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# Disarmament and Arms Control

*Address by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

My purpose tonight is to review with you the principles and objectives which guide United States policy on disarmament and arms control—what we are trying to accomplish at the disarmament conference in Geneva, the obstacles we face, why it is so important to persevere, and the prospects of progress.

At the very outset you have a right to ask whether disarmament is anything more than a will-o'-the-wisp that statesmen have pursued over the decades, even centuries, with lack of success. Are disarmament negotiations anything more than a charade or, as someone has suggested, a ritual dance of the goony birds? In other words, *is* disarmament a serious matter for constructive statecraft?

Certainly few areas of international negotiation have had thus far a more unproductive history. Millions of words have been expended, thousands of pages of verbatim records have been printed in Geneva, New York, and in other centers of international diplomacy, before and since the beginning of the nuclear age. It is sad to reflect that one of the greatest opportunities of all time was frustrated by Soviet rejection of the truly radical moves for peace advanced by the West at the end of World War II. Beginning with the Truman-Attlee-King declaration of November 1945,<sup>2</sup> the West has taken one initiative after another to launch us on the road to disarmament. In the Baruch plan<sup>3</sup> we took a supreme and unparalleled initiative. Rather than make ourselves and the

whole world slaves to the nuclear destruction which a terrible war had forced us to invent, we offered to turn over to the community of nations our monopoly of nuclear power, to make sure that nuclear energy should be used peacefully under international ownership and control. We made that proposal 16 years ago last Thursday. Out of it developed a United Nations plan. Tragically, it was blocked by the Soviet Union. Ever since, the world has been trying—so far vainly—to recapture that turning point of history.

## **Pace of Weapons Development**

The fundamental conviction of the United States is that the awesome nature of modern armaments and of the war which would be fought with these armaments is such that no responsible nation can regard the problem of disarmament and arms control with anything less than the deepest seriousness. We live today with a paradox: Although the nations of the world are pouring more and more resources and skills into improving armaments, they are, on balance, enjoying less and less security. The pace of weapons development since World War II has quickened exponentially. Weapons costs continue their upward spiral. As someone has grimly observed of modern weapons: "If it works, it's obsolete."

Let me illustrate. A key present problem is: How do you defend against missiles with nuclear warheads, traveling at 12,000 miles an hour? Some scientists say this problem is insoluble. Others say not and that the stakes are so large you must not say it is insoluble until you give it a full try; therefore the investment of vast talent and billions of dollars. Suppose you succeed. Then the problem becomes: How do you develop a missile system that will penetrate such a defense? If you suc-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs at Concord, N. H., on June 16 (press release 396 dated June 15).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1945, p. 781.

<sup>3</sup> For a statement by Bernard M. Baruch at the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946, see *ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

ceed in that, how do you develop a defense system that will take care of that much more elaborate missile system? And so both sides go on and on, using huge resources at a level of technical requirement which is already pressing the ceiling of the mind of man. And all the time each side lives under the risk that the other side will make a significant breakthrough, injecting new elements of instability into the world situation.

### **Command and Control Problems**

The command and control problems associated with the weapons in today's arsenals, particularly missiles, are already extraordinarily complex. The possibilities of war by accident, miscalculation, or human failure grow as these weapons increase and proliferate to a widening circle of nations.

This is a situation that modern man must view with becoming gravity. Historically, the purpose of our maintaining a Military Establishment has been to preserve and protect our national security. This will continue to be necessary in the absence of safeguarded disarmament. But it behooves us, at the same time, to draw upon every effort of will and imagination to find an alternative system which will preserve and enhance the national security of the United States, along with that of other nations, and which involves less danger and less instability. This is a major challenge of our time.

This is the standpoint from which the United States approaches disarmament and arms control. We believe that disarmament negotiations should be pursued not as propaganda, nor as a game in which the nations seek to secure some advantage over one another, but as a serious effort stemming from a shared conviction that a continued arms race is not the answer in the search for national and international security in a nuclear age.

### **Soviet Obsession With Secrecy**

The United States entered the Geneva negotiations which began last March with a resolve to explore any pathway which might lead to progress. Upon our initiative eight new members—Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic—were added to these negotiations in the hopes that their influence would help find ways to break the deadlocks which had beset us in the past. The participation of these new members has been useful.

They have let it be known they are more impressed by serious negotiation than by cold-war sallies. And yet, despite their presence, we have found ourselves facing once more the same impasse which we have confronted before: the question of inspection.

More than any other single factor, the attitude of the Soviet Union on the problem of inspection and control has been responsible for the failure to report any significant progress in the quest for disarmament. The Soviet Union has charged that inspection is tantamount to "espionage."

In the negotiations on banning atomic tests the British and we went to great lengths to meet the Soviet obsession with secrecy. Under the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty,<sup>4</sup> control posts would be immobile units with fixed boundaries. No site would be chosen for a control post in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent of the Soviet Government. Within the post, one-third of the technical staff and all of the auxiliary staff would have been Soviet nationals, nominated by the Soviet Government. In these circumstances nothing taking place at the post could remain unknown to the Soviet Government.

The procedures for conducting on-site inspection were equally circumscribed with protection against misuse for espionage. The area to be inspected would be predetermined on the basis of objective seismographic recordings. There would have been no random selection of the geographic site. To get to the site the teams would have to use transport provided by the Soviet Government. In addition the Soviets would be able to assign as many observers as they wished to check on the activities of the inspection team. Finally, it is noteworthy that, under the U.S.-U.K. proposals, less than one part in 2,000 of Soviet territory would be subject to human inspection in any one year.

And yet the Soviet Union persists in calling all of this "espionage."

But this is not the only Soviet position which has blocked progress in this vital question. In the general disarmament negotiations the Soviets have taken the untenable position that inspection in the disarmament process can be applied only to the arms actually destroyed and not to provide assurance that agreed levels are not exceeded.

The United States cannot accept a disarmament agreement which, in the words of Aristide Briand,

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

could leave us dupes or victims. We ask nothing of the Soviet Union which we ourselves are not willing to accord the Soviet Union. But if we were willing to rely on good faith alone, disarmament would not be necessary. Until there is a change of Soviet attitude on this question, the prospects for disarmament are not bright. Unilateral disarmament is a completely unacceptable alternative, since this is a guarantee of surrender.

### **U.S. Proposes Progressive Zonal Inspection**

In the negotiations in Geneva the United States has made a major new proposal<sup>5</sup> for solving the impasse created by Soviet opposition to inspection and control.

Our proposal for progressive zonal inspection should meet every legitimate objection that the Soviet Union could have to inspection. This proposal relates the amount of inspection to the amount of disarmament which takes place, while still providing an acceptable measure of assurance that agreements reached are being lived up to.

Let me describe quite briefly and in broad outline how this proposal would work. According to our inspection proposals, a country—either the United States or the U.S.S.R.—would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones of more or less equal military significance. At specified time periods during the disarmament process, say at the end of each successive step, an agreed number of zones would be selected for inspection by the other side. At the beginning, therefore, there would not be extensive intrusion by the inspectors into the territory of any state. The percentage of a state's territory subject to inspection would, of course, increase with each step, and we would envisage that the amount would, roughly, parallel the amount of disarmament. In a sense this would be a form of sampling, which, when combined with inspection of declared production facilities and of the armaments destroyed in each step, would give satisfactory assurance of compliance.

This imaginative new concept should have opened new pathways to success in the disarmament negotiations. We still hope that this ap-

proach will be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Only one breakthrough is required: The Soviet Union must realize that it cannot eat the cake of disarmament and keep the cake of secrecy. The choice is clear. It is our hope that the Soviets will come to realize that secrecy is a dangerous anachronism in a nuclear age.

The United States and its free-world partners do, I believe, have a common interest with the Soviet Union, in that both sides desire to preserve their mutual security against the dangers of the arms race. I hope this common interest will become increasingly apparent in the period ahead.

### **Dangers Common to East and West**

There are four specific dangers which the East and West now share which could be the basis for early action in the disarmament field, while we continue the more complex negotiations relating to general disarmament.

First, there is the danger which arises from the proliferation of nuclear weapons under the control of an increasing number of individual nations. As more and more nations come to possess their own nuclear stockpiles, the danger of a nuclear conflagration also increases.

Secondly, there is the danger of outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications. This danger grows as modern weapons become more complex, command and control difficulties increase, and the premium is on ever-faster reaction.

Thirdly, there is an increasing danger that outer space will become man's newest battlefield. Steps must be taken at this early stage to keep outer space from being seeded with vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, further reducing the security of all of the inhabitants of our planet. This is preventive disarmament, for such nuclear weapons are not now deployed in space.

Fourthly, there is the danger that mounting proportions of our national resources, skill, and treasure will have to be diverted to the business of developing newer and newer armaments. Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. has so many schools, hospitals, and highways—or so many scientists, engineers, scholars, and artists—that we could not put to better use the funds and energies and talents which go to make our warships and tanks and missiles.

<sup>5</sup> For text of an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," which was submitted to the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva by the U.S. delegation on Apr. 18, 1962, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

These are four areas of potential common interest that are tangible and real. Disarmament negotiations should build upon these areas of interest and achieve concrete agreements which can lessen the dangers that they pose.

#### **U.S. Continues Quest for Agreement**

The United States has offered specific proposals for such concrete action. We will continue to negotiate and to seek effective ways, consistent with our security and that of the nations which associate with us in mutual defense, to turn downward the competition in armaments.

On April 18 of this year in Geneva the United States presented a major new proposal—an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. This plan is a detailed and specific blueprint for disarmament and security.

This program has been presented for negotiation—not as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. We believe it is a good basis for negotiation. I have already spoken of the new inspection feature of this program.

This plan, if put into effect, would contain and reduce the nuclear threat.

It would reverse the upward spiral of destructive capability which, if unchecked, could by 1966 be double what it is today.

It would quickly reverse the trend toward diffusion of nuclear weapons capability to additional nations.

It would put into effect measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack.

It would insure that general and complete disarmament is matched by the strengthening of the world's institutions for keeping the peace, else there could be no safety in general disarmament.

At Geneva we seek the widest possible area of agreement on a general disarmament program. Our goal, of course, is agreement upon the entire process, but we recognize that this will take time. We would hope, therefore, that, in addition to early action in the fields of the four danger areas I mentioned earlier, we and the Soviet Union could agree upon balanced measures that could start the disarmament process while we continue negotiations on some of the more difficult problems that arise in connection with the later phases of a general disarmament program.

We continue to hope for a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests. President Kennedy has said that he has had no greater disappointment since he assumed office than the failure to achieve a test ban agreement. Such an agreement inevitably would improve the prospects for success in broader disarmament efforts. It would also end one significant element in the arms race and help to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons among more and more nations.

The Soviet resumption of nuclear weapons tests last fall left the United States with no option but to resume testing.<sup>6</sup> The decision was undertaken only after the most soul-searching examination, for the President views with great concern the further acceleration of the competition in developing newer and more destructive weapons. However, in the absence of a safeguarded agreement, we could not hold back further in the face of unacceptable military risks for the United States and the entire free world.

#### **Need To Negotiate in Good Faith**

The United States will not abandon its quest for a safeguarded agreement which will put an end to nuclear weapons testing for all time. Under the pressure of world opinion and with an awakening to the need for responsible statesmanship, we hope the Soviet Union will turn from its present negative posture and agree to resume negotiations for an effective test ban agreement.

We are preparing to go up and down the range of negotiation, seeking agreement wherever possible. And we are determined to make only those proposals which we ourselves are prepared to live with. It is important that these negotiations be conducted in good faith and not as propaganda moves.

Let me say in passing that many other countries could well think about this. Everybody is happy to vote for disarmament resolutions in the United Nations—for those which seem particularly applicable to the great powers. But not all the nations which vote for them show the same interest in curbing their own arms races with their neighbors—or in settling the disputes which give rise to these other arms races. I'd like to see a United Nations meeting in which it would be out of order for any delegate to say what somebody

<sup>6</sup> For an address by President Kennedy on nuclear testing and disarmament, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

ought to do about disarmament, in which each would state quite simply what he is prepared to contribute to disarmament.

The United States wants disarmament. We have set forth comprehensive proposals for achieving disarmament. We believe that disarmament on a balanced basis would increase the security of the whole world, including ourselves.

We will insist, however, that disarmament take place in a peaceful world. If we are to be realistic, we must not expect that in the near future such a "peaceful world" will mean a world without rivalries. But it must mean a world where competition between systems is conducted within round rules which preclude the use of force to impose change. If the Soviet Union and other Communist states wish general disarmament, and through it the removal of the present terrible dangers of the arms race, they must be prepared to await the verdict of history—and of peoples—as to the merits of political systems; that verdict must not be imposed. If there is to be agreement that we will both await that verdict and that we are going to gain control of the arms race, then we must be prepared to work together to better keep the peace.

#### Where Disarmament Negotiations Stand

Where do the disarmament negotiations stand now? The negotiations at Geneva have been temporarily recessed for a month. Up to now there has been no major progress. However, the conference is to be resumed on July 16.

Despite the discouraging history of disarmament negotiations, we cannot give up hope. The objective is too important. We intend to keep on pressing. We are moderately optimistic that in time other states, including the Soviet Union, will come to see that an unrestrained arms race poses a threat which requires all of us to change traditional modes of thinking and to cooperate in the prevention of a great war.

There is some basis for hope, although our hopes may remain, for a time, greater than our realistic expectations. For the first time we have been able to identify some of the main problems in talks with the Soviet Union. The joint statement of agreed principles<sup>7</sup> worked out last summer by Mr. [John J.] McCloy and the Soviet delegate, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, have been accepted

as the basis of the Geneva negotiations. While these eight principles are quite general, they have made it possible to begin discussion with a more nearly common language.

By contrast with past performance, the manner of work of the present conference has been encouraging. The atmosphere is businesslike, with somewhat less polemics than usual. The eight new members, chosen to represent the other geographical areas of the world, are making a responsible contribution. The management of the conference by the United States and Soviet cochairmen and the practice of holding informal meetings have also substantially reduced well-known tendencies toward propaganda abuses.

We cannot underestimate the obstacles created by international distrust. We cannot give way to wishful thinking nor overlook the frustrations of the past. This time, however, I think we are farther along the road by virtue of common recognition of the specifics of danger and the creation of a more effective forum for discussion.

The road to disarmament and arms control is a long and hard one at best. Negotiations must be pursued uninterruptedly, patiently, and persistently. We must mobilize all of our efforts, resources, and imagination to explore new approaches. Above all, we must not allow ourselves to become discouraged or to abandon a worthwhile objective because its achievement does not seem to be in sight.

I decline to conclude that what man has invented he cannot control.

#### Department Releases Report on U.S. Policy Toward IAEA

The Department of State announced on June 1 (press release 353) the release of the "Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency."<sup>1</sup>

The report, dated May 19, was prepared by a committee led by Henry D. Smyth, U.S. Representative to the IAEA, and was submitted to Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, as part of a systematic reappraisal of U.S. participation in international organizations.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the report are available upon request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

## The Reality of Change

by Under Secretary Ball<sup>1</sup>

Sixteen years ago last March Mr. Winston Churchill, a statesman with a gift of prophecy, made an historic speech at an institution of higher learning a thousand miles west of here at Fulton, Missouri. That speech will be long remembered for one phrase of sonorous finality which sent a shudder throughout the Western World: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," said Mr. Churchill, "an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."

That speech caught us unprepared. During the 6 months from V-J Day to the time of the Fulton speech we Americans had concentrated on getting back to normal. But under the shock treatment of Churchill's portentous words we were brought face to face with the harsh realization that postwar life was not going to be the easy enjoyment of an easy peace. The Iron Curtain had indeed dropped down to form a cage that now encloses one-third of the world's population. From that day on the United States was to live in an atmosphere of the cold war.

I mention these events on this auspicious June morning not just to recall the atmosphere of those early postwar days but rather to emphasize that the cold war, as we know it, is a phenomenon only a little more than a decade and a half old. Yet to you, who are completing your academic studies this day in 1962, it has existed for a lifetime. You have lived all but the years of early childhood—all your truly sentient years—with the reality of the cold war. You have, in fact, known nothing else.

You have lived all your lives with the brooding awareness that the leaders of the Communist bloc

are bent, as Winston Churchill pointed out 16 years ago, on "the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines." What is more, you have learned to accept the awful knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union each possess the ability to incinerate most of the Northern Hemisphere.

### Fluidity of World Politics

Yet if you have known from childhood what my generation learned only later in life—and then with shocked surprise—that the world is torn by a fierce ideological struggle and a bitter power contest, there is one characteristic of the age of the cold war that you should take particularly to heart. This is not a static age; it is an age in which great forces are at work, an age moving with a rapidity unparalleled in history.

It is a curious and regrettable fact that we Americans, who had our national beginning in a revolution, in a violent leap from colonialism to independence, should tend today to underrate the speed and magnitude of change in the shape and structure of world politics. This is not true, of course, of technological progress. Your generation has taken the giant step from science fiction to the science laboratory with grace and ease. You have not felt disturbed or affronted by the seemingly preposterous idea that within a decade man may fly to the moon and back, or that within the same period we may regularly cross the Atlantic in 2 or 3 hours.

But I challenge you to show the same ability to recognize change in our political and economic affairs. For what is the real lesson of our postwar history? It is that world power relationships are in a great historic period of fluidity, of shift

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at Adelphi College, Garden City, N.Y., on June 13 (press release 386).

and movement, and that we cannot make rational plans either as a nation or as individuals on the assumption that the world will remain as it is today. You who are the generation of the cold war must, I think, accept the probability that, while the cold war is likely to continue for a considerable period into the foreseeable future, even it will not be permanent.

### Developments Since World War II

Consider for a moment what has already occurred in your own lifetime. Better yet, consider that brief decade and a half since World War II. First has come the erection of the Iron Curtain.

Secondly, and quite as important, over the whole of the free world—that two-thirds of the world's population not behind the Iron Curtain—the great colonial systems have been almost entirely liquidated or are on their way to liquidation. When any generation was graduating from the universities, the world was still divided between a relatively small number of industrialized nations that enjoyed autonomy, if not freedom, and most of the rest of the earth's surface that was subject to some form of colonialism. Today the division is of quite a different kind. Out of the old colonial systems has come a great flowering of small nations. Born weak and sometimes prematurely, they are, almost all of them, economically underdeveloped. Diverse in character, they still share one common quality—the determination to establish and maintain their national identities and to apply, within their own societies, the tools and techniques that modern technology has provided.

Third, in spite of the forebodings of political assassins, the shattering of the old colonial structures did not mean the disappearance or even the weakening of the major European colonial powers. Instead, those powers turned their efforts to the construction of a whole new European system—the European Economic Community, which is on the way toward expansion to include the United Kingdom. This process of pooling resources and strength in a new European unity has generated prodigious energies that have already transformed the economic map of Europe and are beginning to transform the political map as well.

Fourth, the coming into being of a Europe capable of speaking with one voice on a broader and broader spectrum of subject matter has given new impetus to the creation of an effective Atlantic

partnership. Not only has the United States committed military might to Europe under the NATO arrangements—a commitment unthinkable before the Second World War—but America and Europe together are forging new instruments for cooperation over a wide spectrum of economic matters.

The speed of these developments, moving currently, has tended to obscure their magnitude. Who could have imagined in 1945, when the United Nations was created, that in a little over 16 years it would have not 51 members but 104?

And wouldn't it have seemed equally as fantastic 16 years ago, when Western Europe was all bricks and rubble, that it could be rebuilt, reshaped, transformed so profoundly in spirit that France and Germany, ancient enemies, would be drawn by their own free will into a community more cohesive than any ever produced by the conquerors of the past?

But if so much can happen in 16 years, what can the next 16 years bring forth?

### Free Will the Credo of Free Men

In seeking to answer that question, or at least to prepare ourselves for the answer that only time can provide, we in the free world must stay firmly committed to the idea of progress. We must never lose faith that freedom and truth are stronger than tyranny and deception and that the values which are the foundation of our free society will in the long run prevail. This is the only acceptable working hypothesis for free men today: We are on the side of history, and the trends are running our way. President Kennedy stated this thesis with great eloquence when he said at Berkeley last March:<sup>2</sup>

No one who examines the modern world can doubt that the great currents of history are carrying the world away from the monolithic idea toward the pluralistic idea—away from communism and toward national independence and freedom. No one can doubt that the wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men.

But if I recommend optimism as a postulate for action, I do not suggest for a moment that the trends will move to our ultimate benefit unless we take pains to see that they do. Free will, not historical determinism, is the credo of free men. And if we are to live and flourish in this world—or even

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

if we are to live at all—it will be by the effective employment of our material resources and the exercise of courage, energy, and imagination.

### Shaping Forces of Freedom

We are going to have to face the fact that we live in a subtle and intricate world. By the very nature of nuclear forces today we are denied the classical arbitrament of major war. The ground rules have changed irrevocably. Mr. Walter Lippmann has made this crystal clear:

Always, in the past, war and the threat of war, whether aggressive or defensive, were usable instruments. They were usable instruments in the sense that nations could go to war for their national purposes. Nations could transform themselves from petty states to great powers by means of war. They could enlarge their territories, acquire profitable colonies, change the religion of a vanquished population, all by means of war. War was the instrument with which the social, political, and legal systems of large areas were changed. . . . The reason for that was that the old wars could be won.

But as President Kennedy has pointed out, in a nuclear war no one can be the winner.

We need, therefore, a fresh formulation of the central question that confronts us. How do we bring about the maintenance and expansion of freedom and of all of those values that we hold most dear without creating conditions that may trigger a nuclear war?

How, in other words, do we shape and channel the great forces that can run our way in order to insure that they, in fact, do so?

### The Simple Approach: Incantation

There are at least two approaches to the problem—one simple, one complex.

The simple approach has not merely historic but prehistoric roots. In primitive societies men sought to appease or deflect the forces of nature by magic words. And there are those still among us today who feel that the massive and mysterious forces confronting the free world can best be dealt with through incantation. All will be well, they argue, if we adopt what they refer to as a "win" rather than a "no win" policy. In fact they seem to assume that if only we utter words such as "victory" often enough and with sufficient belligerence, the Iron Curtain will crumble like the walls of Jericho.

As advertised, this policy has certain attractive features. Not only is it simple, but it is easy. If

we put our faith in incantation, we need not make hard decisions or face difficult tasks. If all that is needed is tough words, there is no reason, for example, why we should assist the less developed countries on their way toward independence—and most of the proponents of this policy are opposed to foreign aid. There is no reason why we should try to assist the forces of change within the Communist countries—and they, therefore, oppose all programs designed to encourage the slow erosion of the Iron Curtain.

### A More Mature and Realistic Solution

But I doubt that you, who have known all your lives about the cold war and who are completing your studies in this year of tension and turbulence, are going to swallow the idea that peace and freedom can be gotten for you wholesale. It has never happened before, and it will not happen now. And so I propose that we look for a moment at the elements of a more mature and realistic solution. Those elements are, I think, not hard to identify.

First, we must at all times have ample military strength. Today this means more than maintaining adequate force levels for our armed services; it also means keeping ahead in the technological contest. We dare not relax our military posture so long as the Communist powers refuse to accept those essential, though small, qualifications of their obsessive secrecy that will make possible arms reductions on a basis which secures world safety—arms reductions with adequate inspection.

Second, we must promote and mobilize the strength and resources of the major industrialized powers of the free world by perfecting an Atlantic partnership with a united Europe and by tightening our bonds with Japan.

Third, we must, in concert with the other major industrialized nations, continue to assist the newly emerging countries to attain that measure of strength that will permit them to secure their independence and self-respect and thus attain the ability to resist the pressures and temptations from the Communist bloc.

Fourth, we must continue to maintain adequate communications with the nations that oppose us, not only in order to detect and develop any possibility of agreement, even in minor areas of tension, but also to avoid the accidental triggering of conflict through mistake or confusion.



### **Creating Effective Poles of Attraction**

All of this, you may say, is purely defensive. It is an expression of a passive policy, a policy of containment—a kind of "Fortress Free World" policy that will not generate the affirmative pressure on the Communist power centers necessary to insure the victory of the free world.

This argument, I think, misses the point, in part because it denies the reality of change. By so doing, it denies the nature of the world today, in which great fluid forces are in motion.

How do we influence these forces at work behind the Iron Curtain? First, by creating effective poles of attraction. Already the Soviet Union has shown its concern at being outstripped and outdistanced by the material success of the free world—by the goods we can bring to the people. The Berlin wall is a dramatic demonstration of that concern. The Communists could not tolerate access to a prosperous West Berlin that stood as a symbolic rebuke to their own economic inadequacy. Their anxiety to destroy this symbol has been, to a considerable extent, the impelling cause for the efforts they have made to impose an altered status on that valiant city.

Already there are increasing signs that the Soviet Government is paying the West the compliment of imitation. They have adopted much of our industrial technology and our managerial techniques. And isn't it quite significant that a few days ago the Kremlin felt compelled to resort to the free-market mechanism as a regulator between the supply of domestic goods available for consumers and the volume of money in circulation?

### **Technology May Prove the Key to Peace**

The Communist states have their insecurities; they cannot face the disclosures of free comparison—and they are right. Obsession with secrecy, with the hermetically sealed society, is more than a heritage of czarist Russia; it is the function of palpable weakness.

Yet it seems clear enough that, over the course of the next few years, the bloc countries will find secrecy a wasting asset. As the societies of the bloc countries become less tightly encysted, as they are subjected to the transforming properties of light and air, they will grow progressively more accessible to the influence of free ideas—ideas that are likely to blunt their aggressive pur-

poses and to render them easier companions in a world community.

Already there is the initial promise of an awakening spirit of interest and inquiry. New generations are moving toward power in the bloc countries. Students are beginning to behave in the traditional manner of students, to display curiosity and impatience as they become aware that there may be an available alternative to a system that is intellectually confining. Quite obviously we must redouble our efforts to give credibility to that alternative, to add yeast to the intellectual ferment now in process by all the techniques available for letting light and air through the Iron Curtain—limited programs of technical and even capital assistance, increased student and cultural exchanges, improved programs of information.

For as the new generation comes increasingly to realize that the alternative to the system they know is not disintegrating but is growing stronger and offering more and more benefits to its people, the forces for change within the structure of the bloc will be fortified by other forces moving in the same direction.

Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the very technology which threatens the whole Northern Hemisphere with the danger of incineration will in the long run prove a key to peace. This paradox is not as bizarre as it sounds. The vaulting pace of that technology is imposing obsolescence at an accelerating rate on existing systems of armament, while the fantastic increase in the cost of each new generation of weapons is consuming an ever greedier share of the economic resources of the bloc. Is it not likely, therefore, that at some point the Communist power will be forced to make the hard choice between insistent demands for a better standard of living and the spiraling costs of an unending arms race? And is it not possible that at such time this conflict of pressures may be resolved in favor of effective progress toward stability and even disarmament?

### **A World of Unlimited Promise**

But let me return again to the theme with which I began these observations to you today. The years ahead will be difficult, confused, and filled with problems. To expect otherwise is to ignore the nature of a world in flux. It will be no age for the indolent or fainthearted. Neither you nor I nor any of us can assume that our own

institutions will survive unless we fight for them. But at the same time neither you nor I should accept the idea that the cold war is a permanent and immutable aspect of life and that we can never have done with it.

For if we are firm enough and strong enough, if we have the wit and the diligence, and, above all, if we have the maturity and forbearance, the will and the courage to refuse to be deflected from our main objectives of building a strong, free world, not only should we survive but we should look forward to a future far brighter than any we have been entitled to expect before.

With strong nerves and a hospitable attitude toward new ideas we should make out all right, provided we prove able to adjust to the shape and form of a world that is changing more rapidly than any of us realize—a world filled with dangers but, more than that, a world filled with unlimited promise if we so comport ourselves as to deserve it.

## U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on Formation of Lao Government

*Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., regarding the announcement on June 11 that a coalition government had been formed in Laos.*

### President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

White House press release dated June 13

JUNE 12, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I share your view that the reports from Laos are very encouraging. The formation of this government of national union under Prince Souvanna Phouma marks a milestone in the sustained efforts which have been put forward toward this end, especially since our meeting in Vienna.<sup>1</sup>

It is of equal importance that we should now press forward, with our associates in the Geneva Conference,<sup>2</sup> to complete these agreements and to work closely together in their execution. We must

continue also to do our best to persuade all concerned in Laos to work together to this same end. It is very important that no untoward actions anywhere be allowed to disrupt the progress which has been made.

I agree that continued progress in the settlement of the Laotian problem can be most helpful in leading toward the resolution of other international difficulties. If together we can help in the establishment of an independent and neutral Laos, securely sustained in this status through time, this accomplishment will surely have a significant and positive effect far beyond the borders of Laos. You can count on the continued and energetic efforts of the Government of the United States toward this end.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

### Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

JUNE 12, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Good news has come from Laos. As a result of the successful completion of negotiations involving the three political forces of Laos, it has been possible to form a coalition government of national unity headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. Without question, this act may become the pivotal event both in the life of the Laotian people themselves and in the cause of strengthening peace in southeast Asia.

Formation of a coalition government of national unity in Laos opens the way toward completing in the near future the work done at the Geneva conference toward a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem and giving life to the agreements worked out at that conference, which constitute a good basis for the development of Laos as a neutral and independent state.

The example of Laos indicates that, provided there is a desire to resolve difficult international problems on the basis of cooperation with mutual account of regard for the interests of all sides, such cooperation bears fruit. At the same time, the results achieved in the settlement of the Laotian problem strengthen the conviction that success in solving other international problems which now divide states and create tension in the world can be achieved on the same road as well.

As for the Soviet Government, it has always adhered, as it does now, to this line, which in present conditions is the only correct policy in international affairs in accordance with the interests of peace.

I avail myself of the occasion to express satisfaction over the fact that the mutual understanding we achieved while meeting in Vienna last June on the support of a neutral and independent Laos is beginning to be translated into life.

Respectfully yours,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

<sup>1</sup> For text of a joint communique released at Vienna on June 4, 1961, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 999.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 85.

## Economic Development: Rival Systems and Comparative Advantage

by John Kenneth Galbraith  
Ambassador to India<sup>1</sup>

One of the well-observed features of economic development in the 20th century is the need to choose between two broad political and economic designs. This choice, one from which developing nations of the 18th and 19th centuries were conveniently exempt, is between Western constitutional organization on the one hand and Marxian and neo-Marxian polity and economic organization on the other.

These are not, as everyone knows, homogeneous alternatives. Wide differences separate a state such as Poland, where the agriculture, and hence close to half the economy, remains in private hands and subject to market influences, from the far more completely socialized economy of the Chinese mainland. There are similar distinctions between the non-Marxian economies, which, in this case, are enlarged by terminological preference and political semantics. In Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and modern India the word "socialism" is politically evocative. As a result politicians try to find as much of it as possible. In the United States, steps that would elsewhere be identified with socialist enlightenment—social security, agricultural price guarantees, even the public development of public power sites—are firmly for the purpose of making private enterprise function better.

Also one must be cautious in speaking of a "choice" between the two designs. Geography and the proximity of military power have had much to do with the decision. Had Poland, to select a country not unaccustomed to movement, been radically relocated after World War II to approximately the position of Paraguay, her subsequent economic and political history would have

been rather different. Individuals do commit themselves as a matter of free choice to a Marxian political and economic design. But nations have rarely done so in the normal course of unmanaged elections—a reluctance, incidentally, which was foreseen by both Marx and Lenin.

Nevertheless these broad alternatives exist. My purpose is to weigh their advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of the developing country. I am aware that an American ambassador will not be considered by everyone a wholly impartial judge. And even in this liberal and sophisticated gathering there would doubtless be eyebrow-lifting if my evidence were to lead me to the wrong conclusion.

But the choice merits serious assessment. Much of the present literature consists of declarations of superiority by one side or the other. We share with the Communists a strong faith in the value of robust assertion. Were the advantage all on our side, we would have little reason to worry. But we do worry, and it might be well, accordingly, for us to have a moderately unemotional appraisal of what we have to offer the developing nations as compared with the Communists.

### The Goal of Developing Countries

The goal of the developing country can be quickly stated: It is to bring itself as rapidly as possible into the 20th century and with the apparatus of individual and group well-being—food, clothing, education, health services, housing, entertainment, and automobiles—which is associated in every mind, urban and rural, bourgeois and Bolshevik, with 20th-century existence. Here and there are some that demur. But in my observation the most monastic Christian, the most

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif., on June 4 (press release 355).

contemplative Buddhist, and the most devout Gandhian cannot be considered completely secure against the charms of the bicycle, motor scooter, or transistor radio.

The things associated with modern civilization are now denied by backwardness and poverty. The task of the two systems is to overcome this poverty. The causes of poverty, in turn, are not simple—although the problem has suffered prodigiously from oversimplification. One cause, clearly, is an oppressive social structure which channels return from the many to the few and which denies the individual the natural reward of his efforts at self-improvement. Another is a feeble, nonexistent, or corrupt apparatus of public administration which denies to the country the things—law and order, education, investment in roads, power, manufacturing—which are possible only where there is effective public authority. Or poverty may be itself a cause of poverty; it denies the country capital for investment, revenues for education, or purchasing power for consumer products which, in turn, are an incentive to effort. Thus poverty perpetuates itself. Such are the fundamentals that both systems must attack. It is unlikely that the same causes operate in the same form and with the same intensity in any two cases. An effective attack, therefore, requires not only efficient remedies but effective diagnosis of the condition to be cured.

Both systems agree on a number of important points. It is common ground that a shortage of capital is a likely cause of stagnation. Both agree on the need for a massive volume of investment to initiate and stimulate not only economic but social advance. There is agreement also that this investment should be in accordance with a carefully conceived plan. (Here we have paid the Soviets the compliment of appropriating an important idea.) There is increasing agreement that a principal object of this investment must be in the educational and cultural improvement of people themselves. The visitor to the more remote parts of Soviet Asia is immediately impressed by the volume of resources going into schools, colleges, adult education programs, and other forms of cultural extension as part of the attack on the traditional backwardness of these areas. If, in the years following World War II, we thought too much of investment in terms of physical capital and too little of the importance

of a literate and educated populace, this is an error we are now correcting.

There are, however—and this will doubtless come as a relief—important differences between the two approaches, and these are vital. The first lies in the diagnosis of the causes of poverty and the related remedy. The second difference is in the way development is organized. The third is in the political and constitutional environment of development. Let me take up each of these differences in turn.

### Diagnosing the Causes of Poverty

In the Marxian view poverty is principally caused by institutions which chain the country to its past—which hold it in colonial subjection, which exploit and subjugate the masses and deny them the reward of their labor, which make government not the efficient servant of the many but the corrupt handmaiden of the few.

In the predominant Western view the poor are the victims of their poverty. All societies have capacity for growth; the poor society lacks the resources to invest in growth. Having less than enough for its current needs for food, clothing, and shelter, it has nothing for investment in education, improved agriculture, transportation, public utilities, or industrial enterprise.

Each of these views leads naturally to a prescription. If institutions hold a country to its past, the answer is the elimination of these institutions. If the problem is the self-perpetuating character of privation, the answer is to provide the catalyzing resources—specifically, economic aid and assistance in its use—which the country cannot supply to itself.

This is the first difference. The Marxian emphasis is on the institutions that inhibit progress and the need to eliminate them. Our emphasis is on the self-perpetuating character of poverty and the catalyzing role of aid. It will be noted that each system has a cause and remedy that is not without convenience to itself. The Soviets, at least until recently, were short of capital. They had a revolution which could be exported at moderate expense. Accordingly it was convenient to associate backwardness with colonialism, feudalism, and repressive capitalism, all of which could be eliminated by revolution. By contrast, we had capital. This we could export with greater ease than comprehensive social change.

The second difference is in the way development is organized. Although there is room for some national preference, and heresy cannot be entirely eliminated, the Marxian commitment is still to state ownership of the means of production—of land, capital plant, and natural resources. Private ownership of productive resources and their use for private gain is one of the retarding institutions. Its elimination leaves the state in possession and this continues. Incentives to individual and group effort are strongly supported. But incentives which use the device of property ownership to combine reward for individual effort with reward for management of property are excluded in principle and in large measure in practice.

The non-Marxian design for organizing development is not so easily characterized. In the past many countries—Japan, Germany, Canada, and to a remarkable degree also the United States—have made state ownership of canals, turnpikes, railroads, electric power and other utilities, and even steel mills the fulcrum of development policy. India, Egypt, and some South American countries are taking the same course today. However, the main and indeed overwhelming reliance in non-Marxian development, both in agriculture and industry, is on private ownership of productive plant. This is true of countries, such as India, which choose to describe themselves as socialist.

#### **Western Advantage in Providing Capital**

The foregoing differences are sufficiently sharp so that we can relate them to results. And in Eastern Europe and China, not to mention the much older case of the Soviet Union, there is now an ample experience of Marxian development on which to draw.

Two major advantages lie with the Western or non-Marxian alternatives. There is, we have anciently been advised, a certain physical difficulty in extracting blood from a stone. This, however, is comparatively easy as compared with getting savings out of a poor society. When people do not have enough to eat, they are loathe to forgo any part of their meal in order to eat better in the future. Pleas on behalf of children and grandchildren leave the man of simple, uncomplicated intelligence unmoved; he reflects that starvation will prevent his having children and, *pro tanto*, grandchildren as well. But Marxian no less than non-Marxian societies must have savings; without

them there can be no growth. Accordingly, the Western pattern of development, with its prospect of assistance from outside the country, eases one of the most painful problems of development. This is why economic aid has become such an important feature of Western foreign policy. It is the process by which savings are transferred from countries where saving is comparatively unpainful to those where it is very painful. It exploits one of the major advantages of our system.

The Communist countries are not without resources in this respect. The Soviet Union, though its capacity has been far less than ours, has spared some savings for other countries. Communist economic and political organization deals more effectively—or ruthlessly—with unproductive and excessively luxurious consumption, of which there is always some and may be much in the poor country. And Communist organization can, within limits, squeeze blood from its turnip. The penalty is the pain, and this cannot be avoided. The rioting in Poland in 1956 which brought Mr. Gomulka to power was occasioned in large measure by the enforcement of a rate of saving that was too grim for the people to bear. These last years on the Chinese mainland have evidently been ones of serious trouble and tension. Part of the problem is inherent in socialist organization of agriculture to which I will advert in a moment. But some has certainly been the consequence of squeezing a large volume of savings out of a very poor population.

The larger consequence is that Marxian development risks the alienation of the people as non-Marxian development does not. It seems doubtful if a majority of the Chinese people are very pleased with their government and would vote for it in an uninhibited poll. By contrast, in India, after a decade of development, there has been an overwhelming vote for the government that led the task. If the Indian Government had to subtract the \$7.3 billions it has received from the West in overseas loans and grants since independence from the meager incomes—an average of about \$70 per year—of its own people, its popularity might well have suffered. We see in India, in remarkably clear relief, the advantages of the Western design in providing capital.

#### **Western Advantage in Agriculture**

The second and equally substantial advantage of Western development is in the matter of agriculture. Industry, on the record at least, is fairly

tolerant as to forms of organization. American industry works well under private ownership. Even the most reluctant among us must agree that the Soviets have made considerable progress with socialism. So no decisive contrast can be registered here. But the undeveloped country is, by definition, a pastoral or agrarian community. The agricultural policy is, accordingly, vital. And it is far from clear, as a practical matter, whether it is possible to socialize a small-scale, densely populated, peasant agriculture. Even in the Soviet Union the agricultural problem has not been wholly solved. And here, at least, there is no serious talk of catching up. Each year we insouciantly extend our advantage in manhour productivity without effort and somewhat to our regret. Outside the Soviet Union, agriculture has been even more of a problem. Poland and Yugoslavia have had to revert to private ownership. In China, by all external evidence, the effort to socialize agriculture has brought a serious crisis. Certainly it has forced her to turn to the West for the largest food imports in history.

There are good reasons for this failure. Farmers, when they are small and numerous, cannot be brought unwillingly into a state-run system of agriculture for they can defeat any system that is available for their control. The employees of a factory, like the men of an army, are subject to external discipline. Failure in performance can be detected, judged, and penalized. (The same rule holds for certain types of plantation agriculture.) A scattered peasantry, carrying on the diverse tasks of crop and especially of livestock husbandry cannot be so regimented. As a consequence, productivity falls off. Working for others, the farmer works at the minimum rather than the maximum, and the difference between the two is enormous. He can be made to work at the maximum by giving him land to work and rewarding him with the fruits of his labor or some substantial share to consume or exchange as he wishes. But this is to restore individual proprietorship—private capitalism—which its doctrine excludes.

One day the Marxian economies may succeed in socializing agriculture—no effort is being spared. And the ability of the small man in agriculture to sabotage a system he dislikes or which treats him badly is not confined to communism. It is the reason for the low productivity and backwardness of the latifundia of Latin America and

the feudal domains of the Middle East. But the fact that it accepts independent agricultural proprietorship is the second clear advantage of Western development.

### Eliminating Retarding Institutions

I come now to a disadvantage of Western development. The Marxian alternative, I have noted, emphasizes the destruction of the bonds that tie the economy to the past. Our emphasis is on capital, education, technical assistance, and the other instruments that allow of change. Until recently, at least, we have been tempted to suppose that any society is a platform on which, given these missing elements, development can be built.

In fact, institutions do chain economies to the past, and the breaking of these chains is essential for progress. The promise that this will be done is a valid and an appealing part of the Marxian case. There is no chance of agricultural development in the underdeveloped and hence agricultural country under systems of absentee landlordism, with the workers or sharecroppers confined by law and tradition to a minor share of a meager product. And feudal systems of farming extend their corrupting influence to government, to the provision of public sinecures to those who lack a claim on the land, to the milking of middle-class and industrial enterprise, and to the destruction of incentives and the morale of the society itself. "In our country," a South American guide once told me, "those who do the least get the most. I hear that in the United States it is the other way around. It's a better system." Progress does require the radical elimination of retarding institutions. If elimination can be had from no other source, the Marxian alternative will sooner or later be tried. The revolution they offer here, we should remind ourselves, is less the Russian Revolution than the French Revolution.

### Political Environment

I come now to the final point of comparison—one, unfortunately, which has been much damaged by bad rhetoric. From the earliest days of their development, personal liberty, equal justice under law, and constitutional government have been important to Englishmen and to Americans. They haven't been the concern of everyone, but we have never supposed they were the fad of the esoteric and privileged minority.

And so it is in the undeveloped country today. The Andean Indian and the landless worker in the Indian village do have a preoccupying concern with keeping themselves fed. But the general yearning for the dignity of democratic and constitutional government is very great. No people who live under a dictatorship ever feel themselves to be first-class citizens.

There can be little question that most people believe that liberty and constitutional process are safer with the Western than with the Marxian alternative. We haven't, in my view, made as much of this advantage as we might. But the Communists are under the considerable handicap that their alternative involves a step into the dark. And while the details are obscure, most people know that it does not involve free selection of rulers by the governed, *habeas corpus*, equal justice under law, and a voluntary return to other economic arrangements should the experiment prove unpalatable.

#### **Making Use of the Advantages**

On first assessment, then, the advantage of the non-Marxian alternative for the developing country is considerable. It promises at least a partial avoidance of the pain that for the poor country is inherent in finding savings for investment and growth. It promises an acceptable and viable system of agriculture rather than a certain unpalatable and possibly unworkable one. And it offers personal liberty and constitutional process. Against this the Marxian alternative promises a more rigorous attack on the institutions—the unproductive claims on revenue and especially the feudal control of land—which exclude change.

But this is not a game where one can count the cards and decide the winner. Some cards count for more than others, and there is the unfortunate possibility that some good cards will not get played.

The Marxian promise can be decisive. That is because the things we offer are only effective and attractive after the retarding institutions are eliminated. In a country where land and other resources are held by and operated for the benefit of a slight minority and where the apparatus of government serves principally to reinforce such privilege, aid is not of much use. It will also

benefit not the many but the few. Our promise of independent proprietorship is obviously nullified so long as land remains in the hands of the few. And personal liberty and constitutional government have little meaning in countries where government is of the privileged for the rich.

We must, in short, meet the Marxian promise of reform of retarding institutions. We cannot organize revolution. We can place our influence solidly on the side of reform. Having done this, our cards give us a clear advantage. To be sure, we must play them. We must make good with aid on our promise of a less painful savings and investment process. We must give firm support to the small farmer. We must be clear in our commitment to constitutional process and personal liberty. We cannot suppose that these are wanted only by people of Anglo-Saxon origin of good income. And we must not excuse dictatorship on grounds of anticommunism or convenience in the absence of visible alternatives. The price of doing so, as we have so painfully learned, is disaster magnified by postponement.

These are highly practical matters. If there are no advantages in our alternative, it won't be chosen. The first resort to the Marxian alternative in this hemisphere was in a country where the concentration of wealth and land ownership was extreme, where these had extended a corrupting influence to other economic life and to government, and where dictatorship had been endemic. This being the experience with the Western alternative, it was not remarkable that so many were so little perturbed by the alternative. India, in face of formidable difficulties, is firmly committed to development on the Western model. That is because already in British India and over the whole country at the time of independence there was a strong attack on retarding institutions—especially on the feudal claims of princes, zamindars and great landlords, and government which was an extension of this landed power; because a substantial measure of peasant ownership had replaced the old system; because aid from outside eased the problem of supply capital; and because people felt secure in the protection of constitutional guarantees and representative government.

The lesson is clear. The advantages are with us. We must, however, have confidence in them and exploit them to the full.

## Good Case in the Congo

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>

### The Sources of International Law

Often the first, and at least the second, chapter of any textbook on international law is entitled "Sources of International Law." Despite fierce disagreements on other matters, most of the authors of these books are prepared to include even the controversial sources in this chapter, and thus most of the chapters read alike. They may even contain similar subheads such as "Treaties as a Source of International Law," "International Custom as a Source of International Law," or "The General Principles of Law as a Source of International Law."

I believe there is a different—and in our day more useful—way of approaching the sources of international law. The law is one thing but the circumstances that lead to its application are another, and, regardless of what law we are talking about, these circumstances have much in common.

• In our own past a politician named Marbury is appointed to the bench by a lameduck administration. He fights for his job against the new party in power—and the course of American history is drastically changed by the doctrine of judicial review.

• On the international scene the rumrunning career of Boatswain Leon Mainguy comes to a watery end as he and the ship *Im Alone* are sunk on the high seas by the guns of a pursuing Coast Guard cutter. Out of the resulting litigation comes a new doctrine in international law.

• Or consider the hard luck and poor judgment that led the celebrated *Demoiselle V.* to choose Monsieur D. as a lover. She is left pregnant, un-

supported, and a losing plaintiff in a Geneva court. Her troubles, however, produce some significant law on the status of a delegate to an international organization.

• A Swedish count is murdered in Palestine. His name leads what is to become the long honor roll of United Nations dead. In the aftermath the United Nations emerges with recognized rights as an international personality.

The sources of international law in these familiar cases are violence and conflict followed by an organized effort to overcome and resolve them. The court decisions, the literature, the impact of practice, if not precedent, and the experience in fitting doctrine to reality—all these are essential, but the source lies in the action that began the chain of events.

Except for Count Bernadotte, the cases mentioned involve someone or some state against someone else or some other state.

In the modern world, however, such adversary proceedings based on the old questions of the rights and obligations of states appear to be attracting less attention in the search for world peace. In their place we are becoming concerned with the peacekeeping and peacemaking capacities of international organizations. Modern international law is more and more the practice of international organizations.

In this new and uncertain approach to world order, theory has not kept pace with practice. There exists an urgent need for law, literature, and the rest. The sources of these are similar to the sources of the weighty law on the rights and obligations of nations: They are violence and conflict, followed by organized effort to resolve them. Assuming this is so, everyone concerned with the

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the U.N. League of Lawyers at Washington, D.C., on May 29 (press release 343).



development of world order might keep his eye on events like these.

- A refugee from a United Nations trust territory is settled by the United Nations peacekeeping force in a neighboring country. He plans to return home when his own country becomes independent but is worried about persecution by a majority group.

- A combat-hardened commander and his troops are sent on a U.N. peacekeeping mission. They are threatened by rebellious and rival governments in their work but must function on the unfamiliar theory that there is no enemy.

- A petty smuggler is apprehended by United Nations soldiers who, uncertain of their authority and the effect of their action on their mission, bring the matter before their brigadier general for disposition.

- Small farmers, unable to take their crops to market, appeal to the commander of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent for trucking services. The commander decides to establish rates and regulations for the use of his vehicles.

- The International Court of Justice is asked for an opinion on a phrase in the U.N. Charter about expenses of the Organization and considers requests to reach beyond the expenses to the legal bases of the actions that were so expensive.

Out of these and other situations a pattern of a new law for international peacekeeping is emerging. Writers have often contrasted the law of nations with the law of the jungle. In a perverse way we may now be learning some important things about international order in an equatorial jungle.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo [UNOC] is, except for the postwar UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] program in China, the largest and most complex international undertaking ever carried on in an underdeveloped country. The Congo is underdeveloped, not in resources, mining, or urbanism, but emphatically so in organization, administrative leadership, and technical expertise in every field.

It is clear that the task facing the Congolese leaders, of making a nation out of the Congo, will be long and tough. There are no easy answers, no quick solutions. But much can be done to get going, even while the "Katanga problem" is being worked out. And when it is, the prospects

for rapid self-sustaining growth are limited only by the speed with which technicians and administrators can be trained and the institutions of modernization can be built. Outside help will be needed, but it should have to be on a large scale only for the first 2 or 3 years—once political and military problems give way to institution building.

### State of the Congo

During the past year the world has watched and debated the alternating tendencies of Katanga to secede from the Congo and to negotiate for an acceptable place as part of a unified Congo. Meanwhile, mostly below the surface of public consciousness, the situation in the rest of the Congo has been changing too—and decidedly for the better.

A year ago Stanleyville province was claiming to harbor the only true national regime, recognized by several African nations and Soviet bloc countries. A military blockade had closed the mainstay of internal trade between Léopoldville and the eastern provinces. The leader of that regime is now under detention; most of its parliamentary supporters have abandoned him; and the diplomatic representatives it had attracted are now in Léopoldville, still inclined to make trouble but in a far less advantageous position to do so.

A year ago the President of Kasai, Albert Kalonji, had declared his independence. Today Kalonji is under detention by the Central Government, and Kasai has renounced its secession.

A year ago the Stanleyville regime was the prime influence in the easternmost province of Kivu. Even 4 or 5 months ago Kivu was regarded as a dangerous place for foreigners, the scene of unchecked tribal rivalries and of brutal massacres by wandering bands of undisciplined soldiers. In my recent study of the U.N. Operation in the Congo, I traveled by car in both the northern and southern sections of Kivu, without incident. U.N. patrols, provincial police, and Congolese Army units all are working successfully to calm things down. Kindu, the place where the 13 Italian air crew members were murdered, is under effective discipline now.

A year ago there was no Central Government in the Congo. Even today the Government consists of a few trained leaders who face an appalling range of problems that would look insoluble if they had not been faced successfully by

other new leaders in other new nations during the past 15 years. But there is a Parliament; it has chosen a Prime Minister, who has formed a government; he and his colleagues can learn to govern, with much help from the outside, if they do not let themselves be paralyzed by the preoccupation with Katanga.

In short, the process of fragmentation of the country into separate hostile units was in full swing a year ago; the Central Government was limited in its jurisdiction to portions of three of the country's six provinces. Progress has now been made in reversing the process: Outside the Katanga, the once hostile armies are all basically responsible to the Central Government, the military blockade on the Congo River has been lifted, and a parliamentary form of government has been restored under Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula.

#### **The U.N. Peacekeeping Operation**

A major share of the credit for the improved outlook goes to two closely related field staffs—the U.N. peacekeeping force and the U.N. nation-building operation. The peacekeeping side of the U.N. Operation consists of about 13,700 combat troops from 10 countries, plus 3,640 supporting troops from 18 countries. Forty percent of the remaining U.N. troops are now Indians, concentrated almost entirely in Katanga Province; the other main units are Nigerians in the Léopoldville area, Ethiopians in Stanleyville and around Kinshasa, and a Malayan brigade in Kivu.

The lessons these units are learning in the Congo may prove to be very important in the future growth of international peacekeeping machinery. For example:

- The supply problems are extraordinarily complex, with several different kinds of rifles, 40-odd different types of vehicles, three different types of fighter aircraft, and four different ration scales for troops from various parts of the world. Standardization of weapons and supplies for U.N. forces should have a high priority in U.N. planning.

- A peacekeeping force needs to rethink many of the most basic precepts that apply to other types of military missions. Peacekeepers cannot select a putative "enemy" and conduct training maneuvers against him; indeed, one of the major objectives of special indoctrination for U.N. troops is to prevent them from thinking of the civilian

population that surrounds them as "the enemy." Moreover, the smallest incident in the life of a minor patrol may readily become a major political issue. As the Brigadier General commanding the Malayan brigade explained it to us, "In a regular war I would be commanding a brigade; here I have to command each platoon."

- A peacekeeping force in an underdeveloped area is drawn deeply into the civil life of the community. Local U.N. units find themselves providing leadership, supplies, and transportation to local governments and even private firms, in a pattern strikingly reminiscent of military government in postwar Italy and Japan. (Force Headquarters has even had to develop a scale of charges by which private firms can be billed for hauling goods to market in U.N. trucks.) The danger is, of course, that temporary peacekeeping units can too easily become an indispensable prop to the civilian economy.

#### **The U.N. as Nation Builder**

On the nation-building side of its dual personality, the United Nations Operation in the Congo has about 420 civilian technicians and administrators, the bulk of them based in Léopoldville but some stationed in each provincial capital and other main centers of population. In Kinshasa, for example, there is one U.N. representative, an Egyptian, and a male secretary; in Bukavu, the capital of Kivu Province, there is a staff of several U.N. officials, with locally hired clerks, headed by a dynamic Argentine. This group provides administrative support for a wide variety of special activities (such as refugee operations, public works, mining research, housing aid, and the like) which are carried on by technical specialists commuting from Léopoldville and local administrators at the project sites.

If the sample we observed in Kivu Province is any indication, the U.N. civilian field operation is both effective and enthusiastic. It serves as the link between the U.N. peacekeeping forces and the local government, props up and helps the inexperienced local authorities.

Altogether the U.N. civilian presence is more actively present in the provincial towns, more effective in pacifying the countryside, and more energetic in injecting some life into the local economy than is generally realized outside the Congo.

The bulk of UNOC's civilian operation, how-

ever, is directed at and located in the ministries and offices of the Central Government in Léopoldville. Dozens of U.N. technical people are not only physically present in the ministries they are supposed to advise but are active in day-to-day operations though this trend has not gone as far as it probably will have to go in order to be fully effective. The chief central banking adviser is an Italian member of the UNOC staff who would be an ornament to any nation's fiscal authority; the chief economic adviser to the Prime Minister is a first-rate Lebanese economist who is on loan to the U.N. from a post as professor of economics at the American University of Beirut. The presence of foreigners inside government operations is familiar from postwar experience in other countries where external agencies have been deeply involved on a very large scale in the workings of every department of a government struggling to govern in very adverse circumstances. Considering U.N. personnel and Belgian advisers, the trend has gone quite far in the Congo.

The civilian operations staff of the United Nations in the Congo is managed by a dozen technical administrators, who form a Consultative Group around the U.N. Chief of Civilian Operations. The Consultative Group consists in part of representatives sent to the Congo by the several specialized agencies of the U.N. The UNESCO chief, an Italian educator, has dozens of UNESCO-recruited teachers in various parts of the country. A Haitian physician is the WHO representative; he presides over an extraordinary program into which the World Health Organization poured some of its best personnel 2 years ago and for which it has since done some very astute worldwide recruiting.

There are staffs also from the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and the World Meteorological Organization from Geneva, and experts in public works, mining, transportation, legal systems, and housing, welfare, and relief operations, all recruited by U.N. Headquarters in New York. The chief administrative officer, a Pakistani, efficiently manages the immensely complicated task of providing administrative support to civil and military operations alike.

Unlike the technical aid rendered by the "U.N. family" of agencies in other underdeveloped countries as specialized contributions, the civilian op-

eration in the Congo is managed as a single unit. The field staff is subject to common administrative arrangements and for all purposes uses funds from the same pot—the U.N. Economic Fund for the Congo, supplemented by our P.L. 480 food imports, the local currency counterpart of which is placed in a special account under UNOC control. Only the representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his associates, experts from the League of Red Cross Societies and several religious voluntary agencies, are not under the umbrella of UNOC as such, and even they are partly dependent on the UNOC field stations for administrative support, transportation, and political liaison with the local authorities.

We met with the Consultative Group for a fruitful 4 hours one afternoon. With three or four exceptions the members are individually first-rate, combining competence with dedication to an extent that compares with the best of our own U.S. aid missions during the past 14 years.

The civil operations of the U.N., then, appear to be well staffed on the whole. There is good cooperation between the civil and military personnel in UNOC headquarters and in the field; the chain of command between Léopoldville and the UNOC representatives in the provinces seems to work well. The United States Embassy has an easy and intimate relationship with the UNOC headquarters.

But there are serious problems. One is the lack of an overall plan—the result of a natural reluctance to plan very far ahead in so fluid and unpredictable a situation. Lacking a careful plan, the individual U.N. officials responsible for worrying about individual sectors of the economy tend to conduct highly compartmentalized programs. The result is too much like a shopping list of projects and too little like a plan for the Congo's future with careful attention to priorities.

The result of this system appears to be something for every sector, but a relative overemphasis is on the needs of people in Léopoldville province and a relative underemphasis on those sectors of the economy (like road transport and secondary education) which are bottlenecks in the revival and expansion of the economy as a whole. I was pleased to learn last week, however, that the Congolese Government, in agreement with the U.N., has earmarked \$8 million of U.S. aid for immediate imports of trucks and spare parts.

To plan priorities for the Congo's development, and to pull together all forms of external aid, it seems clear that some form of coordinating device in Léopoldville is a must. Both from the Congolese point of view and from ours it is essential that all external aid continue to be covered by the umbrella of the United Nations.

### The Economic Problem

The economic problem which the United Nations and its contributing members face in the Congo is an enormous one. So far only stopgap measures have been taken by the Government and the U.N.—or have indeed been possible. These measures have prevented a complete breakdown in the economy and have helped to revive a minimum of activity in public health and sanitation, secondary and vocational education, government administration, transportation, and work relief.

But despite the country's natural riches and the U.N.'s efforts to create a strong Congo administrative apparatus, it has been difficult to carry out any consistent economic program, not only because we still do not have an integrated Congo but simply because all the classic symptoms of underdevelopment are present, including large numbers of untrained Congolese organized into more than two dozen ministries.

The difficult economic problems inherited by the Aouda government have been compounded by the course of events and the curse of nature. The dislocation of production in the interior of the country arising from political unrest was aggravated by the destruction to farmlands and the damage to urban areas caused by a most serious flood of the Congo River. Inflationary pressures, in turn, have been intensified by civil unrest.

Since independence, revenues of the Central Government have covered only a small portion of expenditures, the balance in large part having been covered by advances from the monetary council, which acts as a central bank. Stabilization measures agreed between the Central Government and the U.N. in June 1961 have been delayed; some progress is promised by the preparation early in 1962 of a first rough national budget (not yet approved by the Congolese Parliament) and the formulation of an austerity program.

Export performance in the first quarter of the year was not encouraging. Although production

on the major plantations appears to be well maintained, the dislocation of farm production by small farmers was reflected in sharply reduced export figures for cotton and coffee. Smuggling of goods across the borders is a growing problem; clearly the ratio of one to three between official and free exchange rates for the Congolese franc is a tempting incentive to smuggling. Arrivals of goods financed from American-tied aid and through P.L. 480 during the past few months played an indispensable part in sustaining industrial production and in maintaining the health and diet of the country.

But all this has been maintenance, not development. Here are some typical indications of the present parlous state of affairs.

(a) *Clandestine Trade.* Clandestine trade due to the difference in value of the Congolese franc internally and externally has resulted in a sharp drop in foreign exchange earnings. The Government's administrative weaknesses make it difficult to bring smuggling under control, but control measures such as better bookkeeping records of Government operations, payment by postal check, and various incentive devices are being actively considered by the Government and its U.N. advisers, and a special Finance Brigade is being formed with U.N. cooperation to improve customs operations.

(b) *Deficit Spending.* Deficit spending has reached an extremely dangerous level. The Central Government deficit, which amounts to about 80 percent of budget expenditures, is being financed by issuance of new paper money. Net foreign exchange resources are presently only about \$5 million, or enough to finance the current payments deficit for less than a month. A runaway inflation is prevented not by Government controls but by the large amounts of Congolese currency hoarded by individuals.

(c) *Public Health.* In the public-health sector only the minimal medical facilities will be available to the Congolese for at least the next 5 years, and these will have to be provided largely by non-Congolese. Only about 30 well-trained Congolese doctors can be expected from the limited number of medical students presently in the pipeline. The impressive WHO operation, which has 150 French-speaking doctors strategically placed around the country, is not just the backbone but

practically the whole corpus of the nation's health program.

(d) *Education.* The educational system is being revamped by UNESCO, in concert with the Ministry of Education, in order to bring about better distribution of students in the primary and secondary schools. Of the 1,500,000 students in primary schools, about one-half are in the first two grades; only a couple of hundred graduates of secondary schools will be produced at the top of the educational pyramid this year. Some 2,200 teachers from abroad are needed for 1963, and this figure cannot be met. There are 1,500 teachers (1,200 of whom are Belgians) plus 150 recruited by UNESCO. The latter are not likely to renew their contracts unless they are guaranteed transferability of earnings. The Belgians are guaranteed transfer of 40 percent of their earnings; most of them can therefore be expected to remain while security conditions permit.

(e) *Mining.* Mining production has suffered severely from the breakdown in law and order; improvement in this regard offers prospects for big production increases in provinces outside the Katanga. U.N. technicians are working with the Ministry of Mines to reform mining legislation.

(f) *Public Works.* Congo River floods have hampered U.N. public works programs. With the expected arrival of a few additional U.N. technicians it is hoped that the increase in employment reflected in April figures will be further increased. There is need to speed up negotiation of agreements between the U.N. and the Ministry.

(g) *Agriculture.* Big plantation agriculture is at the 1959 level, but small farm production is vanishing largely because there are no incentive goods available to the small farmer. The present outlook is for further decline in food crops during the next year.

(h) *Judicial System.* There is no established judicial system in the Congo; there are two graduate lawyers, one of whom works for the U.N., and not one qualified magistrate. The U.N. is actively trying to build a judicial system; a first group of European judges was appointed by the Central Government last month.

(i) *Labor.* The ILO is helping to strengthen the administrative structure of the Ministry of Labor and to train native labor inspectors who are needed to fill the void resulting from the mass exodus of Belgians after independence. A trade school training program has been initiated, and

social legislation is being completely revised in the hopes that serious labor difficulties can be avoided.

(j) *Transportation.* Everywhere in the Congo, transportation is clearly the prime bottleneck. The Congo transport system was originally designed to meet large-producer export requirements; the emphasis therefore was on water and rail systems. The number of private vehicles is down to 50 percent since there is accelerated depreciation due to lack of maintenance and spare parts, and roads are badly in need of repair or are lacking altogether.

(k) *Refugees.* The Congo is, curiously, enough of a going concern to provide a haven for refugees from even more troubled spots nearby. For example, relief supplies are being provided to 60,000 Watutsi refugees from Ruanda-Urundi, and many of them are being resettled in uninhabited, but fertile, reaches of Kivu Province. The program is sensible, and no semipermanent camps are being created. Individual pieces of land are granted to heads of families, seeds provided; and, after a few months' grace period to get their first crop harvested, the refugees are on their own.

#### **Katanga and the Other Provinces**

The Congolese Government is heavily dependent on outside assistance and foreign advisers; so are the provincial governments, including Katanga. This will be true for a number of years to come. The Central Government is very centralized in theory, but, in fact, the provinces have a good deal of autonomy. Like provinces in some other countries, the provincial governments in the Congo are inclined to ask not what they can do for the Central Government but what can it do for them. There are no insuperable problems *en principe* (the most used phrase in the Congo); the largely untapped resources of the Congo, and its relative lack of population pressure, are a great potential asset. But much more training, organization, leadership, and drive will be required in every field if the Congo is to become in fact the stable and progressive nation its well-wishers would like to see developing in the heart of Africa.

The key to the situation continues to be an integrated Congo. Katanga's resources are needed for the rapid development of the whole of the Congo; and, more important yet, it seems clear

that no moderate political leadership can survive in the national government until and unless it demonstrates its capacity to deal successfully with the problem of the Katanga secession.

These considerations underline the importance of a speedy conclusion to the Adoula-Tshombe [Moïse Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] talks and have led the United Nations to play a mediatory role in the current phase of these talks. But the same considerations also suggest that there is much to be done regardless of those negotiations, or before they are brought to a useful end. The Congolese and the United Nations can now move ahead more rapidly in establishing the minimum conditions of economic growth: the training of administrators and technicians, the retraining of the national army, the improvement of transportation, the development of workable relations between central and provincial authorities.

#### **Organizing for the Longer Pull**

The Congo has reached a watershed, and we must move from stopgap interim measures to more long-range steps designed to get the Congolese to take over as quickly as possible.

The magnitude of the problem is such that the United Nations may need to name a special officer to manage, with a full-time staff, all aspects of the Congo operation. He should have a staff adequate to backstop the major technical assistance and economic aid coordination job which the U.N. will be doing for some time, perhaps for several years to come. The *ad hoc* management of this unprecedented enterprise directly in the Secretary-General's office was probably advantageous at the beginning; but for the longer pull the Secretary-General's office should not be so burdened with the Congo that it becomes immobilized for effective and imaginative handling of other crises and any needed executive operations.

The U.N. has some 420 administrators and technicians in the Congo and is financing most of the Congo's imports out of the U.N. Economic Fund for the Congo. The United States has a few bilateral projects (including assistance to Lovanium University and the National Institute of Law and Administration) and also a bilateral program of P.L. 480 supplies, some of which are used for direct relief while some are sold and the counterpart deposited in a fund under the control of UNOC. The Belgian Government pays one-third of the

salary of some 2,400 Belgian advisers and technicians. The European Economic Community is considering a contribution in the form of imports from Europe. Other bilateral aid programs will be available to assist in the Congo's economic development. Assuming it settles down politically, the Congo will increasingly be drawn into African regional arrangements, including the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa and perhaps the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA).

The Congolese Government needs a strong system of planning and coordination, to relate all these sources of external assistance to a rational plan. It seems necessary, and is probably acceptable to all the several parties at interest, to establish an effective coordinating device in Léopoldville for external aid. In addition to developing within the Congolese Government a plan of campaign and trying to relate all aid to that plan, this body should comprise a strong and knowledgeable coordinating office for all technical and economic aid from abroad.

By these devices, and others, the practice of the United Nations in the Congo can mutate from a brilliant improvisation to a carefully planned exercise in nation building.

But who is recording the U.N.'s experience in the Congo?

If a main source of international law is now the practice of international organizations, perhaps the first step in writing the next textbook should not be to read what everybody else has written on the subject but to capture and codify the experience we are having every day as a participant in the U.N.'s trials and errors in the Congo.

Why don't you hold your next meeting in Léopoldville?

#### **Council To Advise Department on U.S. Activities in Africa**

Formation of an Advisory Council on African Affairs comprising prominent educators, businessmen, labor leaders, and professional people to consult with officials of the Department of State about U.S. activities in Africa was announced by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, on June 11 (press release 384).

The Advisory Council will meet with Mr. Williams and other high officials in Washington on June 13 and 14 to discuss its future program. Prof. D. Vernon McKay of the Johns Hopkins University has been serving as chairman pro tempore of the steering committee.

Mr. Williams said the Council's membership would provide the Department of State with an opportunity to utilize the background knowledge and resources of nongovernmental experts in African affairs who are engaged in American universities, foundations, missionary organizations, labor unions, and business.<sup>1</sup>

## U.S. Intends To Place New Tariff Schedules in Effect January 1

Press release 384 dated June 15

The United States intends to place the revised U.S. tariff schedules provided for in the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 into effect on January 1, 1963, and is now undertaking the necessary international procedures, the Department of State announced on June 15.

The new act makes it possible for the United States to respect its trade-agreement obligations by negotiating with other countries over the conversion of their present concessions to the language of the new schedules. The new schedules will not go into effect until the necessary steps in this direction have been taken.

The United States recently obtained from the Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) a decision under which the necessary consultations and negotiations with GATT countries can begin promptly. Consultations are also being initiated with countries with which the United States has bilateral trade agreements. The United States also informed the GATT Council of its intention to request a waiver at the 20th session of the GATT this fall, so that the new tariff schedules can be put into effect on January 1 even if the negotiations have not been completed by that date.

The Tariff Classification Act of 1962 was passed by the Congress and signed by the President<sup>2</sup> on

May 24. The new schedules provided for by the Tariff Classification Act will replace the schedules in the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. They were prepared by the United States Tariff Commission under the authority of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954 and do not result in any general change in the level of United States tariffs. The implementation of the new schedules will be a major step forward in the simplification of the United States customs laws.

## Secretary Deplores Restrictions by Senate on Foreign Aid

*Statement by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I consider most unfortunate the action taken by the Senate today [June 6]<sup>2</sup> to prohibit any type of aid, including sales of foodstuffs for local currency, to Poland and Yugoslavia.

The adoption of the Lausche amendment will give the impression abroad that we are permanently writing off to Soviet domination the millions of people who still yearn for freedom. It would, for example, penalize the people of Poland by denying them food and force them into total dependence on the Soviets. Furthermore, the amendment would deprive the President of the discretion which he needs in an explosive world.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Released to news correspondents on June 6.

<sup>2</sup> On June 6 the Senate adopted an amendment to S. 2986 offered by Senator Frank J. Lausche, as follows:

"(g) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act and no commodities may be sold or given under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, to any country known to be dominated by communism or Marxism. This restriction may not be waived pursuant to any authority contained in this Act."

<sup>3</sup> On June 7 the Senate adopted the following amendment offered by Senators Mike Mansfield and Everett M. Dirksen, which permits provision of surplus agricultural products:

"(h) Nothing contained in subsection (g) shall be deemed to prohibit assistance under the provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, if prior to furnishing such assistance the President finds (1) that a recipient country is not participating directly or indirectly in any policy or program for the Communist conquest of the world, and (2) that such recipient country is not controlled by any country promoting the Communist conquest of the world, and (3) that the furnishing of such assistance is in the interest of the national security of the United States, and (4) that the President notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of his intention to furnish such assistance."

<sup>1</sup> For names of the members of the Advisory Council, see Department of State press release 384 dated June 11.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of June 25, 1962, p. 1038.

## Development and Crisis

by George A. Morgan

Director, Foreign Service Institute<sup>1</sup>

Years ago we fought to make the world safe for democracy. Two generations later it is still not safe, and we have long since realized that we live not in an interval but in an age of crisis.

The chief addition of recent years is that crises have become as frequent as morning broadcasts, like Alice's oysters—

And thick and fast they came at last,  
And more, and more, and more. . . .

Our skill in handling crises can never hope to equal the Walrus and the Carpenter eating oysters, but it would be a pity if we did not learn substantial improvement from such plentiful experience. I think we have, and shall do more.

The keys to progress here are understanding, anticipation, and control.

### Understanding the Crises

How understand the crises of our day?

One of the most striking features of their incidence is the way they cluster in that vast segment of human geography which we call the newly developing areas—"newly" because the rest of us are still growing too, we hope. Apart from Berlin—a very special case—almost any international crisis you can name in recent years concerned such an area. Laos, Cuba, Algeria, the Congo leap to mind; also Suez, Kashmir, Viet-Nam, Guatemala, Angola, and a hundred more.

Merely reeling off these names is enough to remind us how superficial the headline approach to crises must be. Although Laos, for instance, has been a crisis area for some years, there were times when the volcano erupted, times when it slept, and each eruption had a unique pattern of rumblings, blast, and fallout.

The newly developing areas themselves are by no means a uniform mass with identical problems. Rather they embrace a marvelous spectrum of human life, extending from Stone Age cultures in New Guinea to the ancient civilizations of China and India.

Why the common denominator of crisis incidence?

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the United Press International Broadcasters Association of Virginia at Virginia Beach, Va., on June 9 (press release 372 dated June 8).

The basic reason lies in the common predicament of these peoples. However various, they are caught up in the great tide of cultural change by which all the families of man are being drawn toward the single world civilization of the future.

A prime mover in this process is Western technology, with its fruits of mass production and communication which are as irresistible as Eve's apple. Around the globe, societies settled for centuries in their own ways of living are being unsettled with modernity and reaching for more. They are in a hurry, too. It is striking how often our African friends tell us, "We've got to catch up with you in 10 years."

Technology does not live by itself. It involves not only new ideas but new modes of organized human action. Back before the war the press reported that a chief export to one of the Buddhist countries was electric motors to run prayer wheels. However eternal the object of men's prayers, their temporal expression was again bringing revolution, as so often in history.

A second prime mover in modernizing traditional societies is the desire to develop means of enjoying the fruits of technology and the status that goes with it: to have something and be something in the modern world. Since the sovereign nation-state has been the political form of the industrial era, "being something" means being an independent nation—even for peoples that have not hitherto been either independent or a nation. So a special kind of nationalism has spread like wildfire throughout most of the less developed lands.

These two prime movers—technology and nationalism—would by themselves be enough to explain why the growing pains of development so frequently break out in crises—sometimes internal, sometimes involving neighbors or excolonial powers. For customary patterns of living are strained and eroded in countless ways by these forces, and social demands are generated with which old elites are unable to cope. The electricity which turns prayer wheels can also turn hi-fi twist.

But there is a third force, not so much a prime mover as a parasite of the modernization process, which seeks to divert the process and its crises to alien ends. That is the force of organized communism. Inside the older industrialized countries of the free world it is no longer the threat it once was, but in the newly developing areas there are plenty of maladjustments and misunderstandings



on which it feeds. Thus it is able to precipitate some crises and make many others worse. For example, it precipitated insurgency in Viet-Nam and it aggravated the Congo situation. Its readiness to exploit political confusion, as in Laos, or quarrels between neighbors, as in New Guinea, is why problems of internal defense are peculiarly urgent for the modernizing nations.

The three forces I have described—technology, nationalism, and communism—are by no means a complete list even of the main factors at work in contemporary crises, and of course each crisis has its own peculiar origins. But they illustrate points of view that may lend perspective to the daily events that prey on the anxieties of your listeners.

### Keeping Ahead of Events

As we learn to understand crises better, we get a sounder basis for anticipating them. The exact shape and date of a particular crisis is virtually unpredictable, like any other unique historical event. But we can observe trends and situations that are likely to produce crises, and sharpen our eyes and ears to detect a rising storm.

Anticipation is foresight plus; it is forehanded action. That is what we mean by keeping ahead of events. To do so infallibly is reserved for Divine Providence. Yet ordinary mortals, where they see signs of trouble, can think out ahead of time some of the more visible dimensions of the problem and thus be the better prepared when it comes, even though it seldom arrives just in the way expected. There were faults in the Lebanon operation which we have since learned to correct, but the main point is that it succeeded, and this was due in no small measure to the planning on which it was based.

Planning is only one kind of forehanded action. Other kinds include logistic preparation—which has its importance in civil as well as military affairs—and preventive or ameliorative measures. ‘Preventive diplomacy,’ a favorite term of Secretary Rusk coined by analogy with “preventive medicine,” is an established practice which has latterly acquired a methodology and is now consciously cultivated as an art. Better than coping with crises is managing so that they do not occur in the first place.

That is far easier said than done, and such are the mysteries of historical causation that it is

seldom easy to demonstrate the fact even when we think it has been done. Everybody knows about the Berlin problems of recent years, but enormous pains have been taken to prevent far worse ones. I believe those pains have been eminently successful, but I could prove it conclusively only by playing history over again to see what would happen if those efforts had not been made—which is impossible.

That is too bad, because in an age of crisis the public gets deluged with bad news of what has happened, while largely ignorant of the bad news that did not happen—partly due to our own efforts. The obvious retort is that what did not happen is not news, but that is only partially true. Perhaps it is because we Americans have a hair-shirt complex, but good news that fails to happen somehow has a magic attraction for the headlines.

I know of few problems that seem to me more serious for responsible journalism today. A deep and potentially ominous anxiety neurosis has been engendered in the American people because it is so difficult to present a balanced picture of daily events—and just in a period when the country needs stout hearts and steady nerves. I do not claim to have the answer, but I believe the unremitting search for it is worthy of the finest talents of your profession and mine.

I too would be presenting an unbalanced view if I spoke only of preventive diplomacy here. Crises bring opportunities as well as troubles. Preparing to make the most of them is equally a part of the job of anticipation. It was in the crisis following Trujillo's death that we seized and won the opportunity to help the Dominican Republic, badly crippled by years of despotism, find its way toward healthy freedom.

### Controlling the Instruments of Action

As we understand and anticipate better, we improve our stance for tackling the third factor of progress in the field of crisis handling: control. This may seem a paradox because a crisis might be defined as a situation out of control. But to speak of our really controlling almost any international situation is a misnomer. Providence controls, men and nations only navigate, the stream of history.

What I am talking about here is control of ourselves and our instruments of action. As we per-

fect it we increase our effectiveness in navigating crises that are upon us.

Controlling ourselves is more than individual self-control, though perhaps we still have something to learn from sages as well as psychologists on this point. It is particularly group self-control.

In foreign affairs, as you well know from your profession, speech is a form of action. Getting any group that is handling a problem, here or abroad, to control relevant acts of communication intelligently is one of the thorniest tasks of leadership. Yet I think we have learned better in recent years to talk as a team where teamwork is important. There is also wider appreciation of the fact that silence on occasion can be more effective than talk.

Other instruments range from the mightiest to the subtlest in the human repertory. Their requirements become daily more complex, their combined potential more varied. The orchestration of

these instruments is a never-ending enterprise of research, of experience, and of training.

The latest experiment in such training begins 2 days from now at the Foreign Service Institute.<sup>2</sup> During 5 intensive weeks, teams of senior officers will train together to tackle the problems of development and internal defense involving our relations with the countries they are to serve in. Thus they will be preparing to understand, anticipate, and navigate their share of crises.

Crisis are not the whole story or indeed the main story of foreign affairs even in this time of troubles. The rise of the Common Market and the gathering headway of the President's trade program are more central to the majestic march of history. But crises are going to be with us for a long time and, as President Kennedy's first book concludes, "It's the system that functions in the pinches that survives."

<sup>2</sup> See p. 41.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Scheduled July Through September 1962

NATO European Radio Frequency Agency . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	July 2-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Rapporteurs on Braking . . . . .	Amsterdam . . . . .	July 2-
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Committee . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	July 2-
25th International Conference on Public Education . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
FAO World Meeting on the Biology of Tuna and Tuna-Like Fishes . . . . .	La Jolla, Calif . . . . .	July 2-
International Whaling Commission: 14th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 2-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 3-
OECD Maritime Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 5-
OECD Pulp and Paper Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 5-
WMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session . . . . .	Toronto . . . . .	July 9-
United Nations Coffee Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	July 9-
OECD Agriculture Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 10-
Council of Europe: Committee of Experts on Patents . . . . .	Strasbourg . . . . .	July 10-
Antarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	July 18-
South Pacific Commission: 23d Session . . . . .	Pago Pago . . . . .	July 18-
South Pacific Conference: 5th Session . . . . .	Pago Pago . . . . .	July 18-
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 23-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 18, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	July 23-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting .	Paris . . . . .	July 25-
UNESCO International Educational Building Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 25-
6th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East . . . . .	Lebanon . . . . .	July 30-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Data Exchange . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	July 30-
IBE Council: 28th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July
UNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	July
U.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World .	Bonn . . . . .	Aug. 3-
UNESCO African Regional Meeting on Copyright Matters Relative to Newly Independent States . . . . .	Brazzaville . . . . .	Aug. 6-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Fixed Stations . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Aug. 6-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim Meeting . . . . .	Honolulu . . . . .	Aug. 13-
12th World's Poultry Congress . . . . .	Sydney . . . . .	Aug. 13-
U.N. ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Asian Institute of Economic Development . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 14-
16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 19-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level . .	México, D. F . . . . .	Aug. 20-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods .	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 20-
ICAO Assembly: 14th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 21-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States . . . . .	Tunis . . . . .	Aug. 23-
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 25-
ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 28-
FAO Poplar Commission: 11th Session . . . . .	Belgrade and Zagreb . . . . .	Aug. 28-
FAO Poplar Commission: 8th Session of Working Party on Utili- zation and Exploitation . . . . .	Belgrade and Zagreb . . . . .	Aug. 28-
FAO Poplar Commission: 4th Session of Working Party on Poplar Diseases . . . . .	Belgrade and Zagreb . . . . .	Aug. 28-
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engi- neering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Aug. 29-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board . . . . .	México, D. F . . . . .	August
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	August
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Conference on Travel . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	August or September
2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on Development of Petroleum Re- sources of Asia and the Far East . . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	Sept. 1-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting on Farm Rationalization . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 3-
16th International Dairy Congress . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 3-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa . . . . .	Tananarive . . . . .	Sept. 3-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level . . . . .	México, D. F . . . . .	Sept. 7-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Group of Experts To Study Certain Technical Railway Questions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 10-
IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter- national Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 17-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East/West Trade Consultations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Materials .	New Delhi . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. General Assembly: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 18-
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly .	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 19-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 20-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Sept. 21-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	(undetermined) . . . . .	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 25-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on Exploitation and Regulation of Fisheries for Crustacea . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	Sept. 28-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 27-
Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana . . . . .	September
CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium) . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	September

## The Financial Obligations of Members of the United Nations

*Statement by Abram Chayes  
Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>*

May it please the Court: The issue before the Court is whether the United Nations has legal authority to raise funds for the accomplishment of its paramount purpose, the maintenance of international peace and security.

It has been rightly said here that the question upon which the General Assembly has asked your advice<sup>2</sup> is a precise and limited one. Nevertheless, its answer requires a consideration of fundamental questions of the distribution of powers within the United Nations. It has profound implications for the capacity of the Organization to survive and to realize its aims. In the view of the Government of the United States, no more important question has ever been before the International Court.

The importance of the case is witnessed by the number of Governments that have taken advantage of the opportunity under the Statute of the Court to submit views in writing and orally on the questions at issue. The Court has had the benefit of written statements on both sides of the question from 18 Governments and has, in the last 10 days, heard oral arguments, also, I am glad to say, on both sides of the question, from 8 Governments.

At this stage, there is little to be added by way of detailed exegesis to what distinguished counsel have already said. Certain remarks have been made in the course of the argument before you calling into question the conduct and the good faith of Governments represented here (including my own) and of some that are not. I reject those remarks, but I do not propose to respond to them. This is not a place where political recriminations,

unfortunately common in other forums, should properly be rehearsed. And such remarks are, of course, wholly irrelevant to the issues in this case. What may be useful now is to restate the essential structure of the case for an affirmative answer to the Assembly's question, and to respond to the major thrusts that have been made against that case.

The argument for an affirmative answer is straightforward. There is only one Article in the Charter dealing with financial obligations of Members, Article 17, paragraph 2. It provides: "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly". It vests in the Organization the power, by resolution of the General Assembly apportioning and assessing expenses, to require Member States to pay charges lawfully incurred. This is the meaning, and the whole meaning, of Article 17. It is the plain meaning of the text; it coincides with the intention of the framers of the Charter evidenced in the preparatory work; it is reinforced by the unbroken practice of the Organization under the Charter. It reflects, as a Committee of Jurists said in construing the parallel Article of the League of Nations Covenant, "the general principle, a principle applicable to all associations, that legally incurred expenses of an association must be borne by all its Members in common". (*Contribution of the State of Salvador to the Expenses of the League*, A. 128.1922.V., p. 193.)

The contention has been advanced that the term "expenses", despite its generality, must be read to mean *some* expenses rather than *all* expenses, "administrative" expenses as opposed to "operational" expenses, "normal" expenses in contrast with "ex-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the International Court of Justice at The Hague on May 21.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI).

traordinary" expenses. These distinctions cannot be sustained. They are without support in the text of the Charter, in the San Francisco discussions, or in the experience of the United Nations. They cannot be applied coherently in practice. If adopted, they would lead to doubt and confusion about the financial obligations of Members, a field in which, more than most, clarity and certainty are needed for the effective functioning of the Organization. These points have been developed persuasively and in detail by others. May I simply add to the references already before the Court the Note of the Controller in the dossier prepared by the Secretary-General. This Note shows, among other things, that the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, though not a part of the "regular" budget and though used to meet "extraordinary" expenditures, notably those for peacekeeping "operations", has been consistently provided for by assessment against the Members under Article 17. (*Note by the Controller on Budgetary and Financial Practice of the United Nations*, pp. 9-10, 25.)

The meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, then, is this: The United Nations has the power, by resolution of the General Assembly apportioning and assessing expenses, to require the Member States to pay for expenditures lawfully made. I think there can be no doubt that that power was exercised in the resolutions levying assessments to cover the expenditures for the Middle East and Congo Forces. It is true that, on occasion, these expenditures were characterized as "extraordinary", that assessments to cover them were not made in the regular budget, that they were charged against an *ad hoc* or special account. On the basis of these factors, it has been suggested to the Court that the General Assembly was not acting to impose the obligation of payment upon Member States for the assessments made in the resolutions.

Direct expressions to the contrary are many and weighty and have been cited to the Court. But put these aside. Read the financing resolutions together, one after the other. Read especially the operative portions rather than the preambular material. Consider the form in which they are stated, the sharpness of the distinction they make between the voluntary contributions they solicit and the assessments they exact. See the concern they show for the burden upon poorer Members caused by the financial obligations imposed. All this is utterly at odds with the notion

that the Assembly did not intend to exercise its power to impose binding assessments. On the other hand, all of the circumstances adduced in support of that notion can be, and have been, explained in terms that are fully consistent with the intention of the Assembly to exercise its power to bind.

If the Assembly has power under Article 17 to impose binding financial obligations for all expenditures lawfully incurred, and if it is granted that the Assembly intended to exercise that power, then the only argument that remains against the binding character of the assessments is that they were not levied to cover expenditures *lawfully* incurred.

A review of the written and oral arguments for a negative answer to the question before the Court reveals that the main thrust of these submissions is indeed directed at the legality of the expenditures themselves; the legality, that is, of the activities giving rise to them.

To what extent, if any, is this question of lawfulness open, assuming, as I think everyone does, that there is no doubt about the formal regularity of the assessing resolutions?

A number of my colleagues have taken the position that the Court need not and should not inquire into the validity of the underlying resolutions establishing and regulating the Congo and Middle East Forces, except, perhaps, to assure itself that these resolutions are not "manifestly invalid". They point to the language of the resolution putting the question to the Court, and to the debates preceding its adoption, as showing an intention that the Court's inquiry should confine itself to the legal effect of the assessing resolutions alone.

The United States is in full agreement with this position. Certainly, the Assembly had no desire to cast doubt on the validity of its own actions over a five year period. The Court can, in my view, decide this case without an investigation into the power of the Assembly and the Security Council, under the Charter, to adopt the resolutions establishing and governing the Congo and Middle East Forces. If it can do so, it is bound to do so, both by the terms of the resolution putting the question and on general principles of constitutional adjudication which prescribe that issues of constitutional power should be passed upon only when that is essential to the decision of the case.

The first way by which to avoid considering the validity of the underlying resolutions is simply to assume that they are valid. The Assembly has the right to define its question as it chooses, so long as the limitation does not stultify the Court's processes. If it does not wish its actions called in question, it may ask the Court to consider the effect of the assessing resolutions on the assumption that the underlying resolutions are valid. The Court should accept that assumption, at least where it does not do violence to common sense or to the Court's own sense of the requirements of adjudication. In this case, the assumption of validity is far from being absurd or far-fetched or patently untenable. Quite the reverse. It is the argument against validity which is fine-spun, and relies on subtle and attenuated argumentation, elaborating limitations, supposedly implied or inherent, upon powers expressly granted. In these circumstances, the Court need not review the Assembly's own considered judgment that its actions were lawful, a judgment expressed initially when the forces were constituted, a judgment reiterated as questions of their mission or financial support came before the Assembly, and a judgment stated finally by the precision with which the Assembly formulated its question to the Court.

Secondly, in a sense, the question of validity is logically irrelevant to the decision the Court must make. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this Court, or some other authoritative organ, were now to determine that the resolutions establishing UNEF [United Nations Emergency Forces] and ONUC [Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo] were "unconstitutional". The decision could not erase the fact that UNEF and ONUC had existed. They existed by virtue of resolutions adopted without dissenting votes. These resolutions are themselves interpretations of the Charter holding that the actions taken are within the powers granted to the organ adopting the resolution. Until they are authoritatively set aside, persons or States dealing with the Organization in respect of matters covered by the resolutions were entitled to regard them as valid and effective, at least in the absence of an important irregularity in the procedure by which they were adopted or a substantive invalidity so patent as to amount to a manifest usurpation. If, acting pursuant to such resolutions, the Secretary-General entered into obligations committing the

United Nations to pay for goods or services furnished by Member States or private persons, those obligations are binding in law upon the United Nations as an organization. It was legally obliged to repay them. And this Court has said, as to expenditures arising out of "obligations already incurred by the Organization":

... the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements.

I refer to the case *The Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal*, I.C.J. Reports 1954, pp. 47, 59.

On this line of reasoning, I believe the Court may give an affirmative answer to the question put to it by the General Assembly without examining the substantive validity of the resolutions by which the Congo and Middle East Forces were created, at least insofar as those assessments are required to cover existing contractual obligations of the Organization to pay money for goods and services furnished. Since the United Nations deficit is estimated at \$170 million as of 30 June 1962, while the arrearages on assessments levied under the resolutions before the Court are at most only \$150 million, this analysis would lead to an affirmative answer as to all past assessing resolutions.

As I understand them, the submissions of the Governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland upon this point do not differ substantially from the arguments I have just made.

Let me repeat. In the words of the Attorney-General of Ireland,

... the Court is not compelled to concern itself with the question of validity and can answer the question on which advice is sought without investigating this issue.

I submit that it should do so.

But if the Court itself should conclude that it must examine the validity of the underlying resolutions in order to arrive at an answer to the question put by the Assembly, then, in my view, the resolution putting the question does not preclude such an inquiry. The written statement of the Government of France seems to say otherwise: I quote from page 74 of the booklet of printed statements—

... the question put to the Court does not enable the latter to give a clear-cut opinion on the juridical basis for the financial obligations of Member States or on the United Nations constitutional problems underlying them.

And the statement concludes, at pages 78-79 :

To sum up, the Government of the French Republic considers that the circumstances in which the Court has been consulted are not such as to make it possible to obtain the legal opinion which is considered necessary.

This, in my submission, cannot be so. The Assembly wanted advice on its question. It did not mean to put to the Court a question which it could not answer, or to place conditions upon the Court which would prevent it from answering. This was expressly stated in the debates before the adoption of the resolution. The representative of the United States said in the Fifth Committee consideration of the resolution—and I quote now from the *Official Records*, General Assembly, 16th Session, Fifth Committee, 879th Meeting, pp. 292-293 :

It was the sponsors' intention that the Court should consider the question exhaustively and in all its aspects.

The representative of the United Kingdom added in Plenary Session of the Assembly—again I quote from the 16th Session of the General Assembly, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, 1086 Plenary Meeting, A/PV 1086, at page 62 :

... the International Court, in considering the question which was formulated in the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee, will undoubtedly be able to take into consideration all relative provisions of the Charter. Furthermore, it will of course be open, under the Statute of the Court, to any Member State that wishes to do so to submit to the Court its views on the conformity with the Charter of the decisions taken in regard to the expenditures referred to in the draft resolution. . . .

On this basis, the Assembly accepted the resolution as reported from the Fifth Committee and rejected a French amendment that would have broadened the statement of the question.

From this it follows that, if the Court should differ with the views, advanced by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland and others, that the issues can properly be limited so as to avoid passing upon the validity of the underlying resolutions, then it is free to inquire into these broader questions.

Now may I digress here for a moment to deal with another challenge to the Court's competence. The South African Government contends that, and I quote from page 216 of the printed volume :

... the whole question submitted for an advisory opinion could only be answered if the Court is fully informed as to the *causa* of the expenditures authorized by the relative General Assembly resolutions.

The short answer to this is that the question put to the Court deals only with "expenditures *authorized* in the General Assembly resolutions . . .". Those resolutions cannot be taken to have *authorized* expenditures for activities outside the terms of the basic resolutions establishing and governing the forces.

Since there may be circumstances in which the validity of the underlying resolutions might be considered by this Court, and since certain governments have argued the matter at length, let me address myself to their principal contentions.

These are two. According to the first, the United Nations is debarred from organizing any international force, except by the means provided in Article 43 of the Charter—that is, special agreements negotiated "on the initiative of the Security Council" to be "concluded between the Security Council and Members . . . or groups of Members". And the United Nations may not deploy any international force except as provided in Articles 44 through 48 of the Charter; that is, at the direction of the Security Council and with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

The second argument is that, even if the United Nations can raise an international force apart from Article 43 by voluntary contribution of troops and equipment, it must limit itself to voluntary financial contributions to support such a force.

Let me take up each of these arguments in turn.

The statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic says :

The pertinent provisions of the Charter, in particular Articles 43 and 48, provide the basis for assistance to be made available by Member States in all operations taken in the name of the Organization. . . .

Any other way of undertaking actions by the Organization with the use of armed forces goes beyond the principles of international co-operation in the efforts for the preservation of peace and security, enunciated by the United Nations Charter, and can in no way establish legal obligations binding the Member States under Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the Charter.

(That is at p. 123 of the printed booklet.)

In the statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the same point is made :

... Chapter VII of the Charter envisaged that it was the Security Council alone and not the General Assembly that may set up international armed forces and take such action as might be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, including the use of such armed forces.

(That is at p. 4 of the Soviet statement.)

Thus, according to the Soviet Union, the Middle East Force, authorized by the General Assembly, was unlawful *ab initio*. The United Nations operations in the Congo, although authorized by the Security Council, are also invalid, it says, because the procedural provisions of Articles 43 and 48 were not complied with.

The text of Article 43 demonstrates that these assertions are unsound. On its face, the Article merely establishes a procedure by which Members are, and I quote:

... to make available to the Security Council, *on its call* ... armed forces, assistance, and facilities ... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

With the implementation of that procedure, the Security Council would not have to depend on volunteers, but could have required that military force be furnished to it. There is no suggestion in the text of the Article that it provides the exclusive method for raising armed forces. On the contrary, it addresses itself to a very special case, the use of armed forces without the contemporaneous consent of the Member State furnishing them.

This conclusion is reinforced by the context in which Article 43 is placed in the Charter. The subject-matter of Chapter VII is "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". Article 39 opens the Chapter by providing that the Security Council shall determine the existence of such events and shall make recommendations or take decisions to deal with them. Article 40 describes provisional measures; Article 41 provides for sanctions short of the use of force. Only when lesser measures are considered inadequate may the Security Council take action by military force "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". What action is contemplated? I quote the Article:

... demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces. . . .

—that is, the commitment of U.N. military forces to battle.

It was to provide forces that could be requisitioned for this purpose, for military hostilities, that agreements under Article 43 were contemplated. Because such forces were subject to being committed to action by mandatory decision of the Security Council, an advance agreement ratified according to the constitutional processes of the Member States was required.

All this is underscored by the subsequent provisions of the Charter. According to Article 44, when the Security Council "has decided to use force" it must invite participation in its deliberations by a Member before summoning its armed forces under an Article 43 agreement. Article 45 deals with "urgent military measures"; Article 46 with "plans for the application of armed force"; Article 47 provides for a Military Staff Committee, responsible for "strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council", under Article 43; and, finally, Article 48 provides that the Security Council shall designate the Member States to take "action" required to carry out its "decisions".

Thus it is seen that the purpose of Chapter VII is to provide for the most far-reaching of the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations—that of taking decisions binding on the Members to bring international force to bear, through active military hostilities if need be, against the will of the aggressor—indeed, to break his will.

The occasions for the exercise of such powers will be rare—they will be moments of supreme crisis. Given the magnitude of the powers envisioned, it was appropriate that they be surrounded with the elaborate procedural safeguards of Chapter VII: Security Council veto, the necessity of prior special agreements ratified by Member States, provisions for qualified membership in the Security Council, and a requirement for the exhaustion of lesser remedies. All these restrictions and safeguards are unnecessary for the more usual range of peace-keeping activities authorized by Articles 11 and 24, even when the instrumentality employed may be men of the armed forces of Member nations.

Activities outside the purview of Chapter VII involve no "action" to carry out "decisions" binding on Member States. I use those terms "action" and "decision" in the special sense they have in Chapter VII. The States concerned, when action is taken outside Chapter VII, would have to consent to those activities in each particular case, either by supplying forces or by admitting them to their territory. This safeguard of contemporaneous consent is adequate to the case.

The special and unique possibility provided in Chapter VII for taking binding decisions for action, including military action, against an aggressor was thought to be the salient advantage correcting the salient weakness that had doomed



the League of Nations to ineffectiveness. Speaking in Plenary Session at San Francisco, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Enforcement Measures, M. Paul-Boncour, made this clear (and I quote at some length from his statement, which is to be found in Vol. I of UNICIO [United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents*] at p. 688. The emphasis in the quotation is the Rapporteur's):

When everything possible has been done to maintain peace, if the aggressor persists in his purpose, there is only one way to oppose him, and that is by force. But the Covenant of the League merely provided for the recommendation of military sanctions involving air, sea, or land forces, and consequently left the nations the option of backing out.

Today this flaw has been eliminated. In the Charter sanctioned by this plenary assembly . . . the obligation for all Member States to help in suppressing aggression is plainly established. An international force is to be formed and placed at the disposal of the Security Council in order to insure respect for its decisions. This force will consist of national contingents arranged for in advance by special agreements negotiated on the initiative of the Security Council. These special agreements will determine the composition of this force, its strength, degree of preparedness, and location. If called upon to do so by the Security Council, the entire force will march against a State convicted of aggression, in accordance with the provisions for enforcement as laid down by the Security Council.

In the event, of course, it has not turned out that way. The Security Council has never taken a binding decision to use force under Article 42 and has never negotiated an agreement under Article 43. But the Charter meant to *add to and reinforce* the peace-keeping powers of the League, not to subtract from them. There was no desire to withdraw the power of recommendation of military sanctions involving land, sea or air forces. There was no purpose to shackle these other peace-keeping enterprises with limitations and restrictions designed solely for the terrible eventuality of a war against aggression. It was San Francisco's intention to eliminate the "option of backing out" that M. Paul-Boncour described in the League Covenant, not the option of coming in.

Now, I should like to recall to the Court that voluntary peace-keeping operations were unlike those here under consideration were undertaken by the League of Nations from its earliest days.

In 1920, a dispute involving considerable fighting broke out between Poland and Lithuania over possession of the city of Vilna. The League Council proposed, and Lithuania and Poland agreed,

that the inhabitants of Vilna and its province should themselves decide whether to belong to Poland or to Lithuania. The vote was to be organized by the League. Polish troops, which had occupied Vilna, were to be replaced by an international force acting under the orders of the League Council. A number of Members of the League were invited to contribute a company each to the proposed international force and nine countries agreed. The international force, consisting of some 1,500 men, did not actually enter upon the disputed territory, but preparations for its organization and dispatch were far advanced and considerable expenses were incurred on the strength of the Council's resolutions. I should say that the reason the force did not enter upon the disputed territory was the objection of a neighboring nation—a factor not present in the Middle East and Congo operations. How were the expenses incurred in the preparation of the force borne? The budget submitted to the League Assembly indicates that the expenses of the force, in the amount of 422,260 gold francs, were borne not by the States contributing the troops, but by the League. (Chapter 3 of the Budget for 1924, League of Nations Document A.4(2).1923.X., at page 6; Item: "Reimbursement of expenses incurred by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1920 for the establishment of an international force for the conducting of the proposed plebiscite in Vilna".)

The history of the League of Nations also provides an example of a voluntary international force that was not only proposed and incurred expenses, but actually discharged its duties in full. You will recall that in 1935 a plebiscite was held to determine whether or not the Saar should rejoin Germany. The League Council decided that an international force was needed to ensure order during the plebiscite period. Accordingly, at the end of 1934, an International Force of 3,300 men was established. Its entry into the Saar was with the agreement of the Governments of Germany and France. Contingents were voluntarily contributed by Britain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. These facts appear from the resolution of the League Council of 8 December 1934. (*Official Journal*, 1934, p. 1730.) Like the Council resolution establishing the Vilna force, this resolution made no reference to the sole article of the Covenant, Article 16, that provided for recommendations on the use of armed force. The resolutions

in both cases were of course approved unanimously by the Council Members. The expenses of the Saar force, over and above the normal costs of the troops already provided for in the national budgets of the Governments contributing them, were not met by those Governments, but were charged to the fund for expenditure in connection with the plebiscite. (*Ibid.*, pp. 1762-63, 1841-42.) The international force for the Saar performed its duties with conspicuous success.

The possibility of voluntary contribution of military force was not only sanctioned by the practice of the League, it was recognized in discussions of the United Nations almost from the beginning. You will recall the construction of the Charter put forward by the Secretary-General in the Trieste case in 1947, already read to the Court by M. Cadieux. (Security Council, *Official Records*, 2nd year, 91st Meeting, pp. 44-45.) There the Secretary-General maintained that, in the light of its broad responsibilities under Article 24, the Security Council was not restricted to powers specifically enumerated in the Charter. The Council, acting on this construction, accepted the Trieste instruments there in question by a vote of 10-0 with one abstention, on the understanding, as expressed by the Secretary-General, that the powers enumerated in the Charter, and I quote:

. . . do not vest the Council with sufficient authority to undertake the responsibilities imposed by the instruments in question.

Thus the Council must have acted on the view of its implied powers set forth by the Secretary-General.

A year later, when the Palestine partition plan was under discussion, the Secretary-General explicitly applied this view of the Security Council's powers to the question of raising armed forces. I refer to a working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the United Nations Palestine Commission covering, among other things, the question of providing an international force to implement the partition plan. In it, the Secretary-General addressed this issue:

Under what conditions the Security Council may employ an international armed force.

The paper recognizes that:

The Security Council might employ an international force in the Palestine case . . . in virtue of Article 42 of the Charter. . . .

To do so, it says, the Council should find as a precondition "the existence in Palestine of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression." But it could also raise an international force apart from Chapter VII. The General Assembly "had requested the Security Council, *inter alia*, to take necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation." And this aspect of the Assembly's resolution, taken in conjunction with Article 24 of the Charter, would authorize the recruitment of an armed force. The Secretary-General concluded, and referred expressly to the interpretation in the Trieste case, that this course would be followed by the Security Council only "after previously having reached the conclusion that no threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression had occurred"—that is to say, when the necessary precondition for action under Chapter VII was absent. "An international armed force set up on this basis", said the Secretary-General, "would not be one in the sense of Chapter VII of the Charter. It would have the character of an international police force for the maintenance of law and order in a territory for which the international society is still responsible." (The document is A.AC.21/13, 9 February 1948, pp. 8-11.)

Again, in 1948, after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a United Nations Guard. The Guard was to be directly recruited and equipped by the Secretary-General, was to serve under his instructions, and was to be financed out of the regular United Nations budget. Although the United Nations Guard itself did not materialize, the United Nations Field Service, so recruited, so directed, and so financed, was derived from this conception. It is in action today with UNEF and ONUC, as well as on other U.N. missions.

Finally, the Uniting for Peace Resolution,<sup>5</sup> adopted in 1950 by a vote of 52-5, with 2 abstentions, foresaw the establishment of international forces on a voluntary basis and outside the scope of Article 43. Indeed agreement on a procedure for establishing such forces was one of the prime purposes motivating that resolution.

In all this, I have the feeling I have been belabouring the obvious. For certainly a sovereign state may volunteer its armed forces for any purpose whatever, so long as it does not trench upon the right of any other sovereign and so long as it

<sup>5</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

obtains the consent of those through or upon whose territory the forces operate. A State, or group of States, would be free, if the necessary consents were obtained, to use its forces to maintain the peace, as the Middle East and Congo Forces are now being used. The United Nations Charter does not limit that right. And surely what States might band together to do outside the United Nations, it is not forbidden that they do through the mechanism of that Organization whose primary purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security.

I shall not devote much time to the question whether, once we are satisfied that the procedures of Article 43 are not themselves exclusive, the Security Council *nevertheless* has the sole right to maintain armed forces for peace-keeping operations to the exclusion of the General Assembly. The Charter provisions are plain. The Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is "primary", not exclusive. The General Assembly, under Articles 10 and 11, has full authority to make recommendations on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. There are only two exceptions. It may not consider such questions while the Security Council is itself so engaged and it must refer to the Council those questions on which "action" is required—that is to say, action pursuant to decisions binding the Members, which the Security Council alone can take. Neither of these exceptions applies to recommendations for the contribution of forces and for their use with the consent of the States concerned, where, as with UNEF, the Security Council is not seized of the matter at the time the resolution is adopted.

For the establishment of an armed force at the call of the Security Council, in accordance with its binding decisions, Article 43 provides the only procedure, true. But the Court will search the Charter in vain to find any prohibition against *voluntary* use of armed force upon the recommendation of either the Council or the Assembly, and with the consent or at the request of nations whose security is threatened. And the Court will be slow to rule that, in adding to the arsenal of powers available to the United Nations the supreme power to order mandatory application of military force, the framers of the Charter withdrew or restricted well-known powers of a lesser character based on the consent of all interested parties.

This leads us to the second argument against the validity of the underlying resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council establishing the forces in question—an argument, on the surface, less sweeping than the one we have just considered. The argument grants that the United Nations could, either through the Security Council or the General Assembly, recommend that Member States contribute forces for the use of the Organization. But how, it asks, can the Organization compel a Member to pay for the expenses of forces that it could not compel that Member to contribute? Voluntary forces, it concludes, must be financed by voluntary contributions.

This is basically the argument put forth in the letter to the Court from the Government of the French Republic. Quoting its representative in the General Assembly debate on the Advisory Opinion Resolution, the letter says:

Firstly, the General Assembly has not the right, merely by voting on a budget, to extend the competence of the United Nations: . . .

Secondly, in the case of any United Nations organ, the power to make recommendations to Member States is not sufficient to impose upon them any form of obligation.

Thirdly, the legal power to make recommendations to Member States does not include permission to create, by the circuitous method of a direction addressed to the Secretary General . . . any obligations for the States. (p. 75)

But the argument proves too much. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would mean that the Organization could not compel its Members to pay for anything, except expenditures flowing from binding decisions of the Security Council. With the exception of such decisions, *all* actions of the Organization are either recommendations to the Member States or directions to the Secretary-General or other subsidiary organs; and, in the French view, these cannot give rise to binding financial obligations. The French submission recognizes that such a conclusion is untenable. Thus, it is led to assert the distinction between administrative and operational expenses which, as appears elsewhere, is unwarranted in the language or history of the Charter and would be unworkable in practice.

More fundamentally, in my view, the French argument puts the case the wrong way. The United Nations can pay for what it is empowered to do. If it can accept volunteers, it can defray the financial obligations generated by the activities of those volunteers.

In the case before the Court, the fact that the United Nations could not compel Members to contribute contingents to an international force is beside the point. It was not obliged to appeal to States for such contingents. This was a convenient way to proceed, but not the only way. The Assembly might have chosen to raise the force by direct recruitment. To do so, it might have needed the consent of individual States to pursue recruiting activities on their soil, or with respect to their nationals; and it would have needed the consent of the States on whose soil the recruits were to be housed, trained or used. But if those consents were obtained, it is hard to see what would prohibit the Organization from raising such a force and, if it did so, from paying for it by assessment. Indeed, just this process was contemplated for the establishment of the proposed United Nations Guard to which I have referred.

Member States do not find their protection against such action—if protection is needed—in legal strictures of the Charter, but in the political requirement of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly both to initiate the action and to make the necessary financial arrangements. If these majorities can be mustered; if the activities engaged in are immediately related to the express purposes of the United Nations; if they are approved in due course according to the regular procedures of one of its organs having competence over the subject matter; if they do not contravene any prohibition of the Charter nor invade the sovereign powers of individual States—if conditions such as these are satisfied, I can perceive no reason why the United Nations should be prohibited from levying assessments to pay for goods and services needed for those activities. The goods and services may be furnished by States Members. Often they will be furnished by private agencies or individuals. In neither case could the United Nations *require* that they be made available. But I do not see why, in either case, this should militate against the Organization's power to raise money by assessment to pay for them.

Thus, in my view, the French argument falls to the ground. It may have a certain plausibility to say that, if the Organization cannot compel a State to contribute forces, it cannot compel it to pay for forces contributed by others. But it would be equally plausible and equally erroneous to say that, since a national Government cannot compel

one of its citizens to work on a dam, it cannot tax him to pay for the work of others.

If any inquiry at all is to be permitted into the validity of the underlying resolutions establishing UNEF and ONUC, it must be directed to the substantive question: what can the United Nations do? What it can do, it can finance under the provisions of Article 17.

Mr. President, Members of the Court: The framers of the Charter and the people of the nations adopting it resolved together "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". They named the first object of their efforts: to maintain international peace and security. This Court in deciding this case will also decide, in large measure, whether they succeeded.

Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in a great case on the treaty power under the United States Constitution:

... when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; . . . The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. . . . (*Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 430, 433 (1920).)

The question before the Court must be addressed in the light of the whole experience of the United Nations Organization. What is that experience?

The innovation of the Charter, the power of the Organization acting through the Security Council to compel the contribution of military forces for military action against aggressors, this innovation was stillborn. If it had been the only method available to the Organization for using armed forces to meet threats to the peace, it may be said with some confidence that the worst of such threats would have remained unmet, and the Organization might now be in the same state as was the League of Nations fifteen years after its establishment.

Instead, however, a power that *was* available to the League, the power to take voluntary collective measures using troops of Member States as instruments in appropriate cases, that power took on a new vitality in dealing with the kind of threats to the peace we have had in the post-war world. By discriminating but imaginative use of this power, through 15 years and under 3 Secretaries-

General, the Organization has been able to carry out its first purpose, to keep the peace. In Palestine and Kashmir, on the Gaza strip, in Lebanon, and now in the Congo, armed contingents contributed voluntarily by their own Governments and acting with the consent of all States concerned have operated successfully under the flag and the command of the United Nations to safeguard international peace and security. In Korea, a United Nations force of national contingents, furnished without the compulsion of a Security Council decision, fought successfully to restore the situation as it existed before hostilities began.

The Court is asked to ignore this history, to strike down the one method by which experience has shown the United Nations can effectively summon military forces to deal with threats of aggression and breaches of the peace. The Soviet argument would reject this method out of hand. It would confine the Organization exclusively to the Chapter VII procedures which experience so far has shown to be sterile and useless. The French submission would accomplish the same result, not by prohibiting entirely the establishment and operation of United Nations forces outside the purview of Chapter VII, but by cutting off the possibility of financing such forces through assessments under Article 17. I said a moment ago that what the United Nations can do, it can pay for. The converse is also true—what it cannot pay for, it cannot do. The French position, equally with the Soviet, would bring to an end the use of United Nations forces for peace-keeping missions.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, if I may be permitted to refer again to the court I know best, the Supreme Court of my own country, it is, like this one, a custodian of a great charter granting and allocating political power to be exercised in pursuit of large purposes.

One of the early historic cases to come before that Court was *McCulloch v. Maryland*. That case too concerned the fiscal power granted by the Constitution to the entity which it had created. The question was whether the Federal Government had power to incorporate a central bank—to establish a subsidiary organ—when neither the power to incorporate nor the power to engage in banking were expressly granted in the words of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Marshall, the first great Chief

Justice, wrote the decision in that case. He said:

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. . . . In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a *constitution* we are expounding. (3 *Wheaton* 406 (1819).)

This injunction—we must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding—is classic in American jurisprudence. It is, indeed, as the Attorney-General of Ireland remarked the other day, a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. The principle found expression in the jurisprudence of this Court when it said:

Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. (*Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 174, 182.)

The Court needs no reminder that it is dealing with a constitutive instrument, regulating, within its scope, important relations among men and nations, meant to endure for many years, designed to promote great ends and intended to grant powers adequate to serve the purposes for which it was established. The constitution we are expounding here must contain within it the authority to mount and support the actions by which, in the years since its adoption, the United Nations has successfully defended a precarious peace.

It remains only to thank you, Mr. President, and Members of the Court, for myself and, if I may, on behalf of my colleagues, for the patience and courtesy with which you have heard us.

## William P. Allis Appointed to NATO Science Post

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 390) that William P. Allis, professor of physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been appointed by the Secretary

General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs to succeed William A. Nierenberg. Dr. Allis will assume his new post July 15.

The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs is concerned with NATO's science program, which originated from the decision taken by the NATO Heads of Government in December 1957<sup>1</sup> and which has helped promote increased scientific cooperation among NATO countries. Under the guidance of a distinguished group of scientists who comprise the NATO Science Committee, a program of science fellowships has permitted over 1,000 students to pursue their studies and research, funds have been made available to sponsor 67 advanced study institutes on scientific subjects, and a program of research grants has encouraged approximately 100 cooperative scientific projects among NATO countries. Included among the latter is a program in oceanographic research in the Shetland-Faeroes and Gibraltar Straits areas. Further activities, including meteorological research, are being planned by the NATO Science Committee, of which Dr. Allis will be the chairman.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.  
*Accession deposited:* Czechoslovakia, June 14, 1962.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at the First Consultative Meeting at Canberra July 10-21, 1961. Enters into force upon approval of all the parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in that meeting.

*Notifications of approval:* Argentina, October 13, 1961; Australia, October 6, 1961; Belgium, February 16, 1962; Chile, April 19, 1962; France, March 6, 1962; Japan, February 21, 1962; New Zealand, October 17, 1961; Norway, March 9, 1962; South Africa, May 7, 1962; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 8, 1962; United Kingdom, December 1, 1961; United States, December 12, 1961.  
*Entered into force:* April 19, 1962.

##### Aviation

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratifications deposited:* Central African Republic, May 22, 1962; Ceylon, May 28, 1962; Congo (Brazzaville), May 26, 1962; Denmark, May 15, 1962; Ghana, April 16, 1962; Netherlands, May 8, 1962; New Zealand, May 14, 1962; Pakistan, April 30, 1962; Poland, May 23, 1962; Portugal, May 29, 1962; Sierra Leone, May 15, 1962; Sudan, May 31, 1962; Switzerland, May 22, 1962; Viet-Nam, April 16, 1962.

##### Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.<sup>2</sup>

*Notification that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Léopoldville), May 3, 1962.

##### Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

*Accession deposited:* Guinea, May 8, 1962.

##### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Open for signature at Vienna until October 31, 1961, and at United Nations Headquarters, New York, until March 31, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Liberia, May 15, 1962.

##### Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.

*Acceptance deposited:* Mongolia, April 18, 1962.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1953. Entered into force July 9, 1953. 48 Stat. 1543.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Guinea, April 26, 1962.

##### Trade

Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.

*Ratification deposited:* Israel, June 5, 1962.

*Enters into force:* July 5, 1962.

#### BILATERAL

##### Congo (Léopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 18, 1961 (TIAS 4925). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville May 4 and 11, 1962. Entered into force May 11, 1962.

##### Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and materials furnished to the Federal Republic of Germany on a grant basis under the mutual defense as-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 12.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

sistance agreement of June 30, 1955 (TIAS 3443). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn May 25, 1962. Entered into force May 25, 1962.

#### **Greece**

Agreement concerning the use of Greek ports and territorial waters by the NS *Savannah*. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens April 23 and 24, 1962. Entered into force April 24, 1962.

#### **New Zealand**

Agreement relating to the loan of a United States naval vessel to New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 8, 1962. Entered into force June 8, 1962.

#### **South Africa**

Amendment to the agreement of July 8, 1957 (TIAS 3885), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 12, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

#### **United Arab Republic**

Cultural agreement. Signed at Cairo May 21, 1962. Entered into force May 21, 1962.

### **DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

## **FSI Begins Seminars on Problems of Development and Internal Defense**

### **DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT**

Press release 350 dated June 10

The Department of State, in cooperation with other responsible agencies of the Government, is inaugurating a series of seminars on "Problems of Development and Internal Defense." This will be a 5-week seminar course given by the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. Members of the first seminar will be senior State Department and other civilian and military officers who will assume positions of responsibility in developing countries. Secretary Rusk will address the opening session on June 11.

The seminar demonstrates the United States' determination to assist the less developed countries of the free world in developing balanced capabilities for the total defense of their societies against internal as well as external threats. It reflects a growing realization that Communist-inspired sub-

version and insurgency represent as great a menace to developing societies as direct aggression across international borders. For these reasons the seminars will stress practical ways in which the United States can most effectively assist countries in defending themselves.

The seminar will be organized along lines of the "country team" concept. This emphasizes that in their programs and activities the various elements of the U.S. Embassies, AID Missions, and Military Assistance Groups abroad work together under direction of the ambassador. Seminar participants will be divided into discussion groups framed along such "country team" lines. The seminar, therefore, covers new ground in that it provides its members with an opportunity jointly to discuss and consider combined approaches to problems they will be facing in areas in which they are scheduled to serve.

The first 2 weeks of each seminar will be the same for all members. Lectures, given by a distinguished team from the academic world, headed by Prof. Max Millikan of MIT, will emphasize the dynamics of development. These lectures, supplemented by intensive reading assignments, will cover such subjects as the structures of emerging societies, stages of economic growth, agricultural and commodity development, and the psychological and social effects of change.

Civilian and military officers of the Government will conduct the final 3 weeks of each seminar, during which time the emphasis will be on specific areas and problems of internal defense.

Between 50 and 60 senior officers will attend the first seminar. The program will be repeated at regular intervals thereafter, with the expectation of training approximately 500 officials during the first year of operation.

### **REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK**

Press release 381 dated June 11

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome this distinguished group of senior officers from the various agencies of our Government to a challenging adventure on a new frontier of American foreign policy. I can think of no areas as important as this to U.S. foreign policy, nor can I recall any course or seminar in the government educational system or the academic world so directly pointed at the struggle, in that vast portion of the earth's

territory and population known as the less developed world, between the forces of democracy and freedom on the one hand and totalitarianism and despotism on the other.

What we as the United States are seeking in the less developed world is not economic development for its own sake, nor the building of military forces as an end in itself, nor the creation of societies that are facsimiles of our own, but rather the use of our resources to assist new nations to remain free to determine their own future destiny and to build the kind of society that can maintain itself, develop in step with the modern world, and, above all, remain free from domination or control by an alien tyranny. Our interests do not require satellites, colonies, political obedience, or ideological subservience. We want these countries to develop in their own way and at their own pace into members of a free community of independent nations.

Our strategy is therefore twofold and interacting: We must encourage the less developed countries to move forward on their own as smoothly as possible, and we must simultaneously assist them against the threat of subversion.

The successful implementation of this strategy requires new insights and techniques. We must become guardians of the development process rather than custodians of the *status quo*. We must be *pro*-modernization as well as *anti*-Communist. Our programs and resources must reach and affect the well-being of the whole society rather than a privileged class alone. We must coordinate our military assistance and economic aid programs so that they reinforce each other in a way that enables local governments to defend themselves from the enemy within.

We therefore hope this seminar will provide you with new insights into the developmental process and the problems of the less developed world so that you can help us diagnose its ills and help us prepare the remedy.

Another important purpose of this seminar is to familiarize you with the totality of political, military, economic, social, and psychological responses—both our own and those of the country we are helping—which are necessary to defeat

Communist-inspired indirect aggression, from subversion up through the spectrum of violence to outright insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Our national purposes will be served if you emerge from this seminar with a clearer idea of how the unique and indispensable capabilities of each of your agencies can interact with greater impact. That is why this seminar is subtitled "The Country Team Seminar." From it, we hope you will develop a unique appreciation of the measures that are needed to strengthen and fortify the weak spots in vulnerable societies.

This seminar responds to the President's desire that we develop and employ a wider range of programs and capabilities to anticipate, prevent, and counter subversion in the underdeveloped world. Khrushchev's January 6, 1961, speech and the post-Korean Communist record attest to communism's hopes for a strategy of indirect aggression. When you complete this seminar you will be better qualified to understand the complexities of assisting governments that want to stay free from falling prey to the Communist virus.

The structural weakness, social cleavages, and growing pains of less developed countries constitute particular points of vulnerability which the Communists seek to exploit so that they may divert the desire for reform and development to their own ends.

As participants in the first seminar, you gentlemen, in collaboration with a distinguished faculty, are striking out on a new frontier and will be constructing a course for your successors. This seminar is as advanced a course as we have ever given in the Foreign Service Institute and is truly an interdepartmental endeavor. You are fortunate to be taking it, and we in turn will be fortunate in being able to utilize and apply the insights and experience you gain from it. The best of luck to you.

### Designations

Isaiah Frank as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective June 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 382 dated June 11.)



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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to June 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 343 of May 29; 353 of June 1; 355 of June 4; 372 of June 8; and 380 of June 10.

No.	Date	Subject
*377	6/11	Cultural exchange (Poland).
*378	6/11	Visit of Australian Prime Minister.
*379	6/11	U.S. participation in international conferences.
381	6/11	Rusk: remarks at FSI seminar.
*382	6/11	Frank designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
*383	6/11	Woodward: University of the Pacific.
384	6/11	Advisory Council on African Affairs (revrite).
†385	6/12	Rusk: VOX interview.
386	6/13	Ball: "The Reality of Change."
*387	6/13	Battle sworn in as Ambassador to Australia (biographic details).
*388	6/13	Program for visit of Australian Prime Minister.
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*391	6/15	Williams: "The New Frontier of Africa."
*392	6/14	Lindley: Montgomery County Council of PTA's (excerpt).
†393	6/15	Working Group on Oceanographic Investigations of Tropical Atlantic (delegation).
394	6/15	Revised tariff schedules to go into effect Jan. 1, 1963.
*395	6/15	Cultural exchange (India).
396	6/15	Rusk: New Hampshire Council on World Affairs.
*397	6/15	Geren appointed consul general at Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (biographic details).
*399	6/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1202

July 9, 1962

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WEEKLY RECORD  
UNITED STATES  
REIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1202 • PUBLICATION 7401

July 9, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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## Three Frontiers That Divide the Communist World From Our Own

by Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>

Is it possible for a freewheeling democracy of 180 million people such as ours to develop, support, and sustain an effective foreign policy in today's complicated world?

More than a century ago De Tocqueville, in referring to a world of far simpler dimensions, expressed grave doubts about the capacity of democratic governments successfully to conduct their foreign affairs. This critical area of public policy, he argued, called for qualities more readily associated with an aristocracy than with the representative government of a democratic people.

Many Americans concerned with the conduct of United States foreign policy in our modern age have had similar forebodings. They point to the extraordinary complexity of the problems which we face, to the need for quick reactions and prompt decisions. They stress that the issues with which the Government has to deal are often concerned with remote and unfamiliar areas.

If the Government allows its policies to be shaped by narrow congressional and public pressures, it may act unwisely. If it takes action contrary to these pressures, it loses popular support and understanding. If it muddles toward a compromise position, it satisfies neither our national interests abroad nor public and congressional opinion at home.

The only rational solution, such critics assert, would be to delegate most foreign policy decisions to specially trained experts who would be free from the illogical short-term swings of democratic

public opinion. The skill with which the elite in the British Foreign Office is said to have guided Britain's foreign policy through the long century of peace prior to the outbreak of World War I is offered as an illustration of the wisdom of this course.

Since these critics realize that our Congress is unlikely to abdicate its own well-established role in the making of United States foreign policy, they are pessimistic about the future. In our relations with the world they believe that confusion, divisiveness, frustration, and general ineffectiveness are likely to be the order of the day.

Now no one who has been near the center of the decisionmaking process in Washington will lightly brush their worries aside. There have been instances, some of them very recent, where a congressional majority has acted in ways which have been embarrassing and deeply damaging to the administration's foreign policy objectives.

Yet it does not follow that a democracy is unable effectively to conduct its relations with the rest of the world. Indeed there is ample evidence to the contrary. Our brilliant response to the critical situation which faced us in Europe following World War II, for example, justifies a large measure of confidence in our ability to devise unprecedented policies, secure widespread public and congressional support, and administer these policies with boldness and political skill.

Moreover, in England's own case, it is worth pointing out that the Oxford-Cambridge elite which directed Britain's foreign policy in the 19th century did not work in hermetically sealed chambers, cut off from the winds of public opinion. On the contrary, it operated within the framework of a remarkably consistent public consensus on

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the Nebraska Center for Continuing Education, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on June 21 (press release 405 dated June 20). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

foreign policy which had developed in England over a period of years. This consensus had grown from the practical experiences of several generations of Englishmen and reflected a broadly based agreement about what constituted British national interests and how those interests could best be advanced and defended.

This is not to say that certain foreign policy questions were not, on occasion, debated with vehemence in the House of Commons, Hyde Park, and elsewhere. Yet, generally speaking, any British government that acted within the broad consensus of British national interests could operate boldly and affirmatively with the assurance of public support.

### Various Schools of Thought on U.S. Foreign Policy

But what about the United States? Does a national consensus on foreign policy exist in America today?

On several basic subjects I think that the answer is yes. For instance, there are few Americans in 1962 who do not accept the need for powerful armed forces. At the same time, it is generally understood that nuclear weapons have brought an utterly new dimension into military conflict and that any war can quickly become an exercise in mutual total destruction.

Furthermore, more and more Americans appreciate the importance of the *political* and *economic* forces which in less than 20 years have so dramatically reshaped the maps of Asia and Africa and altered the lives of millions of human beings.

The "great debate" of the early 1940's—the debate between so-called isolationism and interventionism—has ceased to be a serious political issue. Almost without exception, the American people are now committed to United States participation in world affairs. The question we argue is not "whether" but "how." *How* can the United States most effectively play a role in the world arena so as to achieve the objectives we all share of peace, freedom, and prosperity?

On this key question American opinion divides into four identifiable categories, two of which we can dismiss with a brief comment.

I refer to a limited number of trigger-happy extremists at one end of the spectrum, who seem to argue that issues between the Communists and the non-Communists can be solved only by war, and to the men of good will, at the other end, who are

persuaded that the solution to world tensions lies in varying techniques of unilateral disarmament.

Ninety percent of us, however, fall into one or another of two much larger groups, each honestly and deeply committed to a peaceful, more orderly world, each aware that no panaceas are available to us, but with widely differing views on how the United States can best achieve its objectives.

### Maximum Rigidity vs. Maximum Maneuverability

The first of these two principal groups may be described as advocates of a policy of "maximum rigidity," the second as advocates of "maximum maneuverability." Let us explore the differences between them.

Those who believe in the maximum-rigidity approach hold, in essence, to the old aphorism that he who is not wholly with us is against us. They believe that the lines of conflict everywhere must be tightly drawn, that there can be no basis for compromise with our adversaries, and that eventually either the Communist side or the capitalist side must emerge as the dominant world force.

The application of this maximum-rigidity approach to the practical questions of foreign policy is illustrated by the recent action of a majority in the United States Senate when it first voted to reduce our support for democratic India and then to eliminate United States assistance to Poland and Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup>

The advocates of maximum rigidity are confident that their proposed policies will not result in war. However, in my view, their approach is defeatist, negative, and shortsighted. It abdicates the initiative to the Communists and resigns us to a permanent conflict on all fronts—military, economic, and political.

Now let us briefly consider the alternative policy of maximum maneuverability.

The advocates of this approach believe that the dividing lines between the Communist world and our own should *not* be considered immutable and unchanging. Our policies should be geared to take every advantage of the restless ferment which has already created changes within the Communist world and which is bound to create more.

This approach rejects the concept of nuclear brinkmanship in the name of "liberation." It thinks of power not only in terms of military

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 25.

weapons and industrial capacity but in terms of people and the ideas that move them. It understands and acts upon the yearnings of people throughout the world for decency, dignity, and tranquillity. It refuses to write off the millions who live in Eastern Europe as "Communists" simply because they have been forced to live under Communist rule. It seeks constantly to assure them that they are neither deserted nor forgotten, that their future is not hopeless, that the evolutionary forces of freedom and dignity are still on their side and growing stronger year by year.

Anyone who has recently visited a country like Poland can testify to the way faces light up when people discover that their visitor is from the United States. By their own courage and determination they have resisted the heavy hand of Soviet-style collectivization. Now the warmth of their welcome testifies to their profound faith that the forces of freedom will ultimately transcend man-made political barriers.

And, I may add, such welcomes are by no means reserved for Democrats. Three years ago Richard Nixon was greeted in Warsaw by hundreds of thousands of cheering citizens.<sup>3</sup>

### The Three Frontiers

Now let us consider the difference between these two approaches—one of rigidity, the other of maneuverability—in terms of the three frontiers that lie between Communist interests and our own—military, economic, and cultural.

Along the military frontier, the two worlds are at swords' points.

On the economic frontier, they compete.

On the cultural frontier, they communicate.

Although the significance of these three frontiers varies greatly, the advocates of a maximum-rigidity approach would ignore these differences. In their view each frontier is a barrier to be rigidly held, not simply against tanks but against trade, aid, people, and ideas.

The advocates of the maximum-maneuverability approach, in sharp disagreement, believe that the differences among these three frontiers are the decisive key to an effective foreign policy in the nuclear age.

With this in mind, let us consider the three frontiers more carefully.

### The Military Frontier

From the Baltic to the Bosphorus, along the line of the Iron Curtain, Soviet and NATO troops, guns, and planes confront each other across a barrier of barbed wire, watchtowers, and mined areas.

Through CENTO [Central Treaty Organization], SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], and a variety of other bilateral and multilateral military pacts, the military barrier continues on to the South China Sea.

Looming behind all the arms, overshadowing all the alliances, stands the terrible power of nuclear destruction. Each side has the military capacity to blow the other off the face of the earth. Whoever attempts to change or crack this military frontier risks world war III. In Korea we made this clear, and, in another way, so did the Russians in Hungary.

### The Economic Frontier

Let us now consider the economic frontier.

Here, in contrast to the military frontier, we have room for maneuver. Here the competition between East and West can be given a new evolutionary dimension. Here our interests are best served by maximum flexibility.

This is an area ready made for the shifting tactics, for the improvisations and boldness which reflect America at her purposeful best. To forgo this advantage by freezing the economic frontier as well as the military frontier, as the advocates of maximum rigidity would have us do, strikes me as total folly.

At present, competition along the economic frontier is taking place on three major fronts.

#### *Competition in Economic Expansion*

The first of these is the competition in regard to economic expansion between the most developed parts of each world—the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Atlantic Powers on the other.

Since World War II Soviet industry has grown remarkably. Its technological achievements have commanded worldwide admiration. Recently the Russian people have begun gradually to taste the fruits of rising living standards, with Mr. Khrushchev's promise of even more consumer goods lying alluringly ahead.

Yet the advantage in the long haul lies with the non-Communist world. The impressive accomplishments of the Soviet economy have been more

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 270.

than matched by the rapid development of Western Europe. Given a vigorous shove by the Marshall Plan, Western Europe's economy is now growing by leaps and bounds, far faster indeed than that of the United States.

A dramatic result has been the emergence of the European Common Market, embracing 350 million of the world's most highly skilled people. The very existence of this vast political and economic combination flies in the face of the Marxist-Leninist assumption that competition for markets would make cooperation among capitalistic nations impossible.

### *Competition for Economic Independence*

To make matters worse from the Soviet view, the success of the Common Market in Western Europe has already been exerting a powerful pull on the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Here again a United States policy of maximum maneuverability can pay maximum dividends—and indeed already has done so.

Let us consider an example which has caused some particularly sharp debate between the advocates of the two differing schools of foreign affairs—Yugoslavia.

I believe that our aid to the Yugoslav Government in the last 14 years has been an imaginative, courageous, and successful example of the doctrine of maximum maneuverability. For this I believe that both Democrats and Republicans can and should take full credit.

The advocates of maximum rigidity vigorously disagree. What then are the facts?

First of all, let us briefly consider the conditions which existed in the winter of 1948, when the Yugoslav aid program was first proposed.

At that time the Greek civil war was in full swing, with Soviet-directed Communist guerrillas based in southern Yugoslavia carrying on an all-out war to destroy Greek democracy. In Italy an election campaign was in progress which, because of widespread poverty, war weariness, and frustration, many observers feared would result in the first genuine Communist victory in the history of free elections. On the other side of the world a sweeping victory for the Communists in the Chinese civil war appeared imminent.

Thus in the winter of 1948 we were faced with the prospect of Communist military victory in Greece, the election of a Communist government

in Italy, and the establishment of a monolithic Communist empire stretching all the way from the borders of France to the Sea of Japan. The impact that we might expect from such an array of Communist successes on the war-devastated nations of Europe and the newly liberated nations of Asia was impossible to exaggerate.

At that precise moment in history Tito's long-smoldering disagreements with Stalin suddenly broke into the open. Yugoslavia announced its independence of Soviet control and appealed to us for assistance. The United States Government was faced with a dilemma of the most decisive importance.

During the war the Yugoslavs had fought bravely under the leadership of Tito against the Nazis, pinning down more than 30 German divisions. If these German divisions had been available to oppose the American landings on the French coast in June 1944, casualties would have been far heavier and the result less certain.

However, since the war Yugoslavia had been one of the most belligerent members of the Communist bloc. Only a year earlier Yugoslavs had shot down an American plane charged with flying over Yugoslav territory. A tight, iron-fisted dictatorship was in full control. There had been considerable persecution of members of the Church.

Against this background President Truman called a meeting with congressional leaders, headed by Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Mr. Truman pointed out that, in view of Tito's antagonism in recent years, it would be difficult to get the American people to understand the wisdom of American support for Communist Yugoslavia. Yet if we failed to support Tito in this first break in the Communist empire, we would lose an historic opportunity.

Leaders of both parties agreed that American interests would best be served by support for the Yugoslav Government in its efforts to remain outside the Stalinist orbit. Substantial shipments of military and economic equipment were soon on their way.

By any standard this bold move must be judged a success. The democratic forces in Italy, encouraged by the defection of Yugoslavia, won a decisive victory at the polls; the Communist guerrillas in Greece, deprived of a base for operations in Yugoslavia, were gradually worn down and overcame; and new pressures were opened up within

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the Communist world as the most belligerent of the "satellites" suddenly cut its ties with the Kremlin.

Immediately following the election in 1952, President Eisenhower restated American policy toward Yugoslavia in the same terms as those laid down by President Truman. The policy has been continued to this day.

Now here is the essential point: Neither Harry Truman nor Dwight Eisenhower nor John F. Kennedy ever suggested that U.S. economic assistance to Yugoslavia would persuade Tito to switch sides. What they did say—and on this all three Presidents were everlastingly right—was that U.S. assistance would enable Yugoslavia to maintain its independence.

The Yugoslavs may still vote quite frequently with the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations, and their leaders may make speeches that are critical of us. Yet their freedom to make their own basic choices has been established, and the record shows that by and large they have exercised that freedom.

In the economic field they have abandoned Soviet-type collectives and have established the peasant's right to his own farm. They have also greatly modified Communist dogma in regard to industrial development. Seventy percent of their trade is now with the non-Communist nations.

In the political field they have opposed the U.S.S.R. in the U.N. on the question of a single Secretary-General versus the so-called "troika," on the financing of U.N. forces in the Congo, and on the explosion of the 50-megaton H-bomb last October.

Not only has the total strength of the Communist bloc vis-a-vis the West been weakened by this split, but even more important, the Yugoslav example has given indirect but strong encouragement to independent non-Communist nations to stand up to Soviet blandishments.

Now right here is the political crux of the matter: If the advocates of maximum rigidity had been in control of American policy in 1948, or at any stage since then, they would have closed this economic frontier and cut Yugoslavia off from American help. Economic and political pressures would then have developed to bring Tito back into the Soviet fold. Straight across the world people striving to break loose from Communist rule would have been disheartened and embittered. America, they would have charged, had abandoned them.

### *Competition for Economic Progress in New Nations*

The third battleground along the economic frontier between East and West may be the most important of all: the new and emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Here the advocates of maximum rigidity would give help and support only to those nations whose leaders think as we do; the unaligned and the neutral nations would be left to shift for themselves.

The advocates of maximum maneuverability see the situation in far less dogmatic terms. Again, let us consider the facts. These new developing nations are wrestling with awesome problems of illiteracy, ill health, poverty, and injustice. Unless their people can be convinced that reasonable progress is being made toward the elimination of these evils, orderly political growth will be impossible.

United States efforts to support this development process have often been complicated by the cantankerous political attitudes of Asian, African, and Latin American leaders, who have been embittered by their own past contacts with the economically privileged and—in many cases—race-conscious colonial nations of the West. When these Afro-Asian spokesmen attack the United States policies in the United Nations and elsewhere, editorial writers chastise them as "ungrateful Communist dupes" and Members of Congress rise to demand that our aid programs to such "uncooperative" nations be terminated herewith.

Although reactions of this kind are understandable in terms of our own emotions, they will not cause the complexities of our present world to disappear. Moreover, they overlook not only the deep-seated and often irrational attitudes to which I have referred but also the political purpose and role of economic assistance as an instrument of United States national policy.

Let us consider this latter point as the advocates of maximum maneuverability see it.

A key Communist objective is control of the resources and markets of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, on which the industrialized nations of the West are heavily dependent. It is our task to see that this effort fails and that the developing nations not only assure their own freedom but also achieve an increasing measure of political stability and economic progress. If we conduct ourselves with restraint and good judgment and maintain an open economic frontier, the longrun advantage

in this contest lies heavily on the side of freedom.

However difficult they may sometimes appear to be, the new nations have no desire to exchange British, French, Belgian, and Dutch rule, from which many of them have recently emerged, for the far more ruthless domination of the Russians. Moreover, their own cultures are diverse, and this diversity is deeply rooted. As the Kremlin strategists have discovered, these indigenous counterforces provide formidable barriers to the Leninist vision of a Soviet-dominated world.

Advocates of maximum maneuverability believe that a flexible, well-administered, sensitive economic assistance program can become a vitally important tactical instrument in further strengthening these barriers. They stress, however, that both the objectives and limitations of this effort must be clearly understood.

Our objective is not to control the utterances and policies of the developing nations, to win a global popularity contest with the U.S.S.R., or to purchase votes in the United Nations. Governments that can be "bought" with American dollars, they assert, can no more be counted on to stay bought than can individuals purchased in the same manner. Nor can nations as wealthy as ours expect to be loved by those which are less fortunate: the best we can expect on that score is respect.

The true objectives of our aid program, say the advocates of greater maneuverability, are twofold: first, to increase economic progress in the developing nations; and second, to do so in such a way that broader participation will be encouraged among the people and every family be given an increasing personal stake in national independence.

The economic frontier between the Communist world and our own is thus a complex one. By keeping this frontier open, in line with the policy of maximum maneuverability, we have been making steady progress.

### The Cultural Frontier

What now of the third frontier between East and West—the cultural frontier?

Here again, with the exception of radio propaganda, the maximum-rigidity school would adopt a rigid line identical to the military line, while the maximum-maneuverability school favors flexibility and initiative. Which is the wiser course?

This is the one frontier where we Americans can

actually communicate with the Russians. Since the Geneva conference of 1955, there has been a steady flow of scholars, students, artists, musicians, farmers, and scientists between the Soviet world and the Western world. This two-way exchange has already had a decided effect, it seems to me, in gradually establishing people-to-people understanding and in giving the citizens of each world a clearer appreciation of the other.

In the field of music, art, and even in exchange students the cultural frontier has been pushed back far beyond the Iron Curtain.

Among men of science, communication and even cooperation has been particularly vigorous. The International Geophysical Year, agreement on exploration of Antarctica, and the current negotiations on joint efforts in outer space are only a few of these mutual undertakings across the cultural frontier.

To those who subscribe to the philosophy of maximum rigidity, this flow of communication across the cultural frontier seems dangerous and immoral. In my opinion it is a most hopeful phenomenon. Why should we, a free people, be afraid of ideas? It is the Communists who should fear them.

Moreover, if the barriers that separate East and West are ever to crumble, they will do so, I am convinced, only in proportion to the understanding which has slowly and painfully been cultivated on each side of the military frontier.

To some extent we are all the prisoners of stereotypes; we see each other in terms of distorted and oversimplified images. Wider communication in the realm of ideas, of the arts, and of science can help refashion these false images. And by seeing more clearly we may act more wisely.

### A Glance Into the Future

I would like to conclude my remarks today by a glance into the future. Are there signs of any changes along the three frontiers which divide the Soviet world from our own?

On the military frontier, the prospects for any fundamental change right now appear remote. Yet here, as elsewhere, our position is strong.

Russian deadlines have come and gone, but West Berlin still stands as a shining example of the determination of free men to defend their freedom. In the last 2 years our military power has

become vastly better balanced, more mobile, and more effective in defending the military frontier.

Here the primary question which hangs over us is arms control. When will the Soviet leaders come to see that the secrecy to which they so desperately cling and which now makes agreement impossible is a wasting asset? When will they realize that promises of a better life which they have made to their people cannot possibly be fulfilled with 24 percent of their gross national product assigned to defense and space exploration? When will they recognize the folly of a continuing, escalating contest between the two greatest industrial powers of all time to see which can develop the greatest capacity to destroy?

On the economic and cultural frontiers the prospects appear promising. The non-Communist world is poised on the threshold of more rapid economic growth than ever before.

As we build a more prosperous, more interrelated society of free men, the Soviets will be forced, it seems to me, to modify even further the sterile rigidities of their own system. Indeed Marxism in today's fast-changing world is gradually proving itself irrelevant as a practical formula for economic growth or for political control. In the meantime, the burgeoning flow of ideas and people across the cultural frontier opens up minds, undercuts dogma, and encourages diversity.

I conclude then as I began, with a plea for maximum maneuverability in United States foreign policy. Contrary to the advocates of maximum rigidity, there is not just one frontier between the Communist world and our own; there are three. And two of these frontiers offer us almost unlimited opportunities for affirmative economic and political actions.

Americans have always prided themselves in their diversity, their eagerness to experiment, their adaptability to new situations, and their imagination in devising new courses of action. Within a framework of unflinching dedication to democratic principles, we have grown strong here in America because we have always been willing to try new ways. There is no reason to abandon these principles in our relations with the rest of mankind.

Let us, therefore, seize the economic initiative, expand the flow of ideas, give encouragement to the millions who are forced to live under communism, and assist the struggling new nations of Asia and Africa—even though they attempt to

stand aloof from the cold-war struggle. Did not our own young, developing America follow a similar policy of nonalignment for more than 100 years?

My answer to the question with which I began—whether a democratic people can create a foreign policy adequate to deal with the complexities of today's world—is a confident yes. And the reason for my confidence is precisely because we *are* a free people.

## Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Press Conference U.S.A."

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on the Voice of America's "Press Conference U.S.A." on June 12.*

Press release 385 dated June 12

*Robert L. Redeen, Voice of America: Ladies and gentlemen, this week's guest is the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State in President Kennedy's Cabinet.*

Born in the State of Georgia, Secretary Rusk was graduated with a bachelor of arts degree from Davidson College, North Carolina, where he was Phi Beta Kappa. Later Mr. Rusk studied as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and briefly at the University of Berlin. He was associate professor of government and dean of faculty at Mills College in Oakland, California.

In the Army, Secretary Rusk was discharged with the rank of colonel, having taken part in two campaigns in Burma, rising to Deputy Chief of Staff for that theater of operations. He began his career in the State Department in 1946. Highlights in that career include posts as the first Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, as Deputy Under Secretary, and as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. He continued in the last-named position until 1952, when he left the State Department to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York City. It was from that organization that he was called by President Kennedy 8 years later to accept the position as Secretary of State.

To question Secretary Rusk on the current situation in foreign affairs we have invited three Washington reporters to join us. They are Max Freedman of the Manchester *Guardian*, Stewart Hensley

of United Press International, and Elie Abel of the National Broadcasting Company.

For the first question, Mr. Abel.

#### Discussions Among Atlantic Partners

*Mr. Abel:* Mr. Secretary, you are off to Europe, I believe, in a few days, perhaps in refutation of your original hope that you would spend most of your time in Washington. I wonder, though, what takes you to Europe at this time and why are you going and what do you expect to get out of this voyage?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think it has been obvious to all of us that there is a considerable ferment of discussion among the capitals of the Atlantic community, of the NATO countries, but I think it's very important for us to understand just what this ferment is and what it is not.

I think it's fair to say that the Atlantic community is moving into new chapters in its history. Back in the late forties the NATO military defense alliance was built up, under which its members undertook a deep commitment to act together in the mutual defense of the NATO area. The Marshall Plan set about the economic rebuilding of war-torn Western Europe.

Now, in those major central tasks of the Atlantic community over these years there has not been any disagreement in any discussion in these more recent months. What is happening is that we are moving into fresher chapters. We have Common Market discussions, which open the way for a new vitality, an increased partnership on the other side of the Atlantic, accompanied by major proposals by President Kennedy for trade legislation<sup>1</sup> in this country, which brings a quarter century of reciprocal trade agreements to an end in this country, with a fresh approach.

We have some problems affecting the strategy of NATO in the light of new weapons systems and new military situations. And we have, perhaps most important of all, important questions relating the North Atlantic community to other parts of the world and particularly to the developing countries. So if there is lively discussion reported in the press, this is an accurate report. If there are things that need talking out, this is correct. But it is going on in the exhilaration of new pos-

sibilities in the Western World and not through any disarray among the commitments which have been standing for many years, in which we act together on basic interests.

*Mr. Abel:* Mr. Secretary, we have for some years now, under law, been sharing part of our nuclear know-how with the British. The French have complained that they are left outside. What is our answer to President de Gaulle's demand today for nuclear sharing?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, in the first place, we have not had any demand from President de Gaulle for nuclear sharing. But in any event, we and Britain were wartime partners in the initiation of the work on these weapons. That partnership went back many years, although it was reconfirmed, I think, in 1958. We have felt that we ought not ourselves to take part in adding to the number of nations that have national nuclear capabilities.

To look ahead down the trail of possible disarmament in this field, to look ahead to the means by which these terrible weapons might somehow be brought under control, we feel that the multiplication of governments who have such weapons is not something to which we ought to make a direct contribution. We would much prefer to obtain agreements which would, for example, prohibit nuclear testing in the weapons field, to commit nuclear power to peaceful purposes, and to do everything that we can to prevent the indefinite enlargement and expansion of a nuclear arms race in this present world situation.

#### Talks on Berlin Problem

*Mr. Abel:* Let me take you on to what I believe is your second stopping place—Germany. There have been some fairly open disagreements between us and our West German allies on how best to proceed with this Berlin problem. Could you fill us in, sir, on where does that stand today, to what degree are we still in disagreement, and do you expect to resolve this matter in your talks with Chancellor Adenauer?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, in our discussions with the Soviet Union we have kept our friends in Germany fully informed on those discussions. And we have talked with the Russians on the basis of known agreements on underlying policy as far as the West is concerned. Now, we have on occasion discussed with our allies certain ideas, and they have in turn raised certain ideas with us. Some of

<sup>1</sup> For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

those are involved in, say, contingency planning. Others are looking toward the possibility of matters which we might discuss with the Russians.

But these are incidental details in discussions in which the West is in broad agreement on what our vital interests are and on the necessity for sustaining and defending those vital interests. I don't expect any difficulties in our discussions with our allies over the Berlin question. There is, as you know, some difference of view in Paris as to procedure and tactics, but that itself does not reflect a basic difference on the underlying policies.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Hensley.

#### **U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia**

*Mr. Hensley:* Mr. Secretary, shifting to another part of the world, Senator [Mike] Mansfield recently—one of the administration leaders—has criticized our policy in Southeast Asia in a speech declaring that he doubts its effectiveness and believes it should all be reviewed. I think, in his words, it has not created the stability which might have been hoped for. Do you care to address yourself to that criticism?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, you referred to Senator Mansfield as the administration leader. I think in this statement he was speaking for himself and not for the administration, despite the fact that he is Majority Leader in the Senate, and a very distinguished one.

We do not see in Southeast Asia the kind of stability that we might have hoped for after the last 15 years of serious attention and effort since World War II. But I believe myself that the security and stability and freedom of Southeast Asia is of great importance to the rest of the free world and particularly to the United States.

We have just had indications that the negotiations among the three princes to form a coalition government in Laos may have succeeded in coming to an agreement.<sup>2</sup> This will be the first in a number of steps which will have to be taken before we will know with assurance that Laos can become a neutral and independent country.

Such proposals will have to go to the King and to the Parliament for ratification. Presumably a Laotian delegation will then go to Geneva, and those tentative agreements will be put in final form. Those agreements have in them some im-

portant safeguards for the neutrality and independence of Laos and the security of Laos' neighbors against infiltration through Laos if by any chance that should be tempting to anyone.

So we, as you know, made a major commitment of effort to help the South Vietnamese in their struggle against the guerrillas, and we have re-inforced Thailand.<sup>3</sup> I would say our policy is to give these free countries of Southeast Asia every reasonable assistance and to take our security commitments there with great seriousness.

*Mr. Hensley:* With respect to Laos, Mr. Secretary, now that there is reported to be an agreement, the question arises concerning U.S. aid. I believe in recent months you have withheld the subsidy of \$3 million a month to the Laos Government. Is that possibly to be resumed shortly if the agreement proves binding? Can you give us any timetable or any idea on that?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think if it's evident that the parties in Laos have settled down seriously to the problem of trying to construct a coalition government which would be neutral in character and would strive for the independence of that country, I would think that aid arrangements that are satisfactory would be worked out. But since I do not have official word from the spot, I would not want to make a flat commitment on this point today.

*Mr. Hensley:* How do you view the possible future operations of the Chinese in that area? We hear more of their hunger troubles, their industrial troubles, and others. Are these liable to lead them into any further adventurism down there which might have to be encountered?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think the Chinese must know that, if they move into Southeast Asia or undertake adventures in that area, they not only would find that the peoples of Southeast Asia would resist such moves, as they have historically, but that the peoples of Southeast Asia would have the strongest possible support from the peoples of other countries.

No, the distressing economic problems on the mainland of China are not likely to be solved by foreign adventure. They have to be solved on the mainland with a revision of their productivity capacities, better employment of their manpower, better organization of their distribution systems;

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, June 4, 1962, p. 904.

otherwise I don't see how the problems of feeding 650 million people can be solved.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Freedman?

### **Britain's Role in Western Europe**

*Mr. Freedman:* Mr. Secretary, everyone knows that the United States doesn't want to intervene to influence the decision on British membership in the Common Market. But in the context of general principles, can you tell us what advantages to the free world would flow from British membership in the Common Market?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I think over the years the United States has hoped that Europe would be a strong center of free peoples committed to not only the security and freedom of Europe but also to the support of the cause of freedom in other parts of the world. We believe that it would be a great thing if the solidarity could be achieved in Europe which would make it possible to say after several centuries that we can now be assured that war, for example, would not occur through differences that happen within Western Europe.

We believe that Britain's role in Western Europe could be very important and that that combination of ideas, of economic and military power, of leadership, would give that kind of Europe a very great role to play, and that, in partnership with us in the Atlantic community, that side of the Atlantic would greatly strengthen the cause of the entire free world.

We do not, as you know, Mr. Freedman, think that it is for us to try to offer any plan of our own or any blueprint as to the details of how Europe might move. But we have for many years encouraged the idea of a politically unified Europe and a Europe that could bring its total economic impact to bear upon the common problems of the free world.

### **Soviet Criticism of Common Market**

*Mr. Freedman:* How do you evaluate Russia's recent criticism of the Common Market? Why is she doing it?

*Secretary Rusk:* I suppose that they must realize that the economic vigor of Western Europe poses both some practical and some theoretical problems for them. The idea that close association among the industrialized countries of Western Europe is an unnatural one arises from, I

think, Marxist doctrine, and it's a little uncomfortable for them to have the facts show that that doctrine is wrong.

Our own experience has been, as you know, that as countries develop vigorous industrial societies they tend to trade with each other more. We sell machine tools to Europe. We buy machine tools from Europe. It's in the nature of free trade among free societies that that should happen. I think also that the element of competition arises, not so much in direct economic warfare—anything of that sort—but rather in terms of the comparison of economic performance within the free societies on the one side and the Communist bloc on the other.

When you look at some of the economic problems that are obvious, from East Germany all the way through to North Viet-Nam, there are some serious economic problems in the Communist world. When the West is moving toward more and more vital production, toward rapid increase in standards of living, toward closer and closer economic cooperation, this is distressing from the point of view of doctrine and distressing from the point of view of competition.

*Mr. Freedman:* Again without asking for a blueprint, Mr. Secretary, what role do you see the neutral states playing in free Europe?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I would not want at this stage to go into any details on that, as you anticipated. I do think that there are some practical trading relationships and problems that have to be worked out on a practical trading basis and that there are many forms of political cooperation which would be possible without injuring the broad status of neutrality as it is normally understood.

As far as we are concerned, we would be reluctant to see Europe—Western Europe—grow in such a way as to dilute in a significant way the political commitments of the Treaty of Rome or of the NATO commitments.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Abel?

*Mr. Abel:* Since last September, Mr. Secretary, you have been engaged in an on-again, off-again dialog with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question. Can we take it that your latest discussions with Mr. Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatolij F. Dobrynin] are on the shelf until you return from Europe, or do you expect to see him before you leave?

*Secretary Rusk:* There is no date set at the moment for a further talk with Mr. Dobrynin. I would not want to say whether I would see him again before I leave for Europe. After all, that is about a week off yet.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Hensley?

