Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America.

I have returned from these travels and meetings with a sharpened sense of the problems confronting the people of these lands, their living conditions, their aspirations, and their anxieties. I have felt to the depth of my being the atmosphere of dynamic, drastic, and rapid change which today permeates three-fourths of the world, and I have surveyed the strengths and weaknesses of the economic and political instruments with which we are responding to the unprecedented problems that such change produces.

¹ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 646, and Nov. 6, 1961, p. 762.

² For an announcement of the conferences, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 611.

The direction which the forces of change will ultimately take in other lands, the destiny of these hundreds of millions of people, depends only in part upon their own attitudes and actions. In large measure, their future depends upon the policies and actions of the United States.

It is not easy for the American people to grasp the full dimensions of this challenge. During much of the century between the War of 1812 and World War I, we were cut off from world affairs and we were not only proponents of isolationism but also *products* of isolationism. Behind the protective shield of the great oceans, we were able to throw our energies into the development of our vast continent, the construction of communications, the creation of industries, the production of national power—untroubled and largely unconscious of the outside world.

We were able to do this not only because of the blessings of geography in the age before the emergence of air power but because of the crucial role played by Great Britain on the European Continent. Through the century between Napoleon and World War I, it was British diplomacy that maintained a troubled but still effective balance of power in Europe. At the same time it was the British Fleet that actually gave substance to our Monroe Doctrine and prevented European adventurers from penetrating Latin America.

Not that we Americans gave Britain much credit for playing this essential role of power balancer. Indeed many of our most successful politicians campaigned for elective office by promising, if

elected, to keep British influence out of Illinois, or Missouri, or Connecticut. Nor in all fairness did the British seek our gratitude. They were protecting their interest, not our own, and it was our good fortune that our interests largely coincided.

The First World War brought a rude awakening from our century of isolationism. Yet even then it took us 3 years before we decided that British power was no longer adequate to assure world stability and that our direct participation in that war was essential to our interests.

After World War I many Americans realized that the old European balance of power had collapsed and that continued American participation in the outside world was now a necessity if we were to remain secure.

Yet our old habits of isolationism died hard, and again we decided to withdraw behind our oceans. Tragically, we refused to join the League of Nations in the face of the prophetic warning of Woodrow Wilson that, "There will come sometime, in the vengeful providence of God, another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America will have to die, but as many millions as are necessary to accomplish the final freedom of the peoples of the world."

Our years between the two wars were an uneasy continuation of our isolationist tradition. We watched the breakup of the old world order and the rise of expansionist, totalitarian dictatorships. Yet we still hoped against hope that somehow we could remain aloof, and in terms of our national history these hopes were understandable.

When Hitler marched against Poland, our first reaction was to cut off exports to Great Britain. Although we soon reversed ourselves to provide substantial economic support to the British, we did not become participants until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

In an international sense we came of age in late 1941. Yet even to this day many of us find it difficult to accept the crucial importance of our global role to our own prosperity, freedom, and security.

Revolutionary Changes in World Relationships

Our world is plagued with agonizing problems and the most explosive dangers. These problems are dramatized for us by such crises as Cuba, Laos, the Congo, Viet-Nam, Bizerte, and now Ber-

lin. Yet behind these crises lie enormous revolutionary changes in the whole fabric of world relationships which are too easily overlooked by the headline readers.

The first change is the political, social, economic, and cultural upheaval that is sweeping Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Today millions of people who once knew life only as an endless cycle of poverty, oppression, ignorance, and disease have become aware that better lives are possible; and today they are pressing hard for teachers, doctors, schools, jobs, and above all a greater measure of justice and dignity.

The second of these changes is the rise of the Soviet Union to a position of enormous power as a highly industrialized Communist state seeking by every possible means to bring other states within its sphere of tight totalitarian control.

The third revolutionary change is the emergence of Communist China as the paramount power of east Asia, a dynamic, land-hungry, resource-hungry nation of exploding population with clear expansionist aims.

Finally, these three great revolutions have been compounded in their effect by a revolution in science and technology that has brought the destruction of civilization into the realm of real possibility.

Traditional American Impatience

Any one of these challenges would tax the wisdom and endurance power of any people. Yet we find ourselves heir to world leadership at a time when all four of them are surging at floodtide.

These clear facts help to clarify President Kennedy's recent statement² that most Americans of this generation are destined to live out their lives in a state of uncertainty, challenge, and peril. It would be an understatement to say that such a situation is uncomfortable. The convergence of the four great changes I have described presents the American people with an unprecedented challenge. It has also created considerable confusion as to our national objectives and has caused exasperation, frustration, and bitterness.

Most dangerous of all, perhaps, is the fact that it has induced many Americans to search for an "easy way out." We Americans are an impatient, energetic, and optimistic people. We regard prob-

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1961, p. 699.

lems as things to be solved, not things to be lived with. Such qualities are a rich and invaluable heritage from our frontier tradition. They are a direct result, moreover, of a long series of successes in dealing with difficult domestic problems.

We achieved our independence. We opened up the West. We successfully converted ourselves from an agricultural society to a primarily industrial society. We preserved the Union in a bloody Civil War. We fought and won the two major international wars. And we coped with a severe depression and emerged from it with new economic vigor and new concepts of social justice.

In other words, throughout our national history we have not only expected to find answers to our problems; in most instances we have succeeded in finding them.

But today's world is infinitely more complicated and more dangerous than the one with which our grandfathers had to cope. Some of the more complex questions on the international agenda can be answered only through costly, long, and patient effort, and others, at least in our time, cannot be answered at all.

The frustration that many Americans feel is increased by the fact that the dramatic successes that we scored in Europe immediately following the war were achieved in an abnormal and inevitably temporary situation. In those early postwar years our industrial and military power was dominant. Until 1949 we held a total nuclear monopoly, and our H-bomb monopoly continued until 1953. At the same time, our economy alone was undamaged and our industries expanding.

In contrast, Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was in a state of collapse and slow, painful rehabilitation. The Soviet Union itself had suffered 25 million casualties. In Asia and Africa many peoples were entering the early and least explosive stages of their struggle for national independence.

Against this background the problems of the world, although complicated, at least appeared subject to our control.

This period left us psychologically ill prepared for the inevitable recovery of Europe, the rapid development of the Soviet Union, and the balancing of military power as Soviet scientists predictably cracked the secret of the atom. Our present impatience with difficulties and obstacles is a natural result.

In one sense, however, this built-in, typically American impatience can be an asset in foreign policy. If we had been less determined to find answers to problems, there would have been no Marshall plan, there would have been no NATO, and there would not even have been a United Nations Organization. Equally important, there would be no foreign assistance programs, which today are our most essential task in creating the conditions for orderly political growth in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

In brief, let's recognize the value of our natural impatience; but let's not let it get out of hand. Most of all, we must avoid the temptation to escape from reality, to seek a single easy solution to a complex variety of problems, or to take an "all or nothing" attitude toward our relations with the rest of the world.

Military Power of Free World Vital to Peace

Frustration and bafflement hold great danger for us. Today they manifest themselves in at least four types of thinking among some of our most impatient citizens.

A first category includes those who believe that a nuclear war is inevitable. Indeed, a few years ago an occasional American was heard to urge in private that we move into a war at once and "get it over with." Such reckless and unrealistic thinking reflects the fact that we Americans never felt the full impact of modern war and, in particular, the fact that many of us do not comprehend the catastrophic destructiveness of nuclear weapons.

In the past, war for most Americans involved some domestic restrictions and, for a few, deep sacrifices. But with the exception of our civil strife, war has never yet been a truly national disaster for America.

Today the earth has shriveled in size and the destructive power of weapons has been multiplied fantastically. A nuclear war under present conditions would mean the total destruction of great cities and thousands of towns and villages. Its casualties would not be primarily the soldiers in uniform but millions of civilians, including women and children. When we consider both the blast and the fallout, it is impossible to estimate what the ultimate effects on human life would be.

Our response, of course, would devastate the aggressor, and there is every reason to believe

that the damage to the Communist empire would be even greater than in our own country. Yet this is hardly a contest which any thoughtful man would enter lightheartedly or in ignorance of the implications to mankind.

Of course we cannot achieve peace by running away from the very prospect of war. That prospect must be boldly and courageously faced. It is therefore totally essential that we possess not only the means but also the will to fight if there is no other way to check aggression against our vital interests.

Until there evolves some kind of world society which can assure controlled disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and international justice under law, the military power of the free world is vital to the peace of the whole world.

But being prepared to fight is an entirely different thing from provoking a fight. It would be folly to ignore this vital difference.

Isolation an Absurdity

A second category of escapist thinking is that of those people who would have us withdraw from the world in which we are living on the assumption that we can somehow return to partial or total isolationism.

This escapism expresses itself in many forms.

If we have a disagreement with our allies, there are those who demand that we abandon our alliances.

If we are outvoted on a particular issue in the United Nations, there are those who urge that we withdraw from membership.

If a friendly nation is threatened with aggression, there are those who believe we should let that nation sink or swim for itself and not risk the life of a single American soldier.

If some of our factories are running into difficulties, there are those who say that foreign imports should be banned.

If a foreign nation expresses criticism of the United States, there are those who insist that we should call off our assistance.

Although these expressions of our frustration are understandable, they must be recognized and labeled as dangerously shortsighted and self-defeating in terms of our interests. Let us look at a few examples.

The idea that we should abandon alliances whenever we disagree with our allies ignores the fact

that these alliances are as essential to the United States as they are to the other members. NATO does not exist to protect Europe alone; it also exists to protect North America by discouraging a Soviet attack. We not only add our strength to theirs; they also add their strength to ours. What today's neoisolationists are demanding, in effect, is that we cut ourselves off from all sources of support.

The same shortsightedness is found in the argument that we should cut off or cut down our imports in order to protect American industry from foreign competition.

Most free nations depend upon the sale of their goods overseas to secure the income they need to pay for essential imports and to maintain their economic freedom. If they cannot survive as free and independent states, whether allied or neutral, they become easy targets for Communist subversion or aggression. If this occurs, their population and resources will be added to the strength of the Communist empire and used against us, and the strength of the free world will accordingly be diminished.

But even if we put aside all political considerations, the demand that we shut off foreign imports makes little economic sense. The United States exports a great deal more than it imports. Other nations must sell to us in order to buy from us. Cutting down our imports inevitably means a corresponding decline in our exports, with the loss of profits and hundreds of thousands of jobs both here and abroad. If the United States and the non-Communist world are to be strong and prosperous, trade among the free nations must be expanded, not cut.

Or let us consider the argument of those who insist that we apply punitive measures whenever a nation criticizes American policies or our American way of life.

We do not maintain diplomatic contacts with other nations, nor do we provide them assistance, simply to win their friendship and attract their support. Our primary purpose is to help these nations become strong and healthy, so that they may be permitted freedom of choice as free and independent societies.

As long as we support free nations, we are underwriting free speech, and as long as they enjoy free speech, we will suffer some criticism. Nothing would please Moscow and Peiping more than

a policy of tossing to the wolves any nation which criticizes or disagrees with the United States.

In brief, any policy of isolationism, partial or total, is an absurdity in the modern world. We could not become isolationist without becoming a garrison state, in which our military expenditures would be far greater, in which our economic well-being would be diminished, and in which our fundamental liberties would be impaired.

Our incomes would be lower, and our taxes would be higher. The threat from the outside would be greater, and our means of resisting this threat would be weaker. We would not gain freedom of action but would suffer a paralysis of action—peering over our parapets at a hostile world entirely beyond our influence.

And where would we get the necessary iron ore, manganese, tin, rubber, and other essential commodities which are essential to keep our factories going and our nation strong?

For many years one of the major purposes of Soviet strategy has been to isolate the United States from the rest of the world, politically, economically, and militarily. Those who by one means or another encourage such a withdrawal are unwittingly contributing to this objective.

Fighting Shadow Rather Than Substance

A third category of escapist thinking is illustrated by those who claim to recognize the perils which our nation faces but who insist upon fighting the shadow of the peril rather than the substance.

People who fall prey to this temptation seem less concerned about the power of modern weapons, about the vast implications of the social and economic revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or about the threat posed by Sino-Soviet imperialism. Instead they would have us concentrate fixedly on what they call the "internal Communist danger."

Every thoughtful man knows that an international Communist conspiracy exists and that the Sino-Soviet empire has agents in almost every nation on earth, including the United States. It is also true that these agents are dangerous and that we must be everlastingly on guard against their efforts to undercut or subvert our national efforts. However, we do our cause a disservice when we allow our concern for our domestic Communists

to divert us from the tremendous problems we face in our relations with the outside world.

We may also hope that all Americans will someday learn to distinguish between the concepts of communism as advocated by the Kremlin and the democratic faith as outlined by Jefferson and Lincoln.

Some of our more frustrated citizens, baffled by the problems of our fast-changing age, seem to believe that social security comes perilously close to communism and that the same holds for public education and the TVA. This stems from the illusion that communism arises from socialism, which in turn stems from liberalism, which in turn comes from the democratic ideas established in our Declaration of Independence. This notion is as ridiculous in fact as it is in theory.

The answer to the Communist challenge is more democracy and progressivism, not less.

Of the many nations now under Communist rule, is it possible to name one in which the triumph of communism was preceded by a transitional period of stable and liberal democracy? With the exception of Czechoslovakia, where the Communists seized power through a coup backed up by the Red Army, the answer is a resounding "No."

Communism has never succeeded in those nations which have achieved a large measure of political democracy, economic well-being, and social justice. It has come to power only in societies which were already reactionary and oppressive, where people were illiterate and hungry, and where they had abandoned all hope that their problems could be solved by any other alternative.

A final category of escapist thinking borders on utopianism.

There are some among us who recognize the dangers of Communist imperialism, who are fully aware of the horror of nuclear war, and who know that we cannot escape by turning away from the real world in an effort to survive in a garrison state, but who nevertheless direct their hopes and efforts toward some kind of miraculous solution.

Some suggest that all problems, regardless of their character, be dumped into the United Nations. Others express confidence that since the Sino-Soviet leaders are "only human," their policies and ambitions can be suddenly reversed by the pressure of world opinion, with some generous concessions thrown in for good measure. They

suggest that the source of the great conflict between civilizations results largely from misunderstanding and distrust and that, like other problems, it can be solved by better contact and communication among people. To assure a favorable response from our opponents, they suggest that we follow a course of accommodation, whether the issues at stake involve minor tactics or fundamental principles.

Because their impulses are generous and humanitarian, these people inevitably command a measure of sympathy. And because many of them are hard as granite in asserting and defending their beliefs, they cannot be lightly dismissed as "soft on communism."

They nevertheless fail, in my opinion, to understand the full nature of the world crisis. In their own way they too are demanding the "easy answer." And like the others, they are subconsciously twisting facts to fit their theories, rather than facing the facts squarely.

Unhappily, there are some problems which cannot be solved merely by exposure to public debate in a world assembly of nations. Nor are the Soviet rulers likely to change their basic purposes so long as they believe that these purposes will eventually be realized.

Human nature contains elements of evil as well as elements of goodness—and unhappily, violent passions cannot always be controlled by the application of reason; nor do governments necessarily behave as individual humans behave.

America's Basic Strength

These categories of escapist thought are dangerous, each in its own way. There is no shortcut. We have no alternative but to deal with the world as it is and to address ourselves to the problems that actually confront us.

The challenge of our perilous environment can only be met by positive, realistic policies. We cannot escape the world; we must face it boldly, and with confidence in our basic strength.

This strength is not confined to military power, essential though we know it to be. It is rooted deep in the moral faith on which our country was based. It is expressed in what may be called our national purpose.

We Americans want peace, freedom, justice,

prosperity, and well-being for ourselves and for all other people. We want to assure freedom of choice to all nations and societies.

No people is our enemy, although some peoples are controlled by governments which may be antagonistic to the United States for many years to come. Our ultimate aim is not only to preserve and strengthen our way of life here at home but to help all other peoples attain a way of life that is a natural reflection of their history and culture. For freedom in today's world is indivisible.

To achieve these purposes we must simultaneously pursue a variety of policies aimed at a variety of specific results.

At home, we must maintain a strong and prosperous America. We must have adequate military power, and this power must be based upon a foundation of spiritual strength. We must not permit any private or sectional interest to take precedence over the interests of the Nation as a whole.

We must seek maximum unity among the nations of the free world. We must maintain and strengthen our alliances.

With regard to those nations that have chosen a course of neutrality, we must respect their neutrality and must help them to develop the stability and strength required for the maintenance of their own independence.

And these purposes must be pursued through a variety of means—aid programs, technical assistance, liberal trade policies, closer cultural contacts, and patient diplomacy.

With respect to that portion of the world already engulfed by the Communist empire, there are several things we must do.

We must stand firm against Sino-Soviet aggression, whether direct or indirect. We must resist the untiring campaign of the Sino-Soviet rulers to expand their influence and domination to other nations.

At the same time we must always be ready to negotiate with the Communist rulers to settle specific problems. We must make a continued effort to prevent the cold war they have launched against us from turning into a suicidal "hot war."

We must offer the Soviet leaders reasonable incentives to abandon their dangerous ambitions, to change their policies, to relax their oppression

of the peoples they rule, and eventually to cooperate in building a world in which all nations can be free from fear.

Finally, we must continue to expand our contacts with the peoples under Soviet rule, to establish closer communication with them, to achieve a better understanding of their problems and aspirations, and to give them a true image of America to replace the distorted image drawn by their own propagandists.

The pursuit of all these policies will require a great deal of time, a great deal of effort, a great deal of patience, and a great deal of imagination and intelligence.

We have no desire to remake the world in the image of America. We could not do so even if we wished. Nor do we desire to dictate to our allies or to any other nation. We do not wish to establish a system of American imperialism and colonialism. The world is too big for us to run, and we would not want to run it even if we could.

Our real task is to protect and promote our own basic interests, with full realization of the fact that these interests correspond with the basic interests of other human beings in all lands.

"The Task Will Not Be Easy"

In concluding I would like to repeat what I said in the beginning. The task will not be easy, nor is it likely to be completed within any foreseeable period of time.

Peace and freedom have never been cheap. As Thomas Paine once said, Heaven knows how to put a price upon its treasures and it would have been strange indeed had it failed to attach great value to so precious a commodity as liberty.

Twenty years ago, in the midst of another great world crisis, Winston Churchill had the courage to tell the bitter truth to the people of the United Kingdom, and this truth made possible their survival. He told them he had nothing to offer except "blood, toil, tears and sweat."

Although we are not now engaged in a shooting war, the world situation is no less critical and the need for honesty is no less imperative. For many years to come the Government of the United States must offer its people sweat and toil. Only if the American people are ready to accept this challenge, only if they are willing to rise to the unprecedented crisis of our era, are we likely to be spared the blood and tears.

DALLAS, OCTOBER 27

Press release 741 dated October 27

I am very glad to have this opportunity to talk about our foreign policy here in Dallas. I also welcome this opportunity to get away from the tensions and turmoil of our National Capital and to secure a fresh perspective through this visit to our great Southwest.

These are times of crucial significance for America's future. The supreme test of a nation's maturity is its ability to keep its head in moments of tension and danger. The greater the nation's power, the greater the test.

We in the United States are now passing through such a time of ultimate testing. Today we are confronted with an adversary which challenges the concepts on which every free society is based and which seeks to subject every nation and every people to totalitarian domination.

This adversary is communism.

Yet communism is only part of the challenge which we face. If every Communist handed in his card tomorrow, ours would still be a dangerous and uncertain world.

Since the end of the war more than one-third of mankind has broken its ties with the old colonial nations of Europe. In the most remote villages of Asia, Africa, and Latin America old ways are being challenged, new pressures for progress are being generated. Although in most cases their cultures are old, their desires are new and urgent: to move speedily into a 20th-century world that promises equal opportunity and a greater measure of dignity and justice for each individual.

Only two decades ago the major decisions which affected the people of Asia and Africa were made in London or Paris or The Hague. All this has been changed. Now these decisions are made in New Delhi, in Rangoon, in Djakarta, Lagos, and Dakar.

This upheaval in old colonial relationships has been matched by equally explosive changes in science and technology. We scarcely have time to adjust to one unprecedented innovation before another crowds it from the center of our attention. In weapons development these changes have produced a revolution that has already provided the power which could bring about the extinction of most of the human race.

Placed in the context of the cold-war struggle

between the Soviet Union and ourselves, this extraordinary pace of political, economic, and social change has created unparalleled problems for American policy. Never has there been such complexity in the relations among nations, and never has any generation been more deeply challenged.

In these agonizingly difficult times, simple black and white answers are rarely available. More often than not, our policymakers are called upon to choose among several undesirable courses of action, seeking to determine the least undesirable of these courses.

We command by all odds the strongest individual force on earth, and we are the match for any military adversary. Yet our world is not only complex but vast, and we constitute only 6 percent of mankind. By wise and courageous policies we can strongly influence the future; but we cannot control it.

Such limitations are not easy for any of us to accept; they are particularly difficult for Texans. Texan confidence and Texan energy have become bywords throughout the world. Texas is a place where anything and everything has always been possible, a place where able people have always been able to overcome all obstacles and get things done.

Yet the harsh realities of our today's world are staring us in the face. Through skilled diplomacy, sensitivity to the attitudes and objectives of others, and on occasion the bold use of power, much can be accomplished in diverting dangerous threats, in preparing the ground for broader understanding, and in encouraging favorable trends.

Keeping a Proper Perspective

Indeed, our record since the war has in most ways been a good record. Although the challenge was vast and there was little in our past experience to prepare us for it, I believe that the history of our times will give us high marks in many fields.

In the last 15 years Europe has been stabilized; our relations with much of the new world of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been improved; our industrial capacity has more than doubled; and our military power has enormously expanded.

Our record since the war also includes many failures, some waste of resources, miscalculations, and on occasion outright stupidity.

However, if we are to maintain our national strength and essential unity, it is important that

we keep our perspective on what has happened and what is likely to happen overseas. Although our problems are great, I believe that those our adversaries face are considerably greater.

It would be folly, of course, to minimize the military, scientific, and industrial achievements of the Soviets. In two generations they have become the second greatest industrial power in the world.

They graduate twice as many engineers as we do. They have made exceptional progress in the exploration of space. Their scientists are among the ablest in the world. And their conventional military power is second to none.

In Berlin, southeast Asia, Cuba, and elsewhere today the Communist movement poses an unremitting challenge to our strength of will, our firmness of purpose, and our intelligence. A national policy that fails to take account of Soviet power and determination would be more than dangerous—it would be suicidal.

Yet let us keep our sense of proportion. Not all Russians are 10 feet tall. And Texans should be the last people on earth to contribute to what among some commentators sounds suspiciously like the beginnings of an inferiority complex in regard to our capacity to do what we clearly must do if we are to survive as a great nation.

Every thoughtful citizen is concerned about the pressures which we face in Laos and in Berlin, about the intrusion of Communist power into Cuba, Soviet space exploits, and the development of Soviet industry and education. Yet what we often overlook, particularly in dealing with the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is the clear fact that in the political and economic field the Kremlin's mistakes have been both frequent and serious and their own frustration correspondingly great.

A Review of Soviet Setbacks

To get the situation into focus let us therefore review the last 15 years as members of the Kremlin must see them in moments of cold, realistic perspective. Such a review may help to clarify our own strengths and to place the worldwide situations into better balance.

Following World War II a political and economic vacuum existed in Europe. Most industries lay in ruins, and each nation's economy was scarred by inflation and vast unemployment. In the United States, meanwhile, there was a mad

scramble stimulated by thoughtless political leaders in both parties to disband our victorious armies and to draw back into our shell. With most of Eastern Europe already overrun by the Red Armies and nearly 200 battle-tested Soviet divisions still under arms, Stalin was convinced that communism would quickly fill the entire European vacuum. His techniques to achieve a Communist-dominated Europe combined the threat of military strength, Communist-controlled strikes, divisive propaganda, and in Greece and elsewhere even guerrilla operation.

Yet what was the result?

Soviet pressure toward the Mediterranean through Greece and Turkey in the classic tradition of the czars was forestalled by the prompt counteraction of massive American military and economic assistance under the Truman doctrine. Within months, Marshall plan aid was provided to rebuild the war-torn economies of Western Europe, followed by NATO, which erected an effective military shield between our allies and the Communist world.

It is easy to forget that only 15 years ago many Americans were grimly predicting that Western Europe would soon be in Communist hands. Yet with the exception of Czechoslovakia, Soviet power has been unable to move beyond the areas conquered and seized by the Red Armies.

By prompt, bold, united action, Europe's freedom was assured, and today it is stronger and more prosperous than at any time in its long history.

In 1948 the Soviet Union launched another cold-war maneuver: to seal off and suffocate Berlin. But here again American and British enterprise and ingenuity met this test. Through the fantastic Berlin airlift the Russian thrust was again curtailed, and the net result was an aroused Western awareness of the Communist threat.

It was also in 1948 that the Yugoslavs broke loose from the Soviet bloc; and 13 years of Soviet threats and blandishments have failed to bring them back into the fold. This marked the first important rift in the presumably monolithic Soviet empire. Although they still call themselves Communists, the Yugoslavs are today building a relatively prosperous economy independent of Soviet control.

Most Americans were disturbed and critical of President Tito's recent speech at Belgrade in which he appeared to endorse the Khrushchev

position on several key issues. Yet when the Soviets consider the divisive effect of Yugoslavia's independent development on Poland, Hungary, and the other East European nations, their own irritations undoubtedly surpass our own. Indeed this irritation was reflected in the recent Soviet denunciations of Yugoslavia's errors at the Moscow Communist Congress.

1948 was indeed a busy year for Stalin and his overconfident supporters. In that same year in Asia six new Communist revolutions were launched by order of the Kremlin: in the Philippines, Indonesia, French Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and India.

Five of these six nations were newly freed, relatively disorganized, and presumably weak and divided. In the Kremlin's eyes they must have appeared to be easy targets for carefully organized, well-financed, indigenously led Communist revolutions. Yet in all five the result was a resounding failure. In the sixth area, Indochina, the Communists were able to focus their propaganda and their pressure against France, a white colonial power, and it was here alone that their forces were partially successful.

Now let us continue our review of the Soviet record of setbacks.

Only a few years ago all thoughtful observers were clearly concerned about Soviet penetration into the Middle East. Many thought that Egypt, for example, was on the road to Soviet control. Yet today Nasser's nationalism fiercely combats internal communism and his relations with the U.S.S.R. grow increasingly cool. Although the situation in the Middle East remains unstable and unpredictable, the Soviet gains here run far behind their expectations.

In 1955 the Soviets launched a new Khrushchev-type political-economic program in India and Japan. All sorts of overtures and promises were made. Yet again their efforts have fallen far short of their goals. India today with all its problems is a rapidly developing, increasingly confident, democratic nation. And postwar Japan appears gradually to be overcoming her internal conflicts and to be establishing an extraordinary record of economic and political success under a democratic government.

Now let us consider Africa—one of the highest priority targets for Soviet ambitions and one on which they have set high hopes.

In the past 10 years, 24 newly independent countries have emerged in Africa. As the Communists stepped up their efforts on that vast and chaotic continent there was much talk of the inevitability of African Soviet "satellites."

Yet granted that there have been some irritating speeches from African capitals and some disturbingly wobbly relationships, African nationalism has thus far resisted Soviet blandishments. "We worked for two generations to throw off the colonial rule of the European powers," say African leaders. "Why, now that our freedom has been won, should we become a satellite of the Soviet Union?"

The Soviet suffered a particularly dramatic setback in the Congo with the United Nations itself as its principal adversary. This setback led directly to the Kremlin's effort to destroy the effectiveness of the U.N. through the troika proposal for a three-headed administrative unit to replace the single Secretary-General.

Not one nation outside the Soviet bloc has supported this proposal, and this constitutes another setback.

I do not suggest that everything is going our way in the United Nations. Yet the Soviet attempt to destroy or undermine this Organization has thus far failed.

Even in Communist China, where the Soviets congratulated themselves on a startling victory for communism, the Kremlin faces baffling pressures and unpredictable dangers. As a result of the Chinese revolution, we see today what appears on the surface to be a bitter rivalry for the leadership of the world Communist movement, a rivalry expressed in the recurrent ideological disputes between Peiping and Moscow.

But the primary source of tension runs far deeper than ideology. Let us consider the full implications as the Kremlin must see them.

An overriding need of Communist China is for more arable land. With less than two arable acres available for each farm family, with almost no commercial fertilizer, and with a population that is increasing by 16 million every year, the Chinese Communists face mounting difficulties in feeding their own people. Indeed, it may be argued that this economic and political time-bomb is the single most explosive factor in all of east Asia.

Although it represents a serious challenge to the food-surplus nations of southeast Asia, it presents

a particularly difficult problem for the Soviet Union. It is the Soviets, after all, who have a vast expanse of fertile underpopulated land adjacent to China. And there are times when relatives can be more troublesome than enemies.

A horde of 650 million hungry ideological relatives is struggling for a bare existence along the Soviet's 4,500-mile border. If I were a member of the Politburo, I would have somebody up nights checking that back door. Or else I would be prepared to wake up one morning and find that my ideological relatives had moved in to stay.

Results of "Peaceful Competition"

Now let us consider one more dimension of the economic and political difficulties which the Kremlin must take into account.

For several years now the Kremlin has been talking about "peaceful competition between the two kinds of systems." Yet haven't they experienced precisely such a competition on their very doorstep? For 15 years West Germany has been developing under one system, East Germany under another. And what has been the result? Today in West Germany we have one of the great economic, social, and political success stories of modern times—a free, prosperous, dynamic society of enormous vigor and promise.

By contrast, East Germany stands as a shoddy failure, economically depressed, intellectually sterile, and viewed with outspoken contempt by its own citizens. Indeed the Soviet's failure in East Germany has been so great that the Communists have had to build a wall backed by machineguns and tanks to keep the East Germans from moving en masse from the so-called "Communist utopia" of East Germany to the "capitalist cesspool" of West Germany.

In this act of desperation the Communist leaders have made it clear to the world that the one way they can keep their people in is to lock them in. Although East Berlin creates new problems for the West, it stands as a monumental symbol of the utter bankruptcy of Soviet policy in Europe.

The Communist failure to win support of their own people extends not only to East Germany but to Poland and Hungary and indeed to all the rest of their unhappy satellite states. And this despite 15 years of calculated, high-pressured, relentless indoctrination of the whole postwar generation

through Communist schools, Communist radio, and Communist books and newspapers.

The depth of the Soviet failure is dramatized by the urge for individual freedom and for national independence that has not hesitated to resist Soviet totalitarianism. Twenty-five thousand young Hungarians proved it by giving their lives in the struggle against Soviet tanks in the streets of Budapest 5 years ago. Nearly 4 million East Germans, most of them under 30 years of age, have proved it by leaving their homes to seek security and freedom in the West.

Need for Confidence, Perspective, Courage

Now this brief tour of the ups and downs of Soviet policy since the war should not blind us to the very real material strength of the Soviet Union. Yet the fact remains that in the past decade the Soviet political and economic offensive has failed in Europe, failed in the Far East, failed in the Middle East, and failed in Africa. With the single exception of Cuba, it has also failed in Latin America.

I submit that the Soviets have not been winning the cold war. They have been losing it.

Yet this does not make the danger any less. On the contrary, the very failure of much of the Soviet economic and political effort in Asia and Africa may partly explain the Kremlin's reckless *military* pressure in central Europe.

For the short haul, the frustration born out of these setbacks may make the Soviet Union much more difficult and dangerous to deal with. Over the long run, however, the outlook may be somewhat brighter.

Blocked in their attempt to overrun Asia and Africa by economic and social maneuvers, and blocked from Berlin by NATO power and will, is it not possible that sober-minded members of the Kremlin may feel the time has come for some adjustment? Although no one knows, we should never close the door against this possibility.

Until that time comes, our task is vigorously to pursue our objectives of orderly, peaceful growth in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—and to hold

our ground in regard to Berlin. For contrary to the belief of many, I am convinced that time is on our side.

What men and women everywhere want is freedom to speak and think as they feel, an opportunity to work and to create and to achieve, and justice to enjoy the fruits of their efforts. And more and more it will become clear to these people that what communism has to offer—after the parades, the purges, and the “great leaps forward”—is bleakness, conformity, and forced allegiance to the whims of a foreign power centered in Moscow.

Let me put it in the simplest terms: Our primary asset as a nation in the difficult years ahead is the fact that what *we* want for the people of the world is precisely what *they* want for themselves—freedom of choice, opportunity for development, and an increasing measure of individual dignity.

In other words, our goal is not regimentation but diversity. And therein lies our strength.

There are times, to be sure, when other nations do not see things as we do; and such differences can create deep frustration. Yet our objective is not to create dutiful satellites but rather independent peoples, free to choose their own futures within the framework of their own culture, history, and way of life.

We have made mistakes, and there will be more mistakes to come as we attempt to adapt our policies to new problems and changing situations. Yet we have the means and the will. Equally important, our national purpose is the purpose of the vast majority of mankind regardless of nationality, religion, color, or creed: the creation of just societies in which men can work out their own destiny.

With such assets, what we need right now is greater confidence in ourselves and our ideas, a clear perspective on the scope and nature of the challenge, a wise set of priorities, and the courage to do what is required of us.

This is a mighty challenge, and I know of no people better qualified to lead the way than the people of Texas and the Southwest, who have never lacked conscience or courage, who have so much to give and so much to gain.

Tasks and Opportunities in Africa

by *G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

It is tremendously encouraging to return from Africa to this conference, which offers such concrete evidence of awakening American interest in African problems.

In recent days I have been talking to African leaders and others in all walks of life in nine countries of that great continent, conveying to them the greetings of President Kennedy and reaffirming our Government's deep interest in building with them a bridge of real understanding and cooperation. We seek to build in this way directly and also by contributing to the joint endeavors which can be developed through such instruments as UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. Your meeting here, bringing together distinguished Africans and Americans, is pertinent to these objectives and will, I am sure, generate continuing and accelerated interest in the cause of progress in Africa.

America needs to know Africa better. Our interest, on a broad, national scale, is relatively new compared with some other nations. That interest must emphatically expand.

Conversely, Africa—the many Africas—will, we trust, come to know the United States better. Contact and acquaintanceship between Africans and Americans are only just begun on any real scale. I believe they can be mutually most beneficial. Learning to understand and appreciate our differences, we can derive strength from them, as we can from the many things we have in common. We cannot, in fact, do without each other in today's perilous and promising world. To-

gether we can hope to build for our children and our children's children a world of peace, justice, and dynamic progress.

My own impressions of Africa have been gleaned in very extensive travel, over a relatively short period of time, in most areas of the continent. The conditions of this travel have been favorable to intensive observation and to profiting from the knowledge of trained colleagues, so that the many flashes of sight and insight form kaleidoscopic images that have discernible patterns.

It is one thing to read that there is considerable good will toward America among Africans everywhere—and another to recall the friendship in the eyes of thousands who gathered in the streets of Marrakech or around the main square of Timbuktu or at the airport of Niamey to bid welcome to a visiting American official. It is one thing to hear there's vigor and will and promise for the future in Africa—and another to recall thousands of bright-eyed schoolchildren, lining the road from the airport to Fort Archambault in the southern Chad, who represent that future. It is one thing to know that Africa has health problems—and another to have seen terminal cases in African hospitals, cases of men, women, and children who could have been saved if their illnesses had been discovered sooner.

If one general impression must be given, it is that the tasks to be faced in Africa are of extraordinary magnitude. And I believe that the challenge to us Americans is far greater than most of us realize. It is great because the stakes are high, the problems too overwhelming to be neglected.

The challenge is not at all simply a question of lending material assistance, though that we must do. It confronts us with important moral

¹Address made before a UNESCO conference on Africa and the United States, sponsored by the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, at Boston, Mass., on Oct. 26 (press release 737).

and political issues. Our purposes will not be understood, our aid will fall short, if they do not involve a wholehearted commitment to the burning desires of African peoples for self-determination and independence, for dignity and equality.

Africa has begun to move. Hope has been liberated. The stored-up dynamism of the African peoples points to a great potential for growth, a distinctively African contribution to the world. What we can and must assist in Africa is the realization of an unprecedented opportunity to enrich the future we all will share.

What Is at Stake

Too much public discussion, too many news reports, I'm afraid, register on the negative factors at work in Africa. The danger of Soviet penetration is a category under which every possible item is faithfully entered, usually without much background or perspective. Some commentators would apparently feel comfortable about Africa only if the new nations there pretended never to have heard of the Soviet Union and invariably crossed the street to avoid ever striking up an acquaintance. But is it fair to expect African states to forgo diplomatic relations, trade, and other contacts with the Communists when even their former colonial mentors engage in such activities?

It is better to be realistic. We welcome Africa's new independence. We think it is a positive force. We do not wish to control or direct it.

We can indeed legitimately express our concern over certain Soviet activities—inflammatory, disruptive, subversive. We are not blind or passive to the interventionist design which the Communists are working at—scholarships for political training, subsidies for opportunists and propagandists, promissory notes to front-group agitators. This is the old black bag of Communist tricks, familiar around the world. Let us not underestimate it. But let us avoid a fixation about it. Our scrutiny, our labors, must be directed to the primary subjects—the realities of African political, economic, social, and cultural life in today's interactive world.

Our purpose and policy is plain: We want for Africa what the Africans want for themselves. We want an Africa in which independent nations grow in vigor and prosperity, because Africans are determined to assert all the pride and seek all

the promise that independence means for them, as for peoples everywhere.

This American point of view is born directly out of our sense of African aspirations and our historic interest in the enlargement of freedom in the world. It does not depend on the stimulus of some outside danger. Our aim now is a fuller understanding of these aspirations, which seek to throw off the burdens of poverty, ignorance, and disease and to assert the dignity and worth of new millions who are now citizens of the greater world. And our aim is to help where we can, where our help is wanted and needed, in bringing the fruits of scientific, technological progress to the task of uplift which is the basic program of every African leader. Our criterion is not whether the Communists are interested in country *x* but whether country *x* needs assistance to work toward legitimate goals. As President Kennedy said in his inaugural address,² our pledge is made not out of a concern with votes or with communism "but because it is right" that we help.

Wherever I have visited in Africa, I have found a general appreciation of American motives. But millions of Africans are asking themselves: Is the United States really committed to the necessary actions to fulfill its obligations and attain its goals? We must earnestly ask this question of ourselves, too.

We cannot as a nation be indifferent, because we have learned on the level of personal, human relationships that "no man is an island" and that any abridgment of human dignity anywhere limits and threatens our own integrity. Traditionally we have been opposed to the colonial control of other peoples, and, of course, Woodrow Wilson gave self-determination its modern dynamism. But until recently our sense of direct responsibility was not very consistently engaged in Africa.

There have been important exceptions to this, Americans who have been very much concerned. Among these are the missionaries. Americans have reason to be proud of a missionary school in Timbuktu where Malians are taught the repair of outboard motors which are being brought into use in Niger River traffic. The good works of an American doctor, the son of missionaries, have won the grateful admiration of the people in the south of the Republic of Chad; unfortunately, his busy,

² BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

efficient hospital was completely isolated by flood waters when I was in the area, and it was impossible to visit him.

Often men like these have anticipated colonial administrators and our own national policies of building for African independence and social advancement. As a nation we must catch up with them in lending assistance to African countries that are making honest efforts to become and to remain genuinely independent and to help themselves. The necessary contributions are not only in economic aid but also in a "human investment" of our own, of trained manpower qualified to pass their skills on to Africans.

Some Problems Identified

From my latest trip I have become more conscious than ever of the "many Africas" truism. There are vivid contrasts, not only between major regions but within single countries which, as in the Sudan, may range from Saharan to tropical forest landscapes. More complex still is the infinite variety of cultures. For example, it is easy to refer to the Moslems of the northern Chad as "Arabs," and this is common parlance. But it would be a mistake to assume that these people are essentially identical with, say, the Tunisians.

There are vast differences, also, in the degree of economic development one encounters. A few countries—Nigeria and Tunisia, for example—are within reach of what economists sometimes call the takeoff point leading to self-sustaining economic growth. A number of others have reasonable wealth potential but are still lacking professional cadres and skilled technicians or are missing key elements of capital investment. There are countries like Libya, where discovery of oil or other mineral wealth may suddenly alter the whole economic prospect. Finally, there are countries which are a long way relatively from the promise of rapid development, where even strenuous self-help measures would not open the way ahead at a satisfactory pace.

One becomes conscious also, flying over vast desert areas and semiarid regions, of the problems posed by the low population density of most African countries and the remoteness of great areas out of reach of the seas. These conditions make communications and the transportation of goods and passengers exorbitantly expensive and place almost insuperable difficulties in the way of

Correction

The text of an address by Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams, which appeared on pages 638-642 of the BULLETIN of October 16, 1961, stated on page 641 that Portuguese law requires qualified Portuguese citizens, including those in Portuguese Africa, to "pass a literacy test and comply with a tax proviso" in order to vote. The Portuguese Embassy in Washington has brought to the Department's attention the fact that under Portuguese law an otherwise qualified adult need only meet one of these two requirements rather than both. The Embassy has pointed out further that, in certain classes of certain local elections, no other qualification is required than that a voter be the head of a family, and has indicated that the voting qualifications are now identical in metropolitan Portugal and the overseas territories.

providing educational, health, and social services to nomadic or isolated populations. Equally important are the problems, under such conditions, of achieving a sense of national unity and participation in national development.

The problem of economic development involves to a greater extent than most African countries recognize the task of creating a favorable climate for individual initiative and private enterprise. Such recognition is made difficult by at least two factors. First, private capital is often viewed as being associated with colonialism, and in the minds of some is hence unwelcome. The amounts of domestic private capital available in many developing nations is small, and in those cases foreigners are inevitably involved in new investment, so that private enterprise seems almost an alien phenomenon. Sometimes, too, in countries that genuinely desire injections of capital, witting or unwitting pronouncements or actions occur which are hostile to private capital investment. In places where an inflow from all possible sources of capital investment should be carefully encouraged to support national development, such sentiments are twice costly.

All governments, of course, intervene more or less in national economic life. The government role in Africa will often be central, but the most hopeful situations are those in which policy provides for the fullest play of initiative and individual enterprise. Hundreds and thousands of "new starts" on productive enterprise are necessary,

opening the way to employment and advancement for young people who now, too often, find few career opportunities outside of government.

While African countries want individual dignity and self-expression, it is sobering to find quite a few among them in which there are relatively few signs of the development of a broad political democracy. The alternative tends to be a monolithic political system. In some cases there is considerable room for discussion within the party, but there is also the tendency for simple "strong man" leadership. Clearly, the United States cannot help but believe that the fullest participation in government, with the individual expressing freely his voice as to what course is to be taken, is fundamental to a just and stable political system.

The United States must, it seems to me, do all in its power to encourage, in Africa and elsewhere, assurances by every government of the political rights of the minority, even if full democracy is not an immediate prospect. Realism requires, however, that we take into account with detachment the problems of establishing political democracy where trained leaders are few, literacy is limited, and too many of the citizenry are undernourished. Such conditions obviously affect a people's ability and willingness to look beyond the most basic problems of personal survival to the assumption of citizenship and leadership responsibilities.

Some key problems in Africa are simply beyond solution by normal measures. Illiteracy, which is a constant on the UNESCO agenda, is one of these. What measures will be "enough" to raise rapidly the educational level in a country where some 95 percent of the people do not read or write—in which only one student last year completed the country's accepted college entrance requirement? And what will suffice to raise the health standards of another country in which there is one European doctor—and none of local origin—per 80,000 widely dispersed potential patients?

What must be done to improve the economy of a country where economic survival depends on a cash crop so uneconomically produced that the former colonial power must pay a 30 percent subsidy to permit its marketing at the world market price? Agriculture is the main occupation in most of Africa, yet even the art of plowing with an animal is a recent development in some areas we have visited. In other areas, of course, animal

diseases have made such a prospect impossible.

One must, in many instances, admire the efforts of the former colonial administrators to help these young countries in the poorest category and the devotion of many of the European technicians who try to face these formidable tasks. Yet, all told, not enough has been done, and too little has been tried in developing unusual techniques that might cope with these highly unusual situations.

We are lending support to some exciting new experiments in Africa. One example is the training of male nurses who then go out into the bush to spot victims of endemic diseases, bring them to health centers for diagnosis, and administer treatment in the field. This is part of a new approach to health problems and the forerunner of a broad program of health education. Another example is the use of surplus agricultural commodities under the Food-for-Peace Program, in which the food in effect makes up part of the real wages of workers engaged in vital public-works projects.

The Tasks We Face

These are some of my broad impressions and some of the ideas and forces I have seen at work in Africa. Time forbids speaking at length of the measures I think we can and must take over the next few years to help meet the problems outlined.

The relations of African states with leading Western nations are still in a state of transition, and distinctions often are not very clearly drawn. Too often "the West," which is not a monolith, is equated with "the East," which is an absolutely rigid bloc except in doctrinal squabbles. Because of one colonial experience, a number of African countries are likely to include all Western Powers—including the U.S.—in their sense of grievance over such unresolved problems as Algeria, Angola, or *apartheid*.

At the same time that African feelings are caught up in these effects of historical change and historical hangover, the West is greatly preoccupied with Berlin, which to many Africans seems, by and large, a remote problem. With all of the good will in the world, we cannot, from our vantage point, help but consider certain African nations somewhat unsympathetic in a matter of such profound significance for the future of freedom and self-determination as Berlin so obviously is. My experience, too, is that a good many Africans feel that the United States does not show suffi-

ciently, in a practical way, our concern with the problems which to them seem the really critical ones.

So I believe you may agree that greater mutual understanding, by us, by our allies, and by the Africans, is a vital need. Let me, in this regard, assure my African friends that our commitment to freedom and self-determination is not an expediency but is central to our international policy. We could not otherwise expect to rouse their concern on the same issue when it is at stake elsewhere.

To my American listeners I can only outline a very sizable obligation that America must find the means to meet.

1. Clearly, United States aid to Africa will have to be substantial and widespread; it will have to be increased from all sources, Government and private. It is too little realized that we lag far behind Europe in assistance to African nations. The historical basis for this imbalance has radically altered with the emergence of African states to independence. Yet French aid to Africa last year was much larger than our own.

2. The Peace Corps and similar human-resource and human-commitment programs must be perfected and expanded. We are going to catch an unfavorable headline here and there, out of human fallibility, but such programs are directed at very serious needs and have every prospect of general success.

3. We must devise new methods of cooperating with developed nations who are motivated by a philosophy similar to our own, to continue or to begin to play a part in meeting what is perhaps the greatest challenge of our time—the rising expectations of the peoples of Africa.

4. We must in policy and in action make manifest our commitment to freedom and independence. There is no question as to what the American people in their hearts want for the people of Africa. But sometimes we are slow in acting, sometimes cautious in moving to overcome obstacles. It will be our challenge to measure up in action to the dynamism of the times and the inspiration of our own ideals.

5. We must be understanding and vigorous in our pursuit of the ideal of human dignity. We must banish all vestiges of discrimination from our own national life, and we must be imaginative and faithful in building brotherhood throughout the world.

Under our system I have to do with only part of the machinery that can bring these things about. But I will do my best to assist the President and the Secretary of State, whose dedication to these aims has been unequivocally stated.

You assembled here can contribute mightily to reaching these objectives. Many of you undoubtedly will be called upon to testify before the Congress and before many a forum throughout the year on issues affecting African development. Many of you are well situated to foster and diffuse that increased understanding of Africa that we—Africans and Americans—sorely need.

After feeling the purpose, ability, and dedication of this conference, I know I can count you in the vanguard of those who will bring about that human commitment among Americans which must precede all our other efforts—personal, institutional, governmental—to bring us successfully to grips with the tremendous tasks and opportunities that await us in working with the nations and peoples of Africa.

U.S. Supports U.N. in Efforts To Restore Peace in Katanga

Department Statement

Press release 759 dated November 1

Although the situation on the border between the Katanga and Kasai Provinces of the Congo is far from clear, it would appear that the renewal of hostilities there was provoked by bombing attacks on the part of aircraft from Katanga.

The United States deplores the actions of those who initiated these hostilities in violation of United Nations resolutions and of U.N. efforts to restore peace in the area as a prelude to effective negotiations.

In order to halt the spread of violence in the Congo we understand the United Nations is acting in accordance with its clear mandate, including, if necessary, military action against any offending Katanga aircraft. The United States fully supports this position of the U.N. in its effort to restore the peace.

The United States hopes that the hostilities will be stopped and that the territorial integrity of the Congo will be restored through reconciliation.

U.S. Comments on Soviet Note to Finland

Department Statement

Press release 753 dated October 31

The U.S.S.R. note to Finland made public on October 30 by TASS is a typical effort by the Soviet Union to sow confusion and divert attention from its own activities. The explosion of the 50-megaton bomb in contempt of world opinion as expressed in the United Nations¹ and the Soviet posture toward Germany and Berlin have made it abundantly clear that the Soviet Union is the source of present world tension. In the face of these acts the Soviet Union has good reason to try to cover its own aggressive policies by false accusations.

The old charges against the Republic of Germany and the NATO defensive alliance have been repeatedly exposed as false. The present allegations regarding Finland's Scandinavian neighbors are equally absurd.

We find it repugnant that the Soviet Union should seek to involve Finland in its diversionary propaganda activities, especially in view of Finland's chosen policy of neutrality.

President Kennedy Reaffirms Turkish-American Unity

White House press release dated October 28, for release October 29

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to Cemal Gürsel, President of the Republic of Turkey.

OCTOBER 26, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I congratulate you on your election as President of the Republic of Turkey. I also wish to congratulate, in the name of the United States Government and its people, the Turkish Government and people for their success in promulgating a new constitution and in establishing a freely-elected Grand National Assembly.

As you assume your Presidential responsibilities, let me assure you of my country's dedication to the firm friendship and cooperation which have consistently characterized Turco-American relations. We are united in our aims of preserving

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1961, p. 817.

the security of our homelands and creating a world where mankind can live in peace and freedom. In these cherished causes, we are proud to work side by side with the Government and people of Turkey.

Please accept my warmest greetings and best wishes.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Honorable CEMAL GÜRSEL

President

The Republic of Turkey

Ankara, Turkey

U.S., Viet-Nam Exchange Ratifications on New Economic Treaty

Press release 754 dated November 1

The instruments of ratification of the treaty of amity and economic relations between the United States and Viet-Nam were exchanged in Saigon on October 31. This action completes the formal procedures for bringing the treaty into force. By its terms it will become effective on November 30, 1961, one month after the exchange of ratifications.

The treaty was signed at Saigon on April 3, 1961.¹ It was approved by the National Assembly of Viet-Nam on June 15, 1961, and by the U.S. Senate on September 11, 1961. It was ratified by President Kennedy on September 26, 1961.

The treaty is comparable with a number of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation that the United States has concluded within recent years. It is the first of its type, however, between the United States and Viet-Nam. Its 15 articles include provisions on basic personal freedoms, the status and treatment of persons and corporations, the protection of persons and property, treatment of imports and exports, exchange regulations, shipping, and other matters affecting the status and activities of the citizens and enterprises of either country within the territories of the other.

The new treaty is regarded as a significant testament to the close friendship of the two countries and as constituting an effective means for promoting mutually beneficial economic relations between them.

¹ BULLETIN of May 1, 1961, p. 652; for text, see S. Ex. L, 87th Cong., 1st sess.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During October 1961

4th ICAO North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Sept. 14-Oct. 11
WMO Commission for Aerology: 3d Session	Rome	Sept. 18-Oct. 2
ILO Joint Maritime Commission: 19th Session	Geneva	Sept. 25-Oct. 6
GATT Council of Representatives to the Contracting Parties	Geneva	Sept. 25-Oct. 6
IAEA General Conference: 5th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 25-Oct. 6
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners	New Delhi	Sept. 26-Oct. 3
North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Working Party on High Seas Salmon Distribution of the Committee on Biology and Research.	Tokyo	Oct. 1-20
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Working Party on Rural Electrification.	Geneva	Oct. 2-3
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Group of Experts for the Study of Hydroelectric Resources in Europe.	Geneva	Oct. 2-6
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 19th Session	Geneva	Oct. 2-6
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 49th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen	Oct. 2-11
UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Management Council.	Tokyo	Oct. 2-21
ICAO Informal Caribbean Regional Meeting	Caracas	Oct. 3-7
GATT Meeting of Experts on the Measurement of Agricultural Protection.	Geneva	Oct. 3-7
PAHO Directing Council: 13th Meeting; Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas: 13th Meeting.	Washington	Oct. 3-13
ILO Technical Meeting on Small-Scale and Handicraft Industries.	New Delhi	Oct. 3-15
OECD Maritime Transport Committee	Paris	Oct. 4 (1 day)
PAHO Executive Committee: 44th Meeting	Washington	Oct. 4 (1 day)
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 20th Session	Geneva	Oct. 4-6
OECD Development Assistance Committee	Paris	Oct. 5-7
FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 3d Session	Iraq	Oct. 7-12
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	Washington	Oct. 9-12
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Oct. 9 (1 day)
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport.	Geneva	Oct. 9-11
FAO/ECE Meeting on Food Consumption Surveys	Geneva	Oct. 9-13
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: Standing Committee	Vienna	Oct. 9-13
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 9-13
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Highway Transport	Madras	Oct. 9-13
ITU CCITT Study Group A on Data Transmission	Geneva	Oct. 9-21
OECD Agriculture and Food Committee	Paris	Oct. 10-11
UNESCO Diplomatic Conference on the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasters.	Rome	Oct. 10-26
Red Sea Lights Conference	London	Oct. 11-13
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Tariffs.	Geneva	Oct. 11-13
Inter-American Commission of Women: Executive Board	Washington	Oct. 11-15
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 2d Session of Special Working Group.	Geneva	Oct. 12-13
South Pacific Commission: 22d Session	Nouméa	Oct. 12-25
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee	Geneva	Oct. 16-17
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Construction of Vehicles.	Geneva	Oct. 16-20

¹Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 6, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif International télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During October 1961—Continued

IAEA Symposium on the Programing and Utilization of Research Reactors.	Vienna	Oct. 16-20
Inter-American Children's Institute: 42d Meeting of Directing Council.	Washington	Oct. 16-20
ICEM Executive Committee: 18th Session	Geneva	Oct. 16-20
SEATO Committee on Information, Cultural, Education, and Labor Activities.	Bangkok	Oct. 16-20
OECD Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education.	Washington	Oct. 16-21
FAO Meeting on Regional Development Planning in the Mediterranean Basin.	Madrid	Oct. 16-21
ILO/ECE Seminar on Family Living Studies	Vienna	Oct. 16-27
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 8th Session of Committee on Statistics .	Rome	Oct. 17 (1 day)
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Standing Committee .	Geneva	Oct. 17 (1 day)
United Nations Pledging Conference	New York	Oct. 17 (1 day)
U.N. ECAFE Committee for Coordination of Investigations of Lower Mekong Basin: 15th Special Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 18-20
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 4th Session	Geneva	Oct. 18-24
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 16th General Assembly.	Munich	Oct. 18-25
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee	Rome	Oct. 18-25
NATO Science Committee	Paris	Oct. 19-20
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 1st Session.	Paris	Oct. 19-27
ICEM Council: 15th Session	Geneva	Oct. 23-27
GATT Provisional Cotton Textile Committee	Geneva	Oct. 23-27
ILO Meeting of Experts on Electrical Accidents and Related Matters.	Geneva	Oct. 23-31
OECD Economic Policy Committee and Related Working Party on Policies for the Promotion of Better Payments Equilibrium.	Paris	Oct. 24-26
OECD Committee for Scientific Research	Paris	Oct. 26-27
OECD Trade Committee	Paris	Oct. 30-31
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Oct. 30-31

In Session as of October 31, 1961

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question	Geneva	May 16-
United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session	New York	Sept. 19-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 8th Meeting . .	Tokyo	Oct. 23-
UNESCO Executive Board: 60th Session	Paris	Oct. 25-
2d International Film Festival of India	New Delhi	Oct. 27-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East: 3d Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 27-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 13th Meeting.	Kuala Lumpur	Oct. 30-
FAO Council: 36th Session	Rome	Oct. 30-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on the Problems of Young Workers	Geneva	Oct. 30-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Conditions of Sale for Cereals.	Geneva	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on River Law.	Geneva	Oct. 30-

NATO Research Fellowship Program for 1962-63 Announced

Press release 739 dated October 26

A limited number of advanced research fellowships is offered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for 1962-63 to candidates from member states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States). A can-

didate must be a national of a member state and must undertake his research in one or more member countries. Since NATO in its cultural program is especially concerned with strengthening transatlantic relationships, in general preference will be given to U.S. candidates planning to work in one or more European NATO countries.

Grants are intended for scholars of established reputation. Candidates will be selected on the basis of their special aptitude for and experience in carrying through a major project of research.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, August 15, 1961; Yugoslavia, June 20, 1961.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Application to: Ruanda-Urundi, January 24, 1961.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Application to: Ruanda-Urundi, January 24, 1961.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Application to: Ruanda-Urundi, January 24, 1961.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954; for the United States December 6, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Application to: Ruanda-Urundi, January 24, 1961.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, August 31, 1961; ² Israel, September 6, 1961; ³ Venezuela, August 15, 1961.⁴

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, August 31, 1961; ² Indonesia, August 10, 1961; ⁵ Israel, September 6, 1961; ³ Venezuela, August 15, 1961.

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.¹

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, August 31, 1961; Israel, September 6, 1961; ³ Venezuela, August 15, 1961.⁴

¹ Not in force.

² With reservations and declaration made at time of signing.

³ With a statement.

⁴ With reservations.

⁵ With a reservation.

In making selections, such factors as academic qualifications (generally, the doctoral degree or its equivalent), professional experience, and publications will be taken into account. Awards will be limited to fellows working on projects of direct interest to NATO or to the Atlantic Community as a whole. Projects should pertain to historical, political, economic, and social problems rather than to scientific questions. Preliminary screening of American candidates will be by the Committee on International Exchange of Persons of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, which will recommend candidates to the Department of State and the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships. The Board in turn will nominate a small panel of scholars for consideration, along with similar panels from the above-named countries, by the NATO Selection Committee in Paris. The awards will be made from this total list of candidates from all the member countries. Final selection of candidates will be announced by the Paris committee April 4, 1962. It is expected that only one or two grants will be available to candidates from the United States.

The amount of each advanced research award will be 2,300 new French francs per month (or the equivalent in the currency of any other member state in which the research project is undertaken). Grants will normally be for a period of 2 to 4 months but may, in special cases, be extended to 6 months. NATO will pay the cost of travel by air for such journeys as may be approved for the successful completion of the project.

Application forms and additional information on NATO advanced research fellowships may be obtained from: Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, Committee on International Exchange of Persons, 2101 Constitution Ave., NW., Washington 25, D.C.

Applications should be submitted no later than December 15, 1961.

George C. Starlund Named Member of Salmon Fisheries Commission

The White House announced on October 31 that President Kennedy had on that day appointed George C. Starlund to be a member, on the part of the United States, of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, vice Milo Moore, resigned.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958.¹ *Ratifications deposited:* Czechoslovakia, August 12, 1961; Monaco, September 2, 1961.

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532. *Acceptance deposited:* Ireland, August 31, 1961.

Trade and Commerce

Declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960.¹

Signature: Pakistan, September 12, 1961.

Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹

Signature: Italy, August 29, 1961.

Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into force October 1, 1961.

Acceptances deposited: Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden, October 23, 1961.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz October 23, 1961. Entered into force November 22, 1961.

Canada

Agreement relating to channel improvement work in Pelee Passage area of Lake Erie. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 8, 1959, and October 17, 1961. Entered into force October 17, 1961.

Agreement relating to the dredging of Wolfe Island Cut in the St. Lawrence River. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa October 17, 1961. Entered into force October 17, 1961.

Greece

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with related note. Signed at Athens October 18, 1961. Entered into force October 18, 1961.

New Zealand

Arrangement relating to importation into New Zealand of aircraft and aircraft components manufactured in the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Wellington January 30 and February 28, 1940. Entered into force February 28, 1940. 54 Stat. 2263.

Terminated: November 8, 1961.^o

Pakistan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of

1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Karachi October 14, 1961. Entered into force October 14, 1961.

Switzerland

Agreement concerning the reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern October 13, 1961. Enters into force provisionally October 13, 1961, and definitively on date of notification to the United States that it has been ratified by the Swiss Government.

Viet-Nam

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Saigon April 3, 1961.

Ratifications exchanged: October 31, 1961.

Enters into force: November 30, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 30–November 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to October 30 are Nos. 736, 737, and 739 of October 26; 741 and 743 of October 27; and 745 of October 28.

No.	Date	Subject
†748	10/30	Rusk: departure for Japan.
*749	10/30	Visit of President of Senegal.
†750	10/30	Meeting concerning foreign students in U.S. (rewrite).
†751	10/31	Williams: Overseas Press Club.
†752	10/31	Cleveland: "This House of Politics."
753	10/31	Statement on Soviet note to Finland.
754	11/1	Ratifications exchanged on treaty of amity and economic relations with Viet-Nam.
755	11/1	Ball: "Threshold of a New Trading World."
*756	11/1	Chenery named director, AID Program Review and Coordination Staff (biographic details).
†757	11/1	Report to AID of advisory committee on cooperatives.
*758	11/1	Visit of President of Senegal.
759	11/1	Hostilities in Katanga.
*760	11/2	Coffin sworn in as AID Deputy Administrator (biographic details).
*761	11/2	Visit of Prime Minister of India.
†762	11/2	Williams: "United States Policy and Africa."
*763	11/3	Rubin sworn in as AID General Counsel (biographic details).
†764	11/3	Delegation to 13th Colombo Plan meeting (rewrite).
*765	11/3	Magallas appointed to AID (biographic details).
*766	11/3	Visit of Prime Minister of India.
†767	11/4	Delegation to 11th session of FAO Conference (rewrite).
†768	11/4	Bowles: Adult Education Conferences of U.S.A.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

¹ Not in force.

^o Notice of intention to terminate given by New Zealand May 8, 1961.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS



THE THREAT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

the
Department
of
State

The Communist bloc since 1954 has extended credits and grants to the less developed countries amounting to about \$5.2 billion by June 1961. In the last half of 1960 nearly 7,900 (and probably more in 1961) bloc technicians were occupied in 23 less developed countries on various assignments lasting a month or longer. Bloc trade with these countries has grown from a level of \$860 million in 1954 to about \$2.7 billion in 1960, an increase of more than 210 percent. Arms assistance has played a key role in the Communist economic offensive in the less developed areas. In particular, it has offered a means for increasing tension in already tense situations.

These various aspects of Communist economic diplomacy are described in a new 25-page booklet, which discusses:

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- Communist-Bloc Trade With Less Developed Areas
- Recent Developments in Bloc Economic Diplomacy
- Moscow's Goal: Prestige, Influence, and Power

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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLV, No. 1170 • PUBLICATION 7306

November 27, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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It Is Time To Reaffirm Our National Purpose

Address by Acting Secretary Bowles¹

The theme of this conference reminds us that foreign affairs is the business of the people. Whether we hold public office or not, each of us carries his share of public responsibility, and each is deeply involved in the quest for peace at a particularly dangerous moment in history.

The headlines move from Cuba to Laos, from the Congo to Viet-Nam, from Bizerte to Berlin. Each crisis demands hard decisions and threatens new terrors.

These individual crises and the dangers which flow from them are a reflection of the broad global crisis that in one way or another troubles all mankind. The new world which is rapidly taking shape is the product of forces which are unprecedented in the long history of man. If we are to deal with them effectively and creatively, we must be sure that we understand them.

First, and for the long haul perhaps the most important, is the political, social, economic, and cultural upheaval that is sweeping Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Hundreds of millions of people who once knew life only as an endless cycle of poverty, oppression, ignorance, and disease have suddenly become aware that their misery can be eased, that doctors and teachers can be trained, that schools and roads and dams can be built, and that all men can know an increased measure of dignity and justice.

Second is the development of the Soviet Union within two generations as a highly industrialized, heavily armed Communist state whose clearly stated objective is to bring other states within its sphere of tight totalitarian control.

Third is the emergence of Communist China as a paramount power of east Asia, a dynamic, land-hungry, oil-hungry nation with an exploding population of 650 million people and an imperialistic, expansionist tradition stretching back for 2,000 years.

Fourth, the impact of these three great revolutions has been compounded by advances in military technology that have provided some modern states with weapons of almost infinite destructive power.

America's Entry Into World Affairs

We Americans entered this awesome era in world affairs largely unconscious of its dangers and opportunities, ill-prepared to play our essential role, and uncertain of ourselves.

In large measure our lack of world experience stemmed from the unique nature of our own political and economic development. During much of the century between the War of 1812 and World War I, we had been generally cut off from international problems and pressures. Behind the protective shield of the great oceans we had thrown our energies into the settlement of our vast continent, into the construction of railways, roads, and industries, into the building of a new nation in a new world that we hoped could remain forever aloof from the conflicts of Europe.

Although the natural barriers of geography largely explain our traditional isolationism, it was the existence of British power in Europe that allowed us to practice it, untroubled by foreign interference. In the century between Napoleon and World War I, British diplomacy had maintained an effective balance of power in Europe. At the same time the British fleet in the Atlantic gave

¹ Made before the Adult Education Conferences of the U.S.A. at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 5 (press release 768 dated Nov. 4).

substance to our Monroe Doctrine and prevented imperialistic adventurers from interfering with us and our Latin American neighbors to the south.

Needless to say, it never occurred to our forebears to thank our British cousins for playing this essential role of world power balancer. On the contrary, officeseekers in most eastern cities considered it not only shrewd but mandatory to twist the tail of the British lion at every opportunity.

Nor did the worldly-wise British expect our gratitude. Their policies were created to serve their national interest, not our own. It was our good fortune that their interests and ours happened largely to coincide.

A Growing Feeling of Frustration and Uncertainty

The two great wars changed the old 19th-century world beyond recognition. Now ours is the responsibility and the opportunity, and because this requires us to play a substantially unfamiliar role, many Americans feel frustrated and unsure. Their frustration is compounded by the fact that, in the long years in which we were isolated from world affairs, we were able to handle a vast number of domestic questions in our stride. We had come to regard problems as situations to be solved, not situations to be lived with.

We achieved our independence.

We opened up the West.

We successfully converted ourselves from an agricultural society to a primarily industrial society.

We preserved the Union in a bloody Civil War.

We fought and won the two major international wars.

We coped with a severe depression and emerged from it with new economic vigor and new concepts of social justice.

Now, as our national focus switches to largely unfamiliar *global* problems which often appear so complex as to defy solution, it is understandable that our impatience should multiply.

The material advantages which we bring to this new challenge are great indeed. We have mustered by all odds the strongest industrial capacity on earth, and we are more than a match for any military adversary.

Yet the new world which is emerging is not only intricate but vast, and we constitute only 6 per-

cent of mankind. Although wise and courageous policies will enable us strongly to influence the shape of world affairs, we are beginning to see that we cannot control them, and for many Americans this is a new experience.

Is it any wonder that many of our countrymen should attempt to escape from this dilemma? Is it surprising that frustration and exasperation with new problems and new forces should lead some of our most respected fellow citizens to seek shortcuts?

Reflections of Frustration

There are at least three types of thinking in the United States today which reflect such frustration.

First there are those who have come to believe that sooner or later war is probably inevitable. This is defeatism of the most dangerous kind. Let us consider some of the consequences.

A nuclear war under present conditions would mean the total destruction of most of our great cities and thousands of our towns and villages. When we take into account both the blast and the fallout, it is impossible to estimate what the ultimate effects on human life would be. Our own nuclear response would devastate the aggressor. Indeed the damage to him and to his country would be substantially greater than to our own. Yet this is hardly a contest which thoughtful men would enter lightheartedly or in ignorance of its implications to mankind.

We cannot, of course, achieve peace by running away from the prospect of war. Any failure to live up to our commitments in Berlin would be followed by mounting pressure to retreat from Paris, from London, and ultimately from New York, Kansas City, and Seattle. Until controlled disarmament and international justice under law are fully agreed to, our military power remains essential not only to our own national security but to the vast majority of mankind who have no desire to live in a Communist world.

The present strengthening of our defensive capacity does not suggest the inevitability of war; on the contrary, it provides the essential barrier behind which creative forces may work to lay the foundation for a rational world society.

A second reflection of present-day isolationist thinking is the concentration of many patriotic

Americans on the activities of our small minority of domestic Communists to the exclusion of the far greater challenge abroad.

Every intelligent man knows that a worldwide Communist conspiracy exists and that the Soviet empire has agents in almost every nation on earth, including the United States. It is also true that these agents are dangerous and that we must be everlastingly on guard against their attempts to undercut or subvert our national efforts.

In our concern over internal subversion, however, let us be careful not to hit the wrong target. Some frustrated citizens, for instance, seem to be saying that communism arises from socialism, which in turn stems from liberalism, which in turn emerges from the democratic ideas written into our Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson. This notion will not hold water.

Can they name a single nation which had achieved a reasonable measure of economic well-being and social justice that has been overturned by the Communists?

With the exception of those nations where the Soviet Army has imposed Soviet regimes, communism has moved toward power only in societies which were reactionary and oppressive, where people were illiterate and hungry, and where they had abandoned all hope that their problems could be solved by any other alternative.

The only realistic answer to the Communist challenge is more democracy and progressivism, not less—not only here in America but everywhere in the world.

The third group of isolationists, and perhaps the most unhappy, are those who in effect seem to be saying, "Stop the world, I want to get off." If they had their way, we would retire from world affairs and leave the future to others on the assumption that somehow we can isolate ourselves from the ebb and flow of human events.

Instead of strengthening our alliances they propose that we abandon our commitment to any nation which is reluctant to accept in full our interpretation of world affairs.

Instead of strengthening the United Nations so that it can act more effectively, they propose that we withdraw from this international body unless its members agree to become a subservient arm of American foreign policy.

Instead of seeking adjustments within our own economy which will help expand international

trade, they would have us raise our tariffs to shut out those foreign goods which compete with American products no matter how costly and inefficient our domestic production may be.

Instead of working positively through our Federal Government to strengthen our national defense, to improve our schools and our highways, to help create greater opportunities for all of our people, they would have us slash our Federal budget to the bone.

Instead of seeking through a sensitive balance of military firmness and patient negotiations to reduce cold-war tensions and to find some honorable basis of avoiding war, they would have us break relations with every nation that opposes us.

Instead of applying our surplus foods and a tiny fraction of our great wealth to help the underdeveloped non-Communist nations secure the same freedom of choice which allowed us to build our own great country, they would have us cut off foreign assistance.

The Price of Isolation

This course of action runs counter to all that we have learned by the painful process of trial and error over the last 50 years. It represents total abdication of our responsibility as a world power. It rejects our revolutionary tradition and turns its back on the teachings of Jefferson, Wilson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. Instead of protecting the American way of life, it is a repudiation of the American way of life.

Can any thoughtful man question the ultimate result of such a policy? Indeed is this not almost precisely the line of action that we followed with disastrous results following World War I?

When war came in April 1917, President Wilson recognized the need for a clear set of national objectives that were understandable in human terms, attainable through practical action, and worthy of our greatest efforts. Over and over again he stressed that, if lasting peace were to become a reality, a way must be found gradually to unite mankind. To this end he proposed the creation of a League of Nations to provide both a forum in which world leaders could debate their differences and a political instrument to rally world power and influence against an aggressor.

Wilson carried his fight for a new world organization into every corner of America. He stressed

that if the isolationists should persuade a majority of Americans to reject the League, we would break the heart of the world.

Prophetically he warned that, if we Americans refused to work with other peoples in pursuit of peace, "There will come sometime, in the vengeful providence of God, another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America will have to die, but as many millions as are necessary to accomplish the final freedom of the peoples of the world."

In 1919 the United States Senate rejected the League of Nations. The isolationist had won. The Wilsonian dream was rejected. The rest is history.

In Europe during the next few years the forces of communism, nazism, and fascism grew rapidly. The United Kingdom and France, grievously weakened by the war and working through an enfeebled League of Nations which lacked the essential participation of the United States, were increasingly unable to cope with the challenge.

In 1930, following the stock market crash of 1929, we took a second tragic misstep, this time in the economic field, that further fed the growing forces of world chaos. By adopting the incredible Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, we made it impossible for many nations to sell their goods in the United States and thereby deprived them of the funds with which to buy the products of our American factories. So more factories were shut down, unemployment grew still faster, and we stumbled deeper and deeper into the Great Depression.

The price we paid for this period of isolationism was a heavy one: first, a searing depression that left one-third of our work force without jobs, and then in 1941, almost precisely as Woodrow Wilson had prophesied, "another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America" had to die.

Has the Lesson Been Learned?

What troubles me tonight is the nagging question: Has the lesson been fully and finally learned?

Again we hear the voices of earnest but misguided men who assume that we can ignore the lessons of history, disregard the vital importance of the United Nations, recklessly raise our tariffs, cut off foreign aid, abandon our allies, and somehow escape the consequences.

I respect their sincerity and understand their honest desire for simpler answers. But would their undoubted patriotism and good intentions lessen by one iota the catastrophe that would surely occur if we accepted their advice?

The economic interdependence of our modern world continues to grow steadily. Already the United States is importing almost 50 percent of its industrial raw materials. This includes all of our tin, all of our rubber, 97 percent of our manganese, 89 percent of our nickel, 84 percent of our aluminum, and large percentages of other minerals.

If we should commit the folly of abandoning our relations with the world, we would lose both the strength and resources which we now draw from the world. We would be left alone, and gravely weakened, to face Communist pressures which had been compounded by our own recklessness.

The unprecedented world challenge that confronts us now stems not from foreign aid, not from international trade, not from the ups and downs of U.N. debate, not from the views of our neighbors with whom we may disagree, but from the unprecedented revolutionary forces of today's world.

Although the Communists did not create these forces, it is inevitable that they should seek to capture and control them. In Berlin, southeast Asia, Cuba, and elsewhere, the Communist movement poses an unremitting challenge to our strength of will, our firmness of purpose, and our intelligence.

Yet the Russians are not all 10 feet tall, nor have they demonstrated any particular skill in dealing with the complex forces which have been generated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Indeed, in the political and economic field it may be said that the Kremlin's mistakes have been both frequent and serious.

Nor are the Kremlin's frustrations confined to the developing continents. What, for instance, about their often repeated demands for a contest between the Communist way and the democratic way? Haven't we had precisely such a contest in Germany for the last 15 years? While West Germany has been developing under a democratic system, East Germany has adhered rigidly to the Soviet political and economic philosophy. And what has been the result?

Today in West Germany we have one of the great economic, social, and political success stories of modern times—a free, prosperous, dynamic society of enormous vigor and promise. By contrast East Germany stands as a shoddy failure, economically depressed, intellectually sterile, and scorned by most of its own citizens.

Indeed the Soviet failure in East Germany has been so great that the Communists have had to build a wall backed by machineguns and tanks to keep the East Germans from moving en masse from the so-called “Communist utopia” of East Germany to the “capitalist cesspool” of West Germany. In this single act of desperation the Communist leaders have made it clear to the world that the one way they can keep their people in is to lock them in.

Admittedly, the Berlin wall creates new problems for the West. But let us not forget that it stands as a monumental symbol of the utter bankruptcy of Soviet policy in Europe.

I do not suggest that these Communist setbacks and frustrations lessen the present danger. On the contrary, the very failure of much of the Soviet economic and political effort in Europe, Asia, and Africa may help explain the Kremlin's reckless military pressure in central Europe.

