



SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPT  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
RSB DEC -6-

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)



the  
Department  
of  
State

*Fact Sheet*—SOUTHEAST ASIA

The countries of Southeast Asia are the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Kingdom of Laos, the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

This 16-page leaflet, illustrated with a map of Southeast Asia, describes the land and the people, their political and economic development, their battle to retain independence in the face of continuous Communist pressures, and the importance of this area to the free world.

Publication 7473

10 cents

Africa's Unfinished Struggle  
for Freedom: The Real Issues

A 16-page leaflet containing an address by Robert C. Good, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for African Affairs, Department of State, in which the following issues are discussed: The establishment of a new basis of relations with the former colonial power; the building of the new state; the creation of a new system of states in independent Africa; the relationship of Africa to the East-West struggle, and the problem of expanding the rights of the populations in the southern third of Africa.

Publication 7490

10 cents

*Order Form*

To: Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me the following copies:

\_\_\_\_\_ *Fact Sheet—SOUTHEAST ASIA*

Publication 7473 10 cents

\_\_\_\_\_ *Africa's Unfinished Struggle  
for Freedom: The Real Issues*

Publication 7490 10 cents

Enclosed find:

\$.....  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Name: .....

Street Address: .....

City, Zone, and State: .....



Doc Ac

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1240

April 1, 1963

**SECRETARY RUSK ADDRESSES ADVERTISING COUNCIL . . . . . 467**

**U.S. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SAFEGUARDED TEST BAN TREATY ● *Statement by Secretary Rusk* . . . . . 485**

**A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND ARMS CONTROL ● *by Jacob D. Beam* . . . . . 489**

**THE TRADE EXPANSION PROGRAM ● *by Philip H. Trezise* . . . . . 497**

**THE UNITED NATIONS IN CRISIS: CUBA AND THE CONGO ● *by Richard N. Gardner* . . . . . 477**

**SUMMARY OF U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAM OF AID TO THE CONGO . . . . . 481**

*For index see inside back cover*

AL  
Y RECORD  
D STATES  
EGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1240 • PUBLICATION 75

April 1, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council

*Secretary Rusk spoke informally before the annual conference of the Advertising Council in Washington on March 12. Following is the text of his remarks, together with an introduction by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, and the transcript of a question-and-answer period.*

Press release 126 dated March 13

### INTRODUCTION BY MR. BUNDY

Although Mr. Webb [James E. Webb, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration] spoke as if one of the great commitments of working in outer space was that we might find extraterrestrial population, my own thought, as I think of what confronts our next speaker, is that one of our very considerable advantages is the shortage of people in space.

I once heard a description of the very great problems confronting us in dealing with a particularly recalcitrant country in another continent, and a whole series of recommendations were put forward. Finally, in a desperate way, the chairman asked if no one had a really more sweeping solution, and the answer which came from the back of the room was, "Yes, sir, to place the entire area under 8 feet of water for 4 minutes." (Laughter.)

This prescription is not readily available in most of the Secretary's dealings with our international neighbors.

It's impossible to exaggerate the responsibilities which are carried by the Department of State and, at the head of the Department of State, by the Secretary. It's very difficult to exaggerate the honor and respect in which this Secretary is held by those among our friends

and in this country who know most about the conduct of our foreign affairs.

So it is for me a great pleasure to present to you Secretary Rusk.

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. Bundy and gentlemen: It's very gratifying indeed to have a chance to be with you again this year. I should like at the very beginning to express my appreciation for your "Challenge to Americans" campaign, which you have been involved with for this past year. Because implicit in this theme of your campaign is a deep-seated faith that the American people will indeed rise to the challenge that confronts them, and the rest of the world, and do so with courage and good sense.

This very interesting and, I think, remarkable pamphlet on this theme which you have published<sup>1</sup> points out in the most helpful way the practical ways and means by which the individual citizen can do his part to help the newly emerging peoples to help themselves, to advance human welfare through science and technology, to add to the constructive work of international cooperative efforts, combat the forces of totalitarianism, and give new impetus to our own continuing American revolution.

I am going to make a few very informal remarks before your questions and do so by commenting on three or four somewhat disconnected problems with which we are now confronted.

We are indeed in a great struggle, a great

---

<sup>1</sup> *Challenge to Americans: The Struggle We Face and How To Help Win It*, available upon request from The Advertising Council, Inc., 25 W. 45th St., New York 36, N.Y.

struggle for freedom. But this is not a new struggle.

Freedom was born in courage and sacrifice. And it has flourished and has grown through commitment and dedication and effort. And that is no less so today than it was a hundred years ago, or even three hundred years ago.

The stakes today are what they have always been, a struggle between those who want to erect a society, both national and international, founded broadly on the notion of consent, on the one side, and those who would want to impose a world of coercion, both nationally and internationally.

In that great struggle there are not basically three forces, two sets of allies and neutrals. The great issue internationally is whether we shall have the kind of world sketched out in the United Nations Charter or whether we shall have a world under the structure of a world Communist revolution. And on that, it's a case of the Communist bloc against all the rest. And all the rest have deep feelings on it, great strength, and great determination.

But this is a struggle which cannot be won easily or cheaply. We hear, sitting where we do, from time to time, questions being raised, complaints being made that somehow the free world, and we in this country, are not pursuing a policy of winning.

Well, let me point out that if we want to win we do not make deep cuts in our defense budget, that if we want to win we do not abandon our foreign aid. If we want to win we support a rapidly expanding international trade system. And if we want to win we do not abandon the United Nations to our enemies and withdraw because they don't agree with us 100 percent of the time, say, rather than 98 percent of the time.

We don't win by quitting. And I would hope that those who are most insistent upon winning would throw their effort and their strength and their dedication behind the means which it takes to win this great struggle for freedom.

There is no free-lunch counter here. It's not going to be easy; it's not going to be cheap. It means dedication, sacrifice, effort, and this means also cash, a lot of cash for defense and foreign aid and for our information programs and all the other things that cost money in this great struggle.

I'd like to make just a few comments about the framework of some of the discussions now going on in the North Atlantic community.

### **The North Atlantic Community**

Let me set aside for the moment a discussion which is largely intra-European in character, as to whether the future Europe should be organized, as President de Gaulle apparently prefers, as a Europe of fatherlands, or whether it should be organized as a highly integrated Europe. That question is primarily European in character and one which is not for us to decide.

But let me comment rather on the transatlantic aspect of some of our recent discussions, particularly those that are concerned with the participation in the control of nuclear weapons, the multilateral force.

Since World War II the United States has inherited an enormous responsibility in the nuclear field. No one elected us to that role; no one by conscious political act voted that we should carry that responsibility. This adherence to the role which we had to play as a nation developing nuclear weapons, after the tragic failure of the Baruch proposals back in 1946.

Now, since 1955 and '56 and '57, a new element has come into the situation. Before those dates, for all practical purposes, the United States had an atomic monopoly of effective delivery systems able to deliver these weapons almost any part of the earth. But in the mid-fifties the Soviet Union acquired a large and effective delivery capability against the West, primarily against Western Europe but also deeply serious as far as our own country concerned.

Now, under those conditions of nuclear competition, the possibilities of a genuine nuclear exchange, then in a special sense the life and death of nations became involved in the nuclear decisions. In a Europe which is reviving, which feels its new strength, which is becoming more and more involved in the great policy decisions that affect the entire world, it is entirely understandable that they themselves would wish to play a larger role in the decisions which affect their own national future.

We have tried to meet that in two or three different ways. In the first place, during the



last year we have tried to provide our NATO allies a great deal more essential information about the nuclear problem than they had had before—our own nuclear situation, the nuclear situation of the Soviet Union, the technical and the financial and the operational problems connected with the presence and the employment of nuclear weapons.

I think that has been very helpful in giving our friends in the alliance the basic data on which they can think hard and seriously about these questions. But we also have had the feeling from them that they would like a greater degree of participation in the actual decisions, in the actual management of at least a portion of these forces. I emphasize "participation" rather than "independence" because independence for Europe necessarily involves independence for the United States, and that is not being opposed.

But participation in the consideration of the policy issues involved is a very important factor. And so we have been saying to our friends

in Europe, "If you would like to change the existing situation with respect to determining nuclear policy, then we would be glad to have your proposals."

#### **Proposals for Multilateral Force**

Those proposals were not forthcoming. And therefore we took the next step, and we have said to them, "Now, here is an approach by which we think you might be able to participate more actively and as full equals in this nuclear problem." And so we have laid out, in sketch form, arrangements for a multilateral force, which would give those of our NATO allies who wish to do so a chance to participate with us in an important nuclear force within NATO.

Now, let me say that this process involves a certain nervousness on the part of public opinion in one or another country and perhaps just a little nervousness on the part of certain governments. Because we have been so used to American leadership that it would normally be expected that we would come out with a complete blueprint, complete in every detail. But bear in mind that the issue here is sharing that leadership with our NATO allies. Therefore, we would not be in keeping with the whole pur-

pose of the exercise for us to come forward with a finished plan in every detail and say to them, "Take it or leave it."

Secondly, here is a case where there is an opportunity for the most genuine consultation from the very inception of an idea and a joint and common construction of a possible change in the NATO arrangements. Now, this is not again too easy, because people are more accustomed to reacting to proposals than they are to sitting down and actually helping to construct those proposals. But this is what we are up to at the present time. We are saying to our European friends, "If you would like to join with us in a multilateral force in NATO, in which we would have mixed manning, a sea-borne force, and control of that force by the participants, here is a way we can do it. It's going to be costly, and here is what it would cost. And we would like to get your reactions and your countersuggestions if you in fact are seriously interested in these matters."

We are pleased that there has been expressed a very strong interest on the part of several members of NATO in pursuing these discussions further. But I want to emphasize that this is a common, joint effort and not a question in which we, the United States, are saying to our NATO allies, "Here is something that we think you must take, and this is the way it has got to be."

We are saying to them, "You come in, sit down with us, let's work at this and see if we can't come out of it with a more genuine partnership than we have had thus far in these nuclear matters."

#### **Some Comments on Cuba**

Anticipating, perhaps, one or two of your questions, I'd like to make some comments on Cuba. (Laughter.)

The objective of the hemisphere and of the United States with respect to Cuba must be—and it is—the return of a free Cuba to this hemisphere. On this the hemisphere is unanimous. The foreign ministers themselves unanimously have stated this as the central theme of hemisphere policy toward that island.

Now, we are discovering with regard to Cuba that, having failed to take the steps that might

have prevented in years past the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba, the problem of finding a cure is more difficult. (And let me say parenthetically that this factor alone gives highest priority to an effective and vigorous Alliance for Progress program throughout the hemisphere, because we must anticipate and try to prevent these situations, because the cure becomes so much more difficult.)

Well, let me remind you of some of the elements in the policy and action which are now being pursued with respect to Cuba, because we seldom see these more or less put together all in one place.

It has been made very clear that under no circumstances can the United States accept or tolerate the reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and that, if that should occur, the crisis of last October would look relatively trivial compared to the crisis that would be engendered by any such fresh episode of that sort.

Secondly, it has been made very clear that the armed forces of the hemisphere, including our own, are made available to insure that arms that are now in Cuba not be used outside of Cuba, either in terms of organized effort or through piecemeal infiltration of those arms into other countries of the hemisphere. And the most diligent efforts are being made by us and others to insure that there is not that kind of surreptitious arms traffic in this hemisphere, a policy accepted unanimously by the OAS long since.

Third, we must keep taking a look at Cuba to assure ourselves as well as we can about what is going on in that island—a surveillance which we feel, and which we are confident, is thoroughly based upon the OAS structure and the OAS resolutions, but a surveillance which we believe is necessary under all the circumstances.

Fourth, to protect the free and active use of international waters and airspace in the general vicinity of Cuba and to enforce that use by armed force, if necessary.

Then we have felt, along with many other of our allies, that the kind of Cuban regime that we have today not only is not fit to participate as a regime in the activities of the inter-American system but that, with its declaration

of subversive and other types of war upon the hemisphere, it is not entitled to normal economic or other relations with the free world.

And so there has been a systematic discussion with other governments about the restriction of trade between the free world and Cuba and about the restriction of shipping between the free world and Cuba.

The statistics on both of those show a dramatic decline in the economic relationships between Cuba and the rest of the free world. I think we will find that 1963 will almost surely result in almost complete isolation of Cuba from the free world in such transactions.

Then we have the continued problem of the degree of penetration of the rest of the hemisphere coming through Cuba or leaning upon Cuba in terms of subversive effort, the flow of funds, the training of individuals from other countries in Cuba to be returned for nefarious purposes back to their own country. This is a problem which technically is difficult because of the legal and constitutional problems in existence in some countries but nevertheless is a matter of highest priority among the countries, particularly in the Caribbean area at the present time, and very substantial gains are being made in that respect.

We must look forward to a time when the Soviet military elements are out of Cuba. The penetration of this hemisphere by Marxist-Leninism is itself incompatible with the hemisphere and its commitments.

The presence of Soviet forces in this hemisphere cannot be accepted as a part of the normal situation in this hemisphere. Now, the missiles have gone out; the bombers have gone out; Soviet forces have been moving out.

We will have, I think, a more complete report on just what this amounts to sometime after the middle of the month, because of the recent indication from the Soviet Union that they were taking out several thousand of them before the end of the month. But the continual outflow of Soviet military personnel itself must be and is an object of policy.

In other words, the actions that are being taken include, I think, the actions that can reasonably be taken under all the circumstances short of the actual launching of an armed

tack upon Cuba, which is not a part of our policy at the present time.

That is an action which is easy to think of and in a certain highly theoretical sense is always easy to employ. But this type of action involves costs and risks which have to be related not only to the degree of the threat which exists in Cuba but also to problems for which we are responsible in other parts of the world.

Now, this is about where we are. I think the situation in Cuba is making it clear to the Cuban people that this present course is not a course on which they can find a fit future for themselves. And it's making it very clear also to the rest of the hemisphere that Castroism does not hold within itself any promise for the economical and social development of the people of this hemisphere.

#### **Finding Elements of Common Interest**

I would like in closing, before I come to your questions, to comment on one other point. That is that despite the tensions, despite the enormous diversity of purpose between ourselves and the Soviet Union, despite all of the effort and the struggle in which we are involved in this great underlying crisis about the shape of the world community, it is important, nevertheless, for us to try to find elements of common interest with the Soviet Union in order to discover whether bridges might not be thrown across, along which some elements of peace can be gradually built. We owe it to ourselves and to the human race to keep in touch on those possibilities.

For example, there are fields in which cooperation between us is in our common interest simply because we are both frail human beings caught in a hostile physical environment. Some of the great forces of nature in the field of disease and the attacks upon food crops and things of that sort, where what happens in one part of the world is a danger to events in another part of the world—there are elements of common interest which might support some growing cooperation in these scientific and technical medical fields.

We have supposed that it was possible that in the nuclear testing field there might be also a common interest recognized on both sides

which could provide the basis for an agreement to end nuclear testing. Objectively considered, one would suppose that the Soviet Union shares with us the view that it would be a misfortune if a nuclear race should go on indefinitely and without limit, not only because it involves great burdens and billions upon billions of additional resources thrown into the arms race but because over time, looking out ahead into the future, one sees the possibility of a chanciness, of unpredictability, of growing dangers, of increasing complexity, of increasing difficulty of just human management of weapons systems of such speed and sophistication, so that there might be a common interest on both sides in bringing this matter to a conclusion.

Unfortunately I would have to report today that the prospects do not appear very good that we can move on to a nuclear test ban treaty. I think that, to the extent that the argument turns on inspection, to a certain extent the argument is somewhat unbalanced. If you put yourself in the position of the Soviet Union, looking at the United States, from their point of view they do not need much international machinery to assure themselves that we are not testing. We have an open society. Information of this and other types is rather easy to obtain. They must have learned by now that we find it very difficult ourselves to keep secrets on such matters.

But they, looking at us, might well judge that we can get reasonable assurance out of the existing situation which they describe as national systems, perhaps 98 percent open society, perhaps 2 percent special intelligence activities on their side. But, in any event, the combination gives them reasonable assurance.

From our point of view, looking at the Soviet Union, this is not possible. A closed society, occupying a vast landmass in Eurasia, much of it sparsely populated, requires a degree of instrumentation and physical presence—human presence—from time to time in order to check up on indications that tests might in fact be taking place. So we have to have a testing procedure which will give us reasonable assurance that the treaty is not being violated.

Well now, we are at the present time hung up, not just on the number of inspections. We

are hung up on all the rest of the treaty which specifies what kinds of inspections you would in fact have. We have indicated that we would be ready to set the number aside in order to make our conversations more relevant by talking about what it is we are trying to number, to get down and work out the details as to what kind of data would stimulate a request for an inspection, how large an area would be subject to inspection, who would be the inspectors, how the inspectors would know that they were actually on the spot designated for inspection—questions of that sort which are highly relevant, indeed crucial, to any inspection system. Because one or two hundred inspections which were inadequate would not be as good as seven or eight inspections which were fully adequate in all details that make the difference. But we have had no indication of progress in the last several weeks on this matter, and I would suppose on that at the present time that the prospect for progress is somewhat slow.

Well now, I think these are comments which might form the basis for, or perhaps stimulate, some questions. I'd be glad to take your questions at this time. Thank you.

#### QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

*Mr. Bundy:* The Secretary will take the questions direct.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Rusk:* Yes?

*Q. If the Soviets know that we are not going to war over Cuba—we have practically told them that, I gather—what incentive is there for them to get their troops out? Why should they take them out, in other words?*

A. Well, there were some highly dangerous elements in the Cuba situation today that continue to be there. The necessity for surveillance could lead to a very dangerous situation very quickly.

*Q. On their part, you mean?*

A. If there were any interruption with our surveillance, if Soviet forces in Cuba were to take action against Cubans, that could create a very dangerous situation. If there were any

forays mounting from Cuba against neighboring countries, that could create a very dangerous situation. In other words, this is not a comfortable and easy situation in which we are at the present time. And so I would not suppose that there is a stability and a certainty about it on either side to any extent.

Now, if the threat is sufficiently great, the risks to be taken to meet that threat have to be great as well. Back in October there were very great threats in preparation against the United States. And the maximum risk was taken back in October. Let me say that the decision taken on October 21 and 22<sup>2</sup> may in retrospect look simple and easy. I can assure you that at the time it was taken, at a time when you could not know for sure what would happen, this was by no means an easy and simple decision. It was the gravest decision I think any President of the United States has made in decades.

But if the risks are great, that is, if the threat is great, the necessary steps would have to be taken and the risk would have to be accepted accordingly. We do not judge that the present situation requires that kind of operation at the present time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we have some—we know that there are some substantial Communist activities in Venezuela, Colombia, and other South American countries. Do we have any assurance that there will not be a Castro-type leader take over some of these countries?*

A. Well, I think this is a primary necessity and a primary objective of policy and action in the rest of Latin America, including those countries that you just mentioned, that we must take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the arrival in any other country of a Marxist-Leninist regime of the Castro type. There is no question about it: we are working very closely, indeed, with the authorities of the countries involved to see what has to be done to assure that this does not happen.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes, sir.

*Q. In the recent listing of czarist treaties that were unfair to China, that just came out*

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.



*of Peking. was the United States involved historically in any of those agreements?*

A. I would have to check that. I'm afraid your question caught me without research at the moment. I don't believe that those particular border treaties involved the United States. But I'd have to verify that.

#### **Shipping Between Cuba and Free World**

*Q. Do we currently have a quarantine or blockade of Cuba? And if so, what is its nature?*

A. We do not have a quarantine of the sort that stops ships on the high seas. What is happening is that there is a progressive and very sharp reduction in normal economic or shipping relations between Cuba and the free world. For example, in the month of January there were 12 free-world ships in the Cuban trade and most of those were on long-term charter to the Soviet bloc.

What has been happening is that our friends abroad, including the maritime nations, have themselves been taking action voluntarily and in many situations through private discussions rather than through official action, because in some countries there is an absence of law on the subject, to get their ships out of the Cuban trade. And this has been moving very rapidly, and I would suppose that it will continue to go down in the calendar year 1963. It is now only a trickle.

*Q. Mr. Rusk?*

A. Yes, sir?

*Q. What do you estimate it is costing the Soviet Union to keep the Cuban economy afloat and the regime too?*

A. I have seen the estimate of a million dollars a day. I think that minimum. I think as the situation in Cuba continues to deteriorate with the sharp drop in their sugar crop this year and the multiplying factor of spare-parts shortages and things of that sort, my guess is that this will be increasingly expensive and this is one of the strains which may point to an opportunity to get this problem solved at some later stage.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes?

*Q. Does Cuba get its oil from any source other than Russia?*

A. I understand that there is no free-world oil in the Cuba trade. If there is any, it is the most trivial quantity. They get their oil from the Soviet Union at the present time. Yes, sir?

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that one of the policies of the OAS is to prevent the flow of arms from Cuba—*

A. Right.

*Q. —and other people being trained in Cuba to act in these countries. How can we determine there is no flow without inspection or a blockade?*

A. Well, there are occasional reports, for example, that ships proceeding from Cuba to a Latin American port to pick up a load of something for return to, say, Europe and even to the bloc, might have on board arms. Well, those ships are carefully inspected, and we have not yet found any one of them that have been alleged to have been carrying arms to have any arms on board. But it's not too difficult to check out that kind of report, and we check out all those we can possibly get. We are watching that very carefully.

*Q. Mr. Rusk, can you envisage the structure of the political party that would replace Castro if such a thing occurred?*

A. I think one could not spell that out in detail. One of the difficulties is that the anti-Castro Cubans are themselves diversified, broken up into many factions, and have not fully pulled themselves together in a unified front. At the time that he visited the Cuban brigade in Miami the President urged them to do their best to get together as a solid group,<sup>3</sup> but this has been very difficult for political reasons, and that I suppose one can understand.

But nevertheless it would be very important if the anti-Castro Cubans could work toward a solid front, not only outside Cuba, say, in this country and in the rest of the hemisphere, but

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1963, p. 88.

also to provide a more dynamic leadership of the people still inside Cuba. You see, we have had already now upward of 600,000 people in Cuba who have indicated they want to leave. In terms of voting with your feet, this voting is very persuasive testimony about the general attitude of many Cubans toward the regime there.

Now, about a hundred thousand of those are in this country. We would like to see as much cohesion as possible among them because in the future this cohesion could be very important.

*Q. Sir, could you venture a guess as to how long the so-called Castro regime would remain in power?*

A. No, sir, I wouldn't want to predict that. (Laughter.) I would like to be able to predict it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that a serious acceleration of the sabotage efforts in Latin America directed from Cuba might be considered an equivalent of military interference?*

A. Well, it depends upon the method, the degree, and the ability to demonstrate conclusively that there was the action that was stimulated out of Cuba, directed toward a particular country. I would think that there would come a point where that would be the equivalent of the kind of violation of the Rio Pact that would require additional measures against Cuba.

Yes, sir?

#### **Question of "No-invasion Pledge"**

*Q. Sir, on the no-invasion pledge or lack of a no-invasion pledge, could you clarify it? Because amongst people there seems to be confusion as to whether there is a no-invasion pledge of any type or not. Are you in a position to get that clear to any of us now? Perhaps there is; perhaps there isn't. But under certain circumstances it might change on that. Is there any way to clarify it so that we know?*

A. Well, I would urge you first to turn back at your first opportunity and read the President's November 20th press conference on that point.<sup>4</sup> Let me say that there have been no

<sup>4</sup>For text of a statement read by the President, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.

commitments made that have not been made public on this point. Had we been able to get any agreement with the Soviet Union on all of the qualifications of policy with respect to the future, there might have been an agreement announced at the United Nations in the course of January.

For example, we can't make a commitment that would cut across the Rio Treaty. We can't make a commitment that would cut across the Guantanamo Treaty. We can't make a commitment that would expose the rest of the hemisphere to penetration or assault or subversion from Cuba. It is the present policy of the United States not to invade Cuba for reasons that the President and others have indicated. But this is not in a sense, and has not been, any unqualified commitment without reference to the conduct of Cuba in this hemisphere and Cuba's status as a threat in the hemisphere.

President Kennedy pointed out November 20th that, if Cuba is determined to live at peace, there could be peace in the Caribbean, but Castro's speeches in early January didn't sound like living at peace in the Caribbean, you see.

So I would refer you to his press conference of November 20, which was the most authoritative word on that, and say that nothing has been said privately that has not been said publicly on this point and that the basic treaty instructions and obligations of the hemisphere remain intact.

*Q. Thank you.*

A. Yes, sir?

*Q. It was reported there was a guerrilla movement between Mexico and Cuba. How can you possibly start the building up of numbers of trained saboteurs and guerrillas who are continually reporting back to the respective countries?*

A. Well, in the first place, the general passenger traffic to and from Mexico and Cuba has been sharply reduced in recent weeks—the number of flights, the actual movement of people—and a good many of those have been people on diplomatic or other business of a more formal and official kind.

But this is a troublesome question for a number of Latin American countries, some of whom

ave constitutions that prevent them from interfering with the so-called right to travel. And what has sometimes happened is that people from other Latin American countries would come to Mexico on their normal papers from their own countries and get in touch with an agent of Cuba somehow and get special papers on which he would find his way to Cuba and then come back to Mexico, pick up his normal papers, and go back home; and his country of origin could not know where he had been in the process.

Now, it's not easy to control this travel of individuals because there are hundreds of thousands of people in travel status. So there are some serious technical problems involved. But I think we are making some very substantial headway on it, and I think this is going to be a decreasing problem.

Yes, sir?

#### **The Middle East**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the situation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq?*

A. Well, I would prefer at the moment not to offer any interpretation of what has been happening in Syria because it is a little early yet to particularly offer any public examination of that situation. We have recognized the Syrian Government<sup>5</sup> because it appeared to us that it was in control of the situation and had committed itself to its own international obligations, and so forth.

I think our deepest concern at the moment in the Middle East is to try to get the countries of the Middle East to disengage themselves from the Yemen and to leave the Yemenis alone to work out their own solution in their own country. Because there is a situation which could pit these neighboring countries against each other and lead to rapid escalation of violence that could endanger the entire area.

So we would like very much to see the neighboring countries disengaged from the Yemen and leave the Yemenis alone. And I think that would reduce the tension considerably in the weeks immediately ahead. Otherwise I would

think that we do not see in the Baghdad and Damascus situations any indication of explosion. It seems to be stabilizing, and there seems to be a prospect that things will shake down without too much difficulty.

*Mr. Bundy:* Gentlemen, the Secretary promised us a half hour. He has very generously given us 40 minutes, full measure and more. It's very much worth it, but I think we should let him go.

#### **U.S. Rejects Soviet Charge of Firing on Trawler**

*Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the alleged firing on a Soviet trawler by U.S. Navy ships.*

#### **U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 14<sup>1</sup>**

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of note No. 9 from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated March 12, 1963 expressing serious concern over a reported firing by United States Navy ships on a Soviet refrigerator-trawler (SRTR-9007) March 8, 1963 approximately 70 miles east of Norfolk, Virginia. A thorough investigation was initiated immediately upon the receipt of the Embassy's note with the following results.

The position given in the Embassy's note for the location of the Soviet vessel at the time of the alleged incident lies well within an established and recognized United States Navy operations area used for many years for gunnery and other exercises by ships of the United States Navy. On March 8, 1963, there were in this operations area six United States Navy destroyers which engaged in gunnery exercises during the course of the day. The destroyer nearest the location of the alleged incident within the indicated time period conducted anti-aircraft firing practice (against a target towed by an airplane) in an easterly and westerly direction with ammunition having a maximum

---

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on Mar. 14 (press release 134 dated Mar. 15).

<sup>5</sup> See p. 476.

range of seven miles while the destroyer was ten miles southwest of the location of the alleged incident. Before and during the firing practice, clearance of the range was established in accordance with normal safety procedures and no other surface vessels were within twelve miles of the destroyer at the time of firing. At no time did this destroyer or any other United States naval vessel in the general area engage in any firing when any surface vessel or aircraft could be endangered. No cruisers were among the United States Navy vessels in the area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*Washington, March 14, 1963.*

### SOVIET NOTE OF MARCH 12

Unofficial translation  
No. 9

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to state the following upon instructions from the Soviet Government.

According to information received, on March 8 of this year two American "Boston" class cruisers and a "Franks" class destroyer fired upon a Soviet refrigerator trawler (SRTR-9007), which was fishing in the open sea. At the moment of the firing the Soviet trawler was located 70 miles east of Norfolk (at 36°53.3' North, 74°58' West).

At 12:15<sup>2</sup> the American warships fired two dummy shells towards the trawler from a distance of 5 miles. The shells fell approximately 130 meters from the vessel. Then at 12:50, approaching to a distance of about 1 kilometer, they fired two more dummy shells, which fell 60 meters from the trawler. By their actions, the American warships created a threat to the safety of the Soviet trawler and its crew.

The Soviet Government cannot regard the firing upon of a fishing vessel of the U.S.S.R. by ships of the Navy of the U.S.A. otherwise than as a crude violation of the generally-recognized standards of international law, the principles of freedom of navigation in the open sea, and as an undisguised arbitrary act which can lead to serious consequences.

The Soviet Government protests to the Government of the United States of America on the occasion of the above actions of provocation by American warships, expects that those guilty will be punished, and that the necessary measures will also be taken for the barring of similar actions in the future.

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1963.*

To the Department of State  
of the United States of America,  
Washington.

<sup>2</sup> No time zone indicated—translator's note.

## U.S. Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alaskan Airspace

*Following is the text of a note delivered on March 16 by Ambassador Foy D. Kohler at Moscow to Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vassily Kuznetsov.*

Press release 138 dated March 16

It has been established that two Soviet reconnaissance aircraft violated United States airspace over Alaska on March 15, 1963. The first of these entered United States air space at 59° 52 minutes North 163° West at 0705 Z departing at 60° 18 minutes North 166° 40 minute West at 0730 Z. The second entered United States air space at 59° 50 minutes North 163° 10 minutes West at 0713 Z departing at 61° 10 minutes North 165° 40 minutes West at 0734 Z. Both planes then flew off in the direction of the Soviet Union. The United States Government protests these overflights of United States territory by Soviet aircraft and expects that the Soviet Government will take all necessary measures to prevent any repetition.

## U.S. Recognizes Government of Syrian Arab Republic

*Department Statement*

Press release 125 dated March 12

The United States Government, taking note of the affirmation by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic of its intention to honor its international obligations, has today [March 12] decided to recognize the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and has instructed its Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus to confirm this decision in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic.

With its recognition the United States extends its best wishes for success and prosperity of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and its hopes that the traditional ties of friendship between the American and Syrian people will be expanded and strengthened.

It is expected that Ambassador [Ridgway B.] Knight, who is in the United States on consultation, will return to his post after a short leave.



## The United Nations in Crisis: Cuba and the Congo

by Richard N. Gardner

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>

I don't know which group causes us the most trouble in Washington these days—the unceritcal admirers of the United Nations or the uncritical opponents of the United Nations.

When I say uncritical admirers of the United Nations, I mean those people who are always writing us to say: "Naughty boys—you have bypassed the U.N." They want the United Nations to do *everything*.

These people remind me of the tribal chief who came to the General Assembly some years ago to complain that the British were oppressing him because they would not let him keep his 100 wives. One veteran U.N. delegate rose to his full dignity and said: "This is not a fit subject for the United Nations. Let this man keep his 100 wives—and let the ravages of nature teach him the error of his ways!"

The uncritical opponents of the United Nations are those who are never satisfied, no matter what the U.N. does. I have in mind one critic who wrote me 3 months ago to say that the United Nations was a failure because it was too weak to deal with Tshombe [Moïse Tshombe, President of Katanga Province]. Now he is writing to complain that the U.N. is too strong and has become a "superstate."

Like the uncritical admirers, the uncritical opponents of the U.N. feel under no obligation to base their opinions on facts. As Stephen Leacock said: "It's not what people *don't* know that causes all the trouble; it's what they *do* know that ain't so."

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the 1963 Mid-Atlantic Model General Assembly at Washington, D.C., on Feb. 23 (press release 99 dated Feb. 22).

We in Washington try to steer a course between these two extremes. We look upon the United Nations in a hard and practical way as a means of promoting our national self-interest. This statement should not shock anyone, because this is the way that other countries look upon the United Nations—as a means of promoting their own national self-interest.

The United Nations is not a substitute for national interest but rather a place where nations work together to promote their national interests on those matters where they cannot get adequate results by acting alone.

These general observations are familiar to you. Let us test them in two of the great crises of the last year: Cuba and the Congo.

### The Cuban Crisis

The Cuban crisis was a particularly eloquent illustration of the U.N.'s threefold value to the United States as a place for debate, negotiation, and action—once the power and determination of the United States and its allies had been demonstrated in the quarantine.<sup>2</sup>

As a place for *debate*, the United Nations enabled us to build support for our Cuban policy in the most dramatic and effective way.<sup>3</sup> You will all remember what Mr. Zorin [Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet representative to the U.N.] said

<sup>2</sup> For an address by President Kennedy and text of a proclamation on the interdiction of the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715 and 717.

<sup>3</sup> For statements made in the Security Council by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson on Oct. 23 and 25, 1962, see *ibid.*, p. 723.

before millions on TV—that the Soviets had no need to put missiles into Cuba and that the U.S. evidence of the missile sites was manufactured by the CIA. We countered by showing pictures of the missile sites in the Security Council. Shortly thereafter Khrushchev admitted the presence of the missiles and agreed to withdraw them.<sup>4</sup>

This public exposure of Soviet duplicity had a tremendous impact in building support for the quarantine and other aspects of our Cuban policy. Even though the Cuban matter was considered in the Security Council, it affected the course of the General Assembly and turned the general opinion of mankind in our favor on a number of other subjects. We could not have achieved this result with anything like such success if we had been obliged to show our pictures and tell our story separately in 109 different countries.

As a place for *negotiation*, the United Nations was scarcely less important to us. The Secretary-General served as a useful go-between in negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To begin with, he helped avoid an armed clash at sea between the Soviets and ourselves when he proposed that Soviet ships stay clear of our quarantine fleet. If the Soviets needed an “out,” they could find it in responding to a U.N. appeal and not admitting publicly they were responding to United States power.

As a place for *action*, the United Nations demonstrated its potential for the future. Khrushchev agreed to U.N. inspection on the spot. He could never have agreed to U.S. inspection. Then Castro refused and branded Communist Cuba as unwilling to cooperate with the world peace organization.

The fact that the United Nations was willing and able to perform the inspection role in Cuba and that this was agreed to between the United States and the Soviet Union had a twofold value: The United Nations demonstrated a potential of considerable importance for the future, and Castro was put in the position of defying not just U.S. inspection but U.N. inspection, thereby leaving inspection to our own resources.

<sup>4</sup> For exchanges of messages between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see *ibid.*, p. 741.

### Legality of U.N. Action in the Congo

Let us turn now from Cuba to the Congo. Some people still ask: What is the United Nations doing in the Congo, and why is the United States supporting it?

To answer this question it is useful to recall the choice that confronted the United States in the Congo in the summer of 1960. The alternatives open to the United States were clear.

We could do nothing—in which case the Congo would wallow in chaos and bloodshed and the Soviet bloc would be free to move in to pick up the remains.

We could intervene directly—and trigger a confrontation in the heart of Africa of the great powers, a confrontation which could lead to another “Spanish civil war” and be the prelude to a wider conflict.

Or we could do what we in fact did—give assistance to the Congo through the United Nations.

I think the judgment of history will be that the use of the United Nations in the Congo was the least dangerous of the three dangerous alternatives confronting the United States and the world at large in the summer of 1960.

Most Americans recognize the merit of these arguments. Yet a number of specific questions about the Congo are still raised.

Some people ask: Was the United Nations action in the Congo legal? The answer is yes for three reasons:

First, the Government of the Congo asked for the United Nations to come in.

Second, the Security Council authorized the U.N. to go in with a mandate to maintain law and order—a mandate which was subsequently expanded into a mandate to prevent civil war, protect the Congo’s territorial integrity, and remove the foreign mercenaries.<sup>5</sup>

Third, the military actions of the U.N. Forces were taken in pursuit of these mandates and in self-defense.

It is well to remember that the recent fighting which culminated in the end of the secession of Katanga began on Christmas Eve, when

<sup>5</sup> For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.* Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 384; Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359; and Dec. 25, 1961, p. 1061.

drunken Katangese soldiers attacked a U.N. command post. This was the culmination of a long series of harassments of the U.N. soldiers designed to cut them off from one another and from their supplies and communications.

I think it is a generally accepted principle of both domestic and international law that a cop who is lawfully on the beat has a right to defend himself against attack.

As a part of this legal question, there are people who ask: Isn't this intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo? The answer is no again, for at least two reasons:

First, the Congo asked for the U.N. to come in.

Second, this was not an internal matter—there was a clear threat to international peace and security because of the actual or potential involvement of outside powers.

Still other people ask: Doesn't this violate traditional United States support for the principle of self-determination? The answer is no, for at least three reasons:

First, there is no absolute principle of self-determination. We fought a civil war to deny it. We have recognized both at home and abroad the dangers of Balkanization. Suppose the mayor of a Texas town which happened to have most of the oil in Texas decided to secede from the State and take the oil with him. I don't suppose that would be permitted by the people of Texas or by the people of the United States. The application of the principle of self-determination in the Congo without any qualification would mean the creation of some 20 tribal states and the disintegration of the whole into disorder and chaos.

Second, even according to the standards of self-determination, Tshombe could not pretend to speak for the Katanga. As you know, he was the leader of the Lunda tribe, one of several tribes in Katanga. The Lundas are a minority in numbers and occupy less than half of the land area of Katanga. Tshombe is strongly opposed by the Baluba tribe in the north. In the only popular election in Katanga his party gained only 25 seats in a 60-seat Assembly. The parliamentary group which supported him during the last 2 years was a rump parliament lacking full Baluba representation. We may

also note that the United Nations forces were greeted with open arms when they entered Jadotville and Kolwezi in the heart of Tshombe's tribal area.

Third, Tshombe was stopped from pleading the principle of self-determination when he agreed to accept a single Congolese state. He did this at the Brussels roundtable conference of January 1960 before the Belgians left. He has done it on numerous occasions since. He did it as recently as last fall, when he accepted the conciliation plan of the United Nations.

There are people who will concede all these things but say: Very well, but where will this United Nations business stop? Isn't the Congo a precedent for the U.N. going into Mississippi?

The answer is no again, for three reasons:

First, we would not ask the United Nations to come into Mississippi.

Second, if others insisted on bringing the U.N. into Mississippi, we could prevent this from getting the necessary votes.

Third, by no stretch of the imagination can the situation in Mississippi be regarded as a threat to international peace and security.

Finally, there are those who are satisfied on these legal and moral questions but ask: Wouldn't our national interest have been served better by supporting Tshombe? The answer is no, because:

—The Central Government under Adoula is moderate and pro-Western.

—Tshombe supporters have been working with the leftists to destroy the Central Government.

—Tshombe had no support in Black Africa and very little anywhere else. No country has ever recognized Katanga separatism.

—The secession of Katanga under Tshombe would have ended moderate government in the Congo and would have precipitated the disintegration of the country into tribal groupings with maximum opportunity for the Communists to come in.

In short, the efforts of Tshombe to set up a separate regime in Katanga played into the hands of communism.

Now the military phase of the U.N. Operation in the Congo has passed. The phase of nation building has begun. A U.S. mission to the

Congo under Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, has just returned with proposals for the economic reconstruction of the Congo under U.N. auspices.<sup>6</sup> In the economic tasks ahead for the Congo the United Nations can play a role which no single nation could play alone without compromising Congolese independence and making the Congo a subject of cold-war controversy.

#### **U.S. Position on U.N. Special Fund**

The moral of this story is not that the United Nations is perfect. Indeed, there are a number of things that are done at the U.N. with which we do not agree. During the last 2 weeks we have had a dramatic illustration of this in the decision of the U.N. Special Fund to proceed—albeit on a tentative basis—with an agricultural research project in Cuba.

This project was approved by the Governing Council of the Special Fund in May 1961. It calls for an allocation of \$1,157,000 from the Special Fund to assist in the expansion of an agricultural experimental station in Santiago de las Vegas.

The United States Government did everything consistent with the U.N. Charter to oppose this project.<sup>7</sup> We oppose any source of aid and comfort to the Castro regime. We argued that Special Fund assistance to Cuba at this time could not be justified under the economic and technical criteria of the Special Fund's charter, in view of the chaos in Cuban agriculture which has resulted from the application of Communist techniques and the subordination of the economic and social welfare of the Cuban people to the narrow political aims of the Castro regime.

Our arguments, I am sorry to say, did not receive the necessary support in the Governing Council. Mr. Paul Hoffman, the Managing Director of the Fund, concluded that he had no choice but to proceed with the project on a tentative basis. In the next few months he will send several experts to determine whether

or not conditions in Cuba will permit the project to proceed, and it is possible that the actual operation of the project will not go forward when representatives of the Fund have the opportunity to take an up-to-date reading of conditions on the spot.