*Mr. Hensley:* Mr. Secretary, to go to another continent—in Africa we continue to support the action of the United Nations there, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Adoula [Cyrille Adoula, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo], continues to secure the cooperation and integration of Mr. [Moise] Tshombe's Katanga. I'm wondering what the prospects for success there appear to you to be, and what would be your guess as to how long Mr. Adoula can last as head of that government unless there is some progress on getting Katanga into the Central Government?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, Mr. Hensley, as I hope you know, I try not to avoid questions any more than necessary. At the moment there are discussions going on between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. We have been somewhat encouraged by the progress made in those talks thus far. But there are a considerable number of issues to be worked out, having to do with responsibilities for law and order, certain economic problems, constitutional questions. I think I had better say at this point that we think that it is important that these two men agree on the future integration of Katanga in the Congo. We think that there has been some indication in recent days that they are making headway in their talks, and we certainly wish them well in bringing these talks to a successful conclusion.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Freedman?

#### **Indications of Free-World Strength and Growth**

*Mr. Freedman:* Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement you referred to the ferment of discussion now taking place in the free world. I would like to ask if I am correct in assuming that you regard these problems as being the result of strength rather than weakness in the free world?

*Secretary Rusk:* I would say not only strength, Mr. Freedman, but they are the result of forward motion. I mean, for example, a year ago in April at the spring meeting of NATO in Oslo,<sup>4</sup> we talked about the importance to the alliance of much more

vigorous and comprehensive political discussion within NATO on world problems. Now, obviously, the more subjects we talk about, and particularly the more we talk about matters which range beyond the immediate, say, defense needs of NATO itself, the more opportunity there is for the differences of view and national interest and the position of the different members to come to the fore.

By deliberately inviting—by deliberately stimulating much more effective consultation, we accepted the inevitability that differences of interest and view would make themselves apparent. Now, this is a situation in which people in government find themselves at something of a disadvantage because—and this is not a criticism; this is in the nature of all of us—agreement and solidarity are not headline news. So these are in a sense family discussions, family quarrels, on minor points. They don't bear upon the elementary commitments of members of NATO to each other for defense purposes. They don't bear upon our general commitment to free societies or to the really major or overriding issues which arise from time to time.

The Atlantic alliance is moving into new periods of significance. Certainly in Western Europe the discussions over the Common Market and political developments there are of the greatest importance. They are growing toward a new future. But they are not on the basis of any disrepair or any shattering of the common commitments we have undertaken to each other with respect to the past and on which we rest solidly as a free community of strong nations at the present time. I would say strength plus growth gives rise to this ferment that I mentioned.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Abel?

#### **Foreign Aid Legislation**

*Mr. Abel:* Mr. Secretary, in light of the divided councils that become more and more apparent within the Soviet bloc, which seems to be becoming less and less of a bloc, I wonder to what degree do you feel that the Senate may or may not have been helpful to the administration in forbidding economic aid to any country that is Communist or Marxist-dominated.

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, on the day when an amendment to that effect was first passed, in very severe and limiting terms, I said with a certain

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, May 29, 1961, p. 800.

amount of diplomatic understatement that I thought that action was unfortunate.<sup>5</sup> I thought it was unwise, because we do need the flexibility to keep in contact with certain of these countries who want to be in contact with us—countries whose people have considered themselves to be a part of the general tradition of Western civilization for centuries, who feel a nostalgia to restore those relationships, whether in science, scholarship, or in trade, or what not.

Yugoslavia has very important trade interests with the West. She is a member of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. We think that there are many people there who would like to see relations with the West maintained on a friendly and sound basis, and we feel that the United States ought to be in a position to take its part in maintaining those relationships.

*Mr. Abel:* I wonder how troublesome you may find it, sir, to operate within the language of this law, as now amended, unless it should be changed again? I'm thinking particularly of the wording about Marxist-dominated or Communist-dominated countries. Up to now people have been talking about Yugoslavia and Poland. But it does seem to me that there are perhaps some countries outside of Eastern Europe which can, by someone's definition, be considered Marxist-dominated or -oriented. Do you see a problem there, for example, with Guinea or Ghana?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, Mr. Abel, a friend once advised a predecessor of mine to bear in mind that the future comes one day at a time.

Now, on this particular question, I would think first that I would want to see what language actually resulted from the action of the Congress and give it careful examination against the legislative record of the bill itself. I do not believe that it has been the intention of the Congress to restrict us in dealings with countries in all parts of the world who may have announced that they were Socialist in orientation or have some other orientation that by some language could be interpreted as Marxist. I think we know that what's being talked about is those who are part of and contributing to an international Communist conspiracy against the independence and freedom of nations.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Hensley?

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 25.

## U.S. Relationship to Common Market

*Mr. Hensley:* Mr. Secretary, with respect to the relationship of the United States to the Common Market, a few days ago the Common Market nations increased duties on six American products in retaliation for the President's action in raising tariffs on carpets and glass,<sup>6</sup> which struck, I believe, in part at the Belgians. Is this sort of thing a foretaste of the kind of economic warfare we are going to have with the Common Market, or is this the sort of thing which the President hopes to deal with within the framework of the proposed trade act?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, the action which we took with respect to glass and carpets was taken under an option, under which we had to give certain protection to some industries in our own country who were in a severe situation and where unemployment was an important factor. When we took that action, one of the options which they had across the Atlantic was to retaliate or to permit us to offer a compensatory package of concessions on our side.

We presented a compensatory package which we thought would help them in this situation and which was, I think, our obligation to do. But unfortunately, under the limitations under which we now operate in the trade field, we ran out of legislative authority in building up such a package. That is, the compensation we could offer was not adequate in terms of the trading injuries presumably that were inflicted by our action on glass and carpets.

This underlines the importance of the passage of the trade bill which President Kennedy has asked from the Congress. We were not able to offer sufficient compensation. We regretted, obviously, the action taken across the Atlantic, but I do think that this is not a forerunner of the kind of problem which will arise when the Common Market and our new trade legislation confront each other. Indeed, it's a sample of the kind of problem we would hope to avoid through the new arrangements that will come into being on both sides of the Atlantic.

*Mr. Redeen:* Mr. Freedman, do you have a quick, final question?

*Mr. Freedman:* Yes. The role of the U.N. in

<sup>6</sup> For a White House announcement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1962, p. 649.



world affairs—do you think it's improving?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think it's extremely important and must become more important, and that we should not ourselves become discouraged because at times they seem to be in a little bit of disarray in debates among 104 nations, because we share so many common commitments among the members there. I think there is a great opportunity for us to demonstrate that the long-term foreign policy of the United States is not only that that is sketched out in the opening part of the Charter of the United Nations but is con-

sistent with the long-term commitments and the foreign policies of most other people in most other parts of the world.

*Mr. Redeen:* Thank you, Secretary Rusk. This week's guest on "Press Conference U.S.A." was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Asking him questions were three Washington reporters, Stewart Hensley of United Press International, Elie Abel of the National Broadcasting Company, and Max Freedman of the Manchester *Guardian*.

This is Robert L. Redeen, Voice of America, Washington.

## Ideas and Action

by *Walt W. Rostow*

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council<sup>1</sup>*

Commencements are by tradition a time when one generation talks to another. They are perhaps particularly significant for the older generation: From here on out you will be doing more of the talking and we the listening. We like to get our last licks in before you leave the ranks of studenthood and join us as working colleagues.

Let me begin by telling you a bit about my generation. Many of us who now work in Washington were too young to have been caught up in the challenge of the depression years and the New Deal period. We were formed by the Second World War; after 1945 we were drawn to a continuing concern with the problems of this nation's position on the world scene. Along with many others of my age, my professional life has been a counterpoint between the world of ideas and the world of public policy. In my case, the emphasis has been on military and foreign policy. Of the years since 1940, for example, I spent 9 in public service, 13 in universities, with a good portion of the latter involving consultation in Washington. The proportions are quite typical. Those of us

now in our forties, then, are in a sense children of the era that began with the fall of Paris at about this time of year in 1940 and that has continued through the two decades of world responsibility for the United States which followed that tragic June day.

Today I propose to discuss with you this double prism on the world scene which many of us developed almost pragmatically while you were in the process of being born, being acculturated, and (through various vicissitudes) being projected toward the cap and gown which you wear this morning. My topic, then, is the interplay of ideas and action in modern America.

I am by profession an historian and an economist; so my theoretical prism is that of the social scientist. The intellectual problems to which the social scientist has addressed himself over the past 20 years have been shaped by America's emerging world role to a degree which matches the extent to which science and engineering have been drawn into the challenges of weaponry and space.

For this, neither the social scientist nor the natural scientist need apologize. We have not forsaken the long tradition of Western intellectual life. Many of the fundamental theoretical

<sup>1</sup>Address made at commencement exercises at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa., on June 11 (press release 367 dated June 7).

achievements of the natural sciences have resulted from efforts to solve practical problems—from the flow of the Nile in the ancient world to the requirements of navigation in the 15th and 16th centuries, down to the contemporary struggle to understand and to defeat the viruses.

In the social sciences—from Aristotle to Keynes—in most of the great theoretical works have also been, in part, pamphlets for the times.

This is not to say that all natural scientists should attempt to solve engineering or medical problems, or that all fruitful work in the social sciences should incorporate recommendations for public policy. The world of ideas is a spacious world. It has place within it for all manner of talents and tastes: for those who find satisfaction ordering narrow areas of fact, as well as for those who are concerned with the "grand design"; for those who find in the world of ideas a pure, esthetic satisfaction, as well as those who strain to extract from it practical lessons for the society of which they are a part and the human beings with whom they share a generation.

Moreover, the world of science, whatever its relevance to the affairs of the day, should have a continuity and pride of its own—to a degree withdrawn, protected, and, if necessary, defiant of the active world. In the end, however, a rude pragmatism shapes the content of intellectual life, and, in turn, the behavior of practical men is governed by the abstractions which men of ideas have created in an effort to give a degree of order to the world of human beings and things about them.

As Santayana said:

Practical men may not notice it, but in fact human discourse is intrinsically addressed not to natural existing things but to ideal essences, poetic or logical terms which thought may define and play with. When fortune or necessity diverts our attention from this congenial sport to crude facts and pressing issues, we turn our frail poetic ideas into symbols for those terrible irruptive things. In that paper money of our own stamping, the legal tender of the mind, we are obliged to reckon all the movements and values of the world.

We live at a time when the fate of our society—its ability to understand and control its environment, indeed its ability to survive—is closely linked to the relationship which Santayana described. In the most practical and concrete sense, our ability to bring to bear on the "crude facts and pressing issues" the appropriate "legal tender of the mind" will determine whether our kind of

society can maintain for itself a world environment which will permit it to continue to develop in continuity with our historic past. It was one thing to build a humane democracy on an empty continent, protected from the struggles for world power; it is a quite different matter to maintain it in a world of nuclear weapons and missiles at a time when the protection of the whole free world against the dour and purposeful thrust of the Communist bloc comes instantly to rest on the American people.

### **Intellectual Content of Military Policy**

The linkage between ideas and action is most obvious, of course, in the making of military policy and in contriving the instruments which will make it effective in a world of modern science and technology. The competitive arms race in which we are engaged reaches out into every field of science and engineering. The era of missiles and nuclear weapons has shaped—where it has not dominated—physics, electronics, chemistry, and the development of materials, as well as many other fields from meteorology to oceanography.

But more is involved here than merely the construction in good time of the appropriate weapons and forces required to deter aggression. The protection of the frontiers of freedom in ways which minimize the likelihood of a nuclear war is a most searching political and psychological—as well as scientific, engineering, and production—enterprise. We are engaged in a relentless struggle with the Communist powers in which our strength and theirs, our vital interests and theirs, our diplomacy and theirs, the viability of free-world societies and theirs, are endlessly at play.

There is hardly a diplomatic relationship we conduct in the world, or move that we make, that does not involve within it the question: Does the United States have the capacity and the will to use military force to back its play?

For that reason there is no posture which is more likely to lead to nuclear war than the notion that nuclear war is unthinkable. If nuclear war were unthinkable, there would be no limit to the temptations of those who are committed to the dangerous but illusory idea that world power is an attainable goal; and if they were thus led to overlay their hand, we would have to react late and convulsively.

At every stage, then, the protection of the free

world from aggression by means which minimize the likelihood of nuclear war is a searching test of the capacity of our society not merely to develop the right kind of weapons in the right sequence but of the ability of our society and its allies and friends so to conduct themselves as to make aggression in any form unattractive and to deal with aggression when it occurs in ways which minimize the likelihood that the ultimate sanction of nuclear strength would have to be invoked.

This is a subtle and difficult business. But those who bear responsibility in our Government and, in the end, all of our people must understand its dimensions and accept it with coolness and poise. It requires an effort of imagination, an ability to translate hypothetical future situations into current action—into things as palpable as a new missile or an outgoing cable. We must live with abstract projections into the future as if they were today's headlines, for the lead times of modern technology and modern communications give little time to learn on the job.

This task requires a frame of mind very different from Tocqueville's vision of Americans as simple empiricists immersing themselves in the palpable immediate tasks of organizing a continental society and making it work. In military affairs we have historically been unprepared when conflict began, only then turning to the task of learning what the war was about, what it required of men and of arms. In the First and Second World Wars our power was only coming to a peak as the wars came to an end. Time, distance, and allies made this a possible posture for the United States, although costly to the world at large and to ourselves. The relevant time is now reduced to hours, if not minutes; distance has shrunk so that we now stand in the front line; and there are no allies to buy us time to mobilize and to learn. We must, therefore, steadily behave in ways which persuade a potential enemy that war is unprofitable; and, as a result, the intellectual content of military policy—the role of ideas and of the ability to act on ideas—becomes critical. And this is, of course, equally the case with that aspect of military policy which consists of the field of arms control and disarmament, for, if we are to make progress in this area—as we must over the long pull—it will come about not from wishful hopes but from hardheaded creation, involving scientific, military, and political thought,

combined, at last, with a Soviet acceptance of effective international inspection.

#### **"We Must Understand the Minds of Many Peoples"**

What is true of military and arms control policy is true in a different way of our relations with the various regions and peoples of the globe.

The interests of nations are now so sensitively interwoven and communications are so quick and ample that conventional diplomacy no longer describes how the world works. Our allies in Europe, for example, who depend on our military strength for their security and will do so for the foreseeable future, are as sensitive to the moods and nuances of American politics as any American. An ambiguous phrase, a misinterpreted background conference, an imagined line of policy deduced from some action we take—these produce reactions which are much more like the interplay of politics within a given nation than the formal discourse of classic diplomacy.

More than that, we are caught up with our European friends—and also with Japan and the countries of the British Commonwealth—in a period of extraordinary structural change in the world's arrangements. Everywhere old relationships are changing and new ones are being forged. Everywhere nations are redefining where they stand on the world scene, what their relations to their neighbors and to the whole community of nations will be. The changes involved in the British entry into the Common Market and the forging of a new transatlantic partnership go deep into the history of each nation concerned, to their view of themselves and of the future. For Americans to play a constructive role in this exciting new phase of history requires of us a sympathetic knowledge of other people's history, of their perspectives, their fears, and their ambitions more profound than any required of us in the past. We cannot rely here—any more than we can in military policy—on simple, pragmatic learning on the job or a projection to others of attitudes instinctive to us. We must reach out and understand the minds of many peoples if this great job of architecture, in which we are engaged with our friends, is to be sound and stand the tests and strains of time.

Even more difficult, perhaps, is the task of creating and bringing to bear the ideas and actions which will relate us to the nations, mainly in the

southern half of the globe, which are now caught up in the adventure of modernizing their societies—nations new and old, in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. They are in stages of development which we knew in our own experience only a century or more ago. Moreover, they are learning how to organize themselves for growth and beginning to grow in settings very different from early 19th-century America. Not only do they lack the special blessing that we had—of much good land and relatively few people—but they come to these tasks out of historical and cultural settings very different from that of the United States.

Nevertheless, if we are to maintain for our own society a world environment which will permit us to develop in continuity with our past, we must understand these distant societies and understand them with sufficient insight and sympathy so that we can work in partnership with the men and women, as well as the governments, they contain.

This is a difficult job. It requires that we develop concepts of economic, social, and political development which transcend our own experience and embrace their problems.

But it is not an impossible job, and it is made easier because, in the end, we Americans cannot resist supporting the disadvantaged and we find it difficult to keep out of great constructive ventures. It is made easier, also, because behind the particular problems of the new nations and the special settings in which they occur are universal and recognizable human impulses—for the dignity of their nations and the welfare of their children.

Nevertheless, to formulate and execute policies which will link the more developed and less developed nations of the free world requires of us a marriage of ideas and action as challenging as that required to conduct a rational military policy in a world of nuclear weapons.

#### **Historical Processes of Peaceful Change**

But that is not all. If the great struggle in which we are engaged on the world scene is to be resolved without war, it must be resolved on the basis of historical processes of peaceful change. Rarely in history has any group of men more plainly articulated their hostile objectives than the Communist leadership in stating their intentions toward the free world. If we are not prepared for

any form of aggression—from nuclear war to guerrillas in the rice paddies—it is not the fault of our opponents. On the other hand, it is not enough for us to regard them merely as a hostile force. History has not stopped within the Communist bloc. There are forces at work making for change. Moreover, the simple vision of Marx and Lenin did not prepare the Communist leadership for a world of nuclear weapons and of resurgent nationalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, or for a system of democratic capitalism which has exhibited a remarkable resilience and capacity for adaptation. Nor did it prepare them to grow food efficiently or to cope with generations of the young who, looking about in the dim, bureaucratic world of a police state, set aside the slogans, examine the world about them as it really is, and commit themselves to the search for answers to the oldest and most basic human questions—the meaning of life and how the integrity and uniqueness of the individual should find expression in a complex society.

And so there is thrust on us not merely the requirement of defending a free-world community in an age of modern technology, not merely the task of weaving together its more developed and less developed regions, but also the need to understand with insight the forces at work in Communist societies and the duty to encourage the development of areas—even limited areas—of overlapping interest.

In the end, then, the making of public policy in the times in which we live is a most searching task in engineering. We must bring to bear on our environment in a unified way all that both the natural and social sciences can teach us; and we must do so in settings which cannot be read out automatically from either the social or technological life of contemporary America.

It is a fair question to ask whether the intellectual and philosophical traditions of our nation and its educational institutions are capable of producing men who can cope with this searching test—who can both generate the appropriate ideas and put them into action. I believe, quite soberly, that we have cause for confidence. Just as a century ago in the Morrill Act we launched a set of institutions which could serve our society at a time when we needed improved agricultural technology, railway, mining, and industrial engineers, our contemporary institutions have responded in

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a remarkable way to the current requirements of our society.

But whatever new intellectual and operational virtuosity we develop, it is essential that we retain certain old American virtues: above all the conviction that, within limits, the future can be shaped, that problems can be solved, and that, with strength, patience, and insight, the long tradition of which we are a part shall continue to be the mainstream of human history, to be joined by non-Western streams which essentially share its humane ethic.

Our nation was born out of a commitment to ideas—incorporated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution—which transcend our own borders. There has never been a time, not even at the height of the Second World War, when this commitment has been more real or required of us more loyalty.

### **Continuity and Progress**

Now, if I may, a final word. This is the first commencement speech I've made since I graduated from New Haven High School in 1932. I am conscious of the tradition that what is said on such occasions should incorporate a measure of advice, as you go forth to the next stage of your careers. On the other hand, I am by profession a teacher. And a teacher knows some things better than most. He knows that in personal matters advice, especially advice on a broadside basis, is of little help. We each make our way—and our mistakes—on our own. He knows that in the realm of ideas the young climb easily on our shoulders—absorbing quickly what we have created—and they move easily beyond; and this sense of continuity and progress in the world of ideas, through contact with students, is, I can tell you, the glory of being a teacher.

And much the same is true in public policy. We who now bear a measure of responsibility in Washington are building on all those who have gone before. Where we have moved correctly, we have learned from past successes and failures. Our job is to do the best we can, in our time. Your job will be to bring to bear the fruits of your own study and your own quite different experience, when your time comes. The last thing in the world you now need is for me to tell you what you should think and do.

But I would say this. There are those, viewing the tensions and weapons of our times, the environment of revolution in the world about us, who hanker for quieter days, who look with nostalgia to a past when the world environment of our society was less dangerous and the challenges to us less severe. I put it to you that these are great times. We are the trustees of the principles of national independence and human freedom all over the globe; and, given our history, this is a proud and natural responsibility.

We are challenged—as controller of the greatest military force the world has ever seen—to see this planet safely through these times until the day when nuclear weapons are brought under effective international discipline and control.

We are challenged at home to maintain and develop this society as a solid base for our world position, and this challenge comes to rest on our scientists and engineers, our business and labor leaders, our school boards—in fact, it comes to rest on every citizen.

It was never promised to man that life would be without risk, and we Americans have achieved nothing on this continent without effort and danger. As you move out from this place to assume responsibility in our society, you do so knowing that, as individuals and Americans, there are tasks ahead which will challenge your unique capacities to the limit.

## **Letters of Credence**

### *Argentina*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Argentina, Roberto T. Alemann, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 401 dated June 19.

### *Spain*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, Antonio Garrigues y Diaz-Canabate, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 20. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 404 dated June 20.

## Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community

by Robert S. McNamara  
Secretary of Defense<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to be home, and I am particularly glad to be here for a university occasion. For this university gives meaning and focus to life in Ann Arbor—even for those who are not privileged to be associated with it directly—as the academic community serves to clarify the objectives and focus the energies of the free world.

President Kennedy aptly described the function of the university when he said:<sup>2</sup>

The pursuit of knowledge . . . rests . . . on the idea of a world based on diversity, self-determination, and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles upon which the great Republic was founded.

As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a world which freely unites national diversity and international partnership.

Commencement orators like to point to the fact that what we celebrate here is not an end but a beginning. I prefer to take my text from another aspect of the occasion which we are observing today.

The ancient formula for the award of academic degrees admits you into a long-established community, whether it be the fellowship of educated men, or the ancient and honorable company of scholars, of which you are the newest members. This community embodies the highest ideals of the free world. Its membership includes people of every race, color, and creed. They share a common language, the language of ideas. They are dedicated to the fullest possible development of the

individual human potential. And the only requirement for admission is a demonstrated capacity for and commitment to the use of one's powers of reason.

What I want to talk to you about here today are some of the concrete problems of maintaining a free community in the world today. I want to talk to you particularly about the problems of the community that bind together the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

### The Lessons of Europe

Europe is the source of many of our traditions. One of these is the tradition of the university, which we can trace back to the groves of Academe, on the same site where only a few weeks ago the foreign ministers and ministers of defense of the European nations and the United States met to discuss their common problems.<sup>3</sup>

I need scarcely remind you that Europe is one of the great sources of the American idea of freedom and that it was the European philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who shaped the thinking of our own Founding Fathers. For all of us, Europe has been our teacher since we first learned to read.

One of the most impressive lessons that Europe has provided us recently is the lesson of her revival from the ashes of destruction at the end of the Second World War. The national economies of Europe were almost at a standstill 15 years ago. Their capital plant was largely destroyed, either directly by bombing or indirectly by years of neglect and patchwork repair. The people were

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on June 16 (Department of Defense press release).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 861.

exhausted by 6 years of war, and a large part of the most productive age group had been wiped out. Yet in the last 10 years they have managed to increase the production of steel and electricity by over 130 percent each, and this has been typical of the recovery pattern.

The pump-priming help of the American Marshall Plan came at a crucial time in the process of European recovery. But the genius of the plan, as envisaged by men like George Marshall and Harry Truman, was to help the Europeans help themselves.

At the same time that the nations of Europe were rebuilding at home, they were going through the difficult and often painful process of reestablishing their relationships with the peoples of Africa and Asia, no longer as a master and servant but as members of the human race, all equally entitled to develop their individual capabilities. This process of change is by no means complete, and there are still difficult times ahead. But the joint achievement of Europe and its former colonies in revising their relations with each other is at least as impressive as the economic recovery of Europe itself.

What may be the greatest postwar European achievement is still in the making. The nations of Europe have begun to level the outmoded barriers that confined their individual economies within national boundaries. As Jean Monnet, the principal architect of the new Europe puts it,

An entirely new situation has been created in the world, simply by adding six countries together. It's not an addition; in fact, it's a multiplication. You multiply the capabilities of the countries you unite. A dynamic process is beginning that is changing the face of Europe and the role of Europeans in the world.

The making of Europe has only begun, and indeed it is perhaps at its most critical stage. But we should not overlook the fact that French coal and German steel now move freely across the Continent, and that German refrigerators and Italian shoes are being sold increasingly without restriction in Belgian department stores.

### **Challenges Confronting the Free World**

All of these achievements have been accomplished under pressure from titanic forces which make a rational organization of human society increasingly difficult both for the Europeans and for

ourselves. Let me mention some of these forces.

We are confronted with a population explosion resulting from our own success in coping with disease and abnormalities and by now threatening to double the earth's population by the end of this century. Unless we can control this explosion in the poor and resource-limited countries, the effects of economic growth may be canceled out by population growth, and unsatisfied rising expectations, particularly in the younger nations, may upset the delicate balance of political stability.

We are borne along by the accelerating pace of science and technology. In this country alone, new inventions are patented at a rate of 50,000 a year. Our population of scientists and engineers has increased by more than 40 percent in the last 8 years. In fact, 80 percent of all scientists and engineers who have lived throughout history are alive today.

We are faced with an extraordinary increase in the number of national states. Since World War II, 35 new nations have been formed. Each new nation expresses the natural desire for self-determination and self-government. But their numbers complicate the problem of international diplomacy at the same time that military and economic developments increase our interdependence. Every nation is more and more directly affected by the internal situation of its neighbors, and the globe has shrunk to the point where we are all each other's neighbors.

Lastly, we live in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet drive for world domination—surely not the only shadow on the world today, but one of the longest and deepest. By itself it represents the most serious military force this nation has ever faced; by its exploitation of the entire world's troubles, it is a threat of a kind that is as new to the world as the rising technologies and populations and national sovereignties themselves.

In the face of all these challenges, the ultimate objective of the free world is to establish a system of peaceful world order, based on the dignity of the individual and dedicated to the free development of each man's capacities. The members of the North Atlantic community—the Europeans and ourselves—bear a special responsibility to help achieve this objective. This responsibility derives from the strength of our internal institutions and the wealth of our material resources.

## The Military Power Base

But we cannot hope to move toward our objective unless we move from strength. Part of that strength must be military strength. But I want to emphasize that we see our military strength, not as the means of achieving the kind of world we seek, but as a shield to prevent any other nation from using its military strength, either directly or through threats and intimidation, to frustrate the aspirations we share with all the free peoples of the world. The aggressive use of military strength is foreign to the best traditions of the United States. And, as the President pointed out last week,<sup>4</sup> "the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution."

What the military component of our national power must do, and what we must see that it is capable of doing, is to assure to the peoples of the free world the freedom to choose their own course of development.

Yet the nature and extent of the military power base needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges confronting the free world is beyond the capacity of any single nation to provide. Since our own security cannot be separated from the security of the rest of the free world, we necessarily rely on a series of alliances, the most important of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

## The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO was born in 1949 out of the confrontation with the Soviet Union that ensued from the breakdown in relations between the former wartime allies. The Soviet Union had absorbed the states of Eastern Europe into its own political framework, most dramatically with the Czechoslovakian coup of 1948. It had been fomenting insurrection in Greece, menacing Turkey, and encouraging the Communist parties in Western Europe to seize power in the wake of postwar economic disorder. The sharpest threat to Europe came with the first Berlin crisis, when the Russians attempted to blockade the western sectors of the city. Our response was immediate and positive. President Truman ordered an airlift for the iso-

lated population of West Berlin which, in time, denied the Soviets their prize. The Marshall Plan, then in full swing, was assisting the economic recovery of the Western European nations. The Truman Doctrine had brought our weight to bear in Greece and Turkey to prevent the erosion of their independence.

But Western statesmen concluded that it would be necessary to secure the strength and growth of the North Atlantic community with a more permanent arrangement for its defense. The effective defense of Western Europe could not really be accomplished without a commitment of the United States to that defense for the long term. We made this commitment without hesitation. Arthur Vandenberg, one of the chief architects of NATO, expressed the rationale of the organization in the Senate debate preceding passage of the treaty.

... this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest American idioms, "united we stand, divided we fall."

The North Atlantic alliance is a unique alignment of governments. The provision for the common defense of the members has led to a remarkable degree of military collaboration and diplomatic consultation for a peacetime coalition. The growth of the alliance organization has accelerated as the task of defending the treaty area has increased in scope, size, and complexity. NATO has had its stresses and strains, but it has weathered them all.

Today NATO is involved in a number of controversies, which must be resolved by achieving a consensus within the organization in order to preserve its strength and unity. The question has arisen whether Senator Vandenberg's assertion is as true today as it was when he made it 13 years ago. Three arguments have raised this question most sharply:

It has been argued that the very success of Western European economic development reduces Europe's need to rely on the United States to share in its defenses.

It has been argued that the increasing vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack makes us less willing as a partner in the defense of Europe and hence less effective in deterring such an attack.

It has been argued that nuclear capabilities are alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear threat and that independent national nuclear

<sup>4</sup>For text of remarks made by President Kennedy at the United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., on June 6, see White House press release dated June 6.



forces are sufficient to protect the nations of Europe.

I believe that all of these arguments are mistaken. I think it is worth while to expose the U.S. views on these issues as we have presented them to our allies. In our view, the effect of the new factors in the situation, both economic and military, has been to increase the interdependence of national security interests on both sides of the Atlantic and to enhance the need for the closest coordination of our efforts.

### **Nuclear Strategy**

A central military issue facing NATO today is the role of nuclear strategy. Four facts seem to us to dominate consideration of that role. All of them point in the direction of increased integration to achieve our common defense. First, the alliance has overall nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it. Second, this strength not only minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear war but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur. Third, damage to the civil societies of the alliance resulting from nuclear warfare could be very grave. Fourth, improved non-nuclear forces, well within alliance resources, could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves short of direct, all-out attack on Western Europe.

Let us look at the situation today. First, given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for an enemy to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made highly unlikely.

Second, and equally important, the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when acting in a "rational" way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the way others will react and the way others will interpret what they are doing.

We must hope—indeed I think we have good

reason to hope—that all sides will understand this danger and will refrain from steps that even raise the possibility of such a mutually disastrous misunderstanding. We have taken unilateral steps to reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence. We look forward to the prospect that through arms control the actual use of these terrible weapons may be completely avoided. It is a problem not just for us in the West but for all nations that are involved in this struggle we call the cold war.

For our part we feel we and our NATO allies must frame our strategy with this terrible contingency, however remote, in mind. Simply ignoring the problem is not going to make it go away.

The United States has come to the conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

The very strength and nature of the alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

The strength that makes these contributions to deterrence and to the hope of deterring attack upon civil societies even in wartime does not come cheap. We are confident that our current nuclear programs are adequate and will continue to be adequate for as far into the future as we can reasonably foresee. During the coming fiscal year the United States plans to spend close to \$15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure their adequacy. For what this money buys, there is no substitute.

In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of its being used independently, this force would be inviting a preemptive first strike

against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile the creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers.

In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear contribution to the alliance is neither obsolete nor dispensable.

### Importance of Central Control

At the same time, the general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.

We know that the same forces which are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the United States is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

There is, for example, the Polaris force, which we have been substantially increasing and which, because of its specially invulnerable nature, is peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic reserve force. We have already announced the com-

mitment of five of these ships, fully operational, to the NATO Command.

This sort of commitment has a corollary for the alliance as a whole. We want and need a greater degree of alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the alliance as a whole. As the President has said,<sup>5</sup>

Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, upon our forces and allies.

But let us be quite clear about what we are saying and what we would have to face if the deterrent should fail. This is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear strength, all of us would suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

We accept our share of this responsibility within the alliance. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear strength and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I must point out that we do not regard this as a desirable prospect, nor do we believe that the alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter actions not involving a massive commitment of any hostile force. Surely an alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than extreme reliance on nuclear weapons to meet our common threat. We do not believe that if the formula  $E=MC^2$  had not been discovered, we should all be Communist slaves. On this question I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.

### Strengthening NATO's Nonnuclear Power

With the alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that any power will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. For the kinds of conflicts, both political and military, most likely to arise in the NATO area, our capabilities for response must not be limited to nuclear weapons alone. The Soviets have superiority in nonnuclear forces in Europe

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

today. But that superiority is by no means overwhelming. Collectively, the alliance has the potential for a successful defense against such forces. In manpower alone, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites. We have already shown our willingness to contribute through our divisions now in place on European soil. In order to defend the populations of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty obligations, we have put in hand a series of measures to strengthen our nonnuclear power. We have added \$10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the callup temporarily gave us. The number of U.S. combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.

We expect that our allies will also undertake to strengthen further their nonnuclear forces and to improve the quality and staying power of these forces. These achievements will complement our deterrent strength. With improvements in alliance ground-force strength and staying power, improved nonnuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.

#### **Military Security, a Base for Free-World Strength**

I have described very briefly the United States views on the role of nuclear forces in the strategy of the alliance. I have pointed out that the alliance necessarily depends, for the deterrence of general nuclear war, on the powerful and well-protected nuclear forces of the United States, which are necessarily committed to respond to enemy nuclear strikes wherever they may be made. At the same time I have indicated the need for substantial nonnuclear forces within the alliance to deal with situations where a nuclear response may be inappropriate or simply not believable. Throughout I have emphasized that we in the alliance all need each other.

I want to remind you also that the security provided by military strength is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the achievement of our foreign policy goals, including our goals in the field of arms control and disarmament. Military security provides a base on which we can build free-world strength through the economic advances and political reforms which are the object of the President's programs, like the Alliance for Progress and the trade expansion legislation. Only in a peaceful world can we give full scope to the individual potential, which is for us the ultimate value.

A distinguished European visited the United States last month as a guest of the President. André Malraux, French Minister of State for Cultural Affairs, is an eminent novelist and critic. He led an archeological expedition to Cambodia and fought in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance Movement. Malraux paid a moving tribute to our nation when he said:

The only nation that has waged war but not worshipped it, that has won the greatest power in the world but not sought it, that has wrought the greatest weapon of death but has not wished to wield it . . . . May it inspire men with dreams worthy of its action.

The community of learning to which you have been admitted carries with it great privileges. It also carries great responsibilities. And perhaps the greatest of these is to help insure the wise use of our national power. Let me paraphrase Malraux: May your dreams be worthy of action and your actions be shaped by your dreams.

#### **U.S. and U.A.R. Hold Air Talks**

Press release 406 dated June 21

Delegations of the United States and the United Arab Republic initiated civil aviation consultations at Washington on June 19, 1962. The delegations are discussing various air transport problems in accordance with the bilateral air transport agreement of 1946.<sup>1</sup>

The chairman of the United Arab Republic delegation is Gen. Ahmad Abdel-Hamid Seif, Director General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of War. The United States delegation is headed by Henry T. Snowdon, Chief, Aviation Division, Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> 61 Stat. 3825; Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3884.

## Splendid Slaves and Reasoning Savages

by Carl T. Rowan

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>

I say with deep sincerity that I am pleased to speak here tonight—and not simply because your invitation has afforded me another opportunity to enjoy the summer delights of Minnesota. I am pleased because this graduation ceremony and the thousands more like it that are taking place around the Nation are so vitally important to the State Department and the work it seeks to do.

For that reason I shall not give what you may consider a “typical” commencement speech. I know that this is a warm evening and that those robes are not air-conditioned; still I intend to speak on a foreign policy matter of great seriousness. If the dread specter of boredom has arisen, let me assure you that I shall discuss a matter that directly involves you; it bears on the question of whether you move on to work or war, to college or military camp. So I am confident that you will find the subject fitting for this occasion.

Let me begin by citing a few words written by Joseph Addison in *The Spectator* more than 250 years ago:

Education is a companion which no misfortune can depress, no crime can destroy, no enemy can alienate, no despotism can enslave. At home a friend, abroad an introduction, in solitude a solace, and in society an ornament. It chastens vice, it guides virtue, it gives, at once, grace and government to genius. Without it, what is mankind? A splendid slave, a reasoned savage.

We have had two and a half centuries to learn the wisdom of that remark, and we know today as perhaps never before that a well-educated citizenry is the first and last line of defense of a free society. But we do not always understand the practical, issue-by-issue ways in which the wisdom,

or lack of wisdom, of the public bears directly on the question of national survival. This is what I want to discuss.

I must begin by emphasizing that this is a long and complex struggle that our country is in.

In the fierce battles of the past our security depended primarily on the military shrewdness of the Commander in Chief and of the generals in the field.

The Congress and the American public obviously had strong feelings and a passionate interest in the outcome of these wars, but none seemed to feel qualified to try to alter the strategy of our military planners at Anzio or Salerno or Tarawa or Okinawa. However high emotions may have risen against the Japanese or the Nazis, there was no room for pure emotion in the war rooms where long-trained, dedicated men planned the intricate details of attack and counterattack.

While the country's survival is as much at stake today as it was during any shooting war, the struggle is not primarily military.

As the President said to the graduating class at West Point Wednesday [June 6]:<sup>2</sup>

... the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution. While we will long require the services and admire the dedication and commitment of the fighting men of this country, neither our strategy nor our psychology as a nation, and certainly not our economy, must become permanently dependent upon an ever-increasing Military Establishment.

Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role, as a complement to our diplomacy, as an arm of our diplomacy, as a deterrent to our adversaries, and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.

The great battles of today are diplomatic. Our

<sup>1</sup>Address made at commencement exercises at Owatonna High School, Owatonna, Minn., on June 7 (press release 368; as-delivered text).

<sup>2</sup>For text, see White House press release dated June 6.

key planners are civilians rather than generals and colonels and corporals. They are using intellectual maneuvers rather than the techniques of beach invasions and bombing runs. We are in a long intellectual struggle to prove that we know more about human nature and the aspirations of mankind than do the tyrannical leaders of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

A difficult thing for our open society, with its checks and balances, is the fact that while Congressmen and editors and housewives and college students never pretended to have the military wisdom to overrule an Eisenhower or Omar Bradley, these groups eagerly declare their shrewdness in the field of diplomacy. They do not hesitate to try to alter the strategy of battle in today's grim ideological contest.

#### **Views on Aid to Poland and Yugoslavia**

I refer specifically to yesterday's [June 6] action in which the Senate voted to bar any foreign aid to any country "known to be dominated by communism or Marxism."<sup>3</sup>

Let me make it clear that under our form of government the Congress holds the purse strings and has every right to influence policy by tightening or loosening those strings. That is what the Senate seeks to do with regard to our foreign policy where Yugoslavia and Poland are concerned.

But it seems to me that our society faces a fundamental question of wisdom here. To what extent should Congressmen alter or sharply change strategy in a life-and-death struggle involving matters on which many Congressmen can never be as well informed as the President, the Secretary of State, the diplomats intimately involved in that struggle?

Far be it from me to try to limit the swath cut by Congress. They represent the people. I can do no more than express one man's views to the people. The Senate action yesterday may be welcomed by those eager to show again and again their aversion to communism. But the questions more farsighted Americans must ask are:

"Does this display of contempt for communism

in Yugoslavia and Poland really hurt the Communists we want to hurt?"

"Does this action really serve the interest of our nation and of our children?"

"Does it retard the spread of Sino-Soviet domination of peoples we wish to be independent?"

Obviously these are questions where men of honesty and integrity can come to different conclusions. My conclusion is that the answer to each question is no—that a flat ban on aid to Poland or Yugoslavia or what some may label "Marxist countries" does not serve our national interest.

In fact such a ban would very likely frustrate our diplomatic strategists in their efforts to achieve one of our fundamental goals: that is, to help peoples of other countries to achieve independence of the Soviet Union and to get these countries to refrain from assisting in Communist efforts to subvert other countries.

#### **Reasons for U.S. Aid to Yugoslavia**

When Yugoslavia cast off the yoke of total Soviet domination 14 years ago, we granted assistance without hesitation. We had no illusions about the fact that Yugoslavia's leaders were Communist, that her economic policies differed from ours, that her standards of freedom—of the press, of speech, and of the individual—were far short of what we consider proper. But we felt it was in our national interest and the interest of human freedom to help Yugoslavia to stand outside the bloc, a significant break in the Communist monolith.

Yugoslav communism could be tolerated if it did not try to force itself on Yugoslavia's neighbors or on us—a policy point that President Kennedy spelled out eloquently in his interview with Soviet editor Adzhubei.<sup>4</sup> Beyond that, we could hope that in time a Yugoslav people who had mustered the courage to throw off Soviet domination might shake off the other trappings of Communist dictatorship. We could hope—remembering that this struggle between two ideologies backed by unprecedented military power is likely to be a long one and that some patience is required, even if we cannot consider it a virtue.

<sup>3</sup>For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on June 6 and texts of Senate amendments to the foreign aid bill, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 25.

<sup>4</sup>President Kennedy was interviewed by Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of *Izvestia*, at Hyannis Port, Mass., on Nov. 25, 1961.

Three administrations, including the Republicans for 8 years, agreed that aid to Yugoslavia was clearly in our interest. Officials in the State Department, well-trained and dedicated Americans who have watched Yugoslav developments day after day, concluded that beyond doubt our helping this country to retain its independence has been an advantage to the free, non-Communist world.

Yugoslavia has remained aloof from the aggressions and subversions practiced by the rest of the Communist bloc.

Her U.N. votes have reflected an independence of the Sino-Soviet bloc on several key issues.

True, there have been actions and statements by leaders of both Yugoslavia and Poland which have irritated and exasperated United States leaders. But our policymakers accept the certainty that if our system triumphs and we help to establish a world of free choice—a world of truly independent nations, free to express the will of their peoples—we shall have to live with occasional irritating and exasperating speeches and actions.

After all, our staunchest, most non-Communist allies have provided more than a little irritation and exasperation for us over the years. And I am sure some of our oldest allies occasionally rue the day the British let us float off into independence, for we, too, can be exasperating.

It seems to me that Americans must ask themselves: What do we expect to gain by restricting flexibility on aid to Yugoslavia or Poland or other nations which speak in terms of Marxism or communism but have shown that they desire to stay free of Soviet imperialism?

Do Americans really believe that such restrictions will force these nations to march meekly into our camp so as to induce us to continue our assistance?

Not only is this not likely to happen, but to give even the impression that we want it belies all that this country stands for. We have said again and again that we don't want satellites, even if we could buy them with aid. Satellite-ism is the Communist way, is the way of slavery. Fundamental to our whole position is the principle of "consent of the governed." We want nations to be free enough and strong enough and secure enough to express freely their independence just as any American citizen does—even though these nations

may sometimes be wrong, just as we permit our free citizens to be wrong.

We tolerate error as long as those who err do not try to force their misguided ways on the rest of us, as long as their errors are not detrimental to the freedoms of the rest of society.

As Secretary Rusk pointed out last night [June 6], the only meaningful result of a flat ban on aid to Yugoslavia and Poland very likely would be to endanger the independence these countries now enjoy, and such freedom as their peoples have managed to achieve. The ban probably would push these countries back under Communist bloc domination.

#### Value of Education in a Democracy

Some of you may wonder what Yugoslavia and Poland and yesterday's Senate vote have got to do with 200 high school graduates and some 4,000 of their relatives and friends in a southern Minnesota community.

I have said all this to say that this dispute over aid to Yugoslavia and Poland illustrates the crucial value of a good system of mass education in a democracy. It illustrates the need for us to insure that every youngster here who has the intellectual equipment is pushed on to higher education.

If this great world struggle is settled in war—God forbid!—we shall be grateful to the schools that have produced the brainpower that has given this nation not only shrewd military tacticians but an awesome arsenal of power. But if the struggle is decided in the field of intellect and diplomacy, we shall need the wisest, best educated public imaginable.

The recent vote on the aid bill indicates to me that a President or a Secretary of State can hardly be expected to wage a war of intellect and diplomacy that goes far beyond the intellect and diplomatic skills of Congress and the public. But this is democracy. And this is sometimes referred to as our country's great weakness. The Communists clearly—like tyrants of past eras—regard it as our weakness.

I recall that in 1928, a decade or so before he joined Hitler in a futile attempt to crush democracy, Benito Mussolini said:

Democracy is talking itself to death. The people do not know what they want; they do not know what is the best for them. There is too much foolishness, too

much lost motion. I have stopped the talk and the nonsense. I am a man of action. Democracy is beautiful in theory; in practice it is a fallacy. You in America will see that some day.

I say not only to you graduates but to all who assemble here in pride at what you have accomplished that in the long and difficult days of the cold war you shall have to prove that the people of a democracy do know what they want—that democracy can be beautiful in practice as well as theory. A good starting point would be for all of us to realize that we cannot in one moment of passion demand U.S. military action to help a Hungarian Communist leader, Imre Nagy, pull his countrymen free of Soviet domination, then in a later moment of frustration ban all assistance to a Yugoslav Communist leader who achieved what Nagy could not.

It is this kind of glaring inconsistency that keeps dictators and would-be tyrants believing that the peoples of a democracy don't know what they want.

Yes, as I said, we face a complex struggle, and there are no easy, sure-fire answers. But that is what makes a real challenge to intellect.

That is why I welcome you graduates as brave new soldiers in a struggle of reason. You have taken a big stride toward getting the education that Addison called "a companion which no misfortune can depress, no crime can destroy, no enemy can alienate, no despotism can enslave."

Go forth, young people—and you go with my wish that none of you will join the ranks of what Addison called splendid slaves and reasoned savages.

## Cultural and Educational Affairs in International Relations

*by Lucius D. Battle*

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I am delighted to be back in Williamsburg and particularly as the guest of the College of William and Mary. I am not exactly a stranger to these parts, nor am I a stranger to the class of 1962. I have sat with many of you in some of your classes. It has been my pleasure to have spoken to your clubs and to have faced the challenge of your debates and bull sessions. In a way I consider myself a member of your class, for your period in Williamsburg and my own overlapped in large measure. I find it all the more pleasing, therefore, to think that my new occupation, as the State Department officer responsible for educational and cultural affairs in the conduct of the international relations of the United States, permits me to return to this cherished spot and to address the latest graduates of this ancient college.

Actually, as you well know, the two communi-

ties of Williamsburg, the two great institutions of our city, the college and the Restoration, are dedicated to the same idea: the conservation and the interpretation of what is precious in our heritage. As historians, we all subscribe to Ranke's celebrated dictum: It is the historian's job to find out and to record "the way it really happened." It is a difficult task, but we strive, with all the care and precision of which we are capable, to find out what really happened at Gettysburg or Versailles, what meaning Plato or Shakespeare or Jefferson intended, or how to re-create the Governor's Palace so that any visitor can imagine vividly how the Palace's inhabitants lived among its grandeurs.

We do these things not just because we are antiquarians, loving the past for its own sake, but because we know that the past is truly an aspect of the present. As the famous inscription over our National Archives in Washington says, "What Is Past Is Prologue," and only those who truly know the past are able to apply its lessons to the

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va., on June 10 (press release 376 date June 8).

building of the future. Besides, the more one learns about "the way it really happened," the better one understands that the past is not so different from the present as those imagine who know only the present.

The more one applies oneself to learning to know a monument of the human intellect—whether it is a play, or a painting, or a building—the more one shares the experience of the readers or the spectators for whom the monument was first created. The Greeks who saw Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* for the first time, and trembled at the power of that majestic and appalling tragedy, responded to it with the same immediacy of feeling that the Elizabethans brought to *Hamlet* or that we bring to a modern tragedy or to Igor Stravinsky's great opera based on *Oedipus*. All great art is modern for the spectator who is able to understand it.

Art is universal, not only in time but also in space. Last winter Secretary of State Dean Rusk presented a medal to Igor Stravinsky on behalf of the Department. On that occasion, Secretary Rusk said that Mr. Stravinsky, an American citizen since 1945, had, with his music, "enriched his nation and the world," that he was "a part of that broader community of man" which "no nation, no tongue, no tradition" could claim "strictly for itself." And Secretary Rusk concluded by hailing the "great international communities of the mind and spirit, in science, in music, in the arts, in scholarship."

#### A Basis for International Communication

These "great international communities," which transcend all barriers of geography and language, hold out a promise of establishing a basis for true international communication. For the universality of art is not merely a phrase—it is a true and meaningful concept that is constantly seeking and finding new terms of expression. You have all probably read with pleasure the accounts of Mr. Benny Goodman's triumphant progress through the Soviet Union. The crowds that cheer Mr. Goodman playing "Meadowlands"—like those that cheered the Boston Symphony or *Porgy and Bess* several years ago—obviously are finding through music a channel of communication with the United States that is remarkably effective. The message conveyed is a simple one: These talented American performers offer living evidence that they come from a country in which art

and a truly indigenous American art is cherished and fostered. Where devotion to the arts exists, there exists also a basis for communication and understanding. This logic seems simple in the extreme, but it is nonetheless valid, and it holds out a hope that we cannot and must not ignore.

We are reminded constantly of the difficulty of sharing our thoughts with others. Even when we speak the same language, we do not necessarily attach the same meanings to the words we use. How much more vexed the problem becomes when it is two institutions—or two governments—that are trying to carry on a dialog. The traditional means of establishing a relationship between two countries, for purposes of negotiation, is the diplomatic mission, headed by an ambassador and consisting of professional diplomats. We have learned that the existence of such institutions does not guarantee that a helpful dialog will take place between the representatives of the two countries concerned. And we persevere, despite all disappointments, because we must, hoping that patience and determination will find a way to right reason. Success is often our reward when perseverance produces some achievement such as the Austrian Treaty. But the difficulty remains.

When we come to communication between people, however, we want more than a formal dialog. It is for this reason that our Government's programs in education and the arts have come to play a more and more significant role in contributing to the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives, often producing results that cannot be achieved in any other way. For they provide direct access to people—people who are glad to accept what they purvey as an illumination of the quality of our lives and an enrichment of their own. Their reach is therefore wide, extending to friendly and unfriendly nations alike, in both highly developed and less developed areas.

Among these programs are the familiar Fulbright exchanges of students, teachers, and professors. There are also programs in which other leaders in America's educational, cultural, and professional life—American specialists, we call them—are sent abroad for varying periods of time as teachers and lecturers. Similarly, foreign leaders in many fields are brought to this country.

These programs contribute to economic and social development. But their first concern is with the intellectual and spiritual aspects of life, which



are a free society's greatest concern. They provide an avenue for sustained and fruitful communication across national borders even while conventional channels of diplomatic intercourse are choked by controversy. In the long run, they can create a worldwide common market of ideas, cultural attainments, and human discourse. And, as a matter of immediate practical bearing on the day-to-day operation of programs carried out by the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency, they can reinforce and make more productive a wide range of other Government activities. By rising above ideological differences, education and the arts make possible intuitive contacts that can ripen into mutual trust and understanding and enduring friendship. The universality of the arts and sciences—the ideal which this college has nurtured for almost three centuries—is the truest way of developing in all peoples a world outlook, a profound recognition that the life of the individual and of his community is intimately and richly involved in the life of the nation and of the world.

The involvement of our Government in educational and cultural affairs is of relatively recent date. That we have gone so fast and so far is a tribute to the educational and cultural strength of the Nation. It is the vast and varied resources of our colleges and universities, unparalleled in the world, that make foreign students and scholars want to come here and make possible the qualified company that we are able to send abroad.

America's faith in education as the great force that can transform and elevate human institutions was expressed in the founding of our first two colleges, in the major Southern and Northern colonies of the New World. In Virginia, construction of a college—now the College of William and Mary—was begun as early as 1619 at the city of Henrico, 10 miles south of Richmond. The effort did not come to fruition until 1693, by which time another institution at Cambridge, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, was a ripe 57 years old. The founders of Harvard College have left us a moving statement of their objective. While I hesitate to quote a rival in the honors for antiquity, I think it worth noting. It went as follows:

After God had carried us safe to *New-England*, and wee had builded our houses, provided necessities for our livelihood, reard convenient places for Gods worship and settled the Civill Government; one of the next things we

longed for, and looked after was to advance *Learning* and perpetuate it to Posterity. . . .

In the following century one of the most distinguished graduates of the College of William and Mary drew up a memorable plan for the establishment of a new university at Charlottesville, in Virginia, as part of a great educational system for the Commonwealth. Thomas Jefferson, who surely ranks with the greatest scholars produced in America by this or any other college, was deeply concerned about education and considered his efforts to shape it and give it direction the most important work of his life; you will remember that he asked to be described on his tombstone at Monticello as "father of the University of Virginia."

### Emergence of New Nations

Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would undoubtedly find two familiar points of reference in the world of 1962. One, I am confident, would be Williamsburg itself. The other would be the emergence of new nations from colonial empires. Since most of you of the class of 1962 were freshmen in high school, 27 independent states have come into existence, increasing the total number on this globe from 87 to 114. Twenty-four of the 27 new nations are in Africa, where a whole continent has come alive. Jefferson would hardly have been astonished by such a development; he had seen the beginnings of it in Latin America in his lifetime and, indeed, had contributed to its philosophical and political direction. The magnitude is enormous, of course, but the principles have not changed, and our nation, today as earlier, serves as a guide and beacon for the newly liberated countries of the world. I am not sure that as many constitutions for new countries have been written here as legend says have been written in the British Museum; but I am confident that the Constitution of the United States has been the major influence in the drafting of these instruments, whether here or abroad.

In this vast convulsion the need for educated leaders has been predictably great. Similarly, our need for informed and well-trained specialists in the social, political, and economic aspects of the new nations—and, indeed, of every nation in the world—has grown with our desire to assist them to make their way in the world.

Under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt programs, which were recodified and expanded in

scope last year in the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, known as the Fulbright-Hays Act, a large number of American students, research scholars, and lecturers go abroad every year. This is hardly news to you, I am sure. Some of you will doubtless be going abroad next summer or fall under these programs, and your lives and professional careers will be permanently enriched by this opportunity to study and work abroad. Some of you will, as a consequence, become interested in making a career in international service for your Government and will consider joining the Foreign Service, or the Peace Corps, or the United States Information Service, or the Agency for International Development, depending on the nature of your particular interest.

It is well for us to remember that, in the developing educational relations between the United States and other countries, the street decidedly runs both ways. We are proud to be able to give what we can to our visitors and grateful to them for giving us new knowledge and deeper understanding of other peoples and countries. We also gain immeasurably in this knowledge and understanding as our students and scholars return to the United States from their study and work abroad.

Another major activity in the realm of international educational and cultural affairs is the Cultural Presentations Program, under which American performing artists are sent abroad on tours to demonstrate the cultural interests and achievements of the American people. There has been great variety in the program, from the Juilliard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, from Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale theatrical company, from the New York City Ballet to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this program has been devoted exclusively to sending our own artists abroad, but, with the expanded legislative authority given to the Department last year under the Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be able soon to establish a program of bringing foreign performing artists to this country.

The meaning of the Fulbright-Hays Act was eloquently expressed by President Kennedy when he signed the act on September 21, 1961. "This ceremony," he said, "has historic significance because it marks full recognition by the Congress of the importance of a more comprehensive program

of educational and cultural activities as a component of our foreign relations." No one, in fact has more vigorously championed the role of education and the arts in our foreign relations than the President. One month after his inauguration he said: "There is no better way of helping the new nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in their present pursuit of freedom and better living conditions than by assisting them to develop their human resources through education. Like wise there is no better way to strengthen our bonds of understanding and friendship with older nations than through educational and cultural interchange." On August 1, 1961, the President marked the 15th anniversary of the historic Fulbright Act by saying:

As a result of this program, which permits this exchange of representative scholars, students, educators, artists, from our country to countries around the world and from their countries to our country, as a result of this program and the related Smith-Mundt program, over 50,000 people have been permitted to come to a greater understanding of the benefits of our culture and civilization, and the cultures and the civilization of other countries. This program has been most important in bettering the relations of the United States with other parts of the world. It has been a major constructive step on the road to peace.

We are justly proud of the good work that has been done in this field by our country—which means by our Government, our colleges and universities, our civic organizations, our citizens. And now, you of the class of 1962, who have profited by the great resources of this college for the past 4 years, are on the way to making your own contribution in your own best way to your nation and your time.

As a people we are, in all truth, the sum of our parts. The totality of our individual acts, our day-to-day deeds and activities, make up the picture we offer the world. A new total diplomacy has therefore become essential in foreign policy. This embraces our heritage, our art, our education, our culture, reflecting the richness and variety we have in these fields.

These elements are vital, I believe, in the new total diplomacy. In this realm we may seek hopefully for universality, for international comprehension. On these things, as much as perhaps of anything else, the eventual peace of mankind rests

## The North Atlantic Partnership and the Less Developed Areas

by J. Robert Schaetzel

Of the many myths with which those who have responsibility for foreign affairs must deal, there are two of immediate concern to those who are directly responsible for Asian affairs. The first is the false dilemma that America must make a choice between its commitment to a partnership between the United States and Western Europe—the concept of a North Atlantic partnership—and a policy of United States support for the aspirations and economic growth of the less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The second myth is that the growth and the enlargement of the European Economic Community (the Common Market, as it is frequently called) would be harmful to the interests of Asia and these other continents. Perhaps the best way to exorcise these myths will be to examine our actual views and policies concerning the relationship of the enlarged Common Market to our own interests and to the interests of the rest of the world.

We all know that a strong and united Europe within the framework of close Atlantic partnership is—and has been since the conception of the Marshall Plan—a fundamental objective of American policy. Why is this so?

First, there can be no security in the world unless there is an effective relationship, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whereby the defensive capabilities of Europe and the United States are harnessed to deter Communist aggression in Europe or elsewhere in the world. I need hardly point out that the security which stems from this relationship is of equal importance to the countries of the North Atlantic and to those of the rest of the world.

Second, a stable and prosperous Europe is indispensable to the continued growth and prosperity

of the United States. This is our major market. The intimate interrelationship of the free-world financial system is dependent upon the economic base of the Atlantic area. We are now in a period of world history where the United States cannot remain strong and prosperous without strength and growth in Europe, just as European prosperity is dependent to a considerable extent on the health of the American economy.

Third, as the world's major trading center, Europe is and will remain the major market for the less developed countries and also will be increasingly a source of the capital which the development process demands.

Security, the health of the United States economy, and United States ability to behave responsibly and effectively in international, commercial, and financial affairs—these are all reasons why a strong and united Western Europe is fundamental to the achievement of America's major foreign policy objectives.

### The New Europe

While there has been consistent bipartisan support of European unification by three American administrations, including both the Congress and the executive branch, lately a new element has been introduced. This is the application of the United Kingdom for full membership in the Common Market. Assuming the success of the intricate

• Mr. Schaetzel is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs. The above article is based upon remarks he made at a Far East Regional Operations Conference at Baguio, Philippines, on March 14, 1962.

negotiations required to make British membership an actuality, the Common Market will be composed of a population exceeding that of the United States and rivaling our economic capacity. The United States and the European Common Market together account for 90 percent of free-world trade in industrial goods and almost 90 percent of free-world industrial production. The implications of this concentration of strength—for the international Communist movement, for the countries outside the North Atlantic, and for the United States itself—are readily apparent.

Any fairminded appraisal of European developments must take into account that there are latent dangers in the emergence of a strong, affluent, self-confident, and united Europe. There will undoubtedly be elements in Europe attracted to policies of autarky, elements content to pursue the good life—the easy satisfaction of pent-up demands for goods and services. Second, with the transformation of the 19th-century empire system into a world community of national states there are those in Europe who may be content to see a united Europe meet its international obligations through the Euro-African relationship, forgetful of the rest of the world or assuming that other regions will be looked after by the United States. Third, there is worry about the development of the so-called “thirl force” attitude, the assumption that the new Europe might be attracted to the pursuit of independent security objectives or even to playing the role of a balance between the East and the West.

It is well to state these fears and to recognize that they do exist. In fact the evidence is that a united Europe will display a deeper and stronger sense of responsibility for the defense of freedom than would have been possible under the previous pattern of weak, independent national states. The neutralism which we heard talk of a decade ago was an expression of weakness, not of strength. This is not to say that there will not be disagreements between ourselves and the new Europe but rather that these disagreements will be within the framework of an Atlantic power center committed to the same enlightened security and economic objectives.

The situation confronting the United States, therefore, has these characteristics: We wish to continue encouraging the process of unification and strength. At the same time we wish to make

sure that Europe and the United States work in close and constructive harmony. Finally, we want this partnership to have an outward orientation. Thus we have been engaged in a delicate maneuver whereby we have consciously moved closer toward Europe as Europe itself unifies.

One institutional means of accomplishing this has been the creation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and particularly America's full membership in this body, which means that we take full part in the process of economic cooperation established among European countries since World War II. We are moving toward closer coordination of our monetary policies with those of Europe. We have begun frank discussions and reviews of our domestic economic policies, recognizing that unless we are all committed to policies of adequate growth, distortions and imbalances can play havoc with our international economic relations. Another fundamental objective has been to employ the OECD as a means of involving Europe in the global commitments which are inescapably ours and which we believe to be equally inescapably those of Europe.

#### Trade Expansion Program

In addition to this institutional framework, we have taken a series of steps designed to assure that the new Europe will assume fully the world responsibilities which should properly belong to the enlarged Common Market. The first and most important step is the President's trade expansion program.<sup>1</sup> As you know, the cutting edge of this program is to give the President the tools to negotiate a general and substantial reduction of the common external tariff. Naturally, one of the principal purposes of this program is to serve the immediate self-interest of the United States economy by assuring the access of our goods to the great market of Europe. But it is an equally important objective to preserve and reaffirm Europe's commitment to the most-favored-nation principle. In other words, we contemplate that the negotiations between ourselves and the Common Market will reduce the tariff barriers surrounding the great common markets of both Europe and the United States to minimal levels

<sup>1</sup> For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

and thus open these markets more widely to the goods of the less developed countries.

### **Finding Markets for the Less Developed Areas**

The second step is an effort to promote improved access to markets in industrial countries for the products of the less developed countries of the world. Financial aid and assistance are meaningless unless steps are taken to find markets for their exports. We must therefore set in motion a program which, over time, will eliminate or reduce tariffs, taxes, and other artificial restrictions on the import of the products of these countries.

Our most important initiative in this area relates to tropical products and has arisen primarily from a concern that the association with the EEC of the French overseas territories—most of which have now become sovereign states—could result in a permanent preferential area related to the EEC which would seriously disrupt existing patterns of trade in tropical products. This concern was greatly increased by the decision of the United Kingdom to seek membership in the EEC, which foreshadowed a broadening and consolidation of preferences with the result that essentially all of Africa would enjoy a special preferential arrangement with Europe. This would be discriminatory against similar produce from other tropical areas of the world and would frustrate the attempt to improve the market outlook for those basic commodities—such as coffee, cocoa, and tea—the sale of which is so important to Latin America and Asia as well as Africa.

Instead of a preferential area setting the interest of one producing area against another, we have suggested that the EEC, the U.K., and the United States join in efforts to place world trade in key tropical commodities on a basis of nondiscriminatory free access that will recognize the worldwide nature of the problems. If we can together agree to open our markets to the primary products of less developed countries on a basis of nondiscrimination, we will set in motion a process that will in the long run create a healthy world trading environment in which the less developed countries can develop their production for world markets.

Obviously this cannot be achieved overnight. The shift to nondiscriminatory trade with the less developed nations will require transitional arrangements, compensatory mechanisms that will

ease the adjustment to nondiscriminatory trade for nations now receiving preferences, and assistance on the achievement of sound long-term development plans. The fact that these characteristics—compensatory arrangements for lessened preferences and long-term development assistance—are features of the new arrangements being negotiated between the EEC and the associated African countries augurs well for the ultimate achievement of our goal. For our part, we are seeking improved authority in the President's trade expansion program for the elimination or reduction of our tariffs affecting the traditional and potential exports of the less developed countries, and we are developing further proposals which we hope will facilitate global solutions of the special problems of tropical products.

### **Commodity Stabilization**

The third step is in the broad field of commodity stabilization. This is a highly complicated and difficult problem in which solutions, if they are to be found at all, must be tailored to individual commodities. Plans for the negotiation of a longer term international coffee agreement are the most advanced, but we also are seriously considering the desirability of participating in other commodity stabilization arrangements.

All of our experience has emphasized the extreme difficulty of negotiating commodity agreements. Not only must they take into account the interests of the producers and consumers, but they also call for a prediction of what the future market will be—placing demands on the art of economics which this art has not shown itself fully competent to meet. There should be no misunderstanding about the contribution one can reasonably expect from even the most successfully negotiated commodity stabilization agreements. These are no panaceas. Such agreements at best place a temporary floor under prices—they provide a breathing space. Unless other steps are taken—encouragement of new uses for the commodities, diversification of economies to transfer resources to more attractive pursuits—the inherent instability of commodity arrangements will come into play and further distress will lie ahead. In short, there must be an intimate relationship between such stabilization arrangements and the entire process of economic development, including our aid efforts.

#### Development Assistance Committee

There is one essential point that should be made in this connection. Not only the United States but many of the European nations, Canada, and Australia are generally favorable to efforts to alleviate international commodity problems and are willing to consider international commodity arrangements in this connection. The problem is not, therefore, one of doctrinaire resistance to the search for arrangements which would bring some order into these important markets. The most serious obstacles will be those inherent in the nature of the production and trade of commodities and the difficulty of working out mutually satisfactory agreements between producers and consumers.

We are also studying, with the participation of important European countries, the possibilities for more general techniques for dealing with instability in primary commodity trade. One of the possible techniques is that of compensatory financing, i.e. international financial assistance of some kind to smooth out the fluctuations in export earnings of countries heavily dependent on primary commodities.

#### Dealing With Low-Cost Imports

The fourth step is that of dealing with low-cost imports. This is perhaps the toughest problem of all. Most of what we know about this problem is discouraging. In all of the advanced countries there exists deep-seated and politically potent resistance to the acceptance of manufactured goods from the low-wage countries. Both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the OECD are concerned with this matter, and it is our judgment that we should exploit every opportunity to see that the advanced countries face the issues that exist here and continue the search for solutions. The short- and long-term textile agreements represent one method of dealing with the problem. It is probably not applicable to other commodities. Nonetheless, two principles are set forth in these agreements which are important for the future. One is that the advanced countries have accepted a responsibility to provide continuing and gradually growing access to their markets for the goods of the low-cost producing states. The second principle is that the less developed countries should assume some responsibility for restraint. In short, the low-cost producing states should be conscious of the consequences of actions which would be market-disruptive.

The fifth step is the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. We have recently taken an administrative step in Washington to transfer the backstopping of the DAC from the traditional Departmental staff to the Agency for International Development. The theory here is that our participation in the DAC will only be effective if our own development people look upon this as a major instrument for international action.

The DAC itself has already made substantial progress. It should become an indispensable instrument for increasing the amounts of aid coming from the participating states, for improving the terms of such assistance, and for achieving better coordination of their combined aid efforts. It should also help to minimize situations in which one donor nation "picks off all the cream"—taking the sound, self-liquidating projects—while others assume the burden of essential development projects that are often economically unattractive. A further beneficial effect will flow from DAC activities: The Atlantic nations will be demonstrating, through tangible assistance efforts, that their sense of responsibility runs to all the less developed countries—to Latin America and Asia, as well as to Africa.

We are presently engaged in a major effort to select one or several countries in each region of the world with the objective of developing DAC coordinating teams (or consortia). This would encourage the process whereby Europe and the United States can share responsibility in limited but traditional political relationships. Starting in May this year the DAC is embarking on a program of annual reviews of member countries' aid programs and policies with a view to recommending ways of improving their effectiveness. The establishment of a development center to promote the exchange of experience among institutions concerned with development is also currently under consideration.

#### Changes in U.S. Foreign Economic Policies

There is a final point which should be clearly understood: the fact that the United States is now well embarked upon fundamental changes in its foreign economic policies.

First, the President's trade expansion program embodies the principle of free trade in industrial goods, even though this principle is narrowly de-

financed and limited in application. But this is the first time since 1789 that the Government of the United States has sought seriously to adopt this principle.

Second, we now look upon international commodity arrangements not as a necessary evil to be accepted only in the most desperate circumstances but as an approach which should be realistically and energetically explored as a means of dealing with one of the most difficult and far-ranging problems of the free world economy. Upon this, and in the field of temperate agriculture, the major producing countries of the West are close to agreement in principle, but the growing surpluses of these goods and the technological capability of grinding out even greater surpluses can be managed only through international arrangements which will contain provisions for the control of production surpluses and exports.

Third, we have reached the point where the allocation of resources through taxation for purposes of economic development abroad has become accepted as a permanent part of the responsibility of the United States, and this concept is steadily gaining acceptance in the other affluent nations of the world.

In conclusion let me say that we see these various trends in Western Europe, and the emerging lines of the United States relationships with the new Europe, as presenting us both with great opportunities and with serious problems which must be solved. One major objective of our strategy is to provide a firm and realistic basis for helping the less developed countries realize their own aspirations. In sum, we have a grand strategy whereby we hope to increase the security of the free world and to assure its economic stability and growth by providing both capital and markets to the less developed countries. The value and importance of this strategy to the less developed countries is not immediately apparent, but, as the above explanation of the rationale of our European policy and its relation to our overall strategy demonstrates, it has real significance and value for them—indeed, the policy is essential to the fulfillment of their development aspirations. There can be little question that 1962 and 1963 are the years during which we and the Western Europeans will be making decisions that will set the pattern of the free-world economy for decades to come.

## President Chiari of Panama Holds Talks With President Kennedy

*Roberto F. Chiari, President of the Republic of Panama, visited the United States June 11-16; he was in Washington June 12-14. Following is the text of a joint communique released on June 13 at the conclusion of talks between President Kennedy and President Chiari.*

White House press release dated June 13

The meetings of the President of the Republic of Panama and the President of the United States of America during the past two days have been marked by a spirit of frankness, understanding and sincere friendship. During their talks the two Presidents discussed general relations and existing treaties between their two countries, their mutual interests in the Panama Canal, and topics of world-wide and hemispheric concern. They emphasized the close and friendly ties on which has been established a mutually advantageous association through partnership in the Panama Canal enterprise. On the conclusion of these talks, they agreed to publish the following joint communique.

They reaffirm the traditional friendship between Panama and the United States—a friendship based on their common devotion to the ideals of representative democracy, and to their determination that both nations should work as equal partners in the cause of peace, freedom, economic progress and social justice.

The Presidents recognize that their two countries are bound together by a special relationship arising from the location and operation of the Panama Canal, which has played such an important part in the history of both their countries.

The President of Panama and the President of the United States agreed upon the principle that when two friendly nations are bound by treaty provisions which are not fully satisfactory to one of the parties, arrangements should be made to permit both nations to discuss these points of dissatisfaction. Accordingly, the Presidents have agreed to appoint high level representatives to carry on such discussions. These representatives will start their work promptly.

As to some of these problems, it was agreed that a basis for their solution can now be stated. Accordingly, the two Presidents further agreed to

instruct their representatives to develop measures to assist the Republic of Panama to take advantage of the commercial opportunities available through increased participation by Panamanian private enterprises in the market offered by the Canal Zone, and to solve such labor questions in the Canal Zone as equal employment opportunities, wage matters and social security coverage.

They also agreed that their representatives will arrange for the flying of Panamanian flags in an appropriate way in the Canal Zone.

In order to support the efforts of the Government of Panama to improve tax collections in order to meet better the needs of the people of Panama, President Kennedy agreed in principle to instruct his representatives to work out in conjunction with the Panamanian representatives arrangements under which the U.S. Government will withhold the income taxes of those Panamanian and non-United States citizen employees in the Zone who are liable for such taxes under existing treaties and the Panamanian income tax law.

The President of Panama mentioned a number of other practical problems in relations between the two countries of current concern to his Government including the need of Panama for pier facilities and the two Presidents agreed that their representatives would over the coming months discuss these problems as well as others that may arise.

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and commitments of the Charter of Punta del Este.<sup>1</sup> They agreed on the need to execute rapidly all steps necessary to make the Alliance for Progress effective; they recognized that the Alliance is a joint effort calling for development programming for effective use of national as well as external resources, institutional reforms, tax reforms, vigorous application of existing laws, and a just distribution of the fruits of national development to all sectors of the community.

The two Presidents declared that political democracy, national independence and the self-determination of peoples are the political principles which shape the national policies of Panama and the United States. Both countries are joined in a hemisphere-wide effort to accelerate economic progress and social justice.

In conclusion the two Presidents expressed their gratification at this opportunity to exchange views and to strengthen the friendly and mutually beneficial relationship which has long existed between Panama and the United States. Their meeting was a demonstration of the understanding and reciprocal cooperation of the two countries and strengthened the bonds of common interests and friendship between their respective peoples.

## U.S. Signs Trade Agreements With India and Haiti

The Department of State announced on June 21 (press release 412) that the United States had on June 15 signed a trade agreement with India for the exchange of new tariff concessions. On the same date the Department released the text of an interim trade agreement signed with Haiti on June 7.<sup>1</sup> The negotiations were part of the 1960-61 Geneva tariff conference under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.<sup>2</sup>

In the trade agreement with India the United States granted new concessions on 29 items covering imports from India amounting to \$51.3 million in 1960. A portion of these imports consists of items on which there is no U.S. duty, and the concession merely binds this duty-free status. Some of the more important items which fall in this category are lemon grass oil and mica films and splittings.

In exchange for these concessions India granted the United States new concessions on 26 items covering imports from the United States amounting to \$43.6 million in the last year for which import statistics are available. It is anticipated that trade in a number of these commodities will expand as a result of the tariff concessions and of India's economic development program.

Further details concerning the concessions negotiated will be issued in the near future as a supplement to previous publications analyzing the results of the Geneva tariff conference. Most of the U.S. concessions will become effective in two stages, the first on July 1.

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the agreements with India and Haiti, including schedules of tariff concessions, see Department of State press release 412 dated June 21. Press release 412 also includes texts of agreements rectifying the U.S. schedules to the interim agreements of Mar. 5, 1962, with Peru and Switzerland.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.



## Department Presents Views on New Sugar Legislation

*Statement by C. Griffith Johnson  
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate this opportunity to present to you the views of the Department of State on the proposals for new sugar legislation. I want to be clear at the beginning that we support the bill proposed by the President and vigorously oppose the provisions of H.R. 12154 as passed by the House which relate to foreign imports. It is our firm belief that these provisions are contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

Our first objection is to the emasculation of the former Cuban quota. The President's bill, after taking into consideration increases in domestic quotas, establishes the former Cuban quota at 2.65 million tons. The House bill further reduces this quantity to 1.5 million tons by allocating 1.1 million tons to 25 other foreign countries. The Department of State considers it of critical importance that the former Cuban quota not be reduced below the 2.65-million-ton figure.

We must look forward to the day when Cuba returns to the family of Western nations. We must provide all the inducement we can to have this event occur as soon as possible. By reducing Cuba's potential opportunity to trade with the United States, we would only strengthen Castro's position in Cuba and discourage those forces opposed to him. The reduction contained in the House bill would serve to support Castro's contention that Cuba's future lies with the Communist bloc. To repeat, therefore, I strongly urge that the former Cuban quota not be scattered piecemeal to a large number of foreign countries but retained intact as an open invitation for Cuba to return to the West.

The second point I wish to emphasize is the importance of the concept contained in the Presi-

dent's bill of maintaining the former Cuban quota on a global basis without premiums—and of rejecting the provisions of the House bill, which establishes new quota allotments. These quotas would be substantially increased by the House bill. Fourteen new countries would be given basic quotas. The vested interests thus created would prove difficult if not impossible to withdraw later without a severe impact on our relations with these countries. It is our position that the former Cuban quota, after allowing for the increases in domestic quotas, should be put entirely on a global basis. That is, it should be made available to all friendly countries on a nondiscriminatory first-come, first-served basis. It is only in this way that the door can be held open for Cuba to regain on a freely competitive basis its former position in the United States market.

As an integral part of a global quota system, we recommend that we stop paying foreign suppliers a premium price for sugar imported into the United States. The President's bill proposes that the present basic quotas of foreign countries be retained at their present levels. The premium price paid on the former Cuban quota would and should be eliminated immediately. With the exception of the Philippines, the premium price now paid to other foreign countries would be reduced gradually over a 5-year period. The premium price should be removed on the former Cuban quota and eliminated gradually on other basic quotas by imposing a fee which would be approximately equal to the amount by which our domestic sugar price exceeds the foreign market price for sugar. This fee would eliminate substantially all the subsidy or price incentive which now stimulates the foreign countries to struggle so desperately for a sugar quota in the United States market and which arouses such high emotions and disappointments.

There is no justification for continuing to subsidize foreign sugar producers in order to assure adequate sugar supplies. The United States is heavily dependent upon foreign sources for a wide range of industrial raw materials and foodstuffs, yet has not found it necessary to subsidize foreign production to assure that our import requirements are met.

Interruption of the sugar trade with Cuba provides an opportunity to put an end to an import subsidy system which no longer serves its original

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on June 20 (press release 407).

purpose. Cuba had a significant economic interest in the price premium, as its quota was over 3 million tons. Aside from the Philippines, where we are bound by treaty to accord special treatment to sugar imports, the vested interests of all other countries—14 in number—amount to only 280,000 tons, and the total quota premium to these 14 countries in the last normal year—1959—was worth about \$13 million. If this premium were to be phased out over a 5-year period, these countries should be able to adjust to this small change in their export earnings without serious difficulty.

We have aid programs today to direct resources on the basis of need. Aid through a sugar program does not assure that resources are going to the right places or in the right amounts. In the absence of any objective standards that can be consistently applied, quotas must be doled out on a basis that need bear little relation to needs or to efficiency in production. The temporary allocations made over the past 2 years to replace Cuban supplies have encouraged sugar expansion in some countries, not because of any inadequacy of world sugar supplies but solely in anticipation of receiving permanent quotas in the United States for premium-priced sugar.

The need to allocate valuable quota privileges among competing foreign claimants creates political problems of the most difficult kind. Virtually every cane-sugar producing country in the world and many of the beet-sugar producing countries in Western Europe are seeking quotas. In presenting and carrying out a long-term sugar policy, the administration should not have to take a position favoring some friendly countries over others. We make no friends in this process. Even those who receive a quota complain of its inadequacy and criticize us for favoring others with larger quotas. Already complaints are coming in from foreign countries complaining about the quota provisions of the House bill. A global quota system would eliminate the necessity for choosing among the numerous claimants for the Cuban quota.

We are also gravely disturbed by the provisions of H.R. 12154 which completely eliminate the refined-sugar quota, amounting to 375,000 tons, which formerly was assigned to Cuba. The executive branch, after discussions with domestic sugar interests, proposed a reduction to 250,000 tons. We believe this quantity, which at best is only a

token amount compared to our total imports of raw sugar, should be permitted to enter the United States in refined form. A complete elimination of the opportunity to sell even small quantities of refined sugar to the United States would be indefensible in the eyes of those countries which look forward to some diversification in their trade with the United States.

Further, the Department of State considers that the provisions of section 12 of H.R. 12154 represent an undesirable use of our power to allocate import quotas to affect the behavior of other governments. However, with the elimination of the premium quota concept, as proposed in the President's bill, the provisions of section 12 would automatically lose their effectiveness. Even so, the inclusion of coercive provisions of this kind in this legislation is, in the Department's view, unwise and unwarranted.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 87th Congress, 2d Session

Special Report on Latin America: United States Activities in Mexico, Panama, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Report submitted by Senators John L. McClellan, Mike Mansfield, Margaret Chase Smith, Henry Dworshak, Alan Bible, and Roman L. Hruska. February 16, 1962. 62 pp.

Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendment. Hearings before the House Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 10162, a bill to amend the act to authorize the U.S. to participate in loans to the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the international monetary system. February 27-28, 1962. 165 pp.

Supplemental Report on Tariff Negotiations at the 1960-62 Tariff Conference. Message from the President transmitting a report in compliance with section 4(a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. H. Doc. 357. March 7, 1962. 4 pp.

Trade Agreements With the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden. Message from the President transmitting copies of the trade agreements including schedules signed on March 5 and 7, and reporting actions taken with respect to peril points. H. Doc. 358. March 7, 1962. 242 pp.

Review of Operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. March 8, 1962. 82 pp.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 9900, a bill to promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and security of the United States through international trade agreements and through adjustment assistance to domestic industry, agriculture, and labor, and for other purposes. Parts 1-1. March 12-April 11, 1962. 2,793 pp.

Peace Corps Act Amendments. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2935. March 13-19, 1962. 115 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on a draft bill to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Parts 1-5. March 14-April 16, 1962. 1,020 pp.

Survey of Trade Relations Between the United States and Common Market Nations. Compiled by Senator Kenneth B. Keating. S. Doc. 81. March 19, 1962. 54 pp.

Activities of the Development and Resources Corporation in Iran. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. March 20, 1962. 35 pp.

Juba's Expropriation of U.S.-owned Nickel Plant at Nicaro. Cuba. Twelfth report by the House Government Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1478. March 22, 1962. 12 pp.

Bretton Woods Agreements Act. Report to accompany H.R. 10162. H. Rept. 1484. March 22, 1962. 20 pp.

Regulation of Textile Imports. Report to accompany H.R. 10788. H. Rept. 1511. March 27, 1962. 5 pp.

Latin America and United States Policies. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a study mission to Latin America. S. Doc. 82. March 29, 1962. 85 pp.

Overseas Military Information Programs. Thirteenth report by House Government Operations Committee. H. Rept. 1549. March 30, 1962. 144 pp.

Bretton Woods Agreements Act Amendment. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 10162. March 30-April 3, 1962. 74 pp.

Tariff Classification Act of 1962. Report to accompany H.R. 10607. S. Rept. 1317. April 2, 1962. 12 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of 1948, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1363. April 27, 1962. 8 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

*Ratification deposited:* Mexico, May 4, 1962.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notification of approval:* India, May 8, 1962.

##### Trade

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

*Accessions deposited:* Ceylon, May 3, 1962; Netherlands, May 22, 1962; Peru, May 15, 1962; South Africa, May 3, 1962.

Procès-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 1959

(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force January 8, 1962; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4958.

*Signatures:* Ceylon, May 3, 1962; Netherlands, May 22, 1962.

*Portugal accepted the following instruments pursuant to its acceptance of the protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade April 6, 1962:*

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955. Entered into force January 23, 1959. TIAS 4186.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3483.

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

Third protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 2393.

Fourth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Norway). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3630.

Fifth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden). Done at Geneva July 15, 1955. Entered into force September 19, 1956. TIAS 3631.

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force for the United States June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Seventh protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Austria and Federal Republic of Germany). Done at Bonn February 19, 1957. Entered into force September 1, 1958. TIAS 4324.

Eighth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Cuba and the United States). Done at Habana June 20, 1957. Entered into force June 29, 1957. TIAS 3882.

#### BILATERAL

##### Argentina

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

##### Belgium

Agreement relating to the waiver of passport visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels March 27 and November 23, 1946, and January 17 and February 3, 1947. Entered into force February 17, 1947. TIAS 1879.

*Terminated:* June 22, 1962 (replaced by the agreement of May 3 and 23, 1962).

## China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 27, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5010). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 9, 1962. Entered into force June 9, 1962.

## France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

## Greece

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3310 and 4837), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

## India

Interim agreement relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva June 15, 1962.

## Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, and 4507), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

## Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 2, 1962 (TIAS 4969). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 12, 1962. Entered into force June 12, 1962.

## Nicaragua

General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua March 30, 1962.

*Entered into force:* May 14, 1962.

General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended. Signed at Managua December 23, 1950. Entered into force December 23, 1950. TIAS 2168 and 2643.

*Terminated:* May 14, 1962 (replaced by agreement of March 30, 1962, *supra*).

## Rumania

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of visas to diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucharest April 20 and May 14 and 26, 1962. Entered into force May 26, 1962.

## Spain

Agreement relating to the waiver of counterpart deposits required for certain categories of AID-financed commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid May 7 and 22, 1962. Entered into force May 22, 1962.

## Venezuela

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 17, 1962. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962.

## Viet-Nam

Agreement amending paragraph 2, section 1, of the annex to the economic cooperation agreement of September 7, 1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes at

Saigon June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962. Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 27, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4920 and 5048). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Appointments

Paul Francis Geren as consul general, Salisbury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, effective June 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 397 dated June 15.)

### Designations

Jay Rutherford as New York representative of the Office of the Chief of Protocol, effective June 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 413 dated June 22.)

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 367 and 368 of June 7; 376 of June 8; and 385 of June 12.

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†398	6/18	Rusk: departure statement.
*400	6/19	Cleveland: "The Development Decade" (excerpts).
401	6/19	Argentina credentials (rewrite).
*402	6/20	Welcoming ceremonies for State, AID, and USA student employees.
*403	6/19	Visit of President-elect Valencia of Colombia.
404	6/20	Spain credentials (rewrite).
405	6/20	Bowles: Lincoln, Nebr.
406	6/21	U.S.—U.A.R. aviation consultations.
407	6/20	C. Griffith Johnson: hearings on sugar legislation, H.R. 12154.
*408	6/20	Lindley: "The Current World Situation" (excerpts).
†409	6/21	Visit of Vice President Pelaez of Philippines (rewrite).
†410	6/22	Visit of Premier Bustamante of Jamaica (rewrite).
412	6/21	U.S.—India trade agreement (rewrite).
*413	6/22	Rutherford designated N.Y. representative of Office of Chief of Protocol (biographic details).

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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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July 16, 1962

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## The Third Man in International Politics

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>

People of good will in this country, as in many other countries, have been prominent in the so-called peace movements. They have walked up and down in front of the White House carrying placards on long poles. They have delivered—or tried to deliver—petitions to the Soviet Embassy a few blocks away on 16th Street. They have invited arrest by swimming out to Polaris submarines off New London. They go to rallies and distribute handbills and write editorials and make campus speeches and join in protest marches.

Sometimes the intoxication of pure ideals rather interferes with the clarity of vision: As the wife said to her husband at the cocktail party, "Darling, don't you think you ought to stop drinking? Your face is already beginning to get blurred."

For the most part, we think of the peace marchers as welcome evidence that we live in an open society in which baiting the authorities has not lost its zest—because the authorities are sufficiently secure in their jobs to be tolerant, or even to bait the baiters in return. Not long ago an eminent scientist joined students and others demonstrating in front of the White House to protest American nuclear policy—until he had to leave to go in to dinner with the President and the First Lady. Such are the rewards of freedom.

Above all, the peace movements prove that Americans sometimes lose their way but never lose their idealism. If they did, this would no longer be the nation our predecessors fashioned

out of a wilderness and built into the world's preeminent power.

But pure ideals become powerful engines only when fueled with some definite notion of how to get from A to B on the way to Z. Slogans, clichés, banners, and parades are fun. But an abstract love of humanity is no substitute for a practical interest in the techniques and procedures and institutions of peaceful and constructive living. G. K. Chesterton seemed to have this in mind when he wrote his poem about "The World State":

Oh, how I love Humanity,  
With love so pure and pringlish,  
And how I hate the horrid French,  
Who never will be English.  
The international idea,  
The largest and the clearest,  
Is welding all the nations now,  
Except the one that's nearest.  
This compromise has long been known,  
This scheme of partial pardons,  
In ethical societies  
And small suburban gardens—  
The villas and the chapels where  
I learned with little labor  
The way to love my fellow man  
And hate my next-door neighbor.

Chesterton is saying that world peace begins with peaceful relations across the next fence and over the adjoining frontier. Indeed it does. But note that peaceful communities have rules and systems and organizations for keeping the peace, for settling disputes, for treating all the ills of society, and for doing the community's essential business. A police force, a judicial system, a

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the General Federation of Women's Clubs at Washington, D.C., on June 29 (press release 427).

labor-management arbitration board, a juvenile delinquency center, a social welfare agency, a real estate board, a research center—these and many other kinds of institutions make peaceful living possible in local communities. They do not depend on placards and parades but on rules, techniques, resources, and management. In short, they are operational.

Is it reasonable to think that the practice of peace could be less operational in world affairs than community affairs? Can anyone seriously think that good intentions and high ideals are substitutes for nation-building and peacekeeping machinery abroad, any more than they are at home?

#### **Making the Peacekeeping Machinery Operational**

We who deal with world affairs can now report that, after some centuries of sentimental talk, the task of making and keeping peace is really moving from the hortatory to the operational stage—which means it is being embodied in organizations and not merely in manifestos.

Two kinds of peace machinery are developing—machinery for the settlement of international disputes, and machinery to help modernize the societies in which half the population of the free world happens to live. Those who work for and with the organizations that manage this machinery are operationally involved in the practice of peace—and so is everyone who lends them effective support.

As the practice of peace moves from oratory to operations, we have begun to learn some quite important things about the business. This should surprise no one, since human beings have been learning by doing since time began. And perhaps the most important lesson that emerges from our brief experience with operational peacekeeping is the least surprising thing of all. This is the often essential role of an international third party in restoring the peace, settling disputes, and supervising change in such a way that it does not produce violence.

In world affairs the third party may be an international forum, or a system of mediation, or a team of supervisors, or a police force, or an individual shuttling silently and anonymously from one disputant to another trying to find a basis for getting them together. So let's just talk about the third man in world affairs. An effective

third man in world affairs, like an effective third man in smaller communities, must, of course, be committed to a set of principles to which he owes his total loyalty. His single-minded purpose must be to carry out the instructions given him by the community he serves—in this case the preservation of peace in the world community.

Our third man in world affairs need not necessarily be the United Nations; indeed the Charter of the United Nations instructs the world community to first try to settle its disputes directly or within a regional community before coming to the United Nations at all. But in the case of the most dangerous and intractable disputes the United Nations, in practice, usually *is* the third man.

A quick glance around the world will suggest how active and operational the United Nations has become as a third man in world affairs—charged by the charter with the job of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

In the Middle East, a United Nations team of truce supervisors has been on the job for 14 years, ready to show up on a moment's notice if fighting breaks out again. During a recent incident on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, that team showed up in the middle of the night and an action which started at midnight had been brought to a ceasefire by 7:30 a.m.

Down in the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the United Nations Emergency Force keeps up a ceaseless, 24-hour patrol by foot, jeep, and small aircraft—a peace watch now in its sixth year.

In Korea United Nations machinery is still on the armistice line negotiated 9 years ago.

In West New Guinea hostilities sputter between Indonesian parachutists and Dutch patrols—while a U.N. moderator (who happens to be an American) works to bring the parties back to the negotiating table.

In Kashmir U.N. observers try to preserve a 12-year-old truce despite the remaining bitterness displayed just last week as the Security Council sought unsuccessfully to break a stalemate between the disputants.

In the Congo an international mission of 17,000 soldiers and 420 civilian advisers is trying to raise up a Congo nation while preventing civil war and mediating the constitutional issues that are in dispute.

### Variety of Peacekeeping Tools

This list includes only the third-party peacekeeping machinery that is on the ground today and still operational—even though some of it has been there so long that most people have forgotten about it. In addition the United Nations played a third-party role when the Soviets remained in northern Iran after the end of World War II; when the Dutch and Indonesians were fighting in the Far East; when the Communist nations sponsored and supplied an insurrection in Greece; when Lebanon and then Jordan entered complaints against the United Arab Republic; when Thailand and Cambodia threatened to go to war to settle sovereignty over a temple on their border; and in several other incipient disputes which never made the headlines precisely because they did not lead to war or open threat of war.

You will note that this catalog of crises includes different kinds of disputes—in some cases conflicts between hostile neighbors, in others hostilities arising from colonialism or its aftermath, and in still others insurrection or subversion of Communist inspiration.

To deal with these different kinds of disputes—and the erratic courses they sometimes run—the United Nations has quite a spectrum of tools for its third-party function of practicing peace. These range from the general and sometimes tenuous commitment to the charter, at one end of the spectrum, to specific flesh-and-blood-plus-hardware forces which fought in Korea, took over from the belligerents in the Middle East, and stopped a civil war in the Congo. In between these extremes there are debates before the Security Council and the General Assembly; there is machinery for fact-finding, mediation, and conciliation; there is political and public pressure organized by members; and there are teams of truce supervisors to guard against violations of armistice agreements.

In the practice of peace we not only have come to realize the essential role of the third party but have learned some technical and practical things about the job. We have learned, for example, the need for common training of officers who will work together in a force for peace, and the importance of establishing some standard kinds of equipment and weaponing for units that are assembled on short notice for U.N. service.

We have learned that the essential role of a peacekeeping force, the mind-set and attitude

toward his job of every soldier, has to be fundamentally different from that of a traditional military mission. For a peace force, every move is highly charged with political content. In a peace force, the troops carry guns but have no enemies.

Another thing we have learned is that no standing force—as originally conceived in the early days of the United Nations—would be quite appropriate for any given policing action. In each of the eight major police-force jobs the United Nations has carried out, the problems and the areas were sufficiently different so that a different mix of training, skills, nationalities, and weapons was called for. Incidentally, it may surprise some of us who hear so much about the failure of members to carry out their obligations to the U.N. that 54 countries have contributed personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions, including 15 nations which did not exist as nations prior to World War II.

Speaking of technical points, it is worth noting in passing that the march of science has advanced the technology available to the peacekeepers as well as the weaponmakers.

Not so very long ago a nation in some remote corner of the world could start an aggression, and months could pass before the rest of the world caught up with what was going on. As the world shrank, so did the time available for unpublicized military operations. Today, with nearly instantaneous communications around the world, it is almost impossible to hide an aggression for more than a few hours. Breaches of the peace can now be kept under the klieg lights of international observation—if some agent of the world community is there, able and willing to switch on the lights.

Meanwhile fast transport is available to move agents of peace and order with great speed to any spot on earth. Within less than 24 hours after a cease-fire was reached at the time of Suez, the U.N. recruited and transported its first contingent from Sweden to the banks of the Suez Canal. U.N. troops from Tunisia were on the ground in the Congo in less than a day after the Security Council replied to the call for help in Léopoldville. And from that day to this, U.N. troops have been transported in and out of the Congo by the greatest continuous airlift in peacetime history—carried out with superb efficiency and a perfect safety record by the U.S. Air Force.

We cannot leave the discussion of the U.N.'s third-party role in the practice of peace without

dealing with the question that must be in the minds of many of you. What about the really big conflict going on in the world? What about the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Almost everyone is fond of pointing out that the United Nations has not been able to reconcile the superpowers within the councils of the United Nations and in line with the charter which they both undertook to honor. This is all too true. But the United Nations has, on important occasions, done the next best thing: It has stepped in the middle and prevented the big powers from confronting each other under extremely dangerous circumstances. You will remember that during the series of Middle Eastern crises there were threats of Russian "volunteers." Missiles were rattled and there were ugly noises of impending disaster—until the United Nations stepped between the belligerents. You also know, of course, that when the United Nations arrived on the scene in the Congo, the Soviet Union had recognized the secessionist government of Antoine Gizenga and was moving in to support him. Obviously the United States could not have sat by while a Soviet-supported government took over in the heart of Africa—and just as obviously direct intervention by hostile nuclear powers could have been fatal to the peace of the world. The important thing to keep in mind, of course, is that intervention by the world community served the interests of the United States and did not serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

### Supervising Peaceful Change

The essential role of the third man in world affairs is not limited to restoring breaches of the peace and settling disputes which have broken into the open. There is the almost equally critical job of supervising peaceful change. The simple fact of the matter is that the postwar world has seen the most convulsive political transformation of all time. I need only mention that the map of the world as of today shows 54 sovereign and independent nations which were not sovereign and independent a mere decade and a half ago. On Sunday [July 1] morning an up-to-date map will have to show two more [Burundi and Rwanda]—the eighth and ninth nations to become independent under the direct responsibility of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

The natural resentment between peoples which inevitably has made decolonization an emotional exercise might well have exploded from emotion to passion, and from resentment to conflict, without the moderating influence and the conciliation machinery of the United Nations.

### Working for Economic and Social Progress

But the practice of peace must deal with potential as well as active conflict—as economic and social agencies within peaceful communities deal with injustice and concern themselves with the human condition to keep the community peaceful.

In this age of scientific marvels and unheard-of standards of living in North America and Europe, there are about 1¼ billion people in some 100 countries and territories of the free world with annual incomes of less than \$200, with life expectancies of less than 40 years, without enough food to do a decent day's work, and with less than an even chance of ever learning to read or to write. Even if we put aside the question of justice and humanitarian concern, it is manifestly a matter of great concern to the national interest of the United States that these people be helped in their efforts to get started down the long road to acceptable standards for human life—because the political stability of the world depends upon it and because our security is threatened when stability breaks down. This, of course, is the self-interest which lies behind our own foreign aid programs.

Dreams of economic and social progress, of equitable distribution of wealth, of equal shares of dignity, of mass literacy and decent standards of health and housing—these are as old as civilized man. Our capacity to dream such dreams is indeed what we mean by referring to ourselves as civilized. But it is only in my time, and yours, that it has been technologically possible to transform these antique reveries into action in the here and now.

Once the dreams are converted into action, we find that the task adds up to nothing less than nation building. And when nation-building programs become operational we begin to learn some lessons, as we do when the dream of peace moves into operations to keep the peace.

We learn, for example, that the development process is an organic whole, not a mere collection of meritorious projects.

We learn that a few miles of road in the wilder-

ness, a lonely health center, a country schoolhouse, a cleanup campaign in one village, do not add up to a development process.

We know that technicians who leave institutions behind are good technicians and technicians who just leave techniques behind are bad technicians—even if they are fairly dripping with cultural empathy.

We learn that it is much harder to grow people than it is to grow anything else—and much more important, too.

We learn that people are interested in producing more only if they feel they will get a fair share of what they produce.

We learn that it isn't good enough to tackle the first year of an aid program over and over again, that we have to get on with the 2d and 5th and 10th and 20th years.

We even learn that it isn't good enough to tackle 20-year tasks with 5-year plans staffed with 2-year personnel working with 1-year appropriations.

These lessons are applicable to anybody's aid program—American, British, Swedish, Israeli—and to international programs as well. But the third man in world affairs has a special role in the nation-building aspect of the practice of peace. The United Nations can draw on technical and other resources from many nations; and it can perform services which many of the sensitive new nations are not willing to accept from either side of the cold-war barricades.

It is already quite an effort, by any measure you want to use. We mostly read in the newspapers about political crises in the United Nations—but Paul Hoffman [Managing Director, U.N. Special Fund] is fond of pointing out that, of 18,000 people working directly for the U.N. family of agencies, 15,700 are working at the tasks of economic and social development.

This year the United Nations will have several thousand technicians and experts working at nation building in 125 countries and territories. (To a remarkable extent this exchange of expertness is a two-way street: Chile, for example, received 63 U.N. experts last year but contributed 48; India received 135 but contributed 113; Egypt received 68 but contributed 45.)

The United Nations has four regional economic commissions with full-time staffs working in Geneva, Santiago, Addis Ababa, and Bangkok. Its Children's Fund has 25 offices around the world.

There are now Resident Representatives of the United Nations in 55 nations. And during the past several years the United Nations has agreed to help establish nearly a hundred training institutes throughout the less developed world to introduce new leaders and technicians to the mysteries and excitement of nation building.

#### **Potential Capacity of the U.N.**

In this review of the role of the third man in world affairs—as it is played by the United Nations—I have talked mainly about successes of operations which have worked or are working to maintain the peace, to supervise peaceful change, and to transform traditional societies into modern states designed for membership in the world community in the second half of the 20th century. As anyone knows who reads the morning newspapers, the third man does not always succeed—because he is far from perfect.

I should therefore like to recall quickly that the practice of peace has become operational only within the past decade and a half; that like every other kind of human endeavor one learns by doing and by making mistakes; that the United Nations has inherited the quarrels of the centuries and deals only with the most difficult of all disputes; and that the process of modernization is a mystery which has been explored in a serious fashion for not more than a few odd years.

There are communities in this country which antedate the Revolution and which today are struggling with problems of urban blight, juvenile delinquency, and assorted acts of violence. There are States in this Union which were among the original colonies and which to this day have not made good on the human liberties supposed to be guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. After going on 200 years of operation the Federal Government has enough unsolved problems on its hands to keep the Congress in session overtime even in an election year.

Compared with other institutions established to protect peace, foster progress, and spread justice, it is small wonder, then, if the United Nations after 16 years has not set everything right in the world. Indeed it has not. But it's the only third party in the world community with the potential capacity to learn how to practice peace well enough to some day make possible a secure system of world order.

## Secretary Rusk Holds Talks With European Leaders

*Departure Statement, June 18*

Press release 398 dated June 18

I am leaving tonight [June 18] at midnight for about 10 days in six major European cities.

The Atlantic community is entering a new period of creative activity. Many of the things for which it has struggled have been attained, and now fresh chapters and fresh opportunities are opening up for it.

A great deal has happened since NATO first came into being, since the Marshall Plan first helped Europe move toward full economic recovery and the reconstruction of war damage. What has not changed are the basic beliefs held in common by the nations forming this great community and their fundamental commitments to each other. These remain solid and whole. There are no cracks in the basement of this great edifice of the Atlantic community. What we are talking about is how to add another story on this great structure. There is a ferment in the Atlantic community, and I think in some quarters it has been mistakenly interpreted. It is not a discussion of the fundamentals on which we all agree; those don't need discussion at this time—we have complete agreement on those.

It is, rather, a lively examination in all directions of what is next to be done—the new steps—for example, the enlargement of the Common Market, through the discussions now going on between the Six<sup>1</sup> and the United Kingdom. There are some strategic questions which Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara discussed in a very important speech made this past weekend.<sup>2</sup> And there are the great problems of relating the Atlantic community to the so-called underdeveloped parts of the world.

These are all great new developments, and it is not, I think, unexpected that there is lively discussion among us at this present time, such as the discussion which took place over the European Defense Community a few years ago, or, indeed,

back in the forties, when NATO was first being created.

So I hope that this very quick 10-day trip, which will extend the discussions which were begun at the NATO meeting in Athens,<sup>3</sup> will lead to a further consolidation of this great alliance and draw us together in the great tasks of the future.

## West Berlin, Symbol of Freedom

*Statement by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

Mayor [Willy] Brandt, President Bach [Otto Bach, President of the Berlin House of Representatives], Members of the Senate, honored guests: I wish to thank you, Mayor Brandt, for your kind words of welcome and for extending to me the honor of signing the Golden Book of the City of Berlin. I consider it a privilege to add my name alongside those of the many distinguished men and women who have visited here.

Many thoughts come to the mind of a visitor to this great city. I think first of West Berlin as a symbol—a symbol which has caught the imagination of the world and deeply moved the minds and feelings of men. As a symbol of free men's will to be free, of their capacity to rise to the challenge which history has imposed upon them, West Berlin has played a vibrant role.

This symbolic West Berlin is the city which the world knows best. But West Berlin is more than a symbol; it is also a living reality of 2¼ million people. To appreciate this fully one must come to the city itself, as I have come; one must see, as I have seen, the wall which divides the city—a wall which is an affront to human dignity.

In a more positive sense, there is also the living reality of West Berlin as a thriving center of economic and cultural activity. Even the fleeting glances which I obtained were enough to corroborate the fact that reconstruction here has been linked to creative imagination in architecture and in city planning.

Among the realities of West Berlin is that it is a city under pressure. I shall not weary you with a recital of the events since November 1958, of which you are all too much aware. You have been

<sup>1</sup>The six members of the Common Market are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

<sup>2</sup>For text, see BULLETIN of July 9, 1962, p. 64.

<sup>3</sup>For background, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 861.

<sup>1</sup>Made on the occasion of the signing of the Golden Book of the City of Berlin on June 21.

living them. But we Americans are shoulder to shoulder with you—for the sake of your own freedom. But it does not stop there. As President Kennedy said in his report to the American people on July 25, 1961,<sup>2</sup>

... the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire free world.

It is not unrealistic to add a note of hope. The free world has resources which become increasingly evident in a time of trial. Berlin continues to prosper; its citizenry remains resolute and forward-looking. I should like to think that peace and our vital interests can both be sustained. In a nuclear age, this would mark a victory for reason. Bearing this in mind, I continue ready to explore further with the Soviet Union whether a basis for negotiations exists. To do less would be a dereliction of my duty to the American people and to the people of West Berlin.

I am certain of this: The friendship and mutual respect which has characterized our relationships over the years will endure. I can also assure you that you will have no cause to doubt our determination to honor our pledge to protect your freedom and to insure your continued ties with the rest of the free world.

## U.S. Urges Soviets To Halt Border Firings at Berlin

*Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of recent incidents in Berlin.*

### U.S. NOTE OF JUNE 25<sup>1</sup>

Press release 411 of June 25

In a Note transmitted on June 7 to the Embassy of the United States of America at Moscow, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made known to the United States Government its view regarding certain incidents that took place recently in Berlin.

The United States Government wishes to call the attention of the Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics to the fact that the present difficulties in Berlin are due exclusively to the illegal and inhumane action of the East Berlin authorities, who, with the full consent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, found no other means of opposing free movement inside Berlin except by erecting a wall on August 13, 1961, to divide the city.

The United States Government shares the apparent concern of the Soviet Government at the increasing number of these incidents. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Government has been misled as to the facts and causes of the incidents which its Note describes. The Soviet Note complains of the death on May 23 of Corporal Goering. The Soviet Government should be aware that he and his companion received their injuries at the very moment that they, acting in accordance with their official orders, were firing at and permanently crippling a 15-year old refugee boy who had already reached West Berlin by swimming the Humboldt Hafen.

The Soviet Note cites an exchange of shots across the boundary between East and West Berlin on May 27 as the responsibility of West Berlin authorities. The facts, however, are that East Berlin guards, after shooting to death a would-be refugee while he was still in the Soviet Sector near the boundary, fired a fusillade of bullets at West Berlin police and customs officials when they arrived at a point in the Western Sector opposite the scene of the shooting.

In these cases, as in all such cases, the East Berlin guards fired first. They fired into West Berlin and this fire was returned by West Berlin police in the one case to save the life of the helpless boy, and in the other case to save themselves from unprovoked attack.

Moreover, in the period May 8 to June 11, there were four separate cases in which East Berlin or East German guards deliberately fired into West Berlin. Three persons, all juveniles and one a girl, were wounded in these incidents. In the same period there were four separate incursions by armed East German or East Berlin personnel into West Berlin, three separate incidents involving the kidnapping of four individuals from West Berlin, and at least 10 separate incidents involving attacks upon West Berlin police or citizens by East Berlin or East German guards throwing bottles or smoke grenades or firing blank car-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on June 25 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

tridges, tear gas shells or slingshots loaded with scrap iron.

The Soviet Note mentions various other incidents, the facts about which are quite different from those described by the Soviet Government. In no case is there cause for recrimination by the Soviet Government against the Governments of the Three Western Powers. Some of the incidents in question occurred in the proximity of the wall. It is significant that before August 13, 1961, the sector boundary between East and West Berlin was free from violence. For more than 16 years there was a constant flow of persons from East to West and West to East. There is in fact no doubt whatsoever that the violent incidents to which the Soviet Note draws attention are the direct consequences of the decision to cut off the free movement of persons within Berlin.

The facts set out above show the manner in which the East German and the East Berlin guards, acting in violation of all accepted rules of international behaviour, have killed defenseless people attempting to flee from behind the wall. It is inevitable that actions of this sort should increase still further the tension created by the division of the city. The competent authorities in West Berlin have instructions to do everything in their power to avoid aggravating the situation. However, it goes without saying that the United States Government supports the measures taken to prevent the murder of refugees and danger to West Berlin resulting from shots from across the sector boundaries, and any actions of this type will in future, as has been the case hitherto, call forth the appropriate counter action.

The United States Government welcomes the recognition by the Soviet Government in despatching its Note of June 7 of its continuing responsibility, together with the Three Powers, for Berlin. The United States Government trusts that the Soviet authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that such firing by East Berlin and East German guards is halted forthwith.

The United States Government also welcomes the Soviet Government's expression of concern at the incidents and is desirous of contributing toward any action that would improve the situation in Berlin. The United States Government considers that these questions might be examined, preferably in Berlin by representatives of the Governments of the United States, the United

Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with a view to avoiding, by all appropriate methods, the recurrence of such incidents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate the movement of persons and goods within Berlin.

## SOVIET NOTE OF JUNE 7

### Unofficial Translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., upon the instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following.

During the last ten days in May, a series of dangerous provocations has taken place by the West Berlin police, as well as Fascistic elements, from West Berlin toward the area of Sehornhorststrasse on the border of the British Occupation Sector in West Berlin. West Berlin police fired upon a detail of GDR border police, killing Unteroffizier Goehring and seriously wounding another worker of the border police. At the moment of firing, both border guards were at a distance of more than forty meters from the border, within the territory of the capital of the German Democratic Republic. British military police were brought up to the scene of the incident during this provocation with the aim of supporting the West Berlin police. On May 24, at 2025 hours, in the Tiergarten area, a grenade was thrown on to GDR territory from a military automobile travelling through the British Sector. On the night of May 25-26, explosions aimed at destroying GDR border structures were carried out by criminal elements from West Berlin in two places: in the Eberswaldstrasse area and Gleimstrasse. Another attempt to carry out an explosion was undertaken on the same night on Schwedterstrasse. On May 27 West Berlin police from the British Sector again opened fire on GDR border guards during the latter's fulfillment of their duty in guarding the state border of the Republic. Simultaneously, openly hostile attacks on Soviet organizations located in West Berlin also cannot be disregarded. Thus, on the night of May 24-25, Fascistic elements damaged the show-window of the information section of the VAO (All-Union Stock Company) "Intourist" in West Berlin, organized a hostile demonstration near the building of "Intourist", and shouted threats at the Soviet employees. All these provocations, which have recently acquired the character of openly aggressive acts, have an undoubtedly premeditated character. They are manifestly directed and organized by those who are attempting to evoke serious exacerbation of the situation in West Berlin. It is noteworthy that the West Berlin authorities not only approve the criminal and provocative attacks on the border of the GDR, but openly call for further dangerous subversive acts against peace and tranquillity in this area. One cannot, in particular, ignore the openly instigative statement of Mayor [Willy] Brandt that explosions of bombs on the border of the GDR with West Berlin are a "warning", as well as that the Western Powers should be prepared, in the future "to make greater and perhaps terrible sacrifices." Having failed in their intentions to use West Berlin as



a front city and base for subversive activity against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist States, and devoid of a sense of responsibility, the West Berlin authorities and those who stand behind them have renewed along the border line openly instigative propaganda against the GDR, promising "support by covering fire" to those who would violate its border. It is completely obvious that such acts could not take place at all if American and other occupation organs in West Berlin did not connive with the provocateurs and if they understood what provocative activity of this sort could lead to. Increasing attempts of revanchists and militarists in West Berlin confirm once again how urgent has become the task of normalizing the situation in West Berlin and eliminating the occupation regime there. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state

that it will not take the position of an indifferent observer and, if need be, may be forced to take appropriate measures in order to fulfill its obligations toward the German Democratic Republic. Allied with the U.S.S.R., it cannot permit West Berlin to continue to be used by revanchist and militaristic circles for purposes inimical to the cause of peace and to remain one of the dangerous sources of tension in the center of Europe. The Soviet Government expects that the Government of the U.S.A. will take necessary measures to assure the impermissibility of dangerous provocations from West Berlin toward the GDR. The Soviet Government declares that the responsibility for all possible consequences of such acts, should they be continued, will lie on the occupation authorities in West Berlin and on the three occupation powers.

## Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership

by Under Secretary McGhee<sup>1</sup>

I am greatly honored by the opportunity to address such a distinguished group of leaders of the Greek Orthodox Church assembled here from both North and South America. It is particularly fitting for us to commemorate this evening the 15th anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, which linked inextricably the destiny of our country with that of Greece.

It is also a pleasure to speak before the citizens of the great State of Massachusetts here in the city of Boston, which is proudly known throughout the United States as the "Athens of America."

The ties between Greece and Boston are indeed many. In 1958 one of the world's largest ships, which was launched at Fore River shipyard in Quincy, Massachusetts, was named *Princess Sophie*. Her Majesty Queen Frederika and her daughter, the Princess for whom the vessel was named, took part in the christening ceremonies.

I am told that there are more than 85,000 Massachusetts citizens of Greek origin. The Greek

diocese of Boston has more than 50 churches, and they are well attended and supported.

Greek Independence Day on March 25 is regularly observed in Boston. In 1961, on the 140th anniversary, some 3,000 persons jammed the auditorium of the Greek Theological School, in the town of Brookline, where President Kennedy was born. They came to recall the story of the hard fight for freedom, to express thanks for the great achievements and the great promise of modern Greece, and to join Archbishop Iakovos of North and South America in a solemn oath to defend liberty, whenever and wherever endangered.

Even those Bostonians who are not of Greek ancestry feel the right to cheer for Greek independence. The revolution that led to Greek freedom in 1821 was, as you may know, substantially supported by Boston citizens. Colonel Jonathan Miller and Doctor Samuel Gridley Howe, both of Boston, went to Greece to join the revolutionary forces. Professor Edward Everett of Harvard University and America's great statesman, Daniel Webster, carried the cause of Greece to the American people.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the 16th biennial ecclesiastical congress of the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America at Boston, Mass., on June 26 (press release 418).

But the links between our country and Greece are not limited to the State of Massachusetts. They are nationwide. There are many parallels between America and Greece. The Greek people are a democratic and virtually a classless society, as are the people in our nation. Freedom of thought, freedom of religion, freedom of speech—these cherished principles are of the very essence both of the Greek and American spirit. Greece has been enriched by the blended cultural heritages of many lands—as America has been—and this has kept both countries strong and creative and perpetually young.

The record of the Greeks as champions of liberty is longer than ours. But since the birth of the United States, our sons have fought side by side in both world wars and in Korea. We share the special alliance of NATO—the shield of the free world. Despite her internal problems of recovery and readjustment from her wounds during the last war, Greece plays an important role in NATO.

#### **The Truman Doctrine**

The relations between our countries have, however, been influenced more than any other one factor by the Truman Doctrine. I am proud to quote President Kennedy's words, released on March 12 in commemoration of its 15th anniversary:

We observe today the 15th anniversary of President Truman's historic announcement of the purpose of the United States to help the Greek people defend their freedom. This announcement, with the support of the Congress and the American people, was translated into action. And that action followed on a great tradition of ideals common to Greeks and Americans.

. . . The danger to Greece was overcome, primarily because of the national determination of the Greek people to restore their freedom and democracy. . . .

Today, we are joined together in an effort to strengthen the cultural and spiritual ties we share, and for our part we pledge our loyalty to our faithful and gallant Greek friends. . . .

The whole free world has followed with admiration the great effort the Greek people have made over these 15 years, not only to restore their country from the ravages of the recent war but to meet and crush the legions of Communist tyranny. It is well to recall the background of our Government's decision to assist Greece, made under the leadership of President Truman and rightly called the Truman Doctrine. I am proud to have

been able to play a part in carrying out this doctrine.

In the fall of 1946 Greece was in desperate straits. She had almost no funds to maintain her Government, feed her people, and fight the threat of a Communist-directed guerrilla war. All of her major ports were destroyed, as were 90 percent of her railroads. Only 138 ships of all kinds were left in the Greek commercial fleet, which before the war numbered 577 merchant ships and 733 caiques. National income was 41 percent and industrial production 35 percent of prewar rates. The country's economy was being engulfed by inflation.

Feeding upon this misery was a Communist-directed conspiracy which aimed at establishing a Communist dictatorship in Greece. In the official words of the Greek Communist Party the aim of the Communist conspirators was to place Greece "under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union like the other people's democracies." Stripped of verbiage, this meant that Greece would be a Soviet satellite like Bulgaria and Hungary. The Communist guerrillas, in the fall of 1946, had the capability to carry out this threat unless Greece received outside assistance.

As Greece's situation became more desperate, her means for handling it were diminishing. The relief provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ended in December 1946. The military and economic assistance provided by the British was inadequate, and the British had advised us they would not be able to continue their aid any longer.

The decision to aid Greece was squarely up to the United States. We had a lively awareness of the critical situation in Greece and knew what the collapse of Greece would mean to the free world. In Greece it was evident that the Communist guerrilla movement was being supplied from across the borders of the Communist-controlled countries to the north—an activity which was obviously directed by the Soviet Union.

The decision to provide assistance to Greece involved a basic change in American foreign policy. This policy, best known as the Truman Doctrine and enunciated in March 1947, was the American Government's response to Soviet expansionism, not only in Greece but also in other areas of the world.

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In his historic speech to the Congress<sup>2</sup> President Truman laid down the general principles that he felt should guide American policy. He said:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

In the meantime, the Greek situation was, in fact, deteriorating fast. For the third time in 5 years the Communists were trying to seize power. This time they were in a stronger position, primarily because of the large supplies of Soviet equipment they received from Communist countries to the north.

This Communist guerrilla superiority in weapons was lost with the arrival of large quantities of American equipment under the Greek aid program. American military advisers, headed by General James A. Van Fleet, soon arrived to help in the Greek national army's training program. As in Viet-Nam today, American troops worked closely with national forces both in training camps and in the field, sharing the hardships and, on many occasions, exposing themselves to enemy gunfire.

The Greek Army's new weapons and its improved training began to have their effect in the spring of 1948, when an offensive was mounted in central Greece supported by naval vessels in the Gulf of Corinth. This offensive was successful in its attempt to secure the "waistline" of Greece for the Government forces, thereby hampering communications between rebel forces in the north and the Peloponnese. By the end of the year the Peloponnese campaign was over. Meanwhile, in the north, the national government forces opened up major offensives in the Grammos and Vitsi Mountains.

#### **Importance of Events in Yugoslavia**

It was at this time that the valiant Greek efforts to bring stability and peace to their country were helped dramatically by events in Yugoslavia, which constituted a real windfall not only to Greece but to the entire Western World. I refer, of course, to the break between Tito and Stalin.

This led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav support for the Soviet-inspired guerrilla activity in Greece. By July 1949, when it had become clear to Tito that he could not resolve his differences with the Kremlin—except on Stalin's own terms—the Yugoslav border was closed to the insurgents.

This was the first and most impressive demonstration to the West that the forces of nationalism were still powerful within the Communist empire—that indeed they could cause a Communist state to break away from Soviet control. The West was quick to recognize the importance of the events in Yugoslavia. Understanding and help went to Yugoslavia in what quickly became a crucial struggle by the Yugoslavs for their national sovereignty and independence. The results of the policies adopted by the United States—and by our friends and allies in Western Europe—are, of course, well known.

We know that the events of 1948 did not solve all of the problems of southeastern Europe. We know that we here in America have held views quite different from those of the Yugoslav leaders on many issues. But we also know that the Yugoslavs did gain their independence from the bloc. The new system developed in Yugoslavia, although not like ours, is different from that in the Soviet Union. Relations returned to normal across every one of Yugoslavia's frontiers with our free-world friends. Albania was geographically cut off from the bloc and was thus also able, more than a decade later, to defy the authority of Moscow.

We and the entire Western World have continued to benefit from the gains made in this area during the past 14 years. Changes in the Yugoslav system have become institutionalized. Less than one-third of the trade of Yugoslavia is with the Soviet Union. The contacts and bonds between the Yugoslav people and the West continue to grow, and the strategic use of that important Balkan country continues to be denied to the Soviet Union.

Until 1948 the guerrilla action in Greece had been immeasurably helped by the safe haven made available in the Communist countries to their north. They provided rest, supplies, and convenient escape from the pressure of Greek security forces. This advantage was largely lost to the international Communist effort when the most

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

important of Greece's three Communist neighbors broke away from the Soviet bloc. Stalin continued support for the rebels through Albania and Bulgaria, but the reduced opportunities for so doing and the increasing successes of the loyal Greek forces soon forced him to abandon his faltering adventure. The defection of Yugoslavia had insured and speeded the tipping of the scales.

The new strength of the Greek national armed forces, combined with developments in Yugoslavia, presaged the end of the civil war. The Greek Army mounted a final offensive in the north during the late summer of 1949. On October 16, 1949, the rebel radio announced that rebel troops had ceased operations. The third attempt by the Communists to take Greece by force had failed.

The Greek nation then faced the tremendous task of reconstruction and of creating a better life for the Greek people. You are all familiar with the success of this effort. Modern Greece has passed prewar levels and is making rapid strides in its further economic development. We in America have no doubt that Greece will succeed in achieving its goal.

In the past, U.S. aid has been significant in the defense and development of Greece; in fact, since the inception of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, U.S. aid has amounted to about \$3½ billion. The United States fully intends to continue its assistance to Greece. Grant aid will be terminated at the end of this fiscal year, in light of our policy on a worldwide basis, but other programs will continue or be expanded. We will continue to give Greece military equipment, and we will continue our Food-for-Peace program. We will extend to Greece long-term, low-interest loans for development projects, and we will seek ways, in cooperation with our other European allies, to help Greece obtain assistance from other friendly nations.

#### **U.S. Investment in Freedom of Southeast Europe**

There is, however, grave danger that demands for changes in United States policy toward Yugoslavia, which have been reflected in recent actions by the Congress<sup>3</sup> will seriously jeopardize the progress that has been made, not just in Yugoslavia but in all southeastern Europe.

Curtailement of United States trade and aid to Yugoslavia cannot fail to convey to the Yugo-

slav Government, as it moves into another crucial phase in its relations with the Soviet bloc, that there seem to be no possibilities in United States-Yugoslav relations for a favorable alternative to reassociation with the Soviet bloc or complete economic and political isolation in Europe. Those Yugoslav elements favoring a pro-Western course will surely be discouraged if it is made clear to them in this dramatic way that the United States no longer has an interest in their welfare or an interest in helping the Yugoslavs to sustain their national independence.

In that case, U.S. influence in Yugoslavia would diminish. Bitterness and resentment at all levels of Yugoslav life might provide an emotional drive that would force the Yugoslavs back into a close and dependent relationship with the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia's efforts to move away from Soviet orthodoxy and absolutism, to open itself to the outside world, to demonstrate that the Yugoslav system of organization of the state and the economy can produce more beneficial results than rigid adherence to blind orthodoxy, would then have been in vain.

While striving to improve its commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Eastern European bloc, Yugoslavia has indicated that it wishes to do all in its power to maintain its independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Should Yugoslavia, because of a lack of alternatives, be forced back into the Soviet bloc, the damage would be serious to the interests of the free world. The results of the successful policies of 14 years pursued under three different administrations would be destroyed.

Soviet power would again be reestablished on the Adriatic, and Austria's southern flank would again be under Soviet threat. Moscow would be sitting once more side by side with Albania and Bulgaria on Greece's northern frontiers, potentially menacing Greek hopes for political and economic stability. And Moscow's power would be felt strongly in Italy, which has the largest Communist Party in the Western World.

Since 1949 the United States has made a very substantial investment in rolling back Soviet power from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Over \$9 billion has gone in economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. To abandon our investment in Yugoslavia at this time cannot fail to result in a major Soviet wind-

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 25.

fall in southeastern Europe. All of our other gains in this area would be jeopardized. Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey would increase, and Moscow's long dream of influence and control in the Mediterranean would be closer to realization.

I do not believe that the American people, with these facts before them, would wish to reverse a bipartisan policy of 14 years under three Presidents, a policy which has so clearly produced major benefits for the free world in its struggle against communism. It is not just the friends of Greece or the friends of Turkey or the friends of Yugoslavia who are concerned here. Equally concerned are all who have a stake in preserving the area of freedom created in southeast Europe. It is our sincere desire that all of these countries, including the valiant Greek nation which has been the subject of our particular consideration this evening, will be able to continue to work out their own destinies in freedom.

## U.S. and Cyprus Reaffirm Common Objectives

*Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, at the conclusion of President Makarios' visit to the United States.<sup>1</sup>*

White House press release dated June 17

### President Kennedy to President Makarios

JUNE 13, 1962

YOUR BEATITUDE: YOUR visit here has been a source of great pleasure to me and to the people of the United States. It has given us a new appreciation of the challenges you and the Cypriot people face in building a stable country with expanding opportunities to lead richer and fuller lives. Our discussions have enabled us better to understand each other's problems, and have underscored the fact that we have many common objectives.

I am happy to reassure you of my Government's intent to help with the implementation of your program of economic development, and I look

<sup>1</sup>For text of a joint communique released at Washington on June 6, see BULLETIN of June 25, 1962, p. 1011.

July 16, 1962

forward to the prospect of increasingly effective cooperation following your return.

May God grant you a safe journey, and a happy and prosperous future for you and the people of Cyprus.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

### President Makarios to President Kennedy

JUNE 15, 1962

THE PRESIDENT  
*The White House*

I thank you most cordially for your kind message of farewell. On leaving the United States, today, I wish to express to you, Mr. President, my very deep appreciation and gratitude for the generous hospitality extended to me during my stay in your great country. I take with me unforgettable memories. I have been extremely touched by your kind feelings towards me, your deep interest in the people of Cyprus and their future, your understanding and sincere friendship.

My personal contact with you afforded me the opportunity to confirm once again my conviction that in your person the noble American people have found a great and inspired leader and a devoted champion of the cause of world peace and the happiness of mankind. I pray to God that your service to your great nation and humanity may be rewarded by crowning success.

I am returning to my country very much reassured and encouraged for the future and fully convinced that our meetings have greatly contributed to the further strengthening of the bonds of friendship that already tie our two peoples closely together through the belief in common ideals and by their common heritage. I am looking forward with particular gratification to a closer cooperation between our two countries.

I take this opportunity to extend to you a cordial invitation on behalf of the people of Cyprus and myself to visit our country as my guest at any time convenient to you. We shall consider it a great privilege and honour to welcome you in Cyprus.

With my best wishes for your personal well-being and the prosperity of the American people, and may God be always with you.

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS  
*President of the Republic of Cyprus*

## The Future of the European in Africa

by G. Mennen Williams  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

During the past year and a half, most of my public speaking on Africa has been concerned with the problems and the prospects of the indigenous Africans as they guide their new and emerging nations onto the world stage. Today I would like to change this focus and concentrate on the problems and prospects of another segment of African society—the people in Africa of European origin.

The future of the European in Africa is one of the most hotly debated questions in that continent. I have followed this question with great interest, and it is my considered judgment that favorable possibilities exist which can permit Europeans to live harmoniously in the Africa of the future. There has been a tendency to view the transfer of power from European governments to new African states as a settlement on African terms. In reality there has been considerable accommodation by both Africans and Europeans in working out the future of Africa, and the contributions to the total welfare that Europeans can yet make—in concert with or as parts of African governments—give hope for true interracial societies in Africa. Of course, the day when Europeans can live in Africa as a superior and specially privileged class is gone. However, the future for Europeans who become citizens of the new African states, enjoying equal rights and privileges with all other citizens, certainly looks bright.

The problems of African-European relationships have deep roots. Aside from the Portuguese areas and North Africa, for several hundred years prior to the 19th century the European contacts

of most Africans were limited to slavers, missionaries, hunters, and traders. With the exception of South Africa, where European settlement had begun earlier, the great influx of Europeans into Africa started in the last quarter of the 19th century—the period of the “great scramble,” during which the nations of Europe divided Africa at the conference table.

Following three-quarters of a century of European dominance, the tide began to reverse itself early in the 1950's. Since that time, 25 African nations have achieved independence, and several more will attain that status this year. As a result of this development there has been a radical change in the character of modern African-European relationships from those that existed during colonial days.

For many reasons the patterns of African-European relations developed differently in various sections of Africa. Perhaps the principal difference was between those areas of Africa where Europeans settled in large numbers and those areas where they did not. There were also differences among the colonial policies of the various European powers.

The European-settled areas are located principally in North, East, and South Africa. Even within these areas, however, there are significant differences in African-European relations. There are some 5 million Europeans settled among approximately 65 million Africans in these areas—a ratio of 1 to 13—and, not surprisingly, these are the areas which have had or are now experiencing the greatest difficulties in African-European relations.

In West and West Central Africa, on the other hand, there was no large European settler group,

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Detroit Forum at Detroit, Mich., on June 28 (press release 424 dated June 27; as-delivered text).

and today there are only about 220,000 Europeans in an African population of 80 million—a ratio of 1 to 350. For the most part African-European relationships in these areas have had less friction in the transition to African independence.

The proportion of Europeans to Africans is only one factor affecting relations between the two groups, however. There also are such variables as racial discrimination on the part of the Europeans; the Europeans' feeling of being permanently settled or having definite roots in Africa; the opportunities for economic, political, and social advancement made available to Africans; and the willingness of the Europeans to cooperate with the new African governments, which is the crux of most of the unresolved questions in Africa today.

#### **African-European Relations in West Africa**

West Africa—where nearly all its territories are independent—is the area where relations between Africans and Europeans are the most friendly. This is due in large measure to the fact that there was no large settlement of Europeans in this part of the world. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find Europeans serving in the security forces of the new West African governments, and former European civil servants and technicians have adjusted to their new status of advisers in many West African ministries. In fact, advertisements for specialists of many kinds desired by West African countries can frequently be found in British and French journals.

For example, several Europeans are employed in very responsible capacities in the Nigerian Government. Among those holding positions of great trust are R. P. Fenton, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria; R. A. Clarke, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance; and J. E. Hodge, who is succeeding another Englishman, Sir Kerr Bovell, as Inspector-General of Federal Police.

In the independent Republic of Togo, a French judge, Jean Laloum, was requested to remain in the country and is now President of the Court of Appeals. Another Frenchman, Georges Widmer, a former provincial administrator, is a regional inspector, supervising the administration of several provinces.

In Ghana, the chief executive of the Volta River Authority is a Canadian, Frank Dobson; and

Conor Cruise O'Brien of Ireland, the former head of the U.N. Operation in the Congo at Elisabethville, becomes vice chancellor of the University of Ghana in September.

Another significant example is found in Senegal, where André Peytavin, a Frenchman who opted for Senegalese citizenship, is Minister of Finance.

In Upper Volta, President Maurice Yameogo has appointed Xavier Althuser, a French economic cooperation official, as his financial adviser.

In other West and Equatorial African countries, French advisers and technicians have been asked to remain after independence to help Africans as advisers in various fields. They have the major role of coordinating, staffing, and developing the University of Dakar and institutions of higher learning now being established in Abidjan and Brazzaville. They continue to serve as school-teachers in many countries. And it is reassuring to note the integration of French youth in the schools.

Indicative of this atmosphere in West Africa, a European recently was elected to local government office in a Nigerian election. This is significant because he ran as an independent without the backing of a national political organization and had to base his candidacy solely on his ability to serve the interests of his African neighbors.

Some friction does arise, however, in certain West African countries in the economic field, where an aspiring African small-business class resents the control of much of the area's economic life by overseas interests. Nevertheless, many of the West African governments feel that foreign investors can do much to help their countries move forward rapidly, and many are actively seeking further private foreign capital to accelerate such progress.

In much of independent West Africa, there are more European and American private businessmen working with the new African governments in the economic development of their countries than there were before independence.

#### **The Future of Algeria**

In North Africa there are rising expectations that the end of the long struggle in Algeria is in sight and that this will permit the entire North African area to move forward in peace. The Evian Accords, signed on March 19 of this year

by France and the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria, paved the way for the emergence of a new Algeria.

These accords bear witness to the statesmanship of the French Government under President de Gaulle and to the political maturity of the FLN leadership. In them are contained the essential ingredients of a bright future for Algeria—a foundation for cooperation between the African and European communities in Algeria and a basis for cooperation between Algeria and France.

These accords offer a bridge between the two communities and give them an opportunity to live peacefully together in the new Algeria. This is borne out in a recent Provisional Algerian Government broadcast to the French people of Algeria, which said:

The Algerian people today extend a hand to you and, without passion, make you an offer to associate yourselves with its effort to build. The Evian agreements are the charter of your future in Algeria. Study them and you will see that they leave you all your chances, that they permit you to live in Algeria as free men with security and dignity. . . . For three years, while keeping your French citizenship, you will be able to exercise Algerian civic rights—to vote, run for office, and live in complete equality with all Algerian citizens. These three years will certainly enable you to get used to new realities and to choose and to let your children choose (between French and Algerian citizenship) under conditions of peace and clarity.

In a few days the people of Algeria will determine their own future, and it is expected that they will choose to become independent. In the past there have been strong economic ties between France and Algeria. These ties have been important in many ways to both the French and Algerian people. It is gratifying that French and Algerian leaders have worked out a basis for future cooperation. Such a development would be of benefit to both communities and would be a favorable factor in the peaceful progress of an independent Algeria. And this, in turn, would contribute to the stability of the entire North African region, which has been disturbed for some time by the Algerian situation.

#### **British Areas of East Africa**

In eastern and southern Africa, the numbers and permanency of European settlement in the temperate highlands have complicated the emer-

gence of African nations. Certainly there is every reason to hope that the areas under British administration will shortly and peaceably achieve independence. The chances are good that this will be achieved with workable interracial societies.

In spite of certain setbacks we have already seen development in this direction in newly independent Tanganyika, which formerly was British-administered. Derek Bryceson, an Englishman, has the special distinction of having been chosen to head several Tanganyikan ministries by the African nationalist leadership and is currently Minister of Agriculture.

In East African areas still British-administered, Uganda, which has had sharp tribal differences as well as complications with Asian settlers, is scheduled for independence on October 9 of this year. Kenya, which is facing its European settler problems squarely, has recently achieved internal self-government and is preparing for independence. In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, there has been progress toward the election of legislatures under revised constitutions which provide for an ever-increasing role for the African majority. This progress is being made in the face of difficulties in maintaining the Federation, some of which are caused by European settler recalcitrance in South Rhodesia.

The people of these areas are engaged not only in the vital process of constitutional transition but of accommodation between races as well. These problems of transition and accommodation are questions that must be resolved primarily by the peoples and governments concerned. Solutions to these important problems are not simple because there are some who feel the process is going too fast and others who feel that it is going too slowly. Nearly all factions are making some progress toward the commendable goals of self-government by all the people and of interracial societies. Although the speed at which these goals are being attained may be disputed, there is serious intent by almost all to get on with the job.

It is the genuine hope of the United States that this political and social progress can be made without reference to the race of individual citizens and, certainly, without derogation of the full rights of any element of the population. Certainly this is the hopeful pattern being projected thus far by an independent Tanganyika.



In other areas of East Africa additional examples of progress in European-African relations can be found.

In Kenya the Minister of Land Settlement and Water Development in the present African nationalist government is an Englishman, Bruce McKenzie. Mr. McKenzie is an established member of the Kenya African National Union, the party of Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, which seeks universal suffrage and independence at the earliest possible opportunity. He is also an elected member of the Kenya Legislative Council, and the majority of his supporters are Africans.

In Southern Rhodesia the former Prime Minister and founder of the New Africa Party is Garfield Todd, an English rancher. Mr. Todd's party supports the aims of the African nationalists represented by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union of Joshua Nkomo, and he recently testified before the United Nations Special Committee of 17 in support of the decolonization goals of that group.

Another European, Colin Cameron, is Nyasaland's Minister of Works and Transport in the nationalist government of Dr. Hastings Banda, who heads the Malawi Congress Party, the principal African party in Nyasaland. Although an independent, Mr. Cameron was elected with Malawi Congress Party support.

Sir Stuart Gore-Browne, a European landowner and a longtime supporter of African political goals in Northern Rhodesia, recently joined Kenneth Kaunda, the principal African nationalist political leader and head of the United Nationalist Independence Party, in testifying on behalf of African objectives before the U.N. Committee of 17.

All of these are examples of sound multiracial cooperation emerging in the British areas of East Africa.

### **The Problems of South Africa**

Farther south, however, there are some doubts that harmonious progress is possible. Last year, for example, a contingent of South African reporters met me at the airport in Basutoland, and one of the first questions was: "Do you think the white man is expendable as far as American policy is concerned?" I, of course, replied: "That's a foolish question. The United States doesn't think any person is expendable, whatever his race."

Following the news conference, however, another newspaperman came over to me and said: "That wasn't a foolish question." I asked him what he meant, and he said: "Well, I'll tell you. Every nationalist in Africa—that is, West Africa and on down—is a Communist, and every one of them wants to come down and murder every white man."

When I returned to the Commissioner's house, I asked him if this was a typical attitude in that part of the world. He said: "It's not typical—it's the most exaggerated I've heard. But there is a feeling down here that all these nationalists certainly are troublesome, that they may be Communists, and that they may have this kind of genocide in mind."

This is a kind of induced atmosphere that may be understandable but one that I believe is highly inaccurate. The people who feel this way forget that 24 of the 25 African countries that have achieved independence in the last dozen years have made the transition peacefully.

Even in the Congo, where there were attacks against Europeans in the early days of independence, animosity has subsided and thousands of Belgians are returning to the Congo to work. When I was in Stanleyville in the Congo's Orientale Province recently, I encountered a greatly relaxed atmosphere between Europeans and Congolese in this area where anti-European feelings ran high in 1960 and 1961. While there, General Victor Lundula, the military head of the Province, told me how he personally had saved the lives of some Europeans during the fighting and mentioned how desirable it was to bring in more European technicians to get the Congolese economy moving. It was in Stanleyville, also, where Provincial President Simon Losala gave a luncheon for our party, and a large number of Europeans were there and on good terms with the Congolese.

The Europeans who feel the Africans have an antiwhite attitude are misguided, as far as I'm concerned. In fact, there is so little animosity among Africans that I am always pleasantly surprised on my visits to Africa. Nevertheless, among those Europeans who have denied equality to Africans the feeling that the Africans will seek vengeance is strong.

We in the United States, of course, should be humbly aware that we have yet to achieve the full promise of equality for all Americans. This

fact is something we must remember in our dealings with those Europeans in Africa who oppose giving equal rights to Africans. However, it is the law of the land in our country that all Americans shall have equal rights, and it is the vigorous policy of our administration that this goal shall be achieved.

American foreign policy is based on a set of principles to which we hold most seriously. Self-determination is one of these principles. In fact, it is a universally recognized principle which asserts the right of people to determine the kind of government under which they want to live. It is the principle underlying change without violence in stable democratic societies.

Where this principle is denied in Africa today, where preparations for inevitable change have not yet begun, the hour is dangerously late. But even in those areas determined reform, coupled with genuine good will, may find success.

Certainly this is the prayer of Americans for all the peoples of South Africa, where the separate development of races has set its face against the course of history. Our hope is that we can be of assistance in ameliorating this situation in which Africans are denied their desire to participate in the fundamental tenets of Western civilization and of the free world—tenets which include equality before God and political self-determination. Fortunately a growing number of Europeans in South Africa question this extreme political direction, as their strong opposition to the new South African sabotage bill has shown. A former Chief Justice of the South African Supreme Court said the bill violates the rule of law and empowers a Minister to restrict an individual's freedom and even his means of livelihood without that individual having an opportunity to be heard in his own defense or having the right of appeal to the courts.

From this discussion today it is obvious that there are many problems to be resolved in African-European relationships before true harmony can be achieved on that continent. Nevertheless I am convinced that on a continent-wide basis there are sufficient indications of progress to permit modest hope to be expressed for the future of such relations—provided that both the Africans and the Europeans get on with the job that must be done. The hour is late, however, and I am fully aware that such hope could be left un-

fulfilled if the present rate of progress is not carried forward rapidly.

Certainly the United States has a great interest in the development of good relations between the indigenous Africans and the Africans of European origin. Some of the latter now are third- and fourth-generation Africans, and they are very anxious for a peaceful resolution of their continent's problems. The indigenous Africans, for their part, are anxious to get on with the tasks of nation building.

The essential questions in obtaining a peaceful resolution of Africa's problems will have to be decided by the African and European communities themselves, of course, but our policy in Africa is to assist in the attainment of harmony among all the continent's peoples in whatever ways we can.

## World Peace Assembly, Accra

*The World Peace Assembly met at Accra, Ghana, June 21-28. Following is the text of a message from William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, read to the Assembly on June 25 by James J. Wadsworth.*

The success of the Accra Assembly will be measured by its individual response to the question posed to all mankind by the threat of nuclear war. The question is whether human statecraft is capable of achieving general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. And the response, in my judgment, must be the acceptance of the idea that the nations will have to change the established patterns of their affairs in order ultimately to have disarmament. It is largely because of failure to face this issue that the shadow of disarmament, not the substance, has been in the ascendancy in international debate.

Disarmament means that world stability must be insured by some means other than military power. In a disarmed world, disputes can no longer be settled by strength of arms; they must be settled instead by international arbitration.

Disarmament means that policies of state secrecy must disappear. All activities having a military potential must be subjected to the scrutiny of international observers.

These are startling changes, and they may sound unpleasant to many people. But acceptance of these notions is implicit in the acceptance of a world without the bomb.

We, in the United States, accept the fact that drastic changes in international relationships must accompany general and complete disarmament. But central in our thinking is the idea that a wide measure of agreement can be negotiated and put into effect without waiting for a world from which all political, military, and technical problems have been banished. Implementation of disarmament measures would then proceed without interruption until the goal of a disarmed world had been attained. Upon these premises we have constructed an outline of provisions for a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.<sup>1</sup>

Even in the first stage of our plan, many of the measures which the Accra Assembly is to discuss would have been accomplished. I hope the Accra Assembly will think that the United States approach to disarmament is promising and realistic. It is a plan which will work even in the absence of miracles. We would welcome objective analysis of our plan and the plans of others since this is now needed more than ever to replace slogans and preconceived ideas.

In the United States we have created a special disarmament agency within the Government, and we seek to mobilize our best resources, both public and private, to concentrate on this problem. We value private international conferences where people can discuss and dissect ideas without inhibition or limitation. I hope the Accra Assembly will produce an intellectual ferment and that new and constructive concepts will emerge from it. We would welcome this most heartily for, of the affairs with which governments are concerned, disarmament is a subject which causes them to feel frequently and deeply the need for greater wisdom.

### **Vice President of Philippines Visits Washington**

The Department of State announced on June 21 (press release 409) the acceptance by Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez of the Philippines of an invitation from the Acting Secretary of State to visit Washington June 25-27.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.

Vice President Pelaez, who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, is visiting the United States informally in connection with the inauguration of Philippine Airlines jet service to San Francisco. While he was in Washington he met with several high Government officials and was received by President Kennedy at the White House on June 26.

### **U.S. Comments on Report of Control Commission for Viet-Nam**

#### *Department Statement<sup>1</sup>*

The report just issued by the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam<sup>2</sup> demonstrates that the Communist North Vietnamese are engaged in a campaign of aggression and subversion aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam. It indicates clearly that the hostilities in Viet-Nam, which in the first 5 months of this year alone resulted in the death of more than 9,000 people, are planned, caused, and led by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. These are the conclusions of the Commission's Legal Committee:

... there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. . . . there is evidence to show that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.

The Commission accepted these conclusions of the Legal Committee that there was sufficient evidence to show "beyond reasonable doubt" that the authorities in Communist North Viet-Nam committed these violations. The Commission also cited the Republic of Viet-Nam for its activities in importing military equipment and personnel above the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva Accords.<sup>3</sup> The report clearly demonstrates, however, that these actions were taken by South Viet-

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on June 25 by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>3</sup> For texts, see *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

Nam as part of its effort to defend itself against aggression and subversion from the North. In December of last year President Diem requested increased military assistance from the United States. We have responded to this request.<sup>4</sup>

President Diem and President Kennedy have both stated that they look forward to the discontinuance of the present level of military assistance

when the Communist North Vietnamese halt their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The report of the International Control Commission takes note of this position. The United States welcomes the Commission's report and recommends it for world attention. We hope that the Commission will continue its efforts to restore peace in Viet-Nam.

## The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations

by Lucius D. Battle

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Like the nations of the world—new and old—I suppose government officials span the spectrum of development. Some have been on the job long enough to be fully developed—in the particular situations they are called upon to administer; others, like myself, are newly come to their present responsibilities and hence are, in the language of development, “newly developing.” All of us—to use Ambassador Galbraith’s metaphor for nations in their various stages of growth—are like “beads being moved along on a string,” being pushed farther along by experience and the responsibilities of office just as countries move farther along the line of development as they acquire additional experience and greater national maturity.

This comment will suggest one reason why, after only a few weeks in office, I do not feel disposed to make lengthy or ringing pronouncements. In-

stead I intend, hopefully, to stick to my subject, “The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States,” to which I have added “Their Role in Foreign Relations.” Playing an effective role in our foreign relations is of course the end purpose of all our international activities.

I am grateful for the invitation to be here, to discuss with you some of the opportunities these programs present to us in Washington, to people in 120 countries of the world with which we have exchange agreements, and to you in literally hundreds of communities across the United States. And so I propose to present some first impressions of principal program activities and relationships in this great enterprise of providing purposeful exchanges in an environment of continuing international change.

You are attending this conference primarily because of your interest in the participant training program of AID. Your meetings have not been oriented primarily to the international political crises that occupy so much of the time and energy of diplomats. I am, however, reminded of a phrase that former Secretary of State Acheson used some years ago to describe the number of

<sup>4</sup>For texts of an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem, see BULLETIN of JAN. 1, 1962, p. 13.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before a national conference on the international training programs of the Agency for International Development at Washington, D.C., on June 26 (press release 417).

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methods needed to conduct effectively our relations with the people of other countries. The phrase is "total diplomacy."

The Government's exchange programs provide an example of what he meant because, aside from diplomatic negotiation and economic and military cooperation, they constitute a further facet of our foreign relations—a facet that involves the movement of people for purposes of education, training, observation, and research and with essential supporting activities by citizens and community groups for foreign visitors coming to this country.

Within this aspect of our diplomacy—the exchange of persons—we of course have a great diversity of plans and programs. You have been well briefed on the aims and methods of AID's participant training program. My first function, therefore, is to outline briefly the character and scope of the educational and cultural exchange programs of the Department of State. While other agencies have exchange activities, State and AID represent the great bulk of the exchanges that look to local communities and individual citizens for vital assistance and support.

#### Department of State Programs

The largest category of exchanges in the Department's program is students. There were about 9,000 individuals in the Department's total exchange-of-persons program this last academic year; of these almost half, some 4,000, were students—both American students going abroad and foreign students coming here.

Since our primary interest today is the foreign visitor, let me mention briefly three points of special interest about foreign students. The first is that only some 3,000 foreign students—about 5 percent of the estimated 58,000 foreign students in the United States this last academic year—were grantees under the Department's own programs. With comparable AID grantees, the total of foreign students here under Government grants does not exceed 10 percent.

This leads to the second point I want to make, namely, our relationship to the other 90 percent. The Government, like your own organizations, feels a concern that *all* foreign students, regardless of how they came here, find the best *total* experience that can be made available to them. Both humanitarian purpose and national interest coincide on this point.

In accordance with the authorizations of the new Fulbright-Hays Act for services to all foreign students, and in line with the importance attached to the whole question of foreign students by President Kennedy's administration, we have been taking steps to stimulate greater private support activities for foreign students and to broaden government's own participation. We cannot assume fixed financial support for all foreign students, but in every feasible way we want to help improve the quality of the total experience they have here. This means, for example, a series of efforts to help more foreign students find summer jobs or other useful summer experience, and I am glad to report that, through both private and governmental activity, we have made real gains on this problem this year. Before another year is out we hope there will be other substantial gains in improving and expanding procedures for selection, orientation, and counseling, both overseas and here.

Another point about the foreign students who come here under Department grants is that they are, for the most part, graduate students. About 85 percent of our foreign-student grant funds are "invested," so to speak, on the graduate level.

A second principal category in the State Department program is, of course, foreign leaders and specialists. This program had its origins in the late thirties. Following World War II it took a major advancement in numbers because of the increase in German, Austrian, and Japanese grantees. As a historical footnote, the numbers of those grantees, and of those coming under the technical training programs of predecessor agencies of AID, led many American communities to realize the need for further organization if they were to assist adequately the Government's program of acquainting such visitors with American life and institutions by firsthand observation. And as councils and other groups assisting with foreign leader and specialist grantees exchanged experiences, they saw the need for national coordinating services which has brought into being the cosponsor of this conference, COSERV [National Council for Community Services to International Visitors].

During this last academic year some 2,300 foreign leaders and specialists, including student leaders traveling in groups, were brought to this country by the Department for short-term, aver-

aging about 60-day, visits. A word about the basic thinking behind this program will throw light on the programing arranged for these visitors after they get here. The people who occupy leadership or specialist roles in their own countries are usually active people; they have busy careers, special interests, and curiosity. They usually have well-defined professional or career interests. Their programing here is, therefore, built around the core of these interests. The range of counterpart relationships set up in this country must be as broad as the careers represented and may include supreme court justices, editors and publishers, heads of labor unions, government officials, university presidents, leaders of women's organizations, and representatives of the creative arts, among others.

The aim in the invitations to foreign leaders and specialists is to bring to this country the "philosophical traveler," in George Santayana's memorable phrase—those who possess, as he said, "fixed interests and faculties, to be served by travel."

From their visits here these "philosophical travelers" gain new insights into, and understanding of, American life and institutions. A leader in women's activities in the Republic of Togo—and also Assistant Director of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs—was a recent grantee. She observed women at work here in a variety of fields, in schools and welfare institutions and civic activities, among others. Her visit was concentrated largely in small towns and rural areas since Togo is predominantly agricultural. Before leaving she spoke of the "sense of solidarity" women have in this country toward civic activities and her desire to encourage this sense in her own country.

Because of the excellent cooperation of private organizations of all kinds, the experience of foreign visitors can be rich and varied. An example from a wide variety was the visit of two newspaper editors from India to Emporia, Kansas, where William Allen White had made the *Emporia Gazette* a bellwether of American small-town life and thought. W. L. White, who succeeded his father as editor and publisher, reported their experience in an article in the *Reader's Digest* in which he described the kind of "close view" they had "of an average American small town—not rich, and not poor."

Foreign leaders are also invited in groups, according to professional interest, as well as individually. Likewise, leader groups of college students are brought to this country. Early next month, for example, 70 students from the University of São Paulo in Brazil will arrive for 3 weeks in this country. Ten days will be spent in a seminar at Harvard on American economic and political institutions. They will then be guests in private homes in New England and make a few days' stop in Washington before returning to Brazil.

But it is like carrying coals to Newcastle to discuss foreign leader/specialist activities of the Department at any great length to this audience. Many of you could cite book, chapter, and verse from your own personal experience with grantees. I have discussed leader/specialist activities primarily to provide general background for some later remarks in which I want to try to relate the aims and purposes of the principal AID and State programs.

Both of these principal categories I have just discussed—foreign leaders and specialists and foreign students—are *import* categories. There are *export* categories we should at least note briefly: Students, scholars, teachers, professors, and American specialists have been going abroad under the Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, just as these acts have enabled us to bring in students and leader/specialists from abroad. Our import and export authorizations now arise under the Fulbright-Hays Act (the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961), which was passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress last summer and which codifies and enlarges the authorizations previously available.

There is one further *export* category that ought to be made a part of this record. It is the category we call cultural presentations, a program under which American performing artists are sent abroad on tours to demonstrate the cultural interests and achievements of the American people. There has been great variety in the program, from the Juilliard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, from Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale theatrical company, from the New York City Ballet to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this program has been devoted exclusively to sending our own artists abroad, but, with the expanded

legislative authority given to the Department under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be able soon to begin to give limited assistance in bringing foreign artists to this country for non-profit performances, principally for university and other academic audiences. This would provide a further opportunity for citizen and community participation.

### Some Relationships in U.S. Exchange Programs

The programs we have been discussing—those of AID and of State—came into existence at different times and to serve different needs. But they are interrelated at several points and mutually reinforcing. All are fundamentally directed to a great aim of U.S. foreign policy: to help create the conditions for what President Kennedy has called “a free and diverse world”—rather than a rigid, monolithic world.

Diversity in exchange programs is necessary if we are to deal effectively with diverse peoples and their varied interests and needs in their different stages of development. State, for example, has its primary exchange focus on “mutual understanding.” In the new Fulbright-Hays Act the fundamental purpose is “to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange. . . .”

The act sets forth these further purposes:

. . . to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

AID's programs, as you have heard from others during this conference, contribute directly and effectively to mutual understanding, but their essential authorization goes to a different point. In the Act for International Development of 1961 strong emphasis was given to the concept of human resource development through “programs of technical cooperation.” The AID focus is first, and properly, on economic and social development, with human resource development a major and growing component of this effort. “The de-

velopment of human resources is a prime objective of the Agency for International Development,” Mr. Hamilton [Fowler Hamilton, AID Administrator] has said. “Social and economic growth in any country depends in large measure upon the existence of effective technical and managerial skills in various fields of organized endeavor, public and private. . . .”

AID participant training grantees are here, first of all, for technical training on a project-oriented basis but are also enabled and encouraged to obtain a better understanding of American institutions and culture as a part of their “programming” while they are here. Here is one example of how the aims of AID coincide with our own.

Both AID and State cover a wide age range. In its academic grants AID begins at the preparatory school level, and in its support of the ASPAU program for African students—the African Scholarship Program of American Universities—undergirds the general academic training of highly selected undergraduate students. On the participant training level, the average age is about 30. The State programs cover the range from students to national leaders of senior rank.

The underlying, unifying idea in all our approaches—both governmental and nongovernmental—is that in diversity there is strength. We depend on diversity, on the contributions to our national life that come from all elements of our varied society. It marks our training programs and exchanges which must be directed toward highly developed countries, toward those just achieving industrialization, and toward others where this badge of modernity is not yet being worn. Different kinds of training and education are therefore required. And public support for this varied effort must necessarily rest on a broad and diverse base.

In calling this meeting AID has testified amply to its own faith in this general proposition. Here at this conference, for example, we have representatives of the land-grant colleges and State universities—those great centers of training and enlightenment which had their common origin a century ago in the farsighted act which the son of a Vermont blacksmith-farmer, Senator Justin Morrill, brought into being. We know it as the Morrill Act of 1862; the centennial anniversary date comes in just a few days from now. We are

all, I think, even more aware than before of the dynamic role these institutions play not only, as in their founding years, in practical service to their State and regional communities, but now in varied services to an international constituency all across the world.

Then, we have here the comparatively youthful COSERV group, cosponsor of this conference, which only in May, under the leadership of Mrs. Charles N. Bang of the Cleveland World Affairs Council, completed its first independent regional conference. We all look confidently ahead to the growing benefits to come from this Council's coordinating work on behalf of some 75 individual community organizations in 65 cities, from Honolulu to New York and from Miami to Seattle.