For the short haul the frustration born out of these setbacks, coupled with an uncertain China on their back doorstep, may make the Soviet Union much more difficult and dangerous to deal with. Over the long run, however, the outlook may be somewhat brighter.

Blocked in their attempt to overrun Asia and Africa by economic and political maneuvers, and blocked from West Berlin by NATO power and will, is it not possible that sober-minded members of the Kremlin may ultimately feel that the time has come for a rational adjustment that will humiliate no one, and thereby open the door to meaningful negotiations? Although I can see no particularly hopeful signs on the immediate horizon, we must never close the door to this possibility.

Until that time comes, however, our task is vigorously to pursue our objectives of orderly, peaceful growth in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe, while firmly holding our ground in regard to such questions as Berlin.

Let me add that, in spite of our daily dose of crises and conflict, I am deeply convinced that time is on the side of freedom.

Two Opposing World Tides

There are two great tides in the world today. One is the tide of Communist-instigated cold-war conflict. This is the world of barbed wire and stone walls, of night raids in the jungle and threats of nuclear destruction, of violence, distrust, and fear, of standoff and fallout.

Yet side by side with this current of fear and destruction runs a countercurrent, a tide of hope and opportunity, running strong toward freedom, toward increasing understanding, and toward justice among nations and men.

It will take great energy, patience, and wisdom to deal effectively with the powerful forces which are shaping our new world. It will take all the rich variety of tools which our pluralistic society can provide: the art of diplomacy, the warmth of person-to-person relationships, the helping hand of economic and technical aid, and the protective shield of military strength.

Yet with one essential proviso I remain confident of our capacity successfully to meet the challenge. This proviso can be simply stated: Do we clearly understand the nature of the struggle? At this crucial moment in history, what precisely do we Americans seek? In other words, what is our national purpose?

Some will answer that our national purpose is self-evident: to preserve the American way of life. But in today's tightly interrelated world, is this answer still adequate?

Imagine yourself for a moment talking to a young Assamese schoolteacher on the banks of the great Brahmaputra River in northeastern India. “Why,” he might ask, “should we Indians associate ourselves with you Americans in the struggle against communism?” And suppose you should answer, “Because we need your help in protecting the American way of life.”

Could you expect anything less than total bewilderment?

Why should Mohan Chandri, a simple Indian schoolteacher, agree to risk his life to assure the continued comfort of the richest people in the world 12,000 miles away?

Others may suggest that America's national purpose should be expressed in broader terms. “Is it not our true objective,” they may ask, “to capture the minds of men and, through economic aid and skilled diplomacy, to bring them into line behind American leadership?”

This interpretation of America's national purpose would appear to Mohan Chandri and to most people abroad as even more arrogant and insensitive than the first. "What right has any nation," they would ask, "to set out to capture the minds of men? Didn't Jefferson say that America's task was to *free* men's minds and not to enslave them? And does even the most cynical among you seriously believe that your government can purchase the loyalties of whole nations?"

Such arguments have a hollow ring in the ears of most of mankind because they are so totally unworthy of us.

Making Known America's True Purposes

What then are America's true purposes, and how can we present them to the world in understandable terms?

Although the obstacles to the kind of world which we seek are formidable, our goals, at least, are clear.

Since the beginning of time, men of all races and creeds have worked slowly and tortuously to establish certain universal values. In one form or another these values have provided the dynamic core of every major civilization. They are reflected in the world's great religions, each of which in its own way expresses the Golden Rule.

Today these values are threatened by a Communist movement which denies the importance of the individual and which would deprive him of his dignity and justice.

The present challenge, therefore, is not simply to the privileged minority of mankind who have the most to lose in a material sense. It is a challenge to all men who cherish freedom and the right to work out their destiny in their own way within the framework of their own history and culture.

So again let us imagine ourselves in the village on the Brahmaputra as Mohan Chandri again puts the crucial question, "Why should we Indians associate ourselves with you Americans in the struggle against communism?"

And suppose you should answer:

"Although you and we are thousands of miles apart in a physical sense, we share certain universal beliefs for which generations of our fore-

bears have fought, which we are prepared to defend today, and for which your own great Gandhi died.

"Although we Americans do not always live up to these principles, they are the clearly stated objectives which spur us to improve our own society and to work with others toward a peaceful world.

"Here in India you have your own deeply rooted prejudices and limitations which you are earnestly seeking to remove. You, too, are reaching for the perfectibility which may never come but which will remain the everlasting goal of all free men.

"Therefore we say to you, and to all others who share in these convictions: Let us work together to create a world in which men may free themselves from the sterile grip of totalitarianism which denies these basic human values.

"Because we Americans have much to give, we are prepared to assist your own effort to strengthen your economy and provide greater opportunities for your people. We do this not because we want to possess you as satellites, but solely to enable you to make your own free choices within your own culture and your own historical framework."

When we speak in these universal terms, the faces of hundreds of millions of people of all races, creeds, and cultures will light up in new confidence and understanding. For the most effective response to today's complex, dangerous, yet infinitely promising world lies deep in the democratic faith which provided strength and direction to previous generations of Americans.

Let us therefore put aside our frustrations, let us clear our vision, and let us marshal our energies and patriotism, and those of our well-meaning fellow citizens who today lean toward self-defeating courses of action in the face of our global challenge. Our historic role as a nation is clear, and it is time to reaffirm it at home and abroad.

Only through our traditional democratic faith can we overcome the barriers of language, economic differences, prejudices, and tradition to create the foundation of the world partnership for freedom which eventually may evolve into a peaceful world society.

This, it seems to me, constitutes America's national purpose. Why else are we here?

"This House of Politics"

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

I put it to you tonight that in any kind of public business, whether it is running a family or a redevelopment project or a city or a state or a nation, nearly everything you do is a process of negotiation, which is to say a political process, usually not with just one other person or group but often a complex discussion of multilateral brokerage that involves reconciling many different interests, muting any number of immutable principles.

The problems in your business are like ours in the State Department. Progress comes only when you serve your purpose through a reasonable accommodation among the legitimate interests concerned, without damaging your other vital interests.

As a nation our purposes are pretty clear—and are well expressed in the literature of American statesmanship. We are, for better or worse, among the trustees of one of the truly great perceptions in the history of civilization: the idea that men are born free. It is an idea so naturally attractive on first sight to men and women of every race and nation that even the practitioners of political slavery must package their product to look like freedom. Our purpose, in our own interest, is to fashion free institutions that encourage men to use their freedom to enable other men in turn to build and maintain their own free institutions.

In the heat of global debate about ideas and ideologies, we all have a tendency to speak of the global competition as a struggle between Khrushchev's system and our system. But we do

not have a "system"; it is, if anything, a protected plurality of systems. What makes it so hard to capture and record the "American way of life" is precisely that we deny the Communist dogma that one man's view of society is the correct, approved version. The one essential thing about American democracy is that no individual or group should ever gain the exclusive right to say authoritatively what American democracy is.

The piece of paper on which these ideas about freedom are most persuasively expressed is not some private manuscript, uncleared, unedited, and unfiled, penned in the dead of night by some literary genius. Quite the contrary. These ideas in their pure form appear in a very public document called the charter of the United Nations, a political tract pasted together by compromise in a dozen committees, a state paper ratified by a hundred nations through a hundred constitutional processes.

The U.N. Charter doesn't just *state* these divinely human ideas. It sets up a primitive way to promote man's freedom—by keeping the peace while doing something practical about the basic wants of modern man. It creates a place where nations can agree on next steps while continuing to disagree about their reasons for taking those next steps.

To the outsider, too bored or too offended by the presence of politics to examine what the U.N. is really doing, the goings-on in New York may look the way Greek democracy looked to Plato in his time: "A charming form of government," he called it, "full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike." But adolescent though it is at the age of 16, the United Nations is still the best way we have found to transmute world opinion into a

¹Address made before the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials at Washington, D.C., on Oct. 31 (press release 752).

new and relevant form of power. But this alchemy is politics. And we Americans should understand about politics, because, as befits a democracy, we have a great deal of it.

We know that in national, civic, and personal affairs the national, civic, and personal interests are served with varying degrees of success. We find no difficulty in reconciling the ideal with the possible and even at times with something less than that. We can do so because we realize there is no perfect way of discovering the "ideal" and no better way of trying than through the political process.

We know that national and civic interests have to be defined and made specific by periodic elections. We understand the political process as well as any people in the world; our experience with it even predates our nationhood. As a result, we can take care of shortcomings in the national-interest concept at home and in our personal lives, but we have trouble with it in the wide world.

Problems of Development

There are few matters more in the national interest than good cities, but I'm sure that no one in this room has any illusions about the process by which—in Paul Appleby's classic phrase—good city governments "make a mesh of things." I understand it is relatively easy for a bright student of planning to design a good city. But the most difficult problem, as you know too well, is not to design the city of tomorrow but to tackle the mean and often thankless job of improving the ones we live in today. It is also easy to design a model community of nations. The similarity doesn't stop there.

With only a general knowledge of what actually happened, I understand that it was quite a victory for the urban-renewal forces in New York City when the Board of Estimate approved a large cooperative development south of Pennsylvania Station. Its friends tell me that the project clearly serves the national interest and the interest of the city of New York. They explain, however, that many concessions had to be made in the process and that some interests suffered. What I find revealing in descriptions of the project is that its friends seem proud of the way conflicts were resolved by hard bargaining among astute negotiators.

This particular project, like any large public enterprise, involved a good deal of tough political infighting. The residents of the areas to be redeveloped had no desire to give up their homes and their controlled rents. The old-line political clubs had no desire to lose their members, and the churches felt the same way.

The public-housing advocates questioned whether the cooperatives which were to be built there under trade union sponsorship were not far overpriced. Some private developers who had their eyes on the land were heartbroken at the thought of construction following demolition without a parking-lot stage in between. Altogether, hundreds of groups and thousands of individuals held various views on this project for differing reasons.

The sponsors championed the national interest, but they did so by dealing with the local ones. In the end a political reform group whose strength did not lie with the old residents threw its support behind the project; arrangements were made to leave the churches standing, a few other institutional structures were allowed to remain, and work was speeded on nearby low-cost public housing—too late to help some of those being displaced but not too late to be helpful politically.

What seems to have happened on the West Side of Manhattan is a political process that, in the general opinion of local mankind, served the national interest. On the other side of Manhattan Island, where the United States Mission to the United Nations is working to redevelop what Dag Hammarskjold called "this House," a similar process is clearly visible. It is no less a form of politics, and the diplomats who conduct it have to be practical political operators too.

Their immediate problem, in the weeks since Secretary-General Hammarskjold was killed, has been to work to restore power and flexibility to the executive branch of the United Nations. And Ambassador Adlai Stevenson has gone about the job as realistically as any other good developer.

His first job was to deal with that big operator with the right connections who wanted to buy in on the project so the house could be knocked down and the land paved over for a parking lot. He has given this operator a chance to change his mind and has offered to negotiate on everything but the integrity of the project itself. At the same time he has worked with the other members

of the cooperative to convince them that they can rebuild a decent house with or without that big operator, who doesn't care whose life or property he endangers with his blasting.

The result of these negotiations will be that the "House" survives and will grow in usefulness and power. There will be some unnecessary shrubbery around—purchased to satisfy some members in the nursery business. There will be a modest apartment reserved for the big operator, if he wants to use it; but it's no bigger than the apartments allocated to some of his smaller and poorer neighbors. There will be some hard payments to make from year to year—the kind of payments, as Justice Holmes used to say, that purchase civilization. But even in the cold light of a rainy morning, the new United Nations will look a great deal better than a parking lot.

Politics of Nonalignment

The "House" in question contains much activity of many kinds. I would like this evening to dwell for a moment on one kind of U.N. politics which has a prominent place there—the politics of non-alignment. For the United Nations is a special kind of house—a schoolhouse of international political responsibility. And while most of its members, including ourselves, have come through kindergarten with flying colors, none of them, including ourselves, have earned any graduate degrees.

The essence of the schooling is the responsible use of power in a political process. Some of the members don't have much military power, but all of them can help enforce what our own Declaration of Independence calls "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."

That the United States is restrained in its actions by "world opinion" is well known; it is, indeed, a source of frustration and complaint among political commentators these days. But all countries are subject to a similar restraint.

Perhaps this is not the ideal moment to argue this point, just when the Soviet Union's repudiation of its own promises not to test nuclear weapons has been capped by an atmospheric blast so huge that the words of outrage seem inadequate. Yet the Soviets have clearly been cooled off on the troika, or "three-headed monster," theory of international administration by the well-nigh unanimous opinion of the non-Communist world. And

the general opinion of mankind dictated the reluctant Soviet acknowledgment of the United Nations Congo operation, even after they had decided that the United Nations in the Congo was making their favorite technique of indirect aggression impossible to pursue successfully.

For the smaller powers, whose leaders are in some sense the custodians of mankind's opinion, the United Nations thus serves as a training course in the use of this considerable if invisible form of power. Precisely because talk and action in the name of world opinion are a form of power, it is useful to inquire into the moral basis for its exercise. Those leaders who serve as independent and thoughtful spokesmen for mankind make an immense contribution to world politics, no matter how many square miles, how large or small the population they rule. Those who speak for mankind out of national ambition or personal vanity are not to be taken quite as seriously. The temptation to speak for the general opinion of mankind can be as corrupting as any other form of temptation.

Americans should understand this very well. Secure behind the might of the British Navy, we thumbed our nose at the great powers of the day, lectured them on morality, and expected them to be sentimental about our nonalignment. Even today, when we know that we have to be right in the thick of things on every issue everywhere in the world—because we have power and power willy-nilly must be exercised in the very thick of things—we often hanker for the quiet pools and sleepy lagoons of nonalignment and remember with nostalgia the moralistic description by John Quincy Adams of American foreign policy in 1821. The United States, he wrote,

. . . has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings. . . . She goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. [But] she is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. . . .

Even for a big power in the present day, non-alignment is sometimes the right policy—if it

doesn't mean noninvolvement. On many of the trouble spots in the world we find we can be useful by not taking sides but by consulting the parties concerned, smoothing the way toward private discussions, promoting constructive attempts to study the problems, and not merely shouting about them in loud debates.

Dependent and Independent Neutrality

It is observable that in the General Assembly of the United Nations there are two kinds of "non-aligned" delegates—the dependent kind and the independent kind.

Those who practice the dependent form of non-alignment can be readily identified: They declare themselves uninvolved in every contentious issue and carefully place themselves just halfway between what they see as the two extremes.

The notion was best expressed, in verse, by a political scientist named A. A. Milne in a textbook entitled *When We Were Very Young*.

Halfway down the stairs

Is a stair

Where I sit.

There isn't any

Other stair

Quite like

It.

I'm not at the bottom,

I'm not at the top;

So this is the stair

Where

I always

Stop.

Halfway up the stairs

Isn't up,

And isn't down.

It isn't in the nursery,

It isn't in the town.

And all sorts of funny thoughts

Run round my head:

"It isn't really

Anywhere!

It's somewhere else

Instead!"

Thus, on any lively topic of international affairs the nations with commitments on that subject tend to be ranged against each other, defending their vital interests and hoping the bystanders will agree. The bystanders tend to place themselves at a point equidistant from the positions of commitment. From this position it is both easy and inexpensive to be courageous—for courage, especially of the "let's you and him fight"

or "let's you and him make peace" variety, is directly proportional to one's distance from the real problem. Each of us knows from our own personal experience how easy it is to be decisive about questions we don't have to decide.

A neutral country which must always pick the halfway point in any contention between the big powers has delegated to the big powers the decision where the neutral will stand. Thus, if the range of possible views as between the United States and the Soviet Union on disarmament could be represented by a numerical scale running from zero to 100, a neutral might feel it should occupy a firm and unequivocal position at point 50 on the scale. But if the Soviet Union suddenly decided to take a far more extreme position and moved out to 250 on the same scale, the neutral dedicated to the halfway-house form of neutrality would have to scurry over to the place marked 125.

Acting as a moon to be pulled by the tides of the big powers is, indeed, one form of neutrality; it is the dependent form of it. In diplomacy as in logic, the dependent variable has a passive role; it is the independent variables which have all the fun.

The joyful thing to watch is the transition from the first to the second stage of sovereign existence for a new nation. In the second stage the truly independent nation does not crouch halfway between the extremes of commitment, looking apprehensively to one side and the other. Instead it stands erect at whatever point in the spectrum of relevant opinion its own vital interests and its own mature and independent analysis would indicate is the place to stand. If on some subjects this locates its policy closer to the West and on others closer to the Soviet Union, the leaders of a truly independent nation will accept with good grace the brickbats from either side, as appropriate—for they know that brickbats are the handmaidens of responsibility.

In the real world, of course, no country's U.N. delegation fits neatly into either the first or the second form of nonalignment. Within each country's domestic politics there are first-stage and second-stage thinkers—men struggling for power who find political nourishment in strict halfway-house neutrality, and other men struggling for power who stand wherever their values and their concept of their national interest dictate.

But it is fair, I think, to describe these two

stages as contrasting tendencies in the development of national independence. And to me the encouraging thing about the Belgrade conference² was the demonstration of how difficult it is getting to be to pretend that all forms of nonalignment come together at the halfway point between the big powers.

The Belgrade powers came together on a number of issues; but they were, naturally, the easy ones, those requiring action by others: a Berlin settlement, a disarmament agreement, a ban on nuclear testing, the provision of capital for development, the turning loose of Europe's remaining colonies in Africa and elsewhere. The hard subjects were papered over—or if they touched

the vital interests of any nation present, they went unmentioned altogether.

This growing diversity of views, which can be read between the lines in nearly every paragraph of the Belgrade declaration, may go into history as one of the major political events of the 1961 session. Perhaps it was not quite what some of the conference sponsors had in mind. But perhaps it is something better: evidence that some of the leaders of the world's smaller and weaker powers are becoming so independent-minded that they can afford to be independent even of each other. It is none too soon for actions by the non-aligned that go beyond a declaration of independence to a demonstration of independence.

The Three "A's" of Africa: Algeria, Angola, and Apartheid

by *G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*³

It is good to be with you again here at the Overseas Press Club. On the occasion of my last visit I told you something of my convictions on the question of freedom and self-determination for the peoples of eastern Europe. That question remains very much on the world's agenda today, and I need hardly say that my convictions have not wavered.

The present focus is on the fate of Berlin, but the hopes of other millions in central and eastern Europe are also bound up in the outcome. In fact, the issue reaches out far beyond Europe to the capitals of countries not yet born when World War II ended.

The President, in stating the solemn commitment of the United States on Berlin,⁴ described

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 478, and Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

³ Address made before the Overseas Press Club at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 31 (press release 751).

⁴ BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

the peril and the problem as a challenge not to us alone but "to all who want a world of free choice."

My travels in Africa have taken me among peoples who want this kind of world—a world of free choice, built on the foundations of self-determination and independence. I found this to be true in my first trip, to central Africa; on my second trip, to southern Africa; and most recently in visiting nine countries which lie beside or reach into the great desert of the Sahara.⁵ Six of these latter nations border on Algeria, where the issues of self-determination and independence have been bitterly fought over for 7 years.

We in America, out of historical ties with free Europe and mindful of American blood shed there in the cause of freedom, are gravely concerned with Berlin above all other immediate issues. And in good conscience, with the global view our world position forces us to take, we can and do believe

⁵ For an announcement of Mr. Williams' trip, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 642.

that the future of freedom and self-determination everywhere is profoundly at stake in the fate of the 3½ million people of Berlin.

Thus in my talks with African leaders I have sought a sympathetic understanding, a sense of common cause with our point of view, on this question. Frankly, I have had only partial success.

We can and do share important convictions with the Africans. The germinal ideas of freedom and self-determination, planted from the Western tradition which America has done so much to nurture, have burst into vigorous life in Africa. But the difference comes, usually, in what is in the forefront of the mind when these great principles are evoked. To us it may be Berlin; to them Algeria, or Angola, or *apartheid*.

There is no use complaining of this. We must work tirelessly at bringing home to the new nations of Africa the lesson we have learned at great cost—that freedom is indivisible, that no nation can wash its hands of the issue simply because it is at stake in a distant arena. Then we may gain from them a greater appreciation of the problems which, in the forefront of our preoccupations, we think most vital.

At the same time we must open our minds fully to consideration of those issues which have most immediate force for Africans. We are committed to freedom and self-determination. We must expect to be held to it. We must reckon with its dynamic force not only in areas we have known as battlegrounds but in the lives of peoples and nations we are just beginning to know.

In several issues our position is not an easy one. The interests of countries beside whom we have fought and bled are sometimes seemingly at odds with the interests of other countries or of peoples under their administration. These issues, forcing themselves on the world's attention, we must inevitably face. Where they occur in the context of Africa's changing order—of Africa's future—we must consider them on their merits according to our traditional beliefs and within that basic framework of political and social order, the U.N. Charter.

The charter of the United Nations, echoing the principles which Woodrow Wilson shaped anew, states in article 1 that it is the purpose of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of

equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." The charter's preamble, further, pledges member states "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights" and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. . . ."

In this light let us look at some of the issues in which our commitment must apply if we are to fashion an operative understanding with Africans while doing justice to the views of all others concerned.

Algeria

In every country on my latest trip, and especially in the Arab nations flanking Algeria, the final issue of the Algerian struggle is awaited with—at one and the same time—sympathy and apprehension. The citizens of these neighboring nations, remembering their own recent emergence to independence, feel a deep, sympathetic identity with the Algerian people's aspirations for self-government. And they are apprehensive over the uncertainties of how Algerian self-determination is to be realized.

Nowhere are these feelings as intense as in Morocco and Tunisia, both bound so closely by ties of history, race, and religion to the Algerian peoples. In my conversations in Morocco and Tunisia I was able to sense a growing hope that the tragic Algerian conflict is nearing an end. If good sense and reasonableness prevail, the peace for which we all yearn may soon return to this troubled land. The birth of a new nation, which would become one of the most important in Africa, is at hand. In this the years of sacrifice and perseverance of the Algerian peoples, and at the same time the realistic and progressive policies of General Charles de Gaulle, will find their vindication.

How is the will of the Algerians to be given substance? In the confusion of needless bloodshed and terror the immediate future still seems tortuous and uncertain. But we are hopeful that representatives of the French and Algerian peoples, working together, can find a formula giving effect to Algerian aspirations while protecting legitimate interests of the European minority, many of them second- and third-generation settlers. French-Algerian talks have taken place already on three occasions. The time seems right for—indeed all signs indicate—the early resumption of negotiations.

Our policy reflects President Kennedy's long and well-known interest in the Algerian question. It comes down to this: We feel that the key to a solution lies in negotiations between France and the FLN [National Liberation Front]. We hope these negotiations can soon be resumed and that a settlement based on the principle of Algerian self-determination will be achieved.

The United States has always believed that a settlement, to endure, must be democratic and just—that is, it must fulfill the aspirations of the Algerian people, and it must respect minority as well as majority interests. The goal of a sovereign, independent, peaceful, and prosperous Algeria is commonly accepted by Algerian nationalists and the French policy as publicly stated by President de Gaulle. We, too, support this goal.

The final test, however, lies ahead, and it calls for the highest order of statesmanship. Negotiations are the key to a settlement, and their success in turn depends on the elaboration of assurances sufficient to inspire confidence in the future on the part of all who have legitimate interests at stake. It is my own hope that wisdom and magnanimity will now prevail in the final negotiations between the French and Algerian representatives.

This is a time for responsibility and calm, not for any new aggravation or inflammation of the passions that have racked Algeria and France. The United States calls on all those concerned to choose the path of peace, reconciliation, and construction of the new order in Algeria.

Angola

A second important question is Angola. This Portuguese overseas territory has become the focus of important international discussion. It is a key African issue and one that faces the United Nations General Assembly in the days immediately ahead.

A resolution adopted by the General Assembly last April,⁶ which the United States supported, took the view that Portugal had not accorded the inhabitants of Angola adequate opportunities for social, economic, and political advancement. The resolution in question called for appropriate reforms, for the establishment of a U.N. committee of inquiry, and, perhaps most importantly, for

⁶ U.N. doc. A/RES/1603 (XV); for background on Security Council debates on the Angola question, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 497, and July 10, 1961, p. 88.

acknowledgment of the principle of self-determination for Angola. The note of urgency in this question was heightened by disturbances in Angola itself, involving considerable loss of life and property on both sides. The presence in the Congo of some tens of thousands of refugees from Angola contributes further to the concern of the world community.

The history of relations between the United States and Portugal is long and amicable, and it has been a source of regret to us that past votes at the U.N. on Angola have been construed by the Portuguese as hostile to their interests. That we have not agreed with Portugal does not mean that our purposes run contrary to the spirit of constructive friendship, and we have sought to clarify to the Portuguese Government the necessities which we believe are bound up in this question.

We believe that Africa is experiencing a revolution of expectations based upon the profound human desire for greater political and social self-expression and that the Portuguese territories are not immune to its influence. Portugal, in our view, has the power to make a positive contribution, as other metropolitan powers have done, by giving direction to these forces in her African territories.

Portuguese racial philosophy has a constructive aspect which can be usefully built upon. Moreover, continuing economic development in Angola cannot afford to lose the services of Portuguese technicians and their skills. We believe that these benefits could ultimately be lost if there does not occur a significant and timely accommodation to the legitimate aspirations of all inhabitants of these territories.

As the delegates of the United Nations again take up the Angolan question, I believe they will find a measure of encouragement that is quite new. At the end of August the Portuguese Government announced a series of reforms affecting its African territories. Not the least of these reforms are ones providing for a system of local self-government and the elimination of a separate status for "unassimilated" natives. There are clear indications that additional reforms will be announced, particularly in the important field of education in the African territories.

It is, of course, too early to judge the effectiveness of these reform measures. But they are positive steps, and we trust they will be implemented

in a prompt and comprehensive fashion. They should, we feel, be accorded due weight in the minds of all who have in mind the well-being of the people of Angola.

It is out of basic obligations to the world community, rooted in the U.N. Charter, and to the goal of a just and peaceful settlement of differences that we have upheld the desirability of a progressive evolution for Angola. So, too, we support the need for cooperation with the United Nations, which we see as one avenue for resolving this problem. These have been and are today our purposes in the Angola question.

Apartheid

The question of *apartheid* in the Republic of South Africa presents itself with increased force each year at the U.N. General Assembly. We think *apartheid* is a wrongheaded policy fraught with dangers not alone to the peoples of South Africa but to international peace and security. We oppose it out of our convictions, out of our own experience with questions of racial discrimination, and in recognition of the clear injunctions of the U.N. Charter.

We do not suppose that racial accommodation can be achieved overnight and without the strain of a major social adjustment. We have our own shortcomings to answer for in this matter in parts of the United States, and it behooves us to press on and make good on the national policy of bringing discrimination rapidly to an end. But we cannot hold any sympathy for the policy of South Africa, which, in the words of a U.N. commission, is "contrary to the dignity and worth of the human person."

That is why, not only at the U.N. but in direct, official representations, we have felt obliged to bring our views strongly to the attention of the South African Government. We are mindful of valuable South African contributions to the victory over Hitlerite Germany and to turning back Communist aggression in Korea. But we cannot expediently note only what the right hand of South Africa does, if at home the left is raised to turn aside the wind of change or fend off the U.N. Charter's insistence on fundamental human rights for all peoples.

A timely opportunity is presently open to the South African Government which the United States very much hopes will be taken up. I refer

to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1960 to Chief Albert Luthuli, the Zulu Christian leader who has devoted his life to the struggle for human rights and political equality in South Africa. Seeking to honor this gallant African—a man of peace as well as justice—the world looks to his appearance in Oslo to accept the Nobel award. South Africa should make this possible.

The three issues I have outlined tonight each involve grave tests of responsibility for the nations and peoples directly involved. The responsibility of all others, the United States included, is scarcely less important if the tenets of peace and justice set forth in the U.N. Charter are not to be lost in storms of unbridled anger and destructive propaganda.

Our responsibility, our influence, can be brought fully to bear in these and other African issues only if our commitment to universal principles is clear and operative in Africa as well as elsewhere. All Americans share in this responsibility. People and institutions of influence in this country, as in Africa, must face the necessities of some very tough problems that yield up no simple answer.

Let us be sure we are not distracted either by the din of cold-war propaganda or by fears which seem to argue that this ever-changing world should somehow be stopped from further evolutions. Let us understand better that our own great traditions of freedom and self-determination are shared with other states through the pledges made in the U.N. Charter. Then, I think, we can persist and in the end prevail in building a world of free choice.

President Senghor of Senegal Visits United States

Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal, made an official visit to the United States October 30–November 4. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Kennedy and President Senghor upon the latter's arrival at Washington on November 3.

White House press release dated November 3

President Kennedy

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Members of the Cabinet: I wish to express our great satisfac-

tion, Mr. President, in welcoming you to Washington.

A famous American once said many years ago that he did not care who wrote his nation's laws as long as he could write this nation's songs. Mr. President, you help write your nation's songs and poems and you also help write your nation's laws. You have been an architect of your country's independence. You have been the poet in the sense of the aspirations of the people of Africa, and you will come, as you do, to this country and see millions of men and women who came from Africa to the United States who are building their lives here and making for them a strong place in the American society. They form a valuable link between our country and yours, and your continent.

In addition, you will see millions of other Americans who came from other parts of the world, who came here to build their lives in independence and liberty and fraternity in a free society. So though Senegal and the United States may be separated by thousands of miles, though we occupy different positions and different historical evolutions, nevertheless in a very real sense we wish for the Senegal what you wish for us, which is peace and liberty and national sovereignty, an opportunity to build a better life for your people. So Senegal and the United States, in that very fundamental sense, are sisters under the skin.

Mr. President, we welcome you as the President of your country. We welcome you as a distinguished contributor to the development of Western culture, and I want you to know—and I speak on behalf of all Americans—that you and the members of your Government are most welcome for your counsel and your friendship in the crucial year of 1961.

President Senghor¹

Mr. President, allow me first of all to tell you how deeply touched we are by this welcome, how deeply touched we are to be welcomed by the great Federal Republic of the United States. But if we admire you, we admire you most of all not only for your material power but for your spiritual power. You also were a colony once. We shall never forget your Declaration of Independence. We shall never forget your declaration of

¹ As translated from the French.

human rights. You have indeed carried out the principles of these declarations into the actuality—a great Republic of free men.

During World War I and World War II the United States fought not only for the freedom of the United States but for the freedom of all the peoples of the world, and we admire you for it.

Senegal is a small country, but it is a Republic which is inspired by the principles of democracy. We have a parliamentary regime. We have a majority, it is true, but there is also an opposition, and thus the basic rights of the human person are safeguarded. The resemblances between our two political systems help to explain the friendship between our two nations.

I am very happy to be among you today. Long live the United States!

President Kennedy Assures Finland of U.S. Friendship

Following is the text of a telegram from President Kennedy to President Urho Kekkonen of Finland.

White House press release dated November 6

NOVEMBER 2, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Upon the conclusion of your visit to the United States,¹ I wish on behalf of all Americans to extend to you and the Finnish people our most cordial good wishes for the continued prosperity and well-being of Finland.

The reaction of my fellow countrymen to your presence here has once again shown the depth of our feelings of admiration and esteem for Finland. Your nation, though small in size compared with many others, is peopled with lovers of freedom whose hearts are of giant proportion.

As you have journeyed through our land, I trust you have gained greater knowledge of our unrelenting determination. Americans are united in their resolve to meet with calmness and purpose the problems posed by forces which challenge not only the United States but indeed the whole community of nations sharing democratic institutions. We will never cease our efforts in pursuit of peace with justice for all mankind.

As you depart from our shores, please be assured of our continuing interest in Finland's wel-

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1961, p. 760.

fare, and of our awareness of the value of the shared ideals and bonds of friendship linking our countries.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency
URHO KEKKONEN
President of Finland
Ambassador Hotel
Los Angeles

Cabinet Members Attend Economic Meeting in Japan

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, OCTOBER 26

The Department of State announced on October 26 (press release 735) that the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs would meet at Hakone, Japan, November 2-4. This Committee was established in an exchange of notes between the United States and Japan at the conclusion of the visit of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda to the United States in June of this year.¹ The principal objectives of this Committee are:

1. To demonstrate the importance which the two countries attach to their economic relations.

2. To provide a forum for high-level discussions between the United States and Japan on economic affairs including development and trade matters.

3. To give further substance to the policy of close consultation and cooperation between the two countries on matters of mutual concern.

4. To enable the principal political officials concerned with economic affairs in both countries to obtain firsthand knowledge of the nature and dimensions of the United States-Japanese economic relationship, of the worldwide economic interests of the two countries, and of the major political considerations which affect their economic policies.

5. To establish the basis for further consultations and future negotiations, through diplomatic channels, concerning specific economic and commercial issues between the two countries, and concerning the development of closer United States-

Japanese cooperation on economic programs involving other nations.

For the United States the principals will be Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor; Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; Henry H. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury; and Walter W. Heller, Presidential Adviser on Economics. For Japan the principals will be Zentaro Kosaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mikio Mizuta, Minister for Finance; Ichiro Kono, Minister for Agriculture and Forestry; Eisaku Sato, Minister for International Trade and Industry; Kenji Fukunaga, Minister for Labor; Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director General of the Economic Planning Agency; and Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary. Both the Japanese and the American delegates will be assisted by senior advisers.

The agenda for the Committee meeting is as follows:

1. General survey and outline of the Japanese and American economies.

2. The current financial and balance-of-payments situations of the two countries.

3. Wage substance and labor productivity in Japan and the United States.

4. The expansion of trade and promotion of economic relations between Japan and the United States.

5. The promotion of Japanese and United States economic and commercial relations with other parts of the world.

6. Economic assistance to less developed countries.

7. Proposals for stabilizing primary commodity prices and their relationship to terms of trade.

8. Other business.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, OCTOBER 30

Press release 748 dated October 30

The membership of our delegation emphasizes the importance we attach to the forthcoming meeting in Japan. Together with our Japanese counterparts, my Cabinet colleagues and I constitute the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. This Committee

¹ BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

was formed by agreement between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington last June.

The Committee is a continuing consultative body for discussing the principal trade and economic affairs of the two countries. The United States has a similar arrangement with Canada. This highlights an important economic fact: Canada and Japan are America's two largest trading partners. We sell more to Japan than we do to any other country in the world, except Canada. Japan sells more to the United States than to any other country in the world, bar none.

Of course, new trading patterns always create new problems which need to be ironed out. The development of our economic relations with Japan in the years to come will be a major factor in our overall relations with that country and will afford great opportunities to American industry, labor, and agriculture.

The agenda for our first meeting calls for discussions on a wide range of mutual economic and trade interests. We expect to talk with our Japanese friends fully and frankly in order to improve understanding of each other's problems. We hope to find ways whereby we can improve our mutual relations in the economic and trade fields. We intend to consider jointly the ways and means by which our two countries can help each other and can also help the less developed nations of the world. While the meeting is not designed to settle detailed issues between our two countries, I am confident that it will lay the groundwork for the future settlement of such issues and for increasing cooperation in all aspects of our bilateral and worldwide economic relations.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, NOVEMBER 4

Press release 771 dated November 7

(I)

The first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held at Hakone from the 2nd to the 4th of November 1961.

Japan was represented at the meeting by Mr. Zentaro Kosaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Eisaku Sato, Minister for International Trade and Industry; Mr. Ichiro Kono, Minister for Agriculture and Forestry; Mr. Mikio Mizuta, Minister of Finance; Mr. Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director of

the Economic Planning Agency; Mr. Kenji Fukunaga, Minister of Labor; and Mr. Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary. The Vice-Ministers of the Ministries concerned and Mr. Koichiro Asakai, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, were present.

The United States was represented by Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Mr. Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior; Mr. Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture; Mr. Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor; Mr. Henry H. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury; and Mr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors. Mr. Myer Feldman, Deputy Special Counsel to the President, and Mr. Edwin O. Reischauer, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and the advisors from the Departments concerned were also present.

At the opening of the Committee meeting Mr. Hayato Ikeda, Prime Minister of Japan, extended a word of welcome to Secretary Rusk and the other members of the U.S. delegation and expressed his hope that this meeting would contribute to further consolidation of the economic and trade relationship between Japan and the United States.

The business of the Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Kosaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was carried out smoothly and a lively exchange of views took place in a most cordial and frank atmosphere.

The purpose of the Conference as expressed in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated June 22, 1961² was to exchange information and views in order "to eliminate conflict in the international economic policies of the two countries, to provide for a fuller measure of economic collaboration, and to encourage the flow of trade".

(II)

Discussion covered the general area of trade and economic relationships between Japan and the United States, their trade and economic relations with other areas of the world, and their domestic economic conditions and policies.

At the outset the Committee recognized the close relationship between domestic economic policy and international economic relationships, and

² For texts, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 58.

agreed upon the importance to both countries of the effective functioning on a liberal basis of the multilateral trade and payments system of the free world.

The Committee considered the current economic situation and prospects of both countries. The remarkable growth of the Japanese economy in recent years was noted and the Japanese national income doubling plan was discussed and welcomed.

The current economic situation in the United States economy was outlined and its recovery from the recent recession was noted and welcomed. The basic question of how full economic recovery and more rapid economic growth can be achieved in the United States while still maintaining reasonable price stability and progress toward balance of payments equilibrium was also discussed.

The importance to each country of maintaining healthy economies and satisfactory balance of payments positions, and of improving labor standards and living conditions in both countries, was stressed. It was also noted that trade policies are and must be affected by employment conditions.

The Committee discussed the balance of payments problem of the United States and Japan, and agreed that both countries needed to increase their export market. Japan must trade to live and grow, and the United States must trade to grow and to do its share in insuring the security of the free world. In the case of the United States, the U.S. Delegation emphasized that a trade surplus is required to finance assistance programs and essential U.S. military expenditures abroad, expenditures which are vital to the security and well-being of the free world. They also emphasized that the U.S. imbalance of payments must be corrected by a larger trade surplus in order to assure continued international confidence in the dollar as one of the two key reserve currencies on which the trade and payments system of the free world depends. With reference to the recent Japanese imbalance of trade with the United States, the U.S. Delegation stressed that it was at least in part a result of the recent economic recession in the U.S. and the sudden and rapid increase in Japan's rates of growth and requirements for imports. In the case of Japan, the Japanese Delegation stressed that increased exports are required to help finance the imports necessary for fulfillment of the Government's ten-year income doubling plan. In

this connection they pointed out the recent short imbalance in trade between the U.S. and Japan and expressed the view that Japan could not attain a satisfactory level of exports unless the level of her exports to the U.S. were again to grow. The Japanese Delegation further pointed out that, although it was desirable that both countries attain improved balance of payments by multilateral approaches, every effort should be made on both sides to adjust imports and exports as far as possible on account of the special trading circumstances in which Japan is placed and the recent extraordinary imbalance of trade between Japan and the United States. In consideration of these U.S. and Japanese viewpoints, the Committee examined measures to expand export trade.

The Committee agreed that despite their best efforts exports could not be expanded sufficiently solely by trade between the two countries. It therefore noted with regret that many countries still maintain discriminatory restrictions on imports from Japan under Article XXXV of the GATT.

The Committee reviewed briefly the policies and programs of both countries in respect of aid to the less developed countries. It was noted that coordination in this field between the two governments was taking place bilaterally as well as through the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], the Colombo Plan and now through the Development Assistance Committee of the newly constituted OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

Considerable attention was given to the difficult but important question of improving the income of the less-developed countries through coordinated international measures to stabilize the prices of primary products and through increased purchases of their primary products. The United States referred to the value of its food for peace program to their economic development and invited cooperation in this field.

The Committee discussed wages, employment and labor conditions in Japan and the United States and the relation of these factors to trade between the two countries.

The Committee also discussed various other problems, including the furtherance of the flow of capital and technology between the two countries,

and closer contacts between those concerned with labor in the two countries.

In view of the great importance to each country of the economic and financial policies—both internal and external—which they pursued, and of the operation of the multilateral trade and payments system of the free world on an open and liberal basis, and of the need for a full exchange of information on present and future plans, it was agreed that joint consultations and studies will be undertaken on an intensified basis, through normal diplomatic channels, through discussions between United States and Japanese delegations to international bodies and, where appropriate, by special informal meetings between officials of the two governments. Such close and frequent contacts will enable future meetings at the cabinet level to make even more valuable contributions to the achievement of the economic goals they share.

It was also agreed that the United States Ambassador to Japan, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and an appropriate official from the United States Department of State and from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be responsible for insuring the vigorous pursuit of this work by the two governments between meetings of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.

In accordance with this general agreement for closer cooperation it was decided to start promptly in several areas. It is expected that other subjects on which joint efforts will prove desirable will develop over the coming months.

Both nations agreed to work together toward the continued liberalization of trade with other nations and with each other in order to improve export opportunities on a reciprocal basis.

The United States Delegation agreed to support the efforts of the Government of Japan to reduce or eliminate discrimination against its equal participation in multilateral trade relationships with other nations, especially that under Article XXXV of the GATT.

Both nations agreed to extend their cooperation in economic and technical assistance programs to developing nations and to join in a common effort to raise the standard of living of those nations.

Both delegations agreed to exchange such information relating to current economic and financial developments and future plans and

programs as may be necessary to permit both countries better to anticipate significant changes in their economic and trading relationships.

Both nations have a common interest in better information about labor standards, employment conditions, wages, and other aspects of labor policy in order to avoid misconceptions affecting trading relationships. Accordingly, it was agreed that these subjects would be studied by the two governments.

Both nations, similarly, have a deep interest in market promotional activities, avoiding disruption of markets for specific products, and the question of the effects of imports upon their industries, and consider that these problems need further intensive study. It was agreed that there would be an exchange of relevant information and materials bearing upon these questions.

Noting that a conference participated in by so many cabinet members of Japan and the United States with a view to deepening mutual understanding on problems of common interest is unprecedented in the diplomatic annals of both countries, and recognizing the significance of the agreement between Prime Minister Ikeda of Japan and President Kennedy of the United States in June which created the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs,³ the Committee agreed to promote further economic cooperation thereby strengthening the bonds of friendship between the two nations in the years to come.

Meeting on Foreign Students in U.S. Held at Department of State

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on October 30 (press release 750) that a 2-day meeting to discuss means of improving the experience of the increasing numbers of foreign students in the United States opened at the Department on that day.

Forty persons from all parts of the country attended as representatives of the wide variety of

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Department Releases Report on Aid to Sub-Sahara African Students

The Department of State on October 29 (press release 742 dated October 27) announced the release of a Report on United States Government Assistance to Sub-Sahara African Students Seeking Higher Education in the United States, January-September 1961. Copies may be obtained, upon request, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C., where the report was prepared.

nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign students, including colleges and universities, international houses, student associations, foreign affairs councils, civic organizations, research institutes, and foundations.

The Department's representatives were headed by Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, who addressed the opening meeting, and Donald B. Cook, Director of Foreign Student Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Members of the group were asked to recommend specific actions to be taken by organizations, communities, and government as the Department gives increased emphasis to improving the experience of foreign students in the United States.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

I would like to take this opportunity to express my personal interest in the purpose and plan of your meeting on "The Foreign Student in the United States." The need for greater effort to promote international understanding, both through the Government and through non-Governmental organizations, becomes ever more evident as the number of foreign students increases and the attendant responsibilities and opportunities rise. The object of your meeting—to enable the Government to advise and consult with representatives of many of the vital action groups which have long been concerned with providing a better experience for foreign students—emphasizes the essential basis of our total effort.

Government has its role to play: the Department of State has recently indicated a broadened concern for improving the experience of all foreign students regardless of whether they came here under Government programs. But it is on individuals such as you, and the voluntary groups you represent, that the Government must depend primarily for the character and quality of the relationships we form with foreign students. This responsibility gives all of you and your organizations a first-hand role in this increasingly important part of our foreign relations. I hope your meeting is a most productive one in outlining ways by which we can, jointly, meet this great and growing opportunity more effectively.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Responsibility of Labor in the Cold War

by Gordon W. Chapman¹

We are today locked in a worldwide struggle referred to commonly as the cold war. On one side is the Communist power bloc, whose goal is supremacy throughout the world—a world that would be ruled by coercion, where the wishes and whims of the party are supreme. On the other side in this struggle are the free nations, whose doctrine is, the people are supreme and government must serve the interests of its citizens. This is the doctrine of freedom, of self-determination, of democracy. This struggle is intensified by a period of world revolution. Millions of people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are aspiring to move above subsistence levels. Today they know that food and freedom can be more than words or idle hope—they can be reality; and they are not waiting patiently for a better way of life to unfold. They are demanding change, and change there will be.

Upon the free world rests the responsibility of helping bring into reality the dreams of the downtrodden. The Soviets claim they have the solution

¹ Address made before District Council 37 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 21 (press release 726 dated Oct. 20). Mr. Chapman is Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Labor Affairs.

to obtaining materialistic benefits, and they irresponsibly speak of broad democracy. They carefully conceal the denial of individual freedom. We and our friends throughout the free world must bring about an understanding among the millions of people in the newly developing nations that their ambitions for a better economic life can be secured without sacrificing freedom for a new kind of slavery. Organized labor can and must contribute greatly in this worldwide struggle.

U.S. labor has been taking the initiative by using its own resources of manpower and money to help our friends.

This is being done through worldwide organizations, first the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The ICFTU is composed of free trade unions in America, England, France, West Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Japan, others in the Far East, Africa, Latin America, Australia, the Philippine Islands, and many more. U.S. affiliation is through the AFL-CIO. This world organization of free labor has over 55 million members in 91 countries. With headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, it has regional organizations, maintains labor schools, and has representatives working in the underdeveloped countries helping new, inexperienced unions in their struggle to better the economic conditions of their members.

In addition to the ICFTU, there are International Trade Secretariats (ITS). These are independent international labor federations comprising 35 million workers organized along industry and craft lines. Affiliation is through our national and international unions. Their activities in fostering the development of free trade unionism in newly developing countries have expanded dramatically in recent years. More than 50 American unions representing 9 million members are affiliated with their ITS, which cooperate closely with the anti-Communist ICFTU. Examples: International Metalworkers Federation; International Petroleum Workers Federation; International Transport Workers Federation; Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International; your own Public Services International. These trade secretariats—worldwide international organizations—maintain representatives working constantly throughout the world assisting in the development of free trade unions in their industry or trade.

This is the voluntary work of the free world labor movement. It has a competitor—the Com-

munist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions—a political arm of the Communist Party.

We are unquestionably facing an able and determined adversary. Let us take a look at Mr. Khrushchev's claims and accomplishments. For example, Berlin. Premier Khrushchev has frequently advocated coexistence and peaceful competition. He has repeatedly stated that such competition will prove the ability of a Communist society to surpass capitalistic imperialism. Of course, his terminology "capitalistic imperialism" is merely a slogan and not a true description of the free economic and political society in West Berlin or in our own United States. He has had the opportunity in East Berlin to prove that communism is superior and has failed. He has failed to the degree that it has, in his opinion, been necessary to build a wall between Communist East Berlin and free West Berlin to prevent the mass exodus of East Germans to take advantage of the opportunity to live in a free society.

Mr. Khrushchev now claims, under his 20-year plan, that they will surpass capitalistic imperialism, and in his speech to the 22d Congress he envisages what appear to be very appealing goals such as: free communal services for every family; free sanatoria, medicines, and medical care; 75 to 80 percent of the cost of keeping and educating children to be free; and free maintenance of disabled workers. He neglects to mention whether or not, under this beautiful plan, the people will be free. Everything will be free except freedom itself. He proposes that these materialistic benefits be provided the people by government fiat. He neglects to mention what can be given a people under a dictatorship can be as quickly taken away.

In studying the 20-year program carefully, there is continuous reference to labor and the working classes. It is obvious that there will continue to be a heavy emphasis in obtaining control of the workers. This campaign will be carried on throughout all of the newly developing nations, not to build free trade unions but to build workers' organizations that can be controlled and dominated by the Communist dictatorship. In this field of activity, the free world labor movement has a tremendous responsibility.

Our own U.S. labor movement, which is free to disagree with its Government, is also free to give wholehearted support to its Government. This it is doing and doing it voluntarily and effectively.

What are U.S. union members doing?

Their dues, along with the dues of union members throughout the free world, are helping to finance the work of these organizations, the ICFTU and each trade secretariat. Your union dues are keeping your own representatives at work in Africa, the Far East, and Latin America, keeping them working with those who are much less fortunate than we—helping them to build their unions, helping them to improve their conditions, helping them to build schools for their children and homes to live in. Yes, they are doing all this and more. They are helping these people to build a free society, protecting them from the clutches of communism. Many of these representatives are U.S. trade unionists.

Prior to World War II, international labor developments were considered of relatively little importance in their effect upon United States foreign policy or the requirements of our diplomacy. True, Austria and Germany before the time of Hitler's assumption of power had extremely influential labor movements closely related to their social democratic governments, and the British and the Scandinavians had labor or social democratic parties in which trade unionism played an important role. Until the end of the war, with the exception of the Soviets, no world power explicitly recognized international trade unionism as an important special factor in international relations and diplomacy.

The challenge of the reconstruction of a war-shattered Europe and a rebuilding of its institutions along democratic lines made it clear, however, that important political questions were involved and among them the question of the political direction of the European labor movements. The international Communist tactics, expressed abroad largely through labor penetration, were quickly recognized as aimed at the creation of governments throughout Europe and elsewhere in the world allied with a Soviet Union determined on world conquest. It was clear that the U.S.S.R., though a wartime ally, had been an ally for temporary convenience.

There is no clearer illustration of the Soviet strategy of using international trade unionism as a tool of foreign policy than what happened in 1948 and 1949. The European Recovery Program, in which the Soviet Union was invited by the United States to participate but which she rejected, was opposed by the European Commu-

nists in the WFTU and attempts were made by Communist union leadership throughout Europe to sabotage our aid under this program. The democratic European union leadership responded clearly and affirmatively to this challenge, and encouragement and support was provided by American labor both directly to the European unions and indirectly through participation in advisory services to our Government through the Marshall plan, the Department of State, and, of course, the Labor Department.

The labor attaché program, which had its origin during the war, is a measure of how important a consideration labor has become in the Department's policy and representation functions. From a start in the early 1940's, the program has grown to 50 labor attachés and 25 Foreign Service officers who do labor reporting along with other duties in the embassies and consulates overseas. There are labor advisers in each of the Department's regional bureaus and labor specialists in other functions in Washington. Paralleling this development, of course, has been the assignment of labor advisers within the economic assistance program (AID) overseas and in Washington to assist in carrying out the economic aspects of foreign policy.

In the field, a labor attaché is the ambassador's special adviser on labor problems in the country to which he is accredited, the embassy's eyes and ears in evaluating and reporting the political and economic developments of the country and the point of view of its organized masses, the workers. His "beat," both professionally and during social hours, is the trade union environment of the country, just as that of the political officer is with the government and the political parties (though where the parties are led by trade unionists, the labor attaché often has more entree) and of the economic officer is with the government and private industry and economic circles.

In countries such as Japan and Indonesia in Asia, Kenya and others in Africa, and Brazil, for instance, in South America, in much of the underdeveloped area of the world where the crucial balance of decision in the contest between freedom and Communist world domination resides, it is the trade union movements which increasingly will decide history and by which our foreign policy will be most carefully tested.

It is to these countries, the newest new world, that we must make ourselves known in our own democratic language and in the image of an America where trade unions such as their own play an important role. A policy which would ignore the presence and aspiration of the world's rising labor movement and the opportunities for taking our case for freedom directly to the people who in the end must decide whether it or the Communist philosophy will prevail would be suicidal.

Labor attachés do not make policy. The Secretary of State and the President perform that function, with the general guidance of the legislative and judicial branches, but labor officers can contribute to a policy which takes into account the realities of a world in which trade union issues have become vital to political determination.

Labor specialization is new to diplomacy. The less than 20 years with which we have had experience in this field have not developed a corps with completed expertise. But the broad acceptance of the value to the application of our foreign policy, and to its shaping abroad and at home, is an indication of its contribution to date and its promise for the future.

The terms of the peace under which we are to live are equally important. The terms must provide freedom, and freedom is not purchased easily.

Too frequently we hear such comments as, "The United States has no fixed foreign policy," or the question is asked, "What is the foreign policy of our Government?" If the answer was not clear before, it is today. President Kennedy made it clear to all the world on September 25th in his address to the United Nations.² He has issued a challenge: "It is . . . our intention to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race but to a peace race. . . ."

What policy could be more clear? But to go further with the challenge, he offers a program toward peace, the creation of the machinery within the United Nations to destroy the weapons of destruction. This is the challenge that we are prepared to fulfill not in words but in deeds.

The policy of the United States is:

A. The challenge of leadership in the race for peace.

B. The destruction of the weapons of destruction.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

C. The newly developing AID program for both economic and social improvement to benefit all, not a select few.

D. Strengthen the United Nations—the international organization through which world order can be obtained and maintained.

Too frequently *foreign policy* and the *implementation of foreign policy* are confused. Our foreign policy has been clearly defined by President Kennedy. The implementation of that policy—the methods of obtaining our objectives of peace, social and economic development, and self-determination for all the people in every country—cannot be a rigid, fixed formula. We must work in concert with the other free nations, both those who need help and those who can give help, in devising methods that are most adaptable and effective according to the needs of our neighbors in the newly developing nations.

The fulfillment will not be easy, nor will it be done quickly. It will test the strength, willingness to sacrifice, and solidarity of the free world today and in the weeks, months, and years ahead. Do not expect the struggle against Communist imperialism to be won without effort by all Americans. This includes each of you as members and leaders in your local unions, your District Council, your international union, and your International Trade Secretariat. Through these you can join in the race for peace, and through these you can provide more representatives to go into the newly developing countries and help build free, responsible, democratic trade unions in the public services in the young, eager, energetic, but inexperienced governments.

AID Ready To Receive Applications Under Investment Guaranty Program

Press release 744 dated October 27, for release October 29

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the State Department's Agency for International Development, announced on October 29 that the Agency is ready to receive applications for investment guaranties under the program authorized by the

Congress about a month ago.¹ The total amount of guaranties which can be written under the new program is \$240 million, of which \$100 million can be used for the new all-risk guaranty program.

The investment guaranty program is one of the elements authorized by the Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to encourage and assist U.S. private enterprise to participate in the economic and social development of friendly less developed countries and areas.

The investment guaranty program provides protection against risks peculiar to doing business abroad. The three former types of specific-risk guaranties against losses resulting from inconvertibility, expropriation, and war are still available. The new program includes also losses resulting from revolution and insurrection. In addition coverage is now, for the first time, available not only for U.S. firms but also for dollar investments by wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.

Under the expanded program, the Agency may, in certain instances, write guaranties against all risks. Such guaranties will be at least 50 percent of the dollar investment and may go as high as 75 percent in some cases. In addition to the general all-risk guaranties, a special all-risk guaranty designed to encourage U.S. private enterprise to assist and provide low-cost housing in Latin America is now available.

In announcing initiation of the new guaranty program, Mr. Hamilton emphasized that this is only one of several methods through which the administration cooperates with private enterprise in increasing its role in the development activities of the less developed areas of the world. He expressed his confidence that U.S. private industry will make an increasing contribution to economic and social progress in the newly developing areas.

Mr. Hamilton pointed out that the announced procedures were established after consultation with industry representatives and would speed up administration of the guaranty program. He added also that these procedures would be in effect on an interim basis and may be revised and adjusted in the light of future experience.

Attached is a detailed description of the guaranties available, general criteria to be utilized in

their administration, and procedures for applying for guaranties.

DETAILS OF PROGRAM AND APPLICATION PROCEDURES

General Authority: Section 221

Congress has authorized the investment guaranty program to encourage, facilitate, and increase the participation of U.S. private enterprise in furthering the economic and social development of less developed friendly countries and areas.

Administration of the new program will continue the policy of not competing with private insurance companies. Guaranties may not normally cover a period longer than 20 years, and no payments will be made for any losses arising out of fraud or misconduct for which the investor is responsible. Guaranties issued will not be transferable nor assignable without the express concurrence of AID. Fees will be charged for all guaranties.

Specific-Risk Guaranty: Section 221 (b) (1)

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 repeats, with some modifications, the specific-risk guaranty authority contained in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, i.e. losses resulting from inconvertibility, expropriation, and war. The general policies and procedures in effect for implementing the authorities carried over into the new act will continue as outlined in the *Investment Guaranty Handbook* of July 1960. A revised handbook will soon be issued.

From the investors' point of view the most important new provisions of the 1961 act are:

1. Eligibility for such guaranties is extended to investments by wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies;
2. Protection against loss resulting from revolution or insurrection is authorized;
3. The authority to treat breach of contract by a government as expropriatory is confirmed;
4. Flexibility is authorized in working out arrangements with host governments for institution of the program.

All-Risk Guaranty: Section 221 (b) (2)

In addition to the basic specific-risk guaranty authority described above, AID will in those special and specific cases which occupy an agreed high-priority position in the host country's development plan, issue guaranties of not more than 75 percent, more commonly 50 percent, against loss of any dollar investment and against any risk, including normal business-type risks.

Among the criteria which will be taken into account in reviewing a project are:

¹ Public Law 87-195.

1. whether the activity gives reasonable promise of contributing to the development of economic resources or to the increase of production capacities in furthering the purposes of this title;

2. the extent to which the recipient country is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures; and

3. the possible effects upon the U.S. economy, with special reference to areas of substantial labor surplus, of the guaranty involved.

It is contemplated that this authority, which is new to the foreign aid program, will be used to guarantee general economic development projects, with emphasis on those projects which further social progress and the development of small, independent business enterprises. No such guaranty shall exceed \$10 million; the total face amount of guaranties issued under this authority outstanding at any one time shall not exceed \$90 million. No guaranty shall exceed the total value as of the date of the investment made in the project, plus annual earnings or profits on said investment to the extent provided by such guaranties. It should be kept in mind that funds guaranteed under this title shall not be loaned or re-loaned at rates of interest excessive or unreasonable for the borrower.

General economic development projects are defined as those projects, agricultural as well as industrial, in which private capital desires to participate which further develop economic resources and productive capacities of less developed friendly countries and areas.

Examples of economic development projects which further social progress are agricultural credit institutions, credit unions, cooperatives, low-cost housing projects, and other similar activities. They would have as their aim and purpose the raising of rural and urban living standards and must be designed to have a favorable impact on a broad segment of the public. Consideration would also be given to projects such as food-processing plants, plants producing farm machinery and equipment, building materials, water supply and sanitation equipment.

AID will give consideration to guaranteeing investments which lead to the development of small independent business enterprises. In this connection investors are reminded of the considerable number of development banks in existence in less developed countries, which are supported in part by the AID agency and which are equipped to assist in the financing of deserving small- and medium-size ventures.

Housing

Private U.S. investments in savings and loan associations, housing cooperatives, and other organizations which will finance low-cost housing programs will be eligible for guaranties under the provision of this title (section 221 (b) (2)). In addition, the Congress has made special provisions in section 224 for guaranties to finance pilot

or demonstration private housing projects in Latin America of types similar to those insured by the Federal Housing Administration and suitable for conditions in Latin America. These guaranties also may not exceed 75 percent of the investment and the total face value of the guaranties outstanding at any one time under section 224 cannot exceed \$10 million. Among the criteria for investment guaranties for such pilot or demonstration projects which will be taken into account are:

1. The intensity of the country's concern for its housing problem. This can be determined by the extent with which public and private sources will join in financing the "pilot demonstration project" and to the extent they expect external aid. AID will give the highest priority to those applications in which there is the greatest degree of local financial participation. Also involved in these criteria is the nature of the country's total housing program and its efforts to meet this problem.

2. Human and material resources availability. AID will take into account the availability of human and material resources to carry out an expanded housing program. Consideration will be given to such factors as the local building materials industry, the supply of skilled labor capable and available to carry out the construction effectively, the necessity of incorporating an apprentice training program into the demonstration project to upgrade construction skills, etc.

3. Home ownership. The pilot project must make individual, condominium, or cooperative home ownership possible by regular monthly payments of interest, amortization, taxes, insurance, etc.

4. Projects should be a "demonstration" type which have a reasonable chance of being repeated, thereby acting as a catalyst to stimulate similar projects with or without external aid. There should be evidence that the project is something new to the host country which potentially will have a multiplier effect and will stimulate or strengthen a self-supporting building industry which will in turn contribute to economic development.

5. The housing project should be low-cost and self-liquidating.

General

Inquiries regarding the use of the investment guaranty authority should be addressed to: Investment Guaranty Division, Agency for International Development, Washington 25, D.C.

Individuals desiring to make use of the investment guaranty authority provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 are requested to outline their projects to the Investment Guaranty Division as soon as possible. Such outline should cover at least the following points: description of project; relationship of project to overall economy of the country, including the effect, if any, on social progress and self-help efforts of project; type of investment proposed to be guaranteed; nature and extent of guaranty sought (i.e. risks and percentage); and nature and extent of project country participation, if any, on the project and/or the guaranty.

AID will review the initial responses, together with the applications on hand. Because of the fiscal ceilings established in the law, early submission is recommended. AID desires to hear from principals only.

Presidential Order Provides for Administration of Foreign Aid

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED FUNCTIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 424) and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART I. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECTION 101. *Delegation of functions.* Exclusive of the functions otherwise delegated, or reserved to the President, by the provisions of this order, and subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State (hereafter in this Part referred to as the Secretary) all functions conferred upon the President by (1) the Act (as defined in Part VI hereof), (2) the Act to provide for assistance in the development of Latin America and in the reconstruction of Chile, and for other purposes (74 Stat. 869; 22 U.S.C. 1942 *et seq.*), (3) the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 644; 22 U.S.C. 1611 *et seq.*), (4) the unreported provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832; 22 U.S.C. 1750 *et seq.*), and (5) those provisions of acts appropriating funds under the authority of the Act which relate to the Act.

SEC. 102. *Agency for International Development.* (a) The Secretary shall establish an agency in the Department of State to be known as the Agency for International Development (hereafter in this Part referred to as the Agency).

(b) The Agency shall be headed by an Administrator who shall be the officer provided for in section 624(a) (1) of the Act. Nothing in this order shall be construed as affecting the tenure of the said Administrator now in office.

(c) The officers provided for in sections 624(a) (2) and 624(a) (3) of the Act shall serve in the Agency.

SEC. 103. *Continuation of prior agencies.* The corporate Development Loan Fund, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Office of the Inspector General and Comptroller shall continue in existence until the end of November 3, 1961. The personnel, offices, entities, property, records, and funds of such agencies and office may be utilized by the Secretary prior to the abolition of such agencies and office.

SEC. 104. *Special missions and staffs abroad.* The maintenance of special missions or staffs abroad, the fix-

ing of the ranks of the chiefs thereof after the chiefs of the United States diplomatic missions, and the authorization of the same compensation and allowances as the chief of mission, class 3 and class 4, within the meaning of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 999; 22 U.S.C. 801 *et seq.*), all under section 631 of the Act, shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary.

SEC. 105. *Munitions control.* In carrying out the functions conferred upon the President by section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Secretary shall consult with appropriate agencies. Designations, including changes in designations, by the Secretary of articles which shall be considered as arms, ammunition, and implements of war, including technical data relating thereto, under that section shall have the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.

SEC. 106. *Office of Small Business.* The Office of Small Business provided for in section 602(b) of the Act shall be in the Department of State.

PART II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SEC. 201. *Delegation of functions.* Subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Defense:

(a) The functions conferred upon the President by Part II of the Act not otherwise delegated or reserved to the President.

(b) To the extent that they relate to other functions under the Act administered by the Department of Defense, the functions conferred upon the President by sections 602(a), 605(a), 625(a), 625(h), 627, 628, 631(a), 634(b), 635(b), and 635(d) of the Act.

(c) The function conferred upon the President by section 644(1) of the Act.

(d) The functions conferred upon the President by the fourth and fifth provisos of section 108 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1956 (69 Stat. 438).

SEC. 202. *Reports and information.* In carrying out the functions under section 634(b) of the Act delegated to him by the provisions of section 201(b) of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Secretary of State.

SEC. 203. *Exclusions from delegation to Secretary of Defense.* The following-described functions conferred upon the President by the Act are excluded from the functions delegated by the provisions of section 201(a) of this order:

(a) Those under section 506(a) (introductory clause) of the Act.

(b) Those under sections 506(b)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to countries which agree to the conditions set forth therein.

(c) So much of those under section 511(b) of the Act as consists of determining that internal security requirements may be the basis for programs of military assistance in the form of defense services and reporting any such determination.

(d) That of making the determination provided for in section 507(a) of the Act.

(e) Those of negotiating, concluding, and terminating international agreements.

¹ No. 10973; 26 *Fed. Reg.* 10469.

PART III. OTHER AGENCIES

SEC. 301. *Department of the Treasury.* There is hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the function conferred upon the President by the second sentence of section 612 of the Act.

SEC. 302. *Department of Commerce.* There is hereby delegated to the Secretary of Commerce so much of the functions conferred upon the President by section 601(b) (1) of the Act as consists of drawing the attention of private enterprise to opportunities for investment and development in less-developed friendly countries and areas.

SEC. 303. *Civil Service Commission.* There is hereby delegated to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission the function of prescribing regulations conferred upon the President by the proviso contained in section 625(b) of the Act.

SEC. 304. *United States Information Agency.* The United States Information Agency shall perform all public-information functions abroad with respect to the foreign-assistance, aid, and development programs of the United States Government.

SEC. 305. *Development Loan Committee.* There is hereby established a Development Loan Committee in accordance with section 204 of the Act. The Committee shall consist of the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, who shall be chairman, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury dealing with international finance, and the officer of the Agency for International Development dealing with development financing.

PART IV. RESERVED FUNCTIONS

SEC. 401. *Reservation of functions to the President.* There are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this order:

(a) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 504(b), 613(a), 614(a), 620(a), 620(d), 621(a), 622(b), 622(c), 633(a), 633(b), and 634(a) of the Act.

(b) The functions conferred upon the President by the Act and section 408(b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 with respect to the appointment of officers required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and with respect to the appointment of officers pursuant to section 624(c) of the Act and the function so conferred by section 204 of the Act of assigning officers to the Development Loan Committee.

(c) The functions conferred upon the President with respect to determinations, certifications, directives, or transfers of funds, as the case may be, by sections 202(b), 205, 303, 506(b)(4), 510(a), 604(a), 610, 614(c), 624(e)(7), 632(b), 634(c), and 643(d) of the Act.

(d) The following-described functions conferred upon the President:

(1) Those under section 503 with respect to findings.

(2) Those under sections 506(h)(1), (2), and (3) in respect of countries which do not agree to the conditions set forth therein.

(3) Those under section 511(b), except the functions of determining that internal security requirements may be the basis for programs of military assistance in the form of defense services and reporting any such determination.

(4) That under section 614(b) with respect to determining any provisions of law to be disregarded to achieve the purpose of that section.

(e) Those with respect to determinations under sections 103(b) (first proviso), 104 and 203 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.

(f) That under section 523(d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

(g) Those under section 107 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1962 (75 Stat. 717), and those with respect to determination and certification under sections 109 and 602, respectively, of that act.

PART V. FUNDS

SEC. 501. *Allocation of funds.* Funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the President for carrying out the Act shall be deemed to be allocated without any further action of the President, as follows:

(a) There are allocated to the Secretary of State all funds made available for carrying out the Act except those made available for carrying out Part II of the Act.

(b) There are allocated to the Secretary of Defense funds made available for carrying out Part II of the Act.

SEC. 502. *Reallocation of funds.* The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense may allocate or transfer as appropriate any funds received under subsections (a) and (b), respectively, of section 501 of this order, to any agency, or part thereof, for obligation or expenditure thereby consistent with applicable law.

PART VI. GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 601. *Definitions.* (a) As used in this order, the words "the Act" mean the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 exclusive of Part IV thereof.

(b) As used in this order, the word "function" or "functions" includes any duty, obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, discretion, or activity.

SEC. 602. *Incidental transfers.* (a) Effective at the end of November 3, 1961, all offices, entities, property, and records of the corporate Development Loan Fund, not otherwise disposed of by the Act, are hereby transferred to the Department of State.

(b) So much of the records of the Export-Import Bank of Washington as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine to be necessary for the purposes of section 621(e) of the Act shall be transferred to the Department of State.

SEC. 603. *Personnel.* (a) In carrying out the functions conferred upon the President by the provisions of section 625(d)(1) of the Act, and by this order delegated to the Secretary of State, the Secretary shall authorize such of the agencies which administer programs under the Act

as he may deem appropriate to perform any of the functions under section 625(d)(1) of the Act to the extent that the said functions relate to the programs administered by the respective agencies.

(b) Persons appointed, employed, or assigned after May 19, 1959, under section 527(c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 or section 625(d) of the Act for the purpose of performing functions under such Acts outside the United States shall not, unless otherwise agreed by the agency in which such benefits may be exercised, be entitled to the benefits provided by section 528 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 in cases in which their service under the appointment, employment, or assignment exceeds thirty months.

SEC. 604. *References to orders and Acts.* Except as may for any reason be inappropriate:

(a) References in this order or in any other Executive order to (1) the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (including references herein to "the Act"), (2) unrevoked provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, (3) any other act which relates to the subject of this order, or (4) any provisions of any thereof shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(b) References in any prior Executive order to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 or any provisions thereof shall be deemed to be references to the Act or the corresponding provision, if any, thereof.

(c) References in this order to provisions of any appropriation Act, and references in any other Executive order to provisions of any appropriation Act related to the subject of this order, shall be deemed to include references to any hereafter-enacted provisions of law which are the same or substantially the same as such appropriation Act provisions, respectively.

(d) References in this order or in any other Executive order to this order or to any provision thereof shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(e) References in any prior Executive order not superseded by this order to any provisions of any Executive order so superseded shall hereafter be deemed to be references to the corresponding provisions, if any, of this order.

SEC. 605. *Superseded orders.* The following are hereby superseded:

(a) Executive Order No. 10893 of November 8, 1960 (25 F.R. 10731),² except Part II thereof and except for the purposes of using funds pursuant to section 643(c) of the Act.

(b) Section 2 of Executive Order No. 10915 of January 24, 1961 (26 F.R. 781).³

(c) Executive Order No. 10955 of July 31, 1961 (26 F.R. 6967).⁴


² For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1960, p. 869.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 21, 1961, p. 334.

SEC. 606. *Saving provisions.* Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with this order, all determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives, contracts, agreements, and other actions made, issued, or entered into with respect to any function affected by this order and not revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the date of this order, shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified, or terminated by appropriate authority.

SEC. 607. *Effective date.* The provisions of this order shall become effective as of September 30, 1961.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 3, 1961.

Administration of P.L. 480

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹


ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 104 (e) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1704(e)), and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 10900 of January 5, 1961,² as amended,³ be, and it is hereby, further amended as follows:

(1) By deleting from paragraph (4) of section 4(d) the comma and the text "except to the extent that section 104(e) pertains to the loans referred to in subsection (d) (5) of this section".

(2) By deleting paragraph (5) from section 4(d).

This order shall become effective at the end of November 3, 1961.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 3, 1961.

¹ No. 10972; 26 *Fed. Reg.* 10469.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1961, p. 159.

³ For text of Executive Order 10915, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.

President Makes Determination on Foreign Aid Procurement Policy

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 18, 1961.

Section 604(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that:

Funds made available under this Act may be used for procurement outside the United States only if the President determines that such procurement will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the United States or the industrial mobilization base, with special reference to any areas of labor surplus or to the net position of the United States in its balance of payments with the rest of the world, which outweigh the economic or other advantages to the United States of less costly procurement outside the United States, and only if the price of any commodity procured in bulk is lower than the market price prevailing in the United States at the time of procurement, adjusted for differences in the cost of transportation to destination, quality, and terms of payment.

This section requires that procurement outside the United States using funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may be undertaken only if I determine that, on balance, there is no net detriment to the United States. I am in clear and fundamental agreement with this principle, and trade and foreign policy objectives which I have repeatedly endorsed, including my message on the balance of payments of February 6, 1961,² already substantially provide this assurance.

As I indicated in that message, "our foreign economic assistance programs are now being administered in such a way as to place primary emphasis on the procurement of American goods . . . This restriction will be maintained until reasonable over-all equilibrium has been achieved." Under this policy, which is continued in force by my determination below, the preponderant bulk of foreign assistance procurement will be made in the United States. The necessity for this is clear; such procurement will contribute generally towards resolving our balance of payments difficulties, and also helps stimulate industries in labor surplus areas.

On the other hand, cogent trade and foreign policy objectives and assistance program goals require limited amounts of procurement outside the United States. Some commodities needed in our assistance programs are not produced in the United States, or are not available in the quantities required at the time needed. Procurement from less developed countries, as provided below, advances their economic development, thereby contributing to the objectives of the assistance program and shortening their dependency on foreign assistance. Procurement of military materiel outside the United States is necessary, in some instances, to carry out projects important to our national security.

¹26 *Fed. Reg.* 10543.

²For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

Therefore, I hereby direct that funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for non-military programs not be used for procurement from the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Upon certification by the Secretary of State, however, that exclusion of procurement in these countries would seriously impede attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives and the objectives of the foreign assistance program, the Secretary of State may authorize specific exceptions which involve procurement in the excluded countries.

I also hereby direct that funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for military assistance programs not be used for procurement outside the United States except to procure items required for military assistance which are not produced in the United States, to make local purchases for administrative purposes, and to use local currency available for military assistance purposes. Upon certification by the Secretary of Defense, however, that exclusion of procurement outside the United States would seriously impede attainment of military assistance program objectives, the Secretary of Defense may authorize exceptions to these limitations.

In the event that changed domestic or foreign conditions warrant, the Secretary of State in the case of non-military assistance, and the Secretary of Defense in the case of military assistance, shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury, and other appropriate agencies, and recommend modification as may be appropriate in policies for procurement using funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In the event that procurement outside the United States under the above conditions seriously threatens to affect adversely the industrial mobilization base or the economy of an area of labor surplus, the Secretary of State in the case of non-military assistance and the Secretary of Defense in the case of military assistance, shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce and other appropriate agencies and recommend such action as may be appropriate.

For the reasons and under the conditions stated above, and pursuant to the requirements of Section 604(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (PL 87-195), I hereby determine that the use of funds made available under the Act for procurement from sources outside the United States will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the United States or the industrial mobilization base, with special reference to any areas of labor surplus or to the net position of the United States in its balance of payments with the rest of the world, which outweigh the economic and other advantages of less costly procurement outside the United States. Procurement outside the United States shall be from Free World sources, in any case. The effective date of this determination shall be September 30, 1961.

This determination shall be printed in the *Federal Register*.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

General Assembly Appoints U Thant Acting Secretary-General

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

Only last week we celebrated the 16th anniversary of the United Nations. It is fitting and reassuring that we should begin the 17th year by putting our house in order with the election of our distinguished colleague, U Thant, to the high office of Secretary-General.

There is much to be thankful for here today:

First of all, we may rejoice that there was available to us a diplomat of such character, ability, and experience that he could command the unanimous esteem and confidence of this world organization. That augurs well for the future.

The regard in which he is held has been earned by a lifetime of public service, both at home and abroad. We at the United Nations know at first hand the many contributions he has made to this institution. We have worked with him in his capacity as permanent representative of Burma. We know of his notable contribution to the work of the Congo Advisory Committee. We know of the great esteem in which he was held by the late Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld. And we are also aware of his stature as educator, scholar, and author.