The Special Fund project in Cuba is an example of a U.N. action with which we do not agree. But it is well in these matters to keep our eyes on the big picture. The Special Fund, like all U.N. economic agencies, is prohibited by its charter from making decisions on political grounds. The failure of other U.N. members to support us in our opposition to the Cuban project came not out of any solicitude for Cuba but out of the fear that stopping this project would jeopardize other projects to which the Soviet Union and other countries have objected. The Special Fund has 11 projects, totaling \$7.5 million, in Korea, Viet-Nam, and free China which the Soviets do not like—and which are being carried out today despite their misgivings.

The fact is that the U.N. Special Fund has been a great asset to the free world through its efforts to promote the material basis for free institutions. Even on the narrowest of political calculations the free world has got more out of the Special Fund than it has put in, while the reverse is true of the Communist bloc. The bloc countries have contributed some \$7 million to the Special Fund; with this project in Cuba added to two previous projects in Poland they will have received \$3 million in return. If you add Yugoslavia, Communist contributions add up to \$8 million, projects in Communist countries to \$6 million. Out of the 288 Special Fund projects so far authorized, 282 have been in non-Communist countries. In financial terms, some \$248 million of the grand total of \$254 million of Fund projects—over 97 percent—go to the non-Communist world.

It would be tragic if our dissatisfaction with the project in Cuba were to destroy our support for the Special Fund. It would be the height of folly to sacrifice the 97 percent of its work we do like for the 3 percent we do not like. We do not bench a baseball player who is batting .970 nor fire a football coach because he loses 1 game in 30.

<sup>6</sup> For a summary of U.S. recommendations for a program of international assistance to the Congo, see p. 481.

<sup>7</sup> For statements by Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gardner regarding the U.S. position on the project, see BULLETIN of Mar. 11, 1963, p. 357.



The price of participating in any political institution is that you cannot get your way all of the time. We cannot expect to get our way all of the time in the United Nations. There will be entries on the debit as well as on the credit side of the ledger. The central question is whether the credits exceed the debits—whether, looking at the balance sheet as a whole, the institution is making a net contribution to our national interest. The United States Government continues to believe that the answer to that question is overwhelmingly in the affirmative.

#### **Need To Strengthen the U.N.**

Let me stress once again, however, that we are not entirely satisfied with the United Nations. We want to make it *better*.

In specific terms, we want to:

—Strengthen the independence of the Secretariat against the attacks of the Soviet Union, who have never accepted article 100 in principle or in practice.

—Improve the method of financing peacekeeping operations and make defaulting members pay up.<sup>8</sup>

—Increase the efficiency of the U.N.'s economic and social work, particularly through more effective coordination of the specialized agencies.

—Strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to settle future disputes: first, through preventive diplomacy to keep disputes from erupting into violence; and second, through peacekeeping actions to contain those disputes from widening into a global conflict.

In this last ambition we must learn from the Congo experience to strengthen the U.N.'s future peacekeeping operations. We must improve the training, supply, financing, intelligence, public relations, and command and control of U.N. military operations.

We want to do these latter things not only for their own sake but as a means of promoting general and complete disarmament. For the fact is that nations will never be willing to elim-

inate or even radically reduce their arms until they have some substitute means of protecting their territorial integrity and defending their vital interests.

In an age when the Soviet Union and the United States have in their arsenals weapons each of which has the destructive power of all the bombs dropped in the Second World War, in an age when we face the prospect that no matter how many weapons one side might build neither side could escape unimaginable destruction in a nuclear holocaust—in such an age there is no rational alternative but to develop a civilized system of collective security under the aegis of the United Nations.

In Cuba, in the Congo, and elsewhere the United Nations has acted—in the words of a distinguished commentator—not as a world superstate but as a world public utility. If it did not exist, it would have to be invented.

#### **Summary of U.S. Recommendations for Program of Aid to the Congo**

*In current discussions with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, officials of the United Nations, and other interested countries, the United States is considering the question of future forms of assistance to the Congo. On February 21 Secretary Rusk submitted to President Kennedy a report on U.S. recommendations for a program of international assistance to the Congo prepared by a planning group headed by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs. Following is a summary of the report, which was released by the Department on March 1 (press release 109).*

The Congo is a paradox: staggering problems in the present, and impressive prospects in the future.

The United Nations has already made a very great contribution to the future. There is a large reservoir of good will toward the United States, the product of our general African policy, our support of the United Nations and the Central Government in Léopoldville, and our close working relations with other governments

<sup>8</sup> For a statement released by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on Mar. 6, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443.

interested in the Congo's welfare in spite of policy differences from time to time. The Congo has maintained its independence despite efforts of subversion and secession. Such threats continue, but, on balance, the Congo is going the way of free choice and not coercion; we should not neglect the next necessary steps to help it stay on that course.

As it enters the nation-building phase of its young life, the Republic of the Congo appears to face three key obstacles to progress:

- A political system which is in the developing stage and requires increased executive powers and the capability to discharge such responsibility;

- A relatively expensive military establishment that does not yet function in full response to the country's needs;

- A financial administration which collects too little revenue and does not yet have dependable budgetary controls.

More than on external aid, success of a nation-building effort in the Congo depends on developing the administrative capacity to rehabilitate the national army, bring the fiscal system under control, and construct a political system featuring a strong executive. If these prerequisites can be met, the Congo should no longer require substantial outside aid in a few years' time, for its resources are great and its population relatively small.

## II.

The relevant portions of the U Thant Plan<sup>1</sup> for national reconciliation have been largely fulfilled and partly bypassed by the events of December 1962 and January 1963.

What is needed now is an agenda for nation-building in the Congo, including as one part the knotting of the loose ends of Katanga's reintegration.

One point of the U Thant Plan which awaits further action is the constitution. But a new, Federal Constitution for the Congo will necessarily depend on the parliamentary situation. Meanwhile, a *de facto* federalism is actually developing in the Congo.

- An executive amnesty for political crimes has already been announced for Tshombe

[Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] and his colleagues:

- The integration of the currency is well under way and can be speeded up;

- Parts of the Katangan gendarmerie are being integrated by unit or individual applications to the ANC;

- Katanga's "foreign affairs" establishment is to be formally disestablished; and

- Arrangements to bring the Conakat Party into the Central Government are being considered.

## III.

One of the most critical tasks facing the Congo is to bring military expenditures under control and to raise the Congolese National Army (ANC) to a higher degree of efficiency and discipline. Plans already suggested for a multinational training program based on a reduced but more effective army, plus an adequate air and naval capability, offer excellent prospects if they can be put into effect.

Multinational assistance to the Congolese Government in the military field should be coordinated under an acceptable arrangement between the Congolese Government, the United Nations and the nations concerned. This will permit the establishment of a national military aid pattern allowing several countries to help. Our own assistance, if requested, would primarily take the form of logistics support.

A civic action survey is needed to help plan an economic development role for the ANC and to consider how discharged veterans might best be employed.

The Congolese Government's desire to assure its authority in Katanga against the day when the United Nations will be pulled out must be met.

The requirements of a training program for provincial and municipal police are being given urgent consideration. It is encouraging that offers of assistance have also been forthcoming for this task.

United States policy favors the most rapid possible phase-out of the ONUC [United

<sup>1</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add. 13 (annex I) and Corr. 1.

[Nations Operation in the Congo] Force consistent with the increasing capability of the Congolese Government to maintain minimum levels of security and insure its national integrity. It would, however, be dangerous to phase out the ONUC Force so rapidly as to leave an "internal security gap" before the adequate national security forces are trained, for insecurity in the Congo would invite unacceptable foreign intervention.

## IV.

Domestic harmony in the Congo nation will crucially depend this year on the value of the money in which soldiers are paid and the provincial governments are financed. Just as you cannot do business without ensuring internal security, you cannot have growth without sound money.

In spite of growing production and rising exports, the Congo suffers from severe inflation. The actual market value of Congolese currency is about one-fourth the legal rate.

A well-financed, well-coordinated and well-staffed stabilization program including effective budgetary procedures, spending controls, tax collection and differential exchange rates is required. Unless this is done, the Congo may be faced with runaway inflation. The additional requirement is to obtain enough external resources to maintain minimum levels of essential imports, finance necessary expatriate technicians, and service the external debt.

To move toward stabilization, the Congo will require:

- A strong administration in the Ministry of Finance and provision for this purpose of a substantial number of foreign technicians to assist in the Ministry of Finance;

- Husbanding of military expenditures;

- A special effort to make the most effective use of the sums available for education;

- Assurance through foreign aid of a minimum level of essential imports. This should help to meet the inflation problem.

- Launching a public works program to reduce unemployment, rehabilitate the vital transportation network, and build constructive ties between the Central Government and provincial and local governments.

Other nations can do much, and we should encourage them to do more.

The Belgians already support 2,000 technicians, teachers, judges, and public administrators. They also will be continuing to make other payments, including the service on Congolese debts.

Belgian assistance in the financing of imports would be an important contribution, and we hope substantial assistance of this kind will be made available.

We expect that the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany will also wish to participate in assisting the Congo. The economic development fund of the European Economic Community (EEC) may provide substantial assistance over the next few years.

A dozen other countries are potential small contributors to a plan for nation-building in the Congo. The nation-building effort can be particularly stimulated by contributions from non-European countries.

The United States should endeavor to:

- Continue P.L. 480 food sales as required to assist the supply of food to the Congo.

Although some direct aid will be required to finance imports, we can aim at putting a rapidly increasing portion of this aid on a loan basis, in view of the basically strong potential of the Congolese economy. Loans will be especially appropriate for equipment and spare parts in the transportation sector.

- Continue support of the United Nations Congo Fund but shift the emphasis to such priority sectors as public financing, and try to assure that other donors finance at least half of the fund;

- Secure adequate assurances about the spending of aid-generated local currencies available for economic development, public works and budget support, and their use in support of a vigorous stabilization strategy;

- Continue a Development Grant program operated under the United Nations umbrella and reoriented to emphasize activities directly in support of stabilization and internal security objectives.

## VI.

The presence in the Congo's future of several large contributors, and several additional smaller ones, requires the multilateral coordination of bilateral efforts, both in retraining the ANC and in stabilizing and developing the Congolese economy.

A competition of purely bilateral aid is not only inefficient but risks importing the Cold War into the Congo. A creative combination of bilateral aid and multilateral coordination is what is needed to conduct an effective, well-integrated program.

The United Nations should provide the Central Government with direct technical aid in the areas of greatest national importance—that is, in internal security matters, the control of foreign exchange, the coordination of external aid and the administration of the public finances.

We should help the United Nations to find additional high-level talent for these purposes.

The technical work done by Specialized Agency teams in education, health, food and agriculture, manpower training, meteorology, telecommunications and airport management is useful, and generally of good quality and high repute. The United Nations Secretariat should continue to take the responsibility for the supervision and the coordination of these activities in the field. But they should be increasingly funded after 1963 from the Special Fund, the Expanded Technical Assistance Program, or the Specialized Agencies' budgets themselves.

We understand it is the desire of the Government of the Congo that the United Nations should serve as general coordinator for all bilateral aid to the Congo's economic development. This role will involve:

(a) providing top personnel to help the Government of the Congo coordinate external aid from all sources for all purposes;

(b) reviewing each proposed bilateral program to make sure that it fits within a framework agreed between the Government of the Congo and the United Nations; and

(c) participating directly in decisions about the use of some important development aid, as is now the case in the allocation of local currency generated from P.L. 480 imports.

The contributors to the reconstruction task in the Congo should consult on the types of aid needed in assuring a rational and fair distribution of the assistance effort.

The question of the future financing of the United Nations peace-keeping activities in the Congo is being considered in the Committee of 21<sup>2</sup> and is not being treated in this paper.

It is our hope that the maximum number of countries will find it possible to assist the Republic of the Congo as it enters the important nation-building phase of its development.

### **Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. Delegation to CENTO Meeting**

The Department of State announced on March 13 (press release 131) that Secretary Rusk will head the U.S. observer delegation to the 11th meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization, to be held at Karachi, Pakistan, April 30–May 1. En route the Secretary will make brief visits in Ankara and Tehran for talks with government leaders. Following the CENTO Council meeting Secretary Rusk will pay a brief visit to New Delhi prior to his return to the United States.

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of a General Assembly resolution on financing peacekeeping operations, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37; for a U.S. statement of Mar. 6, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443.

## U.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman, I am very glad to have this opportunity to talk with the committee today about a most important aspect of our foreign policy, our long-continued effort to achieve agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban treaty.

Since the summer of 1958 the United States Government has consistently adhered to the view that a safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons testing would be in our national interest. Periodic policy reviews in the light of shifting patterns of foreign policy, of changes in the negotiating situation, and of technical developments have always produced the same answer: that an effective test ban treaty is in our national interest.

Indeed, it is worth recalling that in 1945-46, at the very birth of the nuclear age, it was clearly perceived that a nuclear arms race would create the greatest dangers for all mankind. Consequently, President Truman directed the most serious and diligent effort to prevent such a race by bringing atomic energy under international control. Unhappily, the Baruch proposals did not succeed.

Today, I would like to discuss a nuclear test ban with you from the standpoint of our relations with the Soviet bloc and with countries outside the bloc, including our allies. I would also like to discuss what I believe to be the basic requirements for a nuclear test ban treaty to be effective. For it is clear that an illusory set of obligations on this sensitive subject ought never to be entered into by the United States.

In my judgment, the conclusion of an effective nuclear test ban treaty would have three advantages of primary importance in our relations with the Soviet Union.

*First*, a nuclear test ban treaty would constitute a significant step in the direction of slackening the pace of the arms race. Once this step had been taken with satisfactory results, new opportunities for further steps toward turning the arms race downward might well be more within the realm of reality than at present. For the past 16 years during which the cold war has been waged we have experienced the effect of an almost unlimited arms race on our national security and on our position in relation to the Soviet Union in the world arena. Although our position has been preserved and Communist aggression has been effectively deterred to a large extent by the buildup and deployment of our military forces, our security in that position has not necessarily been improved. Indeed, our military position might well be more secure today if we had successfully achieved agreement on a test ban treaty several years ago, earlier in the negotiations.

Because of the extensive history of past negotiations on this particular question, the narrowing of the issues that has resulted from these negotiations, and the worldwide interest, I believe that this problem may be more ripe for solution than perhaps any other first step in the arms control and disarmament field. It is clear that unless at some point we are able to step off in a new direction, the upward spiral of the arms race will continue unabated. The prospects of such a future for both ourselves and the Soviet Union are not attractive.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 11.

*Second*, an effective nuclear test ban treaty would be to the military advantage of the United States. At the present time we feel confident in our nuclear capabilities. We have today a stockpile of nuclear weapons which ranges from a few tens of tons of TNT equivalent to many megatons. These weapons are useful for a variety of strategic and tactical uses. The Soviet Union has a stockpile of its own. In certain areas of the spectrum of explosive power, namely the extremely large yields, the Soviets have developed weapons for which I am informed we do not have a present military requirement. In other areas, namely in the development of intermediate and lower yield weapons, we believe that we have a more varied arsenal than the Soviet Union. The President and his chief national security advisers, including myself and the Secretary of Defense, believe it doubtful that either side would, through further testing, achieve major advances in any significant area which could be translated into a military advantage without the other side making either a similar or offsetting gain.

There is one proposition which we must keep in mind despite confidence and understandable national pride: Nature does not yield up its secrets with political favoritism. The list of Nobel Prize winners in the sciences over the past half century shows that major breakthroughs in knowledge come from many directions and have little to do with national frontiers. If our present assessment of the military situation is correct, and I believe it is, now would be an opportune time from our point of view for the conclusion of a treaty to halt further nuclear weapon testing.

The *third* primary advantage of an effective nuclear test ban treaty to the United States in relation to the Soviet bloc is a political one. I have repeatedly emphasized in my public statements in the United States and at the Geneva disarmament conference, and in previous statements before this committee, my conviction that disarmament and secrecy are incompatible. The Soviet Union has reasons of its own for its penchant for secrecy. Regardless of the merits of their case, however, it is clear that a closed society breeds suspicion and distrust on the part of other nations. Such

an atmosphere is not conducive to taking steps to treat the symptoms of international tensions or to come to grips with the causes of these tensions.

A nuclear test ban treaty would obviously not lift the veil of secrecy from the Soviet Union. It would not even result in any substantial opening up of Soviet society. It could, however, have a very important impact on the Soviet attitude toward secrecy, especially as it relates to problems of arms control and disarmament. The carrying out of on-site inspections on Soviet territory would provide the United States with not only the necessary assurance that unidentified seismic signals were not underground nuclear explosions but also additional advantages. If a test ban treaty can operate effectively and in ways which demonstrate that the inspection connected with it does not jeopardize Soviet security or result in any particular embarrassments to the Soviet Union and its people, then the Soviet leadership may be more inclined to enter into other similar agreements. The first step seems to be the most difficult. If it can be made successfully then further steps in the same direction might be taken with less difficulty than the first.

Therefore, in our relations with the Soviet Union I believe that a nuclear test ban treaty would have both political and military advantages. In addition, an effective nuclear test ban would have advantages in our relations with countries outside the Soviet bloc.

#### **Danger of Spread of Nuclear Weapons**

Among the dangers to the United States from continued testing by both sides I would consider the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons to other countries of perhaps primary importance. Unlimited testing by both the United States and the Soviet Union would substantially increase the likelihood that more and more nations would seek the dubious, but what some might consider prestigious, distinction of membership in the nuclear club. The risks to the security of the free world from nuclear capabilities coming within the grasp of governments substantially less stable than either the United States or the Soviet Union are grave indeed.

A test ban would not of itself solve the problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should be recognized that at least one present nuclear power and one power apparently bent on developing nuclear weapons might not be persuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty from the outset. However, many potential nuclear powers might at this stage be induced to accede to the treaty.

Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to further steps which would deal more directly with the proliferation problem. I am referring here to the possibility of an agreement on the one hand by the nuclear powers not to transfer control of weapons or to give assistance in weapons development to countries not already possessing them and, on the other, by the non-nuclear powers not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Another possibility would be an agreement to halt further production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and to transfer agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses. What should be emphasized here is that while a nuclear test ban by no means offers a total solution, it would be a necessary first step.

What I have just said is, I believe, applicable both to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons outside the North Atlantic alliance and to the problem of the development of additional national nuclear capabilities by NATO members. I believe that a nuclear test ban would be fully consistent with the possibilities for increased participation in the multilateral control of nuclear forces dedicated to NATO by our partners in the alliance.

#### **Problem of Fallout**

Of secondary, but nevertheless significant, importance is the problem of radioactive fallout. In large part because of real or assumed dangers from fallout, nuclear testing has become a key political issue in a great many countries around the world. Our relations with those countries are sometimes adversely affected when our tests produce fallout outside our own borders. On the other hand, our initiatives in seeking a test ban agreement have been well received by not only our allies but by the uncommitted countries.

I have pointed out what I believe to be the primary advantages to the United States in an effective nuclear test ban treaty in terms of our relations with the Soviet Union and with other countries around the world. However, I would like to make it clear that I believe there may also be advantages to the Soviet Union in a nuclear test ban.

A certain degree of mutuality of interest is an obvious prerequisite for any agreement.

I have stated that an effective nuclear test ban would be to the military advantage of the United States. This should not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union could at the same time have valid military reasons for entering into a nuclear test ban treaty with the intention of carrying it out. The United States and the Soviet Union have to date apparently pursued somewhat different objectives in their testing programs. This difference in emphasis appears attributable to different strategic concepts, as well as technological considerations. Therefore, while we may be assured that our own retaliatory capability in the event of nuclear attack is sufficient to deter such an attack, the Soviet Union could at the same time believe that it has a sufficient nuclear capability for its own security requirements without the need of further testing. Similarly, the possibility of the further spread of nuclear weapons is a legitimate concern not only to ourselves but to the Soviet Union as well.

#### **What Makes a Test Ban Effective**

I have thus far attempted to demonstrate why and how an effective nuclear test ban treaty would serve the foreign policy interests of the United States. I would now like to address the question of what makes a nuclear test ban treaty effective.

Three requirements are, in my judgment, basic to an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

First, the verification arrangements must provide an adequate deterrent to violation on the part of the Soviet Union. However, no verification system, no matter how elaborate or intrusive, could be foolproof. Therefore, the second requirement of an effective treaty is that the scope of any violation which might escape detection must not be so extensive that it would



substantially affect the military balance. Finally, a nuclear test ban treaty will be adhered to only so long as a mutuality of interest in the agreement persists. If the Soviet Union were ever to conclude that a test ban were no longer in its interests, we can be sure that the Soviet leadership would not hesitate to abrogate the treaty and resume testing. Therefore, an effective test ban treaty must not leave the United States in a state of unpreparedness in the event of a Soviet change of attitude.

In my opinion, our present test ban proposals meet these three requirements for an effective treaty.

### Developments In Detection

Last week the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held a series of illuminating hearings on developments in the field of detection and identification of nuclear explosions and their relationship to the nuclear test ban negotiations. These hearings explored in considerable depth the scientific and technical basis for the present United States position with respect to a nuclear test ban. The efficacy of the technical underpinning for our test ban proposals is certainly an important factor in determining the overall effectiveness of a treaty based on these proposals. However, the effectiveness of the verification arrangements associated with a test ban do not depend entirely upon numbers or locations of detection stations. Nor is any particular number of on-site inspections the key to effectiveness. The verification arrangements must be considered as a totality. The effectiveness of the total system should be judged in the light of the entire geographic, technical, military, political, and economic environment in which it would operate.

The increase in our technical ability to detect seismic events at long distances permits us to rely upon seismic stations *outside* the Soviet Union to detect underground nuclear explosions *inside* the Soviet Union. Moreover, a decrease by a factor of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  in a previous estimate of the number of earthquakes of a given seismic magnitude occurring annually in the Soviet Union has enabled us to reduce the number of on-site inspections on Soviet territory to seven. But perhaps more important than a particular num-

ber of on-site inspections in determining its effectiveness as a deterrent to cheating is the manner in which an on-site inspection would be carried out. Our present position with respect to the number of on-site inspections which would be acceptable to us has, therefore, been very clearly stated by Mr. Foster<sup>2</sup> in discussions with the Soviet representatives to be conditional upon further agreement on such important matters as the method of selecting particular earth tremors for inspection, the size and composition of inspection teams, the area and duration of search, and logistical arrangements.

Finally, an effort has been made to increase the effectiveness of our present proposals over previous positions by vesting control over the installation and operation of the detection network, and control over the carrying out of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, more completely in the hands of the United States and United Kingdom. This has resulted in a proposal for a simpler and more economical system. It would also permit us to evaluate a greater range of factors in determining whether the Soviet Union was honoring its treaty obligations than would be the case under a treaty providing for more complete international operation and control of the verification system.

I will leave to officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the discussion of the details of this proposal. But it is the conclusion of the President and his chief advisers in the national security area that clandestine testing which might escape detection, in spite of the verification system, would not result in developments which would significantly alter the military balance.

Finally, an announced national policy of maintaining our readiness to test will minimize the risks to the United States stemming from the possibility of Soviet abrogation of the treaty and an open resumption of testing. Indeed, such a policy would be a deterrent to abrogation and would reinforce the effectiveness of the treaty itself.

---

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Feb. 12, see BULLETIN of Mar. 18, 1963, p. 398.

In conclusion, I believe that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests would advance the interests of the foreign policy of the United States, and that the present proposals of the United States for a nuclear test ban provide a sound basis for negotiation of an effective treaty. In reaching this conclusion I am aware of the risks involved in an undetected Soviet violation of the treaty or its surprise abrogation. I am also aware, however, of the graver risks to our security and the security of the free world

implicit in a future without any multilateral restraint on the development of nuclear weapons. In addition to the risks with and without a test ban which must be carefully weighed against each other, we should also consider the opportunities created by taking a step in the direction of controlling the arms race. I believe that if these new opportunities are placed in the scale, it will be tipped decisively in favor of our present proposals for a ban on the further testing of nuclear weapons.

## A Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control

*by Jacob D. Beam*

*Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*<sup>1</sup>

We sometimes think our Agency should have been called the Arms Control, Disarmament, and Test Ban Agency, since the test ban question seems to have been advertised much better than other things we do. It may seem curious that such a relatively small item on the disarmament agenda should loom so large. The reason, of course, is evident: A nuclear test ban has for years been the number-one possibility for Soviet-United States agreement in the field of arms control and disarmament. Right now the chances for an agreement on a nuclear test ban are perhaps relatively brighter than anything else we can see on the horizon.

This capacity it has for hovering on the brink of agreement has made the test ban an issue on which passions run high. On the one hand we hear criticism that we are losing our nuclear shirts in the test ban negotiations. On the other hand we hear that the United States is not doing enough to produce an agreement. In fact, it might be concluded that a lot of people in the United States have strongly

held opinions, either for or against test ban, and that nothing anyone can say will shake that opinion. Despite this, I will attempt to tell you why two successive administrations have thought that a test ban is in the United States' national interest.

I would like to begin by quoting a recent statement by Secretary of Defense [Robert S.] McNamara made before the United States Congress:

The expanding arsenals of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Iron Curtain have created an extremely dangerous situation not only for their possessors but also for the entire world. As the arms race continues and the weapons multiply and become more swift and deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either by miscalculation or design, becomes ever more real.

This comment by the Secretary of Defense states the dilemma of today's world quite neatly. It is a hard but a basic lesson to learn, and for me there is only one rational conclusion to draw from it. We must find a way to begin applying the brakes to this competition in armaments. There are great risks in disarmament. I personally, however, cannot accept the view that more security is to be found in one

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Rochester Ad Club at Rochester, N.Y., on Feb. 28.

of Herman Kahn's mythical "doomsday machines"—a wonderful device with which one could eliminate the earth in one fell swoop.

The problems of putting a disarmament program into effect are stupendous. We think it can be done, and we are, of course, attempting to negotiate a general disarmament agreement right now with the Soviet Union at the Geneva disarmament conference. It would help a great deal, however, if we could get the arms control and disarmament process started with some relatively simple first step. This is the significance of the nuclear test ban question. It is a relatively—I underscore relatively—simple first step which would have some quite important results.

It is difficult to overestimate the effect on disarmament negotiations of one satisfactorily operating arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is not saying that once the ice is broken with a test ban agreement disarmament is just around the corner. It should be easier, however, to negotiate and put into effect other arms control and disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union if we have even one really satisfactory arms control agreement in effect. No one expects the Soviets to give up overnight their ideal of a Communist world led by Moscow. Hostility between democracy and totalitarianism will be a fact of life for a long time to come. But there is also a mutual interest between the Communist and the free worlds in seeing that a massive nuclear war does not occur. Within this area of mutual interest we hope there is room for arms control and disarmament agreements.

The situation seems to be a little like the 4-minute mile. For years this was something everyone thought of as a goal but no one could quite make it. Finally, when Roger Bannister did break that mark, other runners found that it was not so impossible after all, and now a less than 4-minute mile is not so uncommon. This analogy can be applied with many reservations, of course, to the arms control field, and this is why we think a test ban may be most significant in the effect it would have in paving the way for other arms control agreements.

### **Problem of Proliferation**

There are other, more directly demonstrable, reasons for a nuclear test ban. One involves the effect a test ban would have in inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities.

There are only two major nuclear powers in the world today, the United States and the Soviet Union. As Walter Lippmann has put it, the United States possesses something like 98 percent of the West's nuclear deterrent. Of course, in the Communist world, the entire nuclear weapon arsenal is in the hands of the Kremlin.

This condition of polarity, while dangerous, is better than some others. It is, we think, a much more stable arrangement than one where many nations would possess the individual capability of exploding nuclear bombs. This conclusion is not the result of distrust concerning the ability of other nations to behave in a responsible manner. Our conclusion is based instead on simple mathematics. We think that the larger the number of governments which can independently control nuclear weapons, the greater is the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used in some local conflict. This, in turn, could escalate into all-out war involving the major powers.

The image of two scorpions in a bottle was once coined to describe the situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in the atomic age. This image is distasteful enough, but the image of 10 or 20 scorpions inside a bottle is even worse.

So long as nuclear power remains essentially polarized, Winston Churchill's hope that safety may be the sturdy twin of danger may still hold true. With a multiplication of nuclear powers we cannot be so hopeful. The chances of an irrational act, the chances of an accident, the chances of some small conflict escalating into an all-out nuclear exchange, the chances of miscalculation—all of these chances would increase enormously. This analysis is the root of a long-standing American policy against the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities.

We regard a nuclear test ban as one method, but only one method, of inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities. By itself, a test ban will not prevent the spread of nuclear

weapons. But without a test ban, all other efforts to limit nuclear weapon capabilities are likely to be futile. The question, therefore, is not whether a nuclear test ban is sufficient to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons but rather what other steps, in addition to a test ban, should be taken to inhibit the spread of nuclear capabilities. This and previous administrations have given earnest attention to this question. One measure that would help would be an agreement under which nations possessing nuclear weapons would not transfer control of such weapons to other countries, and nations not possessing nuclear weapons would not seek to acquire them. We hope such an agreement could be put into effect and the sooner the better.

At this point I would like to say that our effort to establish a NATO nuclear force is fully consistent with, and in fact complements, our effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapon capabilities. We envisage an arrangement under which the members of NATO would share with the United States control over the use of nuclear weapons. We would not, however, transfer to any individual country within NATO the ability to control nuclear weapons on a unilateral basis.

It is not possible to escape the question of our ally, France, and of Moscow's ally, Communist China, when one talks about the proliferation problem. We are not able at this time to predict that either France or Communist China will sign a test ban treaty. But neither do we wish at this time to abandon our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons because of uncertainty about the future action of France and Communist China. This would be like opening the barn door to make sure that the horse is stolen.

Our effort, therefore, has been, first, to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on a nuclear test ban treaty; and second, to attempt to bring all other important nations in the world into the treaty.

We think the treaty would be effective in convincing most nations that they should not embark upon a program of nuclear weapon experimentation. Many governments would prefer not to construct nuclear weapons and nu-

clear weapon delivery systems if it were a reasonable assumption that other nations of the same power status would not build nuclear weapons. So even if France and Communist China failed initially to adhere to a test ban treaty, we think a treaty concluded between the major nuclear powers would offer some advantage if it did nothing more than prevent or delay the 10 or a dozen other potential nuclear powers from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability.

One further advantage in a test ban treaty, and one which may be a byproduct and not a principal reason for a test ban treaty, is the effect it would have in eliminating radioactive fallout. All scientists are agreed that any increase in the general level of radioactivity in the human environment is harmful to a greater or lesser degree. If we can prevent a general increase in background radioactivity, it is in the interest of humanity that we do so. I think that this is all that need be said on this point.

Needless to say, not everyone will assess the advantages of a test ban treaty in the way just stated. Many think the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Most of the critics of a test ban treaty have been responsible, and they deserve a responsible reply.

#### **Question of Verification**

One objection is that the kind of verification system we are discussing with the Soviet Union is inadequate to verify that the Soviet Union has indeed ended its nuclear tests. The critics point out that at one time the United States proposed 20 on-site inspections annually and today we are talking about a smaller number of inspections, and they argue that this means a less than effective control system.

In response I would recall that President Eisenhower in 1959 inaugurated a program to improve the capabilities for detecting and identifying nuclear weapon test explosions. This program was called Project VELA, and the American taxpayers, through their Congress, will have spent about \$90 million when all of the appropriated funds have been used. Because of this program, our capabilities for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions have improved over what they were in 1958.

We once thought there would be several hundred seismic events, which could not be identified as earthquakes, which might occur annually in the Soviet Union. We now know that the number of such unidentified events is much less than we originally estimated. Consequently, unless the number of on-site inspections we now ask for is also less than we originally proposed, we would be demanding more inspection than we thought necessary in 1958. This is one reason why we have been able to reduce our requests for on-site inspections. We are happy to call this a concession—but to scientific progress, not to the Soviet Union.

We have also found that our capabilities for identifying earthquakes at great distances are better than we thought they were in 1958 and 1959. We are examining new techniques which appear to promise even better capabilities in the future. In short, there is every reason to think that our capabilities today are far better than we assumed them to be a few years ago and that these capabilities are likely to improve over the years.

I would not like to convey the impression that a determined cheater could not on occasion outsmart the man who is attempting to catch him. It is likely that in this game of cops and robbers the robber, because he has by definition the advantage of surprise, can, if he goes to great lengths, occasionally fool the cop. If, for example, the cheater constructed a very large cave underground, or if he sent a nuclear warhead millions of miles out into space, he might succeed in detonating a nuclear bomb without being caught.

But this kind of capability would not give the Soviet Union a chance to make any substantial inroads into the United States' nuclear lead. The chances of the Soviet Union conducting a series of tests which would remain undetected are vanishingly small. The probability that the advantage to be gained from a single test would be sufficient to make an attempted evasion worth while is also vanishingly small.

So we firmly believe it is fair to conclude that the verification system now proposed by the United States will, in fact, serve as an effective deterrent against any violation of a treaty. I would add, incidentally, that we now envisage

a system which places primary reliance on our own very good facilities for detecting nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union. We would add to what we get from those facilities the information we can get from automatic seismic stations in Soviet territory and from stations on the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addition, of course, we would make use of information from the nationally manned stations in the Soviet Union. Cap this system with the right to make on-site inspections when we really get worried about an event in Soviet territory, and we would have workable, realistic, and effective machinery for monitoring a nuclear test ban agreement.

### **Maintaining Scientific Momentum**

Other opponents of a test ban treaty argue that the United States must maintain its scientific momentum in the nuclear weapons field and that a test ban would spell the end of our weapons laboratories. This is a problem. But three things need to be said on this score. One is that the United States intends to make it a matter of national policy to keep its weapons laboratories in being after a treaty is signed. We expect to continue to do the maximum amount of work that can be done on nuclear weapons technology within our laboratories. We expect we can maintain a capability for years to come to resume testing on short notice. There are many developments in the nuclear weapon field which can be explored in the laboratory.

Prototypes can be designed and put on the shelf for testing if a treaty should end. Moreover, we would expect that the peaceful nuclear explosion program would continue, as it is now, with explosions for engineering and scientific purposes. We believe, therefore, that, given the patriotism and the dedication of our scientists and given a clear understanding of United States policy, we could hold together our laboratories and even do useful work in order to be ready should a treaty be abrogated in the future.

A second thing should be said about this problem of scientific momentum. In our overall nuclear deterrent capability we rely not only on the nuclear warheads but importantly also

on the means of delivering these warheads. Our nuclear deterrent can be greatly improved through further improvements in the accuracy of missiles. In evaluating the effectiveness of the weapons, there is an obvious trade-off between the accuracy of missiles and the yield of the warhead: The more accurate the missile is, the less yield you require to do the same job. In other words, we do not need to be frozen in our capability to improve our overall nuclear deterrent because a test ban is in effect.

Another objection to a test ban treaty is that there are important nuclear weapon developments which we must have before we stop testing. There are developments, obviously, which could be made in the field of nuclear weapons. Looking at this criticism in perspective, however, one sees that what we are actually talking about when we talk about these predictable improvements represents a small margin of improvement in our present nuclear capabilities. They would not significantly alter our ability to defend against incoming missiles. They would not significantly alter our ability to build a secure second-strike capability. And it is clear that if we and the Soviets do continue testing, the Soviet Union will surely make these improvements too. We are, we believe, ahead of the Soviet Union at the present time in overall nuclear weapon technology. If nuclear testing is continued indefinitely into the future, there is no reason to suppose that the Soviet Union could not ultimately equal the United States' achievements in nuclear technology.

This is the way of science: Nature's secrets can be discovered by competent scientists regardless of their ideology.

It would not be too surprising if someone told us that in 20 years we could blow up three-quarters of the earth with a quarter-pound bomb. This may be a little farfetched, but this is the trend and not many people would argue that it is a good trend.

Secretary Rusk said the other day<sup>2</sup> that . . . the purpose of a nuclear test ban would be to try to impose some ceiling on a qualitative as well as quantitative race which otherwise will extend into the future, with increasingly massive resources contributed to that race on both sides—the diversion of resources from other great tasks. . . .

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1963, p. 235.

This is a succinct description of one important purpose of a test ban. There is no comfort for any of us in the continuation of an arms race.

This is, in essence, the reason why we simply must try to make a start toward arms control and disarmament. In today's world there is not a direct relationship between the arms we pile up and the safety we hope to gain from these arms. We must find an alternative to the present situation, an alternative in which our efforts will, in fact, improve our security and our well-being. We firmly believe that so long as man's intelligence prevails over his irrational instincts we will find an alternative; otherwise we will surely pass on into the abyss of war in which, in the words of Pope Pius XII, "There will be no song of victory, only the inconsolable weeping of humanity, which in desolation will gaze upon the catastrophe brought on by its own folly."

## International Coffee Agreement, 1962

*Statement by Under Secretary McGhee*<sup>1</sup>

My name is George C. McGhee, and I am the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify in behalf of the International Coffee Agreement, which President Kennedy transmitted to the Senate late in the last session for its advice and consent to ratification.<sup>2</sup> This agreement was signed in behalf of the United States on September 28, 1962, by Mr. W. Michael Blumenthal, the chairman of the United States delegation to the United Nations conference which negotiated the agreement.<sup>3</sup> The agreement has the full support of the executive agencies, and I am here to respectfully request your favorable consideration.

In transmitting the agreement to President Kennedy last October 2, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that:

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 12 (press release 127).

<sup>2</sup> S. Ex. H. 87th Cong., 2d sess.; for a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 668.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234; Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667; and Feb. 11, 1963, p. 218.

It is the Department's view that this agreement offers the best prospect of arresting any further decline in world coffee prices, thus helping to assure stability in foreign-exchange earnings of coffee producers in some 35 developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Mr. Chairman, the achievement of this objective would be of great significance. In the first place coffee, during the past decade, was the single most important agricultural commodity in world trade, with shipments valued in many years at over \$2 billion.

Secondly, coffee is the most important source of export earnings of Latin America and of a number of countries in Africa and elsewhere. For example, in 1961 coffee exports from Colombia accounted for 71 percent of all foreign exchange earnings. For Guatemala and El Salvador the corresponding figure was approximately 60 percent. For Brazil it was 51 percent. In fact, about a quarter of the entire export earnings of the 15 Latin American coffee-exporting countries are derived from this one commodity. Its significance to Africa, where five countries obtain more than 40 percent of their foreign exchange earnings from this source, is equally great.

Thirdly, Mr. Chairman, this agreement is of great importance because in many areas of the world coffee is produced by small farmers. It is estimated that about 3 to 4 million farming enterprises produce coffee in 70 different countries. The overwhelming majority of these farms belong to small farmers, each cultivating less than 5 acres of land. About half of all coffee is produced by farmers with 5-75 acre holdings. In Latin America coffee provides direct employment for more than 12 million persons, and we believe that this figure is in excess of 20 million in the world as a whole.

In view of the overwhelming importance of coffee as a foreign exchange earner, it is clear that the economic development of the countries in Latin America and Africa is directly related to this single crop. It has been shown that a decrease of 1 cent per pound for green coffee means a decrease of about \$50 million in the foreign exchange receipts of the Latin American countries. Obviously the tremendous effort we are making under the Alliance for Progress is endangered and the large sums ap-

propriated to assist economic development are canceled out to the extent that earnings from the principal export commodity fluctuate sharply or decrease steadily. Stability in foreign exchange earnings can be the firm foundation for our sustained efforts to help these countries help themselves.

### Coffee a World Trade Problem

Coffee has long been a troublesome commodity in international trade. A number of international meetings were held on this subject prior to World War II, with no results. When European markets were closed and prices fell drastically at the beginning of World War II, the United States in 1940 joined 14 Latin American countries in an inter-American coffee agreement<sup>4</sup> to assure an equitable distribution of the United States market. That agreement expired shortly after the war. The 1950's once again saw international discussions of the coffee problem brought on by sharp price increases during some years and steadily declining price levels since 1955. It was not until the United States took the initiative in 1958 to set up a Coffee Study Group here in Washington that an organized effort by both producing and consuming countries to develop practical solutions was possible.

Today the coffee problem is perhaps the most acute example of the present difficulties in world commodity markets. President Kennedy recognized the importance of these problems to the developing countries and has pledged United States support in the search for adequate solutions. In March 1961, announcing the Alliance for Progress, he said:<sup>5</sup>

... the United States is ready to cooperate in serious, case-by-case examinations of commodity market problems. Frequent violent changes in commodity prices seriously injure the economies of many Latin American countries, draining their resources and stultifying their growth. Together we must find practical methods of bringing an end to this pattern.