The National Association of Foreign Student Advisers is another great source of strength for the exchange effort. Its members are directly involved in personal problems on more than 1,200 college and university campuses of the Nation, and they also keep closely attuned to new national needs and policies. NAFSA brings unique experience and service and dedication to the needs of our growing numbers of foreign student visitors.

Many other organizations represented here, as well as other parts of the academic community, government, industry, and labor—all sectors, public and private—provide additional centers of strength. As a result, we have in this combination of strengths a new affirmation of the traditional American faith in diversity—in different kinds of organizations and individuals coming together *voluntarily* to build unified strength for a common task.

This conference has afforded us all a chance to see the identities and complementarities of interest of private organizations, individuals, and government. And it has given us in government the opportunity to express our great sense of dependence on the voluntary service of diverse private groups and private citizens, and our deep gratitude to you for it.

Our interlocking interests are leading to the preparation of a booklet we hope to have available by early fall. The Department does not have, by its very nature, as many publications of an instructive type as do some other government agencies with special constituencies—with publications, for example, such as seed-testing manuals

or on how to start a small business. I have often wished we might do something of the kind. I am now able to say that we will have a booklet that will meet the general specification. It is a sort of seed manual, in a sense. It is a booklet on *The Seed of Nations*—a phrase the President used in a talk to foreign students at the White House—and it deals with foreign students and what American communities and organizations and families are doing, and can do, to help them. For they are “the seed of nations” and our citizens have the great opportunity of being their hosts and their friends. Many of you know well the role of host and friend to foreign students.

#### National and International Goals

The goals we seek through exchanges are as varied as the situations they are designed to meet. Exchanges as a means of reaching these goals are concerned with developed and developing nations, both friendly and unfriendly. They deal with *people*. As such they are directed to *individuals* in all varieties of human, professional, social, political, and economic contexts. They relate to all the factors that contribute to nation building and mutual understanding. These include, for example, human resource development and the preservation of indigenous national cultures.

Human resource development, the growth of individuals through training and education, has become a major new national and international goal in recent years. It has likewise become a major new field of academic study. Economists have been giving increasing attention to such matters as the “capital value of man” and the yield on investment in human resources.

“Development,” once of limited meaning, has in the last few years been expanded to embrace human resource development, which lies at the base of economic and social growth. AID has pointed out that the “human resources gap” varies from country to country in the light of a nation's objectives and development goals. If human resource development plans are to meet individual country situations, they must be flexible. Individual country planning is therefore being given strong emphasis in the Government. This effort to relate exchange programs to particular needs and priorities and objectives of individual countries, and integrating them with other relevant activities, is leading to closer collaboration in the



exchanges of AID, State, and other agencies, public and private.

There is need for mutually reinforcing efforts, too, in preserving national cultures in nations on the road to industrialization. This is a vitally important aspect of nation building. The impact of modernization will mean changes, but the changes need to be adaptations of old cultural patterns, old value systems, and historic symbols so that these social moorings will not be swept away. Everything feasible must be done to preserve the indigenous arts, the national monuments, and other great symbols of a society's traditions. A common language, common ethnic origins, and common geography may not make a nation. There are cultural experiences and traditions, usually expressed in the plastic arts or in dance or music, that may really be the social bonding that holds a people together. We must therefore think in terms of helping to safeguard these indigenous arts as an early and essential part of any country plan. Fortunately, the cultural roots of most nations lie deep. For example, Secretary of State Rusk has recently pointed to the loyalty of the peoples of Eastern Europe to their national cultures and to their sense of nationhood.<sup>2</sup>

The goals we seek were illuminated a few weeks ago at the University of California in Berkeley, where President Kennedy spoke on the role of the university in the building of world order.<sup>3</sup> ". . . the pursuit of knowledge itself implies," he said, "a world where men are free to follow out the logic of their own ideas. . . . It implies, I believe, the kind of world which is emerging before our eyes—the world produced by the revolution of national independence which is today, and has been since 1945, sweeping across the face of the world."

"No one can doubt," he continued, "that the wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men."

We look hopefully forward to "a free and diverse world"—toward a "more flexible world order," as the President has described it. We know that, as we press forward toward this goal, the role of education and training becomes ever more important to this kind of world.

The conduct of educational and cultural exchanges and training programs gives strong support to the broad national aim of building, with other peoples, a community of independent nations. In the underdeveloped areas in the southern half of the world, for example, we can encourage the emergence—from all the ferment of modernization—of a genuine community of independent nations. We can help them modernize, not in our image but in the image they themselves formulate out of their own unique histories, cultures, aspirations, and observations of other cultures and societies.

Perhaps the principal fact that distinguishes the United States from the Communist world, with respect to the less developed countries, is that our aspirations for these countries largely coincide with their aspirations for themselves. Our political aims, then, are for a world in which their, and our, aspirations can be realized. This cannot be a rigid, monolithic world. It can only be a free and diverse world.

The need for the services you provide—for participant trainees, foreign leaders and specialists, and the like, as well as foreign students—can be expected to rise in the years ahead as the numbers of such visitors increase. We will need more hands and heads to do the job. We will need to look at our procedures as still developing. The attention and help that may be suited to the needs of a visitor from a Western society may fail to meet some of the needs of those now coming in increasing numbers from the non-Western world. We have by no means yet found all the best ways to help the foreign student or trainee or leader or specialist realize the maximum value from his experience in this country.

Here is an area for almost unlimited initiative and imagination on the part of individual volunteers and groups who share a concern for the foreign visitor. Your experience, evolving out of thoughtful service in a variety of forms, can help those in other communities—and those of us in government—toward more useful planning and action. The experience some community groups have had in providing training sessions for host families, for example, should be widely shared.

In this brief time I have only tried to touch some of the highlights which this subject and this occasion suggest. I am confident the pattern of diversity will serve well to meet the increasing de-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

mands of the years ahead. With your continuing imaginative and generous help—and, hopefully, your growing numbers—our varied programs, public and private, for bringing foreign visitors to this country can be increasingly important factors in the “total diplomacy” our times require.

## **Premier of Jamaica Visits Washington**

The Department of State announced on June 22 (press release 410) that Sir Alexander Bustamante, Premier of Jamaica, would arrive at Washington on June 27 to call on President Kennedy and to meet with other officials of the U.S. Government. Sir Alexander, with other members of his government, is on his way to London for talks with British authorities. Jamaica will receive its independence from the United Kingdom on August 6, 1962.

## **President Kennedy and Mr. Marshall Discuss New Zealand Trade Problems**

*Following is a joint statement issued by President Kennedy and John Ross Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade of New Zealand, at the conclusion of discussions held at Washington on June 15.*

White House press release dated June 16

The Deputy Prime Minister reviewed his recent discussions in England and on the Continent relative to the possible entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common Market. The Deputy Prime Minister emphasized New Zealand's dependence on the United Kingdom market for her export trade which is primarily based on temperate agricultural products. He mentioned the assurances he had received in the United Kingdom that New Zealand's position would be a matter of special concern to the British Government in considering arrangements for possible entry into the European Common Market. Mr. Marshall explained why New Zealand wished to see Commonwealth preferences retained; he emphasized, however, that for New Zealand, the issue of paramount importance was market outlets for its products in the United Kingdom, or in an en-

larged European Community, comparable to what it now enjoyed, with the opportunity for growth as the market expanded.

The President and the Deputy Prime Minister agreed upon the desirability of European unity as well as the importance of liberalizing world trade. The President described the trade expansion legislation now pending before the United States Congress, explaining that with the passage of this legislation he expected a general expansion of trade among the nations of the free world. The special problems of New Zealand trade were recognized with understanding. The President and Mr. Marshall agreed that regular consultations between their two countries on matters of trade should continue.

Also participating in the discussions in Washington were for New Zealand, Ambassador G. R. Laking and Mr. Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secretary, Department of External Affairs, and for the United States, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, Under Secretary of Agriculture Charles Murphy, Under Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman.

## **President and Prime Minister Menzies Review U.S.-Australia Relations**

*Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies of Australia made an informal visit to Washington June 17-20 and met with President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and other high Government officials. Following is the text of a joint communique released by the White House on June 20 after meetings between President Kennedy and Mr. Menzies.*

White House press release dated June 20

The President and the Prime Minister expressed gratification at the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister's visit for furthering their personal as well as official friendship symbolizing the cordiality of relations between the American and Australian people.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the question of peace in Southeast Asia. The President noted with satisfaction Australia's active interest in supporting the struggle of the Government of Vietnam against subversion and

aggression organized and directed from abroad. Both leaders looked forward to the effective realization of the Geneva Accords assuring the independence and neutrality of Laos.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that a peaceful solution of the West New Guinea dispute would be in the best interests of all concerned, and they recognized that the efforts of the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, and his representative, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, had provided the atmosphere for the achievement of a significant contribution to the cause of peaceful settlement of international disputes.<sup>1</sup>

Both the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the desirability of maintaining the excellent record of Australian-American security consultation and coordination through the ANZUS and SEATO Treaties.

President Kennedy expressed his strong belief in the importance of the Commonwealth as a source of stability and strength for the Free World. At the same time both leaders recognized that European unity could contribute substantially to the strength of the Free World.

They reviewed therefore the implications for the trade of their two nations of the possible accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community.

It was agreed that in this event the United States and Australia would, as great suppliers to Britain and Europe, face problems in endeavoring to maintain and expand access for their goods.

The Prime Minister offered the view that it would be a grave misfortune if, after the negotiations, it turned out that the conditions laid down for Britain's entry were unacceptable to Commonwealth countries on the ground that they damaged Commonwealth trade and expansion.

The President and the Prime Minister took note of the fact that with respect to certain articles and commodities Australia's historic terms of access are different from those of the United States. They recognized, however, that Australia competed with the United States in the United Kingdom market with respect to only a relatively small number of these items—though the items themselves are by no means of small importance. They agreed that with respect to these items technical

discussions would be held between the two Governments in an effort to reconcile the trading interests of both nations.

With respect to the great bulk of articles and commodities they noted that, as non-members of the European Economic Community, their countries faced essentially the same problems, and they joined in hoping that the Community would pursue liberal trading policies. President Kennedy pointed out that under the Trade Expansion legislation now pending before the Congress the United States Government might be able, through reciprocal agreements, to bring about a general reduction of trade barriers for the benefit of all. Moreover, both leaders agreed that, with respect to a number of key primary products, the problems raised by the expansion of the Common Market might best be solved through international arrangements.

During the course of their interviews the President expressed his warm interest in Australia and his understanding of Australian needs in terms of development and growth, recognizing the problems of particular regions as well as industries. Both he and the Prime Minister were agreed that the problems arising out of Britain's proposed entry should be approached not on any basis of theory or the use of particular words but upon a practical basis examining commodities one by one, having in mind the protection of the interests of both countries.

As a result of their discussions the President and the Prime Minister were encouraged to believe that satisfactory solutions will be found to these problems faced by their two countries.

## President Sets Effective Dates on Various Trade Agreements

The White House announced on June 21 that on June 20 President Kennedy signed a proclamation<sup>1</sup> to give effect on July 1, 1962, to the U.S. concessions in three interim trade agreements negotiated at the 1960-61 tariff conference under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, additional to the agreements proclaimed by Proclamation 3468 of April 30, 1962.<sup>2</sup> These are agreements with Haiti, India, and Japan. Also

<sup>1</sup>No. 3479; for text, see 27 *Fed. Reg.* 5929 or White House press release dated June 21.

<sup>2</sup>27 *Fed. Reg.* 4235.

<sup>1</sup>For background, see BULLETIN of June 25, 1962, p. 1039.

included in the proclamation are protocols for the accession of Israel and Portugal to the General Agreement, which contain schedules of U.S. concessions identical with the concessions in the U.S. schedules to the interim agreements with these two countries and which on July 5, 1962, and on July 1, 1962, respectively, will supersede the latter.

The President on June 20 notified the Secretary of the Treasury<sup>3</sup> that the effective date of the United States concessions in the interim agree-

ments, other than those with Austria and Portugal, proclaimed by the proclamation of April 30, 1962, would be July 1, 1962. No notification was given as to the interim agreement with Portugal because the U.S. schedule to the protocol for the accession of Portugal will take effect on July 1, 1962. The concessions in the U.S. schedule to the interim agreement with Austria will take effect on that date only if Austria has by then ratified the agreement.

## THE CONGRESS

### Department Supports Participation in International Wheat Agreement

*Statement by G. Griffith Johnson  
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

My name is G. Griffith Johnson and I am Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. I appear before you today in support of the continued participation of the United States in the International Wheat Agreement.

In view of the fact that the transmittal letter from the President, dated June 5, 1962, was accompanied by other documents covering the agreement in some detail,<sup>2</sup> my remarks today will be brief.

As you are aware, the 1962 International Wheat Agreement will enter into force on July 16, 1962, with respect to the administrative provisions, and operationally on August 1, 1962, provided that by that date governments holding not less than two-thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of importing countries have accepted or acceded to the agreement.

The first postwar International Wheat Agreement came into force in 1949 and was renewed, with certain modifications, in 1953, 1956, and 1959. The 1962 agreement provides for a further 3-year extension. Essentially the same as the 1959 agreement, it incorporates certain refinements and modifications adopted at the recently concluded negotiating conference, which, we believe, will improve the agreement and render it more effective.

Although it is clear that agreements such as this do not represent a complete solution to the problems confronting those countries most concerned with international trade in wheat, it is fair to say that past agreements have resulted in a degree of market stability which would not have been possible in their absence. In addition meetings of the Wheat Council, which administers the agreement, provide a very useful forum where exporting and importing countries alike may review and discuss their difficulties. Such meetings have been of particular value to the United States in connection with this country's disposal and market development programs by providing an international forum in which not only competing exporters participate but also the importing countries which benefit directly from the special programs of the United States.

Finally, continued participation of the United States in the International Wheat Agreement is fully consistent with the policy of the adminis-

<sup>2</sup> For text of notification, see White House press release dated June 21.

<sup>3</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 26 (press release 415).

<sup>4</sup> S. Ex. D, 87th Cong., 2d sess.

ration to promote greater international cooperation in the commodity field. It is also desirable that this Government give full support to those agreements which, by providing a framework within which trade may take place under internationally agreed rules and within a price range considered to be fair and equitable by both producers and consumers, contribute to the financial and political stability of many countries heavily

dependent on world trade in a few basic commodities.

The Department of State believes that it would be to the advantage of the United States, both from the standpoint of its domestic interests and from the standpoint of its foreign relations, to continue our participation in this agreement and recommends its favorable consideration by the committee.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings

#### Adjourned During June 1962

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 19, 1961- June 28
ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 5-June 9
NESTCO Executive Board: 61st Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 8-June 1
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-June 1
International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Standing Committee on Research and Statistics . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	May 24-June 9
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 6th Session (resumed) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-June 1
MCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability . . . . .	London . . . . .	May 28-June 1
ILO Governing Body: 152d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-June 2
International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 28-June 6
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Technical Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-June 13
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-June 20
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Working Parties on Oceanography of the Subarctic Waters of the North Pacific and Offshore Distribution of Salmon . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	May 28-June 30
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Working Party of Railway Signaling and Operating Officials . . . . .	Melbourne . . . . .	May 29-June 6
WMO Executive Committee: 14th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 29-June 19
NICEF Program Committee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 31-June 1
AIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	June 1-9
ATO Science Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 4-5
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4-7
IANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 4-8
ATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4-8
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 12th Meeting . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	June 4-9
NICEF Executive Board . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 4-12
ECD Trade Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 5-6
ECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meetings . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 5-8 and June 19-21

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences June 26, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; CE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Adjourned During June 1962—Continued

International Labor Conference: 46th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6-27
13th International Film Festival . . . . .	Karlovy-Vary, Czechoslovakia . . . . .	June 9-24
Permanent Bureau of the International (Paris) Union for the Protection of Industrial Property: Working Group on Questions of Reorganization.	Geneva . . . . .	June 10-16
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 12-19
U.N. ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Foodstuffs.	Geneva . . . . .	June 12-21
FAO Group on Grains: 7th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 12-21
ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Television), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting).	Bad Kreuznach, Germany . . . . .	June 13-29
NATO Industrial Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 14-15
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 18-20
OECD Oil Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 19-20
OECD Economic Policy Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 20-21
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the Tropical Atlantic Oceanographic Investigations.	Washington . . . . .	June 20-22
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Paris . . . . .	June 21-22
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 21-22
International Whaling Commission: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Scientific Committee . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 25-29

### In Session as of June 30, 1962

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 1, 1960-
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.	Geneva . . . . .	May 16, 1961-
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed June 15 until July 16).	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 31-
12th International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 22-

## The Public Health Program of the Alliance for Progress

by Edwin M. Martin

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs<sup>1</sup>

The nations of this hemisphere have made it strikingly clear that they are determined to concentrate on the problems of health in the decade of the sixties. In the last two decades, scientific advances and effective cooperation have enabled the American Republics to make enormous improvements in the health of their peoples, and all our populations, including that of the United States, are growing with great rapidity. This population explosion, as it is often called, is dra-

matic evidence of the enormous advances in health which have made it possible for more men to live a longer span of years. It also creates its own problems.

In planning for the future, for example, we must appreciate that in 1980 the geographic distribution of population in the Americas will probably differ from that we know at the present time. A larger percent will be living in Middle and South America. Thus, in estimating health needs and planning health programs, we must think in terms of a Latin American population which may exceed by 80 million the combined population of

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Eighth Congress of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering at Washington, D.C., on June 11.

the United States and Canada. This rapidly growing population already needs and will continue to need expanding resources both of facilities and manpower to provide adequate health services.

But it is not enough for a man simply to survive. A man also desires to produce, to think and to create, to teach and to learn, to enjoy good health and to seek opportunity to improve himself and his family. At Punta del Este the American nations recognized this truth and declared their intention to "strengthen our human potential."<sup>2</sup> We intend, they said, to seek to improve individual and public health as a means of increasing ability to learn and to produce and enjoy. To achieve these goals, the American nations stated in the Charter of Punta del Este, we must take a series of important steps:

Provide adequate potable water supply and sewage disposal for not less than 70 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural population;

Reduce the present mortality rate among children under 5 years of age by at least one-half by controlling the more serious communicable diseases, according to their importance as causes of sickness, disability, and death;

Eradicate those illnesses, especially malaria, for which effective prevention techniques are known; Improve nutrition;

Train medical and health personnel; improve basic health services at national and local levels, and intensify scientific research.

The task ahead is enormous. So is the potential role for the sanitary engineer. Sanitary works, water supply, and pollution control are absolute necessities to the attainment of a high level of public health, the essential underpinning for human progress.

In many areas of the Americas the major causes of death today are the diarrheal diseases, related to the kind of environmental factors sanitary engineers try to change. Lack of readily available water, in ample quantity and of good quality, ranks high as an overall health problem in many of the countries in Middle and South America and is the foremost environmental sanitation problem. We have just had this fact dramatized for us by

<sup>2</sup> For texts of the Declaration to the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta del Este, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, pp. 462 and 463.

the epidemic of gastroenteritis which caused so many deaths during the last 2 weeks in Honduras. Fortunately the U.S. Navy was able to rush teams of doctors with medicines and chemicals into the area, and the situation now seems to be under control.

I have been told that, on the basis of expected increases in population in urban areas, present rates of construction of urban waterworks must be substantially increased or there will hardly be a large city capable of furnishing all its inhabitants with an adequate and reliable water supply. Today a considerable proportion already lacks readily accessible water, with the result that the incidence of gastrointestinal disease is high, hygienic conditions are unfavorable, industrial development is hampered, and social problems develop. Taking rural and urban needs together, unless rates of construction are increased substantially, it is estimated that by 1980 there may be more than 150 million persons without water service in Middle America and South America.

#### Public Health Pioneers

The Alliance for Progress has been formed to attack this among other problems. I am sure that the nations of the hemisphere that are joined in the alliance will be looking to the members of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering for guidance in dealing with it.

In the field of health and sanitation, the Alliance for Progress enjoys special advantages, compared with the tasks at hand in other fields. It has a real headstart, represented by you here at this meeting, by your organization, by the Pan American Health Bureau, and by the constructive experience you have had working together, achieving victories on many fronts in the past.

Some of you have been in this work for a long time and have contributed much to the great advances which already have been made. You have been pioneers in cooperation on the inter-American health frontier. Some of your work, and some of the advances, have undoubtedly contributed materially to shaping the objectives and pinpointing the targets of the Alliance for Progress. But you have done much more. The lessons learned and taught by the sanitary engineers of the American Republics have also been pressed into service on the health frontiers of the world. To cite only

one example: The world campaign to eradicate malaria had its inspiration in this hemisphere.

Nor should we forget that the Pan American Health Organization, the intergovernmental health agency for the Americas, is the oldest international health organization in existence. It is still the largest specialized agency of the Organization of American States. Its relative size and its age show the importance which the member nations have long attached to the improvement of the health of their peoples, for the PAHO has functioned here in Washington since its founding in 1902. The PAHO has long been and is now a living fulfillment of the highest ideals common to the peoples of the Americas, ideals of genuine neighborliness through mutual service, teamwork, and understanding.

These ideals are the motive force of the Organization of American States as a whole. You see them in evidence in political, economic, social, cultural, and other kinds of cooperation. They are eloquently expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este, but over the years they have been fulfilled most dramatically in the field of cooperation in health as practiced through the PAHO and through the dedicated efforts of many of you present today at this Eighth Congress of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering.

Medicine still speaks the most universal language. In part this is because frontier walls do not exclude disease. Bacteria ignore national boundaries, and mosquitoes carry no passports. But there is another reason. All barriers tend to fall before mutual dedication and service in the interest of human life. We and our good neighbors may speak English, Spanish, Portuguese, or French, but our physicians speak a common tongue. So do our nurses, dentists, pharmacists, therapists, sanitary engineers, and the other specialists whose lives are devoted to the well-being of men, women, and children. It is the universal language of deeds and actions that heal.

The more than 242,000 physicians of northern America and the more than 100,000 physicians of Latin America are the frontline fighters in a "hot war" in which all humanity is on the same side. This is a "hot war" for life and against death; for well-being and against misery; for hope and against despair; for opportunity and against defeat. In this war against disease many battles remain to be fought.

I would like to suggest that our strategic plans for the sixties, and the keynote of this conference, might be drawn from an old story of my father's. It is the story of a Vermont farmer who is being interviewed by a young college-educated farm agent. The young man points out how inefficient the farmer's methods and equipment are and tells him he could farm better if he would only study modern agricultural methods. The farmer is scornful and says: "Shucks, son, why should I study? I already know how to farm a lot better than I'm doing."

I suggest we concentrate, in this same spirit, on using and applying the things we know about health, and especially on giving more people the benefit of our knowledge.

Three things are necessary to do this: education, money, and good administration.

### Expansion of Health Education

Education has at least three tasks to perform. First, it must teach the elementary requirements of individual health in primary school, along with the alphabet. The time and money we spend on water and sanitation programs will be wasted if the masses of the people fail to understand what we are doing and why they must cooperate in their daily routines to keep their water and surroundings clean and sanitary.

Second, at all school levels it is important to develop a sense of the importance of public and private health and of personal obligation to contribute to the welfare of the individual and of the community, so that citizens will support actions required to provide health services. These actions include paying taxes for health purposes and, wherever possible, the cost of individual health services.

Third and last, we must supplement such minimum health and scientific training in school curricula with opportunities for students from all walks of life to become doctors, sanitary engineers, and pharmacists and to enter the other professions whose ranks so badly need expanding if our goals are to be achieved.

### Financing Public Health Programs

Money is essential. Public health programs are expensive. To the maximum extent prac-



icable, services such as water and sewerage facilities need to be put on a self-sustaining basis, with each household paying its share.

In many cases capital investments and technical training can be financed by foreign grants and low-cost loans. A substantial portion of the aid provided by the United States under the Alliance for Progress is going and will go for these purposes. The Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will also continue to be sources of capital for them.

But it is of the greatest importance to recognize that many requirements of complete public health programs cannot be met from outside sources, whose volume cannot and never was intended to meet all the needs. The plans of the Alliance for Progress, as developed at Punta del Este, assumed roughly that about 20 percent of the capital investments required to carry them out would come from abroad, while 80 percent would be provided from internal public and private savings. Within this overall pattern we might expect an even larger percentage of capital for programs in the health field to be raised from internal sources. External funds should be reserved as much as possible to pay for the foreign exchange costs of development, which only they can do, leaving local currency costs to be met from domestic budgets. A high percentage of health expenditures involves local costs for labor and for construction materials, which are usually available locally.

The achievement of your goals will be very largely dependent on how well your governments handle their finances. Is there a budget or financial plan? Is it carried out? Are expenditures carefully checked and audited? Is tax collection efficient? Are tax laws enforced vigorously and reasonable penalties imposed? Is the tax structure properly related to incomes? Are there nuisance taxes which cost more to collect than they bring in? The answers to these questions are vital to each one of you and to the cause that you are making your life work. Sound fiscal management is not someone else's business but in a special personal way your own. A great deal of progress is being made in Latin America on this front. But for every new step which has been taken there are a dozen "under study." They need to be taken off the shelf of contemplation and put into action.

## Importance of Good Administration

Lastly, a word about administration. Once you get your hands on money, it is, of course, of great importance to get maximum value out of it. Important progress has been made recently in this regard, largely in the direction of setting up autonomous or semiautonomous administrative bodies.

In Brazil a Special Health Service Foundation has been charged with coordinating all organizations that construct and operate water and sanitation services, and with supervising the technical, administrative, and financial aspects of such projects.

In Costa Rica a National Water and Sewerage System Service was established in 1961. This semiautonomous agency now administers and supervises all technical, administrative, and financial aspects of those services and sets the rates. After the Service was established the Agency for International Development lent \$3.5 million and the Export-Import Bank lent \$4.5 million to expand the water supply system of San José and the surrounding areas.

In El Salvador an autonomous agency, the National Authority for Water Supply and Sewage Disposal (ANDA) was established to carry out projects in urban and rural communities. Authority was consolidated in the ANDA for budgeting, financing, planning, engineering, and administering municipal systems. In 1961 the Inter-American Development Bank made a loan of \$4.8 million to ANDA for improvement of urban water supplies and sewer systems.

In Honduras the National Autonomous Water Supply and Sewerage Service (SANAA) was created in April 1961. The Government has drafted an emergency plan for the construction of 38 water supply systems in rural communities. The Service will also administer water projects to be constructed for Tegucigalpa with funds of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In Peru a National Sanitary Works Corporation is being organized to plan, construct, maintain, and operate facilities throughout Peru. Major water supply and sanitation projects are now being undertaken in Lima and Arequipa.

I don't wish to suggest that an autonomous national body is always the best way to provide these

technical services on the most efficient possible basis. However, freedom from direct political manipulation is often an important consideration.

### Role of the Sanitary Engineer

The discussions of the Eighth Congress of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary Engineering can have an enormous and constructive influence in insuring that this phase of the Alliance for Progress is carried out at the pace and in the manner required to improve the health of the expanding populations of the American Republics in this decade. The influence of the Association's members may be exercised not only in drawing up plans and designs for the construction of facilities but also in pressing for effective administration and, wherever possible, the establishment of rates which will make these vital projects and services self-supporting. The successful operation of one self-supporting project improves the prospects of meeting other needs.

You are also in a central position to promote wider public understanding of the need for proper health programs and thereby to increase the support from all sectors of the population which is essential to their success. You can, better than any other group, make clear their contribution to a better personal life. You can make people see how much more a healthy child can learn and retain than an unhealthy one. You can explain how much more efficient a healthy work force is than one plagued by absenteeism and lethargic workers. To reduce labor costs by making workers more efficient is a major step toward making Latin America more independent of outside sources of manufactured goods, as well, of course, as a great inducement for your private capital to invest at home rather than abroad. Foreign private capital inevitably follows the lead of your own.

I would like to make one last point. I can think of no one of the many aspects of the Alliance for Progress that so typifies the central purpose and spirit of the alliance as the public health program, for our main objective is to better the lives of all the peoples of all the Americas without distinction. Mosquitoes, bacteria, and viruses are not only unaware of national boundaries, as I have said, but they cannot distinguish a white skin from a brown or black one. They will never know how much money their next victim has or what his social status may be. They move from

one to another without prejudice or respect for their betters. Hence a minimum level of public health services must be provided for all, regardless of color or class or ability to pay, not only because it is the purpose of the alliance to help all but because we must do so if we are to help any. In this sense public health is, of course, not basically any different from other fields, but in its case the point—the need to help all, not only a few—is more visible, more readily comprehended.

Improved opportunities and tools are becoming available under the Alliance for Progress. They are opportunities which the members of this outstanding professional association have been seeking for years. I am sure you will know how to make the most of them.

### Plans Made for Synoptic Survey of Tropical Atlantic

Press release 419 dated June 26

The first working group of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission met in Washington at the National Oceanographic Data Center June 20-22 to draw up plans for an international cooperative investigation of the tropical Atlantic which will begin in February 1963.<sup>1</sup>

Such an international cooperative project in synoptic oceanography is a bold new venture in the field of oceanography, and its successful completion will require participation of ships and scientists from many nations. In a synoptic survey simultaneous instrument readings are taken from a number of ships to give what one might consider as a photograph of the surface and subsurface conditions of the ocean. Ships from eight nations and scientists from additional nations are expected to participate in the project, which will be the first international cooperative effort initiated under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.

The Commission was formed within UNESCO and held its first session last October in Paris. The United States called this first working group together under a resolution adopted by the Commission authorizing member governments to convene working groups to draw up comprehen-

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement of the meeting and the names of the U.S. representatives, see Department of State press release 393 dated June 15.

ive plans for such cooperative oceanographic undertakings.

The working group, under the chairmanship of Arthur E. Maxwell of the Office of Naval Research, drew up plans for a multiship synoptic oceanographic investigation in the tropical Atlantic from South America to Africa. The fisheries investigation in the Gulf of Guinea under the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa will be part of the overall project. The Agency for International Development is planning to finance part of this fisheries investigation.

The United States will contribute five ships to the investigation, representing the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas. Two fisheries research vessels and a large oceanographic vessel from the U.S.S.R. will participate. Other ships will be from Argentina, Brazil, France, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).

Other representatives or observers present at the meeting were from Canada, Chile, China, Germany, Italy, Korea, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Spain, Uruguay, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

The working group recommended that each participating member country name a representative to a coordination group, which will nominate an international coordinator of the project to the next Commission meeting in September. Meanwhile, Vernon E. Brock, Director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries Laboratory in Washington, will continue as coordinator.

## **Ninth Pan American Highway Congress to Meet at Washington in May 1963**

The Department of State announced on June 26 (press release 421) the creation of an organizing committee to make plans for the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress. The Congress is scheduled to be held at Washington, D.C., May 6-18, 1963, with the United States as host government. It is anticipated that there will be over 1,000 participants.

Rex M. Whitton, Federal Highway Administrator, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce, has been designated chairman of the

organizing committee. The vice chairmen are Alfred E. Johnson, Executive Secretary, American Association of State Highway Officials; D. Grant Mickle, Deputy Federal Highway Administrator, Bureau of Public Roads; and Gerald W. Russell, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State. Walter Kurylo, of the Bureau of Public Roads, has been designated as executive secretary.<sup>1</sup>

## **TREATY INFORMATION**

### **Current Actions**

#### **MULTILATERAL**

##### **Atomic Energy**

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Ceylon, June 29, 1962; Poland, June 27, 1962.

##### **Health**

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808 and 4643.

*Acceptance deposited:* Western Samoa, May 16, 1962.

##### **Trade**

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Enters into force on 30th day following date of acceptance by signature or otherwise for any contracting party or the European Economic Community. Entry into force for any party shall not be earlier than for Cambodia.<sup>2</sup>

*Signature:* United States, June 22, 1962.

##### **Wheat**

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

*Notification received of undertaking to seek acceptance:* Sweden, June 6, 1962.

*Notification received of undertaking to seek accession:* Belgium, June 27, 1962.

*Acceptance deposited:* India, June 29, 1962.

#### **BILATERAL**

##### **Brazil**

Additional protocol to the extradition treaty of January 13, 1961. Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 18, 1962. Enters into force upon the same date as the treaty.

<sup>1</sup> For names of the public members and other Government officials serving on the committee, see Department of State press release 421 dated June 26.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

## Dahomey

Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Cotonou June 5 and 13, 1962. Entered into force June 13, 1962.

## Niger

Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Niamey May 22 and June 14, 1962. Entered into force June 14, 1962.

## Panama

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles and services to Panama for purpose of contributing to its internal security. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama March 26 and May 23, 1962. Entered into force May 23, 1962.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Foreign Service Examination To Be Held September 8, 1962

Press release 428 dated June 30

The Department of State announced on June 30 that the next annual Foreign Service officer written examination will be held on September 8, 1962, in some 60 cities throughout the United States and at diplomatic and consular posts abroad.

Applications for designation to take the entrance examination may be obtained from the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. The completed application must be received by the Board not later than midnight, July 23.

Candidates are eligible to take the examination if they are between the ages of 21 and 31 years and have been American citizens for 9 years as of July 1, 1962. Candidates who are 20 years of age may take the examination if they have completed their junior year of college.

Initial salaries are scaled to the officer's qualifications, experience, and age and usually range from \$5,625 to \$8,755 per annum, plus allowances and other benefits.

The Foreign Service of the United States is a career professional corps of men and women who are specially selected and trained to carry out the foreign policy of our country in day-to-day relations with other countries. The members of the Foreign Service serve in Washington, in New York with the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and as our representatives at some 300 posts abroad.

Wherever Foreign Service personnel are, whatever they do, they have but one function: to protect and promote the welfare and interests of the United States and of the American people. All their many duties are in one way or another an extension of this function.

The written examination will be held in Civil Service examination centers in the following cities: Agana, Guam; Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Atlanta, Ga.; Augusta, Maine; Austin, Tex.; Balboa Heights, C.Z.; Baltimore,

Md.; Bismarck, N. Dak.; Boise, Idaho; Boston, Mass. Buffalo, N.Y.; Charleston, W. Va.; Charlotte Amalie, V.I.; Cheyenne, Wyo.; Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, S.C.; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Des Moines, Iowa; Detroit, Mich.; El Paso, Tex.; Fairbanks, Alaska; Grand Forks, N. Dak.; Hartford, Conn.; Helena, Mont.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Indianapolis, Ind.; Jackson, Miss.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Juneau, Alaska; Kansas City, Kans.; Little Rock, Ark.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Louisville, Ky.; Madison, Wis.; Manchester, N.H.; Miami, Fla.; Montgomery, Ala.; Montpelier, Vt.; Nashville, Tenn.; New Orleans, La.; New York, N.Y.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Omaha, Neb.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Phoenix, Ariz.; Pierre, S. Dak.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Portland, Oreg.; Providence, R.I.; Raleigh, N.C.; Reno, Nev.; Richmond, Va.; Sacramento, Calif.; St. Louis, Mo.; St. Paul, Minn.; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Francisco, Calif.; San Juan, P.R.; Seattle, Wash.; Spokane, Wash.; Springfield, Ill.; Syracuse, N.Y.; Tampa, Fla.; Trenton, N.J.; Washington, D.C.; Wilmington, Del.; and Worcester, Mass.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases, June 25-July 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 398 of June 18, 409 of June 21, and 410 of June 22.

No.	Date	Subject
411	6/25	Note to U.S.S.R. on incidents at Berlin.
*414	6/25	Visit of Vice President Pelaez of the Philippines.
415	6/26	Johnson: International Wheat Agreement, 1962.
*416	6/25	U.S. participation in international conferences.
417	6/26	Battle: "The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations."
418	6/26	McGhee: "Fifteen Years of Greek-American Partnership."
419	6/26	Working group of Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.
*420	6/27	Duke: General Federation of Women's Clubs.
421	6/26	Organizing committee for Ninth Pan American Highway Congress (rewrite).
*422	6/27	Martin: "Transformation by Education."
*423	6/27	Louhheim: General Federation of Women's Clubs.
424	6/27	Williams: "The Future of the European in Africa."
425	6/28	Stevenson: U.N. loan legislation.
426	6/29	Embassies to be established in Burundi and Rwanda (rewrite).
427	6/29	Cleveland: "The Third Man in International Politics."
428	6/30	Foreign Service officer examination.
*433	6/28	Congo import program.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL

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UNITED STATES

FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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July 23, 1962

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership

*Address by President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>*

It is a high honor for any citizen of the great Republic to speak at this hall of independence on this day of independence. To speak, as President of the United States, to the chief executives of our 50 States is both an opportunity and an obligation. The necessity for comity between the National Government and the several States is an indelible lesson of our history.

Because our system is designed to encourage both differences and dissent—because its checks and balances are designed to preserve the rights of the individual and the locality against preeminent central authority—you and I both recognize how dependent we are, one upon the other, for the successful operation of our unique and happy form of government. Our system and our freedom permit the legislative to be pitted upon occasions against the Executive, the State against the Federal Government, the city against the countryside, the party against party, interest against interest, all in competition or in contention one with another. Our task—your task in the statehouse and my task in the White House—is to weave from all these tangled threads a fabric of law and progress. Others may confine themselves to debate, discussion, and that ultimate luxury—free advice. Our responsibility is one of decision, for to govern is to choose.

Thus, in a very real sense you and I are the executors of the testament handed down by those

who gathered in this historic hall 186 years ago today. For they gathered to affix their names to a document which was above all else a document not of rhetoric but a bold decision. It was, it is true, a document of protest, but protests had been made before. It set forth their grievances with eloquence, but such eloquence had been heard before. But what distinguished this paper from all the others was the final, irrevocable decision that it took to assert the independence of free States in place of colonies and to commit to that goal their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.

Today, 186 years later, that Declaration—whose yellowing parchment and fading, almost illegible lines I saw in the past week in the National Archives in Washington—is still a revolutionary document. To read it today is to hear a trumpet call. For that Declaration unleashed not merely a revolution against the British but a revolution in human affairs. Its authors were highly conscious of its worldwide implications, and George Washington declared that liberty and self-government were, in his words, “finally staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people.”

This prophecy has been borne out for 186 years. This doctrine of national independence has shaken the globe, and it remains the most powerful force anywhere in the world today. There are those struggling to eke out a bare existence in a barren land who have never heard of free enterprise but who cherish the idea of independence. There are those who are grappling with over-

<sup>1</sup>Made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., on July 4 (White House press release (Philadelphia, Pa.): as-delivered text). The audience included the members of the Conference of Governors.

powering problems of illiteracy and ill health and who are ill equipped to hold free elections, but they are determined to hold fast to their national independence. Even those unwilling or unable to take part in any struggle between East and West are strongly on the side of their own national independence. If there is a single issue in the world today which divides the world, it is independence—the independence of Berlin or Laos or Viet-Nam, the longing for independence behind the Iron Curtain, the peaceful transition to independence in those newly emerging areas whose troubles some hope to exploit.

The theory of independence—as old as man himself—was not invented in this hall, but it was in this hall that the theory became a practice—that the word went out to all the world that “The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.”

And today this nation—conceived in revolution, nurtured in liberty, matured in independence—has no intention of abdicating its leadership in that worldwide movement for independence to any nation or society committed to systematic human suppression.

### **Spirit of European Unity**

As apt and applicable as this historic Declaration of Independence is today, we would do well to honor that other historic document drafted in this hall—the Constitution of the United States—for it stressed not independence but interdependence, not the individual liberty of one but the indivisible liberty of all.

In most of the old colonial world the struggle for independence is coming to an end. Even in areas behind the Curtain, that which Jefferson called “the disease of liberty” still appears to be infectious. With the passing of ancient empires, today less than 2 percent of the world’s population lives in territories officially termed “dependent.” As this effort for independence, inspired by the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence, now approaches a successful close, a great new effort—for interdependence—is transforming the world about us. And the spirit of that new effort is the same spirit which gave birth to the American Constitution.

That spirit is today most clearly seen across the

Atlantic Ocean. The nations of Western Europe, long divided by feuds more bitter than any which existed among the Thirteen Colonies, are joining together, seeking, as our forefathers sought, to find freedom in diversity and unity in strength.

The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic objective of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic, and political areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.

It would be premature at this time to do more than to indicate the high regard with which we view the formation of this partnership. The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will some day make this partnership possible.

### **U.S. Ready for a “Declaration of Interdependence”**

A great new edifice is not built overnight. It was 11 years from the Declaration of Independence to the writing of the Constitution. The construction of workable Federal institutions required still another generation. The greatest works of our nation’s founders lay not in documents and declarations but in creative, determined action. The building of the new house of Europe has followed this same practical and purposeful course. Building the Atlantic partnership will not be cheaply or easily finished.

But I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a “Declaration of Interdependence,” that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and

the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.

All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal.

In urging the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton told his fellow New Yorkers to "think continentally." Today Americans must learn to think intercontinentally.

Acting on our own by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the world. We cannot insure its domestic tranquillity, or provide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all this and more. We can assist the developing nations to throw off the yoke of poverty. We can balance our worldwide trade and payments at the highest possible level of growth. We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter any aggression, and ultimately we can help achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war and coercion.

For the Atlantic partnership of which I speak would not look inward only, preoccupied with its own welfare and advancement. It must look outward to cooperate with all nations in meeting their common concern. It would serve as a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men—those who are now free and those who are avowing that some day they will be free.

On Washington's birthday in 1861, standing right there, President-elect Abraham Lincoln spoke at this hall on his way to the Nation's Capital. And he paid a brief and eloquent tribute to the men who wrote, and fought for, and who died for, the Declaration of Independence. Its essence, he said, was its promise not only of liberty "to the people of this country, but hope to the world . . . (hope) that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance."

On this 4th day of July 1962, we who are gathered at this same hall, entrusted with the fate and future of our States and Nation, declare now our vow to do our part to lift the weights from the shoulders of all, to join other men and nations in preserving both peace and freedom, and to regard any threat to the peace or freedom of one as a threat to the peace and freedom of all. "And for the support of this Declaration, with a

firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."

## **Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs**

The Department of State announced on July 7 (press release 445) that Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, would leave for Europe on July 8 for a series of consultations on United Nations affairs. He will be accompanied by Joseph J. Sisco, Director of the State Department's Office of United Nations Political, Security, and Dependent Area Affairs, and Richard F. Pedersen, Chief of the Political Section, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

In Paris July 11-12 Mr. Cleveland will meet with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council for discussions of current U.N. activities and subjects expected to come up at the next U.N. General Assembly, which opens in September.

Mr. Cleveland will be in London on July 9 and 10 for joint discussions with United Kingdom officials. A similar meeting was held in Washington in January 1962<sup>1</sup> in preparation for the resumed session of the just-concluded 16th U.N. General Assembly.

Mr. Cleveland also will meet with representatives of member nations and secretariat officials of the international organizations with headquarters in Geneva July 13-16. He will return to the United States July 17.

## **Assistant Secretary Williams Confers With European Leaders on Africa**

The Department of State announced on July 6 (press release 442) that G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, would depart July 8 for Europe to consult with officials of five governments with interests in the African area.

Mr. Williams has made four trips to Africa, but this will be his first visit to Europe as a State Department official. During his talks with govern-

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 140.

mental leaders, problems of mutual interest in Africa will be discussed. Mr. Williams will be accompanied on his trip by his special assistant, Martin F. Herz.

Mr. Williams' schedule follows: Paris, July 9-11; Bonn, July 12-14; London, July 15-17; Brussels, July 18-19; Rome, July 20.

## U.S. Congratulates Burundi and Rwanda on Independence

*Following are texts of messages from President Kennedy to Mwami Mwambutsa IV of the Kingdom of Burundi and President Gregoire Kayibanda of the Republic of Rwanda. The U.N. Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi became the two independent states of Burundi and Rwanda on July 1.<sup>1</sup>*

### BURUNDI

White House press release (Mexico, D.F.) dated June 30

JUNE 28, 1962

**YOUR MAJESTY:** It gives me the greatest pleasure to extend to Your Majesty, and to the government and people of the kingdom of Burundi, the congratulations of the government and the people of the United States on the attainment of independence by Burundi.

We in the United States have watched with interest the transition of Burundi from its status as a U.N. Trust Territory to independence as a sovereign state. We know that your people, like ours, cherish individual liberty and national independence. Therefore, we share with the people of Burundi the knowledge that these goals are achieved and can be maintained only at the cost of unremitting labor and sacrifice.

Americans also share with the people of Burundi a profound respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. We look forward to your participation in world councils as befits a sovereign nation.

The people of the United States of America will work to strengthen the bonds of friendship between our two countries. We anticipate a future

in which our two peoples shall work together in the cause of freedom, dignity and peace.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Majesty  
MWAMI MWAMBUSHA IV,  
*Usumbura, Burundi.*

### RWANDA

White House press release (Mexico, D.F.) dated June 30

JUNE 28, 1962

**DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:** I wish to extend to you, your Government, and the people of the Republic of Rwanda, on the occasion of Rwanda's accession to independence, the congratulations and warm wishes of the people of the United States.

We in the United States have observed with great interest the transition of Rwanda from its status as a U.N. Trust Territory to sovereign independence. We are confident that the spirit of cooperation which has brought about this wonderful day will condition the Republic of Rwanda's future relationships with all who hold freedom dear.

In extending the congratulations of my country, I speak for a people who cherish individual liberty and independence and who have made great sacrifices so that these principles may endure, and who share with the people of Rwanda a profound respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I look forward to the establishment of the most cordial relations between our two countries, and all Americans stand ready to work with the people of Rwanda to reach the goals we all share of peace, enlightenment and material well-being. I am confident that in the future our two countries will be as one in safeguarding the greatest bond between us—our common belief in a free and democratic way of life.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

His Excellency  
GREGOIRE KAYIBANDA,  
*President of the Republic of Rwanda,  
Kigali.*

<sup>1</sup> See p. 159.

## **President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement of Independence**

*Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release dated July 3

This moment of national independence for the Algerian people is both a solemn occasion and one of great joy. The entire world shares in this important step toward fuller realization of the dignity of man.

I am proud that it falls to me as the President of the people of the United States to voice on their behalf the profound satisfaction we feel that the cause of freedom of choice among peoples has again triumphed.

We Americans, who at this time are celebrating the anniversary of our own independence—a freedom achieved only after great difficulties and much bloodshed—feel with you the surge of pride and satisfaction that is yours today on this momentous occasion.

We congratulate your leaders and their French colleagues on the wise statesmanship, patience, and depth of vision they showed in paving the way for his historic event.

As one who has been interested in the future of the Algerian people for many years, it is with special pride that I extend the good wishes of the American people to the people of Algeria. In the coming days we wish to strengthen and multiply the American bonds of friendship with the Government and people of Algeria. We look forward to working together with you in the cause of freedom, peace, and human welfare.

## **United States and Argentina Review Progress on Development Program**

Press release 431 dated July 2

The Department of State announced on July 2 that U.S. representatives have been holding highly constructive meetings with officials of the National Development Council of Argentina to review and discuss the progress which has been attained by Argentina toward formulation of a national development program within the framework of the Charter of Punta del Este. The U.S. officials indicated their satisfaction with the start which Argentina has made toward that objective, as re-

flected in a preliminary development program embodied in a compilation of fundamental data and analyses pertaining to the Argentine economy. Particular emphasis is placed on the strengthening of agriculture, infrastructure, and basic industries, and the promotion of exports.

Discussions are continuing regarding the financing of specific development projects within the framework of the development program.

## **Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship**

*President and Mrs. Kennedy made a state visit to Mexico City June 29-30. Following is the text of a joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President López Mateos of Mexico at the close of their talks, together with a statement made by Mr. Kennedy on June 30 at the signing of an agricultural credit agreement between the United States and Mexico.*

### **JOINT COMMUNIQUE**

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated June 30

President Adolfo López Mateos and President John F. Kennedy have held a series of conversations which mark a new era of understanding and friendship between Mexico and the United States.

Both Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the ideals of individual liberty and personal dignity which constitute the foundation of a civilization which they share in common. In consonance with their dedication to these ideals and acting always as sovereign and independent countries, which decide their own policies and their own courses of action, they propose to respect and maintain the principles of non-intervention—whether this intervention may come from a continental or extra-continental state—and of self-determination of peoples. Therefore they are resolved to uphold these principles in the international organizations to which they belong, to defend and strengthen the democratic institutions which their peoples, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, have constructed, and to oppose totalitarian institutions and activities which are incompatible with the democratic principles they uphold.

Both Presidents fully accept the responsibility of every sovereign nation to form its own policies, without outside dictation or coercion. They also recognize that the Republics of the Hemisphere share the commitment they have freely accepted, in accordance with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Charter of the Organization of American States to defend the Continent, and to foster the fundamental democratic values. This principle of common responsibility, without impairment of national independence, is the cornerstone of the Organization of American States.

Another dimension of this principle was expressed at the Punta del Este Conference in August of 1961. The two Presidents reaffirm their support of the Charter of Punta del Este<sup>1</sup> and of the program of accelerated social and economic progress which that Charter embodies. In fact, Mexico and the United States, together with the other countries of the Inter-American system, are closely associated in a vast endeavor, without precedent, to promote the well-being of all the inhabitants of the Hemisphere.

President Kennedy recognized that the fundamental goal of the Mexican Revolution is the same as that of the Alliance for Progress—social justice and economic progress within the framework of individual freedom and political liberty.

The two Presidents also discussed the economic and social development program of Mexico. President Kennedy reaffirmed his country's commitment made in the Charter of Punta del Este, to continue to cooperate with the Government of Mexico in the endeavor which it and the Mexican people are carrying out to accelerate the economic and social well-being of all the inhabitants of the Republic. The two Presidents agreed that the Alliance for Progress is essentially a program of mutual cooperation, in which the greater effort should come primarily from the nation which is seeking its development. Mexico and the United States are determined, so far as they are concerned, to continue such effort until hunger, poverty, illiteracy and social injustice have been eliminated from this Hemisphere.

The two Chiefs of State concurred in the need of intensifying the efforts which are being made through the various international organizations

including the United Nations, the Inter-American system, and the European economic community to achieve expanding levels of trade, with special attention to the elimination of discriminatory and restrictive practices against exports of basic commodities from Latin America. They agreed that it is indispensable that a broadened and more stable market should be provided in order to improve the income of the exporting countries. Of such income, workers and farmers should have an equitable share to permit increases in their level of living. Cotton, coffee, sugar and metals were the subject of special discussion.

The two Presidents discussed the importance of achieving higher rates of economic growth in their respective countries. They agreed that government has an essential role in stimulating and supplementing the efforts of private enterprise for attaining this objective, especially through sound economic and fiscal policies. Both Presidents agreed that inflation and financial instability have an adverse effect on economic development and the level of living of the general public. President López Mateos expressed the continued determination of his Government to pursue policies which would promote financial stability and economic growth and President Kennedy promised the cooperation of his Government toward that end.

The two Heads of State exchanged views on the importance of the United Nations in promoting international understanding and peace and in encouraging economic and social progress. They decided, in consequence, that their Governments should consult each other with the view of cooperating even more closely in all matters which maintain and strengthen the purposes and principles of the San Francisco Charter.

Both Presidents expressed the strong desire that, within the scope of the United Nations and particularly at Geneva, negotiations should continue for general disarmament as well as for the termination of nuclear tests, both based upon effective means of control.<sup>2</sup>

Both Heads of State feel gratified by the manner in which their Governments are collaborating in the eradication of illegal drug traffic, and agreed to redouble their efforts and their cooperation to put an end to this criminal activity.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see p. 154.

The two Presidents reviewed the progress of the joint undertaking of their countries in constructing the Amistad Dam and Reservoir Project and expressed satisfaction that this project is proceeding on schedule.

The two Presidents discussed the problem of Chamizal. They agreed to instruct their executive agencies to recommend a complete solution to this problem which, without prejudice to their juridical position, takes into account the entire history of this tract.

In relation to the problem of salinity of the waters of the Colorado River,<sup>3</sup> the two Presidents discussed the studies which have been conducted by the scientists of the two countries. The two Presidents noted that water which the United States plans to release during the winter of 1962-63 for river regulation and such other measures as may be immediately feasible should have the beneficial effect of reducing the salinity of the waters until October, 1963. They expressed their determination, with the scientific studies as a basis, to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time with the aim of preventing the recurrence of this problem after October, 1963.

The Presidents finished their conversations by emphasizing their determination that whatever temporary difficulties may at times arise between Mexico and the United States, the two Governments should resolve them in a spirit of close friendship, inasmuch as they are fundamentally united in defense of those values of liberty and personal dignity which their revolutionary ancestors struggled to establish.

#### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release (México, D.F.) dated June 30

The agricultural credit agreement we sign here today is an historic step forward in cooperation between our two countries under the *Alianza para el Progreso*.

It is especially significant that this agreement is in the field of agriculture. For improvement of the life of the *campesino* is one of the central goals of the Mexican revolution—and a major part of the Alliance for Progress. Here in Mexico you have carried forward the largest and most impressive land reform program in the entire his-

tory of the hemisphere. Since the beginning of your revolution more than 133 million acres of land have been distributed to almost 2 million people. And never has this program been more vigorously administered than during the last 3 years, when the government of López Mateos distributed 24 million acres to hundreds of thousands of *campesinos*.

The tangible results of your land reform can be witnessed in the 223 percent rise in agricultural output over the last two decades—a rise which has made Mexico virtually self-sufficient in foodstuffs and a major exporter of agricultural products. It can be seen too in the new hope which your revolution has brought to all those who work the land—the hope and expectation that they and their children will have ever-widening opportunities for education, health, and a rising standard of living.

But if much has been done, much remains to be done. Farmers who own their own land need credit and technical assistance so that productivity and income can be raised. Land tenure must be made increasingly secure and agricultural units made economically stronger. New research programs and new marketing systems must help bring a new life to those who live on the land.

All these things—and much more—are part of your impressive agricultural development program. And I am glad that through today's agreement we will be able to assist you in this most important effort. This \$20 million loan will be added to your present agricultural credit program—a program designed to help the small farmer buy equipment, improve irrigation, increase storage, and gain access to those resources he so desperately needs to improve his income and raise the productivity of the land.

Today's agreement is another tangible reaffirmation of my country's unyielding and continuing commitment to work with the Mexican Government in its vast development effort to provide more jobs for its workers, a better life for its farmers, and to help Mexico rise to its inevitable high rank among the industrialized nations of the world.

And I hope also that this signing will be heeded beyond your borders and our hemisphere. For—as your own Mexican revolution has so vividly demonstrated—until all the *campesinos* of this hemisphere have the opportunity to own the land

<sup>3</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650.

they till, until they are given the resources to till that land productively, until every rural family has an opportunity for health and a decent income, and education for its children—until that day the peaceful revolution of the Americas will not be complete.

## Letters of Credence

### Costa Rica

The newly appointed Ambassador of Costa Rica, Gonzalo Facio Segreda, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 6. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 443 dated July 6.

## Philippine-American Friendship Day

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines.*

White House press release dated July 3

JULY 3, 1962

The observance of July Fourth as Philippine-American Friendship Day profoundly honors every American.

In an unparalleled way, the Philippines has given expression to the spirit of our sixty-four years of partnership in democracy for the mutual benefit of our people and our beloved nations.

I join the people of the United States in extending to the Philippines our warmest best wishes. Together, dedicated in our freedoms, ideals, and our mutual respect and regard, we shall be stronger in our efforts toward a world of justice, peace and liberty.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## President Delegates Functions Under Exchange Act of 1961

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

ADMINISTRATION OF THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Public

<sup>1</sup>No. 11034; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 6071 (White House press release dated June 26).

Law 87-256; 75 Stat. 527; hereinafter referred to as the Act), and as President of the United States, I find that the delegations set forth in this order are in the interest of the purposes expressed in the said Act and the efficient administration of the programs undertaken pursuant to that Act and determine that the delegates specified in this order are appropriate and I hereby order as follows:

SECTION 1. *Department of State.* (a) The following functions conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State:

(1) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a)(1) 102(a)(2)(i), (ii) and (iv), 102(b)(3), (5) and (9) 103, 104(e)(3), and 105(d)(1) and (e) of the Act.

(2) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a)(2)(iii) and (b)(1), (2), (4), (7) and (8) of the Act (the provisions of Section 2(a) of this order notwithstanding)

(3) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a)(3) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to liquidation of affairs respecting the Universal and International Exhibition of Brussels, 1958.

(4) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(d) and (e)(4) and 108(c) and (d) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this section.

(5) The function so conferred by Section 104(e)(1) of the Act of prescribing rates for per diem in lieu of subsistence; but in carrying out the said function as it relates to functions herein delegated to the Director of the United States Information Agency or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Secretary of State shall consult with them.

(b) The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect to the functions delegated by Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively, of this order, shall prepare and transmit to the President the reports which the President is required to submit to the Congress by Section 108(b) of the Act.

(c) With respect to the carrying out of functions under Section 102(a)(2)(ii) of the Act hereinabove delegated to the Secretary of State, the Director of the United States Information Agency shall participate in the planning of cultural and other attractions. Such participation shall include consultation in connection with (1) the selection and scheduling of such attractions, and (2) the designation of the areas where the attractions will be presented.

SEC. 2. *United States Information Agency.* Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, the following functions conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Director of the United States Information Agency:

(a) The functions so conferred by Sections 102(a)(2)(iii) and (b)(1); Section 102(b)(2) to the extent that it authorizes the type of centers now supported by the United States Information Agency abroad and designated as binational, community, or student centers; Section 102(b)(4) exclusive of professorships and lectureships; and Sections 102(b)(7) and (8) of the Act; all



of the foregoing notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1(a)(2) of this order.

(b) The functions so conferred by Section 104(e)(4) of the Act (the provisions of Sections 1(a)(4) and 3(b) of this order notwithstanding).

(c) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a)(3) of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held outside of the United States, but exclusive of the functions delegated by the provisions of Section 1(a)(3) of this order.

(d) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(d) and 108(c) and (d) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this section.

**SEC. 3. Department of Commerce.** Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, the following functions conferred upon the President by the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Commerce:

(a) The functions so conferred by Section 102(a)(3) of the Act to the extent that they are in respect of fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held in the United States.

(b) The functions so conferred by Sections 104(e)(4) and 108(c) of the Act to the extent that they pertain to the functions delegated by the foregoing provisions of this section.

**SEC. 4. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.** Subject to the provisions of Section 6 of this order, the functions conferred upon the President by Section 102(b)(6) of the Act are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

**SEC. 5. Certain incidental matters.** (a) In respect of functions hereinabove delegated to them, there is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State, the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, respectively:

(1) The authority conferred upon the President by Sections 105(d)(2) and (f) and 106(d) and (f) of the Act.

(2) Subject to the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c) of this order, the authority conferred upon the President by Section 104(b) of the Act to employ personnel.

(b) The employment, by any department or other executive agency under Section 5(a)(2) of this order, of any of the not to exceed ten persons who may be compensated without regard to the Classification Act of 1949 under Section 104(b) of the Act shall require prior authorization by the Secretary of State concurred in by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

(c) Persons employed or assigned by a department or other executive agency for the purpose of performing functions under the Act outside the United States shall be entitled, except in cases in which the period of employment or assignment exceeds thirty months, to the same benefits as are provided by Section 528 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 928), for persons appointed to the Foreign Service Reserve. In cases in which the period of employment or assignment exceeds thirty months, persons so employed or assigned shall be entitled to such benefits if agreed

by the agency in which such benefits may be exercised.

(d) Pursuant to Section 104(f) of the Act, Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953 (18 F.R. 2489) is hereby established as the standards and procedures for the employment or assignment to duties of persons under the Act.

(e) Any officer to whom functions vested in the President by the Act are hereinabove delegated may (1) allocate to any other officer of the executive branch of the Government any funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the functions so delegated to him as he may deem appropriate for the best carrying out of the functions and (2) make available, for use in connection with any funds so allocated by him, any authority he has under this order.

**SEC. 6. Policy guidance.** In order to assure appropriate coordination of programs, and taking into account the statutory functions of the departments and other executive agencies concerned, the Secretary of State shall exercise primary responsibility for Government-wide leadership and policy guidance with regard to international educational and cultural affairs.

**SEC. 7. Functions reserved to the President.** (a) There are hereby excluded from the functions delegated by the provisions of this order the functions conferred upon the President with respect to (1) the delegation of powers under Section 104(a) of the Act, (2) the establishment of standards and procedures for the investigation of personnel under Section 104(f) of the Act, (3) the transfer of appropriations under Section 105(c) of the Act, (4) the appointment of members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships under Section 106(a)(1) of the Act, (5) the appointment of members, the designation of a chairman, and the receipt of recommendations of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs under Section 106(b) of the Act, (6) the waiver of provisions of law or limitations of authority under Section 108(a) of the Act, and (7) the submission of annual reports to the Congress under Section 108(b) of the Act.

(b) Notwithstanding the delegations made by this order, the President may in his discretion exercise any function comprehended by such delegations.

**SEC. 8. Waivers.** (a) It is hereby determined that the performance by any department or other executive agency of functions authorized by Sections 102(a)(2) and 102(a)(3) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 2452(a)(2) and (3)) without regard to Provisions and Limitations of Authority contained in the following-specified provisions of law is in furtherance of the purposes of the Act:

(1) Section 15 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (c. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810), as amended (5 U.S.C. 55a) (experts and consultants); but the compensation paid individuals in pursuance of this paragraph shall not exceed the rate of \$100.00 per diem.

(2) Section 16(a) of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (c. 744, August 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 810; 5 U.S.C. 78) to the extent that it pertains to hiring automobiles and aircraft.

(3) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529) (advance of funds).

(4) Section 322 of the Act of June 30, 1932, c. 314, 47 Stat. 412 (40 U.S.C. 278a) (maximum charges).

(5) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5) (competitive bids).

(6) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8) (opening of bids).

(7) Section 2 of the Act of March 3, 1933, c. 212, 47 Stat. 1520 (41 U.S.C. 10a) (Buy American Act).

(8) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13) (contracts limited to one year).

(9) Sections 302-305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (June 30, 1949, c. 288, 63 Stat. 393 et seq.), as amended (41 U.S.C. 252-255) (competitive bids; negotiated contracts; advances).

(10) Section 87 of the Act of January 12, 1895, c. 23, 28 Stat. 622, and the second proviso of Section 11 of the Act of March 1, 1919, c. 86, 40 Stat. 1270, as amended (44 U.S.C. 111) to the extent that they pertain to printing by the Government Printing Office.

(11) Section 1 of the Act of June 20, 1878, c. 359, 20 Stat. 216, as amended (44 U.S.C. 322) (advertising).

(12) Section 3828 of the Revised Statutes (44 U.S.C. 324) (advertising).

(13) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (June 29, 1936, c. 858, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended; 46 U.S.C. 1241(a)) (official travel overseas of United States officers and employees, and transportation of their personal effects, on ships registered under the laws of the United States).

(14) Any provision of law or limitation of authority to the extent that such provision or limitation would limit or prohibit construction of buildings by the United States on property not owned by it.

(b) It is directed (1) that all waivers of statutes and limitations of authority effected by the foregoing provisions of this section shall be utilized in a prudent manner and as sparingly as may be practical, and (2) that suitable steps shall be taken by the administrative agencies concerned to insure that result, including, as may be appropriate, the imposition of administrative limitations in lieu of waived statutory requirements and limitations of authority.

Sec. 9. *Definition.* As used in this order, the word "function" or "functions" includes any duty, obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, discretion, or activity.

Sec. 10. *References to orders and acts.* Except as may for any reason be inappropriate:

(a) References in this order to the Act or any provision of the Act shall be deemed to include references thereto as amended from time to time.

(b) References in this order to any prior Executive order not superseded by this order shall be deemed to include references thereto as amended from time to time.

Sec. 11. *Prior directives and actions.* (a) This order supersedes Executive Order No. 10716 of June 17, 1957, and Executive Order No. 10912 of January 18, 1961. Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with law or with this order, other directives, regulations, and actions relating to the functions delegated by this order and in force immediately prior to the issuance of this order shall remain in effect until amended, modified, or revoked by appropriate authority.

(b) This order shall neither limit nor be limited by Executive Order No. 11014 of April 17, 1962.

(c) To the extent not heretofore superseded, there are hereby superseded the provisions of the letters of the President to the Director of the United States Information Agency dated August 16, 1955, and August 21, 1956 (22 F.R. 101-103).

Sec. 12. *Effective date.* The provisions of this order shall be effective immediately.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 25, 1962.

## U.S. Offers Grant of \$10 Million for Congo Import Program

### Department Statement

Press release 433 dated June 28

The United States Government has offered to the United Nations for the Congolese Government a grant of \$10 million for imports. This latest grant will bring our aid to the Congo import program during the past year to \$51 million, apart from Food-for-Peace shipments at an annual rate of over \$10 million.

The Congo is faced with a shortage of foreign exchange, a situation greatly aggravated by the continuing loss of foreign exchange revenues from Katanga. There have been serious floods during the past year which disrupted communications and agricultural production. Transportation has suffered from deterioration of equipment and shortages of spare parts. Normal exports have declined substantially as a consequence of these difficulties.

A considerable effort has been undertaken by the United Nations in Léopoldville to improve the staffing of the public administration; to expand technical aid, especially with regard to public finance and monetary management; to provide public works programs and unemployment relief; and to improve transportation and communications. For example, \$8 million of the \$18 million provided by the United States in April and May has been allotted by the Government of the Congo for the purchase of American vehicles and spare parts.

The task of rehabilitation will be greatly facilitated by the restoration of national unity. We earnestly hope that the negotiations now in prog-

ress between the Central Government and Mr. Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] will result in the reintegration of the Katanga. The work of constructive planning for economic growth could then be based on the total resources of the country, and the private sector should be able once again to play a major role in the Congo's development.

The United States Government, in cooperation with the other nations which are attempting to help the Congolese to build their new state, is ready to consider the best means of providing financial support for a longer range economic program.

## **U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for School Building Project**

Press release 434 dated July 3

Secretary Rusk announced on July 3 that a grant of \$250,000 has been made to the Hong Kong Government to provide for the construction and equipping of a new building for the Hong Kong Technical College.

In announcing the grant the Secretary said, "Responsive to the statement made some days ago by the Colonial Secretary outlining areas where offers of outside assistance would be most welcome to meet some of the extraordinary expenses facing the Colonial Government in coping with the problems created by a population swollen by more than a million immigrants in the past 12 years, the U.S. Government is making a grant to meet the major costs of one of the projects upon which the Hong Kong authorities place a high priority. A grant of \$250,000 through the Department's Far East refugee program will provide sorely needed new facilities for the Hong Kong Technical College, which is presently giving highly useful training to 950 day students and 7,100 evening students, many of whom are from the refugee population."

The U.S. contribution will provide for building a new workshop block to include machine shop, bench fitting, welding, sheet metal, carpentry, painting, bricklaying and masonry, plumbing, plastering, electrical installation, and machine and transformer repair. These are among the most critical technical training requirements to meet the increasing manpower needs resulting from continuing massive public and private building pro-

grams in the colony. The gift is part of the continuing assistance program furnished since 1954 under the Far East refugee program and in the amount of \$1.1 million during 1962. The bulk of the funds are ordinarily channeled through the programs and services of accredited American and international agencies working in Hong Kong and Macau.

The Secretary commented further, "It is our hope that this grant to the Colonial Government will reassure it of our continued admiration of the magnificent job which it is doing in behalf of the refugees who now constitute over a third of the colony's population. It is our hope, too, that the refugees who have come to Hong Kong will be reassured of the deep and abiding interest which the American Government and people have for them and for all refugees who have had to leave their homes and seek freedom and a new life in a new land."

## **United States and Canada Refer Waterway Proposal to IJC**

Press release 437 dated July 5

The Department of State announced on July 5 that the United States and Canada have agreed upon the text of a joint reference to the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, concerning the Richelieu River-Lake Champlain Waterway. The Governments in similar letters on July 5, 1962,<sup>1</sup> requested the Commission to conduct a study on the feasibility of improving the existing waterway or developing other routes for a waterway from the St. Lawrence River in Canada through Lake Champlain to the Hudson River at Albany, N.Y.

The Commission was specifically requested to conduct a study on whether improvement or development of the waterway would be feasible and economically advantageous and, if so, with what governing dimensions. The Commission was further asked to make an appraisal of the costs and the value to the two countries of any such projects. The Governments requested the Commission, in making its examination and report, to bear in mind the effects which any such projects would have on conservation, recreation, and other beneficial uses.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

## Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation

*Following are texts of statements made by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and U.S. Representative to the United Nations Adlai E. Stevenson before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs during hearings on the U.N. loan legislation.*

### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, JULY 2

Press release 435 dated July 3

As you know, I have been in Europe talking with our allies about the Atlantic alliance. Europe is a land of great creativeness, great promise, great ferment. In every country I have tried, with our European friends, to stress our basic unity. But we have also been talking realistically about differences—trying to identify the points of actual difference, to learn how to deal with them, and to keep them from infecting the relationship between the Atlantic partnership and the rest of the world.

Before discussing some of these points with you in executive session, I want to say just a word about the legislation you have been considering in public hearings, the proposal to give the President authority to make loans to the United Nations. The United Nations is the framework in which we seek a workable relationship with all nations, including those outside the close partnership of close allies. Our interest in the newly developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—many of them newly independent, some of them feeling "uncommitted" in the rivalries of the great powers—is in their independence, their freedom, their chance to meet their own aspirations for their own futures. Some of them call themselves neutral. But they are not caught up as innocent bystanders in a great struggle between Washington and Moscow. They are themselves the issue—these peoples and their future.

The great world struggle we keep talking about

is between two concepts of the future world order: the picture of world revolution offered by the Communist countries and the more revolutionary and far more attractive picture sketched out in the Charter of the United Nations, especially in its opening sections. On that issue there can be no neutrality for independent nations.

The issue is between those who want an authoritarian world and those who want a world order in which independent societies with free institutions cooperate with each other by consent. The Communists have announced and are pursuing a doctrine that is simply incompatible with the U.N. Charter. As a matter of "scientific" prediction, they have proclaimed that their kind of world is bound to come into being.

But their doctrine has largely been rejected by the peoples of the world. Forty-four countries have become independent since 1945—two of them only yesterday [Burundi and Rwanda]—and not a single one has joined up with the bloc against the charter. Whenever, in the United Nations, this ultimate question of communism versus the charter is posed, it turns out that there are not any neutrals on this subject. The issue was posed when the Soviets tried to substitute a three-man "troika" for a single Secretary-General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld. For this proposition, the Soviets have failed to recruit a single vote outside the Communist bloc itself.

### The U.N. Financial Crisis

The United Nations is in a financial crisis today because the great majority of its members, including the United States, have combined to make the charter operational, to put the United Nations as an operating organization into situations that threaten, if they are not calmed down, to break out in little wars which spread all too easily and rapidly into big wars.

The United Nations works hardest at keeping

the peace in the most intractable situations, those which have defied settlement through bilateral diplomacy or within regional groupings. The U.N.'s operations are therefore bound to seem difficult at best. The problems it tackles sometimes seem in the short run insoluble. The Middle East, Kashmir, and West New Guinea have been active objectives of U.N. concern for more than a dozen years now. The international peace watch in the Gaza Strip has been there for 6 years. And in the Congo, where the largest international operation has been mounted, we are not yet out of the woods.

The stubbornness of these most difficult peace-making tasks is frustrating—for the peoples concerned, for the U.N. membership at large, and perhaps especially for the American people, who have set great store by the U.N. Charter as a symbol of the peaceful world order that is the ultimate objective of all American defense and foreign policies.

A part of this frustration is a feeling that we are doing too much and that the rest of the world community is doing too little to make peace operational. And it is true that some members of the free world are not yet living up to their obligations and are far behind in their payments for the Middle East and Congo operations. It is true that the Soviets—because they do not yet believe in the charter they signed—do not think these operations serve Soviet national interests or the interests of the world Communist movement. With this judgment I think we can agree.

An international enterprise must first of all be international; it is not for the United States to carry the full load. In your hearings the committee has naturally examined the delinquencies and arrearages of many U.N. members. But it is worth remembering also that:

Virtually all countries do pay—not always promptly—their share of the U.N.'s regular budget.

Without benefit of our example and our leadership, 12 countries have already purchased nearly \$26 million worth of U.N. bonds and 29 more have publicly announced their intention to purchase an additional \$41 million.

To staff the U.N.'s various peacekeeping missions, 54 different countries have contributed personnel to serve in the world's danger zones. Fifteen of these are nations which didn't even exist as nations before the Second World War.

And in the U.N.'s nation-building role 75 countries are contributing technicians to work in 125 different countries and territories this very year.

#### **A Crucial Decision**

So the United Nations is an international enterprise—it just is not universal as yet. It cannot be universal until all the free countries see the value to them of an international peacemaking capability. As long as the Soviets see their national interests as world disruption rather than world development, as long as they believe—correctly—that U.N. operations cut across their designs for world domination, we can hardly expect the Communists to approach the financing of the United Nations with great enthusiasm. But we certainly should not measure our national interests by theirs. We certainly should not say, because the Soviets are not doing their part to develop a civilized world order, we will also refuse to do our part. It would be a great bonanza, indeed, for the Soviets if their refusal to pay for world order were to persuade Americans to do likewise. It would be a great and dreadful irony if Soviet attempts to frustrate the U.N. made Americans feel so frustrated with their own efforts to build a world organization that we quit trying.

Starting yesterday, the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations can be carried on only with funds loaned to the United Nations by governments under the arrangements adopted by the General Assembly last winter. More than one-half of the U.N.'s membership has already made the decision we are now debating—to participate in this stopgap financing scheme. But the crucial decision now rests with the U.S. House of Representatives.

The legislation before you will give that community a short breathing space during which it has to develop and adopt a permanent system of financing, one that spreads the responsibility to all the members but does not place the future of the United Nations in the hands of those who would wreck it rather than build it.

To them—to the Soviet Union and its inarticulate and subordinated friends—we then can say: In company with all peoples who want to be independent we are helping to build broad institutions for peacekeeping and nation building. We hope you will cooperate in this effort—because the alternatives are too dangerous, too fruitless. Come and join the United Nations—this charter that you

signed. You speak of revolution—put your hands to the most revolutionary force you have at your disposal: a simple decision to live at peace with the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, for our part, let us demonstrate with a U.N. loan that we can overcome the frustrations that are always the leader's lot and write another chapter in the consistent and bipartisan support of the United States for the United Nations.

#### STATEMENT BY MR. BALL, JUNE 23

I appear today in support of legislation authorizing the appropriation of up to \$100 million for use as a loan to assist in financing the United Nations peace-and-security operations.

#### Costs of U.N. Peacekeeping Activities

The President has succinctly summarized the problem before us in his message to the Congress on January 30, 1962,<sup>1</sup> when he said:

The United Nations is faced with a financial crisis due largely to extraordinary expenditures which it incurred in fulfilling the pledges in its charter to secure peace, progress, and human rights. I regard it as vital to the interests of our country and to the maintenance of peace that the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace not be inhibited by a lack of financial resources.

Up to now, the United Nations has tried to meet the cost of its extraordinary peacekeeping activities—in the Middle East and in the Congo—by special assessments levied on all members. These special assessments have been running at a rate of about \$140 million a year, or approximately double the size of the regular assessments for the ordinary budget.

The United States and many other countries have paid their special assessments—indeed, the United States has made substantial voluntary contributions—but some nations are delinquent. Some claim that they are financially unable to carry the heavy added burden; others are out of sympathy with the operation; and still others deny their legal obligation to pay their share of the costs. In spite of the accumulation of unpaid assessments the United Nations has been able to meet its expenditures, but only by drawing down its working capital, by internal borrowing operations, and by deferring payment on some of the

peacekeeping expenses it has incurred. Today, with an estimated deficit of about \$137 million, the United Nations has exhausted its ability to finance itself by these methods.

To put its affairs on a sounder basis the United Nations has adopted an interim financial plan. This plan includes, as its principal elements, a systematic program for collecting arrearages and a bond issue of \$200 million payable in 25 years at 2 percent interest. It is envisaged that the United States would provide up to one-half of this financing needed to continue peacekeeping operations that have well served the national interest of this country.

I shall speak further about this financial plan in a moment, but first I propose that we look briefly at the usefulness of the United Nations to the United States.

#### U.N. an Essential Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy

The United Nations is an imperfect organization in an imperfect world. It has its obvious limitations, its manifest problems. Nevertheless, it remains an essential instrument of United States foreign policy—just as it is an instrument of the foreign policy of every other member state.

The United Nations is not, of course, the only foreign policy instrument available to us, nor is it usable at all in many situations that arise in our relations with other nations. Yet it has served in the past, and it must continue to serve in the future, as a major mechanism through which we seek to maintain the peace and advance the cause of freedom.

#### U.N. Frustrated in Original Objective

As the one major global institution, the United Nations, directly and through its specialized agencies, engages in many different kinds of activities. Not all of these activities are of the same importance, but unfortunately this fact is not always recognized. All too often, in discussing the United Nations, we neglect to separate the essential from the merely useful. This has, I think, contributed to much of the misunderstanding and confusion that have characterized recent discussions of this vital subject.

What are the principal functions the United Nations performs today? Quite clearly, they are not those that mainly preoccupied the delegates at San Francisco in 1945, when the charter was

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311.

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being drafted. The assumption—or at least the hope—which inspired the drafters of that document was that the great powers, allied in World War II, would be able to live in relative harmony and could cooperate in policing the postwar world. They could settle whatever differences arose among them within the forum of the Security Council.

As we know all too well, the effort to fashion one world with one treaty hardly lasted through the first General Assembly. The Soviet Union disclosed quite quickly that its purposes were not those of the United Nations Charter. Over the next 4 years the Iron Curtain dropped down to form a cage around one-third of the world's population—living on the great land mass that stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yellow Sea.

The United Nations was thus frustrated in its original objective of serving as a forum for reconciling differences among the great powers. This has not, however, destroyed its usefulness—indeed, its indispensability.

Instead, the United Nations has found its post-war destiny in quite different but no less effective endeavors.

### **Preventing Confrontation of Great Powers**

I should like this morning to emphasize two of the most important roles that the United Nations has played—two roles that have rendered it an essential instrument of American foreign policy.

The first of these roles has been to prevent the confrontation of the great powers under circumstances that could lead to a nuclear conflict. If the United Nations has been unable to fulfill its original purpose of bringing the great powers together, it has at least succeeded, in significant instances, in keeping them apart. By bringing about the settlement of conflicts through consultation and debate and by interposing itself as an agency to keep the peace in areas where chaos might otherwise invite great-power intervention, it has served a vital purpose in avoiding situations that might otherwise have produced a major war.

The U.N. was scarcely organized before it was involved in the difficult and dangerous business of peacekeeping—in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, and Kashmir. Since then it has played a part in stopping aggression, threatened aggression, or civil war in Palestine, Korea, at Suez, and in the

Congo. In all of these conflicts the great powers had interests. In the absence of the U.N. they would in all likelihood have intervened to defend those interests. Intervention by both sides could have led to a dangerous confrontation.

The most recent—and perhaps most spectacular—of the trouble spots in which the U.N. has acted to prevent great-power confrontation is, of course, the Congo. Here the U.N.—with full United States support—interposed itself in the nick of time. The Soviet Union was already moving in, and we could never have stood by while it set up shop in the heart of Africa. The intervention of the U.N. prevented the chaos that could well have turned the Congo into another Korea. Today it is doing its best to bring about the conditions under which an integrated Congo Republic can work its way toward stability and peace.

I would suggest therefore that, in thinking about the Congo and about other areas where the United Nations is brought in to keep the peace, we should ask ourselves this question: From the point of view of our national security, would it have been better to send in the American Marines or to act with others to send in the United Nations in the name of the world community?

Obviously, the U.N. cannot keep the peace without expense. Today it has more than 20,000 men in the field, patrolling the truce lines in the Middle East and keeping the lid on the Congo. This is manifestly the work of an executive agency of considerable capacity and skill, capable of performing pragmatic tasks—such as mobilizing, transporting, commanding, and supplying substantial forces in the field when an emergency arises.

### **Assisting the New Nations**

The U.N. has played a second role of vital importance by serving as a forum in which the industrial societies and the less developed nations can be brought together. This is an accomplishment of great significance, particularly when considered in the light of the revolution that has occurred since the end of World War II. In this brief period one-third of the world has made the eventful passage from colonial status to some form of national independence. Almost 50 new states have come into being; a dozen more are actively in the making.

This transformation, involving the breakup of

the great European empires, meant the collapse of a long-standing system of world order. It meant the sudden rupture of old ties, the sudden emergence of new states, and the sudden liberation of a billion people from colonial dependence. The world has never known a comparable political convulsion.

Yet this revolution, this rapid transformation from dependence to independent nationhood of a billion people, has for the most part been achieved in a peaceful and orderly manner and in a fantastically short time—and largely because of the existence of the United Nations. Adrift from their previous associations, these new countries found in the United Nations an organization that gave them status on the world scene and a political system in which they could have a full sense of participation with older, advanced countries. They found there, too, a family of technical organizations whose international staffs could help conceive and carry out the development plans which these people now expect their governments to pursue.

Even had it done nothing else, the U.N. has fully justified its existence by its central role in the complex business of assisting almost 50 new states to make the perilous voyage from dependence to sovereignty—a transition accompanied by speeches rather than by shooting. This is, I think, one of the striking achievements of our time.

#### **A School of Political Responsibility**

Sometimes we are irritated by the performance of certain of these newer nations in the United Nations and its General Assembly, and this irritation tends to be transferred to the U.N. itself. In assessing their attitudes and actions, however, we should realize that in the eyes of the new nations the U.N. has a very special significance. The immediate and natural ambition of every new nation is to establish its national identity. Membership in the United Nations has served this purpose; it has become the badge of independence, the credential of sovereignty, the symbol of nationhood, and the passport of the 20th century. When the delegation of a new nation is seated in the U.N., it has arrived; it can look the world in the eye and speak its piece. And even if that piece may on occasion be discordant to our ears, the fact that it can be spoken has helped to stabilize the postwar period.

Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting off steam; it is also a school of political responsibility. While some of its members may represent closed societies, it is itself an open society. The General Assembly is staged for all the world to see, and performing upon that stage sometimes—though not always—helps turn demagogues into statesmen. How else can one explain the fact that at the last General Assembly the most "anticolonial" members of the United Nations decisively rejected a Soviet resolution calling for independence of all remaining dependent areas by 1962? They sponsored instead moderate and sensible resolutions for which we and most of our European friends could vote without reservation.

#### **Reliance on Both U.N. and Regional Organizations**

Because it can paradoxically perform the task of bringing some nations together and keeping other nations apart, the United Nations is indeed a unique instrument of policy.

But if the United Nations is an instrument of United States policy, it is only one of many instruments available to us. It is one of the tasks of the Secretary of State and the State Department, when confronted with a particular problem, to select and utilize that instrument most appropriate for the purpose.

Clarity in understanding this task helps resolve the contradiction some people seem to find in American foreign policy, a contradiction between our reliance on the institutions of the Atlantic community and our participation in the United Nations.

No such contradiction exists in fact. The founders of the United Nations recognized the necessity for regional institutions and explicitly provided for them in the charter. Indeed the charter calls upon members to seek settlement of disputes within the framework of regional agencies or arrangements before bringing them to the U.N.

In practice we use the various institutions to which we belong for quite different purposes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is, of course, the backbone of our military defense of the free world against the Communist bloc. Through our own massive force and through NATO we maintain the armed strength that is the principal deterrent to Communist aggression. But just as the U.N.'s capabilities are limited, so are NATO's. Quite clearly NATO could not have



intervened in the Congo to restore order when Belgium withdrew. Only a world organization could have done so without arousing anticolonialist reactions.

It is true that the United Nations cannot, by itself, maintain the peace between the major powers. It is equally true that NATO was not qualified to supervise the peaceful change from colonialism to independence. Their roles are different and distinct. Each is essential, and therefore we support each for different reasons.

The same observation can be made with regard to the OECD—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—which came into being last September. The Organization of American States, as another example, gives institutional form to the American system. And the Alliance for Progress provides for a massive cooperative effort between the United States and Latin America.

Each constitutes a different instrument to serve the diverse purposes of our foreign policy.

### Three Major Accounts in U.N. Budget

But I am here this morning because the continued use of the United Nations as an instrument of policy is in danger. It is threatened by a financial crisis. The time has passed when short-term palliatives will permit it to meet its outstanding obligations. What is necessary is the opportunity to put its financial house in order. This is possible through an interim program, involving long-term borrowing, together with expected authority to enforce collection of delinquent assessments.

The U.N. budget now has three major accounts. What has been termed the "regular" budget, under which all members are assessed according to an agreed formula, meets the normal costs of operating the Organization, such as the expenses of the Secretariat, costs of annual meetings, and expenses of regional commissions. It includes some of the lesser peacekeeping expenditures, such as the truce supervision activities in Palestine and Kashmir. This account for the current fiscal year totals \$74 million before credits. The payment record has been good. For 1961 and prior years only \$5.6 million remains unpaid.

To meet the much larger peacekeeping expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Congo, the United Nations, for reasons of ac-

counting convenience, established two special accounts: the special account for the Emergency Force in the Middle East, starting in 1956, and the *ad hoc* account for the Congo operations, starting in 1960. Assessments in both accounts have to date totaled over \$330 million. The problem, however, is that arrearages in both accounts for 1961 and prior years total about \$77 million, since many nations either claim to be unable or are unwilling to pay their shares. In the aggregate, for both regular and special assessments, the U.N. now has arrearages due from many members of about \$82 million in addition to current-year obligations.

Article 19 of the charter provides that a member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years."

Certain members, however, have questioned whether the assessments for peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo constitute "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the charter and, consequently, whether they are binding on all members. They contend that the sanction provided in article 19, namely, loss of vote in the General Assembly, cannot be invoked for failure to pay these assessments.

The General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice<sup>2</sup> to determine whether the Middle East and Congo assessments are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the charter and thus binding on all the members. The United States believes they are and has so argued before the Court.<sup>3</sup> If the Court so rules and the General Assembly gives effect to this advisory opinion, the United Nations should be in a position to enforce collection of all delinquent accounts by application of the mandatory provision of article 19 which I described a moment ago.

### How Loan Would Be Spent

Even the full collection of arrearages will not resolve all of the United Nations financing problems. The problem of the financing of *ad hoc*

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI).

<sup>3</sup> For a statement made by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, on May 21, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30.

peacekeeping operations in the future will still remain. Therefore the U.N. General Assembly has approved the \$200 million borrowing program as an essential step in bringing order into its finances. Repayments of principal and interest on their borrowings would be budgeted by the United Nations as part of the "regular" budget. They would be reflected in the annual assessments of the members.

It may be recalled that there was some dispute in the Senate hearings over precisely how the proceeds of this borrowing would be spent. I wish to be perfectly candid with you so that there will be no misunderstanding. Technically, the proceeds may be used by the U.N. Secretary-General to meet any past or future U.N. obligations. In practice they will be used for two purposes. A part will be used to help pay the most urgent of the existing indebtedness of the United Nations. The balance will be used to defray the costs of peacekeeping operations after July 1, 1962.

We cannot be wholly certain of the proportion in which the proceeds will be allocated between these two purposes, because that depends on how successful the United Nations is in collecting arrearages and on the magnitude of continuing United Nations peacekeeping expenditures. Regardless of the precise way in which the money is allocated, the United Nations needs the entire \$200 million. As has been stated, the costs of maintaining UNEF and ONUC [U.N. Operation in the Congo] now amount to roughly \$140 million a year.

The administration has requested authority to enable the United States to provide up to \$100 million of this financing. The administration initially proposed that this be achieved through the purchase of U.N. bonds and submitted a bill for this purpose. The Senate passed, by a vote of 70 to 22, a substitute measure authorizing an appropriation to the President of \$100 million for the purpose of making loans to the U.N. The Senate bill (S. 2768) also provides that the loan is not to be used to relieve U.N. members of their obligations to pay arrearages and shall not exceed by more than \$25 million the amount of loans made or agreed to be made by other nations. To date, 39 nations have pledged a total of \$65.7 million of bonds and another 22 countries have announced an intention to buy undetermined amounts. Furthermore, the Senate bill indicates

that the United States is to deduct each year from its U.N. assessments the amount the U.N. owes this country for repayment of principal and interest on the loan. Finally, the bill states that this loan is not to be considered a precedent for future large-scale borrowing.

The administration has endorsed the Senate bill and commends it to the consideration of this committee. We find that it substantially achieves the objectives embodied in the administration's original proposal, introduced into the House of Representatives by Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan as H.R. 9982.

#### **Proposal Considered Practical and Sound**

The proposal before this committee has been studied by financial experts, including the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mr. Eugene R. Black. Mr. Black stated in a letter to Senator John Sparkman that he had told the Secretary-General:

... I thought the idea was a sound one, that it would have my full support and that in a personal capacity I would be happy to do whatever I could to assist in the implementation of the proposal and in the sale of the bonds.

The proposal has been found to be practicable and financially sound. The indebtedness would be serviced out of the regularly assessed budget. No one has questioned the binding character of those regular assessments. The annual level of debt service would be reasonable.

Fourteen years ago the U.N. needed funds to construct its headquarters. The Congress authorized a loan to the U.N. of the entire \$65 million required, repayable over 34 years without any interest. Today the U.N. needs \$200 million for a much more important purpose—keeping the peace and preventing the big powers from confronting each other in power vacuums in such troubled spots as the Congo and the Middle East. The U.N. is offering 25-year bonds at 2 percent interest. Other countries have already agreed to take 33 percent of the issue. We are asking the Congress to authorize a United States loan for not more than 50 percent of the U.N.'s needs.

Because it does things we want to see done, the United Nations serves the national interests of the United States. By approving the proposal before you, the Congress can help assure the continued availability of the U.N. as an effective in-

strument for advancing American interests throughout the world.

#### STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, JUNE 27

Press release 425 dated June 28

The question before this committee is whether the United States shall lend \$100 million to the United Nations to help relieve the financial crisis in the world organization and make possible the continuation of peacekeeping activities which are in the national interest of the United States.

The Senate, by a bipartisan vote of 70-22, has approved S. 2768, authorizing the appropriation to the President of up to \$100 million for such a loan. The bill provides that the loan is not to be used to relieve U.N. members of arrearages and shall not exceed by more than \$25 million the loans made or agreed to be made by other countries. Further, the United States is to deduct each year from its U.N. assessments the amount the U.N. owes this country for principal and interest on the loan. Finally, the bill states that the loan shall not be considered a precedent for future large-scale borrowing.

The administration has endorsed the Senate bill and commends it to this committee.

It seems to me that the proposed loan raises what are really two questions. First of all is a question of financial policy: Is the *method* of financing that has been proposed a sound method? Second is the more basic question of foreign policy: Is the *purpose* for which the money is to be used a sound purpose?

#### Financial Problems of Peacekeeping Operations

As to the financial question, the committee was before it a wealth of facts and figures, and two of my colleagues, Ambassador [Francis T. P.] Plimpton and Assistant Secretary [Harlan] Cleveland, will testify as to the financial aspects. I should say that I have considered this matter long and carefully with my associates in the United States Mission to the United Nations and in the Department of State, and I am convinced that the method proposed by President Kennedy, and approved with certain amendments by the Senate, is sound. Indeed, I think there is no alternative method available to us at this time.

The United Nations financial difficulties do not arise from its ordinary operations. Its regular

budget, to which the United States now contributes 32.02 percent, as compared with 39.89 percent in 1946, is in good shape, and the arrears are insubstantial.

However, the major United Nations peacekeeping operations have caused financing problems not found in the regular budget.

In fact, the Congo peacekeeping operation and the smaller United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, taken together, imposed on the members of the U.N. assessments far larger than the regular budget of the United Nations itself. Many member states fell behind in their payments for these special operations. Others, including the members of the Soviet bloc, refused to pay at all because they felt the United Nations actions cut across their own objectives. Questions were raised by some countries as to whether the assessments for these operations are legally binding.

It happens that these actions *do* suit the policies and interests of the United States because they serve the cause of peace and stability and protect emerging nations from outside pressure in two very critical areas of the world. Because of that the United States has not only paid its own assessed share for these activities. To help keep these U.N. forces in the field, we have gone further and made voluntary contributions which, taken together with assessments, have meant that we contribute about 47½ percent of the budgeted costs for peace-and-security operations.

Let me only add that these voluntary contributions were not designed, and have not served, to reduce the amounts that are due from and payable by the Soviet Union or from any other delinquent country.

These financing measures were obviously not a permanent solution. They did not bring in enough cash, and they were too dependent on voluntary contributions. Last year the General Assembly adopted a more businesslike financial plan, one result of which is the bill now before this committee.

The first part of this financial plan is an energetic effort to collect arrearages. To clear up any legal doubts the General Assembly last fall asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether assessments for UNEF and Congo operations are legally binding. If the Court's reply is in the affirmative, this will threaten the more seriously delinquent states with the loss of their votes in the General Assembly.

The Court has already received both written and oral argument on this question from the United States and several other countries and is expected to hand down its advisory opinion later this summer.

The new financial plan also calls for loans by governments, in the form of 25-year bond obligations, in the amount of \$200 million. It assures repayment of both principal and interest by providing that these expenses will be included in the regular U.N. budget, to which all member states regularly contribute in accordance with their regular assessment percentages.

This means that the United States will be contributing only its regular assessed percentage of 32.02 percent toward the repayment of these governmental loans, which will be used in large part to finance the cost of the Congo and Middle East operations.

At this date, 39 states have already purchased or formally pledged the purchase of \$65,701,175 of United Nations bonds. Twenty-two others have definitely said they intend to make purchases. Twenty-nine others, including the United States, are now considering the action they will take.

The present financing plan adopted last fall by the General Assembly is itself an interim solution to a continuing problem. The Senate has wisely insisted, as indeed the General Assembly did also, that this long-term loan arrangement not be a precedent for future U.N. financing.

Once the ICJ opinion has been handed down and has been acted upon by the General Assembly, and its effect assessed, we will be in a position to explore concrete plans for more permanent financial support for the U.N. peacekeeping operations—operations which I firmly believe are in our national interest.

I believe that the loan bill as passed by the Senate provides both a practical and a reasonable way for the United States to do its share this year in support of the U.N.'s ongoing peace and security operations. The bill would enable us to do this—and to do it on terms more favorable than have prevailed in the past.

#### **The Basic Question Is of Ends, Not Means**

But the financial aspect of the problem is only one of the questions before us—and the lesser one at that. For the financial question is one of means; the basic question is of ends—specifically whether,

and how, the United Nations serves the national interest of the United States.

The United Nations Charter sets forth certain basic commitments by all the members: to settle their disputes peacefully, to act collectively against aggression, to work together for economic and social progress, to promote the enjoyment of human rights, and to help dependent peoples prepare themselves for self-government and nationhood.

I believe Americans should feel a certain family pride in the knowledge that the ideals of the United Nations stem chiefly from our own tradition. The same belief in the equality of all men before God and before the law, and in the dignity and freedom of the individual, on which the American nation was founded in 1776 also underlay the launching of the United Nations 170 years later. And a part of the drama of our time is the attempt to apply that belief—not only here in the Western World where it began, but worldwide: not only in conditions of peace, but in times of danger and tumult.

The United Nations has none of the real attributes of government: It cannot impose direct taxes or arrest individuals or draft soldiers. Except in cases of aggression, it lacks even the legal power, let alone the actual capacity, to enter a country against the will of that country's government. Its motive force must be provided by its members.

Ever since the founding of the United Nations the greatest threat to the achievement of its purposes has been the hostile attitude of the Soviet Union. But from the beginning the U.N. has established a pattern of defeating Soviet proposals—and that pattern holds good today.

It is instructive to compare the relative influence on United Nations affairs of the United States and the Soviet Union. Any factual comparison shows that it has been not the Soviet Union but the United States that has exerted the greatest influence in the U.N. This contrast appears throughout the United Nations.

In the Security Council the Soviet Union, unable to prevent adverse majority votes, has resorted to the veto 100 times. The United States has never felt the need to use its veto power.

The General Assembly has proved repeatedly, most recently in the Congo case, that it can act when the Council is tied up by the veto. And the Soviet Union has never been able to organize a

majority, or anything approaching a majority, of the General Assembly against the United States on any important matter. Last winter, for example, Communist charges against the United States of aggressive designs against Cuba did not muster a single vote outside the Communist countries.

The Soviets have tried, and failed again, to paralyze the Secretariat, since they could not control it either.

### **Peaceful March to Independence**

The greatest change which has taken place in the United Nations in the past 7 years is the enlargement of the membership—from the half a hundred that signed the charter in 1945 to the 104 members of today.

This change was brought about by historical causes inherent in Western civilization; it was not brought about by Communist pressure. The Communists have mistakenly thought that they could ride to power on the independence movement, but more and more their hopes have been frustrated. The reason is clear: The new nations have no wish to emerge from one colonial system merely to enter another. That is why none of the 42 nations born since World War II have chosen communism as a way of government.

The United Nations has made many contributions to the peaceful march to independence. Some of its work has been so quiet that few people except specialists know of it. Since 1945 the Trusteeship Council has overseen the process by which the peoples of seven trust territories have become citizens of independent nations. An eighth will follow next week. In several of these cases the United Nations held plebiscites to determine the will of the people. In every case thus far the transition has been entirely peaceful.

Since 1950 the United Nations, drawing on resources and specialists of many countries, has played an increasing part in helping the new nations build the foundations of modern societies—and thus the foundations of political stability. The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the growing Special Fund with its training centers and preinvestment surveys, the investments of the World Bank and the International Development Association—these and other services are available to aid in the urgent tasks of nation building. Four-fifths of the staffs

of the United Nations Secretariat and the specialized agencies are engaged in such nonpolitical functions as these. The new nations themselves put a very high value on this impartial source of aid and counsel, insulated as it is from the cold war but maintaining rigorous technical standards. This role is clearly in the national interest of the United States, for the U.N. is supplementing and complementing what we and our European allies are doing on our own to create an expanding economy in the less developed areas of the world.

### **U.N. an Agent of Peace**

The U.N.'s actions in the field of international peace and security equally serve our interest. Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Congo—through all these actions since 1946 the U.N. has developed a capacity to uphold the independence of small nations under attack and to keep quarreling neighbors from mutual destruction. It has been the agent of peace—not the peace of conquest and surrender but the peace of mutual toleration.

As a world power the United States must defend its interests and pursue its goals through a variety of institutions which serve quite different national purposes. NATO, for example, was formed not to preserve colonies but to defend Europe and the Atlantic community against aggression by the Soviet Union. We look to it, not to the U.N., to perform that vital function. Conversely, we look to the United Nations, not NATO, to shield small and weak nations in Africa and the Middle East and Asia and to provide a community in which they can feel a measure of security and equality and of comity with their former rulers.

I find it impressive that the United States, during the last session of the General Assembly, voted with the majority of its NATO allies on all of the 41 key rollcall votes—including a score of important colonial issues. Of all the members of NATO, in fact, we were the only one to side with the NATO majority in *all* of these votes.

If there were no U.N., and as a result Africa were to move from the old empire of the West into a new empire of communism, then NATO would be outflanked and the security of the United States and the whole Atlantic community would be drastically undermined.

Note that in 1961 Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Africa attacked not only NATO but also the

United Nations, day in and day out, as a sinister tool of "Western imperialism."

Why should the Soviets talk to Africa in that way about the U.N.? Not because the U.N. is a Western institution but because the U.N. as a universal organization is an obstacle to the parochial designs of the Communists. Increasingly the U.N. is becoming a bridge between the advanced nations of the West and the emerging nations of postcolonial Africa. The Russians have been trying to undermine the U.N. bridge at the African end. Thus far they have had little or no success. I just hope we won't do their work for them by undermining it at the Western end, because that bridge is one of the great elements in this country's security.

We have heard fears expressed that the United Nations might be perverted to serve Soviet purposes in this situation: namely, to unite the Soviet bloc with Africa and Asia in a majority against the West under the banner of extreme anticolonialism. But in practice this has not happened. Usually when the Soviets have proposed extreme anti-Western resolutions on colonial issues, such as Angola or the Congo, they have found little support among the Afro-Asian members. I believe this will continue so long as our diplomacy is active and our policies are in harmony with the legitimate aspirations of the African and Asian countries for independence and development.

It is true that the one-nation, one-vote rule in the General Assembly is illogical in some respects. But this same principle of sovereign equality applies without fatal results in many national legislatures. It is certainly more of a problem to them than it is to the U.N. General Assembly, which has no legislative power except, to a limited extent, on its own budget and finances.

Moreover, the members in the General Assembly may have equal votes, but they are far from having equal influence. Dag Hammarskjold made this point 5 years ago in his annual report to the General Assembly. These are his words:

The criticism of "one nation, one vote", irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individual members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of member states represent governmental policies and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case. . . .

## Value of U.N. to U.S.

I would sum up in this way. The United States is not all-powerful at the U.N. any more than we are all-powerful in the world. But even though the numerical majority has shifted from the West to Africa and Asia, our position in the United Nations is still preeminent. Therefore, the value of the United Nations to our interests depends to a great extent on what we make of it.

Sometimes we hear the suggestion that the United States should give less emphasis to the United Nations because—so the argument runs—the U.N. is not a dependable basis for our security against hostile forces.

This argument misses the point. This country does not rely on the United Nations to do anything which some other instrumentality can do better. The greatest achievements of the United Nations for peace and security—Suez, Lebanon, the Congo, and all the rest—have been achievements for which no really valid alternative means existed.

And if we consider their cost—as you do in this committee this week—I think it is clear that the cost to the United States of U.N. operations in the Congo and the Middle East is very modest indeed compared to the cost we would have had to bear, both in dollars and in lives, if our own armed forces instead of U.N. forces were engaged in keeping the peace.

History does not always ask questions of us in the form or at the time we would have chosen. Yet we must answer. Today, in the United Nations financial crisis, history is asking whether the United States wants, or does not want, an effective United Nations; whether the United States will continue to play, or will no longer play, the great part in the U.N.'s affairs that befits our power and our responsibility for the survival and growth of freedom.

I do not like to think what would happen if the United States said no to that question.

## President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for IMF Loans

White House press release dated June 25

The President asked Congress on June 25 for a supplemental appropriation of \$2 billion for the fiscal year 1963 for loans to the International Monetary Fund, as authorized by the act of June 19, 1962.

This request is to allow the United States to adhere to the decision of the executive directors of the International Monetary Fund of January 5, 1962, to establish a special standby borrowing arrangement for industrialized countries with balance-of-payments problems. The special fund will have 10 contributors and will provide loans in foreign currencies to member countries with balance-of-payments difficulties.

No expenditure is foreseen from this appropriation, as the supply of dollars in the Fund is presently ample, and under the new arrangement no country with balance-of-payments problems of its own could be required to make a loan. The special fund is primarily designed to increase the International Monetary Fund's supply of the currencies of Western Europe, Japan, and Canada.

The \$2 billion requested on June 25 was included in the 1963 budget as a 1962 item for separate transmittal on the assumption that the authorizing legislation would have become law earlier in the year. It now seems apparent that the appropriation will be enacted in the fiscal year 1963, and the request is being shifted to that year.

## President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act

*Statement by President Kennedy, June 28*

White House press release dated June 28

I am gratified that the Congress has acted affirmatively on my request of July 21, 1961, by enacting H.R. 8291, the "Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962."

I am personally grateful to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. W. Fulbright, and to the chairman of Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Francis E. Walter, for their efforts in securing the passage of this legislation. With this expression of approval for the administration's proposals to continue our assistance to refugees, the American people will be assured that this Government's leadership will be maintained in the great humanitarian endeavor of helping the world's stateless and homeless people. In continuing this endeavor, we will be carrying forward a great American tradition which is as well known as the generosity of our people in coming to the aid of those in need.

July 23, 1962

The Congress is to be congratulated for its action in providing the necessary authorization. I am confident it will be equally responsive to the appropriation requests which will be submitted to implement the programs which it has endorsed in this bill.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 87th Congress, 2d Session

- Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments, 1962. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, to authorize additional appropriations, and for other purposes. January 30-May 15, 1962. 188 pp.
- Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. Hearings before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Part 2. February 1-28, 1962. 534 pp.
- United States Information Agency Operations in Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. February 7, 1962. 22 pp.
- Study Mission to South America, November-December 1961. Report of Senators Gale W. McGee, Frank E. Moss, Clair Engle, and Stephen M. Young to the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry, and Armed Services. S. Doc. 91. February 13, 1962. 17 pp.
- Commingling of United States and Communist Foreign Aid. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. March 15-May 11, 1962. 265 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2996, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. April 5-18, 1962. 643 pp.
- Fiftieth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress. Message from the President transmitting the report outlining operations under the act during the period July 1-December 31, 1961. H. Doc. 385. April 9, 1962. 101 pp.
- Cuban Refugee Problem. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees. S. Rept. 1328. April 11, 1962. 8 pp.
- Report on Audit of Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, July 1, 1959, Through December 31, 1960. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 389. April 16, 1962. 77 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part VI. April 17-18, 1962, and appendix. 111 pp.
- Amending the Act Entitled "An Act To Provide Better Facilities for the Enforcement of the Customs and Immigration Laws," To Increase the Amounts Authorized To Be Expended, Report to accompany S. 2806. S. Rept. 1366. April 27, 1962. 8 pp.
- Seventh NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Report of the House delegation to the conference held at Paris November 13-18, 1961. H. Rept. 1637. April 30, 1962. 23 pp.
- Extension of Export Control Act—1962. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3161. May 2, 1962. 33 pp.

## Arms Control and Disarmament

### A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, GENEVA, MARCH 14-JUNE 15, 1962<sup>1</sup>

June 25, 1962

Up to now, there has been no substantial progress toward agreement at the 18-nation disarmament conference on any arms control or disarmament measures.

Progress, however, cannot be expected to come quickly in this field because the distrust on both sides is very deep. Yet the awesome nature of modern armaments is such that the United States must continue to press for the greater security that could come to all nations from effectively verified arms control and disarmament agreements. Although more and more resources are directed toward improving armaments, nations are, on balance, enjoying less and less security.

The United States remains hopeful that in time other nations, including the Soviet Union, will come to see that an unrestrained arms race poses a greater threat to their security than disarmament under effective control. Moreover, there are various measures short of disarmament which may be negotiable in the not-too-distant future. These include agreements to limit the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to ban nuclear weapon tests.

The 18-Nation Committee is the best forum for disarmament negotiations which has been utilized since World War II. The eight new members, chosen to represent geographical areas of the world not represented by the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, are making a responsible contribution to the deliberations. Moreover, as cochair-

men of the conference, the United States and Soviet representatives have full opportunity to meet together to exchange views and conduct negotiations under circumstances in which polemics serve no useful purpose.

The conference has provided the United States with an unusual opportunity to communicate its views to the other nations present and to demonstrate its own sincere desire for meaningful disarmament agreement. In United Nations debates and in speeches elsewhere, the Soviets have sometimes used disarmament as a propaganda weapon against the United States. Because the time for debate was limited, or the forum not conducive to probing analysis, the Soviet approach has not always been successfully revealed in its true light.

In this conference, however, adequate opportunity is provided for full analysis and debate. As a result, the Soviet participation has often been revealed as superficial and propagandistic. In contrast, U.S. participation has been constructive and conscientious, as illustrated by the United States disarmament plan submitted on April 18, 1962<sup>2</sup>—the most detailed and comprehensive plan put forward by any country at any disarmament conference.

Even if no agreement is reached in the near future, the conference offers useful opportunities to advance United States interests by communicating our point of view to other nations, by demonstrating that disarmament is a complicated task which cannot be achieved by sweeping and propa-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the office of the Public Affairs Adviser, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

<sup>2</sup> For text of an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," see BULLETIN of May 7, 1962, p. 747.



gandistic proposals, by establishing the common interests of all nations in turning down the arms race, and by defining the issues properly so that practical steps can be taken toward their resolution. The subject of arms control and disarmament is so urgent and important a subject that continuing international discussion of it is inevitable and the United States believes that the negotiations at Geneva offer one of the best available methods of prevailing upon the Soviet Union to accept its responsibility to heed the conscience and aspirations of the world community for genuine peace and security through safeguarded disarmament agreements.

A detailed summary of the first 3 months of negotiations is set forth below.

### Genesis of the Conference

Following the walkout on June 27, 1960, of the Soviet Union and its four allies from the Geneva 10-nation disarmament conference<sup>3</sup> (made up of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania), the United States actively pursued efforts to resume negotiations on disarmament in the firm belief that it was one of the most pressing unresolved matters in the international field.

However, although efforts were made during the remainder of 1960 and early in 1961—particularly at the 15th United Nations General Assembly session—to renew negotiations, little headway was evident until June 1961, when bilateral discussions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. began in Washington, D.C.<sup>4</sup> These discussions, which were later continued in Moscow and New York, were undertaken to achieve two objectives: agreement on the composition of a new disarmament committee; and establishment of a framework of principles which could govern the resumption of negotiations on disarmament.

On September 20, 1961, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed on a Joint Statement of Principles<sup>5</sup> to guide future negotiations. The statement, in setting forth general and complete disarmament as a goal, recognized both the need for international peacekeeping machinery to accompany advances toward achieving general and

complete disarmament and the possibility of deciding upon and carrying out initial disarmament measures even before agreement on an entire disarmament program. The necessity for adequate control was also recognized, although the U.S.S.R. refused to accept the U.S. position that verification procedures should apply not only to forces and armaments disbanded or destroyed but also to the agreed levels of retained forces and armaments.

Agreement on the composition of a negotiating forum followed on December 13, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agreed to invite to the membership of the former 10-Nation Committee on Disarmament Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.

These two agreements were welcomed by the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which called upon the Committee to undertake negotiations "as a matter of the utmost urgency" and to report back to the United Nations Disarmament Commission by June 1, 1962.<sup>6</sup>

In response to this, the 18-Nation Committee began its sessions in Geneva on March 14, 1962.<sup>7</sup>

### The Structure of the Conference

The structure of this conference is unique when viewed in the light of previous post World War II disarmament conferences. To expedite the vast and complex task before it the conference established three separate forums.

Plenary meetings of the conference are confined to efforts aimed at resolving the primary task of developing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. To deal with certain individual measures which need not await agreement on a total disarmament program and which might serve to lessen international tensions, the conference created a Committee of the Whole.

Finally, to provide for a continuation of negotiations on the controlled cessation of nuclear weapon testing, the conference established a subcommittee consisting of the three nuclear powers—the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. These three nations had been engaged in negotiations on this matter since 1958.

The conference has also devised two other innovations: First, it designated the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as permanent cochairmen of the conference—

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 57.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1722 (XVI).

<sup>7</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531.

this in addition to rotation of the chair on a daily basis among all members of the Committee—to provide continuity in the work of the conference. And, second, to permit such free-ranging discussions as might be desired on some or a number of specific problems, the conference instituted the procedure of informal sessions when deemed useful. This, in effect, permits all delegates to discuss matters on an off-the-record basis, since no verbatim records of these sessions are maintained.

Although the plenary, the Committee of the Whole, and the test-ban subcommittee are the only forums thus far established by the 18-Nation Committee, it is possible that as the conference proceeds additional subcommittees may be established to facilitate its work as discussions become more detailed and specific disarmament measures are explored in greater depth.

#### **Documents and Proposals Before the Conference**

The plenary meetings of the conference have been centered on two basic documents:

The United States' "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" and the Soviet Union's "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control." Although both documents are similar in that they propose a three-stage program for the reduction and eventual elimination of national military establishments, there is a considerable difference in the approach of the two plans toward this objective.

The U.S. program is designed to permit the nations of the world to stop the arms race at an agreed time, to freeze the military situation as it then appears, and then to shrink military establishments to zero. The aim in this would be to keep the relative military positions of the parties as closely as possible to what they were at the beginning by cutting all armaments and armed forces by approximately one-third of the initial size in each of the program's three stages. At the same time, it emphasizes the development of peace-keeping machinery to insure that, as national arms are scaled down and eventually eliminated, international peace and security will be fully and fairly safeguarded.

The Soviet Union's program, on the other hand, in its three stages, places its emphasis on reducing selected categories of armaments in the claim

that the threat or danger of nuclear war is directly linked to the presence of those categories of armaments in national arsenals. It seeks the elimination of all nuclear-weapons carriers in the first stage and the total elimination of nuclear weapons during the second stage. Reductions of other arms and armed forces are to take place during each of the three stages to assure their total elimination by the end of stage three. The Soviet plan also advocates reliance upon a strengthened United Nations to keep the peace during and after the disarmament process.

In the plenary sessions, the delegations are attempting to meld these two plans into one treaty which would be the product of the conference. Although no substantive differences have yet been overcome, the conference has worked out an almost fully agreed initial draft preamble to the treaty. At present it is engaged in a similar effort to draft common language setting forth the treaty's general introductory provisions.

As concerns the disarmament measures per se, a number of the plenary sessions have been devoted to an exposition by the Western and Soviet bloc members of the merits of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. programs. As these discussions have proceeded, certain major differences have come clearly to the foreground. And it is these differences that the conference will have to resolve if it is to proceed to draft provisions for the first and then subsequent stages of the treaty.

Key among these is the matter of a 100-percent cut in nuclear delivery vehicles as proposed in the first stage of the Soviet plan as opposed to the 30 percent cut in this and other armaments as proposed in the first stage of the U.S. program. The United States believes that total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage is not only impractical because of the difficulties of control and implementation but would also cause a grave strategic imbalance in the world, which the more gradual across-the-board reductions of the American plan would avoid. Moreover, although the Soviet bloc nations believe the elimination of delivery vehicles would virtually overcome the threat of nuclear war, the Western nations consider that this threat will continue to exist under the Soviet program since, unlike the U.S. program, no provision is made in the first stage in the field of actual nuclear disarmament.

The time period for the carrying out of disarmament measures also looms as a problem.

The U.S. program has not fixed an overall time period for the implementation of general and complete disarmament in the belief that this can only be determined when certain unknown factors—transition period between stages, implementation of verification arrangements, etc.—become clear. The United States has set a 6-year time period for the first two stages, however, but has emphasized that this is an estimate and that in fact the completion of these two stages could take longer or, indeed, a shorter period of time. The Soviet plan, on the other hand, sets a 4-year time period for completion of the total program, roughly allotting 15 months for the carrying out of the measures in each of its three stages. While the Soviet bloc nations believe the U.S. time period is too long, the Western nations feel the 4-year period is too short a time to implement such a far-reaching program in view of the great international changes which will accompany such disarmament as well as the vast technical problems involved.

A further point of difference is the important matter of control or verification. In the view of the Western nations, the Soviet position of control over disarmament would forgo the essential need to know, in addition to what has been destroyed, whether levels are being adhered to and also whether any weapons have been secretly hidden. The Soviet bloc nations claim that this is control over armaments and would mean Western espionage inside the U.S.S.R. The Western nations feel this attitude reflects an unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Union and the other bloc nations to recognize that reasonable controls are necessary in the absence of confidence between East and West that each side will honestly fulfill its disarmament obligations.

Finally, there is the question of peacekeeping machinery. Both plans make some provision for this, but in the U.S. plan the emphasis and obligations in this area are considerably greater than in the Soviet plan. This stems from a different philosophy on the part of East and West. The Western nations believe that disarmament by and of itself will not usher in a peaceful world, and therefore, as national armaments are scaled down, international institutions, including a United Nations peace force, must be gradually strengthened to insure the security of all nations. The Soviet bloc nations contend that disarmament and peace

are synonymous, and therefore the United Nations, along with a peace force consisting of only national contingents operating under a three-bloc type command and used only if no permanent member of the Security Council vetoes its employment, will suffice.

*The Committee of the Whole* has before it proposals for the consideration of the following items: the cessation of war propaganda; cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; reduction of the risks of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of communications; measures to insure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only; establishment of nuclear-free zones; measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons; and conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

Discussions within the committee have been centered on the cessation of war propaganda. The cochairmen were asked to consider the proposal for a declaration against war propaganda. Negotiations between them lasted 6 weeks and culminated in an agreed text, approved by both Governments. This was presented jointly by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to the Committee of the Whole on May 25, where it was unanimously approved by the committee and referred to the plenary for "definitive action." When the conference met May 29 to take final action on the declaration, the Soviet Union submitted amendments to the text it had fully approved as binding on its Government 4 days earlier which completely changed the character of the agreed-upon declaration. Among other things, the Soviet amendments called for enactment of laws making any form of war propaganda a criminal offense, a provision which the United States had rejected previously as contrary to freedom of speech and the press guaranteed by the American Constitution. The United States declared the Soviet amendments to be unacceptable and in view of their abrupt about-face stated that it would not be fruitful to reopen negotiations on war propaganda at this time.

The United States and the other Western nations have urged that the committee take up as its next item one of the proposed measures which would involve at least some degree of disarmament or of reduction of the risk of war, such as cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of com-

munications, or measures to prevent the placing into orbit of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union insisted on consideration by the Committee of the Whole of a second item it favors, namely, measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The United States suggested, in a compromise move, that consideration be given concurrently to its item of reducing the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of communications and the Soviet item on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the globe. The Soviet Union did not accept this proposition and sought to block discussion of any item advanced by the West. The discussion in the committee then pressed for a proposal submitted by the United Arab Republic which would leave to the committee the determination of priority items after the committee had heard the views of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as to why each favored discussion of their respective items. The Soviet Union's acceptance of this procedure, which permits discussion of new topics within the committee, was welcomed by the United States, for it believes that agreement on one or some of the items it has requested be considered could lead to an early reduction of the present levels of international tension, thereby paving the way for broader agreements in the disarmament field. It has led to discussion within the committee both on measures to reduce the possibility of war by accident and measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

*The Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests* has been concerned with three proposals.

At the subcommittee's initial session, the three nuclear powers focused their attention on the U.S.-U.K. position as set forth in their April 18, 1961, treaty,<sup>8</sup> and the Soviet proposal of November 28, 1961. In essence the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty called for the establishment of an international system of internationally built and operated control posts, an international system of inspection—including the right of conducting a limited number of on-site inspections of unidentified events—and an international control commission to supervise verification arrangements which were to be aimed at insuring the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The Soviet proposal called

for the exclusive use of existing national detection equipment to police a test ban in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space with an unpoliced moratorium on underground tests pending the development of a control system for general and complete disarmament.

Given the wide gap between the two sides on this matter, the eight new delegations, in an effort to avoid the impasse which threatened to develop in the three-power subcommittee, submitted, on April 16, 1962, a joint memorandum<sup>9</sup> containing ideas and suggestions which they commended to the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. for consideration. The memorandum suggested "establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis" and outlined in broad terms the principles on which such a system should be based.

Shortly after its introduction the Soviet Union, interpreting these principles in such a manner as to make them appear similar to its November 28 proposal, formally announced that it had "accepted" the memorandum as a new basis for negotiation. The U.S. and U.K. also accepted the memorandum as a basis for negotiation but made it clear that in so doing they were not prepared to consider it as the exclusive basis for negotiation. As the United States understands the document, the eight cosponsors suggested reliance both on national detection networks and on new stations to be joined together in one international agreed system. This system would be subject to supervision by the new international commission. Such a commission would be responsible for assessing the nature of suspicious events (which might be nuclear explosions) and also for obliging parties to the treaty to permit on-site inspections in those cases where this was deemed essential.

Although the memorandum was introduced in an effort to make further progress toward a controlled test ban, the Soviet Union, by demanding that it be accepted as a basis for negotiation within the narrow limits of its interpretation (total reliance on national detection systems, an almost powerless international scientific commission, and inspection by "invitation" of the suspect country only) has blocked for the moment any opportunity for joint three-power exploration of the memorandum's provisions.

<sup>8</sup> For text, see *Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

<sup>9</sup> U.N. doc. ENDC/28.

## Major Differences Remain

The 18-nation conference has completed 13 weeks of intensive deliberations. For the most part, the discussions during this period have been conducted in a businesslike manner. There is no doubt that the constructive contributions being made by the eight new nations in these deliberations have had a positive effect in creating and, in general, sustaining this desirable attitude.

On May 31, 1962, the cochairmen, at the request of the conference, transmitted an interim progress report<sup>10</sup> to the United Nations, covering the period from March 14 to June 1, 1962. The conference then agreed to recess from June 15 to July 16, 1962, in response to the desires of some of the delegations to have time for reflection and consul-

tation with their governments.

It is clear that when the conference resumes its deliberations and moves further into the substantive aspects of the disarmament problem, it will be faced with great difficulties. In all three areas, i.e. general and complete disarmament, individual measures, and the nuclear testing question, major differences exist between the positions of the Allied and the Communist nations. This means that, if the conference is to achieve even a limited degree of success, a genuine spirit of cooperation coupled with a sustained and honest search for fair and practical solutions will be required. The United States, for its part, remains determined to contribute to the work of the conference in just this manner.

## U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi

*Following are statements made by Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, in Committee IV (Trusteeship) and in plenary session, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on June 27.*

### STATEMENT IN COMMITTEE IV, JUNE 18

U.S. delegation press release 4011

Madam Chairman [Miss Angie E. Brooks of Liberia]: I should like to begin by expressing the appreciation of my delegation for your work as chairman of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and for the work of your fellow commissioners. We particularly appreciate the tireless efforts the Commission devoted to assisting the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi in finding the grounds on which unity in a number of fields could be realized, and we commend the Commission, as we also do the two Governments, for the economic and administrative agreements finally concluded. The report of the Commission<sup>1</sup> is long and detailed and contains, I am convinced, the principal elements of importance and interest to the Assem-

bly for its current consideration of Ruanda-Urundi. We are not in full agreement with all the interpretations, views, and conclusions contained in the report, but we recognize the difficulty of the task which the Commission faced and we have given full weight to the report in reaching our own views and conclusions.

The position of the Administering Authority, as set forth on several occasions, in such detail and with a clarity seldom heard in these halls, by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium [Paul-Henri Spaak], has also played a strong part in influencing our conclusions. I might add that in the view of my delegation the precision and honesty with which the Foreign Minister of Belgium has presented the position of his Government so early in the debate has served notably to advance our work and dispel misunderstandings. We have listened also with attention and weighed carefully the views of the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, who have demonstrated great patience in replying to the complex and difficult questions put to them.

In our view one basic point is completely clear. Both Rwanda and Burundi should achieve their separate sovereign independence on the 1st of July, and to this end this Assembly should decide

<sup>10</sup> U.N. doc. DC/288.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/5126 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

to formally terminate the Ruanda-Urundi trusteeship agreement as of that date. This is the fervent desire of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, a desire supported by the recommendations of the Administering Authority and of the Commission.

In supporting the concept that both states should achieve their independence on the 1st of July we do not for a minute believe or even imply Rwanda or Burundi are acceding to independence in easy circumstances. No; the peoples of Burundi and the peoples of Rwanda face many difficult months—even years—ahead. Both new countries will be beset with difficulties of every possible sort that newly independent countries have faced since the dawn of history. Some of the problems in Rwanda and Burundi are particularly acute, but, like others before them, with perseverance, hard work, both internal and external cooperation, we trust they will end by surmounting these obstacles and by establishing the permanence and reality of their independence to their own satisfaction.

It is, however, useful for us, because of the special interest and responsibility the United Nations has in the independence of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, to be frank about the difficulties which we anticipate these two countries will face as newly independent nations and about the responsibility of the United Nations in this regard. After all, our responsibility as reiterated in Resolution 1743 is to insure that the territory accedes to independence under the most favorable conditions. If we, the United Nations and all its members, take action now which renders more difficult after independence the maintenance of political stability or of economic viability in Rwanda or Burundi, we shall assume a very grave responsibility. If we attempt to limit the free exercise of sovereignty by the two Governments after independence, we shall also assume a very grave responsibility. Indeed, our moral, if not our legal, responsibility does not come to an end on the 1st of July. Though the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi become masters of their own house on that date, we must do our part, both now and thereafter, to assist them in establishing the best possible conditions for the exercise of what they have described as effective and viable independence. Our obligation is not merely to set them adrift under conditions which may seem de-

sirable and appropriate to us but to grant them the full, untrammelled independence and the sympathetic cooperation which we members of the United Nations insist upon for ourselves.

#### Problems Facing Rwanda and Burundi

In our view these two new nations will encounter serious difficulties, particularly in three fields: in the technical aspects of government administration, in economic and budgetary viability, and in the maintenance of law and order. In the first of these areas, that is, government administration, the report of the Commission notes a critical shortage of experienced indigenous persons trained in the mechanisms of government administration. Paragraphs 275 through 284 of the Commission's report deal with this problem in some detail. The Commission suggests that a minimum of 350 to 400 foreign technicians or experts would be essential in the year 1962 to keep administrative services in operation. From other information contained in the report, it can be further deduced that this requirement will not be noticeably reduced until the year 1964.

The economic problems which Rwanda and Burundi must be prepared to face are set forth with commendable clarity and simplicity in the report of the Commission and have been brought into even sharper focus by the statement made by the vice chairman of the Commission [Ernest Gassou] on the 13th of June. The Foreign Minister of Belgium has also drawn our attention to economic and budgetary difficulties. The background and cause of these difficulties are covered in the report, and I would only remind the committee that the budget deficit for the current year is approximately \$3 million, each, for Burundi and Rwanda. This is without counting the cost of the technical assistance now being provided by Belgium. It is safe, I think, to conclude that an annual deficit of this nature can be anticipated for several years. Mr. Gassou further suggested that the two states together would require approximately \$10 million per year for development of essential branches of their economies during the coming years. It would not appear that any considerable proportion of this amount could be obtained from internal sources. If you add to the above figure the cost of the present level of Belgian technical and other assistance, you arrive at a figure in the neighborhood of \$20 million an-

nually of external aid required by the two countries.

With regard to maintaining law and order, the problems stem in part from the embryonic stage of development of the national forces in both Rwanda and Burundi as noted by the Commission in its report. For our part we are concerned about their ability to deal with serious disorders, if they should unhappily occur. In Rwanda the task facing those charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order is made perhaps potentially more difficult by political factors which are also covered in considerable detail in the report of the Commission.

While for analytical and assistance purposes we can treat the major difficulties these two new nations will face in three categories—government administration, economic and budgetary deficits, and the maintenance of law and order—we should not be deceived, nor should the Governments themselves, into believing that these difficulties can be overcome without relationship to each other. Unfortunately that is seldom the case. Difficulties in administration breed difficulties in economic fields and vice versa. Difficulties in maintaining law and order create difficulties in administration and economic fields. Specifically, if public security is uncertain in either Rwanda or Burundi, technicians, whether provided by the Government of Belgium, by the United Nations, or by whomsoever, will not remain in the country no matter what the United Nations or the Government of Belgium may say or do. Commensurately, the absence or departure of technicians will greatly reduce the amount and effectiveness of the external economic assistance which can be usefully applied. Money is useless unless the technical expertise to put it to work is present. The Assembly, in searching for the formula which will insure accession to independence under the most favorable conditions, must consider all these factors together and bear in mind that any proposed solution for difficulties in one field must be carefully studied for its interactions in other fields.

Who then is and will be responsible for what? What are the responsibilities of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, of the Administering Authority, of this organization?

The first part of the answer to this question is clear. We are about to approve the granting of independence to Rwanda and Burundi on July 1.

After that date all direct responsibility for the situation there devolves from Belgium and from the United Nations onto the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. It is they who will be responsible for everything. They will be responsible to their people for the administration of their countries, for economic development of their countries, and for the maintenance of law and order. They will be responsible to the world community of nations for the preservation of human rights and adherence to the principles of international peace and security.

I am sure that the Governments have carefully weighed in hours of difficult appraisal their own capacities and means for fulfilling these responsibilities. They have declared themselves capable of fulfilling these responsibilities, and we will look to them to fulfill them.

This does not, or course, mean that they need to be left unassisted in this task. They have in fact already made clear their desire and readiness to have varying degrees of external assistance. What assistance is the international community and its members clearly prepared at this moment to provide?

#### **Belgium's Willingness To Provide Assistance**

In this respect we believe the General Assembly should take special note of the willingness of the Government of Belgium to recognize a continuing responsibility toward providing an independent Rwanda and Burundi with extensive aid. According to the declaration of the distinguished Foreign Minister, Belgium is prepared to provide without conditions technicians and advisers, economic assistance, and assistance in the field of maintenance of law and order, not only now but after independence. In offering this assistance Belgium has shown sympathy for the apprehensions of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi concerning their future sovereignty and has in this spirit made several proposals aimed at assuaging these concerns and guaranteeing this sovereignty. It has made perfectly clear that its aid is offered without conditions of any kind.

As of the moment I am not aware of any other aid having been offered to Rwanda and Burundi. It is to be hoped that the United Nations will provide generous technical assistance, but it is obvious that it cannot be expected to do so overnight. There is no present indication, moreover, that it

can provide economic and budgetary aid in the amounts urgently required by the two Governments.

In this connection we cannot close our eyes to the fact that technicians, Belgian or otherwise, will remain in or come to Rwanda and Burundi only if they are convinced acceptable conditions of public security will exist. We may wish they were indifferent to this consideration, but unfortunately they are not. We welcome the willingness of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to assume the responsibility for maintaining law and order, but we wish to be certain that they are not denied, by our action, any assistance in this respect they consider it desirable to seek and obtain.

This brings us to the hotly debated question of the withdrawal of Belgian troops. The Foreign Minister of Belgium has made it entirely clear that he would consider retaining troops in Rwanda and Burundi after independence only if one or both of the two Governments should request him to do so. There can therefore be absolutely no question of constraint, of foreign troops remaining against the will of the Governments concerned.

However, my delegation finds itself puzzled by the implication in some of the questions which have been posed in this committee that it is incompatible with the independence of a state that there should be foreign troops, even a single foreign soldier, on its soil. It is, for example, entirely normal for states to ask for foreign military missions to organize and train their forces or to instruct in the use of foreign military equipment which the state has purchased. This is an entirely proper arrangement, and many states represented in this committee have taken advantage of it. Other mutually agreeable arrangements for the temporary presence of the troops of one state in the territory of another are also common international practice. To deny to Rwanda or Burundi the right to make similar arrangements, if they so desire, would be an infringement on the exercise of their sovereignty of which the United Nations would certainly not, we believe, wish to be guilty. We for our part believe that the two Governments should, in this as in other respects, be left free to make such arrangements as they believe desirable for the training of their armed forces, for the reinforcement of public security

in their territories, and for extending such assurances as may be necessary and appropriate to foreign technicians in order that their services may be maintained.

### Roles of the United Nations

This brings us, I think, to examine the roles that the United Nations itself can and cannot play in this difficult situation. First, let me deal with the negative side. The United Nations at this juncture, either as regards finances or other resources, is not in a position to provide the economic, technical, or military assistance required by the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. We, the United Nations, cannot offer the assistance which has been offered by the Government of Belgium. What then can we and should we do? The United Nations can and should within existing programs supplement the economic and technical and military assistance provided by Belgium. In this connection, I would add, the United States for its part does not favor the establishment of a special fund for Rwanda and Burundi. We would expect that costs incurred by the United Nations would be financed from the budget for 1962 or, if necessary, under the provisions of Resolution 1735 covering unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year of 1962.

Second, the United Nations can and should provide the assistance of advice and coordination to the Governments of Belgium, of Rwanda, and of Burundi, and to any other governments that may be concerned in making the agreements for the application of assistance and in establishing the conditions of cooperation which will accrue the most benefits to the Governments and peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. Specific forms of such assistance have been suggested in the report of the Commission, by the representatives of Belgium, and by the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. And, as time goes on, no doubt other useful functions for the United Nations will arise.

In the view of the United States delegation these United Nations roles can best be carried out through the instrumentality of a representative or representatives of the Secretary-General in Rwanda and Burundi, and we endorse what we understand to be his intention to dispatch such representatives if the two Governments agree to such arrangements.



## U.S. Recommendations

It seems to us then the resolution we adopt at this session of the Assembly should welcome the accession to independence of the new and sovereign nations of Rwanda and Burundi through the termination of the trust agreement on July 1 of this year and of course invite these two new nations to apply for membership in this organization. It should recognize the needs of both countries for economic and technical assistance and encourage the Government of Belgium to continue to provide a substantial part of this assistance. We would also hope the resolution might call for provision by the United Nations of technical, economic, and other forms of assistance such as can be provided within the limitations of existing programs, funds, and resources. It should encourage the Secretary-General to name a representative whose functions would be, without prejudice to the sovereignty of the Governments, to render appropriate assistance in the provision and coordination of technical, economic, and other forms of assistance for Rwanda and Burundi, to advise the Governments of Belgium, Rwanda, and Burundi and perform such other functions as these Governments might request. It should provide for the training of local forces and the disposition of Belgian troops in accordance with the wishes of the local Governments. If any such troops remain temporarily, it would necessarily be in accordance with the wishes of the Government or Governments concerned and with the approval of the representative of the Secretary-General. However, in drafting such a resolution we must guard against imposing conditions on the Governments of Rwanda or Burundi which might, in effect, prejudice their sovereign right of action after independence.

Finally, because of a special responsibility this organization must have toward its former trust territories when these accede to independence, a responsibility stressed not only in the Commission's report but by almost every speaker who has addressed us, we should, I think, if the provisions we adopt at this session should prove inadequate in assisting and creating conditions necessary for building a firm and real independence, be prepared, if events should unhappily require, to consider the situation again in the light of those events. In short, I am convinced that our responsibilities toward Rwanda and Burundi do not necessarily end with the simple passage of a resolution at this session.

These, Madam Chairman, are the conclusions and recommendations of the United States. I have attempted to present them clearly and precisely in hopes that by so doing I could assist and speed our work, which is already clearly behind the needs of the situation and risks placing us in the position of arriving at the 1st of July without having made a decision. I should like to say that I and my delegation are prepared to sit down and meet with other delegations and contribute in any way which may be deemed desirable to the preparation of a resolution which the committee might consider simultaneously with the general debate. The sooner all members of the committee interested in this problem can work out and table a resolution which can secure very wide and general support, the sooner can we give our friends from Rwanda and Burundi the firm assurance that they will obtain their independence on July 1, that it is the firm intention of all of us that, as they have requested, their independence shall be total, unconditional, and viable, and that, finally, effective aid and cooperation by the United Nations and its members after independence is assured.

## STATEMENT IN PLENARY, JUNE 27

U.S. delegation press release 4019

The United States Government will vote for the resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee yesterday<sup>2</sup> on the future of Rwanda-Urundi. We pay tribute to the conciliatory spirit of many delegations, which made possible the adoption of a comprehensive resolution ending the trusteeship and according independence to Rwanda and Burundi.

However, our support for this resolution is not unqualified. Yesterday in the Fourth Committee we abstained on paragraph 3 because we did not feel that it met the needs of the situation. On the contrary, we felt that this paragraph, which deals with a matter of great delicacy and great importance, is unclear and too doctrinaire in its formulation. Specifically, the paragraph calls for the completion of the evacuation and withdrawal of Belgian troops now stationed in both countries by the 1st of August. Fortunately, at the same time, the paragraph says in effect, but not explicitly, that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi have the sovereign right to make ar-

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.740/Rev. 1.

arrangements with Belgium whereby the withdrawal could be delayed beyond the 1st of August if those Governments so desired.

The next weeks and months will be most critical for Rwanda and Burundi. During this period these two countries must continue to rely for their economic stability almost exclusively on Belgian assistance. No one else has offered to provide assistance in any way commensurate with the amounts required to meet the budgetary, technical, and development needs of the two countries. Therefore, in the view of my delegation, the Assembly has a particular responsibility not to adopt language which by its equivocal nature could create unrest or alarm among any segment of the population and thus jeopardize the effective application of Belgian assistance or, for that matter, other assistance. Unfortunately, we see just these dangers in the wording of operative paragraph 3 and feel that the partisans of the formula set forth therein are taking a serious responsibility in the light of the situation in the territory.

Therefore the United States cannot associate itself with the wording of this paragraph and if it should be put to a vote separately would again abstain on all parts of the paragraph. Needless to say, we shall vote against the Soviet amendment,<sup>3</sup> which, if adopted, would, in our view, make the paragraph entirely unworkable.

However, we shall vote for the resolution as a whole. In doing so, I wish to make it abundantly clear that we welcome and support wholeheartedly the independence of Rwanda and Burundi. We welcome the provisions of the resolution which make for economic and technical assistance to the two new nations. And we are particularly gratified that the resolution includes an active role for the Secretary-General because we believe that the United Nations assistance to these new nations can best be carried out through the Secretary-General. Despite our misgivings about paragraph 3, we are able to support the resolution only because the Fourth Committee was categorically assured by a substantial number of the cosponsors of this resolution—and this assurance was repeated here this morning—that it was their clear intention and conviction that after independence the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi would without any doubt whatsoever enjoy the sovereign

right to make arrangements for the retention of certain Belgian forces if they felt that to be in the interest of their countries.

Finally, I should like to express warmest congratulations and best wishes of the U.S. Government and people to the two new nations who will take their place among the sovereign nations of the world this Sunday. We shall look with keen interest and sympathy to their development as young nations. We shall be happy to welcome them soon here among us as members of the United Nations.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>4</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling its resolution 1743 (XVI) of 23 February 1962 and the other resolutions on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi, as well as its resolution 63 (I) of 13 December 1946,*

*Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi appointed under paragraph 2 of resolution 1743 (XVI),*

*Noting that the efforts to maintain the unity of Ruanda-Urundi did not succeed,*

*Welcoming the Agreement on Economic Union concluded between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at the Conference at Addis Ababa held under the auspices of the Commission,*

*Taking into account the fact that the bulk of the Administering Authority's forces still remain in the Territory notwithstanding the objective, stated in paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI), of securing the rapid withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces before independence,*

*Expressing its satisfaction at the favourable trends towards reconciliation noted by the Commission in its report, in particular, in Rwanda, the participation in the Government of two members of the Opposition,*

*Having heard the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and the petitioners,*

*Recalling the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples embodied in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,*

*Taking note of the desire of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to attain independence as separate States on 1 July 1962, the date envisaged in paragraph 7 of resolution 1743 (XVI),*

*Taking into account the declaration by the Government of Burundi that from the date of the proclamation of independence it will not agree to the presence of foreign troops on its soil, and the declaration by the Government of Rwanda that the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement will make illegal the presence of Belgian troops in the territory of the Republic,*

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/L.388; rejected on June 27 by a vote of 24 to 46, with 33 abstentions. The Soviet draft amendment called for evacuation of Belgian forces by July 1.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1746(XVI); adopted in plenary on June 27 by a vote of 93 to 0, with 10 abstentions (Soviet bloc).

Noting the declaration of the Administering Authority that it will withdraw its forces from Rwanda and Burundi in accordance with the wishes of the General Assembly and the Governments concerned,

Recalling that after independence Rwanda and Burundi will enjoy sovereign rights,

Bearing in mind the needs which will confront Rwanda and Burundi in all fields when they accede to independence,

Recalling its resolution 1415 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on assistance to territories emerging from a trust status and to newly independent States,

1. Expresses its warm appreciation to the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, 1962, for the way it has performed its tasks;

2. Decides, in agreement with the Administering Authority, to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946 in respect of Ruanda-Urundi on 1 July 1962, on which date Rwanda and Burundi shall emerge as two independent and sovereign States;

3. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw and evacuate its forces still remaining in Rwanda and Burundi, and that, as of 1 July 1962, the Belgian troops in process of evacuation will no longer have any role to play and that the evacuation must be completed by 1 August 1962, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Rwanda and Burundi;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to send immediately to Rwanda and Burundi a representative together with a team of experts whose functions shall be:

(a) To supervise the withdrawal and evacuation of Belgian forces in accordance with this resolution;

(b) To help the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to secure the implementation of the Agreement on Economic Union reached between the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi at Addis Ababa on 19 April 1962;

(c) To study, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in the light of the recommendations made by the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, the need for technical and economic assistance in Rwanda and Burundi, so as to enable the Secretary-General to submit a report thereon, together with his recommendation, to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session;

(d) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, at their request, in the organization of their administrative cadres and other related matters;

(e) To assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, at their request, in the development and training of internal security forces;

5. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 1755 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1962, to enter into commitments not exceeding \$2 million for the purpose of such emergency measures as may be required to ensure the continuation of essential services in the two countries, pending the consideration by the General Assembly of the report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 4(c) above;

6. Requests the United Nations Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board and other United Nations

bodies, as well as the specialized agencies, to give special consideration to the needs of Rwanda and Burundi;

7. Expresses the hope that all Member States of the United Nations would render such technical and economic assistance as they can to the new States of Rwanda and Burundi;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on the implementation of this resolution;

9. Recommends that, after the proclamation of independence on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi should be admitted as Members of the United Nations under Article 4 of the Charter.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), May 15, 1962.

##### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Chad, July 3, 1962.

##### Cultural Relations

Agreement for facilitating the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, and cultural character, and protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force August 12, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, May 23, 1962.

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.<sup>1</sup>

Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, May 23, 1962.

##### Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.<sup>1</sup>

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Congo (Leopoldville), May 31, 1962.

##### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>2</sup>

Ratified by the President: May 11, 1962.

##### Telecommunication

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Austria, May 29, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

## Trade

Portugal accepted the following instruments pursuant to its acceptance of the protocol of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade April 6, 1962:

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

Process-verbal of rectification concerning protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol amending preamble and parts II and III, and protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Section B entered into force October 7, 1957.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.<sup>2</sup>

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.<sup>2</sup>

Protocol relating to negotiations for establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.<sup>2</sup>

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.<sup>2</sup>

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.<sup>2</sup>

Chile deposited notification recognizing signature as binding with respect to the following June 7 1962:

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, with annex. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

## BILATERAL

### Bolivia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Bolivia. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz June 19, 1962. Entered into force June 19, 1962.

### Germany

Agreement regarding the application to persons on leave of certain articles of the agreement of June 19, 1951, between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces (TIAS 2846), and the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the NATO status-of-forces agreement with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959. Enters into force on the same date as the supplementary agreement of August 3, 1959.

*Ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany: June 4, 1962.*

*Ratifications exchanged: June 13, 1962.*

Agreement on the settlement of disputes arising out of direct procurement, entered into pursuant to article 44 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the NATO status-of-forces agreement with respect to for-

<sup>2</sup>Not in force.

ign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959. Enters into force on the same date as the supplementary agreement of August 3, 1959.

*Ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany: June 4, 1962.*

*Ratifications exchanged: June 13, 1962.*

Amendment to the agreement of June 28, 1957 (TIAS 3874), for cooperation, on behalf of Berlin, concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Washington June 29, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government advises the other in writing that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Amendment to the agreement of July 3, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3877 and 4314), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 5, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

## Spain

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 1957 (TIAS 3789), relating to the loan of certain naval vessels to Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid June 19, 1962. Entered into force June 19, 1962.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to July 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 425 and 433 of June 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*429	7/2	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*430	7/2	Coert sworn in as Ambassador to Uruguay (biographic details).
431	7/2	Meetings with Argentina on Alliance for Progress.
*432	7/2	Consulates opened at Ibadan and Enugu, Nigeria (rewrite).
434	7/3	U.S. contribution to Hong Kong school project.
435	7/3	Rusk: U.S. loan legislation.
*436	7/5	Chayes: State Junior Bar, San Antonio, Tex.
437	7/5	Richelieu River-Lake Champlain waterway proposal.
*438	7/5	Sprouse sworn in as Ambassador to Cambodia (biographic details).
*439	7/5	Ball: interview, Radio Free Berlin—North German Radio.
*440	7/5	Orrick sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (biographic details).
*441	7/6	Abolition of closed areas for Soviet visitors.
442	7/6	Williams' visit to Europe (rewrite).
443	7/6	Costa Rica credentials (rewrite).
*444	7/6	Wehneyer awarded Princeton Fellowship in Public Affairs.
445	7/7	Cleveland's visit to Europe (rewrite).

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

<b>Africa.</b> Assistant Secretary Williams Confers With European Leaders on Africa . . . . .	133	<b>Hong Kong.</b> U.S. Grants Funds to Hong Kong for School Building Project . . . . .	141
<b>Algeria.</b> President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement of Independence (Kennedy) . . . . .	135	<b>International Organizations and Conferences</b>	
<b>American Principles.</b> The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy) . . . . .	131	<b>Arms Control and Disarmament: A Summary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . . .</b>	154
<b>Argentina.</b> United States and Argentina Review Progress on Development Program . . . . .	135	President Requests Supplemental Appropriation for IMF Loans . . . . .	152
<b>Atomic Energy.</b> Arms Control and Disarmament: A Summary of Developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . . .	154	<b>Mexico.</b> Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship (Kennedy, text of joint communique). . . . .	135
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U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Independence for Rwanda and Burundi (Yost and text of resolution) . . . . .	159	The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership . . . . .	131
<b>Canada.</b> United States and Canada Refer Waterway Proposal to IJC . . . . .	141	Philippine-American Friendship Day . . . . .	138
<b>Congo (Leopoldville).</b> U.S. Offers Grant of \$10 Million for Congo Import Program . . . . .	140	President Congratulates Algeria on Achievement of Independence . . . . .	135
<b>Congress</b>		President Delegates Functions Under Exchange Act of 1961 . . . . .	138
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . . .	153	President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act . . . . .	153
Department Supports U.N. Loan Legislation (Ball, Rusk, Stevenson) . . . . .	142	Presidents of U.S. and Mexico Reaffirm Traditional Friendship . . . . .	135
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<b>Costa Rica.</b> Letters of Credence (Facio Segreda, Gonzalo) . . . . .	138	President Signs Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Kennedy) . . . . .	153
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# Bulletin

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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July 30, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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## Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 12

Press release 456 dated July 13

*Secretary Rusk:* I have no formal statement today, but I would like to make a comment on two or three things that are ahead of us in the next few days and weeks before we take your questions.

Ambassador [Arthur H.] Dean left yesterday to go back to Geneva for the resumption of the disarmament conference next Monday [July 16]. We hope very much that that conference will be able to make some headway. It has made very little thus far.<sup>1</sup> You will have observed that Mr. Khrushchev in his speech to the so-called Peace Congress in Moscow spent a great deal of time on disarmament. In it he said a good many things with which we could not agree. But he did point to the dangers of a thermonuclear war, and he drew attention to the massive resources which are being diverted from peaceful purposes to the arms race.

We believe that both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as many other countries have very serious interest in bringing this arms race to an end. That is in terms of an objective analysis of the national interests of these countries. Certainly we in the United States, as advanced economically and as prosperous as we are, have an enormous number of unfinished tasks to which we would like to commit such resources.

We regretted that Mr. Khrushchev again seemed to confuse international inspection in connection with disarmament with espionage. That is a major obstacle which has to be overcome, because it is difficult to see how we can take the road toward disarmament without effective assurances that the agreements are being in fact kept.

But Ambassador Dean will be there for serious negotiations, and we hope somehow that we can find a way to get started on this process of turning down the arms race. It is not easy to make any

predictions about how that will go, but we shall certainly do our part in that discussion.

At the same time there is now going on in Geneva the conference on Laos. The indications are that the provisional agreement reached last autumn will now find acceptance by the members of the conference. This will be the third in a series of steps looking toward an ending of that problem there and the establishment of a neutral and independent country in Laos. The first was the cease-fire;<sup>2</sup> the second was the formation of a coalition government;<sup>3</sup> the third would be this international agreement. These are three of a series of steps. The remaining steps would involve the actual carrying out of these agreements and commitments. It will take some weeks and months before those can in fact be put into effect. But it will be our hope that these arrangements would be loyally supported on all sides and that in fact that country can be left alone to work out its own future along peaceful lines.

At 4 o'clock this afternoon I will be seeing Ambassador Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin] for the first time since the middle of last month. I will have a chance to take up with him again the conversations we have been having on Berlin and will probably get into some questions concerning disarmament. We have seen statements made recently from Moscow on the subject of Germany and Berlin. The important thing there is that the vital interests of the Western Powers, the vital interests of the people of West Berlin, be acknowledged and that whatever arrangements are to be reached are reached on the basis of recognition of those vital interests.

Now I will take your questions.

<sup>1</sup> On May 12, 1961, the International Control Commission reported that it was satisfied that a general *de facto* cease-fire existed in Laos.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

## Moscow Statements on Berlin

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to these recent Moscow statements on Berlin, we had Khrushchev's speech Tuesday, and just this afternoon TASS put out a long statement. They seemed to be stepping up their public pressure on the subject and increasing the threats to make a separate peace treaty. Does this indicate to you that we are in for an increased crisis there now, or what is your feeling on this subject?*

A. Well, one can't predict what is in the other side's mind at any particular point on a matter of this sort. Perhaps I might know more about that, say, around 5 o'clock this afternoon. But it has been very clear all along that the Western position on what we have referred to repeatedly as our vital interests is very simple, very firm, and the problem is, if there are disagreements, handling those disagreements without a major crisis. But that is not something which can be decided by one side alone.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Moscow statement said that the Department did not show a proper appreciation of Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion that the smaller Allied troops replace those of the American and British and French Governments. It said that Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion was a serious one toward meeting the Western position. Do you agree?*

A. Well, for some time the problem has been that the other side seems not to want to talk about a great many things which are of interest to us—the permanent peace settlement for Germany as a whole, for example, or arrangements with respect to Berlin as a whole—because they have simply said that certain matters are just not discussable. Now, if the only thing that is to be discussed is Western interests—vital interests, the Western position—and the only purpose of such discussion is seriously to reduce or to eliminate Western positions, then there is no basis for serious negotiations in that direction. This is not unusual. This has been a part of the picture from the beginning. Yes, sir?

*Q. Mr. Secretary, according to recent reports, the number of West Berliners and West Germans, including women and children, who have been arrested by Communist People's Police while traveling on the Autobahn has increased. Do you regard this as a threat against free access to the*

*city, and are you prepared to take the subject up with Mr. Dobrynin?*

A. Well, quite frankly—I am sorry to have to say this—I don't have recent information on this kind of point. We have been following the *Autobahn* situation carefully, but quite frankly I am just not informed on the particular point that you make.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mayor Brandt [Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin] has said that he is hopeful that in the talk you have with Ambassador Dobrynin there will be discussion of means of encouraging greater traffic between East and West Berlin by pass provisions for families and similar arrangements. Do you intend to go into that matter?*

A. As you will recall, we sent the Soviets a note not long ago in which we proposed that the responsible authorities in Berlin arrange for talks to try to reduce the tension in Berlin itself. We have no had an answer to that note, but this will be among the things that seem to us the responsible authorities there could discuss with each other, to see whether there were not measures that could be taken to reduce the sense of tension in Berlin itself.

## The Laos Agreements

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Laos accords, how will they affect, let us say in the next 6 months, the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Tekepone area and the Soviet airlift through Tekepone to Viet-Nam?*

A. Well, the agreement itself and the undertakings of the Laotian Government clearly provide that Laos is not to be used as a channel of communication or pathway into neighboring countries. The two cochairmen would have a responsibility for enforcing such an arrangement. The IC [International Control Commission] would have certain responsibilities with respect to it, and of course, neighboring countries themselves would have immediate opportunity to discover whether those provisions were being carried on. We, I think, would have no great difficulty in discovering whether there would continue to be intrusions into South Viet-Nam or across the Mekong into Thailand after these agreements were

<sup>4</sup>For text of a U.S. note of June 25, see *ibid.*, July 1 1962, p. 97.

into effect. So I think that we will know fairly soon whether that part of the agreement and the agreements themselves are being faithfully carried out.

*Q. To follow up on that question, are the Russians and the British agreed on the methods they will pursue to check on such things as the Tcherson area, which, of course, involves the withdrawal of foreign troops?*

A. As far as the airlift is concerned, as far as foreign military personnel are concerned, the agreement provides that all foreign military personnel would be withdrawn from Laos, and the arrangements for anything like aid with the Laotian Government would be worked out internationally and with full knowledge of all parties, so that I think that that itself would cut across the possibility of a continuation of infiltrated supplies into neighboring countries out of Laos.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it definite now that you and Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] will be meeting in Geneva on this Laos matter, and then do you expect to have Berlin discussions?*

A. It is my understanding that a date will shortly be fixed, and might be fixed at any time now, for the formal conclusion of the present conference there, and it is anticipated that foreign ministers would go there for a very brief signing ceremony. If I go, as I would expect to for that purpose, I would suppose I will also see the other foreign ministers, including Mr. Gromyko, and had other questions would come up in those discussions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Laotians have indicated that they don't want protection of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] in the future—the new government. Under what authority in that case would the United States act if it felt that things were going wrong in Laos?*

A. Under the SEATO arrangements, the protocol would apply only on the request of the government of one of the protocol states, so that if the Laotian Government announces that it does not expect to call upon that protection, there is no particular problem from the point of view of the law of the matter or the arrangements concerned. But I wouldn't want now to anticipate the diffi-

culty that you have mentioned because we are going to approach this in terms that the parties will be carrying out their commitments, and if this does not happen, then, of course, the agreement would become unhinged. I mean you would have a fresh situation to consider. We are not approaching it in the expectation that this will be the situation.

#### Positions on Berlin

*Q. Mr. Secretary, reviewing your remarks about Berlin, some things which on the face of it are not news, if they are not spoken about for many months, appear to us to be news. We have been given to understand that in recent months the talk has been about access and getting Soviet acknowledgment of the legitimacy of our vital interests in West Berlin. You have now reintroduced the elements of an all-German settlement and of a Berlin accord that involves all of Berlin. Is this perhaps an interesting outcome of your recent European trip?*

A. No. I didn't intend to make all that much news with that remark. I was reflecting on the general attitude of the West over a considerable period of time. The other side, for example, uses this expression, "drawing a line under World War II." Well, the West has been trying to draw a line under World War II for a very long time in Germany and trying to find a permanent satisfactory German settlement which would bring peace to central Europe. But that has not been pursued because, as you will recall, I did say that was the kind of thing that the other side has not been willing to discuss. They say, "This is not discussable. Now let's talk about your position here in West Berlin."