Some of you may not know that almost 30 years ago, when our colleague was a young man of 23, he wrote a book about the League of Nations. Even then he understood this century's profound need for a world organization to help keep the peace. And this understanding has grown with the years.

I confess that I have sometimes been discouraged during the long weeks of discussion that preceded today's election. But, as we say, all is well that ends well. And this prolonged ordeal has ended brilliantly. Moreover, during these weeks we have often been impressed anew by Ambassador U Thant's independence of mind and spirit, his high intelligence, energy, and idealism, and that becoming modesty which is characteristic of his countrymen and coreligionists.

As I have said, Mr. President, we have much to be thankful for today, not only because of the individual who has just been appointed, but equally because of the propitious circumstances in which the General Assembly has appointed him.

The sole objective of the United States delegation, which has carried much of the burden of negotiation, has been to protect the integrity of the charter and the office of the Secretary-General. That has been the purpose of many others who want to see this Organization grow in strength and influence. And that has been accomplished.

There will be no veto in the Secretariat and no weakening of the office of the Secretary-General. The principles contained in articles 100 and 101 of the charter have been fully preserved. He will have the full powers and responsibilities of that office. He will appoint his own staff and consult them entirely as he alone decides, in a manner consistent with the charter.

May I say, in passing, that I think there is a valuable lesson in the events that led up to today's action. The path of quiet diplomacy often requires endless patience and perseverance, especially when it encounters seemingly unsurmountable obstacles. I am frank to say that there have

¹Made in plenary session on Nov. 3 (U.S. delegation press release 3826), following the appointment of U Thant of Burma as Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations. The vote, by secret ballot, was 103-0.

been some discouraging moments since Dag Hammarskjöld died. But there have been other such moments in the history of the United Nations. And they have been overcome. My own belief is that we should always act in the belief that, for those who are truly faithful in their ideals, the darkest hour is the time to light the brightest light.

Recently I saw a news item about a scientist who was on the brink of an important breakthrough. When he described his experiments to a gathering of fellow specialists, "a wave of *guarded enthusiasm* swept through the audience." Mr. President, in the light of everything I think we delegates might be permitted a wave of unguarded enthusiasm.

I am happy to report to you that the President of the United States is one of those who shares our hopes here today. I have just received a telegram from President Kennedy, which he has asked me to read to you. I am happy to do so. The President says:

The election of U Thant is a splendid achievement in which the whole world can rejoice.

Please express the congratulations of the United States Government to the United Nations membership for their action in electing so distinguished a diplomat to succeed the late Dag Hammarskjöld.

In preserving the integrity of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General, they have reaffirmed their dedication to the United Nations Charter.

To Ambassador U Thant, please express my personal congratulations, and assure him on behalf of the people of the United States that as he begins one of the world's most difficult jobs, he has our confidence and our prayers.²

In my own capacity as the American representative to the United Nations, I should like to add that all of us at the United States Mission feel we owe a great debt to those delegates who have worked so hard and patiently to solve the problems created by the death of Mr. Hammarskjöld.

And to my dear friend and colleague, U Thant, I would like to say just one more thing:

It is written in the Bible that "to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required." There is little doubt, sir, that enormous things will be required of you, and there is even less doubt that you will fulfill them. God bless you.

² President Kennedy's message (White House press release dated Nov. 3) concluded with the following sentence: "I also wish to thank you and your associates for the devoted and successful service you have given your country during these difficult weeks."

Outer Mongolia and Mauritania Admitted to United Nations

Following are two statements made in the Security Council on October 25 by Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Representative, during debate on the admission to U.N. membership of Outer Mongolia and Mauritania.

OUTER MONGOLIA

U.S./U.N. press release 3812

It would seem that the difficulties which we have faced in recent weeks on the questions before us are about to be solved. We have no objection to the procedures which you have proposed for today's meeting in order to facilitate agreement.

We are no less firm than heretofore in our opposition to linking the admission of any one applicant with that of another, a procedure which the International Court of Justice has held to be contrary to the charter. We believe this important principle must be affirmed and reaffirmed, and we think the great majority of the members of the United Nations agree. However, your suggestions for our procedure today are in conformity with this principle. We concur furthermore in your suggestion that, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, members of the Council should clearly state their views on both items before a vote is taken on either. I shall, therefore, proceed to do so.

The United States reaffirms its support for the admission of Mauritania to the United Nations. I shall speak further to this point later in our proceedings.

As to the other application before us, Ambassador Stevenson told the Security Council some time ago¹ that the United States will not obstruct the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. The reasons why we do so, despite the views we hold, are well known. The United States is aware that last April the General Assembly found Outer Mongolia qualified for membership. We are prepared to respect this view of the As-

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 654.

sembly and will do nothing either here or in the Assembly to oppose it. The United States, therefore, will abstain on the draft resolution recommending Outer Mongolia's admission.

MAURITANIA

U.S./U.N. press release 3814

The United States has maintained cordial relations with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania since November of last year, when Mauritania's independence was proclaimed. Last December the Security Council met for the purpose of recommending Mauritania for admission to the United Nations,² as it had done with so many other new African states which we welcomed into our midst last year. Unhappily, this proved impossible in the case of Mauritania. The United States shared the disappointment of the Government of Mauritania and of other African states. We rejoice, therefore, at the prospect of achieving today the end we sought a year ago.

The United States believes that Mauritania's application is justified in accordance with the criteria laid down in the charter and that Mauritania is entitled to membership. Today we have a new opportunity to send the General Assembly a favorable recommendation. We believe that this should be done forthwith.

The United States is confident that the people of Mauritania, as they take their place among us, will remain dedicated to the principles expressed in the charter and that their leaders will devote their energies untiringly to the cause of peace. The United States extends new greetings to Mauritania and welcomes the opportunity to vote in favor of the resolution before us sponsored by France and Liberia.³

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1960, p. 976.

³ The Security Council on Oct. 25 recommended the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic by a vote of 9-0, with 1 abstention (U.S.) (China did not participate in the vote) and of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania by a vote of 9-1 (U.A.R.), with 1 abstention (U.S.S.R.). On Oct. 27 the General Assembly admitted the Mongolian People's Republic by acclamation and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania by a vote of 68-13, with 20 abstentions.

Provisional Cotton Textile Committee Concludes First Meeting

Following is the text of a communique issued on October 28 by the Provisional Cotton Textile Committee, which met at Geneva October 23-27.

The Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles were drawn up at a meeting of countries substantially interested in the importation and exportation of cotton textile products which was held at Geneva in July 1961.¹ The short-term arrangement, designed to deal with immediate problems relating to cotton textiles, applies to the twelve-month period as from 1 October 1961 and is in force.

The long-term arrangement provides for the creation of a Cotton Textile Committee, to undertake work looking towards a long-term solution to the problems in the field of cotton textiles.

The Provisional Cotton Textile Committee² met at Geneva from 23 to 27 October and it reached the following conclusions in connection with the items which it had under consideration:

(1) *Objectives of the long-term arrangement on cotton textiles*

Following expressions of view on this question by some representatives, the Committee agreed that the objectives of a long-term arrangement are those set out in the arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles dated 21 July 1961 (Annex to press release GATT/601).

(2) *Measures for liberalization by countries restricting imports of cotton textiles*

The Committee noted that it was common to the proposals that had been put forward by several delegations that a liberalization formula should be written into a long-term arrangement. As regards the type of formula which might be adopted, the Committee noted that various methods had been suggested, varying from the concept of an automatic increase in the size of quotas to the concept of a share of imports related to consumption

¹ For text of the agreement and background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 336; Sept. 25, 1961, p. 528; and Nov. 6, 1961, pp. 773 and 776.

² The Committee is "provisional" pending confirmation by the Contracting Parties.

or domestic production in the importing countries. It was recognized that those suggestions would need consideration at the technical level on the basis of an examination of all the relevant facts, including the situation of countries which, while maintaining some import restrictions on cotton textiles, were already affording to exporting countries a comparatively high share of the total supply on their markets. It was agreed that the short-term measures envisaged should aim at achieving the same, or nearly the same, degree of liberalization in all importing countries, so as to establish a more internationally homogeneous base for further long-term increase in access to the various markets. With respect to measures of liberalization regarding re-exports, the Committee agreed that this question should also be further considered by the technical sub-committee (see below).

(3) *Provisions relating to action to be taken in order to avoid market disruption in the countries which are not maintaining import restrictions, and provisions relating to the administration of such measures*

It was agreed that the measures envisaged in the proposals which had been put forward would only be invoked in cases of market disruption. It was suggested that the safeguards in connection with market disruption should also be available to a country which, while it maintained import restrictions on cotton textiles, nevertheless had achieved a high degree of liberalization and the Committee agreed that the technical sub-committee should consider this matter further. It was also agreed that the question of whether a long-term arrangement should provide for specific categories of cotton textiles and, if so, how many, should be examined by the technical sub-committee; this question was of particular importance. An alternative to the system of categories should, however, not be excluded from consideration. The Committee recognized that it was desirable not only to avoid disruption in the domestic markets of importing countries, but also to avoid disruption in the production and marketing of exporting countries.

The Committee agreed that the provisions in the long-term arrangement under this heading should have regard to the agreed objective of giving

increased access to the exports of developing countries. One suggestion was that there should be a formula based on growth of consumption in the importing countries. The view was also expressed, however, that other criteria might provide a more effective means of achieving the agreed objective. Accordingly it was agreed that alternatives should be considered. It was agreed that various formulae should be examined by the technical sub-committee. In this connection it was recognized that the special situation of countries which were already affording to exporting countries a comparatively high share of the total supply on their markets would need to be taken into account.

(4) *Bilateral arrangements*

The Committee noted that, as in the short-term arrangement, nothing in the long-term arrangement would prevent the negotiation of bilateral arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the objectives of the long-term arrangement.

(5) *Provisions to prevent circumvention by:*

- (a) *non-participating countries*
- (b) *trans-shipment*
- (c) *substitution of directly competitive textiles*

The Committee agreed that the technical sub-committee should consider these questions and noted that, in the view of some members, the provisions contained in the short-term arrangement might not be suitable, in their present form, for a long-term arrangement.

(6) *Functions of the Cotton Textile Committee*

The Committee noted that all the proposals that had been put forward contained statements relating to the need for the surveillance of the application of the arrangements by the Cotton Textile Committee.

(7) *Duration of the arrangement*

The Committee noted that periods varying from three to five years had been suggested for the duration of a long-term arrangement which would replace the short-term arrangement. It was agreed that this question could only be considered after a detailed examination had been made of the proposed content of such an arrangement.

As a result of its discussions the Textile Committee reaffirmed its reference in the short-term arrangement to the desirability of undertaking work looking towards a long-term arrangement, and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to undertake a detailed examination of the elements which would be contained in such an arrangement.

The Committee decided to establish a *technical sub-committee* which would proceed further with the examination of the points considered by the Committee. The technical sub-committee will meet on 11 December and will report to the Committee at its next meeting, on 29 January 1962. It would make recommendations concerning the form and substance of a long-term arrangement. The technical sub-committee would proceed on the basis of the proposals made by delegations and of the discussion in the Committee, on the understanding that, if as a result of its examination it came to the conclusion that a different form of long-term arrangement was technically preferable, it should report accordingly and submit appropriate recommendations to the Committee.

The Textile Committee also decided to set up a *statistical sub-committee* which will meet on 1 November. It will make the necessary arrangements for the provision of suitable statistics to assist the technical sub-committee in the examination of the questions referred to it.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

11th Session of FAO Conference

The Department of State announced on November 4 (press release 767) the composition of the U.S. delegation to the 11th session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which convened at Rome on November 4.

Delegate

John P. Duncan, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Alternate

Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Associates

Robert C. Tetro, Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Ralph W. Phillips, Director, International Organizations Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Rulon Gibb, Treasurer, Commodity Credit Corporation, Department of Agriculture

H. Gardner Ainsworth, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, Rome

Congressional Advisers

Senator Vance Hartke, Indiana

Representative D. R. Matthews, Florida

Representative Ralph Harvey, Indiana

Advisers

Charles Butler, Chief, Division of Industrial Research, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Wilbert M. Chapman, Director, The Resources Committee, San Diego, Calif.

Faith Clark, Director, Household Economics Research Division, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture

Henry Clepper, Executive Secretary, Society of American Foresters, Washington, D.C.

Warren E. Collins, Assistant Director, Commodity Division, American Farm Bureau Federation, Chicago, Ill.

Ursula H. Duffus, Second Secretary and Economic Officer, American Embassy, Rome

Harold H. Gordon, President, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Richmond, Va.

Kenneth A. Haines, Assistant Director, Foreign Research and Technical Programs Division, Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture

Roy L. Hawes, The National Grange, South Sudbury, Mass.

Carl F. Heisig, Director, Farm Economics Division, Economics Research Service, Department of Agriculture

Charles E. Jackson, General Manager, National Fisheries Institute, Washington, D.C.

Reuben L. Johnson, Jr., Associate Director, National Farmers Union, Washington, D.C.

Richard E. McArdle, Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

John H. Moore, Office of International Administration, Department of State

Thomas C. Robinson, Commodities Division, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Sidney Shapiro, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Department of the Interior

Walter W. Sohl, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

James Symington, Deputy Director, Food for Peace, White House Executive Office

R. Lyle Webster, Director, Office of Information, Department of Agriculture

Clayton E. Whipple, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Rome

Robert K. Winters, International Organizations Affairs in Forestry, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture

Max L. Witcher, *technical secretary*, International Organizations Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Secretary of Delegation

Merrill M. Blevins, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

The Conference is the chief legislative body of the FAO and normally meets biennially. The chief aims of the Organization, as expressed through the Conference, are to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, secure improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products, and better the condition of rural populations. Its membership consists of 82 nations.

Colombo Plan Ministerial Session

The Department of State announced on November 3 (press release 764) that Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State, will serve as U.S. representative to the ministerial session of the 13th meeting of the Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan), which will be held at Kuala Lumpur November 13-18. The ministerial session is a meeting of top-level policy officials held annually following a 2-week preparatory meeting at the officials level. The attendance of the Under Secretary at the ministerial session reflects the great importance which the United States attaches to the Colombo Plan.

Charles F. Baldwin, U.S. Ambassador to Malaya, and Emerson A. Ross, Special Assistant, Office of International Financial Affairs, Department of State, will serve as alternate U.S. representatives. Senior advisers to the delegation are C. Tyler Wood, Minister and Director, Agency for International Development, New Delhi, and John Bullitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs.

Cabinet ministers representing Commonwealth countries met at Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950 to discuss the problem of economic development in south and southeast Asia. The Consultative Committee, which was formed as a result of those discussions, met in May 1950 and decided to invite countries outside the Commonwealth to participate in the activities of the Committee. The United States became a member of the Committee in 1951 and since that time has participated in the annual meetings. Other members of the Committee are: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom (together with North Borneo and Sarawak), and Viet-Nam.

Current U. N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Cable, letter, note verbale, and reports on the Congo. S/4940/Add. 7, September 20, 1961, 3 pp.; S/4940/Add. 8, September 22, 1961, 1 p.; S/4940/Add. 10, October 6, 1961, 4 pp.; S/4940/Add. 11, October 23, 1961, 10 pp.; S/4966, October 23, 1961, 1 p.

General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Material assistance program for 1962. A/AC.96/132. September 7, 1961. 37 pp.

Letter dated September 20 from the U.S. representative addressed to the President of the General Assembly concerning disarmament. A/4880. September 20, 1961. 13 pp.

Annual progress report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for 1961. A/4881. September 21, 1961. 3 pp.

Letter dated September 22 from the Italian representative concerning the Province of Bolzano (Bozen). A/4884. September 22, 1961. 4 pp.

Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. A/4886. September 23, 1961. 3 pp.

Letter dated September 22 from the Soviet representative addressed to the President of the General Assembly concerning disarmament. A/4887. September 25, 1961. 52 pp.

Agenda of the 16th regular session of the General Assembly. A/4890. September 25, 1961. 7 pp.

Letter dated September 25 from the U.S. representative addressed to the President of the General Assembly transmitting a U.S. proposal for disarmament. A/4891. September 25, 1961. 10 pp.

Letter dated September 26 from the Soviet Foreign Minister addressed to the President of the General Assembly transmitting a memorandum of Soviet measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among states, and contribute to general and complete disarmament. A/4892. September 27, 1961. 10 pp.

Letter dated September 26 from the Soviet Foreign Minister concerning granting independence to colonial peoples. A/4889. September 27, 1961. 18 pp.

Part one of the 11th report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the 16th session of the General Assembly. A/4902. September 28, 1961. 8 pp.

Letter dated September 26 from the Soviet Foreign Minister to the President of the General Assembly concerning nuclear weapons tests. A/4893. September 29, 1961. 11 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Africa. Possibilities of standardizing road motor vehicle legislation in West Africa. E/CN.14/115. June 1961. 63 pp.

Social Commission. Planning for balanced social and economic development in the Netherlands with particular reference to the postwar years. E/CN.5/346/Add. 6. September 27, 1961. 59 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on international economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. E/3556. October 4, 1961. 45 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature at Washington December 1, 1958.¹
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, November 3, 1961.

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Enters into force when accepted by two-thirds of the members in accordance with their constitutional processes.
Acceptance deposited: Finland, October 30, 1961.

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Extension to: Trinidad and Tobago, September 15, 1961.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.
Admission to membership: Mauritania and Mongolian People's Republic, October 27, 1961; Sierra Leone, September 27, 1961.

BILATERAL

Ecuador

Agreement amending the agreement of October 31, 1956 (TIAS 3808), for financing educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito May 9, 1961. Entered into force May 9, 1961.

Iceland

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Washington November 6, 1961. Entered into force November 6, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

Japan

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contributions for U.S. administrative and related expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1961 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo October 31, 1961. Entered into force October 31, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on October 27 appointed Armin H. Meyer to be Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 6-12

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to November 6 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 726 of October 20, 735 of October 26, 742 and 744 of October 27, 748 and 750 of October 30, 751 and 752 of October 31, 764 of November 3, and 767 and 768 of November 4.

No.	Date	Subject
*769	11/6	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*770	11/6	Cooperative leaders tour South America.
771	11/7	U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs communique.
*772	11/8	Gaud sworn in as AID regional administrator (biographic details).
†773	11/9	Delegations to GATT ministerial meeting and 19th session (rewrite).
*774	11/9	Mrs. Grasso appointed to Board of Foreign Scholarships.
*775	11/9	Coffin: "Opportunities for North American Economic Statesmanship."
*776	11/9	Lawless appointed AID mission director (biographic details).
*777	11/9	Visit of Gen. Chung Hee Park of Korea.
†778	11/9	Williams: University of Michigan.
†781	11/11	Coombs: Land-Grant Colleges.
*803	11/11	Educational consortium aids Indian technological institute.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

THE THREAT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

the
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of
State

The Communist bloc since 1954 has extended credits and grants to the less developed countries amounting to about \$5.2 billion by June 1961. In the last half of 1960 nearly 7,900 (and probably more in 1961) bloc technicians were occupied in 23 less developed countries on various assignments lasting a month or longer. Bloc trade with these countries has grown from a level of \$860 million in 1954 to about \$2.7 billion in 1960, an increase of more than 210 percent. Arms assistance has played a key role in the Communist economic offensive in the less developed areas. In particular, it has offered a means for increasing tension in already tense situations.

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
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Bulletin



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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December 4, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Diplomacy and Defense: A Test of National Maturity

*Address by President Kennedy*¹

President [Charles E.] Odegaard, members of the Regents, members of the faculty, students, and ladies and gentlemen:

It is a great honor on behalf of the people of the United States to extend to you congratulations on the centennial anniversary of this university, which represents 100 years of service to this State and country.

This nation in two of the most critical times in the life of our country, once in the days after the Revolution and in the Northwest Ordinance to which Dr. Odegaard referred, and again during the most difficult days of the Civil War in the Morrill Act, which established our land-grant colleges—this nation made a basic commitment to the maintenance of education for the very reasons which Thomas Jefferson gave, that if this nation were to remain free it could not remain ignorant. The basis of self-government and freedom requires the development of character and self-restraint and perseverance and the long view. And these are qualities which require many years of training and education. So that I think this university and others like it across the country, and its graduates, have recognized that these schools are not maintained by the people of the various States in order to merely give the graduates of these schools an economic advantage in the life struggle. Rather, these schools are supported by our people because our people realize that this country has needed in the past, and needs today as never before, educated men and women who are committed to the cause of freedom. So for what this university has done in the past, and

what its graduates can do now and in the future, I salute you.

This university was founded when the Civil War was already on, and no one could be sure in 1861 whether this country would survive. But the picture which the student of 1961 has of the world, and indeed the picture which our citizens have of the world, is infinitely more complicated and infinitely more dangerous.

In 1961 the world relations of this country have become tangled and complex. One of our former allies has become our adversary—and he has his own adversaries who are not our allies. Heroes are removed from their tombs, history rewritten, the names of cities changed overnight.

We increase our arms at a heavy cost, primarily to make certain that we will not have to use them. We must face up to the chance of war if we are to maintain the peace. We must work with certain countries lacking in freedom in order to strengthen the cause of freedom. We find some who call themselves neutrals who are our friends and sympathetic to us, and others who call themselves neutral who are unremittingly hostile to us. And as the most powerful defender of freedom on earth, we find ourselves unable to escape the responsibilities of freedom and yet unable to exercise it without restraints imposed by the very freedoms we seek to protect. We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs, and crises.

We cannot, under the scrutiny of a free press and public, tell different stories to different audiences, foreign, domestic, friendly, and hostile.

We cannot abandon the slow processes of consulting with our allies to match the swift ex-

¹Made at the University of Washington at Seattle, Wash., on Nov. 16 (White House press release, as-delivered text).

pediencies of those who merely dictate to their satellites. We can neither abandon nor control the international organization in which we now cast less than 1 percent of the vote in the General Assembly. We possess weapons of tremendous power, but they are least effective in combating the weapons most often used by freedom's foes: subversion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, and civil disorder. We send arms to other peoples—just as we can send them the ideals of democracy in which we believe—but we cannot send them the will to use those arms or to abide by those ideals.

And while we believe not only in the force of arms but in the force of right and reason, we have learned that reason does not always appeal to unreasonable men, that it is not always true that "a soft answer turneth away wrath," and that right does not always make might.

In short we must face problems which do not lend themselves to easy or quick or permanent solutions. And we must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient, that we are only 6 percent of the world's population, that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

II

These burdens and frustrations are accepted by most Americans with maturity and understanding. They may long for the days when war meant charging up San Juan Hill, or when our isolation was guarded by two oceans, or when the atomic bomb was ours alone, or when much of the industrialized world depended upon our resources and our aid. But they now know that those days are gone and that gone with them are the old policies and the old complacencies. And they know, too, that we must make the best of our new problems and our new opportunities, whatever the risk and the cost.

But there are others who cannot bear the burden of a long twilight struggle. They lack confidence in our longrun capacity to survive and succeed. Hating communism, yet they see communism in the long run, perhaps, as the wave of the future. And they want some quick and easy and final and cheap solution—now.

There are two groups of these frustrated citizens, far apart in their views yet very much alike in their approach. On the one hand are those who urge upon us what I regard to be the pathway of surrender—appeasing our enemies, compromising our commitments, purchasing peace at any price, disavowing our arms, our friends, our obligations. If their view had prevailed the world of free choice would be smaller today.

On the other hand are those who urge upon us what I regard to be the pathway of war: equating negotiations with appeasement and substituting rigidity for firmness. If their view had prevailed we would be at war today, and in more than one place.

It is a curious fact that each of these extreme opposites resembles the other. Each believes that we have only two choices: appeasement or war, suicide or surrender, humiliation or holocaust, to be either Red or dead. Each side sees only "hard" and "soft" nations, hard and soft policies, hard and soft men. Each believes that any departure from its own course inevitably leads to the other: one group believes that any peaceful solution means appeasement; the other believes that any arms buildup means war. One group regards everyone else as warmongers; the other regards everyone else as appeasers. Neither side admits its path will lead to disaster, but neither can tell us how or where to draw the line once we descend the slippery slopes of appeasement or constant intervention.

In short, while both extremes profess to be the true realists of our time, neither could be more unrealistic. While both claim to be doing the Nation a service, they could do it no greater disservice. For this kind of talk and easy solution to difficult problems, if believed, could inspire a lack of confidence among our people when they must all—above all else—be united in recognizing the long and difficult days that lie ahead. It could inspire uncertainty among our allies when above all else they must be confident in us. And even more dangerously, it could, if believed, inspire doubt among our adversaries when they must above all be convinced that we will defend our vital interests.

The essential fact that both of these groups fail to grasp is that diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would

fail. A willingness to resist force, unaccompanied by a willingness to talk, could provoke belligerence—while a willingness to talk, unaccompanied by a willingness to resist force, could invite disaster.

III

But as long as we know what comprises our vital interests and our long-range goals, we have nothing to fear from negotiations at the appropriate time and nothing to gain by refusing to play a part in them. At a time when a single clash could escalate overnight into a holocaust of mushroom clouds, a great power does not prove its firmness by leaving the task of exploring the other's intentions to sentries or those without full responsibility. Nor can ultimate weapons rightfully be employed, or the ultimate sacrifice rightfully demanded of our citizens, until every reasonable solution has been explored. "How many wars," Winston Churchill has written, "have been averted by patience and persisting good will! . . . How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands!"

If vital interests under duress can be preserved by peaceful means, negotiations will find that out. If our adversary will accept nothing less than a concession of our rights, negotiations will find that out. And if negotiations are to take place, this nation cannot abdicate to its adversaries the task of choosing the forum and the framework and the time.

For there are carefully defined limits within which any serious negotiations must take place. With respect to any future talks on Germany and Berlin, for example, we cannot, on the one hand, confine our proposals to a list of concessions we are willing to make, nor can we, on the other hand, advance any proposals which compromise the security of free Germans and West Berliners or endanger their ties with the West.

No one should be under the illusion that negotiations for the sake of negotiations always advance the cause of peace. If for lack of preparation they break up in bitterness, the prospects of peace have been endangered. If they are made a forum for propaganda or a cover for aggression, the processes of peace have been abused.

But it is a test of our national maturity to accept the fact that negotiations are not a contest

spelling victory or defeat. They may succeed; they may fail. They are likely to be successful only if both sides reach an agreement which both regard as preferable to the *status quo*—an agreement in which each side can consider its own situation can be improved. And this is most difficult to obtain.

IV

But, while we shall negotiate freely, we shall not negotiate freedom. Our answer to the classic question of Patrick Henry is still "No." Life is not so dear and peace is not so precious ". . . as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery." And that is our answer even though, for the first time since the ancient battles between Greek city-states, war entails the threat of total annihilation, of everything we know, of society itself. For to save mankind's future freedom we must face up to any risk that is necessary. We will always seek peace—but we will never surrender.

In short, we are neither "warmongers" nor "appeasers," neither "hard" nor "soft." We are Americans, determined to defend the frontiers of freedom by an honorable peace if peace is possible, but by arms if arms are used against us.

And if we are to move forward in that spirit, we shall need all the calm and thoughtful citizens that this great university can produce, all the light they can shed, all the wisdom they can bring to bear. It is customary, both here and around the world, to regard life in the United States as easy. Our advantages are many. But more than any other people on earth, we bear burdens and accept risks unprecedented in their size and their duration, not for ourselves alone but for all who wish to be free. No other generation of free men in any country has ever faced so many and such difficult challenges—not even those who lived in the days when this university was founded in 1861.

This nation was then torn by war. This territory had only the simplest elements of civilization. And this city had barely begun to function. But a university was one of their earliest thoughts, and they summed it up in the motto that they adopted: "Let there be light." What more can be said today regarding all the dark and tangled problems we face than: Let there be light. And to accomplish that illumination the University of Washington shall still hold high the torch.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of November 17

Press release 797 dated November 18

Secretary Rusk: Before we start, I understand that you have been discussing among yourselves the problem of getting a transcript more rapidly. I will go from here to the little room where the transcript is being prepared in order to spend a few minutes to see whether there is anything that needs to be changed. I think we might speed it up considerably that way. Normally, I would not expect that there would be any changes to be made, but with the several audiences listening in, as President Kennedy remarked yesterday, there may be occasion when I would want to change a phrase or a word or do something.

These are days when Americans all across the country are thinking about Speaker Sam Rayburn, and on this each will have his own thoughts. Sam Rayburn was born at a time when the American people were just beginning to recover from the wounds of a bitter Civil War. It was a time when there were only 50 million of us, instead of 180 million, when our national income was only a fraction of what it is today, when there were large sections of our country which had not been touched by the miracles of science and technology which we have come to take for granted. Sam Rayburn's life spans the great growth of this nation, the transformation of its life, its emergence as a great world power, with heavy responsibilities and promising opportunities. I think all of us who ever had anything to do with Sam Rayburn appreciate that, as he lived through the period when this nation became great, he became great along with it, and partly because he contributed so much to making this nation great. Whether as junior officers in Government or as senior officials, all of us who had occasion to go down to see him and talk over things with him never found him to deal with large problems in small ways. And he left an indelible imprint on

all of us who had any association with him at all. I know all of us here in Washington who will be attending the memorial service will have our minds with members of his family and his friends and neighbors in Bonham, Texas, next Saturday.

I would strongly commend to all of you a careful reading of the President's speech in Seattle yesterday.¹ In a real sense it is an introduction to every press conference dealing with foreign affairs. In particular one paragraph introduces some of my remarks today:

In short we must face problems which do not lend themselves to easy or quick or permanent solutions. And we must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient, . . . that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

Problems and Expectations

We have, as you know, on our docket these days a considerable number of problems which are complex and difficult. In some of them, such as Berlin, we play a central and major role and can influence the course of events with powerful effect. On others which are remote and where our role is much less important, such as in the difficulties now existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan, our role is that of friendly counselor and adviser. In other issues which are before international bodies of which we are members, such as the United Nations or in the Organization of American States, we can take an active and influential role, but in consultation and collaboration with others.

Behind the problems, the urgent problems and troublesome problems, are always fortunately some encouraging and steady advances. For ex-

¹ See p. 915.

ample, we have been very much impressed in these recent weeks with the prospects, the attitudes, the plans, and the determinations being shown by the present Government of the Republic of Korea.

As you know, Chairman Park has just been here with us for several days' visit, and we have had a chance to talk with him in great detail about the hopes and aspirations which he and his government have for that country.² We believe that Korea is on the move in a sense in which it has not been on the move since the end of World War II, and although they are still in some respects in their revolutionary period, we believe that Chairman Park, against the background of a fine military record, has the capacity of a great civilian as well. And we send them back with our best wishes and our assurance of any help which we can give to let them move on in their program to develop the economic, social, and political life of their people.

I think we have all been greatly impressed and encouraged in the last few days to see the evidences of the strength and the vitality of democratic institutions in the Philippines. Although there were some incidents during the campaign, the elections were held with the order and dignity and good sense of a stabilized, democratic system, and we have high hopes that that augurs well for the future in that great republic.

I believe that the ministerial meeting of the OECD has attracted some newspaper attention. But that, again, is one of those quieter kinds of efforts which are very important for the future of us all. The discussion of the prospective efforts to increase the rate of growth of the Western community and the relation which this has to the combined growth and liberalization of the Western trading world are matters of great satisfaction.

Now, in some of our trouble spots I might comment briefly to indicate relationships in certain ones of them.

Berlin

On the question of Berlin, we shall now be taking up again, intensively, consultation among the several governments who are directly and vitally involved in that question. I know you are aware of the forthcoming visit of Chancellor Adenauer. He will be bringing with him a dis-

² See p. 928.

Four Western Foreign Ministers To Meet at Paris

*Department Statement*¹

It has been agreed to take advantage of meetings at which the four Foreign Ministers will be present to enable them to get together on problems of common interest. While the exact dates have not been fixed, we expect that such a gathering will be arranged on the occasion of the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris next month.

¹ Read to news correspondents by a Department press officer on Nov. 15.

tinguished party of colleagues, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, and they shall be here for some very intensive talks. I gather from some of the tickers today that there is already speculation about the gaps between their point of view and ours. But I should suppose that before Chancellor Adenauer actually arrives that speculation about gaps is a little premature. We are unified on our basic purposes.

The purpose of the visit is to talk detail as well as broad policy, and we have every reason to believe that this visit will contribute greatly to a common position and common understanding, not only between our two Governments but within the Western community.

We believe that the consultations which will be going on between now and the middle of December will be extremely productive from that point of view.

Western Foreign Ministers Meeting

Reference has been made to the possible meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers, so called, in connection with the NATO conference. As a matter of fact some months ago in an effort to simplify some of our procedures, we did agree that we would take advantage of any stated international meetings, such as the United Nations or NATO, in order that the three of us or the four of us, or any other combinations that had common problems to talk about, could get together on those occasions—a part of the general effort to make maximum use of such travel as we en-

gaged in and perhaps, although this may be sometimes a forlorn hope, to cut down on the amount of travel which otherwise might be involved.

The Congo

In the Congo we are faced with a critical situation. We have been horrified, distressed, and shocked by the brutal murder of the 13 Italian airmen. This latest atrocity is only one of many which have marked the problem in the Congo. We believe that we, and all who can and will support the United Nations in its efforts to work out a solution to that problem, should now put themselves to special effort to do so. We ourselves believe that the time has come when all those governments who are trying to reach a decent settlement of that problem in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the Congolese people and in accordance with the balanced good judgment of the world community should now make their voices heard more insistently, and that those voices which represent those who are trying to undermine or frustrate the United Nations effort there and the goal of a united Congo should be put to one side.

There are contending elements, as you know, in the Congo. The Congo did not become independent and responsible for its own affairs against a background of settled national institutions, ready to move in and accept immediate responsibility. Their armed forces were left without leadership and undisciplined and untrained to a considerable extent. Secessionist drives in Katanga as well as in Stanleyville have greatly complicated the task of forming a central government, a national government, in that country. We believe that the time has come for the United Nations and those who can support the policy of the United Nations to speed up their effort, to act with more and more determination, and to get the leadership of the Congo to sit down and work out their problems on a basis of national concern and the real interest in the welfare of their peoples and bring this situation of anarchy and terror and destruction to an end.

Organization of American States

In the OAS there are two questions immediately in front of us. One has to do with the Dominican Republic.³ The question before the OAS is

³ See p. 929.

whether there could be now a partial lifting of the so-called sanctions against the Dominican Republic. This possibility is directly related to events in the Dominican Republic itself. Those turn on events which may change on an hour-to-hour basis.

On the one side we have been encouraged by the tendencies in the Dominican Republic to move toward a more moderate and constitutional government, embracing broader elements of the population in political and constitutional affairs and moving toward the kind of government which the Dominican people themselves could respect and which would win the esteem of the international community of states. Just as there has been some confusion in the last few hours as to exactly what is happening in the Dominican Republic, I would not anticipate that the Organization of American States would feel itself in a position to act immediately upon the suggestions which our representative made this week on that subject.

With respect to Cuba, Peru and Colombia have taken important initiatives in the Organization of American States looking toward the expression in some suitable way and with suitable action on two aspects of the Cuban problem, one emphasizing the problem of human rights and situation of the Cuban people themselves and the other emphasizing the impact of such a situation upon the general position of the hemisphere.

We believe that both of these initiatives ought to be supported and encouraged, and we are looking toward the OAS to come forward with a serious and responsible consideration of this very important problem.

Viet-Nam

Insofar as Viet-Nam, one of our other principal points of concern involved, I should like to just make a few comments on that. The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in north Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations.

The accelerated assault in carrying out the orders of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam to "liberate" the south—overthrow the Gov-

ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam—is of particular concern to the United States. As President Kennedy assured President Diem last October 24th,⁴ the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence, protect its people against the Communist assassins, and build a better growth.

In that same letter the President noted that we would be consulting with the Vietnamese Government about what additional measures we might take to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the Communist aggressors. These consultations to coordinate our activities with those of the Vietnamese Government, to find the most effective means of sustaining the social and economic progress of the people of Viet-Nam and of protecting their liberty, are now under way in Saigon.

In the meantime there has been an acceleration of deliveries under our mutual defense assistance program. It can be expected that in order to help the Government of Viet-Nam meet increased Communist attacks some changes in the type of equipment delivered and in the nature of our training under the military advisory and training program will be required. Perhaps you would appreciate that there are reasons why I cannot go into detail about some of these matters at this time.

Now, I shall try to answer your questions.

Communist Expansion in Indochina

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Viet-Nam and the acceleration and the possible changes in our aid there, and so forth, are we asking or receiving any assurances from President Diem as to the steps that he is willing to take to make the effort against the Communists there more efficient?

A. These are questions which are being discussed with him at the present time, and, of course, in a nation of 14 million people, with a substantial army and military establishment there, there is a major job to be done by the people and the Government of the country concerned. But the precise relationship between their effort and our effort is now being discussed with them, and I would not—indeed I do not—have at the moment reports on those discussions.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1961, p. S10.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what can be done about the increasing use of Laos as a Communist base in violation of the Soviet pledges that this would be made a neutral area?

A. This is one of the subjects which have been discussed at Geneva, and certainly if there is to be any substance whatever in the notion of a neutral and independent Laos, then any arrangements for Laos must insure that Laos not itself be used as a route of penetration and infiltration and subversion against south Viet-Nam. This is, in fact, only one of three of the principal routes for the supply of agents, cadres, and arms from the north into south Viet-Nam. The other is across the 17th parallel. Part of it is in difficult and mountainous country where that kind of traffic can occur and can be dealt with only with the most strenuous measures. The third route is by sea. As you know, there are very large numbers of coastal junks and small vessels plying along there, and we have very specific information that some of this traffic has been utilized for the kind of penetration to which we are now objecting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when Prime Minister Nehru was here,⁵ he said that the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam had been ineffective because of the impediments placed in its way by the south Vietnamese Government. We had been under the impression that it was ineffective because of the impediments placed in its way by the north Vietnamese government. That has been repeated 2 days ago in statements from New Delhi. Can you straighten us out, please?

A. During a period when people in south Viet-Nam found themselves under pressure and did not feel that they were getting adequate assistance from the ICC, irritations did develop, and I think that it would be only fair to say that the ICC has not had, in some problems of detailed arrangements, facilities, and support, all the cooperation which it needs, and that situation has now been, I think, largely rectified. But the first task, as we see it, of the ICC is to take up in the most serious terms the letter which was recently filed with the ICC by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam charging large-scale infiltration and subversion by illegal intrusion from the north. These intrusions are not something

⁵ See p. 926.

that are done just secretly. They are a part of the proclaimed policy of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam. They have spoken about them openly and quite publicly for several months. We believe that these charges are sound, that they are well supported in fact, and that they deserve the immediate and full investigation and report to the world by the ICC.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that what is being done in Viet-Nam is in our view a threat to the peace. Is what we are doing to aid the Government of south Viet-Nam being done within the limitations, and will it continue to be, if so, of the Geneva Accords, or are we moving toward denouncing those accords as a breach of the peace under the terms of General Walter Bedell Smith's statement at the time of the 1954 agreements?**

A. Well, at this stage, the primary question about the Geneva Accords is not how those accords relate to, say, our military assistance program to south Viet-Nam. They relate to the specific, persistent, substantial, and openly proclaimed violations of those accords by the north Vietnamese.

Now the status of those accords will be determined more by the attitude of the north, which has been, is, and so far as we know continues to be ready to disregard them in their own attacks against the south Vietnamese. The first question is, what does the north do about those accords?

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the complaints laid before the ICC, I think more than 700 specific charges and letters and complaints have been laid before the ICC by south Viet-Nam over the years. During the conversations here with the Prime Minister of India, did we get any kind of assurances that, now that south Viet-Nam apparently is willing to cooperate with the ICC, it will in fact act vigorously to put the Commission into operation there?

A. I would not wish to attribute this specifically to a conversation with Prime Minister Nehru, but we have indications that the ICC does expect to take up these questions, and I believe a new chairman has been appointed. I think there is some real prospect that they will go vigorously into these questions that have been raised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have referred to this situation in south Viet-Nam as a threat to the

peace. What are the prospects of taking this to the United Nations?

A. I think there is a possibility that this question will come to the United Nations at some stage. I think at the present time we believe that the consultations with other governments in which we are now engaged and our consultations with the Government of south Viet-Nam would be the most immediate steps to be taken up.

Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President's speech, which you just commended to us, contains a curious and what I take to be pointed sentence, and it reads as follows: "At a time when a single clash could escalate overnight into a holocaust of mushroom clouds, a great power does not prove its firmness by leaving the task of exploring the other's intentions to sentries or those without full responsibility." Can we take this as a statement of dissatisfaction with the Checkpoint Charlie events and disapproval with our people on the spot?

A. No, I think this was not that. I think it was a reference to the fact that the governments that are directly involved in this question of Berlin do understand—and this includes governments on both sides—do understand the potential seriousness of this matter.

I personally, as I have indicated to you before, do not believe that we are in a serious danger of what might be called a mischance or accident here in this situation. The governments are very much involved with it, but nevertheless the governments have to be in communication with each other about these matters. It is not something that can be left to work out along the lines of chance happenings with a gap in communication among the governments concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Chancellor Adenauer said yesterday—was quoted as saying in substance—that he believed it is necessary to have some immediate NATO nuclear power available in Europe. Can you give us the United States' present position on this subject?

A. Well, let me say that we have not had any official communication from the German Government with respect to these statements that were made and reported in the last day or so. There-

* For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

fore I am a little reluctant to seem to be speaking specifically to any words attributed to Chancellor Adenauer. But there has been discussion for some time about a NATO nuclear force. You will recall that in Ottawa the President called attention to this problem.⁷ He indicated that we would commit to the NATO command certain Polaris atomic missile submarines, subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use, and we have discussed in other ways the possibilities of a NATO nuclear deterrent.

This is a problem of quite literally the utmost complexity. You have heard me use that word "complexity" many times, and you will hear me use it many times more. I would hate to dilute the effect of that word. But this is one that is really complex because the political and military management of a nuclear force in the hands of 15 or 16 nations, itself, is a political and a military problem of the highest order of difficulty. These are matters which we hope that our European friends will discuss among themselves. We would like to know what they, themselves, think would be suitable arrangements. These are matters that go to the very life and death of nations. They go to the very heart of the responsibilities of governments for the fate of their own peoples. So it isn't easy to strike off arrangements of this sort under some sort of a pattern of charts and notions of public administration. We are interested in a NATO nuclear deterrent. At the present time the United States basically provides the nuclear support for NATO. We would be interested in their views as to the guidelines which should guide us in the exercise of that onerous responsibility. We would be much interested in their views as to how NATO itself—quite apart from the special position of the United States—how NATO itself would see the organization of such a deterrent force. This is not something which we can, ourselves, impose upon others. This is something that has to be a matter of deep consultation and thought among all of those involved.

Q. But the offer still stands?

A. The offer of Ottawa still stands, of course.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you on another point that the Chancellor is reported to have addressed himself to yesterday, the question of the

wall along the border of East Berlin. As far as the United States is concerned, do you believe that the East Berlin wall must be removed as a condition of any Western-Soviet agreement on Berlin?

A. Well, I wouldn't want to discuss the wall in those terms because, again, I have not had the benefit of any official views from the German Government or the context in which such remarks might have been made. But the wall certainly ought not to be a permanent feature of the European landscape. I see no reason why the Soviet Union should think that it is to their advantage in any way to leave there that monument to Communist failure in East Berlin and East Germany, that prison wall, to demonstrate for all to see that they are having to keep people in behind walls and barbed wire at a time when it was perfectly obvious to them that the purpose of the wall could not be to keep somebody else out.

It is our hope that regardless of the way in which these questions of timing might come up—and I am not now getting into that at all one way or the other—the city of Berlin and the families that have been separated by that wall can find their way back and forth without that most extraordinary and repulsive feature to the German landscape.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a recent spate of speculative stories from Moscow about the possibility of the Soviets' producing or putting forward new proposals, or purporting to say that. Has anything happened that would lead you to revise your estimate of the possibility of negotiations with the Russians now on Berlin?

A. No, I think the question as to whether the Soviets put forward new proposals in recent weeks has been thoroughly clarified. I have had no indication whatever that the Russians have put forward any new proposals.

U.S. Economic Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your Department's views on the recently made report⁸ to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee

⁸ *A New Look at Trade Policy Toward the Communist Bloc: The Elements of a Common Strategy for the West*, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Nov. 1961 [Joint Committee print].

⁷ *Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 839.

calling for a change in economic foreign policy by the West by imposing a tighter control of trade with Russia, for instance, on the import of large quantities of oil from Russia?

A. Would you just repeat the first part of your question again, please?

Q. Could you give us the Department's views on the recently made report of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee for a change in the economic foreign policies by the West?

A. I have seen a digest of that report, but I have not studied it. These are questions which are bound to come up for review in connection with the proceedings of more than one congressional committee, but more importantly in connection with the development of the administration's proposals on general trade as well as discussions within the OECD about free-world trade now going on. I just would not want to comment specifically on that point, if you don't mind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your thinking about what should be done about the expiring reciprocal trade agreements program?

A. I think that at this point there is not much that I could add to the statement made by Under Secretary Ball,⁹ and the comments made by the President very recently at a press conference.

I would like to emphasize, however, that it is perfectly obvious that we are moving into a transformation of world trading patterns and arrangements. The discussions going on for the enlargement of the Common Market, for example, could have the most far-reaching effects upon the trading position of the United States. We feel that it is very important for us to have a legislative position in which the United States can go out and bargain and negotiate and trade with other governments in order to protect our vital trading interests and at the same time that we do so on a nondiscriminatory basis, so that other countries not members of the Common Market and not part of our own market, such as in Latin America and Japan, do find expanding trade opportunities. We feel strongly that, unless we can emphasize two elements in international economic affairs over the period of the immediate future,

we shall be in deep trouble. One of them is an expanding economy based upon the growth—economic growth—of the free world, and the other is the liberalization of trade opportunities so that growing economies can be in active trade with each other in order to increase the strength of all.

We are under no illusions that there won't be some strenuous debates on these matters in the months ahead. To a certain extent these debates tend to be a little one-sided, because those who have a deep interest in exports—the millions of people whose jobs depend upon exports—are not nearly so articulate or so insistent in expressing their views as those who feel themselves in some way endangered by or embarrassed by one or another type of import.

But this is going to be in a special sense not just another debate on reciprocal trade. This is going to be a discussion and must be a discussion of how the United States shall relate itself to a transformed world trading situation, and unless we are in a position to protect the interests of the United States in our own trading position, then we could find ourselves under deep embarrassment and find ourselves facing a shrinking rather than an expanding world.

Neutralism

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been increased pressure by the Russian Government on Finland, and there has been speculation that perhaps the Finnish Government might be absorbed into the Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc, which might result in Sweden joining NATO. Could you give us an assessment of what you think is going on in the Moscow-Finnish situation, and the prospects of Sweden shifting into NATO?

A. I think, sir, that it would not be—quite literally it would not be—helpful for me to speculate on that point at the present moment. We have had great respect for the independence as well as the neutrality of Finland. As far as we in the West are concerned, we have not attempted in any way to embarrass Finland's neutrality. The Finnish are a very sturdy people, and they have the respect of the American people. My guess is that they will have the strong support of people all over the world, neutral as well as those who are so-called aligned peoples, in their attempts to main-

⁹ BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1961, p. S31.

tain their independence and their neutrality in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Nixon made several comments on neutralists in the past week. One of them was that the people of the United States are getting a bellyful of so-called neutralism and also that, if it weren't for the military strength of the United States and our allies, no nation in the world could be neutral today; they would all be Communist. Could you comment on these and give us your definition of neutralism and its impact on U.S. policy?

A. Well, if you would allow me to comment on the questions rather than relate them specifically to Mr. Nixon, I will be glad to do it. I think it is true that the strength of the United States and its allies is directly related to the possibilities of neutralism in this present world situation. Indeed, the underlying issue, once again, in our time is the struggle between those who announce that by 1980 they expect the greater part of the world to be under Communist domination and all those, whether neutral or aligned, who are trying to build the kind of world society that is sketched out in the charter of the United Nations, which anticipates a world community of independent states.

Now the principal threat to neutrality comes from those who are trying to upset it, who are trying to change it into something else. The most immediate threat to that is coming from those who are trying to establish Communist domination by 1980.

Now if the United States, the Western World and her allies, were not strong, then the prospects of maintaining independence would be greatly diminished. Insofar as our attitude toward neutrals is concerned, this is getting into something of a quagmire because there are many neutrals and there is nothing very solid about the only thing they seem to have in common, and that is that they do not happen to be aligned either to the Sino-Soviet bloc or to the so-called Western bloc. So there are many shades of opinion and attitude among the so-called neutrals.

They will say things from time to time which will annoy us. They will take points of view on

particular questions which differ from ours. They will criticize us specifically on certain points, sometimes in the most vigorous terms. But the test is whether they are determined to be independent, whether they are trying to live out their own lives in the way in which their own people would like to have them shape it.

To the extent that that is so, then I think we can afford to have the patience of a great power, to have the persistence of a country that is thinking about the shape of the world 25 or 50 years from now, and not to allow ourselves to be upset on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis by a particular point of view on a particular question. The stakes are too high for that, much too high for that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us when American personnel in civilian clothes is permitted again to go into East Berlin and under what procedures?

A. You say "when," did you say?

Q. Yes.

A. At the present time, American official civilian personnel are not permitted to go to East Berlin. I would not want to speculate on the rest of the question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comment on the reports from Panama that the Panamanian National Assembly has just called for the abrogation of all treaties with the United States?

A. That resolution followed the publication of the exchange of letters between the Presidents of our two countries.¹⁰ From time to time this is a question which is to be discussed; certain revisions have occurred over the years in our arrangements with Panama. We do believe that this is an important question, both for the Panamanians and for ourselves. We shall be giving it very careful study. As the President's letter indicated, beginning in the new year, we will enter into serious discussions with Panama on the problems of the facilities of the Canal.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

¹⁰ For text of a letter of Nov. 2 from President Kennedy to President Roberto Chiari of Panama, see p. 932.

Prime Minister Nehru of India Visits United States

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, made an official visit to the United States November 5-14. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Nehru upon their joint arrival at Washington from Newport, R.I., on November 6 and the text of a joint communique issued at the close of their talks on November 9.

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS AT AIRPORT

White House press release dated November 6

President Kennedy

Prime Minister, Madame Gandhi [Indira Gandhi, daughter of the Prime Minister] Foreign Minister [M. J. Desai], Members of the Indian Cabinet: I wish to express, Prime Minister, on behalf of the people of the United States, our great satisfaction in welcoming you once more to our country, which you have visited in earlier days.

Some national leaders—and it is a source of pride to us, as Americans, that some American leaders have had their fame and their reputations spread across their national frontiers and boundaries, and their reputations and the affection in which they are held have become worldwide—Lincoln, Roosevelt, our earlier leaders—and you, Prime Minister, and your illustrious leader in the fight for Indian independence, Mahatma Gandhi, your reputation, the things for which you have stood, things with which you have been identified in your long career, all these have spread your fame and your reputation beyond the borders of your own country and have been identified with the great aspirations of people all over the world.

India and America are separated by half the globe, but I think that you are aware, as you surely must have been aware during the long days of your struggle for independence, of the great well of affection and regard for which your country and people are held in this country—a great affectionate regard which belongs to you particularly in these difficult days.

So, Prime Minister, we welcome you here to the shores of this country as a friend, as a great world leader, as one who has in his own life and times stood for those basic aspirations which the United States stands for today.

Prime Minister, you are most welcome here to this country, and we hope that when you leave you will find a renewed sense of vigor and purpose here in the United States.

Prime Minister, we are glad to see you again.

Prime Minister Nehru

Mr. President, Mrs. Kennedy, I feel deeply honored and happy to be here again and to receive this great welcome from you, more particularly not for the formal side of it but for the friendship which animated your words. You have been good enough in the past also to refer to my country in terms which evoke a warm response in our hearts.

This is the fourth time I have come to the United States, and whenever I have come here I have been deeply impressed not only by the magnificent achievements of this great country but, if I may say so, even more so by the popular good will and friendship that I met everywhere here.

You have referred, sir, to our struggle for freedom. Many countries have struggled for freedom and achieved it. Your own great country was nurtured in freedom and has grown up in that great tradition. In our struggle, as you yourself just mentioned, those leaders who built up this country in the past, and even in the recent past—we were influenced by them, and I think going back to what we used to say in those days, we often refer to them and to the achievements of this country.

And so when I came here first some 12 years ago, I came with great expectations and fulfilled a long-felt desire of my heart. Those expectations were realized, and I went away with greater admiration for the achievements of this country and with a feeling of almost—if I may say so—warm and personal friendship. They have persisted. Because the relationships of countries are more basic, I think, or should be more basic than temporary political events that happen. If they have that basic quality, they can subsist.

And so I came again on two or three occasions, and every time I was happy that I came and renewed old friendships and made new ones. This time this is a very special pleasure for me to come, to have occasion and opportunity to talk to you, Mr. President, to understand many things, and to some extent to explain what we have on our own minds.

Your nation was nurtured in liberty. So also ours, and in a peculiar way rather unlike other

countries in the sense that we had a peculiar leader, to whom you were pleased to refer, Mahatma Gandhi. And our struggle for freedom as always everywhere conditioned us, and Mr. Gandhi's message and the training he gave us also conditioned us. I do not presume to say that we stood up to his teaching, but anyhow it was always on our minds and still continues on our minds and to some extent still conditions us.

And among the things that he laid great stress on, as you no doubt know, Mr. President, was on peace and peaceful methods of approach to problems. Even in our struggle with the British Empire of those days we adhered to peaceful methods. And so as a result we were fortunate at the end of that struggle when we achieved freedom to do so in friendship with the British people. The past is not only forgotten, of course, but does not come in the way of our friendly relations with the British people today. That was largely, I think, the result of the whole peaceful approach to those problems and our deliberate attempt not to pile up a mountain of bitterness over the past.

We face mighty problems in the world today, and you, Mr. President, bear perhaps the greatest responsibility in this world. And so we look up to you and to your country and seek to learn from you, and sometimes also to express what we have on our minds, so that we can achieve the greatest aim that the world needs today and that is peace and opportunity to grow and flourish in peace.

Our own country is full of its own problems, more particularly to give a better life to all our innumerable people, and that can only be done if there is peace. And so, for us, peace is a passion—not only a passion but something which all our logic and mind drives us to as essential for our growth. And you stand for peace, I know, Mr. President, and I wish you all success in your efforts to maintain peace and freedom.

I am grateful to you, sir, for your warm welcome, and to Mrs. Kennedy also.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated November 9

The President and the Prime Minister have had four days of especially pleasant and rewarding conversations. These began in Newport, Rhode Island, on Monday, were continued for several hours Tuesday morning with senior Indian

U.S. Educational Consortium Formed To Aid Indian Institute of Technology

President Kennedy announced on November 11 (White House press release) formation of an educational consortium representing nine U.S. universities and institutes of technology to help in the development of the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur, India.

Participating in the consortium, which is being sponsored by the new U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) are: California Institute of Technology, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Case Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, Princeton University, Purdue University, University of California, and University of Michigan.

and U.S. officials present, with further private discussions Wednesday, and a brief final meeting today. Subjects covered amount almost to a map of the troubled areas of the world. The problems of getting a peaceful settlement in Berlin, of securing the peace and liberties of the people of Southeast Asia, the problems of control of nuclear testing and disarmament, of the Congo, on how to strengthen the United Nations, and of United States and Indo-Pakistan relations were among the topics. Prime Minister Nehru used the occasion to go deeply into the philosophic and historical background of Indian foreign policy. The President similarly went into the goals and objectives of American foreign policy as they have been molded and shaped over the years.

The President and the Prime Minister examined in particular those areas where peace is threatened. They discussed the dangers inherent in recent developments in Berlin and in Southeast Asia. Concerning Berlin, President Kennedy reaffirmed the United States commitment to support the freedom and economic viability of the two and one-quarter million people of West Berlin and the President and the Prime Minister concurred in the legitimate and necessary right of access to Berlin. The President also assured the Prime Minister that every effort would be made to seek a solution of the Berlin problem by peaceful means, and underlined the importance of the choices of the people directly concerned.

With respect to Southeast Asia, the President and the Prime Minister confirmed that it is the common objective of the United States and India

that Laos be a genuinely neutral state, free of domination by any foreign power, and that each nation in the area have the opportunity to make its own choice of the course it will take in seeking to solve pressing economic and social problems under conditions of peace.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's efforts for the improved well-being of her people. The President reaffirmed the United States' interest in the success of this great effort.

They exchanged views on the desirability of a cessation of nuclear testing. The President referred in this connection to the recent resumption of tests by the Soviet Union which broke the previous moratorium and reaffirmed the United States' unwillingness to accept a further uncontrolled nuclear test moratorium. The Prime Minister and the President agreed on the urgent need for a treaty banning nuclear tests with necessary provision for inspection and control.

The President and Prime Minister stressed the high importance of measures to avoid the risk of war and of negotiations in this connection to achieve agreement on a program of general and complete disarmament.

India and the United States share in the fullest measure their common objective to develop the United Nations as the most effective instrument of world peace. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the United States and Indian contributions to United Nations operations in the Congo, which they regard as an illustration of how that body, even under extremely difficult conditions, can help bring about conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Both the Prime Minister and the President strongly share the hope that as the result of the efforts of the people of the Congo and the United Nations a peaceful and united Congo will be achieved. The President expressed his special appreciation of the role played by the Indian soldiers in the Congo, who comprise more than one-third of the United Nations force there.

The Prime Minister and the President noted the cooperation and exchange of information between United States and Indian scientists in space science research. They agreed that this activity, which has the aim of peaceful exploitation of outer space for the benefit of mankind, could be usefully developed.

The Prime Minister and the President consider

that their talks have been highly useful in the pursuit of their common objectives of an enduring world peace and enhanced understanding between the Governments of India and the United States. They intend to keep closely in touch with each other in the months and years ahead.

President Concludes Talks With General Park of Korea

Gen. Chung Hee Park, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea, visited Washington from November 13 to 17. He was accompanied by Maj. Gen. Yang Soo Yoo, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs National Defense Committee of the Supreme Council; Duk Shin Choi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Byung Kyu Chun, Minister of Finance; Byeng Kwon Bak, Minister of Defense; and Chung Pum Song, Deputy Chairman of the Economic Planning Board. The Korean officials held conversations with Secretary Rusk and other U.S. officials. Following is the text of a joint communique released by the White House at the conclusion of two meetings on November 14 between President Kennedy and General Park.

White House press release dated November 14

Chairman Park and President Kennedy concluded today a friendly and constructive exchange of views on the current situation in Korea and the Far East and the various matters of interest to the governments and peoples of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America. Foreign Minister Choi, Secretary Rusk and other officials of the two governments participated in the conversations.

The two leaders reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship traditionally existing between the two countries and their determination to intensify their common efforts toward the establishment of world peace based on freedom and justice.

The Chairman reviewed the situation in Korea which led to the military revolution of May 16 and set forth the achievements made by the revolutionary Government. He emphasized the positive steps taken by the Government for social reform and economic stability, particularly the new Government's actions to reform the civil service, rationalize tax collections, abolish usury in local

areas, increase employment opportunities, stimulate investment, and expand both domestic and foreign trade. He emphasized as well the positive steps taken by the Government in strengthening the nation against Communism and in eliminating corruption and other social evils.

The President welcomed Chairman Park's full exposition of the current situation in the Republic of Korea and expressed his gratification at the many indications of progress made by the new Government of the Republic.

The Chairman reiterated the solemn pledge of the revolutionary government to return the government to civilian control in the summer of 1963, as he declared in the statement made on August 12, 1961. The President particularly expressed his satisfaction with the Korean government's intention to restore civilian government at the earliest possible date.

The two leaders discussed the position of Korea in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, and in this connection reviewed the continuing contribution of United States economic and military assistance to the strengthening of the Korean nation. Recognizing that the successful achievement of Korean economic development in accordance with a long-range plan is indispensable to build a democratic foundation and to maintain a strong anti-Communist posture in Korea, the President expressed great interest in Korea's draft Five Year Economic Development Plan. In this connection, he assured the Chairman that the United States Government would continue to extend all possible economic aid and cooperation to the Republic of Korea, in order to further such long range economic development.

The Chairman and the President discussed the problem of mutual defense against the threat of external armed aggression in the Pacific area. They recognized that the common interest of their two countries as bulwarks of the Free World against Communist expansion is deepened and reinforced by the fact that Korean and United States troops are brothers-in-arms, standing side by side in the United Nations Command for the defense of Korean soil. The President reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render forthwith and effectively all possible assistance to the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America signed

on October 1, 1953,¹ including the use of armed forces, if there is a renewal of armed attack.

The two leaders recalled that Korea had been successfully defended against armed aggression by the first collective military measures pursuant to the call of the United Nations. They recalled the declarations by United Nations members whose military forces participated in the Korean action, including their affirmation that in the interests of world peace, "if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist."² The Chairman and the President reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations, and their determination to seek the unification of Korea in freedom through peaceful means under the principles laid down and reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly.

Chairman Park and President Kennedy expressed their deep satisfaction with their meeting and discussions and reiterated their resolve to continue to serve the cause of freedom and democracy, and to strengthen the friendly ties between their two peoples.

U.S. Seeks Withdrawal of OAS Action on Trade With Dominican Republic

*Statement by Robert F. Woodward
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs³*

I appreciate the opportunity to clarify the position of my Government on the very important subject before this Committee. As a newcomer to the deliberations of this body, I am at a disadvantage with the group of distinguished representatives who have been studying this difficult problem for months, but my duties in the Department of State have enabled me to follow many of the important developments in the Dominican Republic. I can assure you that the situation in that country has been the object of the most ear-

¹ For text of draft treaty and statements made at the signing ceremony, see BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 204, and Oct. 12, 1953, p. 484.

² For text of a 16-nation declaration issued at Washington on July 27, 1953, see U.N. doc. S/3079.

³ Made at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 14 (press release 785) before the Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States Considering the Situation in the Dominican Republic.

nest attention by the highest authorities of my Government. Also I can assure you that the views which I express to you now are the result of the most careful consideration.

Since I was not privileged to join with the distinguished members of the subcommittee until their most recent meeting, I am able to join in the admiration for their superb work, which resulted in this comprehensive and analytical report. I have also briefly had opportunity to witness the thorough and excellent performance of the secretariat and their unstinting work in preparing a report of this kind.

We realize, of course, that the members of this Special Committee who are not members of the subcommittee have not yet had an opportunity to study the contents of the subcommittee report which was put before them this morning. This report presents its findings and observations to this Special Committee without a specific recommendation concerning action the Special Committee or the Council of the OAS in its turn might take. As a possible contribution to the thought which the Special Committee will devote to the study of the report, I take this opportunity to offer you the points of view of my Government.

Like the other members of the OAS with which the Government of the United States of America has been closely cooperating in this matter, my Government has long shared the hope that the Dominican Republic would soon assume a respected place in the inter-American system as a democratic nation with a government fully representative of the Dominican people and responsive to their will. We have of course hoped that it would soon become possible for the Council of the OAS to find that the Government of the Dominican Republic has ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the continent.

My Government has become convinced, however, that this desired objective can be attained only when leading figures who were closely associated with the repressive measures of the former dictatorship are clearly no longer able to dominate the political and economic life of the nation. Moreover, it appears obvious that full development of representative government cannot be assured until extralegal repressive measures have ceased and human rights are more consistently observed. Unfortunately, the subcommittee received impressive testimony concerning the imper-

fect observance of human rights and concerning measures of repression against opposition political activity.

The delegate of the United States of America on the subcommittee of this Special Committee has therefore subscribed to the view expressed in the penultimate paragraph of the report that greater progress than that already achieved must be demonstrated in the Dominican Republic before a conclusion can be reached that the Government of that country has ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the continent.

My Government believes, however, that there have been significant effects from the resolution of August 21, 1960,² in which the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers agreed to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and to suspend trade in arms and implements of war. We believe that these major restrictions on the Dominican Republic have played a most important role in bringing about the improvements which have occurred up to now. We also deeply hope that further and more significant improvements will be made in the near future and that these will then warrant the definitive action that would enable the members of the OAS to remove the specific measures applied by the resolution of August 21, 1960. When those sanctions can be removed, my Government looks forward to the restoration of diplomatic relations and all forms of normal constructive relationships with the Dominican Republic and its citizens.

Despite the grave reservations I have mentioned, my Government likewise subscribes fully to the statement in the final paragraph of the subcommittee's report expressing the opinion that due recognition should be given to the degree of change which has occurred in the character and policy of the Dominican Government since the previous report of the subcommittee. To summarize, that Government has formally reiterated to the subcommittee its decision not to intervene in the internal affairs of other American States; a vigorous political opposition now acts openly in the Dominican Republic; opposition newspapers and publications circulate; the Government has declared its determination to control and eliminate abuses of police power and has taken

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 358. (Note: The resolution of Aug. 20 was incorporated in the Final Act, which was dated Aug. 21.)

certain measures to this end; there appears to be a possibility of a political solution between the Government and moderate opposition (I wish to note that the Dominican Government has expressed its intention to undertake measures recommended in the report of the OAS electoral procedures mission, which, if carried out effectively, would contribute greatly to such a solution); key figures closely associated with the former regime have departed; and the Trujillo family has publicly announced its intention to deliver their large sugar properties to a foundation which would use these properties for the benefit of the Dominican people. These developments would have seemed unbelievable a few months ago, and they constitute, in the opinion of my Government, a substantial improvement from the long period of dark repression.

We are therefore faced with a situation which is neither black nor white. This should not surprise us; the transition from a dictatorship of 31 years to a society founded on freedom cannot be made at once or without great difficulties. There has been evident progress as a result of the work of men of good will in both the Government and the moderate opposition; it is to these men of good will that we must look for further progress.

After the most careful weighing of the many considerations which enter into this matter, my Government respectfully submits its view to the Special Committee that the Committee should recommend that action be taken by the Council at this time which would give recognition to the constructive efforts of the Government of the Dominican Republic—sufficient recognition to encourage that Government to continue the further progress which is so deeply desired and which is so indispensable to this great humanitarian effort in which the role of the OAS is so important.

Fortunately there is a ready and convenient method of providing this encouragement. This would be the withdrawal by the Council of the OAS of the formal indication which it made to the member states in the resolution approved on January 4, 1961.³ This resolution stated that it was "feasible and desirable" to extend the suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic so that the suspension would apply to trade in petroleum and petroleum products and in trucks and spare

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1961, p. 273.

United States Considers Measures on Dominican Republic

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 799 dated November 18

It has been confirmed that leading figures who were closely associated with the repressive measures of the former dictatorship in the Dominican Republic and who had departed from that country returned to Ciudad Trujillo on November 15.

Moreover, it appears that they may be planning an attempt to reassert dictatorial domination of the political and economic life of that country, threatening the recent gains of the Dominican Government and people toward democratization.

On the recommendation of the United States, the Special Committee of the Organization of American States has already postponed further consideration of a proposal on withdrawing the suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic in certain products.

In view of the possibility of political disintegration and the dangerous situation which could ensue, the Government of the United States is considering the further measures that unpredictable events might warrant.

parts for trucks. As a practical matter, the withdrawal of this action by the COAS would have little material effect upon the basic economy of the Dominican Republic. Moreover, the withdrawal of this action by the Council of the OAS would have no effect on commerce in sugar and other products with the Dominican Republic.

In view of all the foregoing, my Government proposes that the Special Committee recommend that the Council withdraw the action taken in the resolution of January 4, 1961, as a gesture of encouragement to further progress by the Government of the Dominican Republic.

My Government cherishes the hope that Dominican men of good will and sincerity, in the Government and in the democratic opposition, will join together in accelerating their efforts to insure the peaceful transformation of their country into a democratic society. This great effort, which will require courage with moderation and an ability to compromise democratically and which will require a high sense of public responsibility, can well earn these statesmen the lasting admiration and gratitude of the peoples and governments of

all the democratic and peaceloving nations of the Western World.⁴

President Kennedy Affirms Common Ideals With Greece

Following is an exchange of telegrams between President Kennedy and Constantine Caramanlis, Prime Minister of Greece.

President Kennedy to Prime Minister Caramanlis

White House press release dated November 9

NOVEMBER 8, 1961

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I wish to convey my sincere greetings and best wishes to Their Majesties, the Greek people and yourself and to congratulate you on the occasion of your reappointment and investiture as Prime Minister of Greece.

Recalling your recent visit to the United States¹ with pleasure and satisfaction, I am confident that in these troubled times our two nations will continue to work together in the spirit of firm friendship which has traditionally characterized Greek and American relations. As a common aim, we seek a peaceful world based on the ideals of freedom, liberty and democracy which Greece has bequeathed to the world.

Please accept my warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Prime Minister Caramanlis to President Kennedy

ATHENS, November 8, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, On behalf of Their Majesties, the Greek people and myself I wish to thank you warmly for your greetings and good wishes.

I particularly thank you for your congratulations on my election.

I wish to take this opportunity to tell you again of the satisfaction and real pleasure with which I recall my visit to your great democracy, and of the very vivid impression I retain of our personal contacts.

Through the steady friendship and the continued cooperation between our two nations, we, in Greece, aim at the promotion not only of our mutual interests and

⁴ On Nov. 16, Mr. Woodward made the following statement before the Special Committee: "In view of the reports from the Dominican Republic this morning, I recommend that we defer any decision on the date on which the Special Committee should vote on this subject."

¹ BULLETIN of May 15, 1961, p. 724.

welfare, but also of those of the free world, to which by tradition and fundamental conviction we both belong.

Please accept my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

CONSTANTINE CARAMANLIS

President Kennedy Replies to Letter From President Chiari of Panama

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Roberto Chiari, President of the Republic of Panama, in reply to President Chiari's letter of September 8¹ which was delivered to President Kennedy by Ricardo Chiari at the White House on September 15.

White House press release dated November 15

NOVEMBER 2, 1961

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read with great interest your letter of September 8, 1961 which your brother delivered to me on September 15th. I am also very pleased to have had a personal conversation with your brother at that time.

I agree with you that an unusual community of interests exists between the Republic of Panama and the United States. Our respective Governments and peoples have been closely associated since the very beginning of your nation. The Panama Canal has been an important element in the development and growth of the relationship between our two countries, and has also contributed to the bonds of unity which link all the American Republics.

The Government of the United States hopes to maintain and strengthen the relations between our two nations on the basis of mutual respect and sincere friendship. I feel sure that the Government of Panama shares this objective.

Once again, on behalf of the Government of the United States, I reaffirm our willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Government of Panama to insure the full enjoyment of the various benefits which the Canal should afford to the two nations that made possible its construction. We also wish to make these benefits available to all nations interested in international trade.

As I pointed out to your brother on September 15, I realize that the historic friendship and co-

¹ Not printed.

operation between our two countries has sometimes been marred by differences concerning the interpretation of the rights granted to the United States by the Republic of Panama. In past years, these problems have been resolved in various ways—sometimes through formal treaty negotiations and sometimes through friendly discussions and the subsequent implementation of specific measures agreed upon by representatives of the two Governments.

My Government recognizes that differences will inevitably arise between even the friendliest nations, and believes that these differences must be discussed thoroughly and frankly, in order to clarify the interests and attitudes of both parties. It seems clear, therefore, that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provisions which are not fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit qualified representatives of both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction with a view to their resolution.

I have instructed the various responsible Departments and agencies of the United States Government to make a complete re-examination of our current and future needs with respect to Isthmian Canal facilities. I expect this study to be completed within a very few months, at which time my Government will communicate promptly with the Government of Panama.

I am confident that representatives of our two Governments, after a frank exchange of views and a careful assessment of our mutual needs and interests, can reach fruitful conclusions which will promote the mutual welfare of both countries.

With cordial good wishes,

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Advisory Committee on Cooperatives Reports to AID Administrator

Press release 757 dated November 1

An Advisory Committee on Cooperatives to the Agency for International Development has called on AID to embark on a "bold new program of cooperative development" and to "utilize the resources of the Agency for International Development and of all interested government and private agencies in programs for underdeveloped areas

where cooperatives can contribute effectively to the self-help objectives of this country's foreign aid efforts and to total country development plans."

Programs recommended in an 82-page report by the Committee include:

—*technical assistance*: country studies; evaluation studies; pilot projects; training programs in the United States, in third countries, and in host countries.

—*financial assistance*: through loan funds for cooperative capital construction projects; seed capital for credit unions and savings and loan associations; P.L. 480 and other local currency funds; private investment in cooperatives, credit unions, and savings institutions.

The Committee believes that its recommended programs are responsive to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which declares that it is the policy of the United States "to encourage the development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations."

In transmitting its report to the AID Administrator, the Committee, made up of leaders of 13 non-Government organizations, stated that ". . . a bold new program of cooperative development can be a powerful force in the United States foreign policy throughout the world Effective cooperatives, credit unions and savings and loan associations are precisely the kind of institutions which are needed to speed up the tempo of economic and social growth in the developing countries."

The report of the Special Advisory Committee is the result of 4 months of intensive review of the programs and recommendations of more than 30 private U.S. organizations, Government agencies, and international organizations. Reports on the status of cooperatives and the possibilities for future development were also received from some 50 U.S. Operations Missions around the world.

The Committee emphasized the importance of the first Inter-American Cooperative Conference, which is meeting at Bogotá, Colombia, from November 6 to 11. This conference will bring together cooperative leaders from North, Central, and South America. The Advisory Committee endorsed a plan for AID to sponsor a tour of six Latin American countries by a group of five outstanding U.S. cooperative, credit union, and sav-

ings bank leaders, who will be attending the Bogotá conference. During a 3-week period the group will visit Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.

Members of the Advisory Committee include:

John C. Satterfield, Jackson, Miss., president of the American Bar Association, senior member of the firm of Satterfield, Shell, Williams and Buford, Jackson and Yazoo City, Miss., and general counsel of the Mississippi Chemical Corporation, Yazoo City.

Murray D. Lincoln, Columbus, Ohio, president, Cooperative League of the U.S.A., president of Nationwide Insurance Companies; with Jerry Voorhis, Chicago, executive director of Cooperative League, as alternate.

Homer L. Brinkley, Washington, D.C., executive vice president of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives.

M. W. Thatcher, St. Paul, Minn., president, National Federation of Grain Cooperatives; general manager, Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association; with Dwayne O. Andreas, president, Interoceanic Commodity Corporation, chairman of the board, Interoceanic Industries, and executive vice president, Grain Terminal Association, as alternate.

Charles Schuman, Chicago, Ill., president, American Farm Bureau Federation.

James Patton, Denver, Colo., president, National Farmers Union.

Herschel Newsom, Washington, D.C., president, National Grange.

Walter Reuther, Detroit, Mich., president, United Auto Workers, and vice president, AFL-CIO.

R. C. Morgan, El Paso, Tex., president, Credit Union National Association, Inc.; with H. Vance Austin, Madison, Wis., executive director, as alternate.

Leon Keyserling, economic consultant, Washington, D.C., former member of President Truman's Council of Economic Advisers.

Gerrit Vander Ende, Tacoma, Wash., president, National League of Insured Savings Association; president, Pacific First Federal Savings and Loan Association, Tacoma.

Bishop Edward E. Swanstrom, New York, N.Y., chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.

Clyde T. Ellis, general manager, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Washington, D.C.