The International Coffee Agreement which is before you for consideration represents the culmination of about 2 years of effort to implement that policy. In view of its tremendous

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1940, p. 483.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.



importance to the welfare of so many peoples, coffee deserved to be first in line for a sustained effort to solve its problems and help assure an end to the constant instability and price erosion of recent years.

The initiative of the United States led ultimately to the conclusion by the world's major producing and consuming countries that a world conference should be called in 1962 to negotiate a world coffee agreement. This was done at the United Nations in July-August 1962, at a conference attended by representatives of 71 countries, 58 of which participated actively in the negotiations. By the closing date for signature—November 30, 1962—54 governments had signed the agreement. This impressive number—a record for a commodity agreement—is the best testimony that could be given to the tremendous importance producing and consuming countries alike attach to making this agreement succeed. Eleven governments have already ratified the agreement or formally signified their intention to do so. In view of our preponderance in the coffee trade, our ratification is essential before the agreement can be put into effect.

The objective of the agreement is to bring about improved marketing conditions and thus to create a climate in which the difficult problems of overproduction and burdensome stocks may be attacked. This improvement and the expected growth of consumption will bring about a gradual increase in foreign exchange earnings and thereby establish a stable base from which to plan long-range economic development programs. It also means that countries will no longer see their efforts, and substantial amounts of our aid, quickly offset by falling prices for their principal foreign exchange earner.

I shall endeavor to summarize briefly the key features of the agreement:

1. It provides for a system of export quotas, which will be adjusted quarterly to the needs of the market. Shipments of all coffee, in whatever form, are included in the quotas. Exports to so-called new markets are carefully controlled and limited.

2. Importing countries like the United States bring their moral support and administrative machinery to bear on the problem to help

assure the effectiveness of the quota system. Certificates of origin must accompany all shipments. Import statistics will be quickly provided and published. Imports from non-members will be restricted, to prevent noncooperators from receiving the advantages of the agreement without also sharing in the burden of making it work.

3. Production will be brought under control. Specific production targets will be assigned each member and a timetable adopted for its accomplishment. Producing countries that do not cooperate will not share in increasing consumption. Importing countries will assist the producing countries to shift out of coffee production and to diversify their economies. An intelligent stock policy will be identified for each producing country.

4. Consumers will be protected, as will the coffee trade. The specific price objective of the agreement is to assure that the general level of coffee prices does not decline below the general level of coffee prices in 1962. If the agreement works well coffee prices should firm up, but the undesirability of sharp rises in prices is recognized and specific machinery provided to deal with it.

5. An International Coffee Council is created to administer the agreement and to provide a multilateral forum devoted to solving problems affecting the world's coffee industry.

We consider several provisions of this agreement of considerable significance in that they open the way for a concerted attack on the roots of the coffee problem. I refer to those provisions under which the exporting countries undertake to adjust their production of coffee in accordance with certain directives laid down by the members of the agreement. It is provided that the Coffee Council, the administrative body of the agreement, shall develop and recommend production goals to each producing country.

The Council establishes a timetable for the accomplishment of these objectives, periodically reviews the progress being made, and has the authority to deny increases in quota resulting from increasing consumption to any member who is not complying with the directives laid down. The Council also has the authority

to establish a stock policy for each producer which will complement its recommendations with regard to desirable levels of production. We believe that if the provisions of this agreement with regard to production and stocks are fully implemented so that overproduction can be curbed and excessive stocks gradually eliminated, the world's worst commodity problem will be on its way toward solution.

### **Consumer Protection Assured**

The United States is the world's largest importer of coffee, taking about half of all the coffee entering world trade. Obviously we should not consider participation in any agreement that does not fully protect the interests of our consumers. Quite naturally, consumers want to know what the effect will be on coffee prices in the United States. While we expect the agreement to arrest the constant decline in coffee prices, and to maintain them no lower than at the general levels which prevailed in 1962, it is neither intended nor anticipated that there will be substantial increases in coffee prices to consumers in the United States.

There are several reasons outside the agreement which argue against this, including the tremendous stocks of coffee now held by Brazil, Colombia, and others, and the fact that present productive capacity everywhere is in excess of any likely demand over the next 5 years.

Consumer protection against any unwarranted price increases is also assured by a number of specific provisions in the agreement. Probably the most important are the provisions relating to the establishment and adjustment of export quotas. Export quotas are intended to control the amount of coffee that may be made available to the market by the producing countries during a given period, and thus they directly influence the price. The agreement provides that all decisions on the establishment and adjustment of export quotas shall be taken by a distributed two-thirds majority vote, i.e. a concurrent two-thirds majority of the importers and exporters voting separately. As the United States has 400 votes and would require the support from only one other country to exercise a veto, it assures us of a powerful voice in decisions of the Council.

There are two other provisions that specifically recognize the undesirability of marked changes in coffee prices for whatever reason and provide for corrective action under voting procedures which are easier to attain than the standard procedure of a distributed two-thirds majority.

In the unlikely event that unforeseeable circumstances might arise in the administration of the agreement which would operate against the interests of our consumers or our coffee trade, the United States could always withdraw from the agreement. It is provided that any government, after September 30, 1963, may withdraw by giving written notice, such withdrawal to be effective 90 days after notification. It is clear, of course, that the agreement would collapse without our participation.

I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the stated price objective of the agreement, while in our view realistic, is a modest one. The 1962 price of Brazilian coffee averaged slightly less than 34 cents per pound, compared with 36.6 cents in 1960 and 48.4 cents in 1958. The decline in coffee prices began in 1954, when the severe frost damage in Brazil resulted in historic highs of close to 80 cents per pound.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I wish to say that the United States Government team that worked toward this agreement over the past 2 years has had valuable support from the United States coffee industry. The National Coffee Association, representing all major segments of the industry, including importers, brokers, and roasters, has shown unparalleled industrial statesmanship in coming to the conclusion some years ago that ruinously low coffee prices in Latin America and elsewhere would not be in their best interests or the wider interests of the country at large. Accordingly, they appointed a committee of long-time leaders in the coffee industry to work with us as part of the team. Their president, Mr. [Jack] McKiernan, and the other members of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee of the National Coffee Association, participated as our advisers in the negotiations and gave us valuable advice, assistance, and support.

Should the International Coffee Agreement receive your approval and the advice and consent of the Senate, it would be the President's

intention to deposit an instrument of ratification at the earliest possible date. We believe that it is highly desirable to maintain the momentum which has been generated internationally if the agreement is to be of maximum effectiveness.

The obligations of the United States under this agreement are very few. We must restrict imports of coffee from nonparticipants, we must require certificates of origin on all shipments, and we must furnish statistics. These are virtually all the obligations we undertake. To allow us to carry out these obligations it will be necessary for us to ask the Congress for enabling legislation.

## The Trade Expansion Program

*by Philip H. Trezise*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

The Trade Expansion Act<sup>2</sup> was passed last October by large bipartisan majorities in the Congress. It reflected, I believe, a national recognition that our interests in the world, both political and economic, required that the United States Government be in a position to exercise leadership in world trade.

We were confronted then—and of course we still are—by the development of a new trading entity in Europe, the Common Market, representing the world's largest single international trading unit. There was then under active consideration the association of the United Kingdom with the Continental members of the Common Market. If this had come to pass, the total economic weight of the European grouping

Finally, Mr. Chairman, participation in this agreement will cost the United States Treasury only a contribution limited to our pro rata share of the administrative expenses of the agreement. As we will have about 400 votes our share will be 20 percent of the administrative budget. There are no other financial commitments for the United States involved in this agreement.

I wish to thank the committee for the attention you have given this rather long statement. It is our considered judgment that participation in the International Coffee Agreement of 1962 is in the best national interests of the United States, and therefore it is recommended to you for favorable consideration.

would have begun to approach that of the United States itself.

Leaving aside the Common Market, however, we were also increasingly concerned about the trade problems of the less developed countries. It has become more and more clear that the problem in Latin America and Africa and Asia is one to be dealt with by aid and trade, not by aid alone. We have seen that small changes in prices of export crops can completely overbalance any conceivable volume of grants and loans to some of the less developed countries. There is no question but that we must find ways to open markets and to increase the trading opportunities for the less developed countries if the problem of economic growth is to be solved within measurable time.

Also, in considering the Trade Expansion Act, the Congress and the administration and, I believe, the American people had very much in mind that our relationships with Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand were

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Second Florida World Trade Conference at Jacksonville, Fla., on Mar. 8 (press release 118 dated Mar. 7).

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of the act, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

linked to our trade with those countries. As you know, the Trade Expansion Act includes the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, which has been a feature of our trade policy since the 1920's. We have consistently operated on the premise that the expansion of trade would promote the prosperity and the political well-being of the free-world community generally.

Finally, it was recognized that our balance-of-payments deficit, which has existed for a number of years, could be reduced by an expansion of our international trade. We normally run a large surplus of exports over imports. It is these earnings that have kept our overall deficit within manageable proportions. It was reasoned that a general expansion of trade would have the likely effect of increasing the size of that surplus and making our international deficit problem considerably less worrisome.

#### **Plans for New Round of Tariff Negotiations**

We have now had the act for about 5 months. During that period the British negotiations with the Common Market have broken down, and there is no indication that they will be resumed in the near future.

This development obviously has changed somewhat the situation in which the Trade Expansion Act will operate. The special authority given to the President to negotiate for the elimination of tariffs in certain categories of goods cannot as a practical matter be used without British membership in the Common Market.

The remaining negotiating authorities in the act, however, remain a very substantial package. The President is still empowered to negotiate for general tariff reductions of up to 50 percent, and he has special negotiating powers with respect to very low tariffs and with respect to tariffs on certain tropical products and agricultural goods. The need for using these bargaining powers is, if anything, greater than ever. We cannot afford to abdicate our leadership in expanding free-world trade, for otherwise a drift toward the development of restricted trading blocs might gain great momentum.

Work is going forward, therefore, in preparation for a new round of tariff negotiations based on the Trade Expansion Act. The President has appointed a distinguished American, former Governor and former Secretary of State Christian Herter, to direct these preparations and to carry out the negotiations.<sup>3</sup>

A group of technical experts, representing most of the trading countries of the world, will begin work in Geneva on the 18th of this month to draw up the bases for a general multilateral negotiation to take place early in 1964. These experts will attempt to draw up the rules and procedures under which a large-scale tariff negotiation would take place, subject to approval by the governments concerned. In May, we expect, there will be a meeting of senior political officials from the countries subscribing to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These officials will consider the work of the technical experts and will come to a decision about the time and character of a tariff round.

Meanwhile we will be preparing at home to carry through the domestic procedures which the Trade Expansion Act requires. A list of commodities on which tariff reductions may be made will be published, probably in the summer. Public hearings will be held and determinations will be made as to what our eventual negotiating package will be. All this will involve exceedingly laborious and detailed work. It is expected to take the full 6 months provided by law. But we expect to be ready on our part for a major tariff negotiation in 1964.

#### **Trade in Agricultural Commodities**

It is quite clear that so far as future trade negotiations are concerned a central and critical problem is going to be trade in agricultural commodities.

Whether we like it or not, practically every country in the world puts agriculture into a special category. The free market seldom is allowed to operate fully. Support prices or

---

<sup>3</sup> For a statement made by Mr. Herter before the heads of delegations to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at Paris on Jan. 31, see *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 298.

income payment plans are widespread. Their existence makes it politically and economically difficult to allow trade to flow normally.

Thus we find around the world a network of restrictions on international trade in agricultural commodities. These include tariffs, but other devices, such as quotas or even import embargoes, are often the more important means of protectionism. From the point of view of the world's agricultural exporters, of which the United States is quantitatively the largest, a trade negotiation that did not give agricultural trade a better chance to grow would be seriously deficient in content. The job, however, obviously is cut out for us, and we will do well to recognize its difficulties and complexities.

In the Common Market our agricultural trade falls into three more or less distinct categories so far as access is concerned. First, a very substantial grouping—representing 35 percent of our total exports to the Common Market—is made up of items bound on the free list, led by cotton and soy beans. Second, there is the category where conventional tariff bargaining may be possible and effective, on such items as canned fruits and tobacco and, perhaps, fruits and vegetables. These tariffs in principle would be subject to negotiation and reduction, although on some items we would need assurances that tariff concessions would not be nullified in practice by the imposition of other restrictions. Finally, there is the group of agricultural goods that fall under the common agricultural policy proper. This group includes among other things the grains, poultry, and meats. The CAP sets up for these goods a complex system of minimum import prices and sliding fees. In its ultimate effects the system could be heavily or less heavily restrictive on imports, depending on its operation.

We shall have to negotiate on the CAP items and do so in some relationship to the general tariff talks. It is too early to be definitive about what parts of the CAP will be negotiable or in what ways we can best strengthen our trade prospects. We shall be getting clarification of these matters over the next few months, however, and certainly before the tariff negotiations proper have begun.

I wish to touch now on the existing illegal

and unjustifiable restrictions which apply primarily to trade in agriculture.

### **Restrictions Affecting U.S. Fruit Exports**

These restrictions, which tend particularly to affect our exports of fresh fruits and fruit products to the United Kingdom and the Common Market countries, are not subject to tariff bargaining on our part. In fact there is an express prohibition in section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act against offering concessions for the purpose of getting unjustifiable import restrictions reduced or eliminated. We propose rather to continue to press our case, based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, through whatever means promise to be most useful to get satisfactory redress.

We have undertaken negotiations with Italy and France under article XXIII of the GATT. This article permits us, subject to the approval of the GATT membership, to withdraw trade concessions in retaliation for violations of GATT commitments. Our discussions with Italy have been quite productive, with France less so, thus far. We expect, however, to get a satisfactory settlement in both cases.

The United Kingdom's restrictions on citrus fruits and citrus products represent a special Florida problem, as we are very well aware. I suppose that no single commercial issue between ourselves and the British has received more attention or more high-level attention on both sides of the Atlantic. The United Kingdom has pointed out, as you know, that it feels a responsibility for protecting the West Indies citrus industry. We have been sympathetic to this argument, but we have not been sympathetic to a protective system which has the result of discriminating against the United States in favor of all other suppliers, including some that are not even members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

We had examined a number of possible solutions bilaterally but could not get to an understanding. Then, when the U.K. began its negotiations for admission to the Common Market, we looked to the prospect that the British West Indies would gain associate status and thus get a form of preferential entry for its citrus into the whole Common Market. At

that point the West Indies problem would have been solved and the discriminatory treatment of American citrus in the U.K. would have been eliminated.

Now that the U.K.-EEC negotiations have been suspended, we have a new situation. We shall have to go back now to see if we cannot find a solution, in the first instance, through bilateral discussions. As a matter of fact, we have had this week in Washington some preliminary exploration of the problem with senior officials of the U.K. Board of Trade.

### Care Needed in Invoking Retaliatory Procedures

Let me say a word about retaliation as a means for eliminating restrictions on our foreign trade. As you know, the Congress has given the President a variety of possible retaliatory responses to import restrictions burdening our trade. There is no doubt about the feeling of the Congress or about the mandate it has given the President.

Essentially what we have are means for bargaining. Like any bargaining weapons, they need to be used with care and skill particularly as to timing. I suppose nobody would deny that, once you actually invoke a retaliatory procedure, you have come to the end of the road so far as your hopes for improving your trade are concerned. This is not to say that we should not or will not invoke the retaliatory powers given to the President. For one thing, we may find it necessary to demonstrate that we are serious. But I would emphasize that a general resort to retaliation is not something that any of us would wish to see come about. It would mean not trade expansion but trade contraction, and its effects on international relations generally would be most unfortunate.

To conclude, we have a new and far-reaching Trade Expansion Act which gives us the means to undertake a new drive to expand free-world trade. At this early point it is not possible to predict what will happen under it. But the need for expanding trade and for strengthening the commercial links between the free countries has never been more acute. The logic of things argues that strong leadership by the United States will be successful.

## Mr. Manning Interviewed on "News and Comment"

*Following is the transcript of an interview of Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, by Howard K. Smith on the American Broadcasting Company's television program "Howard K. Smith—News and Comment" on March 10.*

Press release 122 dated March 8

*Howard K. Smith: There have been a great many protests about Government management of news lately. Do you think there is a legitimate basis for such protests?*

*Mr. Manning: Well, there certainly has been a controversy in the papers, Mr. Smith. I don't think it has been a particularly fruitful or extremely high-level controversy yet. Perhaps as it goes a bit more, it is going on, we might get a little clearer on what the vocabulary is and whether, indeed, the words that are being used are accepted as having the same meaning.*

*Management of the news, for example. It's a question of putting—attempting to find some way in this complicated world to put some order and coherence into what a national government says or what its position is. Quite a bit of an attempt is under way, both in journalism and in the Government, to arrive at this coherence.*

*Q. Do you think it's fair to say that there is management of news?*

*A. I think if the vocabulary, if the description of management of news is used to define this attempt to put some coherence, to make sure that what this Government is expressing is a position, is indeed the Government's position, or what the United States Government is proposing to do in a given circumstance is being organized in a way that leaves no mistake, either in the minds of the American public or the many other audiences to which it is directed, in that sense I think we would have chaos and a very dangerous state of affairs without it.*

*Q. Now, some people have expressed the view that the press ought to have unlimited access to the information on which policy is based. Do you believe that is an advisable policy?*

*A. One might have a bit of discussion about*

hat we mean precisely by unlimited access, but in the spirit of that question I think it's a very simple answer, yes.

*Q. Is there ever a time, do you think, when a government is justified in telling a falsehood to the press?*

A. I don't think a falsehood is necessary.

*Q. Now, we know that everyone in Government is not of the same mind on the question of making information available. As the State Department officer responsible for dealing with the press, could you describe some of the conflicting viewpoints held by the different departments?*

A. Yes. It is the State Department that is my province, as you know. But first, dealing with diplomacy, everybody knows that there is in the very nature of affairs a certain conflict between the conduct of diplomacy in the ideal sense and the practice of free and aggressive journalism. But it's precisely this sort of controversy that this system of government was set up to resolve, without an impairment either of the conduct of diplomacy or the function of a free press. The fact that the conflict exists, I think, is going to be with us for a long time. But the fact that it can be resolved without impairment, I think, has been proved by many, in any years of a free press dealing with more and more complicated diplomatic and foreign policy affairs in a way that is always, and I think today more than ever, laying out the essentials of those policies or proposals to the public and to the world at large.

*Q. Why do you think this issue of managed news has arisen? Is this administration "managing" news more than the past administrations?*

A. Again in this sense of trying to introduce some order into things, this has been going on—I have been a reporter for 27 years and an official of the Government for only one. I haven't experienced in my career as a journalist a situation in which there wasn't always the probability that you might have to go two or three places to be sure you're getting what you are after. And I haven't experienced a situation in which a given person is not going

to put his particular tone of voice and his particular interpretation on events. But as a reporter I have always assumed, as I am sure you have, that it's a part of my responsibility—or was—to see that I got it in its right context. Human beings being human are, as I say, going to put their own inflection on things. But if this is done for the purpose again of trying to get the facts straight as the person in Government thinks they are, that is one thing. But if it is to be used for effecting purposes of distortion, I think it's deplorable, and if it exists—and I honestly don't think it exists to any intended or important degree in this administration—then I think it should be eliminated.

*Q. Do you think the press in Washington is suffering in any significant way from this suppression of information by Government?*

A. I spent a year involved—again I go back to my own province in the State Department, in which I think we produced, for a group of experienced journalists and Foreign Service officers, a mechanism for producing more news, more information, not manufacturing it but producing it, making it available and providing more access to policy officials than I have known to have existed in the State Department before, and I think this can be very fairly said of the White House, of the Defense Department, and of the other areas of the executive branch.

For example, in the course of this recent controversy after Cuba, one of the most important upshots of this within the State Department was a delineation within the Department of State of this question of the obligation of policy officers—not just information persons—the obligation of policy officers to talk directly with reporters, have a dialog with them. This has been put in writing as a part of the obligation of policy officials, and to my concrete knowledge it is being carried out very energetically as an obligation.

*Q. So you think there is more access to information than in the past administrations?*

A. There is certainly much more than when I covered the State Department back after the war, and I'm told by many of the journalists who covered regularly that they feel there is considerable more access.



*Q. Tell me, do you think it's possible that some parts of the press may be trying to conceal their own inadequacies by blaming the Government for withholding news?*

A. Well, if you heard Senator [Everett] Dirksen the other morning on television, when asked to comment on the attributes of American women—I might paraphrase him. I think American reporters are the best in the world. I think they are the most handsome in the world. I think they are the most charming in the world. And, really, for the most part they are extremely good. There are gradations of quality as there are in every profession, but we have got the best press corps and the best press. They have got great problems themselves of management. There are as many as 30 to 40 columns of news on foreign affairs carried each day on the AP alone. It takes a tremendous feat of management to winnow out what's important and get that into the 4 to 8 columns of foreign news that are used in most newspapers in this country, outside of two or three big ones.

*Q. Why has this question of news management become such a conspicuous one now?*

A. Well, as you know, it has come up time and again, in recent years, and even over a longer period than that, but the origin of this recent controversy rose out of Cuba. There really isn't much controversy as I have seen it over this period of 5 to 7 days when the administration, after having clearly delineated to the American public and to the world at large what its policy would be in the event of Soviet placement of offensive weaponry in Cuba—there wasn't much argument over the necessity and, in fact, the success achieved by the privacy during that period while the Government made up its mind not only about the nature of this threat but how to face it and how to deal with it, before then laying out to the world at large, including the enemy, what it is we are going to do about it.

Then there was a period after that involving certain movements, exchanges of very important diplomatic notes that had a bearing on whether this was going to succeed or not. Again this represented occasional interludes of the use of privacy to carry out a policy that

had been publicly delineated and publicly adhered to and privately adhered to in every way.

I think there is probably great agreement in this country that, while we are all eager to know everything that is going on, there are intervals when if we know what an elected government is clearly announcing it is intending to do, if we know the means it's going to use, we will grant it certain interludes in which to carry out those stated objectives.

A working newspaperman, when world-shaking events are going on, naturally wants to know everything he can about it. And he is quite right to try to find out. A President or a Cabinet officer, indeed a department of Government, has got a responsibility to do some other things besides, for the success of that policy and the avoidance of a nuclear confrontation that might get a lot of people, or whole countries, decimated.

*Q. But you said you haven't had any protests about keeping it private or secret in those intervals when the people knew what the general aim was.*

A. First, there has been very little from any quarter over that first very tense nuclear-confrontation week. The second week was also one of possible nuclear confrontation. There has been, and this is the origin for a lot of the reportorial complaints, but these really are complaints over certain mechanical things and over certain intervals of timing. I don't think that the case has been made for a case of principle, that is, in which the Government has been caught or can be indicted for the suppression of information vital to the democratic process. If this interval has been used to turn around a policy, something that had been explained to the public as something that had not been, then I think there would be room for indictment. This wasn't the case.

*Q. You have no objection to the members of the press seeing anybody in the State Department?*

A. None at all. As a matter of fact, anyone that they can arrange to see, and when they can't, we have got several people in the Department who are always ready to help them

get the access. Every official can't see every correspondent who wants to see him. They see an astonishing number, and they spend an astonishing amount of time, from the Secretary of State on down, dealing with newspapermen,

with television commentators, with magazine writers, and indeed with many people representing relatively obscure corners of journalism, but who nevertheless have a case for a private chance to interview a policymaking official.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Scheduled April Through June 1963

GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 1-
World Meteorological Organization: 4th Congress . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 1-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 35th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 2-
International Sugar Council: 13th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 3-
SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 8-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Rapporteurs on Utilization of Fly Ash . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 8-
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 15-
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission . . . . .	Panamá . . . . .	Apr. 16-
ICAO Communications Division: Special Meeting To Prepare for ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference.	Montreal . . . . .	Apr. 16-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 9th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 17-
Intergovernmental Meeting on Tuna Conservation . . . . .	Panamá . . . . .	Apr. 18-
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 18-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Special Working Party.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 22-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting . . . . .	Bangalore . . . . .	Apr. 23-
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 15th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Illicit Traffic.	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Board of Directors.	Lima . . . . .	Apr. 24-
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session. . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 24-
PAHO Executive Committee: 48th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 25-
IAEA International Conference on Draft Convention on Civil Liability, Land-Based Facilities.	Vienna . . . . .	Apr. 29
IMCO Working Group on Facilitation of International Travel and Transport: 2d Session.	London . . . . .	Apr. 29-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Small-Scale Industries: 7th Session.	Bangkok . . . . .	Apr. 29-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 11th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 29-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-
UNESCO Executive Board: 65th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 29-
ITU African Broadcasting Conference . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-
WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-
CENTO Ministerial Council: 11th Meeting. . . . .	Karachi . . . . .	Apr. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	April

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 14, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled April Through June 1963—Continued

ILO Textiles Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 6-
9th Pan American Highway Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 6-
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 10th Session . . . . .	Mar del Plata, Argentina. . . . .	May 6-
16th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 7-
16th International Film Festival . . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	May 9-
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 3d Session. . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 13-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 14-
ICAO Meeting on Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Operations. . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	May 14-
GATT Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 16-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Symposium on Peak Load Coverage. . . . .	Venice . . . . .	May 20-
ITU CCITT/CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Development of the International Network in Latin America. . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	May 20-
NATO Ministerial Council . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	May 21-
IMCO Council: 8th Session. . . . .	London . . . . .	May 21-
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 21-
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	Mar del Plata, Argentina. . . . .	May 22-
ILO Governing Body: 155th Session (and its committees). . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 24-
U.N. ECE Committee on Electric Power: Group of Experts for the Study of Hydroelectric Resources in Europe. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 27-
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems . . . . .	London . . . . .	May 27-
WHO Executive Board: 32d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 13th Meeting. . . . .	Halifax . . . . .	May
U.N. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources: 4th Session. . . . .	New York . . . . .	May
FAO World Food Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 4-
ITU Panel of Experts: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4-
International Labor Conference: 47th Session. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
CENTO Economic Experts . . . . .	Ankara . . . . .	June 6-
PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 11-
10th International Electronic, Nuclear and Motion Picture Exposition. . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 15-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 17-
13th International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 21-
Antarctic Treaty: Meeting of Experts on Antarctic Communications. . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 24-
ILO Governing Body: 156th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 28-
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June

### TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.  
*Ratification deposited:* Bolivia, March 15, 1963.

#### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

*Adherence deposited:* Trinidad and Tobago, March 14, 1963.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Ivory Coast, March 11, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Ivory Coast, March 11, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

*Signature and acceptance:* Ivory Coast, March 11, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960.

Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.  
*Signatures and acceptances:* Burma, November 5, 1962; Dominican Republic, November 16, 1962; Ivory Coast, March 11, 1963; Nepal, March 6, 1963.  
*Signatures:* Sierra Leone and Tanganyika, September 10, 1962.  
*Acceptances deposited:* Sierra Leone, November 13, 1962; Tanganyika, November 6, 1962.

1962. Entered into force March 28, 1963.  
*Proclaimed by the President:* March 6, 1963.

### Mexico

Agreement amending the migrant labor agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico, D.F., January 10 and February 25, 1963. Entered into force February 25, 1963.

### Turkey

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1951, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Ankara February 21, 1963. Entered into force February 21, 1963.

### Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 27, 1961 (TIAS 4920). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 8, 1963. Entered into force March 8, 1963.

### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

*Proclaimed by the President:* March 1, 1963.

### Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail, with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

*Ratifications deposited:* Dominican Republic, December 28, 1962; Houduras, December 21, 1962; Nepal, January 2, 1963.

### Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Syrian Arab Republic, January 28, 1963.

### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

*Ratifications deposited:* Kuwait, January 23, 1963;<sup>1</sup> Laos, January 17, 1963.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notifications of approval:* Cameroon, January 19, 1963; Ivory Coast, December 28, 1962;<sup>2</sup> Kuwait, January 9, 1963; Paraguay, January 30, 1963.

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

*Notification of approval:* Kuwait, January 9, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5195 and 5252). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago February 14, 1963. Entered into force February 14, 1963.

### Luxembourg

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Luxembourg February 23,

<sup>1</sup> With reservation made at time of signing final protocol.

<sup>2</sup> With a reservation.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on March 8 confirmed the following nominations:

Archibald S. Alexander to be an Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Charles F. Baldwin, Ambassador to the Federation of Malaya, to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as the representative of the United States to the 19th session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Jonathan B. Bingham to be the representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Edward M. Korry to be Ambassador to Ethiopia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 130 dated March 13.)

William J. Porter to be Ambassador to the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Carl T. Rowan to be Ambassador to Finland.

Dr. James Watt to be the representative of the United States on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization, to which office he was appointed during the last recess of the Senate.

Charles D. Withers to be Ambassador to the Republic of Rwanda. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 133 dated March 14.)

Sidney R. Yates to be the representative of the United States on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the following nominations:

Olcott H. Deming to be Ambassador to Uganda.

William C. Doherty to be Ambassador to Jamaica.

Donald A. Dumont to be Minister to the Kingdom of Burundi.

C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic.

Outerbridge Horsely to be Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

William R. Rivkin to be Ambassador to Luxembourg.

Horace G. Torbert, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Somali Republic.

## Appointments

John C. Clark as science attaché at Cairo, United Arab Republic, effective March 11. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 129 dated March 13.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Our Southern Partners: The Story of Inter-American Cooperation.** A survey of the political, social, economic development and problems, and areas of United States and Latin American cooperation. Pub. 7404. Inter-American Series 78. 59 pp. 30¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Colombia, amending the agreement of October 6, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá June 20, 1962. Entered into force June 20, 1962. TIAS 5088. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Venezuela. Exchange of notes—Signed at Caracas April 14 and May 28, 1962. Entered into force May 28, 1962. TIAS 5089. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with China, amending the agreements of April 18, 1958, and of June 9, 1959. August 30, 1960, and July 21, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS 5090. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with Venezuela, amending the agreement of May 17, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962. TIAS 5091. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Disposition of Equipment and Materials.** Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn May 25, 1962. Entered into force May 25, 1962. TIAS 5092. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Peru, amending the agreement of February 12, 1960, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima June 4 and 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962. TIAS 5093. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Antarctica—Measures in Furtherance of Principles and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty.** Recommendations adopted at the First Consultative Meeting under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, at Canberra, July 24, 1961. Effective April 30, 1962. TIAS 5094. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Trade.** Agreement with El Salvador, terminating certain provisions of the agreement of February 19, 1937. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS 5095. 3 pp. 5¢.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 11-17

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to March 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 99 of February 22; 109 of March 1; 118 of March 7; and 122 of March 8.

No.	Date	Subject
*123	3/11	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†124	3/12	Gardner: AAUN Conference of National Organizations.
125	3/12	Recognition of Government of Syrian Arab Republic.
126	3/13	Rusk: Advertising Council.
127	3/12	McGhee: International Coffee Agreement, 1962.
*128	3/13	Louchheim: "Women on World Frontiers."
*129	3/13	Clark appointed science attaché, Cairo (biographic details).
*130	3/13	Korry sworn in as Ambassador to Ethiopia (biographic details).
131	3/13	Rusk to head delegation to CENTO meeting.
*132	3/13	Hughes designated Director of Intelligence and Research (biographic details).
*133	3/14	Withers sworn in as Ambassador to Rwanda (biographic details).
134	3/15	Note to U.S.S.R. on alleged firing on Soviet trawler.
*135	3/15	Fredericks: "Problems and Trends in Education in the African Nations."
†136	3/14	Williams: "Democracy and the Emerging Nations."
*137	3/15	Visit of King of Morocco.
138	3/16	Protest to U.S.S.R. on violation of Alaskan airspace by Soviet planes.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**Agriculture**  
 International Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) . . . 493  
 The Trade Expansion Program (Trezise) . . . 497

**Algeria.** Porter confirmed as Ambassador . . . 505

**Atomic Energy**  
 Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control (Beam) . . . 489  
 Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . . . 467  
 U.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty (Rusk) . . . 485

**Burundi.** Dumont confirmed as Minister . . . 505

**Congo (Léopoldville)**  
 Summary of U.S. Recommendations for Program of Aid to the Congo . . . 481  
 The United Nations in Crisis: Cuba and the Congo (Gardner) . . . 477

**Congress**  
 Confirmations (Alexander, Baldwin, Bingham, Deming, Doherty, Dumont, Ferguson, Horsey, Korry, Porter, Rivkin, Rowan, Torbert, Watt, Withers, Yates) . . . 505  
 International Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) . . . 493  
 U.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty (Rusk) . . . 485

**Cuba**  
 Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . . . 467  
 The United Nations in Crisis: Cuba and the Congo (Gardner) . . . 477

**Czechoslovakia.** Horsey confirmed as Ambassador . . . 506

**Department and Foreign Service**  
 Appointments (Clark) . . . 506  
 Confirmations (Alexander, Baldwin, Bingham, Deming, Doherty, Dumont, Ferguson, Horsey, Korry, Porter, Rivkin, Rowan, Torbert, Watt, Withers, Yates) . . . 505

**Disarmament**  
 Alexander confirmed as Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency . . . 505  
 Nuclear Test Ban and Arms Control (Beam) . . . 489  
 Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . . . 467  
 U.S. Efforts To Achieve Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty (Rusk) . . . 485

**Economic Affairs.** The Trade Expansion Program (Trezise) . . . 497

**Ethiopia.** Korry confirmed as Ambassador . . . 505

**Europe.** Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . . . 467

**Finland.** Rowan confirmed as Ambassador . . . 505

**Foreign Aid.** Summary of U.S. Recommendations for Program of Aid to the Congo . . . 481

**International Organizations and Conferences**  
 Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings . . . 503  
 Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. Delegation to CENTO Meeting . . . 484  
 Watt confirmed as U.S. Representative on WHO Executive Board . . . 505

**Jamaica.** Doherty confirmed as Ambassador . . . 505

**Luxembourg.** Rivkin confirmed as Ambassador . . . 506

**Malagasy Republic.** Ferguson confirmed as Ambassador . . . 506

**Middle East.** Secretary Rusk To Head U.S. Delegation to CENTO Meeting . . . 484

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . . . 467

**Protection of Nationals and Property.** U.S. Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alaskan Airspace (text of note) . . . 476

**Public Affairs.** Mr. Manning Interviewed on "News and Comment" . . . 500

**Publications.** Recent Releases . . . 506

**Recognition.** U.S. Recognizes Government of Syrian Arab Republic . . . 476

**Rwanda.** Withers confirmed as Ambassador . . . 505

**Science.** Clark appointed science attaché, Cairo . . . 506

**Somali Republic.** Torbert confirmed as Ambassador . . . 506

**Syria.** U.S. Recognizes Government of Syrian Arab Republic . . . 476

**Treaty Information**  
 Current Actions . . . 504  
 International Coffee Agreement, 1962 (McGhee) . . . 493

**Uganda.** Deming confirmed as Ambassador . . . 505

**U.S.S.R.**  
 Secretary Rusk Addresses Advertising Council . . . 467  
 U.S. Protests Soviet Planes' Violation of Alaskan Airspace (text of note) . . . 476  
 U.S. Rejects Soviet Charge of Firing on Trawler (exchange of notes) . . . 475

**United Arab Republic.** Clark appointed science attaché . . . 506

**United Nations**  
 Baldwin confirmed as U.S. Representative to 19th session of ECAFE . . . 505  
 Bingham confirmed as U.S. Representative on Economic and Social Council . . . 505  
 Summary of U.S. Recommendations for Program of Aid to the Congo . . . 481  
 The United Nations in Crisis: Cuba and the Congo (Gardner) . . . 477  
 Yates confirmed as U.S. Representative on Trusteeship Council . . . 505

*Name Index*

Alexander, Archibald S . . . 505  
 Baldwin, Charles F . . . 505  
 Beam, Jacob D . . . 489  
 Bingham, Jonathan B . . . 505  
 Bundy, McGeorge . . . 467  
 Clark, John C . . . 506  
 Deming, Oleott H . . . 505  
 Doherty, William C . . . 506  
 Dumont, Donald A . . . 506  
 Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr . . . 506  
 Gardner, Richard N . . . 477  
 Horsey, Outerbridge . . . 506  
 Korry, Edward M . . . 505  
 Manning, Robert J . . . 500  
 McGhee, George C . . . 493  
 Porter, William J . . . 505  
 Rivkin, William R . . . 506  
 Rowan, Carl T . . . 505  
 Rusk, Secretary . . . 467, 485  
 Torbert, Horace G., Jr . . . 506  
 Trezise, Philip H . . . 497  
 Watt, James . . . 505  
 Withers, Charles D . . . 505  
 Yates, Sidney R . . . 505

SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPT  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
RBB DEC -6-

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)



the  
Department  
of  
State

*Fact Sheet* - SOUTHEAST ASIA

The countries of Southeast Asia are the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Kingdom of Laos, the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

This 16-page leaflet, illustrated with a map of Southeast Asia, describes the land and the people, their political and economic development, their battle to retain independence in the face of continuous Communist pressures, and the importance of this area to the free world.

Publication 7473

10 cents

Africa's Unfinished Struggle  
for Freedom: The Real Issues

A 16-page leaflet containing an address by Robert C. Good, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for African Affairs, Department of State, in which the following issues are discussed: The establishment of a new basis of relations with the former colonial power; the building of the new state; the creation of a new system of states in independent Africa; the relationship of Africa to the East-West struggle, and the problem of expanding the rights of the populations in the southern third of Africa.

Publication 7490

10 cents

*Order Form*

Please send me the following copies:

\_\_\_\_\_ *Fact Sheet—SOUTHEAST ASIA*

Publication 7473 10 cents

\_\_\_\_\_ *Africa's Unfinished Struggle  
for Freedom: The Real Issues*

Publication 7490 10 cents

*Enclosed find:*

\$ \_\_\_\_\_  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Street Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City, Zone, and State: \_\_\_\_\_



# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1241

April 8, 1963

**THE PRESIDENTS' MEETING AT SAN JOSE** • *Statements by President Kennedy and Text of Declaration of Central America* . . . . . 511

**DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGING NATIONS OF AFRICA** • *by Assistant Secretary Williams* . . . . . 541

**THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN POLITICAL DISPUTES** • *by Joseph J. Sisco* . . . . . 529

**THE UNITED NATIONS FINANCIAL CRISIS** • *by Richard N. Gardner* . . . . . 535

**THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS VALUE TO THE UNITED STATES** • *Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson* . . . . . 522

*For index see inside back cover*

AL  
RECORD  
STATES  
N POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1241 • PUBLICATION 75

April 8, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
62 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature

## The Presidents' Meeting at San José

*The Presidents of Central America, Panama, and the United States met at San José, Costa Rica, March 18-20. Following is a statement regarding the meeting which President Kennedy read at his news conference at Washington on March 21, together with addresses and remarks he made while he was in Costa Rica and the text of the Declaration of Central America, approved by the Presidents on March 19. Presidents attending the meeting were Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica, Julio Adalberto Rivera of El Salvador, Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes of Guatemala, Ramón Villeda Morales of Honduras, Luís Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua, Roberto F. Chiari of Panama, and John F. Kennedy of the United States. The President-elect of Nicaragua, René Schick Gutiérrez, was also present. All the Presidents were accompanied by their foreign ministers.*

### NEWS CONFERENCE, MARCH 21

Last night I returned from a 3-day meeting in San José, Costa Rica, with the Presidents of five Central American Republics and Panama. This was a most useful meeting. For the first time a President of the United States journeyed to Central America and conferred with all of the leaders of this vital area, which, in terms of history, geography, common interest, and common goals, is as closely allied with the United States as any area in the world. We agreed to continue our efforts under the Alliance for Progress, to build and strengthen the machinery for economic cooperation with and among the nations of Central America and Panama, including the creation of a unified economic community in Central America. And we also agreed on the necessity for measures to halt the flow of agents, money, arms, and propaganda from Cuba to Central America.

Every nation present was determined that we would both protect ourselves against immediate danger and go forward with the great

work of constructing dynamic, progressive societies, immune to the false promises of communism. This is the fourth Latin American country which I have visited. Here, as in all the others, we found a spontaneous outpouring of friendship and affection for the United States; and here, as in all the others, we saw impressive evidence of the work now being made and done under the Alliance for Progress.

Each trip makes it clear that Latin Americans, by an overwhelming majority, are ready to work, to sacrifice, to fight if necessary, to maintain their own freedom and to build societies which serve the welfare of all their people. They lack only the full measure of resources necessary to build a hemisphere where all can be secure and free. They know that they bear the fundamental responsibility for their own welfare and progress, but the receptions we have received in Costa Rica, in Mexico, in Venezuela, and in Colombia demonstrate that they also know that we in the United States today have a deep concern for their problems, a common dedication to their aspirations, and a faith-

ful commitment to help them in their efforts. For all these reasons, I return from San José with increased confidence that we will continue to live in a hemisphere of independent, firm, and faithful friends.

## ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MARCH 18

White House press release (San José) dated March 18

Mr. President, I want to express my warm appreciation to you and to the people of Costa Rica for your welcome to us today.