*Q. Is it fair, then, to conclude that if any accommodation at this stage were to go to the lengths of challenging the occupation basis of our right to be in Berlin, then you would want to talk about all World War II?*

A. I think that it would be difficult to be precise about what aspects of this might be talked about simply because it has ranged all the way, at times, to a permanent satisfactory total solution for a German peace settlement. We have talked about the *de facto* situation. It is a fact that we are in West Berlin and have access to it. We have talked some about how you manage a disagreement in

case you can't get agreement on any other basis. But I would not want to be precise about exactly how the next talk or two might shape up or how the subjects would fall into place. I was just pointing out that there is a tendency on the other side to say these things are not to be talked about, these things are to be talked about, and usually it is an attempt to diminish or eliminate our own vital interests that they would like to discuss—only certain things of their choice.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the troop proposal put forward now publicly by Mr. Khrushchev provide any sort of a topic that can be talked about in these discussions?*

A. I would think not in that form. After all, as you know, a year ago he proposed that Soviet and Western troops share responsibilities for West Berlin.<sup>5</sup> This is a variant of that, and I think they have known this is not acceptable to the West for some time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a related question here? I don't recall your exact words, but back here earlier you said that if all they were willing to talk about was the diminution or elimination of the United States basic position in West Berlin, there really was not very much to talk about. Have you reached that point in your talks now, do you think?*

A. No, I think both sides still believe, as they have for some time, that maintaining contacts on these issues is itself important, even though there has been no clear view as to how they might lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you still sticking to your position that there is no sense talking about internationalization of access routes to Berlin until the Soviets acknowledge the Western right to remain in West Berlin?*

A. Well, the situation on that is that one could talk about a variety of things, but if they are linked to an unacceptable point, such as the one you mentioned, then you could create misunderstandings by seeming to pick up that particular idea of international access and talking about it in isolation. Of course we have talked about it, as you know. Over the past months we have gone into the possibilities of international access.<sup>6</sup> But

then, when the question comes up as to access to what—then we get into the same central question again. So that there does not seem thus far to be very much real advance on any discussion of international access arrangements.

#### West New Guinea Dispute

*Q. Mr. Secretary, after a lapse of several months, the envoys of the Netherlands and Indonesia are meeting near here today to try and work out a peaceful settlement of the New Guinea dispute. Can you say, sir, how this situation appears to you, whether or not the United States can through its influence, help bring this peaceful solution about, or is it all in the hands of the two?*

A. I would think that that problem is really in the hands of the two Governments, assisted by Ambassador Bunker at the present stage.<sup>7</sup> At some point those negotiations may shift from this phase to the United Nations and perhaps a more formal negotiation. But the two Governments have agreed upon a framework within which these talks could go forward, and they are now having their representatives meet here for the purpose of exploring it further. We do hope they have a successful outcome, but this is basically a matter now for the two Governments.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the House of Representatives yesterday the chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. [Armistead I.] Selden said the Government of Cuba was introducing arms and subversive activities into at least 10 or 20 Latin American nations. Is this a matter on which our Government has considered going again to the OAS [Organization of American States] for any collective action on the Cuba situation?*

A. This is the type of problem—and I don't know in what time span Mr. Selden was speaking—but this is the type of problem which this special security committee, the so-called Vigilance Committee, of the OAS is looking into with great urgency. The OAS at Punta del Este did agree to interrupt illicit traffic and trade in arms between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere. S

<sup>5</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 7, 1961, p. 223.

<sup>6</sup> For a Department statement of Mar. 3, 1962, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1962, p. 463.

<sup>7</sup> For text of proposals made by Ellsworth Bunker for the settlement of the West New Guinea problem, see *ibid.* June 25, 1962, p. 1039.

This is something which all of the governments of the hemisphere are following very closely.

#### Algeria

*Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking about another OAS [Organisation de l'armée secrète], could you tell us, sir, is there something which holds up our recognition of the Algerian Government?*

A. Well, there is nothing on our side which holds up further action in this regard. We have recognized the independence of Algeria as a state.<sup>8</sup> We are prepared to transform our consulate general there into an embassy and to appoint a Chargé. But the problem has been an uncertainty on the part of the responsible Algerian authorities as to how they would want foreign governments to proceed in this matter. As far as we are concerned, we are ready to proceed at any time. Meanwhile our official representatives are there and do have contacts with the local authorities and are in a position to act in support of American interests and to take care of American citizens whose needs might arise. But this is a matter which is more on the Algerian side than on our side at this point.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you. It is nice to be recognized. Yesterday Khrushchev denounced our high-level blast or nuclear tests as a crime against humanity. Would you tell us why someone in authority of this Government hasn't pointed out to Mr. Khrushchev and the world that, during the Russian tests, they engaged in high-level tests. There was at least one that was some 200 miles. Why this silence?*

A. I was not aware that we had been silent. We have made a statement on the subject, and we have talked at every opportunity about how this test business can be brought to an end. It may be that what we have said has not gotten around, but we have said some things on the subject.

*Q. Well, would you say you have made a statement in connection with Khrushchev's denunciation of our high-level test?*

A. Yes, I wonder if I could ask my colleague to furnish you with that statement.<sup>9</sup>

*Q. I would appreciate it.*

<sup>8</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 135.

<sup>9</sup> See next column.

#### Department Comments on Soviet Statements on U.S. Nuclear Tests

*Statement by Lincoln White  
Director, Office of News<sup>1</sup>*

I would like to discuss the statements, not only by Mr. Khrushchev but by other Soviet spokesmen, of outrage at the high-altitude nuclear test conducted by the United States yesterday.

These statements reflect a hypocrisy which cannot be let pass without notice. It is necessary to point out once more that the Soviet Union is responsible for the fact that nuclear testing has been put back into the arms race. This responsibility rests with the Soviet Union, as the result of its unexpected and massive series of tests launched last September. These Soviet tests, of course, included the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated, of approximately 58 megatons.

High-altitude tests were also conducted. One of these was considerably more than 100 miles in altitude. These high-altitude tests, conducted at several different altitudes, were probably the most significant tests, from the point of view of United States security.

As a result of these high-altitude tests, the possibility existed that the Soviet Union gained considerable knowledge of the effects of such tests. Thus the United States decision to undertake a limited series of tests, including certain high-altitude tests, was a decision of necessity.

In his statement of March 2<sup>2</sup> of this year, the President emphasized that the foremost aim of the United States is "the control of force, not the pursuit of force, in a world made safe for mankind." An effective nuclear test ban treaty would be a momentous step in this direction, and a step the United States has attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to take for a number of years.

The United States is continuing this effort, the success of which requires only Soviet readiness to accept the minimum required control and verification arrangements.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on July 10.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

A. Thank you very much.

*Q. I haven't seen it anywhere.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some of your views about the situation in Brazil now and what the status of the President's trip might be?*

A. As far as the trip is concerned, Mr. Salinger [White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger] is down there and is going ahead with the anticipa-

tory planning for that visit. As you know, Brazil has been taking some time in forming a new government. I would not want to comment on the internal aspects of their government, but we, of course, would be much interested in the outcome. The planning for the trip is going ahead.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what Ambassador [Llewellyn E.] Thompson will be doing when he comes back to Washington? Are you going to have two Soviet expert specialists?*

A. He will come back for duty in the Department, but I think perhaps, since he has a well-deserved leave coming to him this summer, I perhaps might hold off the announcement of that until he is nearer the job. He will be in the Department.

### Geneva Disarmament Talks

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your early remarks that you expected to take up some disarmament matters with Ambassador Dobrynin. Are these matters that will be coming up at Geneva? Are they questions of substance that you want to take up with him?*

A. I would like to have some discussion with him about the disarmament situation in anticipation of the opening of the disarmament conference—reopening of the disarmament conference—next Monday, but I don't think there is anything new or surprising that will be coming up in that regard. I just want to explore the possibility as to whether they might not, in recognition of both the dangers and the costs of the arms race, find some way to take some steps to get on with disarmament.

*Q. In that regard, Mr. Secretary, do you believe it likely that the recent United States underground experiments may lead to some significant modifications in the U.S. proposals as they are presented at Geneva?*

A. The so-called Vela tests which were laid on for the purpose of investigating the possibilities of instrumental detection and identification of underground events have produced some, I think, quite interesting data. That information has not yet been fully developed to all of its implications and conclusions, but there are some promising signs that instrumentation can do a somewhat better job than was earlier supposed. This is one of the positive results of the Vela tests—tests, by the

way, to which the Soviet have been invited but which they have rejected.

I do want to point out that, so far as what has been said and what I myself know, this will not bring about, or cannot bring about at this stage, a complete substitution of instrumentation for control posts inside large countries such as the Soviet Union or the United States or a number of on-site inspections. It may greatly simplify the problem, but it does not eliminate such arrangements so far as we can tell. If the other side objects on principle to any control posts or any on-site inspections, then we still have a very large problem. The experiments themselves may help, but whether it will close the gap depends on whether the gap is between anything and zero, because in terms of on-site inspections, so far it has been indicated that they would be rejected by the other side.

*Q. To follow that up, would it be correct then to draw the conclusion from that that with the prospect of some improved scientific detection development the United States believes there is now the opportunity to take a new look at this problem and try to bring the Soviets and the U.S. position closer together?*

A. I think the first thing will be to have a complete and thorough examination of what the data means in terms of inspection and then to see what that, in turn, means in terms of our standing proposals. It is too early yet to say whether this would mean any significant change in our proposals, but the announcement by the Department of Defense [July 7] indicated that we were very much encouraged that instrumental means have been improved to sort out the difference between earthquakes and nuclear explosions within certain ranges and under certain conditions. But there are still a good many technical problems that have to be ironed out before we can be sure what that would mean actually in terms of disarmament proposals.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the situation in Brazil is any consideration being given to postponing President Kennedy's trip until a more favorable time?*

A. As I indicated, Mr. Salinger is there to go ahead with the planning, and that is a contingency I wouldn't be able to get into at this point.

*Q. Sir, can you tell us if our Government is making any effort to bring the two sides together in Algeria now, on the spot, with the arrival of Mr. Ben Bella in Algeria?*

A. I think the sides are very much in touch with each other, and quite a number of governments have attempted to be sure that they are in touch with each other, and I don't think that we are needed for that purpose.

#### **Importance of U.S. Agricultural Exports**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you recently returned from the Common Market area, and I wondered if you would have any thoughts on the matter of how our agricultural exports might be affected by Great Britain joining the Common Market?*

A. Well, this is a question in which we have a very great deal of interest and about which we have talked to all of the governments involved in the past several months. We do feel it very important that there be a substantial opportunity for American agricultural exports to Western Europe. It is one of our most important markets. And our ability to maintain a substantial export surplus over imports is vitally important to us if we are to continue to bear the defense and aid burdens which we are carrying outside the United States.

So we are in regular contact with the Common Market members and the U.K. and others to insure that American agricultural products have an adequate market in Western Europe.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Brazil brings to mind Captain Enrico Galvao, of Santa Maria fame. I have heard that he has been invited to testify at a U.N. session of some sort on Portuguese matters, and in the past we have been somewhat reluctant to let him come through here. Will we permit him to appear?*

A. That is a matter that I understand is being discussed with the committee at the U.N. and the U.N. Secretariat. There are some legal problems there. We have a headquarters agreement with the United Nations with respect to travel to and from the headquarters. But, on the other hand, we do have some laws of our own which govern and have to do with people entering this country. And, as you know, in the personal history of Mr. Galvao in the episode of the *Santa Maria* and

others—his legal position in many countries is not very strong. So that I don't know what the final answer is going to be.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment, sir, on the India-China border dispute and how much of a threat that might be to the security in the area?*

A. Well, we have been trying to follow that closely. There are some maneuvers on the northern frontier that India considers a threat to its security. We of course sympathize with the Indian view that the integrity of its northern frontier be assured, but these episodes or the small deployments are in very difficult country, remote country, at great altitudes. It is a little hard to have exact information there, but we are following it and I don't think there is anything much I could say about it today.

#### **Relations With Pakistan**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question about our relations with Pakistan? A couple of months ago President Ayub in an interview said if friends in that area did not get everything they wanted, they might have to turn to other sources. Then a month ago when the new government was formed, Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali said he wanted to have the closest possible relations with Communist China, and Tuesday, Ayub's brother, who is a so-called progressive in the Parliament, said the United States and Britain were to blame for everything that had gone wrong for Pakistan since her independence and the United States had been guilty of continual meddling. Are our relations with Pakistan actually deteriorating as just as those statements would indicate?*

A. I would think not. I would not attach too much importance to the statement made by an individual member of the Parliament, even though he may be closely related to the President of the country. We are in regular contact with Pakistan about a great many subjects, and I think that my discussions in the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] meeting,<sup>10</sup> for example, in London with their representatives there indicate that our relations are in good order. Now, we are going to have some problems with any country that itself has problems with its neighbors. For example, we have been hoping that Pakistan and Afghani-

<sup>10</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of May 28, 1962, p. 859.

stan could work out a solution of the transit and traffic problem from Pakistani ports up to Afghanistan. And where two friends of ours, such as Pakistan and India, have problems between themselves, that inevitably imposes some strains on relations with both, but in general I would say that our relations with Pakistan are in good order.

#### U.N. Bond Legislation

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the House action on the U.N. bond issue sticks, how does the United States intend to make good its substantial obligations?*<sup>11</sup>

A. Well, I hope very much and would expect that the Congress would find some way to adjust that action that was taken on amendment yesterday,<sup>12</sup> because the effect of it would be to give to any one of the 104 members of the United Nations a veto on our ability to buy United Nations bonds. Now, the membership of the United Nations have either bought or subscribed up to about \$70 million worth of bonds already. We are supporting the U.N. in its effort to collect arrearages of assessments. We argued the case before the World Court<sup>13</sup> in favor of the compulsory character of these assessments for the Congo, for example. We expect a decision from the Court at almost any time, but we do not believe that the mere fact that some one member is in arrears should prevent the United States from moving ahead in support of a critically necessary action of the United Nations in a matter as important as the Congo.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you figure Telstar may help you solve some of your foreign policy problems?*

A. I think we were all very pleased and excited by this remarkable technical achievement. I don't want to sound old-fashioned, but I am not always sure that the speeding up of communications helps us too much in the foreign policy business, particularly if it simply speeds up the pace of events. However, we will have to adjust to that because that is inevitable.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the immediate threat to Matsu and Quemoy subsided?*

<sup>11</sup> For statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 142.

<sup>12</sup> The House on July 11 adopted an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill to withhold U.S. funds from the United Nations until all member nations are current in dues and assessments.

<sup>13</sup> BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30.

A. I think there is nothing that I could add to what has been said in the last 2 or 3 weeks on that subject. There is nothing particularly new on that.

#### India and Pakistan

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in our relations with India and Pakistan it has been assumed for a long time that, as we improve relations with one, inevitably relations with the other would worsen. Now we seem to be deteriorating on both fronts. How do you explain that?*

A. Well, that is likely to be the impression at a time when the two themselves seem to be having sharp tensions in their relations with each other. But, as I have indicated before, in the case of Pakistan we worked with them very closely on a considerable number of matters, and in the case of India we and they both have supported the U.N. in the Congo. They have been helpful in the action of their chairman on the ICC in Vietnam, and we and they have worked together very closely on matters affecting the general structure of the financing of the United Nations, for example. There are many, many points of cooperation, even though in the case of important countries such as Pakistan and India there will be times when there are particular points of difference.

*Q. On Quemoy and Matsu is it fair to say that the Communist buildup has reached a kind of plateau, that it is not continuing and not decreasing?*

A. We have had little indications of any further move in that direction. It seems to be about where it was about 2 or 3 weeks ago.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, press reports in recent weeks have called world attention to a policy planning paper prepared under the supervision of Mr. Rostow [Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council]. Some of these reports led to think that Mr. Rostow is advocating a two-China policy—membership for Red China in the United Nations and recognition of Red China by the United States. Would you care to comment on this?*

A. Well, one of the difficulties about the knowledge of the existence of a paper which can't be



made known is that everybody can tend to read into the paper things that are not there. I believe most of those questions will be clarified if the Senate decides to release Mr. Rostow's testimony before the committee. I do not want, any more than my colleagues did before the Senate committee, to get into the question of the content of that paper, but I think those points could be easily clarified by a release of his testimony before the Senate committee.

## Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

*Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk on the American Broadcasting Company's network television program "Issues and Answers" on July 8.*

Press release 450 dated July 10

*The Announcer:* From Washington, D.C., the American Broadcasting Company brings you "Issues and Answers."

With the answers to the critical international issues facing this country, the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk,

Secretary Rusk, here are the issues.

*Question:* Is confusion and bickering undermining the war against the Communists in Viet-Nam?

*Question:* Is Red China going to attack Quemoy and Matsu?

*Question:* Has there been any progress in getting the Berlin talks off dead center?

*Question:* Are we getting ready to make new concessions to the Russians to get a nuclear test ban?

*The Announcer:* Now for the answers from the Secretary of State, recently returned from a 10-day trip to five European capitals. To explore the issues are ABC correspondent Bob Clark and with the first question ABC State Department correspondent John Scali.

### The War in Viet-Nam

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, there are reports that the war to defeat the Communists in Viet-Nam isn't going too well, that the American military advisers there are unhappy at alleged confusion in the command structure, and that things are not as they should be.

*Secretary Rusk:* Mr. Scali, I have seen the reports in the last day or so to which you refer. I also recall during World War II that I served from the company commander of infantry all the way to war plans on the General Staff and know that you can get almost any story that you want out of a situation like this.

The war in Viet-Nam is a dirty, untidy, disagreeable war. But the main fact is that the Vietnamese armed forces are on the initiative. They are out aggressively running down these guerrillas. The guerrilla incidents are dropping in number. There has been a considerable improvement in such things as command structure, mobility, supply, intelligence—all of the elements which are so important in this kind of guerrilla operation.

Now there always is more to be done, and undoubtedly this kind of warfare is frustrating to those who are taking part in it because the enemy is unseen. He strikes without warning or notice. And when you strike back at him, frequently he isn't there. But the important thing is that the South Vietnamese army is taking the initiative, they are reducing the incidents, and I think they are on the move.

*Mr. Scali:* Then you don't see any evidence of confusion in command structure which is hurting us?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think there have been some important steps taken to eliminate some of the confusion that existed. I think the coordination between the support which we are giving to the South Vietnamese forces and the South Vietnamese command itself has to be worked on steadily, but I think these things are being ironed out under the very skillful direction of General Harkins [Paul Harkins, Commanding General, Military Advisory Command, Viet-Nam] and his men, and I am confident that this is not the problem. The problem is the very nature of the guerrilla warfare itself.

*Mr. Clark:* Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that South Viet-Nam's President Diem is doing enough to mobilize public support among his own people for this fight against the Communists?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I think he has been doing a great deal more than say a year or two years ago, but I think I would never in a situation of this sort be willing to use the word "enough," because there is always more to be done. I think he has

been making some very substantial headway in this, but it is the unfinished business that always ought to be our first concern and it is the next step that ought to be at the top of our minds.

*Mr. Clark:* Now that the war is over in Laos, there is some fear this will release some 10,000 Communists to fight in North Viet-Nam. Are we doing anything to provide safeguards that this doesn't happen?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I understand in the tentative—the outlined—Geneva agreement which is now being worked on at the conference on Laos there will be a specific understanding that Laos would not itself be a pathway for supplies or guerrillas or leadership into any of the neighboring countries. This will be an obligation on the part of the Laotian Government. The two cochairmen would accept responsibilities for enforcing it. The International Control Commission would have obligations to keep an eye on it, and of course in South Viet-Nam itself there is intelligence and other means for determining whether or not this in fact is being carried out.

I would say if in fact any of these Communist forces moved through Laos or from Laos into South Viet-Nam that would greatly exaggerate the crisis and we would have a great deal to say and do about what would result from that situation. But it is not contemplated that this could occur under existing agreements.

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, have you been able to determine whether Moscow or Peiping exerts the most influence on the Laotian Communists and on the Communists from North Viet-Nam?

*Secretary Rusk:* No, I wouldn't be able to assess the relative influence of those two capitals on the situation. There have been moments when I have had the impression that perhaps they did not see every particular point in the same terms, or see eye to eye on them, but I wouldn't try to say at this point which had the larger influence at the moment.

#### **Communist Buildup Opposite Quemoy**

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, on another Far East problem, as you well know there has been a buildup of Communist forces opposite Quemoy. Do we detect any sign that this could be a prelude to an attack on either Quemoy or Matsu?

*Secretary Rusk:* It is always a little dangerous to try to say exactly what is in the mind of some-

one on the other side, on the mainland for example. There seems to have been some reinforcement of the areas adjacent to Formosa, but there are several possible explanations, including precautionary measures in view of some of the speeches and talk that has been coming out of Formosa. Another might be the disturbances which have been associated with food shortages and floods in that part of mainland China. There are some indications that perhaps the Communist discipline in that area has not been as tight as they had expected it to be. But I would think at the moment the indications do not point to a major attack on the offshore islands or on Formosa.

*Mr. Clark:* Mr. Secretary, we have said of course we would defend Quemoy and Matsu against any attack that would appear to be an invasion against Formosa. Could you conceive of an attack on these two islands against the backdrop of the present military buildup that we would not regard as an attack upon Formosa?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think this is a matter on which the President would have to make a judgment, and I would not myself want to speculate about the circumstances under which that judgment would be made. I do not think it would be well for me to go into that today.

*Mr. Scali:* Do you plan to fly personally to Geneva to sign the Laotian peace settlement that seems to be about to be drafted?

*Secretary Rusk:* If there is a prompt and satisfactory settlement worked out there, there is some likelihood the foreign ministers would come over very briefly for the purpose of signing the agreement, but that is still in the offing and no final decision has been made on that.

#### **Talks on Berlin**

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister] will apparently be there for the Soviet Union. Would you take advantage of his presence while he is there to discuss Berlin and perhaps disarmament?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think if Mr. Gromyko and I and the other Western foreign ministers found ourselves in the same city that we undoubtedly will have some talks on a good many subjects, including Berlin and disarmament.

*Mr. Clark:* Mr. Khrushchev, as you know, has said this week there has been some progress on Berlin. Do you agree there has been?

*Secretary Rusk:* There have been a number of ideas exchanged back and forth between the West and the Soviet Union. I think perhaps the sense of immediate crisis has been put to one side in the interests of a sober discussion of the underlying issues. I think there are some questions, perhaps of a subsidiary character, upon which it would not be too difficult to get agreement if there were agreement on the central issues, but our concern is that on the central issues of the vital interests of the West we have not made satisfactory progress. So I do not at the moment see what, in the jargon of our trade, we call a satisfactory basis for negotiation.

*Mr. Clark:* Mr. Secretary, you have said several times that we are in Berlin and we intend to stay. Does this mean that we would not negotiate any reduction in the Allied troop force in Berlin?

*Secretary Rusk:* The question of the numbers of Allied forces in Berlin has never come up, and actually I don't believe that is the issue because the numbers there are relatively small. They have no overall military significance from the point of view of the very large number of Russian forces, for example, in East Germany. The issue is really the presence of Western forces and our presence in Berlin and access to it. So the numbers of forces is not really a problem.

*Mr. Clark:* Do you believe the Russians would regard it as progress toward settlement if we reduce the Allied complement in Berlin?

*Secretary Rusk:* That is no impression that I have had, and in any event I don't believe that is a fruitful path to go down. I think the issue there is who is to be responsible and what are the vital interests of the respective parties. We could not trade out things of that sort in any great detail.

#### **Geneva Disarmament Talks**

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, disarmament talks with the Soviet Union will resume in Geneva in exactly 8 days.<sup>1</sup> Do you see a real hope for progress until the Soviets carry out this series of atmospheric tests that they say they are preparing?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I have seen their statements on this subject. I think that we ought to continue to work at this disarmament problem beginning again today just as we have over the last several months to try to find out where we can

make some advance. We don't believe ourselves that this is a matter that the Soviets will indefinitely brush aside because they have a basic interest as do the rest of us in trying to find some way to bring this arms race to a close and begin to turn this arms race downward.

Now we will go back to Geneva to do our best to find any way in which we can get started on actual physical disarmament, or any progress whatever on such an important thing as nuclear testing. One of the great problems thus far has been that the Soviet obsession with secrecy has made it very difficult to take any steps which would have the proper safeguards so that all signatories to any such agreement could be reasonably certain that the other side was carrying out the agreement. I think once we get across that kind of hurdle then we might begin to make some real headway. But as far as we are concerned we have been trying for months, indeed since March of last year, to make some headway in this. We have been trying right through our own test series. We will continue to try and hope very much that some breakthrough will come at some stage when the common interests of both sides in limiting this arms race can be acknowledged and we can get some agreement on the basis of that.

*Mr. Scali:* The Defense Department made public a report yesterday that showed that a series of tests we had conducted had made some important progress in better detecting underground nuclear explosions. Do you think that this continuing series of experiments, if they proved to be successful, could open up the way for us to reduce the amount of inspection we believe necessary on Soviet soil?

*Secretary Rusk:* Those tests, of course, have been of very great interest to us in the Department of State and in the Disarmament Agency. They are a result of a very intensive and elaborate effort made to accomplish just what you have indicated, to find more effective ways of detecting testing. The results of these tests have not been fully evaluated, and the possible developments out of these tests have not been looked at thoroughly. That is being done with great urgency. But I want to emphasize that so far as we can now tell it is still not possible to do all of this from long-distance instrumentation. Even under the best of the results that we have had so far, some control stations and some on-site inspection would in any event be required.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

Now, so long as the Soviet Union is saying adamantly, "No control posts" and "No on-site inspection," then we are still back where we were. But nevertheless we feel if something could come out of these Vela tests in the way of instrumentation which would give us assurance so we could reduce the kind of inspection which would, in the first place, be expensive and, secondly, would cause irritation and nervousness in such fields as espionage, this would be of great advantage. But nevertheless it still turns on whether the Soviet Union is willing to give reasonable assurances that any agreement is in fact being carried out.

*Mr. Scali:* Do you think that the Soviets really are afraid of "espionage" that could be provided for under any inspection teams or detection stations, or do you think this is an excuse for just saying no?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, in purely rational terms I would think that this obsession with secrecy has been carried much too far. For example, in the last session of the Geneva disarmament conference, we and the British put to them control and inspection procedures which would involve having a look—international inspectors having a look—at less than 1/2000th of Soviet territory in any single year. From the point of view of espionage it seemed to us that completely eliminated that problem, but nevertheless Russia—and when I say "Russia" I mean Russia historically, long before the Communist Revolution—seems to have had this obsession with secrecy with respect to the foreigner. And I can't say that this is not genuine on their side. All I can say is I think we have done everything humanly possible to remove this problem from the conversation. I must say that I have been disappointed and even a little surprised that they were not able, in the interests of turning this arms race downward, to accept these minimum assurances of security that were in our latest proposals in Geneva.

#### North Atlantic Partnership

*Mr. Clark:* On a different subject, Mr. Secretary, President Kennedy has created a lot of comment around the world this week with his Fourth of July speech<sup>2</sup> calling for a partnership with Europe. Can you give us some specifics as to what form this partnership might take?

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 131.

*Secretary Rusk:* Mr. Clark, it is not easy for me at this point to add very much to the President's excellent July Fourth speech or to what he said in his press conference last Thursday [July 5]. I think the great historical trend here is toward North Atlantic solidarity.

Now, insofar as next steps are concerned, the next step, as the President pointed out, is in Europe: the Common Market negotiations with the United Kingdom and some others; the determination by the Europeans as to what kind of Europe they want to organize. As far as we are concerned, we would welcome a Europe which is unified and as solidified as the European traffic will bear, as they themselves could manage.

The idea that we have some jealousy or some resistance or some resentment of the arrival on the world scene of a vigorous and strong and confident and self-asserted Europe is just nonsense. This has been an object of American policy since 1945. So the next chapter is to be written in Europe. Then when they make their own determinations about what kind of Europe they want for themselves, then we, within the framework of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and with trade negotiations which we hope will be authorized under the President's proposals to the Congress, then we will talk out with the Europeans that Europe, how we and they can work very closely together. Because we have the same commitments, we are determined to work together. We have the same interests as far as the other parts of the world are concerned.

The President emphasized that this North Atlantic Community as we see it is not a "rich man's club," I think were the words he used. It was outward-looking into all parts of the world—aid to underdeveloped countries, special relationships to countries all over the globe in the interests of this great free world of which we are a part.

Now we have existing machinery which will permit us to go a very long way toward building further the partnership between the United States and Western Europe. Again, NATO and OECD gives us a great latitude with full support of congressional and political leaders in the country. It is for the longer range to consider whether there are still more formal steps which ought to be taken.

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, do you think this au-

tomatically means there will be a reduction in the amount of American leadership and influence that we can exert in the Western World?

*Secretary Rusk:* When you look back to 1947 and 1948, when we, who had been unscathed, by and large, by the war, were about the only free country that could move with great effect in many parts of the world, when we were behind the Marshall Plan, when NATO defenses depended critically upon the United States, that period is fortunately not with us any longer. We have strong partners, strong allies, those who can help carry these burdens, and this is something that we welcome.

Now in that sense the relative responsibilities of the United States may decline somewhat, but the total effect of this free-world partnership will increase and grow. So you can't really put this just in terms of our national position. It is in our national interest that Europe take up the historical burden of the great story of freedom, which Europe has borne over the centuries with great effect—take it up and move it forward. We will be with them moving it forward, and in this joint interest we will have an effect, I think, on the shaping of history that will make an enormous difference.

*Mr. Clark:* Do you think it is in our national interest, Mr. Secretary, that General de Gaulle is exerting his own strong views on many Western problems in Europe?

*Secretary Rusk:* Oh, I think General de Gaulle has made a historic contribution to France and to the Western World in what he has done from 1942 onward. I think it is important for him to speak out on the issues that he feels strongly about because that is a part of the context within which this unified Europe will grow. And I think the joint communique which he and Chancellor Adenauer put out after their meeting showed that they are thinking in terms of a strong and vigorous Europe in which Germany and France would, of course, play an important role. No, I think we are under great obligation to General de Gaulle.

*Mr. Clark:* Don't you think General de Gaulle to a degree has succeeded in wresting the leadership of the Western World away from the United States, to a degree?

*Secretary Rusk:* I wouldn't put it in those terms, because what is involved here really is how we and

Europe best move together within the North Atlantic Community. I think General de Gaulle recognizes the fundamental importance of the closest possible cooperation between the United States and Western Europe. I have had no reason to think that there is any doubt in his mind about the fundamental importance of this great community solidarity.

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, do you think it is possible that some day this Atlantic partnership might include the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries? If I remember correctly, General de Gaulle has spoken of a union stretching from the Atlantic all the way to the Urals.

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, General de Gaulle, I think, was speaking, perhaps, in long-range historical terms on that point.

If the Soviet Union—their leaders—should ever decide to give first priority to the national interests of Russia and to the deep and known interests of the Soviet—of the Russian—people, then over time, over decades, I think things could be worked out to where there could be much more of a normal relation between East and West. But this is going to require some major decisions across the Iron Curtain and some basic changes in their system and their attitude. So long as they are pursuing the basic doctrine of world revolution, so long as they are saying it is this kind of world rather than the type of world anticipated in the United Nations Charter, then there are the deep misgivings and there are deep crises ahead of us.

*Mr. Clark:* Is there a danger at the moment that we are moving in the other direction, that the Common Market is driving such dissident Communist countries as Yugoslavia closer to Moscow?

*Secretary Rusk:* No, this would, I think, depend upon the basis on which the Common Market works out its trade relations with other countries. Unfortunately for this present period, when the Common Market-U.K. discussions are going forward, it isn't possible for them to say clearly and specifically what their attitude is going to be toward a number of other countries. But as we made it clear in our discussions with the Congress in connection with President Kennedy's trade proposals, we see our own negotiations with the Common Market moving in the direction of a common lowering of tariffs between that Common Market and our own common market on a most-favored-nation basis. We don't want Latin America,

Japan, and other countries to be squeezed out of the trading opportunities in these two great trading centers. And I would very much hope that some of these countries in eastern and south-eastern Europe, such as Yugoslavia and Poland, would have easy and free access to the trading relationships with the West because there is no question about it at all that the peoples of those two countries have a deep affinity for Western ties. They have a nostalgia toward a restoration of these great traditional ties with the Western civilization. And that is all in the interests of the future of freedom for these doors to be kept open.

#### Question of Aid to Yugoslavia and India

*Mr. Seali:* Mr. Secretary, as you well know, aid to both Yugoslavia and India suddenly has become a controversial item in Congress, and I think the House is about to act perhaps this week on it.

Would you consider it a diplomatic disaster, let's say, for the administration if the President's hands were to be tied by Congress to the point where no aid was possible to India and Yugoslavia?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think it would be calamitous, Mr. Seali, if the President's freedom of action was inhibited by law in these two matters. The question is not, in the case of Yugoslavia, whether we are for or against communism. Yugoslavia has a Communist government, but it is independent of the Soviet Union. It is not a part of this international conspiracy against the free world. And we feel that it is very important that the door be left open. Now this isn't even a matter of the quantity of trade. This past year we have had very little aid as far as we are concerned to Yugoslavia, outside of the Food-for-Peace Program and a little technical assistance, and that is about all. But it is very important that the President be free to leave the door open so that if and as normal and close relations become possible between Yugoslavia and the West we can continue our general program of assisting Yugoslavia in maintaining its independence.

This has been the attitude of President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy, and I think it is very important that the Congress leave him that freedom of action.

Insofar as India is concerned, there have been irritations between us and India in the last several

months. Two great countries in opposite parts of the world with different positions, different problems, are bound to have particular points in which they are in disagreement, and sometimes they disagree rather sharply.

But the point is, here is a country of 450 million people which is the largest constitutional democracy in the world, that the world has ever seen. More people going to the polls in free, orderly elections than we have ever seen anywhere, with basic commitments with which we are familiar, basic commitments that they borrowed in part from the same people from whom we borrowed them, namely the British, Anglo-Saxon tradition of constitutional government. They have maintained that democracy in the face of some great difficulties: 450 million people, adding about 10 million a year; an average income of about \$70 per capita; 25 percent of them are illiterate; a dozen or more major languages throughout the country; no common language throughout the country. And yet they have made a constitutional system work along democratic lines.

Now we have disagreed with them and they with us on certain issues like Goa, Kashmir, and nuclear testing, but we and they both have joined to support the United Nations in the Congo. They and we joined to defend the United Nations against the troika attack by the Soviet Union. The Indian chairman of the Control Commission in South Viet-Nam joined with his Canadian colleague to call attention to the fact that it was the North Vietnamese intrusion into South Viet-Nam that had stimulated this fighting in the last 2 years.

Now we will disagree on certain subjects. There is no reason why we shouldn't. India is not a satellite of ours, and we are not a satellite of India, and we are great countries with vital interests all over the world. So we will have our differences, but we also have great common commitments that are important and it would be a great mistake, I think, if we did not take an active, even if only a small, part in the Indian development program.

I don't think people realize, Mr. Seali, for example, that in the Indian third 5-year plan more than \$24 billion of investment are going to be needed for that plan. More than \$20 billion of that will come from India itself, and less than \$5 billion will come from outside resources, and we and other friendly countries in the West are pro-

viding a substantial amount of that, but we are only providing as much as others in the West themselves provide.

Our investment there, while it is large in actual terms, is relatively small in Indian terms.

So these are the great historical stakes that we have—that there be in Asia, that there be in the subcontinent, this strong constitutional democracy.

#### Algeria

*Mr. Clark:* Mr. Secretary, one quick question on Algeria. Now that peace has come to Algeria, there seems to be a power struggle going on there among the Moslem leadership. Are we supporting either faction?

*Secretary Rusk:* We are not supporting any of the factions in Algeria at the present time. The provisional executive there has been accorded responsibility for government. We are discussing with them the question of the precise recognition of government in the usual way when arrangements can be worked out. But we do hope that the agony of the last 7 or 8 years can come to an end and these people can settle down to pick up the responsibilities for their independence.

*Mr. Scali:* Mr. Secretary, we want to thank you very much for being with us today on "Issues and Answers."

*Secretary Rusk:* Thank you very much, Mr. Scali.

## Journalism and Foreign Affairs

by Robert J. Manning

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>

By pure coincidence, a few days before coming here I rediscovered a somewhat obscure work by a onetime inhabitant of these parts, Mark Twain. In his story *Report From Paradise*, he tells of the difficulty old Captain Stormfield encountered after he frivolously wandered off course on his way to Heaven and thereby arrived at a golden gate some billion leagues away from the one through which late inhabitants of our planet were accustomed to enter.

The gatekeepers were not at all familiar with the type of creature who appeared impatiently before them and were only puzzled when the captain tried to explain whence he had come. "California" meant nothing to them. Neither did "Earth." Nor even the solar system the newcomer described to them. Finally an attendant, riding a balloon, took off on a study of a map somewhat larger than the State of Rhode Island and, after 2 days

of exploration with telescope and magnifying glass, hastened down with the report, "I've found the place the gentleman comes from. It's the tiny planet we call The Wart."

We can probably stand more of the sort of putting us in place that Mark Twain delighted in. But ours is a generally humorless age—perhaps too much so—and our sense of the smallness and transitoriness of human life is on most days overwhelmed by the sense of hugeness and the complexity of the traps and the obligations that harass us, as individuals and as a society, in our pursuit of life, liberty, and what passes for happiness.

In the higher scheme of things the planet may indeed be only a wart. But it is our wart. And it is for us Americans probably more than any of its 2 billion inhabitants to determine what is to become of it, to influence the shape of its life today and its life for some time to come.

We can truly contend with this only if we place against Twain's sardonicism of half a century ago the faith expressed a dozen years ago by the late

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the New York State Society of Newspaper Editors at Painted Post, N.Y., on July 9 (press release 446).

William Faulkner when, in his Nobel prize acceptance address, he said:

I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure. . . . I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail.

It has become customary in this day of nuclear hazard to punctuate that moving credo with a question mark. Indeed, the facts of science and destructive power are such as to intrude that question mark even into the unconscious of those who refuse consciously to question Faulkner's belief.

It is an intolerable doubt, and there is no more justified goal in public life today than the desire of men to exorcise that doubt in ways that leave mankind not only to prevail but to prevail with the freedom of consent, the freedom of action, and the freedom of mind that are the reasons why prevailing is worth the battle.

#### **Foreign Relations, Part of Mainstream of Life**

This, for all the complications of diplomacy, of economics, of military strategies, is what foreign policy is all about. Foreign relations—our life as a nation and people with other nations and peoples—have become an inseparable part of the mainstream of life on this globe. It is a stream in which this nation, as the richest, most powerful, and, if you will, the most idealistic, must exert a dominant current. This sense of obligation lies close to the frustration that is reflected today in many elements of American life, including the news and editorial pages of many of your newspapers.

It all seemed so simple back in the days when this country had one crisis at a time on its slate and could look at the world as Thoreau looked at his small world around Concord: "Why is it that everywhere I go, people follow and paw me with their dirty institutions?"

As recently as the late war years, when I was covering the Department of State as a United Press correspondent, the reporting of foreign relations was a relatively easy and amiable pursuit. We would gather each day around the desk of Secretary of State Cordell Hull for an informal news conference. The issues at hand were few. Most of the time, the Secretary would listen politely to a question and reply, "You may say that the matter is under constant study."

We could make off for our telephones and dictate into the day's torrent of words our one or two reports on the progress—or retrogression—of the comity of nations. Mr. Hull would return to the contemplation of the few score or at most few hundred cables or reports that represented the day's State Department traffic.

Somehow the newspaper mechanism that had served for a half a century or more seemed still sufficient. Those days' fragments of how the one or two crises were progressing would be sufficient to apprise even the busiest man of, roughly, how affairs were going. He would be able to remember this day's fragments and fit them together with tomorrow's and the next day's with some degree of confidence that he sensed the way the world was.

That he perhaps did not completely sense it was due to the phenomenon that was then beginning to grip and to contort the understanding and the reporting of, as well as the conduct of, international relations in the postwar era—a phenomenon that has as much bearing on American journalism today as on government and diplomacy.

Today foreign policy reaches into every American home. Not just on April 15th, when every taxpayer faces up to his part of the bill (though it can be said that if there is to be any major drop in the tax burden on the American people it would come through developments in the world around us). But it affects every home that has to turn out young people for military service—we have more than 1 million Americans stationed outside the continental limits in defense of the free institutions which are vital to the future of this country. Wherever there are jobs that depend upon or are affected by trade, there are homes directly affected by foreign policy. Our overseas economic commitments are such that we require a favorable gap of more than \$5 billion between our exports and our imports merely to stay even on the books.

#### **World of Crisis and Revolution**

Look at the global map of the moment. Where you lay a finger you find a crisis—in Berlin, the Congo, Viet-Nam, West New Guinea, to name only a few. It is a world, too, of revolution—the revolution that simmers across most of the South American Continent and which will be violent or will be peaceful depending in great part on our ability to help the good elements to prevail in



Latin America before the bad elements gain the upper hand. Look only at a few statistics about conditions south of our border to recognize the enormity—and the immediacy—of this problem.

With a population of 200 million, Latin America has a gross product of \$62 billion—less than \$300 per capita (and in all but six countries the figure is less than \$200 per capita). Roughly 90 percent of the land belongs to 10 percent of the owners. In Peru 1.6 percent of the landowners control 76.2 percent of the cultivated farmland; in Chile 2.2 percent control 73.2 percent. There are 50 million underprivileged adults. Of not quite 40 million children of school age, 11.2 million are not in school. With the school population increasing at a rate of 1.1 million a year, it would require 27,500 new schoolrooms and 30,000 new teachers each year merely to take care of the annual increase—without making any provision for the 11.2 million without schools.

Similarly, revolution pulsates through Southeast Asia and Africa—a kind of revolution also in our relations with a revitalized Western Europe, revolution in the exploration of the universe, and dangerous revolution in man's knowledge of the power to demolish himself and his works.

In most of the trouble areas a sudden turn in events, a small miscalculation, or an arbitrary national act, could touch off violence or war. Even the smallest of those conflicts could be the fuse to bigger war.

In the relatively brief time since the casual conclaves of newsmen around Cordell Hull's desk we have seen the liquidation of colonial empires. We have doubled the membership of the United Nations and now have diplomatic relations with more than 100 countries—dozens more governments with which to come into conflict or common purpose in a multitude of exacting instances.

We have in this brief period come into the time of adjustment between the white and nonwhite races. For three centuries, because of the political and economic and military explosion of Western Europe, the white race has held a very special position in the world. That fact is changing, and the minority white race has in front of it the great process of a realignment and normalization of relationships among human beings, among national states, among cultures and regions—a normalization which we must hope to shape into one that will be tolerable, safe, and acceptable for much time to come.

It would be difficult enough for the men dealing with this world—or those writing about it—if the job before us were simply to cope with and contain the turbulence. The task far surpasses that. The job is not only to maintain the peace, to protect and promote the national interest, and to keep the turbulence under control, but actually to build amid the turbulence—to build new economic and social institutions, to build new channels through which the riches of the world can be more widely distributed and the injustices erased, to transform a climate of fear into an atmosphere of trust and stability.

No corps of engineers sets out to build a huge dam without first diverting the course of the river, so that strong foundations may first be laid. Yet those who would build the new world must do their rebuilding amid the very torrent of events.

There may be many differences of opinion in this country about when, where, and how the building ought to be done, but I cannot believe that there is any doubt that it has to be done. The simple fact is that if we don't try, others will—to the detriment not merely of American ideals but also to the detriment of American national interest.

I have not even mentioned yet, in this recital of the complications that war against coherence and continuity in foreign policy, the two most dominant elements of all. First, of course, is the basic conflict between communism and the Western World; second is the growing phenomenon of Western Europe.

#### **Conflict Between Communism and Western World**

The first remains the central preoccupation—the most threatening, the most dangerous, and the most taxing on the patience and ingenuity of those in the West who would find ways to prevail without nuclear war. It is a preoccupation in which strong certainties must mingle with great uncertainties: the certainty, for example, that Soviet communism is not just a doctrine but also a global program of action—a program by men who desire their system to prevail over the world and who in most cases are most likely convinced that, in time, it will; the uncertainty, for example, about whether the West is indeed willing to shoulder the burdens that must be carried for many years to come if the Communists' conviction is to be proved false.

The so-called cold war has itself become in-

tensely more complex and subtle in recent years. With Stalin's death, Mr. Khrushchev turned to a broader spectrum of tools and instruments for supporting Soviet policy—a more sophisticated and more subtle policy. He has entered into the fields of military, economic, and social assistance outside the Communist bloc. He has given great emphasis to the doctrine of so-called peaceful coexistence and taken over a great many good Western words for Communist purpose.

These changes alone have had a bearing on our dealings with our own allies and with the neutrals and newly freed countries. They have made it necessary for us to reexamine many of our earlier cold-war assumptions and reflexes and clichés. It is a reexamination that I sometimes feel has gone further among diplomats and government officials than among some journalists.

With all this more sophisticated Communist effort has come intensified Communist reliance on what Khrushchev calls "justified wars of liberation," the kind of violent subversion and guerrilla warfare that is giving us so much difficulty in Southeast Asia—and might have taken fire by now in the Congo if it were not for brilliant, if still incomplete, diplomacy by the United States and the United Nations. (I should add with reference to the Congo a cautionary note: The possibilities of serious trouble there, between the U.N. and the Congo Republic on the one hand and the Province of Katanga on the other, are not by any means ended. We cannot be sure that even the next few days will not bring fresh trouble there.)

But all this has been accompanied, too, by difficulties within the Communist world. The Communists' own difficulties in agriculture, the obvious failures in East Germany memorialized by the Berlin wall, attest to this. The doctrinal debate between Moscow and Peking has tended to promote differences between Communist leaders and to throw confusion into what has been a certain intellectual attraction to communism in some non-Communist places.

The more they run into difficulties, the more the Communists have major decisions to make. The more it becomes apparent that they are not making headway, the more they can be expected to move toward their own version of what has been called "an agonizing reappraisal." Obviously, here is opportunity for us—but more hazy, too. We cannot be sure at the moment how any of these

difficulties, or the sum of them, will affect the Communist posture in the world or whether in the long run they might tend to separate the dogma from the program of action.

Where we have the one direct confrontation with the Soviet Union—the nose-to-nose confrontation in Berlin—we have both an obligation and an opportunity. The obligation is naturally to the vital Western interest in maintaining its presence in, and free access to, West Berlin. The opportunity is to maintain, through that crisis, a channel of contact with the Soviet Union—responsible contact that dramatizes the danger if this problem, this potential *casus belli*, goes out of control. The fact that our vital interests in West Berlin are not negotiable should by now be clear to Moscow. That the talks between us have not yet produced any basis for negotiation does not reduce in any appreciable way the wisdom of keeping open the channel of contact over the most dangerous issue we face at this moment.

#### Old Simplicities Outmoded

One of the most trying aspects of this Berlin confrontation, as viewed from a journalist's position, is that it, like so many of the matters we have touched on tonight, no longer lends itself to the daily recital of blacks and whites, of forward or backward steps, that make up the core of the conventional news story.

The same can be said of the developing big story of Western Europe and our ultimate relationship with it. Many chapters lie ahead—the most immediate being the negotiations concerning Britain's entry into the Common Market—before we know the shape of the Europe with whom we on this side of the Atlantic will hope to join in the "declaration of interdependence" proposed earlier this month by President Kennedy.<sup>2</sup>

Here again, the old simplicities and reflexes we have been applying—in government and in journalism—have been altered or outmoded. The Western Europe of our recent postwar image, weak and threatened, suppliant for our aid and nakedly reliant on U.S. military power, is gone. Western Europe has grown up again, and its newfound strength and ambition demand of us quite different acts and emotions. Still another part of the old cliché is gone: The young, too-idealistic

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

America of World War I days, the youthfully disillusioned America of between the wars, both have gone. We are big boys now—very big indeed. I am struck by a phrase used by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to describe what has happened to the America that has become possessor of the frightful night of the nuclear weapon. Owning it and rejecting on the terrible burdens of choice and decisions it entails—decisions related to the basic question, what is the end of man?—has made us, he says, as old as Methuselah.

Perhaps the maturity is not all that evident to our friends, and perhaps it escapes those who have not yet the full inkling of how this power in fact inhibits rather than enhances its owners' freedom of action. But it is a fact, and this, too, lies close to the frustration I referred to a few minutes ago.

I am not attempting here to solicit special mercy for government (though I do believe on the basis of a few months' experience that for its admitted fallibility it is doing a remarkable job of assessing and mounting the opportunities open to this nation). Nor do I care here to take on the mutterings of "no win" policy that have filled the air in recent months. Of course we want to win, and all the efforts, big and small, of our foreign and defense policies are directed at this central aim. We want to win without grievous damage to the human race, including ourselves. If the "no win" critics grant, as they seem to, that the Communists somehow can without a nuclear war take over the world while we aren't paying attention, or caring, they surely must have sufficient faith in America and Western concepts to concede that we, too, can find the way to prevail without reverting to holocaust.

### Schizophrenic Coverage of Foreign Affairs

The point I have been working toward—with-out, I trust, overdrawing on your patience—is to say a few words about how all this seems to relate to journalism. If I may, I speak to you as a journalist, one who has been a journalist all his adult life and happens for the moment to be working in government, a job that keeps me as close to important journalism and its raw material as my past assignments as a reporter or editor. Given that permission, I may take advantage of it to the extent of saying some things that may not be altogether pleasing.

I offer not a declarative sentence but a question,

one that is a fair question for this time and this audience: Has our journalism altogether caught up with the events and complexities of the world it seeks to reflect and to explain? Has journalism, in its techniques, its assessments, its ways of presentation, its judgment of what is new (as against what is news) changed as much in the past half century as the volume and nature of foreign affairs?

I find a curious sort of split personality within the newspaper fraternity on the question of foreign affairs coverage. There is much complaining these days that the Government does not adequately inform the public of the nature and the rudiments of foreign policy and the issues requiring choice by the public as a whole. I am inclined to agree with much of this criticism—and feel that one of the challenging features of my sort of job in government is to find ways for improvement.

There is much criticism to the effect that the Government is too parsimonious with information, that the full facts are not revealed, or revealed so gradually as to obscure the full meaning. I'm not inclined to quarrel with this criticism, either. Even the most publicly oriented bureaucracy is neither empowered nor qualified in a democracy to set itself up as the judge of what the people should or should not know.

Yet there is within government a built-in tendency toward what might be called a "Parkinson's law on information": What you don't tell can't hurt you. There is a natural tendency in any bureaucracy to shield its misjudgments and its mistakes. I would not presume to claim that this part of Parkinson's law has been suddenly rescinded in Washington. I would say quite flatly, however, that in the top reaches of this Government there is a full recognition of the dangers of this tendency to the full operation of the democratic process and there is full and active recognition of the fact that what the public needs and must get is not less information but more.

There is where the schizophrenia seems to me to intrude itself. In instance after instance you will find editors and publishers who insist on the one hand that there must be a greater flow of information but say on the other that the reading public really doesn't want to read all that guff about foreign affairs. I think many of you will agree that the proportion and the placement devoted to more

than spot-news coverage of foreign affairs in many newspapers reflects this somewhat negative view of the public interest.

Which is it: The public needs and wants to know more, or the public doesn't? I think the facts contradict those editors who see a minimal interest in foreign affairs. Only 4 years ago, approximately 40,000 letters on foreign policy questions came to the Department of State for replies. Last year the total was 180,000. This year it will surpass 200,000. Requests for speeches by American diplomats and other foreign policy officers are running twice those of last year.

Beginning last year, the Department began a program of foreign policy briefing conferences in Washington and around the country. The response to those has been such as to cause us to draw plans for twice as many this year.

It is noteworthy that these channels of communication have little or nothing to do with the press. Is there not an inference here? If the public were getting what it wanted from the press, would these extrajournalistic measures be necessary?

I am aware that, in the matter of volume alone, much of the picture implied here can be refuted. Is it perhaps not a matter of volume but of the kind of reporting and writing about foreign affairs that is at issue?

From my new vantage point, I have come closer to a conviction that had begun to be nurtured well before I even knew that I might be working on the government side of the information profession. From this vantage point it often seems that in today's conditions both government and public are too often the captives of the spot-news report, the daily headline, the minute-to-minute news bulletins, the smartly written but not very deep weekly commentaries that tell us too simply and too certainly the momentary dope on each of the dozen or more crises that grip us at the moment. The profusion of material is great, for which we should be grateful. Communications' speed is only a little short of instantaneous, and for this, too, I suppose we should be thankful. But the question persists: Has journalism and its allied crafts moved sufficiently beyond the techniques of a past generation? Is it not worth wondering whether, even in the best hands, the day's or the week's news does not represent fragments? The reader is left to try, if he can, to fit today's pieces

of a dozen big problems into what he can remember of yesterday's fragments and those of the day before. Even in the best of reportorial hands, it is possible that this fragment of the Congo situation or that fragment of the Laos problem tacked to an arbitrary deadline can be something of a distortion.

And what fragments are important anyway? I am astonished—perhaps the word should be “appalled”—at the number of reportorial manhours that can be spent in Washington today in a search, say, for first mention of the name of a prospective new ambassador. What is so important about getting that first at the sacrifice of hours that could be devoted to pulling together a sharp assessment of the long-term results, good or bad, of U.S. aid to Poland, which has been receiving American aid, or in Czechoslovakia, which has not?

Is there perhaps some merit in the advice given recently to a group of editors by Pope John in Rome? With all the complications and ramifications of even the smallest international event today, he wondered, should not more editors cultivate a “discipline of waiting,” for, he added, “nothing is more capable of rendering good sentiments sterile than an avalanche of news used indiscriminately. . . .”

I would be disappointed and, I submit, misunderstood if I were to leave you with the impression that I speak here as a carper or querulous critic. Nothing could be more wrong. I have raised no questions that have not been raised by many reporters and editors. It is as a journalist that I speak, and with pride that I have had the opportunity to talk of these things with a candor that is the best way I know of expressing the esteem and the devotion that is due to an institution as indispensable to democracy as hydrogen or oxygen to water. It takes only a brief squint at the past to show that today's journalism in America is better than yesterday's. There is nothing wrong, I think you will agree, to hope with some confidence that it is not nearly as good as tomorrow's.

## Letters of Credence

### *Somali Republic*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Somali Republic, Omar Mohallim Mohamed, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 13.

For text of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 455 dated July 13.

## President Hails Successful Operation of Telstar

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated July 11

The successful firing and subsequent operation of the Telstar communications satellite is an outstanding example of the way in which government and business can cooperate in a most important field of human endeavor. The achievement of the communications satellite, while only a prelude, already throws open to us the vision of an era of international communications. There is no more important field at the present time than communications, and we must grasp the advantages presented to us by the communications satellite to use this medium wisely and effectively to insure greater understanding among the peoples of the world.

## U.S. Lifts Travel Curbs on Soviet Tourists and Exchange Visitors

Press release 441 dated July 6

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In a note handed on July 6 to Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin at Washington by Under Secretary Ball the United States informed the Soviet Government that it was eliminating the retaliatory system of closed areas so far as they apply to Soviet tourists and to other Soviet citizens visiting the United States within the framework of the exchanges agreement. The step was taken as a contribution toward the successful fulfillment of the new agreement on exchanges in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields concluded on March 8, 1962.<sup>1</sup> The United States note expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would take similar action in the interests of the exchanges program. The note also

reiterated the United States desire for complete and mutual abolition of all travel restrictions and renewed the United States proposal that representatives of the two Governments meet to discuss the question.

The closed-area system which was inaugurated in 1955 in response to longstanding Soviet restrictions will continue to apply to other Soviet citizens in the United States, including personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Although the closed-area system will no longer cover Soviet visitors coming to the United States within the framework of the exchanges agreement, their itineraries, as in the past, will be worked out by the Department's Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff. Itineraries given comparable American groups by the Soviet authorities will likewise continue to be borne in mind in the determination of the itineraries for Soviet visitors.

### U.S. NOTE OF JULY 6

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the notes of January 6, 1961,<sup>2</sup> November 11, 1957,<sup>3</sup> and January 3, 1955,<sup>4</sup> which established regulations concerning travel by Soviet citizens in the United States comparable to those previously imposed by the Soviet Government on the movement of citizens of the United States in the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States regrets that the Soviet Government has not acted on the United States proposal in the note of January 6, 1961, that representatives of the two Governments meet at an early date to discuss the abolition or reduction of travel restrictions. The Government of the United States continues to believe that the closed area system, first instituted by the Soviet Government, is not conducive to improved relations between the two countries.

Several months ago a new exchanges agreement was signed. Like its predecessors it contained an expression of hope that the contemplated exchanges would contribute significantly to the betterment of relations between the two countries, thereby contributing to a lessening of international tension. The continued existence of travel restrictions works in the contrary direction. The Government of the United States has, therefore, decided to eliminate its system of closed areas so far as they apply to Soviet tourists and to other Soviet citizens visiting the United States within the framework of the ex-

<sup>1</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1961, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.

changes program. The Government of the United States wishes to express the hope that the Soviet Government will consider also making a contribution to the aims of better mutual understanding and of broadening of co-operation between the peoples of the two countries which are envisaged in the exchanges agreement.

The existing notification and closed zone regulations will continue to apply to all other Soviet citizens in the United States, in accordance with the notes of January 6, 1961, November 11, 1957, and January 3, 1955. In addition, the notification system presently applied to long-term visitors will be retained.

The Government of the United States reiterates once again its desire for complete and mutual abolition of all travel restrictions. In the absence of a corresponding interest on the part of the Soviet Government, however, it is also prepared on a reciprocal basis to reduce the remaining travel restrictions as a whole or, alternatively, to reduce or abolish them for individual categories of Soviet citizens. The Government of the United States renews, therefore, its proposal of January 6, 1961, that this question be discussed at an early date.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington.

## The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress

by Abram Chayes  
Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>

I was delighted when your chairman suggested that I talk to you about the Alliance for Progress. No time or place could be more appropriate for such a talk. Here is a conception gigantic enough to capture the imagination even of Texans. And the President's visit to Mexico last weekend<sup>2</sup> revealed again—as yours will next week—the importance and the potency of the phrase *Alianza para el Progreso*.

But what is the alliance? Is it anything more than a catchy, high-sounding phrase? I think it is much more than that. But like so many goals to which man has set his heart and strength, only time and history will tell whether it has reality. The alliance is our name for a vast cooperative effort by the peoples of the Western Hemisphere and their governments to lift a continent bodily, and within a decade, into the world of the 20th century.

The alliance represents for us a challenge and an opportunity. But the obverse of challenge and opportunity is danger. And there is no question that in the Latin America of a year ago the conditions of life for the mass of people foretold danger. That danger persists today.

Hunger and dietary deficiencies still account for thousands of deaths each year.

Diseases which are unknown or closely checked in the United States rage throughout vast areas of Latin America, sometimes leaving no one untouched.

Two-thirds of all Latin American families live without adequate or even decent housing.

Illiteracy, the deadly enemy of democracy, is rampant. In half the countries, less than half the people can read and write.

The truth is that today, with all the progress that has been made in Latin America, huge masses of people still live in abject poverty, crowded in city slums or tilling the soil in the ancient ways.

We should recognize frankly that this record is in some measure a consequence of our own neglect. For most of the 180 years of our history, we looked inward, or eastward across the ocean to Europe, or, latterly, around the world. Only rarely have we looked south and then not always with a benevolent eye.

There is a way to measure the dimensions of our recent neglect. Of the \$90.5 billion worth of U.S. financial assistance abroad since the war, Latin America, close to us geographically and historically and of obvious strategic importance, has had only \$5 billion.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the State Junior Bar of Texas at San Antonio, Tex., on July 5 (press release 436).

<sup>2</sup>See BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

We can adduce reasons for this decade and a half of neglect. But history does not accept excuses. In our own hemisphere, as elsewhere, slums, poverty, sickness, ignorance, exploited peasants, and indifferent rulers are the breeding ground of revolution, a revolution all too vulnerable to capture by the adversaries of freedom.

By September 1960, when the Act of Bogotá<sup>3</sup> finally took the first step toward redressing the balance, the danger had come to reality. Castro was in the saddle in Cuba. His agents and imitators found willing ears throughout the hemisphere. The secure southern flank which we had taken for granted was beginning to seethe and buckle. It was, as Dr. José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, said, "one minute to midnight."

### Call for a Decade of Development

In this atmosphere, President Kennedy, on March 13, 1961, launched the Alliance for Progress.<sup>4</sup> He called for a hemispheric meeting in August to map a decade of development. As a starter, he pledged \$1 billion in U.S. aid during the first year of the program.

From the beginning it was recognized that the magnitude of the task eclipsed the resources of any single nation, even one as rich and powerful as ours. This was to be a cooperative task, with the greatest stress on self-help. Of the \$100 billion in capital that is required, \$80 billion is to be generated within the countries of Latin America themselves. Twenty billion will come from outside. Of these external resources, the U.S. contribution, public and private, will account for about half. The rest must come from private investors and governments in the rest of the free world.

But the objectives of the alliance will not be achieved simply by injections of money. What is aimed at is thoroughgoing social transformation. The promise of the alliance is summed up for the 180 million people of South and Central America in the five magic monosyllables—work, home and land, health and schools.

### Progress During First Year

That is a tall order, and it was put in almost a year ago. How are we doing?

It is clear that the concept of the alliance has great emotional and political appeal in Latin America. In country after country—Ecuador, Salvador, Peru, and others—it has become an election issue. Candidates, parties, programs are measured by their congruity with the Alliance for Progress. People know about it and respond to it. In Bogotá, Colombia, for example, 71 percent of people polled knew about the alliance. And that is all to the good for, in order to accomplish great transformations, vast popular energies have to be released.

Second, the social and economic premises of the program have been accepted. It has been recognized that aid cannot come as a handout but only where warranted by the conscientious effort of the receiving country to mobilize its own resources to attack its own problems. This means primarily tax reform, land reform, programs for health, housing, and education, and especially development planning. In this context, I should emphasize, a plan does not mean a blueprint for a centrally regulated economy. It is a national effort to set goals, to match needs and resources, to set priorities so that scarce reserves of hard currency and energy and trained manpower will not be frittered away on nonessentials.

Third, these requirements are beginning to be accepted in practice as well as in theory. Five countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela—have land reform laws. In Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru they are under consideration. Last year new tax laws were passed in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru. And in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Venezuela tax reform is in the works. Eleven countries have submitted long-term development plans or have them in advanced stages of preparation.

Fourth, the results of the alliance are beginning to become visible to the people of the Americas, a tangible earnest of what can be accomplished.

A school lunch program high in the Peruvian Andes has fed 26,000 children and upped school attendance by 50 percent.

In the past 2 months contracts were signed by AID [Agency for International Development] with an American housing firm to finance the construction of low-cost housing for 475 families in Bogotá.

In April AID provided \$131 million for a two-

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

pronged program of development in Northeast Brazil, one of the most impoverished areas of South America.<sup>5</sup> The plan calls for an intensive short-term effort to provide pure water, electricity, medical facilities and schools, and a longer term 5-year program of development in irrigation, highway construction, power development, and farm improvement.

There is a certain impatience among Americans with the pace of these reforms, an impatience which grows in intensity as you climb Capitol Hill in Washington. I share this impatience, as I know many of you do. Once we have set our hands to a task, we are eager to see results; and when the need and the danger are as great as they are in Latin America, they are a spur to our normal desire to get on with the job. But this impatience should not be translated into demands to crack the whip or into inflexible legislative conditions on U.S. aid. We are dealing with economic, social, and legal systems entrenched for centuries. Often political power is concentrated among those who are the principal beneficiaries of the existing system and have most to lose by change. Fundamental arrangements of this sort cannot be whisked away at a command—especially a command from the north. We will need patience, tact, flexibility, a clear perception of the direction in which we want to move, and we will need to keep at it unremittingly. As the President said on the first anniversary of the alliance:<sup>6</sup>

Measured by the past, we have moved swiftly. Measured by the needs of the future, we must all do much better.

#### Legal Aspects of the Alliance

The announced title of this talk is "The Lawyer and the Alliance for Progress." Thus far I have been addressing the lawyer as citizen. That is as it should be, for lawyers traditionally have been looked to in our communities for leadership and understanding on public issues. But I believe the lawyer has a special professional role to play in the alliance to which I would like to direct your attention.

In the first place most of the institutional reforms projected by the alliance have a major legal

component. Land reform, tax reform, the financial instruments to tap private capital resources—all of these depend heavily on lawyers' experience and lawyers' skills.

We know this from our experience here at home. For example, the almost continuous housing boom we have had since World War II has not been sparked by public housing or vast inputs of Federal money. It has been made by a series of imaginative legal arrangements for gathering private savings and mobilizing private credit. I am happy to say that a student of mine is now back in his native Peru supervising the organization of a system of private savings and loan associations with governmentally insured deposits, based largely on U.S. experience. Such experience can be worth as much as U.S. dollars.

In this work of bringing our accumulated legal experience to bear on the problems of Latin America, the organized bar—associations like this one—and the law schools have a major role to play. The bar and the schools are beginning to shoulder the burden. The American Bar Foundation has begun a major study of land reform in Latin America. The University of Wisconsin is also embarking on work in this field. Some of my former colleagues at the Harvard Law School have long been engaged in research on problems of urban land use in the hemisphere, research which they are broadening to cover land use planning in general. The World Tax Center at Harvard has already made a significant contribution to the development of adequate tax systems in Latin America, codifying existing laws, consulting on drafts of new ones, and, perhaps most important of all, training fiscal officers in effective techniques of tax collection and administration. Closer here to home, many of you may know of the work in Latin American law at Tulane Law School. And the Inter-American Bar Association offers a vehicle for professional communication and collaboration with our colleagues to the south.

#### Aid to Private Investors

But not all the bar's service to the Alliance for Progress will be in a corporate capacity. A large proportion of the needed outside capital must come from private investors. In fact, if the alliance is to succeed U.S. private investment must flow south at the rate of at least \$300 million

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 778.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 990.



annually—a 50 percent increase over the 1961 rate. I need not point out to you gentlemen that private investors are clients—and in this case many of them will be Texas clients. What can you do for these clients to help them insure the safety and profitability of their investment?

In the first place, you can make sure that in their operations abroad they are good corporate citizens, just as they would be at home. In many cases there should be a local capital component in the enterprise. There is no better insurance against adverse political action than local investors with a stake in the welfare of their corporation. In all cases there should be a program for using, educating, training, and especially upgrading local personnel. Successful United States firms often provide clinics, hospitals, schools, or recreational facilities in Latin American communities where they are located. It should go without saying, though unfortunately it sometimes doesn't, that local laws and customs are to be respected.

Second, you can help your client with his financing. Washington lending agencies are giving special emphasis to private development investment in Latin America. The Export-Import Bank has long served in this field. The Inter-American Development Bank is a new instrumentality designed especially for the Alliance for Progress. Finally, AID's investment guaranty program can provide insurance protection at low cost against the special nonbusiness risks of doing business in developing countries—inconvertibility, expropriation and confiscation, war, revolution, or insurrection.

Guaranty authority may now be used to insure not only United States corporations but wholly owned foreign subsidiaries as well. Furthermore, the act now makes it clear that expropriation includes a breach of contract by the foreign government where the breach materially adversely affects continued operations of the investor's project.

In addition to this specific risk authority, the Foreign Assistance Act provides for insurance on up to 75 percent of the value of the investment against losses from any risks whatsoever. And Congress has authorized a special Latin American program to encourage private housing by means of all-risk guaranties for projects similar to those insured by the FIA and suitable for conditions in Latin America.

Third, if the investor is threatened with expropriation—certainly if he actually suffers it—he will obviously call upon his lawyer. It is important that you know the position of the United States Government on this matter.

The right to take private property is implicit in sovereignty. Our own Constitution recognizes it. And the United States has long conceded that other countries have the right to expropriate property, including that of Americans, provided they offer just compensation, that is, compensation that is reasonably adequate and reasonably prompt.

This does not mean that we think expropriation is a good thing. In most cases it is clearly not a useful policy for less developed countries. Such countries characteristically are starved for capital, and the takeover of existing properties is often an unwise way to employ these limited resources. We make known to these nations our views on the disadvantages inherent in expropriation.

We react similarly toward forms of government interference with American business that may be more sophisticated but are no less lethal. Of course we do not wish to discourage Latin American countries from adopting such measures as fair labor standards, social security systems, progressive taxation, and the regulation of utilities. Quite the reverse: An objective of the alliance is to encourage these countries, within limits appropriate to their economic strength, to adopt sound and progressive tax and labor laws and other measures to assure an increased sense of social justice and broader participation in the fruits of economic progress. But when such measures are, in fact or in form, applied so as to discriminate against and harass foreign business enterprise, they can amount to what has been often called "creeping expropriation."

If, in the face of American advice, a government proceeds with expropriation, creeping or otherwise, I can assure you that the full diplomatic resources of the United States Government will be made available to see that fair treatment is accorded to the American business involved. Obviously, the embassies of the United States cannot be expected to make a strong presentation where an American national may not himself have clean hands, where he may have been guilty of policies which are manifestly inconsistent with legitimate requirements of the host country. But

any American national who has comported himself properly will receive the full and vigorous assistance of the State Department and our embassies abroad. When this happens, perhaps more often than you think we get results.

Our investment in Latin America, public or private, is not likely to bring us a quiet life over the next 10 years. The Alliance for Progress is engaged in a mighty effort for change, and as it advances, old ways, old habits, old relationships, old institutions, old vested interests will be uprooted and transformed. This cannot be done without releasing enormous energies, and these in turn will generate—are already generating—enormous resistances among those who have a stake in the old order. We may hope that the changes will be relatively peaceful. But they will be far from calm, and progress will not be steady.

We are engaged in a great, perhaps an unparalleled, adventure of trying to bring a fundamental revolution—a controlled revolution, but nonetheless a revolution—to a whole continent within a decade. We must not lose courage, give way to impatience, or slacken our determination in the face of the ups and downs of a process that must work itself out over time. The stakes are high, and if we persist the gains will be magnificent. As President Kennedy said in launching the Alliance for Progress on March 13, 1961:

“. . . our own struggle—the revolution which began in Philadelphia in 1776 and in Caracas in 1811—is not yet finished. Our hemisphere's mission is not yet completed. For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions.”

## Trade With El Salvador

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
TERMINATING IN PART THE PROCLAMATION OF MAY 1,  
1937, AND CONTINUING THE APPLICATION OF A PORTION  
OF THE FEBRUARY 19, 1937 TRADE AGREEMENT WITH  
EL SALVADOR

#### Part I—Statement of Purposes

The purposes of this proclamation are:

First—to terminate the proclamation of May 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 1564, insofar as it put into effect the schedules

of concessions and related provisions of the trade agreement of February 19, 1937 between the United States and the Republic of El Salvador, 50 Stat. 1564. The two governments have, by an exchange of notes dated June 29, 1962, agreed to terminate, as of the close of August 8, 1962, the schedules of concessions and the related provisions, including Article I, the first paragraph of Article II, Articles III, V, VI, XVI, and in Article XVII the references to Article VI.

Second—to continue in effect the language of the note originally appended to Schedule I of the 1937 agreement, which relates to pharmaceutical specialties or patent medicines, and which by the agreement of June 29, 1962 has been transferred into a new Article III of the 1937 agreement.

Part II—Terminating in Part the Proclamation of May 1, 1937 and Continuing the Application of a Portion of the 1937 Agreement With El Salvador

NOW, THEREFORE,

I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, under the authority vested in me as President, by the Constitution and statutes, in particular section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended do proclaim that, as of August 8, 1962:

#### (1) Termination

The proclamation dated May 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 1564, shall be terminated insofar as it relates to the schedules of concessions, and related provisions, contained in the agreement of February 19, 1937, between the United States and El Salvador (50 Stat. 1564), and identified in the first paragraph of Part I of this proclamation.

#### (2) Continuation

The language of the note originally appended to Schedule I of the agreement of February 19, 1937 between the United States and El Salvador (50 Stat. 1564), now contained in new Article III of that agreement and described in the second paragraph of Part I of this proclamation, shall continue to be applied.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-ninth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-sixth.

By the President:  
DEAN RUSK,  
Secretary of State.

<sup>1</sup> No. 3480; 27 Fed. Reg. 6253.

## A Progress Report on the Status of Women

SIXTEENTH SESSION OF U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN  
NEW YORK, MARCH 19-APRIL 6, 1962

by Gladys A. Tillett

Twenty-one countries were represented in the 6th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, which met at New York March 19-April 6, 1962. Sixteen had continued from last year: Argentina, Australia, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Five were new members: Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Spain, and the United Arab Republic. Ghana and the U.A.R. are the first African countries to serve on the Commission; their presence made it representative of all continents.

Seven of the representatives in this session were Members of Parliament; 7 were lawyers and 7 held high posts in education; 2 headed Women's Bureaus in their Ministries of Labor. All were active in organizations in their countries, with 6 serving as president or vice president of international women's organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. Many in the group had served also in other United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly.

The Dominican Republic, Peru, and Rumania sent official observers. The Federal Republic of Germany also sent an observer, Frau Dr. Maria Hagemeyer, the first woman appointed a judge in the German courts. As in previous years, a large number of nongovernmental organizations in consultative status sent representatives, usually more than one. Some 60 nongovernmental organization consultants were accredited from women's organizations, labor unions, church groups, and others of general interest.

### Elections

Zofia Dembinska, a former Deputy Minister of Education in Poland, was elected chairman. She had served on the Commission almost continuously since 1950 and was first vice chairman last year. Maria Lavalle Urbina of Mexico was elected first vice chairman. She is a distinguished lawyer, the first woman in Mexico to serve as District Magistrate in Mexico's Superior Tribunal of Justice, and is presently in charge of a national program to combat juvenile delinquency. The second vice chairman, Helena Benitez of the Philippines, is executive vice president of the Women's University in Manila. Joan Vickers of the United Kingdom was elected *rapporteur*. She is a Member of the British Parliament and before World War II served as a colonial officer in Malaya.

### Equal Pay and Economic Opportunities

The point of major interest in this session proved to be the progress report on equal pay for equal work. This had been prepared by the International Labor Office, in line with ILO Convention 100 and Recommendation on Equal Remuneration

• Mrs. Tillett is the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Her advisers at the 16th session were Alice A. Morrison of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor; Rachel C. Nason, Department of State; and Hugh Smythe, U.S. Mission to the U.N.

for Work of Equal Value, adopted by the ILO in 1951. Thirty-nine countries are now parties to this convention. However, many practical difficulties arise in putting the equal-pay principle into effect, and the ILO report reviewed the constructive work being done in this area. An increasing body of comparable experience will become available from the six countries composing the European Common Market, since they have decided to enforce equal pay and agreed on a time schedule for its full application.

Iran, the U.A.R., and Spain reported recent action by their Governments. Nongovernmental organizations also joined in the discussion of equal pay, which all were finding of immediate concern to their members. I described the new equal-pay bill pending before Congress and my intention to testify in its support. I also called attention to the equal-pay laws already in effect in 22 of our States, the same number of States that had already granted women the vote at the time the suffrage amendment to the Federal Constitution became effective. The Commission resolution calls attention to existing wage differentials as a "serious obstacle to the achievement of equality in the economic field" and urges prompt action by Governments "to promote consistently the principle of equal pay for equal work."

The discussion underscored the importance of better vocational preparation. The Commission considered this in connection with plans for an ILO study. Attention centered on the changing nature of the labor force, with corresponding shifts in training needs. Australia, the United Kingdom, and others reported the same general trend as in the United States, toward an increasing proportion of women in employment, with a large number returning to the labor market after their children and home duties no longer require their full time.

The Commission also had before it a report on day nurseries as a means of assisting working mothers. This was based on information from the International Children's Center in Paris. Various members objected to the assumption that children should be cared for outside the home and urged development also of home-aid and visiting nurse services, financed publicly or through private funds. There was general agreement that young children should be assured the mother's

care wherever possible and that all women should have not only the right to work but also the freedom to choose whether to take up paid employment or not.

### **Political Rights**

The annual U.N. memorandum on women's political rights showed that, of the 108 countries now in the U.N. family, 93 grant women full and equal political rights and 7 more grant partial rights. The principal change since last year was the achievement of equal suffrage in Paraguay, bringing the entire Western Hemisphere into the equality column. It was pointed out that since the United Nations Charter was adopted 65 countries have taken constitutional or legislative action to assure women political rights. Virtually all of the newly independent countries have entered the U.N. with equal suffrage already achieved.

### **Education**

The UNESCO report to the Commission dealt this year with primary and elementary education for girls. It showed satisfactory progress in about two-thirds of the countries of the world. However, in a large number of areas fewer girls than boys attended school and often for only a short time; school facilities are inadequate and more women teachers are needed. Without minimizing these difficulties, the Commission recognized that the fundamental problem could be traced to the force of ancient customs and traditions which discourage education for girls. In some cases, parents consider that education makes girls less attractive for marriage.

Various speakers urged the importance of compulsory education laws; others emphasized the need for effective planning, so that more women teachers would be available and parents would more readily send their daughters to school. The resolution adopted also called on nongovernmental organizations to cooperate in "bringing the population into the work and making full use of local resources."

### **Inheritance Law**

At this session the Commission considered a new report on inheritance laws as they affect the status of women. This had been prepared by the

United Nations on the basis of government replies to a questionnaire. Miss Lavalle Urbina of Mexico opened the debate with a brilliant analysis of historical, philosophic, and religious factors which account for differences in legal systems, noting at the same time that changes in inheritance law had not kept pace with the great economic and social developments of recent years. Others pointed out that in some cases daughters receive only the portion reserved for sons and that married women are often limited in their right to make wills or serve as administrators for estates. In her statement, Aziza Hussein of the U.A.R. explained the concept of the "extended family," under which the rights of parents and more remote relatives govern the distribution of property in order to assure support for all members of the group. The Commission adopted a resolution originally proposed by Mexico noting the inequity in inheritance laws in many countries and urging member states to take "all possible measures" to insure equality of inheritance rights of men and women.

#### **Seminars and Technical Assistance**

Among the most effective tools for advancing the status of women are the regional seminars held under the program of advisory services in the field of human rights. A European seminar was held in June 1960 at Bucharest on the status of women in family law. This was the first in a series on this topic. The second was held at Tokyo in May 1962, with participation from countries in Asia.<sup>1</sup> The popularity of these seminars was demonstrated when two invitations were pressed for 1963, the first by Colombia for the Western Hemisphere and the second by Sierra Leone, whose Ambassador came in person to present an offer for an African seminar. Several members expressed regret that the budget did not permit holding more than one such seminar a year. The United States cosponsored a resolution with the U.A.R. to encourage the development of seminars among smaller groups of countries with local financing.

The technical assistance projects carried for-

<sup>1</sup>Mrs. Tillett attended the Tokyo seminar as U.S. observer.

ward under the United Nations also help improve the status of women. The Commission considered an analysis of these projects prepared in response to an Afghan proposal for a special U.N. program of assistance for the advancement of women in underdeveloped countries. The analysis made it clear that projects in almost every field—education, health, community development, vocational training, public administration—affect women either directly, by bringing them forward in leadership or meeting particular needs, or indirectly, by raising levels of living and of understanding. The Commission decided that better results could be obtained through continuation of established programs than through attempting a new or separate program.

#### **Publications**

The Commission also reviewed the information pamphlets it has prepared in past years, some of which are no longer available. The importance of these pamphlets was impressed on my mind during my travels this past year in Africa and Asia. I found great demand for pamphlets on citizenship responsibilities, equal pay, family law, and other matters. The secretariat reported that the Commission's pamphlet on *Equal Pay for Equal Work* published in 1959 had been sold out. None were available in any language. The Commission decided that this pamphlet should be brought up to date and republished as soon as possible. Similar plans were made for the booklet on the *Legal Status of Married Women*, on which stocks are low. Plans were begun last year for a fresh edition of an early pamphlet on the *Political Education of Women*, which deals with the responsibilities of citizenship. The secretariat announced that most of these publications could be purchased at reduced prices if bulk orders were received in advance.

Interest was expressed by several countries in having the Commission meet away from U.N. headquarters next year. The decision on this question will probably be made in the Economic and Social Council in July. The growing importance of women, especially in the emerging countries, has greatly increased the significance of the Commission and created a wide interest in its work.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

*Adherence deposited:* Mali, December 28, 1961.

##### Germany

Agreement to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951 (TIAS 2846), with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United Kingdom, July 9, 1962.

Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United Kingdom, July 9, 1962.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1953. Entered into force February 11, 1955. 38 Stat. 1912.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230, 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1953. Entered into force July 9, 1955. 48 Stat. 1543.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953.<sup>1</sup>

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

##### Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

*Adherence deposited:* Hungary, July 14, 1962.

##### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification advised by the Senate:* July 9, 1962.

*Ratified by the President:* July 13, 1962.

*Acceptances deposited:* Australia, July 6, 1962; Austria, July 12, 1962; Norway, July 19, 1962; South Africa, July 10, 1962; United States, July 13, 1962; Vatican City, July 10, 1962.

*Accession deposited:* Saudi Arabia, July 10, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Notifications received of undertaking to seek acceptance:* Argentina, July 11, 1962; Cuba, July 12, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany, July 13, 1962; Korea, July 12, 1962; Netherlands, July 10, 1962; Philippines, July 10, 1962.

#### BILATERAL

##### Argentina

Agreement amending the agreement of August 2, 1960 (TIAS 4546), relating to the appointment of officers to constitute a United States Army Mission to Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires January 8 and June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962.

##### Austria

Agreement amending the agreement of August 9 and October 3, 1961 (TIAS 4879), concerning the utilization, for permanent refugee housing construction, of counterpart generated from a grant of corn to Austria under title 11 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 457; 7 U.S.C. 1721-1724). Effected by exchange of notes at Vienna May 18 and June 14, 1962. Entered into force June 14, 1962.

##### China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of April 18, 1958 (TIAS 4022), June 9, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4258, 4428, and 4560), August 30, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4563, 4628, 4634, 4686, and 4770), and July 21, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4825 and 4901). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

##### Colombia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 6, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4237, 4747, 4911, 4962, and 4970). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá June 20, 1962. Entered into force June 20, 1962.

##### El Salvador

Agreement terminating certain provisions of the reciprocal trade agreement of February 19, 1937 (50 Stat. 1564). Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

##### Guinea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 2, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4948 and 5057). Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

##### Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3411, 4407, and 4507), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Entered into force: July 10, 1962.

##### New Zealand

Agreement amending the supplementary air transport agreement of December 30, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4645 and 4789). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

##### Peru

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 12, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4420, 4652, 4708, and 4834). Effected by exchange of notes at Lima June 4 and 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962.

## Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874, 4926, 4937, and 4978). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara June 21, 1962. Entered into force June 21, 1962.

## United Kingdom

Arrangement relating to a weapons production program. Effected by exchange of notes at London June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on June 28 confirmed the nomination of Philip D. Sproule to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 438 dated July 5.)

The Senate on July 2 confirmed the following nominations:

William H. Orrick, Jr., to be Deputy Under Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 440 dated July 5.)

Charles Edward Rhettts to be Ambassador to Liberia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 451 dated July 10.)

William M. Rountree to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Sudan. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 448 dated July 9.)

Leonard Unger to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 462 dated July 17.)

The Senate on July 12 confirmed the nomination of Matthew H. McCloskey to be Ambassador to Ireland. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 458 dated July 13.)

### U.S. To Establish Embassies in Burundi and Rwanda

The United States will establish embassies at Kigali, Republic of Rwanda, and at Usumbura, Kingdom of Burundi, when these two countries formally attain their independence on July 1 and the former United Nations Trusteeship Territory of Ruanda-Urundi is dissolved, the Department of State announced on June 29 (press release 426).

Herbert V. Olds, consul general at Usumbura, will be Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at the Embassy at Usumbura, and David J. S. Manbey will be Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Kigali, pending the appointment of ambassadors to these two missions.

### U.S. Opens Two Consulates in Nigeria

The Department of State announced on July 2 (press release 432) that American consulates were opened that day in the regional capitals of Ibadan and Enugu in the Federation of Nigeria.

The Ibadan consulate will serve western Nigeria, an area of 45,000 square miles with a population of about 7 million. The consulate in Enugu will serve eastern Nigeria, an area of 29,000 square miles with a population of about 8 million. This brings to three the number of U.S. consulates in Nigeria. A consulate was opened at Kaduna, capital of the Northern Region in April 1959.

John P. Meagher is consul and principal officer at the Ibadan consulate. Robert Bruce will serve as acting principal officer in Enugu until the arrival later this month of consul-designate Robert P. Smith.

### PUBLICATIONS

#### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

#### The Newly Independent Nations—

Ceylon. Pub. 7203. Far Eastern Series 106. 8 pp. 10c.  
Ghana. Pub. 7212. African Series 20. 12 pp. 15c.  
Libya. Pub. 7270. African Series 19. 5 pp. 10c.

Fact sheets designed to give readers a few highlights on the land and people of the newly independent nations.

#### Aid in Action—

Cambodia (Revised). Pub. 7287. Far Eastern Series 109. 12 pp. 10c.  
Ceylon (Revised). Pub. 7286. Near and Middle Eastern Series 67. 12 pp. 10c.  
Iran (Revised). Pub. 7301. Near and Middle Eastern Series 68. 13 pp. 10c.  
Paraguay (Revised). Pub. 7265. Inter-American Series 71. 10 pp. 10c.  
Yugoslavia. Pub. 7267. European and British Commonwealth Series 65. 11 pp. 10c.

#### Mutual Security in Action—

Burma. Pub. 7263. Far Eastern Series 109. 12 pp. 10c.  
Libya. Pub. 7207. African Series 16. 9 pp. 10c.  
Morocco. Pub. 7227. African Series 17. 12 pp. 10c.  
Nepal. Pub. 7273. Near and Middle Eastern Series 66. 12 pp. 10c.  
The Sudan. Pub. 7251. African Series 18. 10 pp. 10c.  
Turkey (Revised). Pub. 7208. Near and Middle Eastern Series 63. 10 pp. 10c.

Fact sheets providing background information on the countries as well as the scope of U.S. economic assistance.

**The Threat of Soviet Economic Policy.** Pub. 7234. European and British Commonwealth Series 62. 25 pp. 15c.  
A survey of the U.S.S.R. economic offensive launched in

the less developed countries, designed to reflect the new and ostensibly peaceful approach to coexistence and to advance the unchanged and predatory interests of the Communist movement.

**Kuwait—Persian Gulf Sheikdom.** Pub. 7248. Near and Middle Eastern Series 64. 11 pp. 15¢.

An illustrated *Background* pamphlet briefly reviewing the land, people, history, government and politics, economy, and foreign relations of Kuwait.

**Berlin—1961 (Revised).** Pub. 7257. European and British Commonwealth Series 64. 48 pp. 30¢.

A revision of the *Background* pamphlet, presenting some of the basic facts underlying the Berlin situation including the threats to freedom, the obligations of the Western Allies, and related documents.

**Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests—History and Analysis of Negotiations.** Pub. 7258. Disarmament Series 4. xviii, 641 pp. Limited distribution.

An account of the Geneva negotiations including the genesis and evolution of the conference, an independent discussion of significant unresolved issues which have arisen, and the texts of salient records, statements, correspondence, and other important source materials.

**Educational and Cultural Diplomacy—1960.** Pub. 7259. International Information and Cultural Series 79. 73 pp. Limited distribution.

A study reviewing fiscal year operations involving U.S. exchanges of people with independent and dependent areas of the world under the Educational and Cultural Exchange Program.

**"Let Us Call a Truce to Terror."** Pub. 7282. International Organization and Conference Series 23. 22 pp. 15¢.

Address by President Kennedy before the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961.

**A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam.** Pub. 7308. Far Eastern Series 110. Part I (*Report*) 53 pp., 25¢. Part II (*Appendices*) 102 pp., 55¢.

A report of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) activities in South Viet-Nam and of the elaborate organization in North Viet-Nam that supports these activities.

**Department of State Publications on Diplomatic History, International Law, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, December 1961.** Pub. 7320. General Foreign Policy Series 177. 18 pp. Limited distribution.

A list of books, periodicals, and pamphlets selected from the complete list of Department of State publications because of their special interest to teachers, researchers, librarians, journalists, students, and other persons interested in American foreign policy.

**The Elements in Our Congo Policy.** Pub. 7326. African Series 25. 22 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet based on an address by Under Secretary Ball before the Town Hall at Los Angeles, Calif., on December 19, 1961.

**Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.** TIAS 4797. 35 pp. 15¢.

Treaty and protocol with Denmark—Signed at Copenhagen October 1, 1951. Entered into force July 30, 1961. With minutes of interpretation.

**Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, as Amended.** TIAS 4803. 49 pp. 20¢.

**Constitution with Other Governments. Amendments adopted at the tenth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, October 31-November 20, 1959. And composite text: constitution as signed at Quebec October 16, 1945 and amendments adopted at the second through the ninth sessions of the Conference, September 2-13, 1946-November 2-23, 1957. Entered into force for the United States October 16, 1957.**

**Military Assistance.** TIAS 4805. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Mali. Exchange of notes.—Signed at Bamako May 20, 1961. Entered into force May 20, 1961.

**Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River.** TIAS 4806. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 5, 1961. Entered into force May 5, 1961. Operative retroactively May 1, 1961.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with Certain Agreements and Payment of Necessary Adjustment Refunds.** TIAS 4807. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Finland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Helsinki June 16, 1961. Entered into force June 16, 1961.

**Economic, Technical and Related Assistance.** TIAS 4808. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with the Malagasy Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tananarive June 22, 1961. Entered into force June 22, 1961.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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*448	7/9	Rountree sworn in as Ambassador to Republic of Sudan (biographic details).
*449	7/9	Cultural exchange (marketing seminar).
450	7/10	Rusk: interview on "Issues and Answers."
*451	7/10	Rhetts sworn in as Ambassador to Liberia (biographic details).
†452	7/10	Rowan: "The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom."
†453	7/11	Delegation to consultative meeting, Antarctic Treaty (rewrite).
*454	7/12	McGhee: statement on Peace Bonds.
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# Bulletin

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1206 • PUBLICATION 7416

August 6, 1962

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## Basic Principles of Foreign Aid

by Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>

Our theme today is the Alliance for Progress. Through this partnership we are engaged in the greatest common effort that the American people, north and south, have ever undertaken. Our goal is the creation of a truly "New World," in which the aim of freedom, progress, and justice which has inspired the peoples of the Americas for nearly five centuries will move steadily toward realization.

Yet in a very real sense this vast enterprise is only part of a worldwide alliance for progress which may be spelled in many languages—an alliance which we hope may increasingly tie the United States and its people to the nations and people not only of Latin America but of Asia and Africa as well.

Our United States foreign aid program is an integral part of a global effort involving many of the industrialized free nations, which now contribute capital goods and technicians to speed the development of the less privileged two-thirds of mankind. By and large this unprecedented effort has been extraordinarily successful. In Pakistan, India, Israel, Formosa, Nigeria, and many other developing nations, schools, clinics, and roads are being built, malaria eliminated, and agricultural improvements spread through rural extension services as part of a vast new effort at nation building.

In India, for example, with a population larger than that of Africa and Latin America combined, foreign assistance coupled with able planning and

hard work by the Indian people has set new records in democratic growth. A comparison of India's accomplishments in agriculture, industry, and the organization of natural and human resources with the sorry record of Communist China illustrates the effectiveness of democratic techniques and the dedication of free people.

Yet despite these and many other examples of progress, our foreign aid program is still regarded with skepticism and even hostility by many Americans. What is particularly disturbing are the criticisms of many sober observers who agree that faster economic and social progress in the developing nations is essential but who question the effectiveness of some aspects of the program itself.

Why is it that our foreign aid program, despite its acceptance as a vital element of American foreign policy by almost every responsible leader in each political party, remains a subject of intense congressional debate and critical public comment?

One reason has been a general failure to recognize the clarity and sophistication with which Congress has laid down the guidelines for the program. Another reason, in my opinion, is that many of us have only begun to recognize that the process of nation building is inevitably long and tedious and that dramatic results cannot be achieved quickly. This has often led to frustration and disillusionment with the whole developmental process. Moreover, in the 1950's we were dazzled by the success of the Marshall Plan in helping to rebuild Western Europe and unprepared to deal as realistically as we should have been with the quite different challenge of economic development in the underdeveloped continents.

Ten years of experience have now taught us

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development at Chicago, Ill., on July 19 (press release 467 dated July 18). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

that economic development is necessarily linked to social development, that both are incredibly complex, and that indigenous built-in factors over which we have no control may profoundly affect the final result.

### **Complexity of Problems in Developing Countries**

As we consider developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America our minds boggle at the staggering variety of problems with which our aid programs must cope.

Africa for instance is overwhelmingly rich in resources but lacking in trained men and women to lead the forward surge. Here education and training on a mass basis must have top priority to provide the African nations with a new capacity to develop their capital and human resources.

In most new Asian countries, on the other hand, the central obstacle to rapid growth is the pressure of population against a limited resource base. Here the requirements are not only for more trained people but for substantial capital to create the basis for an industrial and agricultural breakthrough.

Latin America presents a quite different challenge. Here are nations with vast, untapped natural resources which have been free from colonial rule for more than a century. Yet because the essential economic and social revolution has not yet taken place in most countries, great wealth often exists side by side with the most abject poverty. One and one-half percent of the people of Latin America, those with 15,000 or more acres each, are said to own half of all agricultural land. Only a handful of countries have an effective, progressive income tax.

However, when we look beyond these basic political and economic differences among the three developing continents, we see that their problems are remarkably similar in several important ways.

For instance, the vast majority of the people in all underdeveloped countries live in rural areas. Whether they live in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, this means that the framework of their lives is largely shaped by weather, soil, land ownership, disease, and illiteracy.

Most rural peoples are in a constant struggle against the exploitation of landlords and money-lenders.

As the sons of peasant families crowd into the great cities in search of jobs that will pay them

their first cash wage, slum housing becomes steadily more crowded.

Young, idealistic university students, frustrated at the injustice which they see on all sides, parade and protest for change—any change—from the sterile and hated *status quo*.

With relatively few exceptions harried governments lack the financial experience, civil service organization, and the political strength quickly to break the chains of backwardness and prejudice that bind their people.

This political, economic, and social pattern is well established on all three developing continents. It will not be easy to change. Yet if we are to build a rational world in which all men can enjoy a greater measure of opportunity and dignity change it we must.

### **Improving Effectiveness of U.S. Aid Programs**

How can this be accomplished? In particular how can our economic assistance programs contribute with increasing effectiveness to the *process* of change—in Asia and Africa as well as in Latin America?

During the past 18 months the structure of the Agency for International Development has been thoroughly overhauled. New and vigorous individuals have assumed positions of responsibility. I believe that our machinery is now tooled up and ready to go. The pertinent question, therefore, is: Where is it going?

In my opinion the next forward step is the establishment of a series of basic operating principles which will enable the recipients of our aid, the Congress, and the American people clearly to understand what we are striving to accomplish and how we intend to accomplish it. I believe that our experience over the last 10 years provides us with the essential understanding to establish such guidelines. Moreover, this effort has been made easier for us by the fact that the *basis* for a coherent, consistent, effective development program was laid down by Congress in the Act for International Development of 1961.

Our task is to draw directly from this basic source of authority, to develop criteria that meet the congressional intent, and, except in the face of overriding political consideration, to apply these criteria with courage and consistency in allocating loans, grants, and technical help.

This will not be a simple matter. The political

pressures that surround the decision-making process are powerful and persistent. Most relationships throughout the world are in a state of flux. Irritations and frustrations with other governments and individual leaders may produce sudden and unpredictable swings of congressional and public opinion.

In view of these conditions it would be wishful thinking to assume that we can lay down some neat, inviolable rules for the operation of all of our aid programs, turn them over to the IBM machines, and await the results. The most carefully designed guidelines rooted in the most thoughtful congressional language will not allow for all contingencies. There will be many situations where we will have no alternative but to throw away the book and exercise our judgment.

Yet if the guidelines to which I refer can be made to shape no more than 80 percent of our administrative decisions, the economic development programs will have been made much more acceptable to Congress, more understandable to the American people, and vastly more effective in their contribution to a more rational world.

Against this background let us consider five key guidelines, each based on the legislation passed by Congress, which I personally believe would help to bring new consistency and effectiveness to our efforts.

#### **Objective of Development Assistance**

1. *The objective of the program is the development of independent nations, each capable of exercising the maximum freedom of choice within the framework of its own culture.* I say "objective" rather than "objectives" because one factor which has often weakened our efforts in recent years has been our temptation to make the program serve several different and often competitive objectives.

Whatever the byproducts which may flow from a successful aid program, at heart there is only one fundamental objective, which Congress has made abundantly clear. In last year's Act for International Development the purpose of foreign aid was spelled out in the following terms: to help the peoples of less developed countries "to develop their resources and improve their living standards, to realize their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings, and to establish responsible governments."

Congress stressed that this effort would serve to strengthen the forces of freedom and peace on which the survival of free institutions depends. Congress did not say or imply that economic assistance is expected to buy friends or allies. There is no suggestion that those who sometimes disagree with us in the United Nations are unworthy of our help.

In giving *development* assistance—as distinguished from *military* assistance—the congressional directive is simple and clear: to assist in the creation of vigorous independent nations, working to develop their own cultures, as an essential step toward an enlarged community of free and self-reliant nations.

I might add that wherever, in America or abroad, I have spoken of the objective of our economic assistance program in these simple, uncomplicated, human terms I have found understanding and agreement.

#### **A Program for All the People**

2. *Economic growth by itself will not achieve our objective of free, independent societies.*

Once again Congress has made its intentions clear in the law: economic aid should be concentrated on those countries which are "showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns" of their peoples.

This congressional directive reflects the knowledge that additional output by itself will not result in a stable, peaceful, happy society. There is nothing soothing or inherently stabilizing, for instance, about a new steel mill; in an agricultural community it may be a politically and socially disruptive force.

Although industrial expansion is essential, it is only part of the answer to the challenge of the developing nations. This is dramatically apparent in Latin America. The per capita income among the Latin American countries varies widely. Some have an average per capita income that exceeds those of several European countries. Others are among the poorest in the world. The per capita gross national product of Venezuela, for example, is larger than that of Austria; that of Bolivia is less than that of India.

Yet in Latin America as a whole there is no correlation between economic growth and political stability. The richest countries may be as politically explosive as the poorest.

If increased economic capacity does not in itself assure a forward-looking, stable society, what added ingredients are required?

A study of the characteristics of developing nations throughout the world suggests the answer: Responsible, effective governments are most likely to appear in those nations with a sense of individual justice and participation in the great task of nation building.

When this conference was organized a decade ago, the name it chose—the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development—reflected an understanding of an essential fact which at that time was only dimly realized by most Americans: that true development must be both *economic and social*.

And, I would add, *political*, as well. Not political in terms of international diplomatic maneuvering or in the context of the cold-war struggle, but political in terms of domestic institutions which create an informed and constructively motivated citizenry.

In one word Congress has stressed and experience has proven that the proper concern of our aid program should be with *people*—not just a privileged few people, favored by outmoded economic and social systems, but with *all* of the people.

In many countries during the earlier years of the aid program our principal focus outside of the technical assistance program was the minority who live in the cities, where problems were apparent and more easily prescribed for. Yet now we recognize that it is the 75 percent of the people who live in the villages that will largely shape the political and economic future of Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Congress recognized this central but often neglected fact when it laid down the following directive in the AID legislation:

Whenever the President determines that the economy of any country is in major part an agrarian economy, emphasis shall be placed on programs which reach the people in such country who are engaged in agrarian pursuits or who live in the villages or rural areas. . . .

Fortunately it is in the rural areas of the world that the forces of freedom have the greatest advantage.

Which nations—the free or the Communist—now have the agricultural abundance, and which have the shortages? In what kind of societies

is the farmer most likely to own his own land and to live his own life? Which, in short, has the most to offer to the man with the hoe? Here is a contest which we Americans can approach with confidence.

### Criteria for Aid Programing

3. *The congressional language in the AID legislation provides a clear basis for more specific criteria to direct our AID administrators in the programing of loans, grants, and technical assistance.* Without such criteria we can become: prey to every kind of pressure and persuasion and ultimately bogged down in an endless series of unrelated decisions.

Let us again turn to Congress for direction. The AID legislation clearly recognized this need for standards and priorities:

“Assistance,” the law reads, “shall be based upon sound plans and programs; be directed toward the social as well as economic aspects of economic development; be responsive to the efforts of the recipient countries to mobilize their own resources and help themselves; be cognizant of the external and internal pressures which hamper their growth; and should emphasize long-range development assistance as the primary instrument of such growth.”

Although the intent of this language seems evident, it is not an easy matter to transform it into the specific criteria necessary to guide our aid administrators.

It is not easy for two reasons: First, every underdeveloped country is different from every other, and second, the application of criteria drawn directly from the legislation is bound to antagonize the leaders of many countries which fail to meet these standards and who are determined not to change their ways. Yet these two difficulties can and must be overcome.

### Three Categories of Underdeveloped Countries

Let us consider the initial problem of diversity

Despite the wide variation among the developing countries, it is possible, I believe, to distinguish three major categories. These distinctions provide the basis for the criteria to which I refer.

In the first category of countries I would put the handful of nations which possess the precondition for rapid economic and social advance and which are effectively using their own resources. These



nations may be characterized in general terms by the following advantages:

- a. A reasonably competent government, able to maintain law and order;
- b. An equitable tax system based primarily on the ability to pay with a good record of collection;
- c. A well-conceived national economic development plan for the allocation of natural resources and foreign assistance;
- d. An effective program of widespread land ownership;
- e. An integrated approach to community development that includes extension work, the use of volunteer leaders in school and roadbuilding;
- f. Reasonable incentives for private investment;
- g. Effective controls over their foreign exchange.

It is for the handful of developing nations that measure up to these high standards that this administration fought for the 5-year authority in the 1961 AID legislation; and the Congress provided it.

Several of them are now ready and able to move ahead increasingly on their own initiative toward self-sustaining development. Within the limits of our own resources, they deserve the highest priority in the programing of our development assistance. At the same time we should be cautious about lowering this priority standard because of short-term political pressures.

A second category lies at the other end of the spectrum. Here are the countries which are not yet qualified by skills or experience to absorb direct economic assistance even on a project basis.

Again congressional intent appears clear, for with regard to these countries, the development assistance act specified that

... programs of development of education and human resources through such means as technical cooperation shall be emphasized, and the furnishing of capital facilities for purposes other than the development of education and human resources shall be given a lower priority until the requisite knowledge and skills have been developed.

This suggests that in such countries we should concentrate on technical assistance and education programs to help build an administrative and economic structure which will eventually enable these countries effectively to use development assistance funds.

The Peace Corps and various Food-for-Peace programs can carry a major share of the current

load in countries in this category. This will enable us to demonstrate our concern for the people while their governments gain the experience to work out realistic plans and projects.

The remaining nations, in the third category—those between the extremes of readiness for major investment on the one hand and total lack of such readiness on the other—will prove the most difficult for which to devise criteria.

Many *ad hoc* judgments will continue to be necessary. Yet realistic criteria for each of these nations may be based within reasonable limits on the degree to which they approach the standards for category number one.

Our objective should be to encourage their efforts toward balanced, integrated development, with major emphasis on what happens to their *people* in the process of national growth and with due regard to their sense of community participation and individual dignity. Additional funds can be allotted to those which improve their operations along these lines, thereby encouraging them toward the priority-support category. Programs can be cut back where performance lags.

An examination of the experience in the United States with Federal grants-in-aid to our States may be helpful in developing our operating guidelines.

#### **Insistence on Essential Reforms**

The second obstacle to the enforcement of criteria for the distribution of our economic assistance is the resentment and resistance we will face from entrenched privileged groups in some recipient countries when we insist on a better performance.

If we act courageously in accordance with our congressional directives, we shall be pressing many nations to undertake major reforms in long-established social and economic habits.

Land reform and tax reform, to cite two particularly important examples, are inevitably hot domestic political issues. For example, when we press other governments to adopt even the most basic reform programs we may undercut the political positions of government leaders who have regularly supported us in the United Nations in the hope that we will maintain a flow of dollars regardless of their reactionary and outmoded internal policies. This in turn may result in angry speeches attacking "Yankee interference in our country's affairs."

If we seriously intend to carry out the real purpose of the aid program, such situations cannot be avoided. Yet the decision as to how hard we can press a government to carry out essential reforms at a more rapid pace involves a delicate political judgment which we must make on the merits of a specific case.

No doubt on some occasions overriding security or strategic considerations will force us to relax at least temporarily our pressures for reform. To cover such cases the law provides for aid through a special fund for "supporting assistance" or from the "emergency contingency fund."

Let us hope that expedient actions of this kind can be kept to a minimum and that we clearly recognize the nature and probable duration of each expediency. By and large we are impelled by sheer common sense and by clear-cut congressional mandates to support the basic institutional reforms which experience has taught us are necessary to economic progress and political stability.

We should never forget that expending aid *without* insisting on reforms is a kind of "interference"—interference on the side of the forces of the past rather than those of the future.

I can see no valid reason why American taxpayers should be taxed to help developing countries which lack the will or the vigor to help themselves.

The Bell report on the Philippines<sup>2</sup> in 1950 provides an example of the affirmative, *conditioned* approach to the distribution of economic assistance to which I refer.

In this case United States assistance was "strictly conditioned on steps being taken by the Philippine Government to carry out the recommendations outlined above, including the immediate enactment of tax legislation and other urgent reforms." The "recommendations outlined above" included tax reform, land distribution, a merit civil service, labor legislation, and a number of other specific and far-reaching steps.

Our insistence on these reforms encouraged the liberal reform elements in the Philippines to press for fundamental changes in the country's economic and social pattern. Thus, far from imped-

ing growth and creating resentment against us the United States espousal of these essential domestic reforms helped create the economic and political foundations on which subsequent forward-looking governments were elected to office.

#### **Mobilizing Private Participation in Aid Program**

4. *In the task of nation building in Latin America, Asia, and Africa we must mobilize both our private and governmental resources.*

Much of the strength of our free American society lies in its diversity. Our freedom is rooted in the varied organizations and institutions which are represented at this meeting and in the enormous network of citizen activity which they foster.

In accordance with the congressional directive to encourage private participation in the aid program, AID and its predecessors have already done much to draw on the talents and enthusiasm of private organizations.

Yet we must learn how to make even greater use of these resources. Governments alone cannot produce the diversified societies we are seeking to encourage. We are handicapping ourselves if we fail to enrich our aid program with the multitude of special skills and organizational know-how found among our citizen groups—not only those traditionally interested in foreign affairs but those whose horizons have tended to be limited to their immediate professional, cultural, or economic interests.

What is true of *private* American experience is also true of much governmental expertise not ordinarily tapped by an aid agency. State and local governments, for instance, can be drawn into associations with their counterparts overseas. Our Federal agencies in a dozen special fields need to become even more intimately involved in institution building abroad. "Foreign aid" has a need for the talents of every section of American society. Let us involve those talents to the hilt.

#### **Spelling Out American Traditions to the World**

5. *We should boldly spell out to the peoples of the recipient countries and the world our traditional American faith in widespread land ownership, in fair taxes based on the ability to pay, in broader educational opportunities, and in human dignity and justice.*

Our aid program will never work if the prin-

<sup>2</sup> For text of summary and recommendations contained in the report of the U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines headed by Daniel W. Bell, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 724.

principles on which it is based are known only to the government officials with whom we deal abroad. It is precisely the points which I have discussed today which require emphasis in our public presentations.

The purpose of this overseas information effort is not simply to glorify the United States. It is to make it crystal clear to every man, woman, and child within reach of a radio or reading room that the nation of Jefferson and Lincoln still seeks a better life for all people everywhere, that we are still firmly committed to the economic and social reforms necessary to achieve this better life, and that the most lasting international partnerships are not among governments, which are constantly changing, but among people, who alone are enduring.

Just as we Americans seek to mobilize all resources needed to meet the challenge, so must we all on the people and government in each developing nation to rally its own resources. And let us never forget that the most vital of these resources is an informed people, insisting on and dedicated to the all-out effort which alone can provide themselves and their children with the basis for a life of decency, justice, and domestic peace.

#### **Need for Public Understanding**

This brings us to a final element upon which the success or failure of our aid program will ultimately depend: the understanding and support of the American people.

In my opinion the Federal Government has a responsibility to tell the American people about the objectives, methods, accomplishments—and failures—of this crucially important effort. The people of the United States have a right to know where their money is being spent, what it is being spent for, how well these programs are being administered, where and for what reasons Americans are working with peoples of other lands to help build free and independent societies.

If the people have this knowledge, if they understand the principles which Congress has laid down and the ways in which the President and AID are carrying out Congress' wishes, then I am convinced they will give this program the support it deserves.

But the sad truth is that they have not been getting the facts they are entitled to. For years the public information unit of the foreign aid

agency has been a deprived stepchild. It has been wholly inadequate to provide more than a bare minimum of the news which all of us as citizens and taxpayers deserve to have.

To make the AID program understandable to the American people requires pamphlets and books and films and speakers and conferences like this one. In short, it requires an adequate domestic information program and a staff to run it. I am confident that the new leadership of AID is aware of this need and is moving to provide the American people with the essential facts.

This leads me to my final point: Only *people* can make development assistance meaningful.

Our task abroad is to release the energies of the people of the developing nations so that they can work effectively toward economic progress, increased justice, and a sense of individual fulfillment and participation.

Our task here at home is to bring the vast resources and democratic traditions of the American people to bear on the most important and constructive task of our era: the creation of a world of reason and of peace.

The Alliance for Progress in Latin America—and the alliance for progress throughout the world—is essentially an alliance of free people working for the goals for which we Americans have stood since the days of Jefferson.

In this spirit let us get on with the job.

## **U.S. Deplores Coup d'Etat in Peru, Suspends Relations and Aid Programs**

*Following are texts of two Department statements read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, together with the text of a White House statement read to correspondents by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.*

### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JULY 18**

A Peruvian Joint Armed Forces Command communique has announced that the Peruvian Armed Forces have deposed President [Manuel] Prado and assumed control of the Government. The communique also announced the suspension of the constitutional guarantees.

We must deplore this military coup d'état which has overthrown the constitutional government of Peru. We are watching developments in this situation closely and are awaiting more complete reports from our Ambassador [James Loeb] on it. We also expect to be exchanging information with other Latin American countries. Meanwhile, our diplomatic relations with Peru have been suspended.

#### **WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF JULY 19**

The President has noted developments in Peru with great concern. It is his belief that the action taken by the Peruvian military to depose a democratic, constitutional government has contravened the common purposes inherent in the inter-American system and most recently restated in the Charter of Punta del Este,<sup>1</sup> which the former Government of Peru and other hemisphere Republics pledged themselves to support a year ago. At that historic meeting, the signatories agreed to work together for the social and economic welfare of the hemisphere within a framework of developing democratic institutions.

The Declaration to the Peoples of America<sup>2</sup> adopted at Punta del Este sets forth the aim "to improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people." In the case of Peru, this great cause has suffered a serious setback.

#### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JULY 19**

In view of the unfortunate developments in Peru, where a military junta has deposed the democratic constitutional government and nullified the constitutional electoral process, diplomatic relations with that country were yesterday suspended, and diplomatic contact between the two countries has ceased. We are, as of today, suspending our various assistance programs, with certain relatively minor exceptions where important humanitarian factors are involved.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 462.

## **U.S. Seeks Reintegration of Katanga by Steps Short of Military Force**

*Following are texts of three Department statements read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.*

#### **STATEMENT OF JULY 10**

We have instructed our consul in Elisabethville not to participate in the so-called "Independence Day" celebration tomorrow [July 11] in Katang Province of the Congo. We understand further more that representatives of other nations in Elisabethville will similarly abstain from recognition of this event.

No nation recognizes the "independence" of Katanga. The United Nations, with the full support of the United States, has been engaged in long and patient efforts to assist in the peaceful reintegration of Katanga with the rest of the nation. There has been reason to believe that slow progress in this direction was being achieved.

The United States therefore believes that to celebrate the secession of Katanga from the Central Government is contrary to the agreement reached at Kitona last December.<sup>1</sup> It also is in violation of the spirit and purpose of the negotiations which have taken place to carry out the Kitona agreement.

#### **STATEMENT OF JULY 17**

The violence in Elisabethville today was an obviously organized, politically motivated attack of the forces of the United Nations. The United States deeply regrets deaths or injuries which may have resulted, especially since women and children appear to have been deliberately exposed to danger by Katangan authorities. But the United Nations peacekeeping force is obligated to protect itself against mob violence and, according to all reports available to the Department of State, exercised restraint in the face of prolonged hostile provocations.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 10 and Jan. 8, 1962, p. 49.

The riot that occurred today is plainly connected with the celebration of so-called "Independence Day" in Elisabethville on July 11—an event which was contrary to the spirit of the agreement reached at Kitona last December and in violation of the spirit and purpose of the negotiations which have since taken place for the peaceful reintegration of Katanga with the Central Government of the Congo.

#### STATEMENT OF JULY 19

The Department of State continues to believe, as it has from the beginning of the Congo crisis, that the solution lies not in provoking mob scenes but in serious negotiations regarding the details of the reintegration of Katanga. All efforts by officials of the United States Government at the United Nations and through diplomatic channels have been directed exclusively toward this end.

The talks between the Central Government and Katanga provincial leaders should be resumed and a serious effort made to find a way for Katanga to live peacefully within the framework of the Congo nation. Prolongation of the crisis would be dangerous to Katanga, dangerous to peace, and dangerous to the development of political stability in one of the largest countries of Africa.

The intransigence of Mr. Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] in persisting in secession is a matter of deep concern. There is a great and growing determination among interested parties that a peaceful and satisfactory solution should be reached without further delay to this situation.

The resort of Katangan authorities to methods of organized violence appears to be an act of desperation and a last-minute attempt to delay what obviously would be best for Katanga, for the Congo, and for everyone else.

We are, of course, consulting with the U.N. and with the other interested governments. Consultations have dealt with all the possible measures, short of the initiation of military action, which could resolve this matter. Any public discussion of specific measures under consideration would be premature at this time.

The United States Government is not, of course, in a position to comment on the policies or attitudes of any other government in this matter. Mr.

Williams' visit to Europe<sup>2</sup> was intended to cover a wide range of developments in Africa, including the United Nations role in the Congo, as well as many other matters of mutual interest to officials of European governments whom he was meeting. Mr. Cleveland's trip<sup>2</sup> was related to the whole range of U.N. activities.

## U.S. Prepared To Aid Dominican Economic Readjustment Program

White House press release dated July 6

The White House announced on July 6 that the President had received Andres A. Freites, the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, to discuss the current economic situation in that country.

The President reaffirmed to Ambassador Freites the determination of the United States Government to assist the Dominican people and their Government in their courageous struggle to protect and develop their new democracy. The President declared that the efforts of the Dominican people to construct a free society, after more than 30 years of tyranny, were viewed with special sympathy by the American people. The United States Government, he said, accordingly felt a special responsibility toward the Dominican Republic and a special desire to assist the Government and people to resolve their pressing economic and social problems, in keeping with the Charter of Punta del Este, which established the Alliance for Progress.

The President informed the Ambassador that, because of the special situation in the Dominican Republic, the United States Government is prepared to establish a Special Economic Readjustment Fund to assist the Dominican Government immediately in a 3-year grant program designed to permit the readjustment of the Dominican economy with the objective of a sound diversification of agriculture and industry.

The President said that the United States would continue other development assistance to the Dominican Republic.

<sup>2</sup> For announcements of visits to Europe by Assistant Secretaries Harlan Cleveland and G. Mennen Williams, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 133.

## The Blessings and Burdens of Freedom

by Carl T. Rowan

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>

There are those who believe, correctly I think, that the revolution in weaponry has made force obsolete as an instrument of foreign policy. Our vast arsenal is a vital deterrent to any would-be aggressor, but it is of no positive value in our effort to extend to others the blessings of liberty that Americans long have enjoyed.

That is why our ability to communicate effectively has become so important. We shall have to acknowledge that nothing is so powerful as an idea that has met its day. And we shall be tested as to our ability to explain to each other the idea of human freedom—and to convince a doubting, agonizing two-thirds of mankind that for them, too, this is freedom's day.

You see, then, that I want to talk tonight about communications within the context of the ideological struggle in which our country is involved. I want to talk about what communications means where the great issues of war and peace, of freedom and slavery, are concerned. I want to ask whether or not we are doing the things needed to make freedom of speech and freedom of the press a national asset, or whether through carelessness or pennypinching or for other reasons we are permitting censorship and suppression to become a great advantage for tyrants and dictators.

Are we overcommunicating the wrong things among ourselves?

Have we Americans really decided what we wish to communicate to the rest of the world?

Perhaps there is no surer sign of our freedom of speech and of the press than the extent to which

we Americans engage in self-criticism. I doubt that any society in history devoted so much time and talent to the examination of its own flaws, to broadcasting its own weaknesses. This trait on our part may well be our major weakness in the cold war.

We have read and heard so much about the "ugly American," the boorish American tourist, the sex-crazed GI, the effeminate and ineffectual diplomat, the "soft" American public, that I don't find it surprising that we should have so many Americans wailing that we are losing everything everywhere. By exercising our freedom to criticize and complain—by exercising it with so little knowledge and sophistication—we have in effect attributed superhuman wisdom and powers to the Communists and only dull intellectual stagnation and creeping moral decay to ourselves.

True—there is a lot that we are doing wrong in many places in the world today. There is a lot that we do not understand about the emotional forces that are at work today beneath the turbulence of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

But is this any reason for despair? Or for pretending that every Communist is 10 feet tall? Or that Americans have become soft and resigned to defeat, at best—disloyal at worst?

Of course not.

### "The Communists Have Many Woes"

The Communists are having more than their share of troubles in these areas that they have made battlegrounds of ideological conflict. They, too, are bemoaning the results of bureaucratic stupidity, cultural arrogance, racial bigotry, and the general ineptness of those sent out to make good

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Newspaper Guild at Buffalo, N.Y., on July 10 (press release 452).

Comrade Khrushchev's threat of an early burial of us.

In this connection let me say that the Communists are pretty confident about what they want to communicate to the world. The line is that the Communists are going to bury us in the vast production and wealth of the bloc, even as capitalism collapses.

The trouble is, even leading Communists don't think the immediate question is, "When will the Soviet Union overtake the United States?"—not if one judges by this comment by East German puppet [Walter] Ulbricht last March at the 15th plenum of the S.E.D. [Socialist Unity Party] Central Committee: "We know that the standard of living of the Soviet people is lower than that of the people of the German Democratic Republic. For this reason we appreciate the help extended to us all the more," he said.

So the first question seems to be: "When will the Soviet Union overtake East Germany?"

The Communists have many woes. The big difference is that the Communist press is not free to highlight and emphasize every mistake the Reds make. The peoples behind the Curtain are not free to indulge in the loud self-criticism to which we are accustomed.

Are the Communists as politically shrewd as some Americans insist on believing?

No. If they were they would not so consistently overlay their hands in their efforts to indoctrinate African students whom they have lured into Communist countries.

Take the case of an Ethiopian who went to Moscow under a cultural exchange agreement between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. He was to study "medicine" at Moscow University, but his curriculum was confined entirely to study of the Russian language and politics. He was disappointed that the Russians seem to discourage contact between foreign students and their Russian counterparts and particularly by the fact that foreign students could leave Moscow only when granted special passes.

The young man was rankled by Russian arrogance. His Ethiopian-made shoes were the envy of the Russian populace, but nobody wanted to believe that Ethiopians could make them or that they cost only 20 Ethiopian dollars, less than a fourth the cost of an equivalent pair of shoes in Russia.

This young man and four others have quit the Soviet Union in disillusionment.

The Communists have just plain tipped their hand with regard to several neutral countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their bungling has made it clear that the bloc will be satisfied with nothing short of satellitism and that the Communists are prepared to subvert even a "friendly" government in the hope of installing a regime that will give unswerving loyalty to Moscow and/or Peiping.

Then consider reports from African students who have gone to Peiping to study. One student from East Africa asserts that the Chinese Communist attitude is notable for its "overtones of superiority." He complains that the Chinese treat the Africans as though "we have just come down from amongst the coconuts."

Another African student reported that, when he complained the clothing provided by the Chinese did not fit, his host replied: "It's still better than anything you had in Africa."

And of course we delight in digging up stories of mismanagement in our foreign aid program. This is a particularly pleasant pastime within that segment of the press which still speaks in terms of "giveaway" and "handout" and has not accepted the fact that our foreign aid program has been a vital instrument of American foreign policy since the end of World War II.

The Russians more and more are giving our aid program the flattery of imitation. And their efforts have been marked by inefficiency and by some goofs that make our bureaucracy look like a management dream.

Imagine your delight as an official in Conakry, a mere 9° above the Equator, when a Soviet aid shipment arrives—and you find that part of the package is a snowplow!

A Reuters dispatch recently stated that dozens of Russian caterpillar tractors have been rotting for months on the Conakry docks. They are almost useless in Guinea's torrid, superhuman climate because the cabin windows will not open and the exhaust pipe runs through the cabin to warm the driver in icy Siberian winds.

And then there was that first gift to reach Accra from the Polish-Ghana Friendship Society—a batch of secondhand clothing, including thick winter caps with earflaps. Even the Communists know now that one thing the Ghanaians don't dig

is secondhand clothing—even with earflaps.

Again I quote Samuel Johnson, who said: "Criticism is a study by which men grow important and formidable at very small expense."

In the cold-war context I say that tremulous, often baseless, criticism of ourselves and of each other is a study by which the free world becomes dwarfish—and at considerable expense. I ask whether self-derision is a necessary concomitant of freedom in our society.

#### **International Foot-in-Mouth Disease**

There is another area in which the dialog of freedom creates problems of which the Communist bloc seems to be disgustingly free. I refer to international "foot-in-the-mouth disease"—or a tendency of free peoples to talk their way into costly disputes.

Consider our relations with India. I was first there in 1954, when the Indian press was full of anti-American comment and there was a general public resentment and hostility, largely because we had given military aid to Pakistan. Anti-Indian comments were not infrequent in the United States.

I was in India twice last year, and the change was both obvious and remarkable. Indo-American relations seemed to be at an alltime high for cordiality and mutual respect—a condition helped, no doubt, by the fact that the Communists had shown their true colors in Hungary and Tibet and on the border between India and China.

Then what happens? A Krishna Menon makes a speech that irritates Americans. Some United States Senators express a desire to reduce aid to India. India's press responds with anger and wounded pride. The United States press gives Nehru and India a lecture on morality. Back and forth, ad infinitum, goes a public dialog that can occur only where two democracies are involved—only where there is freedom of speech in India's Parliament and our Congress, in India's press or our own TV networks.

The amazing thing to me is that this kind of dialog so often gets completely out of hand, with the rancor and bitterness having cut deeply, before proper consideration is given in either country to the damage being done to vital common interests.

When I was in India in 1954 Americans spoke at length about how the contest between Indian

democracy and Chinese totalitarianism would be crucial to the future of that part of the world. Our aid to India was based in part on our desire to see India prove that more could be achieved in the way of human uplifting and nation building through democracy than through the processes of tyranny.

I find it ironic, perhaps even tragic, that a public dialog should be arousing new expressions of antipathy and distrust between India and the United States just when the evidence is coming in that India has been winning the contest with China. I watch the back and forth of needless criticism of one free friend by another and find myself wishing more people would revert to the cautions of World War II and ask themselves: "Is this lip necessary?"

#### **Function of the Press**

What is the function of the press, I ask you? Is it merely to jump from day-to-day fragments, passing along pieces of this emotional speech, of that editorial written in a moment of pique, or that counterstatement dashed off in a moment of personal or national pride—or is it also to remind the public of the long-range interests and goals which none of us can afford to have obscured by pettifoggery or demagoguery, or the personality quirks of those who must eventually pass from the scene leaving these great issues of democracy and tyranny unresolved?

Yes, freedom brings its own blessings, but it has its dangers and difficulties, too. But let there be no misunderstanding—even though there are abuses and misuses wherever man exercises personal liberty, I choose freedom.

I have talked so far about what we tell ourselves, about what those of us in free societies say to each other and about each other. With your indulgence I should like now to talk about another element of communications in which you members of the Newspaper Guild and the citizens you serve are extremely vital vehicles. I am talking about what it is that we Americans are trying to say to the rest of the world.

One thing that I have noted in my new role of poacher turned game warden is that most of the headlines go to summit meetings, conferences in Geneva, debates at the United Nations, and other dramatic confrontations of the diplomats of the world. The fact is, however, that these things are



but the tiny visible part of the great iceberg of foreign affairs. Relations between nations, and particularly the business of maintaining peace in a world where individual liberty and dignity are protected, has become vastly complicated—so much so that it embraces the actions and the attitudes of all our citizens and professions.

### The Image of America

It may come as a slight surprise to you that we in the State Department are watching the national debate over Medicare with as much interest as any doctor. We are doing so because what our leaders say and what Congress and our major organizations do about this and similar social legislation goes to the very heart of one of our most important tasks—the job of helping the world to understand what we as a people are all about.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America particularly, millions of people hold some rather strange notions about what we Americans are and what we stand for. Earlier I spoke of the “ugly American,” about how tourists have created the notion that we are all overweight, about how Hollywood movies have pictured us as inclined to gangsterism, and on and on.

These notions do exist in far too many parts of the world, but they are not, as I see it, the most damaging from a foreign policy standpoint. The biggest burden, and the most difficult one to destroy, is the idea that we Americans are afraid of change—either in our own country or in any other country. Much of the world believes that American expressions of opposition to communism arise solely from the fear of “the fat cats” who believe that change can only result in their having less and the poor having more.

No wealthy nation in human history ever made a nobler effort to prove its generosity, its humanitarian concern for the welfare of others, than has the United States. Yet the idea of a nation of greedy people clinging stubbornly to the *status quo* lives on and on in many lands.

Why is this so, and what has it got to do with Medicare?

The idea of America's greed and conservatism exists because the technological revolution that has produced so much dramatic change in the world has also produced communication facilities that make each of us the “Voice of America.” The Congressman on the Senate floor or an AMA

official in Madison Square Garden is as much a reflection of this country's attitudes and aspirations as any broadcast we can put out through official chambers.

I think you can understand that no Asian, African, or Latin American is going to believe that we intend to do for them what we are unwilling to do for our own people. When our leaders see “socialism” and even “communism” in every effort at social reform whether it be Medicare for our aged, better schooling for our youngsters, or voting rights for Negro citizens, then this foreigner is going to receive with more than a little doubt our claims that we intend to wage a war against poverty, illiteracy, and social injustice on his behalf.

In my opinion our biggest burden in Latin America is the belief, fanned by pro-Communist propagandists, that when we oppose Castro and the injection of communism in this hemisphere we really are opposing the legitimate social, economic, and political reforms that are being demanded by the peoples of Latin America.

When I mull over the current cries about Medicare, I am reminded that our last President to catch the fancy of Latin America was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt caught the fancy of our neighbors to the south largely because he began a new era of U.S.-Latin American relations in which we treated the other Republics as our equals. Instead of sending the Marines to straighten things out, Roosevelt went in person to make treaties, inaugurate new policies, and make friends. He put an end to both intervention and patronizing treatment.

But Roosevelt also caught the fancy of our neighbor peoples to the south—and won friends and supporters for all Americans of the north—because he had the warmth and wit to understand the hopes and needs of people of all kinds, at home as well as abroad. Roosevelt had the courage to move in the interest of “the little man”—to war against poverty, illness, insecurity, special privilege. Latins saw this as their kind of war. America symbolized something to them.

Nothing is more important than to have them see President Kennedy in the same light. I think they will.

Here is a rich man from Massachusetts who has the nerve to go to the mat with a giant steel corporation; to demand speedier end to segregated

schools; to seek sharp changes in trade policy; to put the vast resources of the Federal Government behind programs to insure the minimum wage level that is needed for a decent standard of living, the health care essential to dignity in old age.

This, then, is a man of change!

How important this is to those anguished masses of humanity who are beginning to assert a knowledge that, while not all change is progress, all progress involves change.

I think that I have made it clear, then, that communications on foreign policy issues will never again be simply a matter of nation to nation, or government to government. It will be people to people, with the most unintentional of comments and declarations speeding around the globe to make up the mass of impressions that will be labeled the "image of America."

Because the average American is so deeply involved in the communications processes of our era, and because these communications are so vital to our national and individual well-beings, it seems to me essential that we endeavor as a people to agree as to what it is we seek to communicate.

### **The Attitude of Americans Toward "Revolution"**

What do we wish to be the "image of America"? How can we best communicate that image to the rest of the world?

Let me discuss it in terms of what I consider our great national concerns today: These would be the preservation of security, independence, and the maintenance of individual political liberty. If Americans see these endangered today, and I believe that they do, it is because of the existence in so many parts of the world of turmoil and upheaval that we have given the general label of "revolution." It is my view, then, that there is no area in which more effective communication is required than on the subject of the attitude and the relationship of the American people to revolution.

On this point the American people show a disturbing, though understandable, ambivalence. This is the way one of your newspaperman colleagues, William V. Shannon, put it:

The fact is that it would be in our selfish national interest if there were no more revolutions anywhere for a good long time. There is nothing the overwhelming majority of Americans would like better than a prolonged

period of stability in foreign affairs. The status quo is from the American viewpoint, a very satisfactory status quo. We are in that sense a status quo power, a satisfied power. Until we have been able to assimilate and cope with at least some of the revolutions we have already witnessed in the twentieth century, such as India's rise to nationhood and its drive for industrial strength, we would prefer that there be no further distracting revolutions elsewhere. No number of quotations from Thomas Jefferson or Tom Paine reminding us how differently we felt on the matter in 1776 or 1848 can alter the nature of our authentic emotions.

In simpler terms, it seems to me that this fear and suspicion that Americans have arises from our knowledge that there are good and bad revolutions. Ours, naturally, we consider the most pre eminent of the good ones; Cuba stands as the most recent and bothersome example of the bad ones—Cuba is the shadow of two larger ones—in Russia and in China—that have made it seem foolish for us to give general approval to "revolution."

Our ambivalence arises from the fact that we live in a period when "wars of liberation" may actually be wars of conquest and when so-called "revolutions of freedom" turn out to be a mere changing of the guard of tyranny. In other words, everybody talking about freedom ain't going there.

But do we want to communicate to the world this fear, this belief that ours was the only perfect revolution, the only national revolt truly dedicated to the rights of mankind?

Do we want to communicate a suspicion that all the revolutions of Latin America must become bad ones because we see little or no signs of an appreciation of democracy or a concern for the rights of mankind in the societies to our south?

I say that the answer is an emphatic no. To communicate such beliefs, fears, suspicions, would reveal not only arrogance but our lack of understanding of our own revolution and our own development.

### **The Growth of Democratic Traditions**

The trouble is that we expect more of others than we ourselves have produced—or we labor under the illusion that our past is what it really was not.

Democratic traditions grow only where people have an opportunity to develop them. The discarding of tyranny may be a revolutionary procedure, but establishing a democratic system such as

we enjoy is an evolutionary process because it involves man's limited capacity to learn from experience.

We would know this from our own history were we not inclined to pretend that a love of democracy was the very sire of Western civilization. Such was not the case in the Greece of the Plato who said: "Democracy is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a kind of equality to equals and unequals alike." Nor of the Aristotle who said: "A democracy is a government in the hands of men of low birth, no property, and vulgar employments."

Much closer among our forebears was Benjamin Disraeli, who said: "If you establish a democracy, you must in due time reap the fruits of a democracy. You will in due season have great impatience of the public burdens, combined in due season with great increase of the public expenditure. You will in due season have wars entered into from passion and not from reason; and you will in due season submit to peace ignominiously sought and ignominiously obtained, which will diminish your authority and perhaps endanger your independence. You will in due season find your property is less valuable, and your freedom less complete."

How natural then that that curmudgeon, Oscar Wilde, should say that "Democracy means simply the bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people." Or that the cynic, George Bernard Shaw, should crack: "Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few."

It was less than 100 years ago that Andrew Johnson, on being sworn in as Vice President, rose in the Senate Chamber to say: "Humble as I am, plebeian as I may be deemed, permit me in the presence of this brilliant assemblage to enunciate the truth that courts and cabinets, the President and his advisers, derive their power and their greatness from the people."

Johnson was drunk at the time, and there are those who say that one had to be drunk to express such feeble sentiments.

But the ideal of democracy survived and grew strong in our land. So it can in others if we but keep the faith and support ideals that may seem troublesome, even dangerous, in our time.

What are the great revolutions of our time all about? The masses are against colonialism,

against economic feudalism, against political domination, against racial oppression.

These revolutions are moving rapidly, and already several sad chapters have been added to Western history because there were those who thought all they needed to do was lift a hand to bring to a halt the whole turbulent current of human progress.

Through the Alliance for Progress and elsewhere we are trying to support, even foster, good revolutions. We do so with a certain feeling that only by doing so can man find any protection from the bad ones.

## Fulbright Agreement With Germany Marks 10th Anniversary

*Following is the text of a statement by Secretary Rusk (press release 465 dated July 18) forwarded to the United States Educational Commission in Germany for release there in connection with the 10th anniversary on July 18 of the Fulbright agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.*

The 10th anniversary of the Fulbright agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany has a special significance to us in the United States.

We see the observance as marking not only a decade of Fulbright exchanges, with all they have meant in enriching educational opportunity for so many German and American students, teachers, and professors, and in enhancing mutual understanding between our peoples.

We see it also as a continuation of the long and honored tradition of educational exchanges with Germany. This tradition reaches well back into the 19th century, when American graduate students in large numbers began to enroll in German universities. This was a development of great importance not only for the individual students but also for American higher education. These 19th-century students carried back the ideals of the German university—including the academic freedoms of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit*—and brought these influences to bear in the newer American institutions. They also carried back the concept of the university as a research institution, with important effects in the shaping of many of our major universities of today.

I recall with pleasure my own experiences as a

graduate student in Germany 30 years ago. Since that time, the benefits of exchanges have come to many thousands of Germans and Americans.

I congratulate the United States Educational Commission in Germany, with its membership drawn from both German and American citizens, for the excellent record it has made under the Fulbright agreement. As we look to the future, we can do so with confidence in the influence of the Commission's past grantees, and of those yet to come, in extending and enlarging the honored tradition of educational exchange between our two nations.

## President Amends Executive Order on Administration of P.L. 480

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1951, AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 10900 of January 5, 1961,<sup>2</sup> as amended,<sup>3</sup> be, and it is hereby, further amended as follows:

(1) By substituting for Section 4(a) the following:

"Sec. 4. *Foreign currencies.* (a)(1) Foreign currencies which accrue under Title I of the Act may be used for the purposes set forth in Section 104 of the Act in amounts consonant with applicable provisions of law and of sales agreements and loan agreements. Except as may be inconsistent with such law or agreements, priority shall be accorded to the sale of such currencies to appropriations or to their sale otherwise for dollars. To such extent as he may deem necessary, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall fix the amounts of such currencies to be used for the purposes set forth in Section 104. The Director shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to any amounts so fixed.

"(2) The function conferred upon the President by the penultimate proviso of Section 104 of the Act of waiving the applicability of Section 1415 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1953 (31 U.S.C. 724), is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State in respect of Section 104(e) of the Act and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in all other respects."


(11) By inserting the following new paragraph after Section 4(d) (4):

"(5) Those under Section 104(s) of the Act by the Department of the Treasury in consultation with the Department of State. The function conferred upon the President by Section 104(s) of the Act of prescribing terms and

conditions is hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury and shall be performed by him in consultation with the Secretary of State."

(111) By substituting for Section 4(d)(7) the following:

"(7) Those under Section 104(g) of the Act by the Department of State. The function conferred upon the President by Section 104(g) of the Act of determining the manner in which the loans provided for in that section shall be made is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State."



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
July 11, 1962.

## Captive Nations Week, 1962

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS there exist many historical and cultural ties between the people of these captive nations and the American people; and


WHEREAS the principles of self-government and human freedom are universal ideals and the common heritage of mankind;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 15, 1962, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirteenth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:  
DEAN RUSK,  
Secretary of State.

<sup>1</sup> No. 3482; 27 Fed. Reg. 6771.

<sup>1</sup> No. 11036; 27 Fed. Reg. 6653.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1961, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> For text of Executive Order 10972, see *ibid.*, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 902.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

Scheduled August Through October 1962

U.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World . . . . .	Bonn . . . . .	Aug. 3-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim Meeting . . . . .	Honolulu . . . . .	Aug. 6-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Communications and Working Group on Fixed Stations . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Aug. 6-
12th World's Poultry Congress . . . . .	Sydney . . . . .	Aug. 13-
U.N. ECAFE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Asian Institute of Economic Development . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 14-
16th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 19-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Aug. 20-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 20-
ICAO Assembly: 14th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 21-
16th Pan American Health Conference and 14th Meeting of WHO Regional Committee for the Americas . . . . .	Minneapolis . . . . .	Aug. 21-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States . . . . .	Tunis . . . . .	Aug. 23-
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Aug. 27-
ICAO Legal Committee: 14th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 28-
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing . . . . .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Aug. 29-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	August
2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East . . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	Sept. 1-
16th International Dairy Congress . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	Sept. 3-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 3-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa . . . . .	Tanarive . . . . .	Sept. 3-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Sept. 7-
FAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Sept. 10-
GATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 12-
IAEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 17-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 17-
ILO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade and East-West Trade Consultations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
U.N. General Assembly: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 18-
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 18-
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 19-
8th Inter-American Travel Congress . . . . .	Guadalajara . . . . .	Sept. 19-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 20-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Sept. 21-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Utilization Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 21-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
2d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	(undetermined)	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 25-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 27-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 13, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

**Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued**

**Scheduled August Through October 1962—Continued**

Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana . . . . .	Septembe
CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium) . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	Septembe
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 6th Session . . . . .	(undetermined)	Septembe
FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East . . . . .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Septembe
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 13th Session . . . . .	(undetermined)	Septembe
ILO Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of Manpower Requirements for Economic Development.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen . . . . .	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale of Potatoes.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
10th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 2-
Management Council of the UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Steering Committee.	Bern . . . . .	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 3-
OECD Agricultural Ministers . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 4-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee . . . . .	Vienna or Geneva (undetermined)	Oct. 4-
FAO Regional Conference for Europe . . . . .	(undetermined)	Oct. 8-
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 8-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 8-
World Power Conference: 6th Plenary Meeting . . . . .	Melbourne . . . . .	Oct. 9-
Peace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Manpower, Volunteer Services and Their Role in Social and Economic Development.	San Juan . . . . .	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Transport Costs . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 10-
FAO Council: 39th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 15-
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 15-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 15-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 15-
South Pacific Commission: 24th Session . . . . .	Nouméa, New Caledonia . . . . .	Oct. 15-
GATT Working Party on United Arab Republic Accession . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 7th Session.	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 15-
United Nations Pledging Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Oct. 16-
IMCO Council: 7th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 17-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party of Experts on Statistical Information.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 17-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 18-
WHO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 18-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London . . . . .	Oct. 22-
Council of Representatives to the GATT Contracting Parties . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 22-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Problems Involved in Establishing a Unified System of Inland Waterways of International Concern in Europe.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 22-
GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 23-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference . . . . .	Brasilia . . . . .	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 25-
ICAO Limited Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (in conjunction with WMO).	(undetermined)	Oct. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 25-
FAO/UNICEF Policy Committee . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 29-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Seattle . . . . .	Oct. 29-
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session (and its committees) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting.	Sydney . . . . .	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 31-

## United Nations Development Decade

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

On September 25 of last year, President Kennedy raised a banner of hope for hundreds of millions of people around the world. He proposed to the General Assembly<sup>2</sup> that the sixties become a United Nations Development Decade, challenging all the nations not to compete but to cooperate in the difficult, sustained, and exciting battle against the age-old enemies of humanity—poverty, ignorance, and disease.

Resolution 1710 was unanimously approved by the General Assembly as a joint pledge and a new dedication to the noblest goal of the United Nations—a better life for people everywhere. In the truest sense we acted as united nations. Not only did we adopt the “grand design” unanimously, but in the process the suggestions and ideas of many nations were sifted and saved.

So we are united in concept; now we must unite in action. The dream must become the deed.

Before embarking on a program for this decade, it might be well to take a look at our record during the fifties. There is much there in which we can take pride. The fifties was a period when many nations in the southern half of the world conceived for the first time the possibility that they could achieve self-sustaining economic growth. This does not appear so revolutionary to us now as it would have in 1945. The fact that we accepted the goal of a better life for people everywhere as a possibility is in itself historic. We have the means to make this concept workable. By pro-

claiming the U.N. Development Decade, all of us have accepted the task of making it work.

It requires, for example, the most massive programs of education and professional training ever undertaken—in the knowledge that human talent is our most precious and least developed resource.

It requires that a proper share of the world's enormous scientific and technical genius be focused on the neglected problems of the developing nations.

It requires a much larger flow of international capital investment—in which private investors must play a major part.

It requires intensive surveys of the natural resources of all emerging countries, including some which only a few years ago were thought to be hopelessly lacking in national wealth.

It requires balanced development of industry and of agriculture.

It requires bold housing and urban development plans to meet the rapid rise in the population of cities.

It requires large and dependable export earnings by the emerging nations as a source of vital savings for their own development plans—which, in turn, means a revitalized program of international action in this field.

It requires the further growth and coordination of international institutions, both regional and worldwide, under the auspices of the United Nations.

Finally, and perhaps most crucially of all, this great world plan requires good country plans. The decision to develop or not to develop is, above all, an act of the national will. A nation's brainpower, its waterpower, the power of fuels buried in its

<sup>1</sup> Made at the 34th session of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 9 (U.S./U.N. press release 4022).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

soil—all these will stay buried without willpower.

The developing nations of today have set out to achieve in a decade, or at most a generation, what other nations have only done in a century or more. In this process they themselves must supply 90 percent of the capital and still more of the human talent. They must supply the self-discipline to save and invest and the courage to reform ancient practices in such fields as land tenure, tax collection, and government administration. These are the hardest tasks in the Development Decade, and they fall on the government and peoples of the developing nations themselves.

### **The Lessons of the Fifties**

Certain notable steps were taken during the fifties to help countries make a reality of their desire for a better life. There was a steadily increasing flow of development capital to the modernizing countries. Technical cooperation expanded in remarkable fashion. It became evident that brainpower and know-how are the most important ingredients in development. There was also an increasing appreciation of the value of multilateral institutions of international economic cooperation, particularly those within the United Nations system. The establishment of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the U.N. Special Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association testifies to this. The United States has supported this move with whole heart. We will go as far in support of these multilateral efforts as the matching efforts of other countries will permit us to go.

But the record of the 1950's is not entirely a matter for congratulation. Many countries made no appreciable progress toward self-sustaining growth. Serious mistakes were made; countries at all stages of development make their share of these mistakes. Indeed it would have been miraculous if such mistakes had not been made. We were plowing virgin soil and mapping uncharted seas. After all, the thought of helping all people toward a better life is less than 20 years old, while people have been fighting each other for more than 20 centuries. Ifonest confession of error does not license more of the same. Surely man, who has unleashed the secret of nuclear power and is now exploring the frontiers of outer space, can do a better job of

solving the problems of this planet. During this decade we must alter the attitudes and traditions of centuries. We must dare to pool the resources and skills of mankind for the common good.

The most important lesson we have learned is that the key to development is the developing country itself. It is up to each government to mobilize its own people and resources and to undertake essential self-help measures for social and economic reform. Without such action by the country itself, no amount of outside help can promote viable economic growth.

The leader of a newborn nation of Africa, the Mwami Mwambutsa IV of Burundi, spoke truly to his countrymen recently when he said: "We must work harder. We must redouble our efforts. No one helps a parasite."

Yet no nation need face its tasks alone. That is the momentous meaning of the United Nations Decade of Development. International machinery can place at the disposal of every country experienced advice to help it in working out a sound hardheaded country plan. Both foreign capital and foreign skills can be imported to supply critical needs. International commodity agreements can assure a dependable supply of foreign exchange. World institutions can train local talent and survey local resources.

Thus, seen in its totality, the plan of construction we build for the Decade of Development can be the most inspired common project that the world community of nations has ever undertaken.

We have also learned that the injection of outside capital into a country is by no means as important as had been generally thought. The common factor of development in countries which have achieved self-sustaining growth has been neither political nor ideological, nor the possession of a wealth of resources or an abundance of capital. It has been the emphasis on the development of human beings, on training, education, and the building of institutions to develop people's capacities. People are the one common denominator of progress. No improvement is possible with unimproved people. Advance is inevitable when people are liberated and educated.

Let us not depreciate the importance of roads, railroads, powerplants, factories, and the other tools of economic development, but these tools will be of little help to real development unless the people who use them are developed. The causes of



verty vary greatly from one country to another, and so must the solutions. An oppressive social structure which channels returns from the many to the few can hobble any real development. Corruption or inefficiency in the public administration can serve to frustrate the efforts of well-intended, intelligent, and hard-working people.

It is not for us to devise patent medicines to be dispensed to the modernizing countries. It is rather for them to examine their own situations, to develop their own country plans, to mobilize their own people in correcting defects in their social and economic structure. A call upon us for marginal but critical help for such a program will find my Government ready to respond sympathetically and effectively.

Without trying to work out any general dicta, we must nevertheless agree on certain courses of action in which we can join. In this respect the Secretary-General has done us all a great service by suggesting in Document E/3613 a number of important measures for action during this decade. Action proposals by the United States Government are outlined in an addendum to that document; consequently, I shall not enlarge on them now. There will, of course, be a more detailed examination of these and other action proposals when the Council decides on its joint action in the form of a resolution.

### **The Human Factor**

In a grand strategy for development the key factor is the human one. The modernizing nations are in a hurry. They do not want to repeat—nor should they—the slow process of centuries which took place in the industrialized countries of the world.

Because of the importance of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund in helping countries to develop their people and their institutions, the United States is convinced that we must reach, without delay, the target of \$150 million for these two programs. I must say frankly that we are greatly disappointed in the slow growth of contributions to date; the total has barely reached \$100 million. My country has pledged \$60 million for 1962, provided only that our contribution may not exceed 40 percent of the total. The next pledging conference for these programs comes in October. It will be a moment of truth for all those nations which

have promised to support the Development Decade.

We are beginning to make quite new headway in the vital field of education. But let us not have any doubt about the scale of the need. For instance, Nigeria alone may need over the next decade to import 7,000 years of teaching power from abroad. The need in other African territories is no less, and we have had spelled out for us at a series of admirable UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] conferences on education in Africa the full scale of the challenge we face.

If the capital needed is vast, the demand for teachers for training is greater still. Yet what could be more moving, nay, inspiring, than the fact that Africa, the youngest of continents politically, should be encouraging us all again with a realization of youth's ardor to know and understand. This passion for education can only be met by a concerted international effort, and we have yet, as a community of nations, to establish the machinery or work out the procedures for dealing with this vast challenge.

We in the United States are perhaps working away at one fringe of it with the provision of young volunteer teachers in our Peace Corps. We have begun to wonder, Mr. President, whether we should not tap the large number of senior citizens of unusual knowledge, skill, and experience who would welcome the opportunity to be of service to their fellow men abroad. Due to modern standards of health, medicine, and nutrition, there are thousands of people who reach the customary retirement age in our country and still have many years of service which they would be glad to devote to a cause as noble as the Development Decade if organized and systematic efforts are made to use them. Perhaps provision could also be made for obtaining some top-level people a few years before they would normally retire. Steps of this nature, taken in many developed countries, could tap a rich mine of skill and experience for the benefit of the less developed countries, especially in the fields of industrial management and advanced technology.

If education is the basis of all the rest, as I believe it is, we must not understand it in any narrow sense. It is education if we take graduate students and give them a basic training in public administration. It is at the same time a profound task

of development, for without a functioning administrative structure there will be no economic expansion.

It is education of a vital sort if we help train experts in farm training and farm extension work. Without this essential task of training, no amount of investment will do the job. The fertilizer will lie in sacks to rot. The better seed will be mixed with the old. Mattock and hoe will continue the old appalling grind of work, and the young people will escape to the cities. There will be no development without a breakthrough in agriculture—and this means men even more than it means machines; it means instruction fully as much as money; it means intelligent work as well as hard effort.

And this is no less true for industry. If capital is invested in developing economies without a whole new emphasis on training at every level, then either the enterprise will have to stay in foreign hands, which is politically unacceptable, or the capital will be wasted, which is quite as unacceptable in the rather longer run.

Much, much more can be done, I am convinced, to upgrade and train the officers and workers already involved in developing industrial systems. On-the-job training, the purposive preparation of men, the closest liaison between business—public and private, foreign and domestic—and educational authorities is a vital part of the "big push" in education that we have to make in the next decade.

In fact, the most vital thing foreign enterprise has to offer at this stage is not so much its capital—vital as it is—but the habits and insights of trained industrial work. Without it, as [Secretary-General] U Thant has reminded us, nothing is easier than to build the wrong factory in the wrong place for the wrong product in the wrong market. Then such factories, all working at a loss, do not contribute anything to development, however bravely their chimneys may smoke. On the contrary, they represent "disinvestment" and, if I may coin the word, "de-development" as well.

Training in men, investment in men—these must be fully as much our aim in the next decade as investment in materials and machines. And I confess that I am uncertain whether we are as well prepared for this need as for the simpler task of transforming resources. Among the contributing countries, methods of recruitment seem chancy.

We have no new service careers to meet the new needs. The old technical services are disintegrating. Service overseas is not always the good mart for further promotion that it should be. We may well be very short, on a worldwide scale, of key kinds of expertise. And men able to train others at the foreman level are probably the scarcest of all.

These, I fear, even more than capital, may be the bottlenecks of our new effort. And, again, how can we hope to break them effectively without a genuine international effort in which the various agencies of the United Nations clearly have a vital part to play—in overseeing recruitment, in training the enlarged cadres, in matching demand and supply, in seeing that all nations, developed and developing alike, play the part they can in filling in other peoples' imperative needs.

In this whole issue of development, in short, our perspectives are constantly widening. The earlier idea of a quick transfer of resources has now been extended to cover a much wider and more subtle transfer: the transfer of skills and ideas and techniques, a transfer which implies much more cooperation and joint action and, I would suggest, a far more creative interplay of ideas between giver and receiver.

To give only one example, are we not all in the process of discovering how much better our scientific and technical training should be, yet how urgent it is that in this training the humane interests of man—morals, history, the sense of beauty, the passion for truth—should not be lost? It is experimental work for us all. May we not find that in trying to help each other we find out more about and for ourselves as well?

I believe it, and this is one more reason why the effort is best conducted at an international level, so that the greatest richness of experience can be drawn upon and the widest exchange of knowledge achieved.

### Trade Expansion

There is another broadening of our horizons which is central to the problem of development. It is the realization that aid—whether in materials or in men—is only half the question. The other half—perhaps the even more vital half—is trade. We have to face the wry fact that for many of the developing nations the golden years of development had little to do with aid. They followed on

the raw-materials boom which was created when the Korean war occurred before the hangover of demand from the Second World War had spent itself.

Throughout Latin America and Africa, the years from 1951 to 1955 were those during which reserves were built up and new high rates of investment achieved. In India, too, the history was the same. But virtually without exception since then, primary prices have slipped steadily downward. No sustained development is possible against this background of feast and famine.

So we are determined to cooperate with other governments of good will in a search for a solution to problems of commodity trade. These are not idle words. At this very moment my Government is sitting down in New York with a conference of producers and consumers of coffee<sup>3</sup> to work out a global agreement on this highly important commodity. Coffee is second only to petroleum in its importance in world trade.

Fifteen of our Latin American neighbors have great interest in coffee, and a number of African and Asian countries also have a substantial interest. An agreement could be of considerable help to the producing countries, particularly if it is coupled with action in European countries to increase coffee consumption. We refer in particular to measures which would reduce internal taxes in Western Europe and narrow the enormous spread between import price and retail price in Eastern Europe. Coffee is known to be a stimulant to individuals. It can also become a most important stimulant to the growth of many developing countries.

We are also engaged in consultations or negotiations on a number of other important commodities, such as cocoa, tin, and rubber. In our approach to all of these problems we have attempted to proceed on a pragmatic case-by-case basis. We are also devoting most sympathetic consideration to possible ways of using compensatory financing as a stabilization technique. We have been impressed by the report of the Inter-American Group of Experts suggesting such a compensatory financial mechanism. We believe that a general, basically automatic, compensatory financing scheme of this type may be both desirable and feasible.

In mentioning the above examples I do not wish

<sup>3</sup> See p. 234.

to slight the extremely important contributions of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], and the United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade in dealing with commodity problems. We are fully cognizant of the value and scope of their work. Indeed, we believe that their increased activity and the heightened interest in their work warrants a new look at the entire international machinery concerned with trade problems. This new examination would not be undertaken with the thought that any new organizational machinery or even substantial changes in existing machinery would be required. It would rather start without prejudice and be aimed at finding out who is doing what in the trade field.

In this way we would have a better idea of what is being done, what capabilities there might be, and where we should direct our future efforts. If a group of experts were to be designated by the Secretary-General, we might have for our next session of the Council a most useful basis for study and effective action. Our delegation will present a concrete proposal along these lines when we come to the appropriate item in our agenda.

### Capital Flow

I hardly need to spell out the issue of capital and saving. Briefly put, it is that growth can hardly be sustained in economies at the early stage of development unless savings rise at a rate which allows for increased population, some growth in consumption, and a margin for saving as well.

Since, however, a large number of the emergent lands have such low per capita incomes, an adequate rate of savings is too onerous. Hence, the fundamental argument for increasing the level of annual assistance from all sources is that, with such a flow of external capital assured, emergent governments would not need to impose a pattern of savings on their peoples which it would be almost impossible for them to accept *voluntarily*.

This is a political argument, and, of course, one can argue endlessly about the scale of saving which leads to intolerable internal pressure and hence to the scale of external aid that may be needed to offset that pressure. I don't think there are any general answers to this question. It has to be answered country by country, plan by plan. Indeed, I think it is one of the generalizations that has to

be treated with considerable care, for although it is true that some nations cannot yet afford much domestic saving, it would be no service to them—or to any state—to suggest that the *whole* task of saving can, as it were, be exported to other wealthier states.