Herbert J. Waters (ex officio member), Special Assistant to the Director, ICA.

AID To Finance Procurement of Fertilizer in United States

Press release 790 dated November 17

Fowler Hamilton, Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), announced on November 17 the cancellation of a proposed course of action which would have resulted in purchase outside the United States of \$6 million worth of fertilizer for the Republic of Korea. AID had received complaints that its procurement plans for this fertilizer would result in unfairness to American industry. Investigation by the Agency showed these complaints to have merit. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton ordered that the fertilizer be purchased from American suppliers.

AID's Administrator further announced that he had started a thorough investigation of all fertilizer procurement procedures inherited by the Agency from ICA. This review will recommend what changes should be made to: (1) simplify and clarify procedures; (2) standardize terms; (3) centralize authorizing authority; (4) protect U.S. taxpayers' interest in the economical and prudent use of AID funds; and (5) guard against fraud or chicanery. Before new procedures are adopted, those proposed will be made public and AID will discuss them with affected parties.

In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, ICA financed the procurement of \$49.1 million worth of fertilizer, of which \$16.6 million was from the United States. Mr. Hamilton anticipated AID would finance the procurement of even a larger aggregate amount of fertilizer this year. He also stated that, when circumstances arise in which the overall national interest appears to require purchase of any fertilizer outside the United States, all interested parties will have an opportunity to present their views to the Agency before any such purchase is made. In such cases all relevant factors, including the views of United States suppliers, will be carefully considered.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Scheduled December 1961 Through February 1962

FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 4th Session	Trivandrum, India	Dec. 4-
ILO Committee on Work on Plantations: 4th Session	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 13th Session	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport.	Geneva	Dec. 4-
U.N. Consultative Group on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders.	Geneva	Dec. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Energy Resources and Electric Power Development.	Bangkok	Dec. 6-
FAO International Rice Commission: 9th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Production and Protection.	New Delhi	Dec. 11-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Meeting of Working Party on Rice, Soil, Water, and Fertilizer Practices.	New Delhi	Dec. 11-
ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching)	Geneva	Dec. 11-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group	Geneva	Dec. 11-
NATO Ministerial Council	Paris	Dec. 13-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: Subcommittee on Electric Power.	Bangkok	Dec. 18-
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	Dec. 18-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics.	Geneva	Dec. 19-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 32d Session (resumed)	New York	December
CENTO Scientific Council	Lahore	Jan. 8-
CENTO Symposium on the Role of Science in the Development of Natural Resources With Particular Reference to Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.	Lahore	Jan. 8-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session of Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 8-
ICAO Communications Division: 7th Session	Montreal	Jan. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Intraregional Trade Promotion Talks	Bangkok	Jan. 10-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Commercial Arbitration	Bangkok	Jan. 11-
CENTO Economic Experts	Ankara	Jan. 15-
IAEA Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law (including third-party liability for nuclear shipping).	Brussels	Jan. 22-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 5th Session	Bangkok	Jan. 22-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: Scientific Committee	Ottawa	Jan. 29-
WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: 3d Session.	New Delhi	Jan. 29-
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Seminar on the Participation of Women in Public Life.	Singapore	Jan. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 14th Session.	Bangkok	Jan. 31-
WHO Executive Board: 29th Session (and Standing Committee on Administration and Finance).	Geneva	January
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 5th Session	London	January
U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 7th Session	New York	January
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 5th Meeting	Ottawa	Feb. 7-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 10th Session.	Bangkok	Feb. 12-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: 2d Session	Paris	Feb. 14-
FAO International Rice Commission: 6th Session of Consultative Subcommittee on Economic Aspects of Rice.	Rangoon	Feb. 15-
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session	Addis Ababa	Feb. 19-
IMCO Council: 6th Session	London	Feb. 20-
CENTO Economic Committee	Washington	Feb. 26-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel	Montreal	February
ICAO Panel on Origin and Destination Statistics: 4th Meeting	Montreal	February
U.N. International Wheat Conference	Geneva	February

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 17, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

General Assembly Adopts Resolutions on Nuclear Testing

Following are statements made in Committee I (Political and Security) by Adlai E. Stevenson and Arthur H. Dean, U.S. Representatives to the General Assembly, together with the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on November 6 and 8.

STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, OCTOBER 30

U.S. delegation press release 3818

At this point in connection with the discussion of the Indian draft resolution,¹ I feel obliged to remind the committee that on last Friday [October 27] the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 87 to 11 a resolution² solemnly appealing to the Soviet Union to refrain from carrying out its intention to explode a 50-megaton bomb in the atmosphere before the end of the month.

This morning, Monday, October 30, we have heard the shocking news that the Soviet Union has exploded a bomb much larger than last week's and apparently even larger than 50 megatons. This, Mr. Chairman, is a solemn day in the history of the United Nations and of international relations in our time, a day which will be long remembered for a display of violence on a scale unheard of in human history to this time.

As he said he would, Mr. Khrushchev has exploded his giant bomb in cynical disregard of the United Nations. By this act the Soviet Union has added injury to insult.

They broke the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

They have raised atmospheric pollution to new heights.

They have started a new race for more deadly weapons.

They have spurned the humanitarian appeal of

the United Nations and of all peace-loving peoples.

They have advanced no solid justification for exploding this monstrous and unnecessary weapon.

They have been wholly unmoved by the dangers of radioactive fallout to the human race.

The United States delegation deeply deplores this contempt for world opinion. We think that in the light of this somber development other delegations may wish to express their views on this shocking and distressing news. For today, Mr. Chairman, the world has taken a great leap backward toward anarchy and disaster.

STATEMENT BY MR. DEAN, NOVEMBER 3

U.S. delegation press release 3825

First I would like to thank the committee for their very kind consideration in permitting the immediate consideration of the United Kingdom-United States motion on item A/C.1/L.280. In view of the lengthy statements that have already been made, in which I am a major offender, I would like to make a very brief statement of explanation in support of the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution.

Over the past few weeks we have discussed in detail many of the aspects of the United States-United Kingdom draft nuclear test ban treaty tabled at Geneva,³ as well as the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution placed before this committee, and I see no necessity to go into that detail again.

As I am sure the committee knows, the central problem of the Geneva conference has been the establishment of effective international control treaty machinery. Over the course of 3 years of negotiation certain underlying principles of control have emerged as the essential cornerstones on which the whole fabric of the treaty control or-

¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.283/Rev. 2.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1961, p. 817.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

ganization would be constructed. That is why the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution recognizes that a permanent, lasting, controlled cessation of nuclear tests requires that all states be satisfied that the obligation to discontinue tests undertaken in the treaty is in fact being observed by all states. As I am sure the committee is aware, the Soviet Union exploded two more nuclear devices in the atmosphere yesterday and may well explode more today. Therefore, the first requirement for control, we believe, is that the treaty control machinery be adequate to insure compliance with the terms of the treaty agreement. We believe that this adequacy is a proper subject for international negotiations. Accepted scientific standards, based on the most advanced information and research, should determine what constitutes adequate control, and the precise terms of the treaty should be worked out in these international negotiations.

We also believe a nuclear test ban treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all tests in all environments—I repeat, the cessation of all tests in all environments. And we have expressed this belief in operative paragraph 2(a) of our draft resolution.

Secondly, we believe all participants in a test ban treaty should be guaranteed a representative role in the staffing and operation of the treaty control organization. Effective controls cannot be guaranteed by having each state inspecting itself. On the contrary, we believe objectivity and confidence are best assured by having competent individuals whose only vital interest, whose only motivation, is the assurance of effective control. Inspectors whose national loyalties may be involved in a particular inspection mission, we believe, are not the best qualified to undertake the inspection and control function under an international treaty. It also goes without saying that the treaty control organization should be exclusively—I repeat, exclusively—devoted to its function of assuring correct observation of the agreement and of nothing else, and that the treaty organization cannot be permitted to exercise its function or to be used in any manner for any other purpose or in the exclusive interests of any of the states parties to the nuclear test ban agreement.

Finally, the vital importance of effective administrative operations within a treaty control

system is recognized in operative paragraph 2(c) of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution. This means, of course, that no state should have the right, for whatever reason or whim, to obstruct the daily control operations so necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the treaty. We believe these control operations should be carefully spelled out in advance in an objective and scientific manner, as they are in the United Kingdom-United States draft test ban treaty, so that the single administrator for the day-to-day direction of the treaty control system would be carefully constrained to act in an impartial manner.

In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States believe that the top policymaking function in a treaty control organization should be vested in a commission properly representative of all parties to the treaty. We have suggested that on this top control commission there should be 4 from the West, 4 from the Soviet Union, and 3 from nonassociated states, or a total of 11. In addition to the treaty requirements the single, impartial, well-qualified administrator, who must be satisfactory to all of the original parties, would also carry out the policies laid down by this top policymaking commission. These procedures of the top policymaking commission would be adopted in accordance with the voting procedures prescribed by the treaty and in which we have tried to the maximum extent possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and to be sure that these voting procedures cannot possibly favor one party or the other.

In order to keep the United Nations informed of the progress made toward conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement we have asked the parties concerned to report this progress to the Disarmament Commission not later than the first of March 1962.⁴

The United Kingdom and the United States are prepared to resume these negotiations immediately, either here or in Geneva, and we call upon our Soviet colleagues to cooperate with us in the resumption of these negotiations. As far as we are concerned, the resumption of the negotiations cannot take place too quickly.

⁴The General Assembly on Nov. 8 adopted an amendment (U.N. doc. A/L.363) introduced by Cyprus which substituted the words "14 December 1961" for the words "1 March 1962" in operative paragraph 3 of the U.S.-U.K. resolution.

Finally, we ask that all states—and I repeat, all states—adhere to or ratify a nuclear test ban treaty when it has been negotiated and signed. We believe that very wide membership and active participation in a nuclear test ban treaty is necessary, and we would sincerely hope that all states would participate under the terms of the treaty in order to assure its effective and impartial operation in order that all nuclear testing may cease forever in all environments.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Indian Resolution ⁵

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1577 (XV) of 20 December 1960 which urged the States concerned to continue the suspension of test explosions, and also its resolution 1578 (XV) of the same date,⁶

Further recalling its resolution 1379 (XIV) of 20 November 1959,

Bearing in mind both the grave and continuing hazards of radiation resulting to humanity from test explosions as well as their adverse consequences to the prospects of world peace through heightening rather than lessening of international tensions,

Considering it urgent and imperative that no further tests should take place,

1. Expresses its deep concern and profound regret that test explosions have been resumed;

2. Earnestly urges the States concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests;

3. Expresses confidence that the States concerned will reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, under appropriate international control;

4. Calls upon the States concerned to engage themselves with urgency and speed in the necessary efforts to conclude such agreements expeditiously.

U.S.-U.K. Resolution ⁷

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1252 (XIII) of 4 November 1958,⁸ 1402 (XIV) of 21 November 1959⁹ and 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV) of 20 December 1960,

Noting with regret the recent initiation of nuclear weapons testing and the rejection of the proposal of the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that further nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere be suspended,

Noting that the negotiations at Geneva on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests have been recessed

pending completion of the discussion of this matter by the General Assembly,

Recognizing that a permanent and continuing cessation of nuclear weapons testing in all environments would be guaranteed only by an effective and impartial system of verification in which all States have confidence,

1. Reaffirms that it is urgently necessary to reach an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests under effective control which would be a first step towards reversing the dangerous and burdensome arms race, would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, would contribute to the reduction of international tensions and would eliminate any health hazards associated with nuclear testing;

2. Urges the States negotiating at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva to renew at once their efforts to conclude at the earliest possible time a treaty on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests on the following basis:

(a) The treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms;

(b) International control machinery should be organized so as to be representative of all parties to the treaty and should be staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness, avoiding self-inspection, under procedures which would ensure that its facilities will be used exclusively for purposes of effective control;

(c) The day-to-day executive and administrative operations of the control system established under the treaty should not be susceptible to obstruction by the exercise of a veto and administrative responsibility should be concentrated in the hands of a single Administrator acting impartially and functioning under the supervision of a commission composed of representatives of parties to the treaty;

3. Requests the negotiating States to report to the Disarmament Commission by 14 December 1961 on the progress of their negotiations;

4. Calls upon all States, upon the conclusion of a treaty which will ensure that nuclear weapons tests will be permanently prohibited under effective controls, to ratify or to adhere to that treaty.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/RES/1648 (XVI) (A/C.1/L.283/Rev. 2); adopted in plenary session on Nov. 6 by a vote of 71 to 20 (U.S.), with 8 abstentions.

⁶ For a U.S. statement made in Committee I on Dec. 19, 1960, explaining the U.S. vote on these resolutions, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1961, p. 94.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/RES/1649 (XVI) (A/C.1/L.280, as amended by A/L.363); adopted in plenary session on Nov. 8 by a vote of 71 (U.S.) to 11, with 15 abstentions.

⁸ For background and texts of the four parts of A/RES/1252, see BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1958, p. 783, and Nov. 24, 1958, p. 837.

⁹ For background and texts of the two parts of A/RES/1402, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 917.

A United Nations Development Decade

*Statement by Philip M. Klutznick
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

We all were doubtless impressed with the comprehensive and illuminating statement presented by the Under-Secretary [Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs]. My delegation expresses its sincere compliments to him on a task well done.

My appearance here marks the first occasion on which the United States representative to the Economic and Social Council has also served as its delegate to the Second Committee. This step reflects the conviction of my Government that the economic and social work of the United Nations can be advanced more effectively through establishing a closer working relationship between this committee and the Economic and Social Council.

The achievements of the Economic and Social Council are set forth in Document A/4820. We shall not weary this committee by commenting at length on a document which you all have the opportunity to read. We should, however, like to mention briefly a few of the Council's achievements which appear noteworthy.

First, the initial meeting of the Council's Committee for Industrial Development. At the Committee's suggestion, endorsed by the Council, there has now been established in the U.N. Secretariat an Industrial Development Center. We believe that this center should not be a place for abstract studies or for reports that collect dust; it should be a working, operating unit which can give effective help where needed. We shall spare no effort in doing our part to make this new center a success. We are glad to note that the Division of Industrial Development has already increased its activity in this field.

Second, the Council took significant action in strengthening the regional economic commissions.

Third, the Council decided to convene in 1962 a U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the benefit of the less developed areas. The United States attaches great importance to this conference. We have already begun the preparation of an effective participation. We support wholeheartedly the Council's decision that the conference's work should avoid extraneous political considerations and should concentrate on matters of real benefit to people in the less developed countries.

Fourth, the Council took several important steps designed to make more effective use of U.N. resources in the fields of technical assistance and preinvestment. Notable among these is Resolution 851 (XXXII), under which the Council established an *ad hoc* committee of eight to study further steps which may be needed to advance the achievement of country-development objectives and of effective country planning.

Fifth, the enlargement of the Council's functional commissions. This important step was taken to give more adequate representation to member states from Africa and Asia. In our view it will also help to bring about a closer working relationship between the Council and the Assembly. We continue to believe that an expansion in the membership of the Council itself is imperative to its increased utility.

Finally, the Council placed a new emphasis on the achievement of balance in economic and social development. The need for such balance has been confirmed by experience. It was underlined by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson,² who struck the

¹Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Oct. 6 (U.S. delegation press release 3785 dated Oct. 5).

²BULLETIN of Aug. 28, 1961, p. 363.

keynote at the Council's session by pointing out that the whole aim of economic development is a better life for people. Following the same line of thought the President of the Council said: "The time may well be approaching when the Council will deem it advisable to broaden and round out its perspective by having one major debate on development in which the parallel problems of both economic and social advance could be fully exposed." We agree wholeheartedly.

A Call to Mankind

Mr. Chairman, elsewhere in these halls vital political issues are under close scrutiny. It has been said that some decisions may determine whether mankind shall live or whether it shall be destroyed in one fiery radioactive convulsion. In the far reaches of the world countless people are prayerfully waiting for some omen to come out of these historic meetings. We owe to them and to our respective states to demonstrate by deeds our simple conviction that there will be a tomorrow, yes, many tomorrows for humanity. This answer may not emerge from the delicate and sometimes imponderable and inscrutable exchanges between diplomats in their dissection of pressing political issues.

It is in this framework that a passage in the speech of the President of my country delivered to the General Assembly on September 25³ opens new horizons. He said:

Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope.

That is why my nation, which has freely shared its capital and its technology to help others help themselves, now proposes officially designating this decade of the 1960's as the United Nations Decade of Development. Under the framework of that resolution, the United Nations' existing efforts in promoting economic growth can be expanded and coordinated. Regional surveys and training institutes can now pool the talents of many. New research, technical assistance, and pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands and untapped waters. And development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise, to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations.

In calling for a United Nations Development Decade the President of the United States gave an

impressive answer to the awesome challenge to mankind's future. He spoke the unexpressed hopes of countless millions of people who look to this Organization to lead in stamping out the ills that beset mankind. To keep humanity from becoming a massive corpse is not enough. This is a call to summon our combined energies away from fighting one another, whether by words or by deeds, and to motivate us to strengthen our fight against the common enemies of all mankind. In these sessions we should not just commend and herald the past; we should design a program to garner what we can from that past to make for a better future.

We believe this Organization needs to be strengthened in playing its appropriate role in the urgent tasks of economic and social development. In these tense days there is an ominous peril that the constructive and affirmative objectives of the United Nations will be buried under the weight of political differences.

Toward this end the General Assembly should resolve that the decade of the 1960's be recognized and designated as the United Nations Development Decade. Such an act would symbolize the determination of the member states to give added meaning to international cooperation in the fields of economic and social enterprise. It would serve to provide a new impetus to national and international efforts aimed at the accelerated development of the less developed countries. It would help to draw together and give more power to ongoing economic and social work of the United Nations system of organizations. It would serve to give the United Nations itself expanded responsibilities consistent with the opportunities as well as the limitations of such action in what is unfortunately still a divided world.

We would urge that the Secretary-General, either through a new and special board, through his own office, or perhaps through the Special Fund and its management, plan and execute a continuing program for this decade.

Sources of Financial Aid

A United Nations Development Decade will not be a substitute for or detract from development or assistance under any other auspices. On the contrary, we believe it will also stimulate and motivate those capital-producing media, both private and public, which exist both in and out of the United Nations system.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

The IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], IFC [International Finance Corporation], and IDA [International Development Association] have a role of gigantic proportions to discharge in this field. The Bank on June 30, 1961, had made development loans amounting to \$5,172,000,000 with increasing commitments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The recent indication by Eugene Black that a substantial increase in the capital of IDA is to be called for is indicative of the speed with which this new multimillion-dollar agency has moved into an area where conventional public or private loans have not been available. OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] has already begun to show its importance in this whole picture. Doubtless its effectiveness in bringing better order and progress to this work will become increasingly apparent. Bilateral activity in supplying capital is of great consequence. The exciting possibilities of private capital are without foreseeable limit. Naturally, these and other facets of the complex and numerous interests in the field must play their parts to the full in the U.N. Development Decade.

Sometimes one hears words of despair from leaders of less developed countries who find time so short and capital so reluctant. We hope that the recent action of the Congress of the United States in adopting a new program in the Act for International Development of 1961 will encourage them to realize that we are still going forward. My Government is the pioneer in the field of aid to nations less fortunate. After many years it would not be strange if there was a desire by our people to reduce expenditures abroad so as to enable the execution of domestic plans long deferred. Yet it is significant that the reverse actually is transpiring.

For the first time such an act stated it to be the policy of the United States "to make assistance available, upon request, . . . in scope and on a basis of a long-range continuity essential to the creation of an environment in which the energies of the peoples of the world can be devoted to constructive purposes." Authorization was given for development loan funds to be made available over a 5-year period. The act also contains a specific provision for "assistance . . . to newly independent countries . . . , to the maximum extent appropriate in the circumstances of each case," to

"be furnished through multilateral organizations or in accordance with multilateral plans, on a fair and equitable basis with due regard to self-help."

The new act, in addition to authorizing an appropriation for the current year, authorizes appropriations of \$6 billion for development loan programs for the fiscal years 1963-66. These loans may be made at little or no interest and with maturities of up to 50 years.

In recognition of the significance of contributions that indigenous and international private investment can make to development, our new aid act emphasizes the importance of private enterprise in advancing economic development and encourages further United States private investment in the less developed countries. It broadens the investment guaranty program by enlarging the range of coverage. In this connection special mention is made of development projects furthering social objectives and the development of small independent business enterprise. Included is an authorization for financing up to half of the costs of surveys by private enterprise of investment opportunities in less developed countries.

There is a tendency in some quarters to underestimate and misunderstand the potential role of private enterprise and capital in facing this overwhelming challenge of the underdeveloped countries. We shall have occasion to comment on this at greater length when certain other items are under more detailed scrutiny. At this point it might be well to briefly direct our attention to the simple fact that the greatest source of capital is the private field. What is even of greater importance is that private enterprise possesses the largest aggregate pool of skills or what is commonly called "know-how" in the universe. And at an equal level of consequence is the customary capacity of private enterprise to indulge in imaginative business adventures which involve risks that governments are reluctant or unable to take.

So much of our development aids are on a government-to-government basis that there seems to be a trend to ignore this huge storehouse of possibilities. It may also be that underdeveloped countries have not had time or the willingness in some instances to examine the true characteristic of present-day capitalism as related to some of the horrific tales of yesteryear. Whatever the reasons, it is almost sinful at this time of great urgency to get on with the job of development if we do not

explore every avenue to make maximum use of such a potentially abundant resource of ideas, manpower, and money. All this can and must be done with full recognition of the attributes of national sovereignty, its duties and responsibilities.

Some of the effects of this revitalized approach can be seen in the Alliance for Progress, which patterned a new day for inter-American cooperation at Punta del Este.⁴

Objectives of Development Decade

We hope others will be encouraged by these steps taken by my Government under the inspiring and vigorous leadership of President Kennedy.

It is consistent with this leadership that he issued a call for a United Nations Development Decade. It is for us to grasp this opportunity to make the most of the immediate years ahead. The detailed plan for management and promotion of the United Nations Development Decade and the character of its program is our mutual responsibility. Without presuming on that fact, permit us to offer a few suggestions as to aims or objectives of such a program and plan.

1. Strengthen and expand United Nations programs

We have already recounted the availability of many resources outside the U.N. system. There are at least three steps presently needed within the Organization.

A. During this period we must achieve a substantial increase in the preinvestment activities of the Special Fund and the work of ETAP [Expanded Program of Technical Assistance] through wider participation on the part of members in providing increased contributions to these programs. The General Assembly has already set a target of \$150 million for the combined budgets of the Special Fund and ETAP. We have supported this target as being an indispensable step in achieving constructive and effective development. We are not unaware that there are those who question whether such a target can be realized in a short period of time. It is my Government's view that, as an act of faith and to give real impetus to the United Nations Development Decade, a determined effort should be made to achieve that

goal this year. This will not be an easy task. It will require a reexamination of the thinking of some states. Nevertheless, at this breathless moment in the history of this Organization and in pursuit of the common weal, my Government pledges itself here and now to make available \$60 million of the \$150 million on the understanding that our contribution shall not exceed 40 percent of the total.

B. In our view industrialization will play an increasingly important role in the years ahead. My Government, through bilateral and international channels, has provided a very considerable amount of assistance in this field. A greater stimulus to industrial development around the world has been provided through private enterprise. But we should not be satisfied with the pace of development thus far.

We believe the time has come to make a comprehensive study of what the United Nations and its related agencies are doing to assist industrial development. It is time to examine the role of the United Nations and in particular of its regional economic commissions, the work of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, the programs of the specialized agencies, and the role of the new Committee for Industrial Development. Along with this study of what is being done, there should be a careful analysis of what the underdeveloped countries need in this field. The survey can then compare present performance with evident need and see what gaps still exist. In particular it can try to determine what strengthening might be required in the newly established Center for Industrial Development, which my delegation was privileged to suggest at the first session of the Committee for Industrial Development.

In the United Nations Development Decade we must capture the rich experience of industrialized countries and devise effective means of accelerating sound industrial development in the less developed countries.

C. This Assembly last year adopted a resolution on the provision of food surpluses to food-deficient peoples through the United Nations system.⁵ As the Director General of FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] has remarked in his inspiring report "Development Through Food," that resolution opened a fresh chapter in

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1960, p. 800.

the history of international relations. He pointed out that some \$12 billion worth of surplus food is likely to be available in the next 5 years from the United States alone. This food could play a major role in economic development on two conditions: (1) that it be integrated in the overall development programs of receiving countries and (2) that its use be planned in such a way as to maintain adequate balance in the development process.

The Director General's report presents a challenge and an opportunity. As we look ahead we must devise increasingly effective ways of using food for the benefit of all the underdeveloped countries, including those who are food exporters. This is not an easy task, but it is a vital one. My delegation will have a specific proposal to make later in this session when this item is considered.

Development conversation is a waste of strength and energy if it is not accompanied by preinvestment dollars. In the U.N. Development Decade enough preinvestment dollars and programs will inevitably produce an increase in the flow of investment capital from all available resources whether private or public, multilateral or bilateral, regional or domestic. Industrial development and utilization of food surpluses for economic development are fields of golden opportunities for progress.

2. Establish a financial service under the Special Fund

The Special Fund is engaged in preinvestment studies, research, and activity. We are on the eve of witnessing the completion of many of its projects. It would be tragic if the sound preinvestment studies of the Special Fund lapsed or failed of execution because of the absence or unavailability of capital. This need not be. As we have demonstrated, private capital is available for sound and good projects. Public capital is in abundance for certain types of projects. It is important that there be a link between needs of the developing countries and sources of capital.

We believe that the Special Fund should establish a financial service to provide guidance and advice to developing countries. This service would maintain current familiarity with potential public, private, national, regional, and international sources of development capital and with the processes, rules, regulations, and preferences

of capital suppliers. Developing countries could channel their inquiries to the Special Fund through the resident representatives. On request the service would provide potential users directly through the resident representatives, the regional economic commissions, or other appropriate channels with information concerning available sources of capital and technical assistance. The service would also provide guidance on procedures for obtaining aid.

The United Nations Development Decade must be a period when increasing completion of preinvestment investigation and other activities by less developed countries produce sound and justifiable demands for developmental capital; it must no less be a decade when that capital is made available and a marriage between demand and supply is consummated.

3. Provide expert advice to assist in development planning

There has been much discussion of the importance of country plans as prerequisites to sound development. The preparation and design of country plans is not a simple process at best. It involves expert investigatory work and requires skilled manpower to produce a pattern, a program, and a plan for a country's immediate future. It should, for optimum results, take into account both government and individual enterprise. The role of international institutions in the drafting and reviewing of development planning should be increased and enhanced.

Any country has difficult decisions to make in the conception of a plan. In some cases it desperately needs the kind of assistance that is not readily available. Without competent and adequate country plans, the whole development process can become distorted, wasteful, and inept.

We believe that the Special Fund, in cooperation with the regional economic commissions, should be enabled to help provide the less developed countries at their request on an increasing scale the qualified experts drawn from international organizations, national governments, universities, foundations, private, public, and professional institutions to insure a sound planning process and to accelerate the activity in this important area.

A United Nations Development Decade should be characterized as a period in which the country

plans, expertly conceived and deliberately and soundly concluded, become the first attribute of the developmental process.

4. *Research and demonstration projects in areas of special promise*

We need to intensify research through science and technology. We need more, and perhaps *more dramatic*, demonstration projects in those areas which promise prompt and impressive results for economic development, for example, desalinization of sea water, the development of cheap power resources, improved weather control, and a host of others.

The Economic and Social Council has already authorized a Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the benefit of less developed countries to be held in August 1962. It is hoped that this vital conference may have countless offshoots that may bring constant emphasis on research and demonstration projects.

We are all conversant with the great revolution which science and technology has brought to the universe for many purposes, including economic development. Let the United Nations Development Decade single out and stress the application of this great ingenuity in science and technology for the benefit of the millions upon millions who live in the less developed countries of the world.

5. *Rationalize U.N. programs*

As noted at the outset of these remarks, the 32d session of the Economic and Social Council was productive in a number of ways. One of its achievements was its examination into the technical assistance activities and programs with a view to securing more effective execution. There has been a strengthening of belief among countries in all stages of development in the coordinating process. There has been a growing understanding of the role of the resident representative and his significance in relating the varied programs that parade within the national boundaries of a state.

There has been established by the Economic and Social Council a committee of eight which has been directed to make a careful examination into all aspects of the problem of rationalization and the more effective coordination and cooperation of the activities of the United Nations, the spe-

cialized agencies, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], and the Special Fund. The impact and results of existing U.N. programs can be increased by strengthening present activities and by measures which we hope the committee will design that will assure that the activities of the U.N. system of organizations are adequately related to country programs.

In connection with the role of the regional economic commissions, ECOSOC adopted an important resolution on decentralization. It must be interpreted in a manner to secure maximum effectiveness from the work of the regional economic commissions.

In many of the programs outlined for the U.N. Development Decade the regional economic commissions will have a crucial role. The regional commissions are very well placed to assist in providing expert advice in development planning. ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America] has blazed a trail in this respect through the use of advisory groups that have assisted countries in planning. There is in preparation a project for an economic planning institute in Santiago to be financed jointly by the Special Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank and to be operated in close cooperation with ECLA. The United States supports this type of proposal.

In the exchange of knowledge and ideas the regional economic commissions have already proved themselves to be an excellent forum. They offer not only the advantage of regions where there is some similarity in the economic, demographic, and climatic factors facing countries but also where the assistance of a regional secretariat can provide continuing service and contact. We need hardly recount to this knowledgeable Assembly the plethora of regional meetings of experts in industry, transportation, energy, trade, economic planning, community development, and other subjects where a great deal of "shirt sleeve" work has been done. These continuing consultations in the regions are far more productive than an isolated operation where technicians have an interesting exchange but there is no followup. The United States supports a further strengthening of this type of activity by the regional economic commissions, together with a strengthening at headquarters of the research and analysis facilities and technical assistance activities which are needed to make

the work of the regional commissions more productive.

We also believe that the regional commissions can play an increasingly important role in conjunction with research and demonstration projects and the establishment of training and research institutes. This applies particularly to the highly technical ones, which are uneconomical if established in a single country but which make sense when established on a regional basis. My Government hopes that an increasing number of such projects will be developed, in cooperation with the regional economic commissions, for presentation to the Special Fund.

In the United Nations Development Decade we must profit by the novel experiences that have grown out of new programs by finding a means of getting more effective use of limited resources and limited manpower in their application against a limitless challenge.

6. Supply and train technicians, professional and executive manpower

If there is anything apparent in the growing need for development it is the shortage of adequately trained manpower. Perhaps of primary importance is the increase in the opportunities for training personnel. We have made a small beginning and some exciting plans are in prospect for the establishment of regional training centers and institutes. We have already commented on some of these. This must be done where appropriate and necessary. While some less developed countries are passing through that transitional period when their own nationals are being trained, we must provide the executive personnel that is needed. This contemplates a substantial increase in the activities of OPEX.

The United Nations Development Decade is calculated to serve mankind; this it can only do if the talents that men need to make it possible are brought into being through the laborious but indispensable process of training and education.

7. Build a consensus on the task ahead through a constant exchange of knowledge and ideas

We hope, through the mobilization of public and governmental support in developed and less developed countries, to bring about measures essential to sound yet rapid economic and social growth. There is a need for a continuing empha-

sis to be placed on the importance of sustained assistance from developed countries. There is no less a need for a cooperative insistence on the self-discipline and requisite reforms in the less developed countries. In the United Nations Development Decade it is contemplated that these two fundamental objectives would be constantly kept before our eyes.

We suggest that conferences, meetings, and consultations be established as a regular diet during this period. On a planned and continuing basis leaders from developed and less developed countries who play important roles in the developmental process should be brought together. As noted earlier the regional economic commissions present an excellent framework for this type of exchange.

The United Nations Development Decade must spark a campaign that continues throughout the period. Goals must be set by each participant, be it a highly developed or an underdeveloped country. Development demands plans which should set achievement objectives.

We have called for meetings and conferences. Let the interest groups such as parliamentarians, business, labor, education, science, et cetera from developed and less developed countries get acquainted personally and with the problems that confront each and one another. Within each country training exhibits and appropriate intelligence should be made available so not only governments but the people may be apprised of the campaign for development.

Statistical and reporting information must be improved so constant measurements of progress toward goals and objectives are available. The agency charged with this effort, be it a new one or the Special Fund, must follow up and follow up ceaselessly to discover weaknesses that need correction and strength that needs emulation.

In brief we need to maintain an inventory of all of our resources in this vital battle for the elevation of man, we need to set our goals—each of us—we need to measure our performance realistically, and we need to involve ourselves in a constant reassessment process. This must have all of the indicia of a live and exhilarating effort which drives relentlessly toward a great goal. Together in a gigantic cooperative enterprise effort we can make great progress; we can engage our

energies in the only worthwhile war of our day—to unshackle the disabilities of man from the yoke of his overburdening ills.

War Against Poverty, Illiteracy, Disease

We sit in this chamber, each of us, as the representative of a sovereign power. Some of us represent industrialized and capital-exporting nations—others, what are usually called less developed nations. In a world shrunk by remarkable scientific achievement the disparity between the “haves” and the “have nots” cannot and must not long subsist. It is not alone in the interests of the less developed countries but of the whole of humanity that we win the most challenging battle of all time—the war against poverty, illiteracy, and disease. For too long did mankind await some supernatural force or external strength to eliminate the disparities that are patent all over the world. Once we spoke of disarmament as a prerequisite to significant economic and social development; on other occasions we were upset by the enormity of the task; and on still others we may have yielded to the temptation of oratory accompanied by inertia. If we wish, we can find ample reasons at this moment for deferring a prime and effective initiative by this Organization in the field of economic and social development. There are pressing political problems that cry out for solution; there is the ever-continuing danger of nuclear warfare by design or mistake; there are trouble spots in scattered places all over the world—all this and more can be cited as cause for deferment.

Sometimes the less developed country thinks that it and it alone has problems. Let it be said with clarity and emphasis that affluent nations are also faced with stupendous challenges to meet the needs of their people. Does this not make us brothers in the need to understand and to cooperate, to develop our respective communities and nations and to build a better life for all people? It is easy to be overwhelmed by one community problem, let alone the multitudinous problems that dot the universe. This is all the more reason for finding the inspiration and the will to clarify and to strengthen and to intensify our common effort to rid the world of its common ills. Economic development for its own sake is a fraud and a fantasy. Economic development to enable the peoples whom it affects to live a better life is

an ideal worth fighting for and worth sacrificing to achieve.

We need to start with a common goal and a will to cooperate. Let us loosen the fetters of our mutual distrust. It is not alone in political areas that this prevails. It has been said in these halls that industrialized nations fear to aid the industrialization of less developed lands because it will destroy their markets. If we conceive our task to keep consumption at today's levels while we increase production to new highs, then there is no purpose to our cooperation. But if we keep our eyes trained on our real goal to destroy the poverty, eliminate the ignorance, and to cure the illness of two-thirds of the population of the world, then we shall have new consumers to absorb our increased product. Our aim is not economic progress or industrialization for its own sake but for the sake of countless millions who go hungry, have no jobs, no schools, and who are plagued by illness. If the governments of the world will cooperate to win this war, we need have no fear of competition from one another. Our task is to unlock the gate of opportunity for millions. No generation has been called to a more inspiring goal nor a more stimulating job.

A United Nations Development Decade should be one in which the less developed countries devise country programs in which they provide maximum help for themselves and in which the capital-exporting countries and private capital expand the availability of their aid, loans, and know-how. A plan and a program designed by either a special board or agency within the Secretariat or by the Special Fund and its management could include among other ideas those which we have suggested as the following:

1. Strengthen and expand United Nations programs:
 - (a) Attain the goal of \$150 million for the Special Fund and ETAP in 1962;
 - (b) Give an increasing role to the United Nations in assisting industrial development;
 - (c) Provide a role for the U.N. system in the use of food surpluses for economic development;
2. Establish a financial service under the Special Fund;
3. Provide expert advice to assist in development planning;

4. Research and demonstration projects in areas of special promise;

5. Rationalize the U.N. programs, emphasizing a more significant role for the resident representative and increased responsibility for the regional commissions;

6. Supply and train technicians, professional and executive manpower;

7. Build and maintain a consensus on the task through an ongoing exchange of knowledge and ideas with an adequate followup.

What better time than now to initiate such a plan and program? This General Assembly began its proceedings under a cloud of tragic sadness. This depressing note added a poignant aura to the many divisive issues which crowd our agenda. It moved the newly elected President [Mongi Slim] to say:

May it please God that this session of the General Assembly which has begun under the shadow of sorrow will finish under the sign of hope at last assured, that concord and peace, world-wide peace, will reign over mankind in freedom and in justice.

These are hours when the Organization itself is being rocked by differences which place its very existence in great peril. At this critical moment how better to save and strengthen the U.N. itself, how better to honor the memory of the late Secretary-General, a martyr to the cause of universal peace, how better to capture the elusive thread of world cooperation than to spell out our mutual resolve to work together energetically in this whole decade against the common enemies of society.

There weighs on our shoulders a solemn and sacred duty to make of our Organization an instrument of peace with justice. If we must hopefully wait for political agreements that advance our common goal let us not do so in idleness. There is much work to be done that is humane in character, economic and social in purpose, and which itself can help immeasurably in creating the climate for peace. A United Nations Development Decade can strengthen the United Nations itself while tackling the problems of human misery, it can create a continuing cooperation while we labor at areas that divide us, it can commemorate in achievements the memory of a tireless servant of peace whose tragic passing threw a pall over this Assembly, and it can unlock the gates of opportunity to countless millions of the less favored of the human race. This job cannot be

done quickly; this job is not easy; but let us begin now and make this first year a harbinger of even greater things to come. On such a note we could face the future with hope.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

GATT Ministerial Meeting and 19th Session

The Department of State announced on November 9 (press release 773) that George W. Ball, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, would be the U.S. ministerial representative to the ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Geneva November 27 to 30. John W. Evans, Counselor of Mission for Economic Affairs and U.S. Representative on the Council of Representatives of the Contracting Parties to the GATT at Geneva, will be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 19th session of GATT, which will meet at Geneva November 13 to December 8.

The more than 40 countries which participate in the work of the GATT will call a recess in their session from November 27 to 30 while ministerial representatives address themselves to the main problems of international trade which have been identified by the GATT during the course of its work under the program for the expansion of trade. Principal topics to be dealt with include the question of future action in the reduction of tariffs, the problem of trade in agricultural products, and the obstacles to the expansion of trade of less developed countries.

Of the more than 60 items on the 19th session's agenda, the most important ones include the removal of nontariff import restrictions; the non-application of the GATT to Japan by a number of contracting parties; the possible accession to the GATT of several more countries; and several topics related to European regional trading arrangements. In the latter area the contracting parties will hear progress reports from both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), begin consideration of the association agreement between the EEC and Greece, receive a report on a working party examination of association arrangements between the EFTA and Finland, discuss problems

related to the EEC's associated overseas countries and territories, and give further attention to certain aspects of the EEC's common external tariff.

The GATT, as the basic instrument guiding commercial relations among most of the principal trading nations of the world, is the cornerstone of U.S. commercial policy. The provisions of the GATT are designed to promote mutually beneficial international trade and thereby to raise living standards, expand productive employment, and utilize more fully the resources of the world. The various meetings of the Contracting Parties to the GATT, such as the 19th session, provide an

international forum in which the Contracting Parties work to achieve the aims of the GATT, discuss trade policy problems, and attempt to resolve trade difficulties in a manner conducive to the growth rather than the reduction of trade levels. The removal of quantitative import restrictions by other countries has, for example, been a principal objective of the United States, and the work of the GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions and other GATT mechanisms have been important factors in influencing the relaxation of such restrictions upon world trade.

The Hague Conference on Private International Law

NINTH SESSION, THE HAGUE, OCTOBER 5-26, 1960

by John Maktos

The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an international organization created by international agreement, the purpose of which is "to work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law." This aim is set out in the statute which was prepared at the seventh session of the Conference held in 1951. Pursuant to article 14, the statute entered into force on July 15, 1955, after it had been approved by the majority of the states represented at that session. Upon the proposal of a member state and approval of the majority of the members, a state may become a new member by depositing with the Netherlands Government a declaration of acceptance of the statute.

The Netherlands Commission of State is "charged with the functioning of the Conference" through "a Permanent Bureau the activities of

which it shall direct." The Bureau has its seat at The Hague and is composed of a Secretary General and two Secretaries of different nationalities who are appointed by the Netherlands Government upon presentation by the Commission of State. The present Secretary General is M. H. van Hoogstraten.

Regular sessions of the Conference are held every 4 years, in principle. However, the Commission of State may request special sessions and, between sessions, may set up special committees to prepare draft conventions or to study questions of private international law which come within the purpose of the Conference. The expenses of the operation and maintenance of the Permanent Bureau and special committees are apportioned among the members of the Conference. While its official language is French, English is permissible and, in the principal meeting room, there is provided simultaneous translation from French into English.

Members of the Conference are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,

• *Mr. Maktos is Assistant Legal Adviser for International Private Law and Unification, Department of State.*

Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. Pending ratification of its acceptance, France participates on a *de facto* basis, sharing in the expenses of the Conference.

Sessions of the Conference have been held in 1893—the first one—1894, 1900, 1904, 1925, 1928, 1951, 1956, and 1960. Its activities have included the preparation of conventions on projects which are closely related to international trade and economic development such as international sale of goods, recognition of legal personality of foreign corporations, and other international transactions.

Role of Observers From the United States

Observers from the United States were first sent to the Hague Conference in 1956. With respect to the importance of their participation a report on the ninth session of the Conference by two of these observers stated:¹

We believe, therefore, that the presence of the U.S. Delegation was not only important to the work of the [U.S.] Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but was also important to the Department of State, as well as the general public.

In an article on the same session, another observer, Kurt H. Nadelmann, said:²

In line with the conclusions reached by the Observer Delegates to the sessions, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the American Bar Association, and all other representative bodies consulted have found American participation in the Hague work desirable and in the national interest. On the basis of the experience with two sessions, a full assessment can be made of advantages and disadvantages, if there be, of American co-operation with the Hague Conference.

Organization of Ninth Session

The ninth session of the Conference was held from October 5 through October 26, 1960. Delegations were sent by 18 member states; two members, Ireland and Turkey, were not present. The United States was represented by the following five observers: Philip W. Amram, Washington,

¹ Report of Joe C. Barrett and James C. Dezendorf to the Executive Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department of State by George R. Richter, Jr., with his letter of Mar. 27, 1961.

² IX Am. J. Comp. L. (1960) 591.

D.C.; Joe C. Barrett, Jonesboro, Ark.; James C. Dezendorf, Portland, Oreg.; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Cambridge, Mass.; and Willis L. M. Reese, New York, N.Y. All of them except Mr. Dezendorf had also attended the 1956 session.

Besides the 72 governmental delegates and observers there were observers sent by the United Nations, the Council of Europe, International Social Service, the Commission Internationale de l'État Civil, the Union Internationale des Huisiers de Justice et Officiers Judiciaires, and the European Economic Community.

The agenda at the ninth session contained the following four items: (1) legalization of foreign public documents, (2) form of wills, (3) protection of infants, and (4) selection of exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising in international contracts. Each of these four subjects was assigned to a separate committee while a fifth committee dealt with miscellaneous matters, including future subjects to be considered by the Conference. There was a U.S. observer on each committee.

At the conclusion of the Conference three new international conventions had been elaborated: (1) Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents, (2) Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions, and (3) Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants.³

Legalization for Foreign Public Documents

Legalization for documents, the subject of the first convention, is the process used in authenticating the signature or seal on a foreign public document. No question was involved regarding authenticity of the document's contents. The convention resulted from a proposal by the Council of Europe which had been initiated by the United Kingdom. A report on the existing law in various countries had been made by a Secretary of the Permanent Bureau. On the basis of this report a special commission of members of the Conference prepared a draft convention which was made the subject of the work at the ninth session.

³ For an English translation of the Final Act of the ninth session of the Conference, which contains the three new draft conventions, see 10 I.C.L.Q. (1960) 37.

The purpose of the convention was solely to deal with the formalities of diplomatic or consular legalization, which in some countries requires action by many authorities. In the United States, for instance, the signature of a notary public may be authenticated by a county court clerk. The latter's signature must then be authenticated by the Secretary of State of the State concerned, and his signature is then authenticated by the United States Secretary of State, whose signature is finally authenticated by the embassy of the country in which the affidavit is to be used. The convention provides a single new certificate (*apostille*) which may replace this old-type legalization.

The *apostille* certifies the authenticity of the signature, the capacity in which the person signing it has acted, and the name of the authority which has affixed the seal or stamp which the certificate bears. The authorities competent to issue the certificate are designated by each contracting state. Use of the certificate is permissible and not obligatory so that cases which at present do not require authentication will remain so. The convention, an improvement on the practice which prevails at the present in this matter, was adopted unanimously by all members except Belgium and Yugoslavia, which abstained.

Form of Wills

The second convention, which relates merely to the form of wills, originated in a United Kingdom proposal at the 1956 Conference. A report on the proposal prepared by a Secretary of the Permanent Bureau and published in June 1958 was studied by a special commission having a chairman and a rapporteur. This commission prepared the draft convention that was discussed at the ninth session. That the convention's purpose is to facilitate the making of valid wills, so far as form is concerned, is shown in the following provisions of article 1:⁴

1. A testamentary disposition shall be valid as regards form if it complies with the internal law:

(a) of the place where the testator made it, or

(b) of a nationality possessed by the testator, either at the time when he made the disposition, or at the time of his death, or

(c) of a place in which the testator had his domicile, either at the time when he made the disposition, or at the time of his death, or

⁴ 10 I.C.L.Q. (1961) 47.

(d) of the place in which the testator had his habitual residence, either at the time when he made the disposition, or at the time of his death, or

(e) so far as immovables are concerned, of the place where they are situated.

After enumerating the choice of legal systems, article 1 provides that "if a national law consists of a non-unified system, the law to be applied shall be determined by the rules in force in that system and, failing any such rules, by that law within such system with which the testator had the closest connection." A novel one in international agreements, this provision will be of assistance in determining the applicable law in cases of federal states or in cases involving British nationality and in similar instances.

Under article 2 revocations of wills are governed by the provisions of article 1. The provisions of the convention, which was adopted unanimously, are made applicable even if the law in question is not that of a contracting state. Under article 6 the convention's rules of conflicts are "independent of any requirement of reciprocity."

Protection of Infants

Originating in a decision of the 1956 Conference, the subject of the convention on infants was referred to a special commission. From answers to a questionnaire there were prepared a report and a draft convention which were considered at the ninth session. As between the contracting states the convention replaces the one governing guardianship of infants signed at The Hague on June 12, 1902. The latter was based on the principle of nationality.

Article 1 of the new convention gives jurisdiction to the judicial or administrative authorities of the state "of the habitual residence of an infant" to take steps directed to the protection of his person or property. These steps are those provided for by the domestic law of that state. While certain authority is preserved to the state of the infant's nationality, in cases of urgency any contracting state where the infant or his property is located may take measures of protection which, however, need not be recognized by other contracting states. This convention was adopted by all members except Belgium and the United Kingdom, which abstained. In the aforesaid report on the ninth

session by Mr. Barrett and Mr. Dezendorf it is stated:

It should be observed that the subject matter covered by each of the three conventions approved at The Hague Conference is important to the several states and that the international problems sought to be solved by them are important to state law in the United States.

Future Work of Conference

With respect to future work of the Conference, the following decisions were made at the ninth session. The State Commission was requested to instruct the Permanent Bureau to continue its studies on the question of the jurisdiction of a court chosen by agreement of the parties as well as on the more general question of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. There was also established a special commission for these two matters which is to be summoned for a meeting by the State Commission as soon as the preparatory work has been completed by the Permanent Bureau. It was also decided to include this item in the agenda of the next session of the Conference.

The special commission just mentioned will not deal with recognition of judgments relating to personal status, a subject covered by the old Hague conventions. However, the Conference requested the State Commission to instruct the Permanent Bureau to undertake the studies and consultations necessary for the preparation of a convention on the recognition of foreign judgments on personal status.

The State Commission was also requested by the Conference to instruct the Permanent Bureau to undertake the study of the problem of giving notice of judicial and extrajudicial documents to interested parties living abroad. Suggestion for this study was made in a memorandum prepared by the Union Internationale des Huissiers de Justice et Officiers Judiciaires. This study is to be undertaken "in order to bring together the factors necessary for a solution of the problems indicated."

With respect to the adoption of foreign children, another subject dealt with by the Conference, a special commission was established to study the conflicts of law and jurisdiction in relation to this problem so far as it concerns the adoption of a child by a person or persons not possessing the same nationality as he or living in another country. The research and consultations necessary for

the preparation of the work of the special commission and contacts with other interested organizations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental, is to be undertaken, at the request of the State Commission, by the Permanent Bureau.

Question of Achieving Uniformity

Methods for achieving uniformity were discussed at the ninth session. This problem, and particularly the use of uniform legislation in addition to conventions, had been raised by the United States observers at the eighth session. The Netherlands State Commission furnished a memorandum on the preparation of uniform laws which, together with the comments thereon by the Governments of Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Norway, and Sweden, was submitted to the Conference. There was also furnished to all the delegates at the ninth session by the United States observers Barrett and Dezendorf a memorandum on the composition and the method of operation of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the United States.

The question of uniform laws was taken up in Commission V and was referred to a small committee which prepared a report.⁵ Its conclusions may be stated in brief as follows. While the use of international conventions should not be abandoned, this method makes cooperation of states with a federal system of government difficult. For fear that the more flexible form of uniform laws without international commitment may be preferred, the proposal for a simultaneous use of conventions and uniform laws was rejected. Conventions could be used by any state that desires to introduce the rules of the convention into its domestic law without any commitment. The report recommends that, when reciprocity is not required, the substantive parts of conventions may be so drafted as to be taken out easily by nonmember states desiring to introduce those parts into their domestic law.

As finally adopted by the Conference, the decision points out "the need to retain the diplomatic character of the Conference, which connotes primarily the preparation of conventions." How-

⁵ For an English translation of the report of this committee, see IX Am. J. Comp. L. (1960) 583, 592.

ever, the decision notes that there is also "need to search for means of insuring a greater sphere of influence for the solutions involved and results obtained." The decision concludes as follows:⁶

It considers that one means of achieving this object might be found on the basis of the rearrangement of the conventions. In the first place, so far as the subject-matter is appropriate, an editorial technique should be used to remove from the substantive provisions elements of a reciprocal character, which would be regrouped in a separate part of the convention. In the second place, with respect to the substance of each convention, delegations and experts should consider whether or not there is a possibility of establishing rules of conflicts free from reciprocal elements and designed for general application, without making any distinction with regard to nations between which legal relations regulated by the convention exist.

In particular it wishes to draw the attention of the Permanent Bureau to the problems and solutions indicated in the present decision.

Finally, the Conference decided to keep on its agenda the subject of conflicts of law concerning agency. As to the method of operation of the Conference in its consideration of drafts, the aforesaid report by Mr. Barrett and Mr. Dezendorf states that it "bears great similarity to the method used by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws" of the United States.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, New York.

General Assembly

Tenth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the 16th session of the General Assembly reviewing the activities and organization of the Secretariat. A/4901. September 29, 1961. 33 pp.

Observations of UNESCO Director-General on African educational development. A/4903/Add. 1. September 29, 1961. 3 pp.

Permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A/4905. October 2, 1961. 3 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on international flow of long-term capital and official donations, 1951-59. A/4906. October 4, 1961. 62 pp.

Provision of food surpluses to food-deficient peoples through the United Nations system. A/4907. October 6, 1961. 45 pp.

Letter dated October 7 from the Netherlands representa-

tive to the President of the General Assembly concerning granting independence to colonial peoples. A/4915. October 9, 1961. 5 pp.

Note verbale dated October 9 from the U.K. representative transmitting a statement of the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland concerning the appointment of a group to investigate the death of Dag Hammarskjöld. A/4917. October 10, 1961. 3 pp.

Nineteenth progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. November 12, 1960, to October 13, 1961. A/4921. October 13, 1961. 7 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on decentralization of U.N. economic and social activities and strengthening regional economic commissions. A/4911. October 14, 1961. 34 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on public information activities of the United Nations. A/4927. October 19, 1961. 16 pp.

Letter dated October 14 from the Ethiopian representative to the President of the General Assembly concerning African educational development. A/4928. October 19, 1961. 2 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on cost estimates and financing the U.N. operation in the Congo. A/4931. October 20, 1961. 15 pp.

Report of the Committee on South West Africa concerning the implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 1568 (XV) and 1596 (XV). A/4926. October 26, 1961. 95 pp.

Note verbale dated October 27 from the Indonesian mission concerning granting independence to colonial peoples. A/4944. October 28, 1961. 4 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943. *Extension to:* Trinidad and Tobago, September 15, 1961.

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defense and for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 15, 1961.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961.

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic¹ and Japan, August 11, 1961; Hungary,²

⁶ 10 I.C.L.Q. (1961) 67.

¹ With a declaration.

² With reservation contained in final protocol.

September 19, 1961; United States,¹ October 23, 1961. Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961.

Notifications of approval: Japan, September 19, 1961; United States, October 23, 1961.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agreement extending for 5 years the loan of certain naval vessels or small craft to Greece under the agreement of July 26 and August 5, 1957 (TIAS 3887). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 21 and November 9, 1961. Entered into force November 9, 1961.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Djakarta October 26, 1961. Entered into force October 26, 1961.

Venezuela

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736). Signed at Caracas November 11, 1961. Entered into force November 11, 1961.

Energy Agency, effective September 12. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 791 dated November 16.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 4748. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of June 10, 1955. Signed at Washington April 27, 1961. Entered into force May 31, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4750. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of January 11, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara March 29, 1961. Entered into force March 29, 1961. With related exchange of notes.

Postal Convention. TIAS 4751. 9 pp. 10¢.

Postal convention with Canada. Signed at Ottawa January 12, and at Washington January 13, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1961.

Economic and Technical Assistance. TIAS 4752. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Sierra Leone. Signed at Freetown May 5, 1961. Entered into force May 5, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4753. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Israel. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv May 10, 1961. Entered into force May 10, 1961.

Economic, Financial, Technical and Related Assistance. TIAS 4754. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Senegal. Signed at Washington May 13, 1961. Entered into force May 13, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4756. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Yugoslavia. Signed at Belgrade April 28, 1961. Entered into force April 28, 1961. With exchanges of letters.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4757. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Republic of Korea, amending the agreement of December 28, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul May 11, 1961. Entered into force May 11, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4758. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Burma, amending the agreement of May 27, 1958, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rangoon June 1, 1961. Entered into force June 1, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on November 11 appointed John O. Bell to be Ambassador to Guatemala. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 788 dated November 15.)

The President on November 11 appointed John H. Burns to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 808 dated November 21.)

The President on November 8 appointed William S. Gaud to be Regional Administrator for the Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 772 dated November 8.)

The President on November 14 appointed Teodoro Moscoso to be Regional Administrator for Latin America, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 783 dated November 14.)

Appointments

Ashton J. O'Donnell as senior scientific and technical adviser to the U.S. delegation to the International Atomic

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4759. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Sierra Leone. Exchange of notes—Signed at Freetown May 16 and 19, 1961. Entered into force May 19, 1961.

Reactivation of Temporary Tracking Station in Magalanes Province. TIAS 4760. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Chile. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santiago April 21 and May 10, 1961. Entered into force May 10, 1961.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Shipbuilding Program for Danish Navy. TIAS 4761. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Denmark, supplementing the agreement of May 8, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Copenhagen May 17, 1961. Entered into force May 17, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4762. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the agreement of August 1, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo May 27, 1961. Entered into force May 27, 1961.

Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement. TIAS 4763. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank. Signed at Washington June 19, 1961. Entered into force June 19, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes. TIAS 4764. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Italy. Signed at Rome December 3, 1960. Entered into force May 24, 1961.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4766. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of December 27, 1949, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara April 21 and May 30, 1961. Entered into force May 30, 1961.

Money Orders. TIAS 4767. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between Postal Administrations of the United States and the Netherlands Antilles. Signed at Willemstad December 20, 1960, and at Washington January 11, 1961. Entered into force May 1, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to November 13 are Nos. 757 of November 1, and 773 of November 9.

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†779	11/13	Note to U.S.S.R. on resumption of nuclear test ban conference.
*780	11/13	Rusk: death of Ambassador Biddle.
*782	11/13	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*783	11/14	Moscoco sworn in as AID administrator for Latin America (biographic details).
†784	11/14	Williams: National Citizens Committee for WHO.
785	11/14	Woodward: OAS Special Committee on Dominican Republic.
†786	11/15	Johnson: "The Aspirations of Asia."
†787	11/15	Rowan: American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities.
*788	11/15	Bell sworn in as ambassador to Guatemala (biographic details).
*789	11/16	Rusk: death of Speaker Rayburn.
790	11/17	AID fertilizer procurement procedures.
*791	11/16	O'Donnell appointed scientific adviser to IAEA delegation (biographic details).
*792	11/17	Torch of Friendship ceremony, Miami.
*793	11/17	Louchheim: National Council of Negro Women.
*794	11/17	Chapman: Pennsylvania State Employees Council.
*795	11/18	Rowan: AP Managing Editors.
*796	11/17	Rusk: death of Italian airmen in Congo.
797	11/18	Rusk: news conference.
†798	11/18	OECD communique.
799	11/18	Rusk: situation in Dominican Republic.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Vol. XLV, No. 1172

December 11, 1961

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The American Tradition and Its Implications for International Law

by *Adlai E. Stevenson*
*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

For us who have been educated in the law and who also have something to do with international affairs, the dedication of this splendid new law school building carries a simple and forceful moral. It says to us that just as this is a time for building in the life of universities, it is also a time for building in the life of nations. Indeed it is a principle of life that when you stop building you start dying, and never has that principle been more evident than it is in our day.

Yet if we build it must be on good foundations. If we are to know where we are going, we must know where we are and where we have been. So I am glad that the theme which you have given me today begins with the words "The American Tradition."

A wise man once said that the trouble with this generation of Americans is that "they haven't read the minutes of the previous meeting." It is all too true. As a result we often repeat the mistakes of the past and think that, in learning from our mistakes exactly what our predecessors learned from theirs, we have done something quite splendid.

But that method is no longer good enough, if it ever was. There is a sage warning in Rousseau's observation about his pupil Emile:

The best way to teach Emile not to lean out of the window is to let him fall out. Unfortunately, the defect of this system is that the pupil may not survive to profit by his experience.

Now, in the legal field I am not going to try to read you the entire "minutes of the previous meet-

ing." I have to leave it to the scholars to do that. But I want to pick out a theme or two which recur in our history and which have relevance to our international predicament today.

For one thing, our people are deeply respectful of the law for the most part; and yet sometimes we show a lingering weakness for anarchy. At the end of a bad day in court long ago I'm afraid I was guilty of saying; "You know, I always thought that judge was impartial, but today he found against me." A good many of us seem to accept the ruling of the umpire but feel we have a constitutional right to talk back to him.

Then when Jefferson wrote that "all men are created equal," it is pretty clear that the gentlemen who signed their names to that explosive proposition didn't mean it quite as much as we mean it today. In their day the vote was generally denied to women, to slaves, and to people without property. Many of the same gentlemen, 11 years later, wrote a Constitution which permitted American citizens to import African slaves until 1808. And even half a century after that Lincoln himself was not absolutely sure that God had made the Negro equal in natural endowment with the white man. His act of emancipation, which ennobled the history of that age, was thus in some degree an act of faith.

We are still redeeming Lincoln's act of faith. Whatever our Constitution and our courts say, we as a people, North as well as South, are still learning by experience and by suffering to realize the truth of racial equality. It seems probable that this painful process will continue for years more, perhaps many years.

¹ Address made at the dedication of the Fordham University Law School building at Lincoln Square, New York, N.Y., on Nov. 17 (U.S./U.N. press releas 3843).

It is thus a newly explored truth, but it is not newly discovered. It was there all along, imbedded in our national heritage. We received it from many sources, but perhaps most of all from the Christian teachings which lie at the heart of our tradition. We find it in the story of Jesus preaching to the people of Samaria, a people whom the Jews feared and despised. We find it in the Apostle Paul reminding his flock in Galatia that in their Christian fellowship "There is neither Jew nor Greek." And through 2,000 years Christian teachers and missionaries have carried to all continents and all races that same universal truth.

The perception of that truth is, of course, one of the central ingredients of the United Nations. It is explicit in the charter. It is a central theme in our debates. It is written on the faces of the delegates of 103 nations, which are the faces of every race of mankind.

Not much over a year ago, Dag Hammarskjöld spoke of the need for solidarity between Europe and Africa and Asia and added this testimony from his own experience: "I believe no anthropologist nowadays," he said, "would say that the various branches of the family of man represent fundamentally different potentialities. . . . For my part I have not been able to discover any such differences."

But perception alone will not save us. A few days ago Prime Minister Nehru, during his visit in this country, observed that "A politician may aim at the right—he may even perceive the right—but he must convey that perception to others to function. A saint need not, and therefore he is often stoned to death."

Through our history we Americans may have perceived the right most of the time, but we have not always tried very hard to act on it or to convey our perception to others. Most of us have practiced the equality and dignity of all men only as much as we found convenient.

Now, for the American people and indeed for all free peoples, that age of convenience is past. In this generation we are compelled by history to practice our beliefs to the limit.

I say "compelled" advisedly. The Communist challenge rejects all ideas of man's "unalienable rights" and yet claims, just as we do, to speak in the name of "all men." This challenge has put us on our mettle. As never before, we are required to search out our values and to exert

ourselves to narrow the gap between our pretensions and the reality of our lives.

This obligation lies upon us in all aspects of our civic duty, at home and abroad. It requires us to raise up our education, the life of our cities, of our families, our churches, our mass media of communication, our party politics, our system of justice, and all the centers of influence in this plural society. And most of all, for the sake of peace as well as freedom, it requires us to build, on a world scale, a true community of nations—a community of "all men."

Let me therefore explore with you the present state of the community and some of the means of strengthening it.

The United Nations

Our exploration must begin with the United Nations—and first of all with the United Nations Charter. The charter is a necessary starting point because, more than any other document of our age, it expresses the adherence of the nations of the world to certain values and standards of conduct. It is, in our time, the supreme embodiment of basic international law.

I should add, because of our topic today, that the charter is also, to a very great extent, a projection onto the international stage of universal principles which lie at the heart of the American tradition. They are all in the charter:

- The principle that the sovereign is subject to the law, especially where the use of force is concerned;
- The principle that human beings are created with certain rights which cannot be taken away from them—including the right to be governed by their own consent;
- The principle that governments are obliged to uphold these rights;
- The principle of reserved powers, which places strict limits on intervention by the central authority;
- The principle of attention to the "general welfare" in order that freedom may be given reality through economic and social progress.

Now the United Nations Charter is a guide to action for its members in *all* their international affairs—not just in the work of the Organization itself. Yet the light of the charter, though it is

supposed to illuminate the whole world, shines a little brighter in the buildings over on the East River than it does anywhere else, so that the shortcomings of nations are more glaringly illuminated there. And there can be no doubt that the United Nations Organization has proved itself a priceless instrument for bringing the aims of the charter nearer to realization.

The Organization has undergone many profound changes since 1945.

It has doubled in size. The signatories of the charter in 1945 numbered 51. Today there are 103 member states, and for many of them nationhood is newer than the United Nations itself.

This increase has significantly altered the balance of influence in voting. There was a time when the United States could be confident of a large majority in the General Assembly on any political issue of real importance to us. But the admission of 43 new members since 1955—the great majority of them from “unaligned” Africa and Asia—has changed all that. In our relations with the newly independent states, time is on our side; at least it is if we use it well. Whatever their original suspicions or skepticism of the West, I think they have begun to find that we are profoundly and anxiously interested in their welfare and their future.

The second great change has been the shift of authority from the 11-member Security Council to the full General Assembly. This arose directly from the Soviet abuse of the Security Council veto to prevent emergency actions sought by the majority. It was necessary, if the United Nations was to act at all, to be able to move the center of decision to a place where a small minority could not prevent action.

This was provided for in 1950, when the General Assembly agreed that, whenever the Security Council was prevented by the veto from taking action, the Assembly itself would meet in emergency session and recommend collective measures, including, if necessary, the use of military force.²

Under this procedure the resolutions condemning Russia for intervening in Hungary, and bringing about the withdrawal of Britain and France from their attack on Suez, were drawn up and approved by the General Assembly in emergency

session. So too were some of the crucial resolutions on the crisis in the Congo.

The Assembly has been a great initiator in many fields. It has devised programs and mobilized hundreds of millions for technical aid and economic development. It has overseen the administration of trust territories and dependent areas. It has enabled a million refugees to find new homes. Most difficult and daring of all, it has put together military forces and corps of civilian administrators to head off civil war and anarchy.

The direction of these global tasks heavily taxed the Secretariat and its chief, the Secretary-General. As a result he acquired more power and discretion than was dreamt of in the early days of the Organization.

It was probably inevitable that this increase in the vigor of the United Nations should eventually collide with the ambitions of the Soviet Union. The challenge came in September 1960. That was the moment when Soviet ambitions in Africa were frustrated by the United Nations, when Mr. Khrushchev launched his famous “troika” proposal, accompanied by the drumming of shoes and fists. Not only was Dag Hammarskjöld to resign; his office would be abolished altogether and a three-headed body substituted—a committee representing the three alleged “forces” of communism, capitalism, and neutralism which, in Moscow’s mythology, are supposed to be running the world at this moment in history. And of course the troika could act only “by agreement”—thus grafting the Soviet veto power onto the Secretariat.

The reaction was hardly a triumph for Soviet diplomacy. Hardly a nation, outside the obedient Communist bloc, was willing to support the troika.

When Dag Hammarskjöld was killed, Moscow resumed the attack. And once again it failed. Gradually, through 6 weeks of negotiation, they receded bit by bit and gave to the new unanimous choice, the able U Thant, of Burma, the *carte blanche* on Secretariat appointments to which the charter entitles him. And when his name came before the General Assembly, without any advance declarations on how he would conduct his office or whom he would appoint, the vote in the 103-nation Assembly was 103 to 0.

So one great crisis has been passed—at least until April 1963. But a second one is nearly upon us: a financial crisis.

² For text of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

U.N.'s Financial Crisis

The United Nations military operation to save the Congo will have cost about \$180 million by the end of this year. Of this total more than \$59 million is unpaid. There is another \$33 million unpaid on the bills of the United Nations Emergency Force, that international force which still guards the border between Israel and Egypt. That adds up to \$92 million in unpaid bills.

Nor is that the whole story. Neither of these two operations has reached the point where it can be reduced with safety. The bills will keep on coming in during 1962.

Who must pay to save the Congo? The United States, by assessment plus voluntary contributions, has already paid nearly half—much more than its assessed share. Twenty-nine others have paid about one-eighth. The Soviet bloc, France, and South Africa say they will not pay. Others say they cannot. Others simply do not.

It has been calculated that, if matters continue as they have gone thus far, the treasury of the United Nations will be empty and its credit exhausted by the end of March 1962. How the Communist bloc, and the promoters of Katanga's secession, and any others who find in the United Nations an obstacle to their dreams—how they must be waiting and hoping for that moment!

What is the answer?

Shall the members allow their Organization to die by financial hemorrhage?

Or shall the United Nations, in the name of economy, strike its colors in the Congo and the Middle East and resign those areas to chaos?

Or do other nations perhaps think that the United States, although we do not call the tune at the United Nations and do not wish to, can somehow be prevailed on to pay the piper? If this illusion exists, it will have to be dispelled as quickly as possible.

The stark fact is that if the members will not pay for the United Nations they will not have it. Will this be fully realized in time?

I have been talking about the United Nations as it now exists, because what it does is directly relevant to the development of international law. With all its limitations and weaknesses, the United Nations gives effect to orderly concepts of law through the rather disorderly proceedings of parliamentary diplomacy.

The international judicial system is something else again. It is far more orderly, but it is gravely undernourished.

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is an organ of the United Nations. Its statute is an integral part of the charter. But it has been sadly neglected. In 16 years it has considered only about 35 cases, made decisions in about 18, and handed down 11 advisory opinions. Some of these decisions have concerned very important legal questions, but the caseload is one which an overworked judge in New York or Chicago would find hard to believe.

The shame of this situation for Americans is that we have done so little to keep busy the 15 eminent judges of this Court, whose work should be one of the great bulwarks of the world order and rule of law about which we talk so much. When the Senate attached the Connally amendment to our act of ratification, it reserved the right to judge for ourselves whether a particular case is a domestic United States matter and therefore beyond the reach of the World Court. We are today the only major power to insist on this crippling "self-judging" principle. The result is, in effect, a legal boomerang. We can refuse to be a defendant in the World Court, to be sure; but by the same token, because of the rule of reciprocity, we can hardly expect to be a plaintiff either. By our own act we have, in effect, cut the United States off from access to the World Court. We can't lose a case, and we can't win one—we just sit on the sidelines in unsplendid isolation while the Court languishes.

Here is a matter on which the American tradition is relevant.

The tradition I have in mind begins in 1794, when Jay's treaty with England cleaned up a number of outstanding issues left over from our War of Independence. One of these was a boundary dispute between what is now the State of Maine and the Canadian Province of New Brunswick. Under the treaty this dispute was to be settled by three commissioners—one chosen by England, one by the United States, and one jointly by the other two.

After the decision had been made unanimously by these three commissioners—and resulted in

Canada's getting a strip of forest which our side had claimed for Maine—the American commissioner, David Howell, commended the decision in these words:

Why shall not all the nations on earth determine their disputes in this mode, rather than choke the rivers with their carcasses and stain the soil of continents with their slain?

That question is still good today, and it acquires extra urgency in the face of the Communist challenge. Do we or don't we favor an international legal order as a means to world peace based on justice? And if we don't, then how are we to insure peace and justice for this community of nations which ultimately is our surest defense against communism?

In my opinion to remove the Connally amendment would do this country a great service and contribute to the growth of the community of peace and justice.

Fields Requiring New Treaties

There is much more to be done.

In the field of treaty law we can expect very important developments over the coming years. The greatest field requiring new treaties is likely to be in the economic sphere, where so many new relationships are evolving. Europe's Common Market, soon to be joined by Great Britain, will be a formidable trading force with which the United States must make creative arrangements for the good of all concerned.

Meanwhile all the nations of the North Atlantic must find ways of promoting quickly the massive economic development which is a matter of life and death through much of Africa and Asia. That movement, on which so much of the future of freedom depends, will require new treaties to establish the rights and duties of private and public investors.

Here truly is one of the most creative areas for the development of new international law. Not the least of its promises is the chance to prove to the emerging nations that not all treaties are like the capitulations or "unequal treaties" of an earlier age. The security and predictability of treaties can work powerfully for them in speeding their development and promoting their independence.

Nor should the Soviet Union be excluded from the reach of treaties, though its interests and ours

are much harder to reconcile. We have a precedent in the recently concluded treaties on the law of the sea.³ And we have the encouraging example of the recent treaty on Antarctica,⁴ which reserves that vast area for peaceful uses, forbids nuclear tests there, suspends territorial claims, and—perhaps most important of all—permits inspection by each party of the installations of all the others.

With that start we can press forward for treaties with the Soviet Union and other nations governing the peaceful use of outer space. More immediately, only this week the United States and the United Kingdom have once again urged the Soviet Union to resume negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear tests under international control.⁵ We have no illusions about the difficulty of that problem. But we are encouraged by an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly urging such a treaty.⁶

I need not say how greatly this one treaty, with full inspection on both sides, would relieve the fear of war and add to the security of every nation. It is important not only as a first step toward nuclear disarmament but as a pilot project for a far more comprehensive general and complete disarmament program. With all the defiant acts of Moscow fresh in our minds, it is easy to dismiss the whole idea of disarmament as a utopian dream. But we dare not be so irresponsible. We know the suicidal power of the new weapons, and people all over the world know it too. Even if we were tempted to give up trying, they wouldn't let us.

We must not yield, then, to despair or to hysteria. We cannot know how long Moscow will withhold its agreement to a sound and fully controlled disarmament program. But we are a grownup nation, and when we have a great goal, however distant, we must be prepared to work for it and believe in its attainment over a long period.

Disarmament is such a goal; and with it is now combined, in the plan we have laid before the United Nations,⁷ a proposal for the progressive

³ For texts of conventions adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, see *ibid.*, June 30, 1958, p. 1111.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.

⁵ For background, see p. 965.

⁶ For text of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 8, see BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 93S.

⁷ For a U.S. proposal on general and complete disarmament submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

development of a United Nations Peace Force and of institutions under the United Nations capable of keeping the peace in a world of disarmed nations.

That is the ultimate limit, thus far, of our vision of a world of law. We may not reach it for many years—perhaps never. But “. . . man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a heaven for?”

Some Shorter Steps To Be Taken

There are many shorter steps which we must take. Some of them lie within the United Nations, some outside—but all within the scope of the charter.

Within the United Nations, the United States has suggested a series of steps to improve the United Nations’ machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, for on-the-spot factfinding, mediation, and adjudication, for extending the rule of international law.

That is a vast field to be explored. Only this week I outlined to the Political Committee of the General Assembly some of the United States’ ideas on this subject, including the designation and special training of national military units for future emergency service at the call of the United Nations.

Outside the United Nations, from the Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere to the growing economic institutions of the Atlantic Community, there is scarcely a region of the non-Communist world in which we are not working to build the foundations of a stronger and more peaceful world order.

Recently Senator Fulbright wrote persuasively in favor of building a “concert of free nations.” I believe we should pursue that line, not as an alternative to the United Nations but rather as a way to strengthen and support its most promising institutions. In fact, the United Nations itself has often acted precisely as such a concert of free nations. Time and again, from Korea to United Nations technical assistance, from the World Bank to the emergency actions in Suez and the Congo, the United Nations has acted either with little or no participation by the Soviet bloc or actually in the teeth of Soviet opposition.

Much of the greatest work of this community remains to be done. In that work the development of international law must take its rightful

place. We all owe a debt to the leaders of the American bar who are joining in a series of regional conferences throughout the free world, this year and next, on “World Peace Through Law.”

Through such contacts, and through the consensus which they help to build, we may look forward to the day when every nation of the free world—our own included!—will accept the jurisdiction of the World Court on international legal disputes and when every member will so prize the community to which it belongs that it will not hesitate to lose a case in that Court and honor the decision.

When that day comes, then truly we can say that a world community has come into being—a community too solid for the Communists to break up, and which they may ultimately decide to join in fact as well as in form.

Grounds for Confidence

These are long perspectives. I cheerfully admit that history leaves ample ammunition for the cynical and the fearful. For instance, it can be pointed out that the great innovations in international order—the concert of Europe, the League, and the U.N. itself—have been made *after* great wars, not in the impending shadow of new wars.

But one can be too fascinated by such fatalistic patterns. Is not this cold war to which we have been condemned for the past 15 years perhaps as close to a real war as the world dares to come in this nuclear age? And will not the settlement of it—to say nothing of the revolutionary transformations in Africa and Asia—demand innovations in international order quite as great as any the world has ever seen before?

I believe they will. I suspect that international law will have a much greater part to play in the remaining decades of this century than it has had in recent years.