About 500 years ago, Christopher Columbus, after having discovered Costa Rica, turned from Panama and began his last journey home. He described this fourth voyage as *el Alto Viaje*, the high voyage, and I feel in a very real sense that this is a high voyage for all of us who meet today in this free and democratic country. Our high voyage, Mr. President, is not to seek new lands to conquer but to make sure that old lands remain free. We don't seek gold for a few in our voyage; we seek a better life for all of our people.

Mr. President, the purpose of our meeting is, as you have suggested, to see what our countries, working together—the United States and the countries of the isthmus—we working together can do for our people to make sure that, along with a system of political independence, hand in hand will go economic well-being.

It is our responsibility in this hemisphere, in this isthmus, in my own country in the 1960's, to demonstrate that economic prosperity is the handmaiden of political liberty. That is the responsibility of all of us. If we meet that responsibility, then this country and all countries like it in this hemisphere will remain free. If we do not meet this responsibility, then their inevitable fate will be one of enslavement by those who already have indicated their desire to crush out independence in this hemisphere.

So this meeting is most vital, and I want you to know, Mr. President, that I come here today not only with the Members of the Congress and the Secretary of State and others, but I come here today with 180 million fellow Americans who want this hemisphere to be free and who want this hemisphere to be an example to a

watching world in the crucial years of this century and this decade.

And, Mr. President, I want to express again our thanks to you. We could not feel more at home a thousand miles from the United States than here in Costa Rica.

## PRESIDENTS' MEETING

### President Kennedy's Opening Statement, March 18

White House press release (San José) dated March 18

I think the extraordinary statements which we have heard this afternoon will serve to illuminate for the people of this hemisphere, and particularly for the people of the United States, the harsh and striking challenges we face in these Republics and in the other Republics of this hemisphere in attempting to improve the life of our people. The statements that have been made today I think serve as a call to action by all of us, north and south, to move ahead in these days before time passes by.

In 1825, a son of El Salvador and a citizen of Central America—Antonio José Canas—the first minister accredited by the United Provinces of Central America to the United States, delivered an invitation to Secretary of State Henry Clay. He asked him to send representatives to the first Inter-American Congress at Panamá, a meeting at which, he said, the struggling new nations of this hemisphere "might consider upon and adopt the best plan for defending the states of the New World from foreign aggression, and . . . raise them to that elevation of wealth and power, which, from their resources, they may attain."

Today, 138 years later, we are gathered in this theater in pursuit of those same goals—the preservation of our independence, the extension of freedom, and the elevation of the welfare of our citizens to a level as high as "from our resources" we can attain. And today I have come from the United States at the invitation of a Central America which, with Panama, is rapidly attaining a unity of purpose, effort, and achievement which has been unknown since the dissolution of that earliest federation.

That early conference did not achieve all its goals. But from it flowed the dream and creation of Bolívar, and Canas, and José Cecilio

le Valle of Costa Rica—the dream which became the inter-American system; and this system has been the most successful, the most fruitful, and the most enduring of international order in the history of the world.

We can say this because every effort to reimpose the despotisms of the Old World on the people of the New has ultimately been beaten back; because within this system 20 Republics have attained the full recognition of their dignity as sovereign nations; and because this system has maintained an unmatched record of peaceful relations among its members. There have been occasional conflicts to mar this record. But nowhere else have nations lived as neighbors with so little hostility and warfare. And today the principles of nonintervention and the peaceful resolution of disputes have been so firmly imbedded in our tradition that the heroic democracy in which we meet today can pursue its national goals without an armed force to guard its frontiers. In few other spots in the world would this be true.

We have not attained this strength by merely trying to protect what was already won, to preserve the gains of the past, to maintain the *tatus quo*. If these were our system's goals, it would inevitably have crumbled as old orders crumbled. Instead, it has survived, prospered, and grown—despite wars and revolutions, despite changing ideologies and changing technologies, despite shifts in power and shifts in wealth—because it has itself been an instrument of change, profound revolutionary change which has molded the history of this hemisphere and shaped the thinking of men seeking freedom and dignity in all lands. As each powerful new wave of ideas and aspirations has swept across our shores, the inter-American system has been able to translate these ideas and aspirations into a working reality for our people. In this respect it has been unique among efforts at world collaboration. That is why it has endured in the past and must endure in the future.

In the first three centuries of our history the seeds of Western civilization and culture were planted here.

In the next century we established an inter-American system which helped to complete and maintain our freedom from foreign rule. This

freedom has often been challenged—as today it is challenged in Cuba. But with the help of dedicated and brave men—men such as those who drove out Maximilian or men such as those who prevented the Spanish reconquest in 1866, men such as Costa Rica's Mora, who helped to drive out William Walker—with such help, we have destroyed all efforts at foreign conquest in the past, as we will ultimately triumph over the new conquerors of today.

In the 50 years following its creation, the inter-American system worked to establish the political equality and national dignity of all its members, to extend political democracy, and to strengthen the principle that no nation should forcibly impose its will upon another. Those goals have been largely met. The equality of sovereign states is accepted by all. Intervention and force have been renounced. Machinery of peaceful settlement has been strengthened. Democracy rules in most of our lands. It will ultimately prevail over the last vestiges of tyranny in every land in this hemisphere.

Now, in our own time, the inter-American system faces old foes and new challenges; and it is again demonstrating the capacity for change which has always given it strength. The foes are stronger and more determined than ever before, and the challenges are more difficult, more complex, and more burdensome. For today we are faced not merely with the protection of new nations but with the remolding of ancient societies, not only with the destruction of political enemies but with the destruction of poverty, hunger, ignorance, and disease, not alone with the creation of national dignity but with the preservation of human dignity.

To meet this enormous challenge, the peoples of the Americas have fashioned an *Alianza para el Progreso*, an alliance in which all the American states have mobilized their resources and energies to secure land for the landless, education for those without schools, and a faster rate of economic growth within a society where all can share in the fruits of progress.

Here in Central America we have already begun to move toward the goals of the *Alianza*.

You have made enormous strides toward the creation of a common market of 13 million people. New regional institutions have been

created; a central bank has been established; and centralized planning and direction are going ahead in education, finance, and many other fields. I congratulate you on your effort to reestablish an historic unity to meet new needs; and I pledge my Government's continued assistance to that great effort.

In addition you have begun to formulate the long-range economic development plans essential to the success of the *Alianza*. The organization of the Central American Joint Planning Mission gives new impetus to planning on a regional development scale.

In nearly every country represented here, new land-reform or tax-reform programs have been adopted in an effort to meet the basic pledges of increased social justice contained in the Charter of Punta del Este<sup>1</sup> and demanded by all of our people.

In the 2-year period beginning July 1961, under programs supported by the United States as part of its contribution to the alliance, almost 3,000 new classrooms will have been built in the nations represented here today; almost a million new books have been distributed; and tomorrow we will begin to distribute more than 2 million more to children hungry for learning. Much more remains to be done.

Some 7,600 new homes will have been built during this 2-year period under *Alianza* programs in these nations—but much more remains to be done.

Three-quarters of a million children will have been fed—but many are still hungry.

Six thousand new teachers have been trained, as well as many thousands of agricultural workers, public-health and other public administrators. Still more are needed.

During the last 18 months almost 3 million people in Central America—farmers, workers, children, and slum dwellers—have received some form of direct benefit under the *Alianza*, and almost \$250 million of external resources have been committed in support of the alliance in Central America and Panama, to help strengthen the basic structure of the economy and at the same time meet the basic needs of the people for improved health, education, housing, and institutions.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

Finally, a revolutionary worldwide agreement to stabilize the price of coffee<sup>2</sup> has been entered into which we in the United States are determined to make work—to protect your most vital source of export earnings. As every speaker here today has said, every one of these countries sell their agricultural commodities in a sense at wholesale, and buy their manufactured goods at retail, and pay the freight both ways. And we are also willing to move ahead on agreements stabilizing the prices of other commodities, so that your future prosperity will not depend on the often destructive fluctuation of prices beyond your control.

Tomorrow, at El Bosque, we will see with our own eyes how the *Alianza* enters into the lives of citizens of Costa Rica, providing them with new homes in which they and their families can find decent shelter for the first time.

We shall continue under the alliance to build economies more balanced and less dependent on one or two export commodities. To this end we must push forward plans for industrialization, greater crop diversification, stronger educational facilities, and better utilization of resources.

Yet we cannot be, and I know none of us are, satisfied with the progress we have made. Peoples who have waited centuries for opportunity and dignity cannot wait much longer. And unless those of us now making an effort are willing to redouble our efforts, unless the rich are willing to use some of their riches more wisely, unless the privileged are willing to yield up their privileges to the common good, unless the young and the educated are given opportunities to use their education, and unless governments are willing to dedicate themselves tirelessly to the tasks of governing efficiently and developing swiftly, then let us realize our *Alianza* will fail, and with it will fall the society of free nations which our forefathers labored to build.

Unfortunately, while this new endeavor goes forward we are also confronted by one of the oldest of our enemies. For, at the very time that newly independent nations rise in the Caribbean, the people of Cuba have been forcibly compelled to submit to a new imperialism, more

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 1, 1963, p. 493.

utless, more powerful, and more deadly in its pursuit of power than any this hemisphere has known. Just when it was hoped that Cuba was about to enter upon a new era of democracy and social justice, the Soviet Union, through its Cuban puppets, absorbed the Cuban nation into its empire—and it now seeks to extend its rule to the shores of the continent itself.

But other foreign powers have discovered that the American hemisphere is not fertile ground for foreign tyranny and that any effort to pread such rule will meet with fierce and unyielding resistance. For Americans will not easily yield up those freedoms which they shed so much blood to achieve.

At the OAS [Organization of American States], at this meeting, and wherever Americans gather to consult about the future of their continent, we will continue to strengthen the structure of resistance to subversion. I am hopeful that at this meeting we will again increase our capacity to prevent the infiltration of Cuban agents, money, and propaganda. We will build a wall around Cuba—not a wall of mortar or brick or barbed wire, but a wall of dedicated men determined to protect their freedom and sovereignty. And in this effort, as in all the other necessary efforts, I can assure you the United States will play its full part and carry its full burden.

In 1822 Bolívar, the father of the inter-American system, said this:

United in heart, in spirit and in aims, this Continent . . . must raise its eyes . . . to peer into the centuries which lie ahead. It can then contemplate with pride those future generations of men, happy and free, enjoying to the full the blessings that heaven bestows on this earth, and recalling in their hearts the protectors and liberators of our day.

My friends and colleagues, today we meet, representing seven of the great Republics of America, united in spirit and in aims. We are confident of our ultimate success in protecting our freedom, in raising the living standards of our citizens, in beginning a new era of hope in American history. Secure in that confidence, we too can look forward to future centuries knowing that our descendants may also gratefully recall in their hearts the “protectors and liberators” of our day.

## Text of Declaration

Press release 145 dated March 20

### DECLARATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA

The Presidents of the Republics of Central America and Panama are determined to improve the well-being of their peoples, and are aware that such a task demands a dynamic economic and social development program based on the carefully planned use of human, natural and financial resources. It also depends on important changes of the economic, social and administrative structure, within the framework of the principles that govern our democratic institutions. They have met with the President of the United States of America in San José, Costa Rica, to review the difficulties which impede the achievement of these objectives as well as the progress thus far made in the Isthmus since the integration programs began and since the Alliance for Progress was jointly established by the Republics of the Hemisphere in August 1961.

Following an analysis of the situation, the Presidents of the Republics of Central America, convinced that the best hope for the development of the region is through economic integration, and bearing in mind the extraordinary efforts made toward this end in the last decade and of the importance of accelerating over-all economic growth, pledge to their peoples:

—To accelerate establishment of a customs union to perfect the functioning of the Central American Common Market;

—To formulate and implement national economic and social development plans, coordinating them at the Central American level, and progressively to carry out regional planning for the various sectors of the economy;

—To establish a monetary union and common fiscal, monetary and social policies within the program of economic integration;

—To cooperate in programs to improve the prices of primary export commodities;

—To complete as soon as possible the reforms needed to achieve the objectives set forth in the Act of Bogotá and the Charter of Punta del Este especially in the fields of agriculture, taxation, education, public administration, and social welfare;

—To take the above measures with a view to achieving the creation of a Central American Economic Community which will establish relationships with other nations or regional groups having similar objectives.

The Central American Presidents affirm that the economic integration movement in itself constitutes an effort which is laying the groundwork for regional planning in which sectoral plans of common interest to the Isthmian Republics serve as a point of departure. Their governments have already taken measures to coordinate national plans so that their execution will aid rather than impede the achievement of the objectives of the economic integration program. It is intended that the first global plan for harmonious regional development be presented as soon as possible for evaluation in accordance with the procedures set



forth in the Charter of Punta del Este. Meanwhile, the Central American Presidents declare their resolve to proceed immediately with their sectoral plans and with projects of interest to the Isthmus. The President of the United States agrees to consider a long-term loan to enable the appropriate Central American regional organizations, principally the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, to conduct economic feasibility surveys relative to this program of regional development.

The Presidents of Central America reaffirm their hope that the Republic of Panama will participate more closely in the economic integration movement, and the President of Panama declares that his Government fully reaffirms its support of the program of Central American economic integration. He further declares that his Government is prepared to initiate immediate negotiations with the Governments of the general treaty of economic integration as a whole with a view to concluding a special agreement to facilitate the association of his country with this program.

The President of the United States is impressed by the determination of the Presidents of the Central American Republics to move as rapidly as possible toward the integration of the economies of their countries, and of their intention to formulate a regional economic development plan within which national plans would be coordinated, and he believes that the coordination of their respective monetary, fiscal, economic and social policies is a great step forward in the achievement of this objective as well as toward the achievement of the goals set forth in the Charter of Punta del Este.

The President of the United States is prepared to offer the greatest cooperation in the preparation and implementation of the regional and national development projects of Central America and Panama and declares that his government will intensify its joint efforts with the governments and appropriate regional organizations in order to extend to them increased technical and financial assistance for this purpose within the framework of the broad regional program entitled "Joint Exposition of the Presidents of Central America" and the development plan being prepared by Panama.

To this end he proposes a fund for Central American economic integration, to be made available through the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, to which the United States would make an immediate substantial initial contribution, to assist in carrying out regional development projects in accordance with various sectoral plans now being developed by the regional organizations.

For the longer term, he also declares that as soon as the Central American Republics have formulated an over-all regional development plan, and as soon as this plan has been evaluated favorably in accordance with the procedures established in the Charter of Punta del Este, the United States will enlarge and expand its participation in the fund and will work with the Cen-

tral American countries in obtaining other Free World resources so that the agreed plan can be effectively implemented.

The Presidents have discussed the fundamental importance to economic development of a vigorous and freely-competitive private sector, and declare their intention of taking the necessary steps to encourage private investment which is prepared to accept the normal responsibilities compatible with the development of a modern economy. These measures include establishment of regional trade and promotion offices for the specific purpose of attracting private foreign investment. They also agree that development banks or corporations should be established in each country as soon as possible to provide credit on reasonable terms for the growth of private industry, the President of the United States offering financial assistance to their operation.

Concurrently they agree that economic and social conditions should be created to assure labor of an improved living standard through a better distribution of national income. Furthermore they agree to encourage and support free democratic labor organizations as a means of contributing toward greater worker participation in the common effort on behalf of the general welfare.

The Presidents also agree that opportunities should be given to the people of Central America to build and purchase their homes. There exist in Central America national savings and loan institutions which have been assisted under the Alliance for Progress, and others are about to be created. In order to give further support for these national efforts, the Presidents of Central America suggest that a regional home loan department, which would be a secondary source of home mortgage funds, should be created as a division within the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the President of the United States agrees to offer technical and financial assistance to it.

The Isthmian Presidents indicate that Central American institutions should be strengthened as much as possible to enable them to play a major role in training the personnel who will be needed to put into effect the plans for integration of the Isthmus. A large part of the responsibility for training will devolve on the Superior Council of Central American Universities (CSUCA). Recognizing, moreover, that trained manpower at all levels is needed for economic development, they agree to the proposal of the President of the United States to establish a multi-million dollar scholarship fund for vocational training in agriculture and in industry for young people of outstanding ability who can not afford the normal expenses of such training, to which the United States will offer substantial financial assistance.

The Presidents note the primary role of coffee in the economies of Central America and the importance of the International Coffee Agreement for the achievement of stable and remunerative prices.

They reiterate the intention of their governments to fully support the agreement so that it will serve as an effective instrument to improve the earnings of exporting countries from coffee and to promote their economic development.

Other primary commodity problems exist and the Isthmian Presidents will hand to President Kennedy studies on these problems.

President Kennedy agrees he will have them reviewed immediately on his return to Washington.

The Presidents, notwithstanding the fact that present conditions are favorable to undertake a solution of the economic and social problems of the Isthmus through joint action of the countries of the area, believe that all of them are faced with an externally provoked political problem, which by its very nature can imperil the exercise of representative democracy and the normal development of the plans in which their respective governments are engaged to attain as rapidly as possible the highest levels of economic and social justice and to bring to full realization the plans for Central American integration. Consequently, the Presidents declare that in order to carry out their programs for economic and social betterment, it is essential to enforce the measures to meet subversive aggression originating in the focal points of Communist agitation which Soviet imperialism may maintain in Cuba or in any other place in America.

The Presidents note that the Council of the Organization of American States is actively engaged in maintaining vigilance over the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this Hemisphere as requested by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers.<sup>3</sup> They express special interest in early completion by the Council of the OAS of the studies on Castro-Communist subversion in the Hemisphere, and particularly in early action by the Council on recommendations to the governments for counteracting those activities in these areas.

The Presidents agree that Ministers of Government of the seven countries should meet as soon as possible to develop and put into immediate effect common measures to restrict the movement of their nationals to and from Cuba, and the flow of materiel, propaganda and funds from that country.

This meeting will take action, among other things, to secure stricter travel and passport controls, including appropriate limitations in passports and other travel documents on travel to Cuba. Cooperative arrangements among not only the countries meeting here but also among all OAS members will have to be sought to restrict more effectively not only these movements of people for subversive purposes but also to prevent insofar as possible the introduction of money, propaganda, materials, and arms, arrangements for additional sea and air surveillance and interception within territorial waters will be worked out with special cooperation from the United States.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

In addition to these measures, a more rapid and complete exchange of intelligence information on the movement of people, propaganda, money and arms between Cuba and our countries is to be developed by the Meeting of Ministers.

The Presidents voice their deep sympathy for the people of Cuba, and reaffirm their conviction that Cuba soon will join the family of free nations. The Presidents recall how, in 1959, the Cuban people were fired with the hope of a purely Cuban revolution that was to bring them freedom and social justice; honest government and free elections; fair sharing of goods; opportunities for all; more schools and jobs, better health and housing, and constructive land reform not collectivization of the land. In sum, a progressive republic which, in the words of Martí, would be "*con todos y para todos*". The Presidents declare that they have no doubt that the genuine Cuban revolution will live again, and its betrayers will fall into the shadows of history, and the martyred people of the oppressed isle of the Caribbean will be free from foreign Communist domination, free to choose for themselves the kind of government they wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the Hemisphere in the common undertaking to secure for each individual the liberty, dignity, and well-being which are the objectives of all free societies.

Finally the Presidents solemnly reaffirm their adherence to the principles established by the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro, the Charter of the OAS, in the Act of Bogotá and in the Charter of Punta del Este.

March 19, 1963

## VISITS TO HOUSING PROJECT AND UNIVERSITY

### El Bosque, March 19

White House press release (San José) dated March 19

We celebrate here today a great victory, and that is a victory for the human spirit; for these houses, these medical units, these books, are today freeing men and women from centuries of bondage and poverty which has imprisoned their capacity, their happiness, and their future, and I am proud, as a citizen of the United States, to be here in Costa Rica taking part in this great effort.

As a citizen of a sister Republic, as a strong believer in the democratic faith, we take pride in the democracy of this Republic and the other Republics of this hemisphere, but we know that our enjoyment of freedom is not so much a gift from the past as a challenge for the future, not

so much a reward for old victories but a goal for new struggles, not so much an inheritance from our forefathers as an obligation to those of us who follow, for democracy is never a final achievement. It is a call to effort, to sacrifice, and a willingness to live and to die in its defense.

Every generation of the Americas has shaped new goals for democracy to suit the demands of a new age. These goals for today's America are summed up in the words *Alianza para el Progreso*. They call for an end to social institutions which deny men and women the opportunity to live decent lives. They call for a better standard of living for all of our citizens in order that they may produce and live up to their capabilities. They call for an end to the remnants of dictatorship in this hemisphere, and they call for an unyielding defense against all those who seek to impose a new tyranny in this hemisphere. They call, in short, for a recognition that no man's job is done until every man in this hemisphere shares an equal opportunity to pursue his hopes as far as his capacities will carry him. That is the commitment of this country and my own, and the commitment of our sister Republics.

It is sometimes easy for us, living in our nations' capitals, to become disheartened about the nature of the struggle, but it is here with you in this project, sharing in your achievements, participating in your labors, that we renew our faith and determination to succeed, for in this project hundreds of people will move into decent housing. By October first of this year, almost 8,000 people will have moved into homes financed under the Alliance for Progress and built by the labor of the people of Costa Rica, and in every country in this hemisphere similar housing programs must go forward. These medical units which we have seen are only a few of the 60 which will be in operation throughout Central America and Panama this year. They will provide 4 million medical examinations a year, reaching almost a third of the population of the isthmus. In them, doctors and nurses will bring modern medicine to our people who have had no protection against disability or disease, entering hundreds of villages where no doctor has been. Approximately 8,000 people

in Costa Rica already have received treatment under these units.

These books we have distributed to these children are a token of a massive program which will bring more than 2 million new schoolbooks to the children of Central America and Panama. With these books millions of children for the first time will have the tools to conquer life and make something of their future.

Education, homes, jobs, health, security—those are the things for which this country stands. Those are the things in which the people of the United States strongly believe. Those are the things which together we must achieve for our people, and I want to assure you through the Alliance for Progress we will stand and work shoulder to shoulder in making this hemisphere an example of what democracy can mean.

*Viva Costa Rica! Arriba Costa Rica!*

#### **University of Costa Rica, March 20**

White House press release (San José) dated March 20

I would like first to present to you my colleagues from the United States Congress who have traveled with us on this voyage of the last 3 days, and I would like to have them meet you

First, I would like to present the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the former president of the University of Arkansas Senator [J. W.] Fulbright.

I would like to present the leader of the opposition in the United States Senate, but we both agree that we love Costa Rica, Senator [Bourke B.] Hickenlooper.

The chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Latin America of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, formerly dean of the University of Oregon Law School, Senator Wayne Morse.

Congressman [Armistead I.] Selden [Jr.] who is chairman of the House Committee on Latin America, Congressman Selden of Alabama.

And the Republican leader of that committee in the House of Representatives, Congressman William Mailliard.

And the United States Ambassador [Raymond Telles].

It is a great pleasure to leave Washington where I am lectured to by professors, to come

to Costa Rica where I can speak to students.

I think it is appropriate that the first speech by any United States President to any student audience in Latin America should take place at this center of learning in a nation so dedicated to democracy, and I am honored that you have invited me here today.

For the past 3 days the Presidents of seven American nations have been grappling with the central question which faces this country, my own country, and my hemisphere, and that is whether, under a system of political liberty, we can solve the economic problems that press upon our people. We are embarked upon a great adventure together, and that is the task of demonstrating to a watching world that free men can conquer the ancient enemies of man, poverty, ignorance, and hunger; of protecting freedom against those who would destroy it; of bringing hope to those who search for hope; of extending liberty to those who lack it.

This is an immense task, filled with difficulty and hardship and danger, but you have been given an opportunity to shape the destiny of man which has been given to no other generation in the last 2,000 years. And as a fellow American, I know that you welcome that responsibility and that opportunity. What Franklin Roosevelt said to the American people in the 1930's I say to you now: This generation of Americans, your generation of Americans, has a rendezvous with destiny. I am confident that you will meet that rendezvous, for I can remember my own country when it was quite different from our country today. It was not so many years ago that I was a university student as you are now, and at that time only 1 in every 10 American farms was electrified, half of the farmers in our Southland were tenant farmers and sharecroppers, thousands of families in the Tennessee Valley had cash incomes of less than \$100 a year, and all this in addition to a great depression which threw 12 million men and women out of work and had 20 million Americans on relief—that in that time I was at the university.

Then, under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt, we carried through a great New Deal for the United States. One program after another brought an end to tenant farm-

ing in the United States, electrified nearly every farm in our country, transformed the poverty-ridden Tennessee Valley into one of the richest agricultural and industrial areas in the United States. It demonstrated in those great years the immense power of affirmative, free government, the power which adds the idea of social responsibility to individual liberty.

The history of your country in the last years has demonstrated that same quality. And if the task of progress with freedom is more complex, more subtle, and more difficult than the promise of progress without freedom, we are unafraid of that challenge.

We are committed to four basic principles in this hemisphere in the Alliance for Progress. The first is the right of every nation to govern itself, to be free from outside dictation and coercion, to mold its own economy and society in any fashion consistent with the will of the people.

Second is the right of every individual citizen to political liberty, the right to speak his own views, to worship God in his own way, to select the government which rules him, and to reject it when it no longer serves the need of a nation.

And third is the right to social justice, the right of every citizen to participate in the progress of his nation. This means land for the landless and education for those who are denied their education today in this hemisphere. It means that ancient institutions which perpetuate privilege must give way. It means that rich and poor alike must bear the burden and the opportunity of building a nation. It will not be easy to achieve social justice, but freedom cannot last without it.

And the fourth principle of the alliance is the right of every nation to make economic progress with modern technological means. This is the job, it seems to me, of all of us in this hemisphere in this decade, all of you who have the opportunity to study at this university, and that is, as I said at the beginning, to demonstrate that we can provide a better life for our people under a system of freedom, to demonstrate that it is our adversaries who must build walls to hold their people in, who must deny their people the right not only of freedom

but economic advancement as well. It is no accident that this year in Cuba agricultural production will be 25 percent below what it was 5 years ago. The great myth of the 1950's was that through a system of communism it was possible to produce a better life for our people—through a denial of political freedom we could provide more material advances; but the fifties showed us well, in China, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, East Berlin, and Cuba, that when you deny political and social freedom you also deny the right to advance economically.

*Gracias.* I want to express the thanks of all of us to you for having us here today. Occasionally universities are regarded as dangerous places for presidents, and we are grateful to you for your warm welcome to all of us on this occasion. We also want to express our thanks to the people of Costa Rica. Every one of us will go home with the most profound impression of what a strong, vital people can accomplish, and I think that this journey to Costa Rica has illuminated the minds of 180 million people of what a great opportunity and privilege we have to be associated together in our common cause. *Viva Costa Rica! Arriba Costa Rica! Muchas gracias.*

#### **DEPARTURE STATEMENT, MARCH 20**

White House press release (San José) dated March 20

I want to express my very warm appreciation to all of you for your kindness to all of us who came from North America to this conference. I think we go back greatly heartened and encouraged by the conversations we have had, by the strong feeling of friendship which we felt across the table, and also by the realization that although we face difficult struggles in this hemisphere and throughout the world, we are not alone and are accompanied on this voyage by fast friends.

May I say, Mr. Presidents, that we leave here greatly encouraged because we recognize that you are committed to the same objectives which so involve us all, and that is the welfare of our people, particularly the people of our countries and the people of this hemisphere. We are joined together by nature, by a common inheritance, a common experience, a common conviction

for the future, a common hope for the future, and I think it is a source of great strength to meet here in the isthmus and in the Central American Republics men who are committed to these same objectives, the preservation of freedom, in this decade of decision.

Mr. Presidents, I know that we all recognize that, regardless of our own efforts, in the final analysis it depends upon the strength of our people, their vitality, their energy, their willingness to assume the heavy burdens for great results, and I think it is this part of the trip which has been most striking. I recognize that the people of Costa Rica share an inheritance and a history with the people of the other Central American Republics and Panama; so we judge them by what we have seen here in Costa Rica.

I must say, Mr. President, I know of no more vital, energetic, warmhearted, vigorous, hopeful people than the great citizens of this great democracy. The impression that we, all of us from the United States carry back is of the hands of friendship which have been extended to us and the strong feeling that, while we came in a sense as strangers 3 days ago, we leave tonight as friends.

So we say goodbye and many thanks.  
*Hasta luego and Viva Costa Rica!*

#### **U.S. Opposes Attacks on Cuba by Splinter Refugee Groups**

*Following is a U.S. Government statement issued by the Department of State on March 17 regarding the reported Alpha 66 attack on a Soviet ship and on Soviet installations in Cuba alleged to have happened on the night of March 18.*

Press release 144 dated March 19

The United States Government is strongly opposed to hit-and-run attacks on Cuba by splinter refugee groups. It has stated repeatedly that such raids do not weaken the grip of the Communist regime on Cuba—indeed they may strengthen it. Nothing we have heard of the latest incident changes our judgment on this matter. Rather it reinforces our belief that these irresponsible and ineffective forays serve

to increase the difficulty of dealing with the unsatisfactory situation which now exists in the Caribbean.

The United States Government is investigating fully to determine whether any violation of United States law is involved.

## **U.S. Regrets Misinterpretation of Statement on Brazil**

*Statement by Acting Secretary Ball*

Press release 143 dated March 19

Earlier this month the Department of State submitted a statement<sup>1</sup> regarding the political situation in Brazil to the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. This statement was released last week. Its timing has given rise to speculation that it was intended to influence the course of the current financial talks with Brazilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas. This speculation is totally groundless.

The statement was released by the subcommittee as part of its hearings. The timing was independently determined by the subcommittee. The fact that the release occurred at the time of the Finance Minister's visit was totally coincidental.

It is unfortunate that one sentence from the statement should have been torn out of context and misinterpreted to suggest that Communists have a substantial influence on Brazilian Government policy. The statement neither says nor implies this, nor is this the opinion of the United States Government.

As President Kennedy has repeatedly emphasized, Brazil occupies a key position in the Western Hemisphere and in the Western World. It is of the highest importance to both countries that the long and valued tradition of close and constructive collaboration between us be maintained and strengthened. The resolution of the difficult issue of constitutional powers on the basis of the popular plebiscite of January 6 gives promise that the Brazilian Government will be able to press forward effectively with a program for economic stabilization and development which can enlist the fruitful cooperation

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

of our own Government within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. It would be most regrettable if minor and unwarranted misunderstandings were to interfere with the strong and solid cooperation between the two largest democracies of the Western Hemisphere.

## **Admiral Smith Appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic**

White House press release dated March 12

The North Atlantic Council on March 12 appointed Adm. Harold Page Smith, United States Navy, as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Adm. Robert L. Dennison.

The Council was informed of the contents of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the President of the United States to the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Chairman of the Permanent Council, in which the President asked the member governments to agree to release Admiral Dennison, who will be placed on the retired list of the United States Navy on May 1, 1963. The Council agreed with great regret to release Admiral Dennison from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, a position which he has held since being appointed by the Council on February 29, 1960. They expressed to Admiral Dennison, in the name of the governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him.

At the Council's request for the nomination of an officer of the United States Navy for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, the President nominated Admiral Smith for consideration by the Council as successor to Admiral Dennison. Admiral Smith is now serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

The Council concurred in this nomination and on March 12 adopted a resolution appointing Admiral Smith as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, as successor to Admiral Dennison with the same powers and functions. The appointment is to become effective on April 30, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## The United Nations: Its Value to the United States

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to report to you again on the work of the United Nations.

As you know, the United Nations is a big subject, one which can be approached from many points of view. From one point of view it is a symbol of the aspirations of most of humanity for peace, for decency and human dignity. From another point of view it is an institution of 110 members pioneering the arts of parliamentary diplomacy on a near-universal level. From still another, it is a very large operating mechanism performing such varied activities as stopping a war, spraying tropical villages with DDT to combat malaria, and drafting a convention on some aspect of human rights. There is even a point of view—albeit it is a narrow one—from which the United Nations appears to be the symbol of wicked one-worldliness, a sinister threat to the national sovereignty, and a joint convention of international do-gooders and bobby-soxers.

So, like a novelist approaching some universal theme, anyone preparing to say or write something about the United Nations must somehow come to grips with his material, determine his point of view, decide where to focus—what to put in and what to leave out. In the process, many arbitrary choices must be made.

My arbitrary choice for this occasion, which I hope will meet with the committee's approval,

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 13 (U.S./U.N. press release 4159 dated Mar. 15).

is to focus briefly but sharply on this question: How and to what extent does our membership in the United Nations serve the foreign policy interests of the United States of America? Or, more crudely, Mr. Chairman, what's in it for us? I think this coincides with your assignment.

I make no apology to the most sensitive supporter of the United Nations for phrasing it that way. After all, if the very considerable effort and time and money which we have invested in the United Nations has not been a good investment from the U.S. point of view, then we should say so and behave accordingly—as I feel sure, every other member does.

### Test of "What's in It for Us"

I shall try to test this question of what's in it for us against two criteria: first, against the record of the 17th General Assembly, which had just over 100 items on its agenda; and second, against the roles of the U.N. in two of the greatest crises of recent history—the collapse of the Congo and the discovery of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. These are tough tests: One covers a virtual compendium of the ongoing problems which beset the modern world; the other raises specific issues of peace and war in specific areas at specific times.

But before coming to these two tests of how well or how badly our membership in the U.N. serves the national interest, it is worth while to pose a prior test: Is the United Nations relevant to the real world of the second half of the 20th century? For if the United Nations does not reflect the real world, it is unlikely to be able to do anything useful about it.



What then are the dominant factors that make the real world what it is in the second half of the 20th century? I think we can limit ourselves to brief mention of five dominant facts of life in our tumultuous times:

Let me say, first is the great confrontation which goes under the name of the East-West conflict or the cold war—and the nuclear arms race which is its most dangerous manifestation. This has brought into conflict two sets of ideas about the value of human dignity which cannot be bridged philosophically. It also has brought into conflict two great and powerful nations whose national differences must be bridged politically if either is to survive. The proceedings of the United Nations consistently reflect both aspects of this so-called East-West confrontation.

The second factor dominating contemporary history is the revolutionary wave of national independence which, in an incredibly short period, has brought political independence to nearly 1 billion people, leaving less than 2 percent of the former colonial peoples in dependent status—an historic convulsion which perhaps offered communism its greatest opportunity to absorb vast areas of the world. The United Nations has itself administered a number of these changes from dependent to independent status and is deeply involved with the difficult and emotional final stages of liquidating the old colonial system and the race problems embedded in it.

The third factor is the so-called “revolution of rising expectations,” which has put a spotlight on the glaring gap between the material conditions of the rich minority and the poor majority among the world’s peoples. Some 85 percent of the entire staffs of the U.N. system is occupied with the first systematic effort at international cooperation in the field of economic and social affairs—certainly one of the great phenomena of contemporary times.

Fourth is the fantastic pace of discovery and invention, which romps ahead oblivious to the political and social consequences and which makes the demands for a decent life for all a practical proposition for the first time in history. The United Nations is concerned increasingly with the complex and little-understood

problems of how to transfer effectively science and technology from one cultural setting to another.

Fifth is the fitful emergence of a restless, teeming, volatile, frequently quarrelsome open society of nation-states—a society of enormous diversity of cultures, races, and political, economic, and social systems. The United Nations is, of course, the institutional center of this open international society—partly the cause and partly the result of the forces which impel an interdependent world into more intimate association on an expanding agenda of political and human problems.

If these are the principal factors which mold our times—the cold war, the liquidation of colonialism, the pervasive demand for a better material way of life, the thundering impact of science, and the emergence of a vast, new open society on the international plane—then we must conclude that the United Nations is indeed relevant to these times, that it is part and parcel of the contemporary scene. And being relevant, it is in a position to be effective.

Let us come, then, to the question of how effective, from our point of view. What’s in it for us? How, as the most recent example, does the record of the 17th General Assembly stand the test?

#### **How the Assembly’s Record Stands the Test**

I said a moment ago that the agenda of the 17th General Assembly was a virtual compendium of the ongoing problems of the modern world.

Listen to this list of trouble spots and sore spots: the Congo, the Gaza Strip, Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa, the Portuguese African territories, Kashmir, Yemen, West New Guinea, and the Arab refugee camps.

Mark this string of contentious issues: Chinese representation, North Korea, Hungary, colonialism, troika, and sovereignty over natural resources.

Consider, if you will, this list of universal concerns: disarmament, nuclear testing, outer space, world food, world trade, world science, and the training of manpower for economic and social development.

All of these issues, in one form or another,

came before the United Nations for some kind of action during the last General Assembly, even if each one did not appear formally on the Assembly's agenda. Many of them are among the most complex, the most intractable, the most ancient troubles of the human race. And many come to the United Nations as a court of last resort—because nobody else has been able to cope with them at all.

Obviously the United Nations did not "solve" all, or even many, of these problems; but it worked on them. On a few it took conclusive action; on some it made progress, and on others it did not.

We have made full reports on the record of the 17th General Assembly, item by item and vote by vote: I shall not take your time to repeat the record. The point to be made is simply this: The United States view was the majority view in over 80 percent of the 40 key votes cast in committees and full Assembly. On several issues we abstained, and on two extreme resolutions recommending sanctions against member states we voted against the majority.

This is the measure of the extent to which our membership in the United Nations served the foreign policy interests of the United States across the spectrum of issues represented by the agenda of the 17th General Assembly.

Meanwhile the impact of the twin crises in the Caribbean and the Himalayas raised our credit—and our credibility; had the opposite effect on the stock of the Soviet Union; improved Western Hemisphere solidarity; activated the members from NATO; and gave pause to those who tend to equate the *bona fides* of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, I am not saying for one moment that the 17th General Assembly—or any other meeting or organ of the United Nations—was the handmaiden of the Department of State. I am not even saying that there were no disappointments or no cause for apprehension; for example, we expect continuing fireworks over the hard-core cases in the remnants of European empires, and we are most gravely concerned at the lack of evidence of financial responsibility on the part of all too many members. But I am saying, most emphatically, that in no case was United States interest damaged,

in most cases our objectives were furthered in a positive fashion, and in other cases we have reason to hope for a better result on another day. In short, it was very much in our national interest to be there, paying our considerable share of the cost and exercising our considerable share of the leadership.

#### **Role of U.N. in Congo and Cuban Crises**

The political problems before the General Assembly tend to be those anguished issues which have roots in the past and drag on from year to year—so hardy or so virulent that sometimes our best efforts succeed only in keeping them from going from bad to worse.

But now I should like to discuss two crises which had sudden beginnings, which directly and immediately involved the United Nations, and which now seem to be ended—at least in the form in which they arose. I refer to those most dangerous events which raised the dire threat of great-power confrontation—and thus of nuclear war—in the Congo and the Caribbean. The point is to ask in each case whether the role of the United Nations in these crises served the foreign policy interests of the United States.

What were our aims in the Congo affair? Our aims in the Congo are the same as our aims for all of tropical Africa. They are quite simple to state: to help create an area of truly free and independent African states, safe from external aggression or subversion, working out their own destinies in their own way, cooperating with each other and with those who wish to help in their overwhelming task of progressive modernization. In the Congo, as elsewhere, this requires national unity and a reasonable degree of political stability.

Contrasted to this, the collapse of the Congo in its first week of nationhood offered these sudden prospects: national disunity, political chaos, civil disorder, social disintegration, and external penetration—prospects made to order for Communist exploitation. And because of this, the ultimate prospect for the Congo was for the forces of the nuclear powers to find themselves face to face in the heart of central Africa in the infancy of independence—about as messy and dangerous a state of affairs as one can imagine.

The story of the struggle of the United Nations—with unflinching support from this country—to bring order out of chaos in the Congo is too well known to members of this committee to review it here. I am all too conscious of every bit and every kind of criticism that has been leveled against this operation; and it has been of every kind—from honest doubts about the legal basis for U.N. action to purple propaganda and outrageous lies. I also will state that in this unprecedented, almost fantastic operation, in any historical sense, some decisions were not perfectly coordinated, some operations were not fully efficient, some judgments were not later justified, and a few actions were not excusable. My point is neither to tabulate the accomplishments nor to count the mistakes.

My point is, rather, to look at the results and state that, as of today, civil war has been replaced by national unity, political chaos has been replaced by reasonable prospects for political stability, total disorder has been replaced by order, social disintegration has been replaced by an evolving program for social progress, and the scavengers have been sent home packing. None of this is yet guaranteed to be permanent. But this is what has happened in the Congo; this is what the United States wanted to happen in the Congo; and it could not have happened under any other auspices than that of the United Nations, without the certainty or at least the risk of international war.

It therefore is difficult—indeed it is impossible—to avoid the conclusion that the foreign policy interests of the United States have been served well by the United Nations performance in the Congo crisis, and this, of course, would have been out of the question without our membership and our full support. I know no way of putting a dollar value on the restoration of peace in central Africa.