This fact has nothing to do with whether or not they—the wealthier communities—can afford more aid. It is simply that no country can grow without learning to save and invest, without building the institutions which encourage saving, without thinking about taxation on the one hand and incentives on the other. Development is strictly a learning-by-doing job, and any expectation of importing the whole revolution from abroad is doomed to expensive and acrimonious failure. Only by keeping the work of development fully international—by matching the contribution from outside by a full-scale, dedicated effort from within—are we likely to make progress in the decade before us.

In this connection we found the latest ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] economic survey<sup>4</sup> of unusual interest, in particular the chapter on the financing of economic growth. The problems of domestic saving, foreign saving, and the financing of investment, related as they are in this chapter to the total problems and goals of various countries, present a discussion in an area which is too frequently misunderstood or often too much ignored. Domestic savings, the report demonstrates conclusively, are not necessarily related to per capita income as much as they are to governmental and population attitudes. One thing seems to be increasingly clear: Irrespective of the capacity of a country to command foreign infusions of capital, whether or not it can go forward depends basically on the willingness of that government and its people to exert all appropriate energy in the direction of achieving a proper level of domestic savings.

However, having said so much, I would also stress the fact that beyond a certain point domestic savings do *not* do the job. At a time of rapid growth many goods will be needed by a developing country which simply cannot be secured at home. If they could be, the economy would already be developed. Machines, components, factories, tools, scarce materials—all these can only be pro-

cured from overseas and only with other people's currencies.

So great is the need for the new types of import that most developing countries would need to double and triple their exports by 1972 if they were going to be able to cover the import bill development demands. A very large increase in private capital investment will be necessary, as the Secretary-General has pointed out. But the gap must also be filled by grants or public loans on favorable terms—once again, a need that can only be met by collective international action and on which lies at the very core of our plans for more rapid growth.

One of the most important developments of the past year has been the substantial increase in multilateral financing. During the fiscal year just ended the International Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association, extended loans and credits amounting to \$1 billion. This is one-third greater than the previous historical high. Almost all of this capital has gone to the modernizing countries.

Of equal significance is the type of credit provided by the International Development Association, which extended its first credit in May 1961. These credits have a 50-year maturity period and bear no interest. Amortization does not begin until a 10-year period of grace has elapsed. IDA is filling a great void by the character and terms of credit that it is extending. Its policy provides a type of credit that supplements what an applicant might otherwise have available on the basis of normal commercial credits. In fact, it has thus filled the void which was of so much concern to the advocates of SUNFED and the U.N. Capital Development Fund. IDA's command of resources, even in its earlier stages, has exceeded the hopes of many.

The creation and growth of the IDA is surely one of the most important single events of recent decades in the field of capital assistance to developing countries. Accordingly, we believe the time has come to explore the conditions under which additional financial resources may be provided to it.

In spite of the encouraging increase in public capital, the gap between capital availabilities and the needs of the developing countries is far greater than the financing available from public sources.

<sup>4</sup>U.N. publication, sales document No. 62.II.F.1.

In most of the industrialized countries of the world the fountain from which we must draw a large portion of the resources and skills is in the private sector. These private resources and skills are not merely additional to those of the public sector. In many areas they are different in kind and may be obtainable only in the private sector. Private enterprise is certainly in the best position to nurture and transplant the entrepreneurial spirit, to conceive, organize, and set into operation new ventures that will prosper and grow, and I can think of no more important ingredient for development.

An increasing number of modernizing countries have come to recognize the contribution foreign private investment can make to economic development. Indeed, many of them have indicated in their development plans and their investment laws the role foreseen for capital.

And capital will only go to work in a community ready to absorb it. We tend to think of aid in terms of capital, because the first experiments in aid giving were made in European nations which possessed a full apparatus of economic and social institutions. Without these preconditions, development must be slow; and where they do not exist, it is our first task, as I have said, to help create them.

For these reasons, Mr. President, we believe that both the private sector and government have indispensable roles to enact in certain activities basic to development. Finding the proper apportionment between them and creating a successful interaction is probably the key to achievement. In my country the relative parts have changed from time to time as the challenges have changed. We recognize that in certain modernizing countries the public sector may for a time be more important than it is in the more developed countries. But no country should lose sight of the need for harnessing both government efforts and the dynamism of free enterprise.

### **The Atlantic Community**

The tides of history, in this particular time, have brought the world to a fortunate conjunction of circumstances. The colonial system throughout the tropical regions of the world is coming rapidly to an end. Almost the first object for which the emerging nations wish to use their new independ-

ence is to overcome the age-old curse of poverty and ignorance, which are the most elementary obstacles to personal freedom.

In this same period the northern Atlantic region is emerging into a postcolonial era of unprecedented growth and prosperity. This growth, starting from the most advanced industrial and technical base known to history and spurred on by increasing regional unity, provides the very resources of capital and technical and scientific accomplishment on which the new and emerging nations must draw.

I speak as the representative of a nation whose stake in the success of the Atlantic community is very great. This is one of the historic creative developments of the postwar generation. We are determined that the Atlantic community, far from being opposed to the general interest, shall move in directions that will serve and invigorate the economic and political freedom of the whole world and especially the interest of the developing nations.

International trade today has hanging over it the vast question mark of Britain's entry into the Common Market. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, it is clear that a new economic giant exists in Western Europe. It is essential that this giant should be a liberal, low-tariff, cooperative giant, ready to engage in joint policies to end the unbalance in world trade and to see to it that positive policies are adopted to give the developing world fuller advantages and wider access to Europe's fabulous demand.

We have also urged in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that all of its developed members endeavor to attain a rate of capital flow and assistance amounting to about 1 percent of their national income. This is in line with two resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the initiative of India. I might note in this connection that the total of capital flow and economic aid from the United States is already about 1 percent of our national income.

I will tell you frankly that in my country some critics insist there is an essential conflict between Atlantic regionalism and the policies pursued by the United Nations. They ask: How can we of the United States work with both? And if we should be forced to choose, how can we choose any-

thing but our friendly alliance with the West?

When my compatriots raise this question, I say to them that I do not believe this is a real antithesis. I do not believe we have to choose. In fact, both these relationships are essential to each other and to the peace of the world.

The United States, therefore, proposes both to support a growing Atlantic community and to use it as a creative force for unity in the world at large. We shall experiment freely within it on the institutions and policies of free association; and thus we may perhaps provide models for other continents and even for the association of continents which ultimately has to come. We shall make use of all the worldwide agencies—the U.N. programs of technical cooperation, the World Bank, the International Development Association, UNESCO, FAO, and other important members of the United Nations family. Atlantic aid, channeled in part through them, will strengthen both the Atlantic community and international society together.

In fact, the Atlantic community will be in a position to seize, more actively than ever, opportunities to join in wider initiatives: in cultural interchange, in the science and technology of outer space, and in the Development Decade itself.

In short, we shall seek, in season and out of season, to demonstrate that the fortunate and advanced nations of the world are forming our association, not to withdraw from our common human responsibilities but to explore them more deeply and more effectively, not to look inward on our own affluence but outward on our common human tasks. That is our pledge for the United Nations Development Decade.

#### **Need for Annual Review**

Mr. President, at this session of the Council we are pledged to adopt a concrete plan of action for the Development Decade. But we must not feel that our job will be done; it will only be begun. We must continue to act in implementation of the goals we set here. Also we must reexamine our programs each year and search for all possible improvements.

To this end I am recommending to the President of the United States that he establish a United States Committee on the United Nations Development Decade. This Committee would include outstanding American authorities on all aspects of

development—economic, social, technical, and above all, human. It would provide the President with the best possible thinking on how to make the most of the United States participation in the U.N. Development Decade. We hope that our contribution, as a modest part of the whole, will lead to a constantly growing and improving effort as we review our progress from year to year.

We are faced with an unprecedented challenge. It is true that poverty, ignorance, and disease have plagued mankind since the beginning of recorded history and probably beyond that. We face the challenge now because, for the first time, we have the means for doing away with these ancient scourges of humanity.

A great American from my State of Illinois spoke of a similar challenge in these words: “. . . the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. . . . As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.” That was President Lincoln in his second annual message. Our challenge is different, but it is no less a call to think anew and to act anew in this first concerted, cooperative, and sustained United Nations effort to better the lot of men everywhere. Old concepts need not be discarded just because they are old, as witness the enduring precepts of Confucius, Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed; nor must we retain what is, merely out of habit. The job we face is nothing less than the development and execution of a grand strategy for world growth. We must therefore be daring in thought and actions; the stubborn problems we face will not yield to indifference, indecision, timidity, or inertia.

Finally, let me point to what many have noted about this question. All round the world, men are in open or potential revolt against the degree to which modern technology seems to make them tools and instruments, not responsible human beings. I believe this fundamental and justified desire to achieve the autonomy and dignity of responsible work explains much of the profound social unrest which we must recognize as a potent fact in the developing world. It underlies the appeal of socialism, the attack on feudalism, the dislike of plantation industry, the distrust of wholly owned foreign corporations, and even distaste for the necessary disciplines of the industrial enterprise.

Is not this a whole area of basic human relationships which we should study together to see

whether technology cannot be combined with less authoritarian structures? We have an immense amount of work to do in studying how the men and women engaged in development can see that their work, their effort, their dedication is the key to all the rest. The truth is that lazy, irresponsible, or indifferent people cannot achieve modernization. Yet how often the human factor is left out.

No society, no system, has all the answers, however much it may be tempted to claim that it has. We must all share our experiences and see if we can do better. And where can we do so more constructively than within the framework of the United Nations family, to which we have already given our assent and support?

Development and modernization are processes which involve the whole human race and which cannot be solved unless the human family is prepared to work together and think together as a human family should. I do not need to underline the hideous dangers to all of us of failing to do so; and I would say that the most profound significance of this Decade of Development should be a determination rising above national or racial or ideological conflicts to discover those tasks which, accomplished together, will give us a living sense of our common humanity.

It is not only in outer space and in moon probes that we ought to seek joint research and activity. Here, in remaking the conditions of existence on the face of our ancient, precious, and life-giving planet, we ought to try with more and more urgency to find the cooperative ways of advance, the joint work which can bring progress, the mutual support which underlines our common humanity.

There is so much to be done, so many patterns of collaboration to be elaborated, so much good will awaiting for demonstration, so much young enthusiasm to be unleashed. Is not this task of development worth infinitely more than the horrific sums we waste on armaments or the fanatic dedication we give to partisan divisions which may end by destroying us all?

We are poised these days between annihilation and the possibility of plenty and a decent life for all. In this decade a decisive choice may be made. I pray that, by embarking with courage and decision on the way of development, we show that we can choose life, not death; hope, not despair; brotherhood, not suicide. Our choices today

mean no less than this in terms of the final destiny of man.

Mr. A. A. Solaru, a Nigerian who participated in the African summer study seminar held at MIT last summer, summarized the message of the conference as follows: "Do not dream dreams. Go do something about them. If it is not going to be a question of asking a man to lift himself up by his shoes or ears—and I am going to do something about it—I must have not only the will but the material and guidance to help me do these things."

I want to say to those of the less developed countries that show the will to do something about their dreams: You will find the United States ready to cooperate in providing that critical margin of material and guidance that you may request and need. We shall be glad to join with others in providing some of these essentials through the U.N. system. If we all work at it, this session of the Council will be remembered as the meeting where the decisive campaign against mankind's ancient enemies was begun.

## 18-Nation Disarmament Conference Resumes at Geneva

*The Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament was resumed at Geneva on July 16. Following is a statement made by President Kennedy on July 14 regarding the resumption of the negotiations, together with a Department statement of July 16 concerning the U.S. position on the issue of inspection and control.*

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JULY 14

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated July 14

The 18-Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its deliberations on Monday in Geneva after a month-long recess.<sup>1</sup>

The United States continues to regard this conference as one of signal importance for the future of humanity. If a beginning can be made by breaking the arms race and moving toward general disarmament, mankind will have turned a corner

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of developments at the conference Mar. 14-June 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

of history. Although the difficulties and frustrations are great, the task of achieving disarmament is not an impossible one. Each day its importance and urgency increases.

The U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, returns to Geneva with instructions to pursue the objective of negotiating a sound disarmament program. The full support of the Government and people of the United States is behind this effort.

We cannot and must not underestimate the difficulties which are presented by the Soviet Union's resistance to the minimum of inspection necessary to insure effective disarmament steps. The renewed sessions in Geneva present one more opportunity to persuade the Soviet Union that in a nuclear age all nations have a common interest in preserving their mutual security against the growing perils of the arms race.

In the resumed negotiations the United States will continue to seek agreement which will meet the dangers of the nuclear threat. These dangers will only increase if early action is not taken to halt the growth of stockpiles of modern armaments, the spread of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of a widening number of countries and to outer space, and the possibilities of outbreak of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

As these vital negotiations resume, we express our hope that the U.S.S.R. will respond constructively to the proposals we have made and will join with us and the other members of the Geneva conference in a creative search for ways to end the arms race and to devote our common skills and resources to the enlargement of the peaceful opportunities of mankind.

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 16<sup>3</sup>

The recent results of the Vela program,<sup>3</sup> although promising, are of a preliminary nature and need to be fully evaluated before they can become the basis of any modifications in the United States test-ban proposals. These findings do not

<sup>3</sup> Read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement of the program, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1960, p. 819; for a statement made by Ambassador Dean on July 27, 1961, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, see *ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 375.

demonstrate the possibility of doing away with control posts and on-site inspections to determine the precise nature of suspicious events.

The United States is evaluating and seeking further substantiation of these findings and will make in the near future whatever modification in its present position as seem possible.

As to reports that the United States might accept a cutoff date for nuclear weapons tests, this is an idea which, along with other new ideas and suggestions, has been noted by the United States. Any such suggestions would have to be considered in the light of the security interests of the United States and of the free world and would be dependent upon the reaching of an agreement on an appropriate system of verification and control. In essence the problem of ending nuclear testing remains the negotiation of a sound agreement in incorporating the necessary degree of international control and verification.

#### U.N. Coffee Conference Opens at New York

*Statement by W. Michael Blumenthal  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*

It is with the greatest of pleasure that I take this opportunity to make a brief opening remark for the United States at this vital United Nations Coffee Conference. A good deal of work has been going on for many months to lay the groundwork for this conference, and we have great hopes for a successful outcome of our deliberations in the weeks ahead. Our conviction that a workable and sound agreement can and will be negotiated has been reinforced in the last 2 days by the successful start this conference has made and by the excellent guiding hand that you, Mr. Chairman [Mitchel Sharp of Canada], have shown from the chair. We are delighted to see you in this position and know that you will make a great contribution to these discussions.

This conference has been convened because of the almost unanimous view among coffee exporting and importing nations that there is an important need for measures to bring order and stability into

<sup>1</sup> Made at the U.N. Coffee Conference at New York, N.Y. on July 10 (U.S./U.N. press release 4023). Mr. Blumenthal is chairman of the U.S. delegation.



world coffee markets. Although the United States traditionally has believed in open trade, free from governmental regulation and interference in the marketplace, we do recognize that commodity situations do occur where governmental intervention becomes a matter of necessity. Such is the present position of coffee. The world coffee situation is unsatisfactory, and it can only get worse unless we are successful in concluding an effective agreement. The vital interests of millions rest on the success of our efforts here. We have a grave responsibility to succeed.

This conference has implications not only for coffee but for other international commodity problems. We will strive for a global agreement, embracing exporters and importers, with emphasis on moving toward multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade. If we succeed, we may be pointing the way toward similar solutions for other products in similar difficulties and we may be easing certain problems that regional trading arrangements appear to be creating.

The United States is already on record as favoring a world coffee agreement. At Punta del Este<sup>2</sup> and on other occasions, the United States indicated its willingness to join a world coffee agreement that promised to be workable, realistic, and equitable. The major objective of such an agreement must be to end world overproduction and to regulate the flow of coffees entering world markets in accordance with actual levels of demand. In this way we will be able to arrest the continuing price decline that we have experienced over the last few years, so as to have stable price levels fair to producers and consumers alike. This is no easy task, and we all have to recognize that if we are to achieve such an agreement both importing and exporting countries will have to assume certain burdens and responsibilities.

It is our view that the successful outcome of this conference rests first and foremost on the ability of the producers to reconcile their differences and arrive at solutions to the fundamental problems of overproduction and the need to limit supplies entering world markets. We have no illusion that this will be easy, for exporters have many important differences to reconcile among themselves. In all probability no nation can be permitted the volume of sales or share of the world market it

might like. Unless producers are prepared now to share equitably the burden of controlling production and exports, the situation in world coffee markets will deteriorate. The resulting chaos would have much more drastic and painful consequences.

Though the success of this conference rests primarily with the exporters, the importing nations likewise have an important responsibility. Underconsumption is the other side of the coin of overproduction. Importing nations should assure that world consumption is not limited by unreasonable restrictions on coffee trade. The United States imposes virtually no fiscal or other burdens on coffee which limit its consumption. If other importing nations were to do the same, strength and stability in the world coffee markets would be achieved sooner.

In this connection I refer, Mr. Chairman, to the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] ministerial declaration of November 30, 1961,<sup>3</sup> which set forth certain guiding principles designed to reduce to the fullest extent possible in the near future the obstacles to exports of the less developed countries. I refer also to the Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products of the GATT, which met in Geneva only last month and which concluded that its members would have an excellent opportunity to observe and include these same principles in the International Coffee Agreement.

Importing nations can also assist in strengthening the administration of the agreement. For its part, the United States is prepared to cooperate in the implementation of export controls provided, of course, that other importing nations accept the same obligations.

In the opinion of the United States, the time for an agreement to be reached is now. The coffee economy was stronger a year ago than now and will be even weaker a year hence if we fail to achieve an agreement at this conference. If participants are prepared to accept the compromises with their aspirations which an agreement inevitably will entail, we should be able to end our work here by mid-August with the requisite signatures on an agreement.

We all have our problems as we enter this conference. After all, we do not sit here simply as technicians oblivious to our domestic political and

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 9.

social forces. But let us remember the sacrifices we will be called upon to make with the greater gains in mind: an end to the threat of further price declines; a healthy coffee economy; the real income of producing countries expanding through increased consumption of coffee, lower costs of production, and diversification of industry and agriculture; and consumers and producers protected by fair prices. These are long-term benefits which justify the short-term sacrifices we may be called upon to make.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to assure you that the United States will make every effort to cooperate in bringing about a successful conclusion to this conference.

## United States Delegations to International Conferences

### Second Consultative Meeting, Antarctic Treaty

The Department of State announced on July 11 (press release 453) that Robert McClintock, U.S. Ambassador to the Argentine Republic, would serve as U.S. representative to the second consultative meeting under article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, which convened at Buenos Aires July 16. George H. Owen, Special Assistant for Antarctica, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, served as alternate U.S. representative.

Advisers to the delegation were:

John F. Fitzgerald, Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Buenos Aires  
Thomas O. Jones, Head, Office of Antarctic Programs, National Science Foundation  
Comdr. Price Lewis, Jr., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy  
Warren H. Reynolds, Historical Office, Department of State

The Antarctic Treaty was signed at Washington on December 1, 1959, at the conclusion of the Conference on Antarctica<sup>1</sup> and entered into force on June 23, 1961, upon the deposit with the Department of State of the final instruments of ratification.<sup>2</sup> The 12 countries which participated in

the Conference on Antarctica and which signed the Antarctic Treaty are: Argentina, Austral, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

### South Pacific Conference

The Department of State announced on July 1 (press release 461) the names of members of the observer delegation attending the fifth session of the South Pacific Conference, which opened July 18 at Pago Pago, American Samoa.

Dr. Knowles A. Ryerson, dean emeritus of the College of Agriculture, University of California and Senior Commissioner, South Pacific Commission, is chairman of the meeting. He is assisted by Carlton Skinner, Commissioner, South Pacific Commission, and vice president of the Fairbank Whitney Corp., New York, N.Y. Others attending are:

#### Senior Advisers

Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior  
Woodruff Wallner, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs  
John A. Burns, Hawaii  
Manuel Guerrero, Secretary of Guam  
Arthur S. Osborne, M.D., U.S. Public Health Service

#### Advisers

Richard Taitano, Director, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior  
George Gray, American Consul, Suva, Fiji Islands  
Thomas Driver, U.S. Information Agency, Wellington, New Zealand  
Curtis Cutter, Department of State  
Frances McReynolds Smith, Department of State

The Conference is held every 3 years to associate the peoples of the region directly with the work of the South Pacific Commission. Member governments of the Commission are Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Delegates will attend from 17 South Pacific territories, including the U.S. territories of Guam and American Samoa as well as the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Principal items to be discussed will be relating education to the needs of the area, including adult education and training in business methods; the improving of agricultural production and marketing; and the changing role of women in the South Pacific territories.

<sup>1</sup> For background and text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 91.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Switzerland, July 13, 1962.

##### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

*Accession deposited:* Ireland (with declarations), May 31, 1962.

##### Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

*Notification that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

##### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Open for signature at Vienna until October 31, 1961, and at United Nations Headquarters, New York, until March 31, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Ghana, June 28, 1962.

##### Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

*Extension to:* Jamaica, August 1, 1962.

Verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

*Acceptances deposited:* Haiti, June 14, 1962; Nicaragua, June 21, 1962.

*Ratification deposited:* Austria, June 24, 1962.

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Austria,<sup>2</sup> May 29, 1962; Denmark, June 18, 1962; European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>2</sup> and Luxembourg, June 27, 1962; Finland, May 8, 1962; Italy, July 5, 1962; Norway, June 19, 1962; Peru, May 30, 1962; Sweden,<sup>2</sup> April 18, 1962.

##### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Subject to ratification.

*Notifications received of undertaking to seek acceptance:* Brazil, Israel, Italy, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Spain, Switzerland, and United Arab Republic, July 16, 1962.

*Acceptances deposited:* Ireland, July 16, 1962; New Zealand, July 18, 1962; Nigeria, July 16, 1962; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, July 18, 1962; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement), July 19, 1962; United Kingdom, July 13, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II.

*Proclaimed by the President:* August 1, 1962.

#### BILATERAL

##### Argentina

Agreement providing for the continuation and extension of the cooperative program initiated and conducted during the International Geophysical Year under which an optical satellite tracking station was established at Villa Dolores, Córdoba Province, Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires March 16, 1962. Entered into force March 16, 1962.

##### Brazil

Agreement extending the period of the loan of two submarines to Brazil under the agreement of January 12 and 16, 1957 (TIAS 3731). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 21 and July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962.

##### Canada

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3304, 3771, 4271, and 4518), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 25, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 12, 1962.

##### China

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3307, 4176, and 4514), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 13, 1962.

##### European Atomic Energy Community

Amendment to the agreement of November 8, 1958 (TIAS 4173), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Brussels and Washington May 21 and 22, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 9, 1962.

Amendment to the additional agreement of June 11, 1960 (TIAS 4650), for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy. Signed at Brussels and Washington May 21 and 22, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 9, 1962.

##### Israel

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem June 18 and 22, 1962. Entered into force June 22, 1962.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, with exchange of notes, as amended. Signed at Washington July 26, 1956. Entered into force July 26, 1956. TIAS 3612 and 4744.

*Terminated:* June 22, 1962 (replaced by agreement of June 18 and 22, 1962, *supra*).

##### Sweden

Agreement terminating the agreement of June 27, 1951 (TIAS 2288), concerning participation of a Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital in the United Nations operations in Korea and the agreement of June 27, 1951, concerning financial arrangements for logistic support

furnished by the United States to the Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 13 and 18, 1962. Entered into force July 18, 1962.

Amendment to agreement of January 18, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3477, 3775, and 4035), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 20, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

#### **Viet-Nam**

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 27, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4920, 5048, and 5080). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon July 5, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962.

## **International Wheat Agreement Enters Into Force**

Press release 463 dated July 17

The International Wheat Agreement, 1962,<sup>1</sup> has been brought into force as a result of action taken by interested governments through July 16, 1962.

The agreement was formulated at the United Nations Wheat Conference which was held at Geneva from January 31 to March 10, 1962. It was open for signature in Washington from April 19 through May 15 and was signed during that period in behalf of the United States and 34 other countries. It was transmitted to the Senate by the President on June 5, 1962, for advice and consent to ratification. On July 9 the Senate gave such advice and consent. The instrument of ratification constituting acceptance of the agreement by the United States was signed by the President on July 13 and deposited on that date.

It is provided in article 35 of the agreement that it shall be subject to acceptance or accession by governments concerned and that instruments of acceptance or accession shall be deposited with the United States Government. It is provided that part I and parts III to VII of the agreement shall enter into force on July 16 and part II on August 1 between those governments which have by July 16 accepted or acceded, pursuant to specified provisions, provided that such governments hold not less than two-thirds of the votes of exporting countries and not less than two-thirds of the votes of importing countries in accordance with the distribution of votes established in annexes B and C to the agreement. It is provided further that if

<sup>1</sup> For a statement by Assistant Secretary Johnson before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 26, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 118.

any of the governments concerned gives, not later than July 16, a notification containing an undertaking to seek acceptance or accession in accordance with constitutional procedures as rapidly as possible, such notification shall be regarded, for the purposes of the entry into force of the agreement, as equal in effect to an instrument of acceptance or accession.

Of the 10 exporting countries named in annex F instruments of acceptance were deposited on or before July 16 by 3, namely, the United States, Australia, and Canada, and notifications containing the above-mentioned undertaking were given on or before July 16 by 4, namely, Argentina, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.

Of the 31 importing countries named in annex C instruments of acceptance or accession were deposited on or before July 16 by 9, namely, Austria, India, Ireland, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Kingdom, and Vatican City, and notifications containing the above-mentioned undertaking were given on or before July 16 by 11, namely, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Philippines, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Switzerland, and the United Arab Republic.

The 1959 wheat agreement, presently in force will expire by its own terms July 31, 1962. The International Wheat Agreement, 1962, is a 3-year agreement like that of 1959. The objectives of the agreement, as stated in article 1, are: (a) to assure supplies of wheat and wheat flour to importing countries and markets for wheat and wheat flour to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices; (b) to promote the expansion of the international trade in wheat and wheat flour and to secure the freest possible flow of this trade in the interests of both exporting and importing countries; (c) to overcome the serious hardship caused to producers and consumers by burdensome surpluses and critical shortages of wheat; (d) to encourage the use and consumption of wheat and wheat flour generally, and in particular in developing countries, so as to improve health and nutrition in those countries and thus to assist in their development; and (e) in general to further international cooperation in connection with world wheat problems, recognizing the relationship of the trade in wheat to the economic stability of markets for other agricultural products.

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461	7/16	Delegation to South Pacific Conference (rewrite).
*462	7/17	Unger sworn in as Ambassador to Laos (biographic details).
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*464	7/17	Visit of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos.
465	7/18	Rusk: 10th anniversary of Fulbright agreement with Germany (rewrite).
*466	7/19	Visit of President Arosemena of Ecuador.
467	7/18	Bowles: National Conference on International Economic and Social Development.
†468	7/20	ICJ decision on U.N. assessments.
*469	7/21	Hillenbrand and Creel designations (biographic details).

\*Not printed.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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August 13, 1962

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## United States Again Calls for Action on Drafting of Disarmament Treaty

Remarks by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues: As others have pointed out, it was 4 months ago that the foreign ministers met here in Geneva to begin this supreme effort to achieve a breakthrough at the disarmament front.<sup>2</sup> Our presence here at that time was meant to show the world that each side represented at the disarmament conference considered an effective solution to the problem of the arms race to be of the utmost importance for the future of our world.

Although it is the conclusion of an international agreement on the future status of Laos<sup>3</sup> that has brought some of us here to Geneva at this time, those of us serving the nations participating in this disarmament conference have the additional pleasure of attending this session of this 18-Nation Committee.

I have not been present myself for conference meetings since those first few weeks, and my stay here necessarily is of brief duration, but we have in no way altered our assessment of the importance of this disarmament conference. The United States considers that progress in disarmament is

a practical goal and a practical necessity. This is a continued conviction of my Government.

I believe we all realize that the conference now finds itself deeply involved in a large number of complicated factors and details directly connected with attaining a satisfactory disarmament agreement. The reaching of such agreement therefore requires both a persistent attention to the exploration of matters in depth and an intensive preoccupation with the very broad subject of general and complete disarmament.

Such labors are necessarily in the province of the permanent heads of delegations, who need not be, and indeed should not be, distracted by daily concern for other pressing international problems. This does not mean, of course, that foreign ministers themselves will be any less concerned with what goes on with respect to disarmament. Indeed, I can assure you that at any appropriate time I will be available to reassemble with the other foreign ministers to assist the Committee to overcome specific difficulties of prime importance or to carry through final agreement on questions which appear to be on the way to resolution. For foreign ministers cannot stray far away from the proceedings of these meetings, nor can we fail to be intimately connected with all of the preparations and the policy decisions that accompany participation in this conference.

The discussions of the first 3 months have carried us more deeply into a thoughtful consideration of the many facts as well as the many diffi-

<sup>1</sup> Made at the 60th plenary session of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 24 (press release 473 dated July 25).

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of developments at the 18-nation conference Mar. 14-June 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154; for texts of statements made by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 15, 23, and 27, see *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1962, p. 5, Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571, and Apr. 16, 1962, p. 618.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 259.

culties of this subject, more so than any previous disarmament conference. The nature and location of the real hurdles which block the achievement of disarmament are now evident to most of us. The fact that we now see where our problems lie demands that we push forward our efforts and that we concentrate on these troublesome points.

#### Effects of Other Events and Troublesome Issues

It is clear, also, that we cannot deal with the problems of disarmament in a vacuum. Problems which arise between states and the resolution of those problems, even though they are far removed geographically from these council chambers, have made and will continue to make their effects felt here.

I need only point out, as Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] has pointed out, that the agreement signed yesterday on the future status of Laos is a welcome sign. Its signature and its effective carrying out could, by improving the international climate, contribute to the work of the nations meeting in this conference to reach their objective of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Unfortunately we cannot overlook or set aside or forget other events and troublesome issues, for their effects on this disarmament conference are in the opposite direction. They tend to retard rather than push forward our vital work here. I need not at this moment mention or debate each of the specific areas which I have in mind. But I am quite sure that you are all aware of the situations where contention prevails over agreement, where difficulties beset our relations, and where conflict rather than harmony appears the order of the day.

But surely we all understand that persistent pressures against the vital interests of others cannot prepare the way for disarmament. Surely we all understand that disdain for solemn agreements concluded in the recent past breeds distrust about agreements on disarmament which ought to be concluded in the near future. Surely we all understand that repeated declarations that a particular socialist system is destined to dominate the world, and that it has programs of action to bring that prediction into reality, are not a useful introduction to a disarmament discussion.

International tensions often generate military forces. And to the extent that these tensions are reduced or eliminated, it becomes easier to view

with less passion and worry those questions relating to the elimination of military establishments which are at the center of all disarmament negotiations.

This conference faces many complex problems, but it can also be the seedbed for agreements of incalculable value. My Government is prepared to press patiently and urgently these potentials for accord—for each agreement in this area will serve to pave the way to still broader and more significant accomplishments. As in the past, so now too, we are convinced that one of the areas where it should be possible to reach early agreement is on a sound and safeguarded agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests now and on a permanent basis.

The regrettable announcement by the Soviet Union over this past weekend that it feels constrained or forced or compelled to follow the recent round of Soviet and United States nuclear tests with still further weapons experiments of its own only makes it more urgent that our efforts in this field succeed. I don't know where the expression came from that "there is a right to test last"—surely from imagination.

But memories tend to be very short. After the Soviet Union last year abandoned the moratorium and conducted a series of more than 40 tests,<sup>4</sup> I suppose that it felt that it had a right to test last. Be that as it may, members here will remember that even after that series of more than 40 tests the United Kingdom and the United States made proposals<sup>5</sup> for the stoppage of testing at that point, and forever—the principal price for which, in terms of assurance, was that international inspection be permitted to look at less than one part in two one-thousandths of Soviet territory in any given year. After that series of tests (before the recent U.S. series of tests) even that farthing was not paid to bring this testing to an end.

But, as has been recently announced, the United States is in the midst of reevaluating both the technical aspects of the problem and its own past proposals to see whether further moves which might facilitate agreement can properly be made.<sup>6</sup> This is a matter on which Ambassador Dean [Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the U.S. delegation] will,

<sup>4</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> For a Department statement of July 16, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234.

in the very near future, have more to say, in the light of new technical data which have been derived from recent tests, and we hope thereby to advance the possibility of agreement.

### Obsession With Secrecy

But let us not be mistaken; an obsession with secrecy locks the door of disarmament. Reference was made to information which the Soviet Union does not need about the United States. They don't need it because they have it. Secrecy and disarmament cannot live together, as Lord Home [British Foreign Secretary] so effectively pointed out in his remarks. Let me repeat what I said here last spring: There is suspicion. There is suspicion about what might be going on in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union when the rest of the world is open for all to see. There is suspicion that even a tiny bit of international inspection involves espionage affecting the security of the Soviet Union. But surely we can find some way not to have to deal with this problem of good faith: arrangements which make it irrelevant; arrangements which provide assurance; arrangements upon which confidence can be built in the light of experience, as we move forward.

And, of course, while pressing forward with subjects where agreement may be somewhat easier to achieve—and I agree with most of what my colleague Mr. Green [Howard C. Green, Canadian Foreign Secretary] said on that point—we cannot neglect the exploration beyond the present limits of our understanding to the other more challenging, and more difficult, areas that have been opened up for discussion in this disarmament conference. Lord Home has referred to the remaking of human nature. It may take some time, but even before that we are talking about the transformation of the political structure of international life. And that, too, will take some thought, some imagination, some creative statesmanship, some patience, and, I suspect, some time. But within my own Government detailed studies continue as a matter of urgency on all aspects of disarmament, and new possibilities are continually under the most careful consideration.

The United States delegation can go forward, under the able leadership of my very distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Dean, with a detailed consideration of the possible provisions

## U.S. Disturbed by News of Soviet Intention To Resume Nuclear Tests

### Department Statement<sup>1</sup>

The announcement by the Soviet Government that it has ordered the resumption of nuclear testing for the second time in less than 1 year is disturbing news.

The world need hardly be reminded that the Soviet Union broke the moratorium on nuclear testing last September.<sup>2</sup> It is to be regretted that the decision by the Soviet Government to resume nuclear testing comes so soon after the resumption last Monday [July 16] of negotiations at the 18-nation conference on disarmament in Geneva and at a time when the delegates are seeking for new approaches to an agreement over a nuclear test ban treaty.

The Soviet Government's announcement is a sharp reminder of the urgent necessity to reach agreement to stop nuclear testing once and for all. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will continue to negotiate—and seriously so—in Geneva for the purpose of reaching agreement to ban nuclear testing which the United States and other countries of the world so earnestly desire.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on July 21 by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We hope the same is true of other governments. For our goal is perhaps the most ambitious, but, certainly, it is the most essential of the items on the agenda of mankind. That goal must be sought in a spirit of fairness and reciprocal accommodation during the negotiations which the forum of this conference makes possible. Attempts to attain propaganda gains and short-sighted or limited tactical maneuvers will get us nowhere and will only engender further mutual suspicion, which is to be avoided. For disarmament is much too important to humanity for such a divisive and a diversionary approach.

I should like to thank each of the eight new members of the conference for their cooperation and understanding. They have made some extremely useful contributions to this subject, both in general and with regard to specific details. And I earnestly hope that we will find in all of the other delegations to this conference a readi-

ness to continue to work with us in a cooperative spirit.

### U.S. Ready To Move Forward

We shall always state our positions frankly, and we shall put forth only those positions which we expect to be accepted—with which we think the world can live—and not positions based purely upon the basic tactics of public opinion. But we will be reasonable and forthcoming and imaginative to the limit of our ability in seeking ways to overcome difficulties.

We will be ready to share certain risks in disarmament. We are not trying to insist upon foolproof arrangements, because we understand, as others around this table, that an unlimited arms race itself is also risky. We should like to find ways to reduce these risks through arrangements which do provide for the growth of confidence. For we must, as the statement of agreed principles<sup>1</sup> indicated, move forward, but with prudent concern for security and peace and also for the security interests of all signatories to these arrangements.

It is, I am confident, an encouraging sign that, during the presence of a number of foreign ministers here, the cochairmen were able to reach an agreement, which is before you, about the general procedures which are to govern the Committee's work in the next months on preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I think we should be grateful to Ambassador Zorin [Vale-rian A. Zorin, chairman of the Soviet delegation] and Ambassador Dean for the patient, skilled work which went into that negotiation. This agreement allows full scope for the consideration in plenary sessions of all of the many detailed problems of stage one, which must be resolved before an accord on treaty language can be reached. It also puts on the two cochairmen the responsibility for drafting such treaty language.

I can assure you that no government is more anxious than the Government of the United States, from President Kennedy on down, to assume the responsibilities which go with the drafting, the signature, and the execution of a sound and safeguarded treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

## ICJ Affirms Binding Force of Congo and Middle East Assessments

### Department Statement

Press release 468 dated July 20

The International Court of Justice has today [July 20] affirmed that the assessments voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations to finance peacekeeping operations of the Organization in the Congo and the Middle East are legally binding on the member states. This historic opinion is of fundamental importance to international law and to the present and future capacity of the United Nations to maintain peace.

The United States Government consistently has been of the view that the assessments in question are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the United Nations Charter and the binding upon the members. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State so argued before the International Court of Justice during its consideration of this issue.<sup>1</sup>

The Court's opinion will strengthen the efforts of the Secretary-General to collect arrearages on assessments to finance the United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Congo and the Middle East. Some members have not paid these assessments, claiming that they were not legally binding. In view of the Court's opinion this claim is plainly not tenable.

Collection of outstanding arrearages on these two accounts would help the United Nations to pay accumulated bills for these two missions through the period ending June 30 of this year. Financing the Congo and Middle East operations beyond June 30, however, depends upon the success of the United Nations proposal to borrow \$200,000,000. No assessments have been voted for these operations after June 30. Expenses for the Congo and Middle East missions are now running at approximately \$11.5 million per month. Forty four nations have purchased or pledged \$72.4 million toward the \$200 million so far. The United States Senate has passed a bill authorizing the President to lend up to \$100 million to the United Nations, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee is currently holding hearings on this legislation.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of statements by Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Ball, and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 142.

## The United States Role in the United Nations

by Jonathan B. Bingham

U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council<sup>1</sup>

"So you work at the U.N." Sometimes that sentence is spoken in a kind of hushed tone, suggesting awe and idealism and a world point of view. At other times and from other people it can be spoken with a sort of scornful incredulity, as much as to say, "What would you want to be wasting your time like that for?" Then again it can be spoken with a menacing note of hostility, indicating that the speaker really means, "You must be practically a Communist."

When I get any one of these three reactions—which I might call the "overidealistic," the "disillusioned" or "bored," and the "antagonistic"—I find that the speaker usually does not have a very clear idea of what the United Nations actually does and even less of what an American like myself might be doing there.

Today my main focus is going to be on the second of these questions, although as we go along I hope to be able to cast some light on the first question also.

In considering what it is like to work at the U.N. it is first of all important to distinguish between the United Nations Secretariat, all of whom are international civil servants working for the Secretary-General, and the members of the various country delegations. I, for example, work for the United States, as does my chief, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. It is our job to present the United States point of view in the various U.N. bodies—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and in a variety of other committees, including the recently created committee of 17

nations which deals with the problems of colonialism.

Right here, I should like to mention one of the misconceptions or myths, if you will, which are circulated in this country about the U.N. and the United States role at the U.N. by those who are either ignorant or hostile. This is the notion that the United States is somehow bamboozled into expressing views at the U.N. or voting for resolutions which we do not really believe in, either to placate other delegations or because we are afraid to disagree with some vague U.N. point of view.

This is simply not true, and I should like to make the point very clear: Never, to my knowledge, has a member of the U.S. delegation made a speech or cast a vote which was against U.S. policy or interests, either in an effort to please or placate other delegations or for any other reason. Our speeches and our votes are based on U.S. policy as determined by the President and the Secretary of State, and that policy in turn is based on what they believe to be right and in the interest of the United States.

In addition to the hundred or so Americans who work at the U.S. Mission to the U.N., there are many hundreds of Americans who work for the United Nations itself or for one of its specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the World Bank. These men and women are international organization civil servants, and they are not allowed to take orders from their home governments nor are their home governments allowed to give them orders. The highest ranking American at the U.N. today is the able and distinguished Dr. Ralph Bunche, and I can assure you that he is both a patriotic American and at

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., on July 19 (U.S./U.N. press release 4025 dated July 17).

the same time a dedicated servant of the international organization. Since he deeply believes that a strong United Nations is in the interest of the United States, he finds no conflict between his loyalty to the United States as an American citizen and his loyalty to the United Nations and to his boss, the Secretary-General.

I too believe that preserving and strengthening the United Nations is in the interest of the United States. The way to judge the truth of this belief, it seems to me, is to consider what are some of our national objectives in the world today and to consider whether or not the United Nations is serving those objectives.

### The U.N. and the Congo

First of all, we are in pursuit of peace and security. Obviously the United Nations cannot guarantee the attainment of this objective, and we and our allies must maintain a sufficiently strong defense to deter any aggressor. But the United Nations can, and does, help to prevent explosive situations from actually exploding and triggering a general war. This has been the case in the Near East and, more recently, in the Congo. In spite of the difficulties that remain, the Congo operation will, in my opinion, go down in history as a milestone in mankind's efforts to achieve a stable world through collective action.

The United Nations has done in the Congo what neither the United States nor the NATO organization could have done by itself, that is, to bring relative order out of the total chaos that followed the sudden granting of independence to the Congo by the Belgian Government in July 1960. In my opinion, if the United Nations had not been able to send an international army to keep order and a very considerable number of technicians to help build the new nation, the chaotic situation in the Congo would have led to a conflict between the free world and the Communist world which could well have engulfed Africa, and quite possibly the whole world, in a catastrophic conflict. As for the principal remaining problem in the Congo, the continued dissidence of Katanga Province, I will say only that all the nations at the United Nations are agreed that it is in the interests of the 15 million Congolese as a whole that the Katanga, with its 500,000 people and its great mineral resources, should be reintegrated; unless this can be accom-

plished, the present moderate government in the Congo is likely to fall in favor of an extremist government, and the future of the whole area will be dark indeed.

It is not true, as some have suggested, that the U.N. has been following a policy in the Congo which was in conflict with the United States policy. While some distinguished Americans have criticized these operations, the policy of the President and of the Secretary of State, based on the best judgment and advice of experts with great experience in African affairs, has been fully in support of what the United Nations has been trying to do. In fact it is quite clear that no nation has had a greater influence on the development of the U.N. policy toward the Congo than the United States itself.

### International Aid Programs

Another major objective of the United States in the world today is to help the less developed areas to solve the age-old problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy and make progress toward a better life and so to contribute to a more prosperous world and to frustrate the subversive efforts of the Communist bloc. Here too the United Nations can be, and is, of enormous assistance. While the developed nations of the Atlantic community and Japan must all pitch in, individually and collectively, to help in this great task, there are many aspects of the work that the United Nations and its related agencies can do better and more efficiently than any individual nation or group of nations.

For one thing, the international aid programs have the advantage of being able to call on technicians from all over the world. The fact that all nations contribute to these programs, in a greater or less degree, gives them a healthy feeling of partnership in a common enterprise, rather than being the recipients of charity. Again, it is often easier for the representatives of an international organization, such as the World Bank, to give advice to sensitive officials of a new nation about necessary but politically difficult fiscal measures that ought to be taken if their development programs are to succeed. In addition to these considerations there is the very practical fact that in international aid programs other member states carry a very substantial share of the load.

## Operations of the Trusteeship Council

What of the extraordinary revolution that has taken place in the world since World War II in the emergence on the international scene of a whole host of new nations that were formerly colonies? What should our attitude be toward those areas of the world where this revolution is still in process? Cherishing the principles of our own Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal and that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, we Americans believe that the world would be a better and a safer place to live in if these principles were applied everywhere. Today, in various parts of the world, especially in Africa, there are still millions of people who are yearning for self-government and for freedom from the domination of a distant country or of a very present local white minority. From a moral point of view we believe that these yearnings deserve to be satisfied, and from a practical point of view we recognize that it is in our own and the world's interest that the process of decolonization be carried on rapidly enough and smoothly enough so as to prevent disastrous outbreaks of violence. We know that change is inevitable, and we want it to be peaceful change. To these ends the United Nations can contribute greatly, just as it has during the past 15 years through the operations of the Trusteeship Council.

The Trusteeship Council was set up under the U.N. Charter to supervise the administration of 11 trust territories by various administering authorities, including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. These trust territories were mostly former mandates under the League of Nations, which had been handed over to various of the Allied Powers to administer after World War I, having previously been German colonies. Of the seven trust territories that originally existed in Africa, all have now achieved their independence, either becoming separate new nations, as in the case of Tanganyika, Cameroon, Togo, Somalia, and most recently Rwanda and Burundi, or by joining with other neighboring states, as in the case of the British Cameroons and British Togoland. In the Pacific one trust territory, Western Samoa, has achieved independence early this year and there remain three trust territories—part of New Guinea, which is under Australian administration;

the small island of Nauru, also administered by Australia; and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which is administered by the United States. The latter comprises some 90 inhabited islands, the Marshalls, the Marianas (except for Guam), and the Carolines, which are scattered over an enormous area of ocean (the size of the continental United States) and are inhabited by about 80,000 Micronesians.

The Trusteeship Council, which has been composed of an equal number of administering authorities and nonadministering powers, has sent out periodic visiting missions to the various trust territories to check on economic, social, and political progress, and these visiting missions have regularly come back with thoughtful reports containing a variety of constructive criticisms. Such a report was submitted last year on our own Trust Territory, and the United States Government has conscientiously set about to put most of the recommendations into practice.<sup>2</sup> Where trust territories have been given their independence, the United Nations has tried to see to it that the conditions for that independence were the best practicable, and so far the process has been carried on in an orderly and peaceful way. The history of the trusteeship system to date, although little known to the general public, has been one of the great achievements of the United Nations.

## U.N. Financial Difficulties

I should like to turn now to the question of U.N. finances, which has attracted a great deal of attention in recent months in the American press. First of all it is important to recognize that there has been no difficulty about the regular United Nations budget, from which the ordinary operations of the organization are paid. This budget is supported by regular annual assessments against the member states, the amount of which is determined in each case by a U.N. committee. Our share, incidentally, has been gradually reduced from about 39 to about 32 percent. Most nations are reasonably up to date in the payment of these assessments, because if they fail to pay their assessments for more than 2 years they are threatened with the loss of their vote in the General Assembly. The difficulty has arisen because of the special peacekeeping operations in the Suez and the

<sup>2</sup> See p. 264.

Congo, which have been expensive in U.N. terms—running about \$10 million a month in the Congo alone—although relatively inexpensive in terms of the cost of U.S. defense programs. Some countries, including the Communist bloc, have refused to pay for these special programs on the ground that the United Nations had no right to impose assessments for them. With the support of all the new nations, and over the objections of the Communist bloc, this question of the legality of the special assessments has been referred to the International Court of Justice and a decision from that Court is expected soon.<sup>3</sup>

Another step which was taken to tide the U.N. over these financial difficulties was the authorization last fall of a \$200 million bond issue. Again, this step was authorized with the active support of most of the Western nations—including ourselves—and the so-called nonaligned nations of Asia and Africa, and over the opposition of the Communist bloc. Under the terms of the bond resolution, all the nations of the U.N. will have to contribute to the repayment of the bonds or run the risk of losing their vote in the General Assembly. To date, other nations have made or pledged bond purchases in the amount of about \$72 million. It is in our view terribly important that the United States Congress make it possible for the United States to subscribe to up to \$100 million of the bond issue. The Senate, by a handsome majority, has already passed a bill to that effect, and that bill is now pending in the House of Representatives. For the U.S. to fail to support the bond issue now would not only vitally endanger the U.N.'s stabilizing role in Africa but would suggest to the world that we Americans were no longer really interested in the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency. Of all the other nations in the world, only the Communists would rejoice at such action, for they would be the ones to gain by it.

### **Impracticality of Go-It-Aloners**

Some of those who are most vocal in their opposition to the U.N., and particularly to the bond issue, are exponents of what is really a "go it alone" philosophy. They seem to consider themselves hardheaded realists, but to my mind they are the most impractical utopians of all. They

appear to believe that we can score a total victory over communism throughout the world, that we can run things everywhere exactly as we would like to see them run, that we can do all this without the support of allies, and that at the same time we can enjoy a reduction in the national budget!

One of the curious characteristics of these go-it-aloners is that, in their state of gloom over what they consider to be "no win" policies, they are constantly overlooking the significant victories over communism that do occur and imagining Communist victories where there are none. For example, these opponents of the United Nations are frequently heard to proclaim that the U.N. is a Communist instrument and that the United States and its allies are constantly being "pushed around" at the U.N. by the Communists, acting with the support of the Afro-Asian neutralists. This is another myth about the U.N. that needs to be exploded. If anything, the opposite is the case.

In the Security Council the Soviet Union has used its veto power 100 times to block action which it opposed. We have not always been able to get through action which we wanted, but we have never had to use the veto to block action that we opposed. In the General Assembly the Soviets' major efforts to weaken the structure of the United Nations Secretariat by substituting a three-man "troika" for a single Secretary-General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld met with absolutely no support, and they had to drop the scheme without even attempting to press for a vote. Similarly, on the issues affecting the financial stability of the U.N. that I have mentioned, the Communist bloc found itself overridden by an overwhelming majority. In the field of colonial issues, while we have not agreed with all the resolutions that have been adopted, the Soviet efforts to tempt the Afro-Asian states into taking extreme positions, such as calling for an end of all colonies by the end of 1962, have met with no success. In summary, it is remarkable that the Soviet Union, considering its military and industrial power, is so relatively uninfluential at the United Nations.

### **U.S. Most Influential Nation at U.N.**

It is true, of course, that, since the United Nations has doubled in size, the United States position is not as easy as it once was. The free nations of the West no longer have the automatic majority

<sup>3</sup> See p. 246.



that we enjoyed 10 or 15 years ago, and we have to work for our successes.

Admittedly, the one-nation, one-vote rule in the General Assembly has disadvantages for a great power. Is it logical, one may well ask, for Iceland, with 170,000 people, to have the same vote as the United States or the United Kingdom? But logic is not all that counts in these matters, any more than it is when one considers that a Senator from the State of New York represents almost 100 times as many people as his colleague from Alaska.

There are several things to be said about this one-nation, one-vote rule in the General Assembly. The first is that to change the system of voting in the General Assembly would require an amendment to the charter, and the likelihood of such an amendment being accepted is practically nil. Secondly, it must be recognized that the General Assembly is by no means the only body of importance at the United Nations and that a power such as the United States enjoys a special position in that it is a member of many other bodies, such as the Security Council, where the membership is limited and the influence of each member is correspondingly increased. Finally, the fact is that even in the General Assembly itself the influence of a state such as the United States is by no means measured by its vote alone. Other delegations who are pressing for resolutions (except for the Communist bloc) are invariably anxious to have the support of the United States because they know that others are likely to look to us for leadership. I personally have spent hours in negotiation with representative members of the Afro-Asian group during which they have patiently tried to work out changes in their own resolutions which would make it possible for the United States to support them. I can say categorically that the United States is by all odds, and without any close competitor, the most influential nation at the United Nations.

#### **Need To Preserve and Strengthen the U.N.**

In conclusion, just let me say this. The world needs, and we in the United States need, an international organization that can provide a collective instrument to further world peace and prosperity. If by some fatal mischance the United Nations were to collapse today, we would tomorrow feel compelled to try to create a new international

organization to perform the same functions. In the cold-war atmosphere that prevails, we would not now—in 1962—be able to persuade the Communists to join with us in setting up an organization as viable and vigorous as the one we created in 1945. If we were to try to set up an international organization without the Communists, huge areas of the world, including most of Asia and Africa and probably a good part of Latin America, would doubtless shy away for fear of “taking sides” and we would be left not with a truly international organization but simply with an alliance, which would be no substitute.

If we could build a Berlin wall about our country and shut out the rest of the world from all contact with us, we might be able to do without the U.N. Short of that improbable achievement, we must, if we are to serve the interests of the United States, continue our efforts to preserve and strengthen the United Nations.

## **U.S. and Ecuador Reaffirm Traditional Friendship**

*The President of the Republic of Ecuador, Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, and Mrs. Arosemena made an official visit to the United States July 22-29.<sup>1</sup> Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and President Arosemena released at the close of their discussions at Washington July 23-24.*

White House press release dated July 24

His Excellency Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, President of the Republic of Ecuador, has visited Washington as the guest of President Kennedy, with the objective of further strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperative relations that exist between Ecuador and the United States. During this visit the two Presidents have held conversations in a spirit of cordiality, frankness and understanding, exploring a number of matters of bilateral interest as well as hemispheric and international matters of a wider scope.

In the course of these conversations the two

<sup>1</sup> President and Mrs. Arosemena visited at Philadelphia July 22, Washington July 23-24, Chicago July 25, and New York July 26-29. For a detailed itinerary and a list of the members of the official party, see Department of State press release 466 dated July 19.

Presidents reaffirmed the friendship which has traditionally united and continues to unite their two countries. This friendship is founded upon their common principles of mutual respect and the concept of juridical equality of states, the effective exercise of representative democracy, and the maintenance of individual liberties and respect for human dignity, which are principles essential for the advancement of nations and the furtherance of social justice.

The two Presidents expressed the importance with which they regard the close ties among the Republics of the hemisphere and their determination to remain united against aggression and subversion either from within or from outside of the hemisphere. They rejected the use of force for the settlement of international disputes and agreed upon the necessity to adhere to the principles of law which are applicable to the settlement of international controversies in seeking solutions to problems which may affect the countries and peoples of the hemisphere, rejecting violence and arbitrary action.

Presidents Kennedy and Arosemena reaffirmed their faith in the Alliance for Progress as an instrument by which the American Republics and peoples can achieve the conditions necessary for their advancement within a framework of developing democratic institutions. They confirmed their adherence to the principles of the Charter of Punta del Este, expressing their determination to carry out the commitments embodied in it. They recognized the need for national planning designed to concentrate the utilization of available resources on objectives of the highest priority for social and economic development and for structural reforms in such fields as agriculture, taxation, and fiscal management, as well as the need for financial and technical assistance from international sources if the objectives of the Alliance for Progress are to be achieved with speed and efficiency.

The two Presidents restated their confidence that the Republic of Ecuador is capable of achieving a high level of economic development in an atmosphere of social equity and justice through the efforts of its own people and Government supplemented by the aid available through international cooperation. They agreed that the achievement of such development would require major changes in the social and economic structure of Ecuador to assure not only steady economic prog-

ress, but also a more equitable distribution of the fruits of such progress among the people so that each Ecuadorean may feel that he is simultaneously an agent and a beneficiary of progress. The Presidents concluded that in view of the present condition and potentialities of the Ecuadorean economy, the current year represents an important period which should witness an intensified effort to work for economic growth.

The two Presidents discussed the problem of the fluctuations of export earnings and agreed that such fluctuations represent a major obstacle to economic growth. They agreed that the stability of such earnings, if accompanied by adequate distribution of their benefits among the people, would represent a factor even more important than external assistance for the growth of the less developed countries. Consequently, the two Presidents were in agreement on the importance of seeking means to reduce such fluctuations. They also recognized the necessity for the more advanced countries to express their spirit of cooperation in a practical manner by following import policies contributing to an expansion in export earnings of the less developed countries, avoiding harmful discrimination and restrictions. In regard to this point, Presidents Kennedy and Arosemena discussed the problems of the exports of bananas, coffee, and cocoa as well as other Ecuadorean products and United States efforts to contribute to price stability and market expansion through such means as the coffee agreement<sup>2</sup> and our activities in the Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products of the GATT.

The Presidents reviewed with satisfaction the progress achieved in the cooperation between the two countries in the execution of various programs and projects in which the Government of Ecuador is engaged. They discussed the special importance of projects for the construction of roads and other investment in transport facilities, efforts in the field of agriculture and industry, in which government action will be reinforced by private investment, social development programs such as education, housing, water supply, and sanitary facilities, as well as efforts planned and under way for regional and community development. In examining such projects in the light of internal and

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by W. Michael Blumenthal at the U.N. Coffee Conference at New York on July 10, see BULLETIN of Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234.

external financing available, the two Presidents agreed to make joint efforts to reduce to a minimum delays in effecting external assistance as well as in carrying out internal steps to insure thorough preparations and successful implementation of such development projects. In this regard, the Presidents stressed the importance of cooperation between their Governments to undertake studies and to prepare projects which will permit the improved utilization of internal resources and external assistance and will form the basis for the preparation by the Government of Ecuador of its important General Development Plan to succeed the present shorter range program now being executed.

President Arosemena and President Kennedy reviewed the prospects for holding the Eleventh Inter-American Conference and expressed their hope that circumstances would make possible the timely convocation of the Eleventh Inter-American Conference in the capital of the Republic of Ecuador. They noted that as the host nation Ecuador had from the beginning faithfully complied with its commitment to make physical preparations for the conference.

The Presidents reiterated their adherence to the principles of liberty which unite the Western World in its struggle against international communism and other despotic doctrines which attempt to destroy the essential values which shape the life of their peoples.

Finally, the Presidents of Ecuador and the United States renewed the expressions of their faith in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of American States, proclaiming their loyal and unrestricted adherence to those principles.

## **Chester Bowles Visits Colombia To Discuss Aid Projects**

Press release 480 dated July 27

Chester Bowles, the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, will visit Colombia from July 31 through August 3, 1962.

Ambassador Bowles will meet with Colombian and U.S. Government officials and with private citizens to discuss Alliance for Progress and other joint U.S.-Colombian undertakings and will assist projects now under way.

## **U.S. and Argentine Minister Conclude Economic Discussions**

Press release 479 dated July 27

The Department of State announced on July 27 the conclusion of a series of discussions between the Argentine Minister of Economy, Alvaro Alsogaray, and representatives of the U.S. Government, including the Secretary of State and other high Department officials, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and the President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. These discussions were a sequel to the meetings with officials of the National Development Council of Argentina.<sup>1</sup>

During the course of the discussions, Minister Alsogaray expressed the firm decision of his Government to restrain inflationary pressures by application of necessary fiscal and other measures within Argentina. He referred to the agreed statement issued by the International Monetary Fund on July 27, 1962, and stressed that important relief for Argentina's budgetary, banking, and balance-of-payments pressures could be derived from a rescheduling of short-term and medium-term debt obligations held abroad. The U.S. officials undertook to provide appropriate assistance for that purpose, and the Export-Import Bank for its part agreed to give sympathetic consideration to refinancing a major portion of the payments of principal due to the Bank in the near future from Argentine borrowers. This agreement by the Export-Import Bank was predicated upon its understanding of the measures which the Argentine Government intends to apply and which the refinancing is designed to assist. The refinancing will also be conditioned upon the rescheduling by Argentina of its obligations to the European creditors on terms no less favorable to Argentina than those proposed to the Export-Import Bank.

The discussions also provided an opportunity for further review, within the framework of the Charter of Punta del Este, of U.S. cooperation in the national development program of Argentina. Minister Alsogaray indicated that, as a result of these and previous discussions, his Government planned to submit specific proposals on projects to the Agency for International Development at an early date. In view of the understanding

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

reached by Minister Alsogaray with the IMF, it was agreed that an Alliance for Progress technical mission would go to Buenos Aires shortly for the review of financing and other arrangements for proposed projects in priority fields within the loan commitments earlier approved in general terms by the Agency for International Development.

In addition a recently announced exchange agreement with the U.S. Treasury remains in effect.<sup>2</sup>

## President Allocates Sugar Imports to Argentina and Dominican Republic

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

ALLOCATING TO CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES PART OF THE SUGAR WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO CUBA

WHEREAS section 202(c) (4) of the Sugar Act of 1948 (P.L. 87-535 and 87-530) provides as follows:

"(4) (A) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of this subsection, whenever the United States is not in diplomatic relations with any country named in paragraph (3) of this subsection and during such period after resumption of diplomatic relations with such country as the Secretary determines is required to permit an orderly adjustment in the channels of commerce for sugar, the proration or allocation provided for in paragraph (3) of this subsection shall not be made to such country, and a quantity of sugar not to exceed an amount equal to the proration or allocation which would have been made but for the provisions of this paragraph, may be authorized for purchase and importation from foreign countries, except that all or any part of such quantity need not be purchased from any country with which the United States is not in diplomatic relations, or from any country designated by the President whenever he finds and proclaims that such action is required in the national interest. In authorizing the purchase and importation of sugar from foreign countries under this paragraph, special consideration shall be given to countries of the Western Hemisphere and to those countries purchasing United States agricultural commodities.

"(B) Of the quantity authorized for purchase and importation under subparagraph (A), the President is authorized to allocate to countries within the Western Hemisphere, for the six-month period ending December 31, 1962, an amount of sugar, raw value, not exceeding in the aggregate 75,000 short tons, and for the calendar years 1963 and 1964, an amount of sugar, raw value, not exceeding in the aggregate 150,000 short tons."; and

WHEREAS the allocation of sugar authorized under the provisions of section 202(c) (4) (B) of the Sugar Act of

1948, as amended, is dependent upon a quantity of sugar being available for purchase and importation in accordance with the provisions of section 202(c) (4) (A) of the Act, during the six-month period ending December 31, 1962, and each of the calendar years 1963 and 1964:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 202(c) (4) (B) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, do hereby allocate, of the quantities authorized for purchase and importation under section 202(c) (4) (A) of such Act, the following quantities of sugar, raw value, as sugar which may be imported into the continental United States from the specified countries for the specified periods pursuant to section 202(c) (4) (B) of such Act:

1. For the six-month period ending December 31, 1962:
  - a. From Argentina 10,000 short tons, and
  - b. From the Dominican Republic 65,000 short tons.
2. For each of the calendar years 1963 and 1964:
  - a. From Argentina 20,000 short tons, and
  - b. From the Dominican Republic 130,000 short tons.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 19th day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] sixty-two, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.

By the President:

DEAN RUSK,  
Secretary of State.

## U.S. and Chile Schedule New Air Talks for February 1963

### Joint Statement

Press release 478 dated July 27

Delegations of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Chile held consultations from July 16 to 26, 1962, concerning the application of the bilateral Air Transport Agreement signed by both countries on May 10, 1947.<sup>1</sup>

These consultations brought into evidence some basic differences in the interpretation of the Agreement which it has not been possible to reconcile, particularly with reference to Resolution 902 of the Junta de Aeronautica Civil.

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement, see Department of the Treasury press release dated June 7, 1962.

<sup>2</sup> No. 3485; 27 Fed. Reg. 7371.

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1905.

In these circumstances it has been agreed that new consultations will be requested to be held during February 1963, with the purpose of considering the compatibility between the Agreement and the objectives of the Chilean Government's air policy particularly in relation to regional traffic.

Under the circumstances the Government of Chile declares its intention to not apply Resolution 902.

## **U.S. Accepts Canadian Proposal To Suspend Welland Canal Tolls**

*The Department of State on July 23 (press release 470) released the following exchange of notes between the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Ottawa regarding the suspension of Welland Canal tolls. The Department has been informed that this suspension is to be retroactive to July 18, 1962.*

### **CANADIAN NOTE**

No. 118

SIR: I have the honour to bring to your attention the proposal of the Canadian Government to suspend in the near future the levying of tolls on the Welland Canal. The Government of Canada is fully satisfied that this action will be beneficial to the shipping and trade interests of both Canada and the United States.

It will be recalled that, although this Canal is within Canada and the revenue from it is not subject to the sharing arrangement, the tolls on this Canal are referred to in a Memorandum of Agreement and Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the exchange of notes of March 9, 1959<sup>1</sup> between Canada and the United States of America concerning the application of tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. I therefore propose that the tariff be modified by an exchange of notes to reflect the suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal.

I shall of course communicate further with you if the Government of Canada subsequently decides that it would be advisable to revoke this suspension and re-impose tolls on the Welland Canal.

<sup>1</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440.

I have the honour to suggest that if the foregoing is agreeable to the Government of the United States, this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States to vary the Tariff of Tolls attached to the 1959 exchange of notes in order to provide for this suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

OTTAWA, July 3, 1962.

### **U.S. NOTE**

No. 14

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Note No. 118 of July 3, 1962 concerning the proposed suspension of Welland Canal tolls and the modification of the Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the exchange of notes of March 9, 1959 to reflect such a suspension.

I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that the proposed suspension of Welland Canal tolls and a consequent modification of the Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the exchange of notes of March 9, 1959 to reflect this suspension are acceptable.

Accordingly, your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada appropriately to modify the Tariff of Tolls incorporated in the 1959 exchange of notes in order to provide for suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

OTTAWA, July 13, 1962.

## **U.S. and Tin Council Discuss Sale of U.S. Stockpile Surplus**

Press release 477 dated July 27

Discussions took place in Washington on July 23 through July 26 between representatives of the State Department and other agencies of the U.S. Government and a delegation of the International Tin Council regarding disposal of surplus tin from the U.S. stockpile for an initial period of 6 months.

There was an exchange of views over a broad

field as to the steps which might be taken to avoid any undue effect of the disposal on the market.

The consultations did not result in agreement as to the specific rate and conditions of disposal which would be most appropriate. However, the U.S. representatives gave assurances that their Government would take into account the views expressed by the delegation of the Council. The U.S. representatives also reaffirmed that their Government would dispose of surplus tin in moderate quantities and would regulate the rate of disposal in accordance with market conditions. Before the end of the initial 6 months' period of operations the U.S. Government will again consult with representatives of the International Tin Council and with substantially interested governments and will reassess the market before reaching a decision as to future sales. In addition the U.S. Government will be prepared to consult at any time with the International Tin Council or with substantially interested governments.

## **President Accepts Resignation of Food-for-Peace Director**

*Following is an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and George McGovern, Director of the Food-for-Peace Program.*

White House press release dated July 18

### **MR. MCGOVERN\_TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY**

JULY 18, 1962

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: For the past year and a half, I have had the high privilege of serving as a member of your staff in directing the Food For Peace Program. I am deeply grateful to you for this rare opportunity of service to the nation and the cause of peace.

I have decided after months of careful thought to resign my present post and ask the people of South Dakota to permit me to continue public service in the U.S. Senate, where I believe I am best able to make a distinct contribution at this time. It is my conviction that the youthful, progressive leadership which you have brought to the nation is needed in the public life of my home State. I should like to think that if the people of South

Dakota give me their approval, I can return to Washington next year to work with your Administration for a greater South Dakota, a better America, and a more peaceful world.

In creating the White House office on Food For Peace, you said on January 24, 1961, that "American agricultural abundance offers a great opportunity for the United States to promote the interests of peace in a significant way."<sup>1</sup>

Your words seem all the more appropriate today.

Most of the people of the globe are engaged in tilling the soil; yet, hunger afflicts two-thirds of humanity. Food For Peace represents a mighty bridge between an abundant American agriculture and a hungry world.

This Program has enjoyed broad bipartisan support from the Congress and the American people since the passage of Public Law 480 in 1954. Under your leadership, however, it has taken on a dynamic new dimension.

Food For Peace is not only an outlet for costly farm storages, not only a device to support farm income, not only a valuable commercial market development tool; it is also a useful ingredient of economic development, an invaluable aid to world health, and a powerful corrective to the misery on which tyranny thrives. Food For Peace—an indispensable foundation stone in the building of a free and peaceful world—has given the American farmer a vital role in U.S. foreign policy.

During the past eighteen months, 93 billion pounds of food have been committed for shipment to over 100 countries. This accomplishment is brought into even clearer perspective when compared with the 80 billion pounds of food to 23 countries shipped during the American Relief operations under Herbert Hoover during the World War I decade. It represents a 75% gain over commitments for any previous eighteen-month period.

The largest share of Food For Peace commitments are sales for foreign currencies, with the bulk of the currency earmarked for development grants or loans. We have made more effective use of foreign currency sales by coordinating them with other forms of U.S. aid and by planning them on a multi-year basis.

Since January 1961, we have increased by eight-fold the number of countries directly utilizing U.S.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.

food grants for economic and social development capital. Today, in 12 countries American grain is being used to finance part of the wage cost involved in building roads, wells, schools, hospitals, and other projects. In four other countries we have for the first time offered grain to self-help groups engaged in poultry and livestock production, thereby converting low-protein surplus grains into desperately needed high-protein meat, poultry, eggs and dairy products.

Religious and humanitarian agencies in the United States have greatly expanded their role, distributing 4 billion pounds of food to nearly 70 million persons—an increase of 34% over the preceding 18 months. The voluntary agencies have been especially effective in strengthening the Alliance for Progress. Food grants to Latin America have increased 100% since early 1961.

Perhaps the most dramatic development in Food For Peace has been the sharp new impetus to the overseas school lunch programs. These programs offer a double thrust because they contribute first to the health of the child and then to improved education. We have noted a striking relationship between school lunch programs and academic performance.

In Peru, for example, attendance has gone up 40% since we started the first school lunch program for 30,000 children in early 1961. We are now cooperating with the Peruvian Government to feed one million school children by 1965. A similar program is underway in the chronically hungry area of Northeast Brazil.

The number of children receiving Food For Peace school lunches has climbed from 25 million to 35 million in the past year. Plans are in motion for a much larger program, especially in Latin America as a vital part of the Alliance for Progress. In India it is expected that 18 million school children will be participating in such programs within five years.

For the first time, six countries have signed agreements for the purchase of food under long-term deferred dollar arrangements. We have also broadened our Food For Peace package by making available bulgur wheat, rolled wheat, edible oil, shortening, butter, beans, and cheese—in addition to cereals and milk which were available prior to 1961.

Other notable steps of the past 18 months include: (1) the completion of a commodity-by-com-

modity, country-by-country survey of food reserves and deficits, "The World Food Budget, 1962-66," published by the Department of Agriculture; (2) the establishment of an effective citizens' Food For Peace Council,<sup>2</sup> which has tapped the advice of private citizens and organizations and enlisted better public understanding of the program; and (3) the formation of an inter-agency group to review new food processes and proposals that may add to the nutritional value and effectiveness of our food assistance.

Finally, we have given force to U.S. participation in multi-national food programs in two ways. Through U.S. initiative, a "World Food Program" of \$100 million in commodities, services, and cash has been approved under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization within the United Nations system.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, a Freedom from Hunger Foundation has been established to permit U.S. citizen participation in the U.N.-FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign.<sup>4</sup> This represents a global effort to enlist the support of private citizens and organizations for projects designed to reduce world hunger.

Thus, we have moved forward on the Food For Peace front in many ways.

The progress of the program cannot and should not be measured merely in terms of the number of tons of food programmed for shipment abroad. An emergency famine relief grant or an economic development plan utilizing American food in small countries such as Dahomey, Ecuador, Tanganyika, or Togo may be just as significant in the long run as the shipment of hundreds of thousands of tons to larger nations.

While continuing to donate food to those who cannot help themselves—to drought and flood-stricken areas, to refugees, to hungry school children throughout the world, we have emphasized the use of our agricultural abundance to initiate self-help projects for long-range social and economic development.

The Food For Peace Program manifests the practical humanitarian convictions of the American people. We have made food donations to those in need under programs that dignify, not demean, the individual recipient. We have sold

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 29, 1961, p. 829.

<sup>3</sup> For a statement on the World Food Program by Richard N. Gardner, see *ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1020.

our agricultural abundance for foreign currency or dollars to those countries that could afford to pay. We have bartered, extended credit, loaned or granted back currencies under generous terms to achieve social and economic development objectives. The program is a powerful long-term market development instrument. For example, Japanese children learned to enjoy American milk and bread flour through Food For Peace; today, Japan is our best commercial customer for farm commodities.

If I were to single out one priority recommendation, I would strongly urge that the United States take an even more active lead in providing a daily school lunch for every needy child in the world. No form of overseas assistance could return greater dividends for so little cost. We should undertake this task with renewed energy "because it is right".

I would emphasize also that additional Food For Peace Program officers be placed in selected regions throughout the world.

The Food For Peace Program, as conceived and conducted under your leadership, will continue to improve. The direction in which it is moving is most hopeful for the American farmer, churchman, and citizen, and for the inhabitants of a developing world.

Sincerely,

GEORGE MCGOVERN

**PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO MR. MCGOVERN**

JULY 18, 1962

DEAR GEORGE: I accept with deep regret your resignation as Director of the Food For Peace Program.

YOURS was an exacting assignment, requiring vigor, intelligence, understanding of farm problems and a sympathy for the under-privileged of the world. You were the first Food For Peace Director. It was a new office with new horizons. The objectives of the program and the urgency were clear; but there were problems of organization, expansion of existing facilities, encouragement of new techniques and development of new ideas. To implement the legislation which led to the creation of the office it was necessary to have a broad knowledge of government and an

ability to weld together diverse efforts. You met each of the challenges and resolved each of the problems in such a way that the Food For Peace Program has become a vital force in the world.

It has channeled our agriculture abundance toward relief of hunger and misery, improvement of living conditions, improved educational opportunity and strengthening of the economies of our friends. The program you headed constituted a powerful barrier to the spread of Communism and utilized the technology of American agriculture in a very effective manner. Under your guidance, sales of food for foreign currencies were almost doubled; six times as many countries are using the food-for-wages formula to employ workers to construct hospitals, schools, roads and wells in developing nations; and the first World Food Bank was created.

We will miss your advice and counsel. However, I am glad you have decided to seek continuance of your distinguished career of public service. Your experience, courage, dedication, training and understanding will be especially valuable in the halls of Congress. In the Senate your voice and vote can, I know, make an immense contribution to the economic progress of South Dakota and the Nation.

I am looking forward to working closely with you in the future as I have in the past.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

**Letters of Credence**

*Malaya*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federation of Malaya, Ong Yoke Lin, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 476 dated July 24.

*Turkey*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey, Turgut Menemencioglu, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 475 dated July 24.



## Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol Signed at Geneva

*The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, which opened at Geneva on May 16, 1961,<sup>1</sup> was concluded on July 23, 1962, when the participating governments signed a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol.<sup>2</sup> Following is a statement made by President Kennedy on the day the agreements were signed, together with texts of the declaration, the protocol, and a letter of July 18 from the U.S. Deputy Representative, W. Averell Harriman, to the U.K. and Soviet cochairmen.*

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated July 23

The signature today [July 23] at Geneva of the agreements which are to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Laos can be a significant milestone in our efforts to maintain and further world peace. It is a heartening indication that difficult, and at times seemingly insoluble, international problems can in fact be solved by patient diplomacy.

The agreements represent a solemn commitment not only by the United States but by all the other signatories to ensure a free, independent, and neutral Laos. This can be accomplished only by full and continued observance of the agreements by all the signatories.

The Kingdom of Laos, which has been torn for

so long by fratricidal strife, now stands on the threshold of a new era. It now has the opportunity to become united and independent, free to pursue its chosen course of neutrality. The success of that policy ultimately must depend not only on the efforts of the Laotians themselves but also on the moral and material support it receives from the rest of the world. For its part, the United States assures Laos of such support as that country enters this new phase in its history.

### TEXT OF DECLARATION

#### DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962:

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, incorporated in the present Declaration as an integral part thereof, and the text of which is as follows:—

The Royal Government of Laos,

Being resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the Joint Communiqué of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954,<sup>3</sup> in

<sup>1</sup> For background and texts of U.S. statements, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 844; June 26, 1961, p. 1023; July 10, 1961, p. 85; and July 2, 1962, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> The agreements were signed on behalf of the United States by Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Harriman.

<sup>3</sup> For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 775.

order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos.

Solemnly declares that:

(1) It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighbouring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos;

(2) It is the will of the Laotian people to protect and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos;

(3) It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries;

(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization];

(5) It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever;

(6) Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos;

(7) It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help the Kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos;

(8) It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.

This statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos shall be promulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the States participating in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, and to all other States, to recognise the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects, and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva Agreements of 1954:

Emphasising the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question;

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in South-East Asia:

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognise and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that

(a) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

(b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;

(c) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;

(d) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;

(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(f) they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;

(g) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;

(h) they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;

(i) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(j) they will not use the territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present Declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

5. The present Declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962 shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all the other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

## TEXT OF PROTOCOL

### PROTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

For the purposes of this Protocol

(a) the term "foreign military personnel" shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials;

(b) the term "the Commission" shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and composed of the representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman;

(c) the term "the Co-Chairmen" shall mean the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;

(d) the term "the members of the Conference" shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962.

#### Article 2

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than thirty days after the Commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of this Protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These points shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the Commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within fifteen days after the points have been determined.

#### Article 3

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission. The Commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

#### Article 4

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

#### Article 5

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the Conference, through the Co-Chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

#### Article 6

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is prohibited.

#### Article 7

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within thirty days after the entry into force

of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

#### Article 8

The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. In addition the Commission shall immediately report to the Co-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this Protocol, all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important information which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Commission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance.

The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference.

The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

The Co-Chairmen will keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

#### Article 9

The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commission shall exercise these functions in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

#### Article 10

The Commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol.

#### Article 11

The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article in accordance with Article 8.

#### Article 12

The Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full co-operation with it.

#### Article 13

The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Protocol in close co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the Commission all possible assistance in the performance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

#### Article 14

The Commission functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in co-operation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission.

Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all recommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

#### Article 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall conduct investigations (directly or by sending inspection teams), when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions on initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote.

The Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

#### Article 16

For the exercise of its functions the Commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented. Each member-State of the Commission shall en-

sure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to perform their duties.

It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

#### Article 17

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

#### Article 18

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(a) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-paragraph (c) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(c) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

The Governments of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet-Nam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

#### Article 19

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairman shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.

#### Article 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature.

It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

#### TEXT OF U.S. LETTER

JULY 18, 1962

SIRS: Article 18 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos relating to finance provides a formula for distributing the costs of the operations of the International Commission among the members of the Conference. I should like to invite your attention to the fact that the contributions by my Government will require annual appropriation action by the Congress of the United States. I am sure you and the members of the Conference are familiar with the legal requirements of my Government in this respect.

Very truly yours,

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

*United States Deputy Representative*

THEIR EXCELLENCIES THE CO-CHAIRMEN  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN QUESTION,  
Geneva.

## The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

*Statement by M. Wilfred Goding*

*U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council*<sup>1</sup>

It is a privilege to appear again as Special Representative of the United States to report on the principal events that have occurred in the progress of the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands since July 1, 1961. This is the second time I have had the pleasure and honor of serving in this capacity, and I look forward to receiving the benefit of the views and recommendations of the members of the Council.

The Council may recall that in my opening statement of last year<sup>2</sup> I commented that we were then reassessing our needs in the territory with the aim in mind of reshaping and revamping our programs where necessary for more rapid development. I am pleased to be able to report that this reassessment has resulted in significant major policy changes and in the adoption of new procedures, many of them along the lines recommended by the 1961 visiting United Nations mission. These policy changes and significant accomplishments of the past year I shall outline only briefly in this presentation, but I shall be pleased to amplify any points or present any additional information that members of this body may desire.

### Administration

Among the most important events of general administrative significance was the unification of the administration of the territory under a single civilian authority. On May 7, 1962, President

Kennedy signed an Executive order<sup>3</sup> placing the Saipan District under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. Thus on July 1, 1962, all the territory shall be consolidated under the administrative authority of the High Commissioner. Since the matter of unification of the administration of the territory has been one which the Council regularly has recommended, I know that all members will be as pleased as I am that this unification has been achieved.

With the integration of the Saipan District into the rest of the territory, it will now be possible to achieve the consolidation of Rota Island with the rest of the Marianas. On July 1, 1962, a new district, the Mariana Islands District, will officially come into existence by amalgamating the present Rota District with that of the present Saipan District. This amalgamation, I might note, long has been desired by the people of Rota and is one recommended on numerous occasions by this Council.

Equally important and perhaps even more significant from a long-range point of view has been the designation of Saipan as the provisional capital of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. On July 1, 1962, when the people of Saipan formally join the rest of the territory under one administration, they also will have the privilege of seeing the flag of their High Commissioner raised in the first headquarters located within the territory. Over one-half of the staff members already have moved to the new headquarters site on Saipan, and the rest of the departments and staff will be moving between now and June 30. We believe

<sup>1</sup> Made at the opening session of the U.N. Trusteeship Council on May 31 (U.S./U.N. press release 3999). Mr. Goding is High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 31, 1961, p. 201.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 887.

that the transfer of the headquarters to a site within the territory will facilitate closer cooperation among the people of the territory and will, as previous visiting missions have suggested, stimulate greater political cohesion.

With the establishment of the headquarters and provisional capital on Saipan, we shall consolidate many headquarters activities now scattered throughout the territory. The central communications unit, the nursing school, the dental school, and public-health activities such as sanitation and health statistics will be consolidated with other headquarters activities, resulting in a more efficient operation.

The establishment of headquarters within the territory also will enable us to intensify the program of training and to meet our aim of utilizing to the maximum extent qualified Micronesians on the headquarters staff. Joining us at our new headquarters will be a Trukese director of sanitation, a Yapese and a Palauan information officer, a Trukese and a Saipanese assistant medical supply officer, a Ponapean assistant political affairs officer, a Palauan interdistrict finance officer, and numerous Micronesians in other positions. The general administrative goal of replacing American staff with qualified Micronesians will be greatly accelerated. Forty-seven headquarters positions in the secretarial, clerical, supply, and other fields, now held by Americans, will be filled by Micronesians after July 1, 1962, in our new headquarters on Saipan.

In the districts during the year, our replacement program also was accelerated. Among the important replacements worthy of mention were the promotion of Mr. David Ramarui to the position of District Director of Education of Palau District, the appointment of Mr. Carl Dannis of Ponape as Assistant Director of Sanitation, and the promotion of Dr. Moonfel of Yap, Dr. Michi Kolios of Truk, and Dr. José Chong of Saipan to full-fledged District Directors of Public Health.

During the past year two Micronesians served with distinction on several occasions as acting district administrators. Mr. Takeo Yano of Palau and Mr. Prudencio Manglona of Rota, in the temporary absence of the District Administrator, assumed full responsibility for the operation of their districts and performed their tasks with confidence and ability.

A number of studies now are underway with

respect to the wage levels incorporated in the Micronesian title and pay plan. A preliminary cost-of-living survey has been conducted, and recommendations as to possible revision of wage scales will be available for review before the close of this fiscal year. In an attempt to establish a more realistic and equitable prevailing wage scale in the Kwajalein area, the District Administrator of the Marshalls was requested to study conditions there and submit a revision of present wage scales for that area. During the year also some 35 top employees were promoted to the senior professional and executive wage classification which was established last year, and others are currently being considered for promotion. The scope of this new classification has been broadened considerably. Individuals promoted to these salaried positions during the year ranged from district directors of public health, senior medical officers, educational administrators, finance officers, supervisors of teacher education, administrative aides, land title officers, social development officers, PICS [Pacific Islands Central School] teachers, and economic and political affairs officers.

Training programs in the districts and at headquarters were accelerated. Each month, for example, has seen on the average some five to six Micronesians in special fields receiving inservice training at our headquarters. Additionally, as shall be described later, there was intensification of formal postgraduate training sessions in such fields as medicine, dentistry, nursing, and sanitation.

#### **Political Development**

The past year saw a number of significant developments in the field of political growth. A political affairs officer was added to the headquarters staff and a Micronesian assistant political affairs officer, a young Ponapean with a degree in political science, was also appointed. These two political affairs officers will work with municipal councils, with district legislatures, with legislative committees, and local officials advising and assisting them in political development.

On August 1, 1961, the Council of Micronesia came into being. This was a step of major importance since previously only an Inter-District Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner was in existence. Noteworthy among the Council of Micronesia's actions was the election for the first

time of a Micronesian chairman, who presided at all meetings. It may be of interest to this body to learn that the first elected chairman of the Council of Micronesia was Mr. Dwight Heine of the Marshalls, who has appeared before the Trusteeship Council on several occasions. The Council of Micronesia also for the first time established drafting committees which prepared official recommendations for the Council to consider. The Council also voted to adopt a territory flag and currently is holding flag-design contests in all districts.

A third major holdover subcommittee of the Council, the Political Development Subcommittee, was formed and, along with the Economic and Social Development Subcommittees, met during the year in the various districts to study and report on problems in these three important fields. As each subcommittee passes through headquarters enroute to the districts, the members meet with me and my staff advising on problems as they see them. These meetings I find extremely valuable and rewarding.

The popular election of delegates to the Council of Micronesia has been instituted. All district congresses this past year had bills under consideration for popular election of delegates, and two districts, Palau and the Marshalls, already have conducted elections for their delegates. It is anticipated that by next month all district congresses will have adopted legislation providing for popular election of delegates to the Council of Micronesia and our 1962 meeting will see a Council whose members have been elected by popular vote by the people of Micronesia. These elections are on a basis of universal adult suffrage.

This fall the Council will meet in Palau as guests of the Palau Congress in the new Congress Building now under construction there. This will be the first meeting of the Council within the territory, and I look forward with anticipation to the forthcoming meeting. In my opinion the Council has made significant strides in 1961 toward its eventual conversion into a true territorial legislative body. The activities of the Council committees and the serious and dedicated manner in which the Council members have attacked common problems permit me at this time to reiterate my statement of last year that by 1965 or earlier a territorial legislative council should be in existence.

On the district level, political development continued to advance. All district congresses met

during the year, and they were in session longer than at any previous sessions. An important measure passed by the various district congresses was revision of the present alcoholic beverages acts. These revisions permitted the importation and sale, subject to local option, of spirituous liquors and imposed a liquor-tax framework under which all liquor imported into the territory is subject to tax levy. Thus the point of tax exemption on liquor for nonindigenous groups noted by the 1961 visiting mission as somewhat of an anomaly no longer exists. In three districts the new alcoholic beverage laws already are in operation, and in the other districts final action and approval is expected prior to July 1 of this year or shortly thereafter.

Our program of chartering municipalities continues, and political development teams in all districts have been strengthened. One of the major tasks of the political affairs officer and the assistant political affairs officer will be to expedite this municipal chartering program in order that all municipalities of the territory may be formally chartered as soon as possible. Our target goal of chartering on an average of 10 municipalities a year has been met, and I envision a more rapid pace in the next few years with the concentrated attention that is to be placed on this chartering program by district political development teams and the headquarters political affairs staff.

### **Economic Development**

An important part of our reassessment this past year was in the area of economic development. Here some very basic policy changes were made and a new attack has been launched on the long-standing economic problems which have faced the people of Micronesia.

An economic unit has been added to the headquarters staff consisting of an economic development officer, a business analyst, and a marketing and cooperative officer. Additionally, a senior economist from the resources planning staff of the Department of the Interior was loaned to us for 3 months this spring to aid in the preparation of a long-range economic plan for the territory. For the first time a specialized economic unit or task force is available on our staff to deal exclusively with economic matters.

Plans are now underway to provide for outside capital participation in economic enterprises



presently beyond the capacity of local investors. As the Council will note, this is a major change from the previous policy which held that outside capital should be excluded from the territory. Capital investment of this nature, however, will be subject to controls that will provide for maximum participation by the Micronesian people. Currently negotiations are underway with a number of major United States commercial fisheries companies for the establishment of large-scale commercial fisheries operations in the Palau and Truk Districts. Other enterprises which may require outside capital participation and which we are currently investigating are fabricating and manufacturing industries, i.e. clothing enterprises, food processing, and eventually commercial transportation and travel facilities.

A Micronesian economic development fund has been proposed, and we have requested \$100,000 in our budget for 1963 as an initial increment for this fund. It is planned to augment the fund capital by providing for a percentage allocation of the existing processing-tax revenues. It is hoped that small business and business development will be greatly accelerated through loans from this fund. During the year expanded use was made of our present loan fund, now limited by law to loans to chartered trading companies. Loans were made from this fund for a boatbuilding enterprise, for capital investments of a copra and cacao cooperative, for expansion of trading company activities, for a slaughterhouse operation, and for fisheries cooperative activities.

Through a new policy established within the last several months, the Administration has guaranteed bank loans to small private businessmen to enable them to invest in productive economic enterprises. Within the last month, for example, through such a loan guarantee procedure a private taxi company, as well as a private bus company, was organized in the Truk District. Similar small private businesses, we trust, can be started in other districts through loan guarantee procedures.

Through the combined services of the new economic development unit and our agricultural extension service, a commercial soapmaking enterprise was launched in the territory. One local entrepreneur in Palau now has a contract to supply Trust Territory boarding schools, hospitals, and territory hotels with locally made coconut-oil toilet soap. In other districts, coconut-oil soap is being made for home consumption.

A Micronesian products center has been established in Guam under the joint auspices of the Trust Territory economic unit and our new community development office. Largely devoted to the sale of handicraft at the present time, this Micronesian products center should in time develop into a territory-wide marketing cooperative capable of servicing a wide variety of producers cooperatives in the various districts.

The 1961 visiting mission in its report<sup>4</sup> listed 11 measures it felt desirable for consideration in economic development. This past year all 11 measures either have been accomplished or are in the process of implementation in some form or other. Much remains to be done, but we feel that we have accomplished a significant breakthrough on the economic front. I am confident that this coming year will see even greater progress.

Bank expansion has continued. An additional branch bank opened in Palau during the year, making banking facilities available in four of the six major districts. Plans now are being formulated for the opening of a branch bank in Ponape District this coming year.

Interest in credit unions and cooperatives is high. Some six new credit unions came into existence during the year, bringing the total credit unions to 11 throughout the territory, and others have submitted charters for consideration. A number of cooperative producing and marketing units also were formed in the year under review. These ranged from a cacao-copra producers unit, a fishermen's cooperative, and a boatbuilding association to a housing cooperative. We expect to devote major emphasis this coming year to the expansion of cooperatives in the territory. Four staff members are now attending a postgraduate training course in cooperatives in Fiji and on their return to the territory will conduct a series of cooperative training courses throughout the territory.

A brief summary also might be given of the annual production progress of our major economic resources. In the first 10 months of the present fiscal year some 11,215 short tons of copra have been produced, and we anticipate that the total copra production this year will exceed 13,000 tons. In spite of the unfavorable world market for copra during the past year we have maintained

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. T/1582.

stabilized prices to the producer through the Copra Stabilization Fund.

### Agriculture

Vegetable produce and fish export revenue continued to show appreciable increases as compared to the previous years. Fish export revenue, for example, rose from \$19,000 in 1959 to \$78,000 last year. If local and interdistrict sales are included, fish revenue totaled over \$150,000 for fiscal year 1961.

Interest in cacao development continued to be high. Even though the majority of cacao beans harvested are still being purchased by the Administration for seedling purposes, some 5½ tons of cacao were sold on the world market. This we hope to increase fivefold this coming year. Cacao trees are now coming into bearing in Truk, Ponape, and Palau, and within the next few years cacao export should assume a significant place in the economic potential of the territory. The demand for seedlings by local farmers still exceeds the supply being grown by our agricultural stations. In Ponape District alone over 500,000 cacao seedlings were planted by local farmers during the year. In Truk some 230,000 seedlings were planted. Approximately 1 million cacao trees now are planted in the territory. On a basis of one pound of dry beans per tree production, by 1970 we should have a cacao production of at least 500 tons annually, even though no more cacao trees were to be planted. If the planting program continues, as we feel it will, our eventual production will be vastly greater. The cacao subsidy program, which started in 1958 and called for 100,000 trees, has been completed, and 10 percent of these trees are already in production.

It is our hope that one or more large-scale commercial fishery ventures will be in operation in the territory in the very near future. These enterprises should bring sizable income to the local people. At the same time we propose to increase the scope of our own fisheries operation. Considerable progress was made during the year in our pilot fisheries development project in Palau. The fisheries training school was opened in Koror, a boatbuilding cooperative was sponsored there, and a training program in tuna-fishing methods was instituted for Micronesian trainees in Honolulu. The pilot refrigeration plant project in Palau is

almost completed and will be in use shortly after July 1, 1962.

Aspects of the agriculture program such as coconut rehabilitation and replanting are progressing satisfactorily. A farm institute will be opened next month in Ponape to train Micronesian agriculture extension workers. Scholarships for training in tropical agriculture were increased this past year.

The typhoon rehabilitation program in Ulithi progressed very satisfactorily, with the replanting aspects of that atoll being completed this past month. The people of Ulithi are to be commended for the hard and persevering work they have done to rehabilitate their devastated islands.

### Transportation Improvements

Major transportation improvements were instituted. A new field-trip ship, built to specific field-trip needs, was placed in operation in the Truk District. The Truk dock was completed and the Truk harbor dredged. The completion of this major harbor improvement project provides Truk with modern and efficient harbor facilities.

A motor vessel, the *North Star*, was acquired from the Department of the Interior as an additional major logistic vessel. This new ship will provide extra logistic and passenger service to all districts and will aid in our economic expansion program.

The acquisition of a DC-4 aircraft and institution of its service as of July 1 this year will materially improve our air service. This new plane, which will carry 40 passengers and appreciable cargo tonnage, will remove many of the problems now found with the operation of the amphibious S-16 aircraft, which can carry a maximum of 14 passengers and has very limited cargo capacity.

The airfield on Yap Island was reconstructed during the year and is expected to be in operation by July 1, 1962. Construction work also was started on the reconstruction of a former airfield on Babelthuap, Palau. Until this airfield is ready, we propose to use the airfield on Angaur Island, Palau, in order to make maximum use of the new DC-4 aircraft. Site studies were also made for airfield construction on Ponape Island, and it is hoped that construction of an airfield on Ponape can be started this coming year. In the meantime we propose to operate the amphibious

aircraft between Majuro-Ponape-Truk, linking that section of the territory to the DC-4 service which for the time being will terminate at Truk.

As we reassessed our economic problems it became increasingly apparent that one of the key points to be solved was not only more frequent and better ship transportation but equally so better land transportation. Those of us who think in terms of a coral atoll as a small entity whose contiguous islands can easily be reached by boat, or a high island like Ponape as a small island that can be traversed easily by foot or car, soon have this impression shattered upon firsthand experience. The 1961 visiting mission will recall that when it was in Majuro Atoll last year some of the members visited Majuro Island, which is across the lagoon from the island where the District Center is located. Though within sight, this major island of the atoll could be reached only by a trip of well over 4 hours by motorboat across the lagoon. The trip was a major undertaking, as I am certain that the visiting mission members who made it will recall, and the round trip took all day to accomplish.

One week ago today a 35-mile road from the District Center to the island of Majuro was opened. I am proud to state that the accomplishment of building the 35 miles of road which now links the entire atoll was done by the community effort on the part of the people of Majuro Atoll aided partially by their Administration. A new policy was initiated this past year which provided for the free use of Trust Territory Government construction equipment for community development projects. Previously communities had to pay rent for the use of such equipment, and their limited municipal budgets did not permit much development work to be done. In Majuro the people, led by their District Administrator, decided that with minimum aid and support from the Administration the entire atoll could be linked by a road. This involved not only road construction but building causeways between contiguous islands. The Administration loaned equipment and gave technical advice. The people of Majuro provided the labor. Today the entire atoll is linked together. The next visiting mission to Majuro need not spend 8 hours on a boat to visit an island they can see from our District Center. They will be able to drive to that island in less than an hour.

The people of Yap, likewise, have decided that roads and bridges are essential to economic and social development. We are providing some funds and equipment; they are providing the hard work and spirit of willingness. In the past 6 months the people of Yap have rehabilitated and improved nearly 14 miles of road on their island. Yap Island also in the near future will no longer be dependent upon the mercy of the tides, waves, and weather for communication from one part of the island to another.

An important start has also been made in opening up and improving roads on Ponape Island and on Babelthup Island in the Palau District. In each district some 6 miles of roadway are currently being opened, leading out from the district centers in connection with airfield and communications projects.

Through this new policy of providing the use of equipment and minimum aid, local communities are building roads, bridges, schools, and municipal buildings. This new joint enterprise will have a major effect on the economy of our islands, and I feel it is one of the outstanding achievements of the past year.

Radio broadcast station facilities were expanded considerably during the year. Two new Government-sponsored broadcast stations were established, one in Saipan and one in Palau, and equipment for a Government-operated broadcast station in Yap was procured. The Yap station should be in operation within the next several months. The first privately owned commercial radio broadcasting station in the territory went on the air several months ago in Truk District. Plans also call for a Government-sponsored broadcast station to open in Truk this coming year. All major districts now, except Ponape, have local radio broadcast stations in operation. Future plans call for a vastly increased expansion of local radio broadcasting, since it is felt that such a program will speed up our educational, social, economic, and political development in the territory. During the year also seven additional Government-owned and -sponsored outer-island radio stations were installed to connect remote areas by radio to the district centers. Fourteen outer-island radio stations of this nature now are in operation.

Master planning of district centers as total communities rather than simply as Administration

bases was initiated during the past year. In collaboration with the local government bodies the Administration now is drawing up plans for long-range development which will provide for suitable zoning for residences, for business establishments, roads, public parks, hospitals, etc., and to provide adequate health and sanitation safeguards for our developing urban centers. The lack of such master planning in the past resulted in a somewhat hodgepodge conglomeration of buildings and functions in our district-center areas. The local government bodies are taking an active interest in this master-plan program, and already several municipal councils and district congresses have passed zoning regulations.

### **Education**

All aspects of education in the territory have been subject to close scrutiny and analysis this past year. The recommendations of the Council of Micronesia, the recommendations of the 1961 visiting mission, the views of our educational staff, American and Micronesian, and the opinions and desires of the people of Micronesia have been carefully considered. Out of this reevaluation has come a reassessment of educational needs in the territory, and, as a result, basic policies formerly underlying our educational system have been modified or changed. Since these are major changes which affect not only the philosophy of educational needs but actual implementation of our educational program in the territory, I wish to list them in some detail at this point.

#### *Elementary Schools*

First, a policy of aiding in the subsidizing of elementary school teacher salaries was instituted. For the first time in the history of the Administration, funds were budgeted to permit the Trust Territory Government to assist the districts in payment of elementary school teacher salaries. This new joint approach, we hope, will make it possible to provide more adequate salaries for qualified teachers than has been possible by local taxation in the past. Communities will still help support their schoolteachers, but they will no longer stand alone.

The Code of the Trust Territory was changed to lower the elementary school entrance age from 8 years to 7 years. The Council will recall that the 1961 visiting mission recommended a lowering to

6 years. The present 7 years was based partly on recommendations made by the Council of Micronesia and partly on the capability of local schools at this time to absorb larger groups of schoolchildren. We will continue to examine this aspect with the view to further lowering the age of admission when conditions are favorable.

This Administration is in agreement with the view that at the present stage of development it is unrealistic to expect local communities to bear complete financial responsibility for their elementary schools. Accordingly this past year we have budgeted for a program to provide elementary schools with school furniture, basic supplies, and materials. The grant-in-aid program for school buildings, which has been unusually successful, was placed on a formal basis with the institution of the first formally budgeted grant-in-aid program. Previously, grants-in-aid were made out of extra funds garnered from miscellaneous administrative sources. We now expect that the grants-in-aid will be further increased through a program of budgeting and long-range planning.

A major and far-reaching change was the adoption of a new policy establishing English as the medium of instruction at the elementary school level, in contrast to the former educational policy which held that all elementary instruction be conducted in the vernacular. This change was made in conformance with the desire of the Micronesian people as expressed at the Council of Micronesia and by Micronesian teachers and students. This does not mean that all elementary classes will be conducted in English immediately. It does mean, however, that English will be used as the medium of instruction in any grade of elementary school where there are teachers capable of teaching it.

To make this change in policy one of actuality an English-language teaching program to train Micronesian teachers to teach in English has been launched. Special training sessions for Micronesian and American teachers already have been instituted in Truk, Ponape, and Palau Districts and a 2-month training session will start in the Marshalls next month. A linguist position has been added to the headquarters educational department, and the primary function of this specialist will be to expand and expedite the teaching of English in our elementary schools.

As a corollary project, we have established a literature production training center, where pri

mary emphasis will be on production of teaching materials in English for the elementary school level. Training courses in literature production already have been conducted in two of the districts, and the program calls for sessions of this nature in the rest of the districts this coming year.

A community development officer has been appointed to the headquarters staff to supervise the literature production center as well as to organize adult education programs and to work on other aspects of community development. The new community development officer will give special attention to the development of an adult literacy program.

### *Intermediate School Construction*

Significant progress on new intermediate school construction has been achieved. A 6-classroom addition to the intermediate school in Palau was completed during the year and work begun on a new vocational classroom building. The first increment of the new intermediate school on Truk, consisting of a 94-bed boys' dormitory and a 62-bed girls' dormitory, also was completed. Work has begun on the new 8-classroom building for the Truk intermediate school. In the Marshalls District, two 64-bed boys' dormitories and one 30-bed girls' dormitory were completed and work started on the new classroom building and on the school administration building.

### *High School Program*

Another major and significant step forward in higher education was the decision to provide full secondary school programs in all districts by expanding the present intermediate schools into full junior-senior high schools. Funds have been budgeted to initiate this program in September 1962 by adding 10th-grade classes to the intermediate schools in the major districts. Additional classes will be added each year until each district will have a full-fledged high school of its own. A certain number of students from each district, however, for the time being will still go to our central high school at PICS in Ponape. The decision to establish public high schools in each district has meant a replanning of building needs, since it is proposed, as noted above, to build a consolidated junior-senior high school plant instead of simply a junior high school. The establishment of district public schools will enable more

students in each district to have the opportunity of acquiring a high school education.

The proposal also will mean that the present Pacific Islands Central School in the future will become a consolidated high school for Ponape District with a postgraduate program of teacher training for students from all the districts. Vocational education, especially in agriculture, carpentry, boatbuilding, and home economics, will be an important part of the curriculum in all the consolidated junior-senior high schools.

Continued emphasis has been given to the field of higher education. The Administration is constructing a \$100,000 dormitory for scholarship students this year on the campus of the College of Guam. During the year, air fares were greatly reduced on Trust Territory planes to enable private Micronesian students to take advantage of high schools and college opportunities on Guam. A full-time student counselor was added to the headquarters staff to handle problems of high school and college students in Guam. Room accommodations were provided for district congress scholars in the temporary dormitory facilities in the Trust Territory area in Guam. One hundred and thirty-three students were studying in institutions of college level in Guam and abroad during the year.

### **Public Health**

The safeguarding of the health of the people of Micronesia is one of the most important aspects of our overall programs. I am pleased at this time to report that, with the appointment this past year of a Saipanese physician to the post of District Director of Public Health in the Mariana Islands District, all of our districts now have qualified Micronesians in charge of district public-health programs. During the year also, other qualified Micronesian public-health staff moved into positions of greater responsibility. These included a Ponapean who was appointed Assistant Director of Sanitation for the territory, a number of medical officers who were promoted to the "C" schedule, our top professional salary-scale classification, and an assistant to our medical supply officer.

Construction of new hospital facilities was expedited. A new hospital opened in Palau. A new hospital plant is nearing completion in Saipan and will be ready for occupancy shortly after

## **Congress Authorizes Increase in Funds for Trust Territory of Pacific Islands**

*Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release dated July 20

It gives me great pleasure to sign the enrolled bill, S. 2775, which provides authorization for a substantial increase in funds for the continued administration by the United States of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

We have a great and challenging responsibility for the development of the peoples and resources of the Trust Territory, and, by the passage of this legislation, the Congress has taken the first step toward providing the means whereby a new and vital phase of development may be instituted. This administration has recognized the fundamental changes that are taking place in the outlook of the people in this area, and we intend to meet this challenge with accelerated economic and social programs commensurate with the responsibilities of our stewardship.

The accelerated program that is contemplated will place great emphasis upon education for, in our opinion, education is the key to all further progress—political, economic, and social. It is our hope that, with this authorization, funds will be made available to meet the urgent need for the immediate initiation of programs leading to striking improvement of education at all levels in the Trust Territory, upgrading education to a level comparable to the level which has been taken for granted in the United States for decades. At the same time, we intend to move forward as rapidly as possible and with the cooperation and the full participation of the citizens of the Trust Territory in all other areas requiring development.

The people of the Trust Territory, I am sure, will mark this day as the beginning of a new era of progress for the Trust Territory and its inhabitants.

July 1 of this year. The new hospital plant for the Marshalls now is half completed. Hospital plants for Truk and Ponape Districts are to be started this coming fiscal year. New hospital plants with modern facilities will be a reality in all districts by the end of 1965, and plans are being made for additional medical facilities at out-island locations.

Postgraduate training for Micronesian doctors, nurses, and dentists was carried out at the U.S. Navy hospital and the Navy dental clinic in Guam this past year. Four medical officers completed postgraduate work in surgery and general medical

fields, while two completed specialized training in anesthesia. Thirteen dental officers completed postgraduate training at the Navy dental clinic in Guam, and one dental officer currently is in graduate school at the Dental College, University of Michigan. Five sanitarians received refresher courses at the Guam Memorial Hospital, and a special postgraduate course for Micronesian head nurses was conducted at the naval hospital. This postgraduate training is part of an intensified program of refresher courses for our Micronesian medical staff. Plans call for continuation and expansion of this training in public medical and health institutions in Guam, in the Philippines, and in the United States. A very significant decision in public-health training was made to the effect that starting this June all future Trust Territory applicants for medical and dental scholarships will qualify for full-fledged medical and dental university work. Although during the past year five candidates were sent to the Fiji medical school, they are the last Trust Territory candidates to enroll for the 5-year Suva medical school course. From now on, all medical and dental candidates will start university work leading to the doctorate degree in medicine or dentistry. This June two additional candidates will be sent to premedical school, bringing the number of our premedical students now studying in universities to six.

### **Land and Claims Settlement**

The program of releasing public-domain land to the Micronesians has been accelerated, and the issuance of homestead deeds was greatly expedited this past year. In Ponape District alone some 276 quitclaims through the homestead program were issued, and every attempt is being made to push the homestead program vigorously. Additional personnel has been authorized for land and claims sections in various districts in order to expedite necessary surveying. Homestead requirements were waived on land held by Micronesians on former Japanese leases, and 162 quitclaims giving complete title to these leaseholders have been issued this past year. A land and claims administrator position is being established on the headquarters staff, and we hope to have the position filled shortly after July 1 of this year.

As reported at last year's session, the only major land claims of significance unresolved in the terri-

tory are those involving the use of Kwajalein Atoll and certain portions of Majuro Atoll. For our part, during the year we have attempted to reach a satisfactory settlement with the principals involved. It is with regret that I must report that such agreement has not yet been reached. Negotiations are continuing, and it is our earnest hope that a mutually satisfactory settlement of this longstanding problem will soon result. If settlement is not possible, provision will be made to resolve the question through judicial proceedings.

#### **Status of Displaced Marshallese**

The general readjustment and condition of the people of Kili, Ujelang, and Rongelap remains satisfactory. The income of the trust funds of the people of Kili and Ujelang provides more than ample cash supplement to their subsistence crops and their income from the sale of copra. On Rongelap the people now have become completely self-supporting from the standpoint of local subsistence and additionally are producing considerable amounts of copra for export. The periodic annual medical reexamination was conducted 3 months ago by a team composed of Trust Territory medical staff and Atomic Energy Commission medical experts. This report indicates that the general health of the Rongelapese remains satisfactory and that no further discernible aftereffects of the fallout were found. Legislation has been submitted to the Congress for settlement of claims.

#### **War-Damage Claims**

The matter of the settlement of war-damage claims received the highest priority during the year. A special survey team was designated to visit the territory and to evaluate the extent and nature of legitimate claims of this nature. The results of that survey have been forwarded to our State Department to provide the basis for official representations to the Japanese Government.

#### **Conclusion**

Within the limits of the budget resources available to us this past year, I feel that we have made significant progress. Our reassessment of educational needs, of construction needs, of economic development needs, and of public-health needs highlighted the obvious fact that at this crucial stage in the territory's development a more rapid

pace of development is required. Accordingly, we presented to the Congress of the United States a budget of \$10 million for the fiscal year 1963 beginning July 1, 1962, an increase of 65 percent over the budget of \$6,304,000 for the current year. At the same time we requested the Congress to raise the ceiling which is set at \$7½ million. Favorable action on the ceiling bill is required for consideration of our increased budget. Should favorable action occur, our Administration will be able within the next several months to appreciably accelerate all of our important substantive programs.

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to present this brief report. I shall attempt to provide any additional information the members of the Council may desire on our recent developments or on the annual report<sup>5</sup> for the year 1961, which is before this body for review.

### **TREATY INFORMATION**

## **Current Actions**

### **MULTILATERAL**

#### **Automotive Traffic**

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Malagasy Republic, June 27, 1962.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

*Accession deposited:* Finland, June 21, 1962.

#### **Aviation**

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.

*Notifications received that they consider themselves bound:* Congo (Brazzaville) (with a statement), January 5, 1962; Ivory Coast, February 7, 1962; Lebanon, February 10, 1962; Niger, February 20, 1962. *Adherence deposited:* Mongolian People's Republic, April 30, 1962.

Protocol to amend the convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at

<sup>5</sup> *Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1961* (Department of State Publication 7362); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (\$1).

Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Notifications received that they consider themselves bound:* Congo (Brazzaville) (with a statement), January 5, 1962; Ivory Coast, February 7, 1962; Niger, February 20, 1962.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.

*Ratification deposited:* Austria, July 17, 1962.  
*Entered into force:* July 17, 1962.

## Germany

Agreement on the abrogation of the convention on the rights and obligations of foreign forces and their members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the agreement on the tax treatment of the forces and their members, and the finance convention, all signed at Bonn May 26, 1952, as amended by the protocol of October 23, 1954, on the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany (TIAS 3425). Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* France, January 24, 1962; United Kingdom, July 5, 1962.

## Laos

Declaration on the neutrality of Laos, and protocol. Signed at Geneva July 23, 1962.

*Signatures:* Burma, Cambodia, Canada, People's Republic of China, France, India, Laos,<sup>2</sup> Polish People's Republic, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Republic of Viet-Nam, and Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

*Entered into force:* July 23, 1962.

## Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

*Ratification deposited:* Ecuador, May 25, 1962.  
*Accession deposited:* Cyprus, March 28, 1962.

## BILATERAL

### Argentina

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, and related notes. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 27, 1962.

### Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5047). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz July 14, 1962. Entered into force July 14, 1962.

### Canada

Agreement regarding the suspension of tolls on the Welland Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 3 and 13, 1962. Entered into force July 13, 1962.

### Ceylon

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 457; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Colombo July 19, 1962. Entered into force July 19, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Laos signed only the protocol.

## Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952 and 5054). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962.

## Pakistan

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Pakistan. Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi May 31, 1962. Entered into force May 31, 1962.

## Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement of July 21, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3317, 3899, and 4519), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 20, 1962.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Department Publishes Third Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations

Press release 472 dated July 23

The Department of State on July 23 published the third volume of its analysis of the U.S. negotiations in the 1960-61 tariff conference<sup>1</sup> held under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Geneva, Switzerland.

Volume III<sup>2</sup> contains an analysis of the reciprocal agreements between the United States and Cambodia, Haiti, India, and Japan, as well as a consolidated schedule of the new concessions granted by the United States in all the reciprocal tariff negotiations concluded in the course of the conference. A summary by commodity group of the concessions granted by the United States is also included in this volume. A subsequent volume will contain the Common External Tariff of the European Common Market, as revised in the Geneva negotiations.

The Geneva tariff conference, which began on September 1, 1960, formally closed on July 16, 1962. However, some negotiations which were initiated in the course of the conference have not been completed and are continuing.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

<sup>2</sup> *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations*, Volume III (Department of State publication 7408); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; price 45 cents. Also available from the Superintendent of Documents are volume I (Department of State publication 7349, price \$1.25) describing the agreements with the EEC and the reciprocal agreements for new concessions, and volume II (Department of State publication 7350, price 35 cents) describing the compensatory negotiations.



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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Release issued prior to July 23 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 468 of July 20.

No.	Date	Subject
470	7/23	Suspension of Welland Canal tolls.
*471	7/23	U.S. participation in international conferences.
472	7/23	Volume III of analysis of 1960-61 GATT tariff conference released.
473	7/25	Rusk: 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
*474	7/25	Visit of Lao Prime Minister.
475	7/24	Turkey credentials (rewrite).
476	7/24	Malaya credentials (rewrite).
477	7/27	Consultations between U.S. and International Tin Council.
478	7/27	Air talks with Chile.
479	7/27	Meetings with Argentine Minister of Economy.
480	7/27	Bowles' visit to Colombia.

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## GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

### Analysis of United States Negotiations

The Department of State has recently released the following three volumes of its analysis of the United States negotiations in the 1960-61 Tariff Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), from September 1, 1960 to July 16, 1962.

- Volume I, released in March 1962, contains the results of reciprocal negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC), Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and the results of renegotiations with the EEC. (Department of State Publication 7349, \$1.25)
- Volume II, released in March 1962, contains the results of negotiations for compensation to the United States from other countries under Article XXVIII of the GATT (Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Peru, Republic of South Africa, Sweden, and Turkey), and a consolidated schedule of concessions granted by the United States in other compensatory renegotiations under Articles II, XIX and XXVIII of the GATT with the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), Denmark, Western Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. (Department of State Publication 7350, 35 cents)
- Volume III, released in July 1962, contains an analysis of the reciprocal agreements between the United States and Cambodia, Haiti, India, and Japan, as well as a consolidated list of concessions granted by the United States in all reciprocal negotiations in the course of the Conference, including those discussed in Volume I. (Department of State Publication 7408, 45 cents)

A subsequent volume in this series, which is now under preparation, will contain an English translation of the Common External Tariff of the European Economic Community, showing the original common tariff rates and the revisions resulting from the Geneva Tariff Conference.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1208 • PUBLICATION 7420

August 20, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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## America and Asia

by U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>

I am honored indeed to have been invited to join with you in this convention. The Japanese-American Citizens League is justly renowned for its success in promoting the highest ideals of this great country of ours while contributing to it some of the distilled wisdom and serene beauty of the Orient. I feel myself to be among old friends, for in many ways I have been associated with many of you over many years. And I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss with you the place that Americans in general, and you in particular, have in the great events that are now taking place in the Pacific. For I know you have a very special interest in and role to play in these events.

The national convention of the Japanese-American Citizens League is a particularly appropriate forum to review America's political, economic, and military strategy to aid in the construction of Asian democracies in a free-world community. This organization since its inception has insisted that the problems of a multiracial nation such as our own must be solved in accord with the ideals of a great democracy. The League's accomplishments in the field of domestic problems have been outstanding. Its record in furthering civil rights legislation and in seeking equal opportunities for all citizens is within the best traditions of this country. Its consistent efforts to encourage better citizenship and eliminate discrimination based on race deserve the support of all Americans.

As we continue to work in correcting the flaws—

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the national convention of the Japanese-American Citizens League at Seattle, Wash., July 30 (press release 481).

the "unfinished business"—in our own society, we also face many problems in our evolving relationship with the lands and peoples of the Pacific. The League's efforts to promote better understanding between the United States and Japan have contributed greatly to this endeavor. I look to the members of the League to play an increasingly strong role in building even stronger ties of friendship between the United States and all the nations of Asia.

Therefore, this evening I want to talk with you about Asia, an area of more than one and a half billion people—more than half the population of the world. It is an area of problems—stubborn, intractable problems. The gap between the resources of its nations and the aspirations of its people is immense. But Asia is also a land of hope and opportunity, and it is particularly to these hopes and opportunities that I would like to address myself tonight.

I think it is well for us Americans to remember several things when we think of the Pacific area. First, Asia is no longer a distant and exotic land. Four of our States border on the Pacific, and one of them, Hawaii, is in the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean is not a barrier, but a highway. Indeed this city in which we meet is one of the main stations on this highway. The great fair with its representation from all over the Pacific is a symbol of this closeness. The main goals of the Asian and American people are shared. We all believe in national independence and economic betterment. We all wish for respect and human dignity in our own eyes and in the eyes of our neighbors. We Americans are not outsiders and strangers to Asia, but an integral part of the Pacific area.

Secondly, the people of this vast region have already made great contributions to the world of today. It was not until the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the West that the nations of Europe and North America pulled ahead of the nations of Asia materially. Historically, the technological advantage of the West has existed for only a relatively short time. There is no reason to assume that this advantage that we have had for the last century and a half will continue. Within the past decade tremendous changes have swept Asia. And during the next decade I am fully confident that we shall see even greater changes.

The Asian nations have in large measure completed their political revolutions and are now moving into the industrial revolution. The technological contributions of the West will come along with the old cultures in these nations, and from this interplay of the new technology with the old culture will come new ideas to enrich the world. Japan, of course, is already well along in this process.

As the industrial revolution gains momentum in Asia, we will see an increasing movement of the world center of gravity toward the Pacific. It is not that the Atlantic will become any less important but that the Pacific will become more important. As the principal power situated between the two oceans, America must conduct its affairs so as to contribute to the harmony and growth of both areas.

The history and the traditions of the United States make us deeply sympathetic to the problems of the new nations imbued with the same ideals and struggling along the same path that we ourselves have traveled. We can and must help in their efforts to complete their revolution. Our contributions are two. First, we must do all we can to help guarantee the freedom of the revolutions. We must help prevent insurgency, subversion, and aggression from stifling the revolutionary process. Second, we must offer cooperation and support for the orderly economic development of the emerging nations.

#### **U.S. Defense Efforts in Asia**

The discharge of our first responsibility has been the history of our national efforts in Asia since the closing days of the Second World War. We furnished a strong political impetus to the

termination of colonialism in Asia and to the establishment of these former colonies as independent nations. We are proud of the example we as the Filipinos set in the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines. The recent election there give new evidence of the strength and vitality of domestic institutions. Our aid in the reconstruction of Japan and the peace treaty with that nation were examples of a helping hand proffered to a former enemy. Our leadership in the United Nations action to repel Communist aggression in Korea demonstrated our awareness of the threat of communism to the nations of Asia and our determination to assist in meeting this threat. The establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, our bilateral defense treaties with Japan, and the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines, and our mutual defense assistance programs with numerous countries in the area are all further indications of our wish to aid the emerging nations in their efforts to maintain the integrity of their countries. The most recent chapter in this history is our assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the North Vietnamese efforts at conquest.

We have been reasonably successful in maintaining this defense umbrella over the nations of Asia as they fight for time to develop. And we cannot relent or relax in our efforts to maintain this strong military posture. Our defense effort is broadening. We are now working in three areas of strategy. First, we are continuing our efforts to maintain a clear superiority in nuclear weapons. Secondly, we are expanding our efforts to deter and defend against limited wars. And thirdly, we are creating the politico-military tools to counter insurgency and subversion.

Our efforts in maintaining nuclear superiority are perhaps the most well known and most costly. Our nuclear weapons and delivery systems are the most powerful and most flexible in the world. And we intend to preserve this clear superiority. We have, I believe, made it perfectly clear that our resort to nuclear weapons will be answered by complete devastation of the aggressor. But we are convinced, and we are trying to convince others, that nuclear warfare is no longer a possible alternative for rational men.

Our military power to deter and defend against limited wars is growing. We now have 16 Army and 3 Marine combat-ready divisions, and we have

vised means to give them an intercontinental mobility. These forces are being augmented with other conventional strength and will give the nations contemplating aggression further pause before launching an attack such as Korea. Lastly, we are creating military and political responses to internal aggression—guerrilla warfare, terror, and subversion. We have stepped up training of special forces, and we are better utilizing our military assistance programs in helping our allies and friends to defend themselves against the local Communist use of force. The public of Viet-Nam is now valiantly coping with such a war, and I am confident subversion and insurgency will be defeated here as it was defeated in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. We recognize that military competition is a grossly unsatisfactory way to provide security in the nuclear age. We are constantly searching for a basis of agreement with the Soviet Union by which we can reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments. We are in complete earnest in our desire to limit the areas and means of conflict. Up to thus far our efforts have foundered on Soviet unwillingness to agree to a system of mutual inspection. We hope that some day soon the Soviet Government will realize that the interests of the Russian people, indeed of all mankind, require an abandonment of their policy of Byzantine reticeness. We shall, however, continue to explore all avenues to end this unlimited arms race.

**Asia's Modernization Process**

But of all the challenges we face perhaps the greatest is in finding ways best to cooperate with the newly emergent countries of Asia as they seek their rightful places in a community of free nations. In the great arc from Pakistan to Korea we find only vestigial remnants of colonialism. The political revolution in this area is virtually complete. But this revolution is only the prelude to the real task—the application of modern scientific technology to elevate the living standards of millions of people and to provide a firm basis for the conditions of national dignity and independence on the world scene.

The United States is firmly committed to help in the establishment of strong nations, which of their own traditions and cultures create their own forms of modern society. We take it as our duty and as our interest to help maintain the

integrity and independence of this vast modernization movement.

Other nations are trying to pervert the urge to freedom in Asia. The Communists perceive that the process of modernization involves fundamental change, and they are trying to exploit the turbulence of the transitional process in order to link these new nations irrevocably to the Communist empire. In 1955 the Communist bloc began seriously to imitate us in the field of foreign assistance. During the 5 years between 1955 and 1960 they made approximately \$4 billion available in commitments for economic assistance and at least \$1.5 billion available in military assistance. But their efforts have not been notably successful.

The newly emergent nations have been quick to realize the imperialist impulse behind the Communist moves. The great myth that rapid economic advancement could only come by sacrificing political freedom and emulating the Soviet system of development has been exposed. The newly emergent nations have seen that where the Communists have had power in underdeveloped areas—for example, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, China—they have failed to fulfill the glowing future they promised. That failure has been most apparent in agriculture. The Communists have managed to turn one satellite after another from a food-surplus to a food-deficit area. This is no trivial matter. Increases in agricultural productivity are essential to maintain an expanding economy and a growing population.

Perhaps the greatest eye opener into the weaknesses of the Communist system has been the events in China. This so-called People's Republic was to be the great economic model for Asia. For 11 years its leaders, suborning their people's peaceful wishes to the creation of an absolute state, have succeeded only in bringing this nation to the verge of national starvation. The full dimensions of the Communist failure in China are becoming increasingly evident, and the repercussions may be very serious indeed. It is my own conviction that the Chinese failure may be one of the most significant developments of this decade.

Today the range of our efforts to aid the newly emergent nations ranges from the Fulbright program to the Food-for-Peace Program, from long-term development loans to the Peace Corps, from technical assistance programs to private invest-

ment, from outright grant aid to enlightened trade policies. I will not elaborate on the full scope of these programs; I will rather discuss some of the premises on which these programs are based.

#### **Premises of U.S. Economic Aid Programs**

First, the transition to modern concepts of human freedom and to the technological base which can support the practice of these concepts can only be carried out by the people of the new nations themselves. No outsider can make their revolution. American resources and talents are of no help if the government and the peoples of a nation do not fully support the effort to move ahead.

Secondly, we have learned that national planning of the development process is necessary to make full use of both foreign aid and domestic resources. Governments must create the framework in which a modern economy can develop. Governments must solve the problems of land tenure. Governments must provide an equitable system of taxation. Governments must insure that inflation does not erode domestic and foreign investment capital. Governments must devise policies to insure that foreign accounts are in balance. After having created a sound investment atmosphere, governments must create a sound investment plan. And paper plans are not enough. The entire administrative apparatus of the state must be involved in the process, not only in outlining the goals but in establishing the means of reaching these goals. Finally, governments must have popular support and be capable of arousing their people to the great efforts needed in creating the modern state.

We have also learned that aid is most effective if it is committed to national development on a long-term basis. When a nation has committed itself to an ambitious program of development and is prepared to make the necessary sacrifices and efforts to fulfill this program, its government naturally wants to know how much assistance from abroad they can count on over a given period of time. This desire of other nations is beginning to be reflected in American foreign aid legislation and in our consultations with the other donor nations.

A final point that lies at the core of our assistance program is that we do not wish to create other nations in our image. Our purpose is to assist each nation to produce out of its own culture

and heritage, out of its own resources and aspirations, the kind of society it wants for itself. We are confident that each nation will fashion in its own way, and at its own pace, a society where human freedom and dignity of the individual are valued, and our own open society will find an increasingly compatible environment.

We are, of course, requesting others to aid the development of the newly emergent nations. We are trying to strengthen international organizations to aid in this task. The United Nations is one example. We are also supporting the creation of new cooperative organizations which will contribute to this effort. Examples are the consortium arrangements of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Finally, we are trying to create a close association of the industrialized democratic states of the Northern Hemisphere to mobilize resources, talent, and energy in fulfilling this gigantic task.

#### **Japan's Aid to Asian Neighbors**

One aspect of the increasingly cordial relations between Japan and the United States is our mutual interest in cooperating with the underdeveloped nations. Japan, as she has assumed her rightful place among the major nations, has progressively shown greater interest in the development of the well-advanced Asian countries. Among her efforts have been visits by the Crown Prince and Prime Ministers Kishi and Ikeda, the extension of economic aid, the payment of reparations, the furnishing of technical advice and assistance, the education of foreign students, and the broadening of trade. These efforts have not only materially benefited the recipient nations but have also enhanced the image of Japan.

The visits to South and Southeast Asia by Japan's leading national figures gave clear expression at the highest level of Japan's interest and concern with the welfare of her Asian neighbors. It is noteworthy that these visitors were more than cordially received. The Asian nations now recognize that the new Japan shares with them their future goals.

Japan has taken a positive approach in extending direct economic assistance in the form of investments and loans to other Asian nations. The total disbursements of Japanese official and private



resources for economic assistance reached \$38.2 million in 1961, about 0.8 percent of Japan's gross national product. The Japanese Government in its 10-year economic plan estimates that economic assistance will account for 2.9 percent of Japan's gross national product in 1970.

Reparations agreements have provided Japan with a unique opportunity to assist the economic development programs of the recipient nations in a significant and public manner. Japan has been able to associate herself with the new nations' desires for material progress and at the same time to lay the groundwork for a favorable long-range relationship between itself and these new nations. The education of foreign students in Japan has been a major part of her efforts to aid other Asians. The Japanese Government inaugurated a scholarship program for foreign students in 1954, and by 1960 a total of 345 scholarships had been received by foreign students. Of this number, 248 were held by citizens of Asian nations. In 1960 alone the Japanese Government disbursed 162 scholarships, of which 162 went to South and Southeast Asians.

Japan has also made determined efforts to expand trade with the less developed nations. In 1961 she expanded her exports to these nations by 18 percent and increased her imports from these countries by 18 percent. Since trade with the underdeveloped nations accounts for more than one-fifth of Japanese exports and more than 40 percent of her imports, Japan has a special interest in furthering the political and economic stability of these countries.

Japan has also played a significant role in the various international organizations interested in the development of the Asian nations. Her active participation in the United Nations is a fundamental part of her foreign policy. Japan participates actively in the consortia sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and has agreed to extend credits of \$50 million to India and \$45 million to Pakistan over the next 2 years. Japan is also actively participating as a member of the Development Assistance Committee in the OECD and is a leading member of the newly formed Asian Productivity Organization.

Japan also has a broad program of technical assistance through participation in the AID [Agency for International Development] third-

country training program, the Colombo Plan, and the Mekong River development program. Since Japan joined the Colombo Plan as a donor nation in 1954, she has sent more than 300 specialists and technicians to Plan member countries.

As the only advanced industrial complex in Asia and one of the leading industrial and trading nations of the world, Japan stands as a vital example to Asian and non-European countries of the success of a free-enterprise system in a country with a paucity of natural resources. Japan's industrial capacity, skilled manpower, functioning democracy, and willingness to assume a role in free-world leadership, will aid immensely in the task ahead. I anticipate that Japan and the United States, as they continue to develop a closer partnership, will devote further energies to exploring new ways in which both nations can contribute to the welfare and growth of the other Asian nations.

The world is increasingly conscious of the rapidly widening gap between the advanced and underdeveloped nations. If a lasting and durable peace is to be obtained, we must find ways of establishing a measure of social justice and economic equality between the poorer and richer countries. The task is immense and will call upon the wit and full energies of us all. But it is here that the challenge of the future lies.

I am confident that in responding to this challenge all Americans—the members of the Japanese-American Citizens League and all our countrymen everywhere—will continue to show courage and faith in meeting the challenge of building in the Pacific a community of free nations in which every man can live in equality and dignity, free from hunger, and at peace with his neighbor.

## United States Reviews Position on Test Ban Treaty

*Statement by President Kennedy*<sup>1</sup>

We are completing a careful review of the technical problems associated with an effective test ban treaty. This review was stimulated by important, new, technical assessments. These assessments

<sup>1</sup> Read by the President at his news conference on Aug. 1.

give promise that we can work toward an internationally supervised system of detection and verification for underground testing which will be simpler and more economical than the system which was contained in the treaty which we tabled in Geneva in April 1961.<sup>2</sup> I must emphasize that these new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system must include provision for on-site inspection of unidentified underground events. It may be that we shall not need as many as we have needed in the past, but we find no justification for the Soviet claim that a test ban treaty can be effective without on-site inspection. We have been conducting a most careful and intensive review of our whole position with the object of bringing it squarely in line with the technical realities. I must express the hope that the Soviet Government, too, will reexamine its position on this matter of inspection.

In the past it has accepted the principle, and if it would return to this earlier position, we, for our part, will be able to engage in an attempt to reach agreement on the number of on-site inspections which is essential. Ambassador Arthur Dean has been participating in these deliberations and will be returning to Geneva promptly.<sup>3</sup> He will be prepared for intensive technical and political discussions of these problems.

## U.S. Regards New Soviet Nuclear Test Series as "Somber Episode"

### Department Statement

Press release 489 dated August 5

The Soviet Union's initiation of yet another series of atmospheric tests<sup>4</sup>—the second such series in less than 1 year<sup>5</sup>—can only be regarded

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 5, 1961, p. 870.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 243.

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announced on Aug. 5 that the Soviet Union on that day had detonated a nuclear weapon in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya. On Aug. 6 the AEC announced that there were "indications that the Soviet Union had resumed atmospheric nuclear testing a few days prior to the nuclear detonation announced as having occurred at Novaya Zemlya on August 5. The indications are that tests were conducted in the low kiloton yield range at the Soviet test site in central Siberia."

<sup>5</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

as a somber episode. The series was started even as the United States has announced new and promising avenues of exploration in its search for agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty.<sup>6</sup> The urgent problem before the world is not who tests last but how we can rid the world of nuclear testing once and for all.

The United States has constantly sought to achieve this goal and even now is preparing to discuss with the other delegations at the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva important new scientific data which indicates that we can move toward a simpler and more economical internationally supervised system of detection and verification. Despite its resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing, we hope the Soviet Union will match our efforts to negotiate an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

## Prince Souvanna Phouma Discusses Future of Laos With U.S. Officials

*Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Laos, made an official visit to Washington July 26-30. Following is the text of a joint communique between President Kennedy and the Prime Minister released on July 31, the day following the Prime Minister's departure.*

White House press release dated July 31

His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Royal Kingdom of Laos, departed Washington yesterday after a four-day official visit to Washington. During the visit he conferred with the President, the Secretary of State and other United States officials on the future of Laos under the new Geneva agreements<sup>1</sup> and upon the future of United States-Lao relations.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the President welcomed the international concord which resulted in conclusion of the Geneva settlement and opened up a new era for Laos. They expressed the mutual determination of their two governments to meet the obligations imposed on them by the agreements and thereby to contribute to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia.

<sup>1</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy on Aug. 5, see p. 283.

<sup>2</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

The Prime Minister spoke of his determination to maintain and perfect the independence, unity and neutrality of his country. He also was particularly appreciative of United States efforts in helping to achieve the peaceful settlement. In discussing the future of Laos, the Prime Minister stressed that the prosperity and well-being of the people of Laos depended upon full observance of the Geneva agreements by all signatories and upon the unity of purpose of the Lao people.

The President confirmed the determination of

the United States to work actively in supporting the independence and neutrality of Laos. He confirmed the willingness of the United States to offer in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration of Neutrality made by the Royal Government of Laos on July 9, 1962,<sup>2</sup> its moral and material support to the Lao people toward achieving their aspirations with dignity and freedom through adherence to the stated course of strict neutrality.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*

## A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress

by Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>

Ever since my brief visit to Colombia with President Kennedy last December I have been anxious to return here to gain a better understanding of the great national effort on which you are embarking.

Nearly 2 years ago, here in Bogotá, the groundwork was laid for the Alliance for Progress<sup>2</sup>—dedicated to the creation of a truly “New World” of prosperity, opportunity, and justice. A year ago this month, at Punta del Este, 20 American nations solemnly pledged to carry forward this great effort for human betterment and dignity.<sup>3</sup>

Looking back over the past 12 months, we may wonder at the easy optimism with which so many of us Americans—North and South—embarked on this unprecedented undertaking. As the difficulties have become more clear, some observers have moved to the pessimistic extreme: The obstacles in their minds have suddenly assumed unyielding proportions; the problems have appeared so many and the time too short.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Colombo-American Chamber of Commerce and the American Society of Bogotá at Bogotá, Colombia, on Aug. 1 (press release 486; as-delivered text). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1960, p. 533.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1961, p. 355, and Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

I have come to Colombia because you in particular are demonstrating that the pessimists are wrong.

Here we see evidence that the objectives of the Alliance for Progress are not illusory.

Here we see solid economic, political, and social progress, some of it the fruit of many years of steady effort at national development, some of it the product of the special dedicated effort of recent months.

Here we see a national determination not only to produce more wealth but to distribute that wealth with an increasing measure of democratic justice to all of your people.

If you can continue to couple able planning with dedicated administration and the wise use of your resources, the success of the Alliance for Progress in Colombia is assured.

In order to put Colombia's impressive efforts in better perspective, let us consider what the alliance itself was set up to accomplish. Its objective can be briefly and clearly stated: Our purpose is to mobilize the resources of the 400 million people of the Americas so that opportunity, dignity, and justice should become the established right of all men in our hemisphere.

In many of the 19 Latin American nations

which are participating in the alliance three massive barriers now stand in the way:

1. The aching poverty of two-thirds of the people.

2. Apathy among many of the underprivileged, and a sense of hopelessness at the very magnitude of the challenge among some of their national leaders.

3. The assumption among many privileged groups that by one means or another they can defy the political and economic forces of our era and maintain the 19th-century *status quo*.

These barriers to the future of dignity, peace, and plenty which we wish to secure for ourselves must be destroyed.

This means that we must learn to utilize the natural riches of the earth for the benefit of all of the people, that we must stop wasting the potential talents of men and women who are now unhealthy and untaught, and that we must free the human spirit stifled by social and political systems which grossly distort the distribution of wealth, opportunity, and power.

As we move to meet this many-sided challenge, we will do well to examine some of the myths and assumptions which have limited our success in the past. For instance, it is time to abandon the narrow assumption that economic growth by itself will assure a happy, creative, democratic society.

As we consider and compare the characteristics of individual Latin American countries, we see dramatic evidence that increased economic production by itself will not assure orderly social and political development. Some of the most productive countries of Latin America already have per capita incomes greater than several European countries. Yet the record shows that these nations may be as politically explosive as the poorest, whose per capita income is no greater than that of Pakistan, Uganda, or Indonesia.

#### **Importance of Social and Political Reforms**

The record is clear: Unless basic social and political reforms go hand in hand with economic growth, increased output may simply widen the gap between rich and poor, increase social tensions, and create the ingredients for a political explosion.

The situation will be compounded if we approach the problems of national development

largely in terms of *industrial* expansion. Although industrialization deserves a high priority in most Latin American countries political stability and increasing national purchasing power are dependent in large measure on what happens on the farms and in the villages.

As in other developing continents, a majority of Latin Americans live in these rural areas. In both a political and economic sense it is folly to neglect them. So long as they lack the purchasing power to buy the goods which the new urban factories are producing, the economy will remain far below its potential. Until they are brought into the mainstream of national life as active participants in the process of nation building, they will remain an explosive source of political instability.

Today in most rural areas of Latin America the majority of people are working as tenant farmers or landless laborers, with inadequate markets, schools, and clinics, and few basic human rights. The appalling slums which characterize so many of the large cities of Latin America are a reflection of this lack of rural opportunity. Men and women unable to make a decent living on the land move to the cities in search of jobs, and because adequate urban housing and social services are lacking the result is often still greater frustration, bitterness, and political divisions.

Experience in development work on three continents suggests that the following seven points are basic to the development of dynamic, progressive democratic societies:

1. A national plan which takes account of national resources and establishes national priorities and objectives.

2. The determination that economic growth will be widely shared and that there shall be increasing opportunities for all citizens.

3. The courage to tax all citizens in relation to their ability to pay, to challenge old patterns of privilege, and to assure an increasing measure of social justice.

4. A realization that agricultural production is the foundation of every economy, that every rural family should have a right to cultivate its own land, and that every rural family should be made to feel an integral part of the process of national growth.

5. A pragmatic approach to economic investment that combines strong incentives for private investment and a recognition of the importance

of individual initiative with an acceptance of governmental responsibility for national planning, priorities, and direction and support for the private sector.

6. An efficient and honest public administration.

7. A sense of national morale and purpose that gives to all elements of society, public and private, that essential feeling of personal participation in the great adventure of human progress.

### Colombia's Accomplishments

When we consider these seven critical points in regard to Colombia, we see why your nation stands in the vanguard of the Alliance for Progress. Let us briefly consider your accomplishments:

Colombia now has a carefully developed plan for its national development that gives wide scope to private initiative, with strong emphasis on economic justice.

In the past 3 years Colombia has more than doubled its education budget. Today it is one of the few countries in the world that spends more on schooling than on its armed forces.

In 1960 you enacted one of the most progressive tax laws in Latin America. Income taxes provide over 40 percent of national government revenues. Import taxes supply another 25 percent.

Last year you established a major land reform program that is designed to give all rural families an opportunity to own their own land. This program, I understand, is now actively underway.

Rural development is being further promoted by substantial planned investment in water, sewerage, and educational facilities.

Through *Acción Comunal* and similar private undertakings, the people of hundreds of remote villages are being drawn into community efforts at self-improvement through democratic action.

A favorable climate for private investment has been created. Your antimonopoly laws encourage fair competition.

Your economic stabilization program has successfully kept down inflation.

Finally, despite vigorous political partisanship, the Colombian people have been able to combine constructive nation building with democratic debate.

This is a great record. You have a right to be enormously proud of it.

However, I have yet to meet a self-satisfied

Colombian. Indeed, I find broad agreement everywhere that the hardest work lies ahead—the unglamorous, day-by-day effort to push forward the programs that have been agreed to and to make them steadily more effective.

Under the agreement of Punta del Este the United States offers you its admiration for a difficult job well begun and its vigorous support for your future efforts.

Latin American countries which show a similar willingness and capacity to muster their own resources, to remove their own domestic obstacles to growth, and to provide a better distribution of the wealth which they are producing will receive similar support.

### Standards and Priorities for U.S. Aid

But let me say with deep conviction that the United States does not intend to subsidize the *status quo* in Latin America or anywhere else. We cannot properly be expected to support governments which are unable, unwilling, or unprepared to take the hard decisions which are essential if our common economic, social, and political objectives are to be secured.

The citizens of my country pay extremely high taxes at steep, progressive rates. Personal and corporate income taxes now provide most of the revenues of our Federal Government; the percentage is higher than almost any country in the world. This year we will spend nearly \$5 billion of our tax funds to assist developing nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa to achieve a better life for their people. More than 80 countries are now seeking some form of direct United States aid.

The claims on our aid budget are enormous. If our assistance is to be truly effective, standards and priorities for the distribution of aid must be developed, with high priorities for those nations which are most able and willing to do their part.

In the aid legislation recently passed by the United States Congress and about to be signed by President Kennedy,<sup>4</sup> such standards can be clearly established. Let me read you some of the language of this legislation which refers particularly to the Alliance for Progress and which lays down the framework within which our foreign aid ad-

<sup>4</sup> See p. 291.

ministrators must operate. It is the sense of the Congress, the law declares,

... that vigorous measures by the countries . . . of Latin America to mobilize their own resources for economic development and to adopt reform measures to spread the benefits of economic progress among the people are essential to the success of the Alliance for Progress and to continued significant United States assistance thereunder.

In furnishing this assistance, the law continues,

... the President shall take into account . . . in particular the extent to which the recipient country . . . is showing a responsiveness to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people and demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures. . . .

These provisions outline the basis of our continuing contribution to the governments and people of Latin America. In my opinion they are sound and reasonable. Indeed, money that is given in disregard of these provisions will serve only to feed the gap between rich and poor, to undermine faith in democracy, and to create new frustrations and bitterness.

The people of Colombia and the United States believe in democratic institutions. We believe in private enterprise and initiative. We believe in economic and social justice. We believe above all in the basic decency and capacity of *people*—and I mean of *all* people.

Here in Colombia you are providing a stirring example of what able, free, dedicated men can accomplish in behalf of human betterment. You are among the pace setters for this dynamic, awakening continent. As more and more Latin American nations move vigorously ahead with programs of reform and development, our high hopes of Punta del Este gradually will be realized.

Let us work together, shoulder to shoulder, to justify those hopes.

## Motorcade To Mark Highway Opening in Central America and Panama

The Department of State released on July 31 (press release 482) an announcement by the U.S. Organizing Committee for the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress that an official motorcade will celebrate the opening of the Pan American Highway to through traffic between the Panama

Canal and the United States in the spring of 1963.

The motorcade will take place immediately prior to the Congress, which is scheduled to open at Washington, D.C., May 6 next year. Leading delegates from the American Republics and Canada will be invited to participate. Under present plans they will be transported in air-conditioned buses, starting from Panamá, R.P., about the middle of April and traversing the approximately 1600 mile route of the highway to the Guatemala Mexico border. They will continue to Mexico City in the buses, then fly by charter plane to Detroit, Mich., for inspection of automobile factories and proving grounds, and finally visit Niagara Falls, Ont., and New York City before reaching Washington on May 4.

The idea of conducting a motorcade over the new highway to signalize its opening for through traffic all the way from Panamá to the United States originated several years ago in the Pan American Highway Congresses and was promptly supported by resolutions of the Inter-American Travel Congresses and the Inter-American Federation of Automobile Clubs. These organizations include in their membership all the countries of South, Central, and North America. Thus the motorcade project, while arranged by the U.S. hosts for the 1963 Highway Congress, will have complete intercontinental sponsorship. Consideration is also being given to facilitating as far as possible the travel of commercial vehicles and numerous private motorists who, although not part of the official group, may be expected to make the trip about the same time.

The opening of the inter-American segment of the Pan American Highway is regarded as an outstanding event in the economic history of the Americas. Costing close to \$1 billion to date it has been a cooperative international enterprise since its inception 30 years ago, with the U.S. contributing about two-thirds of the construction expenditures and the Republics of Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala providing the remainder. Mexico has built its section of the highway with its own funds. While various parts of the route have been in use for many years, closing of the final gaps has been delayed by difficult bridge-building problems in Costa Rica and Guatemala. These have now been solved, finishing touches are being put on the last small bridges, and the highway will be open to

through traffic over its entire length by the end of 1962.

The motorcade next spring will bring to world attention the economic and social potentialities of this new channel of overland communications in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>1</sup>

## President Talks With Group of Brazilian Students

*Following is a transcript of an interview between President Kennedy and a group of Brazilian university students who had just finished a 3-week tour of the United States and who came to the White House on July 31 with Brazilian Ambassador Roberto de Oliveira Campos.*

White House press release dated July 31

*President Kennedy:* Ambassador, we are delighted to welcome all of you to the White House and most especially to the United States.

I have been reading about your trip and I have also been reading about some of your views of our country. I am very glad that you have a chance to travel through the United States to talk to the people who live here, to make some judgment of our institutions, where we have been and where we are going.

Rather than making a speech to you this morning, I would be glad to answer any questions that you might have for a couple of minutes about this country or about our policies.

Do any of you have any questions about the United States?

*Q. Mr. President, I should like to say to you that this contact that I have had the opportunity to have with your country and your people here in this highly developed country has left a profound impression at least on my spirit.*

*I should also like to express the shock that I felt when we realized or saw clearly the situation of underdevelopment in which we are living in our country. In view of this, I should like to ask you, Mr. President, what would be the reaction of the U.S. Government in the event we were to socialize the means of production in our country*

<sup>1</sup> Inquiries concerning the motorcade should be directed to Walter Kurylo, Executive Secretary of the U.S. Organizing Committee, Room 1419, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

*as a way to more effectively wage the battle against underdevelopment?*

A. I think that the decision of your country as to the means of providing progress is your decision, and if by socialization you mean ownership of the means of production or of the basic industries, that is a judgment which you must make.

What we are opposed to is a denial of civil liberties, a denial of opportunities for people to assemble, to have their press, to make a free choice of what kind of government they want.

For example, Great Britain in 1945 chose a Socialist Party which nationalized some of the means of production. Other countries with whom the United States has had friendly relations have made that kind of choice themselves.

We prefer the competitive market economy here. We believe that by free competition we can satisfy the needs of our people best. Every country must make its own choice. But whatever choice Brazil makes, free choice, of course, is their decision. These phrases about socialization are used rather loosely. What we stand for is a free choice, the means of making an alternate choice if that choice should prove unwise. So it is our belief that through a system of freedom we can best achieve the satisfaction of the desires of the people.

I notice that some of you felt that this country, from a story I saw in the paper a couple of days ago, was dominated by the business community and that the Government was dominated by business. That will come as a great shock and a source of pleasure to the business community here in the United States!

We regard business, labor, the farmers, the general public interest as preeminent, and we believe that the competition of our enterprise system has best provided for our people.

You may decide that, or you may decide on another course of action. We would accept that as long as it represented a free choice. What we are against is tyranny.

I noticed in the paper the other day a story about some of you expressing your views about the United States, and it seemed to me many of the points you are making about this country are almost 50 years old—that the view that you have of Western Europe and the United States and its economic, political, and social developments are really views that are pre-World War I.

You ought to take a good look at the extraordinary progress that has been made in the Common Market, the rate of economic growth, what we have been able to do in this country, and also contrast that with the rather obvious failures stretching all the way from the Berlin Wall, all the way to China, in the fields of agriculture, organization, civil liberties, and all the rest.

I think that those of you who are students, particularly those of you who may be somewhat attracted by Marxist dogmas and philosophies, should take a look at this country, the relationship between the Government and the citizen, between the various groups in our society, the extraordinary progress of Europe in the last 10 years, and the failures behind the Iron Curtain before making a judgment that what is needed in your country or any other underdeveloped country is a revolution, a class struggle, or a denial of liberty, and all the rest. What you get is a denial of liberty, the class struggle, the rifle squads, and it seems to me you get no commensurate economic progress.

*Q. Mr. President. I should like to submit a request to you at this moment. In the course of our travels in the United States, we have had the opportunity to observe this country, especially the fact that the Government of your country and its people have difficulties and problems to face.*

*As an example, the bill that you submitted to Congress for approval for aid to senior citizens of your country which was rejected by Congress during this session was indeed a bill highly worthy of the democracy that prevails in this country. So that during the course of our trip here, we have had the opportunity to see that, whereas before our concept was that the United States was a country that had no problems, we see indeed that the United States has many problems to face.*

*I should like to request of you, Mr. President, namely, that when you visit our country in November, I should hope that you will come into contact with people at all levels, from all walks of life, especially in the northeastern sector of our country, where the people are living in a calamitous situation, and that you come into close contact with the people so that you will be able to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation which afflicts our people living there.*

A. I will. We will go, if it is agreeable to the Government, to the Northeast.

*Q. Mr. President, how do you reconcile the fact that, in spite of all the talk of peace that you say that your country advocates, apparently the youth of this country, at least, is being prepared for war through all types of aggressive war propaganda through all the mass media—radio, television, and newspapers?*

*For instance, last Sunday on television we saw 2 to 3 hours of military programs. It would seem in this country instead of orienting the conscience of the people toward peace, it seems that you are orienting them in a way that reminds us of the way of Germany, the militaristic Germany of Hitler.*

A. I think that we have made it very clear that there is not going to be any winner of the next war. No one who is a rational man can possibly desire to see hostilities break out particularly between the major powers which are equipped with nuclear weapons. So your view of the United States in this regard is really inaccurate.

We certainly desire peace. I am not aware of any action which the United States has taken since the end of the second war which has not been in the direction of securing peace.

We have not been guilty of aggression against our neighbors. We occupy no territories. Any troops of the United States which may be stationed abroad are there at the request of the country in order to participate in their defense. The United States believes in national sovereignty, national independence, individual security and liberty, and that is the objective of our policy.

Now we are at Geneva taking part in a disarmament conference. We will accept and have sought for a number of years a nuclear test ban.<sup>1</sup> We have sought a program of general disarmament with inspection. We have been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union, but we shall keep at it. So whatever the television may have been on Sunday—and I was not observing it—I can tell you this is a very peaceful country and that anyone who desires war these days is insane.

We arm to protect our security, but I can assure you that the United States will not be guilty of

<sup>1</sup> For background, see p. 283.



aggression; but of course it will meet its commitments to people and to countries.

In any case, I want to express our thanks and welcome you here.

We have a new Cabinet official who is going to be the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare whom we have to swear in. Perhaps you could just stay and watch the ceremonies if you have a minute. I hope all of you will come and see us when we come to Brazil.

*Ambassador Campos: Mr. President, the students wish to express their appreciation for the welcome you gave them and for the welcome they have received in this country.*

*President Kennedy: Thank you very much.*

## **U.S. Encouraged by Congo Proposal for Federal Constitution**

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The United States is encouraged by Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula's initiative in putting forward his statement [July 29] of constitutional principles. This declaration should offer a basis for achieving the reintegration of the Congo—the goal of the vast majority of the Congolese people and of governments members of the United Nations. It is encouraging to note that the Central Government intends to work for a truly federal system in which there would be room for a reasonable amount of autonomy for its provinces. The Prime Minister's initiative should make possible immediate concrete steps to achieve integration.

## **President Kennedy Signs Into Law Foreign Assistance Act of 1962**

### *Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release dated August 1

I am today [August 1] signing S. 2996, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.

In enacting this legislation, Members of the Congress of both parties have again demonstrated their understanding that it is our national obligation

and in our national interest and security to work for a world in which there is a chance for national sovereignty and national independence. This matter of foreign assistance has been outside of the party dialog since 1947, when the program began, and while it is a matter which has caused a good many Members of the Congress and the executive branch a good deal of difficulty in the political sense, Members of both sides have risen to their greater responsibility, which is the security of the country.

I cannot emphasize too strongly, sitting in this position where I sit, how important this bill is. It provides military assistance to countries which are on the rim of the Communist world and under direct attack. It provides economic assistance to those governments which are under attack from widespread misery and social discontent which are exploited by our adversaries, and this permits us to speak with a much stronger and more effective voice.

The amounts of money involved in the non-military areas are a fraction of what we spend on our national defense every year, and yet this is very much related to our national security and is as important dollar for dollar as any expenditure for national defense itself.

So the very clear identification with our national security has been recognized by President Truman and President Eisenhower; and I cannot emphasize how strongly I recognize it.

In Latin America they have staggering problems; in Africa and Asia many events are encouraging to us, and it would be a great mistake and a great loss if we failed to carry on this program this year. I recognize that many of our fellow citizens disapprove of it, but I really believe that is because they do not recognize how closely it is tied into our national interest. They support these large expenditures for defense in many cases and oppose this, and yet I put the two side by side; and in many areas this is most important because it assists those countries which are directly under the gun.

So I want to express our appreciation to members of both parties who are here. As I say, this is a matter that has been kept out of political dialog and will continue to be so far as all of us are concerned, I am sure, because it is in the interest of our country. I express my thanks to all

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, on July 30.

those who participated in the passage of this bill, both Republicans and Democrats, Members of both the House and the Senate.

## President Amends Determination on Foreign Aid Procurement Policy

AMENDMENT OF DETERMINATION OF OCTOBER 18, 1961, UNDER SECTION 604(a) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961<sup>1</sup>

*Memorandum for the Administrator, Agency for International Development*

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, August 1, 1962.

The first sentence of the fifth paragraph of the memorandum of October 18, 1961 (26 F.R. 10543),<sup>2</sup> is amended to read as follows:

Therefore, I hereby direct that funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for non-military programs not be used for procurement from the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## New Order Bans Holding of Gold Coins Abroad by U.S. Citizens

White House press release dated July 20

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on July 20 signed an Executive order banning the holding of gold coins abroad by U.S. citizens and business enterprises, except in unusual cases.

This action was taken to prevent large-scale counterfeiting and restriking of rare gold coins.

Until now the prohibition against holding gold abroad has applied to all forms of gold except rare coins. The exception is removed by the Executive order. Americans may, however, continue to hold genuine rare gold coins in the United States, and they will have until the end of this year to dispose of or to bring back genuine rare coins which they now hold abroad. After January 1, 1963, gold coins may be im-

ported into the United States only in exceptional cases.

## EXECUTIVE ORDER 11037<sup>1</sup>

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 6260 OF AUGUST 28, 1933, AS AMENDED


By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 95a, and in view of the continued existence of the national emergency proclaimed by Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16, 1950,<sup>2</sup> I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby further amend Executive Order No. 6260, as amended, as follows:

1. Section 12 is amended to read as follows:

"12. Except under license issued therefor pursuant to the provisions of this order, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall, after the effective date of this section, acquire, hold in his possession, earmark, or retain any interest, legal or equitable, in any gold coin, gold certificates, or gold bullion, situated outside of the United States or any securities issued by any person holding, as a substantial part of his assets, gold as a store of value or as, or in lieu of, money and not for a specific and customary industrial, professional or artistic use. The Secretary of the Treasury, subject to such other regulations as he may prescribe, is authorized to issue licenses permitting the acquisition and holding by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of gold bullion situated outside of the United States which the Secretary or such agency as he may designate is satisfied is required for legitimate and customary use in the industry, profession, or art in which such person is regularly engaged."

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue licenses permitting, until January 1, 1963, the holding and disposition or importation of gold coins having a recognized special value to collectors of rare and unusual coin situated outside of the United States which were acquired by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States prior to the effective date of this amendment and are owned by such persons on such date.