None of us can tell what forms will finally emerge, but we have grounds for confidence nonetheless. Dag Hammarskjold once said, in reviewing the development of executive action in the United Nations, that the Organization had already “conquered essential new ground” which would not be lost “even if political complications were one day to force us to a wholly new start.”

In that spirit we must have the fortitude to withstand disappointment and even tragedy, to

be prepared to see all our work apparently lost—and yet to know that nothing of real value in our experience is ever lost and that as long as we have life we must try again.

And I think we already have the warrant of experience to expect that whatever emerges will be in harmony with the great universal principles of the American tradition—the principles of that Declaration in which Lincoln found something “which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time.”

U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S.-U.K. Proposal To Resume Geneva Test Ban Talks

On November 13 the United States and the United Kingdom delivered similar notes to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposing resumption of the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The Soviet Union accepted the U.S.-U.K. proposal on November 21. Following are texts of the U.S. and Soviet notes and two Department statements.

UNITED STATES NOTE, NOVEMBER 13

Press release 779 dated November 13

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to state the following:

The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests recessed on September 9, 1961. The relevant portion of the joint communique agreed to by the Soviet, British, and American delegations is as follows:

The representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom proposed a recess until after the completion of the General Assembly debate on the nuclear tests question.

The Conference went into recess.

The United Nations General Assembly has now completed its debate on the nuclear test issue.¹ Thus, the condition under which the Geneva conference recess was proposed last September has now been fulfilled. Further, the General Assembly has overwhelmingly adopted a resolution call-

ing for resumption of negotiations on a nuclear weapon test ban.

The United States Government therefore formally proposes to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the meetings of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests be resumed on November 28, 1961.

In this connection the United States Government notes that the General Assembly resolution 1649 (XVI) of November 8, 1961, calls for a progress report on nuclear test ban negotiations to be submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission no later than December 14, 1961. The United States Government will consider any other date which the Soviet Government may wish to suggest with respect to prompt resumption of nuclear test ban negotiations which would also permit fulfillment of the requirement laid down in the General Assembly resolution cited above.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 13²

Recently, on November 7, Chairman Khrushchev had a great deal to say about the Soviet Union's current testing series³—the single most intensive testing program in history. Although he acknowledged that atmospheric tests are “harmful to health,” Chairman Khrushchev did not state that the Soviet Union, seemingly oblivious to worldwide concern, is conducting a testing program in which radioactive fallout will exceed all previous amounts from all previous tests ever conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The series to date has included over 30 detonations in the atmosphere, totaling an approximate energy yield of 120 megatons or 120 million tons of TNT.

In stating that the Soviet Union will stop its testing if other powers stop, Chairman Khrushchev conveniently overlooked the fact that it was the Soviet Union which, in an effort to intimidate and terrorize the world to do the Soviet bidding, broke the 3-year test moratorium. If the Soviet Union earnestly desires to erase concern over health hazards, if it is, in fact, ready and willing to end the testing of nuclear weapons, it can do so now.

² Read to news correspondents by a Department press officer on Nov. 13.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1961, p. 844.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 936.

A return to the negotiating table at Geneva, as proposed in today's notes of the United States and the United Kingdom, and the early conclusion of an agreement with adequate safeguards can bring a secure and permanent halt to nuclear weapons testing and can assure the world that there will be no repetition of another series of secretly prepared massive Soviet explosions. For its part the United States will not abandon the objective of agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty but will pursue its own program of carefully circumscribed testing until such agreement is reached.

SOVIET NOTE, NOVEMBER 21

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States and in reply to the 13 November 1961 note of the embassy considers it necessary to state the following:

In the course of the entire postwar period, since the appearance of the new weapon of mass annihilation—the nuclear weapon—the Soviet Union has been consistently striving and is striving for a ban on the use of this weapon, discontinuance of its production, elimination of stockpiles, and consequently discontinuance also of all kinds of nuclear tests for all time.

To deliver mankind from the threat of starting a rocket-nuclear war—such is the aim the Soviet Government is constantly striving to attain. This aim is served by known Soviet proposals on universal and total disarmament which are under examination at the United Nations. The Soviet Government is prepared, as before, to do everything in its power to bring closer the day when nuclear weapons would cease forever to threaten the life of people. It is for this reason that on 14 November it voted at the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly for a draft resolution on banning the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government would welcome appropriate efforts by the governments of the United States and Great Britain.

The position of the Soviet Government with regard to nuclear tests is undoubtedly well known to the governments of the United States and Great Britain, since it has been expounded from every angle and in detail in a number of Soviet Government documents and in speeches made by Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, published after the talks were suspended.

In this connection, attention is drawn to the speech made by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev at the 7 November reception held on the occasion of the 44th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, in which he expounded the position of the Soviet Government on this issue, taking into account the present international situation and proceeding from the sincere striving of the Soviet Union to save mankind, as soon as possible, from the threat of nuclear war.

If, at the present moment, the governments of the United States and Great Britain are of the opinion that the resumption of negotiations between the governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Great Britain on the subject of the termination of nuclear tests can facilitate a rapprochement between the points of view of the two sides, the Soviet Government is ready to make still another joint attempt to achieve progress on this matter, remembering that the three powers who took part in the negotiations proclaimed universal and complete disarmament as their common goal.

In this, the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in the near future, in accordance with the accord reached between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States on the principles of universal and complete disarmament,⁴ the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly, it may be hoped, will adopt a decision on the resumption of negotiations on the whole complex of questions pertaining to universal and complete disarmament and on establishing an organ in which such negotiations will be conducted.

It is self-evident that if during the negotiations any power begins to hold tests of nuclear weapons then, due to circumstances to which the Soviet Government has pointed more than once, the other side would be compelled to make the relevant conclusions also with regard to nuclear tests.

Taking into account the above-mentioned, the Soviet Government expresses its consent that the Geneva conference of the three powers on the subject of terminating nuclear weapons tests should resume its work 28 November 1961.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 21

Press release 811 dated November 21

The United States is today instructing the U.S. delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to return to Geneva in preparation for the resumption of the negotiations November 28. The conference went into recess on September 9.

Soviet agreement to the U.S. proposal to return to negotiations is welcome. Many of the world's hopes for progress in controlling the threat of war and of progressing toward the United Nations goal of general and complete disarmament had been centered in these negotiations, in which a wide area of agreement had been reached. The world will take hope anew with the reconvening of these negotiations.

The United States and United Kingdom tabled a full text of a draft treaty on April 18,⁵ incor-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

porating all of the articles and annexes which had previously been agreed among the three delegations. The United States made a series of further compromise proposals on the outstanding issues confronting the conference as late as August 28, two weeks before the conference recessed. To date there has been no Soviet reply to these compromise proposals. If rapid and constructive efforts are made, the United States believes that early agreement can be reached on a treaty which will insure the ending of nuclear weapons tests under effective control.

The United States and the rest of the world is fully aware that the Soviet Union has carried out within recent months the most extensive testing series in history. This series of tests was obviously prepared and started during the period of the moratorium on testing which the Soviets had agreed to observe and was carried out in defiance of that moratorium. In these circumstances the United States will continue to take such actions as it deems necessary to safeguard its national security interests until a controlled test-ban agreement is achieved.

President and Chancellor Adenauer Hold Talks at Washington

Following is the text of a joint communique by President Kennedy and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary and the State Secretary for the Press Office, Federal Republic of Germany, on November 22 following discussions between the President and the Chancellor at Washington November 20-22.

The President and the Chancellor have had an extended exchange of views during the past three days on a number of problems of vital concern to their Governments. These exchanges took place in a frank and cordial atmosphere and established that there is substantial unanimity of view both on the substance of the problems and how to deal with them.

The visit of the Chancellor afforded an opportunity to the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the two countries to participate in the discussion and exchange views among themselves.

Berlin, over which the Soviet Union has created an international crisis, was the subject of earnest consultation. The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed their clear determination to insure the continuance of a free and vigorous life for the population of Berlin. They are in accord on the basic elements which will permit a peaceful resolution of this crisis through negotiation if there is reasonableness on the part of the Soviet Union. They agreed on the measures which should be taken in pursuing this objective in a manner consistent with the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. At the same time they also agreed on the necessity for maintaining and increasing the ability of the NATO Alliance to cope with any military developments. These discussions will be continued through the already announced meetings between Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Minister Macmillan and President DeGaulle and concluded in the Foreign Ministers meeting and the NATO Ministerial Meeting scheduled in mid-December in Paris.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed the ultimate goal of their Governments of achieving by peaceful means the reunification of Germany on the basis of self-determination. They were also in agreement that this objective could be realized without prejudice to the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and Germany's neighbors.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They welcomed the measures now in progress to strengthen the Alliance, but recognized the need for a sustained effort to further improve the ability of the Alliance to resist aggression.

The President and the Chancellor noted Soviet charges accusing the NATO Alliance of aggressive intent, and singling out the Federal Republic of Germany and its democratically elected government as the principal object of its false and unwarranted attack. In this regard, the President and the Chancellor reaffirmed that:

(1) The North Atlantic Alliance is an alliance for defense against aggression which abides fully by the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations. The peaceful characteristics of its members and their freedom from coercion make it manifestly impossible for NATO to commit aggression against anyone.

(2) The Federal Republic of Germany has demonstrated that it looks to its legitimate secu-

rity interests entirely within the North Atlantic Alliance, and to this end has integrated its entire effective defense establishment into the multinational NATO framework. The Chancellor, in emphasizing the defensive aspects of West German armed forces, noted that the Federal Republic is the only nation of its size all of whose forces are under international command.

While agreeing on the need to take all measures essential to strengthen the defensive posture of NATO, the President and the Chancellor recognized the necessity of not permitting Soviet pressure over Berlin to deflect them from urgently required constructive tasks vital to the welfare of their peoples and those of other nations.

The President reaffirmed the strong support of the United States for the movement toward European unity through the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and EURATOM. The President and the Chancellor agreed on the important role that the development of the European communities can play in further strengthening and complementing the entire Atlantic community. They agreed particularly on the importance and significance of proposals now being considered for a European

Political Union pursuant to the Bonn Declaration of July 1961.

They welcomed the recent decision by the OECD Council of Ministers to increase the combined gross national product of the OECD member countries by 50 percent by 1970 and pledged themselves to work toward this goal.

The President and the Chancellor also discussed the urgent need to increase the flow of development assistance to the less-developed countries. They noted that the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD provides an excellent means of stimulating a greater effort in this field. They considered that in many cases the application of combined resources from several capital exporting countries to specific development assistance problems would be a valuable method of assisting the less-developed countries.

It is the view of the President and the Chancellor that the fruitful exchange of views which they have had will facilitate the close cooperation between the United States and the Federal Republic and result in further strengthening the ties of friendship and mutual understanding which have characterized their relations in the post-war period.

Certain Aspects of the German Problem

by Donald A. Wehmeyer

The relationship of the various parties to the current German problem derives from the events of World War II. The nature of the relationship and of the special status of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R. vis-a-vis Germany is made clear by various wartime and postwar agreements between the states concerned.

During World War II these four states, to-

gether with certain other nations, formed a coalition of Allied Powers united in the common effort of defeating Nazi Germany. While at first the struggle was concentrated on purely military matters, after this initial stage political objectives began to evolve and find expression. By October 1943 the Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow was able to envisage the postwar era and accordingly stated in the agreed communique:¹

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three Governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose the Conference

• *Mr. Wehmeyer is Attorney-Adviser for European Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.*

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1943, p. 307.

decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three Governments.

It was in the European Advisory Commission that the postwar relationships between the parties in Germany were considered. The Commission began its meetings on January 14, 1944. Agreed minutes of meetings were kept as records of these discussions. On February 18, 1944, the Soviet representative submitted a document entitled "Terms of Surrender for Germany," article 15 of which contained proposals of the Soviet Government with regard to the demarcation of zones of occupation in Germany. Paragraph (d) of article 15 of the document proposed the following with regard to Berlin:

d). There shall be established around Berlin a 10/15 kilometer zone which shall be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

At the meeting on February 18, the British representative expressed the view that the arrangement on zones was inappropriate in the terms of surrender, and the minutes of the meeting of March 17, 1944, record the following:

Sir W. Strang then asked whether Mr. Gousev could make any comments on Article 15 of the Soviet draft concerning zones of occupation. . . .

Mr. Gousev stated that he would not insist upon the inclusion of Article 15 in the Instrument of Surrender which could thereby be made shorter. The delimitation could then be set forth in a separate document to be agreed only by the Allies.

At subsequent meetings various texts of such a document were considered.

On June 29, 1944, the Soviet representative submitted a draft of a protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany, "describing the three zones in the Greater Berlin Area and our [the U.S.S.R.'s] suggestions regarding the administration of the City of Berlin." This draft was considered at informal meetings on June 30, July 10, and July 12, 1944. After additional consideration and polishing the draft was agreed and signed on September 12, 1944. Attached maps were also agreed and initialed.

Western Access to Berlin

Insofar as the matter of Western access to Berlin was concerned, the situation is well reflected in a Soviet memorandum of August 26, 1944, on con-

trol machinery in Germany. The initial sentence reads:

At the present time, when it is still difficult to determine in every detail how events in Germany will develop after her surrender, the immediate problem is to decide what Allied agencies should be set up in Germany directly after the cessation of hostilities and the occupation of Germany by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

At the time initial discussions of the zones of occupation and status of Berlin took place in the European Advisory Commission, in February 1944, the Soviet army was still fighting deep inside the Soviet Union on a line Novgorod-Vitebsk-Zhlobin-Krivoi Rog. The Western Allies had not yet landed in France, and their attack from the south in Italy had proceeded only to Cassino. During the entire period of discussion, prior to September 12, 1944, none of the Allied forces were in Germany. All that was known was that heavy bombings were taking place, and the one thing that was certain was that communications were going to be heavily damaged by the end of the fighting.

Under the circumstances of the discussions in the European Advisory Commission, the arrangements made were not inappropriate. It is true that the participants did not insert a clause in the protocol stating, "there shall be a right of access between Berlin and other parts of Germany," but, since the underlying principle of the Commission had been expressed at the Moscow Conference, at which the Three Powers agreed "it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities,"² any possibility to the contrary was simply not in the minds of the participants. Because of uncertainty as to the damage they would find they had no way of being specific about details of communications, and the underlying concepts were such that the general premise was understood and accepted without statement. This is made abundantly clear by every action of the parties from early 1944 to the present day.

On May 7 and 8, 1945, the Acts of Military Surrender were signed, by which the German High Command surrendered "unconditionally to

² *Ibid.*

the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army . . ." all forces under German control. At the time of the surrender British and U.S. forces held by force of arms all of Germany west of a line running from Wismar to Magdeburg to Torgan to Dresden—practically all of the territory allotted to the Western Powers under the protocol of September 12, 1944, and a very substantial portion of the territory allocated to the Soviet Zone.

On June 5, 1945, the four major Allied governments issued a declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany.³ This was the basic declaration of the Allied Powers vis-a-vis Germany. In it they assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority." They expressly stipulated, however, that "The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany." The governments further stated that they "will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory."

Establishment of Occupation Zones

On June 5, 1945, the Four Powers also issued statements announcing the arrangements regarding the occupation regime as devised in the European Advisory Commission.⁴

The early days after the surrender were days of turmoil involving handling of prisoners, masses of refugees, and immediate housekeeping problems. On June 14, 1945, President Truman sent Marshal Stalin a message proposing *inter alia* that "we issue at once definite instructions which will get forces into their respective zones and will initiate orderly administration of the defeated territory. As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal into their own zone on June 21 in accordance with arrangements between the respective commanders, including in these arrangements simultaneous movement of the national garrisons

into Greater Berlin and provision of free access for United States forces by air, road and rail to Berlin from Frankfurt and Bremen."

Marshal Stalin replied on June 16 that, "I should like the beginning of the withdrawal to be put off till July 1," since, he said, the Soviet commanders would be away until then and mine clearing finished. He concluded, "We for our part shall take proper steps in Germany and Austria according to the plan set out above."

President Truman acknowledged Stalin's message on June 19 and stated that he had issued to the American commander instructions to begin the movement on July 1.

Pursuant to these arrangements the respective commanders met on June 29 to discuss "the taking over of the Zones of Berlin and occupation by Russian forces of Germany west of Berlin." Notes of the conference record that, after discussion of number and location of rail, road, and air routes, agreement was reached on the Magdeburg-Berlin railway and the Autobahn Hannover-Magdeburg-Brandenburg-Berlin for use by both British and American forces. Gen. Lucius Clay accepted the one road with right reserved to reopen the question at the Control Council in the event the one road was not satisfactory. An air corridor was agreed through Magdeburg and Gossler.

Shortly thereafter arrangements regarding access began to become specific as the Allied Control Council began to function. The first meeting of the Coordinating Committee took place on August 11, 1945. Various committees were thereafter established, called "Directorates," covering such fields as transport, air, economic, legal, finance, etc. All of these had meetings, minutes of which were kept. It is to be noted that these meetings began immediately after the occupation regime commenced to function. The fact that all powers shared Berlin on an equal footing and that the matter of access to Berlin was not open to question is clearly revealed. This situation is complete confirmation of previous understandings in the European Advisory Commission as set forth above. There was no question about the right of access; the only question related to details.

As will be noted subsequently, this acceptance of the right and normalcy of access to and from Berlin has been reflected in various documents and in constant practice during the intervening years. It is appropriate to note, however, that

³ For text, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1945, p. 1051.

⁴ For texts, see *ibid.*, pp. 1052-1054.

political arrangements were proceeding in pace with the administrative in Germany. Early nebulous concepts involving possible permanent dismemberment of Germany had either been discarded or evolved so that by mid-1945 the Allied Powers had determined on a constructive occupation of Germany. At the Potsdam Conference, from July 17 to August 2, 1945, they considered their occupation and postwar objectives in regard to Germany. In the Potsdam Protocol, they agreed:⁵

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis.

Agreement on political principles included the following:⁶

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

In view of current Soviet proposals regarding a German "peace treaty," it is significant to note that the Potsdam Protocol directed that the Council of Foreign Ministers "shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established."

In these statements are summed up the constant position of the United States regarding Germany—in 1945, in 1955, and in 1961. The United States entered Germany as one of four powers assuming jointly supreme authority. The United States envisaged a constructive, enlightened occupation period emphasizing democratic education and political advancement, and culminating in a peace settlement to be accepted by the government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose could be established.

Berlin Blockade

On March 20, 1948, the Soviet representatives walked out of the Allied Control Council. Shortly thereafter, on March 30, 1948, the Soviet authorities commenced the series of restrictions on traffic and goods to and from Berlin which ultimately culminated in the Berlin blockade.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1945, p. 154.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

It may be assumed that for reasons best known to itself the Soviet Union had changed its view regarding quadripartite policy toward Germany. This change became apparent in connection with efforts to cope with one of the most urgent requirements of the postwar German situation—the need for monetary reform to halt the inflation which severely hampered constructive programs required to carry out the objectives of the occupation. The Western Powers endeavored to obtain Soviet cooperation in essential monetary reform, but protracted efforts met with no success. Finally on June 18, 1948, the three Western Powers were obliged to take necessary measures by instituting currency reform in Western Germany. The Berlin blockade followed.

The blockade lasted for 11 months. On May 4, 1949, an agreement was reached at New York which provided in part as follows:⁷

1. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.

Article 1 of the New York agreement was implemented by Order No. 56 of the Soviet Military Government dated May 9, 1949.

The Council of Foreign Ministers which convened at Paris subsequent to the New York agreement of May 4, 1949, agreed as follows:⁸

5. The Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States agree that the New York agreement of May 4, 1949, shall be maintained. Moreover, in order to promote further the aims set forth in the preceding paragraphs and in order to improve and supplement this and other arrangements and agreements as regards the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and between the zones and Berlin and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take the measures necessary to insure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone, and telegraph.

Insofar as usage of access routes is concerned, the evidence is overwhelming to the effect that the routes have been heavily traveled and that such travel is peaceful. Unrestricted access is the normal situation.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, May 15, 1949, p. 631.

⁸ For text of a communique, see *ibid.*, July 4, 1949, p. 857.

Question of a Peace Treaty

An important element in the current German situation is the matter of a peace treaty. During the years since 1945 the Western Allied Powers have continually sought to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on an arrangement which would bring into existence a central German government with which a final peace settlement might be reached. At the Geneva Conference in 1959 they presented a staged plan designed to lead after a period of years to the establishment of a central German government and the signature of a peace treaty.⁹

The Soviet Union has stressed, however, that acceptance of the regime established in Eastern Germany is a *sine qua non* of a German settlement. It has recently insisted that if the Western Allied Powers do not sign a "peace treaty" with that regime, the Soviet Union will sign a "separate peace treaty" which it declares will terminate the special status of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in respect of Germany and Berlin.

The Soviet Union has proposed that a peace treaty should, indeed must, be signed with a political entity with which no war was fought, which was not even in existence at the time of World War II. The United States considers that it was at war with the international entity of the state of Germany and that any final "peace settlement" must await a government juridically capable of acting for that state.

In 1955 the three Western Powers, recognizing the desirability of resolving some of the residual problems resulting from World War II, entered into the Paris accords with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. These conventions were entered into "In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement. . . ." The Paris accords are recognized as an "interim settlement." They do, however, demonstrate that there exist procedures for overcoming most of the disadvantages flowing from the absence of a peace treaty.

In view of the current emphasis placed by the Soviet Union on the need for a "separate peace treaty," certain specific points may be noted:

1. Of significance is a statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister on May 25, 1959, at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva. Apparently assuming, contrary to fact, that the Western Powers considered the Paris accords a "peace treaty," the Foreign Minister said:

Moreover, even if we leave aside the military trend of the Paris Agreements it is impossible to lose sight of the fact that those Agreements were concluded not with all the Powers who fought against Germany but only with a group of those Powers, and not with the whole of Germany but only with a part. Who, then, in such a situation can seriously regard those Agreements as some sort of likeness to, or substitute for, a peace treaty?

2. The current Soviet preoccupation with seeking to persuade the world of the urgent necessity of a "peace treaty" with Germany is difficult to comprehend in view of the fact that the Soviet Union has failed to negotiate and sign a peace treaty with Japan, although the situation there is far less complex than in Germany.

3. Peace exists between the respective parties and Germany. The Soviet Union officially terminated the state of war with Germany on January 25, 1955. The United States, United Kingdom, and France had taken similar action in 1951.

The Soviet authorities have on numerous occasions recognized the Western rights which they now seek to negate. One interesting illustration is a Soviet report¹⁰ on the history of "Flights of Allied Aircraft Over German Territory," prepared in connection with the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1947.

Soviet and East German authorities have sought to suggest that the maintenance of access rights between Berlin and West Germany is a violation of "East German sovereignty." It is of interest to note accordingly that the Soviet Union for many years had a similar type of right with respect to Finland. As recently as the Finnish Peace Treaty in 1947, the Soviet Union asserted such rights and article 4(2) of the treaty stipulated:

2. Finland confirms having secured to the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, the use of the railways, waterways, roads and air routes necessary for the transport of personnel and freight dispatched from the Soviet Union to the naval base at Porkkala-Udd, and also confirms having granted to the Soviet Union the right of unimpeded use of all forms of communications between the Soviet Union and the territory leased in the area of Porkkala-Udd.

Similarly Soviet statements regarding the danger of German militarism must be weighed in

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 477.

⁹ For text of the Western peace plan, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1959, p. 779.

light of the fact that the U.S.S.R. initiated German rearmament in 1948 by creating a large (50,000 men) paramilitary organization. On May 23, 1950, the United States protested to the U.S.S.R. against the remilitarization of the Soviet Zone but to no avail.¹¹ By the end of 1952 the forces had grown to a "police force" of 100,000 men, supplemented by an additional 140,200 military personnel, including three mechanized divisions and an air force. By June 1959 East German military and paramilitary forces totaled more than 700,000 men.

The West German defense force was not established until mid-1955, at which time the Federal Republic became a member both of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union. The Federal Republic voluntarily accepted limitations on the nature of its armament which continue in effect. The constructive approach of the Federal Republic and the other NATO powers to the problem of militarism is evidenced by proposals for European security arrangements which they put forward as a part of the Western peace plan at Geneva in 1959.

In sum, therefore, as far as its legal rights are concerned, the United States considers that:

1. The rights of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to be in occupation of Berlin and to have access thereto derive from military victory in World War II, which rights have not been relinquished and cannot be legally impaired by any unilateral action of the Soviet Union.

2. An agreement between the Soviet Union and the East German regime could not affect the rights of states not party to the agreement (*Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*).

3. As Berlin has never been a part of the Soviet Zone of occupation, its status cannot be affected by action the Soviet Union may take with respect to that area.

The United States earnestly seeks a constructive settlement of the German problem. It is prepared to negotiate in good faith to this end but expects the U.S.S.R. to show equal good faith.

U.S. Group To Study Conversion of American Bases in Morocco

Press release 806 dated November 21

The U.S. Government announced on November 21 the dispatch to Morocco of a survey team to examine, for review by the Government of Morocco, ways in which the U.S. bases in Morocco can be converted to Moroccan use upon the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The mission will be headed by William O. Baxter of the Department of State and includes experts from Government and private industry technically qualified to suggest how the base facilities can be used for the economic and social development of Morocco. The mission stems from a proposal originally made by the late King Mohamed V to President Eisenhower in 1959, when the two leaders agreed on the withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 1963, and further defined in subsequent conversations between King Hassan II and representatives of the U.S. Government.¹

Food-for-Peace Agreement Signed With Republic of the Congo

Press release 809 dated November 20

As part of the United States support for the United Nations aid program for the Congo, a Public Law 480 agreement under the Food-for-Peace Program has been concluded between the United States and the Republic of the Congo. The agreement, which was signed at Léopoldville November 18, provides for the sale for Congolese francs of \$7.5 million of agricultural commodities. These will include wheat flour, rice, dried and canned milk, frozen chickens, and tobacco.

Ninety percent of the Congo francs accruing from sales under the agreement will be made available to the United Nations for financing projects to promote balanced economic development in the Congo, as agreed between the United Nations and the Government of the Congo.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 956; Nov. 16, 1959, p. 723; and Jan. 11, 1960, p. 57.

¹¹ For text of a U.S. note, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1950, p. 918.

Africa and the Problem of Economic Development

by *G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

It is a joy to return to Ann Arbor and a pleasure to join you this evening during the University of Michigan's Ninth Annual Conference on the Economic Outlook. I am happy to have this occasion to greet this distinguished group of economists from the business world as well as their colleagues from the universities.

Among the many problems facing the nations of Africa none is more vital than that of economic development.

The task faced by the less developed countries in attaining a reasonable rate of development is a tremendous one, as the growing volume of economic literature devoted to the study of the problem will attest. It would be presumptuous for me, particularly before this group, to attempt to suggest any radical new concepts or to offer any final solutions. Perhaps, however, I can, in view of my recent experiences, contribute to a larger understanding of the problem as it exists in Africa.

First let me reemphasize the sheer size of the task facing Africa—and consequently the size of the task we face in Africa. We are dealing here with a tremendous landmass, three times the size of the United States, a continent extraordinarily diverse in its cultural, ethnic, climatic, and geographical aspects. It is the home of some 230 million people, most of whom are only beginning to enter a modern economy and most of whom are only beginning to carry their share of its productive burdens.

The challenge is tremendous. Africa has begun to move with an irresistible force and

intensity. Clearly we find ourselves at a fateful point in history, a moment when the stored-up energies and aspirations of an entire continent are being released. With our help and understanding, the new nations can realize this potential for constructive growth and make a rich and uniquely African contribution to the world. I leave to your own powers of prediction what will happen if we should fail to meet this challenge.

While only partially tapped, Africa's economic potential is increasingly understood. We know Africa produces most of the world's diamonds and gold and cobalt. We know it is the source of very large supplies of uranium, manganese, copper, and iron, that it is coming into the picture as a major oil producer. We know that among its principal resources are rubber, palm oil, cocoa, vanilla, and certain kinds of coffee.

Africa's Needs

But only now are Africa's *needs* being seriously assessed. It is to these needs that the economic potential must inevitably be applied.

So far, in the trips I have made to Africa, I have visited 23 independent nations and 12 of the territories which are still in a dependent status. I have talked to African leaders and to people in all walks of life and have seen something of the needs existing in these lands. Anyone who travels in Africa is struck by great contrasts in economic and social conditions there. In many cities gleaming modern glass-fronted office buildings and handsome homes stand not far from packing-box shacks and primitive huts.

Africa's leaders, now in charge of the destinies of new nations, are determined to roll back pov-

¹ Address made at the Ninth Annual Conference on the Economic Outlook at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on Nov. 9 (press release 778).

erty, ignorance, and disease. They are determined to raise the prevailing very low standard of living. They are impatient and in a hurry. The per capita annual income in the continent is \$132 and only \$89 in tropical Africa. Literacy averages around 10 percent. Life expectancy is dismally low and malnutrition is common.

The tasks Africans face in raising their standard of living are economic tasks. They need capital to work with. They must develop and mobilize necessary labor skills. They must organize and plan intelligently. They need transportation and communications systems. For their leaders, rapid economic development is seen to be a crying need.

The magnitude of the effort that must be made is enormous and will stretch over years. It cannot be accomplished without outside help.

Programs of Assistance

Seeking to assist, the United States has gone to work in Africa with programs of educational and technical assistance. Some of those efforts are made through international organizations. Some are made bilaterally between governments. Some are in the private field. We have begun, alongside the former metropole powers, to assist with grants and loans—although we are still doing much less than Europe. Our assistance in fiscal year 1961 was \$215 million, not counting substantial quantities of surplus agricultural commodities under the Food-for-Peace Program. France has been providing well over \$300 million annually in aid to independent Africa alone. The United Kingdom furnished over \$100 million during its last fiscal year, which ended March 31. Germany has supplied relatively little in the past but is now well along in working out an aid program that will be similar to our own. We are counting not only on the kinds of assistance we can give but on the new methods and concepts laid down in our new AID program, where there is a new stress on careful forward planning by recipient countries and a special consideration given to insure that our help is satisfactorily teamed up with *self-help*.

Other avenues for meeting Africa's needs are new cooperative arrangements between assisting countries and the African nations themselves. On the one hand we have the promise of new concerted and heightened efforts on the part of the nations who are members of the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development. On the other hand there are original groupings in Africa, such as the Organization for African and Malagasy Economic Cooperation, which are developing rational economic plans involving the diverse needs of a number of developing new countries.

The new African states have been quick to recognize the advantages of close cooperation to achieve their hopes for economic development and social progress. In addition to cooperating on certain common political objectives, in the OAMCE 12 former French dependencies have banded together with the view to setting up a customs union, coordinating economic and social development planning, and harmonizing their fiscal and financial institutions. A larger group of 20 nations, which incorporates some English-speaking states as well as most of the former French territories, is planning to adopt a convention in January encompassing many of the same objectives as a larger concentric circle. Six other nations joined in the Casablanca Charter are also working together along similar lines. This surging interest in developing regional organizations represents one of the major constructive forces in Africa today.

In seeking our response to the challenge of African development, we should not forget that America, too, was a newly stirring continent not too long ago. Consider the extent to which our own growth was assisted and shaped by infusions of capital and skills from abroad. Those of you here realize far better than most the role that was played by British capital, for example, in financing some of our major railroads. You know that what we now call "foreign economic and technical assistance" was a major element in the development of our first textile mills, our earliest foundries and steel mills, and even in our shipbuilding, our trapping, and our mines.

Shortage of African Entrepreneurs

The problem of capital is the one on which most attention has been fixed, and I have, on many occasions, emphasized to African leaders the necessity of creating a favorable climate for investment as an essential step in securing private resources from abroad. Tonight I would like to stress another aspect of the problem of economic growth,

an aspect which I am becoming increasingly convinced is of crucial significance in Africa but which may not be adequately understood.

We know that a free economy cannot develop without the entrepreneur—the man who makes decisions and accepts the consequences and who must call his shots right more often than wrong. Yet in so much of the continent there is a serious shortage of experienced African entrepreneurs. It is the African nations with the greatest shortage of this special skill that tend to create government corporations, setting up production boards, and assigning to burgeoning bureaucracies the operation of a variety of enterprises. It is hard to blame them. The determination to develop is not to be denied.

Even where African leaders are prepared to agree that a government instrumentality is a poor substitute for private enterprise, they are forced to conclude that the substitute is better than nothing at all. It may be an expedient but can rarely be a temporary expedient. Once the government has taken full control of a sector of the economy, the possibility of a transfer to private hands becomes extremely small. But there are examples of governments selling shares in some of the enterprises they developed.

When confronted with this situation, the Western World has appeared too often to be saying one of two things to Africa. The first is a counsel of patience: Create a climate conducive to the growth of an entrepreneurial class, accept our help in a long-term program of education, and wait until your own businessmen appear. The second is: Let foreign businessmen fill the gap by building your factories and running your companies until you are ready to do it yourselves.

The difficulty with this advice is not that it is totally wrong but that it does not meet African realities. Africa is no longer prepared to wait patiently. And having only recently obtained political independence, few African leaders can risk the accusation that they are giving up their nation's economic independence to foreign control.

We must recognize that this concern for economic independence is no mere political sloganeering but is deeply rooted in the African consciousness. Almost without exception, whatever large-scale private enterprise exists has been closely associated with the colonial regime. Boards of directors sitting in foreign capitals

have often made decisions vitally affecting the life of an African country thousands of miles away. Furthermore, in some parts of Africa even medium-sized businesses are largely dominated by ethnic groups which the Africans believe—not always fairly—to be transmitting most of their salaries and profits to their home countries and to have only shallow roots in the nation.

It is against this background that we see a number of African leaders, who may otherwise be oriented toward the free world, turning to the Soviet bloc for assistance. The capital resources offered by the bloc are highly important but are by no means the sole element. If we seem to be advocating no more than patience and an indefinite tutelage under alien control, we will find Communist claims of experience in government-directed enterprise and the techniques of rapid growth will become increasingly attractive.

Finding an Acceptable Framework for Development

Fortunately there is more that we can do—and I continue to speak not of financing development but of finding a framework, acceptable to the Africans, within which free economic institutions can grow.

First, we can give explicit recognition to the fact that African governments can and should play a major role in the development of their nations. The free world has a wealth of experience in economic planning which we should be willing to share freely. Sound planning can nurture, not stifle, private initiative, but we must show how this can be done. Sharing our planning skills will enable us to work *with* the Africans toward ends we mutually regard as desirable and place us in a position to influence the planning process along constructive lines. We can show how planning can be used to set national priorities and determine the allocation of resources, while providing a framework within which private initiative can be encouraged and entrepreneurial ability rewarded. Important strides have been taken in this direction by the present administration.

Second, we can encourage local private enterprise by helping set up development banks that can make small loans to business and agriculture. I have seen successful operations of this kind, and I am sure there can be much more.

Third, we can draw on a rich heritage of experience with the cooperative movement that has particular relevancy to African needs today. Cooperatives have been of inestimable value to the United States in making it possible for the small producer, particularly in agriculture, to grow and prosper. Cooperatives have helped to make capital available, have reduced excessive middleman costs, where these were present, in both buying and selling. They have permitted the spreading of risks too great for a small producer to accept. And they have helped educate several generations of Americans in good business practices and in methods for increasing productivity. This experience, which combines the advantages of a free economy with the needs of the small and inexperienced producer or marketer, can be as pertinent in Africa today as anything we have to offer.

Finally, I hope that, as American businessmen increasingly interest themselves in Africa, they will convey for emulation, in a way that no textbook can, the spirit of lively economic competition for which our country has always been known. My travels have convinced me that the individualistic economic man, so characteristic of and important to the growth of both Europe and ourselves, is still a rarity in Africa. This may be a field of endeavor in which we, as Americans, can render a unique service.

“Good Citizenship” Investment

May I say here a word about the necessity for good citizenship on the part of American investment in Africa. There must be at least the civic sense there is in America in the way of community and social benefits. There must be a conscious and determined effort to maximize the use of African manpower not only in labor but administration. Wherever possible equity sharing should be encouraged. This is difficult but by no means impossible to work out, as more than a few in-

dividual American enterprises and American foundations have found.

Incidentally, coming back to the matter of encouraging private investment, a number of African countries have recognized what they can do to promote investment and have organized industrial development agencies similar to those found in our own States. I can testify from personal experience to their aggressiveness. They have undertaken trade missions, hired American advertising counsel, granted tax concessions, et cetera.

The United States has responded through the Department of Commerce in conjunction with the Department of State by developing and classifying industrial and commercial opportunities in Africa, promoting trade conferences in the United States, et cetera. Another interesting program now being worked out is one of providing insurances against various kinds of political risks.²

While I have stressed the importance of the private sector, it obviously will not do the whole job. It will need supplementary help through government funds, but more particularly it will need government investment in those areas where private funds cannot operate as a rule: building schools, roads, clinics, and the like. In underdeveloped countries these needs are simply enormous. Without going into details I am constrained to give it as my personal opinion that the present magnitude of investment from all countries, public and private, does not even come close to measuring up to the very evident needs of African countries.

As I have indicated, Africa is impatient, Africa is on the march. Its leaders cannot delay in providing social and economic improvements, for their citizens are in a hurry and demand results. If the free world wants, as we say we do, to develop a stable and prosperous world, we had better raise our sights and get on with the job.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1961, p. 837.

Land-Grant Colleges and Universities: The Last Hundred Years—and the Next

by Philip H. Coombs

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

It is historically fitting that this convocation should be opened with a message from the President of the United States, filmed in his White House office day before yesterday, expressing his congratulations, confidence, and assurance of continued support.

It was another President—Abraham Lincoln—whose signature 100 years ago gave life to the Morrill Act. Throughout the ensuing years there has been a close bond of mutual cooperation and assistance between the Federal Government and the land-grant colleges.

This century-old association has rendered great benefit to our whole society. It stands as eloquent proof that Federal assistance to education to promote the national interest can be compatible with academic freedom and with the maintenance of local control.

As a member of the President's official family, I have the great privilege to be with you personally on this occasion to reinforce his greetings and to convey the good wishes of the Secretary of State and his gratitude for all you have contributed to the betterment of our world relations. My colleagues in the Department of State welcome, as I do, the heavy emphasis given in this convocation to the role of land-grant colleges and universities in world affairs.

Though I personally have shifted recently from a private to a public payroll, I look forward to continuing the close and pleasant association I have had with many of you. I am grateful for

the help so many of you have offered and given to assist me in carrying out the duties of this new Federal post, whose creation earlier this year was intended to place greater weight and emphasis on educational and cultural affairs as a creative ingredient of United States foreign relations.

A centennial anniversary—like a visit to a museum or ancient monument—affords us an all-too-rare opportunity to renew our perspective on the long road man has traveled and to speculate about the road ahead. Only with such perspective and speculation can we take stock of future opportunities and problems and formulate adequate goals and plans to match them.

One hundred years seems a very long time from some vantage points, but I was recently reminded of how very brief it really is. The occasion was the visit last week of Dr. Sarwat Okasha, the Minister of Culture of the United Arab Republic, who came to Washington to join with Mrs. Kennedy in opening the exhibit of items from the tomb of King Tut-ankh-Amen. Dr. Okasha's government has generously allowed these beautiful and priceless relics to leave Egypt for the first time so that the people of the United States might have the opportunity to see and enjoy them.

Seeing this exhibit compels one to pause and reflect upon the depth of our cultural roots and to appreciate the very transitory nature, against the broad sweep of history, of the serious international crises which command our attention today.

I searched for a yardstick to help put things in perspective and found one in Dr. Caryl Haskins' excellent book *Of Societies and Men*. Dr. Haskins, an eminent biologist, geneticist, and

¹Address made before the Centennial Convocation of the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities at Kansas City, Mo., on Nov. 12 (press release 781 dated Nov. 11; as-delivered text).

Message of President Kennedy ¹

In July 1862—in the darkest days of the Civil War—President Abraham Lincoln signed two acts which were to help to mold the future of the nation which he was then struggling to preserve.

The first of these—the Homestead Act—provided, in Carl Sandburg's words, a "farm free to any man who wanted to put a plow into unbroken sod." The second, the Morrill Act, donated more than a million acres of Federal land to endow at least one university in every State of the Union.

Thus—even as the Nation trembled on the brink of destruction—the vast lands of the American West were opened to final settlement, a new America of unparalleled abundance began to grow, and the most ambitious and fruitful system of higher education in the history of the world was developed.

Today, more than 68 land-grant institutions—located in each of the 50 States and in Puerto Rico—are a monument to the vision of those who built the foundations of peace in a time of war. Over one-half of our Ph. D. degrees in science and engineering are awarded by these schools; 24 out of 40 living Nobel Prize winners in our country are among their graduates; one-fourth of all high school and elementary teachers and over one-third of our college teachers are their products.

These universities have grown as our nation's needs have grown. The original endowment called for in-

¹ Filmed at the White House on Nov. 10 for use at the opening session of the Centennial Convocation of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities at Kansas City, Mo., on Nov. 12.

struction which emphasized "agriculture and mechanized arts." And with their help the strongest agricultural community on earth was built. Today these schools teach subjects ranging from philosophy to science and the conduct of foreign relations—the whole broad spectrum of knowledge upon which the future of this country and freedom depends and upon which the well-being of Americans who will come after us is so richly intertwined. In the history of land-grant schools can be read much of the history of our country—a history they have played no small part in shaping.

In addition these schools are one of the finest examples of our Federal system—the fruitful cooperation between National and State Governments in the pursuit of a decent education for all of our citizens. Founded at Federal initiative, strongly supported by Federal funds—funds which were specifically appropriated for instruction rather than the construction of buildings or facilities—these institutions have built a proud tradition of independence and academic integrity, untroubled by governmental interference of any kind. They are a monument to the fact that the cooperative effort of the Federal and State Governments is the best way to insure an independent educational system of the highest quality.

I congratulate the land-grant colleges on the centennial of their birth. I assure you of my vigorous and continued support. I bring you the thanks of a grateful nation for what you have done in the past, and I bring you the hope of all our people that you will continue to light the way for our country and for future generations.

scientific generalist, reminds us that the human animal is a very young biological species on this planet. As a social animal, he is far younger still.

Life on this planet, he notes, runs back to the single-cellular organisms of 2,000 million years ago. In contrast, the human animal, in approximately his present form, goes back only 1 million years. But apparently it was not until 100,000 years ago, 900,000 years later, that these human animals began associating with one another in groups—that they got on speaking terms, as it were, and began socializing. But even then things moved slowly. It was not until a mere 10,000 years ago, at a maximum, that highly organized human societies appeared, with distinctive cultures, such as the ancient civilizations in Egypt and elsewhere in the Mediterranean area. For

comparison, another relatively young and organized society—the ants—were in business 50 million years ago.

When we now fit in the fact that Columbus visited these shores less than 500 years ago and that the United States became a nation less than 200 years ago, things begin to fall into perspective.

As the charming middle-aged lady, my partner at a lunch in honor of Dr. Okasha, exclaimed on hearing the foregoing facts, "You make me feel so young!"

And so the land-grant colleges—with only a single-century candle on their birthday cake—should also feel young.

But what a fantastic century it has been, measured against any previous century in man's long residence on this planet. If "revolution" is taken to mean "evolution at a breakneck pace,"

then it has certainly been a revolutionary century. Mankind went from the horse to the space missile, by way of the automobile and the airplane; from the daguerreotype and pony express to television and instantaneous worldwide communication. Dietary standards, health standards, general living standards, and the span of life have shot upward—at least for one small sector of total mankind. Indeed, it is the conspicuous gap between this small sector and the rest of mankind that makes further revolutionary changes in the next century mandatory.

The causal factors behind this past explosive century are numerous and not yet fully discernible. But it is clear that several familiar American institutions—among them the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the free public school and library, and the land-grant college—contributed considerably to the explosion.

Indeed, the land-grant college, like the Declaration and the Constitution, is a profoundly revolutionary institution. One wonders whether Congressman Morrill—the son of a Vermont blacksmith-farmer, who was forced to stop his schooling at age 15—half realized what was on the other end of the fuse he lighted by promoting not only the establishment of the land-grant colleges but the great strengthening of the Library of Congress as well. One wonders even more what will be the outcome of establishing new universities today in some of the ancient but still underdeveloped and semifeudal societies around the world.

It is clear that the land-grant colleges have helped greatly to give the American Revolution its continuing thrust and vitality, long after the political revolution for independence was won. This continuing revolution has reached into every corner of our life—agriculture, industry, communications, military weapons, and education itself. It is now on the march all over the world. In the setting of the great American experiment with popular government and individual freedom, all educational institutions are bound to be a major revolutionary force. They provide the great motive power of ideas, knowledge, and developed human talent which propel an ever-accelerating rate of change.

As we ponder the world of rapid change and turmoil all about us—the revolt against colonialism and against tyranny in all its forms, the

“revolution of rising expectations,” the energetic quest of new nations for better living standards and educational opportunity and social justice for all their people—it is well to remind ourselves that this is largely *our* revolution, not the revolution of Marx and Lenin. It was Jefferson who said, long before Marx appeared on the scene, that the American Revolution sought the freedom not alone of Americans but of all mankind. And to share the credit—or the responsibility—properly, we must remember too that the muscular ideas underlying the American struggle for freedom were brought here by Europeans who were in search of freedom. No nation has a monopoly on the idea of freedom. It is the right of all mankind.

Competition Between Two Revolutions

And now, less than 200 years later, the revolution which gave birth to our nation is being internationalized. The Communists, who so often borrow a good thing when they see it, have sought to capture this revolution and turn it to their own purposes.

It is our job and the job of all free nations to keep our identity with this worldwide revolution, to keep it from being stolen and perverted. For the ideological struggle around the world today is not a contest between the Soviet Union and Red China, standing for change, and the United States and its free-world allies, clinging to the *status quo*. Rather it is a competition between two very different kinds of revolutions with very different aims and values. The one is aimed at harnessing the individual to the purposes of the state and harnessing independent nations to the purposes of the Soviet Union and China. The other aims at liberating individuals from all forms of tyranny and bondage—hunger, disease and ignorance, feudal lords, and governmental masters—and liberating whole nations to pursue the aspirations of their peoples in freedom, dignity, and self-respect and in cooperation with other independent nations. Because education above all else liberates individuals from ignorance, to discover the truth for themselves, it is a major instrument of our kind of revolution.

All this is well to remember when we find ourselves—citizens of a strong, young, and well-intentioned nation, not yet fully accustomed to carrying heavy world responsibilities—feeling

frustrated by crisis headlines and by complex, dangerous, and irritating world problems. It is sorely tempting in times like these to grasp for simple and inexpensive solutions to complex problems for which there can be no quick, easy, or cheap solutions. We cannot make these problems disappear by attacking favorite scapegoats, and we cannot resign from the world. We can only learn to live intelligently with these complexities, keeping our heads and our principles, and remembering that the reverse side of a problem is usually an opportunity.

It is important to remember, too, that the agenda of frustrations, disappointments, and doubts in Moscow is far longer, deeper, and more irritating than our own list. Indeed, therein lies the greatest danger to mankind, for frustrated tyrants can make bad judgments, such as resorting to terror tactics.

The nights in the Kremlin must surely be more restless than in Washington, and for good reason. The Soviet revolution has not been doing as well lately as ours, on many fronts. Its doctrine is not proving to be as tough and viable as the doctrine of freedom, in its staying power, in its universal appeal, and in its validity under severe test.

Indeed, there are even serious differences among the high priests of communism today over just what their true doctrine is. This cleavage has lately grown so deep as to cause the mortal remains of the once unchallenged high priest to be relegated to a hole in the Kremlin wall alongside the bones of earlier deviationists.

This shocking development—shocking and confusing especially to those millions who had been taught to revere Stalin as infallible—may well be a very encouraging development for the peace of the world; we cannot yet say. But we can say that, in one fell swoop, it has certainly rendered obsolete millions of textbooks, encyclopedias, and roadmaps. And surely it must have left millions of ordinary Soviet people wondering just whom to believe and where the real truth lies.

The principles—the philosophical and ethical foundations—which underlay the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and the faith which fostered our land-grant colleges, have stood a considerable test of time. These principles are not the product of any one person or nation and are not subject to being rewritten by any new high priest who comes along. They are the product of the whole intellectual, political,

and religious history of mankind. The universality of their validity has been demonstrated. But today they are being subjected to tougher and wider tests than ever.

An International Constituency

In the midst of this tough testing of our own cherished values all around the world, it is not surprising to find many of our land-grant institutions in the vanguard of those promoting better living conditions, better education, greater opportunity, social justice, and freedom in the far corners of the earth. Their traditional hallmark of practical service to the community, once applied to a local and State constituency, then to the whole Nation, has now been broadened to an international constituency. The people of Kansas and California, Missouri and Minnesota, and a host of other States, are being served even better today than ever by their land-grant institutions. But now also the people of Cambodia and Korea, Costa Rica and Nigeria, and a host of other lands are also being served by these same institutions, in behalf of the American people and the whole free world.

Land-grant institutions have in recent years undertaken 126 contracts—since 1958 under the International Cooperation Administration (now the Agency for International Development)—to carry out educational and other constructive projects in 42 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. We can confidently expect the range and size of these services to increase.

The tradition of service of our land-grant institutions has proved contagious, like the idea of popular government, popular education, individual freedom, and equality. All American colleges and universities, in varying degrees, manifest this same mission of practical service to the community, at home and to a growing extent abroad. And in many foreign countries, developed and less developed alike, the contagion of practical university service to the community is spreading rapidly. Just as the idea of freedom is not the monopoly of any one nation, so the land-grant college idea of practical service cannot and should not be the monopoly of any one type of institution. The land-grant colleges can take pride in the fact that their once distinctive characteristic is now being nationalized and inter-

nationalized, not as a carbon copy of their particular curriculum, organizational structure, and methods but as a compelling idea which can be adapted to appropriate local needs and forms in any nation.

Against the backdrop of what has been said about the road we have already traveled and where we seem to be today, what can be said about the road ahead?

Obviously little can be said without risk of error and ridicule long before the second-century birthday party of the land-grant institutions.

Who would have predicted only 25 years ago, for example, as we were pulling out of the Great Depression and feeling good about our "splendid isolation," that we would be gathered here in the Midwest today, in the company of distinguished foreign scholars and diplomats, to discuss the important role our land-grant universities must play in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

Who would have guessed that in 1960-61 there would be 53,000 foreign students from 140 nations and political areas studying in 1,666 American colleges and universities, and that three-quarters of these students would be not from Canada and Europe but from all the great underdeveloped regions of the world?

Who would have dared predict—or even hope—that our universities and schools would be joined in an unprecedented effort to improve the teaching of foreign languages, to enrich and broaden the world affairs content of the curriculum at all levels, and that the Federal Government would be helping our universities to establish linguistic and area centers to eradicate our national ignorance and incompetence in these affairs?

Who could have expected that in the summer of 1961 the Congress would enact, by an overwhelming majority, the Fulbright-Hays Act, which sets the stage for a greatly strengthened national program of international educational and cultural exchange in the sixties? (Or, for that matter, that there would be a character in our Department of State called the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs!)

Future Opportunities and Obligations

The past certainly teaches that the future is inscrutable. Yet to meet our opportunities, our obligations, and our problems, we must do our best to identify them in advance and plan to meet

them. And since Assistant Secretaries of State are more expendable than university presidents, I will hazard a few brief forecasts.

The first is not likely to be challenged by this audience. It is that the United States must invest from all sources over the next 10 years vastly greater resources of talented manpower and money in the whole educational enterprise to meet our rapidly expanding and urgently important domestic and international needs. Doubling our present investment will not be enough, particularly in higher education. This enlarged investment will, however, prove to be highly profitable to our own people, to our nation, and to mankind everywhere.

Second, in addition to vastly increased support from without, there must and will be far-reaching changes within the educational enterprise, including a vast overhauling of the curriculum to keep pace with new knowledge and needs and to produce a new generation that can really understand the complex world in which it must live. There must also be improvements in organization and in the utilization of educational resources, and revolutionary advances in teaching and learning methods, materials, and equipment. Some of these new approaches will prove far more helpful in fitting the needs and resources of less developed countries than the thin carbon copies of conventional Western educational patterns which one now encounters in such countries so frequently.

Third, there must be a vast development of opportunities for adults to continue their learning long after their "formal" education is finished. The explosion of knowledge, the availability of leisure time for fruitful use, the rapid development of new technologies throughout our society, and the rapid obsolescence of prevailing ones make it mandatory that all professional people, above all teachers, and a large portion of the adult population, whatever their station in life, be provided an open-ended opportunity to learn more.

Right now, for example, there is urgent need for our whole adult population to learn a great deal more about world affairs so that our elected leaders can have the broad support of a well-informed citizenry in carrying out appropriate and essential foreign policies and programs.

Our adult educators have made great strides under severe handicaps, but our provisions for adult learning are vastly inadequate to the need.

They will grow rapidly more inadequate unless we take vigorous action. Here, too, there is need for imaginative innovation, including the much fuller harnessing of mass media in all forms to the service of learning. Those who run our daily press, our magazines, our motion pictures, radio, and television, can be among the great teachers in a nation of students if they will; but their "curriculum" can also stand some critical self-appraisal and overhauling. The "learning materials" which they export abroad should certainly be included in such a critical self-appraisal.

Fourth, the colleges and universities will increasingly find the whole world their campus. Their linkages with world affairs will multiply in a host of ways. They will teach more foreign students and use more foreigners as teachers. Their students and faculty will spend more time abroad, learning and teaching, conducting research, and engaging in a wide variety of constructive enterprises. The educational and cultural channels that tie nations together, and through which strength and richness flow in both directions, will multiply and enlarge rapidly in the years right ahead, to the great benefit of our own nation as well as others.

Fifth, to carry these enlarged responsibilities our colleges and universities must become greater repositories of the Nation's most talented manpower—to teach, to pursue research and scholarship, and to serve overseas and elsewhere off the immediate campus. For this the colleges and universities must build a "manpower cushion" so that they can meet the important demands for research and for offcampus service without penalty to their own students and disruption of their regular campus programs. It must become an accepted notion that the typical career of many faculty members will include occasional periods of service abroad and elsewhere off campus, to their betterment as teachers and without prejudice to their advancement as members of the faculty. All this will require greater finance, and the Federal Government along with others must be prepared to bear its proper share.

Sixth, our colleges and universities must develop further ways to mesh their efforts in the international field so that their respective strengths can be more efficiently coordinated and the impact of the burden and benefits equitably spread. It is encouraging to see recent efforts to

form consortia among universities rendering service abroad² and to see the smaller colleges banding together for service and self-improvement in world affairs.

Seventh, there is likewise great need for the academic community as a whole and the Federal Government to devise more effective ways to work together, especially in the international field, so that the national interest will best be served while, at the same time, the academic integrity and freedom of the educational institutions involved will likewise be served and preserved. Here again it is encouraging to find clear recognition of this need, as well expressed in the Ford Foundation-supported report on *The University and World Affairs*. Now that the need has been recognized, the time is ripe for fast action.

What all this adds up to is that our colleges and universities—land-grant and all the rest—face an enormous challenge, opportunity, and responsibility in the next 10 years and beyond, at home and abroad, for which they are right now quite inadequately prepared, despite the strenuous efforts and substantial progress of the past 10 years.

Building a Common Market of Ideas

Our studies, projections, and debates of recent years seem on the whole to have brought into focus the dimensions of the domestic side of the job to be done more clearly than the dimensions of the international side. Actually, of course, the two are inseparable. They are interwoven ingredients of the same large job, but we do need now to achieve clearer insights into the international aspects.

This much seems clear. With the strong emphasis now being given to educational and cultural affairs by the President, the Secretary of State, and their colleagues, with the heavy emphasis being placed in the new foreign aid program on the development of human resources as a prime requisite for economic and social development, and with the recent enactment of the Fulbright-Hays Act, educational and cultural affairs will play a major role in United States foreign relations from here on. A large part of the burden and responsibility for advancing on this new frontier of United States foreign relations must necessarily rest upon our educational insti-

² BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 927.

tutions. The Government can guide and lead and stimulate; it can provide financial support; but it can by itself do but a small fraction of the job.

This is a challenging outlook, but by no means a bleak and unpleasant one. It means that education can now assume an even larger role in the affairs of men, in building the essential conditions of peace, in lifting the level and quality of human life and opportunity in the United States and elsewhere.

Unless there is both the hope and the reality of a better life for the vast millions living in underdeveloped areas of the world, there seems little likelihood that the more developed nations of the world can successfully pursue their own advancement. And there would certainly be little likeli-

hood that the principles and values upon which our own nation was founded and has prospered could survive in splendid isolation on an island of affluence in a sea of misery.

Mankind's greatest hope for an enduring peace—with individual freedom and advancement—rests in the long run not alone on economic growth and cooperation but equally upon the building of a great international common market of ideas, knowledge, education, and cultural affairs. In building this common market, along with all the other great tasks to be done, the land-grant colleges and universities have their work cut out for the next decade and the next century. They have shown before that they can do the impossible. They must do it again.

Education for an Age of Revolution

by Carl T. Rowan

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

Mr. Chairman, I should like to address my few remarks to the international scene and to the role that our land-grant colleges must play in helping man to move down a path of sanity and away from the brink of self-destruction.

Many citizens like to assume that everything is in the hands of striped-pants diplomats—that it is they and they alone who are responsible for moving the world to its present critical state. May I make the rude assertion that our closeness to catastrophe today is largely a reflection of the inadequacy of our educational processes—not just of our land-grant colleges but of all our institutions. Indeed, I should have to go beyond that and say that we learners have too often been unwilling to learn what all men must learn if we are to avoid extinction.

During the last few weeks, as we have grap-

pled with such problems as Berlin, Laos, south Viet-Nam, the Congo, it has occurred to me more than a few times that perhaps none of us really appreciates the extent to which our fears and anxieties are reflections of the shackles on our minds. Life has become so vastly complicated that there are areas in which even the best educated man is woefully ignorant. That is why I am an ardent advocate of the broad, liberal education. To appreciate the role that this kind of education can play in our escape from our present woes, we need only look at man's escapes of the past.

Knowledge Is Freedom From Fear

What is it that has lifted man from an animal-like existence where he ran from the snapping twig and cringed in terror at the flash of lightning or the roar of thunder? It is knowledge. Man rarely fears what he really knows.

If we really want to gage the success of our educational institutions, we should measure the

¹Address made before the Centennial Convocation of the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities at Kansas City, Mo., on Nov. 15 (press release 787).

amount of fear that abounds in the world today. Our achievements leave little reason for pride. We live in a period when one nation fears another, when rulers fear the ruled, when the well-heeled fear the disgruntled poor, when the poor fear help from abroad because of the "imperialism" that they see in it, when race fears race—and when just about all of us fear a future that roars in on the wings of change.

The John Birch Society, the so-called Coalition of Patriotic Organizations, and a host of small and vociferous groups of reactionary viewpoints are striking evidence that man still cringes in terror at the snapping of political twigs and the thunder and lightning from the clash of old and new ideas.

This is a time of genuine physical peril for our country. The barbed wire and the concrete barriers that divide Berlin, and the cry of the innocent as the Communists spread terror in the night in the villages of south Viet-Nam, are symbols of our closeness to the brink. But we must not assume for a moment that our children's future is to be determined solely by our military readiness to meet the challenges imposed in these areas.

The world of the future, and this country's position in it, will be for the most part a reflection of how well institutions like our land-grant colleges have instilled in our citizens the freedom from fear—that is, the knowledge—that will enable us really to understand and come to terms with the age of revolution in which we live.

How well prepared are we for this? Not very well, I think. For example, how able is the educated American to understand and live in reasonable peace with the revolution that sweeps Africa?

Journalists and statesmen have referred to that turbulent continent as "the last great prize" and have used a hundred other phrases to illustrate the importance with which they view Africa in the current conflict between the Western World and the Communist bloc. But how well prepared are we to wage a contest for that "great prize" (if indeed we ought to speak of other peoples and their lands as mere baubles to scuffle over)? I see considerable evidence that fear born of ignorance is the guiding factor in the viewpoint of most Americans.

Almost daily I read in the press derogatory comments about the new nations of Asia and

Africa. Editors, columnists, the radio and television commentators, and others see "dishonesty," "immorality," "a natural inclination to communism," and worse in the fact that these young, new nations do not espouse even those causes about which we feel righteously committed.

"We Are Out of Touch With Our Own History"

The tragedy is that most of us have "educations" that leave us poorly prepared to understand or pass judgment on these countries. One of the shortcomings, and one of the reasons why our magazines and newspapers can criticize these new nations so freely, is that we Americans know so little about our own history. We are so far removed from the Revolution that brought us independence and shaped our society that many of us are inclined to deny that we ever had anything to do with anything so rash as revolution.

Oh, there are those among us who know well enough that it would be futile for us to lift our hand with the expectation that the world will stand still at our bidding. We see the necessity to associate ourselves with change; so we find it expedient to talk about 1776, Thomas Jefferson, Tom Paine. But the sad truth is that very few of us consider it proper or prudent that anyone should talk and act today in the manner of Jefferson or Paine. Thus we are unable to see a Nehru, an Nkrumah, or a Bourguiba as modern-day versions of the English Levelers, or our Jefferson, or France's Robespierre.

Bourguiba and Nehru actually are rather moderate men compared with Robespierre or with the Jefferson who wrote: "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."

We reveal that we are particularly out of touch with our own history when we react to the stumbling and bumbling of the leaders of these new nations. Our comments show us to be supercilious, condescending, and downright arrogant.

What we either do not know or do not care to remember is that new nations, including our own, have always gone through the period of confusion, corruption, and political oppression that is characteristic of so many new nations today. The leaders of a shaky new country throw the political opposition in jail, and we Americans pretend that we never before heard of anything so

scandalous. We don't remember the falling out Washington and Paine had, or this plain talk that Paine directed at Washington:

There was a time when the fame of America, moral and political, stood fair and high in the world. The luster of her revolution extended itself to every individual and to be a citizen of America gave a title to respect in Europe. Neither meanness nor ingratitude had then mingled itself into the composition of her character.

The Washington of politics had not then appeared—

And as to you, sir, treacherous in private friendship . . . and a hypocrite in public life, the world will be puzzled to decide, whether you are an apostate or an impostor; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any.

Sounds disgustingly like Adoula giving Tshombe a verbal lashing—or doesn't it?

We don't recall that corruption was so rampant in our early days that Aaron Burr all but stole the election from Jefferson, who overcame the attempts at thievery on the 36th ballot.

I get a little nauseated when "superior" Americans scoff at the political chaos in the Congo. One said to me the other night: "I had a Belgian friend who warned that, if independence came, the jungle would be back in Léopoldville in a year."

We expect stable, fault-free confederation in the Congo at the snap of our finger. Our knowledge of history is not so sharp as to remind us that it took us well over a decade to approach anything resembling a stable government. And some of the fanciful notions I hear about "States' rights" indicate that, after close to 200 years of independence, we are still working out our confederation problems.

We scoff at denials of press freedom in these new nations, apparently unable to remember that an awful lot of American journalists were thrown in jail in the early days of our country because they wrote things that were displeasing to those in power.

What I am saying is that if we understand our own frailties we are going to spend less time in supercilious laughter and arrogant criticism and more time working on these areas of concern common to our country and these new nations.

If we really understood how closely the futures of these new nations resemble the future of our own, we would not be so fearful, so full of distrust as to what they are and aspire to be.

The Failure of Education

Since going to Washington in February I have heard many cries of anguish as to why we cannot sell our position on Berlin or nuclear testing to the leaders of these new nations. One man said to me: "We have the best salesmen on earth. If we can make refrigerators popular in Alaska, why can't we sell the principles that this nation stands for?" It is a failure of education that this man does not understand why the Madison Avenue tactics that work on the Minnesota housewife do not work in Darjeeling or Ouagadougou.

There are a host of emotions, frustrations, irritations, and bitterness that very few people on Madison Avenue know how to breach. That is because the geniuses of Madison Avenue are too far removed from the poverty, racial oppression, social and political injustices that are a vivid part of the heritage of these new nations for them to begin to devise selling tactics that work.

And slogans do not really mean much in today's world of political-social conflict. People judge what a nation stands for by what it does rather than what it says. An African leader is much more inclined to be impressed by what Americans say to one another than by what Americans say to Africans.

Take this issue of our attitude toward revolution. Those of us in Washington want in the worst way to have the peoples of these emerging nations believe that we support change, that we are not gendarmes of the *status quo*. But can we really expect them to believe what we officials say when they see fear of change being expressed in so many aspects of day-to-day life in our country?

Shortly after his trip to the Far East the Vice President spoke approvingly of our country's efforts to cooperate with India in her economic development program. One of our leading newspapers chastised the Vice President editorially and said that it just couldn't believe Lyndon Johnson had come around to supporting "socialism." I think you can see that Indians have a real problem deciding whether the American official who endorses change really represents the people of this country, or whether that editorial is close to what we stand for.

Here again education has not provided Americans with the proper perspective of the times in which we live. Thus some of us are inclined to

view all sharp change as "socialism" or "communism." These silly exercises in semantics show us to be sadly out of touch with the world in which we live. The leaders of Asia and Africa understand what we know but are afraid to admit: that while not all change is progress, all progress involves change.

What disturbs me so much about this constant prattling over "socialism" or "capitalism" or "free enterprise" is that the prattlers make us look worse as a nation than we really are. Their educations apparently have not impressed upon them the fact that our country is not so capitalistic nor countries like India so socialistic as the prattlers seem to believe—or wish the rest of the world to believe.

These individuals seem to have forgotten that many of our railroads were built with Federal funds (and that the railroads today are not averse to taking more Federal funds); that the Tennessee Valley Authority is a mammoth example of Government activity in the economy; or that any number of our firms have been willing to take help from the Government. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recently pointed out that, while the United States Government disposes of 20 percent of our total gross national product, the Indian Government plans the disposal of less than 15 percent of the gross national product of India. One just might conclude that ours is a more socialistic country than India.

My point is that there is a lot that is wrong in these new nations. There is more impulsiveness, suspicion, reverse prejudice, and irresponsibility than world tranquillity allows. So it was in the days of our infancy. I am not saying we must learn to like these things. I am suggesting only that we make an effort to understand them. It is only through understanding that we can make the necessary sympathetic efforts to help these wobbly infant nations to the position of sturdy manhood that we enjoy. Even as we do this, we must remember that they may not view our version of "manhood" in the same haloed light that we do.

I recall that in 1956, in what was then the British colony of Nigeria, a prominent African sipped whisky and munched Western-style food as he said to me: "Only a madman would deny that the British have done some good things in this country. But it sure irritates me to have these colonials talk about how they rescued us Africans

from the savagery of jungle warfare. These white men won't face the fact they've devised more ways of killing more people than the African tribes ever dreamed of."

I guess time and tribulations have not rendered obsolete Robert Burns' plaint: "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us to see oursels as others see us!"

The task of producing this kind of understanding in an era of tension and frustration is going to be difficult—even for the excellent institutions represented here. It is my fervent belief that much of our futures depends on whether our educational institutions succeed.

In this venture all mankind should wish you well.

Flood Victims in Somali Republic Receive Aid From United States

The Department of State announced on November 21 (press release 807) that the people of the United States are sending medical supplies and personnel to help the flood victims in the Republic of Somali. In response to a plea for aid from Prime Minister Abdir Ascid, the U.S. Government, through its Department of Defense, is airlifting medical supplies from Europe to Mogadiscio, capital of the Somali Republic. Medical supplies which arrived in Mogadiscio on November 20 include 5 million mixed vitamin capsules, 50,000 doses of tetracycline and chloromycetin, as well as half-gram sulfa preparations for treating cases of dysentery. American medical personnel flown to Mogadiscio include an epidemiologist, two medical doctors, and six medical corpsmen experienced in disaster operations.

A total of 3,580 tons of emergency food supplies are in preparation for shipment to Mogadiscio.

The present disaster resulted from unprecedented rainfalls which caused severe flooding of the Giuba and Scebeli rivers. Approximately 60,000 square miles of land between the two rivers is under water. Most villages in the disaster area were completely cut off, while others were swept away by the floods. While the numbers of lives lost cannot be determined, it is estimated that food crops for about 100,000 people have been destroyed.

Building Just Societies in a Decade of Development

Statement by Under Secretary Bowles¹

I should like to express my very real pleasure at the opportunity to participate in this meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee and particularly to listen to this succession of lucid and heartening reports.

This is the 10th anniversary of the Colombo Plan; it is also a 10th anniversary for me. Ten years ago this month I came to Asia as United States Ambassador to India. Several times since then I have revisited this area, and on each occasion I have felt not only the richness of its traditions but also the dynamic promise of its future.

There is little need to stress that we are meeting at a critical moment in history. It is clear from the remarks of those who have spoken before me that we are all deeply conscious of the crisis through which mankind is passing. This crisis is a test of our patience, of our courage, and particularly of our understanding of the forces which are shaping history.

Three of these forces impress me as of decisive importance: one affirmative and universally hopeful, one negative and acutely dangerous, and one that combines threat and opportunity in perhaps equal degree.

The first of these three forces is the passionate determination of hundreds of millions of men and women throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America to achieve a better, fuller life. In once remote villages people have suddenly awakened to the vision of a better tomorrow. They have sensed the possibilities of new schools, roads, and hospitals. They have come to know that poverty, ignorance,

and disease are not punishments to be endured but evils to be fought and conquered. They are on the move, and they will not be stopped.

The second force is dangerously negative and seeks to feed on the human ferment and high expectations aroused by the first. I refer to the manipulators of a certain international ideology who appear determined to disrupt or to destroy any nation which refuses to submit to their will.

The third force is the fast-moving revolution in technology and weapons development. Here infinite hope for human betterment is mixed with the threat of nuclear bombs and monster missiles capable of wiping out most of life on this earth.

When we consider the combined power of these three unprecedented forces, each one feeding on the others, it is not surprising that most human beings have a sense of deep uncertainty about the future. Yet as I listen to our discussions around this table, I wonder if we do not grossly underestimate the positive and creative forces which are now at work in our new world.

What we are experiencing, it seems to me, is the coming together of two great tides, one of hope and the other of conflict.

The latter includes the cold-war struggle, the nuclear arms race, and lingering racialism and communalism—all forces that divide men and nations, feed the daily headlines, dissipate our energies, and distort our perspective.

The Tide of Hope

Yet flowing in the opposite direction is the powerful tide of hope. Although far less publicized, this tide is running at full flood toward deepening international understanding, increasing social and

¹ Made at the ministerial session of the 13th meeting of the Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan) at Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, on Nov. 15.

economic justice, and the creation of a more rational and peaceful world.

Let us briefly consider some of the extraordinarily hopeful developments that have been crowded into the 15 years since the end of World War II.

In 1945 one-third of mankind was living under European colonial rule. Today the figure is less than 2 percent. The virtually complete liquidation of the old European empires, largely without bloodshed and in less than one generation, represents one of the most extraordinary accomplishments in the history of man.

In this respect I should like to pay special tribute to our British friends, whose vision, political skill, and dedication to human values have helped to create the foundations for an enduring relationship with their former colonies, a relationship from which the entire world now greatly profits.

Yet this mass liberation from colonial rule is only one element in what I believe to be the rising tide of hope.

A second positive element of great significance is the efforts of the less developed nations to create modern economies that will help free their people from poverty, illiteracy, and ill health. The plans which we have been considering around this table testify in the most dramatic fashion to the success of these efforts.

Equally unprecedented has been the decision of many fully developed countries to divert ever-growing quantities of their own resources to support these development plans. In the last 10 years my country alone has contributed some \$30 billion for nonmilitary economic assistance in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A very substantial proportion of this amount has been spent in the Colombo Plan nations. As part of this contribution, some 14,000 Colombo Plan technicians have received specialized training through the United States. On the average, two shiploads of grain now leave American ports each day for India and Pakistan.

Still another dramatic expression of the rising tide of hope is the development of regional and other multilateral mechanisms for the pooling of experience and resources, for the settlement or easing of international disputes, for freer trade, improved communications, and increased travel. The determination of nations both old and new to learn to work together is dramatized by the far-

flung activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, by the expanding Common Market in Europe, by the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, by the Monrovia conference in Africa, and by the Colombo Plan itself.

Together these expressions of positive national and international action add up to an unparalleled record of achievement. The tide of conflict may dominate today's newspaper pages. But it is the tide of hope that I deeply believe will dominate tomorrow's history books.

Time for Self-Examination

During the last few days I have been greatly impressed with the care and experience which are going into these challenging new plans for national development. We have heard heartening reports of new railroads and docks, of new factories and village improvement, of more modern communications, and of increased trade.

The chief credit for this record goes to the developing countries themselves. It is their own efforts that are responsible in overwhelming degree for the successes that have already been achieved.

Although massive aid from the donor countries has been of crucial importance, the basic factor in the development of any country is the principle of self-help. This is the solid foundation on which the future of the developing countries will continue to depend.

Yet this is also a time for self-examination, an opportunity to look beyond the statistical record of immediate physical achievements to review our basic purpose.

The new administration which took office in the United States last January has attempted to analyze in the greatest possible depth our own efforts to assist the developing nations.

Although my Government has contributed substantial sums to assist the developing nations, we have made our share of mistakes. On occasion there has been waste in allocating funds, clumsiness in administration, and confusion in regard to basic objectives. In a totally new effort of this kind some mistakes are inevitable. We have been sailing uncharted seas, and often there has been no way to proceed except by trial and error.

Yet the program has been operating for nearly a decade. It is fair to expect from both the donor

countries and from the recipients an increasingly improved performance. In this spirit I should like to share with you some of the lessons which we have learned and outline the changes in emphasis and content of my Government's efforts that will become evident in the future.

Political Growth and Freedom of Choice

The first question we asked ourselves concerned our motivation: Why precisely are we spending between \$4 billion and \$5 billion annually to assist other nations? What is our basic objective?

Our first superficial answer was found in the cold war. We are aiding the less fortunate nations, some argued, in order to combat and stop communism.

Although we have every reason to dislike and oppose communism, this limited explanation of our economic assistance programs is clearly unworthy of the America of Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt. Furthermore, so limited an objective makes a Communist minority into something of a natural resource like petroleum or uranium, exchangeable at the United States Treasury for dollars.

Others have made the equally narrow suggestion that we are giving assistance in order to "win friends." Yet such a motivation also misses the mark. For nations and friends can never be bought for long; and the concept is deeply offensive both to nationhood and friendship.

Still others have assumed that with a little more food in people's stomachs, rising new nations and peoples will become satisfied with their lot and the wealthier nations can then relax undisturbed. Yet the fallacy of such an assumption is obvious to everyone who has participated in these development programs. A little economic growth poorly shared may be more politically disruptive than no growth at all.

Why then are we in this business of international economic assistance? Why are we ready to expand our efforts? What are we trying to accomplish?

Our inquiry has led inevitably to the only valid answer: Our purpose is to help developing nations to achieve orderly political growth, to devise techniques of cooperation, to learn from one another, and, most important of all, to establish maximum freedom of choice.

The Human Factor in Economic Growth

Yet once we arrive at such an answer another question immediately presents itself: Freedom of choice for whom? For the privileged few at the top? Or for the people as a whole?

And these questions, in turn, have persuaded us that by far the most important element in economic development is what happens to *people* in the process.

The record of the last 10 years clearly demonstrates that orderly political growth and freedom of choice cannot be achieved by economic growth alone. Indeed, the *initial* impact of faster economic development may be increased political instability.