The U.N. role in the Congo was, of course, an extremely large operational task, by far the largest it has ever undertaken, involving nearly 20,000 troops from 21 nations, supported by a massive airlift and by hundreds of civilian technicians recruited through a dozen international agencies.

The U.N. role in the Cuban crisis was entirely different. Actually, the United Nations had three roles in the Cuban crisis, two of which

were played out while the third was frustrated but nonetheless useful to us. Because the naval quarantine of Cuba was the first dramatic move in that crisis, and because of the critical part played by the Organization of American States, it is easy to forget how the United Nations fitted into the pattern of these supercharged days when the world stood at the edge of the abyss in late October.

You will remember, of course, that the President called into play at one stroke all the available instruments of diplomatic action—United States military power, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and an appeal to public opinion around the world.<sup>2</sup>

The first role of the United Nations was to serve as a world forum where the facts could be laid on the table. When the Security Council met in emergency session, I was able to present the United States case not only to the members of that Council but to all other members of the United Nations who crowded that tense room, as well as to the press and the microphones and the cameras which carried our story to our own public and to every corner of the world reached by the mass media of today. Our case was right; our case was thoroughly documented; and our case was vastly strengthened as it unfolded before the bar of world opinion in the Security Council of the United Nations—the only bar of universal public opinion there is. Just how much this revelation of Soviet deceit and recklessness shocked the innocent bystanders in the cold war, I can't guess. Nor, of course, can I estimate how much this blow to confidence in Russia's word and influence among the new nations contributed to Mr. Khrushchev's decision to pull out quickly and make the best of a bad mistake.

The second role of the United Nations—or, more precisely, of the Secretary-General of the United Nations—was that of third party to the issue. At a critical moment, when the nuclear powers seemed to be set on a collision course, the Secretary-General's intervention led to the diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba and interception by our Navy. This was an indispensable first step. The mere existence of

---

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-740.

an impartial office which could perform such a service in the middle of the night at such a time is no small asset to the human race.

The third role of the United Nations in the Cuban crisis—the one which could not be played out—was that of an international inspector ready and willing to go at once to Cuba to verify the removal of the missiles. As we all know, Castro refused a United Nations presence on Cuban soil; U Thant's visit was in vain, and thus Castro prevented a quicker and cleaner liquidation of the crisis. But the fact is that at the height of this most dangerous period of the postwar world, Chairman Khrushchev agreed—even proposed—an international inspection team under United Nations auspices, a proposal to which we could quickly agree and which became part of the formula for disengagement between the United States and Soviet heads of state.<sup>3</sup> And Castro's refusal of U.N. inspection converted a quarrel between the Soviet Union and the United States into a defiance of the United Nations by Cuba.

Finally—and I won't detain you longer on this subject—the United Nations also provided a site where Mr. [John J.] McCloy and I could meet with Mr. [Vassily V.] Kuznetsov and the Soviet negotiators for those long weeks to conclude the transaction and bring about the withdrawal of the Soviet bombers.

Mr. Chairman, I should not care to speculate on how or when the Cuban crisis might have been resolved—or whether it could have been resolved—without the United Nations. But I do say that the United Nations played a large part in a complex exercise in diplomatic action which averted the threat of thermonuclear war; and for this I think we can thank our stars.

#### **U.S. Foreign Policy Interests Well Served**

Now, gentlemen, we have put the record of the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly, during the Congo crisis, and during the Cuban crisis to the test; and we have seen that, in very large measure, the performance of the U.N. served well the foreign policy interests of the United States. There was, indeed, much in it for us.

<sup>3</sup> For texts of messages exchanged between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, see *ibid.*, p. 741.

But I should prefer, in the end, not to read that record as though it were a scoreboard on which "victories" and "defeats" are recorded. I prefer to avoid the specious habit of treating the course of human affairs—even the massive conflicts in world affairs—like some sporting event which ends when the timekeeper blows his whistle.

The real world of international politics is, as you know, not that simple. We are dealing with fitful tides of history which ebb and flow. We are wrestling often with problems which, when solved in their immediate forms, promptly give rise to new forms and new problems—as witness the case of the Congo today.

We can, of course, say with assurance that, in this case or that, our policies prevailed and our objectives were gained. We can point to objective proof of progress here and there. We can show that unfriendly moves by *x* and *y* were defeated or diverted, and that in all of these cases the United Nations had a useful part to play.

But to form mature judgments as to the real value of the United Nations to the interests of the United States, it seems to me that we must raise alternatives, that we must ask questions which challenge the imagination to say what might have happened if the United Nations had not been there at all. For example:

Would the Communists have fared better or worse in their efforts to divert the independence movement into a Communist mold—their supreme opportunity to extend power—if the United Nations had not existed?

Would the prospects of peace be better or worse—in Iran, in Greece, in Korea, in Kashmir, in the Middle East, in the western Pacific, in central Africa—if there had been no United Nations during the past decade and a half?

Would United States foreign policy interests, more recently in the Congo and the Caribbean, have been served better or worse without a United Nations during the past few months?

Could the United States put its ideas, its beliefs, its policies before the watching world more—or less—effectively if the United Nations did not exist?

I shall not attempt to speculate on these rather frightening alternatives for it seems to me the questions answer themselves.

## Opportunities for U.S. in an Open Forum

But I should like to conclude my remarks with a few comments about the position of those who favor the United Nations in principle but want to withdraw or restrict our support on those relatively few occasions when the United States finds itself in a minority position.

The basic point here, of course, is that the United States does not own or control the United Nations. It is not a wing of the State Department. We are no more and no less than the most influential of the 110 members. If we were less, we would be failing to exert the influence of freedom's leader; if we were more, we would destroy the effectiveness of the U.N., which depends precisely on the fact that it is not an arm of the United States or of any other government but a truly international organization—no better or worse than the agreements which can be reached by the controlling majorities of its members.

Before such agreements are reached—or not reached—debate and negotiation bare differences and reveal similarities which frequently lead to accommodation and compromise. And I would ask: Is this not the heart of the democratic method? Is this not the parliamentary system in action? Is this not our own idea of how we are most likely to make more wise decisions than foolish ones—how the weak are most likely to be protected from the strong—how the will of the majority and the rights of the minority can both find expression without injustice to either?

The answer to these questions is yes. And if we were to pick up our marbles and go home whenever there is a disappointment, we would not only destroy the effectiveness of the U.N. but would abandon hope that nations can work out their problems most of the time by the same methods by which conflicting interests get resolved within democratic nations and communities. This would deny on the international level the principles, methods, and techniques which we swear by on the national and local levels.

Even faith in our kind of institutions would not, however, be enough to justify support for the United Nations if it worked against us. But this dilemma, happily, does not exist, and the record proves it. The fact is that the story

of the last General Assembly, when the U.S. position was the majority position better than four times out of five, is the standard story of successive Assemblies over the past 17 years. The fact is that in 17 years the Soviet Union has never once—never once—succeeded in building a majority for any proposition of substance against the opposition of the United States. And the fact is that in 17 years the United States has never felt obliged to exercise its veto in the Security Council to protect its interest, and the Soviet Union has used the veto 100 times.

That's the record, and there is, of course, a fundamental reason for it. The reason should be recalled frequently, for in this fact lies one of our greatest assets in the world today: the fact that the foreign policy interests of the United States are generally in harmony with the foreign policy interests of all nations which want to see a peaceful community of independent states working together, by free choice, to improve the lot of humanity. And since the majority of the nations of the world share this goal, the majority consistently side with the United States—or we side with them, depending on your point of view—when the roll is called and the yeas and nays are counted. It's as simple as that.

But let us take a couple of blemishes in the record and the performance of the U.N. and its members—the kind of blemishes that lead some of our people who favor the U.N. in principle to want to restrict it in practice.

First, take a case where the United States could not agree with a majority of the decision-making group in a U.N. agency. A recent case was the one that you referred to in your opening statement. Mr. Chairman, of the decision of the United Nations Special Fund to help finance an agricultural research project in Cuba. We objected to that project and still do.<sup>4</sup> Yet the whole story is that out of 288 projects assisted by that Fund, in the course of its existence, we approved of 287. So we face a choice: Should we retaliate by withholding or limiting our support for an agency which we invented, which has allocated 97 percent of its funds to nations which we ourselves are aiding, and

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 11, 1963, p. 357.

which represents an economical way for the United States to contribute to the Decade of Development, because in 1 instance out of 288 instances we were unable to persuade a majority that our view was the correct one?

Let me refer also to a situation which seems to agitate some of our people—the fact that the Soviet Union does not make the voluntary contributions which it is well able to make to such programs as technical assistance, malaria eradication, the World Food Program, and so forth. Their delinquency is deplorable but understandable from their point of view. These programs do not serve Communist ends; on the contrary. So it is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union makes little or no voluntary contributions to agencies whose work cuts straight across their own objectives. But should we support these programs less because they fail to win applause from the Kremlin?

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I rather suspect that the Soviet Union and other Communist countries will tend to participate—and contribute—somewhat more in the work of these agencies in the years to come. There is some evidence of that already. And I think that the reason is clear. The policy of self-ostracism from the specialized agencies has not worked well for the Soviet Union, even though it has made life with them a bit easier for us.

If this in fact happens, it will raise some day-to-day problems for us, but, in my view, it also will raise problems for them and opportunities for us. For while the so-called Communist states operate more or less closed societies at home, once they step out into a United Nations forum they enter an open society.

In an open forum, over a period of time, ideology becomes transparent, dogma wears thin and becomes tiresome, and the myth of the magical solution evaporates slowly in the free air of a marketplace of ideas. There is contention in all this; there is frustration and the stuff of headlines; there is danger that the fearful and the insecure will want to withdraw from the free interplay of conflicting ideas and concepts and terminology—especially if, now and again, things do not go exactly the way we would like them to.

Yet it is we who do best in the open forum, for this is our natural habitat. And if we have

the nerve to go ahead, if we have the stomach for the test of the open society, if we have the courage to build even that which is not perfect from our point of view, I can foresee nothing but a more meaningful dialog coming out of it, a gradual erosion of tension, and finally the dominance of a set of ideas which are better—and better able also to stand the test—than the Marxist ideas as revealed to his successors.

All this would require, on our part, a degree of responsibility, of restraint, of maturity, and of political sophistication which never before has been demanded of a democratic public and its elected representatives. It will not be easy, and it will not be without temporary disappointments; and I, for one, have no doubt of the outcome—for this, too, would serve and serve well the foreign policy interests of the United States of America.

## **Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography**

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### **Security Council**

Letter dated January 22, 1963, from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting a General Assembly resolution on the situation in Angola. S/5239. January 29, 1963. 3 pp.

### **General Assembly**

Report of the Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola. A/5286. November 14, 1962. 88 pp.

United Nations Conference on Consular Relations:

Collection of bilateral consular treaties. A/CONF.25/4. November 12, 1962. 271 pp.

Guide to the draft articles on consular relations adopted by the International Law Commission. A/CONF.25/5. January 8, 1963. 170 pp.

Chapter II of the report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its 13th session, containing the text of draft articles on consular relations and commentaries adopted by the Commission at that session. A/CONF.25/6. January 8, 1963. 40 pp.

Letter dated December 10 from the permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the Secretary-General transmitting a letter from the North Korean regime and a document of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled "On the Criminal Acts Committed by the U.S. Army in Korea." A/C.1/884. December 10, 1962. 33 pp.

## The United Nations Role in Political Disputes

by Joseph J. Sisco

Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Secretary Rusk said recently,<sup>2</sup> "We tend to forget so much—and so fast. Nowadays there are those who seem to think that . . . the United Nations is a fanciful exercise for those who wish to talk somewhat idly about a world which has not and cannot come into existence. In truth, a central issue of the cold war is the United Nations itself—its charter, its concept of a decent world order, its commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes, its concern for human rights, the expansion of trade, economic and social progress, and our deepest aspirations toward a disarmed and peaceful world."

Because world order does not exist at a time when world interdependence has become a reality, the United Nations is not a "fanciful exercise" but an indispensable necessity.

All of us, I believe, accept the fact that there are no absolute answers to the agonies and searchings of our time. The process of giving flesh to the bones of the United Nations Charter has been going on for 17 years, and the millennium is obviously not just around the corner. This is scarcely a matter for surprise or discouragement. No more arduous task—no more necessary task—has ever been undertaken by mankind in recorded history. For as President Kennedy has said:<sup>3</sup>

. . . arms alone are not enough to keep the peace; it must be kept by men. Our instrument and our hope is the United Nations. . . . We may not always agree

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the 13th Annual Conference of National Organizations, called by the American Association for the United Nations at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 11 (press release 120 dated Mar. 8).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 18, 1963, p. 393.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

with every detailed action taken by every officer of the United Nations, or with every voting majority. But as an institution it should have in the future, as it has had in the past since its inception, no stronger or more faithful member than the United States of America.

Regrettably, an assessment of the United Nations in terms of U.S. national interests has been obscured or distorted by both ardent friends and implacable foes, by those who feel the U.N. does too little and those who feel it does too much.

What I say here today is not intended to provide ammunition for either enthusiastic friend or hard-bitten foe. My hope is that you will find in my words a dispassionate summing up of both the capacities and limitations of the United Nations, for above all the United Nations is a human institution reflecting both the strengths and weaknesses of mankind.

### Scope of the United Nations

The scope of the United Nations today is impressive.

In the Middle East the United Nations Relief and Works Agency continues to feed and clothe over a million refugees. The United Nations Emergency Force patrols daily the armistice demarcation lines. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization copes with touchy incidents which could spark into broader conflagrations. A representative of the Secretary-General, the distinguished American Dr. Ralph Bunche, is exploring ways to help ease relationships between the new Yemen Arab Republic and its neighbors.

In the Far East the United Nations tem-



porary executive authority is helping to assure peaceful transfer of West New Guinea from the Dutch to Indonesian administration, prior to arrangements being made by Indonesia and the U.N. for the exercise of self-determination. A representative of the Secretary-General is actively engaged in easing relations between Thailand and Cambodia. U.N. observers in Kashmir continue to police the cease-fire lines.

In Africa United Nations "presences" are important elements of stability, in addition to the organization's key role in the Congo.

The United Nations has an economic commission in Europe, in Latin America, in the Far East, and in Africa. There are 53 resident representatives, primarily in underdeveloped areas, providing essential technical and administrative guidance.

The United Nations is not a substitute for policy. It is an organization in which the United States pursues its national interests through peaceful means.

This is a familiar theme to you. Let us use this measuring rod to determine how well the U.S. came out in three ways: first, at the recently concluded 17th session of the General Assembly; secondly, during the Cuban crisis; and thirdly, in connection with the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

#### **Restraint and Reason in 17th G.A.**

Restraint and reason, for the most part, prevailed in the 17th General Assembly of the United Nations. A recently completed tabulation of the voting on 29 key issues before the Assembly shows that the majority coincided with the United States position 22 times. Of the total votes compiled, more than twice as many coincided with the U.S. vote as coincided with the Soviet bloc.

For those who fear that the United States is being submerged within the huge voting blocs of the present 110-nation U.N., a brief look at some of the key results of the 17th Assembly is worth while.

The Assembly elected U Thant Secretary-General for a full term. The troika never got out of the barn, and the Soviets were forced to rein in their attempt to get a veto over the U.N. Secretariat.

The World Court's opinion was accepted by an overwhelming majority, thereby making payment of the Congo and Middle East peacekeeping expenses obligatory for member states. But we must guard against optimism. This was an important action but only a preliminary bout won; the main decision will have to come at the special Assembly session on finances in May of this year. Collective financial responsibility—or lack of it—can mean the difference between an effective and ineffective United Nations. It can mean the difference between a conference-type U.N. and one with real executive and peacekeeping capacities. "The U.S. position on any possible future contribution above our regular scale assessment for peacekeeping operations will be decisively influenced in the months ahead by the financial support which other members of the United Nations actually provide."<sup>4</sup>

The Chinese representation vote came out even better than last year.

A resolution reaffirming the United States position on Korean unification was again adopted.

The Assembly asked the Secretary-General to establish a U.N. presence in South-West Africa.

The Assembly once again endorsed our position on Hungary; it has called upon the Secretary-General to take a hand in the matter.

Under the general umbrella of the Decade of Development, the Assembly asked for a study of a proposed U.N. institute for training and research in U.N. operations, called a U.N. conference to study problems of international trade and development, affirmed the importance and the legal rights of private investment in developing countries, and passed a resolution on population which was at once historic in its recognition of the problem and moderate in its proposals for dealing with it.

These results are on the plus side of the ledger. But we must face frankly that on colonial issues we frequently favored more moderate recommendations than some adopted by the Assembly. The preoccupation of the U.N. with colonialism, understandable as it may be,

<sup>4</sup> For text of a statement released by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on Mar. 6, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443.

is of course also exploited by the Soviet Union.

But it must be recognized that the basic problems arising from the breakup of old colonial patterns are, for the most part, ones which the United States would have to face whether or not there were a United Nations. The United States launched and has long been committed to the principle of self-determination. As a leader of the free world, it has a legitimate interest in orderly progress toward self-government. The fact that this progress is faster and less orderly in some cases than we would desire is perhaps inherent in the present irresistible drive for independence. This drive does not originate in the United Nations. While the existence of the United Nations probably helps intensify the drive for self-determination, it also has provided a valuable safety valve as well as a restraining brake. And the existence of United Nations machinery has eased the painful shift from old, established patterns with a minimum of disturbance and disorder in most cases.

The end of traditional colonialism is in sight. But among the problems which remain are some of the toughest ones. Nevertheless, the impact of the colonial issue can be expected to diminish before too long. Where the West is able to take a position that is responsive to the basic objectives that the Africans and the Asians deem important, we can influence them toward moderation.

### **The Cuban Crisis**

Let me turn to the Cuban crisis.

The Cuban crisis demonstrated the utility of the various diplomatic instruments available to the United States in a crisis. Coordination of national action, bilateral diplomacy, regional arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the crisis throughout.

The United Nations was important in three ways: as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity and enlisting diplomatic support; as an effective instrumentality for international conciliation and a defuser of the crisis; and as an institution willing and able on short notice to serve as inspector to verify the removal of the offensive weapons and to guard against their reintroduction.

### **President Greet Conference of National Organizations**

*Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Clark M. Eichelberger, executive director of the American Association for the United Nations.*

White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated March 16, for release March 17

MARCH 7, 1963

DEAR MR. EICHELBERGER: Please extend my greetings and good wishes to each of the delegates to the Thirteenth Annual Conference of National Organizations and to the organizations they represent, including the American Association for the United Nations which is sponsoring this important meeting.

It is good that you are getting a progress report on the first year of the United Nations Decade of Development. Few activities can equal in importance those which are related to helping men and women around the world to acquire the skills and organizations—of government and of business—which are needed not only to improve the standards of living but also to lift up the quality of life. It is the well-established policy of our government to aid such efforts, through the United Nations and through other appropriate channels.

I note that the American Association for the United Nations is now celebrating its fortieth anniversary of work in behalf of organizations standing for hope, and decency, and the rule of law in the affairs of nations: at first the League of Nations and now the United Nations. But the fact that there is now wide public acceptance and support of the United Nations does not mean that your jobs of education and of provoking discussion are finished. Many unresolved problems still face the United Nations. One of the thorniest is that of financial responsibility; another is that of maintaining a truly international civil service.

Finally, may I join you in your tribute to Eleanor Roosevelt? Time will not tarnish the luster of her legacy to us, nor will future generations forget her tireless work and selfless devotion to the highest concept of human rights. May the memory of her life continue to bring inspiration to men and women in every land.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Ambassador Stevenson's speeches in the Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to the delegations, presented incontrovertible evidence of the presence of So-

viet offensive weapons in a dramatic and effective way. In addition the United Nations provided a forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue. This public exposure in the United Nations was one factor—and I do not contend it was the most important factor—for what followed. Shortly thereafter Chairman Khrushchev admitted the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba and agreed to withdraw them.

The Secretary-General was an effective go-between, especially during the early days. His intervention on the second day of the Security Council debate, at the request of a large number of United Nations representatives, helped defuse the crisis and led to the cooling-off formula under which Soviet ships stayed away from the interception area. This was a classic example of the use of the United Nations as a third-party instrumentality.

The readiness of the U.N. to provide on-site inspection in rapid order, after Khrushchev had agreed, attests further to its utility in this crisis. This did not succeed, of course, because Castro would not permit U.N. inspection on Cuban soil, but the rejection helped to underscore that the dispute was not only one between Cuba and the Organization of American States but also one between Cuba and the United Nations.

In short, the United Nations proved useful in a big-power dispute—in an issue of peace and war.

### **The Congo Crisis**

Now I turn to the third test, the Congo.

Today, after 2½ years of difficulties and frustrations, reasonable quiet has returned to the Congo. I believe the conclusion is inescapable. The United Nations Operation in the Congo has served the national interest of the United States.

It has helped to maintain a free, moderate government for the Congo as a whole.

It has warded off dangers of civil war.

It has helped avoid direct great-power intervention which could have resulted in American forces fighting in the Congo.

It has ended secession from the left and from

the right and has spiked the ambitions of the Communists to establish a base in the heart of central Africa.

I believe history will prove that the decision made by the Eisenhower administration in the summer of 1960 and reaffirmed by President Kennedy subsequently to support a U.N. peace-keeping operation was the correct one. Surely those who are critical of the decision to support the United Nations in the Congo would not have preferred the direct use of American military force.

Most Americans recognize the merit in these arguments, yet a number of specific questions about the Congo are still raised.

First, as to its legality. The U.N. operation is and was a legal operation. The United Nations was asked to come in by the Government of the Congo. Moreover, the military actions taken by the United Nations Force were pursuant to the mandate laid down by the Security Council. The fighting which occurred this past December was initiated by the Katangese; the actions taken by the United Nations were in self-defense and in the exercise of freedom of movement throughout the Katanga.

Moreover, the United Nations action did not constitute intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo. The situation there was clearly a threat to international peace and security because of the actual or potential involvement of outside powers. It was in this kind of situation that the Government of the Congo asked for United Nations help.

There are those who have felt that in the Congo we somehow turned our back on the traditional United States support for the principle of self-determination. This is certainly not the case. Too few people realize that Tshombe [Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga Province] could not pretend to speak for all of the Katanga. As leader of the Lunda tribe, his main support resided in South Katanga. In the north he has been strongly opposed by the Baluba tribe. Tshombe's party gained only 25 in a 60-seat Assembly in the only popular election ever held in the Katanga. He received less than a majority in the Katanga Parliament. Support which he has received during the past 2½ years

has been from a rump parliament lacking full Baluba representation.

And it is worth repeating that Tshombe himself agreed to the concept of a single Congolese state at the Brussels roundtable conference of January 1960. At the Kitona conference he did so again. In accepting the Thant conciliation plan, he once more opted for a unified Congo.

All of these are important facts since they relate to questions which are being asked frequently by Americans.

### Looking Ahead in the Congo

But now we must look ahead to the important task of reconstruction and reconciliation. As Assistant Secretary Cleveland reported recently to President Kennedy, the Congo remains a paradox—staggering problems in the present and impressive prospects in the future.<sup>5</sup> The United Nations can play a role which no single nation could play alone without compromising Congolese independence and making the Congo a subject of cold-war controversy.

As it enters the reconstruction phase of its young life, the Republic of the Congo faces three key obstacles to progress:

First, regrettably it still has an underdeveloped political system which is not yet able to take vigorous, executive action which will make itself felt throughout the territorial confines of the Congo.

Secondly, it is maintaining an expensive military establishment which needs more training before it can assume a progressively greater share of the problem of maintaining law and order in all the provinces of the Congo. In the absence of U.N. forces an internal security vacuum could result, inviting outside meddling.

Thirdly, the Congo has a financial administration which collects much less revenue than it needs and than it could.

More than on external aid, success in the reconstruction effort in the Congo depends on developing the administrative fiber to train the national army, get the fiscal system under control, and construct a political system featuring

a strong executive. If these prerequisites can be met, the Congo should not be a burden on its friends for long, because its resources are great.

What is needed now is an agenda for reconstruction in the Congo, including as one part the tying up of the loose ends of Katanga's reintegration. The U Thant plan for peaceful reintegration of Katanga has been partly fulfilled and partly bypassed by the events of last December and this past January.

A *de facto* federalism is actually developing in the Congo.

The integration of the currency, as envisaged in the U Thant plan, is well underway.

The Katanga gendarmerie are being slowly integrated into the national Congolese army, but much more needs to be done.

Katanga's "foreign affairs" establishment remains to be eliminated.

The executive amnesty already announced for Tshombe and his colleagues is in effect.

We hope a training program for the Congolese armed forces under the aegis of the United Nations can get started at a reasonably early date. It should be possible to reduce the United Nations Force level rather quickly so that the financial drain on the United Nations can be reduced.

Inflation is a serious problem in the Congo largely because governmental expenditures exceed revenues despite the growing production and rising exports. For every franc taken in by the Central Government last year, the Government spent nearly five. Nothing less than a well-financed, well-coordinated, and well-staffed stabilization program, pursued with resolution and resourcefulness, will avoid the runaway inflation which could bring serious political trouble to the Congo.

We believe other members of the United Nations, as well as ourselves, can do much. The Congolese Government recognizes it needs the assistance of a number of other countries. The presence in the Congo's future of large and small contributors requires the multilateral coordination of bilateral efforts, both in retaining the national army and in stabilizing the development of the Congolese economy. In this regard we believe the U.N. has an important role.

<sup>5</sup> For a summary of the report, see *ibid.*, Apr. 1, 1963, p. 481.

This is the United Nations story in the Congo, past and future. The situation is better, but risks and uncertainties remain. And I like to think, too, that the 31-month Congo crisis may well have brought Africa of age.

In July 1960 Africa was hurtling toward national independence. Colonialism evoked deep stirrings. In some quarters the Soviet Union was regarded as a friend of Africa, or at least a force that could be safely used to one's advantage. Leftist politicians like Patrice Lumumba were able to secure wide followings.

The Congo's grim ordeal has helped to change some of this. It has impressed upon the African consciences some valuable and lasting lessons which they are the first to acknowledge.

The fact that unprepared independence is not in anyone's best interest was perhaps the most vivid, single lesson of the Congo. Evidence that this lesson was learned, at least by some leaders in Africa, came midway in the Congo experience, when Rwanda and Burundi achieved independence in circumstances quite different from the Congo. A U.N. presence there helped ease the birth pangs.

More and more African nations are learning to make the distinction between colonialism, on the one hand, and legitimate foreign investment on the other.

Efforts to proclaim a rigid U.N. deadline for total independence everywhere could not muster majority support in the last Assembly.

There are also some signs at the United Nations of a new appreciation of the neocolonialism which the Soviet imperialist system and doctrinaire dogma represent. More and more Soviet colonialism is being denounced at the United Nations.

Moreover, it is significant that the United States emerged from the Congo with solid African support. The United States' key role in unifying the Congo has by no means been overlooked by the Africans. Soviet refusal to support the United Nations effort by contrast has also been an eye opener.

None of this is true without exception everywhere in Africa. Communism has not thrown in the sponge, nor have all Africans shaken off the effects of past mistreatment. However, a decade of growth has been concentrated, admittedly painfully, into 2½ tumultuous years.

## Report to Senate Committees

I wish to bring to your attention a few observations made in a report submitted recently to the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees by Senators [Albert] Gore and [Gordon] Allott after their participation at the 17th General Assembly as members of the United States delegation. The report includes three significant points regarding United States participation in the United Nations.

In the first place, our view of the world makes it inescapable that we should maintain the position "that the first principle of a free system is an untrammelled flow of words in an open forum." . . . This tedium and palaver, which characterizes U.N. procedures, is at once its most exasperating aspect and its saving grace.

Secondly, the United States regards the U.N. as at least potentially the best available multilateral instrument for preserving the peace, not only between the great powers, but also in superficially less important areas—especially where the great powers might feel impelled to intervene. In keeping with this aim, our country also labors at the United Nations in an effort to damp down explosive forces which might easily involve free world members in open conflict with one another. Unfortunately, this policy often has the by-product of making it seem that the United States is heavily absorbed in essentially negative tasks, no matter how desirable their outcome.

Thirdly, the United States regards the United Nations as an educational device of great value. . . . the mere act of participating in the deliberations of the United Nations tends to educate the delegates from non-Western societies in concepts favoring our view of the world community.

The report goes on to say that

. . . it is easy to assess the U.S. position as being far more defensive and static than is really the case. This is particularly true at times when the Communist states, which by definition can accept only a totalitarian world community, step up their troublemaking and their attacks on the procedures and organization of the United Nations. Rather than seeing these attacks as a measure of the success of U.S. policy in influencing the United Nations to reflect our concepts, some of our citizens appear to believe that the U.N. is wide open to Communist influence.

With full recognition of the problems involved . . . it is nevertheless clear that there could be diminishing public approval for the U.N. in this country unless these factors are made more comprehensible to our citizens. This continues to be especially true with respect to the United Nations operation in the Congo.

These observations are of direct interest to your association.

I have one final thought. It might be well to recall that the Founding Fathers of our great nation took upon themselves the responsibility for the creation of a new and independent state on American soil. They did so in firm trust in the future and with firm belief in the basic decency of man. In that spirit, they managed to weld together in one nation people from many nations. In its belief for freedom and in its hope for world unity the Charter of the

United Nations expresses an approach to the political problems of man which would have been well understood by men like Jefferson and Lincoln.

Aristotle said that the end of politics must be the good of man. Man's greatest good and greatest present need is to establish world peace. Without it, the democratic enterprise—one might even say the human enterprise—will be utterly, fatally doomed. The United Nations is striving to achieve such a peace.

## The United Nations Financial Crisis

by *Richard N. Gardner*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is a singular privilege to be able to address this annual conference. I do not say this out of mechanical courtesy but from a deep appreciation of the work which all of you are doing to promote understanding and support around the country for U.S. policy in the United Nations—work which I have had an opportunity to admire at first hand on several occasions during the last year.

My admiration for your work has grown with the progress of this conference. You have organized discussions in depth on some of the most significant and challenging aspects of the work of the United Nations. You have charted a bold course for the United Nations in a number of key areas—in keeping the peace, in promoting disarmament, in furthering cooperation in outer space, in guiding economic and social development. Yours has been a rich intellectual menu. Perhaps it is therefore appropriate that you have left to the end the inevitable question, "Who is going to pick up the check?"

In treating this subject today I shall not speak about various long-term solutions to the U.N.'s financial problem—for example, the development of independent sources of revenue.

Other participants in this panel may wish to deal with various possibilities of this kind. It is appropriate—it is useful—for discussions of the long-term problem to go forward. But you will recall the famous words of Lord Keynes: "In the long run we are all dead." There will not be a long run in which to seek bold solutions for U.N. financing unless we can deal with the financial crisis which faces us here and now.

Therefore I propose to confine my remarks today to the present financial crisis of the United Nations and to consider in turn three specific questions: What has caused this financial crisis? What progress has been made in coping with it? What now remains to be done?

### Causes of U.N. Financial Crisis

The causes of the U.N.'s financial difficulties are familiar to most of you. These difficulties do not arise from the ordinary operations which are paid from the U.N.'s regular budget. The

---

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the 13th Annual Conference of National Organizations, called by the American Association for the United Nations at Washington, D.C., on Mar. 12 (press release 124).

regular budget covers such items as salaries of members of the Secretariat, expenses of operating the headquarters building in New York, and the costs of meetings and conferences. It also includes some of the smaller peacekeeping expenditures such as the truce supervision activities in Palestine, Kashmir, and Korea.

The regular budget is financed principally by an agreed scale of assessments on members, which is broadly based on capacity to pay. The U.S. contributes 32.02 percent of this amount. The payment record of the members is generally good, and the arrears are not of disruptive dimensions.

As you know, however, the expenses for the Middle East and Congo operations were financed from the beginning from separate accounts. Taken together, these operations since 1960 have imposed on the members of the U.N. expenses of about \$140 million a year—about double the size of the regular budget.

Because these costs were so large, opposition quickly developed on the part of many U.N. members to sharing the cost in the usual manner—that is, on the basis of the percentage assessments used in the regular budget. In order to gain approval by the General Assembly for resolutions to finance these operations it was necessary, beginning with the Middle East operation in 1956, to reduce the assessments for members less able to pay—in other words to assess them for peacekeeping operations at only a fraction of the assessment they have to pay for the regular budget.

Over the last few years almost 90 percent of the U.N. membership has secured relief from the regular assessment rate with respect to the Congo and Middle East budgets. Of the 110 U.N. members, 42 countries have a regular assessment rate of .04 percent. For Congo and UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force] their assessment was reduced by 80 percent of their normal scale—to .008 percent. As an example of how this has worked out, we can look at the way the costs of the Congo and Middle East operations were shared in the first half of 1962. Instead of being asked to pay the \$35,900 they would have paid at the regular budget scale, these countries were asked to pay only \$7,180.

Reductions by 80 percent were also given 43 additional countries whose regular budget assessment rate was more than .04 percent but who were recipients of U.N. technical assistance. Moreover, 4 additional countries received 50-percent reductions. Thus no less than 89 member governments were excused from 50 percent to 80 percent of their assessments to these vital peace and security operations.

To finance these operations, notwithstanding the reduced assessments on these 89 countries, the Secretary-General appealed for voluntary contributions. Starting with the Middle East operation in 1957, the United States has made large voluntary contributions each year in addition to its regular scale assessment to make it possible for these operations to go forward. In the last several years no other country has made voluntary contributions of this kind—with the sole exception of the United Kingdom, which has made very small voluntary payments for the Middle East operation. With these voluntary payments added to our assessed share, the United States in recent years has been assuming an average of about 48 percent of the burden of the Congo and Middle East operations.

This is the method of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations which has been in effect since 1957. It does not take very long to conclude that this system had two unacceptable aspects:

First, it placed a disproportionate share—nearly half—of the cost of these operations on the United States.

Second, and even more important, a large number of U.N. members were not even meeting their obligations under this arrangement:

—The members of the Communist bloc refused to pay because they oppose peacekeeping operations in general.

—France, South Africa, the Arab countries, and others refused to pay for at least one of the operations because they did not agree with this peacekeeping operation in particular.

—Others, including most of the less developed countries, failed to pay even their reduced assessments and argued that they were too poor to do so.



—To make matters worse, legal arguments were advanced by the Communist bloc and many other countries to the effect that the General Assembly could not levy valid assessments for peacekeeping operations outside the regular budget and accordingly that they were under no obligation to pay.

As a result of this nonpayment of assessments, the United States was in the unacceptable position of paying in even more than the 8 percent of the Middle East and Congo operations it had undertaken to pay, although of course the amounts are still due and payable by the defaulters. At the same time the gap between the assessments due for the costs of the two operations and the money actually received from the membership continued to grow until it reached about \$100 million by the middle of 1962.

### Progress of "Rescue Operation"

To reduce the disproportionate U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping operations, to avoid the imminent collapse of these operations as a result of the growing deficit, and to safeguard the future potential of the U.N. as a vital factor in maintaining peace and security, the U.S. Government joined with other free-world countries and with the Secretary-General to search for ways and means of solving the U.N.'s financial crisis. This search produced a rescue operation beginning in the 16th General Assembly which had four major elements:

*First*, one more General Assembly resolution for the emergency financing of the Middle East and Congo operations for the first 6 months of 1962 by the usual combination of assessments and voluntary contributions.

*Second*, a bond issue to finance these operations after June 30, 1962, while a more satisfactory solution to the financial problem was worked out.

*Third*, a request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion which would establish a firm legal basis for the collection of arrearages by determining whether peacekeeping assessments constituted binding legal obligations in the same way as assessments for the regular budget.

*Fourth*, an intensified study of better ways of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations in the future.

Since this rescue operation was approved by the 16th General Assembly in December 1961, there has been progress on a number of fronts.

Purchases of U.N. bonds got underway in 1962. The United States Congress authorized a loan to the United Nations to purchase bonds up to the amount purchased by all other countries.<sup>2</sup> Some foreign governments, such as the Scandinavian countries, responded handsomely to the bond issue by purchasing amounts far in excess of their regular budget percentage. And the 17th General Assembly in its budget authorization for 1963 included an amount of \$4,650,000 for repayment of interest and principal of the bonds in the regular U.N. budget, in which the U.S. share is 32.02 percent.

The International Court of Justice handed down last July a favorable advisory opinion which ruled that the costs incurred by the U.N. in the Congo and Middle East operations were "expenses of the organization" and that the assessments levied to pay for them constituted binding legal obligations. The General Assembly accepted this opinion on December 19, 1962, by a vote of 76 in favor, 17 against, and 8 abstentions.<sup>3</sup>

The events in the General Assembly leading up to the acceptance of this opinion provided considerable grounds for satisfaction. A number of states, including the Soviet bloc and France, urged that the General Assembly should only "take note" of the Court's opinion. The effect of this language, as brought out in the debate, would have left it to the discretion of each state whether it considered itself bound to pay for the peacekeeping assessments. An amendment to change the wording of the resolution from "accepts" to "takes note" was proposed in the Fifth Committee and defeated by 28 votes in favor, 61 against, and 14 abstentions.

The debate on the advisory opinion made it abundantly clear that the term "accepts" used in the General Assembly resolution meant that

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311, and July 23, 1962, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.

the U.N. was adopting the Court's view as its operating rule. This means that the assessments in question have been determined to be binding obligations on member states and are therefore due and payable. If not paid, a member becomes subject to loss of vote in the General Assembly, under article 19 of the charter, if its total arrears exceed its last 2 years' assessments on all accounts. This will apply to the Soviet Union as of January 1, 1964, if it pays nothing for the Congo and UNEF between now and that time.

With the question about the legality of past assessments out of the way, the Secretary-General was at last in a position to mount an effective campaign to collect them. A number of governments which had declined to pay their assessments for the Middle East and Congo operations announced in the wake of the General Assembly resolution that they would now begin to pay.

The 17th General Assembly also decided to increase the working capital fund from \$25 million to \$40 million. This action establishes a more rational relationship between the present level of the regular budget and the need for reserves. It adds significantly to the financial capacity and resources of the organization.

As a further measure to put the U.N.'s financial house in order, the Secretary-General appointed as his chief financial adviser Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank. Mr. Black will assist the Secretary-General in dealing with the problem of arrearages as well as advise him generally on other aspects of the U.N.'s financial problem.

Finally, the General Assembly buckled down to work on the future financing of peacekeeping operations. It set up a working group of 21 nations, of which the U.S. is a member, to study and make recommendations on a cost-sharing formula for the future costs of these operations.<sup>4</sup> The group is now in session and is under instructions to complete its work by March 31. A special session of the General Assembly has been called to convene on May 14 to act on its recommendations.

All this is on the credit side of the ledger.

<sup>4</sup> For text of a General Assembly resolution on financing peacekeeping operations, see *ibid.*, p. 37.

but the last year has registered serious debits as well.

Although the General Assembly authorized a \$200 million bond issue, only about \$74 million has been subscribed by 58 countries other than the United States, despite our readiness to buy up to \$100 million of bonds on a matching basis. Assuming that all the bonds subscribed are actually purchased, the United States' matching purchase would bring the total up to only about \$148 million of the \$200 million worth of bonds that was anticipated. Prudent financing dictates that the rest of these bonds be sold—and sold quickly.

Moreover, although many members have indicated their readiness to abide by the law declared by the International Court and confirmed by the General Assembly, they have not actually paid. The Soviet bloc, which apparently does not believe in abiding by the law even after it has been declared, has still not paid one cent toward the Middle East and Congo operations. France is still refusing to pay its past assessments for the Congo; indeed, it has announced that it will not even pay that portion of its regular budget assessment which is necessary to pay back the principal and interest on the U.N. bonds.

As a result of these and other facts, arrears owed to the U.N. as of January 1, 1963, amounted to \$121 million. Twenty-five U.N. members have still paid nothing on their UNEF assessments; 48 members have still paid nothing on their Congo assessments.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the United Nations is *not* being supported and is *not* supporting itself, when arrears have accumulated so far and continue to increase and when major and minor powers continue to refuse to fulfill their legal obligations.

If this situation long continues, public opinion in the United States will be forced to interpret these facts as a denial in practice by many members of the U.N. of something which all the members have accepted in principle: that peacekeeping operations are conducted in the interest of the well-being of the entire world and should be the responsibility of all the members of the organization. This is what we mean by the phrase "collective financial responsi-

ility"—it is, or should be, the cornerstone of the organization.

### Next Steps To Be Taken

It is against this mixed record of success and failure that we must now consider what next steps to take in dealing with the U.N.'s financial crisis.

In discussing these next steps it will be useful to keep our eye on the central question. The problem currently before the Working Group of Twenty-one in New York is very specific; namely, how to finance the Congo and Middle East operations beyond June 30, which is about when the money from the bond issue runs out.