This amendment shall become effective upon filing for publication with the Office of the Federal Register.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
July 29, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> 27 Fed. Reg. 7603.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 903.

<sup>1</sup> 27 Fed. Reg. 6967.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1003.

## U.S. Participation in the United Nations During 1961

*Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy transmitting to the Congress the 16th annual report on U.S. participation in the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>*

White House press release dated August 2

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, I transmit herewith the sixteenth annual report covering United States participation in the United Nations in 1961.

In the course of that year the United Nations faced and surmounted several crises; dealt with a heavy parliamentary agenda; administered expanding programs in the economic and social field; and took several steps of potentially great significance for the future peace and prosperity of the world.

A detailed record of these events and accomplishments is set forth in the body of this report, but in transmitting it to the Congress I should like to call attention to three matters of compelling importance which the United Nations faced in 1961.

*First* was the administrative crisis at United Nations Headquarters. This arose when the Soviet Union sought to replace an impartial Secretariat with a three-headed directorate—representing the Communist bloc and the so-called capitalist and neutralist groups of nations—each with a veto. This attempt to destroy the executive capacity of the United Nations, following the untimely death of the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, was rejected decisively. In the

unanimous election of U Thant to fill Mr. Hammarskjöld's unexpired term, the full integrity of the office of the Secretary-General was preserved.<sup>2</sup>

*Second* was the operational crisis for the United Nations peace-keeping force in the Congo. By the end of the year the secession of Orientale Province had been brought to an end, fighting in Katanga was replaced by a cease-fire, and the dissidents in Katanga had agreed to negotiate for reintegration of that Province with the rest of the Congo.

*Third* was the financial crisis. This was brought on mainly by the refusal or inability of some members to pay their share of the cost of peace-keeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East. In the course of the year the General Assembly adopted a three-point plan to meet immediate peace-keeping costs, collect arrearages, and provide adequate funds until a more permanent method can be devised for financing future peace-keeping operations.

Despite the dangers and strains of these crises, the United Nations in 1961 took three steps which I believe will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being.

1. The United Nations created the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union as a forum for renewed disarmament negotiations which began this spring in Geneva.<sup>3</sup> In presenting to the General Assembly the United States

<sup>1</sup>For a statement made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson on Nov. 3, 1961, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 904.

<sup>2</sup>For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson in Committee I on Nov. 15, 1961, see *ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1023; for a summary of developments at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Mar. 14–June 15, 1962, see *ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 154.

proposals<sup>4</sup> for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States delegation made clear that steps toward disarmament must be matched, at each stage, by steps toward improving the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. It is this essential linkage which will make disarmament a practical proposition whenever nations can agree on the necessary goals and safeguards. Every improvement in the machinery of peace will make it easier for us, with confidence, ultimately to begin dismantling the machinery of war. Whatever obstacles and disappointments may lie ahead, the world must some day travel the road to disarmament. For in the nuclear age, armaments no longer offer fundamental security to any nation.

2. The United Nations also laid the groundwork in 1961 for a U.N. Decade of Development<sup>5</sup> to help speed progress toward the economic and social goals of the newly emerging nations. The launching of a World Food Program<sup>6</sup> and the decision to hold an international conference on the application of science and technology to the less developed world are only initial steps. The United States intends to propose further measures to focus the resources of the United Nations on this 10-year drive against economic want and social injustice.

3. Finally, the United Nations, in 1961, turned in earnest to the critical search for international cooperation in the exploration of outer space.<sup>7</sup> Within the framework of the newly created U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, discussions were under way at the end of the year looking toward international cooperation in outer space, including cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of communications and weather programs.

<sup>4</sup> For an address made by President Kennedy before the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619; for text of the U.S. proposal, see *ibid.*, p. 650.

<sup>5</sup> For a statement made by Philip M. Klutznick in Committee II on Oct. 6, 1961, see *ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1961, p. 939; for a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson before the Economic and Social Council on July 9, 1962, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 225.

<sup>6</sup> For a statement made by Richard N. Gardner in Committee II on Dec. 8, 1961, see *ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 150.

<sup>7</sup> For a statement by Ambassador Stevenson and text of a resolution adopted in plenary on Dec. 20, 1961, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 180.

These were major constructive moves of the United Nations in 1961: to work toward the replacement of the machinery of war with the institutions of peace; to help guide the newly developing nations toward modernization; and to seek international cooperation in the exploration of outer space for the benefit of all. The United States played a major role in initiating these progressive steps in the United Nations. They served the foreign policy interest of this country. And they were wholly compatible with the mutually reinforcing policies which we have pursued through the institutions of the North Atlantic Community, through regional organizations, and through diplomatic channels.

Meanwhile, the United Nations continued to play vigorously two indispensable continuing roles. It kept the peace in the Middle East and the Congo. And it continued to be absorbed in the often difficult transfer of dependent areas to nationhood.

Finally, it cannot be said too often that the Charter of the United Nations expresses well the basic precepts and standards of conduct that guide our own society. These precepts and standards are not destroyed because this nation or that, consistently or occasionally, violates them. The indestructible principles of the Charter exert a gravitational pull which adds strength to every aspect of our world-wide diplomacy. The United Nations, under that Charter, provides a framework within which we can pursue the highest goal of American foreign policy: a world community of independent nations living together in free association and at peace with each other.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
August 2, 1962.

## President Hails Passage by House of Philippine War Damage Bill

*Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release dated August 1

The action of the House of Representatives today [August 1] in passing the Philippines War Damage Bill<sup>1</sup> is a reaffirmation of the United

<sup>1</sup> H.R. 11721.

States intention to honor a longstanding moral commitment to the Filipino people. It corrects the record of last May<sup>2</sup> when, partly through a misunderstanding of the issues involved, an earlier

version of this bill was defeated. I congratulate the House of Representatives for taking this action designed to clarify our relations with our Filipino friends and allies. I hope the Senate will soon act favorably on this important legislation.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement made by President Kennedy on May 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of June 4, 1962, p. 911.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During July 1962

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 1, 1960-- July 16, 1962
International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 16, 1961-- July 23, 1962
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 31-July 17
12th International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 22-July 3
NATO European Radio Frequency Agency . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	July 2-5
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Rapporteurs on Braking . . . . .	Amsterdam . . . . .	July 2-6
International Whaling Commission: 14th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 2-6
Pan American Highway Congress: Permanent Executive Committee . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	July 2-7
25th International Conference on Public Education . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-13
FAO World Scientific Meeting on Biology of Tuna and Related Species . . . . .	La Jolla, Calif. . . . .	July 2-14
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 3-6
OECD Maritime Transport Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 5-6
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 5-7
IBE Council: 28th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 7 (1 day)
OECD Fisheries Committee: 4th Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 9-10
UNESCO International Indian Ocean Expedition: Meeting on the Coordination of Operating Plans in the Arabian Sea . . . . .	Wormley, England . . . . .	July 9-11
WMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session . . . . .	Toronto . . . . .	July 9-27
OECD Agriculture Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 11-12
UNESCO: 1st Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 16-26
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments) . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 17-18
International Wheat Council: 34th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 17 (1 day)
International Wheat Council: Conference of Signatory Governments . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 18 (1 day)
Antarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	July 18-23
South Pacific Conference: 5th Session . . . . .	Pago Pago . . . . .	July 18-30
International Wheat Council: 35th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 19-20
OECD Working Party I: Group of Experts on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 23-24
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 23-24
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 25-26

#### In Session as of July 31, 1962

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 3-
United Nations Coffee Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	July 9-
UNESCO International Educational Building Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 25-
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Meeting on Commodity Price Stabilization . . . . .	Lagos . . . . .	July 30-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 31, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IBE, International Bureau of Education; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

## Security Council Recommends U.N. Admit Burundi and Rwanda

*Statement by Charles W. Yost  
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*<sup>1</sup>

The United States welcomes this meeting of the Security Council to consider the applications for membership in the United Nations of the Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi. We take satisfaction in warmly congratulating the Governments and the peoples of Burundi and Rwanda on their splendid achievement.

The peoples of Rwanda and Burundi reached the fulfillment of their inherent right to govern themselves on July 1, 1962,<sup>2</sup> when the independence of the Republic of Rwanda and of the Kingdom of Burundi was proclaimed after 39 years under the stewardship first of the League of Nations then of the United Nations. We are pleased to note the progressive advance of Rwanda and Burundi toward self-government and independence under Belgium, the Administering Authority, and with the assistance of the Trusteeship Council.

As the United States is one of the countries which, from the founding of the trusteeship system, has taken an active interest in the work of the Trusteeship Council, it is with special pride and satisfaction that we welcome the applications of these nations. We are also happy to acknowledge the efforts of the Belgian Government in carrying out its responsibilities under the trusteeship system and the selfless efforts for many years of the Belgian citizens who have worked in cooperation with the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. We are gratified that the basis for enduring friendship between Belgium and the two new states has thus been created.

The President of Rwanda, M. Gregoire Kayibanda, who has led his country from internal self-government to independence, is to be congratulated for his efforts to reconcile all of the Rwanda people so that all the Banyarwanda may together work toward the solution of the formidable problems ahead. Mr. Kayibanda and Rwanda's other leaders are fully aware of these

challenges and have declared their intention to raise the standard of living of their people and the general circumstances of life in the days to come. In this endeavor we wish them all success.

The Chief of State in the Kingdom of Burundi, His Majesty Mwami Mwambutsa IV, has wisely urged his people to work hard at the task of building their country. We extend our best wishes to His Majesty, to Prime Minister [André] Muhirwa, and to the leaders and people of the new nation of Burundi for success in overcoming the difficult problems that now face them as a sovereign state in raising their standard of living and improving the lot of every Murundi.

The Security Council once again has the pleasant task of voting to recommend the admission of new African states for membership in the United Nations. Many new states have been admitted in recent years, but the experience never fails to move those who take part. The responsibilities each member state bears in this difficult world of ours are heavy, but I have no doubt of the contribution which the people of Burundi and Rwanda can make to furthering the cause of human dignity and brotherhood. We therefore, Mr. President, extend our sincere congratulations to the Governments and the people of Rwanda and Burundi and with great pleasure will vote in favor of the resolutions sponsored by France, Ghana, Ireland, the United Arab Republic, and Venezuela.<sup>3</sup>

We look forward with pleasure to a happy and fruitful association in the United Nations with the representatives of the two countries.

## Members Named to U.S. Commission on Pan American Railways

White House press release dated July 31

The White House announced on July 31 the following persons to be members of the United States National Commission in the Pan American Railway Congress Association:

Clarence D. Martin, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Security Council on July 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 4027).

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> U.N. docs. S/5147 and S/5148; the Council on July 26 unanimously recommended that Burundi and Rwanda be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

John W. Bush, Interstate Commerce Commissioner

Donald L. Manion, president, The American Short Line Railroad Association

This Commission concerns itself with the standardization of railway equipment in the Western Hemisphere.

## U.N. General Assembly Debates Question of Southern Rhodesia

*Following are statements made by U.S. Representatives Adlai E. Stevenson and Jonathan B.ingham in plenary sessions of the 16th General Assembly.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, JUNE 12

J.S. delegation press release 4007

I have been very much impressed, as I am sure you all have, with the temperance and the respect for our rules and procedures of the speakers who have preceded me this morning. I shall try, Mr. President, to continue the discussion in the same vein and in the same spirit. I must preface what I say also by expressing in advance my disappointment that I must disagree with some delegates, whom I respect very much indeed, insofar as they have expressed personal conclusions on the basis of the facts as we know them here this morning.

No one can dispute the importance of the situation in Central Africa, and in Southern Rhodesia in particular. It presents a problem of great complexity and difficulty with a bearing on wider issues affecting the whole future of Africa. As my delegation has previously indicated during the course of the debate on Southern Rhodesia in the Committee of 17, we are gravely concerned by the situation in that country and its implications.

Thus we agree with those delegations who believe that the question of Southern Rhodesia should be discussed by the General Assembly at an early date. Indeed, we all know that the question of Southern Rhodesia will be debated in the 17th General Assembly and that this 16th Assembly has already taken action to that end through its instructions to the Committee of 17.

The only real issue that divides us at this juncture is not whether the question of Rhodesia should be included, but whether the matter should be discussed now or in the fall at the 17th Assembly. It is not a question, then, of whether, but of when.

When the Committee of 17 was considering the status of Southern Rhodesia it was confronted by one fact of conspicuous importance: that is to say, that the new constitution introduced in 1961 was scheduled to come into effect in October; while representing a gain in some respects, this constitution was felt to be in other vital respects a step in the wrong direction for the people of Southern Rhodesia.

The Committee of 17 acted energetically in the light of the danger that it foresaw. In the first place it sent a special subcommittee to London to hold discussions with ministers of the United Kingdom Government. Next, it recommended that this resumed session take up the question of Southern Rhodesia "in the absence of favorable developments."

Underlying that recommendation was the fact that by October the situation would have reached a "point of no return." Members of the Committee of 17 expressed the fear that, once the 1961 constitution was in effect, Great Britain would have little chance to stimulate and encourage further constitutional progress in Southern Rhodesia because under that constitution, as has been pointed out here this morning, it relinquished even its limited powers. The United States delegate expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would not "wash its hands" of this problem. The majority of the Committee, believing the Assembly as a whole would share its views, wanted the Assembly to have an opportunity to express itself while it might still have some effect. An early debate was therefore required, and this resumed session offered an opportunity.

### Effective Date of Constitution Postponed

We sympathize, therefore, with the feeling of urgency which impelled some 41 countries to request an extraordinary addition to our agenda, in spite of an Assembly decision that our agenda should be limited exclusively to Ruanda-Urundi.

In the meantime, however, something definite and important—which can be called a "favorable

development," to use the language of the Committee of 17—has happened. And on this score I must take issue with my distinguished friend the representative of Iraq [Adnan M. Pachachi] because the October elections have been postponed until at least March of 1963. The 1961 constitution to which the Committee objected has not fully come into effect and cannot come into effect until these elections have taken place. To afford us time for further forward steps, the appointment of the senior Minister of the British Government to find a way to take such steps is certainly a "favorable development," to say the very least.

This postponement of the effective date of the 1961 constitution has eliminated the special reason for urgency on which the recommendation of the Committee of 17 was based.

I repeat, Mr. President, that Southern Rhodesia is a most important question—one which causes us great concern. But extraordinary importance and extraordinary urgency are by no means the same thing. The United Nations faces a number of problems of great importance—nuclear testing, disarmament, *apartheid*, and many others—but these are dealt with at regular Assembly sessions unless there is some overwhelming reason to the contrary.

No delegation favors the idea of frequent resumed or special sessions, which would have the effect of keeping the Assembly in virtually constant session. Moreover, hasty sessions, called in response to insistent pressures, sweeping declarations, and impetuous resolutions, may not serve well the ends of those who propose them.

#### **Need for Time to Review Problem**

Just because a peaceful solution of this menacing problem of Southern Rhodesia is most important for Africa and for the world, my delegation believes that the United Kingdom Government should have an opportunity to follow up deliberately on the steps it has begun. Animated by this same sense of the seriousness of the situation, Mr. [R. A.] Butler, the Deputy Prime Minister, has recently been charged with the special task of dealing with the problems of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. He has only just now returned to London after extended consultations in those countries. A start has been made toward the review and solution of the problems of the Federation. As the delegate of the United Kingdom

[Sir Patrick Dean] has confirmed in his statement they are looking again at the whole complex problem. It is an intricate, delicate task; it demands sympathetic understanding and aid, not impatient or provocative action. It needs, if I may say so time.

Any such review must include the components of the problem of the Federation, including the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia, where the vast majority of the people appear to reject the 1961 constitution.

And surely, Mr. Butler, the Minister, must have time to weigh the issue, to pursue his discussions and, if possible, to find a way to resolve the infinite and fearsome political difficulties of this mixed society of Africans and white settlers, many of whom have been there for a generation or more. Because of the degree of self-government long exercised by the electorate of Southern Rhodesia the United Kingdom Government is not in a position abruptly to impose any given solution. I must achieve its objectives through persuasion which in turn requires a degree of cooperation and adjustment from all elements in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Butler and his colleagues in the United Kingdom Government will in this work be fully aware of the currents of opinion here at the United Nations. These were not only thoroughly aired in the Committee of 17, but they were also presented in detail by a subcommittee, including three African, two Asian, and one Latin American state, to the responsible ministers of Her Majesty's Government in London. The United Kingdom Government is thus well aware of the strong views held by many delegations on this subject, and no new debate or resolution would add to that knowledge.

What the United Kingdom needs now is no goading, as I say, but time—time for reflection for reconciliation of diverse and opposing elements, and for more constructive steps in the direction everyone wants to go, the United Kingdom no less than the rest of us.

Mr. President, surely the United Kingdom, on its record, is entitled to that courtesy and to that confidence. And surely the rest of us—African, European, or Asian—all recognize the imperative importance of keeping Britain seized with this responsibility. For were she to let go, the future in Southern Rhodesia would become opaque and menacing, to say the least.



## U.K.'s Record of Decolonization

The United Kingdom has a unique record of decolonization. This Assembly is dotted with delegates from territories it formerly ruled. As it has given independence to country after country, virtually without violence, it has left behind liberal constitutions and working political institutions based on consent.

Southern Rhodesia presents one of the most difficult problems the United Kingdom has had to face in this whole process of decolonization. It is by reason of this very difficulty and complexity that it remains a problem today.

Ultimate and hasty debate, charged with understandable emotion, is not likely to reduce the difficulties. It is likely to harden the positions of the various parties involved, just at the time when a spirit of mutual accommodation and conciliation is most needed.

If, by next fall, there are no further indications of the progress many of us would like to see in the direction of a political solution acceptable to all of the people of Southern Rhodesia, we should have a better perspective on what the General Assembly might be able to do to help.

The United States supports and has worked steadily for an orderly and rapid decolonization in Africa. We consider this to be one of the great political processes of our time. Obviously the people of Southern Rhodesia are entitled to share in that process. The objective is progressive liberalization of the franchise in the direction of universal adult suffrage, so as to permit true self-determination for all of the people. We hope that all concerned, and very particularly the Government of the United Kingdom, will not cease to exert their influence and their best efforts in that direction.

We do not believe that a debate now, rather than in September or October, will contribute to that objective. It may well impede its attainment—with long-term political consequences in England and Rhodesia.

I conclude: that there is no question about whether there is to be a debate about Southern Rhodesia—the question is when; that the urgency which influenced the Committee's report no longer exists; that hopeful steps are in process toward constitutional progress; and that what we need now is some time and not sweeping declarations that can only make Britain's task more difficult.

## STATEMENT BY MR. BINGHAM, JUNE 22

U.S. delegation press release 4014

On the important question before us—the question of Southern Rhodesia—we believe there is in this hall a large measure of agreement on what we hope to see achieved. Delegations differ on the thorny question of what this Assembly can do to help, but most delegations, we believe, are agreed on the objectives. We would state those objectives as follows:

*First:* We hope to see in Southern Rhodesia, as in every country, a progressive liberalization of the franchise with a view to early attainment of the objective of universal adult suffrage. In this way there could emerge a government which, in the words of my country's Declaration of Independence, would derive its just powers from the consent of the governed—all of the governed.

*Second:* We hope to see further and faster progress toward the elimination of racial discrimination. We would hope to see develop a society in which whatever distinction a man has is one which is based on his merit and proven capacities and not on his race.

*Third:* We hope for peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between Southern Rhodesia and its neighbors in Africa. In our view any continuing association between Southern Rhodesia and neighboring territories should be founded on the freely given support of the majority of the peoples concerned.

*Fourth:* We hope that the United Kingdom will continue for the present its special concern with Southern Rhodesia and will use its unique influence toward achieving the objectives I have just mentioned.

### Complexity of Situation

It is easier to state these objectives than to discern the way to reach them. The situation is complex and fraught with difficulties and dangers.

We see no simple answers, even to the question which this Assembly put to the Special Committee of 17: Is Southern Rhodesia a non-self-governing territory under chapter XI of the charter?

On the one hand, it seems clear that Southern Rhodesia has not attained a "full measure of self-government" as that term has been defined by the General Assembly in Resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1541 (XV). Indeed the delegation of the United Kingdom has not contended otherwise.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the Government of the United Kingdom is not in a position to exercise certain powers with respect to the territory which are ordinarily exercised by an "administering authority" with respect to a non-self-governing territory.

The United Kingdom Government's power unilaterally to change the Southern Rhodesian constitution or to repeal laws of Southern Rhodesia is from a constitutional point of view difficult to define and from a practical point of view is severely limited.

There seems to be a feeling among some delegations here that, if the United Nations finds Southern Rhodesia to be a non-self-governing territory, such a finding will require the Government of the United Kingdom to exercise the power of an administering authority. But a finding by this Assembly cannot change the constitutional and practical relationships that exist between the United Kingdom and the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The facts of international political life are not so easily altered.

Does it follow from these considerations that the United Kingdom has no responsibility toward the people of Southern Rhodesia? Far from it. We believe that the Government of the United Kingdom does have a responsibility, stemming from the past, which is not negated by the fact that in 1923 the United Kingdom gave substantial autonomy to a Government of Southern Rhodesia, based on a limited electorate.

The United Kingdom is rightly proud of a tradition of giving sovereign independence to territories after seeing to it that free and representative political institutions have been developed to take and hold the reins of power. For the United Kingdom to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia at the present stage in the development of its political institutions would not in our view be consistent with that tradition. We share the hope expressed by all the speakers in this debate that Her Majesty's Government, consistent with this tradition, will continue to fulfill her responsibility to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

If the power of the United Kingdom to affect the course of events in Southern Rhodesia is limited, in our view it is all the more important that Her Majesty's Government should for the time being hold on to what influence it does retain

and should use it in the direction of the objectives we all believe in.

We are under no illusions that this will be an easy task. On the side of the African 90 percent of the population, there is understandably a growing impatience and a tendency to demand immediate and total political victory. On the side of the European minority, there are signs, in spite of recent legislative measures aimed at eliminating discrimination, of rigidity and of impatience with what is left of United Kingdom control.

What we fear most of all is that these hostile and conflicting attitudes will harden into complete intransigence. If that happens, a disaster will be almost inevitable.

#### **U.S. To Abstain in Vote**

The questions which all of us should prayerfully ponder are: What can this General Assembly do to prevent this disaster? What can we do here to contribute to the progress which can be made if all concerned—the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government and people of Southern Rhodesia—will work together in a spirit of mutual understanding and adjustment?

We did not think this debate would help, and we do not think the adoption of the resolution before us will help. We fully recognize the sincerity of its proponents and there is much in it with which we agree, but we believe it suffers from grave flaws. First, it proceeds on the erroneous assumption that the British are in a position to move unilaterally with respect to the political situation in the territory; second, its appeal is directed solely to the Government of the United Kingdom, as if the sole responsibility and the sole power to act were in London; third, we are concerned that its adoption may make it more difficult for the United Kingdom to help bring about the results we all desire.

If any resolution were to be adopted, it would in our view be more helpful and more realistic if it were to urge the Government of the United Kingdom to continue to use its special influence toward the elimination of racial discrimination and the progressive liberalization of the franchise and if it were to appeal to all concerned—the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of Southern Rhodesia, the leaders of the

several parties in Southern Rhodesia, and all the peoples of Southern Rhodesia—to devote their best efforts, by mutual understanding and conciliation, to the rapid, peaceful, and orderly achievement of a political future for Southern Rhodesia in which all elements of the population would play a full and free role.

In summary then, Mr. President, my delegation shares with the cosponsors of the draft resolution A/L.386 before us their concern with the situation in Southern Rhodesia and their general objective of progressive liberalization of the fran-

chise so as to permit true self-determination for all the people. We do not, however, believe that this draft resolution will be helpful in achieving these common aims. Therefore, Mr. President, in the vote on this resolution, my delegation will abstain.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The General Assembly on June 28 by a vote of 73 to 1 (South Africa), with 27 abstentions (U.S.), adopted a resolution (A/RES/1747 (XVI)) requesting the United Kingdom, as administering authority, to convene a conference to draw up a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia to "ensure the rights of the majority of the people, on the basis of 'one man, one vote.'"

## Human Rights Commission Reviews Principles on Freedom and Nondiscrimination in Religious Rights and Practices

**EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
NEW YORK, N.Y., MARCH 19-APRIL 14, 1962**

by Marietta Tree

At its 1962 session in New York, March 19 to April 14, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights undertook the initial review of principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of religious rights and practices. It did not have sufficient time to complete its review of these principles and accordingly decided to continue with their consideration next year. The Commission invited member states to review and comment on two other major topics it will consider at its session next year: (1) general principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of political rights and (2) principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.

The 21 countries represented on the Commission are Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, China, Denmark, El Salvador, France, India, Italy, Lebanon, Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. Ambassador

Georges Hakim of Lebanon was elected chairman of the Commission. Other officers elected were Professor Petr E. Nedbailo of the Ukraine for first vice chairman; Professor Ilhan Lutem of Turkey for second vice chairman; and Mr. Horcencio J. Brillantes of the Philippines for *rappporteur*.

### Draft Principles on Religious Rights and Practices

The Commission spent more than a week discussing the draft principles on freedom and non-

• Mrs. Tree is U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Her advisers at the 18th session were James Sim-sarian and Marten H. A. van Heuven of the Department of State and Hugh Smythe of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

discrimination in the matter of religious rights and practices. The draft principles were before the Commission as a result of a study undertaken at the request of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by Arcot Krishnaswami of India. The study had been before the Commission at its 1961 session, but the Commission did not have time to consider it then. When it took up this item at its session this year, the Commission also had before it comments on the draft principles by 61 governments.

In the general debate I expressed appreciation to the subcommittee and to the *rapporteur* for the preparation of his report. I pointed out that the heart of the issue was set forth in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While indicating that the United States would like to see certain improvements in the text—mostly of a drafting nature—I expressed general agreement with the draft principles. I stressed that the degree to which the draft principles in any field concerning human rights were useful depended in large measure on the extent to which they were generally acceptable to the world community. To the extent that the draft principles reflected the feeling that there should be freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and that everyone should be free to manifest his religion and belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance, I was sure that such general agreement existed. I stated that the United States favored the approval of the draft principles as a statement, declaration, or recommendation of principles.

At the outset of the discussion, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Mario Amadeo, in a lengthy statement, introduced some 17 amendments of a substantive nature. These amendments were in addition to the various other amendments which had already been proposed by other governments in their written comments.

The reason why the Commission, in the space of more than 1 week, completed only a few paragraphs of the preamble of the draft principles must be ascribed to basic difficulties of definition. The introduction to the study of the *rapporteur*, entitled "Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices," adverted to his difficulty in defining "religion" and said that the term "religion or belief" would in his study include, in addition to various theistic creeds, such other beliefs as agnosticism, free thought, atheism, and

rationalism. Several delegations agreed with this interpretation. Others, however, felt that religion was of a special nature so as to differentiate it from other, nontranscendental beliefs. Such delegations in general supported amendments which would have led to a dichotomy in the text between protection accorded to religious beliefs on the one hand and that accorded to other beliefs on the other. Still other delegations interpreted the word "belief" not to include, for example, political or social beliefs, a point on which they found themselves in very sharp disagreement with representatives of the Soviet bloc. These differences of approach led to a debate in which members of the Commission repeatedly found themselves unable to come to general agreement.

The text of the five paragraphs of the preamble which were adopted is as follows:

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, and have taken a stand against all forms of discrimination;

Whereas the principle of non-discrimination and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief have been proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Whereas the disregard of human rights and fundamental freedoms and in particular of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion has brought great suffering to mankind;

Whereas religion, for anyone who professes it, is a fundamental element of his conception of life, and therefore freedom to practice religion as well as to manifest a belief should be fully respected and guaranteed;

Whereas it is essential that Governments, organizations and private persons strive to promote through education, as well as by other means, a spirit of understanding, tolerance and friendship in matters of religion and belief; . . . .

The first three preambular clauses were agreed upon unanimously. The fourth preambular clause was based on a proposal by Argentina and was adopted by a vote of 12 (U.S.)-4-4. The fifth preambular clause was adopted by a vote of 11 (U.S.)-4-5.

Since the Commission did not have sufficient time to complete its consideration of the draft principles, it was decided to continue the consideration of this subject at its session next year.

#### Periodic Reports on Human Rights

The Commission agreed to the recommendation of its Committee on Periodic Reports that the program of periodic reports should be continued

and accordingly proposed that the Economic and Social Council adopt a resolution so stating. The Commission adopted two proposals of the United States concerning this program. Pursuant to one of these proposals, the Council will invite nongovernmental organizations in consultative status to submit comments and observations of an objective character on the situation in the field of human rights to assist the Commission in its consideration of the summaries of periodic reports. Under the second proposal, the Secretary-General will transmit the summaries to the Commission on the Status of Women and to the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities for comment.

There was wide satisfaction expressed by members of the Commission with the report of the Committee on Periodic Reports. Although there was considerable sentiment expressed that a similar committee should be appointed to convene prior to the 1964 session of the Commission, when the next series of reports will be considered, action was not taken to establish the committee. It was generally agreed that such action might usefully be taken at the 1963 session of the Commission.

The Commission approved the proposal of the subcommission that it undertake a study of discrimination against persons born out of wedlock. During the discussion of this subject, I observed that it would be desirable for the subcommission to consider also undertaking a study of the right of everyone to equality in the administration of justice and to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as provided in article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Commission agreed with the recommendations of the subcommission that the Secretary-General print and circulate as widely as possible the study prepared by the special *rapporteur* of the subcommission, Hernán Santa Cruz, on discrimination in the field of political rights. The Commission decided not to authorize the preparation of a popular version of this study this year since it seemed premature to do so prior to the adoption of principles relating to discrimination in the matter of political rights. However, there was general agreement that the Commission should authorize the Secretary-General to prepare and publish a popular version following the approval of principles on this subject.

The Commission requested the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the draft principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of political rights, prepared by Mr. Santa Cruz, to member states and nongovernmental organizations for comment, and to include this question on the agenda of the 1963 session of the Commission.

#### **Election of Membership of Subcommission**

Since the term of office of the incumbent members of the subcommission will expire on December 31, 1962, the Human Rights Commission had to elect anew the members of the subcommission for a 3-year term. There were 14 places to be filled. The elections were held by secret ballot in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Commission. The following persons were elected: Morris Abram (U.S.), Francesco Capotorti (Italy), Boris S. Ivanov (U.S.S.R.), Pierre Juvigny (France), Wojciech Ketrzynski (Poland), Hernán Santa Cruz (Chile), Peter Calvocoressi (U.K.), Gabino Fraga (Mexico), José D. Ingles (Philippines), Arcot Krishnaswami (India), Mohammed Ahmed Abu Rannat (Sudan), Vieno Voitto Saario (Finland), Franz Matsch (Austria), and Charles Ammoun (Lebanon).

#### **Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, Exile**

The Commission had before it the report of the Commission's Committee on Study on the Right of Everyone To Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile. Since the report was made available rather late for consideration of the draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention at this session, a procedural resolution, introduced by Afghanistan, Austria, Denmark, El Salvador, and Venezuela, was adopted to transmit the draft principles to member states and to have the Commission consider the draft principles at its next session in the light of the comments of governments. In a statement on this subject I stressed the importance of the study and drew attention to some of its more fundamental provisions.

#### **Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination**

At the 1961 session of the Commission, it adopted, after considerable discussion, a resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council, at its 32d session in July 1961, to recommend that the General Assembly adopt a resolution for the ob-

servance of Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Year and Day. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 (U.S.)-0-5 (Austria, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and United Kingdom). Member governments were requested to comment.

When the Council considered the draft resolution, two amendments were proposed. One, by the United Kingdom, was to limit the resolution to a recommendation for the observance of Human Rights Day or United Nations Day. The other, by the United States, was to observe a Human Rights Year rather than a Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Year. The observance of Human Rights Day would, under this amendment, be continued. The Council was unable to reach general agreement and decided to defer consideration of the draft resolution, requesting further comments of member states and referring the matter to the Commission on Human Rights for consideration at its 1962 session, with a request to make any recommendations which it might consider useful.

The Commission had before it the comments of a number of governments. The United Kingdom proposed a draft resolution which, while patterned largely along the lines of the resolution adopted by the Commission in 1961, would, in the operative paragraphs, invite all states, in arranging for the observance either of Human Rights Day or of United Nations Day, to lay special emphasis both on the causes, and on the importance of the elimination, of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance, and urge all states and interested organizations to organize, promote, and participate on a national basis in any action directed to this purpose through effective means such as posters, films, radio and television programs, and other available educational media. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sought to amend the draft resolution by the insertion of a new operative paragraph requesting all states and specialized agencies to celebrate 1963 as Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Year and subsequently to observe an annual Freedom From Prejudice and Discrimination Day.

In an attempt to arrive at a general agreement, I suggested that the first operative paragraph of the United Kingdom draft resolution be amended to read "invites all states to arrange in the near

future for the observance of a Human Rights Week for the elimination of prejudice and discrimination." I also suggested that the title of the resolution be amended to read "Human Rights Week for the Elimination of Prejudice and Discrimination." Various other suggestions were put forward by other delegations. After extensive discussion the Commission proved unable to resolve the many differences of approach and finally adopted an Austrian procedural motion to adjourn debate on this item for the remainder of the session. This proposal was adopted by a vote of 17 (U.S.)-1-2.

#### **Freedom of Information**

The Commission decided to postpone subitem on freedom of information concerning (a) the report of Dr. Hilding Eek of Sweden on developments in the field of freedom of information since 1954 and (b) the annual report on freedom of information prepared by the Secretary-General for 1960-61.

On subitem (c) relating to the reports of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the development of information media in less developed countries, the Commission recommended that the Economic and Social Council adopt a resolution commending UNESCO for its program in this field. To Gjesdal, director of the Department of Mass Communication of UNESCO, made a general statement to the Commission, summarizing developments going forward. Particular attention was given to UNESCO reports on the regional meeting on the development of information media in African countries, held in Paris this year, and the regional meeting on news agencies in Asian countries, held in Bangkok in December of last year.

The United States joined Afghanistan, Argentina, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Venezuela in cosponsoring a draft resolution on international cooperation to assist in the development of information media in less developed countries which was adopted unanimously by the Commission. In this resolution the Commission (1) invited governments to include adequate provision in their economic plans for the development of their national information media; (2) invited regional commissions and financial agencies to assist less developed countries in developing their national

information media; (3) requested UNESCO to continue its program in this field; (4) forwarded the UNESCO reports to the General Assembly; and (5) recommended that the General Assembly take this program into account in connection with the U.N. Development Decade and invite the governments of more developed countries to cooperate with less developed countries to help meet urgent needs in this field.

#### **Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights**

The Commission had before it a report of the seminar on freedom of information already held in 1962 in New Delhi. In addition the Secretary-General reported on plans for two more seminars in 1962, one in May in Tokyo on the status of women in family law, and the other in June in Stockholm on judicial and other remedies against the abuse of administrative authority with special emphasis on the role of parliamentary institutions. The Secretary-General announced that arrangements were being made for three seminars in 1963, one in Australia on the role of the police in the protection of human rights, a second in Senegal on public freedoms in developing countries, and a third in Colombia on the status of women.

I stressed the significance of this program of advisory services, especially the programs of seminars and fellowships going forward. I called attention to the action of the 1961 session of the U.N. General Assembly making available an additional \$40,000 to be used for additional fellowships in the field of human rights.

The Commission unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by Argentina, India, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela which (1) commended the Secretary-General for his report and approved the program of seminars proposed; (2) requested the Secretary-General to direct the attention of mem-

ber governments to assistance available to them under the advisory services program; (3) invited the Secretary-General to submit a report next year on the extent to which advantage is taken by member governments of the facilities available in the form of fellowships and expert advisory services; and (4) also invited the Secretary-General to report further to the next session of the Commission on additional ways in which the effectiveness of this program might be increased.

#### **National Advisory Committees on Human Rights**

I made a statement on this item in which I drew attention to the Committees on Civil Rights which had been established in all the States in the United States, and I described the work of these committees in some detail.

Following a debate on this subject, the Commission adopted a resolution recommending that the Economic and Social Council invite the governments of member states to favor, in the light of conditions in their countries, the formation of national advisory committees on human rights and to encourage activities of such committees already in existence.

#### **Future Program of Commission**

The Commission authorized the Secretary-General to prepare and publish a guide to national legal institutions and procedures for the protection of human rights. This decision was taken by a vote of 15 (U.S.)-0-4 (Soviet bloc and the United Kingdom). The United Kingdom opposed the resolution for financial reasons.

A proposal by France to request the Secretary-General to prepare a succinct memorandum for the Commission's session next year setting forth ideas and suggestions for a development decade in the field of human rights was approved.

## Provisional Agenda of the Seventeenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. A/5150 dated July 20

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Tunisia.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly:
  - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
  - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Opening of the general debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of one member of the Trusteeship Council.
18. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
19. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission.
20. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
21. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter [resolution 1670 (XVI) of 15 December 1961].
22. Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and of members of the party accompanying him [resolution 1628 (XVI) of 26 October 1961].
23. Organization of peace [decision of 19 December 1961 (1083rd plenary meeting)].
24. United Nations Year for International Co-operation [decision of 20 December 1961 (1087th plenary meeting)].
25. The situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples: report of the Special Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) [resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961].
26. Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961].
27. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the World Meteorological Organization and the International Telecommunication Union [resolution 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961].
28. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950].
29. The situation in Angola: reports of the Sub-Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and of the Government of Portugal [resolution 1742 (XVI) of 30 January 1962].
30. Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [resolution 1629 (XVI) of 27 October 1961].
31. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949].
32. United Nations Emergency Force:
  - (a) Report on the Force;
  - (b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force.
33. Economic and social consequences of disarmament: report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of the group of expert consultants appointed under General Assembly resolution 1516 (XV) [resolution 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960].
34. United Nations Development Decade: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December 1961].
35. Economic development of under-developed countries:
  - (a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical assistance

<sup>1</sup> To convene at Headquarters, New York, on Sept. 18, 1962.



o the developing countries; report of the Secretary-General [resolutions 1522(XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1711(XVI) of 19 December 1961];

(b) Establishment of a United Nations capital development fund; report of the Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1521(XV) [resolution 1706(XVI) of 19 December 1961];

(c) Industrial development and activities of the organs of the United Nations in the field of industrialization resolutions 1525(XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1712(XVI) of 19 December 1961.

(d) Long-term projections of world economic trends; progress report prepared by the Secretary-General [resolutions 1428 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, 1517 (XV) of 15 December 1960 and 1708(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

(e) Land reform; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1426(XIV) of 5 December 1959].

(f) Decentralization of the economic and social activities of the United Nations and strengthening of the regional economic commissions [resolution 1709(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

46. Questions relating to international trade and commodities:

(a) Question of holding an international conference on international trade problems relating especially to primary commodity markets; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1707(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

(b) International measures to assist in offsetting fluctuations in commodity prices [resolution 1423(XIV) of 5 December 1959].

47. Population growth and economic development [resolution 1719(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

48. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources [resolution 1720(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

49. Progress and operations of the Special Fund [resolution 1240(XIII) of 14 October 1958, part B, paras. 10 and 54].

50. United Nations programmes of technical co-operation;

(a) Review of activities;

(b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [resolution 331(IX) of 26 November 1954];

(c) Question of assistance to Libya; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1528(XV) of 15 December 1960].

51. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:

(a) Report of the High Commissioner;

(b) Question of the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner [resolution 1165(XII) of 26 November 1957].

52. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights [resolution 1666(XVI) of 11 December 1961].

53. Draft Convention and draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages [resolution 1680(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

44. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information [resolution 1681(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

45. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum [resolution 1682(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

46. Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information [resolution 1683(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

47. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance [resolution 1684(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

48. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations; reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

(a) Political and constitutional information on Non-Self-Governing Territories;

(b) Information on educational, economic and social advancement;

(c) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information.

49. Dissemination of information on the United Nations in the Non-Self-Governing Territories; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1695(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

50. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1696(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

51. Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in Non-Self-Governing Territories; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1697(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

52. Racial discrimination in Non-Self-Governing Territories; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1698(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

53. Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542(XV); report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration [resolution 1699(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

54. Election to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

55. Question of Southern Rhodesia; report of the Special Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1654(XVI) [resolution 1745(XVI) of 23 February 1962].

56. Question of South West Africa:

(a) Report of the United Nations Special Committee for South West Africa [resolution 1702(XVI) of 19 December 1961];

(b) Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1705(XVI) of 19 December 1961].

57. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories; report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1643(XVI) of 6 November 1961].

58. Dissemination of information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in the Trust Territories [resolution 1644(XVI) of 6 November 1961].

59. Financial reports and accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 1961, and reports of the Board of Auditors:

(a) United Nations;

(b) United Nations Children's Fund;

(c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

(d) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

60. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1962.

61. Budget estimates for the financial year 1963.

62. United Nations operations in the Congo: cost estimates and financing.

63. Obligations of Members, under the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and the Organization's operations in the Congo: advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice [resolution 1731(XVI) of 20 December 1961].

64. Review of the pattern of conferences [resolution 1202(XII) of 13 December 1957].

65. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;

(b) Committee on Contributions;

(c) Board of Auditors;

(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointment made by the Secretary-General;

(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

66. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions [resolution 1691(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

67. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency:

(a) Earmarkings and contingency allocations from the Special Account of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;

(b) Earmarkings and allotments from the Special Fund.

68. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and with the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

69. Personnel questions:

(a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General [A/5083, para. 51];

(b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;

(c) Other personnel questions.

70. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.

71. United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General.

72. Question of the publication of a United Nations juridical yearbook [resolution 1506(XV) of 12 December 1960].

73. Consular relations [resolution 1685(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

74. Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 1686(XVI) of 18 December 1961].

75. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fourteenth session.

76. The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea [item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/5140)].

77. The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests [item proposed by India (A/5141 and Add. 1)].

78. Rwanda and Burundi: report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1746(XVI) of 27 June 1962.

79. Question of Oman [item proposed by Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen (A/5149)].

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Progress report on UNICEF programs for 1960 and 1961 and on the former UNREF program, as of December 31, 1961. A/C.9/153. March 16, 1962. 144 pp.

Information from non-self-governing territories (summaries of information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations: African and adjacent territories, A/5078/Add. 2-19, March 21-April 30, 1962; Asian territories, A/5079/Add. 2-5, March 20-April 12, 1962; Caribbean and Western Atlantic territories, A/5080 and Add. 1-19, March 20-May 1, 1962; Pacific territories, A/5081 and Add. 1-5, March 15-April 24, 1962; U.K. memorandum relating to political and constitutional information on territories under U.K. administration, A/5120, April 27, 1962.

International Law Commission. Report on the fifth session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee held at Rangoon, January 1962. A/CN.4/146. March 27, 1962. 9 pp.

Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/5109, March 30, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated March 28, 1962, from the Czechoslovak deputy permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban conference, A/5110, March 30, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated March 28, 1962, from the Nigerian permanent representative addressed to the Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons, A/5111, March 30, 1962. 1 p.

Note verbale dated March 30, 1962, from the Israeli permanent representative addressed to the Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5112. March 30, 1962. 2 pp.

Letter dated March 29, 1962, from the Rumanian permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban. A/5113. April 3, 1962. 2 pp.

Special Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration. Communication dated March 23, 1962, from the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister. A/AC.108/7. April 3, 1962. 3 pp.

Special Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration. Statement submitted by Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane of Mozambique. A/AC.108/11. April 10, 1962. 31 pp.

Note verbale dated April 9, 1962, from the permanent mission of Hungary addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban conference. A/5115. April 12, 1962. 2 pp.

Note verbale dated April 9, 1962, from the permanent mission of Hungary addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5116. April 12, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated April 13, 1962, from the Yugoslav permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning nuclear tests. A/5117 and Corr. 1. April 16, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated April 17, 1962, from the Byelorussian permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning nuclear weapons. A/5118. April 18, 1962. 4 pp.

Letter dated April 17, 1962, from the Byelorussian permanent representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning a nuclear test ban conference. A/5119. April 18, 1962. 3 pp.

Report of the commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of members of the party accompanying him. A/5069 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1. April 24, 1962. 243 pp.

Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in non-self-governing territories. A/5122. May 1, 1962. 6 pp.

Letter dated April 26, 1962, from the President of the General Assembly to the Acting Secretary-General and transmitting a memorandum on the work of the General Assembly. A/5123. May 3, 1962. 8 pp.

## Economic and Social Council

Capital requirements of petroleum exploration and methods of financing. E/3580. March 15, 1962. 81 pp.

Statistical Commission. Problems and developments in the integration of accounts on financial and income statistics. E/CN.3/290. March 16, 1962. 40 pp.

Statistical Commission. The 1963 world program of basic industrial statistics. E/CN.3/288. March 19, 1962. 31 pp.

Travel, transport, and communications development of international travel. E/3590. March 22, 1962. 34 pp.

United Nations Children's Fund. Children in national development. E/ICEF/448. April 7, 1962. 37 pp.

Procedures and arrangements for the world food program. E/3608. April 17, 1962. 3 pp.

Progress in land reform. E/3603. April 5, 1962. 283 pp.

Questions relating to science and technology: international cooperation in the field of seismological research. E/3617. April 24, 1962. 52 pp.

Technical assistance activities of the United Nations. E/3619. April 26, 1962. 152 pp.

1962 review of international commodity problems by the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements. E/3614. April 27, 1962. 41 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Cambodia, July 31, 1962; China, July 30, 1962; New Zealand and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 25, 1962; Philippines, July 26, 1962.

##### Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* New Zealand (including Tokelau Islands), June 29, 1962.

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Togo, August 1, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Togo, August 1, 1962.

##### Law of the Sea

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Poland, June 29, 1962.<sup>3</sup>

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Poland, June 29, 1962.

##### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United States, August 2, 1962.

##### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.

Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II.

*Acceptance deposited:* Korea, July 30, 1962.

#### BILATERAL

##### Austria

Counterpart settlement agreement, with related notes of March 10 and 28, 1961. Signed at Vienna March 29, 1961.

*Entered into force:* July 12, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> With reservations made at time of signing.

## Brazil

Amendment to the agreement of August 3, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3303, 4255, and 4539), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 20, 1962.

## Colombia

General agreement for economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at Bogotá July 23, 1962. Entered into force July 23, 1962.

Agreement relating to technical cooperation, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá March 5 and 9, 1951. Entered into force March 9, 1951. TIAS 2231 and 2628.

*Terminated:* July 23, 1962 (superseded by agreement of July 23, 1962, *supra*).

Agreement providing for the furnishing of economic assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 30 and April 4, 1961. Entered into force April 4, 1961. TIAS 4712.

*Terminated:* July 23, 1962 (superseded by agreement of July 23, 1962, *supra*).

## Germany

Amendment to the agreement of June 28, 1957 (TIAS 3574), for cooperation on behalf of Berlin concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 29, 1962.

*Entered into force:* July 30, 1962.

## Senegal

Agreement relating to the furnishing of military equipment, materials and services to Senegal for the purposes of assuring its security and supporting its development. Effected by exchange of notes at Dakar July 20, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

Missile Defense Alarm System (Midas) Station. TIAS 4809. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London July 18, 1961. Entered into force July 18, 1961.

Transfer of Equipment for Use of National Police Force of Mexico. TIAS 4810. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 26, 1961. Entered into force June 26, 1961.

Peace Corps Program. TIAS 4811. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ghana. Exchange of notes—Signed at Accra July 19, 1961. Entered into force July 19, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4812. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Italy, amending the agreement of October

30, 1956, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome May 23, 1961. Entered into force May 23, 1961.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4813. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Paraguay, amending the agreement of April 4, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción June 5 and 19, 1961. Entered into force June 19, 1961.

Strategic Materials. TIAS 4814. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Brazil, amending the agreement of January 5, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 20 and August 7, 1961. Entered into force August 7, 1961.

Mexican Agricultural Workers. TIAS 4815. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Mexico, extending and supplementing the agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at México June 27, 1961. Entered into force June 27, 1961.

United States Educational Foundation in Thailand. TIAS 4816. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Thailand, amending the agreement of July 1, 1950, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangkok July 20 and December 23, 1960. Entered into force December 23, 1960. With related notes—Dated at Bangkok October 19, November 16 and 29, and December 1 and 23, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4817. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of April 28, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade July 1, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4818. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of November 6, 1958, as supplemented and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv June 15 and at Jerusalem July 10, 1961. Entered into force July 12, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4819. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Turkey—Signed at Ankara July 29, 1961. Entered into force July 29, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 4820. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Indonesia, extending the agreement of February 2 and March 2, 1959, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Djakarta, one March 30, 1961; the other May, 1961, received May 31, 1961. Entered into force May 31, 1961. Operative retroactively April 1, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4821. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of January 11, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara July 17, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4822. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Viet-Nam—Signed at Saigon July 15, 1961. Entered into force July 14, 1961. With exchange of notes.

International Sanitary Regulations—Additional Regulations Amending WHO Regulations No. 2—Sanitary Control of Pilgrim Traffic. TIAS 4823. 6 pp. 5¢.

Regulations adopted by the Ninth World Health Assembly at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force January 3, 1957. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America May 22, 1957, with reservation.

United States Commission for Cultural Exchange With Iran. TIAS 4824. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Iran, amending the agreement of September 1, 1949, as amended. Exchange of Notes—Signed at Tehran June 20, 1961. Entered into force June 20, 1961.

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482	7/31	Section of Pan American Highway to open in 1963 (rewrite).
*483	7/30	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*484	8/2	Gardner: "Outer Space Cooperation and the United Nations."
486	8/1	Bowles: "A Fresh Look at the Alliance for Progress."
†488	8/4	Bowles: "A New Deal for Latin America."
489	8/5	Soviet resumption of nuclear tests.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State has recently released the following three volumes of its analysis of the United States negotiations in the 1960-61 Tariff Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), from September 1, 1960 to July 16, 1962.

- Volume I, released in March 1962, contains the results of reciprocal negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC), Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and the results of renegotiations with the EEC. (Department of State Publication 7349, \$1.25)
- Volume II, released in March 1962, contains the results of renegotiations for compensation to the United States from other countries under Article XXVIII of the GATT (Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Peru, Republic of South Africa, Sweden, and Turkey), and a consolidated schedule of concessions granted by the United States in other compensatory renegotiations under Articles II, XIX and XXVIII of the GATT with the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), Denmark, Western Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. (Department of State Publication 7350, 35 cents)
- Volume III, released in July 1962, contains an analysis of the reciprocal agreements between the United States and Cambodia, Haiti, India, and Japan, as well as a consolidated list of concessions granted by the United States in all reciprocal negotiations in the course of the Conference, including those discussed in Volume I. (Department of State Publication 7408, 45 cents)

A subsequent volume in this series, which is now under preparation, will contain an English translation of the Common External Tariff of the European Economic Community, showing the original common tariff rates and the revisions resulting from the Geneva Tariff Conference.

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# Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1209

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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August 27, 1962

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## Foreign Policy Aspects of Space Communications

*Statement by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I appreciate your invitation, Mr. Chairman, to present the views of the Department of State on the communications satellite bill<sup>2</sup> presently being considered by the Senate. The Department has been closely concerned with this legislation from the outset. As you know, we support the bill now before the Senate.

The problems of satellite communications have been the subject of examination by several committees of the Congress and of extensive debate. Although there are obviously areas of disagreement, I think it is important to emphasize that there is wide agreement on the significance of a satellite communications system in our foreign relations. There is unquestionably an advantage for the United States in moving rapidly to establish an effective system in which other nations may participate and which, we may hope, will soon have global coverage. Such rapid progress would be in keeping with the leadership in science and technology which is expected of us. Our ability to provide this most dramatic form of international communications service to all the world efficiently and at just rates would be a notable service to the conduct of the world's business. And it is a truism that if this system is to be of greatest value for our own country and to other nations, it must, necessarily, be developed in harmony with them.

I shall not dwell on these major areas of general agreement beyond pointing to their breadth and importance. In line with the committee's request,

I shall confine my statement to the foreign policy implications of the pending bill and to some general remarks about the international law applicable to space communications.

As to foreign policy, two basic questions need to be answered: First, is the privately owned corporate entity envisioned in the bill an effective instrument for United States participation in a global satellite communications system in the light of relevant foreign policy considerations? Second, does the bill provide adequate authority in the National Government to safeguard and promote our foreign policy interests insofar as the activities of the corporation may impinge on this area? Our answer to both of these questions is yes. Let me address each of them in turn.

### II

In the first place, although the shares of this company are to be privately owned, it would be inaccurate to call it a private corporation in the usual sense. Indeed, it is different in kind from the ordinary public utility company under our system. We have here a new form of organization designed as an instrument for the necessary cooperation between government, the private communications industry, and the public in this great enterprise. The National Government's role in the corporation will be a major one. Three members of the board of directors will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The corporation will be subject to close and continuing governmental supervision, review, and regulation through the Federal Communications Commission, the President, and the

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Aug. 6 (press release 490).

<sup>2</sup> H.R. 11040 as reported.

courts. It will depend upon the Federal Government for its very ability to launch its satellites.

The corporation proposed by this bill is in fact another evidence of the pragmatic ability of Americans to devise new institutions, new techniques, and new organizational forms to meet the practical demands of new situations.

The fact that the corporation will be owned and the capital supplied by private companies and individuals will not impair the ability of the United States to cooperate successfully with other countries and international organizations in establishing a global communications system. The ownership and management of telecommunications take a variety of forms in other countries. It is true that most often they are treated as a function of government, but there are countries where private or quasi-private ownership is employed. The traditional form of ownership in this country has been private. This has not prevented us from taking the lead in the development of telecommunications and in cooperating successfully with other countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

I know of no country that has refused to participate in a communications system because it would be doing business with a privately capitalized United States company. I do not believe that the form of organization proposed by this legislation will impede the necessary international cooperation.

### III

Let me turn to the second question: Does the bill provide adequate authority to safeguard and promote the foreign policy interests of the United States?

To begin with, we expect there will be a powerful corporate interest in the closest cooperation with the United States Government. Unless it cooperates, the corporation will simply be unable to carry forward its business effectively. Therefore we are proceeding on the basis that it will be in the elementary self-interest of both the corporation and the Government to work together harmoniously rather than as antagonists.

Prudence requires that, in the event of failure of cooperation, the interests of the Government and the public be fully protected. Our belief is that the bill itself provides fully adequate protections. But before discussing these in detail, let me emphasize that there are other protections in the very

facts of international life. In the conduct of foreign relations the State Department is frequently in the position of supporting and assisting American companies doing business abroad. We are also in a position to advise and restrain these companies and to make clear to other governments the policies and attitudes of the United States. The legislation itself reinforces this authority.

In recent weeks most of the discussion of the foreign policy provisions of the bill has centered on whether they delegate to the corporation a part of the President's authority to engage in international negotiations on behalf of the United States Government. Let me state most emphatically that they do not. Indeed, to my mind there would be a constitutional question whether Congress could by legislation deprive the President of any such authority.

The fact is that the bill, in section 201(a) (4) expressly directs the President to "exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States." This provision confirms the authority of the President to control international negotiations with respect to the satellite communications system in any way he deems appropriate where the foreign policy interests of the United States are involved. Where he considers it necessary for the executive branch to conduct the negotiations himself, he will be able to direct this.

A certain confusion has arisen on this subject because section 402 of the administrative bill in its original form contained the following provision:

The corporation shall not enter into negotiations with any international agency, foreign government or entity without a prior notification to the Department of State which will conduct or supervise such negotiations. All agreements and arrangements with any such agency, government, or entity shall be subject to the approval of the Department of State.

That provision taken literally was perhaps too broad. But as Under Secretary [George C. McGhee] made clear in the very first testimony of the State Department on this bill,<sup>3</sup> the Department has neither the time, the personnel, the technical competence, nor the desire to carry on ordinary business negotiations for this corporation, ar

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here.

more than it carries on such detailed negotiations on behalf of other American corporations engaged in international business. Moreover, the original language lodged the negotiating authority in the State Department rather than in the President, who has the constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy. For these reasons that language was dropped and the language I have previously read to you was inserted in section 201(a)(4) to confirm the President's authority to conduct negotiations having international political significance. In exercising this authority the President will use the Department of State as its principal arm; but, as this committee knows, in conducting its international negotiations the Department associates with itself representatives of other agencies which have interest and competence in the subject matter.

In the course of congressional consideration, section 402 was rewritten to govern those situations in which the corporation is negotiating broad on business or technical matters arising in the conduct of its operations. We do not interpret this new section 402 as a grant of power to the corporation to negotiate on these matters. That derives from its charter power to do the kind of business it will be doing. Section 402 in its present form is a recognition that, with this corporation, even technical or minor business negotiations may raise problems of wider concern. It provides a procedure for dealing with those problems. Under this procedure the corporation must keep the Department informed about such negotiations. The Department will advise the company of relevant foreign policy considerations and be ready to provide appropriate assistance if necessary. Although the bill contains no definition of "business negotiations," this creates no difficulty. It is, after all, for the President to determine, under section 201(a)(4) as well as under his constitutional power to conduct foreign policy, what negotiations should be conducted by the Government and which may be left to the corporation.

I can assure the committee that we in the State Department are fully aware of the broad range of questions involving foreign policy interests that may arise in connection with this satellite communications system. The Department will wish to follow them closely either through direct contact of the negotiations or by close association

with the company under the procedure prescribed by section 402, whichever is appropriate.

#### IV

The bill shows its concern and care for United States foreign policy interests in broader ways. This concern is written into the "Declaration of Policy and Purpose." The bill proposes to establish "a commercial communications satellite system." But it declares the policy of Congress to do this

... in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries . . . as part of an improved global communications network, which will be responsive to public needs and national objectives, which will serve the communication needs of the United States and other countries, and which will contribute to world peace and understanding. . . . as promptly as possible and . . . [so as] to provide global coverage at the earliest practicable date.

And it ordains that

... care and attention will be directed toward providing such services to economically less developed countries and areas as well as those more highly developed. . . .

These are our international and foreign policy objectives so far as a general commercial satellite communications system is concerned and apart from "unique governmental needs" which the bill recognizes as a possibility but is not intended to deal with.

These declarations are not empty platitudes. The bill provides implementing power in the President, the Communications Commission, and the Federal courts. Section 201 begins by directing the President "In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes of this Act"—including the objectives and purposes I have just read—to do certain things. Most relevant for present purposes are these:

(4) exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States;

(5) insure that timely arrangements are made under which there can be foreign participation in the establishment and use of a communications satellite system;

(7) so exercise his authority as to help attain coordinated and efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the technical compatibility of the system with existing communications facilities both in the United States and abroad.

When the Congress, by legislation, says the President *shall* do something, I believe it constitutes a grant of authority to do that thing. Thus section 201(a), in the passages I have indicated, gives the President authority to require action by the corporation in those directions, so long as that action is consistent with the overall concept of this corporation as a commercial enterprise and is not at odds with other provisions of our Constitution and laws.

Chairman [Newton N.] Minow of the Federal Communications Commission has already explained the authority granted to the Commission to compel in certain circumstances the establishment of communication to foreign points. As you know, proceedings under this authority may be activated by the Secretary under section 201(c)(3) of the bill, when he advises the Commission that such communication should be established in the national interest.

Finally, the Attorney General has explained how, in a last resort, section 403 provides for recourse to the courts to enforce compliance by the corporation with the policies and purposes of the act.

These powers taken together, and the governmental representation on the board of directors of the company, provide legal authority that is, in my judgment, fully adequate to protect the foreign policy interests of the United States.

But, in the last analysis, Mr. Chairman, this issue is not really a matter of legal authority. The space communications program so far has been the product of close and intimate cooperation between private industry and government in all its aspects, including foreign policy aspects. This must necessarily be, for the talents, energies, resources, and knowledge needed for success are not to be found exclusively either in the Government or the private sector. As far as the responsibilities of the Department of State are concerned, industry's cooperation has been cheerful and willing. I see no reason why that should change merely because an entity is established that gives form to the necessary private interest in the system.

## V

The committee has asked for a discussion of international law applicable to space communications. Obviously, in a new field of this kind, the regime of law is hardly beyond the threshold of

development. Nevertheless, we believe a firm foundation of fundamental principle has been laid and that the space satellite communications system contemplated by this bill will be wholly consistent with those principles.

The basic source of legal principle governing space activities is General Assembly Resolution 1721,\* jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union and adopted at the last session of the General Assembly. It says

### *The General Assembly . . .*

1. *Commends to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the following principles:*

(a) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies;

(b) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation. . . .

Although the resolution "commends" the principles to member states, the United States takes the position that these principles are presently the law; the unanimous action of the General Assembly in adopting the resolution, as action by the governments of the world assembled, confirms this view.

It is evident that nothing contemplated by this bill is in conflict with the resolution. On the contrary, our pressing forward with this space satellite communications system is a constructive exercise of the freedom of space for exploration and use by all states that the resolution affirms.

Of course, it would be foolish to contend that all the legal problems of space communications have been solved, or even adequately formulated. Quite obviously they have not. But that is no valid reason for holding back. I speak about the American legal system with deference before this committee, but I had always believed the genius of the common law was that it proceeded from case to case, refining its rules and norms out of the ore of experience and practice, solving problems pragmatically as they arise, rather than seeking to provide all the answers in advance through some sort of generalized code.

We believe the law of space communications will grow in this organic way rather than by a process of abstract speculation. Where early in-

\* For text, see BULLETIN of JAN. 29, 1962, p. 185.

ernational agreement—one might almost say legislation”—is needed to move ahead, as in the case of frequency allocation, we will be prepared to take our position at the conference table.

On other questions the development of workable solutions will await the accumulation of practice and experience. The activities of the corporation under this bill will provide much of that experience and will in this way help to provide a basis for the further development of space law.

## VI

Let me, in concluding, say a word about why early passage of this bill is desirable. I do not intend that further progress in the space communications field would be impossible without this corporation. Great progress has already been made under a series of *ad hoc* arrangements between industry and government, and it would be foolish to deny that additional gains could be made on this basis in the future.

But we have reached a stage where space communications are developing at an accelerating rate. These developments call for a multitude of decisions—technical, financial, legal, political, international. In the necessity of the case these decisions must be made jointly by government and industry if they are to be made soundly and in a way that assures the continued availability of the resources, both public and private, that are needed for further progress.

There is need for an organized and systematic framework for this joint decision making. There is need for a central focus of responsibility and direction of effort on operational matters. We need to know what our domestic arrangements will be in order to address intelligently the international questions. These needs the establishment of the corporation will supply.

The policy questions involved in this bill have been carefully considered within the administration. They have been reviewed in four prior committee hearings this year. They have been fully debated on the floor of Congress. There is no reason to suppose that they would be more wisely decided if this process were to be extended another year.

But there is every reason to suppose that the impetus from the passage of this legislation and the organization of this company will bring

measurably closer the time when an effective global satellite communications system is in operation. That in itself will be a great advance for the foreign policy of the United States.

## United States Rejects Soviet Charge of Western Provocations in Berlin

*Following is the text of a Department statement read to news correspondents by Joseph W. Reap, Deputy Director, Office of News, on August 11, together with the text of a Soviet note of August 10.*

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF AUGUST 11

The Department would like to offer the following comments on the Soviet note of August 10.

The charge contained in the note that the three Western Powers and the Government of the Federal Republic have been organizing provocations against the Soviet Union and the East German Communist regime is completely groundless and can only be ascribed to misinformation or a conscious attempt to deceive world opinion. The unsupported allegations in the note are largely descriptive of events which have occurred on the Soviet side of the Berlin wall rather than in West Berlin. The U.S. note of June 25<sup>1</sup> gave details as to how many acts which can only be termed provocative originated in East Berlin. The tensions which have arisen in Berlin have been a direct result of the erection of the wall. The responsibility for this illegal action rests squarely with the Soviet Government.

It is clear that the Soviet note of August 10 is but an attempt to distract world attention from the fact that August 13 is the first anniversary of the wall which divides the city today.

In its note of June 25 the United States proposed to the Soviet Government that representatives of the Four Powers meet in Berlin to review the incidents which had occurred since the wall was built, "with a view to avoiding, by all appropriate methods, the recurrence of such incidents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate the movement of persons and goods within Berlin."

The Soviet Government rejected this proposal.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 97.

If the Soviet Government is sincerely interested in an improvement in the situation in Berlin, it is to be hoped that it will reconsider the U.S. proposal for discussions on this problem.

## SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 10

Unofficial translation

Recently, the West Berlin powers, in collusion with the Federal Republic of Germany Government, have been organizing serious new provocations against the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries. Taking advantage of full freedom and impunity, fascistic elements in West Berlin in recent days have several times attempted to breach German Democratic Republic border installations by means of explosions.

Bomb explosions on the border of the German Democratic Republic with West Berlin have led in a number of cases to human sacrifices, among which have been even German Democratic Republic border guards. Leaflets with open appeal to subversive activity against the German Democratic Republic Government and other Socialist countries have been thrown from West Berlin onto the territory of the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic of Germany Government and the West Berlin Senat openly patronize these provocative actions.

All these provocations are timed for August 13, i.e. for the anniversary of the establishment of the control and protection of the German Democratic Republic border with West Berlin, which were introduced by the German Democratic Republic Government in answer to widely organized criminal and diversionary espionage activity from West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other Socialist countries. The Journey to West Berlin of Federal Republic of Germany President [Heinrich] Luebke is set precisely for this anniversary. Whole series of other official Federal Republic of Germany persons, who are known as organizers of revanchist and subversive activity, also intend to go there.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that the occupation powers of West Berlin, which has been turned into a NATO military base, not only do not undertake any measures to ban provocative actions of West Berlin and the Bonn authorities, but even encourage them in every way. They have undertaken a series of measures which can only inspire West German revanchists.

It is enough to say that various sorts of demonstrations of the occupation forces in West Berlin and flights of

American helicopters over the capital of the German Democratic Republic and over the position of Soviet troops have been carried out in just the last few days.

The Soviet Government in its note of July 14, 1962, has already drawn the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that the situation, which cannot fail to evoke concern of states interested in maintenance of tranquillity and peace in the area, is being created in West Berlin, in view of provocative actions conducted against the German Democratic Republic and other Socialist countries.

The Soviet Government declares that full responsibility for the consequences of the provocative acts from West Berlin towards the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries will be born by those who are organizing these provocations and who are supporting this sort of adventuristic activity.

## Vice President To Visit Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran

The White House announced on August 8 that Vice President and Mrs. Johnson have accepted the invitations of the Governments of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Iran to visit their countries during late August and early September.

President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson have discussed the important contributions such trip could make to United States foreign policy. Vice President Johnson is looking forward to having informal discussions with the heads of state and other leading officials in each of the countries which he will visit and to the opportunity to express to the Governments and people of these countries the sincere friendship and interest of the United States.

In addition to spending several days in each country, Vice President Johnson will open the American exhibit at the international trade fair at Izmir, Turkey, and Thessaloniki, Greece. He will visit the headquarters of the Central Treaty Organization at Ankara, discuss impending Peace Corps projects with officials in Cyprus, Iran, and Turkey, and discuss space projects in Italy.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

## The Meaning of the Trade Expansion Act

by Under Secretary Ball<sup>1</sup>

The proposed legislation, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, has both a brave future and a distinguished heritage. It is in the great tradition of the reciprocal trade agreements program first conceived by Cordell Hull almost 30 years ago. But it has been drafted to take account of the requirements of American policy in a world that has undergone, and is still undergoing, swift and pervasive change.

Since the end of the Second World War, the political and economic shape of the world has been altered more profoundly than in any two centuries in the past.

An Iron Curtain has dropped down to form a cage around one-third of the human population.

Relationships among the other two-thirds have been radically revised. The great colonial systems that controlled the destiny of more than half of the people in what we have come to call the free world have either disappeared or are on their way toward ultimate disappearance—to be replaced by a whole geography book of new independent nations (46 since 1943) that are shaping a new set of relations with the old colonial powers based on the principle of mutual self-respect.

These former colonial powers—our allies, the great industrial nations of Western Europe—far from being weakened or destroyed by the passing of this outmoded form of power relationship have instead turned their energies with remarkable success toward the monumental task of building a strong and united Europe.

By the mutual consent of peoples expressed in the Treaty of Rome—which is the organic docu-

ment of the European Economic Community—six nations of Europe have achieved a greater unity today than could ever be imposed by military might in the past, and this new "Europe" may soon be expanded. Last August the United Kingdom applied for membership in the European Community. Since then, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland have made similar applications.

It would not be appropriate for me to comment today on the negotiations now in progress between the United Kingdom and the member states of the Community. But if those negotiations do lead to the accession of the United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome—and I think they will—the Common Market will embrace a population of about one-quarter of a billion people, with a gross national product, on the basis of 1961, exceeding \$340 billion. It will be an expanding market. The creation of internal free trade within the area of the Community is unleashing strong forces that are giving a new energy both to industry and agriculture. As a result the member nations today are experiencing a rate of growth half again higher than that of the current growth rate of the United States.

Since the end of the Second World War, consistently through three administrations, the United States has encouraged and supported those forces in Europe pressing toward unity. Our interest in a united Europe, our interest in the European Economic Community, is primarily political. We recognize, as President Kennedy so eloquently said on the Fourth of July in Philadelphia,<sup>2</sup> that the United States and the great nations that are forming the new Europe are interdependent and

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Bar Association at San Francisco, Calif., on Aug. 7 (press release 487 dated Aug. 6; revised text).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

that a united Europe can be a partner with whom we could deal "on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations."

#### **Interdependence of the Two Atlantic Economies**

In current discussions of the European Economic Community there is sometimes a tendency to think only of the most conspicuous of its achievements, to regard it merely as a customs union, a commercial arrangement for the advancement of the trading interests of the member nations. Yet the main driving force that has brought the Community into being has stemmed from larger aspirations—a relentless drive toward the ancient goal of a United States of Europe.

Signatory nations to the Treaty of Rome have taken far-reaching commitments. They have agreed not only to create a Common Market but also to undertake a wide spectrum of common action covering all aspects of economic integration—including the concerting of monetary and fiscal policy, the harmonization of social security systems, the development of a common antitrust law, common provisions for the regulation of transport, the free movement not only of goods but of labor, capital, and services, and so on.

Equally as important, they have created a set of institutions, comprising an executive in the form of a Commission and a Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body in the form of an Assembly, and a court—the Court of Justice of the Community—that by its decisions has already begun to build up a formidable body of European jurisprudence.

If we think of the European Community not as a static concept but a living process, we can begin to comprehend its larger political implications. If the negotiations for British accession to the Community succeed we shall have on either side of the Atlantic two enormous entities: on our side a federation of States tied together by developed institutions and a century and a half of common experience to form a nation that is the world's leading power; on the other, a community of states, trading as a single market and seeking among themselves to perfect the common policies and institutional arrangements that can lead toward increasing economic and political integration.

Between them these two entities will account for 90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial

goods and almost as much of the free world's production of such goods. Between them they will represent the world's key currencies; they will provide the world's principal markets for raw materials; and they will constitute the world's principal source of capital to assist the less developed countries to move toward decent living standards.

The degree of interdependence between the great economies flanking the Atlantic—the interdependence to which President Kennedy so eloquently adverted—has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent years. Imbalances within the trade or payments arrangements among the major economically advanced nations can create serious problems. Our own troubling and persistent balance-of-payments deficit is in a very real sense the mirror image of surpluses in the accounts of certain of our European friends.

We have been working to achieve a high degree of coordination of domestic economic policies through the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in order to minimize these imbalances, just as we have been working with our European friends through NATO to achieve an effective defense of the free world or through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to coordinate national programs for aid to less developed countries.

#### **New Trading Opportunities for U.S.**

If the growing partnership between the United States and the new Europe is to result in the strengthening of the free world, our pursuit of common policies on the two sides of the Atlantic must be extended to the construction of a new and more liberal set of commercial relationships.

We in the United States have much to gain by this. For many reasons the development of the European Common Market will provide an unparalleled opportunity for the sale of our products. Our trade with the nations of an expanded Community is today very much in our favor. Our exports of all products to the member nations are about 50 percent higher than our imports. Most Europeans are only just beginning to enjoy many of the consumer goods Americans have known for years—automobiles, electric refrigerators, air conditioning. Using automobile ownership as an index, one may say that the European market is about at the level of consumer demand which existed in the United States in the late twenties—



and think of the expansion which has taken place in our market since that day!

We alone in the free world have fully developed the techniques of mass production, for we alone have had a great mass market open to us. If American industry invests the will and energy, and if access to the Common Market can be assured to it by the tools provided by the Trade Expansion Act, we should find in Europe new trading opportunities of a kind not dreamed of a few years ago.

I do not mean to suggest that the development of the European market for American products will be easy. It will require a considerable effort of merchandising of a kind few American firms have ever attempted in Europe, because in the past the potential of limited national markets has never seemed to justify the trouble. It will require us to do much more than merely ship abroad the surplus of the goods we produce for Americans. It will mean far greater attention to the tailoring of products designed expressly for European tastes and European conditions.

But we are a creative nation, and there is every reason to suppose that we shall remain so. And we respond with vigor when the challenge is great enough. That we can turn our creative genius to use in this new and promising mass market of Europe, I have no doubt. The gains for the American economy will be extraordinary.

#### **U.S. and EEC Tariff Schedules**

From this you will understand that, when I said a few moments ago that America's primary interest in the European Economic Community was political, I did not at all underestimate its economic implications.

Consider the opportunities for us.

By the mid-1950's Europe had effectively completed the major task of postwar reconstruction, assisted, of course, by the Marshall Plan. European production was back to the level of prewar days. Since that time it has been given a prodigious impetus by the bright promise of a common market.

In spite of some signs of a slowing down, this extraordinary drive continues. As the full economic benefits of a mass market are progressively made available, Europe may be expected to continue its giant march toward a higher living standard.

But, you may ask, granted that the Common Market will mean a greatly enhanced consumption of goods, what are the chances for American suppliers who produce outside the walls of the common external tariff?

Notwithstanding a common belief to the contrary, the two great common markets of the free world—the Common Market of Europe and that of the United States—enjoy with respect to industrial goods about the same level of protection from outside competition. This has been established by recent studies of the Tariff Commission and the Department of Commerce.

In suggesting that the average tariff rates on industrial imports are roughly similar in these two great common markets and that the median rates of duty are about the same, I do not mean to imply that the two areas have the same tariff structure. Our own tariff rates range from the very low to the very high. We admit nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 items on our tariff schedule on a duty-free basis. At the same time there are about 900 items on which we levy a duty of 30 percent or more. Products governed by such high rates are largely excluded from the American market, while the duty-free items, to a considerable extent, are products not suited to production in the United States.

The common external tariff of the European Community has a quite different structure, because it has developed under the provisions of the Rome Treaty by averaging the rates that existed at the beginning of 1957 in France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux Customs Union. As a result of this averaging process, practically all the high tariff rates existing in the individual countries have been greatly reduced. Whereas over one-sixth of the rates in the United States are above 30 percent, less than one-fiftieth of European rates are over 30 percent. There are few rates in the European Community as protective as are many rates in our own tariff schedule; at the same time there are fewer items on the free list.

These facts are significant for two reasons. In the first place they show that in any new trade negotiation the United States and the European Community would be starting at substantially the same levels of protection. It should be possible to phase down the levels of protection at roughly the same pace.

But these studies also demonstrate that, contrary to the prevailing mythology, our trade

negotiators have effectively defended U.S. interests. There is a tendency in discussing these matters to cite rates that are markedly higher in Europe than in the United States—such as the current rate on automobiles, which is 22 percent under the common external tariff of the Common Market and only 6½ percent under the U.S. tariff. But one should not ignore cases where the reverse is true, such as clocks and watches, where our rate is 51 percent and the Common Market rate is one-fourth as much, or such items as safety razors, where our rates run from 85 to 255 percent and the Common Market rate is 17 percent.

The myth has somehow grown up that America has been foolishly improvident in past negotiations and that our negotiators have consistently gotten the worst of it. This attitude is, in part perhaps, the reflection of an ancient sense of inferiority, a hangover of colonial psychology, a feeling born of disillusion over early experiences, such as John Jay's superficially bad bargain with the British in 1794—a feeling that persisted during the 19th century throughout a rural America which mistrusted the city slickers, particularly those wearing striped pants and knee breeches in the chancelleries of Europe. We continually tell ourselves that when our diplomats go abroad they are too naive and too high-principled to protect their country's interests. Regardless of his demonstrated hardheadedness in private life, it is a pervasive myth that when an American enters the service of his Government he automatically becomes a foolish and dangerous fellow not worthy of being trusted in his dealings with other nations.

Such a view does more credit to our modesty than our judgment. Speaking for the Department of State, which has had the major responsibility for the actual negotiation of trade agreements, I can assure you quite categorically that this view is held nowhere outside of the United States. It is a myth that stops, so to speak, at the water's edge. The officials of our Government, who over the years have participated in trade agreement negotiations, have served their country well. If this were not so, we could expect to find the tariff rates of Europe today well above those of the United States—and they are not.

With the advent of the European Common Market—and particularly if that market is expanded by the accession of Great Britain—future

negotiations will depend to a large extent on the bargain that can be struck, not between our representatives and those of a dozen smaller states, as has hitherto been the case, but between the negotiators who speak for our own large market and their European counterparts who speak for market of almost comparable size. This, in itself, should greatly facilitate the achievement of deals that will be beneficial not only to the Europeans and ourselves but to the whole free world.

#### **Factors Affecting U.S. Agricultural Exports**

I have so far dealt primarily with the problem of trade in industrial goods. But we also have a vital interest in maintaining and expanding access for our agriculture products. Our commercial agricultural exports to the countries that would make up an enlarged common market are now around \$1.6 billion annually and represent nearly half of our total commercial exports of U.S. agricultural products to all countries.

Two developments have an important effect on our position as a major supplier of farm commodities to Europe. One is the technological revolution in agriculture, which Europe is only now beginning to experience. Just as the United States has enjoyed a tremendous growth in agricultural productivity as a result of new scientific techniques, so is Europe now proceeding along the same path. Over the long pull we can expect Europe to produce more grains and other Temperate Zone products with fewer farmers. Though the vitality generated by the Common Market may accelerate this trend, it is one that would have existed even in the absence of the Treaty of Rome.

Another factor affecting our position is the common agricultural policy developed by the Common Market countries early this year after the most intense and difficult negotiations. Those countries began on July 30 to put this common agricultural policy into effect. By 1970 there will be free trade in virtually all agricultural products among the member states.

These are the two factors that we must take into account in seeking to maintain the United States position as a principal supplier of agriculture products to the crucial markets of Western Europe, but there are also others of only slight significance. With the steady growth of personal income, Europeans will tend to shift toward

a greater consumption of protein and a reduced direct consumption of cereals. Since farm animals are relatively inefficient meat factories, this means a substantially increased requirement for certain cereal imports—but at the expense of others.

The extent to which an advancing agricultural technology will move Europe toward a higher degree of self-sufficiency in its food requirements—to the disadvantage of imports—will depend upon the price and access policies that the European Community may adopt. It is at this point that negotiations by the Trade Expansion Act can be of critical importance. At the same time it is clear that the major producing and consuming nations must face the hard necessity of achieving global solutions to the difficult problems that exist in certain agricultural sectors.

In insuring a bright future for our agricultural exports we shall need all the bargaining counters we can mobilize, and the Trade Expansion Act was drawn with this fact firmly in mind.

### **J.S. Trading Interests Global in Scope**

I have up to this point dealt largely with our vital trading interests in Western Europe, but I have very much in mind the fact that our direct trading interests, as well as our security interests, are global in scope. We need to expand our exports to markets throughout the free world.

We have important trading partners in many areas. I need only mention that our trade with Canada alone is of the same order of magnitude as our trade with the six member states of the Common Market. Across the Pacific, Japan is a major market for manufactured goods and the most important single customer anywhere in the world for our agricultural exports. Last year we sold to Japan nearly \$700 million more in goods of every kind than we bought from Japan—to the great benefit of our balance of payments. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will provide effective authority for negotiations with these countries, as well as with the less developed countries and the Common Market.

### **Prospect for Partnership of Coequals**

Let me now return for a final moment to the proposition I put to you at the beginning of these observations: that the Trade Expansion Act should

be viewed not merely as an instrument for expanding free-world commerce and thus benefiting our own economy but as a solemn political act taken in recognition of the interdependence of which President Kennedy has spoken and of the need for forging an effective Atlantic partnership if the free world is to be strong and secure.

With the progress of Europe toward unity we have for the first time the possibility of a partnership that can become, over the years, a common enterprise in which power and responsibility can be fully and freely shared. We have never been altogether happy with our postwar arrangements in which the preponderance, not only of power but of responsibility, has been so heavily on one side. Now with the prospects of a strong and united Europe we can for the first time see the possibility of a partnership of coequals.

Already we are making substantial progress within that partnership in tackling a broad spectrum of common problems: the coordination of economic policies to avoid persistent imbalances, the perfection of techniques for meeting our common responsibilities toward the less developed areas of the world, the agreement on common objectives of economic growth. Through the Trade Expansion Act we should move rapidly ahead in a further vital area—the expansion of trade not only across the Atlantic but within the whole free world.

And by moving toward this great objective on a basis of agreements reached after patient bargaining we should establish a further strong link among those nations on whom the security of the free world largely depends.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **87th Congress, 2d Session**

**Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Amorphous Graphite.** Report to accompany H.R. 10086. H. Rept. 1659. May 7, 1962. 3 pp.

**Extension of Export Control Act of 1949.** Hearing before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 11309. May 8, 1962. 39 pp.

**Amendment to Bretton Woods Agreements Act.** Report to accompany H.R. 10162. S. Rept. 1477. May 9, 1962. 16 pp.

**Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, January 1-June 30, 1961.** Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting the report. H. Doc. 402. May 10, 1962. 83 pp.

## U.S. Reviews Role of International Atomic Energy Agency

*Following is a statement made by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on August 2, together with the text of a section entitled "Summary and Principal Recommendations" contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. CLEVELAND

The technical institutions in the U.N. complex of international agencies are something new on the face of the earth. Most of them are still less than 20 years old.

Like domestic institutions, public and private, they frequently require several years to get on their feet; and when they do, they seldom turn out to be doing just what those that created them thought they would do. In the process of maturing they normally develop some growing pains and suffer some uncertainties about their proper roles in international life.

Because of this, and because our own national interests and needs also change with changing circumstances, the Department of State has undertaken a comprehensive review of the current operations of international agencies to which we belong, to reassess their utility to United States foreign policy, to recalculate the dollar value of our participation, to reexamine the way they are managed and the way we work with them.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has had more than its share of the trials of growing up. It has suffered more acute growing pains and greater uncertainties about its future than any other technical agency in the U.N. family of agencies. Last fall we felt that the time had come for a formal review of the IAEA by knowl-

edgeable people who could take a fresh look at the Agency from the combined viewpoints of United States foreign policy, technology, and administration. That was why the Department of State, in agreement with the Atomic Energy Commission established the Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry D. Smyth [U.S. Representative to the IAEA], whose testimony you have just heard and whose report<sup>1</sup> you have had an opportunity to study. It has been a stimulating exercise, immensely useful to the United States Government.

### Prospects for Nuclear Power Expansion Abroad

The Committee's report gives us a new judgment by competent experts on the prospects for an expansion of nuclear power abroad in the near term future. As you will recall, when President Eisenhower proposed the establishment of what became the IAEA, it was widely believed that economic nuclear power was just around the corner. That turned out to be somewhat premature and gave rise to uncertainties about the utility of the international agency. The assessment made in the Smyth report, which is generally endorsed by the Atomic Energy Commission, confirms the earlier judgment that nuclear power will increasingly play a part in economic development.

The Department of State, of course, is not in a position to make technical judgments on the extent or the speed of nuclear power expansion in various areas of the world. But expert opinion that such growth is likely to occur is important

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Advisory Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency*; the report was submitted to Mr. Cleveland on May 19 and released to the public on June 1 (Department of State press release 353).

to foreign policy planning from two points of view. First, we are concerned that adequate safeguards be maintained to guard against military applications of a proliferating nuclear technology. Second, the prospect of increasing use of nuclear energy, for power as well as for research, makes it important to help the newly developing nations to develop the new technical people who can handle the new technology.

We are seeking to make a practical start on an international program of safeguards, as the Committee recommends, looking into the enormously complex question of how best to relate an international agency to the bilateral arrangements which have thus far been the dominant pattern of our international atomic energy program.

In one way or another, we will probably want to ask the IAEA to assume some kind of third-party role in relation to our bilateral agreements. We have not arrived at a precise formula which would serve this purpose; in fact we are persuaded that somewhat different formulae would be needed for different countries, and they would, of course, have to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis. We therefore are not prepared to make a precise statement on this matter at the present time.

#### **Role of U.N. Technical Agencies**

In the meantime, the advantage of technical assistance from an international agency has been confirmed by the Committee report, especially in cases where the assistance involves areas which many nations consider to be politically sensitive.

We do not, however, believe that IAEA, or any of the other technical agencies in the United Nations complex, should be used as channels for major inputs of financial aid. The IAEA is not a bank. We continue to believe that the international, regional, and national financing institutions are better equipped for this purpose.

Nor do we believe that the United States should increase its proportional financial support of the IAEA. We are now contributing 32.27 percent to the regular budget and 50 percent to the operational budget, and we believe it would not be good policy to assume a greater share than that.

At the same time we hope that, as the Agency continues to mature, other members will agree with us on the desirability of expanding its opera-

tions, especially the technical assistance, fellowship, and visiting-expert programs. The Agency's fellowship program and the visiting experts which the IAEA sends to countries that are newly experimenting with nuclear energy tend to give a major boost to the rapid expansion of scientific and technical skills across the board. We agree with the Advisory Committee's recommendation that these activities merit the vigorous support of the United States.

We most explicitly agree that the Agency is the most appropriate instrument for establishing uniform health and safety standards, for working out uniform rules for liability and indemnification for atomic accidents, for developing and publishing international standards for waste management, and for conducting research and calling scientific conferences on problems which require international planning and coordination. With respect to all these important functions, we believe that the Agency has earned—and will continue to deserve—strong support from the United States Government.

#### **Soviet Participation in IAEA Welcomed**

Finally, despite the political difficulties that are sometimes involved, we welcome the presence in this international agency of the Soviet Union. In this way the Agency serves not only as an effective instrument of cooperation between ourselves and our Atlantic partners on the one hand, and the newly developing countries on the other, but also as an avenue of communication between the two principal atomic powers, the Soviet Union and ourselves.

As in other large international organizations, our membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency produces periodic political fireworks at the main conferences of the organization. But in between these sometimes grumpy sessions much work is done by most of the countries of the world, working together with the support of the Agency's secretariat, to build an effective instrument of their common interest in putting the atom to work for peaceful purposes. With the sense of direction provided by the work of Dr. Smyth and his colleagues, we propose to continue and develop that constructive work, without getting too excited about the occasional thunder and lightning offstage.

## REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE (EXCERPT)

### SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

This Committee has reviewed the history of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of United States participation in Agency affairs, necessarily considering also the objectives and accomplishments of the United States Atoms for Peace Program. We have examined the present technical situation and probable future developments in the field of atomic energy and the role that the Agency might play in these developments.

We have concluded that the International Atomic Energy Agency in its first four years of life has served a useful function in promoting the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and has prepared itself for future activities of great significance.

Consideration of the United States Atoms for Peace Program has led us to conclude that the peaceful uses of atomic energy can and should play an important and fruitful role in our foreign policy. In our judgment, active support of the Agency is an effective means for furtherance of this policy.

We believe that various circumstances now combine to give the Agency considerable promise of future usefulness. This opinion is based on our judgment that the development of nuclear power is the key issue in determining the fate of the Agency and that nuclear power is on the threshold of economic attractiveness in a number of technologically advanced parts of the world. We believe that it is to the advantage of the United States to encourage and participate in this development.

We consider it to be of great importance that nuclear power be developed under conditions that discourage the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses. The Agency has already adopted a system of basic principles and procedures which constitute a good start toward the establishment of an adequate system of safeguards for materials and equipment procured under Agency auspices. Maintenance of an adequate world-wide safeguards system requires that transactions taking place under bilateral agreements contain provisions equivalent to those of the Agency or that the Agency be requested to administer its own system of safeguards for these transactions.

We have reviewed the activities of the Agency in technical assistance, dissemination of technical information, conduct of research, establishment of international standards and conventions, evaluation of economic aspects of nuclear power, and other fields. We have concluded that, in general, these activities have been competently carried forward and have contributed significantly to the basic goal of promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Some detailed criticism will be found in the body of the report. On the whole, this Committee has been impressed by the technical competence of the staff of the Agency and by its morale, dedication, and enthusiasm during the difficult formative years just passed. In our judgment, many of the areas in which the Agency has been active are best carried forward by an international organization, and we believe that the Agency has shown its competence to be designated as the appropriate mechanism for these functions.

During its first four years, uncertainties about the course of development of nuclear power and about the strength and usefulness of the newly-formed Agency engendered a certain amount of caution in United States policy toward the organization. Clarification of the situation in the Agency as well as in nuclear power technology now provides a solid basis for clear-cut policy decisions.

This Committee recommends therefore that:

1. The United States reaffirm and constructively support its policy of furthering the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world.

2. The International Atomic Energy Agency be recognized as the most effective means by which the United States can carry out that policy. To that end, activities now being conducted under existing bilateral agreements should be transferred to Agency auspices wherever practical.

3. The United States take the lead in securing international agreement that the Agency be recognized as the instrument most appropriate for carrying out certain important functions in the field of atomic energy. In the opinion of the Committee, these include the following:

- a. The provision of the best attainable assurance against diversion of material and equipment to military purposes;
- b. The establishment of uniform health and safety standards;
- c. The provision of technical assistance;
- d. The reconciliation of liability and indemnification practices;
- e. The conduct of international research projects;
- f. The promulgation of waste management standards.

4. A detailed study be made within the United States Government of the steps to be taken to further foreign policy objectives in the field of atomic power. We believe that such a study will show that an effective program need not be costly.

5. The United States Government continue to support actively the programs of the Agency in the fields listed above by providing financial assistance, by supplying experts for special assignments, and by encouraging competent technical men to serve upon the Agency staff.

6. The United States Government take under advisement various other suggestions contained in the body of this report.

## Increase Proposed for AID Investment Guarantee Program

White House press release dated August 6

The President transmitted to Congress on August 6 an amendment to the 1963 budget involving an increase of \$80 million for the foreign investment guarantee program of the Agency for International Development.

The proposed increase is to provide additional

reserves for the investment guarantee program based on current estimates of \$610 million in face amount guarantees for 1963 instead of \$350 million originally estimated. The revised estimate is based on an unusually heavy volume of applications and the interest being shown in housing guarantees, particularly for Latin America.

The budget estimate of \$100 million for the foreign investment guarantee program is revised to \$180 million.

## President Issues Executive Order on Administration of Peace Corps

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

#### CONTINUANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PEACE CORPS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Peace Corps Act (75 Stat. 612), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

#### PART I—DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS AND ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

**SECTION 101. Delegation of functions to the Secretary of State.** (a) Exclusive of the functions otherwise delegated or reserved to the President by this order, and subject to the provisions of this order, there are hereby delegated to the Secretary of State all functions conferred upon the President by the Act.

(b) The function of determining the portion of living allowances constituting basic compensation, conferred upon the President by Section 912(3)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State and shall be performed in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury.

(c) The functions of prescribing conditions, conferred upon the President by the second sentence of Section 5(e) and the concluding phrase of Section 6(3) of the Act and hereinabove delegated to the Secretary of State, shall be exercised in consultation with the head of the United States Government agency responsible for the facility.

**SEC. 102. Continuance of the Peace Corps.** (a) The Secretary of State shall take such action as may be appropriate to continue in existence under the Act the Peace Corps established as an agency in the Department of State pursuant to Executive Order No. 10924 of March 1, 1961 (26 F.R. 1789).<sup>2</sup>

(b) The Peace Corps shall be headed by the Director for whom provision is made in Section 4(a) of the Act. The Deputy Director, for whom provision is made in Section 4(a) of the Act, shall also serve in the Peace Corps.

**SEC. 103. Allocation and transfer of funds.** All funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Pres-

ident for carrying out the provisions of the Act shall be deemed to be allocated without any further action of the President to the Secretary of State or to such subordinate officer as he may designate. The Secretary of State or such officer may allocate or transfer, as appropriate, any of such funds to any United States Government agency or part thereof for obligation or expenditure thereby consistent with applicable law.

**SEC. 104. Delegation of functions to the Civil Service Commission.** There is hereby delegated to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, with respect to the laws administered by the Commission, the function conferred upon the President by that portion of Section 5(f)(1)(B) of the Act which reads "except as otherwise determined by the President."

#### PART II—RESERVED FUNCTIONS

**SEC. 201. Reservation of functions to the President.** There are hereby excluded from the delegations made by Part I of this order the following-described functions of the President:

(a) All authority conferred upon him by Sections 4(b), 4(c)(2), 4(c)(3), 10(d), 11, 16(b), and 18 of the Act.

(b) The authority conferred upon him by Section 4(a) of the Act to appoint the Director and the Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

(c) The authority conferred upon him by that portion of Section 5(f)(1)(B) of the Act which reads "except as otherwise provided in Section 104 of this order and except to the extent that such authority is in respect of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

(d) The authority conferred upon him by Section 10(f) of the Act to direct any agency of the United States Government as provided in that section.

(e) The authority conferred upon him by Section 12 of the Act to appoint persons to membership in the Peace Corps National Advisory Council and to determine the level of service of the members of that Council.

(f) The authority conferred upon him by Section 19 of the Act to adopt and alter an official seal or emblem of the Peace Corps.

(g) The authority conferred upon him by the first sentence of Section 22 of the Act to establish standards and procedures to the extent not inconsistent with the proviso of Section 303 of this order.

#### PART III—INCIDENTAL PROVISIONS

**SEC. 301. Personnel.** Persons appointed, employed or assigned after May 19, 1959, under Section 527(c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 or Section 7(c) of the Act for the purpose of performing functions under such Acts outside the United States shall not, unless otherwise agreed by the agency in which such benefits may be exercised, be entitled to the benefits provided by Section 528 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 in cases in which their service under the appointment, employment or assignment exceeds thirty months.

**SEC. 302. Determination.** Pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Act, it is hereby determined to be in furtherance

<sup>1</sup> No. 11041; 27 Fed. Reg. 7859.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1961, p. 400.

## A New Deal for Latin America

*Message from Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>*

of the purposes of the Act that functions authorized thereby may be performed without regard to the applicable laws specified in Sections 1 and 2 and with or without consideration as specified in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 10784 of October 1, 1958 (23 F.R. 7691) but, except as may be inappropriate, subject to limitations set forth in that order.

Sec. 303. *Security requirements.* (a) Pursuant to Section 22 of the Act, Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953 (18 F.R. 2489) is hereby established as the standards and procedures for the employment or assignment to duties of persons under the Act: *Provided*, That the Secretary of State may establish such additional standards and procedures with respect to the employment or assignment to duties of volunteers as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act.

(b) Nothing in Section 303(a) hereof or in Executive Order No. 10450 or in any other Executive order heretofore issued shall affect the exercise of the authority conferred upon the President by Section 5(i) of the Act.

Sec. 304. *Definitions.* (a) As used in this order the words "the Peace Corps Act" and the words "the Act" mean Title I of "An Act to provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower" (Public Law 87-293, approved September 22, 1961; 75 Stat. 612 et seq.).

(b) As used in this order, the words "volunteers," "function," "United States," and "United States Government agency" shall have the same meanings, respectively, as they have under the Act.

Sec. 305. *References to orders and acts.* Except as may for any reason be inappropriate:


(a) References in this order to (1) "the Peace Corps Act" or "the Act", (2) any other Act, or (3) any provision thereof shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(b) References in this order, or in any other Executive order, to this order or to any provision thereof shall be deemed to include references thereto, respectively, as amended from time to time.

(c) References in this order to any prior Executive order not superseded by this order shall be deemed to include references thereto as amended from time to time.

Sec. 306. *Superseded order.* Executive Order No. 10924 of March 1, 1961 (26 F.R. 1789) is hereby superseded.

Sec. 307. *Saving provisions.* Except to the extent that they may be inconsistent with this order, all determinations, authorizations, regulations, rulings, certificates, orders, directives, contracts, agreements, and other actions made, issued or entered into with respect to any function affected by this order and not revoked, superseded, or otherwise made inapplicable before the date of this order shall continue in full force and effect until amended, modified, or terminated by appropriate authority.



Thirty years after his election to the Presidency of the United States, most Latin Americans still remember Franklin Delano Roosevelt primarily as the author of the so-called good-neighbor policy: an effort to end long years of neglect, conflict, and abuse in the relations between our two regions and to establish a new basis for cooperation.

Franklin Roosevelt is less widely remembered in Latin America, however, for the great domestic reforms which he launched in our country—for his bold and hotly debated "New Deal," which sought to bring to the common people of the United States a greater sharing of opportunity, dignity, and justice. Yet I am convinced that Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal has special meaning for all of us as we face together the challenge of the Alliance for Progress.

Like the Alliance for Progress, the New Deal represented an effort both to raise our national income and—equally important—to close the gap between the privileged few and the underprivileged millions.

It sought to clear away the slums of our North American cities, to create millions of new homes, schools, and hospitals, and to build a solid basis for the small businessman and the farmer.

Above all, it sought to give to all the people of my country a sense of individual participation, a sense of belonging, and a sense of justice.

Among us North Americans the New Deal developed a new respect for the rights of labor and minority groups. It created a system of social security to help our parents' generation face old age with fewer concerns and privations.

It provided minimum wages so that no man's income could fall below a certain point. It brought new life to our American South through such pioneering successes as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Farm Security Administration.

And it developed programs of taxation based directly on each individual's ability to pay—pro-

<sup>1</sup> Distributed to delegates at the opening session of the Conference on Tensions in Development in the Western Hemisphere at Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on Aug. 6 (press release 488 dated Aug. 4). Mr. Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.



grams that drew from the wealth of the more developed parts of our country to raise the living standards of those areas which had lagged behind.

For all those who participated in it, the New Deal was an era of dynamism and vitality, a period of promise, hope, and brand new concepts for tens of millions of Americans.

Through Mr. Roosevelt's New Deal we learned by trial and error something of the unlimited capacity of a free people to produce a prosperous and well-balanced society. We also learned some important lessons: the dangers of conflict between economic groups; the limitations of governmental action in some fields, the necessity for it in others; and the importance of economic incentives to spur increased effort.

Much of what we learned in those difficult years can assist and inspire us in the present struggle in partnership to create a better life for the people of all of the Americas. We can also borrow from my own country's experience in 15 years of international programs of economic assistance and from the record of many developing nations on other continents.

As I look back over these years of effort at home and abroad, it strikes me that the greatest single mistake that we can make is to assume that economic progress by itself will insure a happy and stable society. For instance, if we examine the per capita incomes of the 20 Latin American countries and attempt to relate those figures to political stability, we will find virtually no relationship between the two: Some of those countries which have the highest per capita income are among the most uneasy and restless.

Here is persuasive evidence that while growth in itself is important, what happens to the people in the process of that growth is infinitely more important.

Another vitally important need is clearly to establish in our own minds what we are striving to accomplish and why we feel it is important. As part of its contribution to greater freedom and opportunity, the United States is prepared to draw heavily not only on our experience with the development of economies in many parts of the world but also on our own financial resources and on the energies and skills of our people.

Why are we doing this?

Our purpose in joining the Alliance for Progress is not to win the gratitude of Latin American

governments or to influence their votes or their attitudes. Experience has taught us that any government whose "loyalty" can be bought through economic grants is an ally not worth buying. True loyalty and friendship are not for sale.

Our objective is no more nor less than to assist in the building of independent nations in which the people are free to choose their own institutions and to make their own choices within the framework of their own cultures, religions, and history. Only through the creation of such societies can peace and freedom be guaranteed for all nations.

Now as the developing nations in Latin America and elsewhere shed the political habits and prejudices of the past and achieve this newer sense of independence, they are likely to take the first opportunity to demonstrate their thoroughgoing independence of those who have tried to assist them.

There is no reason why we should deplore this or be irritated by it. A strong show of independence is not only the right of every nation; it is often the essential means of expressing a newfound confidence and sense of direction. More than that, such independence is often the first essential step in the building of a solid foundation for interdependence: the partnership of free nations that can lead to an increasing willingness to work together toward common objectives of world peace and decency.

I have traveled widely throughout the United States in the past year. Everywhere I found my fellow citizens deeply interested and excited by the promise of the Alliance for Progress. I do not believe that this interest is a temporary one. If we boldly meet our respective responsibilities, the interest of all our fellow citizens will grow as the development process in Latin America becomes more evident.

However, there is one essential reservation that deserves the greatest emphasis: The willingness of the United States Government and its heavily taxed people to work toward this common future will depend in large measure on the willingness of the countries of Latin America to deal competently, fairly, and vigorously with their own problems.

Through free institutions the people of my country are taxing themselves not only to provide better schools, hospitals, universities, roads, and housing but also to create an adequate shield of

defense for all free nations; and behind that shield we are investing additional billions to help other nations create the basis for prosperity and individual justice.

When my fellow citizens see other governments seek to use our assistance as a substitute for funds that might so easily be raised from their own privileged people, they become frustrated and critical.

When they see great landlords cling to large estates on which hundreds and thousands of people work on a semifeudal basis, they are equally concerned.

When they look in vain for evidence of governmental efficiency, teamwork, streamlined administrative techniques, and effective use of national resources in the process of development, their doubts increase.

And when they see recipient governments allow their scarce foreign exchange to be used to buy luxuries for the few rather than necessities for the many, they question whether there is an adequate basis for the kind of cooperation which is so essential to what we are striving to achieve.

So let the Alliance for Progress become in fact a New Deal for all of the people of Latin America. Let us join together not only in the plans and the programs but also in the sacrifices, the hard work, the willingness to face harsh facts, to discard old methods, and to put aside ancient prejudices.

We are living in an era of revolution. The privileged nations of the world, like the privileged individuals in each society, are faced with a decisive choice: either to cast off their coats and become participants in this revolution for world betterment or to sit on the sidelines, anxious and afraid, as history passes them by.

As a privileged nation, the United States has made its decision. We are participants, prepared to do our share to make this world revolution for human betterment a success.

Are the privileged groups of Latin America prepared to join with us in this effort?

## Claims to Real Estate in Windward Islands To Be Registered

Press release 492 dated August 8

The Department of State announced on August 8 that the Administrator of Finance of the Netherlands Antilles has invited all persons considering themselves entitled to ownership of real estate on

the islands of St. Maarten (Netherlands Division), St. Eustatius, or Saba to make their claim known by the completion and presentation of appropriate forms. The necessary forms may be obtained at all land registry offices in the Netherlands Antilles or will be forwarded, without cost, by the Lieutenant Governor of the Windward Islands, St. Maarten. In order for effect to be given to the rights of all persons in the registration of all real estate on the above-named islands, the Administrator has stated that filing on or before December 31, 1962, would be of major importance to those entitled.

The Department of State is making this announcement at the request of the Netherlands Antilles Government. It is understood that United States citizens and residents, whose names and addresses are unknown, may have interests of the type involved in the registration.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

Letters addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the West Irian situation. S/5123, May 21, 1962, 4 pp. S/5126, May 24, 1962, 1 p.; S/5128, May 25, 1962, 4 pp.; S/5135, June 25, 1962, 1 p.  
Letter dated January 8, 1962, from the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitting a resolution adopted on January 4 by the OAS Council, together with other documents concerning the Dominican Republic. S/5130. May 29, 1962. 153 pp.

### General Assembly

International Law Commission. Study on juridical regime of historic waters, including historic bays A/CN.4/143. March 9, 1962. 74 pp.  
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on the resettlement of refugees A/AC.96/154. March 13, 1962. 28 pp.  
International Law Commission. Working paper on future work in the field of the codification and progressive development of international law. A/CN.4/145. March 22, 1962. 48 pp.  
International Law Commission. First report on the law of treaties and addendum. A/CN.4/144 and Add. 1 March 26-May 2, 1962. 171 pp.  
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on the mental health of refugees II the special-case category in Austria, Germany, Greece Italy, and Turkey. A/AC.96/156. March 29, 1962 10 pp.

## America's Interest in African Education

by J. Wayne Fredericks

It is now a little more than a year since UNESCO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa sponsored the Conference on African States on the Development of Education in Africa.<sup>1</sup> That Conference, held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, closed on the premise that major and massive efforts in education would be required by all concerned—African states, donor countries, and international organizations—if progress and accomplishment were to match desire and need. It is timely, therefore, to take stock of where we are and to what extent the United States has attempted to fulfill both the spirit and the expectations of the Addis Ababa Conference.

Central to the core of specific decisions taken at that historic gathering was the concept that educational planning must be made a part of total economic progress; that the development of human resources is an essential element in economic and social growth; and that hard priorities must be established and stern criteria applied before substantial money grants and loans would be made to African states by international programs, donor states, and private foundations.

Prior to the Addis Ababa Conference a beginning had been made in Africa along several of these fronts. Some 17 African states had initiated or were in the process of preparing total economic and social development plans; 4 states had started educational planning projects within the framework of total economic planning; and 4 more had plans in varying degrees of preparation. However, the Addis Ababa Conference emphasized the importance of human resource development and focused attention of other countries on the need for coordinating educational and economic

planning. The extent of these preconference activities also revealed that African states themselves were not unwilling to take difficult but necessary first steps in developing a sound approach to the solution of their educational and economic problems. These same activities also provided Conference deliberations with a firm foundation from which to move on to the consideration of a wider complex of educational concerns.

### Response in U.S. to African Educational Needs

In the United States public and private responses to African educational requirements prior to the Addis Ababa Conference had not been insensitive to this need for educational planning. But the Conference encouraged both public and private organizations to increase their attention to central planning and to explore ways and means to integrate a wide variety of educational interests into a more coherent national effort.

During the 15 months since the Addis Ababa Conference, the major U.S. agency for administering foreign aid—the Agency for International Development—has been completely reorganized. This has involved restudying technical assistance, establishing new priorities, and making adjustments in foreign aid programs. This reorganization has strengthened the U.S. Government's con-

• *Mr. Fredericks is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. This article is based upon remarks he made on March 29, 1962, before a Conference of African Ministers of Education at UNESCO House, Paris.*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of June 12, 1961, p. 936.

cern with and greater support of developmental planning, yet in no way has it interrupted programs of assistance which have been channeling into Africa in recent years. Furthermore, this reorganization has not disrupted U.S. attention to the educational problems of African countries.

#### **Areas of Concern at Addis Ababa Conference**

Africa's educational problems were divided into nine major areas of immediate concern by the delegates to the Addis Ababa Conference:

1. Financial or budget needs;
2. Material and building requirements;
3. Teacher shortages;
4. Curriculum development;
5. Acceleration of education for girls and women;
6. Expansion of higher educational facilities;
7. Adult education;
8. Reform of teaching materials; and
9. Planning.

Priority status was assigned to three specific needs—the need to remove the bottlenecks at secondary school levels; the need to study, re-direct, and expand school curriculums, particularly in the fields of technical and agricultural education; and the need for trained teachers at all levels.

In the ensuing months major U.S. efforts have been directed principally toward redeploying previously programed resources to alleviate these priority problems while devoting new resources to all nine areas of concern. The success of these efforts is reflected in the new program levels of official U.S. Government foreign aid to educational projects in Africa and in the movement of American teachers, either under AID or Peace Corps programs, to areas where teacher shortages are particularly acute.

Perhaps this is best illustrated by a few facts and figures. In the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 1961, a total of \$26,129,000 was allocated to African education under U.S. foreign aid programs. For the year ending June 30, 1962, the total was raised to \$46,515,000—virtually double that of the previous year. These figures include assistance to programs administered by African ministries of education and do not include aid to education programs in such fields as agriculture, public administration, and labor, which are conducted under other ministries. For 1963 President

Kennedy has recommended to the Congress a substantial foreign aid increase over the 1962 amount; legislative action on America's total aid budget for 1963 has not yet been completed.

To help ease the serious bottleneck in secondary school education, the United States in fiscal 1962 allocated more than \$6.7 million in 10 countries for secondary school and teacher-training projects, for the construction of new classroom facilities, and for the building of demonstration schools for technical and vocational education, teacher supply to secondary schools, and training of secondary school teachers. An additional \$8 million was provided for the construction, equipping, and staffing of urban and rural teacher-training institutions in 12 countries.

#### **Teacher Supply Programs**

American teacher supply programs were stepped up to help meet the serious shortage of qualified teachers. Actually the United States had begun work on this problem before the Addis Ababa Conference with a project that placed 150 American teachers in Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar during 1961. This year the Agency for International Development provided financial assistance for a second group of 120 teachers to raise the total of American teachers in East Africa to some 270.

The second and newest teacher supply program is administered by the Peace Corps, which began recruitment efforts for Africa almost immediately after Peace Corps legislation was signed by President Kennedy last year.<sup>2</sup> Since September of 1961 about 200 Peace Corps volunteer teachers have begun work in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. By September 1962 it is expected that more than 1,000 Peace Corps volunteers will be teaching in 10 countries of Africa. In this program the Peace Corps recruits, trains, and transports volunteers, who work on a minimum living allowance and who receive a nominal fee of \$75 per month which will be paid to them upon completion of their 2-year assignments. The living allowance is provided either by the Peace Corps or, in some cases by the host country. As requests for Peace Corps services continue, it can be expected that increasing numbers will be sent to Africa to meet the expanding need for their services.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 603.

The third and oldest source of American secondary school teachers in Africa is the educational exchange program, which, through its two-way flow of teachers, not only contributes teaching personnel so badly needed in African schools but serves as a medium by which African teachers can enjoy an opportunity to upgrade their training and experience through study and observation visits to American school systems. This program now brings 25-30 African teachers, inspectors, and educational officials to the United States each year. Since 1960, when only a handful of Americans went to Africa to teach under U.S. Government auspices, the total of American exchange teachers has steadily grown. In 1960 it numbered 11; in 1961 it had grown to 37; and this year it increased to 45.

### Secondary School and Curriculum Aid

Meanwhile, American private agencies have been active in the secondary school field, principally through Ford Foundation projects designed to improve science and mathematics teaching and Carnegie Corporation assistance in the field of advanced teacher-training programs. A number of other private organizations also are making valuable contributions.

Today I think it is safe to say that combined American private and governmental projects designed to help relieve the bottleneck in African secondary school education amounts to a sum well in excess of \$20 million.

The Addis Ababa Conference recommended very strongly that "African educational authorities should revise and reform the content of education in the areas of curricula, textbooks, and methods to take account of African environment, child development, cultural heritage and the demands of technological progress and economic development." Since that time AID has assisted some dozen countries in adapting conventional educational curriculums to meet changing technical and vocational education. Approximately \$3 million has been allocated for agricultural training and \$5 million for surveys and development of educational facilities and resources connected with curriculum change, course content, and classroom methods.

In addition to suggesting changes in subject matter areas, the Addis Ababa Conference also stressed that the broad outline of educational content "shall include a language for everyday com-

munication" and "a language of wide currency." As early as the late 1950's the U.S. Government had begun to provide assistance to governments and foreign educational institutions interested in adding English to school curriculums or in improving facilities for the teaching of English as a second language. Today a variety of English-language training programs are being carried out in 27 African countries. Besides training English-language teachers and developing English-language curriculums and texts for school systems, these programs include classes for adults and the placement of American teachers of English in African schools and colleges.

### Varieties of Higher Education Assistance

American assistance in helping to develop African higher education varies and takes the form of institution-building programs, various types of scholarship grants, and help in the training of faculty staff. In addition, private foundation activity in this field plays a significant role in American support to the growth of institutions of higher learning in Africa.

Two forms of U.S. Government-supported contracts between American universities and educational institutions in Africa have been developed in recent years. The AID-sponsored system is related to a specific project in a country—in agriculture or vocational education, for instance—in which the contract activity usually involves, following an agreement signed by both governments, a university-to-university relationship. There are 25 such contracts in 11 countries costing approximately \$16 million, with 10 more in the process of development.

In another type of program AID allocated approximately \$3.5 million in 1962 toward the construction and reorganization of educational institutions of higher learning in Africa. Of particular interest is a regional project to assist British and African efforts to establish the new University College of East Africa at Kampala, Uganda, and support of the building of the new University of Nigeria at Nsukka.

In the area of scholarship programs designed to increase the pool of trained specialists in all fields, AID Participant-Academic Training Programs supported 238 grants for the academic year 1961-62 and provided funds for 300 undergraduate students to study in the United States under the ASPAU (African Scholarship Program of

American Universities) program. Ultimately this cooperative program between African and U.S. Governments on the one hand and American universities on the other will support a total of 540 students.

Shortly after the Addis Ababa Conference the Department of State, in close cooperation with private American agencies, took additional scholarship action of an emergency nature by granting \$100,000 to assist privately sponsored African students already studying in the United States whose academic progress was sufficiently promising and whose needs were urgent enough to warrant special financial help in the forthcoming academic year. The Department, supplemented by AID, also made funds available for financial assistance to African students who were completing the 1961-62 school year but had neither adequate funds nor prospects for summer employment. These funds were also used to establish an academic summer program to constructively occupy these students. A total of 258 students from 14 African countries were thus aided. An additional \$100,000 was granted to provide financial aid for well-qualified East African students who had been offered scholarships by American universities but who needed partial financial help if they were to take advantage of the opportunity.

The American private sector also has been active in assisting the growth of higher education in Africa, principally in English-speaking countries. Aside from missionary activities, the three main agencies for this assistance are the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation.

The Ford Foundation is by far the most active of the American foundations in terms of the range of its interests and the financial resources it makes available for their support. In the first 5 months of 1962 the Ford Foundation put more than \$10.8 million into projects for African education and vocational training, industrial and business development, public administration, economic and social research, and special projects. Its most recent and largest individual grant has been \$840,000 to the Tanganyika University College to enable it to make more rapid and effective progress with its major task of building construction. This was done in order that the college may open by 1964 and be a more effective partner in the University College of East Africa.

The Rockefeller Foundation, which in recent months has contributed more than \$2 million to African education, is becoming increasingly interested in the specific problem of more effective development of African universities. Among its grants have been sums of \$500,000 for further development of veterinary medicine in East Africa, \$300,000 for developing a new agricultural college at Morogoro, Tanganyika, and \$800,000 for cereal crop improvements in northern Nigeria.

The Carnegie Corporation maintains a very active interest in the development of African educational institutions and has made grants totaling approximately \$750,000 in the past 20 months. In general the Carnegie Corporation does not use funds for large undertakings, such as building construction. Rather it seeks—and with considerable success—to facilitate the movement of people to support significant studies that clarify important issues, and to promote conferences within the United States and between Americans and persons from abroad concerned with African educational development.

The Carnegie Corporation is financing, at a cost of approximately \$510,000, a study of the staffing of institutions of higher learning and the development of a plan for coordinating external aid to these institutions. This is being done in conjunction with UNESCO's plan to hold a Conference on Problems of Higher Education in Africa, which is scheduled to take place later this year in Tananarive. This conference will not only devote itself to problems of staffing and financing higher education, but it will give considerable time to the need for curriculum reform and modification so that African universities will become better equipped for larger responsibilities in the development of the countries and regions they serve. The Tananarive Conference, therefore, will focus on the need to institute or expand curriculums in four major areas—economic development, public administration, natural resources, and African studies.

#### **Adult Education Programs**

Although U.S. assistance to African education has concentrated on priority needs at secondary, vocational, and agricultural levels, some indirect American aid has been given to assist adult education in Africa. Of most significance in this area are the book programs and operations of the

J.S. Information Agency, which is making a substantial contribution. At the present time USIA operates a total of 49 information centers and 2 reading rooms in 33 African countries. The book collections of these 49 centers contain roughly 93,000 books in English and 27,000 American titles in French and Arabic translations. More than 200 magazines and newspapers are received by the centers, and collections of pamphlets, government publications, slides, and records are maintained for the use of the public. Recently, to increase the number of American books in French translation, a new AID program has been initiated in Rabat for the production of low-cost books and French versions of appropriate technical and training films for distribution in Africa.

A further adult education recommendation at Addis Ababa suggested that "the press be encouraged to fulfill its potentialities as an instrument of adult education and literacy" and that governments take all possible steps to improve and expand their educational radio services and to introduce, when and where it becomes appropriate, educational television services for adults." Since this decision, almost \$1 million has been provided under the AID program for the improvement of communication skills and advanced media facilities.

Moreover, through the Department of State's exchange program, a number of African editors and radio experts have visited the United States either as leaders or as specialists to participate in programs which combine observation studies and working experiences.

#### **Education of Women**

Three recent U.S. programs in the field of women's education reveal American response to his African need. The first is the AID-supported project for the construction and administration of the Uganda Girls School. The second program involves the AID-sponsored seminars which took place this year at Nairobi, Kenya (for East Africa), and Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria (for West Africa). From both groups, numbering more than 80 women, 17 were chosen to come to the United States for 3 months of experience in their fields of interest and for the purpose of observing American women's groups in a variety of voluntary and professional activities. The third program is a Department of State leadership-

training pilot program for African women designed to assist women leaders to work together in a common cause. This project includes a short course of study at Columbia University followed by practical and home-stay experiences with American women who are members of groups that work in both urban and rural situations.

Undergirding the large number of specific educational projects of both the American private and public sectors are the Department's educational and cultural exchange programs, several of which have been mentioned. The program as a whole reveals a continuous trend upward in terms of the number of grantees it has assisted. During the 11-year period from 1949 to 1960, a total of 671 persons—both Africans and Americans—received grants of one sort or another. In 1961, however, the total for the single 12-month period almost equaled this 11-year number, with 562 persons moving between Africa and the United States. In 1962 the total will reach 1,008 in all categories—professors, teachers, students, leaders, and specialists—as the exchange program plays its role in the thrust forward which has characterized education in Africa during the past decade.

#### **Education—Key to Progress**

In conclusion I would like to make four summary observations:

First, U.S. educational assistance and exchange programs are under continuous review and are being redesigned to meet the most significant recommendations of the Addis Ababa Conference.

Second, the United States welcomes the opportunity to participate in the work being carried out in the field of African education.

Third, the United States believes that the massive resources required to solve the problems of African education can be mobilized only through a variety of channels—international, multilateral, bilateral, and private. Fundamental to this mobilization is the importance of continuing efforts to provide basic educational data, clearly summarized and maintained in a regular and up-to-date fashion.

Fourth, the United States repeats its commitment made at Addis Ababa to assist African states promptly in taking the necessary first steps in the development of sound and comprehensive educational plans geared to overall economic and social development planning.

As a final word, I would like to close with a thought expressed by President Kennedy during a speech he made in 1959 more than a year and a half before he assumed the Presidency: "Africans want education—for education is in their eyes the backbone to gaining and maintaining the political institutions they want. Education is the means to personal and national prestige. Education is, in truth, the only key to genuine African independence and progress."

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Burma, August 10, 1962; Cambodia, July 31, 1962; Portugal, August 3, 1962.

##### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Peru, July 25, 1962.

##### Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendix, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959 (TIAS 4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notification of approval:* Korea, June 15, 1962.

##### Trade

Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Austria, July 19, 1962.

Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Austria, July 19, 1962.

#### BILATERAL

##### Germany

Amendment to the agreement of July 3, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3877 and 4314), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 5, 1962.

*Entered into force:* August 7, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Office of Security Placed Under Direction of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Department of State announced on August 8 (press release 493) that, effective that day, the Office of Security had been separated from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. John Francis Reilly was designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security.

The Office of Security is responsible for the physical, technical, procedural, and personnel security programs of the Department and its overseas posts. In addition, it is charged with the protection of visiting dignitaries.

Certain security functions inseparably associated with visa, passport, munitions control, and refugee matters will continue to be administered by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

### Designations

John Francis Reilly as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, effective August 8. (For biographic details see Department of State press release 493 dated August 8.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4825. pp. 15¢.

Agreement with China—Signed at Taipei July 21, 1961. Entered into force July 21, 1961. With exchanges of notes.

Reciprocal Legal Assistance in Penal Matters and Information From Penal Register. TIAS 4826. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn November 7 and December 28, 1960, and January 3, 1961. Entered into force January 3, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4827. 3 pp.

Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of April 7, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik July 6 and 18, 1961. Entered into force July 18, 1961.



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No.	Date	Subject
*485	8/6	Ball: "America in a World of Change."
487	8/6	Ball: "The Meaning of the Trade Expansion Act" (revised text).
490	8/6	Rusk: communications satellite legislation.
*491	8/6	U.S. participation in international conferences.
492	8/8	Real estate claims in Netherlands Antilles.
493	8/8	Office of Security transferred (rewrite).

\* Not printed.



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## U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN

### REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961

the

Department

of

State

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to ". . . matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which ". . . will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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# Winning a Worldwide Victory for Freedom

*Address by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I want to speak to you very directly and very imply about some fundamental issues of our foreign policy. If I do not add all the adjectives and he adverbs which some of you might wish to add, bear in mind that, when we in the United States speak out, there are other audiences overseas, around the world, who are listening in beyond those here at home. So if I use measured tones, it is because I want to speak directly and without elaboration on some of the elementary matters before us.

All of us, of course, are deeply concerned about our country's future; but there is something special about that concern among men and women who have worn the uniform of their country in times of trial. For us, words like "war" and "peace" have a special meaning. We know, as veterans, that foreign policy reaches into every home and into every community. We know the price when statecraft fails. We know why it is important to seek peaceful solutions wherever possible, consistent with basic principle and vital interest.

I know I don't need to prove to you that we live in a world of turmoil and change. I know I don't need to emphasize to you that we live in a time of danger and that the primary cause of this danger is the existence of powerful forces which are determined to destroy our free way of life.

The global struggle for freedom and against Communist imperialism is our main business in the State Department. My colleagues and I give

intensive attention, day by day, to Communist strategy and tactics.

No one has to convince us that when Khrushchev said communism will bury us he was proclaiming not just an alleged historical inevitability but an objective toward which Communists work relentlessly by all the means they deem effective. No one has to convince us that "peaceful coexistence" means to them a continuing attempt to spread their system over the earth by all means short of the great war which would be self-defeating. No one has to convince us that the contest between Communist imperialism and freedom is for keeps.

## **Achieving a Peaceful World Community**

We have a simple but transcendent goal. It has been stated many times and in many ways. It is, in President Kennedy's words, "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."<sup>2</sup>

This goal of ours—and of most of the nations of the world—and the Communist goal are incompatible. This global struggle will continue until freedom prevails. It goes without saying that our purpose is to win.

One hears now and then that we have a "no win" purpose or policy. That is simply not so. Of course we intend to win. And we are going to win.

And who makes up the "we"? Not only 185 million Americans, but most of the rest of the people of the world. And what is the worldwide

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention at Minneapolis, Minn., on Aug. 13 (press release 494; as delivered text).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

victory we work for? Not the victory of one nation over another or of one people over another, but a worldwide victory for freedom.

To win this worldwide victory we must achieve:

A world free of aggression—aggression by whatever means.

A world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage.

A world which yields continuing progress in economic and social justice for all peoples.

A world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and moves progressively toward a rule of law which lays down and enforces standards of conduct in relations between nations.

A world in which, in the great tradition shared by peoples in every continent, governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed."

A world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law, practice, and custom—in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure.

Our hope and purpose is to win without a great war and the damage which the weapons of today would inflict upon the human race. For we will defend our vital interests and those of the free world by whatever means may be necessary, but a military climax to this struggle is to be prevented if possible.

#### **Primary Purpose of U.S. Military Strength**

The primary purpose of our military forces is to make resort to force by our adversaries unprofitable and dangerous. Our forces have been greatly strengthened in the last 18 months. Our nuclear deterrent has been amplified, and a rising proportion of it is relatively invulnerable to attack. We have the capacity to inflict massive destruction upon any nation that would be so irrational as to attack us or our allies.

Our conventional forces, too, have been strengthened. They are being modernized and made more mobile—not as a substitute for our nuclear capacity but to cope with more limited requirements.

In addition we have been improving our capacity to deal, and assist our allies in dealing,

with guerrilla warfare, a form of aggression which the Communists, in their inverted jargon call "wars of national liberation." This is the form of the present aggression against South Viet-Nam. And it will not be allowed to succeed.

Thus, as my colleagues in the State Department and I go about our business, we have at our backs a formidable array of military strength under the command of a resolute President. This strength, with that of our many allies, is capable of defending the vital interests of the free world. When President Kennedy says that we and our allies have vital interests in West Berlin—vital interests which all free peoples share with the brave inhabitants of that city—"vital interests" means just that: interests to be protected as a matter of elementary safety for free men. We are prepared to discuss ways and means for reducing tensions in Central Europe and to search for more permanent solutions to those problems but we will not be forced, harassed, or squeezed out of West Berlin. We are determined to see that West Berlin thrives in freedom. And we have other vital interests in common with the free peoples of Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Far East, and elsewhere, which we are also resolved to maintain.

#### **Search for Areas of Potential Agreements**

At the same time, despite bitter and far-reaching differences, we seek continually areas of common or overlapping interest—areas of potential concrete agreements. In June 1961, at Vienna Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy agreed that both favored an independent and neutral Laos.<sup>3</sup> Last month at Geneva an agreement was signed by 14 nations providing for the independence and neutrality of Laos.<sup>4</sup> If the agreement is faithfully executed, all foreign troops will leave Laos and the Laotians will be left alone to control their own affairs—and Laos will cease to be an avenue of supply and reinforcement for the Communist aggression against South Viet-Nam. I underline the need that the agreement be faithfully executed. We on our side shall do every-

<sup>3</sup> For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 26, 1961, p. 399.

<sup>4</sup> For texts of a declaration and protocol, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

ing possible to see that it is. We believe the government of Laos will do its best, and we expect all others to do the same.

There is another matter in which, objectively examined, all the great powers have a genuine common interest. I refer to the halting of the upward spiral of the arms race. Let us be clear about what this means and what it does not mean. We have a security interest in turning the arms race downward; otherwise the path ahead means increasingly vast diversions of resources away from the unfinished business of mankind as well as increasing dangers for all concerned as weapons systems tax or exceed the capacities of the mind of man. But disarmament measures cannot be unilateral; surely the free world learned that lesson from the demobilization after World War I. Disarmament must be achieved by steps consistent with the security of all concerned and with fully adequate assurance that agreements are faithfully carried out. In today's world such agreements cannot rest upon blind faith; but arrangements can be worked out under which confidence can rest upon knowledge and not mere trust. In limited fields, such as nuclear testing, approved techniques and instrumentation may permit somewhat more efficient and less costly arrangements. But the need for verification remains. We see no way in which the abolition of all nuclear testing can be achieved unless the Soviet Union is ready to abandon its obsession with secrecy. And the rest of the world cannot disarm without knowing what arms are being concealed in those vast and closely policed areas in the very heart of the Eurasian landmass. We hope that self-interest and the yearning of the Soviet peoples for a better life will cause the Soviet Government to reconsider and sit down with the rest of us to work out practical steps which will begin to reduce the burdens and dangers.

#### **Progress Toward Our Goal**

Now how are we getting along in this great struggle for freedom? A Secretary of State, watching the daily flow of cables from a world in rapid and far-reaching change, cannot afford to be an easy optimist. But I believe that a measured appraisal leads to the conclusion that the historical forces of freedom are writing fresh chapters of achievement and confidence.

With regard to the industrially advanced countries of the free world, a new industrial revolution has swept over the free countries of Europe in this postwar period. Everywhere there are new factories, new jobs, new buildings, growth and prosperity. Strong new economic and political links have been forged, and still others are now taking shape.

The notion that we in America somehow resent or regret this new vitality and confidence in Europe is plain nonsense. This new era has been an objective of our own hopes and policy; it is, among other things, the rich harvest of the massive efforts which the Europeans and we made together through the Marshall Plan. We applaud the result thus far and warmly support the prospects for an even stronger and more unified Europe.

For let us not underestimate the importance of these developments to the worldwide struggle for freedom. A vigorous Atlantic partnership will mean closer political consultation to build the strength and unity of the free world as a whole. It will mean an ability to share more broadly the larger economic responsibilities for development beyond the Atlantic community. Already Europe is approaching the magnitude of effort of the United States in responding to the urgent needs of the developing countries.

And under the strenuous conditions of a still unsettled world, this partnership can provide the military strength, both conventional and nuclear, necessary to defend the peace and to sustain a steadily growing rule of law. In a period of lively discussion within the NATO alliance about next chapters in the organization of our common defense, it is inevitable that there would be speculation which sometimes misses the point. NATO is not a limited liability company. For us, and for our allies, the defense of NATO requires whatever means are necessary. We have taken important steps, through the sharing of information, the frank discussion of strategic problems, and consultation on multilateral NATO nuclear forces, to emphasize that we consider that the safety of NATO as a whole is critical to our own security. If there is a ferment of discussion within the alliance, this has nothing to do with the underlying commitments to which we all pledged ourselves when NATO was born. "What is past is

prologue." What is present is the takeoff point of the future. The ferment comes out of the creative discussion of next steps, of which the Common Market and those negotiations are only the most immediate.

Beyond the Atlantic community are others joining in similar efforts—nations such as Japan and Australia, whose contributions are large and growing.

The prospect among all these nations is for vigorous economic growth and the steady expansion of trade. Let me point out that according to Marxist-Leninist dogma this could not occur. According to that fanciful doctrine, the industrialized nations should be ripped by ever deepening economic crises and by fighting among themselves. Instead, they are working together in ever closer cooperation and are enjoying levels of well-being undreamed of a generation ago.

#### Progress Within the Underdeveloped World

Equally dramatic changes are taking place in that vast portion of the non-Communist world that is less advanced industrially. Never before in history have so many new, independent states been born in so short a period of time. And all of them, as well as the older but still underdeveloped nations, are determined to modernize their societies and improve the standards of living of their people.

One by one, new nations and their leaders are experiencing the sobering influence of responsibility. They are learning, sometimes painfully, that independence is by itself no panacea for their ills: Independence alone does not feed hungry mouths nor turn the wheels of industry; nor does it alone find markets for excess production or automatically build schoolhouses or homes or communications.

But some have managed the transition from revolutionary struggle to peaceful construction with great skill and statesmanship. Within the last few years a number of underdeveloped countries have made solid economic and social advances. And many others have made promising starts.

Some are still floundering. Some are devoting time and energy and resources to questionable adventures. But, on the whole, there is progress

within the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world. All the free nations have a vital interest in assisting this progress.

#### New Partnerships Developing in Free World

As for us, we have rejoiced in the arrival of the peoples of Asia and Africa to the "separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature's God entitle them." This is well understood in the new nations. Most of their leaders are familiar with our history and the great and enduring ideas expressed in our Declaration of Independence.

Nearly all of them also appreciate our readiness to assist them and understand well that our on-purpose is to help them maintain their independence and improve the well-being of their people. And nearly all understand that the United States stands not for a sterile *status quo* but for vigorous progress.

As President Kennedy said in Venezuela last December:<sup>6</sup>

We do not merely talk of slogans, of democracy and freedom; it is our function here in this hemisphere in 1961 to make it possible for all the people not only to be free but to have a home and educate their children and have a job for themselves and in security. And that what we are determined to do.

President Kennedy spoke of this hemisphere but the goal he set applies to other regions as well.

New ties are being created almost daily between us and the new states of Asia and Africa. In Latin America the Alliance for Progress has breathed new life and vigor into an old and valued relationship. We must expect change to create tension; but we and our Latin American partners must insure that change and tension mean movement toward a free society.

We are not interested in maintaining a dole or giveaway program. We are pledged to help most those who do most to help themselves bridge the wide gap between what they have and what they need to provide their people with a decent life.

For the most part, the transformation of the old empires into independent states has proceeded in an orderly manner. In some places resentments still linger from the old colonial era. These the Communists try to inflame. But on the new and

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 89.



better basis of political and social equality, new partnerships are developing between the industrially advanced free nations and the underdeveloped areas.

#### **Difficulties in Communist Bloc**

There are other reasons for quiet confidence, and these come out of the Communist world itself. The sterility of their original doctrine has long been exposed. Marxism first offered a fictitious debate between a communism rejected by its own disciples and a capitalism which has long since disappeared if it ever existed at all. And in recent decades the Communists themselves have, in a curious left-handed way, recognized the overwhelming strength of the great tradition of freedom throughout the world. They have done this by their insistent efforts to capture the great words of that tradition and turn them to their own ends.

They have spoken of "peace" to conceal the use of force; they have spoken of "liberation" to conceal an effort to capture; they speak of "people's democracy" to avoid the free consultation of the people themselves. Conversely, the people of Germany who want self-determination are "ranchists." Free peoples determined to defend themselves are "militarists." And, oddly enough, those the Communists like most to call "imperialists" or "colonialists" are exactly those who have ushered into the United Nations row upon row of independent nations since World War II.

This tactic is increasingly transparent all over the world. So too is the emptiness of such phrases as "classless society," "workers paradise," and "great leap forward."

There is no question but that the Soviet Union has achieved some notable successes in certain directions, for example, in space science and technology, in mass education, in public health, and in selected sectors of industry. But it is interesting to note that their successes have come where they have permitted science and technology to move forward without doctrinal blinders and where substantial freedom of action is given to those responsible for the particular enterprise. In other sectors, for example in agriculture, there are serious difficulties throughout the bloc from East Germany to North Viet-Nam. Nature itself has imposed certain limitations, but this cannot be the answer throughout so vast an area. Limitations

are imposed by organization, by official stultification of scientific freedom, and by failure to mobilize the most productive element in the history of agriculture, namely, the incentive and individual initiative of the farmer himself. The desperate situation in mainland China cannot advertise successfully the promised paradise of communism.

Other adjustments are having to be made within their bloc because of powerful ideas which long preceded the Communist revolution. A sense of national pride and desire for national independence, yearnings for more freedom for the individual himself, and the desire for higher standards of living and security for family and home have forced certain changes in the monolithic structure of the authoritarian system. And these changes, in turn, have produced sharp differences within the bloc itself—differences of doctrine, of organization, tactics, and priorities.

Successful societies do not have to build walls and string barbed wire against their own people. The Berlin wall, erected a year ago today, is a monument to failure—the failure of a "competitive coexistence" that dared not compete.

#### **The Winds of Freedom**

No quick or easy victory for freedom can be promised. But those who are committed to freedom have less to worry about than those who would reverse this centuries-old history of man. As I have said on another occasion:

"It is not for us to fear the great winds of change that are blowing today. They are the winds we have long known and sailed with, the winds which have carried man on his unending journey, the winds of freedom.

"... America at her best is admired and trusted; and America is at her best when she is true to the commitments we made to ourselves and to history in the Declaration of Independence. These are the ideas and ideals which give us allies, spoken or silent, among men and women in every corner of the earth. They are part of the unfinished business which is a part of our story. This is the basis of our confidence; this is the scope of our task.

"The revolution of freedom, which we have so proudly nurtured and fought for in the past and to which we pledge today, as in 1776, 'our Lives,

our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,' is the true, enduring revolution, because it springs from the deepest, most persistent aspirations of men. History says this revolution will not fail."

## Secretary Rusk Hopes for Greater Cooperation in Space Field

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by Erik de Mauny, Washington correspondent of the British Broadcasting Corporation, on August 15, which was transmitted via Telstar, the U.S. communications satellite, and broadcast over BBC television facilities on that day.*

Press release 498 dated August 15

*Mr. de Mauny:* Mr. Rusk, is the United States getting value for money with its own space efforts in terms of national prestige?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I don't think the value of the space effort is to be measured just in terms of prestige, although it is clear that governments and peoples all over the earth hope very much that we will go ahead with our space effort and that we will be highly successful with it. Incidentally we were very pleased that the two Soviet astronauts [Maj. Andrian G. Nikolayev and Lt. Col. Pavel R. Popovich] came back safely this morning.

But, in the practical sense, the results of research in the space program—in meteorology, in metallurgy, systems controls, computers—all that research will be fed back into the economies of the world and will make a very large difference. A great part of the space effort will, in fact, pay for itself through the byproducts of the space work itself.

*Q.* Now how does this Russian success affect your job as Secretary of State? Do you think it makes it easier or more difficult to talk to the Russians about a whole range of a whole lot of other problems?

*A.* Well, I don't think it makes very much difference. Certainly, we have never found that any performance on our side in this field seems to have made much difference to the Russians. When you are talking about questions—like Berlin, or disarmament, or these great issues that affect war

and peace and affect the basic security of nations—I don't think demonstrations of this sort enter into the relationships very much. The underlying issues are too fundamental and far-reaching to be determined one way or another by matters of this sort. So I would say it makes very little difference.

We do hope that ways will be open for more cooperation in the space field, and I think this may be, perhaps, the next step.

## U.S. Resumes Diplomatic Relations With Government of Peru

### Department Statement

Press release 506 dated August 17

The Department of State has cabled our Chargé d'Affaires in Lima, Mr. Douglas Henderson, directing him to acknowledge the communication of July 18 from Foreign Minister [Luis Edgardo Llosa of the Government of the Military Junta] By means of this acknowledgment we are resuming relations with the Peruvian Government, and thus recognizing the junta as the provisional Government of Peru. This action was taken after consultation with other hemisphere governments in the light of the following facts:

The United States Government has ascertained that the junta is in effective control of the government and the country, and that it has pledged itself to fulfill Peru's international obligations.

In considering this action, and our economic assistance program within the framework of the Charter of Punta del Este, the United States Government notes that the junta has decreed the restoration of constitutional guarantees of civil liberties in Peru. It has set the date June 9, 1963, for the holding of free elections. Furthermore, it has guaranteed that, under the Constitution, all political parties will be accorded full electoral rights and that the results of the elections, whatever they may be, will be respected and defended by the junta and the Armed Forces which it represents. By announcing that on July 28, 1963, power will be turned over to an elected President and Congress, the junta has affirmed the provisional nature of its position.

We note that the Organization of American States has been assured by the junta that it will

maintain an open-door policy toward all those desiring to witness the electoral process at close hand and that, in accordance with that policy, the junta is considering inviting in due course appropriate organizations and persons of stature and responsibility in the Americas. The United States Government welcomes this open-door policy which will permit international representatives of stature and responsibility to be present in Peru to observe the carrying out of the electoral process in accordance with the announced terms and conditions.

We attach particular significance not only to the guarantee to respect the results of free elections and the restoration of constitutionally assured civil liberties but also to the fact that the junta government has formally and publicly affirmed its commitment to this program at the August 8 meeting of the OAS Council, thereby demonstrating its belief in the value of the inter-American system. Thus the interim government has taken important steps on the road back to constitutional government in Peru.

In the light of these solemn commitments and since a recognized government succeeds to the agreements entered into by prior governments, performance under previously signed loan, grant, and other agreements of our economic assistance programs will, generally speaking) be resumed with the resumption of diplomatic relations. The same will apply to the Peace Corps program.

## **President Kennedy Salutes Indonesia on 17th Anniversary of Independence**

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to President Sukarno of Indonesia.*

White House press release dated August 17

August 16, 1962

On this anniversary of the independence of Indonesia, it is a particular pleasure to send to your people and to you warmest congratulations from the people and government of the United

States. This August 17th comes at the conclusion of an historic negotiation for the peaceful future of West Irian.<sup>1</sup> The United States joins in the hope that this agreement will lead forward to increasing satisfactory relations among all who have been concerned with it. Meanwhile we join with you in a salute to your 17th anniversary.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## **United States Welcomes Resolution of West New Guinea Dispute**

*Following is a Department statement read to news correspondents by Joseph W. Reap, Deputy Director, Office of News, on August 16, the day after representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands had signed an agreement<sup>2</sup> at U.N. Headquarters in New York for the settlement of the West New Guinea problem.*

The resolution of the West New Guinea dispute, through peaceful negotiations, is a source of great satisfaction to us all. The conclusion of the agreement is a tribute to the skill, patience, and good will of the Dutch and Indonesian negotiators, of Acting Secretary-General U Thant, and of Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker, who served as the Secretary-General's moderator in this undertaking.

## **Crown Prince of Libya To Visit U.S.**

White House press release dated August 15

The President announced on August 15 that His Royal Highness Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of Libya, has accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States. He will be in Washington for a 2-day official visit beginning October 16 and will spend an additional 5 days elsewhere in the United States.

<sup>1</sup> See item below.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/5170.

## The United States and the Common Market

by J. Robert Schaezel  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs<sup>1</sup>

"Why does the United States support the Common Market?" The question produces a rich array of answers. The answers reveal in some distortion national attitudes, confusion, fears, but most of all, further evidence of the impact of the Common Market on world affairs.

Some French observers seem sincerely puzzled at why the United States supports the Common Market at all. And the more suspicious wonder if United States support of the British decision to seek entry in the Common Market is not a veiled attempt by Washington to achieve American control of the European Community—a British Trojan horse from which Americans will pour once the animal has been wheeled across the channel and into the Common Market.

And in England we have heard some Tory backbenchers—and a few members of the Labor Party—assess American support of an enlarged Common Market as evidence of a dark American ambition to take over the Commonwealth. A few Commonwealth observers seem to join in this gloomy judgment.

Some Australians have suggested, with their special candor and directness—a trait they share with us—that our support of the Common Market in general and British entry in particular is sadly misguided.

Then there is that handful of Commonwealth citizens who condemn American policy in support of the European Community as little more than a callous device whereby we gain the wind-

fall trade benefits for our own exports of the dismantlement of the Ottawa preference system, which will be one result of British membership.

This kaleidoscope, of course, does not represent either national attitudes or government positions. But it does convey perhaps the uncertain mood of the world and mounting interest in European unity.

It is possible, however, to cite statements by another nation with absolute assurance that they reflect with high fidelity government policy. In *May Pravda* said:

U.S. ruling circles, which formerly played the role of behind-the-scenes producer of Western European integration, but formerly stood aside, are also gradually beginning to change their tactics. . . . The program of the formation of an Atlantic economic community, put forward by President Kennedy, gives a new scale and new features to "imperialist" integration. . . . This [Atlantic] union at the same time aims to prevent the newly liberated peoples from achieving economic independence and to put on them new chains of colonial exploitation.

The Communist world is clearly in the throes of theological gymnastics as it tries to square European integration with Marx. Not to be left behind, Ulbricht [Walter Ulbricht, head of the East German regime] has offered a variation on the themes. He insists that the integration movement is merely a technique whereby the West German leaders can subject other members of the EEC [European Economic Community] to their control. Further Ulbricht embroidery points to West Germany as engineering the split between the EEC and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] as a means of forcing Britain into the Common Market.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the 1962 Summer Institute of the Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, on Aug. 18 (press release 503 dated Aug. 16).

### American Enthusiasm for Common Market

Against these varied and conflicting views and suspicions what have been American motives and policies? In point of fact, American policy on European integration and the broad support this policy enjoys in the United States is perhaps easier to define and easier to explain than almost any other aspect of our foreign policy. In a word, this support rests on the solid basis of what we conceive to be enlightened American self-interest.

Since 1948 there has been a consistent stream of American policy endorsing the principle of the unification of Europe. Americans, legislators as well as executives, Republicans as well as Democrats, have felt that within the framework of European unity the historical and disastrous enmity between French and German, and which has brought such tragedy to the world, could be eliminated for all time. In addition we have believed that the economies of scale available to a united Europe would bring the promise and the fact of economic growth and stability and, with this prosperity, the security of the West would be enhanced.

There are obvious additional considerations. The United States of America, with its balance of power and Federal-State division, is the unique political experiment in federation, about which we are proud and self-conscious. We believe that our system works. It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might also work for other people.

Washington is not the best vantage point from which to judge American opinion and attitudes. Nonetheless it is probably fair to say that the support for the European integration movement, the excitement the idea generates, rest not on precise knowledge, or on full awareness of the problems that lie ahead both for the Europeans and for us, but rather on impressions and on the visceral considerations I have just outlined. It is a kind of optimistic bypassing of detail. A New York friend reports that on the commuting train to Bronxville he asked his seat companion what the latter thought of the Common Market. The response was, "I suppose you mean that new super-market down in White Plains." On the Pacific Coast, just to prove that parochialism is no monopoly of the Atlantic area and to emphasize the baroque working of some American minds, a lady in Pasadena insisted, "Why should we join the

Common Market after all we have already done for Europe?"

I am convinced that the broad and swelling current of support for the European Community and for closer American relations with this dynamic force rests on a sound although instinctive judgment that North America and Europe share a destiny which is rooted in our common religious, cultural, legal, and ethnic development. A judgment common to almost all walks of American life is that we must build on this 2,000 years of common experience if the things we value are to survive.

American enthusiasm for the Common Market does not derive so much from economic or security compulsions clearly seen as from a sense of optimism about the future. Jean Monnet has frequently observed that one of the special American virtues is our willingness to accept change. Change is in the air and Europe is feeling its full force for the first time in hundreds of years. We feel in America the secondary effects of this new European atmosphere. Much of this positive reaction rests on a native optimism which Brogan suggested arose from the early history of the United States. "It took optimism to cross the Atlantic, optimism or despair and anger at the old world from which the reluctant pioneer had come." Curiously enough there are today a few signs in Europe of their "despair" at the slow pace and reaction of North America to the pioneering efforts of the new Europe. Frederick Turner concluded that the molding force of the American character has been the conquering of the frontier, which is another way of saying "optimism" and "change."

In this connection it might be well to recall American attitudes toward Canada in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The United States looked apprehensively on the economic development and industrialization of Canada. Questions arose as to whether this would not produce a competitor and thus deny us our existing market in Canada for industrial goods. As we all know, the opposite has been the case. Both Canada and the United States look on the other as its largest and most promising market.

The American attitude toward the Common Market, while basically one of hopeful anticipation, is not without its shadow of apprehension. A good deal of the favorable anticipation on the

part of the business community correlates with the disproportionate growth of our exports to the European market as contrasted with the movement of American goods to other markets. In view of the great load which the United States is carrying in the field of military and economic assistance we consider this volume of trade and the imbalance in our favor as not only desirable but indispensable.

Canadian exports to the Continent in important categories have also continued to grow in volume well beyond the expansion of trade to the other areas, except for the tremendous flow that moves both ways across our common border. Canadian exports to the EEC countries rose from 6.4 percent of the total in 1951 to 8.5 percent of the total in 1961. Japan, another great trading nation, also apprehensive about the impact of the Common Market on its exports, has nonetheless seen its exports to the EEC grow by 70 percent from 1958 to 1961.

#### **U.S. Trade Expansion Act**

American policy toward the Common Market has entered a new phase. The decisions made by the Council of Ministers in January on the common agriculture policy, on further reduction of the internal duties within the Community down to 50 percent of their pretreaty levels, and on the movement to the second phase of the treaty means to us that the Community had passed the point of no return.

These decisive actions and the prospect of British entry in the Common Market caused us to face squarely the issue of how the United States could best prepare itself to work with an enlarged European Community. Our initial response to this new challenge was the decision by the President to seek radical new trade authority from the Congress.<sup>2</sup> The principal objective of the Trade Expansion Act is to permit us to engage in far-reaching tariff bargaining with an enlarged European Community. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives with an impressive majority and is now before the Senate. We hope to use this authority not to seek any special benefits from the European Community but to negotiate mutually

beneficial reductions in the tariff barriers of the two great common markets of the world—the EEC and the United States. We believe that the resulting reductions will be to the immediate self-interest of the United States and to the immediate self-interest of Europe.

As the tariff reductions will be on the most-favored-nation basis, substantial benefits will accrue to other exporting states. We assume that such beneficiaries will be prepared to make their appropriate contribution and join in this great effort to reduce trade barriers.

#### **Now Is the Time for Tariff Negotiations**

The immediate economic motive behind our Trade Expansion Act is self-evident to any responsible observer. But there seem to us to be other important objectives served by these prospective negotiations. The Community, through the adherence of new members, by taking perhaps in 1963 the first step toward political union, enters a new phase. In the coming year or so and in this state of malleability and experimentation it will and must make broad policy decisions which will profoundly affect the future development of the Community. In addition the great business of building Europe threatens so to tax the energies of its leaders that even such a major trading area as the Common Market could become preoccupied with the internal affairs of the Community.

This is the moment then to attack decisively the common external tariff and the American tariff. The timing capitalizes on the recent experience of European business and labor groups that have found quite to their surprise that the elimination of barriers are helpful and stimulating rather than harmful. It is a period of full employment in Europe and of high levels of economic growth. All of these considerations demonstrate that now is the time to act.

#### **EEC Assistance to Less Developed Areas**

We have also felt, as have many Europeans, that a prosperous, self-confident, and unifying Europe is in a position and will wish to be an important contributor of capital to the less developed countries. Through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Coopera-

<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's message to Congress on trade, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

tion and Development we have been working with the more affluent European members of the OECD and the European Community to seek ways to enlarge the volume of capital moving into the development process, to improve its terms, and to achieve a higher degree of coordination. Substantial success has marked this effort. Today the volume of assistance going from the European Community has gone up from \$953 million in 1957 to \$1,273 million in 1961.

In addition to increasing the volume of aid the six governments and the EEC Commission, through engagement in the affairs of the Development Assistance Committee, have set their sights beyond their traditional ties with Africa. This again meets a conscious objective we have set for ourselves to see extended the interests and the responsibilities of an expanding Community beyond the borders of Europe.

#### **Issues in the Military Field**

In the military field there are three main issues.

First, there is clearly need for reappraisal, discussion, and decision within the alliance on military doctrine. There can be no more serious business for NATO. Our initiative in this matter arises from the changing military environment and the consequent need to relate modern weapon systems to strategy. We must also review the role of conventional arms and take into account a period of growing nuclear capabilities on both sides.

Second, we have continued to stress the need for building the conventional strength of the West. We have suggested, I believe fairly, that the European desire for more equal status in the councils of NATO carries with it responsibility for assuming a greater share of the military burden. It is well to recall that the defense expenditures of the United States—and these are basically expenditures for the defense of North America and Europe—amount to \$60 billion as contrasted with a total European defense expenditure of \$16 billion.

Finally, there is the desire of existing members of the alliance to play a larger role in nuclear defense and their ability to do so as a result of their economic affluence and the progress of European unity. We have responded to this desire by indicating our willingness to consider with the

Europeans the question of whether and, if so, how a sea-based multilateral MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force such as the President spoke of in Ottawa in May 1961<sup>3</sup> might be organized. There have been some indications recently of European interest in the principle of a multilateral approach to nuclear problems. There has been discussion of a so-called European nuclear force within the NATO framework. We have encouraged study of various multilateral approaches. We shall be ready and willing in the coming months to provide information to our allies so that they can evaluate the desirability, feasibility, and the costs of such approaches. To aid the inquiry we have set forth the criteria which we believe must be met if such a venture is to serve the overall interests of the alliance:

It must not discriminate against, or in favor of, individual countries. This would be politically divisive in the extreme.

It must be so integrated that no country could withdraw its contribution and reconstitute it as a national force. This means that it must be multilaterally owned, controlled, and manned.

It must be closely linked in military planning to other alliance nuclear force.

#### **U.S. Concept of Partnership Relationship**

In this and other areas the United States has continued to support the concept of a partnership relationship across the Atlantic, as elaborated in the President's speech in Philadelphia on July 4th.<sup>4</sup> The policy is novel. It is a conscious encouragement by a major world power of the development of a coequal power. We do this with full awareness that while Europe and the United States may differ on tactics there can be no disagreement on fundamental objectives. Furthermore, we believe that disagreement on strategy and tactics can be minimized and made manageable by the constant improvement in our consultative habits and procedures.

It must be admitted that the American approach to consultation has neither been fully understood nor taken at face value. There are not a few Europeans who find it difficult to accept consultation as not being disingenuous, that some devi-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 829.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 131.

ous American purpose exists and needs to be uncovered. What we are working toward is consultation in the economic, political, and military fields, not merely on established governmental policies but as an aid in determining what governmental policies should be.

In a sense American official and public interest for a closer association with Europe is in advance of European opinion. The executive branch understands this situation, but we may have to deal with considerable public impatience. Those who support the idea of European unity must appreciate the work of consolidation to be completed before Europe is fully prepared to play the role of a constructive partner.

We are also conscious, as must be the Europeans, of the implications of a partnership concept for third countries—both those of the Atlantic area and those of the other continents of the world. The President has stressed the open, nonexclusive character of this relationship. The test of this Atlantic relationship must be the extent to which it benefits not merely the participants but the free world as a whole.

#### **Problems of the Transition Period**

Out of these considerations of fact and timing a problem is posed for the next few years, for those both inside and outside the Community. The problem is a rather protracted transition period. There is being shaped a "grand design" made up in the first instance of a unifying Western Europe. We hope to see develop out of this unity a new relationship across the Atlantic. The problem will be to retain the vision and not lose heart in face of the frustrations and abrasions ahead. We have not found it always easy in the past, nor will we find it invariably so in the future, to do business with the Community. Lines of responsibility are still obscure, and we are never entirely certain when and how decisions will be made.

We occasionally have our worries as to whether the Community is going to beat out policies through their Commission and Council of Ministers process that reflect the lowest common denominator or whether the Community will rise to the high purpose and the responsibility which has brought it into being. We believe it will be the latter. We think this belief is more apt to become reality if those countries tied by history and cul-

ture to Europe take actions which encourage the Community in this direction.

I have stressed the transition period which lie ahead. I can repeat that few Americans either understand the present structure of the Community or its stage of development. Even fewer appreciate the reorganization and adjustment of the Community implicit in United Kingdom adherence to the Treaty of Rome. Beyond this, and as President Hallstein [Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community] said last year in Paris, "It is absurd for us to maintain three separate executives for the three Communities." There is also increased uneasiness about the lack of normal parliamentary control over the executives or of the Council of Ministers. In this connection Dr. Hallstein and the European Parliamentary Assembly point to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome that call for preparations for the direct election of the European parliament.