Consider the son of a peasant family who leaves the familiar surroundings of his home village to seek a job in the new cement factory in a distant city. Soon he is earning real money for the first time in his life, money that enables him to buy a bicycle, some white shirts, and to go to an occasional movie. But in spite of this material improvement, his new experience may breed acute personal insecurity and frustration. He feels suddenly alone in a strange society; uprooted from his village, his land, his family, and his friends; confused and uncertain about values and objectives that had always seemed simple and clear.

Moreover, in many if not most new nations today an explosive gap already exists between the rich and poor. The first stages of economic development, instead of closing that gap, may widen it still further. And again the result may be added frustration and bitterness in spite of a rapidly rising gross national product.

The lesson is clear: Our primary objective, orderly political growth and increasing freedom of choice, cannot be measured by indices of production, however favorable, by rising rates of savings, and by improved trade statistics; in large degree it depends on what happens to *people* in the process of achieving that growth.

Does the extra production give most families a firmer sense of belonging? Does it produce a deepening sense of individual participation, of increasing social justice? Does it make them feel that the roads and schools and factories are somehow *theirs*, a product of their aspirations and decisions and labor, an achievement of direct meaning to themselves and their children?

Or does such growth leave most people feeling detached, uprooted, and adrift in unfamiliar and confusing surroundings?

In reviewing our years of gradual experience in the process of development, we have concluded then that the human factor is of paramount importance.

Central Role of Rural Development

But how can we best create this essential sense of personal involvement for the people of a developing nation?

If there is one lesson to be learned from our 10 brief years of experience, it is that effective development must give particular emphasis to the peasants and villagers for it is they who represent some three-fourths of the population of most developing countries. Although much has been said about rural programs, I question whether we are giving our rural societies the full attention they should have.

It is often argued that most peasant families have lived and died for centuries without significant change, that rural areas are hard to reach, and that rural minds are the most difficult to awaken to new techniques and opportunities.

Yet rural people constitute the fundamental reservoir of strength or weakness for every developing nation. We will ignore them at our peril.

Last week on my way to this conference I was vividly reminded of the central role of rural development in creating a stable society.

Eight years ago I had spent several days in the Japanese countryside studying that nation's remarkable progress in rural development. This time I revisited Japan to bring myself up to date on the progress since that time. I came away from this second visit with an earlier conviction confirmed: that in rural Japan we have a striking example of what intelligent effort can produce in transforming the life of the countryside.

The elements of this transformation are well known to everyone here.

First is the fact that 94 percent of all Japanese farmers own and till their own land. This widespread individual ownership has released human energies in a most remarkable manner, for every extra hour he spends developing his land pays the farmer immediate dividends.

Second is a thorough system of rural extension services that helps each farmer use his land most effectively.

Third is the development of universal education in even the most remote areas with special opportunities for the ablest boys and girls to go on to high school and college.

Fourth is the creation of a nationwide network of cooperatives for agricultural credit, producing, and marketing. As small machinery gradually becomes available through such farm cooperatives, manpower is released for other purposes and part-time farming is advanced.

Fifth is the development of local village industries to provide jobs for those for whom there is no opportunity on the land and for whom there is at present little room in the already overcrowded cities.

When the economist looks at the extraordinary development of rural Japan since the war, he may be impressed by the fact that Japan is now self-sufficient in rice. But the social scientist may see something which is even more important: that the farmers and villagers of Japan today have a new and abiding sense of social justice, of direct participation in the process of growth and national achievement, of rising prosperity and broadening educational opportunities.

I do not suggest that Japan's fully developed prosperous rural society can be reproduced elsewhere overnight. Nor is this integrated approach confined to that country alone. Such a people-centered approach is also being promoted vigorously in the rural communities of India, Pakistan, Malaya, and in other parts of this region as well. Indeed, we have heard several impressive progress reports this week.

In every nation what happens in the rural areas is likely to be decisive, for it is here that the food is grown, where the greatest poverty exists, and where most people live.

Hazards of Industrial Growth

No thoughtful man, however, will suggest that we can neglect the cities and the essential process of industrial growth.

Yet here again our review and reappraisal of our own assistance efforts have convinced us that in the cities as well as in the rural areas we must

return to our basic question: What happens to people in the course of economic change?

Industrial growth has traditionally been a grim and brutal affair. We need only remember the industrial revolution in Europe that stimulated the writings of Karl Marx, the blight of child labor in my own country a century ago, and the more recent ruthless squeeze on the Russian people in the economic development of the Soviet Union.

Today the exploitation of human beings can no longer be accepted as an inevitable part of the development process. For we live in a new kind of world, a world in which social services can and must be introduced at an early stage of economic growth, where the obligation of the state to provide for a minimum of basic welfare and health services is no longer questioned.

In the creation of an industrial society, statistics, communications, and industrial plants are all vitally important. Yet let us never neglect the basic need for adequate housing, for clinics, and for schools which reflect our growing respect for human dignity.

What is required is not only massive investment capital and massive programs for technical training but also a massive new sensitivity to human values.

In our reappraisal of our international assistance efforts, my Government has sought better ways to make use of our agricultural commodities to accelerate development and to tap the energies of our young people as Peace Corps volunteers.

Finally, we have concluded that effective development requires long-term plans, and long-term plans call, to the maximum possible extent, for long-term commitments. Our new AID program will enable us to make loans over a period of years to those countries whose plans qualify them for such assistance.

Partnership of Mutual Development

I have dealt at some length with the process of review and self-examination through which my country has been passing. I believe that it will make our own efforts more effective and thereby serve the interests of the Colombo Plan partnership.

In closing there is one further point I would stress in introducing to this distinguished gathering our American chapter in the Colombo Plan

draft annual report. It concerns the ultimate factors that unite us all, donors and recipients alike, in the partnership of mutual development.

For what brings us together here is not, in essence, a fascination with statistics or a common admiration for steel mills. It is, instead, a common body of values that infuse all our efforts however inarticulated these values may be. I speak of our common belief in the dignity of man and the sanctity of his freedoms: to live, to work, and to choose as he sees fit in a world of opportunity.

These are not American values, nor are they Indian values, nor are they Japanese, Malayan, Cambodian, or Indonesian values. They are values that have been embodied in all the great religions of man since the beginning of time, values that can only be protected and extended as we learn to live by them and work for them.

Wherever men work in freedom, in peace with their neighbor, in the knowledge that their children can live out lives in justice, prosperity, and opportunity, there the life of other free men is made a little more secure.

We seek then such a community of fellow participants in the age-old struggle for the right of every individual to develop his own abilities and interests within his own culture and in his own way. We shall extend our aid wherever the opportunity exists to help create such a community.

That is why we feel so deeply the value of such associations as the partnership of the Colombo Plan. And that is why we welcome the opportunity of joining with you in the greatest venture undertaken by man: the building of just societies in a Decade of Development.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: Norway, October 10, 1961.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and supplementary protocols

nos. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961.

Ratifications deposited: Austria, September 29, 1961; Belgium, September 13, 1961; Canada, April 10, 1961; Denmark, May 30, 1961; France, August 7, 1961; Federal Republic of Germany and Greece, September 27, 1961; Iceland, June 5, 1961; Ireland, August 17, 1961; Norway, July 4, 1961; Portugal, August 4, 1961; Spain, August 3, 1961; Sweden and Switzerland, September 28, 1961; Turkey, August 2, 1961; United Kingdom, May 2, 1961.

Narcotics

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The Hague January 23, 1912 (38 Stat. 1912), at Geneva February 11, 1925,¹ February 19, 1925,² and July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), at Bangkok November 27, 1931,¹ and at Geneva June 26, 1936.² Signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946. Entered into force December 11, 1946; for the United States August 12, 1947. TIAS 1671 and 1859.

Acceptance deposited: Rumania, October 11, 1961.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949; for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.

Acceptance deposited: Rumania, October 11, 1961.

BILATERAL

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement on cooperation in intercontinental testing in connection with experimental communications satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn September 5 and 29, 1961. Entered into force September 29, 1961.

Syrian Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Damascus November 9, 1961. Entered into force November 9, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

William J. Tonesk as Deputy Chief of Protocol, effective November 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 813 dated November 22.)

William Carter Ide as Deputy Regional Administrator for the Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, effective November 21. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 810 dated November 21.)

¹ Not in force for the United States.

President Outlines Responsibilities of U.S. Ambassadors

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES¹

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 27, 1961.

There is attached a copy of a letter which I have sent to each American Ambassador abroad. The fourth and fifth paragraphs on page three were omitted from the letter sent to countries where we do not have military forces.

On page three of this letter I state:

I have informed all heads of departments and agencies of the Government of the responsibilities of the chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions for our combined operations abroad, and I have asked them to instruct their representatives in the field accordingly.

I shall appreciate your instructing representatives you may have in the field in accordance with the attached letter.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

MAY 29, 1961.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

Please accept my best wishes for the successful accomplishment of your mission. As the personal representative of the President of the United States in _____ you are part of a memorable tradition which began with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and which has included many of our most distinguished citizens.

We are living in a critical moment in history. Powerful destructive forces are challenging the universal values which, for centuries, have inspired men of good will in all parts of the world.

If we are to make progress toward a prosperous community of nations in a world of peace, the United States must exercise the most affirmative and responsible leadership. Beyond our shores, this leadership, in large measure, must be provided by our ambassadors and their staffs.

I have asked you to represent our Government in _____ because I am confident that you have the ability, dedication, and experience. The purpose of this letter is to define guidelines which I hope may be helpful to you.

The practice of modern diplomacy requires a close understanding not only of governments but also of people, their cultures and institutions. Therefore, I hope that you will plan your work so that you may have the time to travel extensively outside the nation's capital. Only in this way can you develop the close, personal associations that go beyond official diplomatic circles and maintain a sympathetic and accurate understanding of all segments of the country.

¹ 26 Fed. Reg. 10749.

Moreover, the improved understanding which is so essential to a more peaceful and rational world is a two-way street. It is our task not only to understand what motivates others, but to give them a better understanding of what motivates us.

Many persons in _____ who have never visited the United States, receive their principal impressions of our nation through their contact with Americans who come to their country either as private citizens or as government employees.

Therefore, the manner in which you and your staff personally conduct yourselves is of the utmost importance. This applies to the way in which you carry out your official duties and to the attitudes you and they bring to day-to-day contacts and associations.

It is an essential part of your task to create a climate of dignified, dedicated understanding, cooperation, and service in and around the Embassy.

In regard to your personal authority and responsibility, I shall count on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United States Government in _____.

You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in _____. I shall give you full support and backing in carrying out your assignment.

Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies are expected to communicate directly with their offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington.

However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully informed of their views and activities and to abide by your decisions unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary.

If in your judgment individual members of the Mission are not functioning effectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Department of State.

In case the departure from _____ of any individual member of the Mission is indicated in your judgment, I shall expect you to make the decision and see that it is carried into effect. Such instances I am confident will be rare.

Now one word about your relations to the military. As you know, the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attachés, Military Assistance Advisory Groups and other Military components attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander. The line of authority to these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field.

Although this means that the chief of the American Diplomatic Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military commander to assure

the full exchange of information. If it is your opinion that activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect our over-all relations with the people or government of _____, you should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.

I have informed all heads of departments and agencies of the Government of the responsibilities of the chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions for our combined operations abroad, and I have asked them to instruct their representatives in the field accordingly.

As you know, your own lines of communication as Chief of Mission run through the Department of State.

Let me close with an expression of confidence in you personally and the earnest hope that your efforts may help strengthen our relations with both the Government and the people of _____. I am sure that you will make a major contribution to the cause of world peace and understanding.

Good luck and my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to November 20 are Nos. 778 of November 9, 779 of November 13, 781 of November 11, and 787 of November 15.

No.	Date	Subject
*800	11/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†801	11/21	Nichols: mandatory oil imports program.
†802	11/20	AID loan to Brazil.
†804	11/21	Duke: Torch of Friendship ceremonies, Miami, Fla.
†805	11/21	Bowles: Yale Law Forum.
806	11/21	Conversion of U.S. bases in Morocco.
807	11/21	Aid to flood victims in Somali Republic (rewrite).
*808	11/21	Burns sworn in as Ambassador to Central African Republic (biographic details).
809	11/20	Food-for-Peace agreement with Congo.
*810	11/21	Ide sworn in as AID Deputy Administrator for the Near East and South Asia (biographic details).
811	11/21	Resumption of Geneva nuclear test talks.
*812	11/21	Cultural exchange (Togo).
*813	11/22	Tonesk appointed Deputy Chief of Protocol (biographic details).
†814	11/22	Morrison: OAS Council on Dominican Republic.
*815	11/25	Cultural exchange (Eastman Philharmonia).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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ICIAL
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UNITED STATES
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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A Milestone in the Alliance for Progress

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

Ambassadors, representatives, ministers, Mr. Secretary:² Today marks another milestone in the Alliance for Progress. For today we begin to select the panel of experts established by the Charter of Punta del Este.³

This panel is an historic innovation, not only in inter-American relations but in the effort to develop the economies of half the world. Not since the Marshall plan has a group of allied nations embarked on a program of regional development guided by a regional body largely selected by the developing nations themselves.

These experts will review the long-term development plans of the Latin American nations, advising them on measures to strengthen the plans and the self-help and the social reform measures which will accompany them. In addition they will provide help in financing agencies to provide external resources in the most effective manner.

I am confident that the skills and ability of the men you select will enable the nations of the hemisphere to benefit greatly from their work. And I assure you that the United States will give the greatest possible weight to the conclusions of the experts in the distribution of funds. Similarly, we will instruct our representatives to international agencies to rely heavily on the work of the panel.

I am confident that this new and imaginative creation of the inter-American system will vastly strengthen our common effort—the Alliance for Progress for all our people.

¹ Made before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 29 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

² José A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

U.S. Makes \$6 Million Available for Pan American Union Projects

The Department of State announced on November 29 (press release 825) that an agreement¹ was signed that day making U.S. Government funds in the amount of \$6 million available to the Pan American Union to assist in financing technical assistance projects to be carried out under the Alliance for Progress. President Kennedy signed the agreement for the United States and Dr. José A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, signed for the Pan American Union.

¹ For text, see press release 825 dated Nov. 29.

I have also, today, signed an agreement for the use of \$6 million in Alliance for Progress funds to strengthen the OAS. This money will be used for studies and technical assistance, called for by the Charter of Punta del Este, to help nations in planning the growth of their economies. Thus a pledge of long standing has been fulfilled.

I would also like to express my gratification at the important progress which has been made since the Alliance for Progress was proposed in March.⁴

In August the American nations drafted the Charter of Punta del Este—the framework for the decade of development—a document whose scope and significance is matched only by the charter of the OAS itself. The Inter-American Bank, ECLA [U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America], and the OAS have agreed to provide development missions to assist nations in their planning—and some of these missions are

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

already in the field. In addition, you have strengthened the machinery of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and prepared for today's selection of the panel of experts.

For its part the United States has streamlined its own AID [Agency for International Development] program, placing general responsibility for coordination of our effort in the hands of a distinguished administrator with long experience in the work of development—Ambassador [Teodoro] Moscoso. And we have already developed new sets of standards to guide our work.

In these and in many other ways we have developed the basic structure for our future effort—for the work of the next 10 years. But we have not waited for the establishment of that structure to begin our work.

All over Latin America new development plans are being formulated, and some have already been completed. New tax- and land-reform programs—basic requirements of social progress—have been instituted or are being prepared. Many of the American nations are now mobilizing their resources, and the energies of their people, for the task of development. And the United States, for its part, has already committed more than \$800 million of the more than a billion dollars which it pledged to the first year of the Alliance—a year which ends on March 13.

But despite this speed, I am determined to do better, as far as this country goes, in the coming months. The urgent needs of our people in this hemisphere cannot wait. Their need for food and shelter, for education and relief from poverty, and, above all, their need to feel hope for their future and the future of their children, demand attention and toil this year, this month, today.

Measured by the past, we have moved swiftly. Measured by the needs of the future, we must all do much better. And I can assure you that the energies of this Government, and my own personal efforts, will be devoted to speeding up the pace of development. For I share with you a determination that before this decade comes to a close the Americas will have entered upon a new era when the material progress of American man and woman, and the justice of his society, will match the spiritual and cultural achievements of this hemisphere.

I am fully aware of the immensity of the task and of the difficulties that we face. But I know

we share the faith of one of the earliest settlers of my country, William Bradford of Massachusetts, who, when told in 1630 that the hazards of settling this part of the United States were too great to overcome, answered:

All great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and must be both enterprised and overcome with answerable courage. . . . the dangers were great, but not desperate; the difficulties were many, but not invincible. . . . all of them, through the help of God, by fortitude and patience, might either be borne or overcome.

We shall overcome them.

U.S. Rebuts Cuban Charges in OAS of Intervention in Dominican Affairs

*Statement by deLesseps S. Morrison*¹

The statement and charges just made by the delegate from Cuba, as has been so characteristic of his frequent utterances in this Council for many months, lack any relationship to the truth. He pretends to find a threat to the peace and security of the Caribbean area in the sympathetic attitude of the Government of the United States of America, shared by other governments, toward efforts to bring about a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy in the Dominican Republic.

May I repeat to the delegate from Cuba what has been said so often in reply to his frequent propagandistic outbursts—the real danger to the peace and security of the Caribbean area and to the independence of every American state lies in the suppression of freedom and democracy in Cuba and in the subservience of his Government to the Communist bloc in a manner which permits the once independent country of Cuba to be used as an instrument of subversion and agitation throughout the hemisphere. This is what constitutes a threat to the hemisphere, as has been made so abundantly clear in this Council in recent weeks.

¹Made at a special session of the Council of the Organization of American States at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 22 (press release 814) in answer to charges by Cuba of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Morrison is U.S. Representative on the OAS Council.

I will not at this time make any effort to take up in detail the many falsehoods, distortions, and insults which comprise the Cuban note.² Neither do I intend to go into detail regarding the numerous procedural incongruities with which this special session of the Council confronts us today. These include, however, (1) the strange circumstance of a regime—and a discredited regime at that—demanding an opportunity to present the case of a sovereign government which is fully and adequately represented; (2) the simultaneous approach of the Castro regime to both the United Nations and the OAS to take up this alleged affront to a third government, particularly after it has systematically ignored the regional organization of which it pretends to be a responsible member when it happens to suit its convenience; (3) the curious manner of presentation of the request for an extraordinary meeting of this Council on a matter which has been before this Council and under consideration by an appropriate committee since August of 1960. Obviously the delegate from Cuba has been required to ignore these procedural aspects in order to continue with the consistent pattern of Cuban efforts, which is to use and misuse any forum which may be available to it to spew forth its dangerous propaganda.

Recent Developments in Dominican Republic

The facts regarding recent developments in the Dominican Republic are well known to the members of this Council. They have been the subject matter of recent meetings of the Special Committee on the Dominican Republic to carry out the mandate given to the Council by Resolution I of the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers.³ They have been given full and adequate publicity. With particular reference to the statements made by the United States in this connection, may I call attention to the following:

1. On November 14, 1961, the Special Representative of the United States on the Special Committee presented a formal statement summarizing the reaction of my Government to the recently prepared report of the subcommittee of that Com-

mittee.⁴ Based upon our view that recognition should be given to "constructive efforts" that had been made by the Government of the Dominican Republic to remove the basis for the OAS action which was taken in August of 1960, my Government proposed withdrawal of the formal indication made by the Council on January 4, 1961, that it was "feasible and desirable" to extend suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic to petroleum and petroleum products and trucks and spare parts for trucks. An important consideration in this proposal was the fact that "key figures closely associated with the former regime" had departed, since it appeared important that leading figures closely associated with the former dictatorship should no longer be able to dominate the political and economic life of the Dominican Republic.

2. Shortly after the meeting in which the above statement was made, and while the other members of the Committee were considering further the problems before it, two of the above-mentioned "leading figures," members of the Trujillo family, returned to the Dominican Republic from their brief sojourn abroad. As a result of this development, which clearly appeared a backward step, the United States representative recommended postponement of a decision regarding the date on which the Special Committee would vote on the above problem.⁵ This was accepted by the Committee.

3. On November 18, the Secretary of State issued the following statement:⁶

It has been confirmed that leading figures who were closely associated with the repressive measures of the former dictatorship in the Dominican Republic and who had departed from that country returned to Ciudad Trujillo on November 15.

Moreover, it appears that they may be planning an attempt to reassert dictatorial domination of the political and economic life of that country, threatening the recent gains of the Dominican Government and people toward democratization.

On the recommendation of the United States, the Special Committee of the Organization of American States has already postponed further consideration of a proposal on withdrawing the suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic in certain products.

In view of the possibility of political disintegration and

² Not printed here.

³ For statements made by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on Aug. 18 and 20, 1960, together with text of Resolution I, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 929.

⁵ *Ibid.*, footnote 4, p. 932.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 931.

the dangerous situation which could ensue, the Government of the United States is considering the further measures that unpredictable events might warrant.

4. As signs of political disintegration appeared, and the possibility of an even more dangerous situation increased, units of the U.S. Navy were stationed near the Dominican Republic on the high seas and constituted a friendly presence with the full knowledge of the constitutional authorities and responsible leaders of the Dominican Republic.

5. The stationing of these units of the U.S. Fleet on the high seas outside the territorial waters and outside the airspace of any sovereign government, in no way was or is an act of intervention violating the sovereignty or territorial integrity of a sovereign state, or contrary to any international obligations. There have been no flights by United States aircraft over Dominican territory as the delegate of Cuba charges.

Record of Castro Regime

May I point to the sharp contrast which is offered by the record of the Castro regime during the past 3 years with respect to the Dominican Republic, for whose rights Cuba now appears to be so concerned:

In June 1959 an expedition which had been organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials invaded the Dominican Republic. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic. The principal leader of the invasion—Delio Gómez Ochoa—was captured and eventually allowed by the Trujillos to return to Cuba.

A Dominican closely associated with the Castro regime—López Molina—was personally protected by the Trujillos after his return to the Dominican Republic in June 1960 and encouraged to form a Castro-Communist political party at the same time that the Trujillos were persecuting the democratic opposition. Recently President Balaguer has acted against both totalitarian elements: The Trujillo clan has been forced to abandon the country while López Molina has been arrested for deportation.

In a televised interview on January 6, 1961, shortly after he returned from behind the Iron Curtain, "Che" Guevara referred to Trujillo as "now our friend." The understanding between the Castro-Communist dictatorship and the Trujillo dictatorship illustrates once again the historical affinity of totalitarian systems of the two extremes.

Radio broadcasts positively identified as coming from a station in or about the city of Habana on November 20, 1961, repeatedly incited armed revolt in the Dominican Republic against the very government that was ridding the country of the dictators, using words such as these:

All power in the hands of the people! All weapons in the hands of the people! The weapons are in the barracks. Nothing can stop it; . . . Take over the weapons necessary to destroy the repressive apparatus!

All to the battle! All to the streets! . . . All power in the hands of the people! All weapons in the hands of the people! The entire government in revolutionary hands!

I wish to emphasize that this incitement was aimed at the government that was eliminating dictatorial rule. Such broadcasts emanating from a police state have official approval.

Stripped of all its calculated insult, of all of the cynical appeal to inter-American instruments which the Castro regime has long since cast aside, the Cuban note constitutes a flagrant attempt to intervene in the courageous efforts of the Dominican people to achieve a new and democratic life for their country. What hollow mockery more ridiculous than the references made in that note to the "struggle of another American people for true democracy and national liberty"! This from a dictatorship which has made itself subservient to the foremost dictatorial system of modern times, and from a regime which speaks of "true democracy" while suppressing every form of liberty and freedom to which its own people have aspired. What solemn words about intervention from a government which has dedicated itself to the proposition that governments which do not conform to its own ugly image must be subverted and destroyed! The hysteria of its clamor will never hide the reality of the misery which it has brought upon the Cuban people.

The Dominican people in emerging from the tyranny of the Trujillo era have won an important

initial victory. It is heartwarming to see their great happiness and jubilation as manifest in the wave of celebration going on throughout the Dominican Republic and participated in by all the democratic forces of the country. They have a right to be heartened by the fact that a military coup which was being planned and in the making did not succeed, and as they look forward to strengthening the freedom they have won they also have a right to claim the sympathy and support of the governments and peoples of the hemisphere in their own efforts to guard against other extremists who are already trying to impose on the Dominican Republic a new dictatorship—a dictatorship as deadly as the Trujillos' to individual liberties and representative democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that in this instance the attack has reached a new low of irrelevance, hypocrisy, and slander which we should all contemplate very carefully.

U.S. Expresses Concern Over Events in Dominican Republic

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 30

Press release S29 dated November 30

The United States Government is deeply anxious that the people of the Dominican Republic bring to a successful conclusion their efforts to establish democratic government.

The United States joined the other nations of the Americas in condemning—through collective sanctions¹—the regime of Generalissimo Trujillo. Since his death we have supported in every appropriate way a rapid transition toward democratic government. We especially welcomed and lent sympathetic encouragement to the successful resistance to the efforts by the brothers of the late dictator to reassert totalitarian domination. We intend to continue our encouragement of all responsible peaceful efforts to secure freedom for the Dominican people. We think it is of the utmost importance that the people of the Dominican Republic continue on the path toward democracy, and we hope that all men of good will in the

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 358; Feb. 20, 1961, p. 273; and Dec. 4, 1961, p. 929.

Dominican Republic will exercise moderation and responsibility in seeking the political means by which a truly democratic future for the country may be assured.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DECEMBER 1²

The United States is concerned that events in the Dominican Republic yesterday may signify a backward step in the movement of the Dominican people along the path toward democratic government. These developments are particularly disappointing in view of the considerable progress made in the past few months toward democratization and in view of the recent negotiations between the Balaguer government and leaders of the moderate opposition which held out so much hope for an early and peaceful solution of the political, social, and economic problems of that country. The U.S. Government, which has consistently given sympathetic support to the democratic aspirations of the Dominican people, hopes that responsible elements in the Dominican Republic, both within and outside of the Government, will continue to strive through the exercise of statesmanship and moderation to reach a prompt resolution of the present situation.

Brazil Receives First AID Loan

Press release 802 dated November 20

The first loan made by the United States Agency for International Development was signed on November 20 by Roberto Campos, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, and Teodoro Moscoso, AID Regional Administrator for Latin America. The loan agreement makes available \$50 million of a total of \$100 million in credits earmarked for Brazil by AID.

The purpose of the loan is to provide further assistance to the Brazilian Government's program of promoting economic and social progress under conditions of financial stability. These objectives are an essential part of the Alliance for Progress concept as expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este.¹

² Read to news correspondents by a Department press officer on Dec. 1.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

Since the inception of a new economic and financial program earlier this year, Brazil has sought to achieve the twin goals of economic growth and economic stabilization. The new government which came into office in September has expressed its determination to pursue these objectives with renewed vigor. In his speech before the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies on November 14, Prime Minister [Tancredo] Neves stressed the importance of further action along these lines, including measures to bring inflation under control and to strengthen Brazil's external financial position through a free exchange system. He presented a number of proposals for legislation to carry the program forward, including a comprehensive revision of tax laws.

The loan agreement is a further step in the implementation of the financial agreements concluded between the United States and Brazil in May 1961.² At that time the United States announced \$338 million in new credits, which were accompanied by new credits from other governments, from private sources, and from international financial institutions. At the same time, arrangements were made for the rescheduling of Brazilian debts abroad. Of the \$338 million, \$100 million was conditional upon the action taken by the United States Congress on the foreign aid program for 1962. The recent passage of the Act for International Development has enabled the United States to implement this part of the arrangement.

The \$50 million released under the loan agreement will bring total drawings on U.S. Government credits, under the May arrangements, to \$178 million. All of these releases have taken place since September 7, 1961.

The proceeds of the loan will be used to help Brazil finance essential imports from the United States. In order to contribute most effectively to the objective of easing Brazil's foreign debt repayment obligations, particularly during the next few years, repayment of the loan will be made in 40 years without interest and with no payments during the first 10 years. Repayment will be in dollars. There will be a small credit fee of three-quarters of 1 percent of the balance outstanding each year.

²*Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 862.

Great Seal Dedicated at Torch of Friendship in Miami

*Remarks by Angier Biddle Duke
Chief of Protocol¹*

We are assembled here this afternoon at the Torch of Friendship to install the Great Seal of the United States at this monument. The first national seal of another great American Republic, Peru, has already been placed here. In placing our own here today we are reaffirming not only our historic ties to our brothers in the New World but our commitment to a common future with them in an Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere.

It is most appropriate that this Torch of Friendship stand in this spot at the gateway of the Americas. Miami's role as the link between the Americas is most fittingly memorialized in this monument to friendship—a friendship which has been put to a hard and cruel test since January 1, 1960.

For the first time in the history of our country the United States has become a land of first asylum for those seeking freedom from abroad. Traditionally we have opened our hearts and our gates to refugees from tyranny and oppression from overseas after they have found their way to us through other countries. Now we find neighbors literally throwing themselves on our mercy at the first instance of disaster. Their tragedy has quite literally meant a sobering burden to their hosts in Miami and in the State of Florida. This freedom torch is symbolic of the hand of friendship which you have extended in dark times of need, and, as such, I believe it will come to partake in our Southern Hemisphere of much the same aura of majesty and significance as enshrines the Statue of Liberty.

To Mayor [Robert K.] High and the Councilors of the City of Miami goes so much of the credit for the vision and imagination of this inspiring project. But, as it is a symbol of friendship in times of trial and trouble, it is also a symbol of hopes for a future in freedom for our beleaguered neighbors in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Under the leadership of President Kennedy, the

¹Made at ceremonies dedicating the Great Seal of the United States at the Torch of Friendship at Miami, Fla., on Nov. 22 (press release 804 dated Nov. 21).

Alliance for Progress, called into being last January and ratified in August at Punta del Este,² is now moving from the planning to the action stage. I sometimes wonder if many of us understand the very profound implications of this massive program. It seems to me that some of us are prone to consider large-scale assistance to Latin America within the same frame of reference as the Marshall plan; yet it must be recalled that the \$10 billion fed into the economic structure of Europe was able to be absorbed and turned to constructive use by a highly developed industrial society with the manpower trained and skilled to manage and administer it successfully. Europe, no matter how badly battered and bruised, was a going concern with a long tradition and experience in industrialization, commerce, and transportation.

In Latin America, however, we know that many of these essential factors are virtually missing. Latin American countries, for example, trade more with Europe and with the United States than they do with each other. The economic basis of society is still largely agricultural, and mostly monocultural at that, with a system of land ownership which assures uneven distribution of the fruits of production and inhibits the diversification of capital.

It is easy to describe the inadequacies of societies. It is easy to understand that a massive application of capital to their structure will not in itself shore them up or solve their problems. Their economic and social institutions through their own efforts must be modernized and equipped to be able to receive this kind of help. Our problem, of course, is how to work out with our neighbors ways and means of directing capital flow so as to increase their own productive capacity. And this must be done with speed and urgency, pressed as we are by the ongoing revolution of rising expectations. Lipservice has been paid throughout the Americas to recognition of the need for emergency evolution, reform, and modernized institutions. Yet what this will actually mean in practice is a marked change in the social and economic system prevailing in most countries in the Southern Hemisphere.

I am not concerned at the moment with the ability or the sincerity of the people who must manage this movement in Latin America. I am

led to believe that there is a burgeoning group of dedicated and educated men who are eager to meet our assistance with reformed and revitalized institutions, capable of absorbing that assistance. But what I am concerned about is our own sincerity. Do all of us really mean what we say? Are the stirring words of hope for reform, for a democratic and free society, for a release of the energies of the submerged majority merely the comfortable clichés of Pan American Day speakers? Do we in effect know what we are talking about or understand the implications when we call for a release of these energies?

Our American press is often and, in my view, rightly criticized for its failure to publish interpretive analyses of Latin American affairs—articles which will educate the American public on the basic forces at work in Latin America. In defense of our press, perhaps public interest in the Americas does not extend much beyond the spot news. This interest will grow as the Alliance for Progress is implemented by the terms of the Punta del Este Charter. The translation of this developing program into action will indeed be news.

In some ways I do not envy the role of an American ambassador today in Latin America at a time when the restless, growing, and ambitious middle class, backed by new productive power being infused by our own Alliance for Progress program, is beginning to break up or transform the institutions of the past. The pressures on our ambassador from the right and from the left will challenge every ounce of ingenuity, integrity, and ability that he will be able to summon. On the other hand, he is challenged by serving his country in an era to which generations to come may point as the turning point in the battle for survival and freedom in our New World.

This ambassador, in fact all of our representatives abroad, will be carrying out the policy of the American people. I hope we understand that policy, that we understand the stakes involved and the profound implications to us in either its failure or its success. This program is going to be many times more difficult to implement than the Marshall plan and at least as important.

Here in Florida, as close as you are to the Southern Hemisphere, I feel that there is an understanding of the grave and serious nature of the course on which we have embarked. It is our common

² BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

hope that your interest, understanding, and support will be matched throughout the country.

The people of Miami who have established this Torch of Friendship deserve the highest recogni-

tion for the responsible role being played during this epic period. And it is therefore with great pride that I hereby affix to this Torch of Friendship the Great Seal of the United States.

Redefining the Potentials of the Democratic Faith

*by Under Secretary Bowles*¹

For the last 2 weeks I have been traveling through east and southeast Asia, visiting Tokyo, Singapore, Djakarta, and attending the annual meeting of the Colombo Plan nations in Kuala Lumpur in the beautiful and dynamic new nation of Malaya.² This trip served to refresh my knowledge of what I believe may become the most decisive geopolitical area in the world. It also helped to put our own country in sharper focus, and this provides the basis for my remarks here tonight.

Unless I am seriously mistaken, we are approaching a watershed in regard to the world, our economy, and relations with other nations. We are at the end of the postwar period, poised uncertainly before the opening of a new era in the history of man. I believe that the political, economic, and social confusions which are evident within our own society are part of the ferment that precedes great national decisions.

In such a period it is not surprising that some of our fellow citizens should seek to find their way back to old patterns of life that appear more understandable and controllable. Yet the strength of the current conservative movement may be exaggerated by the fact that it has developed in a time of political transition. The positive ideas which sooner or later will invigorate our public debates are not yet clearly defined, nor have they yet taken root.

In the meantime at least three powerful political

forces are at work in our society, no one of which is likely to succumb to old slogans or to fit easily into familiar political pigeonholes. Bit by bit each of us is being pressed to come to grips with these forces, to rethink our attitudes toward public questions, to abandon sterile concepts, and to stake out new positions.

Meeting the Global Pressures

The first of these three forces is the massive impact of the interrelated postwar world on our American society and our search for a more realistic response.

For the last 15 years many of us have been assuring each other that the global pressures which we have been striving to meet are temporary, that, if we were wise and courageous, the so-called world emergency would somehow subside, and that this would leave us happily undisturbed with nothing to do but enjoy our material comforts. This dangerously parochial view is due partly to the pull of our isolationist past and partly to the distorted view of world affairs that developed as a result of the specially favored position from which we tackled international problems following the war.

In the late 1940's Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had been largely devastated by war. Japan was striving to get back on its feet. In Communist China an uncertain new government was faced with the staggering problems created by 20 years of exhausting civil war.

The American economy alone was physically intact, strengthened by heavy wartime investment, and raring to go. American military power was firmly based in a monopoly of nuclear weapons.

¹ Address made before the Yale Law Forum at New Haven, Conn., on Nov. 21 (press release 805).

² For text of a statement made by Mr. Bowles at the Colombo Plan meeting, see BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1961, p. 988.

As a result, American power relative to that of other nations was overwhelming. As we looked around the world, there was almost nothing we could not do if we had the will to do it.

In the last few years this situation has been profoundly altered. As we enter the decade of the sixties a vital new Europe is creating the first integrated society since the Romans, the Soviet Union has emerged with industrial and military power second only to our own, and China under a tough and embittered Communist government has been developing some alarmingly expansionist notions in regard to its neighbors. Simultaneously Asia, Africa, and Latin America have awakened to the exciting fact that illiteracy, poverty, and ill health may gradually be eliminated and that new opportunities can be created for their people.

The result is a world of infinite potential and of profound uncertainties. Is it then surprising that the more timid of us should be anxious to withdraw from it, or to ignore it, or to wish it out of existence?

In the coming months we shall be called upon to make some critically important decisions on how to deal with this new world. What path will we follow?

If we choose the negative path of high tariffs, of disdain for the United Nations, of impatient attempts to impose our will on others as a requirement for American assistance, we shall run the grave danger of national destruction; at the very best we will see our great country with its long tradition of democratic government becoming increasingly isolated from the dynamic new world which has been taking shape.

If, on the other hand, we choose the affirmative path of world cooperation and participation, we will be called upon for a degree of mutual patience, sacrifice, and fresh thinking that will challenge our very best efforts.

The questions that will appear on our agenda are formidable indeed:

How can we build an economic and political partnership with non-Communist nations?

How can we develop freer and greatly expanded world trade and still maintain full employment?

How can we best help the new nations of the world not only to ease their economic difficulties but to do so in a way that increases their sense of dignity?

How can we deal most fruitfully with the new

Europe which is building itself up across the Atlantic?

Is a new power balance of some kind possible in Asia?

Can the powerful new China be persuaded to adopt a more moderate course, or will a head-on conflict become inevitable?

Can the United Nations develop into an effective instrument of world peace in its own right?

Can there be a realistic program of arms control?

How should we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union?

The implications of such questions are infinite. Is it any wonder that many Americans would prefer to retreat into their intellectual bomb shelters in the hope that when they come out the world will have somehow returned to the more orderly pattern of their father's day?

This brings us to yet another crucial question: In a world setting of this kind how do we define a "liberal" and what is a "conservative"? For instance, is the labor leader who demands high tariffs as the answer for every domestic economic problem still a liberal because he once supported Roosevelt's New Deal? And how about the anti-New Deal businessman who now vigorously supports expanded foreign aid and freer trade? Is he still a conservative?

Strengthening the Domestic Economy

Let us turn to the second force which I believe will help shape the political patterns of the 1960's, namely the evolving pressures within our own economy. As we attempt to cope with these pressures we again find that many old concepts begin to sound hollow if not irrelevant.

Working at its most effective and dynamic best our capitalistic system has been based on able management, small unit profits, and a vigorous sales effort to achieve the largest possible volume, with profits increasing as volume expands.

In certain industries we now see this formula hopelessly compromised by price and wage manipulation which has little relevance to economic realities. In some industries we see prices arbitrarily set to provide for substantial profits with 25 percent or more of productive capacity lying idle. In others we face featherbedding practices in the labor movement which slow down production and raise costs and prices correspondingly.

Taking a broad view, it is clear that we have been drifting into a situation in which powerful vested interests find it possible to protect their own economic interests with several million people unemployed and an important fraction of our people ill-nourished, ill-housed, and poorly educated.

What is required is a searching reexamination to determine why many areas of our economy remain stagnant, why our rate of growth has lagged behind that of most industrial countries, why 20 percent of all American families are still living on less than \$2,000 a year, and why unemployment stubbornly persists in many centers of population at a time that calls for all the production that we can get.

Among the various questions about our domestic economy which are waiting to be asked and answered are the following:

How can we reorganize our housing industry to build more and better homes each year at lower prices?

How can we speed up the rebuilding of our cities so that our slums may be wiped out in the decade of the sixties?

How can we make the best medical attention available to those who are in greatest need?

Above all, how can we strengthen our public educational system to insure that all bright American boys and girls can enter college?

Such questions would be important at any period in our history. Yet today, when our society is facing the challenge of Communist concepts of development and growth, they are of the utmost urgency.

Our search for better answers should not be confined to local, State, and Federal governments. It should enlist the best minds in our labor unions, our universities, our business and farm organizations.

Our economy is the essential instrument with which we must achieve greater opportunity and security for all citizens, assure an adequate defense system, and provide the resources with which to ease the growing pains of new nations that are striving to relieve their poverty through democratic institutions.

Only a confident, dynamic America can meet this challenge. Yet built-in obstacles to expanding production have kept us on dead center.

Eliminating Discrimination

The third force with which we must contend in this period of political reorientation is found in the rapidly growing demands of our Negro citizens for full citizenship in what we believe to be the greatest democracy on earth. For generations the struggle against racial discrimination was largely spearheaded by white Americans whose consciences told them that discrimination against any group was a violation of their moral creed. Now the lead is being taken by Negro Americans who are calling upon Negro fellow citizens to demand their rights under our Constitution. The response grows month by month.

Moreover, these voices are now heard not only in our own country but increasingly throughout the world. As long as we deny full democratic rights to those Americans whose ancestors came from Africa we cannot expect the representatives of the Asian and African nations to accept our protestation of democratic faith.

Of the 100 ambassadors in Washington, D.C., a large percentage are from Africa and Asia. They are the proud representatives of new nations, determined to make their voices heard and their views respected.

Again the obvious questions present themselves:

How can the moderates of the South be persuaded to speak out more vigorously?

How can the real-estate discrimination which now creates Negro tenement areas in most northern cities be counteracted?

How can we create a national climate that will make faster school integration possible?

How can we persuade the two-thirds of the world which is colored that the land that revered Thomas Jefferson still believes in what Jefferson said?

These then are the three challenges which face the American people in the decade of the sixties: our relations with the world, our ability to improve the performance of our economy, and our efforts to eliminate discrimination against any American on the grounds of race, creed, or religion.

Out of our conflicting reactions to these questions new political patterns will almost certainly emerge in the 1960's. Since the old political tags of "liberal," "conservative," "radical," or "reactionary" are rapidly losing their

relevance, the sooner a new orientation develops, the better it will be for all of us. The slogans which moved us in the 1930's are leaving an increasing number of Americans uninspired and apathetic.

This Christmas vacation thousands of college-age sons will listen politely as their fathers nostalgically refight the battles of the New Deal years. Fathers will explain how as young liberals they boldly stormed the ramparts of the National Association of Manufacturers, or how as young conservatives they fought the battle for a financial "soundness" which left no room for TVA, social security, or public housing.

Although the sons are expected to listen respectfully, they may be pardoned if they feel that this history of old wars lost and won is becoming increasingly irrelevant to their own era. The most thoughtful among them will know that the struggle is now being switched to new battlegrounds, that the bugle is calling for new alignments.

I do not suggest that the lines of political argument and action that will divide us in the 1960's will be totally unconnected with the past. Liberalism in any age calls for belief in certain universal values which must be reframed by each generation in response to the realities of its own experience and objectives.

In the new days as in the old, conservative thinkers may be expected to draw more vigorously from the past and to approach the future with greater misgivings. The more extreme among them will demand that we withdraw from the United Nations and from our alliances, that we slash our governmental budgets, slow down our efforts to rebuild our cities and improve our education, and that we urge American Negroes to be patient for yet a little while. In effect they will be saying, "Stop the world, we want to get off."

But the world will not stop, and not even the most timid of us can get off.

No period in history provides such awesome dangers as does our fast-changing world of today; nor does any period offer such exhilarating opportunities for the individual to grow, for his dignity to become a reality, and for human energies to be released for the common good.

Thus we may hope to hear the liberal-minded people of tomorrow call for a stronger world partnership between ourselves and other non-Com-

munist nations, increased concern for freedom and well-being of other people, added determination not merely to stand up to Soviet threats but to **create a better society here at home** in which men are free to do what they are capable of doing, no matter what their race, their creed, or their color.

The Soviet Union and Communist China represent growing industrial and military power, and communism will continue to have dangerous appeal for the weak and the frustrated. Yet if we Americans provide bold and affirmative alternatives I believe that hundreds of millions of human beings will come to see communism as the sterile and outmoded doctrine that it is, offering nothing to the spirit, nothing to those who seek a faith to live by, in short, nothing to anyone but the hollow promise of ruthless and bankrupt materialism.

As the true meaning of democracy is debated in the new framework, as new differences are crystallized and new political postures chosen, we must hope that the advantage will continue to lie with those who place above all else the rights and responsibilities of man.

It is the task of such people to redefine the potentials of democratic faith in the framework of today's dangerous, exciting, and promising world. Let us pray that they may have the courage and insight to do so.

The most crucially important questions involving the future of our nation and of our universal faith are waiting to be asked and answered. The way in which we Americans answer these questions in the early 1960's will be decisive, I believe, for many generations to come.

East German Communist Intelligence Official Defects to West

Press release 818 dated November 28

How East Berlin is used for subversive activities against the Federal Republic of Germany and a great number of other countries was disclosed on November 28 by the announcement at Bonn, West Germany, of the defection of a senior officer of the secret service of the so-called "German Democratic Republic."¹ According to the announcement,

¹A limited number of copies of a Department of State report on "Soviet Bloc Espionage Centers in East Berlin" is available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

made by the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany, the defector, Guenter Maennel, was a member of the Hauptverwaltung fuer Aufklaerung (HVA), which is charged with intelligence operations abroad.

Maennel's unit, according to his own admission, was engaged in activities against North and South America as well as several countries in Scandinavia, Africa, and in the Middle East. Maennel has identified a total of 14 agents who are or were stationed in these areas and has revealed that a unit of the HVA is headed by Brigadier Markus Wolf, a Soviet citizen of German birth, and has more than 500 staff officers engaged in espionage and subversion.

Maennel has described the activities of his unit from East Berlin. The Soviet sector of Berlin, he makes clear, also serves the intelligence services of other Soviet bloc countries as a springboard for their espionage activities against the Federal Republic and other countries. In addition, these services use the Soviet sector as a base for kidnaping or assassination of their political enemies and for their efforts against non-Communist countries.

The Soviet Government and its propagandists in the Soviet sector of Berlin have claimed that free Berlin is a center of espionage and subversion. Maennel's disclosures emphasize that the recent Soviet propaganda attacks on West Berlin are sheer hypocrisy. He declared that the Soviet secret police are increasingly using the foreign trade and press representatives of the East German regime to conduct subversion and political espionage in a great number of countries.

Four American Missionaries Released at Lisbon

Department Statement

Press release 835 dated December 2

The Department of State is pleased to report that four American missionaries of the Methodist

Church, who have been under arrest by Portuguese authorities since early September, were released today in Lisbon, Portugal. The four men are Wendell L. Golden, Rockford, Ill.; Marion Way, Jr., Charleston, S.C.; Fred Brancel, Endeavor, Wis.; and Edwin LeMaster, Lexington, Ky. The men will be deported from Portuguese territory. The intention of the Portuguese authorities to deport the missionaries once the investigation of their cases was completed had been previously indicated to the American Embassy at Lisbon on October 17.

The men were arrested on September 5 and 6 in Angola, where they had been working under the auspices of the American Methodist Missionary Board. The American consul at Luanda, Angola, discussed their detention with police authorities on the day of their arrest, and several times subsequently, and visited the men on September 7, 8, and 9. The American Embassy at Lisbon first discussed their arrest with the Portuguese Foreign Ministry on September 7.

The four missionaries were transferred to Lisbon on September 17. They were met on arrival there by a representative of the Embassy. Officers of the Embassy visited the men frequently during their imprisonment, ascertained that their needs and wants were being met, and provided them with certain materials such as books, magazines, and toilet articles to ease their detention. C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, visited the missionaries personally. Following his visit he wrote letters to their wives assuring them that the men were being well treated and were in good health.

From the day of their arrest, the imprisonment of the missionaries received close and continuing attention from the Department of State and our Foreign Service posts in Lisbon and Luanda. On instructions from the Department of State, officers of the American Embassy at Lisbon, including the Ambassador, discussed the detention of the four men with judicial authorities and officials of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry on a series of occasions.

The Aspirations of Asia

by U. Alexis Johnson

*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*¹

I appreciate that it is perhaps somewhat presumptuous for an American to choose the subject of "The Aspirations of Asia," for it is only an Asian who could speak with full confidence and authority on such a subject. However, I hope my Asian friends will pardon me if, on the basis of somewhat extended service in a number of countries of the area, I presume to give my impressions of what the many peoples of that great area are seeking and the part that the United States is playing and can play in meeting those aspirations.

While this is an economic meeting devoted primarily to economic subjects, we can no more divorce the economic aspirations of Asia from the political and spiritual aspirations than we could with any other area or people. That man does not live by bread alone is as true of Asia as of the rest of the world. It is the fundamental truth that the Communists have yet to learn and is probably the most striking weakness of the doctrine they espouse.

Above all else the peoples of Asia seek for themselves as individuals and for their countries human dignity and self-respect—in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. I know I need not say to you Americans here, who are so intimately concerned with business relations with the Far East, that these words are not empty rhetoric or some broad political principle to be applied by the Department of State but rather are most pertinent to every phase of our business and economic relations with Asia, down to our most obscure employee.

On the economic side it is of course a truism to say that the peoples of Asia are seeking economic betterment. This of course goes hand in hand with dignity and self-respect, for a ragged, starving man has little respect for himself or in the eyes of others. During the decade of the 1950's a great myth was foisted upon the peoples of Asia. This myth was that, while the Marxian system as practiced by the Soviet Union and Communist China might carry with it a certain loss of political freedoms, it was the answer to the cry for rapid economic development of underdeveloped countries. Communist China was to be the great model. (This was related to the older myth that there was no economic development in Russia until after the revolution of 1917.) Perhaps what may turn out to be the most profound development of these first years of the 1960's has been the puncturing of this myth with respect to China. The full dimensions of the Communist failure in China are only now beginning to emerge, and their repercussions, not only on Asia but the world as well, may be very deep indeed. What those repercussions may be it is not yet given to us to see, but it is my own conviction that they may well be among the most significant developments of this decade.

Communist Asia vs. Free Asia

None of us can take satisfaction in human suffering, whether in mainland China or any other part of the world. However, it is not we but the present rulers in Peiping who have imposed this suffering on the great Chinese people. This has come from the blind enthusiasm for rigidly approaching all problems from the

¹Address made before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., at New York, N.Y., on Nov. 16 (press release 786 dated Nov. 15; as-delivered text).

standpoint of supposed Marxian doctrine rather than from the standpoint of human welfare.

All of you will recall the announcement just a few years ago of the "great leap forward" and the dire prophecies that were made that Communist China would so far outstrip the other countries of Asia that all would see that the Chinese brand of communism was inevitably the "wave of the future" in Asia. This image of Communist China is now very tarnished indeed and becoming blacker as each month passes. It is now clear that, in spite of the substantial abandonment of the disastrous commune system, food production in Communist China today is substantially below the 1958 level, and there are now 35 to 40 million more Chinese to feed than there were in 1958. Per capita food output is now below even the level when the country was just emerging from the ravages of the civil war. Whereas in 1958, the year in which the "great leap forward" was proclaimed, staple food production was probably around 210 million tons, in 1960 the total was about 185 million tons. 1961 may be only a few million tons above that.

Average food rations are now less than the 1 catty (1.1 lbs.) which is the very minimal daily subsistence need. The average caloric intake is not over 1,600 calories, and probably 95 percent of this is starch. This deficiency has only in small part been made up by purchase of some 6 million tons of grain. Where has this grain been purchased? Not from the Communist bloc, for even after all these years of flaunted agricultural development the Soviet Union is normally still only barely able to feed itself. Rather, the grain has been purchased from the despised "capitalist" economies at the cost of probably around \$350 million.

This has been not only an agricultural failure but an industrial failure as well, for it is in the last analysis from the surplus of agricultural production that must come the capital for the industrialization of Communist China, and underfed workers are not productive workers. One statistic alone dramatically illustrates this failure. In the first half of 1961 the ration of cloth was only 1½ feet, as compared with the previous ration of about 18 feet a year. It is not without significance that since early 1960 Communist China has stopped issuing even the very limited economic data it previously made available. How-

ever, it is clear that there has also been a net drop of serious proportions in industrial production during both 1960 and 1961.

I will not bore you with statistics on the other Communist countries of Asia except to say that food production in both north Viet-Nam and north Korea has, on a gross basis, largely been standing still and, on a per capita basis, has also clearly been dropping.

What Has Been Happening in Free Asia

Let us take just a quick look at what has been happening in free Asia during these same years. In those crowded islands of Japan, with so little room for agricultural expansion, agricultural production both in absolute and per capita terms has been going steadily upward. For example, rice production went from 13½ million tons in 1956 to over 16 million tons in 1960. We of course know that the manufacturing index has gone up even faster, more than doubling in just the 5 years between 1956 and 1960. It is substantially the same story on Taiwan, with a steady increase in both food and industrial production and a steady rise in the gross national product. Between 1954 and the first half of this year the rate of industrial production in Taiwan has more than doubled. In India industrial production has about doubled in the last 10 years and agricultural production is going up in both absolute and per capita terms.

While the story may not be as dramatic in some of the other countries of free Asia, the overall picture is nevertheless one of steady gains in the well-being of the free Asian peoples. In any event the past few years have dramatically illustrated the point that the sacrifice of independence and political freedoms is not necessary for economic development and in fact may work in exactly the opposite direction. This is a lesson that is not being lost on Asia. At the same time it is probably, at least in part, the source of some of the present difficulties in the area. For example, there are some grounds for believing that the turning of north Viet-Nam in 1960 to openly declared guerrilla warfare against south Viet-Nam was the result of north Viet-Nam's recognizing that it was falling so far behind south Viet-Nam in development that it could not hope to win except by the use of murder and terror.

However, in saying this I do not want to mini-

mize the problems of free Asia; they are colossal indeed. In this territory from Korea and Japan around through Pakistan we find some 870 million people living in a territory slightly smaller than the area of our 50 States. The total national product is only about one-fifth of that of the United States and, on a per capita basis, only a very minor fraction of ours. However, this is not a hopeless situation, for, as all of you know, the peoples of Asia have in full measure those human qualities from which growth can come. Asia fell behind the industrial, political, and social revolutions that swept the Western World in the 18th and 19th centuries. Free Asia has either gone or is now going through its political and social revolutions and is beginning to move into the industrial revolution. In the case of Japan it is, of course, more than well into this latter revolution. I do not believe there is any doubt that the other countries of Asia will continue to move in the same direction, each in its own way and each with its own timing.

I know that this is something that those of you in this room do not fear but rather welcome. It is going to require adjustments on our part as well as adjustments on the part of the Asian countries concerned. In the case of individual industries and lines of endeavor this will require adjustments, some of which may be painful. It will also require adjustments for us as a government. But that the overall results will be beneficial for all our peoples there can be no doubt. As a government we are committed to assisting in this process, and your taxes are in part being used for this purpose, both directly and indirectly.

The failure of the Asian Communist regimes to keep pace economically with the free nations of the area does not of course eliminate—and, in fact, may operate, as in south Viet-Nam, so as to increase—the threat which those regimes pose to their neighbors. As you know, the United States is in many ways acting to help preserve the security of the free Asian peoples. Indirectly what you are contributing to the direct defense of these United States is also contributing to the security of the free countries of Asia.

I do not apologize to my Asian friends for mentioning this reality, which is, I fear, often overlooked. This was brought home to me the other day in my office when I was talking with a group

of students from an Asian country. During the course of our conversation they expressed confident assurance that their country need not fear an attack from Communist China because, as they put it in response to my question, Communist China knew that that would mean world war. With some surprise they agreed when I pointed out to them that their assurance really derived from their confidence that the United States would go to war on their behalf and that the nuclear weapons which they could afford to disdain, unceasingly manned by thousands of Americans, were in fact as surely protecting them as they were the United States.

Your tax dollars are also being used directly to assist these countries in contributing to their own protection, as well as in building the base upon which their own economic development can take place. What we as a government can do in this regard is, of course, very limited. For the most part we can help in a small way in building primarily the base of power, transportation, communications, and education upon which all economic development must take place. However, inevitably the greater part of the job must be done by the countries themselves. In this the capital, skill, and know-how of American private enterprise has a tremendous stake in demonstrating that flexibility, adaptability, and vision which it has demonstrated elsewhere. However, it is not my purpose to lecture you on what you can and should do in this regard in the interest of yourselves and this country. Those in this audience know this perhaps better than I.

U.S. Plans To Meet Asia's Problems

However, I can tell you what we in Washington are planning and thinking beyond our immediate economic and military cooperation programs.

First, we all know that one of the most serious problems confronting the raw-material and food-producing countries of Asia is the abrupt shifts and gyrations in the prices of the one or two commodities which are of controlling importance in their economies. Such shifts may be of little importance in a country with a highly diversified and sophisticated economy, but they can mean disaster for a country dependent upon such commodities for most of its export earnings. International commodity agreements or understandings, of course, present very complex and difficult prob-

lems, and historically they have not always accomplished their objectives. However, as the President has stated, we are prepared to cooperate in a serious case-by-case examination of commodity problems to see where we can be helpful.² In this endeavor, however, care will be required to avoid putting a straitjacket on economic structures. Change and growth are as essential to economic as to other forms of life and are to be resisted only at grave peril. However, to the extent such problems can be met, it will assist these countries in better providing and planning for the use of their own resources in their development.

There is another most important subject to which time does not now permit me to give the full consideration that it deserves. Each of you, as well as the countries of Asia, are well aware of the literal revolution in trading patterns upon which the entire world is now entering as a result of the formation and pending expansion of the European Common Market. Under Secretary Ball spoke on this subject in this city on the first of this month, and to those of you who did not hear or have not read his address, I commend it to you.³

Mr. Ball spoke of the future of relations between the United States and the Common Market and the adjustments that will be required to realize the full potential for the common good of this truly revolutionary development. I want to say to this audience today that your interests and the interests of the countries of Asia are much in the forefront of our minds in this development. We are very conscious that the interests of the United States are no less in the Pacific and Asia than they are in the Atlantic and Europe. We front on both oceans, and five of our States are literally on or in the Pacific. While we look forward to closer relations with Europe, we equally look forward to closer relations with Asia, including the field of commerce and industry. Thus, in looking toward the working out of new commercial and trade relationships with the great industrial complex represented by the Common Market, we on our part are not thinking in terms of exclusive arrangements which would discriminate against any other part of the world. Rather, in accord-

ance with our long tradition, we are thinking of arrangements under which the benefits would also accrue to other free countries, including those of Asia. Thus we seek for Asia its full share in the increasing prosperity for all peoples that is coming from this great development.

And we seek for Asia, not only because it is right but because it will benefit all mankind, including this country, a realization of the aspirations of Asia for that economic growth in individual and national dignity and self-respect which I am confident they seek for themselves. That this can and will be achieved in freedom, I have no doubt.

OECD Sets Collective Target for 50 Percent Growth in GNP

Following are texts of a statement made by Under Secretary Ball before the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris on November 16 and a communique issued by the Council on November 17.

STATEMENT BY MR. BALL

Mr. Chairman, the proposal before us this afternoon for the adoption of a target for accelerated economic growth is in our judgment both within the traditions of the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] and within the stated purposes of the OECD. It is in a sense a part of the heritage from the OEEC, of which you spoke so eloquently this morning. A growth target was adopted by members of the OEEC early in the 1950's, and it was virtually achieved by the concerting of policies among the member nations.

The first aim of the OECD, as we all know, is stated in the convention as being "to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy."¹ Mr. Chairman, what we are proposing is to give concrete and explicit form to this aim. The growth target which we have pro-

² For an address by President Kennedy on Mar. 13 setting forth his proposal for an Alliance for Progress with Latin America, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 831.

¹ For text of convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 11.

posed would call for a 50 percent increase in the real gross national products of the member nations combined between this year and the end of this decade. We have proposed that this be achieved with the maintenance of price stability and without exacerbating balance-of-payments difficulties.

Further economic growth of 50 percent would add to the Atlantic Community the economic equivalent of a new country of the present size and wealth of the United States. This is a rather striking statement of the possibilities that lie before us if we exercise determination and take the necessary policy measures. We have within our power the achievement of an unparalleled conquest—a conquest without sacrifice on the part of the people and without damage to our spiritual or cultural values, a conquest achieved merely by the effective utilization of our inherent capabilities.

The proposal to set a target for further economic growth has several implications: It makes clear to the world that accelerated growth is an obligation which we all feel, that we recognize the new state of interdependence which exists principally among the highly industrialized nations of the world represented here, and that an achievement such as this is not possible solely through uncoordinated, unrelated national efforts. It reflects our determination to use the OECD for the purposes of achieving the necessary cooperation; and it represents a determination on the part of the governments of the member nations to take the steps that are required to achieve this aim.

Accelerated economic growth is imperative. Today we live in a world experiencing unparalleled technological, political, and social change; and it is a world threatened by new forces. It is a world in which we must go forward quickly if we are to mobilize the strength necessary for the kind of society that we are all interested in and for the preservation of that society. So we feel that not only is there a potentiality of reaching this goal but that we, the individual nations represented here, actually have a responsibility to do so.

This is the means whereby we can achieve the strength that is requisite to the maintenance of peace and security. This will provide us with the means whereby we can fulfill what is an obvious and great obligation of all of us, to assist the less developed countries of the world to achieve adequate standards of living and to achieve, them-

selves, the possibility of self-sustaining growth. We have an obligation, it seems to me, to demonstrate to the whole world the strength and vitality of the Western civilization to which we subscribe and of the free institutions to which we are committed.

Finally, it seems to me that there is a very great value in the form of cooperation which is implied in the adoption of a target for accelerated economic growth. We, on the American side, consider it essential that the OECD at its first ministerial meeting should take a decision for action which is not only symbolically important but which is actually important. By setting a target for further economic growth we will demonstrate our determination to work together for freer and expanded international trade, to coordinate our monetary and fiscal policies, to adjust our internal economic policies to the needs of the whole community of OECD nations. Finally, by adopting a growth target, we give ourselves a sense of discipline, we create for ourselves a sense of direction, and we provide a frame of reference in which we can carry on our economic labors within the OECD.

In suggesting a growth target I want to make it very clear indeed that we do not minimize the need for the maintenance of price stability or the need to attain and maintain balance-of-payments equilibrium. The maintenance of equilibrium in the international balance of payments is a very complex matter. The balance of payments is subject to conflicting forces, forces which are difficult to predict in advance. The nations assembled here must be prepared to deal constructively either with deficits or with surpluses as they may appear.

Lag in U.S. Growth Rate

I believe it is quite safe to assert that the proposed agreement on a common target for economic growth will present as formidable difficulties to the United States, and involve as substantial commitments from the United States, as for any other member nation. The gross national product of the United States represents approximately 60 percent of the total gross national product of all the OECD countries combined. During recent years our rate of growth has lagged significantly behind the rate of growth in the great majority of the OECD countries.

We are suffering from certain rather unusual economic difficulties. We have an abnormally high rate of unemployment. We have had a continuing deficit in our balance of payments. We have a large unused plant capacity, and we have, as you all know, assumed international economic commitments, both with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security and with respect to the encouragement of economic growth of the less developed nations of the world, which are very great indeed. However, our economy in the United States is already beginning to solve these problems. We are recovering from the recession. Industrial production is climbing. Housing construction employment has increased.

My Government is determined that the United States will move forward to attain accelerated economic growth, which will enable us to make our full contribution to meeting the proposed goals which we put before this meeting. We are determined that we ourselves shall adopt policies that will permit us to attain this proposed rate of growth without any retreat from our international commitments. In fact, an accelerated rate of economic growth is almost essential if we are to maintain with other OECD governments these vast commitments.

The projection of a 50 percent rise in the United States output between 1961 and 1970—a compound rate of growth, as was noted by the Secretary General, of 4.6 percent a year—implies only a moderate improvement on past trends in the growth of capacity. In the middle and late 1950's the rate of growth in our capacity to produce was of the order of 3½ percent annually. This rate of growth of potential is compounded out of a productivity growth rate of 2 percent per annum (in gross national product per person employed) and a labor force growth rate of 1½ percent. In the earlier postwar period productivity advanced more rapidly and the rate of growth was higher. Only part of this higher rate of growth was the consequence of nonrepeatable factors stemming from the depression and the war.

Actual gross national product grew at a rate of only 2.3 percent per annum between 1955 and 1960. The discrepancy between actual and potential growth output is easily explained. Some slack began to appear toward the end of the 1955-57 boom, and, more significantly, the recovery

after the recession of 1958 failed to carry the economy to its then existing potential. The rates of unemployment at the peaks of the cycle in 1957 and 1960 were 4.2 percent and 5.1 percent respectively.

It is expected that policies for the improved training and increased mobility of the labor force will, before the end of the decade, allow the economy to operate with a higher pressure of demand on capacity than seems feasible at present without inflationary pressure. Both of the peaks in the period 1955 to 1960 also found the economy with considerable excess capacity in terms both of plant and equipment.

However, the year 1961 finds our economy operating at about 93 percent of its potential output, with a gross national product of \$520 billion. If by 1963 it can attain its potential output (defined as output produced at about 4 percent unemployment) it will then have a gross national product of \$600 billion, stated in prices of the second quarter of 1961. An average rate of compound growth of 3.8 percent for the 7 years following would be sufficient to carry real GNP to \$780 billion in 1970—a 50 percent gain over 1961.

Prospects of Reaching Potential

What are the prospects that the United States economy will reach its potential in the present recovery? The prospects, we believe, are excellent given the application of sensible fiscal and monetary policies. The gross failure to achieve potential at the peak is a fairly recent phenomenon in America; and, in the present state of economic knowledge, it is a phenomenon that we are persuaded is avoidable. My Government is determined to revert to the earlier days when our performance in this respect was better.

An average growth rate of 3.8 percent after the achievement of potential is a very modest extrapolation of past trends. The 3½ percent yearly rate of growth of potential in the latter half of the fifties was diminished by the persistent gap between actual and potential output experienced in the period. Billions of dollars' worth of investment in new plant and equipment were forgone by the economy, as businessmen with idle capacity were reluctant to invest. Average labor productivity, which rises as overhead manage-

ment, clerical, and maintenance staffs are spread over a large output, and with investment in improved equipment, inevitably lagged during this period.

In short, a better record in achieving and maintaining full employment during the sixties than was achieved in the fifties can be expected to maintain or perhaps raise the rate of growth of potential above its present level, and the modest increase of three-tenths of a point necessary for the achievement of our 1970 goal is well within our grasp.

Thus far we have assumed that unemployment would fall at the peak of the present recovery to 4 percent and that, at cyclical peaks in the remainder of the decade, unemployment would not drop below 4 percent. But a 4 percent rate of unemployment is only an intermediate goal. A further source of growth from present levels would be a drop in unemployment at cyclical peaks to 3-3½ percent, for example. Such a development would make it possible to exceed the proposed target growth of 50 percent in 1970.

Between 1950 and 1960 the total labor force grew at an average annual rate of 1¼ percent in the United States. Demographic projections indicate that between 1960 and 1970 that rate will rise to 1¾ percent. Such an acceleration in the growth of the labor force adds to the difficulties of a full-employment policy. But the administration is determined to meet that problem in any case. Mere continuation of the 2 percent annual increase in productivity per worker will then imply an annual growth in potential of 3¾ percent, which again underlines the modesty of the proposed target.

Merely to maintain the already achieved rate of growth of productivity will require an increased volume of investment so that additional workers may be equipped with capital and so that capital per worker may increase at faster rates. Acceleration of the rate of growth of productivity will entail a rise in the fraction of GNP invested in private plant and equipment from the present 9-9½ percent to 10-10½ percent—a figure which was equaled or exceeded throughout the period 1947-57.

Our own sights are set even higher than that since it is our intent to move to an annual growth rate of potential output in excess of 4 percent.

Policies in the tax and monetary fields aimed at achieving an increased volume of investment are already part of the program of the Kennedy administration.

The other major components of a growth policy are the expansion of the amount and share of resources devoted to education in the broadest sense, and to scientific and technological research, the retraining of technologically displaced workers, public assistance for the redevelopment of depressed areas, and a liberalization of international trade on a reciprocal basis.

The carrying out of such policies will add to the growth potential of the American economy by amounts which cannot yet be estimated; but we expect the United States to be able to do its full share to meet the proposed growth target which we are discussing this afternoon.

Problems of Other OECD Countries

Now I am aware that the problems which may concern other members of the OECD in meeting the proposed 50 percent increase in our combined gross products are somewhat different, both in kind and degree, from those we face in the United States. On the other hand, I am also aware that several important OECD countries are currently growing at a rate much faster than is necessary to meet the proposed target and have already maintained this rate of growth for several years. On balance, therefore, the proposed target seems to us conservative.

It is my personal belief that the OECD countries will surpass the target by a substantial margin. I think that, in assessing the possibilities of attaining the proposed rate of growth, it is not enough merely to examine the growth potential of each member nation. We should not overlook the extra impetus to growth that should come from our working together for the achievement of a common target.

As our distinguished Secretary General [Thorkil Kristensen] eloquently said—last August in Oxford, I believe:

It is very much easier to take courageous, constructive, expansionist, liberal measures, if many countries do it at the same time, than if the individual country is doing it in isolation.

Now I have made these suggestions in support of a proposal that we set a growth target which

would call for an increase in the combined GNP's of the OECD countries by 50 percent between this year and the end of the decade. It is our understanding that certain of the delegations here feel that it would be more appropriate for us to set this target of a 50 percent increase, not in terms of the 9 years that remain from now to the end of the decade but in terms of the decade of the sixties. Well, we believe that the target that we have suggested is a reasonable one. We nevertheless feel that, if this body prefers the 10-year target, we would certainly interpose no objections to its adoption.

Let me say in closing, Mr. Chairman, that I do believe that the efforts which are envisaged by either the 9-year or the 10-year target are relatively modest; but I must emphasize that the ultimate purposes which we are facing here today are by no means modest. We have an opportunity to prove (not only by what we do this afternoon, but the way in which we carry out the steps necessary to the achievement of the goal that we may set) that our empirical mixture of public and private enterprise is far more dynamic and, simultaneously, more conducive to human well-being than any other economic arrangement that the world has devised. We have an opportunity to prove that personal freedom is compatible with vigorous economic advancement and that it can be sustained even in a world of change, uncertainty, and peril. We have an opportunity to reaffirm—both among ourselves and in our relations with less developed nations—a central thesis of our ethics, that self-interest is entirely consistent with a sincere devotion to the interests of others.

Finally, we have an opportunity to prove again what has been proved so many times in the past, that history contains no laws of inevitability and that the future belongs to whatever men and nations are willing to grasp it.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 708 dated November 18

The First Ministerial Council of the OECD, meeting in Paris on November 16 and 17 under the chairmanship of the Canadian Minister of Finance, the Honorable Donald M. Fleming, surveyed the economic prospects of the vast

community of member nations comprising more than five hundred million people in Europe and North America and examined its world responsibilities.

The Ministers noted the substantial economic growth that had taken place in most member countries during the past decade. They agreed on the desirability of establishing a target for further growth. Under conditions of price stability and the necessary provision for investment, rapid growth facilitates the harmonious development of world economy, helps to promote a liberal world trading system, provides a necessary foundation for rising living standards, and ensures a high level of employment. It will enable industrialized member countries to contribute more effectively to the development of less-advanced countries both through the provision of financial and technical assistance and through a widening of their export markets and the increase of their export revenues.

Accordingly the Ministers set as a collective target the attainment during the decade from 1960 to 1970 of a growth in real gross national product of fifty percent for the twenty member countries taken together. The rate of growth may vary from year to year and from country to country. Moreover, being a collective target, individual countries may fall short of or exceed it in varying degrees.

Each country will have to make its contribution to collective growth in accordance with its own special circumstances. This contribution will be supported and made more effective by simultaneous expansion in other countries. The setting of a joint target for economic growth is itself recognition of the increasing interdependence of the separate economies of the twenty member countries. Given their needs, it is desirable that member countries in the process of development should have a relatively higher rate of growth. A fifty percent increase in output during the decade will call for deliberate national economic policies and their coordination through the Organization's procedures of consultations and cooperation.

In this respect the Ministers put particular emphasis on the necessity of a proper equilibrium in the external payments of member countries as a condition for the fulfillment of the growth target mentioned above. It was therefore necessary to develop still further the close coordination of fi-

financial and economic policies and the mutual sense of responsibility between deficit and surplus countries in order to attain the common objective of accelerated economic growth while further improving the international payments mechanism. The various means already available to relieve temporary pressures on particular currencies were of great value, but they should be further developed.

Price stability is of the highest importance in order to assure to the population the full benefit of economic growth and to maintain equilibrium in international payments. Excess demand should, therefore, be prevented and efforts made to improve productivity and labor mobility. The gains through higher productivity should be fairly distributed, and increases in the level of money incomes should be kept generally in line with increases in productivity, which alone provide the means to a durable increase in the standard of living. In countries with payments deficits it is particularly important that the competitive position is not undermined through cost increases. Liberal import policies are another means of assuring price stability. The surplus countries have a special responsibility to use this and other means available to them which contribute to both external and internal equilibrium.

The Ministers emphasized that a special effort must be made to promote growth in less-developed member countries and thus endeavor to reduce the very great disparities in incomes per head. In these countries there are great possibilities for achieving a higher standard of living through more intensive use of natural and human resources. They stressed their conviction that more investment and more training are necessary conditions for such a development. To induce a real increase in the inadequate growth rates of such member countries the Ministers instructed the Organization to encourage and assist such countries in their efforts, including the preparation and achievement of sound development plans.

In order to achieve the growth target, increasing use of scientific training and research is needed. Their utilization in agriculture and industry should be closely studied. The Organization should further develop its work in these fields.

The Ministers noted that, thanks to increased productivity and mechanization, agricultural production had risen considerably in the OECD

countries and they recognized that agriculture would also play an important role in attaining the collective growth target. The Ministers agreed that necessary adjustments within agriculture should be carefully studied. They thought that increased productivity within agriculture should contribute to general price stability. In addition, agriculture could, in many countries, make manpower available for the expansion of industry. In this connection the importance was recognized of insuring that the agricultural population should share in the rising standard of living resulting from economic growth. The Ministers agreed with the OECD Ministers of Agriculture meeting of October 1961 that agricultural policies should be the subject of continuous consultation and confrontation within the Organization in order to insure that industrial and agricultural production developed harmoniously.

The Ministers were determined that increased production should lead to a significant increase in the aid to the less-developed countries. In 1960, the aggregate flow of resources, both public and private, from member countries and Japan, a member of the Organization's Development Assistance Committee, amounted to about \$7.5 billion. The Ministers agreed that a further increase of development assistance was needed and they welcomed the intention of the Development Assistance Committee to institute, beginning in 1962, an annual review of aid efforts and policies of its member countries. The main purpose should be to increase the efforts and to adapt them better to the needs and circumstances of the recipient countries through exchange of experience regarding bilateral aid. The Ministers expressed the desire that the Development Assistance Committee should encourage greater cooperation among donor countries in their bilateral aid efforts and that a common approach should be applied increasingly to specific problems of economic development assistance. They also recognized the need for full cooperation with and support of multilateral institutions providing development aid, and they welcomed the work going on to define measures to encourage private capital exports to less-developed countries.

The Ministers recognized that successful economic expansion in less-developed countries can best be achieved through carefully prepared programs based on an assessment of needs and re-

sources. They, therefore, welcome individual and regional efforts by less-developed countries in drawing up such programs. The Ministers instructed the Organization to study the functions and structure of the contemplated OECD development center which could help, in coordination with existing institutions, to meet the urgent need for more knowledge and for qualified persons to assist in the development efforts.

The Ministers stressed the importance of reducing barriers to the exchange of goods and services, in particular on the part of the more industrialized countries, as a means of promoting economic growth and of providing expanding markets. They emphasized the need to seek ways and means, both in the OECD and in other international forums, to reduce barriers to trade among OECD countries and between OECD countries and the rest of the world. The main instrument of the Organization in achieving this aim should be periodic confrontations of trade policies. The Ministers underlined the significance of the negotiations between the European economic community and other European countries. The arrangements adopted should safeguard the legitimate interests of other countries. They expressed their satisfaction that the countries engaged in negotiations were willing to keep the OECD informed of the progress of the negotiations. The aim of the Organization should be to contribute to the maximum freedom of trade and to enable the less-developed countries to obtain increasing export revenues.