When the General Assembly meets in special session in May it will have to adopt resolutions which will provide for the future financing of these two operations, at least from July 1 to December 31—or it will have to recommend their abrupt discontinuance. This is the very practical problem immediately before us. It should receive prompt attention and not be lost sight of in a search for possible general principles to govern the financing of unknown operations which are not yet even a gleam in any member's eye.

To put it more broadly, the United States believes that for some time to come it would be wise for the U.N. to deal with the method of financing of each peacekeeping operation if and when that operation occurs, learning from each experience what might be desirable for the future and adjusting each solution to the particular facts of each case. We believe that this approach is the only sensible and practical one to follow at this time, given the present financial plight of the United Nations, the present deep political difficulties between its members, the unpredictable character of any future peacekeeping operations, and the virtual impossibility of now agreeing on any one single formula or any one single set of principles or criteria to govern unknown operations yet to be begun.

Assuming, then, that the immediate question is the financing of the Middle East and Congo operations for the 6 months of 1963—and that the answer to this question constitutes no precedent for the future—what is the answer to be?

In posing this question we are assuming that

these operations must continue. Obviously the United States favors the most rapid possible reduction of the Congo force consistent with the increasing capability of the Congolese Government to maintain minimal levels of security and insure its national integrity.

At the same time it would be the height of "penny-wise, pound-foolishness" to reduce either operation so rapidly as to jeopardize all the substantial gains that they have brought to Africa and the Middle East with much sacrifice and effort over the past few years.

Assuming there will be a cost, though somewhat reduced, for the Congo and UNEF operations in the last 6 months of 1963, a strong case can be made for financing this cost at the regular budget scale for the following reasons:

1. The regular budget assessment scale is broadly based on capacity to pay. Very substantial adjustments in the regular assessments scale are made for low per capita income countries, beyond what would be called for by comparative national income figures. It is true that the regular budget scale involves a ceiling for the United States contribution. But this ceiling derives from a fundamental principle long accepted by the General Assembly—that, in an organization of sovereign states where each nation has one vote, it is not in the interest of the organization to depend too much financially on any one state.

2. The United States has been virtually alone in making voluntary financial contributions to the Congo and Middle East operations. It has thus been assuming an average of 48 percent of the burden. The financial load simply must be more broadly based, and the carefully worked out cost-sharing formula to accomplish this is the regular budget scale.

3. Since the establishment of the United Nations, the United States has been by far its largest financial supporter. Its assessed contributions have always been more than twice those of the second largest contributor. The proportion of its voluntary contributions has been even higher. It contributes 70 percent for the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees, over 50 percent for the Congo economic assistance program, 42 percent for the U.N. Children's Fund, and 40 percent for the Special

Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance.

4. Quite apart from the United Nations, the United States is bearing a heavy load of foreign aid and defense burdens. Our total contributions for economic development abroad amount to over \$5 billion a year—more than double the aid total of the rest of the free world and at least five times the aid made available by the Communist bloc.

5. The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations are not just a matter of interest to the great powers. The small countries have perhaps the greatest stake of all in their success and effectiveness. It is true that these countries are not well off, but the amounts involved are not substantial. For the last 6 months of 1963 the regular assessment share of the 42 countries in the .04 percent category would amount to the cost of two or three large limousines or a few big diplomatic receptions. Is this too high a price to pay for keeping the peace?

It is these reasons—coupled with the still inadequate record on the payment of past assessments—which have led to the present U.S. position in the Working Group of Twenty-one.<sup>5</sup> Lest there be any question, the United States stands ready to pay its full 32.02 percent share of the Congo and Middle East operations. But until collective financial responsibility becomes a fiscal practice as well as a legal theory, it would hardly be fair for the United States to pay more than this percentage, either through assessed or voluntary contributions.

We are hopeful that a determination to get the U.N.'s financial house in order is beginning to manifest itself among the members. There are signs of recognition that only through a meaningful system of collective financial responsibility can the organization continue to carry out its current tasks and future responsibilities.

The hard fact of political life is this: Attitudes in the United States toward any possible future contribution above our regular scale assessment for peacekeeping operations will inevitably depend on whether the vast majority

of the membership takes the necessary measures in the next several months to give the United Nations the financial support which is absolutely essential to its survival.

"The United Nations," said U Thant in his recent Johns Hopkins lecture, "does not represent a vague ideal of universal peace and brotherhood which has its appeal only to starry-eyed idealists and moralists. Far from it. It is hardheaded, enlightened self-interest, the stake that all humanity has in peace and progress and, most important of all, survival that dictates the need for the United Nations as a practical, institutional embodiment of the needs of nations on a shrinking planet, as a potent and dynamic instrument at the service of all nations, east and west, north as well as south."

If this statement of the Secretary-General is correct—and we most definitely believe that it is—then it is time to face the financial consequences.

The present financial crisis of the United Nations involves the survival of the organization itself, for no institution can long survive if it cannot pay its debts and if its members are not willing to supply it with the funds necessary to continue its operations.

The "menu" of the U.N. is substantial and important. The "check" is no less so. Countries cannot expect to take the benefits of membership in the U.N. without the burdens.

## **Members Named to International Business Advisory Committee**

Under Secretary Ball announced on March 21 (press release 147) the appointments of Jacob Blaustein and C. Daggett Harvey to serve as members of the Advisory Committee on International Business Problems.

The Committee, chaired by Clarence B. Randall, will advise the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development on the handling of specific business problems confronting American firms abroad. The public members previously announced are Edwin A. Locke, Jr., and Lloyd N. Cutler.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1963, p. 296.

<sup>5</sup> For text of a statement released by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on Mar. 6, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443.

## Democracy and the Emerging Nations of Africa

by G. Mennen Williams  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Discussion of the kind of democracy practiced by African governments and the State Department's reaction to it was touched off by a reporter's question to me in the Congo some weeks ago. I was asked to comment on the prevalence of one-party governments in Africa. I answered by saying that naturally we Americans preferred a two-party system and observed that scholars had taken some note of the growing African practice. Since that time the matter has tended to be no longer academic. Here, however, in this university atmosphere I would like to put down a few thoughts on the subject without in any way attempting to be categorical or definitive on a subject which could well fill a Ph. D. thesis and on which there can be shades of emphasis.

To begin with I believe we all would agree that democracy revolves around certain philosophical concepts relating to government by the consent of the governed and human dignity. But we would find it more difficult to be absolutely categorical on precisely what forms have to be included or excluded to keep within a general definition of democracy. For example, we all think of ancient Athens as a glorious exemplar of democracy, but we would have considerable difficulty today in defining as democratic a system based on a slave economy.

But to be more modern, all over this country the debate goes on about whether each man's vote should be exactly equal to every other man's vote; or whether a system is still demo-

cratic where in one State a State Senator represents about 6 million people and another Senator represents only some tens of thousands; or where in another State one party often gets less than a majority of the popular legislative vote but nonetheless has a substantial majority of the representation in the legislature.

Of course, some of our States virtually have one-party systems too. These are generally characterized by vigorous internal factions—a condition which defenders of the one-party system can quite properly say represents real democratic expression. This situation, while not ideal, may also be a significant test of African one-party systems.

Before looking directly at African experience, I feel it is wise to recognize that democracy is many-faceted—involving not only political but also economic, social, and moral values. Superficially we often think of democracy in terms of constitutions and forms of government almost exclusively. In the underdeveloped parts of the world, however, I am confident they think more emphatically in terms of achieving human dignity, freedom, and an opportunity to enjoy a decent living—not unlike the unalienable rights of our Declaration of Independence—"Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

Professor T. V. Smith in *The Democratic Way of Life* catches this idea well, where he says:

Democracy is more than a form of government. It is also a way of life, variegated and full of growth. Like every manifestation of vitality, democracy is many-dimensional. Its leeways are legion.

At the beginning of this discussion, let me

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the 13th annual North Carolina Conference on World Affairs at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Mar. 14 (press release 136).

say that I cannot agree with all practices carried on in the name of democracy in Africa, just as many Africans would take vigorous exception to certain aspects of American society. But many different practices do exist, some of which have a special validity in the African context and others which resemble transitional steps that have characterized other evolving societies. I believe it is important to our understanding of Africa to know what Africans consider elements of democratic societies—always keeping in mind that there is yet no perfect democratic model. African mores are part of the context within which our African policy must be made and carried out. And although we may disagree with some African practices, we can ignore them only at the risk of failing to comprehend some of the major forces at work on that continent today.

### **Essential Philosophical Objectives**

American democracy evolved from the dual tradition of Crown and town meeting. In Africa the concept of democracy also started from a dual tradition. Some African kingdoms had privileged castes which kept the majority in feudal detention. But other African societies existed for centuries in tribal structures that were in many ways as democratic at the grass-roots level as American town meetings. African societies also experienced colonial systems which until shortly before independence were unrepresentative of the democratic ideals expressed by the European mother countries. In view of these mixed antecedents, it is not surprising that contemporary democracy in Africa has specific characteristics related to both precolonial and colonial African history.

Broadly speaking, the philosophical objectives most African leaders consider essential to the development of democracy in Africa are summarized in Lincoln's phrase "government of the people, by the people, for the people."

In the African context, "of the people" means transfer of power from alien suzerainty to indigenous rule, or decolonization; "by the people" means government with the consent of the governed—one man, one vote; "for the people" means a government concerned with people having a decent living.

To these objectives must be added a word on the means most Africans feel feasible to achieve their goals—centralization of power to meet the tasks of building new nations. In their desire to attain their philosophical objectives, they do not always insist on, nor do they always deny, certain rights and checks and balances that we consider fundamental to democracy—freedom of speech and press, free enterprise, free labor, freedom from government control. Sometimes all or some of these are present; sometimes they are not. Just like other people, they sometimes recognize these values but fail to fully achieve them in practice. This is because many Africans believe the developmental problems faced by their new nations are so vast and urgent that these desirable Western values must wait until they have achieved their immediate goals of freedom and material progress. This is not wholly unlike the tendency in Western democracies to curtail certain rights during national or local emergencies.

While we cannot agree that basic freedoms need be delayed and while we are unhappy when they are, we can be understanding if complete perfection is not immediately achieved. This was made clear by President Kennedy in his second state of the Union message, when he said:<sup>2</sup>

... our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others. Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosing.

Of the three philosophical objectives I have indicated that Africans consider essential to the growth of democracy, there is the greatest consensus among African leaders on the first—the transfer of power from alien suzerainty to indigenous rule. All Africans believe the removal of colonial servitude is the beginning of democracy. Although we may feel that Africa's drive toward independence is progressing swiftly—29 new nations in the past dozen years—most African leaders are impatient because many Africans have not yet attained self-determination.

Most of the transition from European to

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

African rule has successfully taken place under relatively peaceful conditions. This was not true in Algeria, and the Congo erupted violently after independence occurred. On the whole, transition to independence has been a tribute to African and European statesmanship alike, and throughout much of the continent cordial African-European relations have been established. There is definitely a place for persons of European origin as equal citizens in the new Africa.

Such relations are beneficial for the timely success of newly achieved independence, and African leaders realize they must rely not only on self-help but on help from external sources. Nevertheless they wish to avoid charges of neo-colonialism arising from overly close or exclusive associations with former metropolises, and they feel impelled to seek associations with other industrialized nations. This generally means associations with the United States or the Communist bloc, and it is mutually preferable that such relations be with us. In all of these associations, however, Africans tread carefully because to them democracy means self-rule and they want no relationships that threaten exercise of their sovereign choice.

### Consent of the Governed

The second African philosophical objective is government with the consent of the people. This goal is easy for us to understand. In our own Constitution, for example, power flows from "We the People of the United States" and government is merely an instrument to express the people's will. We believe with Lincoln that "no man is good enough to govern another man without that other's consent."

This philosophy is widespread in Africa. As the British authority, Thomas Hodgkin, points out, most African political parties seek to establish political institutions that enable the people to become, effectively, the ruling class. These institutions, he says, include: "government responsible to a popularly elected assembly; universal adult suffrage, with no discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, or educational level, and no special, separate, or weighted representation for minorities, communities, or interests; free elections."

Scrupulous attention to popular sovereignty is found throughout African political writing. A good example is this statement by President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika: "In my opinion, the two basic essentials to democracy are freedom of the individual and insurance that the government of a country is freely chosen by the people."

Democracy in Africa also means raising living standards and standards of education rapidly—the third African philosophical objective in democratic development. Africans are anxious to overcome their age-old enemies—poverty, illiteracy, disease, malnutrition—and unless this is accomplished rapidly, democracy will be a hollow theory to them.

In Africa, annual income is on the order of \$100 per person, compared to our \$2,500, and many Africans have no money income at all. Only about 10 percent of the people have achieved literacy, and life expectancy is low throughout much of the continent. Although Africa has more arable land than we do, it produces only one-twentieth of the world's agricultural commodities compared to our one-sixth.

To meet the problems posed by low productivity, little capital, a lack of trained manpower, and a shortage of entrepreneurs, many African governments feel they must turn to some form of state operation for swift economic and social advances. They feel full-blown capitalism is too complex a system for underdeveloped societies and believe state control of resources is necessary for progress.

So-called African "socialism," however, is as far removed from Marxian socialism as the American free enterprise system is from the Marxian concept of capitalism. It has no industrial proletariat upon which to build; it embraces all religions without causing conflicting loyalties; and it is cautious in its response to Communist overtures. As Senegal's President [Leopold] Senghor puts it: "We are not 'Marxists' . . . we are socialists. . . . We stand for a middle course, for a *democratic socialism* which goes so far as to integrate spiritual values."

The emphasis on so-called "socialism" in African development has by no means ruled out interest in a domestic or foreign private sec-



tor. Indeed, such interest appears to be general and growing. Even in countries which most strongly profess socialist beliefs, private investment is not only welcomed but eagerly sought. For example, last month in a speech in which he encouraged the flow of investment into Ghana, President [Kwame] Nkrumah said:

Our ideas of socialism can coexist with private enterprises. I also believe that private capital and private investment capital, in particular, has a recognized and legitimate part to play in Ghana's economic development. We are consistent in these ideas. I have never made any secret of my faith in socialist principles, but I have always tried to make it quite clear that Ghana's socialism is not incompatible with the existence and growth of a vigorous private sector in the economy.

### **U.S. Concern Over One-Party System**

While we can find much to support in the philosophical objectives most Africans hold, we are less happy about what many of them often consider an emergency necessity for national development—strong centralization of power. This reasoning leads them to the conclusion that at present democratic results are more important than democratic forms. In a slight majority of new African nations this means one-party government, although these systems are far from the monolithic structures of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. They allow considerable latitude for dissent and internal self-expression.

A strong case for one-party rule has been made by many articulate African spokesmen who assert that: the number of experienced leaders is too small to be divided; mature and loyal opposition is rare in a new state; they have classless societies, and the only genuine opposition to African nationalist parties came from the former metropolises or extremists; this is their time of emergency, and unity is essential to achieve national goals; they need strong central leadership to counter such divisive forces as tribalism; their present leaders are revolutionary heroes and have no mass opposition; the democratic processes are fulfilled by permitting full expression of opposing viewpoints in party councils.

President [Sékou] Touré of Guinea puts it this way:

The concerns of the state of Guinea are the concerns of all the citizens of Guinea. The program of the party is discussed democratically. As long as a decision has not been taken, each one is free to say what he thinks or wishes. But when—after a long discussion in the Congress or Assembly—the decisions have been taken by a unanimous vote or by a majority, the workers and the leaders are required to apply them faithfully.

That there is some free discussion within party structures is borne out by Professor Immanuel Wallerstein of Columbia, who writes "There is no single-party structure in African independent states where the observer cannot identify factions and tendencies which argue with each other to some extent over issues."

In some African states, moreover, there is strong opposition to the one-party concept from equally articulate Africans. Dr. [Nnaudi] Azikiwe, the Governor General of the Federation of Nigeria, which has a multiparty government, says: "Unless an opposition exists—as a 'shadow cabinet' capable of replacing the government—democracy becomes a sham."

And Prime Minister [A. Milton] Obote of Uganda, who sees the need for a responsible opposition, has remarked: "We have a vigorous and healthy people composed of tribes whose diversity, far from being a drawback, does constitute a wealth of cultural heritage and will constitute a source of great strength."

For my own part I believe a multiparty system is the best system for democratic government, but I recognize that we had only one party for the first 8 years of our national life and even as late as 1820 James Monroe was elected President without any opposition. The absence of opposition is not unusual in countries new to independence.

While we hope the one-party system in Africa will be a short-term, transitional arrangement, the principal point of our concern at the moment is whether these governments remain free and independent and give the people genuine choice and an opportunity for democratic expression.

### **Development of a Unique Way of Life**

From this discussion today I think what emerges is the fact that Africa is independently developing a way of life of its own. In many respects they seek the same objectives we do—sometimes in the same way we do, sometimes in

fferent ways. Often they assign different absolute or time priorities to the attainment of these objectives. They have made real progress, but they have not achieved perfection any more than any other part of the world has. So we must continue to make a real effort to see Africa through African eyes, as well as our own, if we intend to conduct a successful African policy. And we must seek the substance and not be misled by the form. Only in this manner can we possibly hope to understand the phenomenon of African nationalism and come to grips with the realities of that continent for our mutual benefit.

This does not mean, of course, that we must accept the unfavorable aspects of African government as desirable, inevitable, or eternal. There are a number of practices—some of them adapted from former colonial administrations—that we consider undemocratic. *Apartheid*, for example, quickly springs to mind. But there are others—preventive detention, summary deportation, house arrest, the outlawing of political parties, violation of the principle of political asylum, confiscation of foreign publications, restrictions on press freedom and the right to assemble, and the practice of restricting persons to their home villages.

Although we believe these practices retard the growth of democracy, many African leaders do not. In fact, many of them believe that these devices are essential at this time to permit the development of democratic institutions in the future. Although we can understand the realities that guide such thinking, we also feel we should work toward what have come to be considered indisputable democratic values, and whenever the opportunity presents itself, therefore, we suggest and try to help achieve the growth of these values.

Finally, what do I think of the chances for continuing democratic development in Africa? I would say that the chances are good, as long as we think of basic values and not simply rigid forms. After all, our Republic and Britain, Switzerland, and Athens do not all fit into the same mold, but who will say that democracy has not breathed freely in all these forms?

As in many other parts of the world, many democratic values have not yet been attained. But, on balance, I believe Africa's future is

hopeful, and I would like to conclude with a statement by Tanganyika's President Nyerere which expresses this hope compellingly:

"To those who wonder if democracy can survive in Africa, my own answer, then, would be that, far from its being an alien idea, democracy has long been familiar to the African. There is nothing in our traditional attitude toward discussion and our current dedication to human rights to justify the claim that democracy is in danger in Africa. I see exactly the opposite: The principles of our nationalist struggles for human dignity, augmented by our traditional attitude toward discussion, should augur well for democracy in Africa."

### **Anniversary of Fulbright Agreement Observed at Manila**

The Department of State announced on March 22 (press release 149) that the 15th anniversary of one of the earliest Fulbright agreements, with the Republic of the Philippines, would be observed at Manila March 23. It was the third educational exchange agreement concluded after passage of the Fulbright Act in 1946.

President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines and American Ambassador William E. Stevenson are among the scheduled participants in the ceremonies.

The ceremonies will also recall more than a half-century of close educational relations between the United States and the Philippines, dating back to 1901, when the SS *Thomas* landed some 600 American teachers on the islands to help make primary and secondary education more widely available. New "Thomasites" arrived each year until the outbreak of World War II. Under the Fulbright program teachers, as well as students, professors, and research scholars, have been "exchanged," with Filipino teachers among those coming to this country for study and other special programs.

Since 1948 the program has brought 748 grantees from the Philippines to the United States and sent 211 American grantees to the Philippines. It is administered by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is un-

der the general supervision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President. The U.S. Educational Foundation in the Philippines, which nominates Filipinos for grants and makes arrangements for American grantees, is one of the 44 binational commissions which have been established under the act (now the Fulbright-Hays Act).

## Current Treaty Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Copyright

Protocol I to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Finland, January 16, 1963.

#### International Labor Organization

Agreement concerning the Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Geneva February 21 and 22, 1963. Entered into force February 22, 1963.

#### Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

*Acceptance deposited:* France, February 14, 1963.

#### Trade

*Trinidad and Tobago on January 23, 1963, acknowledged applicable rights and obligations of the United Kingdom with respect to the following:*

Protocol of rectification to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force March 24, 1948. TIAS 1761.

Protocol modifying certain provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 15, 1948. TIAS 1763.

Special protocol modifying article XIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force April 19, 1948. TIAS 1764.

Special protocol relating to article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Habana March 24, 1948. Entered into force June 7, 1948. TIAS 1765.

Second protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force September 14, 1948. TIAS 1888.

Protocol modifying part I and article XXIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2744.

Protocol modifying part II and article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva September 14, 1948. Entered into force December 14, 1948. TIAS 1890.

First protocol of modifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2745.

Third protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2393.

Protocol modifying article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force March 28, 1950. TIAS 2300.

Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1951. TIAS 2394.

Protocol replacing schedule VI (Ceylon) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy August 13, 1949. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2746.

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy October 10, 1949. Entered into force for the United States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100.

Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950. Entered into force September 24, 1952. TIAS 2747.

Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16, 1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764.

Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.

First protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into force October 21, 1953. TIAS 2885.

Second protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4250.

Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197.

#### Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Uganda, March 15, 1963.

### BILATERAL

#### Guatemala

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala City December 28 and 29, 1962. Entered into force December 29, 1962.

#### Japan

Consular convention. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963. Enters into force on 30th day following the day of exchange of ratifications.

**Africa.** Democracy and the Emerging Nations of Africa (Williams) . . . . . 541

**American Principles.** The Presidents' Meeting at San José (Kennedy, text of declaration) . . . . . 511

**American Republics.** The Presidents' Meeting at San José (Kennedy, text of declaration) . . . . . 511

**Brazil.** U.S. Regrets Misinterpretation of Statement on Brazil (Ball) . . . . . 521

**Congo (Léopoldville)**

The United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . . . . . 535

The United Nations: Its Value to the United States (Stevenson) . . . . . 522

The United Nations Role in Political Disputes (Sisco) . . . . . 529

**Congress.** The United Nations: Its Value to the United States (Stevenson) . . . . . 522

**Cuba**

The United Nations: Its Value to the United States (Stevenson) . . . . . 522

The United Nations Role in Political Disputes (Sisco) . . . . . 529

U.S. Opposes Attacks on Cuba by Splinter Refugee Groups . . . . . 520

**Economic Affairs.** Members Named to International Business Advisory Committee . . . . . 540

**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** Anniversary of Fulbright Agreement Observed at Manila . . . . . 545

**Foreign Aid.** The Presidents' Meeting at San José (Kennedy, text of declaration) . . . . . 511

**Middle East.** The United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . . . . . 535

**Military Affairs.** Admiral Smith Appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic . . . . . 521

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** Admiral Smith Appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic . . . . . 521

**Philippines.** Anniversary of Fulbright Agreement Observed at Manila . . . . . 545

**Presidential Documents**

President Greet Conference of National Organizations . . . . . 531

The Presidents' Meeting at San José . . . . . 511

**Treaty Information.** Current Treaty Actions . . . . . 546

**United Nations**

Current U.N. Documents . . . . . 528

President Greet Conference of National Organizations (text of letter) . . . . . 531

The United Nations Financial Crisis (Gardner) . . . . . 535

The United Nations: Its Value to the United States (Stevenson) . . . . . 522

The United Nations Role in Political Disputes (Sisco) . . . . . 529

*Name Index*

Ball, George W . . . . . 521

Gardner, Richard N . . . . . 535

Kennedy, President . . . . . 511, 531

Sisco, Joseph J . . . . . 529

Smith, Harold Page . . . . . 521

Stevenson, Adlai E . . . . . 522

Williams, G. Mennen . . . . . 541

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 18-24**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to March 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 120 of March 8; 124 of March 12; and 136 of March 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*139	3/18	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*140	3/18	Morrow appointed Special Adviser on Community Relations (biographic details).
*141	3/19	Program for visit of King of Morocco.
*142	3/19	Harriman: National Farmers Union (excerpts).
143	3/19	Ball: statement on Brazil.
144	3/19	Statement on hit-and-run attacks on Cuba.
145	3/20	Declaration of Central America.
†146	3/21	Consular convention with Japan.
147	3/21	Blaustein and Harvey appointed members of Advisory Committee on International Business Problems (rewrite).
†148	3/21	Chayes: Bar Association of St. Louis.
149	3/22	Anniversary of Fulbright agreement with Philippines (rewrite).
*150	3/22	Program for visit of King of Morocco.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPT  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
DSB DEC -G-

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)



# TREATIES IN FORCE . . .

## the

## January 1, 1963

# Department

## of

# State

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

Publication 7481

\$1.75

*Order Form*

Publication 7481

\$1.75

to: Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *TREATIES IN FORCE—A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1963.*

**Enclosed find:**

Name: -----

\$:-----  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Street Address: -----

City, Zone, and State: -----

150 20

# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1242

April 15, 1963

**THE COLD WAR—A LOOK AHEAD** ● *by W. W. Rostow, Counselor . . . . .* 551

**THE UNITED NATIONS—WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT HAS DONE** ● *by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser . . . . .* 562

**THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN LAOS . . . . .** 567

**FOREIGN POLICY IN THE OPEN SOCIETY** ● *Statement by Assistant Secretary Manning . . . . .* 575

L  
RECORD  
STATES  
N POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1242 • PUBLICATION 7

April 15, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements which the United States is or may become a party to and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed current*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.



# The Cold War—A Look Ahead

by *W. W. Rostow*

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*<sup>1</sup>

From the earliest days of his administration the President made it clear that we faced two types of challenges and had to deal with them simultaneously.

One consisted in a series of crises which had developed in the post-Sputnik period—that is, in the period 1957–61—in particular, the crises in Laos, Viet-Nam, the Congo, Cuba, and Berlin.

The second challenge consisted not of urgent crises but of situations which required sustained constructive action if the positive interests of the free world were to be advanced and degeneration avoided. There was a need, for example, to move forward in our relations with the fully revived and rapidly developing Western Europe and Japan; in our relations with Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where a powerful desire to modernize their societies had taken root. And there remained the challenge to make progress in the task of bringing the nuclear arms race under control, in ways compatible with the security of the United States and the free world.

One way to characterize the last several months—perhaps the whole interval since the Cuban crisis of last autumn—is that, to some extent, the great crises of 1961–62 have receded into the background and the problems of moving forward in the longer run enterprises of the free world have come nearer to the center of the stage.

Let me be clear: None of the crises on the national agenda as of January 1961 has been

finally and satisfactorily settled. The treaty arrangements in Laos remain precarious, still violated by the continued presence in that country of Viet Minh units under the control of Hanoi. The guerrilla war directed from Hanoi against South Viet-Nam remains dangerous and costly. In the Congo the unity of the country remains to be consolidated and economic, social, and political momentum to be achieved. West Berlin stands firm, confident, and prosperous, but the threat to its future remains. And evidently the crisis over Cuba is not at an end. Nevertheless we have achieved something substantial in these 26 months: The momentum of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive has been halted, and in the vast areas which have been threatened by it—Southeast Asia, Central Africa, the Caribbean, and Western Europe—free men breathe easier.

There is no cause for complacency; but there is reason for us all to understand that hard, dangerous, but patient efforts, backed by a radical expansion in U.S. military power and by a demonstration that our European and Latin American alliances hold firm, have produced important and positive results.

Meanwhile within the camp of our adversaries the forces of history have placed on their agenda serious problems. From one end to the other of the Communist bloc, nationalism and, in certain quarters, the pressure of men for higher degrees of human freedom have weakened the unity of the bloc. Every Communist party in the world is trapped in a painful debate over the issues posed in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moreover, the inability of communism to grow food efficiently exerts a grinding pres-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before a regional foreign policy conference at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 28 (press release 158).

sure on Communist hopes and pretensions from East Germany to North Viet-Nam.

With the drama of intense crisis somewhat diminished—no man can say for how long—the constructive tasks of the free world and of our relations with the Communist bloc are more to the forefront.

Our broad objectives are clear and have been often stated by the President and the Secretary of State.

We seek to build a community of independent nations, their governments increasingly responsive to the consent of the governed, cooperating of their own free will in their areas of interdependence, settling their disputes by peaceful means. On the basis of this kind of community of free nations, we seek by every means at our disposal, compatible with our own security and that of other free nations, to bring the arms race under control and to move the nations now under Communist control toward acceptance of the principles of national independence, human freedom, international legal order, and peace.

To those who work from day to day in foreign policy these objectives are not abstractions produced for public occasions. They are the working guidelines which suffuse our business, cable by cable, country by country, region by region.

#### **Atlantic Partnership in Nuclear Matters**

Perhaps the most basic of our creative tasks for the 1960's is to move forward in our relations with Western Europe and Japan toward a true partnership, in which the responsibilities and burdens of organizing the free world and of dealing with the menace presented by communism will be more equitably shared. One aspect of this process has been dramatized in recent months by the debate within the Atlantic community over the future organization of nuclear power.

The problem presented to us all is how a community of sovereign nations, bound together by treaty, should organize to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent in a period of cold war and for the use of nuclear weapons should their use be required in the common interest. The fundamental fact that has to be faced is that the problem cannot be solved by simply maintaining a monopoly of nuclear power in the hands of the

United States. The fact is that during the 1950's Great Britain and France developed a capacity to produce nuclear weapons and means of delivery; and there is no technological reason why other nations could not also achieve this capability. In the face of this fact what are our alternatives?

Theoretically one could conceive of a solution in which the European nations would decide that, despite their scientific and technological capacity, they would consciously forgo the production, operation, and management of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and leave the job to the United States. I believe we can assume that this is an unrealistic solution. As I say, Great Britain and France are already launched on another path; and one can easily understand why proud and free men now fully recovered from the economic consequences of the Second World War—men who have been threatened by Moscow over the past several years as hostages to the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles lined up in western Russia—would wish to play a larger, rather than a smaller, role in the deterrence of nuclear attack. They are not content, when threatened, to say to Moscow: Washington will protect us.

In short, the American nuclear monopoly was broken by events and decisions in the 1950's and it is unlikely to return.

A second solution has been suggested by certain theorists on the other side of the Atlantic. They argue that the consequences of a nuclear war are so great that one nation cannot rely on any other nation to come to its defense in the face of the danger of nuclear attack. Therefore the only secure and dignified position for a nation is to command its own nuclear capability. Among our NATO allies a certain number have the industrial and technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons and some kind of delivery system. But if we were all to accept this theory, which denies the possibility of collective security arrangements in a nuclear age two consequences would flow. First, the alliance would fragment into a series of national nuclear capabilities, the European components of which would be inefficiently produced, unsystematically targeted, and quite unpersuasive in Moscow. Second, we would be proclaiming in the alliance that no effective protection could be

fforded to those among our allies who did not command a national nuclear capability. We could be inviting Moscow, in effect, to put diplomatic and military pressure on these smaller powers, one by one, in the face of a doctrine which asserted that no other nation would rationally protect them.

The acceptance of this doctrine could only mean the end of the North Atlantic Alliance, opening the way for the fragmentation and piecemeal diplomatic or military defeat of Western Europe.

In the light of these two extreme alternatives, it has been the policy of your Government, beginning with the latter days of the Eisenhower administration, to look toward arrangements which would increase the effective degree of partnership in nuclear matters within the Atlantic community without diminishing the effectiveness and unity of our collective security deterrent. This is no simple matter in a world where 15 nations are committed to a system of mutual defense but in which no united sovereign institutions exist.

It has been natural for newspaper and other commentators to focus sharply on this ultimate problem: Whose finger will be on the trigger, whose finger on the safety catch? Could the European forces fire their atomic weapons without the agreement of the United States? Could the United States fire without the agreement of Europe? Could individual nations within the alliance veto firing by others? It has been our view that these ultimate questions could not and should not now be settled immediately and finally. The terms of the Atlantic partnership which evolve over coming months and years will depend on many factors, including, in particular, how the process of European unification, now temporarily frustrated, proceeds.

It has been our view that four more immediate courses of action should be considered urgently, which would move toward Atlantic partnership in nuclear matters. First, that we should commit ourselves to work toward a solution which would maintain the unity of the alliance, with a unified nuclear deterrent at its core. Second, that we devise and agree on general guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in the face of Soviet attack. Such agreed guide-

lines now exist within NATO. Third, that we take active steps to bring our European partners more deeply and directly into the nuclear business with respect to problems of targeting, control, and the strategic relationship between nuclear and conventional forces. Measures to this end are actively under way within NATO. Fourth, that we provide within this framework for active European (and Canadian) participation in the operation and control of strategic as well as tactical nuclear weapons. Out of the process of shared experience, consultation, and debate thus set in motion it has been our belief and our faith that a rational and sensible resolution of the control issue would emerge, acceptable to the peoples and parliaments of our allies and to our own people and the Congress.

As you know, we have been discussing with certain of our European friends the possibility of setting up a mixed-manned multilateral nuclear force to be based at sea. This proposal, first made by Secretary [Christian A.] Herter at the NATO meeting of 1960,<sup>2</sup> was reaffirmed by President Kennedy at Ottawa in May of 1961.<sup>3</sup> In the autumn of 1962 an American technical mission, representing both the civil and military parts of our Government, discussed how such a force might work with our NATO allies. As part of the Nassau agreement of December 1962,<sup>4</sup> we stated that we would present this concept at a high political level to our allies. Acting as the President's personal representative, Ambassador Livingston Merchant has been engaged in discussions at the North Atlantic Council itself and in a number of European capitals.<sup>5</sup> As the most powerful member of the North Atlantic Alliance, bearing special responsibilities in the field of nuclear arms, we felt that we had a duty to lay before our friends a proposal which would permit an enlarged participation in nuclear matters within the alliance in a form which would increase the unity of the alliance rather than fragment it.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 839.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

<sup>5</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197.

These discussions have already had two important and useful effects. First, the European nations concerned have begun to come to grips with the real problems of the joint management of a nuclear deterrent. The discussions have been candid and mature. A matter which is bound to be the subject of heated and sometimes superficial debate is now being gripped in high seriousness by the NATO governments. Second, these discussions have been conducted in a setting in which there is an overwhelming commitment within the alliance to move forward on a collective security basis. The dangers of fragmentation are now widely understood, and there is, in Ben Franklin's old phrase, a growing sense that in this decisive area we must hang together or we will hang separately.

The transition in our relations with Europe from dependence to partnership—a transition taking place in economic, political, and military affairs—requires changes in attitude and policy by all the nations in the alliance. It is a complicated and delicate transition. In no field is it more critical than nuclear matters, for on a credible nuclear deterrent the security of the 400 million human beings who live within the Atlantic system depends. The debates and explorations that accompany this transition should not be viewed as petty squabbles or as evidence of disarray. They are part of a living constitutional debate of the first order of magnitude—a debate that must take place if inescapable problems are to be solved and Europe move from dependence to global partnership within the free world. Against the background of NATO's success in the past 14 years there is every reason for us to carry forward these explorations and negotiations with confidence.

#### **Relations With the Underdeveloped Areas**

A second great constructive issue centers on our foreign aid programs and, more generally, on our relations with governments and peoples of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Here again, as in our relations with Western Europe, it is necessary to understand what our national objective is and to understand why the track on which we are engaged is and must be a long-term track.

The underdeveloped areas within the free world are caught up, as we all know, in a great revolution. They are seeking to restructure their societies in such ways as to permit them to absorb and apply, for their own purposes, the fruits of modern science and technology. Simultaneously they are moved by a desire to assert more strongly their national interests and presence on the world scene.

The changes through which they are passing in an effort to develop modern societies and to develop governments which can more effectively organize and project their national interests involve alteration in every dimension. Rural and urban life, social and political institutions as well as the economy itself, are being radically changed. These revolutionary changes are taking place in an environment where the Communists perceive a unique and transient opportunity to exploit the inevitable confusion and to seize power from within.

The danger of nuclear war and the problem of its deterrence are with us every day. Although the Korean war recedes into distant memory, the danger of an overt crossing of frontiers by the Communists is still a danger which we must bear in mind every day; and we were reminded of it again last autumn when the Chinese Communists moved down from occupied Tibet across the Indian frontiers. But the possibility which the Communists are most actively exploiting in every part of the underdeveloped world is the possibility of creating the conditions which permit the kind of seizure of power from within which Castro accomplished in Cuba at the end of 1958.

Developments over the past 2 years give us grounds for hope that a combination of preventive measures and constructive measures can frustrate this Communist intent and yield us in time independent and increasingly modern nations which take their place within the world community as constructive members. But we cannot expect to see dramatic and final results within a short period; nor can we expect such results unless the United States, Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand work together to bring about a new relationship between the more developed and less developed parts of the free world.

What is required basically, of course, is that the underdeveloped areas organize themselves and organize their human and material resources in such ways as to produce a rate of growth which outstrips their rate of population increase. Self-help is the only sound basis for programs of external aid. Despite the evident difficulties and frustrations of this process, there are many hopeful signs.

A number of nations which 5 years ago required U.S. assistance in the form of grants or soft loans are now moving into a position of self-sustained growth where they can support themselves with the help of outside capital granted on essentially business terms. Nations containing almost half the population of the underdeveloped areas have already begun to demonstrate the capacity regularly to grow at a rate higher than their population increase. Some of them may require outside assistance for many years; but growth is a powerful force, and if it can be sustained by their own efforts and ours, there are decent and hardheaded prospects that, in a measurable period of time, they can emerge into self-supporting status. Another group of countries, representing perhaps 5 percent of the population of the underdeveloped areas, are within a measurable distance of achieving regular growth, notably if they can establish reasonable political stability over the next decade.

Others—for example, some of the new African nations—are just beginning to organize the basic foundations for growth in education, transport facilities, power resources, and the rest of the overhead capital for modernization. But most of the underdeveloped areas have already rounded the corner—or should round—in this decade; for the capacity to grow is the critical measure of progress.

As we look ahead, then, the prospect is that we shall require from the more developed nations of the free world programs of assistance to the underdeveloped areas for a considerable period of time; but the task is not endless nor are the prospects hopeless. The underdeveloped areas, aided by their more affluent friends, are well on the way to making growth their normal condition.

In confronting this sustained challenge over the coming years three fundamental facts should be borne in mind. First, the contribution to the development effort being made by nations other than the United States is substantial and rising. The acceptance of the aid burden which, in our country, grew out of lend-lease and the problems of wartime reconstruction in Europe and Japan is spreading to the peoples and governments of other nations. From 1960 to 1961, for example, aid contributed by nations other than the United States rose from \$2 to \$2.5 billion. We are not in this alone; and in this area of policy the concept of partnership is clearly under way.

Second, within the less developed areas the tendency of governments and peoples to face their development problems—which must be faced if aid is to be effective—is increasing. This trend does not make headlines and is not easy to dramatize, but for those whose duty it is to follow these matters from day to day it is unmistakable. It is no easy matter to assess a nation's resources and to design a coherent development program in sufficient detail to guide policy. It is no easy matter for fragile governments, presiding over turbulent political situations, to get agreement, for example, to increase tax rates and to improve tax collections when their societies have never developed the institutions and habits and attitudes required for modern fiscal systems. It is no easy matter to train and organize the technicians required for effective rural development programs. It is no easy matter to develop in new societies the skills required to translate an idea in a planning paper into a feasibility study and the engineering blueprint required for a foreign loan. Nevertheless this is the underlying direction within the underdeveloped world, and it is the right direction. The number of good development plans is increasing; tax collections, rural development programs, and bankable projects are expanding.

Third, and most fundamental, we should be conscious that in the past decade the Communists have held up to the peoples and governments of the underdeveloped world a banner and a program. They asserted that the problems of modernizing an underdeveloped society

could be accomplished only by Communist means, by a divorce from association with the West, and by intimate ties to the Communist bloc. In one area after another and in one country after another they asserted the proposition that communism was the right road for the peoples of the developing nations to follow.

Communist efforts in the underdeveloped areas have by no means ceased. There is no weakness or opportunity that the Communists will not exploit. On the other hand, the unmistakable feeling and trend in the underdeveloped areas are toward the maintenance of their national independence and toward the devising of practical and pragmatic ways to develop, which conform not to Communist formulas but to their own traditions, problems, and aspirations.

It can never be said too often that our national interest in the underdeveloped areas is, simply, that they maintain their independence and become part of an effectively working international community. Our greatest strength is that the Communists cannot say this with credibility. If these nations maintain their independence in the difficult transitional process in which they are engaged, we will win the struggle. But to win this struggle requires that we maintain our own efforts at economic assistance; that we make it easier for these nations to earn foreign exchange by normal trade; and that we exhibit understanding and patience in working with them through this revolutionary passage whose outcome will help determine the kind of world our children and grandchildren shall live in.