In addition to these institutional changes the entry of Britain and perhaps several other states would have unquestioned effects on the day-to-day operation of the Community's institutions. After all, the six continental members have had 10 years of experience in working with and within this unique, quasi-federal structure. The six have committed themselves to building Europe pragmatically and with perhaps less commitment to traditional forms of constitutional behavior than the British. This suggests some special transitional growing pains both for the Community and for the British as they adjust to one another.

The conclusion one draws is that patience and understanding will be required—never easy sentiments to generate and ones especially elusive at this moment when the nations of the North Atlantic are struggling with demanding military and economic problems. Dazzled by the concept of European unity and enthused by the goal of an Atlantic partnership, this optimism could degenerate in the United States to an irritated impatience over the failure of the new Europe to react quickly and decisively to our common problems.

However, the problems confronting Europe are those which Americans, of all peoples, ought to appreciate. We have been conducting our own continuing experiment with a federal society. In-



deed, not content with the normal frictions inherent in any political environment, our Constitution elaborates and then accentuates conflict. If we Americans bear in mind the glass in our own house, we may be somewhat restrained before we start throwing criticisms through the windows of the new house of Europe. Dr. Hallstein pointed out in his series of lectures in Boston last spring that the history of political development is that a federal entity is always constructed against national governments. There can be no question whatsoever that the greater the unity at the center, the greater the resistance against this unity generated in the capitals of the member governments.

In this connection I would like to dispel the canard that the United States has supported the Common Market with the self-serving motive that we wished to see created a United States of Europe closely patterned on our own Federal structure. Even the most enthusiastic "Europeans" have no desire to impose the American constitutional system on their society, nor in fact do we have the slightest interest in encouraging them in this direction. All of the participating countries in Europe have brilliant and cherished national histories which they wish to preserve. This richness of culture and tradition makes up the strong mosaic of Europe, and it cannot and must not be lost. What seems to be developing in Europe, however, is a new breed—young people at once proud of being Italian, German, French, or Dutch who are becoming as well enthusiastic "Europeans." This blending of European peoples into an effective political entity, which retains the values of the past while meeting the challenge of the future, may be the common denominator of the United States and the new Europe.

### **The Idea of Unity**

The excesses of nationalism are so noisily a part of the contemporary scene that we have forgotten the relative newness and novelty of this aspect of man in society. After all, the bright page of modern history was the Age of Enlightenment. The distinguished men and women of the 18th century would have been incredulous in the presence of the sharp and arbitrary national divisions of 19th-century Europe that seem to be an

unfortunate part of our legacy to the new nations of Asia and Africa.

Preoccupation with the endless details, with the uncertain character and direction of Europe, with the unsolved problems, and with the surface tensions, can lead to doubts as to the wisdom of a unified Europe and to nostalgia for the known evil of the past. No one dares predict how it will all come out—least of all Monnet.

A European soldier-statesman in the 17th century said that no man goes as far as the man who does not know where he is going. Neither Europe nor the United States can define the ultimate objective. Man in society is a dynamic relationship. The important thing is that an idea of unity has gained ascendancy where disunity existed before. The idea has caught on at the moment when history needed it. If we Atlantic nations continue on our present course, we can create a position of such overwhelming but constructive strength that peace can be achieved either by deterrence or by negotiation with the East. We have great constructive work to do and the latent capacity to do it—among ourselves and with the developing nations. It is this combination of strength and constructive purpose that will bring the Soviet world to the negotiating table.

## **U.S. and Canada Hold Discussions on Softwood Lumber Industry**

Press release 495 dated August 15

In view of the present and future problems confronting the North American softwood lumber industry and the program announced by the President on July 26 to assist the industry,<sup>1</sup> the U.S. and Canadian Governments have agreed to initiate discussions at Ottawa on this subject commencing the week of August 27. The U.S. delegation will be composed of G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, *chairman*; John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior; and Jack N. Behrman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> For text of an announcement, see White House press release dated July 26.

## ITAC To Consider Problems Related to Textiles Other Than Cotton

White House press release dated August 16

The President has requested the Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee to expand the functions of the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee to include problems related to textiles other than cotton textiles.

The Interagency Textile Administrative Committee was established at the request of the President in a memorandum<sup>1</sup> sent to the Secretary of Commerce on October 18, 1961. Its functions up to this time have been "to carry out the rights and obligations of the United States under the 'Short-Term Arrangement' provided for in the International Textile Agreement<sup>2</sup> of July 21, 1961, at Geneva." The ITAC consists of representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, State, and Treasury. The Committee is chaired by the Commerce Department representative.

## U.S. To Request Plenary Meeting of International Wool Study Group

Press release 500 dated August 16

The U.S. Government has requested a meeting of the Management Committee of the International Wool Study Group with a view to convening a plenary meeting of the members of the Group in London in the near future. The purpose of the plenary meeting would be to discuss present and future problems of trade in wool and wool textiles and the difficulties which these products face as a result of competition from other fibers and products. The U.S. request is made pursuant to a decision reached by the Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee that international discussions pertaining to problems of wool and wool textiles be undertaken.

The International Wool Study Group was established in 1946 and has met from time to time since then. The more than two dozen governments which are members of the IWSG account for the bulk of world trade in wool and wool textiles. The Management Committee meets in London.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1961, p. 773.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 87th Congress, 2d Session

- Economic Developments in South America. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee, pursuant to sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress). May 10-11, 1962. 151 pp.
- St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. Message from the President transmitting the annual report of the Corporation, covering its activities for the year ended December 31, 1961. H. Doc. 404. May 14, 1962. 38 pp.
- Sugar. Hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 11730. Serial II. May 15-25, 1962. 552 pp.
- Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 10937. H. Rept. 1684. May 16, 1962. 30 pp.
- Recommendation Adopted by the International Labor Conference at Its 45th Session at Geneva. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State transmitting the text of a recommendation (no. 115) concerning workers' housing adopted by the International Labor Conference on June 28, 1961. H. Doc. 406. May 17, 1962. 15 pp.
- Payment of Balance of Awards Under Philippine Rehabilitation Act of April 30, 1946. Report to accompany H.R. 11721. H. Rept. 1715. May 17, 1962. 42 pp.
- Forty-Third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. Message from the President transmitting the report for the year ending December 31, 1961. H. Doc. 373. May 21, 1962. 37 pp.
- Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949 and Related Acts. Report of the House Select Committee on Export Control pursuant to H. Res. 403. H. Rept. 1753. May 31, 1962. 65 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2906. S. Rept. 1535. May 28, 1962. 95 pp.
- Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany S. 3161. S. Rept. 1576. June 7, 1962. 10 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 11921. H. Rept. 1788. June 7, 1962. 95 pp.
- Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, To Authorize Additional Appropriations. Report to accompany H.R. 11880. H. Rept. 1795. June 11, 1962. 12 pp.
- Final Annual Report on the Operations of the Mutual Security Program. Message from the President transmitting the report for the period ending June 30, 1961. H. Doc. 432. June 12, 1962. 48 pp.
- Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries and the Extension of Certain Naval Vessel Loans Now in Existence. Report to accompany H.R. 12067. H. Rept. 1814. June 12, 1962. 8 pp.
- Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 11970. H. Rept. 1818. June 12, 1962. 104 pp.
- Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany H.R. 11300. H. Rept. 1830. June 18, 1962. 9 pp.
- Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To Cooperate With the First World Conference on National Parks. Report to accompany S. 2164. H. Rept. 1863. June 21, 1962. 6 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings <sup>1</sup>

#### Scheduled September Through November 1962

J.N. ECAFE: 2d Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East.	Tehran . . . . .	Sept. 1-
J.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 2d Meeting on Farm Rationalization.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 3-
6th International Dairy Congress . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	Sept. 3-
J.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Vehicles . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 3-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Higher Education in Africa . . . . .	Tananarive . . . . .	Sept. 3-
IAO International Rice Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Sept. 10-
IATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
J.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
J.N. ECE Group of Experts To Study Certain Technical Railway Questions.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
J.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 10-
AEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 12-
AEA General Conference: 6th Regular Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 17-
IAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East . . . . .	Kuala Lumpur . . . . .	Sept. 17-
IATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
J.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 17-
LO Metal Trades Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
J.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade and East/West Trade Consultations.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 17-
J.N. ECAFE Seminar on Community Facilities in Relation to Housing and Working Party on Housing and Building Materials.	New Delhi . . . . .	Sept. 17-
J.N. General Assembly: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 18-
International Criminal Police Organization: 31st General Assembly . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 19-
8th Inter-American Travel Congress . . . . .	Guadalajara . . . . .	Sept. 19-
J.N. ECE Coal Committee: Utilization Working Party . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 20-
JPU Executive and Liaison Committee . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Sept. 21-
J.N. ECE Coal Committee: Utilization Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 21-
CEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 21-
1st UNESCO World Conference on Illiteracy . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Sept. 24-
IATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
IATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
3d ICAO Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Vancouver . . . . .	Sept. 25-
J.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 25-
J.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 25-
ITU CGIT Study Group I (Telegraph Operation and Tariffs) and Study Group III (General Tariff Principles and Lease of Telecommunications Circuits).	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 27-
J.N. ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 27-
Caribbean Organization Council: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana . . . . .	September
CENTO Scientific Council (preceded by scientific symposium) . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	September
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 6th Session . . . . .	(undetermined) . . . . .	September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 13th Session . . . . .	(undetermined) . . . . .	September
Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics Control: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	September

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 13, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CGITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICGEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled September Through November 1962—Continued

ILO Meeting of Experts on the Assessment of Manpower Requirements for Economic Development.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 50th Statutory Meeting.	Copenhagen . . . . .	Oct. 1-
ITU Special Working Group on Radio Regulations Revision	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale of Potatoes.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Annual Meeting at Expert Level	México, D.F. . . . .	Oct. 1-
10th ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECA Seminar on Administrative Problems in African Countries	Addis Ababa . . . . .	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Chemicals and Allied Industries	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 3-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	Vienna or Geneva (undetermined)	Oct. 4-
FAO Regional Conference for Europe . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 8-
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement	London . . . . .	Oct. 8-
NATO Science Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 8-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 8-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Simplification and Standardization of Export Documents.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 8-
World Power Conference: 6th Plenary Meeting	Melbourne . . . . .	Oct. 9-
Peace Corps: International Conference on Middle-Level Manpower, Volunteer Services and Their Role in Social and Economic Development.	Sau Juan . . . . .	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Transport Costs . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 10-
FAO Council: 39th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 15-
4th Inter-American Statistical Conference	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 15-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics.	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 15-
ILO Meeting of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 15-
South Pacific Commission: 24th Session . . . . .	Nouméa, New Caledonia . . . . .	Oct. 15-
GATT Working Party on United Arab Republic Accession	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 7th Session.	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 15-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 10th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 15-
United Nations Pledging Conference	New York . . . . .	Oct. 16-
IMCO Council: 7th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 17-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party of Experts on Statistical Information.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 17-
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Annual Review Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 18-
WMO Regional Association II (Asia): 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 18-
IAEA Intergovernmental Committee on Draft Convention on Civil Liability, Land-Based Facilities: 2d Meeting.	Vienna . . . . .	Oct. 22-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 22-
OECD Oil Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 22-
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport.	London . . . . .	Oct. 22-
Council of Representatives to the GATT Contracting Parties . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 22-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Problems Involved in Establishing a Unified System of Inland Waterways of International Concern in Europe.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 22-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 8th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 22-
IA-ECOSOC: 1st Regular Meeting at Ministerial Level . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Oct. 22-
GATT Contracting Parties: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 23-
ILO Governing Body: 153d Session (and its committees)	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 24-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 51st Conference . . . . .	Brasilia . . . . .	Oct. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 3d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 25-
UNESCO Executive Board: 63d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 25-
ICAO Limited Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (in conjunction with WMO).	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 29-
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 29-
FAO UNICEF Policy Committee . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 29-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Seattle . . . . .	Oct. 29-
U.N. ECA Eastern African Transport Conference	Addis Ababa . . . . .	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 14th Meeting.	Sydney . . . . .	Oct. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Rail Transport.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 31-
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session . . . . .	(undetermined)	October
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 10th Meeting . . . . .	Seoul . . . . .	October
FAO 1963 World Food Congress Preparatory Committee: 2d session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	October
FAO Regional Conference for Africa: 2d Session . . . . .	Tunisia . . . . .	Nov. 1-
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 17th General Assembly.	Bangkok . . . . .	Nov. 3-

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled September Through November 1962—Continued

[MCO Working Group of Experts on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea.	London . . . . .	Nov. 5-
[CEM Executive Committee: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 5-
[WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 3d Session . . . . .	Nouméa, New Caledonia . . . . .	Nov. 5-
[J.N. ECE Meeting of Senior Economic Advisers . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 5-
[J.N. ECAFE Inland Waterways Subcommittee . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Nov. 6-
[JNESCO General Conference: 12th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 9-
[CAO Meeting on European-Mediterranean Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 12-
[CEM Council: 17th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 12-
[LO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Printing and Allied Trades . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 12-
[d U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Problems of Methodology of Agricultural Problems . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 12-
[CAO Aerodromes and Ground Aids Division: 7th Session . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Nov. 13-
[MCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport . . . . .	London . . . . .	Nov. 13-
[7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Nov. 19-
[ILO Advisory Committee of the International Institute for Labor Studies . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 19-
[5th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources Development . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Nov. 20-
[2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	Cartagena . . . . .	Nov. 20-
[FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	Nov. 22-
[LO Committee of Social Security Experts . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 26-
[North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Nov. 26-
[LO Asian Regional Conference: 5th Session . . . . .	Melbourne . . . . .	Nov. 26-
[J.N. ECE Working Party on Housing and Building Statistics . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 26-
[J.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on International Passenger Transport Services by Road . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 26-
[J.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 26-
[OECD Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 27-
[NATO Medical Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 27-
[J.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Nov. 27-
[J.N. ECE Gas Committee: 9th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 28-
[WMO Regional Association III (South America) and Regional Association IV (North and Central America) . . . . .	(undetermined) . . . . .	November
[U.N. ECAFE Electric Power Subcommittee . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	November
[International Wheat Council: 36th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	November
[U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Technical Working Group on Compensatory Financing . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	November

## United States Delegations to International Conferences

### Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Regional Committee for the Americas

The Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 504) that the United States would be represented by the following delegation at the 16th Pan American Sanitary Conference and the 14th meeting of the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization for the Americas, which will meet at Minneapolis, Minn., August 21 to September 6:

#### Delegates

Luther L. Terry (*chairman*), Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Guillermo Arbona, M.D., Secretary of Health, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

James Watt, M.D., Chief, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

#### Alternate Delegates

Howard Calderwood, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Charles Mayo, M.D., Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minn.

Charles Williams, M.D., Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

#### Advisers

Gaylord Anderson, M.D., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

C. H. Atkins, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Robert N. Barr, M.D., Minnesota State Department of Public Health, St. Paul, Minn.  
William Bowdler, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
Carter Hills, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State  
Emory W. Morris, M.D., Kellogg Foundation, Battle Creek, Mich.  
Frederick J. Vintinner, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development

The Pan American Sanitary Conference is the international coordinating authority for public health in the Americas and meets every 4 years. The 15th conference was held at San Juan, P.R., September 1958.

In addition to planning the activities of the Pan American Health Organization for the next 4 years, the Conference will consider the annual reports of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) and the budget for 1963; elect the Director of the PASB; nominate the Regional Director of the WHO for the Americas; elect two member countries to fill the vacancies on the Executive Committee created by the termination of the periods of office of Colombia and El Salvador; and review reports of the members of the Organization on public health conditions and progress achieved during the period between the 15th and 16th conferences.

The principal technical programs to be discussed are: the status of malaria eradication in the Americas; eradication of smallpox; work on nutrition; the status of *Aedes aegypti* (urban mosquito vector of yellow fever) eradication campaign; and the health programs under the Alliance for Progress.

#### 14th ICAO Assembly

The Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 505) that Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, would be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 14th session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which will be held at Rome, August 21 to September 17. Other members of the delegation are:

##### Delegates

Edward A. Bolster (*vice chairman*), Director, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State

Nelson B. David, U.S. Representative on the Council of ICAO, Montreal, Canada  
Raymond B. Maloy, Director, International Aviation Service, Federal Aviation Agency  
Clarence D. Martin, Jr., Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce

##### Alternate Delegates

Robert P. Boyle, Associate General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency  
John T. Brennan, Assistant Chief, International Organizations Division, Federal Aviation Agency  
Joseph C. Watson, Director, Bureau of International Affairs, Civil Aeronautics Board  
Wilbur H. Ziehl, Office of International Administration, Department of State

##### Advisers

John Bowman, Assistant Director for Operations, Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.  
H. Alberta Colclaser, American Embassy, Paris, France  
Edward F. Dodd, Chief, Air Transport Branch, Federal Aviation Agency  
Joan Gravatt, Aviation Division, Department of State  
Martha C. Hillyer, Assistant Director, Bureau of International Affairs, Civil Aeronautics Board  
Francis E. Holladay, Program Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary, Department of Commerce  
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State  
Col. Jesse C. Peaslee, USAF, Office of the Deputy Director of Plans for Policy, United States Air Force  
Norman Philion, Director, International Services, Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.  
John Wanner, General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board  
Daniel A. Ward, Chief, Ground Branch, International Organizations, Federal Aviation Agency

ICAO is concerned with developing the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fostering the planning and development of international air transport. Major sessions of the Assembly have been held every 3 years since 1950.

In addition to reviewing the technical, economic, legal, and administrative work of the Organization, the Assembly will for the first time elect 27 member governments to be represented on its Council. This increase of six members is the result of an extraordinary session of the Assembly held at Montreal in June 1961. Other items to be considered will be the Organization's activities and policies on technical assistance; policy relating to improving the implementation of regional plans; and problems relating to foreseeable major

developments in international civil aviation, such as supersonic aircraft.

Official delegations from almost all of the 98 member countries of ICAO are expected to attend.

## **International Bank Issues Year-End Financial Statement**

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported on August 6 additions of \$100.3 million to its reserves during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, raising its total reserves to \$699.3 million.

Additions during the year were made up of net earnings of \$70.3 million and loan commissions of \$30 million. The earnings were placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees, and the loan commissions were credited to the special reserve. These figures compare with net earnings of \$63.2 million and loan commissions of \$28.8 million in the fiscal year 1961. On June 30, 1962, the supplemental reserve totaled \$475.7 million and the special reserve was \$223.6 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$188.3 million, compared with \$166.6 million in the preceding year. Expenses, which included \$99 million for interest on Bank borrowing and other financial expenses, totaled \$118 million, compared with \$103.4 million last year.

During the year the Bank made 29 loans totaling the equivalent of \$882.3 million, compared with a total of \$610 million last year. The loans were made in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Colombia (2 loans), Costa Rica (2 loans), Ethiopia (2 loans), Finland, Ghana, Iceland, India (5 loans), Israel, Japan, Kenya, Mexico (2 loans), Peru, Philippines (2 loans), South Africa (2 loans), Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. This brought the gross total of loan commitments at June 30 to \$6,672.8 million. By June 30, as a result of cancellations, repayments, sales of loans, and exchange adjustments, the portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$4,665.4 million.

Disbursements were \$485.4 million, compared with \$398.5 million in the preceding year. Cumulative disbursements amounted to \$4,805.1 million on June 30, 1962.

During the year the Bank sold or agreed to sell \$318.8 million principal amount of loans. On June 30 the total sales of loans amounted to \$1,332 million, of which all except \$69 million was withdrawn from the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank during the year amounted to \$104 million, and repayments to purchasers of parts of loans amounted to \$121.6 million. This brought total principal repayments to \$1,075.4 million on June 30, consisting of \$542.5 million repaid to the Bank and \$532.9 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

The outstanding funded debt of the Bank amounted to \$2,520.8 million on June 30, 1962, reflecting a net increase of \$292.3 million in the past year. During the year there was a gross increase in borrowings of \$463 million. This consisted of the following: Public bond issues: an Italian lire issue in the amount of Lit 15 billion (\$24 million), a \$100 million U.S. dollar issue, and a Swiss Franc issue in the amount of Sw Fr 100 million (\$23.3 million); the private placement of an issue of \$100 million of U.S. dollar bonds; the drawing down of the Swiss Franc borrowing of Sw Fr 100 million (\$23.2 million) of October 1961; the drawing down of \$120 million and the balance of DM 250 million (\$62.5 million) of the German borrowing of August 1960; and the delivery of \$10 million of bonds which had been subject to delayed delivery arrangements. The funded debt was decreased by \$170.7 million as a result of the maturing of \$122.7 million of bonds, the redemption of Sw Fr 100 million (\$23.2 million), the revaluation of the Canadian dollar issues by \$3.2 million, \$4.5 million of unissued bonds which were subject to delayed delivery, and sinking and purchase fund transactions amounting to \$17.1 million.

During the fiscal year Laos (with a capital subscription of \$10 million), Liberia (\$15 million), New Zealand (\$166.7 million), Nepal (\$10 million), and Cyprus (\$15 million) became members of the Bank; the Dominican Republic was admitted to membership in the Bank with a capital subscription of \$8 million; and Syria resumed separate membership in the Bank with a capital subscription of \$20 million. At June 30, 1962, the Bank had 75 members with capital subscriptions totaling \$20,484.8 million.

TREATY INFORMATION

Department Reports on Developments on Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on August 16 (press release 501) the results of the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) study on the Warsaw Convention<sup>1</sup> and the Hague Protocol.<sup>2</sup> The IGIA made two basic related recommendations:

(1) ratification of the Hague Protocol which (upon ratification by a sufficient number of states) would raise the liability of carriers in international aviation from the present limit of \$8,300 to a new limit of \$16,600; and

(2) enactment of complementary legislation which would require United States flag carriers operating in international air transportation to provide all passengers with automatic accident insurance in the amount of \$50,000 for the benefit of each passenger killed and up to \$50,000 for each passenger injured in an accident, in addition to the amount of recovery provided for in the Hague Protocol.

Secretary Rusk in a letter of August 9, 1962, to Senator J. William Fulbright stated his tentative approval of the IGIA recommendations and his expectation that formal proposals in accordance with these recommendations will be a part of the administration's legislative program for the 88th Congress. In addition Secretary Rusk emphasized the need for prompt implementation of this program in order to relieve the traveling public from the present \$8,300 limitation of liability provided in the Warsaw Convention.

The IGIA's conclusion and recommendations are contained in a letter of August 3, 1962, from N. E. Halaby, Chairman of IGIA, to Secretary of State Rusk.

<sup>1</sup> 49 Stat. 3000.

<sup>2</sup> S. Ex. II, 86th Cong., 1st sess.

SECRETARY RUSK TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT

AUGUST 9, 1962

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On June 12, 1961 you wrote to me inquiring about the Department of State's attitude on the Hague Protocol amending the Warsaw Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air. By letter of September 22, 1961 from Mr. Brook Hays, we indicated that we were referring the matter of the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and related questions concerning compensation for passengers injured in aviation accidents to the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA).

Since that time the Interagency Group on International Aviation has held a number of meetings and has conducted public hearings on the subject, and has studied recommendations from a great number of representatives of the aviation industry and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of the Interagency Group are contained in a letter to me from Mr. N. E. Halaby, Chairman, dated August 3, 1962. I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Halaby's letter.

You will note that the IGIA makes two basic related recommendations:

1. that the United States ratify the Hague Protocol, which (upon ratification by a sufficient number of states) would raise the liability of carrier in international aviation from the present limit of \$8,300 to a new limit of \$16,600;

2. that the United States enact complementary legislation which would require United States flag carriers operating in international air transportation to provide all passengers with automatic accident insurance in the amount of \$50,000 for the benefit of each passenger killed and up to \$50,000 for each passenger injured in an accident, in addition to the amount of recovery provided for in the Hague Protocol.

There are also certain other recommendations of a more technical nature which are stated in Mr. Halaby's letter.

I have tentatively approved the recommendations made by the IGIA. We are going ahead with the appointment of an interagency committee to draft the appropriate legislation, and we are also preparing a supplemental message concern-



ratification of the Hague Protocol. It is expected that formal proposals for action in accordance with the IGIA recommendations will be submitted as part of the Administration's legislative program for the 88th Congress. We believe that this program should be implemented as soon as possible, thus relieving the traveling public from the present \$8,300 limit of liability provided in the Warsaw Convention.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

The Honorable

J. W. FULERIGHT, *Chairman,*  
*Committee on Foreign Relations,*  
*United States Senate.*

**MR. HALABY TO SECRETARY RUSK**

**FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY**

Washington 25, D.C., August 3, 1962

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: By letter dated July 26, 1961, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson requested that the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) broadly review the relationship of the United States to The Hague Protocol and the Warsaw Convention in consultation with representatives of industry and the public.

The members of the IGIA, and a representative of the Department of Justice, met on September 7, 1961, to consider Mr. Johnson's letter. As a result of decisions taken at that meeting the Civil Aeronautics Board prepared a limited economic study of the impact of denunciation of Warsaw on United States flag carriers (Attachment A hereto<sup>1</sup>). It was also decided to solicit the views of industry and public representatives. Accordingly, on September 22 a letter<sup>2</sup> requesting comments was sent to approximately 300 addressees. These included all certificated United States direct and indirect air carriers, bar associations, law professors, insurers, selected individuals expert in aviation, and attorneys. An invitation to the general public to submit comments was made by publication of the September 22 letter in the Federal Register and by means of a press release<sup>3</sup> containing the text of the letter.

In response to the September 22 letter, the notice in the Federal Register and the press release, 138 comments were received (Attachment B<sup>4</sup> contains a list, arranged according to the positions taken, of the persons and organizations that responded; copies of the replies have

been sent to the Legal Adviser). In general, the air carriers and lawyers associated with the air carriers favor ratification of the Protocol, while claimants' and certain other attorneys favor denunciation of Warsaw. Among the bar associations that submitted comments, the Committee on Aeronautical Law, and its subcommittee on International Agreements, of the American Bar Association; the Illinois State Bar Association; the Committee on Aeronautical Law of the New York State Bar Association; the Chicago Bar Association; the Committee on Aeronautics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; and the Committee on International Law of the State Bar Association of Connecticut favor ratification of the Protocol; whereas the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys and the New York County Lawyers Association favor denunciation of Warsaw. The Pennsylvania Bar Association recommended that the United States should reconsider the desirability of continuing to adhere to the Warsaw Convention. A majority of the professors of law favor ratification of the Protocol.

On December 18, 1961, a hearing was held in Washington at which 10 witnesses testified before and were questioned by the IGIA members and the *ad hoc* members from the Departments of Justice and Labor (a copy of the transcript of this hearing has been sent to the Legal Adviser). At the hearing considerable attention was directed to the possibility of enacting legislation to require automatic insurance coverage for passengers whose international transportation would be subject to the liability provisions of the Convention. Subsequent to the meeting the Civil Aeronautics Board prepared a preliminary estimate of the possible cost of automatic insurance (Attachment C<sup>5</sup>).

On January 3, 1962, the regular and *ad hoc* members of the IGIA met to consider the written and oral comments obtained from the public and industry. Having the CAB cost data before it, the IGIA agreed that the possibilities of automatic insurance legislation should be explored. To this end the Civil Aeronautics Board was requested to prepare a study of such a scheme (Attachment D<sup>6</sup>).

On April 10 the IGIA members, together with the *ad hoc* representatives of the Departments of Justice and Labor, met to exchange views and to consider the Civil Aeronautics Board's insurance legislation report. It was agreed that the several proposals put forward at the meeting should be circulated, and that the regular and *ad hoc* members should vote thereon, indicating, if more than one affirmative vote were cast, the order of preference. The proposals, as subsequently refined and amended, were reduced to four alternatives as follows:

1. Recommend ratification of The Hague Protocol;
2. Recommend ratification of The Hague Protocol and recommend complementary legislation which would require United States air carriers to provide all passengers engaged in international travel with compulsory, automatic accident insurance in the amount of \$25,000 for the benefit of each such passenger killed or injured in an accident (i.e., the CAB report—Attachment D);

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1961, p. 692.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

3. Recommend ratification of The Hague Protocol and recommend complementary legislation which would require United States air carriers to contract with their passengers (in accordance with Article 22) that notwithstanding the limitation of liability in the Warsaw Convention they would agree to accept liability up to a limit of \$100,000 in the case of death, and \$200,000 in the case of personal injury;

4. Recommend against ratification of The Hague Protocol and recommend denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.

It is to be noted that the first three alternatives recommend that the United States ratify The Hague Protocol, although two of these (2 and 3) also recommend supplementary legislation; only alternative 4 recommends that the Protocol not be ratified and the Warsaw Convention be denounced.

On June 5 the IGIA Staff Officer circulated the written submissions of the regular and *ad hoc* members (Attachment E<sup>1</sup>). The record shows that all the regular member agencies of the IGIA, and the Department of Justice, favor ratification of The Hague Protocol by the United States. Only the Department of Labor has recommended that The Hague Protocol not be ratified and the Warsaw Convention be denounced.

The Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Department of Justice favor, as their first preference, alternative 2, insurance legislation. The Department of State favors alternative 3, increased limit of liability, and the Department of Defense favors a combination of alternatives 2 and 3. The Department of Commerce recommended, as its first choice, that The Hague Protocol should be ratified without supplementary legislation of any kind, that is to say, it favors alternative 1 (however, Commerce does favor "a greatly strengthened regulation" to notify the passenger of the limit of liability and "easy access to purchase additional trip insurance . . ."). The Department of Labor, as aforesaid, advocates alternative 4.

As second choice the Departments of Justice and Labor favor alternative 3. If a combination of alternatives 2 and 3 is not feasible, the Department of Defense favors alternatives 3, 2 and 1 in that order. Other preferences were not expressed.

While there was no absolute majority for any one alternative, alternative 2 received the largest number of first preference affirmative votes (3); alternatives 1, 3 and 4 received only one first preference affirmative vote each. Alternative 3 received three second preference votes.

Because all first preference votes, except that of the Department of Labor, advocate that the United States should ratify The Hague Protocol, it is the recommendation of the IGIA that the Department of State should advise the President to maintain the request for Senate advice and consent to The Hague Protocol.

It is also clear from the first preference votes of the IGIA that supplementary legislation is desirable. Only the Department of Commerce, which favors alternative 1,

and the Department of Labor, which favors denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, do not support the passage of supplementary legislation as outlined in alternative 2 and 3. Such supplementary legislation is designed to meet the principal criticism of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol: the low limitation of liability. The critics of Warsaw state that the Convention, even if amended by The Hague Protocol, will in certain cases result in inequities to United States passengers. Thus except in the case of willful misconduct, recoveries for death or injury will be limited to \$16,600, an amount that is often not compensatory to United States citizens because of the standard of living prevailing in this country. They also state that the amount is often below the damages recoverable in similar cases in some domestic airline accidents.

Having reviewed the recommendations of the individual agencies contained in Attachment E, and after further interagency discussions, it has been concluded that the IGIA recommendation should be the additional legislative scheme set out in alternative 2, rather than in alternative 3, but that the amount of such automatic insurance should be \$50,000 rather than the \$25,000 originally suggested. With this modification the Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice concur in this IGIA recommendation.

Alternative 2 meets the major criticism directed to the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol that the limit of liability is too low. If the Protocol is ratified and the \$50,000 automatic insurance legislation is enacted, a plaintiff can recover up to \$66,600, taking into account both the limit under the Protocol and the maximum amount payable under the insurance plan.

It is also recommended that in supplementary legislation United States air carriers be required to give clear and positive notice of the limitation of liability article (Article 22) of the Warsaw Convention and the extent of coverage under the automatic insurance plan. Thus each passenger intending to embark on carriage covered by the Warsaw Convention should be positively advised when he buys his ticket or when he checks in, of the exact amount of the carrier's limitation of liability under the Protocol (or the Convention) and the insurance plan. Such a passenger would then have the opportunity of buying at his own expense additional insurance according to his needs.

It is further recommended that the supplementary legislation create a separate right of action under the Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague Protocol. This would enable passengers or their representatives to sue directly upon the Convention in U.S. District Court and not have to rely upon local law, foreign or state, to establish a cause of action. It would avoid the possibility of the application of a lower limit of liability imposed by the local law and will serve to answer a criticism

<sup>1</sup> Should call for notice of the automatic insurance coverage as well as the Protocol limits in order to enable the passenger to determine whether he needs additional insurance. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

the Convention to the effect that it constitutes only upper limit. There is substantial authority that this is the original intent of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention but recent United States court decisions have indicated to the contrary (e.g., *Noel vs. Linea Aeropostal venezolana*, 247 F. 2d 667). In establishing a separate field of action the legislation should further provide, in accordance with, and within the limitation of, Article XI of the Hague Protocol (Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention, as amended) that the judge hearing the case award an additional amount to the plaintiff for court costs and other expenses of litigation, including attorneys' fees.

The Department of Defense has requested that in the event the United States ratifies The Hague Protocol the reservation permitted by Article XXVI be declared by ratification to the depository State that the Convention as amended by the Protocol shall not apply to the carriage of persons, cargo and baggage for United States military authorities on aircraft, registered in the United States, the whole capacity of which has been reserved or on behalf of such authorities.

The United States had, at the time of adherence, made an equivalent reservation under the Warsaw Convention. A objection is interposed by the other members of IGIA to this request, and it is accordingly included in this communication.

In summary, it is recommended that the Department of State advise the President to maintain the request for Senate advice and consent to The Hague Protocol and to commend complementary legislation as set forth in alternative 2 modified as previously indicated to change the amount of the automatic insurance from \$25,000 to \$100,000. It is also suggested that every effort be made to obtain Senate advice and consent to the Protocol as soon as possible in order to expedite the coming into effect of the Hague Protocol thus relieving claimants from the present \$8,300 limit of liability provided in the Warsaw Convention.

If the recommendations made by the IGIA meet your approval, I recommend that you concur in the appointment of a committee composed of the representatives of the Departments of State and Justice, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Agency, which would be charged with the preparation of the legislation in time for consideration by all agencies and for inclusion in the administration's legislative programs for the 88th Congress.

The Department of Commerce and the Department of Labor were not in full agreement with the foregoing and have submitted separate letters (Attachments F and G<sup>3</sup>).

Sincerely,

N. E. HALABY  
Chairman, Interagency Group  
on International Aviation

Honorable DEAN RUSK  
The Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D.C.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 6, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Iceland and Pakistan, August 13, 1962.

#### Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

*Adherence deposited:* Mauritania, July 23, 1962.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962.

*Ratifications deposited:* Japan, June 4, 1962; Kuwait, July 3, 1962; Lebanon, June 18, 1962; Panama, July 9, 1962; Syrian Arab Republic, July 16, 1962.

#### Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Panama, July 17, 1962.

Protocol I to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Panama, July 17, 1962.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Panama, July 17, 1962.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Panama, July 17, 1962.

#### Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, as amended by protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2164). Signed at Paris May 4, 1910. 37 Stat. 1511.

*Acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom:* Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Léopoldville), May 31, 1962.

#### White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

*Acknowledged rights and obligations of the United Kingdom:* Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

*Notifications received that they consider themselves bound:* Dahomey, April 4, 1962; Ivory Coast, December 8, 1961.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## BILATERAL

### Ethiopia

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa August 3, 1962. Entered into force August 3, 1962.

### France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962.  
*Entered into force:* August 10, 1962.

### Japan

Protocol modifying and supplementing the convention for avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901). Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962. Enters into force on date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

### Mexico

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of August 23 and 29, 1957 (TIAS 3905), for the continuation of a cooperative meteorological program in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico August 8, 1962. Entered into force August 8, 1962.

### Pakistan

Agreement relating to the commitment of \$500 million by the United States to the Pakistan second 5-year plan. Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi July 25, 1962. Entered into force July 25, 1962.

### Thailand

Amendment to the agreement of March 13, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3522, 3842, and 4533), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962.  
*Entered into force:* August 16, 1962.

## PUBLICATION

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

Defense—Loan of Additional Vessels to China. TIAS 4828. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with China. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei June 8, 1961. Entered into force June 8, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4829. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of April 11, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi August 12, 1961. Entered into force August 12, 1961.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposal of Redistributable and Excess Property. TIAS 4830. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Belgium. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels July 7, 1961. Entered into force July 7, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4831. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Peru, amending the agreement of February 12, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima April 2 and July 31, 1961. Entered into force July 31, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4832. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Finland—Signed at Helsinki August 1, 1961. Entered into force August 14, 1961. With exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Account in Connection with Certain Agreements and Payment of Necessary Adjustment Refunds. TIAS 4833. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Austria. Exchange of notes—Signed at Vienna June 26 and July 26, 1961. Entered into force July 26, 1961.

United States Educational Foundation in Burma. TIAS 4834. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Burma, amending the agreement of December 22, 1947, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rangoon August 29, 1961. Entered into force August 29, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4835. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ceylon, amending the agreement of June 18, 1958, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Colombo August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4836. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ceylon, amending the agreement of March 13, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Colombo August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 4837. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of August 4, 1955. Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Entered into force provisionally August 4, 1960. Entered into force definitively September 13, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title I of the Act. TIAS 4838. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador August 21, 1961. Entered into force August 21, 1961. With exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador August 21 and 24, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Arrangements in Connection with Shipment of Cargo of Rice. TIAS 4839. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Ceylon, relating to the agreement of March 13, 1959, as amended May 28, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 1 and 8, 1959. Entered into force December 8, 1959. Operative retroactively November 10, 1959.

Space Research Program. TIAS 4840. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 8, 1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

Disposal of United States Excess Property in Canada. TIAS 4841. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Canada, replacing the agreement of April 11 and 18, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa August 28 and September 1, 1961. Entered into force September 1, 1961.

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494	8/13	Rusk: Veterans of Foreign Wars.
495	8/14	Lumber talks with Canada.
*496	8/13	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*497	8/16	Ball: Senate Finance Committee.
498	8/15	Rusk interview by BBC for Telstar transmission.
*499	8/15	Rusk: death of FSO's in Nepal.
500	8/16	International wool study group meeting.
501	8/16	Developments on Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol.
†502	8/16	Income-tax protocol with Japan.
503	8/16	Schaezel: "The United States and the Common Market."
504	8/16	Delegation to Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO regional meeting (rewrite).
505	8/16	Delegation to 14th ICAO Assembly (rewrite).
506	8/17	Resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru.
†507	8/17	Coppock: "Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security."
*509	8/18	Rucker appointed labor adviser, Bureau of African Affairs (biographic details).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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### REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961

the

Department

of

State

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to "... matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which "... will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

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# Bulletin

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1211 • PUBLICATION 7425

September 10, 1962

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security

by Joseph D. Coppock  
Director, Foreign Economic Advisory Staff<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly many visitors at Chautauqua have commented on the Chautauqua slogan, "Where Education and Recreation Meet." And undoubtedly most of the programs here combine education and recreation. But for the life of me I do not see how I am going to work any recreation into the topic of "Foreign Economic Policy and Our National Security." Education, yes; recreation, no. The linking of foreign economic policy and national security is a fairly recent development in American discussions of public affairs. Chautauqua audiences of 1882 or 1892, and possibly even those of 1922 or 1932, would have been inclined to put foreign economic policy in one compartment and national security in another. Foreign economic policy, in their minds, would probably have boiled down to the height of the U.S. tariff on imports, which was to be changed according to internal politics, not according to the international political situation. National security would have been seen to depend almost entirely on the great oceans separating us from Europe and Asia, on avoiding "entangling alliances," on maintaining national unity, on keeping an Army and Navy of modest size, and on holding a dominant position in the Western Hemisphere. The precepts of Washington, Monroe, and Lincoln provided ample policy guidance.

Those happy days disappeared with World War I though our thinking about foreign economic policy and national security did not undergo a drastic change until World War II. In 1962 national security is not assured by the oceans, by avoiding alliances, by having a dominant position

in the Western Hemisphere, by having a modest Army and Navy. And foreign economic policy cannot be limited to tinkering with the tariff.

Instead, in this era since World War II we seek national security by maintaining a large Military Establishment—one that would look very strange to Admiral Dewey or General Pershing; by working closely with other nations through such organizations as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Organization of American States; and by engaging in international economic and social arrangements the like of which the world has never before known. Governmental actions affecting our foreign economic relations now cover a wide range of matters and often determine whether another country is to be an ally, a friend, a neutral, or an enemy.

While many things affecting our national security have changed since the late 19th century, some have remained constant. The successful functioning of the U.S. political system is just as important now as it was then. It is difficult to overstate the contribution of our representative, constitutional Government and our ideal of scrupulous respect for and protection of the freedoms and rights of individual persons. The economic progress of the United States is just as important now as it was earlier. Without the economic base we would certainly lack the *means* to provide for our national security; without the political base we would probably lack the *will* to provide for it.

At this point I should like to say something about the notion of national security. A nation is secure if it is safe against conquest by foreign countries. Conquest may be by external pressure or by internal subversion. Stated thus baldly, it is instantly apparent that no nation has

<sup>1</sup>Address made at Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, N.Y., on Aug. 21 (press release 507 dated Aug. 17; as-derived text).

ever had complete security. The Roman Empire came closer to it than any other political state in recorded history. Such security is impossible in a world of rival national states, but nations rarely cease trying to reduce their exposure to conquest. Some consider a good offense the best defense. Some try to make their countries into impregnable fortresses. Some set up alliances. Some move from alliance to alliance in an effort to maintain a balance of power. Some organize systems of collective security. In the contemporary world no nation can have even an approximation of complete national security. At best, it can only reduce its insecurity.

Sometimes people—even Americans—get so concerned about national security that they forget about other values. The United States of America was organized “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, . . . promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”—not just to “provide for the common defence.”

#### Current Issues in Foreign Economic Relations

In these opening remarks I have talked in quite general terms about national security and foreign economic policy. Only rarely, however, can a government—even the United States Government—deal with these matters in general terms, through such broad initiatives as the trade agreements program, the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Point 4 Program, the atoms-for-peace proposal, the Alliance for Progress. To a very large extent government actions in the international sphere are responses to specific events or pressures, domestic or foreign—not dramatic, sweeping policy proposals. I should like, therefore, to cite some concrete examples of current issues in the field of foreign economic relations. Most of these examples have a direct or indirect bearing on national security. Some are real; others are paraphrases of the real.

The government of country *A* protests vigorously the imposition of higher tariffs by the President of the United States on articles *x* and *y*, following investigations by the Tariff Commission, in accordance with the latest version of the Trade Agreements Act.

The government of country *B*, a European neutral, seeks U.S. support for its application to be an associate member of the European Economic Community—the Common Market.

The finance minister of country *C*, an underdeveloped country, wants the United States and the Soviet Union to coordinate their aid program in country *C*.

The government of country *D* requests a team of economic advisers to help it draw up an economic development plan which will provide a basis for an application for an international loan or grant.

The foreign minister of country *E* informs our Ambassador that his government is considering signing an agreement with the Soviet Union which will allow regular Soviet air service to country *E*.

Country *F*, a newly independent country, wants U.S. advice in setting up a central bank and a monetary system.

Some prominent United States Senators inform the Secretary of State that he must persuade the Western European countries to increase their aid contributions to the less developed countries. U.S. aid is to be continued on its present large scale.

The government of country *G* wants item *z* removed from the list of commodities which NATO countries have agreed not to ship to the Communist countries on the ground that it is no longer strategic.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations recommends that U.S. aid to country *H* be made available through the U.N. as a part of a multilateral aid program.

Several dozen Congressmen sign a letter to the President requesting the imposition of import quotas on item *o*.

A former Cabinet officer calls on high State Department officials to express his hopes that the U.S. import quota of country *I* for commodity *w* will be increased by at least 25 percent.

The government of country *J* seizes the property of a U.S. corporation in country *J*, without notice and without promise of proper compensation.

At the summer session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations a group of less developed countries proposes a world trade

ference. The U.S. delegation asks for instructions.

The government and press of country *K* protest strongly the proposed disposal of U.S. stockpile surplus of commodity *r*.

The U.S. Ambassador to country *Z* reports that the government of *Z* will fall if the U.S. does not make an emergency loan of \$50 million in the next weeks.

Country *M*'s ambassador asks the State Department what the U.S. position would be on his country's application to become a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Country *N* seeks a large credit from the International Monetary Fund to meet a run on its currency.

A U.S. delegate to a meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development sends instructions for a discussion of restrictions on international capital movements.

An intergovernmental study group reports on the growing stocks and declining price of commodity *h*, a major export item for several friendly less developed countries.

The U.S. Ambassador to country *O* reports that country *O* is not cooperating with the United States in refusing to restrict imports of Cuban sugar.

Some influential Europeans ask for suggestions on how, in connection with the negotiations for British entrance into the European Economic Community, the problems of trade with the British Commonwealth might be eased.

The U.S. Ambassador to country *P* reports that the president of country *P* is eager to come to Washington to solicit a \$300 million long-term loan.

The ambassador of country *Q* reports to the State Department that in view of the import restrictions being imposed by the United States on certain exports from his country, *Q*'s imports from the United States will have to be curtailed unless, of course, some financial assistance can be provided to meet the emerging deficit in *Q*'s balance of international payments.

A major U.S. industry requests the State Department to do everything possible to guarantee its export markets abroad and to establish tighter quotas on imports of competing products coming into the United States.

A U.S. representative to the United Nations asks

for instructions for participation in a debate on the economic consequences of disarmament.

The government of country *R* registers a protest with the U.S. Ambassador over the requirement that its aid funds from the United States be used to buy goods only from the United States.

The ambassador of country *S* requests a meeting with U.S. representatives to discuss revision of the existing treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation. He says it discriminates against the citizens of *S*.

Country *T* is offered a major manufacturing plant on easy credit terms by a Communist government, according to reliable reports reaching the U.S. Ambassador to country *T*.

The U.S. Treasury reports that the U.S. balance of payments is still in a deficit condition and recommends that defense procurement abroad be reduced and that an increasing amount of economic aid to other countries be tied to procurement in the United States.

As a result of an ideological rift, Communist country *U*'s trade with the Soviet Union is cut in half. *U*'s foreign minister asks the U.S. Ambassador about trade opportunities or credits to prevent the country from economic collapse.

The Russians agree to discuss again the settlement of the World War II lend-lease transactions.

The government of country *V*, a recipient of substantial U.S. aid, announces the arrival of a Soviet military mission to advise on the production of certain types of weapons.

The foreign minister of country *W* proposes a world commodity control agreement for commodity *g*, which is sold principally in the United States.

A U.S. agricultural organization protests the U.S. policy which embargoes exports of U.S. wheat to Communist China while Canadian and Australian exporters make large sales there.

The Soviet Government offers some European countries crude oil at favorable prices in return for large quantities of industrial equipment.

A group of Senators offers an amendment to the proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which would make it more difficult for the U.S. Government to bargain with the European Economic Community for lower tariffs.

Country *X*'s president asks the U.S. Ambassador if the United States Government would ask the International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development to take the lead in organizing a consortium to finance a major long-term development program for country X.

The finance minister of country Y reports to the U.S. Ambassador that country Y will not contribute to the development fund for country Z. Balance-of-payments reasons are cited.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations reports to the State Department that the United Nations is running short of money to finance the U.N. operations in the Congo.

### Dealing With the Problems

That may seem to you like a long list. In fact it is only the merest sample of the torrent of primarily economic problems and requests and complaints that pour into the State Department—by telegram, by telephone, by dispatch, by letter, by personal conference. This sample might be considered a good single day's "haul." There are also the informational and cultural—educational—scientific issues. Then, most important of all, there are the political and military communications with important military implications.

How should the Department of State—or more generally the U.S. Government—deal with problems such as those I have enumerated? Maybe I should ask, "How would you deal with them?" Your first reaction might be the same as that of many officials, namely, to hope that the problems will go away if they are neglected for a while. But time heals only some things. Most problems such as these have to be dealt with, even if they cannot be solved. The U.S. Government cannot pass the buck.

If the problems will not go away, you—if you are like many people in Washington—might try the off-the-cuff or *ad hoc* method of dealing with them. There are some interesting variants of this method. One is to meet with the parties raising the problem, say in Paris, and try to persuade them that the problem is not really as bad as contended, or that if anything were done about it the consequences of action would be worse than living with the problem. A second variant is to express a willingness to discuss the problem at some length, perhaps some months in the future, or even to have a "study group" or "task force" or "working party" set up to inquire into the matter in the course of the next year or so. A third variant is to respond with

a definite proposal, meeting the problem in whole or in part. One trouble with the off-the-cuff or *ad hoc* approach is that contradictory and inconsistent decisions are likely to be made. This hazard is especially great when many different persons are making the decisions. It is like leaving selling prices entirely up to the clerks in a large department store.

A third general approach to problems of this sort is to rely on policies, that is, principles or guides to decision making. A cynic once said that a policy is what you refer to when you want to say "No." There is obviously some truth in that remark, since a proposal within the framework of a policy does not have to be curbed by the policy. Rigid rules are out of the question, but policies do have a place as a counterweight to the off-the-cuff response.

Policies appropriate to current conditions cannot be lifted off the shelf of history nor taken off the production line ready-made. Policies have to be worked and reworked in the light of objective sought and problems faced. A foreign economic policy that contributes to one objective may not contribute to another. For example, the imposition of an economic embargo on a country for national security reasons is almost certain to rebound negatively on our national economic well-being.

### U.S. Foreign Economic Policies

Let us now look squarely at the foreign economic relations of the United States and see how our policies in this realm contribute to our national security. The foreign economic relations of a country are of four types: movements of people, interchange of ideas having economic consequences, financial transactions, and trade in goods and services. Government policies can and do affect all four types.

#### Movements of People

Since shortly after World War I the United States has had a policy, embodied in legislation of limiting "quota immigration" to 150,000 persons per year, although there have been exceptions in favor of various groups. Immigrants have actually averaged 236,000 per year during the 1950's. The population of the United States is now more than 180 million, and it is expected to be 260 mi-

tion by 1980. National security depends to only a limited degree on sheer manpower, so it is difficult to see how a further substantial increase in population, which would presumably result from lowering the immigration barriers, would contribute to national security. There are no restrictions of consequence on leaving the United States.

Temporary travel of foreigners in the United States and of Americans to foreign countries is restricted only when internal security considerations are involved. The restrictions affect very few people. In 1960 nearly 2 million Americans traveled abroad and about 1.2 million foreigners visited here. Travel greatly increases understanding and helps to build a sense of common interest among people of different countries. Although the effects may be of the longrun variety, travel would appear to contribute to national security.

#### **Interchange of Information**

The interchange of information between the United States and other countries is extensive. Much of this information has economic consequences. The interchange of information is on such a scale and is accomplished by so many means in the contemporary world that it is difficult for governments to control much of it for very long. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government, like other governments, can and does affect the international flow of information. With minor exceptions the U.S. Government has been a promoter, not a censor. Looked at from the point of view of national security, the outflow of information with economic implications can help the economies of countries which are able to threaten our national security, as well as those of friendly countries. As a practical matter, however, the information which we might restrict is generally available from other countries. It is very difficult to enforce any kind of a boycott internationally. Moreover, if we tried to restrict the outflow of information, other countries might try to restrict their outflow and thus impede our inflow. Of course, one hears of proposals occasionally to impede our inflow on our own initiative—in order to keep us ignorant of foreign ideas! Obviously, the international interchange of knowledge has a lot to do with economic life and economic progress, and indirectly with national security, but the difficulties and disadvantages of control measures generally outweigh any possible benefit.

#### **Financial Transactions**

Financial relations among nations involve the transfer of property, including currencies and securities, between individuals or organizations of different countries. Different currencies are used in many transactions; so exchange rates between currencies are necessarily involved. Some of the international financial transactions are in connection with trade in goods and services; some are in connection with the advancing or repaying of loans; some are in connection with the making or repatriating of direct investments; some are in connection with private or governmental gifts; some involve gold. The United States has fewer controls over international financial transactions than any other country in the world. An individual may buy foreign currencies with dollars whether he wants to take a foreign trip, buy a foreign product, buy a foreign security, make a gift to friends or religious institutions abroad or simply collect foreign currencies as a hobby. An American may not buy monetary gold, however.<sup>2</sup> Foreigners, with minor exceptions, may make similar transactions involving dollars, provided, of course, their governments do not restrict them. U.S. policy in the monetary field makes its contribution to national security indirectly—through its facilitation of international trade, communication, and investment.

The U.S. Government engages in other international financial transactions. As everybody knows, it makes aid funds available to selected foreign countries. It also, among other things, sells gold to foreign official agencies, makes loans through the Export-Import Bank of Washington, contributes to the capital of the International Monetary Fund (for short-term loans), and helps finance the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (for long-term loans).

The international financial transactions which have the closest connection with our national security are of two sorts. One includes the foreign private investments of U.S. companies, for example, in oil. The other consists of the Government loans and grants to foreign countries, usually called "foreign aid." These private and governmental capital transfers enable foreign countries to obtain real economic resources they would not otherwise be able to obtain. Consumption and

<sup>2</sup> For text of an Executive order of July 20, see BULLETIN OF AUG. 20, 1962, p. 292.

production levels are raised. These countries are thus better able to bear necessary defense burdens, are less vulnerable to Communist political penetration and subversion. They are more closely linked with the United States in economic partnership than they would otherwise be. Economic aid is, in many cases, a substitute for military aid. Hence, there is a close positive correlation, in most circumstances, between our national security and our foreign investments, loans, and grants.

### **Trade in Goods and Services**

The fourth and last category of international economic relations—trade in goods and services—receives an immense amount of attention of governments, including the United States Government. The general policy of the United States is to permit goods and services to be bought and sold without interference, internationally as well as domestically. There are many exceptions to this policy in our foreign trade, however, just as there are in our domestic. Exports to the Communist bloc countries are either not permitted at all or are limited to nonstrategic items. Exports to other countries are unrestricted; in fact, they are promoted by the U.S. Government. Many kinds of imports are subject to tariffs, which range from less than 5 percent to more than 100 percent ad valorem. Some types of imports—for example, oil and sugar—are limited by quotas. U.S. imports of goods amount to about \$15 billion per year, exports to about \$20 billion. These figures represent about 12 to 15 percent of total world trade and about 3 to 4 percent of U.S. gross national product. Some types of imports are essential to the functioning of the U.S. economy; some U.S. exports are crucial to the functioning of various foreign economies.

With fewer restrictions on trade, the physical volume would undoubtedly be larger; with more restrictions, the physical volume would undoubtedly be smaller. How is our national security affected by the present policy of moderate restrictionism? This question has to be answered in parts. The restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites deny those countries certain types of goods from the United States. The tendency is thus to reduce their economic and military potential. Against this tendency, however, must be set the fact that

some of the goods denied to them by us are in considerable measure available to them from other sources and that they are not very dependent on them. Also, we buy nothing from Communist China and very little from the other Communist countries, so we fail almost entirely to drain goods away from them. We, as well as they, fail to reap the gains which would result from less restricted trade. Furthermore, by our refusing to permit very much trade we let the Soviet Union gain the propaganda advantage of being the advocate of freer trade. And we reduce the opportunities to expand the range of peaceful contacts. Under the law the President of the United States has the power, however, to modify the controls in the national interest and thus to take advantage of opportunities for gain. Though the sole purpose of this part of our foreign economic policy is to enhance our national security by impeding the economic-military progress of the Soviet Communist bloc, the controls clearly have only marginal value. Soviet military power is obviously a threat, despite our controls. Controls are in no sense a substitute for our own economic and military power.

Our commercial exports to non-Communist countries improve the economic life of those countries and thus contribute indirectly to our national security in much the same way our aid exports do. Our exports also enable us to buy our imports.

U.S. free trade policy with respect to about 40 percent of the dollar volume of imports enables Americans, as both consumers and producers, to have more goods and services, to have a greater variety of them, and to obtain them more cheaply than they would with tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions. The country is better off and can thus support heavier national security programs.

The restrictions on the remainder of our imports obviously restrict the volume of these imports in varying degrees and thus cut down on the gains from the international division of labor. Thus their tendency is to make the United States poorer and less able to support heavy national security programs. They also tend to make for less cordial relations with other countries and thus weaken the bonds of political cooperation which underlie military alliances. On the other hand, the limitation of imports could conceivably help to keep alive domestic industries which would be important to the national defense. Some industry

spokesmen have advocated tariffs for their industries on this ground. The executive branch, however, has rarely sought national security in this way, since the imposition of import taxes is a very indirect and uncertain method for assuring supplies. Outright government production and long-term government contracts with private firms, including a subsidy element if necessary, are much surer methods if the supplies are really needed.

The whole thrust of President Kennedy's proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which is also vigorously supported by former President Eisenhower, is to make it possible to reduce our barriers to imports so that we can establish firmer economic and political bonds with other friendly countries, in particular those in the North Atlantic area with which we are closely associated in the NATO military alliance. A firm partnership among the North Atlantic countries—based on a high degree of economic, cultural, political, and military interdependence—is the highroad to national security, and to world peace, in our time. Hence, it is correct to conclude that a foreign trade policy that calls for the reduction of tariffs, the elimination of quotas, and the minimizing of administrative restrictions on trade is in our national security interest. The few conceivable exceptions do not invalidate the general principle.

#### **Contributing to National Security Objectives**

This completes the review of U.S. foreign economic policies with respect to the four elements of our foreign economic relations—movements of people, interchange of information, financial transactions, and trade in goods and services—as they affect the national security position of the United States in the contemporary world. With certain exceptions, the policies clearly contribute to the national security objective. The principal weakness is in the field of international trade policy, but this weakness can be overcome in part if the Senate passes substantially the same trade expansion bill the House of Representatives has already passed with an overwhelming majority and if the President is then able to engage in effective trade negotiations with the members of the European Economic Community and other countries of the free world.

In conclusion I should like to put in perspective our foreign economic policies as contributors to

our national security. There is always the risk of overemphasizing some things and underemphasizing others. Certainly our military power, supplemented by that of our principal allies, is our primary, direct instrument for providing national security. Without it, and without the will to use it if necessary, the Communists would step up their expansionist drive.

Then, underlying our military power, there is the mighty U.S. economy, with total output as large as that of Western Europe and the Soviet Union combined. Our economy does not function as well as it should, but it is a major determinant of our national security.

In another dimension the vitality of our American society in its many aspects—political, cultural, educational, scientific, religious—provides the indispensable morale element of our national security. Also, Americans are increasingly alert to what is going on all over the world and are willing to enter into arrangements with other countries that hold promise of reducing the sources of conflict, of settling disputes peaceably, and of building a sense of world community. It is in this context that our foreign economic policies have their greatest significance. They are longrun instruments for peace and security as well as both longrun and shortrun instruments for economic gain.

### **Three Western Powers Issue Statement on Berlin**

*Following is the text of a tripartite statement on Berlin issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on August 23.*

Press release 518 dated August 23

The Soviet Government has announced the liquidation as of August 23, 1962, of the office of the Soviet Commandant in Berlin. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France note with concern that at a moment when tension has arisen in Berlin as a consequence of irresponsible action at the Wall by East Berlin guards the Soviet Government is attempting by unilateral steps to dilute long-existing Four-Power responsibilities and procedures in the City of Berlin.

It is quite clear that these unilateral steps can

have no effect whatsoever on either Allied rights or Soviet responsibilities in Berlin. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France will continue to exercise their full rights and discharge their full responsibilities in Berlin. They will continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the discharge of its obligations there.

The Soviet Government obviously has authority to organize or reorganize its military structure in Germany as it sees fit. It does not have the authority to abolish or change the Kommandatura (the Four-Power governing authority in Berlin) which was established by quadripartite agreement<sup>1</sup> on the basis of the rights accruing to the Four Powers as the result of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

The unwarranted withdrawal of the Soviet representative from the Kommandatura in 1948 did not destroy the authority of the Kommandatura, and the announced abolition of the office of the Soviet Commandant likewise cannot have that result. That office was established under Four-Power agreements as a part of the administrative machinery for Berlin, and its quadripartite responsibilities cannot be abolished by the Soviet Government without the consent of the three Western Powers.

The reference in the Soviet announcement to certain limited functions does not and cannot in any respect limit or restrict the full responsibilities of the Soviet Union in Berlin. Nor can the reference to the "temporary" discharge of functions in any way alter the fact that Four-Power responsibilities for Berlin can be changed only by Four-Power agreement and that fundamental responsibilities for Berlin can only be terminated by a peace settlement with Germany as a whole. There is no unilateral way to dispose of these responsibilities, and the Soviet assertions concerning the alleged sovereignty and independence of the so-called German Democratic Republic and the non-existence of the Four-Power Kommandatura are without foundation or effect.

Accordingly, the Commandants in the Western Sectors of Berlin will continue to exercise their rights and discharge their responsibilities both in their individual sectors and jointly in the Kommandatura in accordance with long-established

procedures and agreements. They will continue to consider the Soviet officials as responsible for carrying out their obligations regarding the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

Moreover, the Soviet announcement can in no way affect the unity of Berlin as a whole. Despite the illegality of the Wall and the brutality of the East German authorities in preventing the inhabitants of East Berlin from leaving that area, Berlin remains a single city. No unilateral action by the Soviet Government can change this.

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France cannot acquiesce in any impairment of their rights or in any encroachment threatening the life of Berlin. Responsibility for the consequences of any such attempts will rest entirely with the Soviet Government. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France must take whatever steps they think necessary to discharge their obligations to the population of Berlin and to protect their right and vital interests.

## U.S. Lays Tensions in Berlin to Soviet Erection of Wall

*Following is the text of a U.S. note delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on August 24 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow. Similar notes were delivered by France and the United Kingdom.*

Press release 519 dated August 24

The United States Government wishes to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the situation in Berlin, which has been recently aggravated by the brutal killing on the Berlin Wall of Peter Fechter, a young German. This must be a matter of deep concern to the Four Powers which have the responsibility for Berlin.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet note of August 10<sup>2</sup> gives evidence of the acceptance by the Soviet Government of that responsibility.

The Soviet Government's note contains numerous errors of fact. There have been no Western acts endangering human life. As for the suggestion that the Allies and the West Berlin au

<sup>1</sup> For a Department statement and text of the 1944 agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1960, p. 554.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 377.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1962, p. 320.



authorities have been the authors of provocative actions, this seems, in the existing circumstances in Berlin, singularly ironic. The tensions which have undoubtedly recently arisen in Berlin are due to the building of the Wall on August 13 last year, which cut the city in two, and to the attitude of the Soviet Government in opposing by every means free circulation within the city. The responsibility for the Wall and for its consequences rests solely with the Soviet Government. This action a violation of international agreements and of the most elementary principles of humanity has been further aggravated by the attitude and actions of the East German authorities toward the inhabitants of the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

The very existence of a wall which prevents the inhabitants of East Berlin and of East Germany from leaving that area bears eloquent testimony to the character of the regime. The brutality which the East German regime has continually used toward its inhabitants trying to seek refuge in West Berlin has long been notorious. Despite this, recent acts by the East German authorities operating in areas for which the Soviet Government is responsible, and in particular the cold-blooded killing along the Wall of many Germans, including women and young people are daily causing growing horror in the civilized world.

The latest incident, the killing of Peter Fechter, is of a particularly revolting nature. On August 7 this 18-year-old worker who tried to enter the Western Sectors of Berlin was shot down by East Berlin guards at the Wall dividing the city. Gravely wounded, he lay for an hour near the Wall without help and in full view of the public before he died.

It is evident that such acts contrary to the principles of humanity can only deeply affect the sentiments of the population of Berlin and cause a deterioration in the climate of the city.

For their part, the United States Government and its allies, far from encouraging provocative action, have made every effort to maintain calm and order in the city. It was in this spirit and in recognition of the Four-Power responsibility for Berlin that they made their proposal in their note of June 25<sup>3</sup> that representatives of the Four Powers meet in Berlin to review the incidents which had occurred since the Wall was built "with

a view to avoiding, by all appropriate methods, the recurrence of such incidents, in particular by seeking means to facilitate the movement of persons and goods within Berlin."

This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government on July 14, and the Soviet Commandant also rejected on August 19 the invitation which was issued with the same purpose by the United States, British, and French Commandants. In these circumstances, it is hard to see how the Soviet Government expects the tension provoked by the East Berlin and East German authorities to be reduced. The United States Government nevertheless is prepared to persist in its attempts to bring about joint consultation with the Soviet authorities with a view to preventing further deterioration of the situation in Berlin. Accordingly, the United States Government repeats its proposal for a quadripartite meeting, preferably at Berlin, which could provide for the establishment of the necessary contacts in accordance with existing agreements.

## **U.N. Plan for Peaceful Achievement of Congo Unity Supported by U.S.**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 523 dated August 25

The Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations has come forward with a plan for the Congo that offers a reasonable basis upon which Congolese leaders can settle their differences. The United States supports the Secretary-General's efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in the Congo.

The United States Government hopes that the U.N. proposals will be accepted in the spirit in which they have been offered—as a sincere effort to bring about a national settlement.

In putting forward its peace plan, the United Nations is acting in a manner consistent with its role of assisting the Congolese, at the request of the Government of the Congo, to resolve outstanding problems of that country.

The United Nations plan calls for a Federal Constitution that leaves room for a considerable measure of local autonomy. Both parties have spoken with approval of such a Constitution. It also calls for an agreement on a division of revenues and provides an important place in the Na-

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, July 16, 1962, p. 97.

tional Congolese Government for Mr. [Moise] Tshombe's political party.

The logic of the Acting Secretary-General's proposals offers compelling reasons for other nations to lend their support so that statesmanship in the Congo may put that nation on the road to federal unity and progress. Such progress will enable the United Nations and countries like the United States to devote greater resources to economic and technical assistance in the Congo. Progress toward conciliation is vital, not only to the people of the Congo but also to the stability of Central Africa.

### **Soviet Minister of Agriculture Visits United States**

The Departments of Agriculture and State announced on August 25 (press release 522 dated August 24) that a group of Soviet agricultural experts, headed by Konstantin Georgiyevich Pysin, Minister of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., would come to the United States about September 10 for a month's tour of American farmlands in the West and Midwest.

The visit of the Soviet agricultural group is being made within the framework of the agreement on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields for 1962-63, which was signed at Washington on March 8, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to Minister Pysin, the Soviet group includes Mikhail Aleksandrovich Olshanskiy, President of the Academy of Agricultural Sci-

ences, whom Mr. Pysin succeeded as Minister of Agriculture in April 1962; Vladimir Ivanovich Polyakov, editor of a Soviet farm newspaper *Agricultural Life* (*Selskoye zhizn*); Andrei Stepanovich Shevchenko of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences; and G. A. Nalivayko, Director of the Altai Agricultural Scientific-Research Institute.

Accompanying the Soviet group will be an American team from the U.S. Department of Agriculture headed by E. T. York, Jr., Administrator of the Federal Extension Service. The other Department of Agriculture officials on the tour will be Eugene T. Olson, Soviet Agricultural Affairs Officer of the Foreign Agricultural Service, and a press officer. An interpreter from the Department of State will also make the trip.

During their stay in this country members of the Soviet group will confer with officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and cooperating land-grant institutions on education and information methods and techniques in the field of agriculture and will observe how scientific agricultural methods are utilized by the family farmers of the nation to produce a constantly increasing abundance of agricultural products. The itinerary for the tour is being worked out and will be announced later.

### **Letters of Credence**

#### *Lebanon*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Lebanon Ibrahim Al-Ahdab, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on August 22. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 57, dated August 22.

<sup>1</sup> For a statement made at the signing ceremony by Charles E. Bohlen and text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 652; for text of the agreement, see Department of State press release 151 dated Mar. 8.

## Ohio and the World

by Foy D. Kohler

*Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

I am highly honored to have been invited to join today's ceremony and to share with this graduating class the deep gratification of receiving a degree from the Ohio State University. In my other special case, I am grateful to the university authorities for waiving the rules applying to most of my fellow graduates, in particular the normal residence requirements. Much as I love my State and my university, it has been impossible for me to spend much time here in the years since I received my first degree back in 1931. But I like to think I am otherwise not an unqualified interloper among my new classmates.

The flattering citation in your program, with its reference to travel and meetings, indicates that personal contact and communication between governments at high levels still plays a role in the conduct of international affairs. I must reveal to you, though, that this is only a small part of the picture—just the top of the iceberg. Diplomacy is no longer a matter of dealing with a handful of leaders, of influencing a sovereign. It bears only remote resemblance to the glamorous picture of personal intrigue emerging from old histories and romantic novels and exciting “whodunits.”

Modern diplomacy is rather a continuing and exhaustive study of whole societies and of their interrelationships. Embracing all the academic disciplines, today's diplomacy requires knowledge of the history, the culture, the political, economic, technological, and social forces at work in the so-

ciety in which the diplomat resides. It requires careful evaluation of the direction in which these forces will move within that society and of the effect they will have on relations between that society and other societies—especially his own.

But all this study, all this analysis, all this evaluation, all this resulting knowledge of man and his environment is not an end in itself. The diplomat must seek the means to influence the movement of these social forces toward the goal of assuring for his fellow citizen and for his fellow man the enjoyment of his unalienable right to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” If this purpose is to be achieved in today's shrinking world, the art of persuasive communication, as diplomacy has sometimes been described, cannot be limited to a few leaders or professionals. Communication must extend throughout the social complex and even to mass populations. This would not be an easy job in a static world. It is a most difficult and complicated one in a world characterized by rapid change. It is not a job which the diplomat can do by himself. He can at best only reflect and project the will and the power of his own people. To me my native State is the yardstick and the test of American life. I come back for renewal.

For more than a century and a half of our national life we Americans were almost wholly preoccupied with the development of our own vast country, happily isolated from what we regarded as the irrational conduct of the rest of the world. The great Midwest was the specially sheltered center of the prevailing isolationist sentiment. World War I finally fetched us out of our shells, but we crawled back into them as soon as it was over. That event did shake us enough, however,

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, on Aug. 24 (press release 517 dated Aug. 23). Mr. Kohler, whose nomination by the President to be Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. had been confirmed by the Senate on Aug. 17, was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters.

to lead to the establishment, in 1924, of our first really professional Foreign Service.

When I entered that Foreign Service 7 years later, I was one of two successful candidates who claimed Ohio as home and the only one from Ohio State. We brought to 30 the number of Ohioans in a Foreign Service Officer Corps of about 750 members. Today Ohio contributes more than 300 members to the greatly expanded corps of nearly 3,700 officers. The ratio of Ohioans in the Foreign Service has thus more than doubled, and Ohio's percentage contribution to the Service now considerably exceeds its percentage of the country's population. Ohio State ranks 19th on the list of over 200 universities providing successful Foreign Service candidates over the past 5 years.

#### **Americans Readjusting to Changing Role**

This increased participation of Ohioans—and I may add of Midwesterners in general—in the professional handling of international affairs is happily a reflection of a more basic phenomenon. It is a measure of the readjustment of Americans to the drastic and dramatic changes which have taken place in our role in the world over these past 30 years, particularly during and since World War II. We now realize that our longtime preoccupation with our own development was only possible because we enjoyed the protection of Great Britain's rule of the waves. We have accepted our obligation to pick up the burden that Britain had to lay down. Rejecting the precedent of our action after World War I, we have taken the lead in setting up a global United Nations Organization. Breaking with cherished tradition, we are today allied with some 42 nations for our own security and the security of the free world. We recognize that these are indivisible. Today we know that it is no longer possible for us to live to ourselves and for ourselves alone. We can take pride in the fact that it was a great Senator from our neighbor State, Arthur Vandenberg, who was a key figure in, and remains the symbol of, this epochal readjustment in our national attitudes.

I find that many fellow Ohioans who have lived at home throughout this period are hardly conscious of the extent of the changes which have taken place in their own lives and attitudes. It is only when we look back, like a traveler on a mountain road, that we realize how far we have come

and how high we have climbed. In the late 1930's our Congress was preoccupied with "neutrality" legislation in the fatuous hope we could insulate ourselves from approaching world conflict. Only 10 years later the Senate ratified the treaty establishing the North Atlantic alliance, which enables us to do something effective about deterring conflict. This is indeed a fantastic distance to have traveled in so short a time. Today Ohio's increased participation in the Foreign Service is paralleled by other and abundant evidence of active acceptance of America's changed role in the world. I am reassured, when I come back home, to note such signs as the development of profusion of popular organizations devoted to world affairs, the increased reporting and discussion of international news, the expansion of training facilities in world subjects in schools and universities, or the establishment of a Graduate Institute for World Affairs here at Ohio State. I am encouraged, if I may say so, by my invitation to talk to you today and to receive an honorary degree—certainly the first one ever awarded by Ohio State for activities in the field of foreign affairs.

#### **The Pace Is Quickening**

But the pace is quickening. We are in the midst of a technical and technological revolution which has shrunk our planet physically to the point where man is already reaching out for the universe. The development of jet and rocket engines, the wonders of chemistry, the power of the atom, the miracles of electronics are changing and will continue to change the very nature of the physical environment in which we live. The development of the arts and sciences of communication has opened up vast areas and released the energies of vast populations previously living in isolation, ignorance, and misery. We refer to their demand for a better life as the "revolution of rising expectations." The worldwide availability of modern medical science has so reduced the toll of disease and lengthened the span of life as to produce almost literally an explosion of the earth's population. What we in the past comfortably referred to as a total of 2 billion people has now passed billion and is predicted to double—to 6 billion—by the end of the century. The free nations of Europe, from which we sprang and with which we

are closely allied, are engaged in an historic process of moving toward economic, political, and social unification. All these factors will face us with the most serious problems and require of us the ability to make even greater readjustments than we have to date. They may well involve fundamental reform of the free world's trading and financial systems and will certainly affect our domestic economy.

We will have to cope with all of this in a world where free societies are challenged as never before by a relentlessly hostile political system. Its leaders claim that only that system—materialistic in concept, authoritarian in nature—is capable of solving the problems besetting mankind. They proclaim, as a matter of historical inevitability, that that system is destined to rule the world.

It is thus up to us—up to every one of us—to prove them wrong. We must show that we can solve the great problems ahead by methods consistent with the freedom and dignity of man. We must show that we can adjust to the changes which science is making in man's environment without damage to the political institutions which assure to us freedom with order and justice. We must show that our system satisfies not only the material but the spiritual wants of man. We must show that it provides equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for all. The example of a strong, healthy, and adaptable society in our own country will be the fundamental factor in the contest in which we are engaged.

Change is not easy. Change always encounters resistance, particularly when the need seems to be thrust upon us from outside, as is the case in this era. There is a tendency to look for a scapegoat, and more often than not eyes turn toward the Foreign Service, which deals with these intruding concerns, along with the State Department and the White House. President Kennedy, speaking recently to members of our American Foreign Service Association, discussed the problem very frankly with us. "Change is what we need in a changing world," he said, "[but] when we embark on new policies, we drag along all the anchors of old opinions and old views. . . . This is not an easy career, to be a Foreign Service officer," he continued. "It is not an easy life. The Foreign Service and the White House are bound to be in the center of every great controversy in-

volving the security of the United States, and there is nothing you can do about it. . . . Those who cannot stand the heat," he concluded, "should get out of the kitchen."

We in the Foreign Service agree with the President that, whatever the heat, the place to be is in the kitchen. Personally, I am not sure the heat will be so intense. When I look back down the slope, as I have with you today, and realize how far we have already come, I turn and look forward with confidence that the going will be even easier ahead. And as my wife and I leave for a new mission abroad, it will be with the feeling that our fellow citizens back home are partners in that mission. Indeed yours is the greater part. You must keep America a shining example of a strong, wise, and generous society, changing in its adaptation to a changing world environment, but changeless in its faith in the worth and the dignity of man. For our part it will be a high privilege and a pleasant duty to represent you abroad.

## Executive Order Sets Up Procedures To Coordinate Disarmament Matters

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

#### INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MATTERS

WHEREAS there has been established by law the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and

WHEREAS the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides that the Director of that Agency shall be the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters and requires the Director to assume primary responsibility within the Government for such matters under the direction of the Secretary of State; and

WHEREAS the Act authorizes and directs the said Director to coordinate significant aspects of the United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters; and

WHEREAS it is desirable that the President establish procedures for coordination, and for the resolution of differences of opinion between the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other affected Government agencies, concerning all significant aspects of arms control and disarmament policy and related matters;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (75 Stat.

<sup>1</sup> No. 11044; 27 Fed. Reg. 8341.

631; 50 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Definitions.* As used hereinafter:

(a) The word "Director" means the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(b) The term "affected agencies" shall include the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and, when not inappropriate in the context, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and shall include also such other agencies as the Director may designate hereunder.

(c) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" shall be defined as they are defined in section 3(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

(d) The term "related matters" shall include those matters which are necessary to, desirable for, or otherwise directly connected with the functions described in sections 3 and 4 of this order.

Sec. 2. *Cooperation.* The Director and the heads of affected agencies shall keep each other fully and currently informed on all significant aspects of United States arms control and disarmament policy and related matters, including current and prospective policies, plans and programs. Differences of opinion concerning arms control and disarmament policy and related matters arising between the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other affected agencies with respect to such subjects which involve major matters of policy and cannot be resolved through consultation shall be promptly referred to the President for decision. In such instances the head of an agency presenting recommendations with respect to such differences to the President shall give the heads of affected agencies notice of the occasion for and substance of his recommendations.

Sec. 3. *Policy coordination.* (a) The Director shall establish procedures consistent with this order and the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to assure coordination of:

(1) his recommendations to the Secretary of State and the President and to the heads of affected agencies relating to United States arms control and disarmament policy;

(2) Government planning for the conduct and support of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation, including the comprehensive and balanced plan provided for in Section 4 of this order;

(3) Government planning for the dissemination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament;

(4) the preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field; and


(5) the preparation for, operation of or, as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

(b) The Director shall exercise leadership in assuring that differences of opinion concerning arms control and

disarmament policy and related matters are resolved expeditiously and shall take such steps as may be appropriate in order to produce common or harmonious action among the agencies concerned.

Sec. 4. *Research.* With the advice and assistance of affected agencies, the Director shall develop and keep current a comprehensive and balanced program of research, development and other studies needed to be conducted by or for the Government for arms control and disarmament policy formulation. The Director shall maintain a continuing inventory of Federal activities related to the planned program and advise the affected agencies as to their respective participations in the planned program in order to produce harmonious action and prevent duplication of effort. The Director shall periodically submit to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget a consolidated schedule of such activities with assessments of their respective programs by the responsible agencies, together with his evaluations regarding these activities.

Sec. 5. *Force and armament levels.* The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Director informed with respect to the planning of armed forces levels and armaments and, for consideration in connection with such planning, the Director shall furnish the Secretary of Defense statements of existing and projected arms control and disarmament policies.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
August 20, 1962.

## President Liberalizes Travel to Guam and Pacific Trust Territory

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated August 23

On Tuesday, August 21, 1962, the President signed an order<sup>1</sup> rescinding Executive Order 8683 of February 14, 1941, under which the Navy exercised entry control into the Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area and Airspace Reservation. Entry into the territory previously required prior Navy security clearance, although in effect United States citizens have been free to enter the territory since September 1961.

The President's action, which removes this requirement, was recommended by the Secretaries of

<sup>1</sup> No. 11045; 27 *Fed. Reg.* 8511.

State, Defense, and the Interior. The rescission of the 1941 order now places Guam, insofar as entry of persons is concerned, in the same status as the United States, controlled under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. The Department of Defense will continue to exercise control over entry into military and naval installations in Guam, including Apra Harbor.

Removal of entry controls is expected to encourage the development of the civilian economy of Guam. It will, for example, remove a major hindrance to the growth of tourism and will provide the territorial government with the opportunity to attract long-term investments, a necessary element in the economic development of the island. This, together with administration support for legislation to provide for an elected governor and a nonvoting deputy in Congress for Guam, is in furtherance of our national policies of increasing self-government and encouraging the social and economic development of the area of the Pacific for which we are responsible.

Guam was acquired by the United States in 1898 as a consequence of the Spanish-American War. Navy administration, except for a period when it was occupied by Japan during World War II, continued until August 1950 when jurisdiction was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior. The Congress enacted organic legislation in 1950 which granted United States citizenship to the people of Guam and established a civilian government with a Governor appointed by the President and an elective legislature.

Simultaneously with the rescission of Executive Order 8683, the President directed opening the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to United States citizens, investment, and shipping without prior Navy security clearance.

Since 1947 the Trust Territory, which came under United States control during World War II, has been administered by the United States as a strategic trusteeship under agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations. Under the President's policy directive, entry by United States persons and American-flag vessels into the area will be the responsibility of the High Commissioner under the guidance of the Secretary of the Interior and in accordance with regulations developed by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Interior.

The Trust Territory contains certain defense installations. Entry into such areas by all persons and vessels will continue to be subject to Navy clearance. Concurrently with the decision to remove the Navy entry controls for United States citizens and American-flag vessels, the administration has undertaken a vigorous and far-reaching program of political, social, and economic development. Education will receive first priority. The goal is to provide standards comparable to those in the United States. The construction of over 200 new schoolrooms is planned as well as the employment of enough teachers to carry out the program.

#### **STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, AUGUST 23**

White House press release dated August 23

In furtherance of our national policy of promoting self-government and encouraging expanded social and economic development in the territories under United States administration, I have signed an Executive order rescinding a 1941 Executive order (8683) which established the Guam Naval and Airspace Reservations. As a result of this action, Navy security clearances no longer will be required as a condition of entering the Territory of Guam, thus providing the same freedom of movement that exists in other parts of the United States.

Further, I have directed that regulations relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be revised to facilitate free entry of United States citizens, United States investment, and United States-flag vessels into that area. Revised procedures will be developed by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Interior.

Entry into Eniwetok, Bikini, and Kwajalein Atolls, together with such other islands as may be designated for national defense purposes from time to time, will continue to be under control of the Department of Defense. All appropriate measures will be taken to insure that the security interests of the United States in the Pacific are amply safeguarded.

I intend that these actions I have taken will foster responsible political development, stimulate new economic activity, and enable the people of the islands to participate fully in the world of today.

## United States Announces Decision on Disposal of Surplus Tin

### Department Statement

Press release 521 dated August 24

The United States Government, having had consultations with the International Tin Council and further consultations with the governments of the major tin-producing countries—Malaya, Bolivia, Indonesia, Thailand, Nigeria, and the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville)—has announced its decision on the proposed disposal of surplus tin during the remainder of 1962.

Desiring to take into account the problems of the producing countries, and to conform as nearly as feasible to the suggestions advanced by their governments, the United States Government has decided to reduce the quantity of tin to be disposed of to a maximum of 200 tons per week. Of this, an average of approximately 30 tons per week is expected to be used in the foreign aid programs, and approximately 10 tons per week for direct use by United States Government agencies. The quantity to be actually sold in commercial markets will be reduced accordingly. The weekly limitation will not be cumulative as far as commercial sales are concerned.

A separate statement being issued by the General Services Administration<sup>1</sup> gives the detailed procedures of offerings and disposals. The General Services Administration will accept only those bids which are reasonably consistent with prevailing market prices. It will reduce or temporarily suspend the sales if it should appear that they are exerting substantial downward pressure on prices.

The United States Government is interested in protecting the long-term stability and prosperity of the tin-producing countries and therefore assumes the responsibility to observe the market situation closely. The effects of the disposals covered by this announcement will be reviewed if there are any significant changes in the market and in any case before the expiration of the announced period as regards disposals thereafter which will

not necessarily be the same as those now being announced. The United States Government intends to consult with the governments of the major producing countries and the International Tin Council if the operation of the program indicates that a change is desirable.

## Japan To Suspend Exports to U.S. of Certain Cotton Textile Items

Press release 520 dated August 24

The Japanese Government has informed the U.S. Government that it will suspend exports of blouses, shorts, and trousers to the United States after August 31, 1962, pending discussions between the two Governments with regard to the implementation of the bilateral cotton textile agreement<sup>1</sup> as it affects these items. The bilateral agreement has been in effect since January 1, 1962.

The Japanese Government has also assured the U.S. Government that exports to the United States of certain cotton textile items, such as gingham, poplins, and pillowcases will be greatly reduced during the remaining months of 1962 to insure that the individual and overall ceilings provided for in the bilateral agreement will not be exceeded.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 87th Congress, 2d Session

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for Loans to the International Monetary Fund. Communication from the President transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1963 of \$2 billion. H. Doc. 446. June 25, 1962. 2 pp.

Sugar Act Amendments of 1962. Report to accompany H.R. 12154. S. Rept. 1631. June 26, 1962. 9 pp.

Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 8291. H. Rept. 1923. June 26, 1962. 8 pp.

Amending the Act of June 30, 1954, Providing for a Continuance of Civil Government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany S. 2775. H. Rept. 1936. June 27, 1962. 5 pp.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see GSA news release 1772 dated Aug. 24.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 571.



## U.S. Outlines New Position on Test Ban Treaty

*Statement by Arthur H. Dean<sup>1</sup>*

Let me begin my presentation today by restating that the goal of the United States is to achieve a workable and effective treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments for all time. During the past few years the United States has devoted a great deal of effort to deal with all aspects of the issues which have been the major stumbling block in the path of reaching agreement—the detection, location, and identification of underground nuclear tests.

When the eight new members<sup>2</sup> of the Conference on April 16, 1962, addressed an earnest appeal to the nuclear powers to reach agreement on a test ban treaty and coupled that appeal with a joint memorandum,<sup>3</sup> the United States sought to reply to this appeal by intensifying its evaluation of the status of efforts to establish effective verification of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests.

This evaluation also included an appraisal of the political and military factors which affect the reaching of agreement. Our evaluation has covered a review of the findings, which have only recently become available, of the U.S. research program on detection, identification, and location of

underground seismic events and an analysis of seismic data produced by the recent U.S. underground test series.<sup>4</sup>

The review has shown that much of the technical data resulting from the U.S. program bear on the efforts of the United States to respond to the eight-nation initiative and to achieve a workable, comprehensive test ban treaty. The United States now has qualified scientists and technical experts available at Geneva to assist in explaining in detail these various developments and their significance to all delegations at this Conference. At this time I would only like to summarize two of the developments which offer real promise.

### Significance of U.S. Test Data

The first of these developments is a reassessment, on the basis of technical developments and increased experience, of seismic detection capability which indicates a substantially better capability to detect, i.e. record, seismic events at long range, as compared to short range, than had been predicted in the past.

The second development is that the number of earthquakes occurring in certain areas of interest comparable to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude has been substantially reduced from the previous estimate.

These developments are significant, both as to

<sup>1</sup> Made at the 60th plenary session of the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Switzerland, on Aug. 14. Ambassador Dean is U.S. Representative to the Conference. For a summary of developments Mar. 14–June 15, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> The new member nations are: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. DC/203 (ENDC/28).

<sup>4</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy on Aug. 1, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 283.

what they change and as to what they do not change. They are significant in three respects:

First, the increase in the long-range detection capability makes it possible to develop without very serious degradation a network of control posts with substantially fewer detection stations in the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries than those proposed in the April 18th, 1961, U.S.-U.K. treaty draft.<sup>8</sup> This increase in long-range detection capability makes it possible to place increased reliance upon stations outside the territory of any party to a treaty for detecting events within that country using a system of stations which includes posts both within and without the country. Also this development means that the findings of stations near to a seismic event can now be more easily correlated with data received at greater distances from the event. Thus it is possible to rely on a detection system composed of internationally supervised national stations rather than of internationally operated stations.

Second, the decrease in the number of unidentified events with which a verification system will have to cope makes it possible to decrease the number of on-site inspections required for verification.

Third, these developments do not provide a definitive way of determining from seismic data in all cases that a particular seismic event was not an underground explosion and, therefore, do not eliminate the certain requirement of effective, reliable, and objective on-site inspections as an essential element of any system of verification.

On the basis of these technical conclusions my Government has presented proposals which involve:

1. Acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections.
2. A willingness to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections.
3. A willingness to consider a network of detection stations which would involve a substantially smaller number of stations than the number previously proposed, including a substantially smaller number of stations in the Soviet Union, and would involve nationally manned, internationally supervised stations instead of a network of internationally manned and operated stations.

These proposals have been presented in the hope that the Soviet Union would make a similar urgent and far-reaching effort to narrow the gap which lies between us. They were presented to the Soviet Union in two informal meetings held on Sunday and Monday [August 5 and 6] of last week and at a meeting of the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests held last Thursday [August 9].

#### **Soviet Reaction to U.S. Proposals**

The reaction of the Soviet Union to these proposals has been disappointing, to say the least. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union [Valerian A. Zorin] has completely rejected the concept of any obligation to facilitate inspection. He has rejected, as nothing new, the change from internationally manned and operated detection stations to nationally operated, internationally supervised detection stations. He has dismissed the possible reduction of the number of detection stations, including those on Soviet soil, and the possible reduction of the number of on-site inspections as mere details.

The distinguished Soviet representative bases his position in large part on the eight-nation memorandum which, he states, only allows inspection by invitation. In so doing I submit that he has completely misinterpreted the spirit and purpose of this memorandum.

Much has been said here about the eight-nation memorandum and the various types of control systems which might be negotiated on the basis of the principles which the memorandum contains. While we have disagreed about the meaning of some of these principles and how they would be incorporated in a system of effective control, there appears to have developed a consensus that at least the principles of the memorandum are concerned with the three essential elements of verification: (1) identification including on-site inspection, (2) detection stations, and (3) an International Commission. The International Commission, I believe we have all agreed, is to play an important role in seeing that the two major elements of verification—detection and identification—are carried out properly.

The proposals my delegation has made are an attempt to work out a verification system which includes all three elements presented in the mem-

<sup>8</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

orandum—in short, an attempt to use the memorandum as a means of bringing agreement nearer.

The Soviet Union is attempting to use the memorandum for exactly the opposite purpose—as a means of blocking agreement. Moreover, in relying on the eight-nation memorandum as providing the basis for his flat rejection of the U.S. proposals, Mr. Zorin has made a unilateral interpretation of that memorandum in a manner clearly not justified by its provisions. A day after this memorandum was tabled the United States asked the authors of that memorandum a series of questions dealing with the interpretation of that memorandum. Many of them dealt with the obligation to permit an on-site inspection. The response, on behalf of the Eight, was given by Mr. [Peter] Sahlou of Ethiopia, speaking at the 24th meeting:

It is our conviction that the Joint Memorandum must in most respects rest on its own merits, so to speak. It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break a deadlock in the Three-Power talks. This implies that the vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the Joint Memorandum. No Delegation of the Eight, I feel, can really give elaborate explanations which would be a substitute for the work that we believe can be undertaken only by the parties concerned. We are not in a position to offer a synopsis that will spare you the effort of new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises.

Now it seems to me that this is exactly what the United States has been trying to do with the eight-nation memorandum. The Soviet Union attempts to block these efforts at new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments, and new compromises with its unilateral interpretation of the memorandum. The Soviet Union constantly prevents any effort to try to fill in by negotiation the vast areas of the picture which, as Mr. Sahlou pointed out, remain to be completed.

#### **Examination of Background of Negotiations**

Mr. Zorin has dismissed the substantial movement of the U.S. in its attempt to obtain agreement as mere matters of detail. I believe that this calls for an examination of the background of the negotiations against which the United States has been making an evaluation of its position. I would like to discuss this background briefly for two reasons. First, because I want to make clear our view of the negotiations—and most particu-

larly what is new in the U.S. position—and where the Soviet Union has retreated. Secondly, because it will help to explain why the United States can only conclude with regret that the Soviet Union does not now want a workable test ban treaty and is doing all it possibly can to prevent one from being concluded by clouding the real issue.

The background of the negotiations falls into three parts: (1) a period of almost 3 years (July 1958–March 1961) of slow but basically fruitful negotiations in which the position of the Soviet Union and that of the United States came close together, (2) a period of 1 year (March 1961–April 1962) during which the Soviet Union not only repudiated all the positions it had formerly adopted but also adopted positions which went substantially away from those advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom, (3) a period of 4 months following the time when the eight new nations offered suggestions to bring the positions of the nuclear powers together.

#### *Negotiations From July 1958 to March 1961*

In the first part the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted serious and continuous negotiations. A wide measure of agreement was achieved. In the United States we believed a successful end to the negotiations was in sight. My Government did its utmost to construe the scientific basis for a test ban control system to minimize the amount of verification required. Even when data advanced by United States scientists in January 1959<sup>6</sup> indicated detection and identification of seismic events were more difficult, my Government did not abandon the negotiations. We continued to work for an agreement.

During this period the Soviet Union appeared to accept many elements of verification which the scientists of our two countries had agreed were necessary. These elements of verification accepted by the Soviet Union included:

1. Fifteen control posts to be placed on Soviet territory.
2. The control posts to be manned and operated by an international team of technicians, at least

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 118.

two-thirds of whom would not be Soviet nationals.

3. On-site inspection of unidentified events to be obligatory.

At the same time the United States in move after move sought to work toward a treaty. It reduced the number of control posts in the Soviet Union; it reduced the number of on-site inspections. The U.S. agreed to allow more Soviet nationals to man posts on Soviet territory.

This was the first period of our negotiations.

#### *Negotiations From March 1961 to April 1962*

In the spring of 1961 the United States entered resumed negotiations for a test ban treaty with several additional moves toward the position of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union replied by moving backwards. It reversed its position and advanced the concept of a three-man, self-canceling directorate to administer and operate the control system. The Soviet Union then refused to negotiate on any other part of a test ban treaty. Still the United States did not give up. We made further moves in May and August 1961.

In September 1961 the Soviet Union began a large series of nuclear weapons tests.<sup>7</sup> These tests were begun despite the firm assertion by Premier Khrushchev in 1960 that the Soviet Government would not break its pledge not to be the first to test. He stated in January 1960:

I would like to reemphasize that the Soviet Government, with a view to safeguarding the most favorable conditions for the working out in the very near future of an agreement on the discontinuation of tests, will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Finally, on November 28, 1961, the Soviet Government repudiated every part of the treaty that its negotiators, along with the negotiators of the United States and the United Kingdom, had labored so diligently and patiently for over 3 years to achieve.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet Union has not changed its position since.

This was the second period of our negotiations.

#### *Negotiations Since Resumption of Conference*

In March 1962 negotiations resumed at this Conference. In April 1962 the Soviet Union stated that it accepted the suggestions of the eight new members of the Conference as the basis for resumed negotiations. It did not give any further details of its position.

The United States also accepted the suggestions of the eight nations as one of the bases for negotiations and proceeded to determine in a detailed and concrete fashion how a system, as outlined by the eight nations, might work. We asked our scientists to make studies, based on all technical advances of any sort, and to try to devise a workable system with a capability at least comparable to the system agreed upon in 1958 with the Soviet Union at the Geneva Conference of Experts.<sup>9</sup>

#### **U.S. Proposal for Revised Verification System**

The United States has now proposed a revised verification system based on new technical data. As I mentioned earlier, the essential aspects of these new data are the increase in long-range detection capability and the decrease in the number of earthquakes of a given magnitude.

The verification system which the United States is prepared to consider if the obligation to facilitate on-site inspections is accepted will have the following main features.

1. There would be a network of nationally manned, internationally supervised stations to detect, locate, and, where possible, identify seismic events.

This network would involve substantially fewer stations than the 180 internationally operated stations dealing with detection in all environments which were called for under the system proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts and which at one time both of our Governments accepted. Some of these stations may be existing ones which are improved and equipped with standard instruments. But there will need to be new ones, installed in properly located sites with the best guidance and help of the nations which will operate them. The reason for this is clear. With only a modest number of stations it is important for

<sup>7</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

<sup>8</sup> For a report submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on Dec. 19, 1961, see *ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63.

<sup>9</sup> For background and text of a report, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

good detection that they be geographically well located, particularly in terms of detecting and, where possible, identifying events in seismic areas. Furthermore, it is important that all of this group of superior stations be in suitable sites for maximum sensitivity.

2. The staff at the stations would be nationals of the country in which the station was located, rather than nonnationals who had been hired by the Commission.

The stations would be internationally supervised but would retain their character as essentially national stations. They would of course record natural seismic events for the use of the operating country. They would contribute basic research information to the operating country and, through the International Commission, to the entire world. This integrated network would be a fine research tool for use by scientists of all countries.

Since a larger proportion of stations outside the nuclear powers would be reporting events within those countries, a somewhat lesser reliance would be placed upon the stations within those countries. The detection stations inside the territory of the nuclear powers, however, remain very important for the collection of data for the international system.

The International Commission must be able to process systematically and regularly the data received from all stations. For this reason the international supervision or monitoring by the Commission must be of a nature to assure: the rapid and reliable means of sending data to the Commission; the continuous operation in accordance with the high scientific standards which the Commission would be expected to prescribe; the additional training of personnel according to agreed standards; the equipping of stations with instruments that are calibrated according to standards which the Commission would establish; and the locating of the control posts, after consultation with the Commission, at a quiet site in a region satisfactory to the Commission.

3. There would be a reduction of the number of on-site inspections from the 12-20 proposed previously by the United States.

This position of the United States is wholly consistent with the spirit of the eight nations' memorandum. That memorandum attempts to reach

an accommodation of the fundamental interest of the parties. That memorandum, it is true, uses the term "suspicious event," while I have used the term "unidentified events." But when one considers that the process of identification is a process of elimination, all seismic events are suspicious which have been detected and located and not eliminated from consideration by being identified as earthquakes.

#### **Need for On-Site Inspection Explained**

I would like to explain again to this Conference how the U.S. position on the need for on-site inspection is based on scientific facts and political realities.

The U.S. position is that present scientific knowledge does not enable us always to form a firm judgment that an event is of natural origin. Both underground explosions and earthquakes generate waves which travel through the earth and may be detected in many cases at great distances from the source of the disturbance. These signals are transmitted through the very complicated layers of the earth and are drastically altered by the earth. For this reason the signals from both types of events are, when detected at a great distance, rather similar.

In some cases, however, there are still enough properties of the source of the disturbance present in the signal that we may determine that a signal was generated by a natural event. For instance we may be able to determine that an event occurred at a great depth and hence must be considered as natural. Or we might be able to see that the event caused the earth surrounding the event to move first in some directions toward the origin of the disturbance. This would also indicate a natural event, since a manmade explosion could not cause a first motion of the earth to be toward the origin of the disturbance.

We know, however, of no certain way at this time of determining that any particular signal was positively generated by a nuclear explosion. Furthermore, many events detected by any control system will have their characteristics obscured by the seismic noise present at all detection stations and, therefore, no determination of the nature of the origin of the event will be possible. Such events are unidentified.

To summarize: It is our view that any system will be able to identify some events as earthquakes; there are others that it will not be able to identify either as earthquakes or as nuclear explosions.

We, therefore, believe that a verification system must include some on-site inspections to identify enough events to provide a reasonable assurance that the treaty is being observed.

#### **Soviet Position on Detection and Identification**

The present position of the U.S.S.R. appears to be that distant seismic stations can in all cases detect and identify the nature of a seismic event. To support this position Mr. Zorin has referred to the large Soviet and French underground tests. Mr. Zorin spoke about the French test at the last meeting of our subcommittee, that is the 23d meeting. He said:

The fact that 65 stations in the world, located as far from the place of the explosion as Bolivia, Canada, Finland, Iran, Norway, Peru, Puerto Rico, Sweden, the United States and other countries registered the French underground tests in the Sahara confirms the basic conclusion that by national means of control it is quite possible not only to detect but to identify any nuclear explosion, including those which are made underground.

Let us analyze this contention carefully. The Soviet test of February 2, 1962, produced a seismic signal equivalent to magnitude 5.3. In hard rock, the medium in which it is believed the test was conducted, this would indicate an explosion of from 40 to 60 kilotons. It was located as coming from an area of low seismicity and in particular from an area previously identified as a nuclear test site.

The French test of May 1, 1962, produced a seismic signal of magnitude 5.2. In hard rock, the medium in which it is believed the test was conducted, this would indicate an explosion of from 30 to 50 kilotons. It also was located as coming from an aseismic area and an area previously identified as a test site.

We do not disagree with the inference which the Soviet delegate draws from the Soviet and French tests if he implies merely that any large seismic signals picked up from an area in which earthquakes normally do not occur are highly suspicious as having been nuclear explosions, particularly if they were located in areas previously located as a test area. We do disagree if it is attempted to

infer from the experience with these two tests that distant seismic stations can be relied upon to identify the nature of all seismic events.

Mr. Zorin, when he cited the French and Soviet underground tests, did not discuss the underground tests series conducted by the United States which included over 40 shots. This was a significant test series and included a large number of small nuclear shots in the low-kiloton range. I would like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to produce data from his country's national stations showing in how many of these cases they detected the tests. I would also ask how many tests they detected only because the tests had been announced. And I would like to ask him to produce data showing in how many instances his stations could have determined from the seismic data alone that the event was a nuclear explosion, not an earthquake? In other words, how many were identified?

Let us assume that a potential violator did undertake a clandestine test in the most unlikely of all circumstances, by detonating a large device in the medium which produces the biggest seismic signal, in an aseismic area, and near an area identified as a test site. I submit that even then on-site inspections would be necessary. Of course everybody would be suspicious that a country had violated the agreement by conducting a test. But what then? Would we want to take only the signals as proof? Would we want to enter into a treaty which allowed any party to denounce it and resume testing simply because a seismic signal had occurred which, if investigated, might have turned out to be a natural event? Even in that large area of the Soviet Union where almost no earthquakes occur, a few earthquakes have indeed occurred. If such an unusual earthquake occurred would the parties to this treaty want to rest the entire fate of the treaty on the signals alone? We think it would be decidedly unwise to allow the treaty to fall without an on-site investigation by an objective, international commission to determine the nature of such an event. This approach completely underestimates the solemn nature of the commitment undertaken by the states in entering a treaty to ban nuclear tests.

The United States views the necessity of on-site inspection for monitoring a test ban treaty which covers underground nuclear explosions as being

duced simply to a question of solid scientific and technical fact. A superior, well-operated detection system of distant stations for seismic vents will every year detect numerous events in either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. which it will not be able to identify. If this is so, and if the world is to have confidence that the treaty is being obeyed, some on-site inspections are necessarily required.

Unfortunately, we have another difference with the Soviet Union in addition to our difference over the scientific facts about distinguishing between the seismic signals from explosions and earthquakes. That difference is the one regarding the nature of the obligation to facilitate an inspection. The fact that the Soviet Union is making such an issue over whether an inspection should be stated as an obligation suggests that the Soviet Union does really think there will be occasions when an inspection will be needed.

#### **Views of U.S.S.R. on Inspection**

The position of the Soviet Union appears to be that it will not accept inspection as part of a verification system unless the Soviet Union itself invites it.

The Soviet Union appears to regard the obligation of inspection as an option to be honored only at whim. Such a position is incompatible with the agreed principle that disarmament measures must have strict and effective international control to assure that all parties are honoring their obligations.

I am also aware of the finespun argument that, since the only remedy for a failure to permit an on-site inspection is to denounce the treaty, it is not even necessary to state an obligation to permit and facilitate an on-site inspection. Rather, so his argument goes, inspection should be set forth in a treaty as entirely optional. Failure by a state to issue the invitation when called for under the treaty would then shift to the other parties theonus of denouncing the treaty with all the heavy consequences this entails.

The denouncing parties must then bear not only the responsibility for scrapping the treaty, but they must also make the case for ending the treaty. They must do this with no opportunity to get the true evidence in the case by the only means possible, that is, on-site inspection.

The consequences of the Soviet position on inspection are ominous. If the United States interprets the position of the Soviet Union correctly, the entire prospects for any progress in any field of disarmament are now placed in jeopardy. Essentially, the Soviet Union will not accept any reasonable system of verification. This is the implication of its total refusal to accept the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection.

#### **Soviet Position on Verification**

Let us apply this position of the Soviet Union to verification of other disarmament measures. Last Friday, at the 68th meeting of this Committee, the Soviet representative made some interesting statements regarding the matter of verification of a reduction of armaments and verification of a halt in the production of such armaments. The Soviet representative said that, in order to verify the destruction of weapons, international inspectors should be at depots to witness destruction. The Soviet representative said that, in order to verify the stoppage and monitoring of production, international inspectors would have to be stationed at production plants. Are we to assume that these inspectors are to be allowed at these depots and at these plants by invitation only? If the Soviet position on verification for a reduction in armaments is consistent with its position on verification of a test ban treaty, is then the Soviet Union really contending that any verification in a disarmament agreement can be by invitation only? It is important that we all know if this is the real Soviet position.

The United States had thought that the Soviet Union, when it signed the joint statement of agreed principles,<sup>10</sup> was accepting the obligation of verification. The Soviet Union accepted principle number six which reads: "All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. . . ."

It is completely inconsistent for the Soviet Union to accept the obligation of inspection in one kind of disarmament measure and refuse to accept it in another kind of disarmament measure.

<sup>10</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

The only apparent reason for its unwillingness to accept inspection for a test ban treaty is that the Soviet Union does not really want an agreement. It does not want evidently to stop testing its own weapons.

#### Restatement of U.S.-Soviet Differences

Let me conclude with a restatement of the two basic differences which today prevent the signing of an agreement to end all our nuclear weapons tests.

First, we have a difference as to the facts. The United States believes that a superior, well-operated detection system of distant stations for seismic events will every year detect numerous events in either the U.S. or the Soviet Union which it will not be able to identify and that in these cases the source of the seismic signal can only be identified by an on-site inspection. We have produced our reasons why we believe our contention is the correct one, and we have scientists here to discuss the matter in greater detail. The Soviet Union challenges the basic scientific fact that I have just given and states that in no case will on-site inspection be necessary to determine the source of a seismic signal. This challenge places upon the Soviet Union a duty to present to the Conference the data which they believe support their position.

Secondly, we have a difference about accepting the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection if one is called for under the treaty. The United States believes that all parties to the treaty should accept on-site inspection as an unquestioned obligation. The Soviet Union believes that the conduct of an on-site inspection should be viewed only as optional. This is not satisfactory. The United States believes this is contrary to the principle of adequate verification of disarmament measures "under . . . strict and effective international control" which both the United States and the Soviet Union subscribed to in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations.

The United States sincerely regrets that efforts to make progress for a sound and effective treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments so far have not yielded results. We implore the Soviet Union to examine carefully the consequences of the position it has taken. We hope Mr. Zorin's words of last Thursday do not represent his country's final conclusion on our proposals. The whole

world is anxiously awaiting our work. We cannot afford to permit this opportunity for a sound and workable nuclear test ban treaty to escape.

#### U.S. Requests Inclusion of Item on Hungary in G.A. Agenda

*Following are texts of a letter and an explanatory memorandum from Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant.*

August 17, 1962

SIR: I have the honor to request the inclusion on the agenda of the Seventeenth General Assembly of an item entitled, "the Question of Hungary."

In accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure an explanatory memorandum is attached.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

His Excellency

U THANT,

*Acting Secretary-General  
of the United Nations.*

#### EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

During the period since the events of 1956 in Hungary, the members of the United Nations, first in the Security Council, then in emergency special session, then at regular sessions of the General Assembly have devoted close attention to "the Question of Hungary". Actions taken on these occasions have been aimed consistently at ameliorating the plight of the Hungarian people, whose interests were so adversely affected by Soviet armed intervention to crush the Hungarian national uprising and by the subsequent repressive measures taken against the Hungarian people.

The governments of the Soviet Union and of Hungary have failed thus far to cooperate with the United Nations and its appointed representatives as requested by pertinent decisions of the Organization. The problem of Hungary consequently remains an outstanding issue involving the principles of the Charter, and the Soviet and Hungarian authorities have to date taken no satis-



factory steps that would enable the United Nations to progress toward its fundamental objective of ameliorating the situation of the Hungarian people and resolving this long-standing issue in the United Nations.

In view of this continuing situation, the Government of the United States of America believes that "the Question of Hungary" merits further discussion by the General Assembly and that it should be inscribed in the agenda of the Seventeenth Session.

## Development Assistance Committee Concludes Tenth Meeting

*The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development<sup>1</sup> held its 10th meeting at Paris July 25-26. Following is the text of a press communique released at the end of the meeting, together with a resolution adopted by the Committee on July 26.*

### TEXT OF PRESS COMMUNIQUE

A high-level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.) under the Chairmanship of Ambassador James W. Riddleberger was held in Paris on July 25th-26th to discuss the results of the first annual Aid Review and future lines of activity. The D.A.C. is a Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It comprises the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States and the Commission of the European Economic Community. Norway, which has now become a Member of the Committee, was warmly welcomed on the occasion of its first attendance. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank were represented by observers.

The Review, which has just been completed, was concerned principally with the effort which each of the D.A.C. Members is making to provide financial assistance to the developing countries. It was an expression of the determination of D.A.C. Members, which comprise all the major

aid-providing countries of the free world, to expand the aggregate amount of resources which they make available to the developing countries and to increase the effectiveness of the help thus provided. The development assistance policies of Members were systematically examined in a series of meetings spread over several months and the complex range of problems which are encountered in providing such assistance was thoroughly discussed. Subsequent Reviews will enable these problems to be investigated further and common approaches worked out.

The Review showed that the total flow of long-term official and private financial resources from Members of the D.A.C. to the developing countries expanded from \$7.4 billion in 1960 to \$8.7 billion in 1961. This substantial increase followed on a marked rise in such financial flows from most Members in recent years. D.A.C. Members have provided directly or through multilateral channels over 90 percent of all long-term financial flows to developing countries outside the Soviet Bloc over the past few years.

The Chairman reported on the substantial increase in the assistance provided by Members. The total figures mentioned above include both public and private financial flows. Official contributions made bilaterally and to multilateral aid agencies rose to \$6.0 billion in 1961—22 percent more than the \$4.9 billion extended in 1960. Private capital flows to developing countries also increased, but by a smaller amount, from \$2.5 billion in 1960 to about \$2.7 billion in 1961. In the light of the Review it seems probable that the aggregate expenditures by Member Governments for development financing will rise further during the current year.

Within the total resources made available, grants and grant-like contributions rose from \$1.2 billion in 1960 to \$1.5 billion in 1961 and official net lending from \$0.7 billion to \$1.4 billion. Thus by far the largest part of the resources provided by several D.A.C. Members is already in the form of grants or loans on very lenient terms. In this connection, the Chairman reported significant improvements in 1961 in the terms of official assistance and a general tendency towards easier lending conditions.

The Committee also took into account the need to accompany financial aid with technical assistance. During the last few months, the D.A.C. has

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 8.

shown increasing interest in the technical assistance needs of Latin America and the importance of the Alliance for Progress in the achievement of economic and social development in the area and Members have agreed to increase their technical assistance to the extent possible in that area without prejudice to the interests of developing countries in Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

The results of the Review were incorporated in a report prepared by the Chairman and discussed by the Committee. This report is now to be placed before the Council of the Organisation and published shortly. While noting the improvement and progress made during the past year, the meeting was chiefly concerned with examining ways of improving on present assistance efforts. The meeting also adopted a resolution, providing guidance for the future work of the D.A.C., which is attached to this communiqué.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION

### RESOLUTION ON THE FIRST ANNUAL AID REVIEW AND THE FUTURE WORK OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

The Committee,

1. *Having considered* the results of the first Annual Aid Review as contained in the report by the Chairman and having, in particular, considered the Chairman's recommendations set out in paragraph 82 of his report,

2. *Reaffirms* the principles contained in the Resolution on the Common Aid Effort<sup>2</sup> adopted at the March 1961 meeting of the Development Assistance Group,

3. *Recalls* particularly, among these principles, that (1) the Members of the Committee have agreed to make it their common objective to secure the expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to less-developed countries and to improve the effectiveness of the Common Aid Effort and (2) while private and public financing extended on commercial terms is valuable, the needs of some less-developed countries are such that the common aid effort should provide expanded assistance in the form of grants or loans on favourable terms, including long maturities where justified in order to prevent the burden of external debt from becoming too heavy,

4. *Agrees* to recommend to Members of the Committee that they should take account of the Chairman's report in determining their development assistance efforts and policies, and in particular of the following:

(a) The effort being made by Members of the Committee to aid underdeveloped countries is substantial and growing. While it is difficult to measure quantitatively the overall needs of the less-developed countries for external finance, it is clear that these needs exceed the present flow of resources and that they are steadily growing.

It is important, therefore, that the more advanced countries should not relax their efforts to expand the flow of development assistance within the scope of their economic and budgetary capacity. Fresh initiatives should be taken to secure public support for expanding development aid programmes.

(b) In relation to their resources and capabilities, some Members of the Committee are contributing more than others. This indicates that, from the point of view of resources, there is scope for special emphasis on an increase in the aid effort of certain countries. Account has to be taken, however, not only of relative resources but also of other factors including past and present political relationships with underdeveloped countries.

(c) In determining the financial terms of aid, attention should be given to the overall needs and circumstances of the recipient country, while recognising that no one form of aid has an inherent superiority.

(d) Better co-ordination of aid programmes in general and of contributions to particular recipients is required to ensure a maximum development effect. To this end increasing use should be made, on a selective basis, of the Co-ordinating Group concept recently developed by the Development Assistance Committee. The IBRD and other international organisations, as appropriate, should be invited to co-operate to the fullest extent possible.

(e) Members of the Committee should link their aid policies more directly to long-term development objectives. They should assess more systematically the efficacy of their past and current aid activities in furthering development objectives and exchange experiences in the framework of the Development Assistance Committee. Furthermore, it should be recognised that both the effectiveness and the availability of development assistance will be considerably affected by the efforts which less-developed countries are prepared to make themselves from their own resources.

(f) Members of the Committee should work toward a balanced geographic distribution of overall aid taking account of existing special relationships.

(g) Joint efforts should be made to reverse the trend towards more tying of aid.

(h) The important function of multilateral aid agencies is recognised. Members of the Committee should give early consideration to the adequacy of the financial resources of these agencies.

(i) There should be a further exploration of ways and means to promote and safeguard the flow of private capital to less-developed countries.

(j) Members of the Committee should recognise the importance of the relationship of trade to aid.

5. *Agrees* that annual Aid Reviews should be continued and that future Aid Reviews should give greater emphasis to the systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of aid having regard to

—the methods which the donor countries use for providing assistance (e.g. project or programme aid, commodity aid) in various forms (e.g. grants, loans on various terms, guarantees);

—the policies of the recipient countries to make full use of their domestic resources in the development effort

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 554.

and to adopt long-term planning based upon clearly defined development objectives.

6. *Agrees* that the Committee should study the incidence of aid tying, whether by statutory, administrative or other means, on the economies of donor, recipient and other countries based upon comprehensive data provided by Members of the Committee and having regard to all relevant factors in order to arrive at the objective mentioned in paragraph 4(g) above.

7. *Agrees* that the Committee should take account of, and encourage through its Members, studies by bodies of the Organisation and other international bodies with a view to contributing to the achievement of an increased and more effective mobilisation of the resources of the less-developed countries, particularly as it relates to the need for stable and growing foreign exchange earnings thus ensuring fuller effectiveness of the common aid effort.

8. *Agrees* to explore further the attitude of Members as to the usefulness of multilateral investment guarantee schemes and, on the basis of their findings, and bearing in mind the report of the staff of the IBRD on Multilateral Investment Insurance, to proceed further to a study of the feasibility of such schemes.

9. *Agrees* to establish close liaison and co-operation with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee of O.E.C.D. for the purpose of furthering the objectives of the Development Assistance Committee.

10. *Agrees* that there is continued and further need for effective co-ordination of Members' aid policies and programmes as they apply to specific regions and countries and that consultations to that effect should be conducted through the DAC and use should be made, on a selective basis, of the Co-ordinating Group mechanism, in close co-operation with other international organisations, notably the IBRD, and where appropriate with the aid receiving countries, the donor countries which are not Members of the DAC.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on August 17 confirmed the following nominations:

Bernard T. Brennan to be Deputy Administrator for Administration, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 1.)

John H. Ferguson to be Ambassador to Morocco. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 514 dated August 22.)

Foy D. Kohler to be Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 510 dated August 20.)

William Leonhart to be Ambassador to Tanganyika. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 516 dated August 23.)

William R. Tyler to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 511 dated August 20.)

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol Signed With Japan

Press release 502 dated August 16

The Department of State announced on August 16 the signing of an income-tax protocol with Japan which modifies and supplements the convention of April 16, 1954,<sup>1</sup> between the United States and Japan for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as supplemented by the protocol of March 23, 1957,<sup>2</sup> and as modified and supplemented by the protocol of May 7, 1960.<sup>3</sup> The documents were signed by the American Ambassador and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo on August 14.

The 1954 convention with Japan, like income-tax conventions in force between the United States and numerous other countries, contains provisions designed to eliminate as far as practicable double taxation with respect to taxes on income. The 1957 protocol, which is in force, supplements the convention by granting to the Export-Import Bank of Washington exemption from Japanese tax with respect to interest on loans or investments received from sources within Japan and to the Export-Import Bank of Japan exemption from U.S. tax with respect to interest on loans or investments received from sources within the United States. The 1960 protocol, which remains under consideration in the U.S. Senate and is not in force, clarifies certain provisions of the 1954 convention and expands certain exemptions ac-

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3176.

<sup>2</sup> TIAS 3901.

<sup>3</sup> S. Ex. K, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

corded thereby or modifies certain rules set forth therein.

The modifications which would be effected by the new protocol are intended, in general, to bring the 1954 convention into conformity with other income-tax conventions to which the United States is a party. It modifies in some respects the definitions in the 1954 convention, particularly with respect to the definitions of "permanent establishment," "Japanese corporation or other entity," and "industrial and commercial profits." It makes technical changes in provisions for exemption from tax of the source state with respect to industrial and commercial profits derived by an enterprise of the other state. It provides that interest and royalties received from sources within one of the states by residents, corporations, or other entities of the other state shall not be taxed at a rate exceeding 10 percent if the recipient has no permanent establishment in the former state or has a permanent establishment of the type described in article I (1) of this protocol. It adds to the convention a new article to accord tax treatment with respect to dividends in conformity with the treatment presently accorded under provisions of other income-tax conventions to which the United States is a party. It amends the provisions of the convention relating to compensation for labor or personal services. It makes technical changes in the convention provisions relating to source rules, broadening the source rule dealing with compensation for labor or personal services and modifying the source rule on royalty income to conform to the expanded definition of such income. It amends the credit article of the convention as modified by the 1960 protocol.

According to the terms of the protocol, it would enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, with varying provisions regarding the applicability of specified amendments. Provision is made for the gradual imposition over a 4-year period of Japanese withholding tax upon dividends and for the related reduction in the amount of the deemed credit by the United States under the 1954 convention. The protocol would continue in force concurrently with the 1954 convention.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

*Accession deposited:* Venezuela (with reservations), May 11, 1962.

*Notifications received that they consider themselves bound:* Cyprus, July 6, 1962; Senegal (with a declaration), July 13, 1962.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Mauritania, July 16, 1962.

#### Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

*Acceptance deposited:* Guinea, July 12, 1962.

### BILATERAL

#### Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to the continued operation by the United States of the communications and other facilities at the Long-Range Proving Ground for the Testing of Guided Missiles under the same conditions as those contained in the agreement of November 26, 1951 (TIAS 2425). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo March 31 and July 25, 1962. Entered into force July 25, 1962.

#### Ecuador

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Ecuador. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito August 3, 1962. Entered into force August 3, 1962.

#### Ethiopia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis Ababa August 13, 1962. Entered into force August 13, 1962.

#### South Africa

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, and 4694), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 12, 1962.

*Entered into force:* August 23, 1962.

#### Thailand

Agreement for the exchange of international money orders. Signed at Bangkok January 12 and at Washington February 21, 1962. Entered into force July 1, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

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Releases issued prior to August 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 502 of August 16 and 507 of August 17.

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*508	8/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*510	8/20	Kohler sworn in as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (biographic details).
*511	8/20	Tyler sworn in as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (biographic details).
*512	8/22	Vice President Johnson's itinerary.
513	8/22	Lebanon credentials (rewrite).
*514	8/22	Ferguson sworn in as Ambassador to Morocco (biographic details).
515	8/22	Morrison: OAS Council Meeting.
*516	8/23	Leonhart sworn in as Ambassador to Tanganyika (biographic details).
517	8/23	Kohler: "Ohio and the World."
518	8/23	Tripartite statement on Berlin.
519	8/24	Note to U.S.S.R. on Berlin.
520	8/24	Suspension of certain exports by Japan.
521	8/24	Disposal of tin by U.S.
522	8/24	Visit of Soviet Minister of Agriculture (rewrite).
523	8/25	U.N. proposals for Congo.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN

### REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to ". . . matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which ". . . will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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# Bulletin

Vol. XLVII, No. 1212

September 17, 1962

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1212 • PUBLICATION 7428

September 17, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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## United States and United Kingdom Offer New Proposals or Banning Nuclear Tests

*On August 27 the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments and an alternative draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.*

*Following are a joint statement by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a statement made by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, U.S. Representative to the Conference, and texts of the draft treaties.*

### **JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN**

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated August 27

A guaranteed end to all nuclear testing in all environments is a fundamental objective of the free world. We are deeply convinced that the achievement of this objective would serve our best national interests and the national interests of all the nations of the world.

In recent weeks the United States and the United Kingdom have renewed their efforts at the Geneva Disarmament Conference to reach this goal. Based on the latest scientific findings of our research program, we have put forward proposals in the strong hope of obtaining prompt agreement on this crucial issue.

As a further step in the direction of this long-sought-after goal, the United States and the United Kingdom have instructed their representatives at Geneva to present today to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee a draft treaty containing proposals for an end to all nuclear testing in all environments as well as an alternative draft treaty providing for an end to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. We both believe the arrangements we have outlined in these documents for insuring compliance with the terms of the agreement—whether comprehen-

sive or limited—are sound and reasonable providing, as they do, the necessary guarantees for our own security and the security of all nations which might become parties to either agreement. We wish to make clear the strong preference of the United States and the United Kingdom for prompt action on the first of them, namely, the comprehensive treaty. However, we are also prepared to conclude an early agreement on the basis of the second document, that covering a more limited field, if this represents the widest area of agreement possible at this time.

Unlike a ban on testing in all environments, including underground, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space can be effectively verified without on-site inspections. Such a treaty would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race as it is represented by testing to develop weapons technology. It would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. It would free mankind from the dangers and fear of radioactive fallout. Furthermore, agreement on such a treaty might be a first step toward an agreement banning testing in all environments.

The United States and the United Kingdom cannot emphasize too strongly the urgency we attach to the problem of ending all nuclear testing

once and for all. For the safety and security of all of us, this deadly competition must be halted and we, again, urge the Soviet Government to join with us in meaningful action to make this necessity a reality.

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DEAN<sup>1</sup>

In the interest of humanity and of generations as yet unborn, the United States earnestly seeks a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which will ban all nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time. For over 4 years we have been patiently conducting extensive scientific research and negotiating for such a treaty, and we shall continue to do so.

What are we trying to stop? We are trying to stop the destruction of the human race and historical values. If we do not stop testing altogether, we may stop human progress altogether. So let us move forward about our business.

The United States believes that a workable comprehensive test ban treaty is urgently needed. Such an agreement will be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. It will be the foundation for the establishment of the necessary confidence, which must be built upon in order to insure that other more far-reaching disarmament measures will be concluded and faithfully carried out. Such a treaty can serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. Finally, it will prevent further increases in the radioactive fallout from nuclear tests.

To achieve the workable comprehensive test ban which it seeks the United States has recently made a number of proposals on detection, location, and identification in order to break the deadlock which has gripped the test ban negotiations. Each of those proposals has been based upon an intensive study by the United States of each aspect of the issues which has been a major stumbling block in the negotiations—the detection, the location, and the necessary identification of underground nuclear weapon tests.

The results of our studies and evaluations, as I pointed out at our 69th plenary meeting on 14

August of this year,<sup>2</sup> have permitted us to make certain proposals with regard to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Those proposals include:

1. Acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections;
2. A willingness to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections;
3. A willingness to consider a network of detection stations equipped with various types of up-to-date instrumentation which (a) would involve a number of stations substantially smaller than the number previously proposed, including a smaller number of stations in the Soviet Union; and (b) would involve nationally manned, internationally supervised, inspected, and monitored stations instead of a network of internationally manned and operated stations.

So, on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States I am now tabling a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the proposals which my delegation has made and which I have just outlined for the Committee.

As I stated to this Committee on 14 August these proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty reflect the recent findings of the United States research program on detection, identification, and location of underground seismic events and an analysis of seismic data produced by the recent United States underground test series. These proposals also take into account constructive suggestions of the eight new members to this Conference, including those contained in their memorandum of 16 April 1962.<sup>3</sup>

A reading of the text of the comprehensive treaty now laid before you will show the serious extent to which these suggestions of the eight new members have been taken into account.

I would like to ask the secretariat to circulate this draft treaty as a Conference document.

#### Provisions of Proposed Comprehensive Treaty

The proposed comprehensive treaty provides for the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments. The parties to the treaty would undertake to prevent and prohibit the carrying out of such tests at any place under their jurisdiction or con-

<sup>1</sup> Made at the 75th plenary meeting of the 18-nation conference on Aug. 27.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 387.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. DC/203(ENDC/28).

ol. The parties would also undertake to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of such tests anywhere at any time. These obligations would be supervised by an international scientific commission assisted by an international staff and a verification system. Each party would also undertake to cooperate with that commission in carrying out all measures of detection, location, identification, and inspection and in establishing elements of the system. The commission would have general responsibility for the collection of data on, and the reporting of, all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions and for making positive identification of the nature and origin of such events as necessary.

The draft treaty provides that the commission would consist of 15 members—4 from the West, from the Soviet bloc, and 7 chosen from among parties jointly nominated by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union would hold permanent membership in the commission.

The international staff would assist the commission by carrying out functions at the headquarters and by manning any international stations which might be set up by the commission in agreement with the parties concerned where that was considered desirable and was mutually acceptable. The staff would also participate in the international supervision, inspection, and monitoring of the nationally manned detection stations.

The executive officer of the commission would be responsible for the staff under the direction of the commission. He would select the scientific and technical personnel for the international staff under criteria set forth in the treaty. The verification system would include nationally manned, internationally supervised and monitored detection stations to be constructed at sites which would be agreed upon by the parties to the treaty. The commission would establish the specifications and pay for maintaining, constructing, equipping, and training of personnel for these nationally manned stations.

In addition, insofar as appropriate, use would be made of a number of national stations already in existence. The parties would assume an obligation to insure that the system would begin opera-

tion at least 6 months after the entry into force of the treaty. Obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified events would be provided for on the basis of carefully defined procedures laid down in the treaty. The executive officer, on behalf of the commission, would indicate which events had been located and remained unidentified after the application of criteria specified in the treaty.

The size of the area in any party's territory which might be inspected in connection with any unidentified event would also be designated in the treaty. Inspection would take place under an annual quota arrangement for each country—an agreed maximum per year—but only if the events met the treaty requirements for eligibility for on-site inspection. Let me be clear: If there were no unidentified events certified by the commission in any year, then there would be no on-site inspections.

As I stated at a meeting of the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on 9 August 1962, after certification of an unidentified event by the commission the events to be inspected in the Soviet Union, for maximum deterrence, would be selected jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom; and accordingly events to be inspected in the United States and the United Kingdom would be selected by the Soviet Union. Unidentified events in other states would also follow a quota arrangement. The objective of on-site inspections would be carried out by teams organized by the commission so as to prevent nationals from any state inspecting events on its own territory. States would assume an obligation to facilitate and to cooperate in any on-site inspection undertaken under the treaty.

A party would have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it determined that the treaty had been violated; or the obligation to facilitate an on-site inspection had not been fulfilled; or a nuclear explosion was conducted by a state not a party to the treaty, and such an explosion jeopardized the withdrawing state's security; or an explosion occurred and it was not possible to identify the state conducting the explosion but such explosion might jeopardize the withdrawing party's national security. The withdrawing party could request that a conference be called to include all other parties. Withdrawal would not take effect until the passing of a specified time.

The treaty would come into force on a specified

date which would be subject to negotiation, thus incorporating the recommendation made by the representative of Mexico on 9 May 1962. Other details are given in the text of the treaty which has now been distributed to the Committee. The details on these and other aspects of the treaty, such as what constitutes a nuclear explosion, must be negotiated.

As I have indicated before, the keynote of this comprehensive treaty is the provision for obligatory on-site inspections which provides that all states have an unconditional, unequivocal, and an "Honest Injun" obligation to facilitate such an on-site inspection.

### Dealing With Unidentified Events

I have presented to this Committee the scientific and technical reasons which underlie the significance of obligatory on-site inspections. According to United Kingdom and United States scientists and, insofar as I know or am aware, not disputed by any other scientists—I repeat, not disputed by any other scientists—there will be a substantial number of seismic events each year within the Soviet Union which will be detected by seismic stations but which cannot be identified by seismic means alone. The Soviet delegation does indeed appear to admit that some number of seismic events will remain unidentified after all the data have been reported by the detection stations. The United States-United Kingdom draft comprehensive treaty, I submit, provides a reasonable and effective means of dealing with these unidentified events.

The basic question is what type of verification arrangements are most likely to serve as an effective deterrent so that there never will be a violation of the treaty. A treaty containing debatable and arguable provisions is not one which provides effective deterrence. An effective treaty must have provisions for obligatory, objective on-site inspection by the commission in order to provide the necessary assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations and that the treaty, once entered into, will last.

Therefore, in order to deter violations, to detect violations if they occur, to remove doubts about the nature of certain unidentified events, and to make the treaty last and not fall when the first number of unidentified events appear, there must

be, I submit, a clear-cut, unequivocal obligation to accept and facilitate some number of objective on-site inspections per year by the commission.

The number of these inspections will assure a state that its national security will not be jeopardized. Each side would choose unidentified events for inspection on the territory of the other side but only, as I have said, after such unidentified events had been certified as eligible by the commission according to scientific criteria to be stated in the treaty.

This acceptance of the obligation to facilitate and permit on-site inspection involves no derogation of sovereignty. It is a commitment to be undertaken by a sovereign state, just as the obligation not to test is a commitment to be undertaken by a sovereign state.

The carrying out of on-site inspection can be accomplished by the strictly objective teams organized by the commission without any danger or possibility whatsoever of espionage. We have made numerous suggestions to our Soviet colleagues as to how espionage could be absolutely prevented. The United States is prepared to discuss with its Soviet colleagues any detail of inspection in order to avoid any problems that the Soviet Union believes might exist regarding this question of espionage.

I have indicated what, in the United States view, are the essential requirements for a comprehensive treaty. But it takes more than proposal by one side alone to get our negotiations moving for effective negotiations require the work of more than one party.

It is a source of great regret to my Government that the Soviet Union has apparently determined to meet these new, and I believe constructive United Kingdom and United States proposal with a straight-arm rebuff, to insist that we have not changed our old positions, and to continue a result to keep our negotiations stalled on dead center.

### U.S. Prepared To Agree to Partial Treaty

My Government, nevertheless, earnestly desires to begin the job of meaningful disarmament and to end the arms race. To do so we are pledged in the joint statement of agreed principles<sup>4</sup> to seek the widest possible area of agreement which

<sup>4</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

can be achieved at the earliest possible time. My Government is not content in this search for agreement to leave any area unexplored or any worthwhile idea unproposed.

So the United States, while continuing to negotiate urgently and in any appropriate forum for a comprehensive treaty, in the interests of all humanity, would nevertheless be prepared, in an effort to reach the widest possible area of agreement in the soonest possible time, to agree to a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

The United States believes that such a partial treaty would represent a substantial positive gain for society.

First, such a treaty would result in a definite downward turn in the arms race. Under such a ban, for example, it would not be possible to explore further the interaction of nuclear weapons with the ionosphere or the atmosphere. Operational proof testing of entire weapons systems would be precluded. Testing of weapons to learn how they can be used in battlefield situations would be denied nuclear powers. Development of ever larger yield warheads for missiles would be stopped or at least much inhibited.

Second, a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans would have an effect on the countries that are about to enter the nuclear arms race. Almost all areas of weapons development and technology, particularly those areas I have just discussed, would be made more difficult for them if these nations became parties to such a treaty. Consequently, a significant portion of the nuclear arms race can be prevented from spreading to other countries if, as we sincerely hope, the Soviet Union joins with us in accepting such a treaty.

Third, such a treaty would stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, space, and the oceans. Much argument has taken place on the extent to which radioactive fallout does or does not represent a danger. But we do know that at the very least fallout is not desirable. We also know that if the testing continues in these environments at an accelerated pace, fallout will increase. A definite end to further increases in radioactive fallout is a significant byproduct of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

A proposal for a limited test ban treaty has been

offered in the past by the United States. President Eisenhower made a proposal for an atmospheric treaty on 13 April 1959 to Chairman Khrushchev, and it was rejected.<sup>5</sup> President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan also proposed a limited treaty on 3 September 1961.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, at those times they met with rejection from the Soviet Union.

It is now our earnest hope, in the interest of all mankind, that this proposal for a partial treaty will meet with the immediate and responsive approval of the Soviet Government and that we can get on with the job of drafting an agreement which will break the deadlock in which we find ourselves.

#### Other Nations Support Partial Test Ban Treaty

This proposal has also been discussed on several occasions by many of the representatives at this Conference. The proposal was first mentioned at this resumed session by the representative of Brazil when he said at our 61st plenary meeting on 25 July 1962:

It has been implied that a nuclear test ban is difficult to attain because the great Powers cannot or do not wish to agree on the intricate question of control, a problem which is based on confidence. It is well known, however, that the main divergencies and discrepancies do lie in the problems of detection and identification of underground tests, as the international control required for atmospheric and outer space tests does not appear to present so many insurmountable difficulties. Why, then, not concentrate our efforts on this question of atmospheric and outer space tests which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and nerves?

The representative of Mexico supported this proposal at our 63d plenary meeting, on 30 July 1962, when he said:

... we now think it might be possible to go back to the idea of ending atmospheric tests while continuing to negotiate on underground tests, if the present differences about the technical difficulties of detection and identification and the form of adequate control continue to hold up the framing of a treaty.

Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden also supported this approach when she stated at our 64th meeting:

<sup>5</sup> For exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev, Apr. 13-23 and May 5-14, 1959, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704, and June 8, 1959, p. 825.

<sup>6</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

If such an undertaking were restricted, as an initial measure, to atmospheric and outer space tests—plus, I hope, underwater tests—a treaty would be easy to draft and the hopes of the tormented world would mount and confidence would begin to be felt.

Support for an atmospheric test ban treaty was also voiced by the representative of Nigeria, Foreign Minister Wachuku, when he said on 23 March 1962:

My delegation demands that every effort should be made to conclude an agreement to stop nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, told us of his delegation's interest in an approach to a ban on such tests. He said:

Since less than a year ago it was possible for one party and the other to offer a test ban treaty banning atmospheric tests, with no additional international obligatory controls required, and relegating the solution of the more thorny, less important underground tests to some future date, would it not again prove possible for both parties to give a little here and a little there and arrive at a settlement which might embody the desires, and indeed the spirit, of the offers of both parties already referred to?

A proposal to ban tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water was supported by the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Alamayehu, in his interesting first address to this Committee on 3 August. He stated that he strongly supported a proposal of Mexico, Brazil, and Sweden.

The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, voiced his support for the proposals of the delegations of Mexico and Brazil for a limited treaty when he said:

We believe that the concessions and sacrifices would be worth while if they helped to put us on the road leading to a complete test ban. We accordingly support both those proposals, and commend them to the Nuclear Subcommittee.

In addition support for such an approach in this Conference to the problem came from the delegation of India. The Defense Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, told the Committee on 20 March 1962, at our fifth plenary meeting:

The main explosions we are worried about at the moment are explosions in the atmosphere and the biosphere.

Thus India too would, I feel sure, concur with that even partial agreement banning tests in these environments would be a positive and constructive step forward.

In sum, therefore, it seems to us that there is a wide measure of agreement among the eight new members of this Committee that, if a comprehensive test ban treaty cannot be achieved in the near future, efforts should be made to reach agreement on a cessation of tests in those environments acceptable to all the states concerned.

I also wish to note in this connection the constructive suggestion regarding a limited treaty made by you, Mr. Chairman [F. Cavalletti], in your capacity as representative of Italy, at our 70th meeting.

My Government and that of the United Kingdom have for a long time been studying such a limited proposal, and I am now, on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom, submitting a draft treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. I should like to ask the secretariat to circulate this treaty as a Conference document.

#### Essential Features of Partial Treaty

Briefly, this partial treaty would:

- ban nuclear weapon tests in or above the atmosphere and in territorial waters or high seas;
- bind the signatories to refrain from encouraging or participating in such nuclear explosions by any other state;
- permit explosions proscribed in the treaty for peaceful purposes under conditions specified in the treaty;
- not require any international verification machinery;
- provide a cutoff date for testing; and,
- contain provision for withdrawal, after notice had been given, if a party deemed the treaty had been violated or that a state not a party to the treaty had tested and if the party also deemed this jeopardized its national security.

Let me now discuss the essential features of this proposed partial treaty.

The parties would undertake an obligation to prohibit and prevent nuclear weapon test explosions in any place under their jurisdiction and control in or above the atmosphere, in territorial waters or on the high seas, or in any other environment if radioactive debris would be produced outside the territorial limits of the state in which such tests were conducted.

Parties would also be under an obligation to refrain from participating in or encouraging prohibited nuclear weapon test explosions by any other state.

The parties would be allowed to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes in environments proscribed by the treaty with the unanimous consent of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union or, if required, under conditions in which the nuclear device was open to internal inspection.

A party would have a right to withdraw if the treaty had been violated by another party, if a state not a party to the treaty had tested nuclear weapons and that was deemed to be a threat to the party's national security, or if nuclear weapon tests occurred which either violated the treaty or jeopardized the withdrawing party's national security and it was not possible to identify the state responsible.

Before a state could withdraw it would have to request that a conference of all parties be called, at which it would present its reasons for withdrawal. The withdrawal could take effect only after a period of 60 days from the submission of a notice of withdrawal.

Those provisions are all that would be basically necessary for a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. My Government is prepared to sign such a treaty without the addition of any international verification machinery, and it is my understanding that that is also the position of the United Kingdom. That position is consistent with the position taken by the United States throughout this Conference—namely, that verification measures should be related to the needs of the parties and to the degree of risk to them from possible clandestine violations.

The United States suggests that in any limited agreement, as in a comprehensive test ban treaty, there be a cutoff date for testing. All parties would thus be under notice regarding the date when testing proscribed by the treaty would end. That idea was recommended by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, on 9 May 1962 at the 34th meeting of this Committee. He said at that time:

... it is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every day to draw up an agreement fixing now—I repeat

now—the date for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion of the series of explosions already begun and before the beginning of the answering series announced by the Soviet Union.

I might interpolate that, as the Committee knows, that series of tests in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union has begun and is continuing.

The plans of both parties for carrying out explosions must have an end, and this end should be fixed now in a treaty, because it is dangerous to wait until both series of tests are finished before negotiating an effective agreement that will put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

#### **U.S. Views on Moratorium on Underground Tests**

In the past it has been suggested that a proposal for a partial ban on tests be accompanied by a moratorium on underground testing. Such a proposal, of course, goes contrary to the reasons for which such a partial ban is proposed. The reason for which my Government reluctantly chose to consider a partial ban—in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space—was the seemingly adamant refusal of the Soviet Union to accept a reasonable number of obligatory on-site inspections of unidentified events certified by the commission, so that apparently, at least at the present time, no satisfactory comprehensive test ban agreement could be reached. Regrettable as that situation is—and it is indeed regrettable—we have accepted the suggestion that we continue to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty but accept now a partial ban for the moment. But to make agreement on a partial ban contingent upon a moratorium with respect to underground tests would merely revive the issues which we have asked be reserved for solution as part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Why cannot the United States accept a moratorium on underground tests? It is because, as we have made clear, we believe testing in that environment must cease under adequate and effective international control. It is not necessary to recall here the unfortunate experience the United States had last autumn when the Soviet Union began to test,<sup>7</sup> despite the solemn pledge to the contrary by Chairman Khrushchev in January 1960—to be precise, on 14 January 1960—and during a period when the United States not only did not test but with the United Kingdom had made and

<sup>7</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, p. 475.

was making far-reaching and constructive proposals here in Geneva designed to produce agreement. Indeed, we thought we had cleared away the last remaining vestige of reason why the Soviet Union would not sign such a treaty on the evening of 30 August, only to hear the announcement that night that the Soviet Union was going to resume tests.

The United States wishes to make it abundantly clear that no party is precluded under any test ban treaty from conducting laboratory tests and other work preparatory to tests. We intend to keep ourselves in readiness, and we note that in the past few weeks the Soviet Union has started another nuclear test series, including weapons the equivalent of several million tons of explosive power, and as I have said those tests in the atmosphere are continuing.

I submit that the position of the United States on the banning of nuclear weapon tests is reasonable and forthcoming. Basically, we wish to ban all nuclear tests in all environments under a treaty with effective international verification, including obligatory, objective, on-site inspection. We have moved in many ways to new positions based on sound scientific research. In cooperation with the United Kingdom we have done our level best to reach agreement, and I submit that we have not been stubborn or obstinate, unyielding or unmoving. For its part the United States is prepared to accept such a comprehensive treaty at any time if the Soviet Union will accept a detection, location, identification, and inspection system which is related to the degree of risk involved and is therefore adequate for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The United States earnestly hopes that the discontinuance of tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water will stimulate progress toward an early agreement on an effective treaty banning tests in all environments. To further this objective, the United States pledges itself to continue negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of urgency and to continue its research efforts concerning the detection and identification of underground nuclear weapons tests. The United States will continue to make public, as it did on 7 July 1962,<sup>a</sup> the results of any research which may be helpful in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to offer its scientists for consultation as it did here at Geneva.

<sup>a</sup> Department of Defense press release dated July 7.

## U.S. and U.K. Ready To Negotiate

In conclusion, let me make clear and explicit what the United States and the United Kingdom are today proposing.

We are submitting a new comprehensive treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States for the banning of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. This comprehensive treaty has taken into account recent advances in research on the detection, location, and identification of nuclear weapons tests. The proposed comprehensive treaty contains reasonable and effective measures on inspection to assure that all parties can have confidence that the treaty is being observed.

The details of the comprehensive treaty are ones that should and must be discussed so that they meet the interests and requirements of all parties. The United States is prepared to continue working for such a comprehensive treaty without interruption and with a sense of urgency and dedication. We will bring our scientists back to Geneva if that will further negotiations.

We are also submitting a new treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States for the banning of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans. This treaty requires no international verification machinery. It could and indeed should be accepted at the earliest possible date. There are no stumbling blocks which should stand in the way of its adoption by the nuclear powers represented at this Conference.

We, the nuclear powers, have the capacity to protect or to destroy the peoples of all countries. We have, therefore, a compelling and an urgent responsibility to strive unceasingly to resolve our differences and to present to the world an effective agreement which can be signed just as soon as possible to ban all nuclear weapons tests. But if we cannot do this immediately, then, I submit with regret, a partial treaty is better than none at all. Let us not be deterred from accepting the good because we cannot at this time accomplish the best. At the same time we must demonstrate by our continued and conscientious efforts that more comprehensive agreements will soon be forthcoming.

The United States and the United Kingdom, in presenting these draft treaties, have made a determined, far-reaching, and epochal step toward reaching agreement in the interest of all mankind. We stand ready to negotiate on these draft treaties.



We now respectfully request the Soviet Union to take an equally far-reaching step so that real and lasting progress will be achieved.

## **DRAFT TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS**

### **PREAMBLE**

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Desirous of ending permanently all nuclear weapon test explosions,

Have agreed as follows:

### **ARTICLE I**

#### *Obligations To Discontinue*

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty:

a. to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and

b. to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere.

### **ARTICLE II**

#### *Establishment of the International Scientific Commission*

1. The carrying out of the obligations assumed in Articles I and IX of this Treaty shall be verified by an International Scientific Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission." The Commission shall include an International Staff, hereinafter referred to as the "Staff," and a Verification System, hereinafter referred to as the "System."

2. Each of the Parties undertakes to cooperate promptly and fully in the establishment and effective organization of the Commission. Each of the Parties also undertakes to cooperate promptly and fully in carrying out the measures of verification set forth in this Treaty and in any agreements which the Parties may conclude with the Commission.

### **ARTICLE III**

#### *Functions of the International Scientific Commission*

1. The Commission shall have general responsibility for the collection of data on, and the reporting of, all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions, and for making positive identification of the nature and origin of such events wherever possible.

2. The Commission shall maintain supervision of all elements of the System in order to ensure that such elements function in an integrated manner. For this purpose the Commission shall establish and monitor adherence to standards for the operation, calibration and coordination of all elements of the System.

3. The Commission may consult with the Parties concerning the nature of any unidentified event which could be suspected of being a nuclear weapon test explosion and, on the basis of available data, may issue to all

Parties a report concerning the nature and origin of any event reported to it by the Staff.

4. The Commission, by majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members, shall approve the total amount of its annual budget.

5. The Commission shall arrange for observers to be permanently stationed at, and to make periodic visits to, elements of the System in order to ensure that established procedures for the rapid, coordinated and reliable collection of data are being followed.

6. The Commission may enter into an agreement with any State or authority to aid in carrying out the provisions of this Treaty.

7. The Commission shall establish such laboratories and other facilities as it deems necessary for the carrying out of the tasks assigned to it under this Treaty.

8. The Commission, by majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members, shall appoint an Executive Officer to assist it in carrying out its functions.

9. The Commission shall conduct, and shall facilitate the participation of members of the Staff in, programs of basic scientific research to improve the capability of the Commission to perform its functions under the present Treaty and to ensure the use of the most efficient and up-to-date methods of verification of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to this Treaty.

10. The permanent members of the Commission shall arrange for a conference of Parties to the Treaty to be held when, in the opinion of the permanent members, a sufficient number of states have become Parties to it, in order to hold the elections referred to in paragraph 1b of Article IV. Such conference shall be held, in any event, when \_\_\_\_\_ number of States, including the permanent members, have become Parties.

11. Approximately every three years thereafter, the Commission shall invite the Parties to a conference in order to hold subsequent elections to the Commission.

12. The Commission may arrange for a conference, at any time it deems appropriate, in order to discuss matters pertaining to the Treaty.

### **ARTICLE IV**

#### *Organization and Procedures of the International Scientific Commission*

1. The Commission shall be composed of 15 members. They shall be selected as follows:

a. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members.

b. Twelve other members shall be elected by majority vote of the Parties present and voting in the conference described in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article III, of which

(i) three shall be from among Parties nominated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(ii) two shall be from among Parties nominated jointly by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

(iii) seven shall be from among Parties nominated jointly by the permanent members of the Commission on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

*Organization of the International Staff*

c. To the extent that any nominations called for in paragraph 1b of this Article are not made, the Parties to the Treaty shall elect, at the conferences described in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article III, the remaining members of the Commission from among all of the Parties.

2. The members elected to the first Commission shall serve for three years from their election. Regular elections shall be held triennially thereafter, and those members elected to the Commission shall serve until replaced or reelected at the next triennial election.

3. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote. All decisions, unless otherwise specified in this Treaty, shall be taken by a simple majority of the members present and voting.

4. Any Party to the Treaty which is not a member of the Commission may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Commission whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Party are specially affected.

5. The Commission shall meet at such times as it may determine, or within twenty-four hours at the request of any member.

6. The permanent members shall carry out the functions of the Commission until it has been established pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article. In doing so, the permanent members shall act by unanimous agreement. They shall cooperate in encouraging other States to become Parties and they shall take prompt action to nominate Parties, as provided in paragraph 1b of this Article, for the purpose of ensuring selection of membership in the Commission at the earliest possible date.

7. The headquarters of the Commission shall be located at \_\_\_\_\_

## ARTICLE V

*Functions of the International Staff*

1. The Staff shall assist the Commission in carrying out its functions.

2. The Staff shall supervise the collection of data by all elements of the System and shall provide the observers who are to be stationed at and make visits to elements of the System for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 of Article III.

3. The Staff shall provide the personnel for the manning of such international elements of the System as may be established by the Commission.

4. The Staff shall analyze data collected by the System in accordance with such standards as are set forth in this Treaty and as may be set forth by the Commission, and shall forward to the Commission reports on all such data. Such data and reports shall be available for the inspection of any Party upon request.

5. The System shall, in accordance with procedures and standards prescribed by the Commission, collect and report to the Staff, within 24 hours after detection of any event which could be suspected of being a nuclear weapon test explosion, all data received relating to the detection, location and identification of the event. Thereafter, additional data, if any, relating to the event shall be reported to the Staff as it becomes available.

6. The Staff shall provide technical instruction for personnel operating elements of the System.

1. The Executive Officer shall be responsible to the Commission and, under its supervision, shall carry out its policy directives. His appointment shall extend for a period of four years. The Executive Officer shall be subject to removal from office by the Commission if as a result of failure on his part to comply with the directives of the Commission or for any other reason, the Commission decides that it no longer has confidence in him. Any such decision, and the exercise of the power of removal, shall require the concurring votes of 11 members of the Commission.

2. Subject to regulations approved by the Commission the Executive Officer shall recruit, organize and oversee the functioning of the Staff.

3. The Staff shall include such qualified scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfill its functions, and paramount consideration shall be given to obtaining officials of the highest standards, efficiency, technical competence and integrity. Subject to this principle, the Executive Officer shall also give consideration to the selection of personnel who are nationals of States which have participated in, or intend to participate in, the establishment of elements of the System.

4. The Executive Officer shall also be guided by the considerations that the permanent Staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary to perform its assigned tasks and that personnel should be obtained on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

5. In the performance of their duties, the Executive Officer and the Staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Commission. Each Party undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Executive Officer and the Staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

## ARTICLE VII

*Organization of the Verification System*

1. The System shall consist of the integrated elements described in the Annex on Verification, together with such additions as the Commission deems desirable. It shall be designed to ensure the rapid and reliable collection and reporting of data. It shall include the following classes of stations:

a. Stations to be constructed at sites listed in the Verification Annex. Each such station shall be maintained and manned, in accordance with specifications established by the Commission, by nationals of the State in whose territory such station is located. The construction of and equipment for each such station shall be paid for by the Commission and the personnel for such station shall be trained by the Commission. All Parties in whose territories such stations are located agree to accept observers at such stations for the purposes specified in paragraph 5 of Article III.

b. Existing stations to be provided, maintained and manned by individual Parties as requested by and in agreement with the Commission.

c. Stations to be constructed, maintained and manned by the Commission in agreement with individual Parties if the Commission deems such stations desirable.

d. Such detection instruments in outer space, in the atmosphere, and on and beneath the surface of the earth (including the waters thereof) as the Commission may deem desirable. These may be provided, maintained and manned by the Commission or by particular Parties, as the Commission may determine.

2. The Parties to this Treaty agree to cooperate in the establishment (including the provision of suitable sites), operation, expansion, calibration and standardization of all elements of the System and in providing the Commission with such assistance, equipment or data as may be useful to the Commission in performing its functions.

3. The Parties to this Treaty agree to ensure that within six months from the entry into force of this Treaty, all existing stations referred to in paragraph 1b of this Article will commence operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. They also agree to ensure that within twelve months the stations referred to in paragraph 1a of this Article will be constructed and commence operation in accordance with such provisions.

4. In accordance with standards set forth by the Commission, stations referred to in paragraph 1a of this Article shall maintain continuous operation of such equipment as the Commission deems desirable for each station including the following: apparatus for the collection of radioactive debris and for the recording of fluorescence of the upper atmosphere, visible light, cosmic noise absorption, telluric currents, resonance scattering of sunlight, acoustic waves, seismic waves and electromagnetic signals. Stations on islands or near the shorelines of oceans shall, in addition, maintain continuous operation of apparatus for the recording of hydroacoustic waves as deemed desirable by the Commission. Stations aboard ships shall include and continuously operate equipment for the recording of hydroacoustic waves, fluorescence of the upper atmosphere and visible light as deemed desirable by the Commission.

## ARTICLE VIII

### *On-Site Inspection*

1. The Executive Officer shall certify immediately by public notice at the Headquarters of the Staff whenever he determines that a seismic event has been located pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article and not eliminated from consideration pursuant to paragraph 3. The Executive Officer shall make every effort to make this certification within seventy-two hours after the location of the event.

2. A seismic event shall be considered located when seismic signals, whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations, and velocities are consistent with those of waves from earthquakes or explosions, are recorded at a sufficient number of stations to establish the approximate time and position of the event. This requires at least four clearly measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within plus or minus three seconds. These four mutually consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different detection stations.

3. A located seismic event shall not be suspected of being a nuclear weapon test explosion if it fulfills one or more of the following criteria:

a. Its depth of focus is established as below sixty kilometers;

b. Its epicentral location is established in the deep ocean, and the event is unaccompanied by a hydroacoustical signal consistent with the seismic epicenter and origin time;

c. It is established to be a foreshock or after-shock of a seismic event of at least magnitude six which has clearly been identified as an earthquake by the criteria in sub-paragraphs a and b of this paragraph. For this purpose a foreshock must occur as part of a sequence of earthquakes less than forty-eight hours before the main shock, and an after-shock must occur as part of a sequence of earthquakes less than a week after the main shock, and their epicenters must have been located within ten kilometers of the epicenter of the main shock.

4. Data provided by stations in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State in which the event may be located may not be used to render it ineligible for inspection but may be used to assist in establishing its eligibility for inspection.

5. When a seismic event has been certified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Executive Officer shall designate an area lying within the circumference of a circle, the radius of which is \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers, and the center of which is the location of the epicenter of that event.

6. On-site inspection of areas designated by the Executive Officer pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article shall be carried out pursuant to this Article:

a. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, if requested by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

b. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, if requested by the United States of America or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

c. on territory under the jurisdiction or control of any other Party, if directed by the Commission.

7. Any Party having jurisdiction or control over territory on which an on-site inspection is requested or directed pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article shall make the necessary arrangements to facilitate the prompt on-site inspection of the area designated pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article.