In conclusion, the Ministers noted that these measures were but first steps in a collective effort that must extend increasingly beyond the relationships among their own countries and the material well-being of their citizens. Member countries will pursue together the three objectives of the OECD convention pertaining to economic growth, aid and trade in order to ensure a sound expanding free world economy.

AID Awards Contract to Nigeria

The Department of State announced on November 29 (press release 823) that the Agency for International Development has awarded its first contract to assist industrial growth in an under-developed nation. At the request of the Nigerian

Government, the Agency on November 20 signed a \$1.9 million, 2-year agreement to help the Nigerian Government expand its economy, create new industries, and stimulate private investment. The contract has been placed with Arthur D. Little, Inc., a research and consulting firm of Cambridge, Mass.

The new project launches AID's first joint effort for a comprehensive industrial development program ever made in tropical Africa. Experts of the Little firm will work with officials of the Federal and Regional Governments of Nigeria in making detailed studies designed to identify and evaluate specific industrial opportunities for private investment. The Nigerian Government will use these studies in developing programs to attract private capital from both Nigerian and outside sources. In addition, the American advisers will be working with local entrepreneurs in three regional development centers to improve their product lines, marketing techniques, and financial structures.

United States To Cooperate With FAO in Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign

*Remarks by President Kennedy*¹

White House press release dated November 22

It is a great pleasure and honor to welcome to the White House again Mrs. Woodrow Wilson and Miss Marian Anderson as representatives of the United States Freedom-From-Hunger Foundation.

It is fitting that on tomorrow, Thanksgiving Day, the United States will launch its freedom-from-hunger campaign in cooperation with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.² As the Pilgrims gave thanks more than three centuries ago for a bountiful harvest, so we give thanks in 1961 for the blessings of our agriculture and the continued opportunity that the

¹Made at the White House on Nov. 22 at a ceremony announcing the appointment of 33 members of the United States Freedom-From-Hunger Foundation, which will spearhead U.S. participation in the 5-year Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. For a list of the members of the Foundation, see White House press release dated Nov. 22.

²For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1960, p. 94, and July 18, 1960, p. 117.

great productivity of our farms gives us in sharing our food with the world's hungry.

President Woodrow Wilson responded to that opportunity in 1914, when food was sent to Europe. The American people have answered this call before, in all parts of the world, and they answer it now. Since last January, under the Food-for-Peace Program directed by Mr. [George] McGovern, nearly 28 million tons of food have been programed for shipment abroad.

The challenge of world hunger is one that we must meet, knowing that the burden is greater today than it has ever been before. But it is heartening to know that we are now joined in a worldwide alliance, the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, to eliminate hunger from the earth.

As long as there are hungry families—mothers, fathers, and children—through the world, we cannot possibly believe or feel that our great agricultural production, in any sense, is a burden. It is a great asset, not only for ourselves but for people all over the world; and I think that, instead of using the term “surpluses,” and regarding it, in a sense, as a failure, we should regard it as one of the great evidences of our country's capacity and also as a great resource in order to demonstrate our concern for our fellow men.

As I have said, as long as any of them are hungry tomorrow, I am sure that Americans will not sit down at their table without hoping that we can do more to aid those who sit at no table.

President Requests Investigation of Duty on Cotton Imports

White House press release dated November 21

Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Ben D. Dorfman, Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission.

NOVEMBER 21, 1961

DEAR MR. DORFMAN: I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that there is reason to believe that articles or materials wholly or in part of cotton are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the programs or operations undertaken by the Depart-

ment of Agriculture with respect to cotton or products thereof, or to reduce substantially the amount of cotton processed in the United States from cotton or products thereof with respect to which such programs or operations are being undertaken.

The Tariff Commission is requested to make an immediate investigation under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, to determine whether a fee equivalent to the per pound export subsidy rate on the cotton content of imported articles and materials wholly or in part of cotton is necessary to prevent the imports of such articles from rendering or tending to render ineffective or materially interfering with the Department's programs for cotton and cotton products, or from reducing substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from cotton or products thereof, with respect to which such programs are being undertaken.

The Commission's investigation and report should be completed as soon as practicable.

A copy of the Secretary's letter is enclosed.¹

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

Export of Ball Bearing Machines to Russia. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. February 28, 1961. 266 pp.

Wetlands Acquisition and Oil Pollution of the Sea. Hearing before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 2187, a bill to implement the provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, and S. 2175 and H.R. 7391, bills to promote the conservation of migratory waterfowl by the acquisition of wetlands and other essential waterfowl habitat, and for other purposes. July 31, 1961. 40 pp.

Organizing for National Security: State, Defense, and the National Security Council. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Government Operations Committee. Part IX. August 1-24, 1961. 165 pp.

Report of the Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a report for the period July 1 to December 31, 1960. H. Doc. 241. September 14, 1961. 47 pp.

¹ Not printed.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Adjourned During November 1961

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 8th Meeting.	Tokyo	Oct. 23–Nov. 11
UNESCO Executive Board: 60th Session	Paris	Oct. 25–Nov. 29
2d International Film Festival of India	New Delhi	Oct. 27–Nov. 2
U.N. ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East: 3d Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 27–Nov. 10
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Conditions of Sale for Cereals.	Geneva	Oct. 30–Nov. 3
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on River Law.	Geneva	Oct. 30–Nov. 3
FAO Council: 36th Session	Rome	Oct. 30–Nov. 3
ILO Meeting of Consultants on the Problems of Young Workers	Geneva	Oct. 30–Nov. 4
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions	Geneva	Oct. 30–Nov. 10
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 13th Meeting.	Kuala Lumpur	Oct. 30–Nov. 18
OECD Oil Committee	Paris	Nov. 1 (1 day)
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee.	Paris	Nov. 1 (1 day)
GATT Provisional Cotton Textile Committee: Statistical Subcommittee.	Geneva	Nov. 1–2
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Organization and Operation of Industrial Estates.	Madras	Nov. 1–11
Subcommittee of the Heads of Examining Patent Offices of the Council of Europe.	Strasbourg	Nov. 2–6
FAO Conference: 11th Session	Rome	Nov. 4–24
CENTO Military Committee	Washington	Nov. 6–7
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel.	Paris	Nov. 6–10
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 6th Session.	Geneva	Nov. 6–10
Committee of Experts on Patents of the Council of Europe.	Strasbourg	Nov. 7–11
Inter-American Commission of Women: Executive Committee.	Washington	Nov. 9 (1 day)
ILO Governing Body: 150th Session	Geneva	Nov. 13–25
NATO Medical Committee	Paris	Nov. 14–15
OECD Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Nov. 16–17
OECD Nonferrous Metals Committee	Paris	Nov. 17 (1 day)
SEATO Committee of Economic Experts	Bangkok	Nov. 20–24
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group.	Geneva	Nov. 20–24
IMCO Expert Working Group on Pollution of the Sea by Oil	London	Nov. 21–22
FAO Council: 37th Session	Rome	Nov. 25 (1 day)
International Rubber Study Group: 68th Meeting of Management Committee.	London	Nov. 27–29
GATT Ministerial Meeting	Geneva	Nov. 27–30

In Session as of November 30, 1961

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1, 1960–
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.	Geneva	May 16–
United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session	New York	Sept. 19–
GATT Contracting Parties: 19th Session	Geneva	Nov. 13–
ICAO Limited European-Mediterranean Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting.	Paris	Nov. 14–
ICAO South American-South Atlantic Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services/Communications Meeting.	Lima	Nov. 14–
U.N. ECAFE Regional Training Seminar on Trade Promotion	New Delhi	Nov. 20–
International Wheat Council: 33d Session	London	Nov. 20–
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 4th Session	Tokyo	Nov. 27–

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Nov. 30, 1961. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

2d U.N. ECAFE/WMO International Seminar on Field Methods and Equipment Used in Hydrology and Hydrometeorology	Bangkok	Nov. 27-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting of Study Group for Projections on Agricultural Problems.	Geneva	Nov. 27-
Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control: 2d Meeting.	Rio de Janeiro	Nov. 27-
Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (resumed session).	Geneva	Nov. 28-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Gas Problems	Geneva	Nov. 29-
ITU Roundtable Discussions on Revisions of Radio Regulations and Schedule of Conferences.	Geneva	Nov. 30-
IA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Expert Level	Washington	Nov. 29-

Working Toward a World Without War

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

The earlier portions of the remarks by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union were devoted to a repetition of the Soviet version of the problem of Berlin and of Germany. While this is quite irrelevant, I must remind the committee for the record that it is clear that the Berlin problem is a problem created by the Soviet Union for its own purposes. It is the Soviet Union which is trying to breach the agreements on Berlin. It is the Soviet Union which has illegally erected a wall which divides that city. It is the Soviet Union which is seeking to perpetuate the division of Germany.

Regarding the Soviet desire to liquidate what they call the vestiges of the war, I would remind the committee that the Soviet Union regards as vestiges of the war only what is not to its liking, that is, the Western presence in Berlin, the freedom of movement within that city, and the hope for the reunification of Germany. It evidently does not regard as a vestige of the war such things as the division of Germany and of Berlin.

It calls this a situation brought about by life itself. But this problem of Germany is not before us today, and I have no intention of pressing

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 15 (U.S. delegation press release 3837).

this matter further but rather propose to turn my attention to the item on our agenda, which is disarmament.

If I understood Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, he said that the American plan² was ambiguous about the production, for example, of arms and fissionable materials. I would invite his attention to paragraph c of stage III, which reads as follows:

The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the United Nations Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

But such misstatements will be dealt with when the details of disarmament are discussed.

I agree with Mr. Zorin that this subject of disarmament is the most important question before this committee and, indeed, before this General Assembly. I only wish that his misleading and frequently abusive speech had produced something new and some encouragement for real disarmament. I earnestly hope that on examination

² For text of a U.S. proposal entitled "Declaration on Disarmament: A Programme for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," which was submitted to the General Assembly on Sept. 25, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

the draft resolution which he has presented to me just now will give us some greater hope than the speech portends.

War is one of our oldest institutions. It is deeply imbedded in the traditions, the folkways, the literature, even the values of most all countries. It has engaged talented men and produced national heroes. At the same time, civilized men and women for centuries past have abhorred the immorality of organized killing of men by men. Yet let us confess at once, to our common shame, that this deep sense of revulsion has not averted wars, nor shortened one by a day.

While I do not say that all wars have been started for unworthy purposes, let us also confess—morality to the side—that most all past wars have served to promote what was conceived to be the national or princely or religious interests of those who fought them—or at least those who won them. For in past wars there have been winners as well as losers, the victors and the vanquished, the decorated and the dead. In the end, valuable real estate and other riches have changed hands. Thrones have been won, regimes transferred, rule extended, religions and ideologies imposed, empires gained and lost, aggressions halted or advanced. Thus wars in the past have sometimes been a means of settling international disputes, of changing political control, of inducing social transformation, and even of stimulating science and technology.

And I suppose that on moral grounds it is only a difference of degree whether millions are killed or only thousands—whether the victims include children in the debris of a big city building or only young men lying on a battlefield in the countryside. Nor has war been a very efficient way of settling disputes. Yesterday's enemies are today's friends. First the victor pays for destruction of his enemy, then for reconstruction of his friend.

But war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in the past—not in degree but in kind. It is this which seems so difficult to grasp. Thermonuclear war cannot serve anyone's national interest—no matter how moral or immoral that interest may be, no matter how just or unjust, no matter how noble or ignoble—regardless of the nation's ideology, faith, or social system.

It is no satisfaction to suggest that the issue of morality in war thus has become academic. Yet

this is the fact, and perhaps it will serve to clarify the dialog of war and peace. For we can now free our collective conscience of nice ethical distinctions and face the stark, amoral fact that war has ceased to be practical, that no nation can contemplate resort to modern war except in defense against intolerable exaction or aggression. Therefore we must abolish war to save our collective skins. For as long as this nuclear death dance continues, millions—tens of millions—perhaps hundreds of millions are living on borrowed time.

I suggested a moment ago that war is such an ancient institution, so deeply entrenched in tradition, that it requires a strenuous intellectual effort to imagine a world free from war. So it does, and I shall have more to say about this later. But I submit that the alternative effort is to imagine a world at the end of another war, when great areas and great places have been turned into radioactive wasteland, when millions upon millions of people are already dead while debris from those great mushroom clouds drifts ghoulishly over the living, when great parts of our institutions, ideologies, faiths, and beliefs—even our art and literature—lie smashed in the smoke and rubble of material destruction.

I submit that, however difficult the vision of a world *without war* may be, it is not only a happier but an easier vision to imagine than one of a world *after war*. In any event, we must choose between them.

It is against this bleak reality that we meet once again, Mr. Chairman, to take up the subject of disarmament.

History of Disarmament Negotiations

The story of man's efforts to do away with armaments is a long and sorry one. At various times this or that measure of disarmament has seemed within our grasp. My own country has a proud record in this respect. We supported the two Hague conferences. We took the lead in naval disarmament after World War I. We did our utmost to make the comprehensive Disarmament Conference of 1932 a success. And after World War II we stripped our armed forces to the bone in the hope and belief that we had made some progress toward a peaceful world.

Disarmament was one of the first orders of business for the United Nations. Fifteen years ago, at the first meeting of this Assembly, the United

States delegation, of which I was a member, made a proposal as revolutionary as the scientific discovery which prompted it. At that time we proposed to destroy the few atomic weapons which the United States alone possessed, to outlaw forever the manufacture of such weapons, to place the development of atomic energy in all its forms under the full control of the United Nations, and to turn over to this Organization all facilities and all information bearing on atomic science and technology; all this to prevent an atomic arms race.

The world does not need to be reminded here of the tragic consequences of the rejection of that initiative of a decade and a half ago. Since then there has been a long series of commissions, committees, subcommittees, and conferences, inside the United Nations and out, which have tried to deal with the question of general disarmament and first steps toward it.

After the Soviet delegation walked out of the 10-power general disarmament talks in June 1960,³ our main hopes were focused on the 3-power negotiations at Geneva for a treaty to ban the testing of atomic weapons. After 2½ years of patient negotiations, in the course of which significant progress was made, the United States and Britain tabled a comprehensive treaty⁴ which they had every reason to believe would meet the remaining points of difference with the Soviet Union. The United States and Britain were prepared to sign a comprehensive treaty at once—and still are.

Then on the last day of last August came the shocking news that the Soviet Union would break the moratorium which it had advocated and vowed never to break. The United States and Britain immediately offered to agree with the Soviet Union to ban at once all tests in the atmosphere without inspection—to spare mankind the hazards of radioactive fallout.⁵ We regret that, like the Baruch proposals, this offer was also rejected by the Soviet Union.⁶

Since that time the Soviet Union has carried on a series of nuclear weapons tests with unprecedented pollution of the atmosphere. It was climaxed by the explosion of history's most appalling weapon, a superbomb of more than 50

megatons, or more than 50 million tons of TNT. This weapon's destructive power exceeds any known military requirements. So its principal purpose is to serve the political strategy of terror.

This action was taken in disregard of pleas from governments and peoples all over the non-Communist world—and, finally, in defiance of an unprecedented resolution of the United Nations General Assembly supported by 87 nations.⁷

To all our pleas the Soviet Union, for months past, has invariably replied that it will agree to a ban on nuclear tests only as part of an agreement for general and complete disarmament. By insisting on this link between an issue which we had nearly resolved and the difficult issue of disarmament, the Soviet Union has tightened the knot and made it harder than ever to untie. Only last Thursday the General Assembly rejected the idea of delaying a test ban treaty by calling once again, by a vote of 71 to 11, for the urgent resumption of negotiations to outlaw nuclear tests.⁸

So let me point out at once to the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that it is his country alone which insists on making a genuine and effective test ban dependent on the achievement of general disarmament. And because it does so insist, the Soviet Union, as we now move into the debate on general and complete disarmament, becomes doubly answerable to world opinion. The world will look to them in this debate to answer not one but two burning questions: Do you or don't you want disarmament? and—once again—Do you or don't you want an end to nuclear weapons, in fact or just in rhetoric?

And yet there is this much connection between the two subjects: The advance in weapons technology as a result of tests must ultimately increase our common peril. It is a measure of the tragic failure of all our efforts to reach disarmament agreements. And it is a compelling challenge to my Government to try again—to make a fresh start—to insist with the utmost urgency that the weapons which have made war an obsolete institution be laid aside quickly before others are forced in self-defense to carry this insensate race yet another stage toward ultimate folly.

No doubt there are those who will ask how we can dare realistically to speak of disarmament today, when the winds of conflict blow all about us.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

⁵ For background and text of a joint U.S.-U.K. proposal of Sept. 1, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1961, p. 515.

⁷ For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 13, 1961, p. 817.

⁸ *ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 936.

There are those who will ask whether this is mere wishful thinking, whether this is more than escapism.

To that we would reply: Escapism, no; escape, yes. For man *must* escape, not in wishful dreams but in hard reality. We *must* escape from this spiral of fear, from the outmoded illusion that lasting security for peoples can be found by balancing out the wildly destructive power in the hands of their governments.

As President Kennedy said to the General Assembly on September 25:⁹

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

President Kennedy informed the General Assembly then that the United States has prepared a new set of proposals for general and complete disarmament. These proposals were circulated subsequently to all members.¹⁰

He also outlined my Government's conception of what is needed to create a world without war. It is a view which embraces first steps, subsequent steps, and the ultimate goal at the end of the road. And it goes far beyond the technical steps in arms reduction. It requires the reservation of outer space for peaceful uses. It includes international programs for economic and social progress. And it insists especially upon the essential need to build up the machinery of peace while we tear down the machinery of war—that these must go hand in hand, that these, indeed, must be but two parts of a single program.

For in a world without arms, military power would be taken out of the hands of nations; but other forms of power would remain—and mostly in the hands of the same states which are the most powerful military states today.

Conflicting ideologies would still be with us.

Political struggles would still take place.

Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pressures from within and without.

Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an instrument of, national foreign policies.

And the world would still be the scene of peaceful transformations—for it cannot and should not remain static.

Let us be clear about all this: Disarmament alone will not purify the human race of the last vestiges of greed, ambition, and brutality, of false pride and the love of power. Nor will it cleanse every last national leader of the least impulse to international lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pretend to foresee such a paradise on earth—even an earth without arms. But it would be a safer earth, where the contest and conflict could be waged in peace.

Clearly, then, disarmament will not usher in utopia. But it will prevent the wanton wastage of life and the wholesale destruction of material resources. And it will free the energies of man to engage in beneficent pursuits. How much could be done to improve the conditions of man—his education, his health, his nutrition, and his housing—if even a small portion of the funds and the ingenuity of man now devoted to improving the art of killing were transferred to improving the art of living!

Who would keep the peace in a disarmed world? How would our disputes get settled when arms have been taken away?

If we can answer these questions, we are much nearer to a solution of the problem of disarmament. For these questions open up the unexplored ground between first steps toward disarmament and the vision at the end of the road. And the vision of a world free from war will remain a utopian illusion until means for keeping the peace lend it reality.

It therefore seems clear to me that the only way to general and complete disarmament lies along two parallel paths which must be traveled together. One leads to the absence of arms, the other to the presence of adequate machinery for keeping the peace. As we destroy an obsolete institution for the settlement of disputes, we must create new institutions for the settlement of disputes—and simultaneously.

Let me repeat for emphasis. We do not hold the vision of a world without conflict. We do hold the vision of a world without war—and this inevitably requires an alternative system for coping with conflict. We cannot have one without the other. But if we travel the two roads to-

⁹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 650.

gether, if we build as we destroy, we can solve the technical problems of dismantling the vast apparatus of war.

U.S. Proposal for Disarmament

Let me come now to the United States proposals for dismantling the towering and costly machinery of war.

To begin with, the United States emphatically embraces the commitment to general and complete disarmament. We proclaim the goal—without reservation—and in the shortest possible span of time. And we take this terminology to mean exactly what it says: the general and complete disarmament of all national forces capable of international aggression and the safe disposal of all their arms.

It is interesting to note that the conference of nonaligned nations which met in Belgrade in September of this year¹¹ demonstrates how widely shared our goal is. I quote their words:

The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, the United States proposal is, indeed, a "radical" one.

It calls for large reductions of armaments even in the first stages—both conventional and nuclear armaments.

It calls for an end to production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and the transfer of such materials from existing stocks for non-weapons use.

The program calls for a stop in the further development of independent national nuclear capabilities.

It calls for the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.

It calls for an end to the production of such delivery vehicles.

It calls for the abolition of chemical, biological, and radioactive weapons.

In short, the United States program calls for the total elimination of national capacity to make

¹¹ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 539.

international war. And, to insure that all these steps are actually carried out by each side, every step of the way, the plan calls for the creation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations.

If the United States program is comprehensive, it also is flexible. It does not pretend to be the final word—nor would we wish it to be. We expect it to be examined exhaustively, to be altered and to be improved. It certainly is not perfect; but it can stand up to close scrutiny, for it has been prepared at great pains and in good faith. It is presented in dead earnest and in the conviction that propaganda on the subject of disarmament is a cynical and cruel mockery of man's deepest hope.

Need for Adequate Verification

At one point and one point alone the United States is, and will remain, inflexible: This is on the familiar question of verification, on the indispensable need for the world to know that disarmament agreements are, in fact, being carried out. Because of the confusion that persists on this point, I must dwell upon it for a moment.

First of all, verification must be understood not as a technical point but as a fundamental principle—as the essential condition for any significant progress in disarmament—as its *sine qua non*. To pretend that there is enough confidence between the major armed powers to accept disarmament without verification is to deny the existence of the arms race itself. For the arms race is nothing if not living proof of the absence of mutual trust, and confidence has been rudely shaken by recent events.

I will say quite bluntly that mistrust exists on our side, and how could it be otherwise? The hostility of Soviet leaders toward my country, its institutions, and its way of life is proclaimed, documented, and demonstrated in a thousand ways. Yet we earnestly seek agreement with them—through diplomatic methods and through agreements recorded in words and deeds. So we may be excused, it seems to me, if we are wary of agreements deeply involving our national security with a nation whose recent leader wrote this: "Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood."

These are the words of the late Marshal Stalin. I am aware that his former absolute authority has been subject to a certain reevaluation recently. But the present Premier of the Soviet Union, who served Stalin so loyally, still proclaims his indebtedness to Lenin. And after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenin said this:

We must demobilize the army as quickly as possible, because it is a sick organ; meanwhile we will assist the Finnish Revolution. Yes, of course we are violating the Treaty; we have violated it thirty or forty times.

More recently we have seen wholesale violation of agreements pledging self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe—not to mention so contemporary an event as the erection of a wall through the middle of a city in violation of a postwar agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mention these matters to belabor the dead, nor to rub salt in wounds both old and fresh, nor to becloud the disarmament problem with irrelevant questions. They are not irrelevant, because there can be no disarmament without agreement and because clear warnings and harsh experience have taught us to insist upon independent and international verification of agreements with the Soviet Union.

Our deepest hope—our most fervent prayer—is for proof that this acquired lack of trust will no longer be justified. Meanwhile we do not ask that those who are suspicious of us take us at our word. We offer to them the same guarantees that we have the right and duty to demand of them. We offer to submit to verification procedures under international control at each step of disarmament.

Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has no interest in controls for the sake of controls. We do not wish to buy control or to trade something for it. We have no stake in playing the host to teams of foreign inspectors within our borders. But there is no other way to dispel mistrust, to exorcise suspicion, to begin to build the mutual confidence upon which peaceful cooperation ultimately depends.

So we accept the need for adequate verification procedures. We recognize the right of others to assure themselves that we in fact do what we say we shall do with respect to disarmament.

But in the meantime we must find a basis for workable agreement.

Last spring, as delegates here will recall, this committee agreed to postpone further discussion

of disarmament so that the United States and the Soviet Union could exchange views “on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition is to be agreed upon.”¹²

Beginning on June 19 and ending on September 19, meeting in Moscow, Washington, and New York, representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States discussed these two questions.¹³ The results of these talks were reported to the General Assembly by the United States and the Soviet Union in a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which is before this committee, document A/4879.¹⁴

This report shows that, although our conversations did not bring complete success, neither did they bring complete failure. We were unable to agree on a forum for negotiations. But we did agree on a set of principles to guide negotiations on disarmament.

The U.S. Government welcomed this limited agreement with some hope, especially since the Soviet and American delegates agreed quite explicitly to the implementation of all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under international control. This looked like a very bright spot on a dark horizon—perhaps a real breakthrough toward a world without arms.

But, Mr. Chairman, our hopes have been restrained by the Soviet refusal to follow through on this aspect of the agreed principles. In his address to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on September 26, Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] made the following statement:

After all, no one knows right now what armaments and armed forces the states possess. This is quite normal. For perfectly obvious reasons states do not reveal that kind of information and the same situation will endure after the implementation of disarmament measures provided for in this or that state, pending the completion of general and complete disarmament.

What can this possibly mean? The meaning is that to our Soviet colleagues inspection should apply to the destruction of armaments—but not to existing armaments or the production of new ones.

¹² For a statement by Mr. Stevenson, see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 568.

¹³ For texts of joint communique concerning the talks, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57, and July 17, 1961, p. 106.

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

Apparently we are being asked to establish an elaborate international inspection force simply to witness the destruction of certain quantities and categories of arms, with no knowledge of what remains—to watch while one weapon is junked without seeing whether two others are in production to take its place, perhaps in reality to certify the disposal of inventories of obsolete equipment. I am reminded of the story of the little boy who was showing off his conjuring tricks and said to his parents: “I am going to do some magic for you, but you have to promise not to look.”

The Soviet position thus seems to be the same as it was when the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, addressed a letter¹⁵ to the U.S. disarmament representative, Mr. [John J.] McCloy, on September 21, at the conclusion of the bilateral Soviet-American disarmament negotiations. Mr. McCloy had noted¹⁶ that the Soviet Union had refused to accept, in the Statement of Agreed Principles, a clause reading

Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Now, Mr. President, this sentence seemed to us to represent a *sine qua non* for any effective verification and control. But in his reply Mr. Zorin insisted that such control—that is, control over the armed forces and armaments retained by states at any given stage of disarmament—would turn into what he called an international system of recognized espionage.

If it is the position of the Soviet Union that verification of agreed levels of armaments retained by states under a disarmament plan is espionage, then clearly there can be no general and complete disarmament agreement, for armaments destroyed are of less concern to us than armaments retained. It is the latter and not the former which states attacked in war would have to fear. No matter how many weapons were destroyed, it would be the weapons which were left that would be utilized in a military operation. This is a stumbling block which could be crucial. Unless we can get a clear and satisfactory agreement on this particular point, it is difficult to envisage very substantial progress in disarmament negotiations.

¹⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1961, p. 767.

¹⁶ For text of Mr. McCloy's letter to Mr. Zorin, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 595.

For under the Soviet concept of disarmament inspection, the arms race could continue and the arsenals of war could be larger and deadlier at the end of the first stage of “disarmament” than at the beginning. In short, we would disarm in public and be perfectly free to rearm in secret.

Mr. Chairman, this interpretation turns common sense on its head and makes mockery of logic. This turns reason into gibberish, meaning into nonsense, words into water.

The purpose of disarmament is to abolish war precisely by abolishing the means of making war—which is to say, the armaments and armed forces with which wars are fought. If disarmament does not mean the reduction of the actual levels of armament, it has no meaning at all.

I can only hope that Soviet delegates will not persist in their attitude. If I have misunderstood the position I shall be happy to be informed, and we can go forward. For on their face the principles agreed between the United States and the U.S.S.R. do provide sound and workable guidelines for serious disarmament negotiations, and I prefer to think that they represent an important step in the right direction.

Question of the Proper Forum

This brings us to the question of the proper forum. During our exchanges with the Soviet Union on this point we of the United States tried to reach agreement on a formula which could then be recommended to the other states concerned. Our position on the exact representation was and still is flexible. These proposals can be found in document A/4880.¹⁷ In fact we suggested four possible alternative solutions, but to no avail. The Soviet Union continued to insist on a formula which we felt was restrictive and based on artificial and arbitrary criteria.

Quite frankly, we have grown a little weary of the repeated Soviet demands for changes in the negotiating forum on disarmament. The history of the disarmament talks is full of them. The Ten-Nation Committee was established at Soviet insistence. This was because they seemed to set great store by what they called “parity” in numbers of delegations between their side and the West—even though on the Western side there are several major powers and on their side there has been only one. Then when the Soviets found that

¹⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 591.

the negotiations in the Ten-Nation Committee were not to their liking, they abruptly broke off the talks and demanded an entirely new forum.

Now the latest Soviet proposal for altering the forum into three "groups" is all too reminiscent of the Soviet view, which is quite extraneous to disarmament and quite unacceptable to many other nations: the view that the world can be neatly divided into three so-called "blocs."

The United States recognizes that all nations have a vital stake in the cause of peace and disarmament. On that basis we supported in past years the expansion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to include all members of the United Nations. We recognize, in fact, that the world outside the old Ten-Nation Committee is much larger and more populous than the countries represented in that Committee. Therefore, if we do expand its membership, we would be inclined to include additional members to insure the representation and the advice of the world at large. This is the sense of our proposal to add 10 members to the Ten-Nation Committee which was carrying on disarmament negotiations in 1960, on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.

We hope the Soviet Union is ready to discuss with us the composition of the negotiating forum. I am sure most of the members of the committee would welcome an agreement on this point which would enable us to get started on the substantive negotiations which have been interrupted ever since the U.S.S.R. decided it did not like the 10-nation forum it had demanded. The world wants disarmament, and so do we, and not everlasting negotiations about the number of negotiators.

While we consider the first moves toward disarmament, we can begin right away to strengthen our machinery for keeping the peace. We can do this without hampering our efforts to reach agreement on disarmament. Every step to improve the machinery of peace will make it easier to take the next step in destroying the machinery of war.

We need not even be at a loss as to where to begin or how to proceed. The experience of the United Nations itself gives us a starting point and a guideline. In its earliest years the United Nations had successful experience with mediation and conciliation. It defended collective security and the independence of small nations against their assailants in Korea. Then, at a time of urgent need in the Middle East, the United Nations acquired an effective power to police the

lines of an armistice agreement. At another time of great need—in the Congo—it added an effective power to use force, if necessary, to restore order and to prevent a civil war. Out of such emergencies, the United Nations is becoming a stronger instrument for keeping the peace.

It will have to be much stronger still. Our task now is to strengthen, refine, and develop more fully the peacekeeping structure of the United Nations.

We can begin by drawing lessons from the United Nations' most recent experience in the Congo. From this operation it is not difficult to see that effectiveness in such peacemaking missions depends in large measure on four things: first, the ready availability and mobility of national units; second, their discipline and training and capacity to work with contingents of other nationalities; third, the length of their commitment; and, fourth, a clear chain of command flowing from United Nations Headquarters.

Improving U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery

When the United Nations is so often pitted in a race against time, we risk a dangerous vacuum during the interval while military forces are being assembled. And we further risk a dangerous erosion in the political and moral authority of the United Nations if troops trained for national forces are thrust without special training into situations unique to the purposes and methods of the United Nations, or if such troops are either kept on the job without rotation, are precipitately withdrawn when no replacements are at hand, or are insufficiently supported for lack of adequate financial resources.

We are all deeply in the debt of those officers and men who have served and are serving the cause of peace under the United Nations flag. We must proceed without delay to strengthen the context in which they act in this pioneering work of the United Nations as the guardian of peace.

The United States has suggested that all nations indicate the kind and quality of military units they might be prepared to send for service with the United Nations. My own country has provided very important logistic support for both UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] in the Middle East and the United Nations Forces in the Congo. We now suggest that member countries make available to the United Nations an inventory of the forces, equipment, and logistic support which they

would be prepared to put at the disposal of the United Nations for peace-preserving functions.

But to commit such facilities on paper is not enough. The functions of a United Nations Force are likely to be different from those of national forces. The United States believes that national units should be specially trained for the special character of United Nations operations. Recent United Nations experience should be studied so manuals can be prepared to assist the United Nations in officer training and to help member countries in training noncommissioned personnel.

Such steps would strengthen the United Nations' capacity to serve as an international police force. But a stronger and better organized police force would be needed only when threats to peace have reached dangerous proportions. The police force, therefore, must be supplemented with improved machinery for settling disputes before they reach an explosive stage. Our task, here again, is to build on the existing resources of the United Nations, including the International Court of Justice, and to avail ourselves more fully of the potentials for action within these existing resources.

The Secretary-General may wish to present to the United Nations members his own ideas for the expansion and improvement of United Nations machinery for observation, factfinding, conciliation, mediation, and adjudication. He undoubtedly will wish to make use of senior members of his staff in his conciliation activities. The political organs themselves may wish on occasion to avail themselves of the services of *rapporteurs*.

Moves such as these—and I hope other members will have other suggestions—would permit us to get on with the job of creating the kind of peace-keeping machinery that will be essential for dealing with conflicts in a world free from war. And we can start them at once—even without waiting for agreement on disarmament.

Taking the First Steps

Every such move will help to reduce danger, help to lower distrust, help to blunt fear. The way to start is to start; and a good place to start is ready to hand. I refer to the proposed treaty whose objective it is to outlaw further testing of atomic devices in space, in the atmosphere, on the ground, or under the ground or the water, which is still tabled at Geneva. We are flexible about first steps; we are adamant only on the point that we begin at once—immediately—to disarm.

U.N. Resolution on Disarmament¹

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a result of negotiations between them, that general and complete disarmament should be accomplished and their agreement on the principles which should guide disarmament negotiations,

Noting that the two Governments are desirous of resuming disarmament negotiations in an appropriate body, whose composition is yet to be agreed upon,

Considering it essential that these two principal parties should agree to and accept a negotiating body,

Having regard to the success of negotiations between these two parties resulting in the emergence of an agreement on principles,

1. *Urges* the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory;

2. *Expresses the hope* that such negotiations will be started without delay and will lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to report to the General Assembly, before the conclusion of its sixteenth session, on the results of such negotiations.

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1660 (XVI); unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 28.

Mr. Chairman, we can begin at once to disarm. To start now in no sense limits or postpones the goal of general and complete disarmament; indeed, this is the way to reach it faster. For some steps can be taken sooner than others, without disadvantage to any nation or groups of nations.

Let no one doubt our seriousness. Six weeks ago the President of our nation presented in person to this session of the General Assembly the boldest and most comprehensive plan for disarmament that my nation has ever offered to the world. Since then he has signed into a law an act creating a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,¹⁸ directly under his authority and containing an array of expert talent whose counterpart I would be very happy to see in a similar agency in the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 646.

Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, it is extremely difficult for the mind to grasp a clear vision of a world without arms, for it is a condition totally foreign to the human experience. But as I also said earlier, it is even more difficult to envision a world turned to a radioactive wasteland—which may well be the alternative. Difficult as it is, then, we must grasp the easier and happier vision.

And I do think we can see, however dimly, the general outlines of such a world. A world disarmed would not be utopia, but one suddenly blessed by freedom from war. It would not usher in world government, but the world community would have the capacity to keep the peace. It would not end national sovereignty, but the sovereign right to commit national suicide would be yielded up forever.

A disarmed world would still be a world of great diversity, in which no one nation could seriously pretend to have the wit and wisdom to manage mankind.

It would be a world in which ideas, for the first time, could compete on their own merits without the possibility of their imposition by force of arms.

It would be a world in which men could turn their talents to an agenda of progress and justice for all mankind in the second half of the 20th century.

In short, it would not be a perfect world, but a world both safer and more exhilarating for us all to live in.

There is nothing inherently impossible in creating the conditions for a world without war. Our basic problems are not technical, mechanistic, or administrative. The basic question is whether every nation will agree to abandon the means to coerce others by force.

If they will not, the arms race will go on. For those who love freedom and have the power to defend it will not be coerced. And, uncertain as it is, free people prefer to live on borrowed time than to yield to terror.

Conceivably the world could survive on this perpetual brink of universal disaster. Conceivably fortune would spare us from the fatal act of a lunatic, the miscalculation of an uninformed leader, the false step of a nervous young sentry.

But on behalf of my Government and my people I propose that this Assembly set the world on the road toward freedom from war. And I propose that this committee take the first steps by approving a negotiating forum, endorsing the statement

of agreed principles already worked out by the United States and the Soviet Union, and recommending that the new forum get on at once with the first business of this dangerous world—general and complete disarmament.

I ask Mr. Zorin whether his country cannot so conduct negotiations now that we and our respective allies may be able to turn to the rest of the members here, and to the hundreds of millions for whom they speak, and say: "We have not failed you."

Area of U.N. "Headquarters District and Immediate Vicinity" Enlarged

Press release 826 dated November 30

The Department of State and the Department of Justice on November 30 announced the enlargement, effective January 1, 1962, of the area in and near New York City to which aliens who are issued visas and admitted solely in transit to and from the United Nations headquarters district are limited. The term "headquarters district and its immediate vicinity" as used in section 11 and section 13(e) of the Agreement between the United States of America and the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,¹ which was approved by joint resolution of the Congress on August 4, 1947, will be redefined as "that area lying within a twenty-five mile radius of Columbus Circle, New York, New York."

The aliens affected by the redefinition are the comparatively few news media representatives and other invitees to the United Nations, most of whom would otherwise be ineligible for visas but who are admitted to the United States solely because of their responsibilities in connection with the United Nations and therefore are now restricted to the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity. The term "immediate vicinity of the United Nations headquarters district" has heretofore been defined as that area within Manhattan Island bounded on the north by East 97th St. and Transverse Road Number 4; on the west by Ninth Ave. (between 28th and 49th Sts.), Eighth Ave. (49th St. to Columbus Circle), and Central Park West (Columbus Circle to Transverse Road Number 4); on the south by 28th St. (from Ninth Ave. to First Ave.) and 26th St. (from First Ave. to East River Drive); and on the east by East River Drive.

¹ 61 Stat. 3416.

TREATY INFORMATION

Time Extended for Public Comment on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol

Department Announcement

Press release S24 dated November 29

The State Department refers to press release 679 of October 2, 1961, entitled "Invitation to Public to Submit Comments; Reconsideration of Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol"¹ and states that the date for the receipt of written comments regarding the reconsideration of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol has been extended from November 15, 1961, to December 1 and the date for the presentation of oral statements has been extended from December 4 to December 18. Presentation will be made beginning at 9:30 a.m. on December 18 in the main conference room (1309A), New State Building, 22d and C Streets, NW., Washington, D.C.

Persons and organizations desiring to be heard on December 18 should notify the Interagency Group on International Aviation, c/o Federal Aviation Agency, Washington 25, D.C., by December 1.

There has been established a public docket which will contain all pertinent comments received on the relationship of the United States to the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol thereto. This docket is available in the office of the General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency, Miss R. Chesley Prioleau, GC-2, Room C-226, 1711 New York Ave., Washington, D.C., telephone WOrth 7-3324.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 9, 1961.

Accession deposited: Nigeria, November 14, 1961.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of

stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 9, 1961.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Denmark, November 9, 1961.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and supplementary protocols no. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 20, 1961.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Acceptance deposited: Dominican Republic, October 31, 1961.

Notification of withdrawal: Indonesia, November 6, 1961. Effective November 6, 1961.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signatures: Greece, October 31, 1961; Nigeria, November 17, 1961.

Acceptances deposited: Ecuador, November 7, 1961; Nigeria, November 17, 1961.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, October 20, 1961.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, September 6, 1961.

Accessions deposited: Haiti, January 17, 1961; Iran, September 10, 1960.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Notification by United Kingdom of joint associate membership of: Sarawak and North Borneo, September 29, 1961.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 22, 1961.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961.

Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 22, 1961.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1961, p. 692.

¹ Not in force.

Trade and Commerce

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹
Confirmation of signature deposited: Ghana, November 2, 1961.

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹
Signature: Sweden, November 1, 1961.

Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.¹
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, November 1, 1961.

Arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Done at Geneva July 21, 1961. Entered into force October 1, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Norway, November 10, 1961.

United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Signature and acceptance: Ireland, October 3, 1961.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at La Paz November 15, 1961. Entered into force November 15, 1961.

China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 21, 1961 (TIAS 4825). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei November 15, 1961. Entered into force November 15, 1961.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in El Salvador. Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador August 11, November 13 and 20, 1961. Entered into force November 13, 1961.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 26, 1961. Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta November 17, 1961. Entered into force November 17, 1961.

Pan American Union

Agreement concerning certain funds to be made available under the Alliance for Progress. Signed at Washington November 29, 1961. Entered into force November 29, 1961.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in the Republic of the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila October 11 and 31, 1961. Entered into force October 31, 1961.

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Khartoum November 14, 1961. Entered into force November 14, 1961.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of September 2, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4844 and 4868). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo November 11, 1961. Entered into force November 11, 1961.

Viet-Nam

Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at Saigon April 3, 1961. Entered into force November 30, 1961.
Proclaimed by the President of the United States: November 10, 1961.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: November 27-December 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases appearing in this issue of the BULLETIN which were issued prior to November 27 are Nos. 786 of November 15; 798 of November 18; 802 of November 20; 804 and 805 of November 21; and 814 of November 22.

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*816	11/27	Johnston designated AID mission director, Mexico (biographic details).
*817	11/27	U.S. participation in international conferences.
818	11/28	East German Communist intelligence official defects to West.
*819	11/28	Roberts appointed AID Director of Engineering (biographic details).
*820	11/28	Fowler sworn in as AID Deputy Regional Administrator for Far East (biographic details).
*821	11/28	Bowles: International Association of Machinists.
*822	11/28	Rusk: Academy of Political Science (excerpts).
823	11/29	AID industrial growth contract with Nigeria (rewrite).
824	11/29	Time extended for public comment on reconsideration of Warsaw convention and Hague protocol.
825	11/29	Assistance to Pan American Union projects (rewrite).
826	11/30	U.N. headquarters district area enlarged.
†827	11/30	Nunley: National Conference for International Economic and Social Development.
†828	12/1	Williams: "Africa's Challenge to American Enterprise."
829	11/30	Statement on Dominican Republic.
*830	12/1	Boerner designated Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
*831	12/1	Cultural exchange (Africa).
†832	12/1	Rusk: National Conference for International Economic and Social Development.
*833	12/2	Ball: interview on "Close Up."
*834	12/2	Rusk: interview on "College News Conference."
835	12/2	Missionaries released by Portugal.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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December 25, 1961

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Hour of Decision: A New Approach to American Trade Policy

Addresses by President Kennedy Before the National Association of Manufacturers and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

ADDRESS BEFORE NAM¹

Mr. President and gentlemen: I understand that President McKinley and I are the only two Presidents of the United States to ever address such an occasion. I suppose that President McKinley and I are the only two that are regarded as fiscally sound enough to be qualified for admission to this organization on an occasion such as this.

I have not always considered the membership of the NAM as among my strongest supporters. I am not sure you have all approached the New Frontier with the greatest possible enthusiasm, and I was therefore somewhat nervous about accepting this invitation, until I did some studying of the history of this organization. I learned that this organization had once denounced on one occasion—I'll quote—"swollen bureaucracy" as among the triumphs of Karl Marx and decried on another occasion new governmental "paternalism and socialism." I was comforted when reading this very familiar language to note that I was in very good company. For the first attack I quoted was on Calvin Coolidge and the second on Herbert Hoover.

I remind you of this only to indicate the happy failure of many of our most pessimistic predictions. And that is true of all of us. I recognize that in the last campaign most of the members of this luncheon group today supported my opponent,

except for a very few—who were under the impression that I was my father's son. But I hope that some of your most alarming feelings of a year ago about the imminent collapse of the whole business system if I was elected have been somewhat lessened.

We have selected, I think, able men, whom I hope you have come to have a regard for, to serve in the responsible positions of the Government. One of them here, our distinguished Secretary of Commerce, Governor Hodges, who had a long career in business; Secretary Goldberg, who I think has earned the respect of business as well as labor; Secretary of the Treasury Dillon and his Under Secretary, Mr. Robert Roosa, who was the Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Mr. Robert McNamara, whom many of you know, the Secretary of Defense; Mr. John McCone, who is the head of the Central Intelligence Agency succeeding Mr. Dulles; and Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State—I think they are all men of experience, and also, I think, they are vitally interested in the maintenance of all kinds of freedom in this country.

I think that, while we may not have been together a year ago, we are together now, and I will be the President of the United States for the next 3 years, and I am most anxious that, while we may not agree on all matters, good will at least will prevail among us and that we will both recognize that those of us who work in the National Government, and all of you, are motivated by a desire to serve our country.

¹ Made at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 6 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

Cooperation of Business and Government

Our responsibilities are different, but I believe that we can have a period, in the next few years, of cooperation between business and government in order to advance the common interest.

I have read about the feeling of some businessmen that we are antibusiness, and I would think that a moment's thought would show how really untrue that must be; and I say it, really, for three reasons.

In the first place, we are committed to the defense of freedom around the world. When business does well in this country, we have full employment, and this country is moving ahead, then it strengthens our image as a prosperous and vital country in this great fight in which we are engaged. When you do well, the United States does well, and our policies abroad do well. And when you do badly, all suffer.

Secondly, we are unable to maintain the kind of high employment which we must maintain, unless you are making profits, and reinvesting, and producing; and therefore as we are committed to the goal—and we must all be in this country—of trying to make sure that everyone who wants a job will find it, then quite obviously we must make the system work and the business community must prosper.

And thirdly, and to put it on its most narrow basis, we are—in the National Government, and I know—a rather unpopular partner in every one of your businesses. Our revenues come from you. When you are making profits, then we are able to meet our bills. When you fail, then we fail. So for every reason government and business are completely interdependent and completely involved. And while we may differ on the policies which may bring this country prosperity, there is no disagreement, I am sure, on either side about the tremendous importance of you gentlemen moving ahead, and prospering, and contributing to the growth of this country.

And I hope, if nothing else, that my presence here today indicates that my remarks represent the views of all of us who occupy a position of responsibility in Washington today.

It is not an exaggeration to say that this endeavor of building a prosperous America, in a world of free and prosperous states, making the most of our human and material resources, and avoiding the harmful effects and fluctuations of

inflation and recession, are of course matters of the greatest importance to us all.

And it is not an exaggeration to say that this endeavor proceeds under conditions today more fraught with peril than any in our history.

Seizing the Initiative

As communism continues its long-range drive to impose its way of life all around the world, our strongest desire is not unnaturally to seize the initiative—to get off the defensive—to do more than react to the Soviets. But while this is not an unreasonable urge, its concrete application is more difficult. In the military arena, the initiative rests with the aggressor—a role that we shun by nature and tradition—and our alliances are largely, therefore, defensive. In the paramilitary arenas of subversion, intimidation, and insurrection, an open and peaceful society is again at a disadvantage.

But there is one area in particular where the initiative can and has been ours—an area of strategic importance in which we have the capacity for a still greater effort—and that is in the area of economic policy.

The Marshall plan was an example of our initiative in this area. So were point 4 and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the Alliance for Progress. This year's new long-range program to aid in the growth of the underdeveloped regions of the world and the unaligned nations can bring us still further gains, not merely as a blow against communism but as a blow for freedom. Of equal if not greater importance is the stunning evolution of Western European economic unity from treaty to concrete reality. And it is the success of this still-growing movement which presents the West, at this time, with an historic opportunity to seize the initiative again. The United States is, in fact, required to do so for its own self-interest and progress.

Combining and Coordinating Our Strength

The Communist bloc, largely self-contained and isolated, represents an economic power already by some standards larger than that of Western Europe and gaining to some degree on the United States. But the combined output and purchasing power of the United States and Western Europe is more than twice as great as that of the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. Though we have only half as

much population and far less than half as much territory, our coordinated economic strength will represent a powerful force for the maintenance and growth of freedom.

But will our strength be combined and coordinated—or divided and self-defeating? Will we work together on problems of trade, payments, and monetary reserves—or will our mutual strength be splintered by a network of tariff walls, exchange controls, and the pursuit of narrow self-interest in unrelated if not outright hostile policies on aid, trade, procurement, interest rates, and currency?

This is not a debate between “deficit” nations and “surplus” nations. It is not speculation over some “grand design” for the future. It is a hard, practical question for every member of the Western community—involving most immediately for this nation our policies in two mutually dependent areas: our balance of payments and our balance of trade.

Our Balance of Payments

While exaggerated fears can be harmful, we would not inspire needed confidence abroad by feigning satisfaction with our international balance-of-payments position. In essence, that position reflects the burden of our responsibilities as the free world’s leader, the chief defender of freedom, and the major source of capital investment around the world. As the cost of these responsibilities grows, and is not offset by foreign expenditures here, the monetary deficit in our relations with the rest of the world grows, except to the extent that our trade surplus (of exports over imports) can increase with it. During the previous 3 years, as competition in international markets increased, in spite of the fact that we had a generous balance in our favor in trade, our trade surplus did not keep pace with our needs. At the same time, higher interest rates in other countries as well as speculation in the price of gold attracted some American short-term capital away from our shores. Our balance of payments was in deficit at a rate of nearly \$4 billion a year; and, with its consequences extended by a weakened confidence in the dollar, we suffered over that 3-year period a net loss of \$5 billion in our gold reserves.

The complete elimination of this problem is clearly some time off—but so are any ultimately dangerous consequences. The United States still

holds some 43 percent of the free world’s monetary gold stock, a proportion far larger than our share of its trade and clearly sufficient to tide us over a temporary deficit period—and I emphasize the words “temporary deficit period”—while we mount an offensive to reverse these trends. Our exports and export surplus have both been rising. The net claims of Americans against foreigners have doubled during the last decade, and the annual increase in the value of our assets abroad—which now total nearly \$45 billion and must always be put in the balance sheet when we are considering the movement of gold dollars—has regularly exceeded our payments deficit. Contrary to the assertion that this nation has been living beyond its means abroad, we have been increasing those means instead.

This year, moreover, our wholesale prices have been steadier. In fact, in spite of recovery, our wholesale prices are a fraction less than they were in February, and in a very real sense, for the last 3 years, the United States has had generally stable prices. Confidence in the dollar has been upheld—the speculation fever against the dollar has ceased—the outflow of gold has been reduced from \$2 billion, in the 10 months before February 1961, to \$450 million in the last 10 months, and, due partly to the temporary decline in the imports that accompanied the recession, our general payments deficit in 1961 will be less than half of the 1960 deficit.

There is cause for concern, in short, but I do not believe that there is cause for alarm. We should be blind neither to our basic strengths nor to our basic problems. A long-term deficit requires long-term solutions, and we must not be panicked by setbacks of a short-run nature or the inevitable results of a reviving economy which has increased our imports and therefore leaves us in a less favorable position than we might have expected 2 or 3 months ago.

For negative, shortsighted remedies will do more to weaken confidence in the dollar than strengthen it; and this administration, therefore, during its term of office—and I repeat this and make it as a flat statement—has no intention of imposing exchange controls, devaluing the dollar, raising trade barriers, or choking off our economic recovery.

What we will do, and have been doing, is to take a series of positive steps to reduce our outpayments and to increase our receipts from abroad.

Meeting Our Basic Commitments

First of all, we recognize, as already stressed, that this country cannot solve this problem alone. Our allies have a vital interest in its solution. Because, let me repeat, if it were not for our national security commitment abroad, which defends our own interests and that of our allies, the United States would have gold pouring in rather than pouring out. It is this commitment, which is extremely large and constant, which gives us our problem and should be so recognized. Our allies, therefore, have a vital interest in the solution. Thus we have sought to increase the share of the contribution which other industrialized states are making to the less developed world, and are seeking their assumption of a larger share of the cost of our joint defense requirements.

We lose \$3 billion a year because of our defense expenditures. It costs us hundreds of millions of dollars to keep our troops in Western Germany. We lose nearly \$300 million a year to France alone because of our defense expenditures in those areas. That \$3 billion, therefore, represents a charge in the interests of our national security, which is vitally important. That drain is serious. And it was because of that reason that President Eisenhower last year suggested the exceptional step of bringing back our dependents from Western Europe, which would have saved \$250 million. But \$3 billion represents the contribution which we make to our defense establishments abroad.

The reason why the British, as you know, have been considering withdrawing some of their troops from bases stationed around the world is because of their balance-of-payments difficulty. The reason that they have been reluctant to station additional troops in Western Germany has been because of the same reason. In other words, therefore, the matter which we are now discussing, of trade, involves not only our economic well-being but the basic commitments of the United States to dozens of countries around the world.

Unless our balance of trade, and our surplus, is sufficient, for example, to pay for this 3 billions of dollars, then we have no remedy but to start pulling back. So that for those who address themselves to this subject in the coming months, they must realize that it goes to the heart of our survival as well as our economic vitality.

We are working with foreign governments now and central banks on new techniques for dealing

in foreign currencies; on coordinating our development aid, fiscal, debt management, monetary, and other policies through the OECD; on preparing a new standby lending authority for the International Monetary Fund; on the prepayment of our allies' long-term debts during this period of adverse trends; and on increasing the proportion of their own military procurement in the United States, a very important move, because of the arrangements that have been recently made, that is expected to cut our payments deficit by at least another half a billion dollars next year.

Procurement Policy

Secondly, to hold our own outlays abroad to the absolute essentials, we have emphasized procurement in this country for our military aid and overseas defense and insisted upon it for three-quarters of our economic aid. This means that our economic aid to these countries does not go as far as it once did. The South Koreans can buy fertilizer from Japan at half the cost that they can buy it here in the United States, and much less shipping. But because we are determined to protect our gold, and therefore our dollar, we have imposed the Buy American policy, which means now that our losses because of economic aid abroad, our general program which amounts to about \$4 billion, is now down, as far as our dollar loss, to \$500 million, and we are hopeful that we can squeeze it even down further.

We have also substituted local currency expenditures for dollar expenditures to cover local costs wherever possible, and sought to discourage (by a change in the customs law) heavy expenditures abroad by tourists to supplement restrictions already placed on military families. I will say I was alarmed to hear the other day of a study in the Defense Department of this question of dependents abroad which indicated that those who had no dependents abroad spent more money abroad than those with dependents; so it indicates that for every solution there are additional problems.

Encouraging Movement of Funds to U. S.

Third, to encourage a greater movement of funds in this direction and to discourage transfers in these other directions, we have set up a new program to attract foreign visitors; secured pas-

sage of a tax exemption encouraging foreign central banks to invest their capital in U.S. securities; kept our own short-term interest rates high enough to avoid unnecessary outflows; and urged our allies to free their own private capital for investment here. At the same time we have directed the Treasury, for the first time in a generation, to buy and sell foreign currencies in the international exchange markets so as to strengthen its ability to offset unfavorable developments affecting the value of the dollar.

Removing Artificial Tax Preference

Fourth, we have asked the Congress—and this is a matter which is controversial and to which this group has taken exception—we have asked the Congress to remove the artificial tax preference for American investment in highly developed countries with no capital shortage and the unjustifiable tax avoidance loopholes available to those Americans investing in so-called “tax haven” nations. We do not seek to penalize those who wish to invest their capital abroad. We are committed to the free flow of capital, but we also want to make sure that our tax laws do not encourage the outward movement of capital in a way which does not serve our national purpose.

I am aware that many of you will argue that the investment abroad of these funds will mean that ultimately and in the long run these moneys will be coming back. But how long a run? And how long can we afford, without taking every responsible step to try to bring this in balance in the short run? We can't wait till 1970, if we're losing two or three billion dollars a year. And we are now, for the first time, down to about \$16,900,000,000 in gold in the United States.

So that I want to emphasize that, however unsatisfactory you may feel it is, it is not being done to harass business but only because it represents one additional effort to try to bring the dollar into balance. And if we can increase our trade so that our surplus in trade is sufficient to make up these figures, then this kind of tax would be unnecessary.

Or, if this organization has some other plan or program—which does not affect our national security—which is more equitable, we will be glad to listen to that. But we are concerned that while capital moves freely, the tax policies do not stimulate it.

And I emphasize this in saying again that I do

not believe that exchange controls, based on the experience of the British and others and our unique role as the banker of the world, would be either workable or helpful. But the recent flow of our capital to nations already fully developed has been a serious drain, in the short run, on our current balance-of-payments position. The eventual return from that capital is no help to us today. And at a time when we are hard pressed to pay for the maintenance of our forces in Europe without unreasonably increasing our payments deficit and our gold outflow, I am sure you must realize that it makes no sense to be encouraging an exodus of capital through tax laws that were more appropriate at a time when Europe was deficient in capital. You probably are familiar with these figures: In 1960 the long-term outward flow of capital funds was \$1,700,000,000. The return was \$2,300,000,000, and therefore you might argue that we are getting more back than we are sending out. But when those figures are broken down, we see that the outward investment into the developed countries, such as Western Europe, was \$1,500,000,000, and the return was only \$1 billion, a loss therefore in dollars and potentially in gold of a half billion dollars to these countries, while in the underdeveloped countries, where we would like to see American capital be invested, we took in \$1,300,000,000 and invested \$200,000,000.

So that I would say, gentlemen, that all of the proposals which we will have to put forward in the coming months and years to try to bring this into balance—and I will say that we are going to reduce without weakening our defenses our expenditures for military purchases from \$3 billion to \$2 billion—we do have to use every available means that we have. And if this organization has suggestions as to how it may be done, we want to hear them. The best way, of course, is by increasing our exports.

Increasing Exports

Fifth, and most important of all, we are seeking to increase our exports and thus our surplus of exports over imports. I shall discuss our opportunities, but it is worth while recounting now that we have embarked on a stepped-up campaign of export promotion and trade fair exhibits—increased our agricultural exports—and to indicate the kind of problems that we are going to have, we send to Western Europe in agricultural exports nearly \$2

billion, which is one of our great dollar earners. We take in, in agricultural exports from Europe, only about \$80 million, a balance of trade for us of nearly \$1,920,000,000. And yet, as the Common Market begins to get more and more developed, with all of these countries beginning to face surplus problems, there isn't any doubt that one of our most important problems in maintaining this kind of dollar flow would be to maintain the free flow of our agricultural commodities into the Common Market. There's going to be no more difficult task than that, and therefore we have to recognize that this, too, may affect our balance of payments.

We have broadened the Export-Import Bank's loan guarantee system, created a new program of export credit insurance, and in a variety of ways sought to help you to keep American prices competitive. This requires—if we are to avoid the inflation that will price our goods out of the world markets—price and wage restraint by both industry and labor and responsible budget policies by the Government. It requires—if we are to offer modern products efficiently produced at a low cost—a higher rate of investment in new equipment, encouraged by the fullest use of existing capacity in a strong recovery, by the investment tax credit now pending before the House Ways and Means Committee, and by the depreciation reform now under study and already put into effect on textile machinery.

This organization has taken a position against our tax credit, and the reason is that you do not feel it is sufficient and you support a much more general overhaul of our depreciation. I support that, too, but our tax credit will cost \$1,800,000,000 in our revenue. We have suggested—and I know this has been unpopular—certain taxes to make up that revenue, because quite obviously we cannot carry out a tax reduction, in these critical times, with our budget problems as difficult as they are. Therefore, while we would like, under ideal conditions, and had hoped, for example, to have a surplus this year before our additional expenditures for defense in July, it is very difficult for us to send up a broad tax depreciation scheme which might cost \$3 billion with the expectation that other tax reductions would be added to it, at a time when we balance our budget with the greatest difficulty.

So that we are not unsympathetic, and I can

think of very few tax changes that would be more useful to the country in stimulating employment and keeping us competitive, particularly with Western Europe. And the only reason we have not gone further in it, and the only reason we have limited ourselves to the proposal which is now before the House Ways and Means Committee, is because we do not have the available revenue to provide for a tax reduction this year.

So that I am hopeful, in making your position known to the Congress this year, that while you will continue to commit yourselves to depreciation changes—and as I say, we have made some progress in textiles—you will also recognize what our budgetary problems are and work with us in attempting to get the best arrangements we can at this time and plan for more satisfactory arrangements in the future.

Responsibility of Business Community

In short, achieving a healthy equilibrium in our international accounts depends in part upon the cooperation of our allies, in part upon action by the Congress, in part upon the self-discipline exercised by this administration in its executive and budgetary policies (and here I repeat my intention to submit a balanced budget in January), and in part upon you and other members of the business community. (Labor, too, has its responsibility for price stability, and I shall stress this tomorrow in addressing the AFL-CIO.) I recognize that your efforts will be governed in part by the kind of atmosphere the Government can help to create. That is why we intend to submit our balanced budget. The Government must not be demanding more from the savings of the country, nor draining more from the available supplies of credit, when the national interest demands a priority for productive, creative investment—not only to spur our growth at home but to make sure that we can sell, and sell effectively, in markets abroad.

But your own responsibility is great, and there are three things in particular that you can do: *Be competitive*, through lower costs and prices and better products and productivity. *Be export-minded*. In a very real sense, the British used to say they exported or died. We are going to meet our commitments. We've got to export. And we have to increase our exports, and however impressive it has been in the past it must be better

in the future for the security of this country. And finally, *be calm*, in the sense of refraining from talk which really does not represent the facts and which causes a concern about where we are going abroad. It is my hope that, when we submit our balanced budget in January, those who look at our fiscal situation from abroad and make their judgment will recognize that we are in control, that we are moving ahead, and that the United States is a good bet.

All of us must share in this effort, for this in part, as I have said, is a part of the national security. I don't want the United States pulling troops home because we are unable to meet our problems another way.

But we can be calm because our basic international position is strong: This year's deficit will be lower than last year's, our gold stores are large and the outflow is easing, we are going to make progress next year in diminishing it still further, we will submit a balanced budget, we are not undergoing a damaging inflation. We can, over the next few years, offset with the help of our allies a billion dollars, as I have said, of our \$3-billion overseas defense outlays; reduce, with the help of the Congress, the money which goes because of tax advantages; cut back still further that portion of our foreign aid procurement which is not already spent here; and take the other steps I have mentioned, including an increase in our exports, for which all the additional tools we need are well within our reach.

Our Balance of Trade

One of those tools, one which we urgently need for our own well-being, is a new trade and tariff policy. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act expires in June of next year. It must not simply be renewed—it must be replaced. If the West is to take the initiative in the economic arena, if the United States is to keep pace with the revolutionary changes which are taking place throughout the world, if our exports are to retain and expand their position in the world market, then we need a new and bold instrument of American trade policy.

For the world of trade is no longer the same. Some 90 percent of the free world's industrial production may soon be concentrated in two great markets—the United States of America and an expanded European Common Market. Our own

example—of 50 States without a trade barrier behind a common external tariff—helped to inspire the Common Market. Our support, ever since the close of World War II, has been thrown behind greater European unity. For we recognized long ago that such unity would produce a Europe in which the ancient rivalries which resulted in two world wars, for us as well as for them, could rest in peace—a Europe in which the strength and the destiny of Germany would be inextricably tied with the West—and a Europe no longer dependent upon us but, on the contrary, strong enough to share in full partnership with us the responsibilities and initiatives of the free world.

Now this new “house of Europe” that we sought so long, under different administrations, is actually rising, and it means vast new changes in our outlook as well. With the accession of the United Kingdom and other European nations to the Common Market, they will have almost twice as many people as we do. It will cover nations whose economies have been growing twice as fast as ours, and it will represent an area with a purchasing power which some day will rival our own. It could be—it should be—our most reliable and profitable customer. Its consumer demands are growing, particularly for the type of goods that we produce best, for American goods not previously sold and sometimes not even known in European markets today. It is an historic meeting of need and opportunity; at the very time that we urgently need to increase our exports, to protect our balance of payments, and to pay for our troops abroad, a vast new market is rising across the Atlantic.

Need for New Trade Policy

If, however, the United States is to enjoy this opportunity, it must have the means to persuade the Common Market to reduce external tariffs to a level which permits our products to enter on a truly competitive basis. That is why a trade policy adequate to deal with a large number of small states is no longer adequate. For almost 30 years the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act has strengthened our foreign trade policy. But today the approaches and procedures provided for in that act are totally irrelevant to the problems and opportunities that we confront. Its vitality is gone—a fresh approach is essential—and the

longer we postpone its replacement, the more painful that step will be when it finally happens.

For this is no longer a matter of local economic interests but of high national policy. We can no longer haggle over item-by-item reductions with our principal trading partners but must adjust our trading tools to keep pace with world trading patterns—and the EEC [European Economic Community] cannot bargain effectively on an item-by-item basis.

I am proposing, in short, a new American trade initiative which will make it possible for the economic potential of these two great markets to be harnessed together in a team capable of pulling the full weight of our common military, economic, and political aspirations. And I do not under-rate at all the difficulties that we will have in developing this initiative.

I am *not* proposing—nor is it either necessary or desirable—that we join the Common Market, alter our concepts of political sovereignty, establish a “rich man’s” trading community, abandon our traditional most-favored-nation policy, create an Atlantic free-trade area, or impair in any way our close economic ties with Canada, Japan, and the rest of the free world. And this, of course, is a problem of the greatest importance to us also. We do not want Japan left out of this great market, or Latin America, which has depended so much on the European markets it may find it now increasingly difficult because of competition from Africa to sell in Europe—which could mean serious trouble for them and therefore for us in the long run, both political as well as economic.

I am *not* proposing—nor is it either necessary or desirable—that in setting new policies on imports we do away altogether with our traditional safeguards and institutions. I believe we can provide more meaningful concepts of injury and relief and far speedier proceedings. We can use tariffs to cushion adjustment instead of using them only to shut off competition. And the Federal Government can aid that process of adjustment through a program I shall discuss further tomorrow—not a welfare program, or a permanent subsidy, but a means of permitting the traditional American forces of adaptability and initiative to substitute progress for injury.

For obviously our imports will also increase—not as much as our exports, but they will increase.

And we need those imports if other nations are to have the money to buy our exports and the incentive to lower their own tariff barriers. Because nobody is going to lower their barriers unless the United States makes a bargain with them which they feel to be in their own economic interest. We need those imports to give our consumers a wider choice of goods at competitive prices. We need those imports to give our industries and Defense Establishment the raw materials they require at prices they can afford—and to keep a healthy pressure on our own producers and workers to improve efficiency, develop better products, and avoid the inflation that could price us out of markets vital to our own prosperity.

Finally, let me make it clear that I am *not* proposing a unilateral lowering of our trade barriers. What I am proposing is a joint step on both sides of the Atlantic, aimed at benefiting not only the exporters of the countries concerned but the economies of all of the countries of the free world. Led by the two great Common Markets of the Atlantic, trade barriers in all the industrial nations must be brought down. Surely it will be said that the bold vision which produced the EEC will fall short if it merely transfers European protectionism from the national to the continental level.

Benefits to Entire Economy

But if we can obtain from the Congress, and successfully use in negotiations, sufficient bargaining power to lower Common Market restrictions against our goods, every segment of the American economy will benefit. There are relatively few members of the business community who do not or could not transport, distribute, or process either exports or imports. There are millions of American workers whose jobs depend on the sale of our goods abroad—making industrial sewing machines, or trucks, or aircraft parts, or chemicals, or equipment for oil fields or mining or construction. They may process lubricants or resin, they may dig coal or plant cotton. In fact, the average American farmer today depends on foreign markets to sell the crops grown on one out of every six acres he plants—in wheat, cotton, rice, and tobacco, to name but a few examples. Our consumers, as mentioned, will benefit most of all.

But if American industry cannot increase its sales to the Common Market and increase this nation’s surplus of exports over imports, our interna-

tional payments position and our commitments to the defense of freedom will be endangered.

If American businessmen cannot increase or even maintain their exports to the Common Market, they will surely step up their investment in new American-owned plants behind those tariff walls so they can compete on an equal basis—thereby taking capital away from us, as well as jobs from our shores, and worsening still further our balance-of-payments position.

If American industry cannot increase its outlets in the Common Market, our own expansion will be stifled, the growth target of 50 percent in the sixties, adopted last month by the 20 nations of OECD for their combined gross national product, will not be reached, and our business community will lack the incentives to lower prices and improve technology which greater competition would otherwise inspire. The industries which would benefit the most from increased trade are our most efficient; even though in many cases they pay our highest wages, their goods can compete with the goods of any other nation. Those who would benefit the least, and are unwilling to adjust to competition, are standing in the way, as the NAM Economic Advisory Committee pointed out last year, of greater growth and a higher standard of living. They are endangering the profits and jobs of others, our efforts against inflation, our balance-of-payments position, and in the long run their own economic well-being because they will suffer from competition in the United States inevitably, if not from abroad—for, in order to avoid exertion, they accept paralysis.

Capitalism on Trial

Finally, let me add, if we cannot increase our sales abroad, we will diminish our stature in the free world. Economic isolation and political leadership are wholly incompatible. The United Kingdom, faced with even more serious problems in her efforts to achieve both higher growth and reasonable balance of payments, is moving with boldness, welcoming, in the Prime Minister's words, "the brisk shower of competition." We cannot do less. For if the nations of the West can weld together on these problems a common program of action as extraordinary in economic history as NATO was unprecedented in military history, the long-range Communist aim of dividing and encircling us all is doomed to failure.

In every sense of the word, therefore, capitalism is on trial as we debate these issues. For many years, in many lands, we have boasted of the virtues of the marketplace under free competitive enterprise, of America's ability to compete and sell, of the vitality of our system in keeping abreast with the times. Now the world will see whether we mean it or not—whether America will remain the foremost economic power in the world—whether we will evacuate the field of power before a shot is fired, or go forth to meet new risks and tests of our ability.

The hour of decision has arrived. We cannot afford to "wait and see what happens" while the tide of events sweeps over and beyond us. We must use time as a tool, not as a couch. We must carve out our own destiny. This is what Americans have always done, and this, I have every confidence, is what we will continue to do in each new trial and opportunity that lies ahead.

ADDRESS BEFORE AFL-CIO²

Mr. Meany [George Meany, president, AFL-CIO], clergy, Governor [Farris] Bryant, gentlemen, and ladies: It's warmer here today than it was yesterday. I want to express my pleasure at this invitation. As one whose work and continuity of employment has depended in part upon the union movement, I want to say that I have been on the job, training for about 11 months, and feel that I have some seniority rights in the matter.

I am delighted to be here with you and with Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. I was up in New York stressing physical fitness, and in line with that Arthur went over with a group to Switzerland to climb some of the mountains there. They all got up about 5, and he was in bed—got up to join them later—and when they all came back at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, he didn't come back with them. They sent out a search party, and there was no sign of him that afternoon or night. The next day the Red Cross went out, and they went around calling, "Goldberg—Goldberg—it's the Red Cross." And this voice came down from the mountain, "I gave at the office."

Those are liberties you can take with members of the Cabinet, but I want to say it is a pleasure

² Made at Miami, Fla., on Dec. 7 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

to be here on this important anniversary for all of us, the 20th anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

I suppose, really, the only two dates that most people remember where they were are Pearl Harbor and the death of President Franklin Roosevelt. We face entirely different challenges on this Pearl Harbor. In many ways the challenges are more serious, and in a sense long-reaching, because I don't think that any of us had any doubt in those days that the United States would survive and prevail and our strength increase.

Importance of American Labor Movement

Now we are face to face in a most critical time with challenges all around the world, and you in the labor movement bear a heavy responsibility. Occasionally I read articles by those who say that the labor movement has fallen into dark days. I don't believe that, and I would be very distressed if it were true.

One of the great qualities about the United States, which I don't think people realize who are not in the labor movement, is what a great asset for freedom the American labor movement represents, not only here but all around the world. It is no accident that Communists concentrate their attention on the trade union movement. They know that people—those who work are people who are frequently left out, that in many areas of the world they have no one to speak for them, and the Communists mislead them and say that they will protect their rights. So they go along.

But in the United States, because we have had a strong, free labor movement, the working people of this country have not felt that they were left out. And as long as the labor movement is strong and as long as it is committed to freedom, then I think that freedom in this country is stronger. So I would hope that every American, whether he was on one side of the bargaining table or the other, or whether he was in a wholly different sphere of life, would recognize that the strength of a free American labor movement is vital to the maintenance of freedom in this country and all around the world.

Strong Labor Movement Essential to Democracy

And I am delighted that there are here today, I understand, nearly 150 trade union leaders from nearly 32 countries around the world. I believe—

and I say this as President—that one of the great assets that this country has is the influence which this labor movement can promote around the world in demonstrating what a free trade union can do.

I hope that they will go back from this meeting recognizing that in the long run a strong labor movement is essential to the maintenance of democracy in their country. It is no accident that there hasn't been a strike in the Soviet Union for 30, 35, or 40 years. The Communists, who in Latin America, in Africa, or Asia say that they represent the people, cannot possibly—under any rule of reason or debate—say that a labor movement is free when it is not able to express its rights, not only in relationship to the employer but also to speak out and recognize the limitations on governmental power. We are not omniscient—we are not all-powerful—this is a free society, and management and labor, and the farmer and the citizen have their rights. We did not give them their rights in government. And I hope that those who go from this hall to Latin America, to Europe, to Africa, will recognize that we believe in freedom and in progress in this country, that we believe that freedom is not an end in itself, but we believe that freedom can bring material abundance and prosperity. And I want you to know that I consider this meeting and the house of labor vital to the interests of this country and the cause of freedom in the coming days.

What unites labor, what unites this country is far more important than those things on which we may disagree. So, gentlemen and ladies, you are not only leaders of your unions but you occupy a position of responsibility as citizens of the United States; and therefore I felt it most appropriate to come here today and talk with you.

Cooperation of American Labor

First, I want to express my appreciation to you for several things. For example, I appreciate the effort that those of you who represent the interests of men and women who work at our missile plants have made, the fact that you have given and that the men and women who work there have lived up to the no-strike pledge at our missile and space sites has made an appreciable difference in the progress that we are making in these areas—and the country appreciates the efforts you are making.

Secondly, we have for the first time a Presidential advisory committee on labor-management

policy, which for once did not break up on the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 but instead meets month by month in an attempt to work out and develop economic policy which will permit this country to go forward under conditions of full employment. And I want to thank you for the participation you have given that.

Third, as I said, I want to thank the labor movement for what it is doing abroad in strengthening the free labor movement, and I urge you to redouble your efforts. And as I have said, the freedom of these countries rests in many parts on the labor movement. We do not want to leave the people of some countries a choice between placing their destiny in the hands of a few who hold in their hands most of the property, and on the other side the Communist movement—we do not give them that choice. We want them to have the instruments of freedom to protect themselves and provide for progress in their country, and a strong, free labor movement can do it—and I hope you will concentrate your attention in the next 12 months in that area—in Latin America, and all around the world.

The fact is that the head of the Congo—[Cyrille] Adoula—who has been a strong figure for freedom, came out of the labor movement, and that is happening in country after country, and this is a great opportunity and responsibility for all of us, to continue to work together.

And finally I want to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the AFL-CIO for the support that it gave in the passage of our legislative program in the long session of the Congress. We did not always agree on every tactic, we may not have achieved every goal, but we can take some satisfaction in the fact that we did make progress toward a \$1.25 minimum wage, that we did expand the coverage for the first time in 20 years, that we did pass the best Housing Act since 1949, that we did finally after two Presidential vetoes in the last 4 years pass a bill providing assistance to those areas suffering from chronic unemployment, that we did pass a long-range water pollution bill, that we did pass increased Social Security benefits, a lowering of the retirement age in Social Security from 65 to 62 for men, temporary unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children.

And we are coming back in January, and we are going to start again.