I can think of no moment in the postwar years when it would be less appropriate for us radically to reduce our aid programs or to despair of achieving important results for the national interest through those programs. The facts suggest that this is a time to persist—and to persist in good heart.

### **Two Kinds of Challenges**

I have cited two major examples of the kind of long-term challenges that we as a nation face in helping to bring about the kind of world we want. There are others. For example, the problem of avoiding conflict within regions of the free world over deeply felt issues, often centering on problems inherited from the

colonial era. As a great power, we are often drawn into these disputes. Some of the proudest passages in American diplomacy have been written in recent years in quietly using our limited but real margin of influence to bring about peaceful resolution of such conflicts—conflicts in which the Communists have invested vast resources in an effort to disrupt the unity and peace of the free world.

The same kind of persistent patience is required in the field of arms control and in those real but narrow areas where we can work constructively with the peoples of Eastern Europe.

There are moments that call for bold and decisive action; for example, the Cuban crisis of last autumn or the decision made late in 1961 to throw increased U.S. military support behind South Viet-Nam. But the great objectives of foreign policy are not achieved in a day, nor are they achieved by dramatic gimmicks. They are achieved by setting a sound objective and sticking with it, through thick and thin, with stubborn patience and steady application of energy. As a distinguished postwar Secretary of State [Dean Acheson] once said, the task of advancing the Nation's interest on the world scene in a dangerous and turbulent era of history, in the face of communism's implacable hostility, is like "the pain of earning a living."

What I am saying essentially, then, is this: We have been engaged in the past years in a mixture of urgent and dramatic crises and long term essential constructive tasks. An effective American policy on the world scene requires that we deal effectively with both kinds of challenges. Although this administration came to responsibility in the midst of multiple crises we have from the beginning accepted both challenges.

In an interval such as the present, when the crises are not as urgent and dramatic as they have recently been, it is important for all of us to focus our minds and gain perspective on these longer run constructive ventures. Unless we meet the direct challenges of communism and their intrusions into the free world effectively—unless we maintain the frontiers of freedom—there will be no free world to build. On the other hand, if we fail to develop clear and constructive goals and the durable, stub

born patience to pursue them day after day in the face of all the inevitable frustrations, the concept of a free-world community capable of creating and maintaining within itself an essential unity, an environment of progress, and the capacity to settle its conflicts without resort to force will remain a matter of rhetoric—and freedom will be in jeopardy in quite as real a way as it has been jeopardized by violent crises.

Now, if I may, a final word which I speak as much as an historian as I do as a working member of the Government I am proud to serve.

It is perfectly evident to us all that this nation faces many unresolved problems on the world scene: Cuba; the continuing net drain on our balance of payments; differences of conception about the Atlantic partnership. The Alliance for Progress has not yet acquired full forward momentum. The war in South Viet-Nam is still unresolved. And I could, of course, extend the list. As we look around us, there is evidently no cause for complacency, for slackening of effort, or for assuming that danger has passed.

Nevertheless great things have happened in the past 2 years and we should be conscious of them.

A mortal threat to Southeast Asia has been brought under control—a threat which could have shifted the balance of power not merely in Asia but on the world scene; the threat in central Africa, which could have torn apart the life of that aspiring but still fragile continent, has been averted; the powerful psychological appeal that Castro was able to project from Habana and the means for backing it by the techniques of subversion and guerrilla warfare to which he is committed have been radically reduced by his own performance in Cuba and by what we in this hemisphere have done together through the OAS [Organization of American States]. The threat of ultimatum which hung over West Berlin for almost 5 years after Khrushchev's 1958 statement has, for the time at least, been withdrawn. And the whole of this nation, led by the President, stood as one in compelling the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. There are few people on either side of the Iron Curtain who do not understand that, despite Soviet nuclear weapons and deliv-

ery capabilities, we were all prepared to do whatever might be required to force their removal. If we were to lead the free world in the decade ahead, it was essential that the question be answered as to whether the United States was prepared to undertake military action in the face of the Soviet nuclear threat in defense of our vital interests and those of the free world.

As nearly as history produces a straight answer to such a question, that answer was given not merely by the Government but by all the American people last autumn.

In facing the tasks ahead and in debating what we should do about them in the vigorous style of our democracy, we should not forget these things we have done together in the past 2 years. As a nation we have a right to be proud and confident as well as a duty to be alert and determined as we face what lies ahead.

## **U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Economic and Financial Talks**

*Following is the text of a joint communique between David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas, Minister of Finance of the United States of Brazil, released by the White House on March 25.*

White House press release dated March 25

The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, Mr. David E. Bell, and the Brazilian Minister of Finance, Professor San Tiago Dantas, announced today the conclusion of the economic and financial discussions with the several United States departments and agencies concerned which were initiated on March 11. They are agreed that with the effective collaboration of the United States, other friendly countries, international financial institutions, and private enterprise, in support of the self-help efforts of the Brazilian people, Brazil will be able to accelerate its economic and social progress on a basis of financial stability and within the framework of the Alliance for Progress.

During his stay in Washington, Minister Dantas also held conversations with officials of



the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Minister Dantas stated that these conversations had considerably encouraged him as to the prospects for the increased collaboration of those institutions in helping to support Brazil's program of stabilization and development.

The understandings reached between the two Governments are set forth in the exchange of letters which follows:

**Letter of March 25, 1963, from Finance Minister Dantas to Administrator Bell**

MY DEAR MR. ADMINISTRATOR: I have the pleasure of calling to your attention the essential elements in the program which the Brazilian Government has deemed it appropriate to adopt, in order to attack, with its own means and resources, the problem of economic and social development of the Brazilian people, while at the same time reestablishing monetary stability.

A number of major actions have already been taken by our Congress and by the Brazilian Government within the framework of the tax reform law of November 28, 1962, and of the Three-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. They include:

1. The adoption of tax reforms which are increasing revenues by about 25 per cent, and which provide the foundation for important administrative improvements in tax collection;

2. The elimination of subsidies on wheat and petroleum products, so as to reduce the cash deficit of the Treasury and free resources for developmental purposes;

3. An increase in railroad freight and passenger rates, with a view to reducing operating deficits;

4. The issuance of Decree 51,814 setting forth the plan of containment of budgetary expenditures for 1963;

5. The issuance of SUMOC [Superintendency of Currency and Credit] Instruction 234 limiting the expansion of credit to the private sector from the Bank of Brazil;

6. The issuance of SUMOC Instruction 235 providing for priorities in the extension of

credit by private banks, enforced through a penalty of increased reserve requirements;

7. Presentation to the Congress of a proposal to give SUMOC additional power to control the banking system and to reorganize its administrative structure so it may adequately carry out the basic functions of a Central Bank;

8. Conversion of the specific tax on electric power consumption into an *ad valorem* tax, and adoption for ten years of a compulsory loan system related to power rates, in order to raise non-inflationary resources for the expansion of power systems;

9. An appeal to the state governments, and their agreement, to cooperate with the national stabilization and development effort and to improve the efficiency of their governmental operations;

10. Presentation to Congress of a Message proposing that wage increases for public employees be fixed at 40 per cent effective in April;

11. An appeal to labor unions for the adoption of a wage policy based on the principle that wage readjustments this year should not exceed actual increases in the cost of living;

12. Agreement by business associations in the clothing, shoe and automotive parts industries to the adoption of a policy of voluntary price restraint; similar agreements are being negotiated with other industries;

13. Presentation of a Message to Congress proposing the adoption of an agrarian reform program, with a view to assuring an improved social distribution of land, creating conditions for increasing agricultural productivity, and reorganizing the nation's agricultural system.

In addition, it is the intention of the Brazilian Government, during the course of the coming few months, to take other measures for the purpose of carrying forward the development and stabilization program, including the following:

1. Further elaboration of the plan for reducing the Treasury's cash deficit, so as to (a) identify in appropriate detail the main forms of government spending as among development operating expenses, and subsidies to the federal agencies, (b) establish a system of priorities to assure that development spending will be reduced as little as possible (or, if practicable

increased) within the limits of total expenditures prescribed in said plan, and (c) improve the control mechanism in order to assure compliance with expenditure ceilings;

2. Application of any excess of budgetary receipts over the amounts foreseen in the program mainly to a reduction in the forecast issuance of currency, and to some increase in expenditures for high priority investment sectors such as education and health, which have been especially affected by the economy program. In any event, the cash deficit of the Treasury will be held within the limits stated in the Three-Year Plan of Cr.\$300 billion for the year 1963;

3. Adoption as soon as possible of further measures for the progressive elimination of the deficits of the railroads and the merchant marine, in accordance with the program already formulated by the Minister of Transportation and Public Works. This program includes rate increases, limits on number of employees, elimination of uneconomic railroad trackage, and other operational and administrative improvements;

4. The formulation, already under way, of a further tax reform measure to improve both the social equity and the economic efficiency of the incidence of taxation, to be submitted to Congress in time to permit legislative consideration this year. The corporate tax provisions will be designed to provide added stimulus to productive private enterprise. At the same time, further administrative measures will be taken to improve the collection of taxes and to reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance;

5. Maintenance of the coffee policy set forth in the Three-Year Plan, in order to yield a net surplus in the coffee account of at least Cr.\$100 billion in 1963. A definite target will be established as soon as the size of the crop can be more precisely determined;

6. Securing additional non-inflationary resources as offsets to the budget deficit, in accordance with the same Plan, of at least Cr.\$100 billion during the year 1963, either related to the import system or through other means;

7. Direction of exchange policy, as provided in the Three-Year Plan, to reduce progressively the balance of payments dis-equilibrium and

for that purpose the rate of exchange will not be dissociated from the trend of internal prices;

8. Adoption of specific measures to expand exports, particularly of iron ore, meat, and manufactured goods;

9. Adoption of measures to encourage the inflow of productive private investments in order to help attain the targets of the Three-Year Plan in relation to capital imports, creation of productive employment, and maintenance of a high rate of economic growth;

10. Liquidation of commercial arrears as rapidly as possible, in the light of exchange availabilities, with a view to their full liquidation by not later than May 1964, and the prompt institution of effective controls over importation on the basis of suppliers' credits so as to avoid undesirable levels of medium-term indebtedness;

11. Elaboration in greater detail, during the next several months, of the Three-Year Plan for Economic and Social development, and in accordance with the Charter of Punta del Este<sup>1</sup> securing the collaboration of the Panel of Nine Experts, with a view to the subsequent organization of an international consortium of credit institutions and governments for the support of the Brazilian program within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. This program will contain specific developmental objectives for at least the years 1964 and 1965, and will take into account the measures being adopted during 1963 toward monetary stabilization and to strengthen our resources for development.

These are the actions taken and the measures intended by my Government, in order, within the framework of our national effort, to carry out successfully our program of development and stabilization, so as to ensure the economic and social progress of the Brazilian people.

The conditions for the successful execution of that program in a relatively brief time span can be favorably effected by the degree of external assistance which may be received from international financial institutions, Western European countries, Japan, and the United States, especially taking into account the estimated balance-of-payments deficits, this year and next, of Brazil vis-a-vis the United States

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

and Western Europe, respectively. These deficits, whose magnitude has been estimated and reviewed by our respective technical advisers, can be absorbed or offset by means of credit operations which will at the same time serve the purposes of growth.

On the basis of the encouraging preliminary discussions which I have held in Washington with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, we are asking the Fund to negotiate a standby arrangement by June, and in order to achieve this purpose to send a mission to Brazil. In the meantime, the Fund has agreed to the deferral of the \$26.5 million payment obligation which would otherwise have been due in March.

Continuing the discussions which I have already initiated with representatives of other countries which are creditors of Brazil, we will seek to obtain, during the same time period, new resources from Europe and Japan in an amount of approximately \$100 million, including reactivation of the \$77 million which were not used under the European standby credits negotiated in 1961.

It would be highly important for me to learn the viewpoint of your Government concerning the possibilities of your participation henceforth in support of Brazil's program of development and stabilization, so that this support may be included in the implementation of the Three-Year Plan already adopted by the Brazilian Government. I am sure that such collaboration, supplementing our own self-help efforts, together with the aforementioned cooperation of other governments and international institutions, would make a valuable contribution to the achievement of the objectives of social wellbeing and economic strength set forth in the Charter of Punta del Este.

Please accept, Mr. Administrator, the assurances of my highest esteem.

FRANCISCO CLEMENTINO SAN TIAGO DANTAS  
*Minister of Finance*

**Letter of Reply of March 25, 1963, from Administrator Bell to Finance Minister Dantas**

DEAR MR. MINISTER: During our talks in Washington in the last two weeks, we have greatly appreciated the opportunity to be in-

formed by you and your associates of the program for economic stabilization and development of the Government of Brazil, and the actions and policy decisions already taken to implement that program as set forth in your letter of March 25, 1963. We have been deeply impressed by the way in which the program has been initiated and by the opportunities it appears to present for constructive international cooperation within the framework of the Alliance for Progress.

As you have indicated, the volume of resources required by the Brazilian program as well as your trade and investment connections with Western European countries and Japan render it desirable to enlist the support of those countries and also of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. We are accordingly glad to know that it is your intention to seek a standby agreement with the Fund during the next two months, to initiate conversations for long-term financing with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association, and to obtain financial support from other international banking institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank and from the principal Western European countries and Japan. In this connection, we have noted the encouraging results of your initial conversations with the International Monetary Fund and the other international financial organizations.

As a result of these discussions, we can now foresee a combined supply of external resources from the United States, the other creditor countries, and international agencies in support of your program for development and stabilization adequate to cover fully Brazil's balance-of-payments deficit as now estimated for 1963 and to make a substantial contribution toward meeting the 1964 deficit. At the same time, a major portion of the credits from the United States will provide support for key elements in Brazil's program for economic development, such as roads, electric power supply, and the expansion of small and medium industrial enterprises.

Looking farther ahead, we warmly welcome your intention to detail further your three-year

plan as a basis for long-term economic and social development and to seek international collaboration in its support in accordance with the principles and procedures of the Charter of Punta del Este. The United States will be prepared to participate whole-heartedly in that effort. Thus international financial cooperation with Brazil can be freed from the pressures of intermittent balance-of-payments crises, and placed on the constructive basis of support for long-term economic and social progress.

For the period through May of next year, on the assumption that external financial assistance will successfully be negotiated by June 1963 from other sources, as foreseen in your letter, the United States Government will for its part be prepared to commit, subject to applicable legislation, the following financial resources, totaling approximately \$400 million, in support of your program for stabilization and development:

Funds to be provided immediately:

Export-Import Bank	\$33.0 million
Treasury	\$25.5 million
AID	\$25.5 million

Further funds:

Agency for International Development	
Program Support	\$100.0 million
Project Loans	\$100.0 million
Export-Import Bank	
Refunding of debt repayments falling due between June 1, 1963 and May 31, 1964	\$44.5 million
Public Law 480, Title I Commodity shipments (estimated)	\$70.0 million
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$398.5 million</b>

Disbursements of these funds are expected to be phased in time as required by the program and parallel with the successful implementation of the measures described by you. In order to meet the immediate needs of the program while negotiations are conducted with the International Monetary Fund and European countries, in addition to the postponement already agreed of the \$26.5 million due this month to the Fund, the United States will provide immediately credits from the Export-Import

Bank, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Treasury in a total of \$84 million.

The funds to be provided from AID resources would come in part from appropriations already made for the Alliance for Progress by the United States Congress for the fiscal year 1962-63; the remainder would be subject to the appropriation of funds by the Congress for the fiscal year 1963-64. It is expected that these AID funds will be made available in the form of loans repayable with a substantial period of grace and a long subsequent period of amortization and at minimum rates of interest. The Administration's total request for authorization and appropriation of funds makes sufficient allowance for these purposes, and also to provide resources for the Northeast Development Program and initial support for subsequent phases of your three-year development program. The funds from the Export-Import Bank would consist of a release of \$33 million from the commitment made in 1961 and on the terms then agreed, and \$44.5 million in refunding of debt repayments over periods of seven years. The Treasury funds will be applied immediately on an interim basis and would later become part of the longer-term arrangements.

In addition the United States is now considering appropriate terms and conditions for the sale of wheat to Brazil under Title I of P.L. 480 for the calendar year 1963 and would be prepared, subject to the requirements of existing legislation and established procedures, to extend this consideration to cover calendar year 1964 as requested by the Brazilian Government. The total estimated value of such an extended agreement would be approximately \$140 million.

I look forward to the early completion by representatives of our two Governments of specific arrangements to implement the foregoing understandings, parallel with the progressive implementation of your own program.

DAVID E. BELL

## The United Nations—What It Is, What It Has Done

by *Abram Chayes*  
*Legal Adviser*<sup>1</sup>

Law and politics go together in this country. For Americans the characteristic business of government is the making and enforcement of laws. From the Continental Congress to the 88th more lawyers have sat in our national legislature than members of any other profession. Governors, Senators, Secretaries of State have, as often as not, been lawyers. Officers necessarily drawn from the bar—judges and prosecutors—play a more direct and acknowledged part in political processes here than elsewhere. It is perhaps no more than the just desserts of a country that prides itself on having a government of laws and not of men to wind up with a government of lawyers.

The United Nations is not a government. But it is a political institution. It has an organizational structure, complete with legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It has written rules and unwritten traditions. It has a constitutional history as well as a political and diplomatic history.

As lawyers with a flair for politics, we have a special interest in the ways in which the form and structure of that institution shape its work. Many of us here tonight are old enough to remember with what hopes and dreams the United Nations was launched in 1946. For many Americans, especially, the adoption of the charter was a kind of expiation of our earlier rejection of the League of Nations, and their expectations, like those of most repentant sinners, were correspondingly extravagant.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Bar Association of St. Louis, the St. Louis University School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law at St. Louis, Mo., on Mar. 21 (press release 148).

The framers of the charter met in the shadow of a long, cruel war whose toll of blood and suffering was still vivid. The U.N. was to be the instrument for preventing another such war and at least a first step toward the universal vision of a parliament of man. The San Francisco conference had the political experience of millennia to draw on; but at the same time its vision was circumscribed by contemporary political relationships erected for the defeat of Germany and Japan. Like the draftsmen of any great charter, they called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.

The champagne was hardly dry on the bow however, when the United Nations began to change and grow from the conception of its begetters. For many this was a disappointment or a betrayal. But for lawyers it should have been ground to realize or to hope that they had created an organism, something that could live and grow to play a vital role in the world's affairs.

### **Security Council and General Assembly**

In the original conception of the organization most of its important powers were lodged in and were to be exercised by the Security Council, composed of the five powers which had led the wartime alliance and six other members elected for 2-year terms.

The charter assigns the Security Council "primary" responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The operating premise of the Council was continuing big power cooperation in policing the world. This

premise led the framers to view the Security Council as the principal peacekeeping agency, to give it power to make binding decisions when the peace was breached or threatened, and to vest in it a near monopoly on the legitimate use of force. We may be permitted to doubt whether, even if postwar politics had vindicated the hopes of San Francisco, the Security Council could have fulfilled the place foreseen for it. In Utopia the thrust of change and the clash of interest may be small enough to be contained by so limited a political device as benevolent oligarchy. Not in the real world.

In any event the wartime solidarity between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, already strained at Yalta and Potsdam, quickly passed into history. The premise of Big Five unanimity was early betrayed, and the veto disabled the Security Council from functioning according to the original plan. Events demonstrated that the Council was not a wholly viable institution. Fortunately the charter, like other living documents, contains in the amplitude of its conception and language the materials for giving effect to the primary purposes of the United Nations, notwithstanding the withering of what was intended as its most powerful organ. Both to insure that the organization remained an ongoing concern and to secure for the increasing membership a greater voice in the activities of the organization, members have consistently invested the General Assembly with greater responsibility.

They have rejected constructions which would make the exercise of this authority dependent upon the concurrence of the Security Council. And they have narrowed the restraints on the authority of the Assembly originally intended to give the Security Council the fullest freedom of action. This development is recorded in actions of United Nations organs interpreting the charter by exercising their powers under it and is reaffirmed in opinions of the International Court of Justice.

The General Assembly, unlike a legislature, can act to bind its members in only a narrow range of questions, mostly organizational. But the charter grants a sweeping jurisdiction to exercise those other characteristic powers of legislatures—the power to debate and to inquire. Article 10 provides that the Assembly may “dis-

cuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter.” It may consider the “general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.” And it may “discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.” On all these questions the Assembly may adopt resolutions recommending, either to members or the Security Council, that action be taken.

There are two principal limitations on the power of the Assembly to act: It may not intervene in matters which are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” and it may not interfere with the Security Council when the Council is exercising its “primary responsibility” to maintain peace and security. In the event, this last restriction has been given a narrow scope.

The formal work of the Assembly, adopting resolutions, is done at plenary sessions. Most of the real work of the Assembly, however, is carried on in its seven committees of the whole—two for political affairs, two for economic and social affairs, one for trusteeship affairs, one for administrative and budgetary questions, and one, unfortunately the least active, for legal affairs. In addition to these committees the Assembly has created numerous subsidiary bodies, such as the Working Group of Twenty-one, which is currently seeking an acceptable method of resolving the U.N.’s financial crisis, or the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, with its legal and technical subcommittees scheduled to meet shortly, or the Committee of Twenty-four, which reports to the General Assembly on colonial questions.

In this way, the Assembly has acted throughout the range of its charter powers. Last year, for example, it considered and dealt with, among other things, problems arising in the Congo and the Gaza Strip, Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa, the Portuguese African territories, Yemen, and West New Guinea. It concerned itself with colonialism, the troika, sovereignty over natural resources, disarmament, outer space, world science, world food, world trade, and the training of manpower for economic and social development and with the

recurring problem of how to finance these diverse enterprises.

Many of these problems the United Nations has not solved. Thus, after 15 years, the question of Palestine refugees remains unsettled. Despite hundreds of meetings and reports, and numerous resolutions on the subject, the world is not disarmed. And, above all, the United Nations has not ended the great conflict between East and West, with its continuing threat of omnivorous war.

But the Assembly is not a legislature. Its calls for action take the form of recommendations addressed to sovereign states. In this light its record is no cause for despair. For more than half a decade its United Nations Emergency Force has maintained an uneasy truce along the Gaza Strip. It is today overseeing the passage of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian administration, pending arrangements for self-determination. Along with the Security Council, it mounted the Congo operation to bring stability out of chaos in central Africa against overwhelming odds. In Iran, Greece, Palestine, and Lebanon it has moved less dramatically but no less effectively to keep the peace.

These peacekeeping operations, and their successes or failures in dealing with flaring crises, dominate the headline reader's view of the U.N. But in the broader perspective of history a different part of the Assembly's activity may come to seem of predominant importance. The transformation of former colonial territories into sovereign states is one of the great movements of our time. It meant the collapse of a long-standing system of world order, the sudden rupture of old ties, the rapid liberation of a billion people. The Assembly has presided over this liquidation of the prewar colonial empires and has helped bring to birth, in less than a generation, and without major bloodshed, almost as many nations as existed in the two centuries preceding San Francisco.

Peacekeeping and nation building are only the more dramatic items on the Assembly's agenda. In countless other ways that body has participated in the primary business of our age, the business of creating a viable order of free states with the means to combat the hunger,

the poverty, the misery that has been the accepted lot for most of the world throughout history.

### **Functions of the Secretary-General**

The executive functions of the organization are entrusted to the Secretary-General and his staff. The charter says little about the office of the Secretary-General. He is "the chief administrative officer of the Organization"; he performs "such other functions" as are entrusted to him by organs of the United Nations; he makes an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the United Nations; and he may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten international peace and security.

From these bare and abstract phrases the Secretary-General has emerged as the vital "third man" in international politics. Dag Hammarskjöld saw that the moral force of his office, its assurance of political impartiality, and the respect and prestige invested in the person of the Secretary-General as the primary representative of the organization could be exploited decisively in the settlement of international disputes. It is a tricky role, but Hammarskjöld developed it with consummate skill. The Congo crisis, which cost him his life, was his greatest effort. Both the conclusion of the Congo operation and the Cuban crisis last fall showed that his successor, U Thant, is also willing and able to act as the "third man" at times of tension.

The Secretary-General also administers the United Nations staff. The Secretariat is composed of some 5,500 international civil servants, who, as with their domestic counterparts, owe their allegiance to their organization and are apolitical in theory. The conception of an international civil service is not a new one. It was developed both in the League of Nations and, more significantly, in the International Labor Organization. Like the national civil services, the international civil service of the U.N. has not always fulfilled the neutrality of its conception. Some countries do not permit their nationals sufficient freedom to carry out their pledge of allegiance to the international community. Competition for representation in the



international secretariat, concerns for national security, and international tensions have all tended to render the international civil service less apolitical in fact than in theory. However, on the whole it is fair to say there is an independent international civil service and a large body of men and women dedicated to the organization they serve and prepared to carry out their tasks in a politically impartial fashion.

### **International Court of Justice**

The judicial arm of the United Nations is the International Court of Justice. Its 15 judges are sworn to exercise their powers "impartially and conscientiously." They owe obedience to no nation.

The Court has jurisdiction over all cases referred to it by members of the United Nations or parties to the Statute of the Court. In addition states may, by declaration filed with the Court, submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on terms set forth in the declaration.

Under the charter, members are obligated to comply with decisions of the Court. The Court has no bailiff. But, by and large, members have lived up to their obligations and given effect to decisions of the Court nevertheless. Although disappointingly few cases have been submitted to the Court for adjudication, it has resolved thorny and contentious disputes. The border controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua, which had disturbed their relations for years, was decided by the Court, as was a territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia involving possession of the ancient Temple of Preah Vihear.

In addition to deciding contentious disputes between parties, the Court is empowered by the charter to give advisory opinions "on any legal question" put to it by the General Assembly, the Security Council, or any other organ of the United Nations and specialized agencies authorized by the General Assembly to request advisory opinions. In practice the legal questions put to the Court for advisory opinions have involved concrete facts and actual disputes so that the advisory opinions of the Court have resembled the declaratory judgments of United States courts. In the end this may turn out to be the Court's most important jurisdiction, for

under it the Court passes on fundamental questions of the grant and distribution of powers in the charter in a way that approaches most nearly the familiar constitutional adjudication of our own Supreme Court.

### **U.N. Operations Comport With U.S. Interests**

So far we have been talking about the structure of the United Nations, the distribution and exercise of powers. But the question remains: How does it work? More especially, do its deliberations and operations comport with the interests of the United States? More particularly still, what of the charge that in the U.N. we have constructed a kind of Frankenstein's monster, not made of the vital stuff and interests of the real world and responding to the shifting will of an irresponsible majority of new and untried nations?

It might be thought that such an accusation sounds strange coming from citizens of a nation which a scant hundred years ago was itself new and untried, and whose principal contribution to international affairs consisted of moralistic pronouncements on colonialism and other evils of its elders and betters. But putting aside any question of the standing of the accusers, what of the merits of the charge?

There is no question that today's General Assembly, with its more than 100 members, half of them or more from the new nations of the southern continents, is different from the body of 50 mostly Western nations which started 18 years ago. There is certainly no automatic majority ready to do American bidding, willy-nilly. The range of interest, outlook, and background is not confined by any single regional or historical perspective. To secure general assent for policies in such a body requires the arts of democratic politics—negotiation, persuasion, debate, compromise—above all, the art of defining one's own particular interest in a way that coincides with and forwards the felt needs and interests of others. American politics has taught those arts to its practitioners for more than a century and a half now; so it is not surprising that we are good at them. A careful examination of the actions of the General Assembly will show few, if any, instances where the Assembly took significant action contrary to our announced

policies, much less to our fundamental interest.

I remember Ambassador [Francis T. P.] Plimpton's testimony before a committee of the House of Representatives, conditioned by press comment and political oratory to think of the United Nations in terms of unruly "Afro-Asian" majorities. Ambassador Plimpton ran through the important issues of the 16th General Assembly: the Russian troika proposal, the replacement of Dag Hammarskjold as Secretary-General, the question of seating Communist China and North Korea, nuclear test ban resolutions, the protest against the Soviet Union's 50-megaton bomb test, the Tibetan and Hungarian resolutions, Cuban charges against the United States, and the plans for U.N. financing. On all of these he showed, to the surprise of the committee, that the majority of the so-called Afro-Asian bloc voted for the United States position and against that of the Soviet Union.

A similar catalog could be made of the questions considered by the recently ended 17th General Assembly, and with the same result.

#### **Charter Affirms Traditional Principles**

Box scores of this kind are fun, and we like to keep them. The ADA and the AFL-CIO and the NAM and the League of Women Voters all produce them for each and every Congressman and Senator. Even the Justices of the Supreme Court are put through the statistical litmus test to see whether they turn up blue or pink. I think it was your distinguished alumnus Paul Freund who characterized this procedure as one in which the counters don't think and the thinkers don't count.

For in the last analysis we recognize that politics and government are not like a football game, where the winner and the loser and the score can be reported in the next day's papers. Politics and government are a process, and the important questions go always to the vitality of the process and the soundness and integrity of the institutions by which it is carried out. Measuring by this more fundamental standard, I think we have little to fear from the

United Nations and much to take comfort and hope from. For it is an organization whose structure and values are rooted in the central ideas of Western political thought. It is startling how many of the familiar precepts of high school civics textbooks are embodied in the Charter of the U.N.—separation of powers, an independent and impartial judiciary, an apolitical career civil service, free and open debate, the notion of one man, one vote.

We take these concepts for granted—they are the only ones we have known as a nation—just as we take for granted the notion that politics is the practice of talking and voting, of bargaining and compromise, of drafting and redrafting. But these concepts are all violently antithetical to everything the Soviet system stands for. And they have not always been taken for granted, even in the West. They have developed out of centuries of struggle. They are enshrined in our great charters and constitutions, in our laws, and in our traditions.

The United Nations Charter affirms these principles as universal rules of action. And in their daily work in New York nearly 100 nations are learning to use these principles as guides and measures of effective political action. The new nations of the world are learning their international politics in a parliamentary framework. They are learning diplomacy and democracy at the same time and in the same place. They guard jealously their sovereign prerogative to participate in the process of making decisions or, to put it more simply, to make up their own minds and to vote as they choose.

It is, I believe, immeasurably to our advantage that this should be so. More than that. When we, as lawyers, who have as a profession been so intimately connected with the emergence of the democratic values—when we, as lawyers, look at the United Nations Organization, we may be pardoned for thinking that the reaffirmation and dissemination of these values may be its most enduring and important achievement.

## The Refugee Problem in Laos

### BACKGROUND

In its efforts to assist the Royal Lao Government to achieve stability since the formation of the Government of National Union in August 1962, the United States Government has, at the request of the Royal Lao Government, continued a program of supplying food and other relief material to refugee groups in various parts of the Kingdom. Many of these refugees are opposed to the Pathet Lao, one of the three factions within the Government of National Union, and the Pathet Lao have sought to prevent delivery of these relief supplies by several means, even including shooting down unarmed relief planes.

The Pathet Lao have sought to justify these actions by asserting that the relief aircraft drop arms and ammunition, that alleged arms drops originate outside Laos, and that the United States contract air carrier is a paramilitary organization which violates the Geneva Accords of July 23, 1962, which provided international guarantees for the neutral status of Laos.<sup>1</sup>

In order to establish the falsity of the Pathet Lao accusations, the American Embassy at Vientiane released to the press on January 25 the following statement and attached memorandum.

### STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, VIENTIANE

Protracted civil strife in Laos has given rise to strong emotions and deep suspicions which are not easily forgotten. The Government of National Union, under the leadership of its Prime Minister, His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, was formed nearly seven months ago.

<sup>1</sup>For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

During this period, many of these emotions have begun to cool, and a beginning has been made toward achieving the cooperation and mutual confidence needed to unify Laos once again. The United States fully supports His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma and his Government and has manifested this support by providing substantial assistance for education, roads, village development, agriculture, and other development projects; and by contributing the cost of a large part of the Kingdom's needs for imported commodities. The United States will continue to do whatever possible to assist His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma and his Government.

One of the problems facing his Government—and, in humanitarian terms, one of the most important—is that of the refugees who temporarily require relief supplies in order to survive. An estimated 125,000 to 150,000 men, women, and children, members of the Lao, Meo, Lao-Thoung, and other ethnic groups, in northern, central, and southern Laos, have had their livelihood disrupted during the fighting. Many thousands sought refuge in isolated mountain areas, defending themselves when attacked. Others fled to populated centers in the valleys. Like the other people of Laos, they wish to return to useful lives in a peaceful and united Kingdom. In order to do so, they need tools and seeds to plant new crops, and food to sustain them until their harvest is sufficient once again. Those in the northern mountains, in the provinces of Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, Luang Prabang, and Nam Tha, who constitute a majority of the total number of refugees, pose an especially difficult problem. The rugged and roadless terrain precludes ordinary transport, and they must depend on air supply or face starvation within a few weeks. This requires a large and expensive operation, involving the air

transport of about 1,500 tons of relief supplies per month.

It would be expected that no one would oppose a program to feed refugees until they were able to feed themselves. It is regrettable that the Pathet Lao have, in fact, appeared to seek to put an end to refugee relief. The Pathet Lao mounted extensive military operations against the hill people before the formation of the Government of National Union and have made occasional attacks since. The Pathet Lao have also concentrated their efforts against the air supply on which a majority of the refugees depend. The hill people have persistently held out in the areas which have been their homes for generations. The Pathet Lao claim however that these refugees are in their "zone." The Pathet Lao charge that the United States has been violating the Geneva Accords, alleging that arms and ammunition have been dropped and that one of the contractors providing air services, Air America, Inc., is a "paramilitary organization." They assert that the agreement signed by the Royal Lao Government and the United States Government to continue refugee relief was "illegal." Finally, the Pathet Lao have consistently fired upon aircraft carrying relief supplies to refugees, and have shot down such an aircraft.

The United States, in cooperating with the Royal Lao Government to provide sustenance to people in need, has been the object of repeated accusations, misrepresentations, and calumny. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to make the United States position entirely clear.

The United States has traditionally offered help to the victims of war and disaster all over the world. This has been true in Laos. Successive Lao Governments have asked the United States to assist their relief programs, and the United States has gladly provided supplies, ground and air transport, and technical assistance. On October 1, 1962, the Prime Minister wrote to the American Ambassador [Leonard Unger], requesting that arrangements be made for U.S. help to the relief program to continue under the Government of National Union. This was provided for in a formal agreement signed on October 7, 1962, by representatives of the Royal Lao Government and the United States

Government. Under this agreement, the United States has continued its assistance to refugees, and is prepared to continue to do so as long as there is a need.

The United States has been glad to examine with the Royal Lao Government the problems raised by the needs of the refugees in Laos and to help the Royal Lao Government to continue to supply them with the necessities of life. The American Ambassador has frequently discussed the question of such supply with His Highness the Prime Minister. He has repeatedly reminded the leaders of the Pathet Lao that the American-chartered aircraft which provide supplies to refugees are open to inspection at all times. The Ambassador has reiterated that the United States has fully observed its obligations under the Geneva Accords and will continue to do so, and that no arms or ammunition have been supplied in violation of the Accords. He has also pointed out that the air service contractors are civilian companies which in no way violate the Accords.

The Ambassador has, furthermore, suggested adoption of means which would eliminate any suspicion that these are other than legitimate relief flights, and which would put an end to attacks on unarmed civilian aircraft flying humanitarian missions. He has made it clear that the United States would accept special markings for relief aircraft, liaison officers from the three factions in Laos to accompany the flights, verification by the International Commission for Supervision and Control, or any other reasonable method. Regrettably, the Pathet Lao leaders have as yet shown no interest in considering these suggestions.

The United States is now discussing with the Royal Lao Government means for placing aircraft at that Government's disposition. If the current discussions reach agreement, this could provide assistance to the Royal Lao Government for its general air transport needs as well as a method for supplying the refugees with the seed, tools, and food they require. It is sincerely hoped that, once these arrangements are concluded, the Pathet Lao would not continue to seek to put an end to the refugee program.

The unification of Laos is one of the principal objectives of the Geneva Accords and of the Government of National Union. By virtue of their participation in the Government of National Union, and their signature of earlier agreements among the three factions, the Pathet Lao have declared their commitment to the goal of reunification. Up to the present, however, the Pathet Lao's actions have implied that they are attempting to shift the balance of forces in Laos in their favor by seeking to cut off food supplies to the isolated refugees, imposing their will on the hill peoples, and consolidating what they claim to be the Pathet Lao "zone." It is obvious that these actions are not in keeping with the objectives which have been declared by the Government of National Union, and that they violate all accepted humanitarian principles. It is to be hoped that the Pathet Lao will agree to reasonable arrangements for continued relief supply, and that they will join whole-heartedly in the work of unifying Laos.

This is a question of simple human need. It is also a matter of grave importance to the Government of National Union and to the Geneva Accords. If it is indeed the intention of the Pathet Lao to attempt to alter the *status quo* in their favor and to consolidate their "zone" rather than to work toward reunification, the future of the Government of National Union and of the Geneva Accords may be in peril.

The attached Memorandum, "The Refugee Problem in Laos," provides further information on this subject.

## TEXT OF MEMORANDUM

### THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN LAOS

#### I. Scope, Nature and Causes of the Problem

There are no precise statistics about refugees in Laos: basic population data are inadequate and outdated, and the frequent movements of many refugees make it difficult to keep records. The best available estimates place the total number of refugees between 125,000 and 150,000.

Most are members of ethnic minorities, in large part because much of the fighting in Laos was concentrated in mountainous areas where the minorities predominate. The refugee problem in Laos has frequently been described as one principally or exclusively con-

cerned with the Meo, but they constitute only 50% to 60% of the overall total, and 60% to 65% of the refugees in the northern provinces of Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, Nam Tha, Luang Prabang, and Sayaboury. The numbers of refugees belonging to each major ethnic group are roughly as follows:

Meo: 65,000 to 75,000; primarily in the northern provinces just mentioned;

Lao-Thoung: About 50,000; in Saravane, Attapeu, Sam Neua, Savannakhet, Thakhek, Sayaboury, and Sedone provinces;

Ethnic Lao: 10,000 to 15,000; primarily in Sam Neua, Xieng Khouang, and Luang Prabang provinces;

Other ethnic groups, including Yao and Thai-Deng: About 5,000; in several northern provinces, especially Nam Tha and Luang Prabang.

These people, from widely-separated parts of Laos and belonging to many distinct tribes and sub-groups, nevertheless share certain common characteristics and experiences. Many lived at the higher altitudes of Laos' many mountain ranges, using the slash-and-burn technique to grow dry rice and other crops on the hillsides. It has always been at best a difficult and precarious living, but they have wished to live in their own way on their high ridges, which they prefer to the climate of the lowlands.

A large proportion of those who are now refugees in Laos had earlier experience with the Pathet Lao. In 1953 and 1954, when Viet Minh units, accompanied by Pathet Lao troops, invaded Laos, many upland people defended their homes. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, Pathet Lao units and guerrilla bands sought to influence and dominate the hill peoples in both southern and northern Laos. They employed persuasion, propaganda, promises, intimidation, exactions of food, and conscription for labor and military service. In some areas, especially among the southern Lao-Thoung living near the border with South Viet-Nam, the Pathet Lao established control. For the most part, and especially in the north, the hill people came to distrust and dislike the Pathet Lao and Pathet Lao efforts simply strengthened their desire to avoid Pathet Lao domination. Many villages and districts formed local Home Defense Companies (ADC's) in order to put up an organized resistance against Pathet Lao pressure.

After large-scale fighting broke out again in 1960, the Pathet Lao concentrated their forces and were joined once again by large numbers of Viet Minh. The Pathet Lao reestablished themselves in the area around Sam Neua town, moved into the Plaine des Jarres, and increased their activity in other areas, including the south. Much of this strength was directed against the mountain peoples, which the Pathet Lao sought to bring under complete control.

Remembering their earlier treatment by the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao, large numbers of hill people left their homes and sought to reestablish themselves in or near Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, and smaller towns. A larger number defended their home areas,

using their existing Home Defense organizations, locally-made muzzle-loaders, and obsolete rifles. In cases where resistance could not be continued, they withdrew deeper into the mountains to more secure areas. Others remained behind, decided later to flee Pathet Lao control, and reached the refugee areas. Continued defense was still necessary, however, and many groups moved again and again as Pathet Lao pressure continued. The Royal Lao Army provided better weapons and equipment, and the Home Defense organization was broadened and improved. The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), at the request of the Royal Lao Government, assisted in the equipping and training of the hill peoples' Home Defense units, just as it assisted other units of the Royal Lao Army at that time. United States advisers assisting these people were, along with all other United States military advisers, withdrawn from Laos by October 7, 1962, in full compliance with the Geneva Accords.