8. The maximum number of inspections which may be requested in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a permanent member of the Commission shall be \_\_\_\_\_ in each annual period. The maximum number of inspections which may be directed in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party not a permanent member of the Commission shall be three in each annual period, or such higher number as the Commission, after consultation with the Party, may determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

9. For territory under the jurisdiction or control of

permanent members of the Commission, not more than \_\_\_\_\_ percent of the annual number of inspections provided in paragraph 8 of this Article shall be carried out each year in the aseismic area of that territory described in the Annex on Verification.

10. The on-site inspections, when requested or directed in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, shall be carried out by teams organized by the Executive Officer. In forming the teams, the Executive Officer shall ensure the adequate representation of scientific and technical skills and shall avoid composition which would result in inspection of territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State by any nationals of that State. The leader of a team shall be appointed by the Executive Officer from among its members.

11. Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection teams, despatched pursuant to this Article, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection team and to give such teams the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission.

#### ARTICLE IX

##### *Explosions for Peaceful Purposes*

The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes may be conducted only:

(1) if unanimously agreed to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America; or

(2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto.

#### ARTICLE X

##### *Relationships With Other International Organizations*

1. The Commission is authorized to enter into agreements establishing appropriate relationships between the Commission and the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies.

2. The Commission may make appropriate arrangements for the Commission, Staff and System to become a part of, or to enter into an appropriate relationship with, an international disarmament organization, or any international organization which may in the future be established among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament or related measures.

#### ARTICLE XI

##### *Periodic Review*

1. One year after the coming into force of this Treaty, and annually thereafter, the Commission shall review the Treaty and the operations of the Staff and System in order to:

a. Evaluate their effectiveness for verifying compliance with the obligations undertaken in Articles I and IX;

b. Recommend any improvements in the System which the Commission deems desirable, particularly with respect to the identification of nuclear explosions;

c. Recommend any changes in the quotas of on-site inspections which the Commission deems desirable.

2. The Commission shall:

a. Communicate the results of such review to all Parties of this Treaty;

b. Consider any improvements proposed by any Party to this Treaty and decide upon the adoption of those which do not require amendments to this Treaty; and

c. Vote upon any amendments to this Treaty proposed by any Party as a result of such review in accordance with the provisions of Article XVI.

#### ARTICLE XII

##### *Finance*

1. The annual budget shall be drawn up by the Executive Officer of the Staff and approved by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article III.

2. Parties to this Treaty shall contribute to the expenses of the annual budget in accordance with the following scale:

a. \_\_\_\_\_ per cent contributed by the permanent members as follows:

(i) \_\_\_\_\_ per cent of the annual budget by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(ii) \_\_\_\_\_ per cent of the annual budget by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

(iii) \_\_\_\_\_ per cent of the annual budget by the United States of America.

b. \_\_\_\_\_ per cent contributed by the remaining members of the Commission in equal shares.

#### ARTICLE XIII

##### *Withdrawal*

1. If any Party to this Treaty determines:

a. that the obligations contained in Articles I or IX of this Treaty have not been fulfilled,

b. that any other obligations under this Treaty, including those relating to arrangements for on-site inspections, have not been fulfilled and that such non-fulfilment might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

c. that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, or

d. that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty or, if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depositary Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request from the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based.

2. The conference shall, taking into account the statement of evidence provided by the determining Party and any other relevant information, examine the facts and assess the significance of the situation.

3. After the conclusion of the conference or after the expiration of a period of sixty days from the date of the receipt of the request for the conference by the Depository Government, whichever is the earlier, any Party to this Treaty, may, if it deems withdrawal from the Treaty necessary for its national security, give notice of withdrawal to the Depository Government. Such withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified in the notice, which shall in no event be earlier than sixty days from receipt of the notice by the Depository Government. The notice shall be accompanied by a detailed statement of the reasons for the withdrawal.

#### ARTICLE XIV

##### *Privileges and Immunities*

The privileges and immunities which the Commission, the Staff, and the representatives of Parties shall be granted by the Parties, and the legal capacity which the Commission shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties, shall be set forth in Annex — of this Treaty.

#### ARTICLE XV

##### *Signature, Ratification, Accession, Entry Into Force and Registration*

1. This Treaty shall be open until \_\_\_\_\_ to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of \_\_\_\_\_, which is hereby designated the Depository Government.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on \_\_\_\_\_ for States which have deposited instruments of ratification or accession on or before that date, provided that the ratifications deposited include those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. If ratifications by all three of the States specified in the preceding sentence are not deposited on or before \_\_\_\_\_, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which ratifications by all of them have been deposited.

4. Instruments of ratification or accession deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty shall become binding on the date of deposit.

5. The Depository Government shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each ratification and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences, or any notices of withdrawal pursuant to Article XIII.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE XVI

##### *Amendments*

Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the Commission including the con-

curring votes of the permanent members, and shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of ratifications by two-thirds of the Parties, including ratification by the permanent members of the Commission.

#### ARTICLE XVII

##### *Annexes*

The Annexes to the present Treaty constitute an integral part thereof, and any signature, ratification, or accession to this Treaty shall apply to both the Treaty and the Annexes. The phrase "this Treaty" shall include all annexes hereto.

#### ARTICLE XVIII

##### *Authentic Texts*

This Treaty, done in the English and Russian languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Government, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two.

### **DRAFT TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND UNDERWATER**

#### PREAMBLE

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the "original Parties",

Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance of all nuclear weapon test explosions and determined to continue negotiations to this end,

Confident that immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and in the oceans will facilitate progress toward the early agreement providing for the permanent and verified discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

##### *Obligations*

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

a. in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, or in territorial or high seas; or

b. in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect proscribed, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

## ARTICLE II

### *Explosions for Peaceful Purposes*

The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect proscribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only:

- (1) if unanimously agreed to by the original Parties; or
- (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE III

### *Withdrawal*

1. If any Party to this Treaty determines

- a. that any other Party has not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty,
- b. that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, or
- c. that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty, or, if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

it may submit to the Depository Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the Depository Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request for the determining Party to the Depository Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based.

2. The conference shall, taking into account the statement of evidence provided by the determining Party and any other relevant information, examine the facts and assess the significance of the situation.

3. After the conclusion of the conference or after the expiration of a period of sixty days from the date of the receipt of the request for the conference by the Depository Government, whichever is the earlier, any Party to this Treaty may, if it deems withdrawal from the Treaty necessary for its national security, give notice of such withdrawal to the Depository Government. Such withdrawal shall take effect on the date specified in the notice, which shall in no event be earlier than sixty days from receipt of the notice of the Depository Government. The notice shall be accompanied by a detailed statement of the reasons for the withdrawal.

## ARTICLE IV

### *Amendments*

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendments shall be submitted to the Depository Government which shall circulate it to all Parties. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depository Government shall convene a conference, to which it shall invite all Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty or its Annex must be approved by a vote of two-thirds of the Parties, including all of the original Parties. It shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of ratifications by two-thirds of the Parties to this Treaty, including ratification by the original Parties.

## ARTICLE V

### *Signature, Ratification, Accession, Entry Into Force and Registration*

1. This Treaty shall be open until \_\_\_\_\_ to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of \_\_\_\_\_, which is hereby designated the Depository Government.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on \_\_\_\_\_ for States which have deposited instruments of ratification or accession on or before that date, provided that the ratifications deposited include those of the original Parties. If ratifications by all three original Parties are not deposited on or before \_\_\_\_\_, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date on which ratifications by all of them have been deposited.

4. Instruments of ratification or accession deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty shall become binding on the date of deposit.

5. The Depository Government shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or notices of withdrawals.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## ARTICLE VI

### *Authentic Texts*

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Government to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two.

## U.S. Welcomes Target Date for Nuclear Test Agreements

*Statement by President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>*

In Geneva this morning the Soviet representative [Vasily V. Kuznetsov] proposed that an agreement should be reached on a cutoff time for all nuclear weapons tests and that this date should be set as of January 1, 1963. I am happy to say that the United States Government regards this as a reasonable target date and would like to join with all interested parties in a maximum effort to conclude effective agreements which can enter into force on next New Year's Day. To accomplish this purpose the governments involved must accelerate their negotiations, looking toward an agreed treaty.

For our part in the United States such an agreed treaty must be presented to the Senate for consent to ratification. We therefore have no time to lose.

The world will welcome an agreement that a way should be found to stop all nuclear testing at the end of this year. But I must point out again that in order to end testing we must have workable international agreements. Gentlemen's agreements and moratoria do not provide the types of guarantees that are necessary. They do not give assurance against an abrupt renewal of testing by unilateral action. This is the lesson of the Soviet Government's decision just a year ago.<sup>2</sup> Nor can such informal arrangements give any assurance against secret underground testing. That is why we must have a definite agreement with reasonable and adequate assurance.

The United States cannot be a party to any renewal of false hopes which the Soviet Government shattered last September. The two treaties now before the Geneva Conference<sup>3</sup> have been prepared with care to meet the technical necessities of an effective test ban. If the Soviet Government will accept a serious and formal agreement in either form, a real downward turn in the arms

race is possible. The United States Government, for its part, will spare no effort to this end.

## U.S. Again Calls on Soviet Union To Consult on Berlin Tensions

*Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of recent incidents in Berlin.*

### U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 27<sup>1</sup>

Press release 525 dated August 27

It should not be necessary to remind the Soviet Government that the present tensions in Berlin have been caused by the illegal erection of the wall and the senseless cruelty of the police of the Soviet sector. The people of the Western sectors were manifesting revulsion, which was worldwide, against the criminal shooting of a defenseless and innocent boy on August 17, who was left to die in the Soviet sector without even the elementary aid demanded by civilized codes of behavior. On August 23 another young German was shot in the back by the police of the Soviet sector. Although he was taken to a West Berlin hospital as soon as possible, his life could not be saved.

Despite these wanton provocations, the U.S. authorities in Berlin are maintaining law and order in their sector. All traffic, including that of members of the Soviet armed forces, is moving without incident. The U.S. Government understands the concern of the Soviet Government about the stone-throwing at Soviet personnel, but the Soviet Government cannot expect to escape censure for, or to avoid the consequences of, permitting these brutalities to occur in the sector of the city for which it is responsible.

The Governments of the U.S., U.K., and France have repeatedly called on the Government of the U.S.S.R. to have its officials meet with their representatives to find ways of reducing dangerous tensions and restoring normal conditions in Berlin. The U.S. Government hopes the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on Aug. 27 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Read by the President at his news conference on Aug. 29.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.

<sup>3</sup> For texts of a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments and an alternative draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, see p. 411.

Government will agree promptly to the proposal for consultation made in its notes of June 25<sup>2</sup> and August 24<sup>3</sup> of this year.

## SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 24

Unofficial translation  
No. 41, USA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on instruction of the Soviet Government declares the following:

In recent days fascist elements with the obvious connivance of the U.S. occupation authorities have carried out in the American sector of West Berlin a series of dangerous provocations against members of the Honor Guard of the Soviet forces proceeding to perform guard duties at the Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten, and also against a group of diplomatic employees of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 378.

Before the eyes of representatives of the occupation authorities and West Berlin police and in the presence of their complete inactivity, bandit elements on August 13, 18, 19, and 20 in the American sector at the Friedrichstrasse control point attempted by force to hinder passage of Soviet military personnel who were proceeding to change the guard at the Soviet war memorial in Tiergarten with the result that three members of the military forces received injuries.

On August 19 in the American sector of West Berlin an autobus with Soviet officers was subject to attack. A similar criminal act occurred in connection with transit through the American sector of diplomatic personnel of the Soviet Embassy in the German Democratic Republic.

In connection with the cited hostile acts of fascist and revanchist elements in West Berlin, the Soviet Government vigorously protests to the United States Government and considers it necessary to point out that in the event of a repetition of similar provocations, necessary measures will be taken to insure the safety of Soviet representatives and soldiers.

The Soviet Government insists that the U.S. authorities who bear direct responsibility for these provocations immediately take measures to suppress them and severely punish those guilty.

## The United Nations Plan for the Congo

by G. Mennen Williams  
*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Fellow veterans, I am pleased to address a veterans' group today because I want to speak about a country balanced between strife and progress—the Republic of the Congo. I can think of no more timely or more important topic to discuss with you who have experienced past failures to find peaceful solutions.

A United Nations plan for Congo unity was announced on August 20 by Acting Secretary-General U Thant,<sup>2</sup> and its early acceptance was indicated by Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. Last Friday Robert Gardiner, Chief of the U.N. Operation in the Congo, presented the United Nations plan for uniting that unfortu-

nately divided country to representatives of Katanga Province.

Since its presentation to the Katangese provincial government of Mr. Moise Tshombe, Mr. Adoula announced that his government had studied the Secretary-General's plan and had given its agreement to it. He noted that his government's only criterion for judging the Congo problem was in the context of 14 million human beings aspiring for a better life, and added:

We hope all countries will adopt this view and support in all phases the Secretary-General's plan, which takes into account our observations and is in accord with the Government of the Congo's point of view. If all of these conditions are realized, we do not doubt an era of peace and prosperity would begin for the Congo, which could, in fruitful cooperation with all nations, make its contribution to the international community.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Jewish War Veterans national convention at Detroit, Mich., on Aug. 30 (press release 528).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 11.



## **I.S. Support of Plan**

Over this past weekend the United States Government also announced its support of the Acting Secretary-General's efforts to reach a settlement in the Congo.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. announcement pointed out that the J.N. plan offers a reasonable basis upon which Congolese leaders can settle their differences. Our Government said that the plan offers compelling reasons for other nations to lend their support and that statesmanship in the Congo can put that nation on the road to federal unity and progress.

Such progress, the United States concluded, will enable the United Nations and countries like the United States to devote greater resources to economic and technical assistance in the Congo.

It is gratifying to be able to say today that many interested nations have indicated their firm support for the U.N. plan. For example, last weekend, Britain announced its support of the plan, and on Tuesday the Belgian Government issued a statement of support.

While there has not yet been time for an official acceptance of the United Nations plan from the provincial government of Katanga, provision for a federal system of government for the Congo enhances the possibility of its acceptance by Katanga. Evariste Kimba, who handles foreign affairs for Mr. Tshombe, said in a letter to Secretary-General U Thant following his announcement of the plan on August 20 that the plan "contains a number of positive elements." There is considerable reason to hope that Mr. Tshombe will support the plan. On August 1 and August 21 he stated his belief that Katanga was ready to join a Congolese federation.

On the initial evidence, then, we are hopeful that the U.N. plan is the basis for Congolese unity and can put an end to Katanga's secession.

The resolution of this problem is naturally one which the Congolese themselves must achieve. You will recall the United Nations was invited into the Congo by the Congolese Government to assist that new nation in overcoming postindependence disorders, in safeguarding Congolese unity, and in rebuilding the nation's administrative and economic health. The United Nations prevented unilateral Soviet intervention and succeeded to a large extent in keeping order. It has

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 379.

## **United Kingdom and Belgium Support U.N. Plan for Congo**

### **U.K. Statement of August 25**

Her Majesty's Government support the proposals for reconciliation in the Congo put forward by the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council on August 20. They consider that these proposals are a fair basis for a settlement which should be acceptable to all parties and should provide a federal structure appropriate to the needs of the Congo.

They welcome the recent statement by Prime Minister Adoula of his intention to prepare, with the assistance of the United Nations, and to present in Parliament, a draft federal constitution.<sup>1</sup> Such a constitution which takes account of the view of the provinces offers the prospect of a re-integration of Katanga in the national life of the country and the cooperation of all elements in the Congo in the vital task of reconstruction. Her Majesty's Government affirm their support for the Government of the Congo in working for a solution on these lines. They earnestly desire to see these problems which have beset the country brought to an end at the earliest possible date by peaceful means.

### **Belgian Communique of August 28**

Unofficial translation

On July 28, Prime Minister Adoula announced his intention to have a draft federal constitution prepared, in cooperation with United Nations experts, to be submitted to the Congolese Parliament.

On August 20, Mr. U Thant, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitted to the Security Council a report setting forth a number of proposals to lead to a reconciliation in the Congo, to which the Government of Léopoldville has just given its approval. The Belgian Government considers that the statements of Prime Minister Adoula and the proposals for reconciliation submitted by Secretary-General U Thant constitute a basis for a settlement acceptable to all the parties involved. By offering a federal structure adapted to Congolese needs, they permit the peaceful reintegration of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo. Therefore, the Belgian Government approves the proposals of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and is prepared to help him and the Government of the Congo in their efforts to arrive at a solution based on Mr. Thant's proposals.

It is the wish of the Government that the Congolese reconciliation, which is essential to the welfare of the Congolese people and the political stability of Central Africa, may be established by peaceful means as promptly as possible.

<sup>1</sup> For a Department statement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1962, p. 291.

helped maintain Congolese administrative services and assisted in the reestablishment of parliamentary government.

The principal block to Congolese unity and economic progress today is this Katangan problem. Prime Minister Adoula's government was established under orders from Parliament to end this secession, and no Congolese government can long hope to remain in office without demonstrating progress toward this goal. Until this is achieved, Congolese resources, both human and material, will be diverted from the essential long-range task of nation building and economic progress. Until unity is achieved, the threats of chaos and renewed Soviet intervention are ever-present dangers.

We welcome the plan put forth by Acting Secretary-General U Thant because it offers a reasonable way to achieve these goals and head off these dangers.

#### Seven Principal Points

Because this U.N. plan was not widely publicized at the time of its announcement, I would like to take a few minutes this morning to point out its salient features. There are seven principal points in the U.N. plan:

1. The National Government, after consultation with the provincial governments and interested political groups, will present a federal constitution to the Parliament in September. The United Nations is providing legal experts to assist in drafting this document. Under present law this constitution cannot become law without a two-thirds vote of the Parliament, in which all provinces and parties are represented, plus approval by the provincial assemblies. Under the proposed federal constitution certain powers will be delegated to the National Government. These include:

- a. Foreign affairs.
- b. National defense (other than local police functions).
- c. Customs.
- d. Currency, exchange control, and fiscal policy.
- e. Interstate and foreign commerce.
- f. Taxing powers sufficient for National Government needs.
- g. Nationality and immigration.
- h. Post and telecommunications.

Powers not delegated to the National Government will be reserved to the provincial governments.

2. The National Government, after consultation with the provincial governments and interested political groups, will present to the Parliament a new law to establish definitive arrangements for division of revenues between the National and provincial governments, and regulations and procedures for the use of foreign exchange. U.N. experts also will assist in the preparation of this law.

Until that process is completed, the National Government and Katanga should agree to share revenues, duties, and royalties equally, and all foreign exchange earned by any part of the Congo will be paid to the Monetary Council of the National Government or an agreed-upon institution.

The Monetary Council should control use of all foreign exchange and make available for essential needs in Katanga at least 50 percent of the foreign exchange generated in that province. This provision is of particular importance because upon Congolese independence Katanga generated 50 percent of the Congo's foreign exchange earnings.

3. The National Government will ask the International Monetary Fund to help with a plan for national currency unification, which will be implemented within the shortest possible time.

4. Rapid integration and unification of all military units must be accomplished. A commission composed of representatives from the National Government, Katanga, and the United Nations should prepare a plan within 30 days to go into effect within the following 60 days. Provision is made, however, for the provinces to retain control of their local police forces.

5. There should be a general amnesty.

6. All Congolese authorities—national, state, and local—should cooperate fully with the United Nations in carrying out U.N. resolutions.

7. The National Government should be reconstituted to provide a suitable representation for all political and provincial groups.

The United States Government believes that this program is eminently reasonable and necessary. It provides for full consultation and hearing of interested groups, and the plan provides for democratic approval of the constitution and other laws. We believe that, if prompt action is taken on this plan by all Congolese authorities, it will get the Congo back on the road to a peaceful and viable future.

## Peaceful Reunification Essential for Progress

This, then, is the Congo situation as it stands at this moment. It is delicate; it is difficult; but it is by no means devoid of hope.

In some respects, the current Congo situation is reminiscent of the young, radical America of 1783, when the Dean of Gloucester said:

As to the future grandeur of America and its being a rising Empire under one head . . . it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that was ever conceived. . . . The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans, their difference of governments, habitudes and manners, indicate that they will have no center of union and common interest. They never can be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever. . . .

However, as our Constitution led us to unity and an integrated nation, so the U.N. plan offers a path to peaceful reconciliation of differences in the Congo. And this country has pledged its full support to that plan.

Today I want to call on you and all other Americans to back your country's support of the United Nations on this important issue. I know you share our hope and our desire that reason will prevail over ruin in the Congo. And there really is no alternative to Congolese unification except chaos and civil war.

If the United Nations is unable to achieve unity in the Congo, there is a strong possibility that that country will be plunged into a destructive civil war as the rest of the Congo seeks to reintegrate Katanga by whatever means available or necessary. These conditions, in turn, would breed external subversion and loss of true independence.

This is the principal reason why the United States is so concerned with the Congo situation. This is why our policy continues to be to help establish a unified and stable Congo—a Congo on good terms with the West and able to resist extremist and Communist influence and penetration. This is why we continue to welcome all steps toward political reconciliation of the Congo.

Since the beginning of the crisis, both the United States and the United Nations have looked on reconciliation as one of their major tasks. This is why we look so favorably on the plan drawn up by Secretary-General U Thant.

Once a peaceful reunification of the Congo is achieved, then all parties involved can turn to the really important job of helping the Congo build itself into a strong, viable nation. The U.N. plan

offers real promise for a settlement under which the United Nations can work itself out of the expensive job of peacekeeping and policing the country and into the constructive job of economic and technical assistance.

Once this transition is accomplished, we will have made a major contribution toward lasting peace and security, not only in Africa but throughout the world.

This is what we hope will be achieved through the United Nations Congo Plan of Reconciliation. And this is why we are giving our full support and best efforts toward making this plan succeed.

We hope you will join us in support of this endeavor.

## Human Relations and International Relations

*Remarks by Lucius D. Battle<sup>1</sup>*

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you here tonight on behalf of the Department of State. We are proud to be a partner in your program, now completing its seventh year. We are also pleased that the generating power and the main supporting power of this important program have come from private citizens and organizations—from what we call the private sector of our society. It is a sector which I hope you now know better as a result of your summer work assignments in many parts of the country and your special programs in Cleveland, Chicago, and Houston. It is the sector on which many of our programs are based and on which all of our programs ultimately depend.

We usually call a concluding ceremony of this kind, after completion of a program of academic study and work experience such as you have had, a "commencement"—a form of linguistic license, since the event of graduation marks both an end and a beginning. However apt and accurate this time-honored designation may be, it does suggest that a commencement speaker is expected to think in terms of what his hearers are "commencing"

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Cleveland International Program for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, Inc., at Washington, D.C., on Aug. 30 (press release 531). Mr. Battle is Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

to experience, or, as the question usually takes form, what the future can, and does, hold for mankind.

Quite naturally, therefore, I began to think in these terms—of you as the seventh graduating class this program has produced and of your “commencement” upon even greater services to your own countries and, as may be possible, to other countries in need of the skills and insights you possess.

Your professions do, in fact, give you unusual opportunities not only to build better human relations within your own countries, in a very special way, but also to help build better relations with other countries.

Why is this so? In youth work and child welfare activities within your own countries you have especially close and personal relations with those you serve—both young and old, at both high and lower levels of physical and social well-being, and especially in the middle and lower levels, where the needs are greatest. You have the high privilege of helping young people, the leaders of next generations. As your associations extend across national lines, exchanging your professional interests and skills and joining your efforts with those of colleagues in other countries, new doors of opportunity open for you.

We are of course concerned in all our international exchange activities with better human relations, as a way to better understanding among nations.

#### **Scope of Department's Exchange Program**

Let me outline briefly the general scope of our exchange effort in the Department of State, to suggest the total context in which the Cleveland International Program plays its special part. Exchange activities are a comparatively new facet of our foreign relations. The Fulbright program, now known throughout the world as a symbol of the opportunities educational exchange can provide, is only some 15 years old. Nonetheless, under the Fulbright Act and the complementary Smith-Mundt Act, more than 80,000 professors, teachers, research scholars, and students have come here from other countries or gone abroad from this country. The number of countries and territories with which we have exchanges has now reached 120.

The total effort of our educational exchanges is

one in which public and private hands are, and must be, joined. You have had an opportunity to observe something of the way our system works. Colleges and universities, foundations, corporations, labor unions, professional and scholarly associations, other national voluntary organizations, and local community groups of many kinds are all playing an active and effective part in support of the growing role of educational and cultural exchanges in our international relations. No better evidence could be cited than the leadership given by Henry Ollendorff and his supporters in Cleveland in establishing this program, and by the some 75 cooperating social and welfare organizations, the hundreds of families which have provided home hospitality, and the community groups in Chicago and Houston which have made possible the extension of the program to these cities this year. Without this kind of partnership with individual citizens and organizations in the private sector, our educational and cultural programs in the Department of State could not be carried on as effectively as they are.

The reach of our educational and cultural exchange programs is extremely wide, extending to friendly and unfriendly nations alike, in both developed and developing areas of the world. Evidence of scope and outreach comes from the statistics on foreign students. Probably the most striking single fact is that there were some 58,000 foreign students enrolled in almost 1,800 American colleges and universities during the last academic year. Only about 10 percent, however, were here under U.S. Government programs, primarily those of the Department of State and of the Agency for International Development (AID). Since you may well have occasion in your countries to advise or consult regarding foreign students—both those who may want to come or those who may already have been here—you might like to know this Government's general philosophy on foreign students.

The 10 percent who are Government grantees are clearly subjects of Government interest in all aspects of their experience, from the selection process through the college program and after its completion. But the Government feels a concern that the other 90 percent, regardless of how they came here, likewise find the best total experience that can be made available to them. Both humanitarian purpose and national interest coincide on this point. In accordance with the authorizations

under the new Fulbright-Hays Act for services to all foreign students, and in line with the special importance attached to this aspect of foreign relations by President Kennedy's administration, we have been taking steps to stimulate greater private support activities for foreign students and to broaden Government's own participation. We cannot assume fixed financial support for all foreign students, but in every feasible way we want to help improve the quality of the total experience they have here. This means, for example, a series of efforts to help foreign students find summer jobs or other useful summer experience. I am glad to be able to say that, through both private and governmental activity, we have made real gains on this problem this year. Before another year is out we hope there will be other substantial gains in improving and expanding procedures for selection, orientation, and counseling, both overseas and here.

A second principal category of exchanges in the State Department program is, of course, leaders and specialists. Under this program leaders in America's educational, cultural, and professional life—American specialists, we call them—are sent abroad for varying periods as teachers and lecturers. Similarly, foreign leaders in many fields are brought to this country to meet with their counterparts, to travel, lecture, and observe. They are, in George Santayana's memorable phrase, "philosophical travelers," able by virtue of "fixed interests and faculties" to benefit from the opportunity to travel and observe.

One further bracket of activity ought to be mentioned—the category we call cultural presentations, a program under which American performing artists are sent abroad as representatives of the cultural interests and activities of the American people. Our definition of American culture is very broad and covers the clarinet virtuosity of Benny Goodman, the theatrical artistry of Helen Hayes, Negro spirituals sung by William Warfield, the Philharmonic under Leonard Bernstein, and a host of other performing talents and presentations.

This gives you at least some indication of the extent of the Department of State's activity in educational and cultural exchange. The total number of grantees in the last fiscal year was something over 9,000, and we want to see this number increased to meet, at least in part, new opportu-

nities arising especially in newly developing parts of the world.

But I have not told you, as perhaps I should, that there are, in all, 24 United States Government agencies engaged directly or in supporting roles in programs which bring foreign nationals to the United States or send Americans abroad for purposes of education, training, research, observation, and related activities. Seven of these agencies have funds appropriated to them for these purposes; the other 17 support the activities in various ways. You might like to know that the seven "primary" agencies which conduct exchanges are, besides the Department of State through its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the following: the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the National Science Foundation, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Peace Corps. The United States Information Agency (USIA) also renders important services overseas in the field of educational and cultural exchange.

#### **Cleveland International Program**

The Cleveland International Program illustrates a number of the principles on which we rely heavily in planning or supporting exchanges. One is, of course, the multinational group, with all the benefits it brings to its members as well as to its host country. Another is the organization of such groups around a common professional interest, in this case that of social work and youth leadership. Here is a "community of interest" in which meaningful exchange can take place and around which other close ties and associations can naturally form. Another principle, which we have already discussed, is that of private leadership, with government in the role of a supporting partner. And perhaps it should be noted, too, that exchange under the Cleveland International Program is essentially pointed to one of the most urgent needs and opportunities of our time: human resource development.

Education, of course, lies at the base of human resource development. Fundamental efforts are underway to extend and improve educational opportunities in many countries, old and new. But there is much to be done, too, within the range of existing social relationships and within new relationships emerging as industrialization and

other forms of modernization proceed. They of course bring with them the strains and stresses of urbanization and other aspects of an industrial society. The provision of adequate social services and youth leadership has a special urgency in such growing and changing societies, if the conditions of freedom and independent nationhood are to be kept or won. Your work helps to strengthen the foundations of societies, your own and others, so that they will better stand the impact of new cultural and political developments arising from the wider spread of educational opportunity and from new technologies of industrial or other productive activity.

It has been fortuitous, I think, that this systematic effort to exchange information and experience in this field, on an international basis, should have emerged when it did, in 1956. For in the succeeding years we have seen a tremendous growth—the greatest for any like period of time—in the number of emerging and newly developing societies and in the pace of their development efforts. It has been a time of far-reaching changes in the world and a time when the revolutionary heritage of this country has again been evident in our efforts to assist emerging and newly developing states.

It is not surprising that such a timely program as this one has come out of Cleveland. This city has a tradition of leadership activity in the social welfare and social work field, as you know. I would remind you only of the creation of the Cleveland Foundation back in 1914—the pioneer community trust in the country—and of the distinguished leadership in civic and social work affairs given to the city by such great mayors as Tom L. Johnson, Newton D. Baker, Senator Frank J. Lausche, and the new Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Anthony J. Celebrezze.

I believe that efforts such as the Cleveland International Program can be of increasing effectiveness in the years ahead. There has been enough time now for alumni—former participants, that

is—to reach substantial numbers and to take an active part in supporting the programs in which they were once grantees. It is not unlike the situation of a new college that finally, and happily, reaches the point of having alumni able and willing to help in terms of screening candidates, suggesting activities, and giving other advice and help.

I note with great interest the emphasis CIP is putting on its 1962 international reunion at Dassel-Einbeck in Saxony later this year. CIP's sponsorship of a seminar of several days' duration, to share with the less experienced your knowledge of "Social and Cultural Needs of Developing Countries," seems a fine flowering of the whole CIP effort, and I wish it all success.

As you soon leave for your own countries, I hope you will take with you the knowledge that we have been proud to be your hosts these last 4 months and that we have wanted you to see us as we are. Like Oliver Cromwell, who asked to be painted with his warts and blemishes showing, you have seen us as we are.

Out of the experience of observation, of work, and of study, and of life together, we hope you will have formed new insights into the international opportunities there are through better human relations. It has, I think, been amply demonstrated by this program that men and women of many nations can counsel together on how to improve their professional contributions to a field of common interest and, doing so, can understand better that through the formation of such international "communities of interest" lies one of our most promising approaches to better understanding among the nations.

I hope your visit with us has been a rewarding one for all of you; on our part, we thank you for what you have brought to us and given to us. I hope, too, that this is only the "commencement" of continuing, close relations among you and your American counterparts with whom you have been associated during these crowded and memorable months.

## The United States and the United Nations: Reflections on the 17th General Assembly

by Richard N. Gardner

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs

Another session of the United Nations General Assembly is now underway. While the world organization is a long way from becoming the Parliament of Man that many would wish, it definitely has become the town meeting of the world. The comfortable atmosphere of a somewhat exclusive club has given way to the clamor of a political hurly-burly. Peoples who heretofore were represented in world affairs only indirectly, or in some cases not at all, now have a voice. Some observers see in this situation an analogy to Andrew Jackson's inaugural, when numbers of the underrepresented or nonrepresented arrived on the scene. In spite of the pessimists and alarmists, American democracy not only survived but was reinvigorated by that experience.

Will the United Nations be similarly strengthened by the infusion of new faces, ideas, and viewpoints? Or will it be weakened by the influx of new and inexperienced members? And in either case what will be the consequence for the national interest of the United States?

These difficult questions are being asked by Americans with increasing frequency. For the first time in many years U.S. participation in the United Nations has become a subject of national debate. To be sure, there has always been a small minority of Americans hostile to policies of international cooperation who have opposed U.S. participation in the United Nations as a matter of principle. What makes the present situation different, however, is that a number of citizens who accept the necessity for our involvement in world affairs and for our membership in the United

Nations are raising questions about the place of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy. They are asking whether we are not placing too much emphasis on the United Nations and whether our attempts to strengthen the organization continue to serve the national interest.

This new situation is understandable. The United Nations today is a very different organization from the one which was created in 1945 and to which most Americans have become accustomed. It has grown from a small, Western-oriented institution of less than 60 countries to a parliament of 104 nations—soon to be 110—in which the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia hold nearly half the seats. Even more significant, it has evolved from being mainly a forum for discussion to an executive instrument with an increasing capability for promoting economic progress and keeping the peace.

The fact that U.S. participation in the U.N. has become a subject of intense national interest is something to be welcomed, not deplored. It was easy for people to pay lipservice to the United Nations so long as it was regarded merely as a sentimental abstraction, a symbol of the international good society. But human institutions, like

• *The 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens at New York on September 18. This article is based on an address made by Mr. Gardner at Harvard University on April 13.*

the human body, develop muscle only painfully. Our Congress, our Executive, our Supreme Court all achieved greater strength only in the stress and strain of national controversy.

That United Nations actions and the United States relationship to the U.N. are now subjects of national concern reflects the fact that the United Nations is doing things that really matter. Far from dying, the United Nations has become a significant mechanism of international politics—one of the important arenas for the exercise of national power.

#### **Value of U.N. to U.S. National Interest**

With these facts in mind let us turn to the central question: Does our present policy toward the United Nations serve the national interest?

Possibly some may take exception to the form in which this question is put. They may feel that the U.S. commitment to the United Nations should be a matter of faith and that questions of "selfish" national interest are not involved. But a responsible official of the U.S. Government cannot accept this view. All of us who serve in Washington are under an obligation to further the national interest of our country. There can be no other test in our decision making.

In fact, the difference between those who think our commitment to the United Nations should be a matter of faith and those who think it should be contingent upon the national interest is probably more apparent than real. There is a profound sense in which idealism is realism. When we say that the United States is "committed" to the support of the United Nations we really mean—or ought to mean—that the United States is determined to help make the United Nations a success out of conviction that the long-term interest of our country requires the development of a civilized system of collective security.

#### **What the United Nations Is**

Before we can decide whether our present policy toward the United Nations serves the national interest, we must consider carefully just what the United Nations is—and how we presently use it in the development of our foreign policy. This may seem to some an unduly elementary exercise, but such a return to fundamentals is essential. Listening to some of the things that are being said about

the United Nations and our relation to it, one gets the impression that there is no institution in our domestic or international life less understood than the organization whose headquarters is located at 42d Street and the East River in New York City.

What, then, is the United Nations, and what is our national strategy for making use of it? The United Nations is really three institutions in one, and each of them has a unique value for the United States.

#### **A Place for Debate**

First, the United Nations is a place for debate, a center for publicity, education, and persuasion, a forum in which the weak as well as the strong can make their case.

It is fashionable in some quarters to denigrate this aspect of the United Nations. It is said that the United Nations is a "cave of winds," a "debating society." These are strange words for Americans to use. Our whole history and tradition have taught us the value of free and open discussion, of commerce in the marketplace of ideas. Our parliamentary institutions in the West all place great emphasis on debate and are not notably more disciplined than the General Assembly. Most Americans believe—and rightly so—that in the long run free debate works against error and for truth and justice. Those who deplore the United Nations as a "debating society" are really saying that they have lost confidence in the capacity of our country to present its case successfully in the councils of nations.

Of course no one claims that "world opinion" is self-enforcing or that debates in the United Nations can work miraculous changes in the behavior of nations. The Soviets have demonstrated their contempt for what the rest of the world thinks on numerous occasions, notably in their brutal suppression of Hungarian freedom and in their decision to break the moratorium on nuclear testing. But it would be absurd to conclude from this that there is no such thing as world opinion or that U.N. debates are utterly futile.

The fact of the matter is that, starting with the Security Council debates which led to the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946, the United Nations has served as a useful instrument to throw the spotlight of publicity on acts of injustice or, to vary the metaphor, to "blow the whistle" on



breaches of the peace. This function of the United Nations has real vitality where small powers are concerned—the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait is a recent example. This function has value too, though to a lesser extent, in moderating the behavior of larger powers, even of the Soviet Union. The Soviet posture on the Congo, disarmament, outer space, economic development, and countless other issues has been influenced by concern with its “public relations,” both in the industrialized West and in the less developed countries and particularly as reflected in the United Nations.

The role of the U.N. as a place for debate serves our national interest by providing us with a useful instrument to build support for American policies. We use debates in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other U.N. organs to defend and explain American positions on a range of subjects from disarmament to economic development. If we fail to persuade all members of the U.N. of the justice of our positions, it is not the fault of the U.N.—we would have to take account of the views of other countries in any case. The point is that the existence of the U.N. has enabled us in case after case to change the opinions of foreign representatives to an extent which would otherwise not have been possible. These changes are not always reflected immediately in U.N. votes, but they are reflected in gradual shifts in direction in a country's foreign policy. And even in the U.N. itself, the last General Assembly saw significant changes in the voting patterns of some of the new nations—changes notably favorable from the U.S. point of view—changes which testify to the utility of the U.N. as a crucible for the molding of world opinion.

#### **A Place for Negotiation**

Second, the United Nations is a place for negotiation—a standing diplomatic conference where the peaceful settlement of disputes can be sought through quiet diplomacy.

This aspect of the United Nations is still only dimly understood. It is the seven-eighths of the iceberg below the surface of the water. Diplomats and historians, schooled in the arts of old-fashioned diplomacy, continue to deplore the “glass house” on the East River where there are “open disagreements openly arrived at.”

In spite of such critics the United Nations offers

one of the greatest opportunities for quiet diplomacy the world has ever known. It is a place where the representatives of more than 100 sovereign states can meet on an informal and continuing basis, rubbing elbows in countless conferences and social occasions, from formal dinners and receptions to amiable chats in the delegates' lounge.

To be sure, we will continue to rely heavily on our relations with the diplomatic corps in Washington and on our embassies around the world as the principal channels of quiet diplomacy. But the United Nations does have advantages which make it of distinct usefulness in particular situations. It is a natural forum for a multilateral negotiation which involves the interests of many countries. It is a place where diplomatic encounters can be conveniently managed on an informal and quiet basis.

The United Nations as a facility for negotiation has demonstrated its value on countless occasions. One famous example occurred a dozen years ago when a series of informal meetings between American Ambassador Philip C. Jessup and Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik led to an agreement which settled the Berlin crisis of that day and made it possible to terminate the Berlin airlift. More recently, quiet negotiations with the Soviets broke the longstanding deadlock which had prevented the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space from commencing its work and laid the foundation for the hopeful negotiations on outer space cooperation now underway between the Soviet Union and the United States.

#### **A Place for Action**

Third and last, the United Nations is a place for action—an international executive—a place for doing things rather than merely talking about them. It is this third function of the United Nations—its capacity to act—which is now the subject of particular controversy. Does the strengthening of the United Nations as an action agency serve our national interest?

The answer to this question must be in two parts—in accord with the two-pronged nature of the U.N.'s executive contribution.

The first role of the United Nations as an action agency is in the economic and social field. This is by far the larger part in terms of money and personnel involved. It is much less controversial

than the U.N.'s political and military role, but by no means beyond controversy.

This facet of the U.N. in action seldom makes the headlines, nor are its manifestations seen within our borders. But its influence in the less developed countries is enormous. The U.N. and its specialized agencies together are spending some \$300 million a year on programs for economic and social betterment around the world. The United Nations is at work in dozens of countries healing the sick, feeding the hungry, teaching the illiterate. It is setting standards for workers in factories, for air and ocean transport, for peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is building governmental services in less developed countries and aiding these countries in the drawing up of rational development plans. It is training the human resources of the future in the manifold tasks required to make a reality of independence, a success of self-determination.

How does this aspect of the U.N. at work serve our national interest? Part of the answer lies in the familiar argument that the promotion of economic growth in an environment of freedom abroad promotes the prosperity and security of our own country. But this argument does not provide the whole answer. We can, and do, give technical and economic aid to other countries outside the United Nations. Indeed, our contribution to U.N. programs is but a small fraction of our total aid effort.

The case for using the United Nations as an instrument for promoting economic and social development rests on one fundamental point. The less developed countries badly need advice and financial aid from the United States and other industrial countries in building healthy economies and free institutions. But the political leaders in many of these countries do not wish to depend for aid entirely upon the United States or even upon a group of Western countries. Such dependence would render them too vulnerable to the charge of homegrown nationalists or neutralists that they were becoming tools of Western policy or compromising their neutrality in the cold war. Such leaders can, however, accept aid and advice when it comes under a United Nations umbrella. Thus, in many circumstances, the United Nations provides the essential bridge from the United States and the prosperous nations of Europe to the developing nations of the Southern Hemispheres.

The pattern of economic development assistance that has been emerging in recent years defies easy classification. It goes beyond bilateralism but stops short of complete multilateralism, if that term is thought to mean the administration of all aid by international agencies. A large part of technical assistance and a smaller part of financial aid is now administered by the United Nations and other international organizations. For much of the rest there is gradually emerging a kind of multilateral bilateralism, or multilateral coordination of bilateral programs, in which countries supply, on a voluntary basis in each case, technical, financial, and commodity aid in support of projects and programs drawn up under international auspices. This pattern well serves the national interest of the United States by assuring the maximum financial contribution from donor countries and the maximum cooperation in self-help and domestic reforms from the recipients themselves.

The second role of the United Nations as an action agency is in the political field. One aspect of this role consists of the diplomatic initiatives of the Secretary-General in mediation, conciliation, observation, and factfinding. A recent example of the U.N.'s contribution to pacific settlement was the resolution of the longstanding dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea.<sup>1</sup> Thanks to the activity of U Thant and his special representative, Ellsworth Bunker, a formula was found under which both sides were able to realize their basic objectives. This settlement avoided not merely divisive U.N. debate but also the serious danger of armed conflict.

### The Congo Story

The other aspect of the U.N.'s political function extends to large-scale administrative and military operations such as the policing of the uneasy truce between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the preventing of civil war in the Congo. How does this administrative and military aspect of the U.N.'s work serve our national interest?

To answer this question it is useful to recall the choice that confronted the United States in the Congo in the summer of 1960. The Congo had been granted independence suddenly and, as it

<sup>1</sup> For a Department statement of Aug. 16, see BULLETIN of Sept. 3, 1962, p. 349.

now appears, prematurely by Belgium. Almost immediately after this event, Congolese troops rebelled against their own officers. Looting, killing, and general disorder followed. The Belgians started flying back their troops and personnel to protect the European population. At this point the two leaders of the Congo, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, together appealed to the United States to send American troops and other assistance to protect the Congo against Belgian "aggression."

President Eisenhower rightly declined this appeal. It was apparent that for the United States to airlift thousands of American boys into the Congo would have the gravest domestic and international political implications. We would have become directly embroiled through the presence of American troops in fighting between our Belgian allies and the new Congolese nation—with the ugly overtones of racial warfare. Worse still, we would have provided the occasion and the excuse for competitive Soviet intervention in the heart of Africa.

With these considerations in mind, President Eisenhower told the Congolese leaders that if they wished American assistance they would have to get it through the United Nations acting in the name of the world community. Kasavubu and Lumumba then sent a second appeal—this time to the United Nations. At the time of making this appeal they also issued a public warning that if United Nations assistance was not forthcoming, they would look for help elsewhere. There is not the slightest doubt that "elsewhere" meant the Soviet Union.

The alternatives open to the United States, therefore, were clear:

We could do nothing—in which case the Congo would fallow in chaos and bloodshed and the Soviet bloc would be free to move in to pick up the remains.

We could intervene directly—and trigger a confrontation in the heart of Africa of the great powers—a confrontation which could lead to another "Spanish civil war" and be the prelude to a wider conflict.

Or we could do what we in fact did—propose that assistance to the Congo be given through the United Nations.

No one pretends that the United Nations Operation in the Congo has been an unqualified success.

How could it have been, when 20,000 troops from 21 different countries, speaking different languages and following different military traditions, sought to keep order in a country one-third the size of the United States, with no effective public administration or basic services?

The test of the Congo operation is not whether it achieved some imaginary standard of peace-keeping excellence. It is whether the operation resulted in a situation better than would have occurred through the use of any available alternative. Sober reflection will confirm that the use of the United Nations in the Congo was the least dangerous of the three dangerous alternatives confronting the United States and the world at large in the summer of 1960.

The Congo story reveals in microcosm a basic truth about the United Nations, namely, that in *some* situations in *some* parts of the world it represents the lesser of several evils—the least undesirable alternative of American action. When critics complain about the use of the United Nations in situations of this kind, they have the obligation to answer the question: What is the alternative?

#### **U.N. Can Intervene To Enforce Nonintervention**

There is good reason to believe that the United Nations offers the best available alternative in a number of situations in our unhappy world. A prime reason for this has to do with Communist strategy. The Communists do not believe in true "peaceful coexistence" because they know that in any peaceful competition they would eventually lose. Khrushchev must know in his heart what we all know—that communism cannot win without violence and that no people has ever chosen communism as a matter of free choice. Therefore his definition of "peaceful coexistence" specifically includes "wars of liberation" against so-called "rotten reactionary regimes." This means that the Communists claim the right to intervene everywhere in the world to help impose communism by force. We are witnessing such intervention at this very moment in places such as Berlin and Viet-Nam.

How is the United States to respond to the Communist campaign of forceful intervention in the affairs of other nations? In the face of this behavior, can the United States follow a principle of nonintervention, a hands-off policy which gives a

free hand to Communist subversion and aggression in every part of the world?

A century ago, at the time of czarist Russian intervention for Austria and against the Hungarian revolution of 1848, John Stuart Mill posed the same question. He concluded that "the doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free states. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue: that the wrong side may help the wrong but the right must not help the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent."

Applying this insight to our present situation, we can surely agree that "intervention to enforce non-intervention" continues to be a rightful and moral policy essential to the defense of a free and open international society. To enforce nonintervention, Communist aggression or subversion must sometimes be met by forceful counteraction by free nations acting together through military alliances. But, in Mill's phrase, such unilateral or regional action may not be "always prudent"—or, to put it another way, always the most effective political alternative. In some situations it may prove incompatible with the wishes of the affected country or involve too great a risk of escalation into a wider conflict. In these situations the most effective type of counteraction by the non-Communist countries is counteraction taken in the name of the world community under the aegis of the United Nations. The world organization has special advantages of acceptability and noninflammability because it can intervene more easily in the name of nonintervention—because its actions are taken in the name of the community of nations as a whole.

This important potentiality of the United Nations has not been lost upon the Communists. The Soviet bloc has consistently opposed the development of the third function of the United Nations—its capacity to act. During his famous visit to the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, Premier Khrushchev noted significantly:

Experience of the work of the United Nations has shown that this body is useful and necessary, because in it are represented all the States which are called upon to solve, through negotiation and discussion, the pressing issues of international relations so as to prevent them from reaching a point where conflicts and wars might break

out. That is the positive aspect of the work of the United Nations. That, indeed, constitutes the main purpose of the creation of the United Nations.

Notably missing from this Soviet benediction of the U.N. was any reference to the U.N.'s function as an operating agency—as an instrument for building free nations and keeping the peace. This is not surprising. The Communists are clearly alarmed by the prospect of a greater operational ability of the United Nations to carry out a charter full of dangerous thoughts about freedom of choice for all men—a capability that could bury the Communist version of history without the necessity of a major war. That is why the Soviet bloc has insisted upon the "principle of unanimity," why it has flagrantly misused the veto, why it has pressed its "troika" demand for a veto within the executive of the organization, and why it has sought through its financial boycott to starve the U.N. to death as a peacekeeping agency.

These Soviet actions are disquieting. But they do not doom to frustration the United Nations as an operating institution. We must not allow ourselves to get into the frame of mind that nothing can be done in the United Nations without the approval of the Soviet bloc. The whole history of the organization—in Korea and the Congo, in technical assistance and economic aid—proves that the contrary is the case. This will continue to be so as long as the United States and other free nations work together to maintain and strengthen the United Nations as an action agency on the basis of the common interest of the vast majority of U.N. members in the promotion of an open society of prosperous and independent states.

#### **Some Criticisms of U.S. Relation to U.N.**

This, in summary form, is the case for the proposition that the United Nations has been and continues to be a useful instrument for the promotion of our national interest. But we cannot rest the case on such a general statement. In recent months a number of specific criticisms have been voiced about our relation to the United Nations. Let us examine the most important of these criticisms in some detail.

1. *The United Nations is a failure because it has not brought peace.*

This is one of the most frequently heard, and least substantial, of the criticisms. The United Nations is not a guaranteed patent remedy for all

he ills of our unhappy world. It has failed to lo a number of things—free Hungary or defend Joa, for example—but since neither the United States nor anyone else was willing or able to do these things, it seems a bit hard to blame them in the U.N. The U.N. has no more solved all he world's problems than our foreign aid program has cured political instability and economic tagnation; yet both institutions have brought neasurable improvements in the state of the world. The test of the success of the United Nations is ot whether it has solved every problem but whether the world is better off on balance than it ould have been if the United Nations had never xisted. Looking at the record of the United ations in economic and social development, in eacekeeping undertakings in Iran, Palestine, uez, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, the Congo, West ew Guinea, and many other places, no one can riously doubt the answer to this question.

It is probably true that the United Nations, like ost new institutions, was "oversold" at its inceptions. To some people it heralded the dawn of a ew era in which power politics would vanish and he rule of law would be achieved. We know now at this view was hopelessly inadequate, not rily because it failed to forecast the cold war ut also because it misconceived the true nature f international relations.

The United Nations is not the substitute for over politics or the clash of national interests. t merely provides a new arena for the play of olitics and the adjustment of interests and hope- ally a substitute in some situations for the use f force. The organization is not a superstate; cannot make or enforce law for any of its members.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb employed a useful metaphor o answer the objection that the United Nations ad not brought peace to the world. "The United ations is a mirror of the world we live in," he ked to say, "and if the reflection is ugly, it is of the mirror which is to blame."

Unfortunately there are still a number of people ho are prone to blame the mirror. For example, ublic support for the United Nations still tends o fluctuate in accordance with the way the Congo peration is going in a particular week. When an atbreak of violence occurs or relations between hombe and Adoula deteriorate, the stock of the nited Nations plummets. When order is re-

stored and there is progress in the achievement of a unified Congo, the stock of the United Nations rises.

Surely our support of the United Nations must be based on a more solid foundation than this. Our opinion of our family doctor does not go up and down in accordance with the temperature of his patient. If we have confidence in the doctor, we support his best efforts and understand that sometimes people sicken and even die in spite of everything he can do to help them.

## 2. *The United Nations costs too much for the United States.*

To evaluate this charge it is necessary to see the U.N. financial picture in broad outline. There are four kinds of United Nations operations toward which the United States contributes:

First, there is the regular assessed budget of the United Nations. In 1961 this totaled \$72.7 million. The United States paid 32.5 percent of this, or \$22.3 million. The U.S. share of the regular budget has been steadily decreasing and this year is 32 percent.

Second, there are the regular assessed budgets of the specialized agencies. In 1961 these totaled \$64.9 million, of which the United States contributed \$18 million. The U.S. share in these budgets is in most cases the same as its share in the U.N. budget; in a few cases it is even less.

Third, there are the voluntary programs—such as the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Special Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees—in which each country puts up what it wishes to contribute. In 1961 these programs totaled \$159 million, of which the United States contributed \$79.8 million. The U.S. share in the individual programs varies from 40 percent to two-thirds—overall, our share is about half of the total.

Fourth, there are the peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and the Congo. In 1961 these cost about \$140 million, of which the United States contributed something over \$60 million.

With the gradual expansion of United Nations activities, the total annual budget of the U.N. family will soon reach \$500 million, of which the U.S. share will be something like \$200 million.

Is this too expensive for the United States? It

amounts to little more than \$1 a year for every man, woman, and child in our country. It is less than the cost of one B-70 aircraft—a weapons system which the Congress has been urging the President to procure. In terms of the net return to world peace and prosperity and therefore to our national interest, it could hardly be termed an unreasonable cost.

Of course, the most frequent objection to U.N. financing is not that the cost of the United Nations is too great but that the United States bears too great a share. The United States has pressed successfully over the years for a reduction in its share of the cost of U.N. programs in recognition of the growing prosperity of other countries and also of the desirability of maintaining the multilateral character of the institution. Our share in the regular budget has been reduced from 40 percent to 32 percent; in technical assistance from 61 percent to 40 percent; in UNICEF from 72 percent to 44 percent. The present share of the United States in U.N. costs is not unreasonable when one bears in mind that the United States accounts for some two-fifths of the world's national income and that our standard of living is nearly double the average in other industrialized countries and some 20 times greater than the average in less developed countries.

The question of our share in U.N. costs is related to the controversy over how to deal with the U.N.'s present financial crisis. This crisis does not derive from the regular U.N. budget, from the regular budgets of the specialized agencies, or from the voluntary programs. Although the Soviet contribution to the voluntary programs is obviously inadequate and although some of the poorer countries are occasionally slow payers to the regular budgets as well as the voluntary programs, the United Nations has no problem of arrearages on account of these three sets of operations.

The problem arises because of the failure of the Soviet bloc and certain other countries to pay for the Congo and Middle East operations. Some of these countries, such as the Soviet Union, argue that there is no legal obligation to pay for these peacekeeping expenses; others contend that they are unable to pay. As a result, the United Nations was \$147 million in the red as of June 30, 1962.

To deal with this predicament Acting Secretary-

General U Thant presented in December 1961, and the General Assembly approved, a three-part financial plan. This plan provided for another assessment to carry forward the Middle East and Congo operations to July 1, 1962. It called for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to settle the question of whether the obligation to pay for such assessments was a binding obligation on all members. And it authorized the issuance of \$200 million of United Nations bonds bearing 2 percent interest and repayable over 25 years.

The United States supported this program because it represented the only sound and workable way open at this time to restore fiscal responsibility to the U.N. and permit it to carry on its peacekeeping mission in the immediate future. The Senate has now enacted legislation authorizing the President to lend the United Nations up to \$100 million. This legislation clearly gives the President authority to purchase U.N. bonds if he believes this will serve the national interest.

There are some people who oppose our coming to the aid of the United Nations in its present financial crisis on the grounds that we will be paying for the Soviet share. This charge is completely incorrect. On July 20 the International Court of Justice confirmed the obligation of United Nations members to pay assessments levied by the General Assembly for the expenditures incurred in the conduct of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United Nations Operation in the Congo.<sup>2</sup> If the Communist bloc countries continue to refuse to pay their arrearages on these accounts, they stand to lose their votes in the General Assembly as of January 1, 1964, in accordance with article 19 of the charter.

In the meantime it makes little sense for the United States to withhold its financial support for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations because the Soviet bloc does so. The United States has a very big stake in the peacekeeping mission of the United Nations. By contrast, the Soviet bloc appears to be convinced that strengthening the United Nations as an action agency to promote order works against its goal of world communism. This is why it is seeking to starve the United Na-

<sup>2</sup> For a Department statement of July 20 regarding the Court's decision, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

ions to death as an action agency. Should the United States refuse to support U.N. programs which serve its interest because the Soviet Union boycotts the very same programs on the grounds that they work against communism? A town's number-one householder does not refuse to pay for the police force and the school board because the town's number-one delinquent refuses to pay. To do so would put the safety of the householder at the mercy of the delinquent. Such a policy makes no more sense in international organizations than it does in domestic affairs.

### 3. *The voting procedures of the General Assembly are unreasonable and work against American interests.*

Much is heard these days about the unreasonableness of the rule of one-nation, one-vote in the General Assembly and about the dangers which are resulted from the inflation of that body through the influx of new members.

Naturally, it is easy to criticize the system of one-nation, one-vote, just as it is easy for critics of our domestic institutions to criticize the principle of two Senators from each State or to pick flaws in the electoral college. But in criticizing international as well as domestic institutions the critics have the obligation once again to answer the question: What is the alternative?

Any system of weighted voting in the General Assembly would have to weight population as a major—if not *the* major—factor. It is questionable whether such an arrangement would suit a country like ours, which has only 6 percent of the world's population and which, even with its NATO allies, has only 16 percent. If population were a major criterion, India, with its 400 million people, might well end up with more votes than the United States. Of course, it is always possible to imagine a system of weighted voting which would offset the population factor with such factors as literacy, per capita income, and military power. But those critics are living in a dream world who think that any charter amendment is presently possible which would deprive the small and poor countries of all the prerogatives they now enjoy.

We should not overlook the fact that as between the free world and the Communist bloc the present system of voting in the General Assembly is far from unfavorable. To the critics of the present

arrangement, we should put the question: Can you show us a politically possible alternative which would confine the Communists to what they now have—only 11 votes out of 104?

But it is not such speculations but solid experience which provides the answer to this line of criticism. The fact is that most of the new nations which have come to the United Nations find that their desire for political independence and economic progress puts them on the same side as the United States on a large majority of U.N. votes. Moreover, it is possible to see in the voting patterns of the new nations a perceptible trend in favor of positions advocated by the United States.

Let us look at the record of the last General Assembly—an Assembly which has been dubbed by a leading news magazine as the "sensible Sixteenth."

The President of the United States presented a comprehensive program to this General Assembly on September 25, 1961.<sup>3</sup> The reception his program received provides some interesting clues to the way the United Nations is going.

- The President asked that the Soviet "troika" demand be rejected and that a single impartial Secretary-General be appointed to succeed Dag Hammarskjöld. The troika demand was overwhelmingly rejected, the candidate we supported was chosen, and the integrity of the Secretariat was maintained.

- The President called for responsible measures to cope with the U.N.'s financial crisis. A three-part financial plan proposed by the Secretary-General and supported by the U.S. was passed, despite Soviet opposition.

- The President proposed a broad program of international cooperation in outer space. When the details of this program were presented to the Assembly later in the session, they received such wide endorsement that the Soviet Union, after some initial hesitation, asked permission to co-sponsor. The program was unanimously approved.

- The President proposed a U.N. Development Decade to strengthen the work of the United Nations in the economic and social field. This program was unanimously approved. Its first concrete manifestation, the U.S.-sponsored World

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

Food Program, was approved overwhelmingly despite Soviet bloc abstention.

• The President asked support for free-world positions on basic cold-war issues. The Assembly gave resounding majorities to free-world positions on Korea, Hungary, and Tibet. The Communist attempt to substitute Red China for the Republic of China was defeated by a larger vote in the 16th Assembly than in the 15th.

To be sure, the U.S. did not win every vote at the 16th General Assembly. In a world in which there are substantial differences of opinion between nations this could scarcely be expected. But when one looks at the record as a whole, as distinguished from the record on individual votes, one finds little to support the charge that the voting procedures of the General Assembly, combined with the inflation of membership, have made it impossible for the United States successfully to prosecute its foreign policy in the United Nations.

4. *The Afro-Asian "bloc" is irresponsible on colonial issues and our desire to please them in the United Nations has divided the NATO alliance.*

There are three main points to be made about this charge.

In the first place, there is no such thing as a cohesive Afro-Asian bloc with a unified view on colonial (or other) questions. There are more than 50 U.N. members from Africa and Asia. So far as the countries of Asia are concerned, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China, Malaya, Burma, and others often find themselves on the same side as the Western countries. In Africa there are at least three distinguishable groups of countries—the Western-oriented Brazzaville group of some 12 former French colonies; the Monrovia group led by moderate countries, such as Nigeria; and the Casablanca group of countries, such as Egypt and Ghana, which take a more militant view on colonial questions.

When these various views are distilled in the 104-nation General Assembly, it is the moderate resolutions calling for orderly progress toward self-government which command the necessary two-thirds majority. The record of the 16th General Assembly on the colonial issue reflected genuine progress over previous years. An irresponsible Soviet proposal calling for independence for all colonies in 1962 was categorically rejected. So,

too, was a bloc resolution calling for sanctions against Portugal over Angola. So, too, was a Soviet demand to reopen Security Council debate on the Congo in order to attack the U.N.'s Congo policy. On this latter maneuver, 20 African countries backed Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo in opposing the Soviet move.

The United States, of course, has an interest in maintaining and strengthening the NATO alliance. It also has an interest in promoting orderly progress toward self-government by those relatively few peoples around the world who have not achieved independence. So far as the vast majority of NATO members are concerned, the pursuit of these objectives is not inconsistent. Indeed the record of the 16th General Assembly reveals one startling fact: *The United States voted with the majority of NATO countries on every one of the 20 colonial issues which came to a vote in the Assembly.*

5. *The United Nations makes U.S. foreign policy.*

So far as this charge is concerned, it would be more accurate to say that the United States makes U.N. foreign policy—or, to be more precise, that the United States influences profoundly the outcome of U.N. votes and, more importantly, the nature of the U.N. actions.

U.S. foreign policy is not made by the United Nations; nor is U.S. foreign policy made by the United States Mission to the United Nations. The center of decision on U.N. affairs, as on all other matters of our foreign policy, is Washington D.C. To be sure, the facts and recommendations received from the U.S. Mission receive considerable weight, as do the facts and recommendations received from within the Department, from our embassies around the world, and from other executive agencies. But on any question which arises in the United Nations, the determination of U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington on the basis of a total appreciation of the national interest.

The United States uses the U.N.'s facilities for debate and negotiation to build support for our foreign policy positions. Equally important, we use the United Nations to carry forward action programs which we could not carry out as well on a unilateral basis. The Congo operation is an obvious illustration. The U.N. outer space program is a less obvious but no less revealing



example. We need the assistance of many nations if our national space program is to be successfully carried on. In weather and communications, for example, the technology of the United States can yield dividends to ourselves and others only if many nations join in allocating radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating with space vehicles, and in placing necessary ground installations on their territories. By developing some of our outer space activities within the framework of the U.N. and its specialized agencies, we encourage needed cooperation from a number of countries which might not otherwise be forthcoming.

6. *The development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role is dangerous because it might be used against us.*

There are essentially three reasons why we have much more to gain than to fear from the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity.

First, the Charter of the United Nations is our kind of charter. It is an eloquent restatement of the values which lie at the center of our national policy. It embodies the concept of an open world society of independent states which stands at the opposite extreme from the Communist pattern of standardization and coercion. It should be possible for the United States to pursue its interests in the world within the framework of charter principles. The same cannot be said for the Soviet Union.

Second, the United Nations' capacity to act in peacekeeping as well as economic programs depends crucially on our support. The Soviet bloc boycotts nearly all of the main executive operations of the United Nations. In the world of symbolism U.N. actions are taken in the name of global universality. But in the real world the U.N. in action is the free world in action.

The United States, the members of the North Atlantic community, and the British Commonwealth pay for three-quarters or more of the economic and peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. Without the support of the Western Powers, the United Nations would quite suddenly lose its capacity to act. Its executive arm could not be used against us because it would largely cease to exist.

Third, the procedures of the United Nations provide us with important defenses against peacekeeping actions which we do not approve.

The United States has a veto in the Security Council. Under the Uniting-for-Peace resolution,<sup>4</sup> a veto can be overridden and a peacekeeping operation sent to the General Assembly only if there is an affirmative vote of 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council. In other words, the United States could stop a peacekeeping operation if it could muster a "blocking 5" negative or abstaining votes in the Security Council. When one considers that the Council includes, as permanent members, the U.S., the U.K., France, and Nationalist China and, as elective members, normally a Western European country and two Latin American countries, it is hard to conceive of a situation where the necessary 5 negative or abstaining votes could not be secured.

In the unlikely event that 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council voted a peacekeeping operation over American opposition, or that the General Assembly decided to meet in special session independently, the operation could still not proceed without a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. Here again it would be extraordinary if the United States could not muster a blocking third, considering all the abstaining votes which would result in a situation where the United States expressed determined opposition to a peacekeeping action. And, in any case, the General Assembly has the power only to make recommendations and not to take decisions binding on the members.

Of course, there is no ironclad guarantee for the United States in the present procedures of the United Nations. All one can say with assurance is that the procedures are extremely favorable to our country and that the authorization of a peacekeeping action against our opposition is difficult to imagine, *assuming always that the American position is reasonably founded in justice and the United Nations Charter.*

There can be no assurance that the United States will succeed 100 percent of the time in the United Nations. But in an age when the arsenals of the two superpowers contain warheads the largest of which have a destructive power greater than all the bombs dropped during the Second World War, it should be obvious that the interest of nations in having some means for the peaceful settlement of disputes outweighs their interest in winning every one of them.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

7. *The United States should rely on the Atlantic community rather than the United Nations to promote its national interest.*

Both the supporters and the critics of the United Nations should avoid an either-or philosophy. Despite some of its uncritical enthusiasts, the United Nations is by no means the only instrument of our foreign policy. We have many important institutions for the promotion of our national interest. We have the Strategic Air Command. We have Polarix submarines. We have NATO. We have the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We have the Alliance for Progress. We have the United Nations. There is no inconsistency in our use of all these instruments of national policy.

We should be on our guard in particular against thinking that there is a necessary conflict between the building of the North Atlantic community, on the one hand, and effective Western participation in the United Nations, on the other.

What we see emerging today are two concentric circles. At the core—in the inner circle—are the regional organizations of Western Europe and the North Atlantic community, such as the Common Market and OECD. In the outer circle are the institutions of the United Nations family. These two circles are complementary, not competitive. The outer circle—the United Nations family—needs the inner circle of North Atlantic institutions with their great accumulation of experience, power, and wealth. But the inner circle also needs the outer circle as a bridge to the less developed countries and the Communist bloc.

Our task today is to build a concert of free nations, not in any one of these circles alone, but in both of them at once.

The North Atlantic institutions can be invaluable to Western interests if they are used not as an alternative to the U.N. but to concert Western support of the United Nations and to increase the Western contribution to the United Nations in both money and personnel.

#### Efforts To Be Made in Months Ahead

The conclusion of this reappraisal of the U.S. interest in the United Nations is not that the United Nations is perfect. We are *not* wholly satisfied with the U.N. as it now exists. In the months ahead we intend to press for needed improvements in a number of areas—for better co-

ordination of U.N. economic activities, for better ways of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations, for more efficient and orderly General Assembly procedures, and for more effective means of fact-finding, observation, and pacific settlement.

To make progress in these and other areas will require a maximum effort on the part of the United States. This effort will be aided by frank and constructive criticism of U.N. shortcomings. But to be successful it must also be founded on a broadly based American conviction that, with all its shortcomings, the United Nations remains a valuable institution for the United States. Such a conviction is justified not merely as a matter of faith but as the result of a careful scrutiny of the recent record in the hard light of the national interest.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, New York.*

### Security Council

Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General on developments relating to the application of the Security Council resolutions of February 21 and November 24, 1961: Report on the Adoula-Tshombe talks, and annexes 1-46. S/5053/Add. 10, June 27, 1962, 10 pp., and S/5053/Add.10/Annexes, June 28, 1962, 154 pp.

Communications concerning applications for admission of Burundi and Rwanda to U.N. membership. S/5137, July 1, 1962, 1 p.; S/5137/Add.1, July 2, 1962, 1 p.; S/5137/Add.2, July 2, 1962, 1 p.; S/5139, July 5, 1962, 1 p.; S/5146, July 24, 1962, 1 p.

Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from July 20, 1961, to July 16, 1962. S/5143, July 19, 1962, 67 pp.

Letters concerning a complaint by Jordan against Israel for violating the Jordan-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line. S/5144, July 20, 1962, 2 pp.; S/5152, August 1, 1962, 3 pp.

Telegrams concerning application of Jamaica for admission to U.N. membership. S/5154, August 6, 1962, 2 pp.

### General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on refugee housing. A/AC.96/106, April 18, 1962, 8 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Material assistance programs for 1962 (new and revised projects). A/AC.96/164, May 1, 1962, 5 pp.

# Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

## Adjourned During August 1962

J.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 3-Aug. 3
United Nations Coffee Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	July 9-Aug. 25
JNESCO International Educational Building Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 25-Aug. 2
J.N. Economic Commission for Africa: Meeting on Commodity Price Stabilization . . . . .	Lagos . . . . .	July 30-Aug. 7
J.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World . . . . .	Bonn . . . . .	Aug. 3-23
JNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Communications and Working Group on Fixed Stations . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Aug. 6-10
JNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on Data Exchange . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Aug. 7-10
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Scientific Committee . . . . .	Honolulu . . . . .	Aug. 8-11
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Aug. 9-10
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Interim Meeting . . . . .	Honolulu . . . . .	Aug. 13-18
2th World's Poultry Congress . . . . .	Sydney . . . . .	Aug. 13-18
Inter-American Children's Institute: 43d Meeting of Directing Council . . . . .	Montevideo . . . . .	Aug. 14-17
J.N. ECAFE Ad Hoc Committee on Asian Institute of Economic Development . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 14-17

## Session as of August 31, 1962

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14-
6th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 19-
6th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 14th Meeting of WHO Regional Committee for the Americas . . . . .	Minneapolis . . . . .	Aug. 21-
CAO Assembly: 14th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 21-
JNESCO Meeting of Experts on General Secondary Education in Arab States . . . . .	Tunis . . . . .	Aug. 23-
JNESCO Executive Board: 62d Session . . . . .	Paris and Istanbul . . . . .	Aug. 23-
3rd International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 25-
CAO Legal Committee: 14th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 28-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 24, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Signed at Vienna October 4, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

Acceptance deposited: Paraguay, August 22, 1962.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signatures and acceptances: Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances: Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

Signatures: Argentina, January 19, 1962; Syrian Arab Republic, June 28, 1962; Togo, August 21, 1962; Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Acceptances deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, June 28, 1962; Argentina, August 3, 1962; Togo, August 21, 1962; Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 4894. Signatures and acceptances: Cyprus, March 2, 1962; Syrian Arab Republic, June 28, 1962; Tunisia, July 25, 1962; Senegal and Somalia, August 31, 1962.

## Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Opened for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115. *Acceptance deposited:* Indonesia, August 29, 1962.

## BILATERAL

### Belgium

Reciprocal trade agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 27, 1935. Entered into force May 1, 1935. 49 Stat. 3689.

*Terminates:* February 10, 1963.<sup>2</sup>  
Understanding that the most-favored-nation provision of the trade agreement of February 27, 1935, *supra*, should not require the extension to Belgium of advantages accorded by the United States to the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes May 4 and July 11, 1946. TIAS 1572.

*Terminates:* February 10, 1963.<sup>2</sup>  
Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchange of letters. Signed at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force October 30, 1947. TIAS 1701.  
*Terminate:* February 10, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

### British Honduras

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Belize July 26 and August 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962.

### China

Agreement for extension of period of the loan of six naval vessels to China under terms of agreement of May 14, 1954, as amended (TIAS 2979 and 3837). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei August 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962.

### Costa Rica

General agreement for economic, technical and related assistance. Signed at San José December 22, 1961. Enters into force on date of communication by which Costa Rica gives notification of ratification.

### Cuba

Commercial convention signed at Habana December 11, 1962, as amended by the supplementary convention signed at Washington January 26, 1963. Entered into force April 10, 1963. 33 Stat. 2136, 2145.  
*Terminates:* August 21, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

Reciprocal trade agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington August 24, 1934. Entered into force September 3, 1934. 49 Stat. 3559.  
*Terminate:* August 21, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

Supplementary trade agreement, and protocol. Signed at Washington December 18, 1939. Entered into force December 23, 1939. 54 Stat. 1967.  
*Terminate:* August 21, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

Second supplementary trade agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed at Habana December 23, 1941. Entered into force January 5, 1942. 55 Stat. 1449.  
*Terminate:* August 21, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

### France

Reciprocal trade agreement, and protocol. Signed at Washington May 6, 1936. Entered into force June 15, 1936. 53 Stat. 2236.  
*Terminate:* December 13, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Notice by the United States of intention to terminate.

Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchange of notes. Signed at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force October 30, 1947. TIAS 1704.  
*Terminate:* December 13, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

### Honduras

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa July 16 and 20, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962.

### Netherlands

Reciprocal trade agreement, annexed schedules, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington December 20, 1935. Entered into force May 8, 1937. 50 Stat. 1504.  
*Terminate:* December 7, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

Agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchange of notes. Signed at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force October 30, 1947. TIAS 1705.  
*Terminate:* December 7, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

### Portugal

Agreement amending agreement of November 7, 1956 (TIAS 3681), relating to the loan of two destroyer escort vessels to Portugal. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 8 and July 27, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962.

### United Kingdom

Agreement terminating the reciprocal trade agreement, and exchanges of notes, of November 17, 1938 (54 Stat. 1897), and the agreement supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and exchanges of notes, of October 30, 1947 (TIAS 1706). Effected by exchange of notes at London June 27 and 28, 1962. Terminations effective July 28, 1962. TIAS 5124.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 27-September 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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525	8/27	Reply to Soviet note of August 24.
*526	8/27	U.S. delegation to 17th U.N. General Assembly (biographic details).
†527	8/29	U.S.-Canada statement on lumber problems.
528	8/30	Williams: "The United Nations Plan for the Congo."
*529	8/29	Hastie: Trinidad-Tobago independence ceremonies.
†530	8/30	Textile agreement with Italy.
531	8/30	Battle: "Human Relations and International Relations."
†533	8/31	Williams: "Africa and Food for Peace."

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN

### REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1961

# the Department of State

This is the sixteenth annual report covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for the year 1961.

It contains President Kennedy's letter of transmittal of the report to the Congress in which he calls attention to ". . . matters of compelling importance" with which the United Nations dealt in 1961 and the actions it took which ". . . will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described under the following sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and information on the various organizations and availability of publications and documents.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVII, No. 1213 • PUBLICATION 7429

September 24, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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## The Significance of the European Common Market

by Leonard Weiss

Director, Office of International Trade and Finance<sup>1</sup>

The subject on which you have invited me to speak is an especially timely one. Only 3 days from now the members of the British Commonwealth will be meeting to review the results to date of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Common Market for the accession of that country to the European Economic Community (EEC). Later on this month, negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Common Market will resume. Should these negotiations be successful, as we expect they will, and the United Kingdom accede to the Common Market, other countries of Western Europe may follow. It is therefore appropriate to take a look at the Common Market and assess its significance, particularly in terms of the interests of the United States.

### What the Common Market Is

So that we know what we are talking about, I believe it would be useful first to understand what the Common Market is.

Inspired by successes such as the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community in 1950, and overcoming setbacks such as the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, the European integration movement moved strongly ahead after World War II. It culminated in the signing on March 25, 1957, of the Treaty of Rome, which established the Common Market.

The Common Market presently consists of six

full members: France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In addition, Greece has concluded an agreement with the EEC providing for full economic integration, but over a longer period than for the present members. The United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway have applied for membership, and, as I have noted, negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom have been intensively underway. Other countries have applied for various types of relationships with the Common Market.

Economically, the EEC is an arrangement under which the present national economies of the members will be amalgamated into a single economic entity. The process of amalgamation is now underway in a so-called transitional period, which is to end by 1970 or possibly sooner. By the end of this period there will be a full-fledged customs union with a common commercial policy under which the member states will eliminate all tariffs and other barriers to trade among themselves and will maintain a single tariff around the area against outside countries. Capital, labor, and services will be free to move throughout the Community. Common or harmonized internal policies and rules will apply to such matters as agriculture, transportation, conditions of competition, taxation and other fiscal questions, and social policies, including those related to employment, labor legislation and working conditions, and the regulation of trade unions and collective bargaining.

To implement this economic union, the EEC treaty has set up a number of common institutions. There is a Council of Ministers, composed of representatives of member states, which serves as the

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the annual convention of the Federal Bar Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 7 (press release 539 dated Sept. 6).

highest decision-making body. There is a Commission of nine persons, appointed by the member states and presided over by Dr. [Walter] Hallstein, which serves as the principal executive organ and represents the Community as a whole. There is a Parliamentary Assembly, composed of representatives chosen by the parliaments of the EEC states, which is consulted by the Council and Commission on a wide variety of subjects. And there is a Court of Justice, which interprets the Treaty of Rome and the implementing regulations in the event of disputes.

#### **Economic Potential of Common Market**

The Common Market thus already consists of an important and collectively powerful group of states and promises to be enlarged even further in the relatively near future. It affects the fundamental aspects of economic life in the member states.

But it is more than an economic entity. It provides a basis for political cooperation, a point of the greatest importance and one to which I shall return at the end of my remarks.

The Common Market has a vast economic potential. It has already demonstrated its strength and vitality. Its population presently numbers 170 million and, with the accession of the United Kingdom, would expand to nearly a quarter of a billion, over 20 percent larger than our own. While the gross national product of the Common Market is at the present time less than half that of the United States, in the 4 years since the formation of the Common Market its gross national product has grown at a rate almost double that of the United States. Trade between the EEC countries has been increasing faster than trade with the outside world.

The EEC is a large and growing market. It is moving into an age of mass consumption similar to that of the United States. Its consumption of such goods as automobiles, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and other household appliances is at the point ours was a decade or more ago. With increased growth and economic activity and rising income levels, the demand within the EEC for such products is bound to increase enormously.

The Common Market presents an opportunity uniquely suited to the talents and capacities of American producers. American producers are

experienced, and our plants are tooled, to serve a mass market such as that emerging in Europe. The EEC thus affords a major opportunity for U.S. exports.

#### **Relation to Outside Countries**

While the Common Market thus presents an opportunity, it also raises a point of concern for outside countries. As I have indicated, the Common Market eliminates trade barriers among its members but maintains them against outside countries. In this respect it is no different from the United States. A purchaser in New York buying a precision camera from a producer in the United States pays no duty. But if he buys such a camera from West Germany, he pays a duty of 25 percent. Those inside a common market, whether in Europe or the United States, thus have a competitive advantage over those outside it.

This problem faced by outsiders in relation to the European Common Market is all the more acute because of the relative speed with which outside countries must adapt to the new situation. The United States has been around for almost 17 years, and through this period outsiders have adjusted, though not always happily, to the U.S. tariff. For an even longer period exporters have been doing business with individual European states, each charging its particular tariffs. Now in the relatively short span of 12 years or less, outsiders must face a situation where their competitors in the Common Market will pay no tariff while they must pay duties on the basis of the new common external tariff of the EEC.

Countries are seeking to adjust to this situation in various ways. Some, like the United Kingdom, are seeking full membership in the EEC. Other European states, such as the three neutrals [Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland], are seeking more limited relationships with the EEC which would give them some of the advantages of membership and some of the obligations, but not all. Still others, like some of the African states, have obtained an even more limited form of relationship, providing free entry for their goods into the Common Market but not a comparable access in reverse for the goods of the EEC into the African states.

And, finally, there is the United States, which is seeking to meet the challenge of the Common Market by developing an Atlantic partnership

with it. The relationship we are seeking is called a "partnership" because it would be one between two great and equal powers, based on a recognition of our unavoidable interdependence and devoted to achieving a common approach to the problems of the free world.

Such an Atlantic partnership will be called upon to resolve in the first instance any problems between the partners, Europe and ourselves, but it must equally deal with the problems facing the free world as a whole. At the head of the list are the defense of freedom, economic development, and the expansion of trade.

In the trade field the partnership would take the form of the reciprocal reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers between the United States and the EEC, and the extension of such reductions to other countries of the free world on a most-favored-nation basis. Such reduction of trade barriers would enable the United States to maintain and expand its markets in the EEC and provide reciprocal opportunities for the EEC in the United States. By providing for the extension to third countries of any reductions which the United States might work out with the EEC, this approach would ease adjustment problems for such third countries. The approach is thus one which seeks to meet our particular trading problems with respect to the Common Market and at the same time provide for the participation of all free-world countries in the expansion of international commerce.

#### **Trade Expansion Act**

This is the major rationale behind the Trade Expansion Act<sup>2</sup> which was proposed by the President and which the Congress is now considering. It is intended to provide authority to the President to negotiate with the Common Market as well as with other countries for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs. It would require any duty reductions made by the United States under the act to be generalized to all free-world countries.

The act provides the President with a variety of authorities to reduce tariffs. First, there is general authority to reduce duties in trade agreements with any free-world country by 50 percent of the

rates in effect, or to which we are committed, on July 1, 1962. Second, there is special authority to reduce by more than 50 percent or to eliminate duties completely in negotiations with the EEC under specified circumstances. Third, there is special authority to reduce or eliminate duties in relation to the less developed countries. And finally, there is authority to eliminate duties of 5 percent or less.

All these authorities would affect the EEC and will undoubtedly be used in negotiations with the EEC. I should like, however, to make a few remarks regarding the special authority which is limited to negotiations with the Community.

Because, as we have seen, the EEC presents a special problem for our exporters, a simple 50-percent reduction in the level of the common external tariff may not be sufficient to maintain or expand our exports. Accordingly, the act permits the President in an agreement with the EEC to reduce by more than 50 percent or to eliminate completely tariffs on goods in categories where the United States and the EEC together account for 80 percent or more of the free-world export value of these products.

This authority has been drawn in the way it has in order to protect our position in the EEC market in commodities where we have an obvious comparative advantage. The fact that we and the EEC have dominated 80 percent of the world export value in a category reflects the advantage we have over other suppliers in such categories. We want to be sure that these advantages are not frustrated as a result of the trade-diverting effects of the Common Market. At the same time, because we do enjoy a strong competitive position as reflected by our dominance in world exports in these commodities, we can make substantial duty reductions with reasonable confidence that our industry will not face undue difficulties from imports, including imports from other countries to which the duty reductions would be generalized.

With respect to agricultural products the bill goes one step further. The EEC is the largest market for our agricultural exports. \$1.2 billion, or one-quarter of our total agricultural exports, went to the EEC in 1961. In view of the importance of the EEC market the proposed bill authorizes the President to reduce duties by more than 50 percent or to eliminate them on an agricultural product even if the 80-percent trade coverage test

<sup>2</sup> For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress on Jan. 25, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231; for an address of Aug. 7 by Under Secretary Ball, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1962, p. 231.

could not be met, if he determines that such action would help maintain or expand U.S. exports of such products.

### **The Problem of the Agricultural Market**

Temperate agriculture raises a special point of concern which deserves a further comment. As I said, the EEC is a major agricultural market for the United States and for other countries. With the accession of the United Kingdom, the world's largest importer of foodstuffs, the importance of the EEC as an agricultural market will be even further enhanced.

Western Europe has been going through a technological revolution in agriculture similar to the one we have experienced. Production is expanding faster than consumption, and Europe will become increasingly self-sufficient and independent of outside sources for supplies.

Apart from such considerations, agriculture has always been a problem child in international trade. It has always been subject to severe ups and downs, and farmers in every country, including our own, have been the object of special support.

The EEC has moved to adopt a common agricultural policy (CAP) designed to replace the separate national systems of the member states for the support of agriculture. The CAP will provide a unified system of internal price supports and arrangements to prevent the system from being frustrated by imports. The latter arrangements will take the form of variable levies designed to equalize EEC domestic prices and world market prices.

How this variable levy system will affect opportunities for access to the EEC market depends on how it is applied. Variable levies could be applied in an exceedingly restrictive manner to the detriment of imports. They could also be applied in a liberal manner so as to permit reasonable access for imports. The EEC has given assurances that the latter is their intention.

Of the greatest importance in this connection is the level of internal support prices which the EEC finally determines. Should these be set too high, domestic production will be excessively stimulated, imports will be subject to more restrictive levies, and the interests of outside countries will correspondingly be adversely affected.

### **Common Market and Less Developed Countries**

The Common Market also carries great significance for tropical and other less developed countries. A number of the African states have in the past been colonial dependencies of EEC member countries, particularly France. Though they have achieved independence, close ties, economic and otherwise, still remain. Europe is a major market for tropical products.

These former dependencies have, as I have already noted, achieved a form of association with the Common Market under which they will enjoy free access into the Common Market. This preferential position can raise serious competitive problems for other less developed countries which do not enjoy such free access. These outside countries producing bananas, cocoa, coffee, tropical woods, and oils are concerned about their ability to sell in the Common Market against the competition of countries producing the same commodities and enjoying free access. They are thus seeking the elimination or at least the reduction of this preferential treatment.

The African states economically dependent on this preferential relationship naturally resist losing it. The loss of it raises problems of economic adjustment for them.

The United States believes that the right course is to work toward the elimination of these preferences but at the same time provide appropriate solutions to cope with the problems of adjustment which the elimination of preferences may entail.

### **Financial Significance**

I have thus far concentrated on the trade implications of the Common Market. I believe a word is in order as regards the financial significance of the EEC, particularly in relation to the United States.

The Common Market countries, together with the United Kingdom, comprise a financial power of the same order of magnitude as the United States. At the end of 1961, the combined gold and foreign exchange reserves of the six nations of the EEC totaled \$16.2 billion, and of the Six plus the United Kingdom, \$19.6 billion, as compared with U.S. reserves of \$17.2 billion. These seven nations also held some \$7.9 billion of the total of \$18.8 billion of U.S. liquid dollar liabilities to foreigners at the end of 1961. It is obvious

from these few figures that the financial policies, as well as the trade policies, to be followed by our transatlantic partners will have an important effect on our own economic strength and the stability of the dollar.

This point is abundantly illustrated by our respective balances of international payments. It has been noted that the balance-of-payments surpluses of the continental European countries have largely been the counterpart of our own payments deficits. This does not mean to say that we buy more from the countries of Western Europe in terms of goods and services than they buy from us. On the contrary, in direct trade and service transactions, Western Europe, including the EEC, is a net customer of the United States. It is only when we look at the sum total of our international transactions that we note that Europe's overall dollar earnings on trade and service account and on capital account, directly with the United States and in dollar receipts from third countries, exceed our own receipts from Europe.

The following figures illustrate this pattern. In 1961 our net earnings from Western Europe were \$3 billion in goods and services alone, and, even after subtracting military expenditures, we earned \$1.8 billion. However, after taking account of capital transactions and excluding special debt prepayments, our direct payments with Europe were in deficit; if receipts from third countries and other unidentifiable transactions were included, our total deficit with Europe in 1961 was \$1.9 billion, or three-quarters of our total global balance-of-payments deficit last year of \$2.5 billion.

These figures point up the importance of coordinating international financial policies with our European partners to support continued world economic stability. We must work together to insure that the large dollar holdings and earnings of Western Europe support the dollar in its role as the world's major reserve currency.

An important step in this direction has been taken in negotiating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) borrowing arrangement<sup>3</sup> under which the key industrial countries of the world have undertaken to make available a total of \$6 billion in convertible currencies to increase Fund resources available for maintaining stability in

the international monetary system. The mechanism of coordinating national financial policies has also been improved by the regularly scheduled meetings of policy officials within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The need for maintaining and improving this coordination will grow as the United Kingdom becomes more closely linked with the EEC. The role of the pound sterling as the world's other major key reserve currency will increasingly become the intimate concern of the Common Market countries, while these countries will have available to them the resources and machinery of the London capital market.

Coordination of financial policies is also important in another sense. The balance-of-payments figures mentioned earlier illustrate that outflows of American investment capital to Europe contributed significantly to our deficit with that area. In the period 1959 through 1961, the Western European area was the most important single recipient of American direct investment capital, accounting for \$2.1 billion, or 45 percent, of our total net direct investment abroad of \$4.7 billion in that period. About one-third of this direct investment, both in Western Europe and in all foreign countries, was in the petroleum industry. In portfolio investment, the United States was a net recipient of \$0.2 billion during the 3-year period. Considering all forms of investment from 1959 to 1961, Western Europe received 30 percent, or \$1.9 billion, of our total net capital outflow of \$6.3 billion.

There are three main reasons for this continued capital outflow from the United States to Europe. First, the European countries continue to maintain exchange controls on capital movements in contrast to the dismantlement of other exchange controls imposed during the postwar reconstruction period. Second, European capital markets, except for the United Kingdom, are small and underdeveloped, and access by both domestic and foreign borrowers to these markets is limited by the authorities. Finally, rapid economic growth in Europe has not only attracted outside capital but has tended to keep European capital in Europe, where investment opportunities have appeared best.

To promote a larger outflow of direct and portfolio investments from the European countries, the United States has been urging them to remove

<sup>3</sup> For an IMF announcement of Jan. 8, 1962, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

the restrictions they still maintain on capital exports and to build up their markets so they can accommodate larger borrowings by both residents and nonresidents. The accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC could help meet this problem as well as contribute to the integration of Europe by making available more directly to an expanded EEC its great international experience as a banker for the free world and by bringing directly within the EEC the facilities of the London capital market. Coordination and cooperation in matters of financial policy will continue to be necessary to adjust international capital movements to balance-of-payments considerations.

### Political Aspects

I have been discussing thus far the significance of the economic aspects of the Common Market. I should like to close with some remarks about the political aspects.

It should be apparent, from what I have already said, that the Common Market is much more than an economic arrangement. It provides the basis for a political arrangement as well. To carry out its economic union it has established, as I have noted, a number of common institutions. These institutions embrace economic, legislative, and judicial functions. They thus provide a base for the further political development of Europe.

The member states of the EEC are now engaged in the negotiation of arrangements directed to closer political and defense cooperation. The United Kingdom will presumably take part in this political development when it becomes a member of the EEC. It is thus possible to visualize an entirely different kind of political and economic entity in Europe, which will exercise a far greater role in world affairs than a fragmented Europe has been capable of playing in the postwar world.

It is in these political aspects that the first and principal interest of the United States in the Common Market lies. The Common Market affords a prospect of a strong and unified Europe capable of reconciling historic national rivalries and providing a bulwark against Soviet and Communist pressures. It affords the means of bringing the major powers of Europe together into a major entity and preventing the costly clashes that have characterized relations among these countries in the past.

Such a Europe would also provide an equal

partner of the United States in the achievement of our common goals. In the place of numerous states, relatively weak and divided, an enlarged EEC would provide an area comparable in strength to the United States and capable of sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities in meeting the problems of the free world. Through this partnership the prospects for economic well-being and a durable peace are improved. It is in this that the larger significance of the Common Market lies.

## United States Charges Soviet Union Distorts Situation in Berlin

### Department Statement<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet note of September 5 purports to be a reply to the Western Allied notes of August 24,<sup>2</sup> and to the United States note of August 27.<sup>3</sup> These notes emphasized the responsibility of the Soviet Government for the erection of the Berlin wall and for the tensions and incidents which have resulted from this illegal action, and called upon the Soviet Government to participate in a meeting of representatives of the Four Powers, preferably in Berlin, to bring about a reduction of tensions in Berlin and an amelioration of the inhumane consequences of the wall.

The Soviet note is completely unresponsive to the Western Allied proposals and consists primarily of a lengthy compilation of the fallacious and unsupported charges which the Soviet Union has made in the past with reference to the Federal Republic and the situation in West Berlin.

The Soviet Government has attempted in its note of September 5 to divert the attention of world opinion from its own failure to carry out its responsibilities with respect to Germany and Berlin by questioning the motives and good faith of the Western Powers and by painting a completely distorted picture of the situation in Berlin.

We are further studying the note in consultation with our allies.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Sept. 6.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1962, p. 378.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 417.

## U.S. Replies to Soviet Protest on Patrol Aircraft

### U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 4<sup>1</sup>

Press release 535 dated September 4

The charge contained in the Soviet Note of September 4, 1962 that a United States aircraft violated Soviet air space August 30 and overflowed Soviet territory and territorial waters was investigated immediately upon receipt of the Soviet note. Investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may in fact have taken place. A patrol aircraft operated by the United States Air Force was in the northern Pacific area east of Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note. The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he was flying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encountered severe winds during this night time flight and may therefore have unintentionally overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin.

My Government has instructed me to state that the policy of the United States Government with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been altered and remains as stated by the President on January 25, 1961.<sup>2</sup> If the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions. Precautions intended to prevent such incidents are under review.

### SOVIET NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 4

Unofficial translation

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare the following to the Government of the United States of America:

According to proven data, on August 30, 1962 at 19:21 hours Moscow time, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane intruded into the air space of the Soviet Union in the Far East 65 kilometers east of the city of South Sakhalinsk and for a period of nine minutes flew over the territory and territorial waters of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This flagrant violation of the state border of the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by John M. McSweeney, Minister-Counselor of the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> At his news conference on Jan. 25, 1961, President Kennedy said:

"Flights of American aircraft penetrating the airspace of the Soviet Union have been suspended since May 1960. I have ordered that they not be resumed."

Union by an American reconnaissance plane has a clearly provocative character. It is well known to what serious international complications the espionage flight of Powers in a U-2 plane led in May, 1960<sup>3</sup> and what indignation was evoked among world public opinion by the treachery, at that time revealed before the entire world, of the former government of the United States of America. These aggressive actions of the Eisenhower administration led to the breakup of the summit conference, to sharp aggravation of the entire international situation, heightened alarm among peoples of all countries for the fate of peace, and placed a heavy burden on relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

For this reason the Soviet Government welcomed the announcement of President Kennedy of January of last year that he had given instructions not to resume flights of U-2 planes and not to permit violation of the state borders of the Soviet Union by American planes.

In connection with the new case of a crude violation of Soviet air space by an American U-2 airplane, the lawful question arises: What is this? A rebirth of the old, piratical practice of the previous administration, condemned by President Kennedy himself? Or is this: a provocative action of those militaristic circles in the United States of America which would like to create a new international conflict, similar to the conflict of 1960, and once again bring the situation to a white heat?

The Government of the United States of America should give a clear answer to this question.

Recently, information has been received about the activation of operations of American U-2 reconnaissance airplanes in the proximity of the Soviet borders. U-2 airplanes again have appeared on aviation bases in England; U-2 reconnaissance airplanes are also based on American bases in Japan, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany and carry out flights from these bases. Along with this, approximately the same versions regarding the purposes of such flights have been given out as were released by the Eisenhower administration until it was caught with the evidence on the scene of the crime.

The Government of the United States of America should take into consideration the position in which it puts its allies. The Soviet Government has previously warned, in the most serious way, of the grave consequences for those countries whose governments make available their territory to American military aircraft for preparation and carrying out of infringements of the borders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It has also warned that if such provocations should be repeated, the Soviet Government will be forced to take appropriate retaliatory measures, right up to rendering harmless the military bases utilized against the Soviet Union. It is not necessary to remind that these warnings remain in full force.

The Soviet Government vigorously protests to the

<sup>3</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1960, p. 816; May 30, 1960, p. 851; June 6, 1960, pp. 899 and 904; June 13, 1960, pp. 947 and 955; Aug. 22, 1960, p. 276; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 361; and Nov. 7, 1960, p. 726.

Government of the United States of America regarding the new crude violation by an American reconnaissance airplane of the national border of the Soviet Union. It anticipates that the United States Government will sternly punish persons guilty of the organization of this flight of the American U-2 airplane and will take prompt measures toward future banning of violations of Soviet air space.

If this is not done by the United States Government, the Soviet Government will take measures which it will consider indispensable for the protection of the security of its borders in the event of new violations. In addition to this, the Soviet Government reserves for itself the right to place the question of aggressive actions of the United States of America before the United Nations General Assembly.

## **U.S. Reaffirms Policy on Prevention of Aggressive Actions by Cuba**

*Statement by President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>*

All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere, have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached this Government in the last 4 days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft defense missiles with a slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and

guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.

It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other hemisphere countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will be nothing more.

## **President Hopes To Meet With Chiefs of State of Central America, Panama**

Press release 536 dated September 6

The Department of State announced on September 6 that the President has expressed his interest in meeting with the Presidents of the five countries of Central America and Panama sometime next year. The date and place are to be determined later.

In replying to a letter from President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala, who last July formally suggested the meeting between the heads of state, President Kennedy stated that he was encouraged by the progress being made toward economic integration in Central America. He recalled that in March of 1961, in his first public statement on the Alliance for Progress,<sup>1</sup> he indicated his special interest and support of the Central American common market as a means of achieving the aims of the alliance. He said that this interest has since been translated into concrete action by accelerating U.S. support of the Central American economic integration movement.

President Kennedy wrote to President Ydigoras:

I would like sometime to have the opportunity to become better acquainted with the Chiefs of State of

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents on Sept. 4 by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.

<sup>1</sup>For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.



Central America and Panama as you suggested. However, my present commitments would not make such a visit possible before sometime next year.

The countries of Central America are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Panama is not a member of the institutions which the other five countries have organized pursuant to Central American integration, but has shown close interest in their development.

The memorandum<sup>2</sup> from President Ydigoras of Guatemala suggesting the meeting between the seven heads of state was handed to Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin on July 4 during a visit which Mr. Martin made to the capitals of the five Central American Republics and Panama, immediately after accompanying President Kennedy on his state visit to Mexico.<sup>3</sup>

## **U.S. and Korea To Resume Talks on Status-of-Forces Agreement**

*Following is the text of a joint U.S.-Republic of Korea press statement released at Seoul on September 6.*

The American Ambassador has informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the United States Government is prepared to reopen negotiations for an agreement covering the status of the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister welcomed this development on behalf of his Government.

Both sides agreed that negotiations would resume at the working level sometime in September. It is recognized that any status-of-forces agreement involves complex matters, and it is expected that negotiations will require a considerable period of time. Accordingly, it is understood that in view of the forthcoming constitutional changes in Korea, the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement will await the restoration of civil government.

## **Eighth Anniversary of SEATO**

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*

Press release 542 dated September 7

Today [September 8] we observe the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,<sup>1</sup> which joined the eight member states of SEATO for the collective preservation of peace and security in the treaty area. In marking this occasion it is fitting that I should restate the dedication of the United States to the peaceful purposes of SEATO.

This alliance was born in a period of danger, but its high aim has always been to encourage stability. It was created to meet the threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, but its constant effort has been to preserve the peace. One way in which SEATO serves these ends is by deterring potential aggressors. Thus, in a world in which Communist threats persist, we maintain our defensive strength and we remain ready to assist in resisting aggression. We recognize in the treaty that Communist aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would endanger our own peace and safety, and we agree in that event to act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. We stand by this solemn pledge.

The SEATO partners know, however, that real security involves economic and social progress as well as defense. Thus the presence in the treaty area of American teachers, doctors, and engineers betokens no less than the presence of American forces our firm resolve, in the language of the treaty, "to strengthen the fabric of peace . . . to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area." On this eighth anniversary of SEATO I am pleased to renew our pledge of support for these lofty purposes and to associate the United States with our treaty allies in their continued pursuit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

## The Policymaker's View of Transitional Societies

by W. W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council<sup>1</sup>

The perspective of a contemporary policymaker viewing societies and social analysis is inevitably marked by three characteristics.

First, he must work, quite technically, in a dynamic framework. For him change is not a variable which can be introduced marginally to illuminate the properties of a static, integrated system. The fundamental frames of thought enforced by the situations he confronts are dynamic. This is equally true whether the policymaker is concerned with the implications of weapons technology, relations between the United States and Western Europe or Japan, relations with the underdeveloped areas, or relations with the Communist states.

The rate of obsolescence of military equipment is, perhaps, 20 percent per annum. Societies don't move quite that fast. If by nothing else, they are constrained by the stately rhythms of the generations; but history is on the move everywhere at a quite extraordinary pace. And useful communication between a social scientist and a policymaker must begin with this minimal common understanding that they are both in the business of dynamic analysis.

Second, the abstractions which are necessary and legitimate for a social scientist, to narrow and give intellectual order to his study, are a luxury denied to those who make policy and especially to those who bear political responsibility.

It is often remarked that the President of the United States has a lonely job. That loneliness

proceeds in part from the power and responsibility he must exercise, notably in a world where the issue of war or peace can never be far from the surface of his thought. But in part that loneliness stems from the fact that centered in him alone must be all the variables which bear on the making of a given national decision. He cannot afford to be a pure economist, sociologist, or political scientist, nor a pure diplomatist, soldier, or politician: He must be all of these things. This is inescapable because his decisions will have consequences in each of these dimensions of life; these consequences will play back upon him, and he must seek to take them into account before a decision is made.

What is true of the American President is true, in less extreme form, of all policymakers. Among your papers there is an engaging and candid observation on the dialog between the sociologist and the policymaker by Mr. [D.] Ghosh:

The result is that the specialist has a hard job putting his advice across to the policy-maker. If the former uses an over-simplified analysis, he offends the *amour propre* of the latter. On the other hand, if his analysis is elaborate, the latter feels baffled or bored. Again, if the specialist is bright and quick, he raises suspicion about the reliability of his recommendations. Some specialists, indeed, find the job of advising the policy-maker so tricky that they prefer to make their recommendations through writing, public addresses and work in committees; and it is not unoften that the less able men become advisers. One even comes across social scientists who belittle their own sciences and boost "common sense" to the delight of the policy-makers and the discomfort of his colleagues.

I would suggest that a part of the problem in such dialogs is the fact that the policymaker is faced with an extremely high order of complexity because of the number of variables he must take into account; that, since we lack any fully inte-

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Fifth World Congress of Sociology at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 6 (press release 528).

grated science covering all these variables, the number of unknowns will always be greater than the number of equations. The responsible politician must solve his equations in part by instinct or by what might appear to a scientist as rather crude "common sense."

Put another way, a policymaker may resist a social scientist's vocabulary not merely because he may not understand it—or because he finds it odd—but because he may sense correctly that, if he accepts the going scientific vocabulary, he may be accepting a definition of his problem which will automatically screen out variables that ought to remain a relevant part of his consideration.

The third inevitable characteristic of a policymaker's view of the world is that it has become quite extraordinarily interdependent. This cliché about the times in which we live is, in Government, a vivid day-to-day reality.

The interests of nations are now so sensitively interwoven, communications are so quick and ample, that conventional diplomacy between discrete governments no longer describes how the world works. International relations consist in complex interaction among whole societies. A social (economic or political) model based on the conventional notion of an integrated, insulated nation or society will no longer suffice.

Our allies in Europe, for example, are as sensitive to the moods and nuances of American politics as they are to their own—although neither they nor we may yet be very expert at the game of understanding fully each other's politics. But their future relation to us and our future relation to them are an active part of the political, social, and economic life of both regions.

The interplay between the more advanced and the less developed parts of the non-Communist world is, from the point of view of social analysis, even more dramatic. The more advanced nations impinge on the lives of less developed countries at every level of society, from the highest governmental circles down to the elementary schools and the villages, while the adventures and travail of the modernizing nations capture the imagination and commitment of our young, affect the contours of our whole military and foreign policy, and form an important part of our domestic political debate.

And even across the barriers of the cold war there is, beneath the surface, a lively interplay of communication and interaction.

### Social Problems of Transitional Nations

I should like to pursue a little the implications of the policymaker's dynamic, multivariable, and interdependent view of societies for a subject which has formed a part of the agenda of this Congress, that is, the social problems of societies in the early stages of growth.

We are evidently living at a time when more nations than ever before in history are caught up in strong impulses to modernize their societies but have not yet proceeded to the point where regular growth and progressive modernization is their normal condition. If you will permit me to use a somewhat private vocabulary, the world is full of societies engaged in seeking to create the preconditions for takeoff, but relatively few of the underdeveloped nations are yet successfully in or beyond the takeoff stage. On the other hand, there are relatively few even small enclaves of pure traditional life: A degree of modernization has been imposed or accepted in all but a relatively few regions of the contemporary world.

From the point of view of policy, the broad consequences of this state of things are relatively clear. We must expect over the foreseeable future an environment of turbulence as these nations—committed to modernize but not yet sufficiently modernized to make growth their regular condition—undergo radical economic, social, and political change. Such change inevitably meets resistance and involves conflict both among men and within the minds of men, torn between the heritage of the past, the confusions of the present, and hopes or fears for the future. And since modernization involves, in many cases, a disengagement from colonialism and, in all cases, appears to involve an impulse to build and maintain a more dignified and assertive stance on the world scene, we must expect a great deal of international as well as domestic readjustment as this process proceeds.

Moreover we are quite clear in our Government as to our broad objective with respect to this revolutionary set of changes. The interest of the United States is that modernization proceed in such a way as to preserve the independence of nations and the national and cultural integrity of the modernization process, within the inevitable and mutual limits of a profoundly interdependent world. It is also our interest that, as the new nations emerge on the world scene—or moderniz-

ing nations assert themselves with new force—they assume a degree of responsibility for the international order.

It is from this policy that our programs of both military and economic assistance directly flow, as well as many of our positions in the United Nations and our own efforts at conciliation at points of conflict.

All of this is easily said. But the design of day-to-day policies and relationships between ourselves and transitional nations going through the early, pretakeoff stages of development—which would move us toward these large objectives—is an enormously complex affair. We have a great deal to learn; but I believe we're learning. I suspect you'd be surprised at the amount of hard work going forward within the American Government designed to permit a more solid and sympathetic understanding of the problems faced by the politician, worker, peasant, student, union leader, soldier, and the other central figures in the societies of the less developed countries; and social scientists can help us if the three considerations which I suggested earlier are woven into their analyses.

Let me say a few words about the meaning of each as they bear on the analysis of societies at this early stage of modernization.

### **Working in a Dynamic Framework**

First, the question of a dynamic model. The fact is that we all come to our consideration of such transitional societies with two theoretical models fairly firmly fixed in our heads: the model of a traditional society, whether it derives from ancient or medieval civilizations or from study of African, Polynesian, or other fairly untouched traditional societies accessible to students in modern times, and then the model of a modern industrial society, with its complex functional differentiation. I suspect we could evoke from our students in most countries a reasonably uniform list of typical characteristics of traditional and industrial societies under the headings suggested, for example, by M. [J.] Maquet in his paper "L'Intégration Culturelle dans les Sociétés en Croissance": that is, typical characteristics relating to technological economic progress, political structure, family system, religion, philosophic concepts, and art.

Sociology has fairly satisfactory tools for defining more or less integrated static structures. We are quite good at what might be called cross-sectional analysis. What we lack are the concepts and tools for dealing with a society which is inherently dynamic, inherently in transition.

The question I am getting at is, indeed, posed clearly by Herr [R. F.] Behrendt's paper presented to this Congress, "The Image of New Political Forms and Their Influence on Economic Development." At its close he states as a goal of policy: ". . . to carry out technically and economically necessary modification in an atmosphere of continuity and non-violent change." This is an objective which most social scientists and governments outside the Communist bloc would, of course, accept. It poses for analysts of society, however, the problem of creating an inherently dynamic model of the transition from a traditional to a regular growing and modernizing society and of defining the rate and character of change which is consistent with conditions of tolerable stability.

I put it to you that it is a wholly different task to define conditions of tolerable stability in an inherently dynamic situation than it is to delineate a pattern of integration or equilibrium.

One must begin by assuming that a transitional society is in profound disequilibrium and pose the question: What patterns and rates of change are most consistent with the maintenance of social continuity? Or, in operational terms, by what process can the transition be fulfilled in ways which avoid violent civil conflict and minimize a society's vulnerability to external or internal aggression?

For the analyst the key question about a society ceases to be: What is its pattern of cultural and functional integration? It becomes: What are the tolerable limits of conflict and disintegration and reintegration as it moves from a traditional to a modern way of life? And this, in turn, requires a precise and detailed understanding of where it has come from, of the transitional process it is experiencing, and of its particular stage in that transition. For the policymaker the problem ceases to be: How can the *status quo* be maintained? It becomes: What can we do to assist movement forward without inducing excessive friction and vulnerability to external or internal aggression?

### Widening the Frame of Social Analysis

If one poses the question of analysis and policy of transitional societies in this way, it follows that one requires a dynamic map of the transitional society, embracing all its sectors—political, social, economic, cultural, and, I would add, military. Sociological analysis must expand to embrace all the dimensions of the society.

Even if the primary focus of attention is the narrow, classical question of social structure or stratification, a useful dynamic analysis must widen out to take into account the changing political, economic, and ideological environment; for it is the choices made by individuals as they act with respect to the limits and possibilities of this changing total environment that will help determine the future composition of the social structure and the effective values of various social groups.

The requirement for widening the frame of social analysis is heightened by the fact that in a transitional society some of the most significant change occurs within social groups rather than out of conflict between unified social groups. In such societies the landowners, civil servants, the military, the businessmen, the intellectuals, et cetera, are *not* generally homogenous groups, as we sometimes assume. They are undergoing rapid change, as individuals make their dispositions with respect to an evolving total environment.

How such intragroup changes can be charted and measured is a difficult task. One possible tool for acquiring a working feel for the process of intragroup social change is the systematic analysis of different generations.

Our vocabularies for dealing with societies—and even the separate disciplines we have created—are abstract ways of isolating aspects of human organization and activity. The men and women we are talking about are complex, but they are, after all, the ultimate units which make up society. Within themselves they seek to strike livable balances among the opportunities and constraints they confront. Or to use a concept you have taught me, they seek to make sense of the multiple roles they are called upon to play. Taken together, these roles—and the arena of opportunities and constraints within which they must be exercised—represent the whole frame of society, not merely its social structure, economy, or political life. In committing ourselves to an analysis which would break out of the static patterns and

the conventional barriers of our disciplines, our task may be eased, and our insight may be increased, by analyses which would focus directly on human beings and the powerful dynamics of change from one generation to the next.

But my general point is quite simple. To make intelligent and helpful policy toward a transitional society, conventional discrete economic, social, or political analysis is not enough. The policymaker must struggle to develop a view which combines and connects those abstract ways of looking at things. And, if I may say so, the marked tendency in the papers of this Congress to move in this direction is heartening.

### Interdependence

Now, finally, the question of interdependence.

In making policy toward transitional societies we are conscious of two facts. First, that their development is and should be mainly their own business. In more scientific terms, movement along the road of modernization will be determined in each society by unique factors in its history, culture, and ambitions which a society outside can only influence marginally. In our Government this proposition is incorporated in the principle that our development aid be allocated in proportion to a nation's demonstrated capacity to mobilize its own resources. There is no way an external power can effectively substitute for the domestic acts and the domestic will to take the steps necessary for economic development. But it can stand ready to assist when such capacity and will are demonstrated.

The second fact is that at this particular stage of history the influence of the United States on other societies is, to some extent, inescapable. Given the intensive character of interdependence this influence is exerted even when we fail to act with respect to another society. The reciprocal is, of course, also true: Other societies exert an inescapable influence on us, although the role of the United States as a world power imposes special responsibilities in exerting the limited but real margin of our influence.

The central problem of policy is, therefore, to use wisely this inevitable but limited margin of influence on the contours of other peoples' development.

A part of the total impact of the United States on other nations flows, of course, from activities,

communications, and images which are not under the control of government; for example, the flow of news in mass communications, films, tourists, et cetera. But a part of this impact flows directly from diplomatic, military, and economic policy in its widest sense, including what we do about education, economic aid, activities of the Peace Corps, et cetera. What we are trying to do is to focus these activities so that they strengthen the two fundamental interests the United States shares with the peoples and governments in the underdeveloped areas; that is, their desire for independence and their desire to modernize their societies in ways consonant with their own history, culture, and ambitions. These two objectives are related, since a longrun base for independence requires that the modernization process succeed.

#### Relation of Independence to Modernization

In seeking to focus our impact on them around these two shared objectives we are, I believe, also strengthening forces within their societies most likely to maintain minimum unity and cohesion in a period of inevitable strain and tension stemming from the dynamics of the modernization process itself. It is evident that political leaders who have been effective amidst the turbulence of the modernization process have been successful to the extent that they have dramatized successfully these two related objectives, and, especially, those who have made modernization the primary route for expressing the inevitable nationalist impulses within a transitional society. Men who believe that it is possible for their society to assume and maintain a role of dignity on the world scene and who also believe that this requires the transformation of their society so that it may absorb effectively the fruits of modern science and technology are more likely to bear the strains of social, economic, and political change than if they are committed to some other goal.

Thus in focusing our policy around the conception of independence and its longrun relation to modernization, we would hope that we are not merely reflecting abiding interests of the United States but also contributing something to the maintenance of minimum stability conditions during an inevitable revolutionary experience.

Behind our approach to these transitional nations is an article of faith. It is often held by sophisticated analysts that political democracy

as we have known it in the West is not an article of export to societies which have not shared our religious heritage or our long political preconditioning. And, indeed, it is evident that Western political democracy cannot be simply transplanted in societies which have had a different cultural and institutional heritage. We cannot expect smooth-functioning, modern political democracies to emerge everywhere soon; nor can we expect that when they do emerge they will necessarily function as do our own.

On the other hand, deep in the non-Western cultures are moral canons which would assert the integrity of the individual, set limits on the powers of the state over the individual, and which would regard that government as good which, by one route or another, is subject to the consent of the governed. The limits of legitimate government and the forms of consent have varied historically; and I would emphasize again that we do not necessarily assume that democratic practice as it emerges will everywhere mirror our own institutions. On the other hand, we hold to the faith that if the independence and national integrity of the modernization process can be maintained, in time increasingly democratic governments will emerge; that the achievement and maintenance of sustained growth and progressive modernization will lead other societies to that underlying consensus about goals and procedures which are always the foundation for political democracy; and that the humane values embedded in their cultures will assert themselves and suffuse the life of the modern societies that, in time, they will surely create.

### Cambodia Asks U.S. for Guarantee of Neutrality, Territorial Integrity

*Following is an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia.*

Press release 532 dated September 3

#### PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRINCE SIHANOUK

AUGUST 31, 1962

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS, It always gives me great pleasure to receive a personal communication from Your Royal Highness and I only regret that the reason for your letter of August 20 was to ex-

press your worry over the security of Cambodia. For, as you know, the fundamental and abiding objective of the United States is that each country, large and small, live in peace and independence so that its people may prosper, enjoy the fruits of its own endeavors, and pursue a course of international relations of its own choosing. This applies especially to countries with which we have such close friendly relations as we have with Cambodia.

In this spirit and in view of the present preoccupations of Your Royal Highness, I assure you that the United States respects the neutrality, territorial integrity and independence of Cambodia. I am sure you will recognize that this attitude is the foundation of United States relations with your Government and people. We recognize and respect the high aims you have set for Cambodia, and we wholeheartedly desire to further them. Our economic cooperation has aimed at supplementing Cambodia's own intensive efforts at economic and social progress, while our military assistance has been designed to help your people maintain the security of their beloved country.

The contribution of Cambodia and that of Your Royal Highness in person to peace in the world is known to all. I have in mind particularly your sponsorship of the recent conference on the Lao question.<sup>1</sup> If for no other reason, therefore, Cambodia has the right to live in peace and tranquility. The United States stands ready to do whatever it can to assure this, not only for Cambodia, but for its neighbors in Southeast Asia, all friends of the United States.

There are various methods by which nations achieve a state of peaceful harmony with each other. One, which you mentioned in your letter, is the idea of an international conference to recognize the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Another, which you suggested to Ambassador [Philip D.] Sprouse in your conversation with him on August 28, is the issuance of "official letters" by interested governments declaring their respect for Cambodia's independence, neutrality and territorial integrity. This second method appears to me to be a wise suggestion, and a more expeditious and effective means of achieving the objectives cited in your letter. I should be glad to write such a formal letter for the United States. It is my hope that other governments interested

in peace and stability in the area would likewise affirm these principles in an appropriate manner. Noting that your letter expresses willingness to accept whatever controls are necessary to insure Cambodia's aims as set forth therein, I would be interested in your ideas regarding the instrumentality for bringing the desired stability to Cambodia's border areas.

Ambassador Sprouse has also reported to me the statement that Your Royal Highness does not intend to be at New York for the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. This I regret, for I took great pleasure in our conversation during your visit last year. However, I hope, as I mentioned then, that you may find it possible to make a more leisurely visit to our country. My trusted military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, whom I have chosen to be Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, will soon be visiting your country, and I have asked him to discuss with Your Royal Highness, as well as with other leaders in the area, the general question of peace in Southeast Asia.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration and personal esteem.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

#### PRINCE SIHANOUK TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Translated from the French

PHNOM PENH, August 20, 1962

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to call Your Excellency's attention particularly to the very serious threat that has for years been hanging over my country, which has constantly been subjected to threats, plots, sabotage, blockades, and aggression by neighboring powers that are very much stronger militarily, concerning whose annexationist aims there is no longer any doubt. Territorial claims supported by the use of armed forces, the crossing of frontiers, flights over our territory, and its recent occupation by foreign troops cause me to fear that, in a short time, an insoluble situation will be created which could lead to an international conflict with *unforeseeable consequences*.

Cambodia can no longer endure this constant provocation and aggression, or the official or unofficial accusations made repeatedly by these same neighbors, to the effect that it is encouraging and promoting subversion in their countries; this is not and has never been true.

Sincerely desiring peace, but resolved to defend its honor and what remains of its national territory after numerous "amputations," Cambodia sees no other reasonable solution of this situation than to claim for itself the benefit of the international protection provisions that have been granted to Laos.

I take the liberty of reminding you that it is thanks to

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

Cambodian initiative that Laos has been spared from greater sacrifices and that the western and socialist camps have not clashed.

Actually, my country has been making valuable contributions to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia since 1954.

Today, before making decisions of prime importance in order to protect its existence, Cambodia requests of Your Excellency's Government and the other powers which met last month in Geneva *the official recognition and guarantee of its neutrality and territorial integrity*. It is ready to accept any appropriate control for that purpose.

The beneficial international accomplishments in Laos would not be lasting and the balance of forces in Southeast Asia would not long be maintained if Cambodia should in turn become a battle field, a prospect which appears to me to be inevitable if the powers concerned with the security of this region should fail to reach an agreement to neutralize it.

I venture to say to Your Excellency that my country is entitled to this consideration.

All foreign statesmen and observers of good faith have recognized that it formed a peaceful, closely united nation that abided by the United Nations Charter and met its international obligations; that practiced genuine neutrality; and that was faithful to the principles of peaceful co-existence. They have also recognized that Cambodia succeeded in following this just and equitable policy through its own efforts, without aid from anyone and by surmounting innumerable difficulties.

I take the liberty of suggesting that Your Excellency be good enough to take an active interest in our fate and agree that an international conference on Cambodia be held as soon as possible in a large neutral capital or city of your choice (Geneva, New Delhi, Stockholm, etc.).

Thanking Your Excellency for whatever interest you may be good enough to take in this urgent petition from a small peaceful nation, which desires only to live independent and free and to have its boundaries respected, I beg you to accept the assurances of my very high consideration.

NORODOM SIHANOUK

## United States Rushes Aid to Iran for Relief of Earthquake Victims

*Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, together with a Department announcement.*

### EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES

White House press release dated September 6

#### President Kennedy to Shah of Iran

SEPTEMBER 2, 1962

I have been profoundly shocked to learn of the great natural catastrophe which has struck Iran.

The hearts of the American people go out to those who have lost families or friends or seen their homes destroyed. Iran has suffered adversity many times before in its 2500 years of recorded history. But it has always triumphed. I know the people of Iran under your leadership will rise above this tragedy as well. The American Government and people are prepared to help in this effort. I have instructed our Ambassador to render any help he and U.S. Government agencies can provide which will alleviate the suffering and loss created by this disaster.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

#### Shah of Iran to President Kennedy

SEPTEMBER 5, 1962

To the Honorable JOHN F. KENNEDY

*President of the United States of America*

Your heartening message of sympathy conveying you and the American people's feelings of friendly solidarity on the occasion of our national mourning has profoundly touched me. I hasten to express the gratitude of my people and of myself to you and to the Government of the United States for your contribution in alleviating the sufferings created by the recent unprecedented loss of life and property.

MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 540 dated September 6

"Operation Helping Hand," the United States program of assistance to Iran following the tragic earthquake on September 1, added another chapter in America's responses to human disaster in all parts of the world.

First reports of the earthquake reached the Department early on the morning of September 3 with the information that some 20,000 persons had been killed or injured and that additional tens of thousands had been left homeless. Iranian affairs officers in the Department immediately instituted steps against an anticipated call for assistance from the Government of Iran.

Appropriate offices of the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development and the American Red Cross were in contact with the State Department with assurances that they were standing by to render whatever assistance was possible. In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces European Command was also alerted to stand by to start an airlift on a possible urgent basis.

Shortly thereafter President Kennedy sent a



personal message to the Shah of Iran expressing his deep regret and offering whatever assistance the United States could provide in response to a request from the Government of Iran.

Due to the extent of the area of the quake and its remoteness from communications centers in Iran, it was not until 36 hours after the quake occurred that the Iranian authorities, acting through the Red Lion and Sun Society (Iranian Red Cross), were able to assess the extent of the damage and the measures needed to alleviate the suffering. They then requested immediate provision of 1,000 tents, 10,000 blankets, and an American-manned 100-bed field hospital for caring for the survivors, and two helicopters for use in inaccessible areas.

These supplies were made available from U.S. Armed Forces supplies in Europe and immediately put aboard the already alerted Air Force planes and airlifted to Tehran for distribution to the quake victims. The tents and blankets arrived in Tehran within 28 hours of the initial request, and within 8 hours following their arrival they were being distributed in the area of the

quake. The field hospital, complete with medical personnel, arrived and was set up the following day, and the two helicopters had also arrived and were in service.

The American Ambassador in Tehran, Julius C. Holmes, presented the Red Lion and Sun Society with a check for \$10,000 from the special emergency funds provided for such contingencies on the day following the earthquake. The following day he was authorized to disburse another \$10,000 to assist in the distribution of American-supplied goods and equipment in the area. One thousand tons of powdered milk, flour, and cooking oils from surplus American food stored in Tehran for distribution by the CARE organization were drawn on, for ultimate replacement by the United States. Distribution was made by the personnel of the CARE organization in cooperation with the Red Lion and Sun officials.

In addition to providing transport for the field hospital and 200 medical personnel to man it, the U.S. Air Force in Europe flew 30 Iranian doctors and medical students in Germany back to Iran to assist their country in its hour of need.

## Africa and Food for Peace

*by G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is always a great pleasure for me to return to Michigan and be among old friends. But when I have an opportunity to return here for the Michigan State Fair and speak on both agriculture and Africa, such pleasure is heightened many times.

Let me begin by congratulating Sandy Brown and his associates on the Michigan Food for Peace Council, as well as those of you who represent the other States in Regional Committee No. 2. I commend you for your public-spirited and self-

less cooperation in this vital task of developing public understanding and support for the Food-for-Peace Program.

The importance of this program has been made abundantly clear by President Kennedy. One of his first acts after taking office—in fact, his second Executive order dated January 24, 1961<sup>2</sup>—established a Food-for-Peace office in the White House. At that time the President said:<sup>2</sup>

American agricultural abundance offers a great opportunity for the United States to promote the interests of peace in a significant way and to play an important role in helping to provide a more adequate diet for peoples all

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Michigan Food for Peace Council at Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 1 (press release 533 dated Aug. 31).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 216.

around the world. We must make the most vigorous and constructive use possible of this opportunity.

What is it about our Food-for-Peace Program that makes it so important in the overall scheme of our foreign policy? What are its objectives, and what kind of thinking is there behind the program?

Initially, the Food-for-Peace Program—which operates under Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act—was conceived of as a kind of “surplus disposal” plan. But its objectives have been broadened considerably in the last year and a half. We have come to realize that we can put America’s agricultural abundance to work to relieve hunger and improve nutrition throughout the world—and to contribute to world economic growth and security at the same time.

In 1961 exports under the program amounted to some \$1.5 billion, or approximately 30 percent of the total U.S. agricultural exports of \$5 billion. In volume, this adds up to about 60 billion pounds of U.S. commodities, principally wheat, corn, rice, and fats and oils. In Michigan, out of total agricultural exports of \$94.9 million in fiscal year 1962, almost 30 percent, or \$27.4 million, were shipped under the Food-for-Peace Program.

Africa ranks at the bottom among continents receiving Food-for-Peace assistance, but it has been receiving an increasingly larger share in the last 2 years. In fiscal year 1962, for example, our African food-for-peace program, excluding Egypt, amounted to \$163 million, which is almost 10 percent of the total worldwide program. I might point out here that the values of all of the program’s commodities are figured at Commodity Credit Corporation prices and do not reflect absolutely equivalent benefits in dollar expenditures.

We now have African programs under all four titles of Public Law 480, and an example or two of each may more meaningfully explain what we are trying to do under the program.

#### **Title I Programs**

An important segment of the Food-for-Peace Program is contained in title I of Public Law 480. Under this title, we can sell U.S. agricultural commodities abroad and accept payment in the currency of the importing country.

This part of the program also has a second

advantage. Much of the money paid to the United States under title I can be returned to the purchasing country in the form of loans or grants for schools, dams, roads, electric power, or other projects that can help speed the country’s development. In addition we can use some of this currency to defray the costs of our representatives abroad. Also some currency is used to support joint efforts of government and industry to develop larger commercial markets for U.S. farm products in foreign countries.

At the present time six African countries are participating in title I programs—Congo (Léopoldville), Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.

Guinea, for example, signed a title I agreement on February 2 of this year. At that time Guinea agreed to buy \$7.5 million worth of U.S. rice, wheat, edible oils, and other agricultural commodities over a 3-year period, in exchange for Guinean francs. Two subsequent amendments raised this agreement to \$10.67 million. Seventy-three percent of the proceeds from this sale will be loaned back to the Guinean Government for development of industry, agriculture, education, and public administration—projects agreed upon by both the United States and Guinea.

#### **Emergency Relief and Economic Development**

There are two principal uses to which America’s farm abundance is put under title II of the law—(1) emergency relief and (2) economic development.

In East Africa in the past year both floods and drought raised havoc with the natural food supply of many thousands of people. You may recall the airdrop of corn and dried milk in Tanganyika in May of this year, in which our Air Force worked around the clock in speeding food to famine-stricken areas of that country. In Kenya, too, more than \$5 million worth of corn, dried milk, and edible oil was sent into the country in the past year for famine relief. Our Air Force also airdropped supplies in Kenya.

Turning now to that section of title II under which food is used as an instrument of economic development, both Tunisia and Morocco are using U.S.-donated food for partial payment of wages on public works projects. We have a \$17.8 million work project agreement with Morocco under which

200,000 tons of U.S. wheat will be used by the Moroccan Government as partial wage payments for 200,000 workers employed in economic development projects. In Tunisia another 180,000 people employed on roads, irrigation, reforestation, and land conservation are being partially paid in U.S. wheat. Both Morocco and Tunisia pay part of the workers' wages in cash. The significant part of this program, however, is that it gives highly useful work to the unemployed—unemployed workers in Africa and unemployed foodstuffs in the United States.

#### **Distribution by Voluntary Agencies**

Under title III of Public Law 480, food supplies are made available for distribution abroad through U.S. voluntary agencies. Although the volume of total agricultural exports accounted for by these efforts is relatively small, the benefits from this approach are very great.

On my most recent trip to Africa, in April and May of this year, I had an opportunity to see some of these operations firsthand. I was greatly impressed with the effects of these voluntary programs and the dedication of the Americans distributing U.S. food in such places as Upper Volta, Dahomey, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo.

One of the most dramatic uses of both titles II and III of the Food-for-Peace Program is taking place in Algeria, where between one-third and one-half of that war-ravaged country's population of 10 million is in need of relief. A new food-for-work project in Algeria announced on Thursday of this week [August 30], together with an extension of direct relief, will raise the total value of U.S. food provided to Algerians since 1956 to \$73 million.

The new food-for-work project will provide \$11.5 million worth of surplus food as partial wages to workers in a reforestation project in northeastern Algeria. It is estimated that this project will provide subsistence to 93,000 persons. The increased relief program of food for direct distribution is valued at \$13.7 million.

The costs of the food and transportation under these projects will be paid for by the U.S. Government, but the distribution and handling is the responsibility of voluntary organizations—Church World Service, Catholic Relief Services, and the International Red Cross.

#### **Agreements Under Title IV**

The least known and thus far least used part of Public Law 480 is title IV, under which the United States can deliver surplus agricultural commodities over a number of years and be repaid in dollars over an extended period. Last April the first such agreement in Africa was signed with Liberia, and only 2 weeks ago one was signed with Ethiopia. Under the Liberian agreement, wheat, rice, and mixed livestock feeds valued at \$8.64 million will be provided to that country over a 3-year period and repayment will be made in dollars in 15 equal annual installments.

On balance, then, how effective is America's Food-for-Peace Program? Is it meeting its objectives and doing the job it was designed to do? Is it helping us to fulfill those aspirations of the American people that underlie our national policy—our interest in seeking a stable world and our deep and sincere concern for the welfare of people throughout the world?

I can see a resounding affirmative in the eyes and actions of an otherwise unemployed North African I met. This man was throwing all his strength and pride into running a pneumatic hammer on a country road work project. I can feel it in the lump that came into my throat as I watched central African schoolchildren line up to receive their milk, which came from boxes of dried milk proudly bearing the insignia of the United States of America.

#### **Difficulties of Program**

Before pointing out positive features, however, let me make clear that we are aware of the genuinely difficult problems related to Food-for-Peace. I would be less than frank if I didn't mention some of the program's difficulties.

First, this program is not a cure-all for our agricultural surplus problems.

Secondly, in administering this program abroad there are day-to-day practical problems. Distribution in recipient countries is a particularly thorny one. Furthermore, reasonable precautions must be taken to be sure that these programs do not interfere with normal patterns of commercial trade. We want this program to supplement rather than hinder the development of the world's agricultural countries. And again, traditional eating habits in many countries cannot be changed

overnight. Our surpluses may be completely unsatisfactory to people who have never tasted such food.

These are a few of the knotty problems connected with Food-for-Peace, and it is clear from them that our use of agricultural surpluses must be approached judiciously. Nevertheless, the stakes are so high—the urgent need to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and to solve some of the pressing difficulties of agriculture—that we must have the vision to accept these problems and try to surmount them.

#### **Food-for-Peace Welcomed in Africa**

On the positive side the program offers constructive outlets for surplus agricultural production without endangering our balance-of-payments position; it lowers the costs of surplus storage; it bolsters farm income; and it is improving business for our railroads, seaports, and shipping lines. Furthermore, it is showing the people of the world that farmers in our free democratic system can outproduce regimented Soviet farm workers by a ratio of 5 to 1. Our Food-for-Peace Program also is raising nutritional levels abroad, developing new markets for American agriculture, and assisting in the vital economic development of many new countries.

Perhaps most importantly of all, Food-for-Peace reaches large numbers of individuals in the recipient countries directly. This is one of the most personal of all our foreign aid programs. The African people know where these foodstuffs are coming from, and this is building a broad-based reservoir of good will for the United States.

In terms of how this program is received in Africa, we have evidence that it is widely and gratefully welcomed. On my recent trip, for example, I was personally thanked many times in Coquilhatville, in the Congo's Equateur Province, for the flood relief supplied under Ambassador [Edmund A.] Gullion's special fund. Following the airdrop in Tanganyika, the appreciation of the Tanganyikan people was widely reported in the press when they presented President Kennedy with a stuffed baby crocodile and a dugout canoe.

In Kenya, Masai tribesmen sent the President a shield and spear, and their spokesman said:

We are an insignificant people, but America is a big nation and probably the richest in the world. If she

chose, she could remain unconcerned. We are deeply touched by the generosity of your people. We believe the kindly action has no political bearing, and in it we can learn that even in the world of atomic bombs the simple and natural kindness of man to man still remains.

Now, what of the future of the Food-for-Peace Program?

This is a good program and will be with us for a long time. It is of great interest to the Congress. Based on discussions abroad and evaluations by the Department of Agriculture, we expect the program to expand and become increasingly effective in years ahead. We foresee more long-term arrangements under title IV as these operations become better understood. We see a broader variety of foods made available, and we see greater use of food to pay foreign workers on public works projects.

You on the Michigan Food for Peace Council and Regional Committee No. 2 have a unique opportunity to contribute materially to the program's future. You can give us advice on how to conduct the program and expert technical assistance on problems of production, storage, transportation, and distribution. You can arouse the interest and enthusiasm of civic groups and private citizens alike. You can select specific agricultural problems in particular countries and take on their solution as your personal projects to make the program more effective.

With your help the future of the Food-for-Peace Program takes on a very optimistic outlook—even though we realize the program in itself will not solve our farm problem, nor will it end the world's hunger and malnutrition. But it can make a major contribution toward an eventual solution of these problems and help speed the development of new and emerging nations—and this is a desirable goal that we can share with all people interested in world peace and stability.

#### **President Accepts Tariff Commission's Findings on Certain Imports**

White House press release dated August 27

The President on August 27 concurred with the recent reports of the U.S. Tariff Commission that no formal investigations should be instituted at this time to determine whether the existing restrictions on imports of watch movements and on imports of toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie could

be relaxed without resulting in serious injury to the domestic industries.

The President found, with the Tariff Commission, that there is not sufficient reason to reopen the escape-clause actions of July 27, 1954,<sup>1</sup> and of June 25, 1956,<sup>2</sup> which resulted in the withdrawal of concessions on watch movements, granted in a trade agreement with Switzerland, and on toweling of flax, hemp, or ramie, granted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, respectively.

The President's action was taken after consultation with the Trade Policy Committee. The Tariff Commission reports were made pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which requires periodic review of affirmative actions taken under the escape-clause provisions of trade agreements legislation. The Commission's reports were submitted to the President on July 25, 1962.

## President Seeks To End Price Inequity to U.S. Cotton Textile Industry

*Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release dated September 30

On May 2, 1961, I announced a seven-point program<sup>3</sup> designed to meet a wide range of problems facing the textile and apparel industry and its more than 2 million employees. The fourth of these seven measures directed the Department of Agriculture to explore and make recommendations to eliminate or offset the adverse differential in raw cotton costs between domestic and foreign textile producers.

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, I requested the Tariff Commission to make an immediate investigation under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.<sup>4</sup> The Commission has now made its report.

The Commission rejected the Department's recommendation for an import fee of 8½ cents a pound on the cotton content of textile imports to offset the difference between the cost of raw cotton to foreign mills and that which our mills are required by law to pay.

Thus the inequity of the two-price system of cotton costs remains as a unique burden upon the

American textile industry, for which a solution must be found in the near future.

I am therefore requesting the Department of Agriculture to give immediate attention to the formulation of a domestic program that would eliminate this inequity. I am also instructing all other departments and offices of the executive branch to cooperate fully to this end. Such a program will undoubtedly require enabling legislation.

Accordingly, between now and the next session of Congress, representatives of this administration will confer with appropriate congressional leaders and with spokesmen for all interested segments of the cotton industry, including various producer organizations and the textile mills. Based upon the results of these conferences and the recommendations of the Department of Agriculture, early in the next session of Congress I shall recommend legislation designed to remove the inequity created by the present two-price cotton system.

## Agreement Reached With Italy on Level of Cotton Velveteen Exports to U.S.

Press release 530 dated August 30

Through a recent exchange of notes<sup>1</sup> the Governments of the United States and of Italy have concluded an agreement concerning the level of imports into the United States of cotton velveteen fabrics exported from Italy. This agreement was undertaken pursuant to the Geneva cotton textile agreements.<sup>2</sup>

The Italian Government has agreed to restrain exports of this item during each calendar year from 1962 through 1967 to a level not exceeding 1.5 million square yards. The United States Government has agreed to consult with the Italian Government each year, upon the latter's request, in order to review market conditions in this country and to determine if the situation will permit imports from Italy in excess of the agreed figure.

This agreement supersedes a previous arrangement, in effect since 1957,<sup>3</sup> under which Italy has voluntarily controlled its exports of cotton velveteen to the United States.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>2</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1961, p. 337, and May 12, 1962, p. 431.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1957, p. 220.

## U.S. and Canada To Hold Further Talks on Softwood Lumber Industry

### *Joint Statement*

Press release 527 dated August 29

Officials of the United States and Canadian Governments today [August 29] concluded two days of discussions at Ottawa, Canada, on the present and future problems confronting the North American softwood lumber industries.<sup>1</sup> They examined the position with respect to forest resources, growth rates, employment and markets. They also examined other factors currently affecting the respective industries in the two countries and the outlook for the future, including a detailed discussion of the trade in lumber between the United States and Canada, imports into the United States, and the problems of the United States softwood lumber industry. During the consideration of the position of the softwood lumber industry in the United States, the United States officials drew attention to the program announced on July 26 by President Kennedy.<sup>2</sup>

It was agreed that both countries have a mutual interest in a satisfactory resolution of the problems facing the North American softwood lumber industries. It was further agreed that discussions will be resumed in the near future. In the meantime, the delegations will be reporting back to their respective Governments and consulting with their industries.

### **Technical Papers Due in January for Pan American Highway Congress**

The Department of State announced on September 7 (press release 541) that highway and traffic problems confronting all American nations will be the subject of special reports and technical papers to be presented at the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress, to be held at Washington, D.C., May 6 to 18, 1963. One hundred subjects are included in the draft agenda prepared by the Organizing Committee. They range from such

matters as regulation of size and weight of commercial vehicles, urban traffic congestion, uniform traffic laws, and control of billboards, to simplification of customs and entry regulations, according to Dr. Walter Kurylo, executive secretary of the Organizing Committee for the Congress.

Another subject to be further considered by the Highway Congress will be the Darien Gap—a stretch of some 450 miles which, with the completion of the Inter-American Highway to the Panama Canal, will remain the last obstacle to a continuous usable highway from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America. Planning the location for a highway through the parts of Panama and Colombia which constitute the Darien is complicated by the cloud cover which seriously interferes with aerial photography. Dense tropical jungles, mountains, rivers often swollen by tropical rains, and the many almost completely isolated areas to be traversed, will present a challenge to road designers and builders who eventually undertake this last task in providing an unbroken highway network for the Western Hemisphere.

Numerous technical papers on various subjects included in the draft agenda will be prepared by experienced specialists of the nations participating in the Congress.

A new incentive to authors is the opportunity to have their papers given special recognition. Each participating nation is being invited to establish a Committee on Technical Papers to review papers presented by its own citizens before the best papers are submitted to the Organizing Committee. By official decree the President of Colombia has already created such a committee. Appropriate recognition will be given to not more than three authors in each country for excellence of their papers. Similar recognition will be given for the outstanding paper considered by each of the technical committees of the Ninth Pan American Highway Congress. Special instructions as to the format of the papers and related details are being prepared for prospective authors. Prospective authors in Latin America may obtain these instructions from their national committees on technical papers or, in the event one has not been established in their country, from their national highway departments.

Another plan will help make technical papers valuable to interested persons. Each technical

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Sept. 3, 1962, p. 355.

<sup>2</sup> White House press release dated July 26.

paper is to be accompanied by a summary of not over 1,500 words, including findings, conclusions, and suggestions for consideration by the Highway Congress. The summaries will be available in the four official languages of the Congress: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish.

Papers should be prepared as soon as possible in order to provide sufficient time for their review in each country and later submission to the Organizing Committee at Washington, D.C., where all technical papers are due not later than January 7, 1963. Inquiries concerning the Highway Congress, its draft agenda, instructions concerning technical papers and related details should be directed to Dr. Walter Kurylo, executive secretary, Organizing Committee, Ninth Pan American Highway Congress, Room 1419, Office of International Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C., U.S.A. Telephone numbers: WUdley 3-2409 and DUdley 3-5946. Cable address: PANORCOM.<sup>1</sup>

## **Human Skills in Development Decade to Be Topic of Worldwide Conference**

*Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated September 1, 1962, release September 2

It is appropriate that on this day [Labor Day, September 3] dedicated to the contribution which the skills of American labor have made to our national development, I am able to announce the convening of an international conference devoted to the role of human skills in creating rapid economic progress for the developing countries.

Under the sponsorship of the Peace Corps, with the cooperation of the Departments of State and Labor and the Agency for International Development, the United States Government has invited more than 40 nations to a conference on "Human Skills in the Decade of Development (The Middle Level Manpower Approach)" to be held in Puerto Rico on October 10-12. Most of these nations will be represented by delegates of Cabinet rank. Our own delegation will be headed by the Vice Presi-

dent and will include the Secretaries of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare.

I regard this conference as a milestone in the formulation of a strategy of economic development. In the last 15 years many nations and international agencies have been engaged in the task of supplying and training skilled manpower for the underdeveloped world. From this experience has come a heightened awareness of the critical importance of human skills in economic development.

Many recent studies, including surveys of the development of the United States, have indicated that human skills and technology are an even greater factor than capital investment in effecting a rapid transition to a developed economy. It is vital that we combine past international experience with new developments and knowledge in order to give urgent and intensive consideration to ways in which these critical human skills can be developed and modern technology applied to developing economies.

The particular focus of this conference will be on middle-level manpower, that range of skills lying between the unskilled laborer and the highly trained scientific skills such as doctors or engineers. It includes the nurses, teachers, construction foremen, and the hundreds of others whose talents can make possible the effective and productive use of a nation's resources. And there is no doubt that the techniques developed in this field will be immediately applicable to the entire range of a nation's manpower needs.

This will be one of the largest high-level conferences on any aspect of economic development held since World War II. It will be the first such conference involving the worldwide participation of both industrialized and developing countries. Since the impetus for this meeting came from the Peace Corps, those countries have been invited which are participating in Peace Corps programs or themselves have a tradition of volunteer services.

I am hopeful that from this meeting will emerge new techniques of assessing manpower needs, new methods of rapidly supplying and training skilled manpower for all the developing countries, and, perhaps most important, a vastly heightened and informed understanding of the critical role which human skills play in the great work of economic and social progress.

<sup>1</sup> For names of the members of the Committee on Technical Papers, which also serves as the National Committee on Technical Papers for the United States, see Department of State press release 541 dated Sept. 7.

## Supplementary Items for Agenda of 17th U.N. General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. A/5180

1. Advisory services in the field of human rights [Economic and Social Council resolution 889 (XXXIV) of 24 July 1962].
2. Implementation of the Supplementary Convention of 1956 on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery [Economic and Social Council resolution 890 (XXXIV) of 24 July 1962].
3. The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation [Economic and Social Council resolution 892 (XXXIV) of 26 July 1962].
4. Measures designed to promote among youth the ideals of peace, mutual respect and understanding between peoples [Economic and Social Council resolution 895 (XXXIV) of 27 July 1962].
5. The Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries [item proposed by the United Arab Republic (A/5162)].
6. Question of Hungary [item proposed by the United States of America (A/5164)].
7. Improvement of the methods of work of the General Assembly [item proposed by Tunisia (A/5165)].
8. The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa [item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen and Yugoslavia (A/5167 and Add. 1-3)]:
  - (a) Race conflict in South Africa;
  - (b) Treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistani origin in the Republic of South Africa.
9. Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the territory of British Guiana [item proposed by Venezuela (A/5168 and Add. 1)].
10. Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) [item proposed by the Secretary-General (A/5170 and Corr. 1)].

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on assistance to refugees from Algeria

<sup>1</sup> For the provisional agenda, see BULLETIN of AUG. 20, 1962, p. 306.

in Morocco and Tunisia. A/AC.96/100. May 14, 1962 15 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Chinese refugees in Hong Kong (summary of recent developments). A/AC.96/INF.8. May 15, 1962 22 pp.

Question of Southern Rhodesia. A/5124. May 21, 1962 26 pp.

Preparation and training of indigenous civil and technical cadres in non-self-governing territories. A/5125 May 23, 1962. 16 pp.

Report of the U.N. Commission for Ruanda-Urundi an addendum. A/5126 and Add. 1. May 30, 1962. 110 pp

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letter from the United States and the Soviet Union transmitting data on space launchings. A/AC.105/INF.7 June 1, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.8, June 22, 1962 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.9, June 25, 1962, 2 pp. A/AC.105/INF.11, July 13, 1962, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.12, August 1, 1962, 2 pp.

Manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. A/5129. June 6, 1962. 3 pp

Letter dated June 6, 1962, from the Soviet acting permanent representative to the Acting Secretary-General of nuclear tests. A/5130. June 6, 1962. 6 pp.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Report on the seventh session of the Executive Committee at Geneva May 14-22, 1962. A/AC.96 170. June 8, 1962. 36 pp.

Interim report by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees on the operation for the repatriation of Algerian refugees. A/5132. June 11, 1962. 5 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Report of the legal sub-committee on the work of its first session May 28-June 20, 1962. A/AC.105/6. July 9, 1962 15 pp.

Letter dated July 11, 1962, from the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary-General on nuclear testing A/5135. July 16, 1962. 2 pp.

### Economic and Social Council

Replies of governments and international organization on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. E/3593/Add. 1, April 11, 1962, 343 pp.; Add. 2 May 4, 1962, 16 pp. and Add. 3, May 24, 1962, 4 pp.

Survey on the organization and functioning of abstraction services in the various branches of science and technology. E/3618. April 24, 1962. 264 pp.

U.N. assistance for the advancement of women in developing countries. E/3598/Add. 1. April 30, 1962. 12 pp

General review of the development, coordination, concentration of the economic, social, and human right programs and activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as a whole. E/3625. May 5, 1962 90 pp.

Economic Commission for Africa. Report of the expert group meeting on the organization and administration of social welfare services. E/CN.14/169. May 7, 1962 52 pp.

Question of holding an international conference on international trade problems. E/3631. May 10, 1962 41 pp.

Programs in the field of public administration in the United Nations and specialized agencies. E/3630. May 7, 1962. 102 pp.

Provisional agenda for the 34th session of the Economic and Social Council. E/3622. May 17, 1962. 16 pp.

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Eight on programs of technical cooperation. E/3639. May 21, 1962. 29 pp

Sixth progress report on the plight of victims of so-called scientific experiments in Nazi concentration camps E/3640. May 21, 1962. 8 pp.

Proposals for action on the U.N. Development Decade E/3643, May 22, 1962. 164 pp.; Add. 1, May 22, 1962 97 pp.; and Add. 2, June 1, 1962, 74 pp.



## Communications Satellite Act Signed by President

*Remarks by President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>*

I am today signing H.R. 11040, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.

By enacting this legislation, Congress has taken a step of historic importance. It promises significant benefits to our own people and to the whole world. Its purpose is to establish a commercial communications system utilizing space satellites which will serve our needs and those of other countries and contribute to world peace and understanding. This objective is to be accomplished through the joint efforts of private individuals and concerns, and agencies of the Federal Government.

The satellite corporation authorized by the act will establish and operate the United States portion of the new communications system. In a few days I will send to the Senate for confirmation a list of the incorporators of this enterprise.

The statute provides many safeguards to protect the public interest. No single company or group will have the power to dominate the corporation. The general public, the communications industry, and the Federal Government all will have a voice. All will contribute their resources, and all may reasonably hope to benefit. In this way, the vigor of our competitive free enterprise system will be effectively used in a challenging new activity on the frontier of space.

The benefits which a satellite system should make possible within a few years will stem largely from a vastly increased capacity to exchange information cheaply and reliably with all parts of the world by telephone, telegraph, radio, and television. The ultimate result will be to encour-

age and facilitate world trade, education, entertainment, and many kinds of professional, political, and personal discourse which are essential to healthy human relationships and international understanding.

Better and less expensive communications, like better and less expensive transportation, are vital elements in the march of civilization. This legislation will, by advancing the peaceful and productive use of space, help to accelerate that march, and I extend appreciation to the Members of Congress who worked so hard to secure passage of a very effective piece of legislation.

## Department Supports Friendship Treaty With Luxembourg

*Statement by Philip H. Trezise  
Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I am appearing before the committee in support of the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg (Senate Ex. B).<sup>2</sup> This treaty is another unit in the series of commercial treaties that the Department of State has been negotiating since 1946. It constitutes the 22d treaty that has been negotiated in this series. It conforms to the general pattern of treaties of the class, many examples of which have been before the committee in recent years. Their broad objectives are the same: to encourage investment and commerce, and to provide an agreed basis for the protection of American citizens, their property and other interests in foreign countries, with reciprocal rights for the other country's citizens in the United States. Their provisions, including specifically those of the Luxembourg treaty, contain no new commitments that raise problems as to their effect upon domestic law.

This is the first treaty of its type that has been concluded between the United States and Luxem-

<sup>1</sup> Made on Aug. 31 upon the signing of H.R. 11040, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (White House press release). For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Aug. 6 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during hearings on the bill, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1962, p. 315.

<sup>2</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 7 (press release 544).

<sup>3</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 437.

bourg. It is significant, therefore, in that it adds a new country to the list of those that have endorsed the standards of fair treatment that form the principal content of a United States commercial treaty. But it is also a treaty of friendship which expresses the intent of the two parties to cooperate to achieve mutual economic advancement.

When this treaty enters into force, the United States will have completed its network of such treaties with the members of the European Economic Community. Through these treaties, we will have established a virtually uniform system of legal rules governing general economic relations with the EEC countries. United States business enterprises will thereby be assured rights of entry and establishment within each and be enabled to carry on a wide range of commercial and industrial activities on terms of competitive equality with enterprises of the country and of the other members of the Community.

The main features of the treaty with Luxembourg were described in the report of the Secretary of State that accompanies the treaty, and I shall not attempt a detailed outline in this statement. I shall refer to one or two matters, however. This treaty closely resembles the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Belgium,<sup>3</sup> which was favorably reported upon by the committee last session. In fact, it was modeled upon that treaty, because of the very close relations maintained between Belgium and Luxembourg. As in the case of the Belgian treaty, the provisions usually included in our commercial treaties with respect to trade in goods were omitted. This followed from the position of Luxembourg, as of several other of the EEC countries, that long-term commitments on trade with nonmembers should not be made. Since Luxembourg is a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, we did not consider new commitments in this field essential. Because Luxembourg lacks direct access to the ocean, the treaty contains a very limited provision on navigation, which merely assures against flag discrimination on the ocean voyage in trade between the two countries.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1961, p. 383, and Sept. 18, 1961, p. 495.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

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Higher Interest Rates on Time Deposits of Foreign Governments. Hearings before the House Banking and Currency Committee on H.R. 12080, a bill to permit domestic banks to pay interest on time deposits of foreign governments at rates differing from those applicable to domestic depositors. July 10-18, 1962. 156 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

Acceptance deposited: United Arab Republic, August 30, 1962.

##### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accessions deposited: Hungary (with a reservation), July 30, 1962; Venezuela (with reservations), May 11, 1962.

Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Cyprus, July 6, 1962; Senegal (with a declaration), July 13, 1962.

##### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

Accession deposited: Mauritania, July 16, 1962.

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620 and 4894.

Signature and acceptance: Morocco, August 30, 1962.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961.

Extension to: Netherlands Antilles, July 20, 1962.

##### Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

Acceptance deposited: Guinea, July 12, 1962.

##### Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

Cessation of application to: Jamaica, August 6, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

September 24, 1962

### Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Acceptances deposited: Ghana, July 24, 1962; Israel, July 27, 1962.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), July 25, 1962; Ghana, July 24, 1962; Israel, July 27, 1962.

#### BILATERAL

##### Japan

Agreement for the return of 18 patrol frigates loaned to Japan under the Charter Party Agreement of November 12, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2714 and 3977), and for their grant to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962.

##### Nepal

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Katmandu August 24, 1962. Entered into force August 24, 1962.

##### Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 7 and 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962.

##### Paraguay

Agreement concerning the furnishing of assistance by the United States to Paraguay for the purpose of increasing the air transport capability of the Paraguayan Air Force. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción August 25, 1962. Entered into force August 25, 1962.

##### Sweden

Amendment to the agreement of January 18, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3477, 3775, and 4035), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 20, 1962.

Entered into force: September 6, 1962.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on August 31 confirmed the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be Ambassador to France. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 11.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

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Agreement with Chile. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santiago March 29 and August 12, 1961. Entered into force August 12, 1961.

**Peace Corps Program.** TIAS 4843. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Malaya. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kuala Lumpur September 4, 1961. Entered into force September 4, 1961.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4844. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with the United Arab Republic—Signed at Cairo September 2, 1961. Entered into force September 2, 1961. With exchanges of notes.

**Commission for Educational Exchange.** TIAS 4845. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Nepal—Signed at Kathmandu June 9, 1961. Entered into force June 9, 1961.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4846. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Indonesia, amending the agreement of November 5, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta September 8, 1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

**Trade—Agreement Supplementary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.** TIAS 4847. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Sweden—Signed at Washington September 15, 1961. Entered into force September 15, 1961. With exchange of notes.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with the Agreement of December 23, 1955, and Payment of Adjustment Refunds.** TIAS 4848. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn May 19 and August 24, 1961. Entered into force August 24, 1961.

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** TIAS 4849. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Norway, amending Annex C to the Agreement of January 27, 1959. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo August 17 and 30, 1961. Entered into force August 30, 1961.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4850. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreement of June 3, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade July 1, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1961.

**Saint Lawrence Seaway—Dredging of Wolfe Island Cut in the St. Lawrence River.** TIAS 4851. Map, 3 pp. 20¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa October 17, 1961. Entered into force October 17, 1961.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4852. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with Pakistan—Signed at Karachi October 14, 1961. Entered into force October 14, 1961. With exchange of notes.

**Caribbean Organization.** TIAS 4853. 53 pp. 20¢.

Agreement, with annexed statute, with France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington June 21, 1960. Entered into force September 6, 1961. And Joint Declaration—Signed at San Juan September 6, 1961.

**Air Service—Lease of Equipment.** TIAS 4854. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, extending the agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn August 14 and September 11, 1961. Entered into force September 11, 1961. Operative retroactively August 2, 1961.

**Weather Stations—Betio Island.** TIAS 4855. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with the United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 26, 1961. Entered into force September 26, 1961.

**Defense—Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) Facility at Cape Dyer.** TIAS 4856. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa September 19 and 23, 1961. Entered into force September 23, 1961.

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Agreement with Australia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington September 13 and October 2, 1961. Entered into force October 2, 1961.

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Agreement with Liberia, supplementing the agreement of August 13, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia August 8 and 15, 1960. Entered into force August 15, 1960. And amending agreement effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia July 11 and 24, 1961. Entered into force July 24, 1961.

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Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa September 27, 1961. Entered into force September 27, 1961.

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Agreement with Paraguay—Signed at Asunción July 7, 1961. Entered into force July 7, 1961. With exchanges of notes.



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INTER-AMERICAN EFFORTS  
TO RELIEVE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS  
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE  
1959-1960

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