Increasing Employment

The gross national product has climbed since January from \$500 billion to an estimated \$540 billion in the last quarter, and it is a pleasure for me to say that the November employment figures received this morning show not only 2 million more people than were working in February but we have now an all-time high for November, 67,349,000 people working. But more importantly, unlike the usual seasonal run in November, which ordinarily provides for an increase in unemployment of about a half a million, we have now brought the figure for the first time below the 7 percent where it has hovered down to 6.1 percent, and we're going to have to get it lower.

I would not claim we have achieved full recovery or the permanently high growth rate of which we are capable. Since the recession of 1958, from which we only partially recovered in going into the recession of 1960, too many men and women have been idle for too long a time. And our first concern must still be with those unable to get work. Unemployment compensation must be placed on a permanent, rational basis of nationwide standards, and even more importantly those who are older and retired must be permitted under a system of Social Security to get assistance and relief from the staggering cost of their medical bills.

The time has come in the next session of the Congress to face the fact that our elder citizens do need these benefits, that their needs cannot be adequately met in any other way, and that every Member of the Congress should have the opportunity to go on the record, up or down, on this question—and I believe if it comes to the floor, as I believe it must, they are going to vote it up and through before they adjourn in July or August.

Problems of Young People

Now there are six areas that I believe that we need to give our attention to, if the manpower budget is to be balanced. First, we must give special attention to the problems of our younger people. Dr. [James B.] Conant's recent book [*Slums and Suburbs*] only highlighted a fact which all of you are familiar with, and that is the problem of those who drop out of school before they have finished because of hardships in

their home, inadequate motivation or counseling, or whatever it may be, and then drift without being able to find a decent job. And this falls particularly heavily upon the young men and women who are in our minority groups.

In addition to that, 26 million young people will be crowding into the labor market in the next 10 years. This can be a tremendous asset, because we have many tasks that require their talent, but today there are 1 million young Americans under the age of 25 who are out of school and out of work. Millions of others leave school early, destined to fall for life into a pattern of being untrained, unskilled, and frequently unemployed. It is for this reason that I have asked the Congress to pass a Youth Employment Opportunities Act, to guide these hands so that they can make a life for themselves.

Equally important, if our young people are to be well trained—and skilled labor is going to be needed in the next years—and if they are to be inspired to finish their studies, the Federal Government must meet its responsibility in the field of education. I'm not satisfied if my particular community has a good school. I want to make sure that every child in this country has an adequate opportunity for a good education.

Thomas Jefferson once said, "If you expect a country to be ignorant and free, you expect what never was and never will be." It is not enough that our own hometown have a good school; we want the United States as a country to be among the best educated in the world. And I believe that we must invest in our youth.

Retraining the Unemployed

Secondly, we need a program of retraining our unemployed workers. All of you who live so close to this problem know what happens when technology changes and industries move out and men are left. And I have seen it in my own State of Massachusetts, where textile workers are unemployed, unable to find work, even with new electronic plants going up all around them. We want to make sure that our workers are able to take advantage of the new jobs that must inevitably come as technology changes in the 1960's. And I believe, therefore, that retraining deserves the attention of this Congress in the coming days.

Fair Opportunity for Minority Groups

And the third group requiring our attention consists of our minority citizens. All of you know the statistics of those who are first discharged, and the last to be rehired too often are among those who are members of our minority groups. We want everyone to have a chance, regardless of their race or color, to have an opportunity to make a life for themselves and their families, to get a decent education so that they have a fair chance to compete, and then be judged on what's in here and not on what's outside. And the American labor movement has been identified with this cause, and I know that you will be in the future.

And we are making a great effort to make sure that all those who secure Federal contracts—and there are billions of dollars spent each year by the Federal Government—will give fair opportunity to all of our citizens to participate in that work.

Plant Reinvestment

Fourth, we want to provide opportunities for plant reinvestment. One of the matters which is of concern in maintaining our economy now is the fact that we do not have as much reinvestment in our plants as we did, for example, in 1955, 6, and 7; and we want this economy and this rise to be continuous, and I believe we have to give as much incentive as is possible to provide reinvestment in plants, which makes work and will keep our economy moving ahead.

And therefore I have suggested a tax credit, which I am hopeful—the American labor movement has not placed on its list of those matters yet that it has supported—that it will consider this proposal as a method of stimulating the economy, so that this recovery does not run out of gas in 12 months or 18 months from now—as the 1958-1959 recovery—after the recession of 1958—ran out in 1960.

Grants-in-Aid for Public Works

Fifth, to add to our arsenals of built-in stabilizers so we can keep our economy moving ahead, it is my intention to ask the Congress at its next session for standby authority somewhat along the lines of the bill introduced by Senator [Joseph S.] Clark of Pennsylvania to make grants-in-aid to

communities for needed public works when our unemployment begins to mount and our economy to slow down.

Stimulating Trade Abroad

Sixth and finally, we must expand our job opportunities by stimulating our trade abroad. I know that this is a matter to which the labor movement has given a good deal of attention. Mr. Meany made an outstanding speech on this matter several weeks ago, and it is a matter which is of concern to this administration. I am sure you wonder, perhaps, why we are placing so much emphasis on it, and I would like to say why we are, very briefly.

The first is, this country must maintain a favorable balance of trade or suffer severely from the point of view of our national security. We sell abroad now nearly \$5 billion more than we import, but unfortunately that \$5 billion goes abroad in order to maintain the national security requirements of the United States.

We spend \$3 billion of that in order to keep our troops overseas. It costs us nearly \$700 to \$800 million to keep our divisions in Western Germany and \$300 million to keep our troop establishments in France. And what is true in France and Germany, which are outposts of our commitments, is true in other areas.

So that if we are not able to maintain a favorable balance of trade, then of course we will have to do as the British have had to do, which is begin to bring our troops back and lay the way open for other actions. So that this is a matter which involves very greatly our security, and unless you believe that the United States should retreat to our own hemisphere and forget our commitments abroad, then you can share with me my concern about what will happen if that balance of trade begins to drop.

European Common Market

Now the problems that we face have been intensified by the development of the Common Market. This is our best market for manufactured products. What I am concerned about is that we shall be able to keep moving our trade into those areas; otherwise what we will find is that American capital which cannot place its goods in that market will decide, as they are doing now, to

build their plants in Western Europe, and then they hire Western European workers—and you suffer, and the country suffers, and the balance of payments suffers.

So this is a matter of the greatest importance to you and in fact to all Americans. It is, for example, of the greatest importance to American farmers. They sell \$2 billion of agricultural commodities to Western Europe. We bring in \$80 million of agricultural commodities from Western Europe. In other words, we make almost \$2 billion of our foreign exchange from that sale of agricultural commodities, and yet Western Europe has great agricultural resources which are increasing and we are going to find it increasingly difficult unless we are able to negotiate from a position of strength with them. So this matter is important.

The purpose of this discussion is to increase employment. The purpose of this discussion is to strengthen the United States, and it is a matter which deserves our most profound attention. Are we going to export our goods and our crops, or are we going to export our capital? That's the question that we are now facing.

Exporting Capital to Underdeveloped Areas

And I know that those of you who have been concerned about this know this to be a major problem. Last year—1960—we invested abroad \$1,700,000,000, and we took in from our investments abroad \$2,300,000,000, which sounded like it was a pretty good exchange. But if you analyze these figures you will see that we took in from the underdeveloped world, which needs capital—we took in \$1,300,000,000 and we sent out in capital for investment \$200,000,000. And yet this is the area that needs our investment. While in Western Europe we sent out \$1,500,000,000 and took in \$1,000,000,000, so that if this trend should continue and more and more Western Europe became the object of American investment, it affects us all and affects the people who work with you.

We are attempting to repeal those tax privileges which make it particularly attractive for American capital to invest in Western Europe. We passed laws in the days of the Marshall plan when we wanted American capital over there, and as the result of that there are provisions on the tax book which make it good business to go over

there. Now we want it all to be fair, and we have stated we are not putting in exchange controls, which we will not; but we recommended in January the passage of a bill which would lessen the tax privileges of investing in Western Europe and which would have given us \$250 million in revenue and in balance of payments.

The tax privileges or the attractions should be in the underdeveloped world, where we have been taking capital out rather than putting it in, and not in Western Europe, where the capital is sufficient and which does not serve that great national purpose. So this is a matter of concern for all of us, and it is a matter which we must consider in the coming months.

The Common Market is a tremendous market. It has more people than we do. Its rate of growth is twice ours. Its income is about three-fifths of ours and may some day be equal to ours. This can be a great asset not only to them but to us—a great strength tying the United States, Western Europe, Latin America, and Japan together as a great area of freedom. And I think that it represents one of the most hopeful signs since 1945. It is one place where the free world can be on the offensive, and I am anxious that the United States play its proper role to protect the interests of our people and to advance the cause of freedom. And I ask the careful consideration of the American labor movement in this area.

Protection for Industries Affected by Imports

One of the problems which we have is to recognize that those who have been affected by imports have received no protection at all for a number of years from the United States Government. When I was a Senator in 1954, I introduced legislation to provide assistance to those industries which are hard hit by imports. I am going to recommend in January a program which I hope the Congress will pass, which will provide a recognition of the national responsibility in the period of transition for those industries and people who may be adversely affected.

I am optimistic about the future of this country. This is a great country, with an energetic people, and I believe over the long period that the people of this country and of the world really want freedom and wish to solve their own lives and their own destiny. I am hopeful that we can be associated with that movement. I am hopeful that

you will continue to meet your responsibilities to your people, as well as to the country. I hope that we can maintain a viable economy here with full employment. I am hopeful we can be competitive here and around the world. I am hopeful that management and labor will recognize their responsibility to permit us to compete, that those of you who are in the area of wage negotiation will recognize the desirability of our maintaining as stable prices as possible, and that the area of productivity and stable prices—that your negotiations will take adequate calculation and account of this need for us to maintain a balance of trade in our favor. In the long run it's in the interests of your own workers.

Let me repeat: If we cannot maintain the balance of trade in our favor, which it now is, of \$5 billion, and indeed increase it, then this country is going to face most serious problems. In the last 3 years, even though the balance of trade in our favor has been \$5 billion, we have lost \$5 billion in gold; and if this trend should go on year after year, then the United States, as I have said, would have to make adjustments which would be extremely adverse to the cause of freedom around the world.

The solution rests with increasing our export trade, with remaining competitive, with our businesses selling abroad, finding new markets, and keeping our people working at home and around the world.

And it is a fact that the six countries of the Common Market, which faced the problems that we now face, have had in the last 4 years full employment and an economic growth twice ours. Even a country which faced staggering economic problems a decade ago—Italy—has been steadily building its gold balance, cutting down its unemployment, and moving ahead twice what we have over the last 4 years.

So what I am talking about is an opportunity, not a burden. This is a chance to move the United States forward in the 1960's, not only in the economic sphere but also to make a contribution to the cause of freedom.

And I come to Miami today and ask your help, as on other occasions other Presidents of the United States, stretching back to the time of Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt and Truman, have come to the A.F. of L. and the CIO—and each time this organization has said "Yes."

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 8

Press release 865 dated December 9

Secretary Rusk: The last time we met, I discussed with you the ruthless campaign by which the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has been trying to conquer South Viet-Nam.¹ I said then that this campaign posed a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of a free country and its people and was a serious threat to the peace. I want to underline that earlier statement.

We are releasing today a report on what is happening in Viet-Nam. It documents the elaborate program of subversion, terror, and armed infiltration carried out under the direction of the authorities in Hanoi.

It points out—with extensive documentation for the world to see—the methods by which North Viet-Nam has introduced its espionage agents, military personnel, weapons, and supplies into the south in recent years. This report shows that this already considerable effort by North Viet-Nam has been accelerated sharply in recent months. Kidnapings, assassinations of public officials, and other forms of terrorism have increased. The number and size of armed engagements have grown. The pace of infiltration from the north, across the demilitarized zone, through Laos, and by sea, has been stepped up. These documents show clearly that the North Vietnamese Communists have repeatedly violated the Geneva Accords.² I believe that this report makes it clear that South Viet-Nam needs additional help in defending itself.

The Government of South Viet-Nam realizes this and has welcomed support from the non-Communist world. The United States is now taking

¹ For a transcript of the Secretary's news conference of Nov. 17, see BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1961, p. 918.

² For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

Department Releases Report on Threat to Peace in South Viet-Nam

The Department of State announced on December 8 (press release 858 dated December 7) that it had released a two-part report entitled *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam* (Department of State publication 7308). Parts I and II may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 25 cents and 55 cents, respectively.

steps to help South Viet-Nam develop the military, economic, and social strength needed to preserve its national integrity. It is our hope that other nations will join us in providing assistance to South Viet-Nam until such time as the Communists have halted their acts of violence and terror.

U.S. Support for U.N. Program in the Congo

I should like to reiterate United States support for the current program of Secretary-General U Thant to restore freedom of movement for United Nations forces in the Katanga and to implement its mandate there. The United States has in the past and will in the future consistently work for the reintegration of the Province of Katanga by reconciliation.³ The Secretary-General has made clear his readiness to help in the reconciliation. The United States deeply regrets that elements in the Katanga have chosen to resort to violence once more. As you know, the United States is providing upon request unarmed transport aircraft for the needs of the United Nations Congo operation. Transport aircraft already available

³ For statements made by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson in the Security Council Nov. 16, 21, and 24, see p. 1061.

to the United Nations for their international movement of troops and supplies to the Congo are now also being used within the Congo to carry troops and supplies in support of United Nations operations there. Our aim is the consolidation of the country under a stable government which will be able to pursue freely the true national interests of the Congolese.

Premier [Cyrille] Adoula is a man of intelligence, moderation, and nationwide stature and should be able to achieve this task. He has made clear his determination to keep his country free from control from any foreign quarter. To succeed in all of this, he has to overcome secessionists, including the secession of Katanga, and the threat of extremist politicians, and the threat of economic stagnation. If Katanga is not peacefully reintegrated, the Congo will face civil war and anarchy and be open to Communist penetration.

It is our policy to help the Congolese people to resolve these difficulties and to give the United Nations, whose aid they have sought, our best support to achieve its mandate. We regret the loss of life caused by renewed fighting against the U.N., but we believe that the U.N. must not be prevented from fulfilling its mandate. We hope that the leaders of Katanga will recognize that their present path leads nowhere and that the Katanga will soon be reconciled with the rest of the Congolese people.

Some of you may have seen the statement made in a broadcast this morning by Mr. Linner [Sture C. Linner, Officer in Charge of U.N. Operations in the Congo] in the Congo, in which he pointed out that the United Nations operations there are not being conducted to impose a political solution. The primary mission of the U.N. forces is to protect themselves, to maintain their communications, and to provide a situation in which the political processes among Congolese leaders can move on to a responsible and peaceful settlement. We fully subscribe to the U.N. program in that regard.

Meetings at Paris

I shall be leaving this weekend for meetings in Paris. First, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and then for the annual ministerial meeting of the NATO Council, where we shall be joined by not only the foreign ministers but ministers of defense and of finance.

Secretary Rusk To Visit Spain

Press release 857 dated December 7

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Señor Fernando María Castiella y Maiz, has invited Secretary Rusk to visit Madrid and lunch with him on Mr. Rusk's way back to Washington from the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Paris. The Secretary of State has accepted with pleasure Señor Castiella's invitation and will visit Madrid on December 16. He will also pay a courtesy call on General Franco. Mr. Rusk will return directly to Washington the same day.

We shall, of course, in the foreign ministers' meeting, be talking about the German problem. I want to underline the importance of keeping our eyes on the main ball as we think about the German problem. That there are margins of difference among the Western governments as to how, specifically, we might proceed to deal with this question is a matter of general knowledge. But the differences which really count are those which exist between Moscow and the West. That is the heart of the matter. That is the cause of the crisis. That is the problem to be resolved.

The West is united on an understanding and appreciation of the vital interests that are involved, but the problem of peaceful settlement is whether the Soviet Union will recognize and respect these long-established rights and vital interests in that situation.

At the NATO meeting we anticipate that a number of things will be discussed which will maintain the increasing momentum of the Atlantic Community, in its economic development, in its growing military strength, and in the strengthening ties between the Atlantic Community and the rest of the free world. We feel that the NATO and the Atlantic Community are on the move and that the momentum of this movement should be maintained.

Situation in Dominican Republic

I regret that it is not possible to announce today that we have received information that the situation in the Dominican Republic has reached a peaceful settlement. There was some hope yesterday that the leaders of that country might have been able to find a basis for agreement.

I think those of us who are at some distance from that situation might well pause and think compassionately about the problem which those people face. It is not easy to set aside the fears and the suspicions and the hatreds which have developed over a period of decades of violence and overnight to establish a going constitutional government on a broad basis of consent.

I must say I have been impressed with the nerve-racking and sustained effort which has been made in recent weeks by the leadership of the Dominican Republic on all sides to try to find an answer, but after many years it is too much to suppose that this can come easily. But we remain hopeful that those leaders will be able to find a basis on which the Dominican Republic can take up its great national tasks once again and move back into its traditional role in the Organization of American States and move on to achieve the aspirations which we know are there among its people.

Now I am ready for some questions.

Assistance to South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to your opening statement on Viet-Nam, your statement, like the report which is being issued today, gives no guidelines at all as to what help the United States would like to see other nations provide or the mechanism by which they might provide it. Can you be more specific in what you have in mind?

A. Well, I think there are a number of ways in which other nations can help. There is first, of course, the sense of political support for the Government of Viet-Nam as it meets this serious threat from the north. Then there are many tasks which are present in South Viet-Nam on which assistance is needed. They are economic assistance, technical assistance, administrative help, and measures of the sort which we have in mind to improve the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Improvements in their mobility, their communications, and their equipment, and things of that sort.

I would think that the mechanisms are those which are already established in South Viet-Nam, and I know that the South Vietnamese Government has had discussions and is having discussions with others on this particular point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that same connection, how do you regard the statements of Communist China

that they will not remain indifferent to United States assistance to South Viet-Nam? Do you feel that this might lead to an escalation of war preparations?

A. Well, I think, as our report brings out, the Communist powers themselves have not been indifferent to South Viet-Nam for the last several years. One of the problems is that they have not used their influence to insist upon full compliance on the part of the other side with the Geneva Accords. I don't myself believe that those expressions from Peiping can be treated as a shield behind which North Viet-Nam takes over South Viet-Nam.

U.N. Operations in the Congo

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that Great Britain fully understands that our support of the current operation by the U.N. in Katanga does not constitute imposition of a political solution by force of arms?

A. Following consultations in New York with the Secretary-General and following clarification of the situation by U.N. representatives on the ground, I think there is general understanding that it is not the intention of the United Nations to, shall we say, conquer Katanga or to impose a particular political solution. This has been reiterated by the U.N., but it is important that the position of the U.N. in the Katanga, as elsewhere in the Congo, be a secure one if the U.N. is to carry out its very heavy responsibilities in that country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you draw the line between what you call conciliation in Katanga and imposing a political settlement? Doesn't the use of force by the U.N. against the Katangese represent a form of pressure for a particular political settlement?

A. I think that we ought to remind ourselves that this recent outbreak of fighting occurred after several days of harassment by Katangese against U.N. personnel, both civilian and military. Whether or not these particular soldiers or individuals who carried out these harassments were acting under the full authority of the Katangese authorities is something that is not entirely clear in every case. One of the problems in the Congo has been the question of responsibility and discipline on the part of many of those who have taken

action from time to time. But the U.N. position there was becoming weakened, and it was being subjected to harassment. If these actions had continued, there would have been a loss of communications among the U.N. elements in Elisabethville and in the airport, and they would have been subjected to very considerable dangers. I think the elementary first step is to assure the position of the U.N. in that situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken of our supplying of internal transport in the Congo. Do we have any request for or do you envisage any further American contribution to the effort there materially?

A. As you know, the United States, over the last many months, has made very large contributions to the U.N. effort in the Congo financially, materially, and in assistance with such things as transportation. Some of this has been by plane, some by ship. I would think that we would continue to support the very large needs of the United Nations in the Congo, but we have not had the request for anything, shall we say, of a military character beyond this assistance of transportation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier this year there was considerable hope of strengthening what U.S. officials call the executive capacity of the United Nations to act. Even though there is some agreement on objectives in the Congo, there seems to be some disagreement about the extent of the use of force. How are we to develop that executive capacity to act while there are differences between the United States, Britain, and France?

A. I would minimize the differences to which you refer at this point. I do think that the new Secretary-General, Mr. U Thant, has moved with dispatch and with clarity on this present Congo situation in the very earliest weeks of his assumption of office. I would suppose that the executive and administrative functions of the United Nations are in good hands.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the U.N. went into action in Katanga last September, virtually as soon as the first shots were fired there was a call by Britain for a cease-fire. Now they have been fighting for 4 days. Are you considering calling for a cease-fire?

A. I think that would be for the U.N. authorities there to determine. I think we need to try

to re-create, if we can, the situation on the spot. You have a limited number of U.N. forces. Their situation does require local security. That local security was under pressure and harassment. I think that the first requirement for a cease-fire is the assurance and consolidation of the U.N. position there in Elisabethville.

Hope for ICC Action in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to the report on Viet-Nam, there is a statement therein suggesting that the Indian attitude in the [International] Control Commission is responsible for the lack of international inspection and perhaps even action. Does this suggest failure on our part to persuade Mr. Nehru to alter his stand?

A. No, I think this part of the report refers more to the, shall we say, historical situation over a period of a long time. I think the report itself points out that the real problem has been the Polish member of the ICC. I think there are indications now that the ICC will, in fact, take up for investigation many of the complaints which have been put before it.

You will recall that the Government of South Viet-Nam quite recently filed with the ICC a letter which put to the ICC a number of the complaints which were also included in this report here. We hope very much that the ICC will turn its attention promptly to an investigation of these charges.

Problems To Be Discussed at Paris Meetings

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light, sir, of the statements made in the French National Assembly by the French Foreign Minister, can you tell us what you regard as the prospects for full Western agreement on an approach to negotiations on Berlin, and also, if full agreement is not possible, sir, do you regard it as possible that there may be simply direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

A. I wouldn't want to try to anticipate answers to those questions. One of the reasons for going to Paris 2 days early is to sit down with my colleagues, with the principal Western Powers, and talk about just these matters.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions which is to confront you in Paris, if I remember correctly, is the problem of making NATO a fourth nuclear

power. Can you tell us what your thoughts are on this just before you leave?

A. This is a question, of course, which will be discussed. NATO does have nuclear resources in its support as a part of its general strategy. The President, in Ottawa, indicated that we expected at a suitable time to take action with respect to Polaris submarines,⁴ but I would not wish to comment today on details.

Communism in Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Castro recently announced that he is, after all, a member of the Communist Party. Could you give us your reaction to that and possibly any background as to why you think this announcement was timed at this particular time?

A. On your second point, I am not able to explain the timing of the statement. I gather the timing of the statement has created a certain problem within the Communist world, if one can judge from the absence of their distribution of this statement widely, as one might have thought likely. As for the content of his statement and others that have been made in the last 2 or 3 days by other leaders down there, certainly this saves us the considerable task of proving to other people in conclusive terms what we have known for some time, because they now have said it themselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Communist Hungary has hinted that it might discuss the fate of Cardinal Mindszenty with the United States and the general question of improving relations. Secretary-General U Thant was invited to go to Hungary. Could you tell us, sir, what you think about this new development, especially whether there is any direct contact between the United States and Hungary on the fate of the Cardinal?

A. There are facilities for direct contact, of course, between ourselves and Hungary. I would not suppose that this is a question—it is not a question which can be worked out through public exchanges but would have to be taken up in other channels. I frankly do not know what the significance of these statements as yet may be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you spoke about the Congo, you mentioned the reintegration of Ka-

tanga. I was wondering whether you favor a centralized or a federal system for the future of the Congo?

A. I think it would not be right for us to say that we have a plan for the Congo which we would try to press upon them. What we do think is that these constitutional matters ought to be worked out among the Congolese leaders themselves, and, as we have seen in other situations of this sort, there is a considerable range of possibilities open. The combination of an effective central government, on the one side, and a considerable degree of autonomy for local provinces or regions, on the other, is something that has not proved insoluble. But this is something that has to be talked out among the Congolese leaders, and we don't have a blueprint for the Congo up our own sleeves.

Q. Back to South Viet-Nam—conversations have been under way for some time following the Taylor mission between the United States Government and the Diem government. What is the status of those conversations, and have they produced firm agreements yet on major points or things that ought to be done?

A. I think there has been very welcome headway in those talks in terms of what can be done by the Government of South Viet-Nam and by ourselves and others to move more effectively and promptly to the protection of that country against the assaults that are being directed against it. We have been very much encouraged by the exchanges we have had in the last 10 days.

Q. What others, Mr. Secretary? You mentioned the South Vietnamese and the United States. What other countries?

A. I don't think I should name other countries under the circumstances. I think that will eventually become known.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported there was a growing movement among certain delegations at the U.N. for execution of the two-China policy to resolve the matter of Red China's membership. Would you state the Government's present attitude on two Chinas in the U.N.?

A. The attitude of the United States was set forth at the U.N. by Ambassador Stevenson in his principal speech on this subject at the General As-

⁴ BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 839.

sembly. That did not embrace a two-Chinas program. Indeed, the one thing that is quite certain in this situation is that both the Government of the Republic of China and the authorities in Peiping themselves utterly reject any such approach to the question.

OAS Consideration of Extracontinental Intervention

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on the recent vote of the Organization of American States on the Colombian proposal,⁵ and are you satisfied with the action which has been taken?

A. I think that was a very important forward step. If you will analyze both the voting and the speeches which were made at the time the action was taken, you will note that the voting itself was 14 to 2 but that those who abstained did not themselves reject the utility of or the need for a foreign ministers' meeting. Some of them abstained on what might be called juridical grounds and wanted to discuss further the basis and the outcomes of the meetings of the foreign ministers. But we were very much encouraged and impressed by the general recognition that a meeting of the foreign ministers on this matter should be held.

Q. Mr. Secretary, India is involved in two disputes, one with Portugal over Goa and the other with the Communist Chinese over the border. Could you give us what the present thinking of the U.S. is toward the Indian claims in both of these instances and whether or not there is serious danger of conflict in either?

A. We, of course, support the Indian view with respect to their northern borders. Those borders have been well established in law, if not, in every locality, demarcated exactly on the ground. But the McMahon line generally is something that the rest of the world has accepted.

On the other matter we do not have clear and accurate reports as to just what is happening. This is one of those questions which we feel ought not to be resolved by force, and we welcome the indications of both parties that this is not in their minds. But I would not wish at this distance to complicate a delicate situation by commenting on it today.

Q. Mr. Secretary, high and low the State Department has been reorganized. You have gotten

new agencies for disarmament, for foreign aid. Has this produced an interruption in what you would consider the normal conduct of work?

A. No, I would think that the speed and the ability with which Mr. [Fowler] Hamilton and Mr. William Foster have taken on the AID administration and the Disarmament Agency have greatly simplified the work of the Secretary of State.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a couple of days ago a Government official told a congressional committee that the United States has attempted to block the sale of British aircraft to China. Could you give us some idea of the thinking behind that attempt?

A. We were not very happy about that sale of aircraft to Communist China, but this is one of those transactions in the commercial field which governments must decide for themselves. I think I might just let it rest at that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said quite pointedly that North Viet-Nam had violated the Geneva Accord. While we are not a signatory of the accord, we did have an arrangement with the ICC and South Viet-Nam about the number of military personnel we would have in South Viet-Nam. We have also observed the kind of material we sent in there. Do we now feel bound by these prior arrangements?

A. I think that puts the question the wrong way around. There is no question that the North Vietnamese have been systematically violating the 1954 Geneva Accords. Indeed, the title of the report which we are issuing to the public today, *A Threat to the Peace*, is taken from Under Secretary Bedell Smith's statement⁶ at the time of the Geneva Accords as to our attitude toward that situation.

Now, actions are being taken by the other side to breach these accords. It is not a violation of an agreement of this sort to take steps to protect oneself against the other party's breach, even though in the absence of such a breach those steps might not be considered normal.

If the North Vietnamese bring themselves into full compliance with the Geneva Accord, there will be no problem on the part of South Viet-Nam or anyone supporting South Viet-Nam.

⁵ See p. 1069.

⁶ BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether we are discussing with friendly and allied countries the degree of assistance and the kind of assistance they might furnish to South Viet-Nam?

A. South Viet-Nam is being actively discussed with a number of other countries.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Letters of Credence

Costa Rica

The newly appointed Ambassador of Costa Rica, José Rafael Oreamuno Flores, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on December 5. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 846 dated December 5.

President and Mrs. Kennedy To Visit Venezuela and Colombia

White House press release dated December 5

President and Mrs. Kennedy will visit Caracas, Venezuela, and Bogotá, Colombia, on the 16th and 17th of December. The President intends to participate in the dedication of projects being carried out under the Alliance for Progress program in both countries.

The purpose of the visit is to dramatize and spotlight the cooperative effort being made by the United States and the Republics of South America to accelerate the economic and social development of the Western Hemisphere. The Presidential trip will demonstrate the intense concern of the United States for those programs aimed at improving the welfare of the greatest number of people. The projects to be dedicated will include low-cost housing, primary education, and rural community improvement. The trip to Bogotá and Caracas will symbolize the effort which is now going on in most of the American nations.

The President will leave the United States on December 15 and will proceed to Puerto Rico, where he will spend the night at the Governor's mansion, La Fortaleza. He will leave the next morning for Caracas, where he will visit projects, spend the evening, and leave for Bogotá on December 17. He will spend that day in Bogotá,

returning to the United States on December 18.

Although the President's schedule does not permit him to visit other countries at this time, he hopes to visit other parts of Latin America in the future.

U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation Established

The Department of State announced on December 4 (press release 844) that the following will be the U.S. members of the United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation: Detlev W. Bronk, Caryl P. Haskins, Harry C. Kelly (chairman), Edwin H. Land, Robert F. Loeb, Emanuel R. Piore, and William W. Rubey.

In their joint communique of June 22, 1961,¹ President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda agreed that a United States-Japan committee should be formed to seek ways to strengthen scientific cooperation between the two countries.

The committee will be a consultative body. Its functions will be to explore ways to facilitate scientific cooperation between Japan and the United States for peaceful purposes and to report and, as appropriate, make recommendations to the two Governments. Recommendations of the committee would not commit either of the two Governments; approval or support of any recommended action or project would in each case depend upon normal governmental procedures.

The first meeting of the committee will take place December 13-15 at Tokyo.

Department Announces Release of IJC Report on Lake Ontario Water Levels

Press release 855 dated December 7

The Department of State announced on December 7 the public release of the report of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, on the *Water Levels of Lake Ontario*, dated April 5, 1961.² The matter was referred to the Commission for investigation and report by

¹ BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

² A limited number of copies are available on request from the U.S. Section of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, Federal Trade Building, Washington 25, D.C.

the Governments of the United States and Canada on June 25, 1952, pursuant to article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Under this Reference, the United States and Canada asked the Commission to study the various factors affecting the fluctuations of Lake Ontario water levels and to determine whether action could be taken by either or both Governments to bring about a more beneficial range of levels. The investigation was carried out in conjunction with related studies concerning applications for the development of power in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River.

The Commission's investigations were organized to evaluate the effects of various factors on the levels of Lake Ontario, to determine possibilities for regulation of Lake Ontario so as to reduce the range of water levels, to determine desirable changes in existing works or other measures in the public interest, and to evaluate the effects of changes in existing works and other measures on various interests—riparian, navigation, and power.

The Commission previously recommended for Lake Ontario a range of stage of 244.0 feet to 248.0 feet as nearly as may be, which was accepted by the Governments in December 1955. In its Order of Approval, dated July 2, 1956, the Commission set forth that regulation of the outflows of Lake Ontario and of the flows through the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River should be carried out in accordance with certain criteria, including the above range of stage. Another criterion provides that, in the event of water supplies in excess of past supplies, the regulatory works shall be operated to provide relief to riparian owners both upstream and downstream and, in the event of supplies less than those of the past, to provide relief to navigation and power interests.

A plan of regulation was instituted on April 20, 1960, on the basis of recommendations of the Commission, and therefore no further action by the two Governments was recommended in the Commission's report. The Governments of the United States and Canada have expressed their appreciation and thanks to the Commission for the Lake Ontario water-levels report, which represents a great deal of intensive study and which should prove a useful reference work for many years to come for all those concerned with or affected by future developments in Lake Ontario.

U.S. and Ireland Conclude Air Transport Talks

Press release 861 dated December 7, for release December 8

Delegations representing the United States and Irish Governments met at Dublin beginning November 27 to discuss the operations of their respective airlines under the provisions of the Air Transport Agreement¹ between the two countries. The talks were concluded on December 7.

Full and frank discussions were held on several aspects of the agreement. The U.S. delegation left with the Irish delegation certain proposals which would provide U.S. airlines with the opportunity of conducting services to Dublin and beyond, as well as continuing operations at Shannon. These proposals will be submitted to the Irish Government for consideration.

The U.S. delegation is returning to Washington, and, if necessary, the talks will be resumed in the new year.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

War Claims and Enemy Property Legislation. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on H.R. 5028, a bill to amend the Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended, so as to provide for certain payments for the relief and rehabilitation of needy victims of Nazi persecution, and H.R. 7283 and H.R. 7479, bills to amend the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended, to provide compensation for certain World War II losses. August 2-3, 1961. 269 pp.

The University in Latin America: Argentina and the Alliance for Progress. A study-trip report to the House Education and Labor Committee. September 15, 1961. 18 pp. [Committee print]

World Communist Movement: Selective Chronology, 1818-1957. Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Volume 1, 1818-1945. H. Doc. 245. September 15, 1961. 232 pp.

International Air Transportation Problems. Hearing before the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce. September 22, 1961. 60 pp.

Forty-second Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. Message from the President transmitting a report for the year ending December 31, 1960. H. Doc. 205. October 16, 1961. 43 pp.

A New Look at Foreign Economic Policy in Light of the Cold War and the Extension of the Common Market in Europe. Statement prepared by Christian A. Herter and William L. Clayton for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee. October 23, 1961. 10 pp. [Joint Committee print]

¹ 59 Stat. 1402, 61 Stat. 2872, and TIAS 4007.

Security Council Acts To End Secessionist Activities and Reestablish Political Unity in the Congo

Following are statements made by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, during consideration in the Security Council of the situation in the Republic of the Congo and text of a three-power resolution which was adopted by the Council on November 24, together with text of U.S. draft amendments to the three-power resolution.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 16

U.S./U.N. press release 3842

The Council has met once again on the question of the Congo, faced by both new and old difficulties, in conditions that are both ominous and also hopeful.

We are, I am sure, grateful to the Foreign Ministers of Sweden, of the Congo (Léopoldville), and of Belgium for their contributions to our discussions. For my delegation I want to say that we are most happy to see at the table in the seat of Belgium one of the founders of this Organization and one of the great architects of peace and reason in these troubled times, Dr. Henri Spaak.

For its part the United States approaches the critical problem with fresh resolve. We are determined that the pioneer United Nations effort in the Congo should succeed. We are determined that a truly unified Congo shall emerge. We are determined that the Congolese people will some day govern themselves free from outside interference, free to put their house in order and to get on with the task of improving the welfare of their people.

In all of this we are moved and nurtured by the spirit of the late Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld. His task—our task—as we see it, is unfinished. To his successor [U Thant],

whom my delegation is gratified to welcome to the Council for the first time, the United States pledges its full support. We are confident that he will bring to his task the wisdom of the East, the tenacity of purpose and wise counsel and leadership so essential to cope with present difficulties. His is a heavy burden in which all of us should share. This is particularly true of those countries whose manpower has been made available to the United Nations and of those which have provided political, material, and financial support in this great undertaking.

While reports are still not entirely clear, the situation appears even more grave than before. Individuals in the Province of Orientale, apparently under the leadership of Antoine Gizenga, are presently operating in Kivu Province in defiance of the central government. Their failure to cooperate in fact with the central government serves only the cause of greater disunity and instability.

And now comes confirmation of the latest revolting acts—the massacre of 13 Italian airmen serving the United Nations, presumably by soldiers from Stanleyville. We are profoundly shocked by these actions, and our heartfelt sympathy goes to their relatives as well as to the Government of Italy. Their names are added to the long list of those who have lost their lives in the cause of peace in the service of the United Nations.

Therefore we welcome the quick action taken by the Secretary-General yesterday in authorizing United Nations officials on the ground to take every measure possible to restore law and order. We hope this can be done soon since disorder, instability, and drift can only jeopardize the thin fabric of peace which exists in the Congo today.

The United States believes that separatism and defiance—from whatever quarters—must end.

What we are pledged to accomplish on behalf of the central government is to assist in the preservation of the country's integrity as an independent nation with the same frontiers that it possessed at the time the United Nations action began.

The refusal of the authorities of southern Katanga to cease their secessionist activities poses a threat to that unity. If chaos is to be avoided, it is necessary that the Katanga authorities cease their interminable delays and undertake immediately with the central government serious, direct discussions for the prompt reestablishment of political unity in the Congo.

U.S. Position on Congo Unity

The moral pressure of the United Nations and of the governments it represents should, we believe, be brought most emphatically to bear to this end. Let me make clear the attitude of the United States toward this problem.

We support fully, as I have said, the concept of a united Congo. The Congo has a 75-year history as a single unity. As such it acceded to independence under a constitution which, though provisional, was agreed to by all Congolese political leaders. The United Nations itself has endorsed the principle of Congolese unity in a number of resolutions. Not a single country in the world has recognized the claims of Katanga leaders to separate nationhood.

There is, therefore, no legal warrant for the concept of a separate Katanga as preached by Mr. [Moise] Tshombe and his associates or a rebellious Orientale led by Mr. Gizenga.

The present Katanga authorities clearly have no claim to speak for the entire province. The Katanga parliament is a rump organization formed of not more than 25 of the 60 legal members of the original Assembly, and the ethnic groupings which support the present regime constitute, as we understand it, less than half of the province's inhabitants.

The reasons for the attitude of Katanga's leaders are not difficult to find. Prior to independence the province contributed over 50 percent of the country's tax revenues. And all of this has been lost to the central government since July 11, 1960, and much of it is going into maintaining and strengthening the forces of Mr. Tshombe.

As to Orientale, the hopes of the central gov-

ernment and of the United Nations that Gizenga intended to cooperate loyally in the maintenance of a unified Congo were ill-founded. And he and his supporters now seem to be in open rebellion. This is a situation of no less gravity, perhaps in the long run of even greater gravity, than that in Katanga.

It is certainly in the interests of everyone to secure the peaceful and complete integration of all of these areas. There can be no real future for a secessionist Katanga or a secessionist Orientale.

The Congolese, like any people anywhere in the world, will not rest until these provinces once again assume their rightful place in their country. For their leaders to persist in their ambitions can only bring civil war and misery. In such a holocaust they would certainly not be the winners.

Nor, if civil war were to break out, would the Congolese Government be in a much better position. The probable result would be the destruction of an invaluable national asset and great loss of life. If these men persist in this secessionist ambition, they might go down in history as the perpetrators of one of the most tragic follies in the history of Africa. This is precisely what we all want to avoid. At the same time, the opportunities for constructive participation with the central government are challenging and great. Katanga or Orientale has a vital role to play in the Congo, but that role must be a national one.

Suggestions for Achieving Unity

The question, then, is how to achieve this objective. The United States has a number of suggestions.

The present mandate, as it has been implemented in practice by the United Nations authorities, is reasonably adequate. However, it has become increasingly apparent that the intention of the United Nations has been frustrated in a number of important areas.

First, it was the intention of the General Assembly at its Fourth Emergency Special Session to prevent all outside military assistance to the Congo except through the United Nations.¹ The Council subsequently endorsed this position. Resolution A/1474 called upon "all States to refrain from the direct or indirect provision of arms

¹ For background and text of a resolution, see *BULLETIN* of Oct. 10, 1960, p. 583.

or other materials of war" to the Congo. Unfortunately there has been a steady trickle of arms to Katanga. I do not minimize the difficulty of shutting tight the tap. Nevertheless it seems clear to my Government that greater responsibility for neutralizing such weapons should now be vested in the United Nations.

Secondly, the Security Council resolution of February 21, 1961,² was vague on the subject of removal of mercenaries. It simply urged that measures be undertaken. Again, primary reliance was placed by the United Nations on cooperation by member states. But we have reached the point where the mercenaries involved now are irresponsible soldiers of fortune, many of whom could never return to their own countries and who are not subject to any effective national control. We believe, therefore, that the Secretary-General should take vigorous action to end the problem of mercenaries. He should be allowed sufficient flexibility to employ such methods as he deems appropriate. And we hope he will soon have the assistance of Mr. Tshombe himself, who will be convinced by conference and conciliation of the futility of further resistance.

Thirdly, the provisions of the February 21 Security Council resolution on retraining of the Congolese armed forces have remained unimplemented and a dead letter. The United States believes that these armed forces should now be strengthened and retrained by the Congolese Government with United Nations assistance, so that, in time, the Congolese armed forces will, by themselves, be able to implement national policy and objectives. We also believe that nothing would be more likely to bring secessionists to their senses than energetic implementation of this part of the mandate. It seems obvious in this connection that the Congolese armed forces, in the light of the situation in southern Katanga and in Orientale, should possess a small but effective air force, and we believe the United Nations should provide appropriate assistance to that end.

Now let me turn for a moment to the resolution submitted by the representatives of Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic.³ We believe that it has elements which are entirely constructive. However, in our judgment it is not fully

responsive to the present situation. Its focus appears to us to be predominantly on one aspect of the problem to the exclusion of the others. There are also a number of important omissions, particularly in the light of developments over the past 36 hours. Surely the Council will not be acting responsibly if it seeks to focus on one danger while shutting its eyes to another. If Tshombe's unwillingness thus far to meet with the central government authorities has prevented the achievement of political unity, how much more dangerous are the defiant actions and declarations of the authorities in Orientale Province.

I am sure that the sponsors of the resolution before the Council will agree that further consultations are essential if we are to take effective action here on all important aspects of the Congolese question. The United Nations Operation in the Congo has had its sponsors and its detractors. At this critical moment it is important that United Nations members, and in particular those who have supported the United Nations Operation in the Congo—politically, materially, and financially—and those members whose forces today stand firm to prevent greater chaos and anarchy, band together to assure that this Council's action will help rather than hinder in the achievement of United Nations objectives.

In this connection the United States has developed some concrete suggestions which we will put forward at a subsequent meeting of the Council in the form of a draft resolution.

FIRST STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 21

U.S./U.N. press release 3848

The question before us is, of course, of the very gravest importance to the Government and to the people of the Congo and to the United Nations itself. What we do or what we fail to do here today may be decisive in determining the future of the Congo and of the most significant operation in which our Organization has engaged. We feel, therefore, that the language of this new mandate is of the utmost importance and merits the most careful draftsmanship.

Yesterday the delegate of Liberia suggested a revision of paragraph 8 of the three-power text submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic. It appears in document S/4985/Rev. 1,

² For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1961, p. 368.

³ U.N. doc. S/4985.

paragraph 8. Its effect would be to make clear the opposition of the Security Council to secession wherever it may occur in the Congo, as well as specifically to demand that such activity in the Katanga cease forthwith. Speaking for my delegation, we welcome this revision of paragraph 8 as a distinct improvement in the text.

The United States delegation can support almost all of the provisions of the three-power draft now before the Council. We feel, however, that it would be desirable for the draft to be expanded, to be strengthened, and to be clarified in certain respects. Our amendments, circulated last night in document S/4989, are really additions which we hope that the Council members will agree strengthen and broaden the three-power draft. They do not contradict it. They give somewhat broader authority to the Secretary-General, both in the action that he may take and where he may take it.

To better enable members to follow these amendments, we have prepared a composite resolution so that you can quickly identify the new language we are proposing, and I believe copies of this have been circulated—copies of this informal document have been circulated to members of the Council to aid in the consideration of the proposals that I shall advance.

Now let me describe briefly the various amendments that we wish to offer.

First, while we believe that the primary current cause of trouble in the Congo is secession in the Katanga, the Government of the Congo is also plagued with other attacks against its authority. Whatever may be the origin or whatever may be the motives of such attacks, they weaken the effectiveness of the central government and they threaten the United Nations efforts to assist the Congo. We believe the Security Council, therefore, should express itself clearly against all such activities and authorize the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures against them. We have therefore suggested that the fifth preambular paragraph of the three-power draft be expanded slightly to read as follows:

Deploring all armed action and secessionist activities in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, including specifically those carried on with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and *completely rejecting* the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation," . . .

Now, if you would please turn to operative paragraph 2—I am not going to discuss these in the sequence in which they are presented but rather gather those together which relate to the same subject—to make operative paragraph 2 parallel this declaration in the preambular portion of the resolution, in other words, to cover the same problem of armed action against the Government of the Congo, we propose that the operative paragraph 2 be amended to read:

Further deprecates all armed action against United Nations forces and personnel and against the Government of the Republic of the Congo. . . .

I think the reason for that is self-evident.

In this connection we would favor adding to the preamble an expression of regret for the actions of violence against United Nations personnel from such armed action. This seems to be an appropriate addition in view of the loss of life of United Nations forces which they have suffered, including most recently the barbaric slaying of 13 Italian airmen, which Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula so eloquently denounced. We have therefore suggested the addition of a paragraph to the preamble following the "Deploring" paragraph reading as follows:

Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against UN personnel. . . .

Since the formation of the government of the Congo headed by Prime Minister Adoula, any question concerning the exclusive authority to conduct foreign policy in the Congo has vanished. Only one government exists, and the claims of any province to independence are inadmissible. For that reason we favor adding to the three-power draft explicit recognition of the sole authority of the central government, and we propose, therefore, that another preambular paragraph be added reading as follows:

Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo. . . .

Next, we favor giving the Secretary-General broad authority to rid the Congo of foreign mercenaries. However, the use of force by the United Nations is a most serious matter, as we all know. It should only be authorized in as precise terms as the Security Council can possibly state for the protection of the Secretary-General and for universal understanding. For that reason we

would favor a drafting change in operative paragraph 4, deleting the ambiguous phrase "hostile elements" and substituting therefor the exact language of paragraph A-2 of our resolution of last February 21, to which the three-power draft already refers. The phrase "hostile elements" could cause needless alarm and uncertainty as to the intention of the United Nations and creates a very imprecise authority for United Nations action. We understand the intention of the sponsors is to give the Secretary-General authority that he needs for defense of United Nations forces against whoever may forcibly oppose their actions. We believe this authority becomes more precise if the paragraph adopts the language of the February resolution on the subject of mercenaries. So the suggestion is that it read as follows:

Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the UN command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. . . .

Our next proposal relates to secession. We believe that secession in the Katanga, as well as the use of armed force against the authority of the Government elsewhere, is often the result of outside influence, including the use of arms imported from abroad. We feel that the three-power resolution was defective in that it did not give the Secretary-General the broadest possible mandate to neutralize the effect of such arms everywhere in the Congo, especially aircraft and heavy weapons. In this connection, we approve the decision—the very historic decision, I suspect—to resist aircraft of the so-called Katanga Air Force if again used for military purposes. In order to give the Secretary-General explicit authority to deal with the problem, we favor the addition of the following paragraph to the three-power draft:

(6) *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo to neutralize, where necessary to prevent their use for military purposes against the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo, or the civilian population, aircraft and other weapons of war which have entered the Congo contrary to its laws and UN resolutions. . . .

One of the great needs in the Congo today is, we feel, for a rebuilding of the Congolese armed

forces. This is a need we have recognized in past resolutions. Recent examples in which discipline disappeared in certain Congolese army units demonstrate that this problem, which we discussed at length last February, is still with us. We therefore propose the addition of a paragraph which would give new emphasis to United Nations efforts for assisting the Congolese Government in rebuilding its armed forces, which would read as follows:

(11) *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the Government of the Republic of the Congo to reorganize and retrain Congolese armed units and personnel and to assist the Government to develop its armed forces for the tasks which confront it. . . .

Finally, one of the most discouraging problems which faces us in the Congo is the continuing disunity of the country. We believe the Secretary-General should once again be empowered to take steps to promote the unity of the Congo, including, of course, in the first instance, peaceful measures of conciliation and negotiation. We therefore propose the addition of the following:

(13) *Further authorizes* the Secretary-General to take all such steps in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo.

Several delegates have suggested in this amendment that the word "authorizes" should be changed to "requests," and we are completely in accord with the suggestion. I should like, therefore, to offer it as a slight verbal alteration to our amendment No. 7, that is, that the second word read "requests" rather than "authorizes."

Mr. President [Valerian A. Zorin, U.S.S.R.], we believe that the sentiments which I have attempted to express and the amendments I have presented are in accordance with the views of almost, if not all, members of this Council. We believe that they reflect the needs of the United Nations and the experience of the United Nations in the Congo. We believe our amendments are entirely consistent with what we understand to be the intent of the three-power resolution. We consider them vital aspects of our current effort to assist effectively the Government of the Congo and the new Secretary-General in their respective tasks. We hope, therefore, that they will have the full approval of the Council.

SECOND STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 21

U.S./U.N. press release 3S49

The distinguished representative of Ceylon was good enough to refer to me in his remarks as the "Representative of the United Nations." Well, as long as we are congratulating each other today, I must say I am deeply grateful for this promotion. I have always felt that I should speak for all of the United Nations, but I have concluded that there might be some objection.

Now I am going to forgo any argument with the representative of the Soviet Union [Mr. Zorin] regarding his charge that these amendments were designed to distract attention from the principal problem, in order not to protract this meeting. The object of these amendments is transparently clear. It is not to distract attention. It is rather to concentrate attention on all of the problems so that the Secretary-General's mandate is clear and comprehensive and we would not have to have another Security Council meeting to remedy the situation.

The objections advanced by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union seem to relate to one paragraph, that is, No. 5 of our amendments. He suggests that the word "neutralize" be replaced by the word "remove." Now the purpose of this paragraph was to remedy a defect or an oversight in the three-power draft, which only prevents entry of arms into the Katanga. It does not authorize the Secretary-General to eliminate their use. This paragraph was intended to prevent the use of arms.

Speaking for the United States delegation, we would accept "remove" as proposed by the Soviet Union, albeit reluctantly, because it is a more limiting word in our language than "neutralize." It is obviously harder to go into enemy country and remove an airplane, for example, than it is to shoot it down. But we will accept that change as requested, providing we can also alter the subsequent language slightly so that it would read: ". . . to remove or to prevent the use for military purposes against the United Nations," and so forth, thus giving the Secretary-General complete latitude to remove or prevent by other means. I do not believe the representative of the Soviet Union would take exception to that alteration.

Finally, in the last line of that paragraph, he suggested that the language be limited to weapons

of war which have entered Katanga. I would gladly accept that, too, and say ". . . weapons of war which have entered Katanga or any other region of the Congo contrary to the laws of the Congo and U.N. resolutions." Surely it was not the intention of the representative of the Soviet Union to limit the defense capability of the Secretary-General to only one area.

Mr. President, if anyone thinks that it would strengthen the resolution as a whole, we would gladly add to the language of amendment No. 1 some more language in the third sentence reading as follows: ". . . specifically those carried on by the Provisional Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries," and so on.

With those additions, sir, I would hope very much that the Council might conclude to act on these amendments as a whole⁴ so that we could proceed to the adoption of a resolution at this morning's session.

THIRD STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 21

U.S./U.N. press release 3S50

Mr. President, I take the liberty of speaking only on the assumption that there is no one else who wants to speak, in view of your inquiry a moment ago.

I must say, sir, that in view of the Soviet threat of a veto at the last minute this morning and the strong statements of the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Congo which we have heard this afternoon, I am wondering if we should not adjourn before voting in order to see if something can be worked out which would be acceptable to all and constitute a positive service to the Congo, to the Secretary-General, and to the United Nations.

After 10 days of meetings here, paralysis and no action whatever would be a positive disservice to the Congo. In spite of the present discouraging impasse, I do not personally despair of doing something to save the situation and to advance the interests of the international community in peace and order and progress in the Congo.

[In a further intervention, Ambassador Stevenson said:]

⁴ U.N. doc. S/4989/Rev. 1.

I had hoped to avoid a further intervention, Mr. President, but in view of your last statement I am obliged to say some further words.

Everyone in this room who has expressed himself has approved this resolution, as amended, except the Soviet Union, and that includes the Congo itself. And yet you say that it is not you but we who are obstructing the Council's action. What you are saying is that we are all obliged to accept your version of what should be done, including the Congo, or you won't play. I regret this very much because I do not admire dictatorship in any form.

But I regret it more because of its effect on the Congo, to which the United States has contributed a great deal of money and a great deal of help through the United Nations and will contribute more, even as others who are here have contributed both blood and treasure. I noticed your boast that the Soviet Union had contributed nothing.

It is not helpful to use this occasion as just another exercise in rhetorical anticolonialism. This is an emergency, a crisis in the affairs of the Congo that demands prompt attention. A resolution, as amended, that all have approved who have spoken lies before you. Accept it, I beg you, and let Mr. Bomboko [Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko] go back to the Congo and that unhappy country start a new chapter with a new mandate for our new Secretary-General. If you cannot, I must then press my motion for adjournment under Rule 33 without further debate.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 24

U.S./U.N. press release 3859

Before proceeding to a vote I should like the privilege of saying a word in explanation of the position of my Government.

We will vote for the three-power resolution as amended with great reluctance so that the Foreign Minister of the Congo, Mr. Bomboko, will not return to his tormented country emptyhanded after all of these days of talk.

We appreciate the efforts of so many delegations and virtually all of the members of this Council to get unanimity on a satisfactory, comprehensive mandate for the Secretary-General.

We deeply regret the Soviet vetoes and are disturbed by what they imply for the future of the

Congo. In spite of these vetoes of paragraphs desired by the representative of the Congo and clearly defining the authority of the Secretary-General, we will vote for this resolution because we believe that the Council should take a firm stand against the activities in the Katanga and specifically in support of the central government. We do so in light of our view of previous resolutions and executive actions by the Secretariat, which have convinced us that this new resolution can in no way be a diminution but only an addition to authority previously granted. We have full confidence that the Secretary-General will continue to carry out all of these resolutions to the full effect.

We reserve the right to introduce these amendments again in the General Assembly.

U.S. DRAFT AMENDMENTS ⁵

1. Revise the paragraph of the preamble which begins "Deploring, etc." to read:

"Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and armed action now being carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and *completely rejecting* the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation,"

2. Add thereafter two new preambular paragraphs:

"Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against UN personnel," and

"Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,"

3. Revise operative paragraph No. 2 to read:

"Further deprecates all armed action against United Nations forces and personnel and against the Government of the Republic of the Congo,"

4. Revise operative paragraph No. 4 to read:

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the UN command, and mer-

⁵ U.N. doc. S/4989/Rev. 2. Amendment No. 7 was withdrawn by the U.S. representative on Nov. 24, and on that date the Council voted on the remaining amendments with the following results: Nos. 1, 2, and 4 were adopted; No. 5 was not adopted, having failed to receive the required majority; and Nos. 3 and 6 were not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member, the vote in each case being 9-1 (U.S.S.R.), with 1 abstention (France).

cenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961,"

5. Add a new paragraph (6) as follows, renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

"(6) *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo to remove or to prevent the use for military purposes against the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo, or the civilian population, of aircraft and other weapons of war which have entered Katanga or any other region of the Congo contrary to the laws of the Congo and UN resolutions;"

6. Add a new paragraph (11) (after original No. (9)) as follows:

"(11) *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the Government of the Republic of the Congo to reorganize and retrain Congolese armed units and personnel and to assist the Government to develop its armed forces for the tasks which confront it;"

7. Add a new penultimate paragraph, No. (13), as follows:

"(13) *Further requests* the Secretary-General to take all such steps in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo."

THREE-POWER RESOLUTION ⁶

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions S/4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S/4741,⁷

Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 1592 (XV), 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV),⁸

Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely:

(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;

(b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;

(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo;

(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and

(e) To render technical assistance,

Welcoming the restoration of the national Parliament of the Congo in accordance with the *Loi fondamentale* and

⁶ U.N. doc. S/5002 (S/4985/Rev. 1, as amended); adopted by the Council on Nov. 24 by a vote of 9-0, with 2 abstentions (France, U.K.).

⁷ For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 161; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 223; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 385; and Mar. 13, 1961, p. 368.

⁸ For texts, see *ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 588; Jan. 9, 1961, p. 62; and May 22, 1961, p. 784.

the consequent formation of a Central Government on 2 August 1961,

Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and armed action now being carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and *completely rejecting* the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation",

Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel,

Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,

Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the interests of world peace and international co-operation, and stability and progress of Africa as a whole,

1. *Strongly deprecates* the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries;

2. *Further deprecates* the armed action against United Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities;

3. *Insists* that such activities shall cease forthwith, and *calls* upon all concerned to desist therefrom;

4. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961;

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities;

6. *Requests* all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations;

7. *Calls upon* all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly, to activities against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities against the United Nations forces and personnel;

8. *Declares* that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the *Loi fondamentale* and Security Council decisions and specifically *demands* that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;

9. *Declares* full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist

that Government in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national integrity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions;

10. *Urges* all Member States to lend their support, according to their national procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations;

11. *Requests* all Member States to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter.

OAS Foreign Ministers To Consider Extracontinental Intervention

The Council of the Organization of American States met at Washington December 4 to consider a proposal of the Government of Colombia that a meeting of foreign ministers be convoked January 10 to consider threats to peace and the political independence of the American states that may emerge from an intervention of extracontinental powers designed to break American solidarity. Following is a statement made before the Council by Ambassador deLesseps S. Morrison, U.S. Representative.

Press release 840 dated December 4; as-delivered text

This is a critical moment for the inter-American system. At our meeting on November 14 we agreed to set this date on which to act on the proposal of the Government of Colombia. In the intervening 3 weeks we have all had an ample opportunity to consult our governments and to exchange views on how best to proceed in accomplishing the objectives of the Colombian initiative. From these conversations it is clear that a considerable majority of the American governments recognizes the pressing need for a meeting of foreign ministers to consider the dangerous situation created by the intervention of international communism in this hemisphere facilitated by the Castro regime's now publicly proclaimed alinement with the Sino-Soviet bloc. While most of the governments comprising this considerable majority, including my own, favor moving ahead with the Colombian proposal as presented, a few continue to be concerned over the juridical basis for such a Meeting of Consultation.

My Government from the outset has maintained that the threat which confronts all the American Republics today is clearly a matter which appropriately should be dealt with under the Rio Treaty.¹ The threat is not abstract but actual. It is not in the future but real and present. The principal elements of the threat are Cuba's proclaimed alinement with the extracontinental system of international communism and its declared purpose and known efforts to extend that system to other countries of the hemisphere through agitation, subversion, and civil strife. There is not a country here represented that to one degree or another has not felt the impact of the Castro regime's interventionist activities.

This situation is without doubt an "urgent matter of common concern" as stated in article 39 of the charter. But it is much more than that. It is clearly a situation which not only *might* but actually *does* endanger the peace of America as contemplated in article 6 of the Rio Treaty. And for those who in these circumstances place such importance on the grammatical construction of article 6, I would add that this situation, involving as it does flagrant subversion, endangers and thus affects the political independence of the American states.

The United States delegation report on the Quitandinha conference, which was referred to in the meeting on November 14, in our opinion makes abundantly clear the very broad scope of article 6 when it states:

. . . the procedures and obligations in article 6 are declared to be operative whenever:

- a. The inviolability or integrity of the territory;
- b. the sovereignty; or [and I stress the word "or"]
- c. the political independence of any American State is affected by:

1. An act of aggression other than an armed attack;
2. An extracontinental or intracontinental conflict; or [and I again stress the "or"]
3. Any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America.

"The reference to 'any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America,'" continues the report, "was considered by the framers to be sufficiently broad to include most if not all of the occasions specified in the various proposals [made during the Conference] as calling for consultation." Among these proposals was one ad-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

vanced by Uruguay covering the "violation of the essential rights of man or the departure from the democratic system" as requiring "the joint and voluntary action of the countries of the continent."

My delegation is thoroughly convinced that the history of the formulation, as well as the precise language, of article 6 fully supports the juridical soundness of the Colombian initiative in calling for the meeting of foreign ministers to be held under the Rio Treaty. Furthermore, the nature of the danger which faces us is such that the need for collective action under the Rio Treaty confronts the Organization of American States with its foremost immediate challenge. My Government enthusiastically supports the resolution proposed by the Government of Colombia.

Now I should like to say a few words about the basic issue before the Council. This issue, which has come into much sharper focus during the past 3 weeks, is the intervention of an extracontinental, totalitarian system in this hemisphere, using Castro's Cuba as a base. Dr. Castro, with his well-timed speech of December 1, has now, finally, removed any doubts about this. The issue was already, of course, quite clear, but it is always helpful to have it defined by the protagonist himself. Incidentally, such an abrupt revelation by the maximum leader of the revolution of a conviction long held may catch some members of his supporting cast unawares, but they will quickly recognize that sudden about-faces are inherent in the Communist system. We have all watched with amusement in recent weeks, for example, Communist parties throughout the world trying to rationalize the de-Stalinization program of Khrushchev.

Castro's speech of December 1 is a remarkably candid confession of intrigue and deception by a man who for close to 10 years studiously hid his real political orientation. Now he tells us that he was basically influenced by Marxist-Leninist theory when he was in the university, that his revolutionary thinking was well formed by the time of his "History Will Absolve Me" speech in 1953, and that some of the ideas in that statement were deliberately disguised so as not to affect adversely his movement. Now he boasts of taking the help of other revolutionary groups during the struggle against Batista, while opposing efforts at

unity until he could gain the upper hand. He makes clear that the same cynical considerations underlay the establishment of a moderate government during his first months in power while he went about consolidating his apparatus. With startling frankness, he states that, if his radical views had been known, those opposed to him today would have been fighting him from the very start. This is the record of a man who deceived the Cuban people who had placed their trust in him and betrayed a revolution that was welcomed and admired the world over. This is something for those to ponder who are still tempted to believe that temporizing with Communist tactics is likely to be successful or that freedom and independence are not constantly endangered by the Communist movement.

Castro also made clear that he has chosen the path of communism, via socialism, traced by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. He said:

In effect, we had to apply scientific socialism. That is why I began to tell you with all candor that we believe in Marxism, that we believe that it is the most correct, most scientific, the only true theory, the only true revolutionary theory. Yes, I state it here, with complete satisfaction and with full confidence. I am a Marxist-Leninist and I will continue to be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life.

One is reminded of his promises made some time ago to return Cuba to the path of individual liberty and representative democracy, when at his Moncada trial in 1953 he proclaimed:

The first revolutionary law will return to the people their sovereignty and proclaim the Constitution of 1940 as the true supreme law of the State until such times as the people decide to modify or change it.

In the early days of his regime, Dr. Castro told the Cuban people that his revolution was *tan cubana como las palmas*. He used to say: *La revolución cubana no es roja sino verde olivo*. He described *fidelismo* as neither capitalism nor communism but *humanismo*. He liked to say that capitalism was *libertad sin pan* and communism was *pan sin libertad*. *Humanismo*, he said, meant *pan con libertad*. And now he further mocks the Cuban people by telling them that if they are frightened over the prospects of being led down the road to communism, they really should not be worried, as it will take 30 years of socialism to get there.

Despite all the disclaimers, Dr. Castro likewise clarifies again his design for Latin America by proclaiming that guerrilla warfare will work in other nations of this hemisphere if they will but try it. Castro's "guerrilla warfare" is synonymous with Khrushchev's "wars of national liberation" through which international communism proposes to undermine and destroy established governments and extend its influence throughout the world.

Dr. Castro has now lifted his personal mask, revealing the treachery of his rise to power. He has at last personally and publicly alined himself, as well as his regime, with the Sino-Soviet bloc, prescribing his formula for extending Castro-communism throughout the hemisphere. In doing this, he again has emphasized a fundamental truth regarding communism; namely, that wherever it has seized power and whenever it retains control, it has done so on the basis of deceit and oppression, destroying individual freedom and flouting the will of the majority of the people.

It is well that we contemplate carefully this record. Castro's Marxist-Leninist regime advocates economic and social change in our hemisphere through violence and oppression. Our governments, through the Bogotá and Punta del Este charters,² have chosen to work toward the same objectives of economic and social change within the framework of liberty, national independence, and respect for individual rights. Are we now to defend the course which we have chosen against those who impede our forward march through agitation and subversion? My delegation firmly believes that the independent governments of the Organization of American States have a grave responsibility to act collectively to protect the sovereignty and political independence of the peoples of this hemisphere from any extension of the treachery of *fidélismo* and to let the Cuban people know that they are not alone and that they are not abandoned in their struggle to regain their God-given freedom.³

² For texts, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537, and Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

³ On Dec. 4 the Council approved the Colombian resolution by a vote of 14 to 2 (Cuba and Mexico), with 5 abstentions (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador).

United States Delegations to International Conferences

NATO Ministerial Meeting

The Department of State announced on December 5 (press release 848) the members of the U.S. delegation to the 28th Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Paris December 13-15. The U.S. representatives will be Secretary of State Dean Rusk (chairman of the delegation), Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.¹

TREATY INFORMATION

Educational Exchange Agreement Concluded With Ethiopia

Press release 854 dated December 6

The United States and Ethiopia concluded an agreement on December 6 for the establishment of a program of educational exchange between the two countries. The agreement was signed by the Minister of State for Education, Otto Gabre Meskal Kifle-Egzy, for Ethiopia and by American Ambassador Arthur L. Richards. The only other country in Africa to have an active educational exchange agreement with the United States is the United Arab Republic. The United States now has active educational exchange agreements with 41 countries throughout the world.

The agreement with Ethiopia authorizes the two-way exchange of students, trainees, teachers, research scholars, and professors in all fields. It also authorizes the establishment of a binational commission to plan and administer the program in Ethiopia. The equivalent of \$250,000 in Ethiopian currency is made available for the initial 3 years of the program.

The agreement with Ethiopia was the first to be concluded under the Fulbright-Hays Act (P.L. 256, 87th Congress), signed by the President on

¹ For the names of the other members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 848 dated Dec. 5.

September 21.¹ The new act broadens the scope of previous legislation and provides more liberal terms for the participating country.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Sierra Leone, November 22, 1961.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and supplementary protocols no. 1 and 2. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, November 13, 1961.

Finance

Amendment of article III of the articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation of May 25, 1955 (TIAS 3620). Adopted September 1, 1961. Entered into force September 21, 1961.

Fisheries

International convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Dated at Washington February 8, 1949. Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.

Adherence deposited: Poland, November 21, 1961.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961.

Ratifications deposited: China, October 19, 1961; Korea and Paraguay, October 26, 1961.

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: British East Africa, October 19, 1961.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1959, with annex. Opened for signature at Washington April 6 through 24, 1959. Entered into force July 16, 1959, for part I and parts III to VIII, and August 1, 1959, for part II. TIAS 4302.

Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, November 30, 1961.

BILATERAL

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, with exchange of letters. Signed at Léopoldville November 18, 1961. Entered into force November 18, 1961.

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement of October 8, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3660 and 4599), relating to the sale to the Federal Republic of Germany of certain military equipment, materials, and services. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn November 24, 1961. Entered into force November 24, 1961.

Morocco

Agreement for the exchange of international money orders between the postal administrations of the United States and Morocco. Signed at Rabat October 31, 1961, and at Washington November 30, 1961. Enters into force on a date to be agreed upon by the parties.

Portugal

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Lisbon November 28, 1961. Entered into force November 28, 1961.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of May 10 and 13, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3843 and 4156), relating to the disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States under the mutual defense assistance program and found surplus to the needs of the armed forces of the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at London November 7 and 10, 1961. Entered into force November 10, 1961.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate General at Dar-es-Salaam Elevated to Embassy

The Department of State announced on December 9 (press release 866) that the U.S. consulate general at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika, was elevated to an embassy on that day. Tanganyika achieved independence on December 9 after administration by the British under United Nations trusteeship.

William R. Duggan, the U.S. consul general at Dar-es-Salaam and principal officer there since September 1958, has been named *Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*.

Recess Appointments

The President on October 25 appointed Frank M. Coffin to be Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 760 dated November 2.)

The President on November 26 made the following recess appointments:

George W. Ball to be Under Secretary of State.

Frederick G. Dutton to be Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 849 dated December 5.)

¹ For remarks by the President, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 603.

W. Averell Harriman to be Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 841 dated December 4.)

Edmond Hutchinson to be Regional Administrator for Africa, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated November 26.)

George C. McGhee to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Walt W. Rostow to be Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 852 dated December 6.)

The President on November 30 appointed William A. Crawford to be Minister to Rumania. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated November 30.)

Appointments

Richard N. Goodwin as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective November 30.

Designations

Alfred V. Boerner to be Director of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective December 1. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 830 dated December 1.)

PUBLICATIONS

100th Anniversary of Publication of Foreign Relations Volumes

Department Announcement

Press release 851 dated December 6

One hundred years ago this month, President Abraham Lincoln delivered his first annual message to Congress. For the first time in history the papers on foreign affairs that accompanied the message were bound in permanent form and issued by the Government Printing Office under the title *Diplomatic Correspondence*. Thus began the series of annual volumes, now known as *Foreign Relations of the United States*, that have been compiled in the Department and published for the information of all who have been interested in the

development of the international position and policy of the United States during this eventful century. The Department is gratified to note that the American Historical Association, which is holding its annual convention in Washington, December 28-30, has scheduled a discussion of the *Foreign Relations* series in commemoration of its 100th anniversary.

The series now numbers 210 volumes, the most extensive regular publication of its type in the world. Among the most recent volumes to appear in this series are those dealing with the momentous World War II conferences at Cairo, Tehran, and Potsdam. The very titles of these volumes vividly reflect the shift in U.S. foreign policy from 19th-century aloofness and isolation to 20th-century participation and leadership in the affairs of the world.

In this year of the Civil War Centennial it is of interest to note that the first document in the first volume of *Foreign Relations* was a circular instruction of February 28, 1861, from the Secretary of State to the American ministers in the capitals of Europe, urging them to see to it that the sovereigns to whom they were accredited understood that their long-term interests would not be served by recognizing the Southern Confederacy.

Mr. Lincoln's message to Congress, printed in the first volume of *Foreign Relations*, concluded with these ringing words:

"The struggle of to-day is not altogether for to-day—it is for a vast future also. With a reliance on Providence, all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us."

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The Foreign Service of the United States—Origins, Development, and Functions. Pub. 7050. Department and Foreign Service Series 96. xiii, 430 pp. \$3.50.

A comprehensive basic reference work on the growth of the Foreign Service from Revolutionary times to the present day. This volume, prepared in the Historical Office of the Department of State, includes appendixes, a bibliography, and an index.

Documents on Disarmament, 1960. Pub. 7172. xii, 419 pp. \$1.25.

A sequel to *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, this volume contains an additional collection of papers, arranged in chronological order, on disarmament negotiations and related questions.

25th Semiannual Report to Congress, Educational and Cultural Exchange Program, January 1-June 30, 1960. Pub. 7191. International Information and Cultural Series 76. 73 pp. Limited distribution.

A report summarizing activities of the educational and cultural exchange programs of the Department of State for the second half of fiscal year 1960.

U.S. Participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency—Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1960. Pub. 7214. International Organization and Conference Series 19. 39 pp. Limited distribution.

This report covers the work of the Board of Governors and the meeting of the fourth regular session of the General Conference on IAEA, and the work of the Secretariat.

Publications of the Department of State, January 1, 1958-December 31, 1960. Pub. 7219. 116 pp. 60¢.

A list of publications of the Department arranged alphabetically by subject for ease of reference.

An Act for International Development, a Program for the Decade of Development—Summary Presentation, (Revised). Pub. 7224. General Foreign Policy Series 174. xxi, 189 pp. 75¢.

A six-part volume describing the new foreign aid program which President Kennedy outlined in his message to the Congress on March 22, 1961.

United Nations—Guardian of Peace. Pub. 7225. International Organization and Conference Series 20. 46 pp. 25¢.

Remarks made by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on a nationwide closed-circuit television program organized by the American Association for the United Nations and originating at New York, N.Y., March 2, 1961.

Chile: Rebuilding for a Better Future. Pub. 7228. Inter-American Series 70. 26 pp. 25¢.

An illustrated background including details of U.S. aid to Chile, information on the country's history, economy, political development, and other aspects of Chilean life, as well as a brief résumé of official U.S.-Chilean relations.

The Berlin Crisis—Report to the Nation by President Kennedy, July 25, 1961. Pub. 7243. European and British Commonwealth Series 63. 21 pp. 15¢.

A White House radio-television report to the American people explaining the legal rights and commitments of the Western Powers and the first steps being taken by the United States in this crisis.

Career Opportunities as a Foreign Service Officer (Revised). Pub. 7245. Department and Foreign Service Series 102. 31 pp. 20¢.

A booklet describing the examination, the work and training of the officer, and the benefits to be derived from a career in the Foreign Service.

The UN . . . Meeting Place of Nations (Revised). Pub. 7247. International Organization and Conference Series 21. 12 pp. 10¢.

Leaflet summarizing the various functions and organizations of the United Nations.

The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Gateway to Peace. Pub. 7254. Disarmament Series 3. 34 pp. 20¢.

Provisions of the proposed new treaty of the Geneva Conference and the many problems preventing its adoption are discussed in this pamphlet.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
*836	12/4	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*837	12/4	Coombs: "Let's Talk Sense About Foreign Students."
†838	12/4	Brown: "People on the Move."
*839	12/4	Johnson: "Asia Today."
840	12/4	Morrison: OAS Council.
*841	12/4	Harriman sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (biographic details).
†842	12/5	Johnson: "The Emerging Nations of Asia."
*843	12/5	Chapman: AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department.
844	12/4	U.S.-Japan committee on scientific cooperation (rewrite).
*845	12/5	Contribution of women's organizations to projects overseas.
846	12/5	Costa Rica credentials (rewrite).
*847	12/5	Meyer sworn in as Ambassador to Lebanon (biographic details).
848	12/5	Delegation to NATO Ministerial Meeting (rewrite).
*849	12/5	Dutton sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (biographic details).
*850	12/6	Ambassador Attwood returns to Guinea.
851	12/6	Centennial of <i>Foreign Relations</i> volumes.
*852	12/6	Rostow sworn in as Counselor of Department and Chairman of Policy Planning Council (biographic details).
*853	12/6	Niger independence ceremonies.
854	12/6	Educational exchange agreement with Ethiopia.
855	12/7	IJC report on water levels of Lake Ontario.
*856	12/7	Washington visit of women delegates to 16th General Assembly.
857	12/7	Rusk visit to Spain.
858	12/7	Publication on Viet-Nam (rewrite).
*859	12/7	Reception for Washington diplomatic corps.
†860	12/7	Tubby: "The Challenge to Government, the Media, and Educational Institutions."
861	12/7	Air talks with Ireland.
†862	12/8	McGhee: "Atlantic Unity—Key to World Community."
*863	12/8	Delegate to university convocation ceremonies in Ethiopia.
†864	12/8	Statement on Dominican sugar.
865	12/9	Rusk: news conference of December 8.
866	12/9	Post raised to embassy at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika (rewrite).
*867	12/9	Washington visit of women delegates to 16th General Assembly.
†868	12/10	Rusk: arrival at Paris.
†869	12/10	Ball: U.N. action in the Congo.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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