Pathet Lao attacks and harassment continued even after May 3, 1961, when the Pathet Lao declared their acceptance of the cease-fire. In June 1961, for example, the Pathet Lao attacked Ban Padong, about 30 kilometers south of the Plaine des Jarres, where Home Defense units were protecting several thousand women and children. All were forced to withdraw. There were many other attacks on less well-known locations. Military pressure on the refugees in mountain areas has declined sharply since the formation of the Government of National Union, but the refugees report Pathet Lao probes, mortar bombardments, and continuing small-scale attacks.

The Pathet Lao, who had failed to win the allegiance of the mountain peoples, also failed to impose their will on them through military force. The upland people lost a number of areas to Pathet Lao attacks, but the Meo, Lao, and Lao-Thoung mountaineers retained control over more than half the total area of Xieng Khouang province, between one-quarter and one-third of Sam Neua province, and other extensive areas in what the Pathet Lao claimed to be their "zone." The southern Lao-Thoung in the Bolovens Plateau area succeeded in sharply reducing Pathet Lao harassment of their villages.

Conditions in the refugee villages vary widely. Morale, social cohesion, and the will to continue are at different levels in different villages, but officials of the Ministry of Social Welfare, newsmen, U.S. AID [Agency for International Development] technicians, foreign diplomats, and others who have visited refugee areas have been impressed by their spirit and determination. It must be borne in mind that most refugees suffered great losses: it is difficult to estimate the total, but it is believed that on the average the refugees lost, in addition to their houses, crops, and fields, 80% to 90% of their cattle and pigs and 70% to 80% of their clothing, cooking pots, tools, and other possessions. They have managed, nevertheless, to build new homes and begin farming again. Groups and tribes which formerly regarded one another with some suspicion or

even hostility found that they could live close together and work in cooperation. Thus the war has moved the hill peoples closer toward a sense of unity in the Lao nation.

The experiences of the refugees in Laos can best be understood by a review of the history of several refugee villages. Brief accounts of four villages, one primarily Meo, another composed of northern Lao-Thoung, one principally a refuge for ethnic Lao, and a fourth inhabited by two tribes of southern Lao-Thoung, may be found in the Appendix<sup>2</sup> to this Memorandum. These accounts show the sacrifices made by the refugees, and their efforts to live decently, building their own schools—where the textbooks and subjects are the same as in other village schools in Laos—and operating simple dispensaries to care for the wounded and sick.

Since the formation of the Government of National Union, the refugees in the mountain areas have taken advantage of the return of relatively peaceful conditions and are clearing more land for planting. With very few exceptions, they would prefer to return to their original villages, where they would have familiar surroundings and, in most cases, better land. They are afraid to leave their refuges, however, until they can be sure of freedom from Pathet Lao retaliation or interference. The war has led to suspicions and bitter memories. When free movement is permitted, and military and civil integration provide a basis for confidence, it can be expected that these feelings will dissipate. Then the hill peoples will be able to play a useful part in a unified Laos. Until this occurs, there is a need to assist them in achieving self-sufficiency and to sustain them until they can support themselves.

In the provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang, for example, the refugees who have been able to farm despite adverse conditions have saved enough rice-seed to sow over half the area they need for cultivation. Requirements for cooking pots, cloth, and similar goods are only 25% of their initial level. It is expected that the quantity of rice supplied per month, now nearly 1500 tons, can be reduced to 300 tons per month by the end of 1963. This level of 75% overall self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs can be achieved if the refugees receive tools, materials for making tools, and seed to supplement their own stock. Using these supplies, they will be able to clear more land, sow, and harvest. This assumes, of course, that the refugees will not be subjected to further Pathet Lao attacks or harassment. Equally promising possibilities are present for the refugees in the south.

These objectives cannot be achieved overnight, and until this effort is completed, the refugees will need further food supplies. The need is particularly acute for refugees in the northern provinces who depend upon air supply. Depending upon local opportunities for farming, many villages would be reduced to starvation within ten days if air supplies were suspended, while all isolated villages would face starvation within two months.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

## II. The Refugee Assistance Programs of the Royal Lao Government and United States Help to Those Programs

The refugee programs of the Royal Lao Government have been aimed at providing support until self-sufficiency becomes possible. Specifically, this program has been administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare. The International Committee of the Red Cross, working in conjunction with the Lao Red Cross, private organizations such as CARE, and a number of friendly governments have offered assistance which has been accepted by the Royal Lao Government.

The United States Government has also been glad to offer assistance. It had long been meeting requests from successive Lao Governments for help to refugees, and when fighting was renewed in 1960 the need became more acute. Working closely with Social Welfare officials, the United States provided food, blankets, medical supplies and other needs to those who had suffered during the fighting in Vientiane. Similar assistance was later provided in Vang Vieng, Luang Prabang, Muong Kassy, Pakse, Ban Houei Sai, and other areas. At the request of the Royal Lao Government and on the basis of agreements with the Ministry of Social Welfare, increasing quantities of food and other relief supplies were provided, usually by air, to isolated refugees in the mountains. This assistance continued following the formation of the Government of National Union, with United States officials continuing to work with their counterparts in the Ministry of Social Welfare.

On October 7, 1962, following an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the American Ambassador, a new agreement governing the program for assisting refugees was signed by representatives of the Royal Lao Government and the United States Government. A communique issued by the Ministry of Social Welfare and published on October 13, 1962, in *Lao Presse*, the official bulletin of the Information Ministry, described this agreement: "In conformity with the wishes expressed by His Highness the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of National Union in his letter of October 1st, 1962, to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States, an increase in assistance to refugees has been arranged in the form of an addition to the initial program of the Social Welfare Ministry. This assistance consists of the provision of imported goods, technical and administrative advice, or personnel qualified for the purchase, gathering, packing, and distribution of relief articles, and transport by air or other necessary means." The communique added that 3,115,800 kip (equivalent to about \$39,000) in counterpart funds and \$786,500 in dollars were to be provided by the United States for local expenses and the purchase of seeds, rice, and other necessary supplies. It stated that "The project is administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare."

Procedures for implementing this agreement have varied in accordance with problems involved in supplying different refugee groups. In many areas, re-

quirements are met by provincial Social Welfare officers, operating under the direction of provincial Governors and in consultation with regional U.S. AID representatives, drawing on stocks provided to the Ministry of Social Welfare by U.S. AID. Specific needs for clothing, cooking utensils, and similar items are certified jointly by representatives of the Ministry and U.S. AID and filled by the Ministry from stocks in its warehouses which were supplied by U.S. AID. Rice is provided by U.S. AID on the basis of estimated monthly requirements for refugee areas, which are drawn up on the basis of requests by refugees to U.S. AID and Royal Lao Government representatives. Where air transport is necessary, U.S. AID makes it available through contracts with private American firms, including Air America, Inc., meeting all costs for fuel, maintenance, and other expenses. Flight schedules are filed with the appropriate officials of the Directorate of Civil Aviation.

Air supply to refugees is a complex and large-scale operation, involving 14 aircraft making over 1,000 flights per month, carrying about 1500 tons of cargo. Whenever possible, cargo is landed at airstrips and unloaded. Rice is usually dropped free-fall, while medical supplies, cooking utensils, school materials, and similar items are parachuted or taken to refugee areas in light aircraft, which also carry out medical evacuation missions and transport the Social Welfare and U.S. AID technicians who verify requirements and supervise distribution. As officials of the Ministry of Social Welfare have become more familiar with the techniques and procedures involved in the refugee program, the requirement for United States technical assistance and advice has been reduced.

## III. The Pathet Lao Attitude Toward Refugee Relief

The Pathet Lao have long faced a situation which must cause them acute frustration and embarrassment. Since the early months of 1961, they have claimed that most of northern Laos and a wide area of the south contiguous to Viet-Nam constitute their "liberated zone." They are well aware, however, that the peoples of very extensive areas of the north and substantial parts of the southern mountains have resisted Pathet Lao domination; attempts at persuasion, intimidation, and conquest have failed. In the north, effective Pathet Lao control has been limited to the towns, the areas along major roads, some of the valleys, and a few other areas which they seized. Realizing that the people in the mountains of the north, cut off from normal transport and unable to support themselves in peace, depended upon air supply for their survival, the Pathet Lao appear to have made a deliberate effort to starve the hill people into submission by bringing this air supply to an end.

Beginning early in 1961, the Pathet Lao alleged that they were engaged in a police action against "bandits" who had been "airdropped" by the United States into the "zone" claimed by the Pathet Lao. This propa-



ganda line was also adopted in an attempt to justify Pathet Lao attacks on the hill people following the cease-fire. The Pathet Lao appeared to have forgotten that these people had resisted them in 1953 and 1954 and had avoided Pathet Lao domination ever since. The absurdity of the "air-dropping" contention is apparent if one wonders how, and why, anyone would parachute 100,000 or more men, women, and children into the rugged mountains of northern Laos. The hill people were there, they freely chose to defend themselves, and the Pathet Lao had to search for some way to explain it.

Throughout 1961 and 1962, however, this remained a frequent theme of Pathet Lao propaganda. Following the formation of Prince Souvanna Phouma's Government, the Pathet Lao representatives sought to achieve the cessation of relief supplies through manipulation of their position in the coalition. They claimed that the agreement on refugee relief signed by the Royal Lao Government and the United States Government was "illegal," although it had been worked out on the basis of a request from the Prime Minister that refugee relief continue under the Government of National Union. After the fact, Pathet Lao officials said that the agreement was not valid because they had not assented to it. Propaganda from the Pathet Lao radio became more intense, and General Singkapo, Pathet Lao commander in the Plaine des Jarres area, told newsmen that a special effort had been made to emplace anti-aircraft weapons. Relief aircraft were fired upon frequently, and an American aircraft on a refugee relief mission was shot down in Nam Tha province on January 5, 1963, resulting in the death of a cargo handler. The Pathet Lao radio has since indicated that they would shoot down other aircraft whenever possible.

The Pathet Lao have also sought to cut off supplies to Neutralist forces in the Plaine des Jarres area. At the specific request of the Prime Minister, American aircraft carrying rice and other foodstuffs made drops to Neutralist units and unloaded at the Plaine des Jarres airstrip. The Pathet Lao radio, quoting General Singkapo, announced in November that American aircraft taking supplies to Neutralist forces would be shot down. On November 27, 1962, an aircraft loaded with rice was shot down while preparing to land at the Plaine des Jarres. Although it is reported that the shots were fired by members of a Neutralist unit who had forsworn their loyalty to the Prime Minister and to General Kong Le, the Pathet Lao's responsibility is clear.

The Pathet Lao have sought to justify these attacks on unarmed relief flights by asserting that the aircraft drop arms and ammunition, that alleged arms drops originate outside Laos, and that Air America, Inc., is a paramilitary organization which violates the Geneva Accords.

These accusations are entirely false. The United States is not introducing arms, ammunition, or other military supplies into Laos in violation of the Accords.

No United States aircraft are making arms drops in violation of the Accords. All flights to destinations in Laos by American-chartered aircraft, including relief flights, originate in Vientiane. The companies providing air services under contract to the United States are entirely civilian, and their employees are not, to use the language of the Accords, "foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials."

If the Pathet Lao wish to satisfy themselves that the refugee program in Laos is a legitimate relief operation, they can easily do so by inspecting the aircraft and their cargo. If any doubts remain, the Geneva Accords provide an international mechanism for verification: the International Commission for Supervision and Control. The Pathet Lao have not, however, made any official complaint about air supply to the Commission.

## **U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in OECD**

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*

Press release 155 dated March 28

Today the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development asked the Secretary General of that organization to initiate discussions with the Japanese Government designed to bring about formal accession by Japan to the OECD convention.

The United States has for some time supported full Japanese membership in the OECD and welcomes this development. Japan will make a valuable contribution to the major aims of the Organization, which are to contribute to the development of the world economy through economic growth and financial stability, to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, nondiscriminatory basis, and to the economic advancement of the less developed countries. The potentialities for useful work by the OECD will be greatly enhanced. The accession of Japan will add to the membership of the OECD the only major industrial, financial, and trading nation not now in the Organization.

Since its inception Japan has been a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (and its predecessor, the Development Assistance Group). Japan has been an active participant in this Committee's activities in promoting and coordinating economic as-



assistance to the developing countries. It ranks fifth among the countries contributing to such assistance.

We look forward to the successful completion of the preliminary discussions between representatives of the Japanese Government and the Secretary General of the OECD, which should lead to the formal accession of Japan at an early date.

## U.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation of Attack on "Floridian"

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MARCH 28<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Coast Guard has reported the receipt of a message from the United States Motorship *Floridian* proceeding in international waters off the north coast of Cuba en route from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Miami, Fla.

The message reported that at approximately 6:05 p.m. Washington time today two unidentified jet aircraft had fired bursts across the *Floridian's* bow and stern without striking the ship.

CINCLANT [Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Forces] immediately dispatched their jet fighters to the area.

The *Floridian*, under U.S. air escort, is now proceeding toward Miami, where it is due at 7 a.m. Friday morning.

Further details are expected to be available after the *Floridian* arrives in Miami.

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MARCH 29

Press release 163 dated March 29

The United States Government is currently in receipt through diplomatic channels of two messages<sup>2</sup> from the Cuban government in connection with the firing by two Cuban MIG aircraft in the immediate vicinity of the United States Motorship *Floridian* on the evening of March 28.

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by John F. King, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed here.

In the first message the Cuban government said that the Cuban planes on the afternoon of March 28 had discovered what Cuban authorities considered to be a suspect boat flying the United States flag 25 miles northeast of Cayo Frago in Las Villas province. The Cuban government inquired of the United States Government as to whether the United States flag was being legitimately flown by the ship in question. Simultaneously, a Cuban naval vessel was ordered to proceed to the spot to clarify the matter.

Upon learning of the statement issued at 9:15 p.m. last evening by the Department of State, the Cuban government in a second message indicated it presumed that the boat sighted by Cuban aircraft earlier in the afternoon was the same ship mentioned in the Department of State announcement and informed us that the Cuban naval vessel had turned back.

The Cuban government in this second message added that the MIG's probably fired in error and that there had been no intention on the part of the Cuban government to shoot at the *Floridian*. These are the facts as they are now known.

The United States today is asking the government of Cuba for a full explanation of this matter.

## United States Expresses Views on Military Rule in Korea

### Department Statement<sup>1</sup>

The military junta's effort to continue military rule for 4 more years has created a difficult situation in Korea. We believe that prolongation of military rule could constitute a threat to stable and effective government, and we understand that this whole matter is being reexamined by the Korean Government.

We hope the junta and the major political groups in Korea can work out together a procedure for transition to civil government that will be acceptable to the nation as a whole.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Mar. 25 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

## President Receives Clay Report on AID Program

*Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Gen. Lucius D. Clay, chairman of the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World.*

White House press release dated March 23

MARCH 22, 1963

DEAR GENERAL CLAY: I have received your report<sup>1</sup> and I want to tell you how grateful I am to you and the other distinguished private citizens on your Committee<sup>2</sup> for the time and effort you have devoted to preparing it. The Committee's expression of support for properly administered mutual defense and development programs—coming as it did after an intensive and searching review—is very heartening.

I was pleased to note the Committee's recognition of the improvements which have been made in the Foreign Assistance Program in recent years, including the increased emphasis on self-help, better definition of program goals, reduction in its balance of payments impact, and the increased emphasis on the role of United States private investment. You may be sure that the Committee's recommendations including greater selectivity, stricter self-help standards, greater participation by the developed countries in aid efforts and continued improvements in administration, will be carefully applied in our continuing review of this program.

I am hopeful that we will be able to develop widespread public awareness of—to quote your report—"the great value of properly conceived and administered foreign aid programs to the

<sup>1</sup> *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20, 1963*; available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents).

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 25, 1963, p. 431.

national interest of the United States and of the contribution of the foreign assistance dollar in such programs to the service of our nation's security". Again, I want to thank you and the other members of the Committee for the important service which you have rendered.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut Abstention

### *White House Statement*

White House press release dated March 23

The President has today [March 23] taken action in accordance with the North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954 to accept the recommendation of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, which, if accepted by Canada, Japan, and the United States, will permit the Japanese to fish for halibut in the eastern Bering Sea along with the U.S. and Canadian fishermen.

In reaching this decision we have not only taken into account our international obligations but also the domestic factors which have come to our attention. We consider that this action advances the cause of the principle of abstention, which is at the heart of the tripartite fisheries treaty of 1952<sup>1</sup> and which provides a reasonable, workable, and essential procedure for dealing with certain major North Pacific fishery problems. We are determined to work for the continuation of this principle and of the treaty in which it is set forth.

We are cognizant of the Commission's recent successful efforts to develop conservation measures which, if accepted by the three parties to the tripartite treaty, will provide suitable protection for eastern Bering Sea halibut. This action will not take effect until the Canadian Government takes similar action.

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786.

## Foreign Policy in the Open Society

*Statement by Robert J. Manning  
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome this hearing as an opportunity to air more than one side of an issue that lies as close to the question of democratic survival as any in modern times.

The dilemma posed by the conduct of governmental affairs in an open society is one this country willingly assumed from its founding. We have sought and found the means to live with the dilemma and to prosper and grow without recourse to repressive practices or, so far as the printed press is concerned, regulatory controls. The dilemma might be more bluntly described as a built-in conflict between the easier way of conducting certain important governmental business or delicate diplomatic negotiations in privacy and the right and need of the democratic public to know the facts and policies on which the national business is being conducted. Such a paradox exists, and it lies at the center of the questions before this subcommittee today.

Obviously the first step toward easing and living with this problem is to admit that it is there. A second step is to admit that, while the American press and the American Government share identical devotion to the cause of their country and to its interests, the two do not—cannot—always share identical concepts of their functions or of their obligations to the public.

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on Mar. 25 (press release 151).

While one seeks to serve the public by disclosure, the other may be serving a public need—and a public desire—by protecting a national policy from failure through premature disclosure. Indeed, the public in many instances might well find the government official derelict if he does not so protect it. Like photographic film, many a diplomatic or strategic position can be destroyed by premature exposure.

We all know that it is difficult to strike bargains in public. Quite aside from the complications of doing business with other governments, what are some of the realities within our own democratic system? Are reporters to sit in the Supreme Court council chamber when Justices are deciding their cases? The closed “executive session” is a frequent occurrence on Capitol Hill. How many reporters have been covering the negotiations between the New York City newspaper publishers and the printers’ union? Where are the reporters when the executive committee of U.S. Steel convenes? Indeed, in this hearing where are the cameras and microphones of the television-radio media?

There are good and long-accepted answers to all—or most of—these questions, but these and many similar realities have been obscured in the great fog bank of clichés raised by some of the press in recent months.

This hearing arises from the subcommittee’s concern about the public’s right to know. I

want to assure you first of all that, as a working newspaperman of 27 years' standing, I too am concerned that Americans know. Since coming to the State Department slightly less than a year ago, I have seen more sharply the dimension of a parallel fact, the public's *need* to know. Day after day we see the difficulties that arise because there is not enough public knowledge and understanding of the events and forces at work in today's labyrinth of international affairs. So let me assure you that to keep the public uninformed, or to have it ill-informed by an ill-informed press, does not serve the Government's purpose.

I am here today without apologies. If anything, I am here to speak with pride about this Government's information activities.

The business of American foreign policy is public business. Only a fraction of State Department business—perhaps no more than 1 percent—is not immediately or imminently public.

The State Department is as wide open as Yankee Stadium, and the admission is free. The first item handed to a new correspondent by the Office of News is a Departmental telephone book listing both office and home telephone numbers of Department officials. The top officials and policymakers of the Department spend at least a third of their time, and often more, in defining and explaining American policy to the public, to Members of Congress, and, day in, day out, to newsmen. We like it that way, and we are going to keep it that way.

If I were to express a philosophy for an information official in government, I would not have to change that which served me as a reporter: to find out the facts, get them into perspective, and, within the limitations of national security, put them out truthfully and quickly. The principles are the same.

It is obvious, however, that for the reporter and for the government official in this democratic society, considerations and circumstances differ. In 1851, Lord Derby, in assailing *The Times* of London, said:

If the press aspires to share the influence of statesmen, it must also share in the responsibilities of statesmen.

That can be disputed, as it was at the time by Robert Lowe of *The Times*. He wrote:

The first duty of the press is to obtain the earliest and most correct intelligence of the events of the time and instantly, by disclosure of them, to make them the common property of the nation. . . . The press lives by disclosure. . . .

He added:

The statesman's duty is precisely the reverse. He cautiously guards from the public eye the information by which his actions and opinions are regulated; he reserves his judgment of passing events till the latest moment and then he records it in obscure or conventional language; *he strictly confines himself, if he be wise, to the practical interests of his country, or to those turning immediately upon it.*

From an American perspective, there is extreme oversimplicity in both Derby's and Lowe's generalities. But they serve well in helping to define what we are grappling with: namely, that there are moments when the interests of a government serving the people and a press informing the people do not coincide. Between the enunciation of a policy and the actions undertaken to carry out that policy, government must sometimes make a sharp distinction. Quite properly, journalism need not and frequently does not make that distinction. It applies its mission of disclosure both to the rudiments of policy and to the day-by-day, even hour-by-hour, actions of governments in carrying out those policies.

Government is of the public, and responsible directly and unequivocally to the public—the public as a whole, not merely to one segment, even that powerful segment, the press. In most instances, government can serve the public in the field of information by the direct expedient of serving the press. Life would be simpler for us all if this were always the case. But it is not.

If we Americans lived in a closed society—in a vast continental house, sealed tight of sound and impregnable to eavesdrop and wiretap—we could engage in the fullest, freest disclosure and discussion of all information, all facts, all the delicate nuts and bolts of foreign or military policy. Even the tightly closed society of Soviet Russia finds this unfeasible; it solves the problem by telling its people little or nothing.

Here in the openest society, every government pronouncement, every expressed detail of a policy formulation or a negotiating position, every official evaluation of a political situation or a news event flows directly to four audiences—the American public, our allies, the neutral nations, and our cold-war antagonists. This is a fact that may not figure large in the reckoning of some newsmen, but it must be very much in the mind of the government official.

Rarely in foreign policy matters is there a direct issue of suppression versus disclosure. Where government and press find themselves in conflict, the issue is often one of timing, of tone of voice, or of attribution. Both sides usually find ways of getting around such problems.

### Some Working Principles

You have proposed, Mr. Chairman, that these hearings should seek to trace some contingency lines of procedure for handling information in periods of high crisis. It is very difficult to conceive of specific rules and procedures that can be laid down in advance for the handling of foreign policy and politicomilitary developments, as distinct from purely military activities, but I know that the Department of State and, I am sure, the Government at large would welcome concrete suggestions from this subcommittee.

Even without specific guidelines, those dealing officially with foreign relations must work from certain set principles and apply them with flexibility to each individual set of circumstances.

1. Foreign policy in the United States must be evolved by open public discussion of proposed policies, of the objectives of those policies, and, in most cases, of the means to be used to attain those policies. There must be ample candor and ample time for public and Congress to debate, alter, approve, or disapprove. In short, public policies publicly arrived at.

2. Once a policy has been publicly enunciated to the full, those responsible for carrying out that policy may require certain interludes of privacy in which to get the job done. Mr. Walter B. Potter [publisher, Culpeper *Star-Ex-*

*ponent*, Culpeper, Va., and director, National Editorial Association] in his statement to you Tuesday said:

They (editors) also recognize that delicate diplomatic situations sometimes require that full disclosure be delayed until negotiations are completed.

It is fair to assume, I believe, that this also reflects the view of other publishers, editors, and correspondents. In any case, it reflects a down-to-earth necessity. Without such interludes of privacy—interludes employed to carry out, not to alter, enunciated policies—this Government would find it impossible to coordinate with its many allies or seek honorable arrangements with other nations.

In the case of Berlin, as one of many examples, the United States has long made clear a policy that has been widely discussed and endorsed by the American public. Briefly, it is a policy that insists on continued Western military presence in West Berlin, continued viability of West Berlin, and guaranteed access to West Berlin. What the public wants to know is (1) that this is the policy and (2) that the necessary private diplomatic interludes are being used to achieve that policy. I cannot begin to measure the amount of time and energy that topmost officials of this administration have invested in seeing to it that such knowledge and assurance is continuously made available to the press.

The other foreign policies of this Government meet these criteria as well.

3. Truth is an essential. Quite aside from the issue of morality, falsehood is unnecessary. If choice did come down to holocaust or truth—to the “ultimate extremity” Mr. Reston [James B. Reston, Washington bureau chief, the *New York Times*] mentioned in his statement to this subcommittee last week—I suppose many might accept the slogan: “better misled than dead”—a slogan which does not represent State Department policy or mine and which I fondly hope will not be jerked out of context.

This subcommittee is concerned with the practical matter of day-to-day information policies. On this there can be no argument; truth and factuality must be the touchstones. The obligation of the government official is to tell the truth or, if security dictates, to button his

lip. I know nobody, inside or outside government, who disputes this.

### Getting Out the News

I referred earlier to the openness of the Department of State and to the broad channels of access for reporters there. Mr. Reston has been so kind—and accurate—as to define this access as the greatest in 20 years. That's a piece of news that's fit to print.

On the point of access, I am sure the subcommittee has questions about the so-called reporting procedure instituted at the Department of State on October 31 and suspended on November 27. You have in your files, Mr. Chairman, a letter explaining the circumstances and context of that procedure and also a copy of the circular distributed to officers of the Department on November 27 explaining the purpose of that procedure. I need not take the time of the subcommittee to repeat those details, but I would like the opportunity to correct some of the sloppy reporting and commentary growing out of the matter.

The procedure was very simple, requiring only that officials report, after the fact, the occurrence of an interview with a newsman, his name and paper, and the subject discussed. It excluded telephone interviews and all meetings outside the Department. It specifically did not require the presence of a third person—"a body in the room"—as Mr. Reston erroneously put it; nor did it require a memorandum on the substance of what was discussed; nor did it require that advance permission for interviews be secured.

Perhaps I might quote briefly from that November 27 circular its expression of the information philosophy at the Department of State:

It is essential both to the public and the government that there be the fullest possible dialogue between policy officials and newsmen, and . . . it is the policy of the Department, as interpreted by the Bureau of Public Affairs, to encourage this dialogue, not to inhibit it. . . . This requires contact between policy officials and newsmen.

We invited correspondents to report any instances of seeming inhibition. To this day none has charged any.

I might point out in this connection that in-

vestigation shows that this is the first time in the history of the Department that officers have been told, on the direct authority of the Secretary of State, that direct discussion with the press is a fixed part of the officers' duty. I assure you, that obligation is daily honored in a multitude of ways.

The reporting procedure, now suspended but not abolished, grows out of a simple right to know—the right of the Secretary of State and his public affairs advisers to know whether and how this important part of the Department's business is being conducted. I insist on the validity of this right, on the Secretary's behalf and my own.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, a few words about the activities of information officers at the Department of State and other parts of the executive branch. I have never known a time when information officials have been so fortified with intimate access to major government policies and actions. There was a time when this function was relegated to the late stages of policy decisions; the information officer was called in, fitted with a Western Union suit, and sent off to deliver the message. That has changed. It has changed because the leaders of this Government exercise high and healthy regard for the fundamental obligation to keep the public informed. At the Department of State it has been possible to assemble a team of professional journalists and high-ranking Foreign Service officers who have deep access to the facts and dialog of foreign policy. They are men who know or who, in those instances when they do not know, can and do put reporters in touch with the experts who do know. No newsman is required to seek their help or screen his own reporting initiative through their offices. The fact that one small group of 4 information officers handles some 500 telephone and personal interviews with reporters each week suggests the value attached to their services.

Similarly, for individuals and for groups of reporters the Department provides a weekly stream of background interviews and exchanges. The "background" technique is one of the most valuable devices for elucidating the facts and policies that might otherwise remain obscure until negotiations are completed. The

reporter is the sole judge of whether he chooses to attend background briefings, of whether the information is printed or not printed, of whether the "background" information fits the picture as he sees it. Any good reporter approaches them *caveat emptor*, and that is the way it should be.

### Volume of Information

The volume of available information is overwhelming—so overwhelming that in these days of many complex crises the press cannot fully digest and convey all that is happening and all that has crucial meaning to the people of this country. That is not a criticism. It is a fact—one that suggests increasing obligations on government as well as on the press. As one small illustration, Mr. Chairman, the United States this week is engaged in some two dozen different international conferences or conclaves around the world. The torrent of news developed in this country and abroad will bury most of those deliberations in temporary obscurity. So the press and other media have a problem of "news management" that should elicit our sympathy.

All of us engaged in this important enterprise have problems. We all are subject to imperfections. We face, among the press, the public, and the government, the continual challenge of achieving mutual confidence. With energy and good faith, we can solve the problems as Americans have done through their history.

I thank the members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to be here today.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 88th Congress, 1st Session

- Nominations of Christian A. Herter, William T. Gossett, and David E. Bell. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January 22, 1963. 60 pp.
- Nomination of Bill D. Moyers to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January 23, 1963. 23 pp.
- Fifty-First Conference of the Interparliamentary Union. Report of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, held at Brasilia, Brazil, October 24–November 1, 1962. S. Doc. 5. January 24, 1963. 32 pp.

- Eighteenth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 53. January 28, 1963. 33 pp.
- Sixth Annual Report of the President on the Operation of the Trade Agreements Program. H. Doc. 51. January 28, 1963. 102 pp.
- Events in United States–Cuban Relations. A chronology, 1957–1963, prepared by the Department of State for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January 29, 1963. 28 pp. [Committee print.]
- Duty Treatment of Certain Bread. Report to accompany H.R. 370. H. Rept. 22. February 4, 1963. 3 pp.
- Free Importation of Wild Birds and Wild Animals. Report to accompany H.R. 1839. H. Rept. 25. February 4, 1963. 2 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duties on Corkboard Insulation and on Cork Stoppers. Report to accompany H.R. 2053. H. Rept. 26. February 4, 1963. 2 pp.
- Tariff Treatment of Certain Electron Microscopes. Report to accompany H.R. 2874. H. Rept. 29. February 4, 1963. 2 pp.
- The Soviet Economic Offensive in Western Europe. Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe comprising Representatives Kelly, McDowell, Merrow, Frelinghuysen, and Barry of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 60. H. Rept. 32. February 7, 1963. 36 pp.
- Marking Requirements for Articles Imported in Containers. Report to accompany H.R. 2513. H. Rept. 33. February 11, 1963. 7 pp.
- Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Report of Senators Mike Mansfield, J. Caleb Boggs, Claiborne Pell, and Benjamin A. Smith to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Undated. 22 pp. [Committee print.]
- Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference, Lagos, Nigeria, 1962. Report of the delegation appointed to attend the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in Lagos, Nigeria, November 9–10, 1962. Undated. 25 pp. [Committee print.]
- The Seventeenth General Assembly of the United Nations. Report by Senators Albert Gore and Gordon Allott to the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. February 1963. 39 pp. [Committee print.]
- United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Second Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1962–December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 57. February 4, 1963. 102 pp.
- Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 1. February 4–6, 1963. 167 pp.
- United Nations Special Fund. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. February 18, 1963. 44 pp.
- Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. February 18–March 6, 1963. 295 pp.
- Legislation on Foreign Relations, With Explanatory Notes. Collection of laws and related material prepared by officials in various departments and agencies of the executive branch in collaboration with the staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 1963. 621 pp. [Joint committee print.]
- To Proclaim Sir Winston Churchill an Honorary Citizen of the United States of America. Report to accompany H.R. 4374. H. Rept. 57. March 6, 1963. 5 pp.
- Study of U.S. Foreign Policy. Report to accompany S. Res. 25. S. Rept. 23. March 11, 1963. 3 pp.
- Activities of Nondiplomatic Foreign Principals. Report to accompany S. Res. 26. S. Rept. 22. March 11, 1963. 4 pp.



## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During March 1963

U.N. Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures.	New York . . . . .	Jan. 29-Mar. 3
Meeting of the Parties to the Interim Convention on North Pacific Fur Seals.	Tokyo . . . . .	Feb. 18-Mar. 1
ICAO North Atlantic Cable Meteorological Communications Panel.	Paris . . . . .	Feb. 18-Mar. 8
ILO Governing Body: 154th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 19-Mar. 8
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 4-8
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Working Party I.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 5 (1 day)
Intergovernmental Meeting of Exporters of Temperate Agricultural Products.	Washington . . . . .	Mar. 5-7
IMCO Working Group on Intact Stability of Ships: 1st Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 5-8
IA-ECOSOC Committee To Study Problems Affecting Air Transportation in Latin America.	Washington . . . . .	Mar. 5-8
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 19th Session . . . . .	Manila . . . . .	Mar. 5-18
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing: Working Party on Effective Demand.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 6-7
European Radio Frequency Agency . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 6-8
IMCO Working Group on Watertight Subdivision and Damage Stability of Passenger and Cargo Ships.	London . . . . .	Mar. 11-14
U.N. ECE Committee on Housing: Working Party on Urban Renewal and Town Planning.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 11-14
U.N. ECOSOC <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee Established Under Council Resolution 851 (XXXII) on Coordination of Technical Assistance Activities.	New York . . . . .	Mar. 11-20
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 11-29
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 12-14
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 6th Session and Preparatory Working Group.	Port-of-Spain . . . . .	Mar. 13-30
IA-ECOSOC Action Group on Latin American Exports of Cacao . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Mar. 13-30
OECD European Nuclear Energy Agency . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 14-15
OECD Trade Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 14-15
OECD Industry Committee: General Working Party of Special Committee for Pulp and Paper.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 18-19
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 57th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 18-22
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 18-22
GATT Subgroup on Trade in Tropical Products . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 18-22
UNESCO Executive and Pledging Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 18-23
ITU Experts on Frequency Allocations . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 19-21
OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee on Nonferrous Metals.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 21-22
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists: 5th Session . . . . .	Manila . . . . .	Mar. 21-27
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 3d Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 25-29
U.N. ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Comparisons of Systems of National Accounts in Use in Europe.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-29
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 29th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-29
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Party on Technical Cooperation.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 25-30
OECD Ministers of Science Conference: Preparatory Group . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 28 (1 day)

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 28, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

**In Session as of March 31, 1963**

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Consular Relations.	Vienna . . . . .	Mar. 4, 1963-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 19th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 11-
CAO Legal Subcommittee . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Mar. 18-
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 18-
CAO Facilitation Division: 6th Meeting . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	Mar. 19-
ITU Administrative Council: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 23-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session of Special Working Group.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources and Development.	Manila . . . . .	Mar. 27-
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Community Development.	Bogotá . . . . .	Mar. 27-
GATT Working Party on Relations With Less Developed Countries.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 28-

**In Recess as of March 31, 1963**

GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. 15 until mid-1963).	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24, 1962-
--	------------------	-----------------

**U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism and Portuguese African Territories**

*Statement by Sidney R. Yates<sup>1</sup>*

This is my first occasion to speak at the United Nations, and I am most mindful of the great honor accorded me, both of representing my country and of being associated with the able and distinguished members of this Committee in their important effort to carry out the instructions of the General Assembly.

We stand at one of the crossroads of history. In the words of the great British playwright Christopher Fry, "The frozen misery of centuries breaks, cracks, begins to move." We on this Committee must be more than witnesses to this great historical wave. It is our responsibility to help in some measure to channel the course of that flood by bringing the opportunity toward self-determination to peoples seeking to make their own mark in the world.

The cause of freedom is one with the history and ideals of the United States. Engraved

upon the consciousness of all Americans is the faith proclaimed by the founders of our Republic in our Declaration of Independence when it was stated:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

We believe in this political ethic for ourselves. We believe in it for other nations. Our task on this Committee will be to help bring a peaceful end to the colonial era, to replace the paternalism of the past with political relationships based on consent.

In today's world colonialism is an anachronism which is rapidly disappearing. The task of decolonization has in many cases been difficult, but it has moved swiftly in the last decade. The United Nations deserves great credit for its contribution in this respect. Under its auspices the peoples of many lands have made the transition from colonialism to proud independence. Their representatives are members of this Committee, and we are delighted to be working with them as they and we seek to bring to others the blessings of freedom which they now enjoy.

<sup>1</sup>Made in the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on Mar. 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 4156). Mr. Yates is the U.S. representative in the Special Committee.

We have high hopes that constructive proposals will emanate from this Committee. We have high hopes that the forces of reason, justice, law, and peace will be paramount as the remaining colonial areas move to self-determination.

This Committee can make a constructive contribution to the course of history by actively seeking a spirit of cooperation and pragmatism, by utilizing the tools of diplomacy in searching for practical solutions to practical questions. I am pleased to hear this same viewpoint widely expressed by other members, and it augurs well for our efforts.

Above all, the Committee must avoid the entanglements of being dragged into the cold war. The problems of colonial peoples are already sufficiently complicated without compounding their difficulties by extraneous ideological attacks. It is unfortunate that such a diversionary effort has already been made. For our part, we intend to avoid polemics uttered purely for political advantage. We want to deal with the problems at hand.

It hardly seems necessary to point out to this body, working within the framework of the United Nations Charter, that the solution to the problem of decolonization should be sought exclusively by means envisioned in and permitted by the charter itself. We will cooperate with this Committee and with other United Nations bodies in an effort to assure such constructive and timely progress. We could not, on the other hand, countenance or support interventionist or expansionist aspirations or predatory attacks by one state against the territory of another in the name of self-determination. Faced with the possibility of such attacks, the United States Government would, of course, oppose them as being inconsistent with the provisions of the charter.

With respect to the subject immediately before us, like most of those who have already spoken we do not intend to dwell on the conditions within the various Portuguese African territories. The Committee has various documents which treat this subject at length, and on the basis of these documents, other information of record, and its own deliberations the Assembly has pronounced itself fully in several resolutions.

I would, however, like briefly to restate the principles which guide our policy toward Portuguese territories.

First, the General Assembly has found that the territories under consideration are non-self-governing territories within the meaning of chapter XI of the charter and are therefore subject to the provisions of that chapter. Among others, an obligation exists under chapter XI for information to be submitted on these territories by the administering authorities. Consistent with this obligation we have called upon Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations in its proper consideration of these reports.

Second, we believe the principle of self-determination, the right of peoples to choose the terms of their political, economic, and social destiny, about which I have just spoken, is applicable to the areas under consideration. We have continuously supported measures, since the initial consideration of Angola in the Security Council, calling for Portuguese recognition of this principle and for an acceleration of political, economic, and social advancement for all inhabitants of Portuguese territories toward the full exercise of this self-determination. We believe Portugal should accept this principle and give it practical effect for the people of the territories.

Third, we believe the United Nations and this Committee should continue their efforts to produce change and development through the creative paths of peace, difficult though these paths often seem. This principle is fundamental not only to the charter but to the very concept of the United Nations. To abandon efforts to achieve cooperation, to abandon the means of diplomacy and to substitute instead methods of coercion, would certainly not increase the prestige of this Committee, nor would it achieve the desired aims.

Fourth, from the moment this question was first considered in a U.N. forum we have felt that the U.N. could play a constructive and meaningful role, fruitful for the peoples of Portuguese territories and for the Portuguese people themselves. We have felt this way because the United Nations is an organization dedicated both to peace and to justice. We have accordingly applied ourselves to searching for means, whether new or old, of applying the U.N.

machinery in a constructive sense to achieve progress toward peaceful and just solutions. I doubt if there is any government which has devoted more effort in seeking to bring about in practice the basic objective underlying U.N. resolutions on Portuguese territories—that of self-determination—than the United States. We have done so because of our long friendship with Portugal. This motive, among others, has led us to seek to persuade Portugal to modify its attitudes and to cooperate with the objectives of the U.N. with respect to the principle of self-determination. Where U.N. machinery has been established to deal with some aspect of this principle, we have suggested ways in which the Government of Portugal could cooperate with the machinery.

We have also sought to determine, in consultation with the Government of Portugal, ways in which the U.N. could play a useful and constructive role. In this spirit on the basis of an understanding between the United States and Portugal achieved through extended high-level consultations, and after further broad consultations with the members of the Assembly, the United States proposed that United Nations representatives should be sent to the territories of Angola and Mozambique to report back to the United Nations on conditions there.<sup>2</sup> Portugal was prepared to cooperate with these representatives. This proposal, if adopted and carried out, would have meant that for the first time representatives of the United Nations would officially visit Portuguese territories. Such an event would have been and still would be a significant step for the peoples of Portuguese territories as well as a meaningful and realistic U.N. effort toward a peaceful settlement.

As members of this Committee know, the United States finally decided with regret not to press this proposal to a vote because of an appeal from delegations who were not prepared to accept the resolution without amendments which would have prevented its application.

The progress which this proposal represented should not be abandoned. Many members of this Committee have already spoken in favor

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 21, 1963, p. 105.

of devoting our efforts first and foremost to finding practical ways and means for approaching this problem. The general approach embodied in our initiative could provide one good way. Undoubtedly others can be devised. As we consider such steps, we would urge that we take decisions that are achievable rather than attempt ones which, while perhaps more ideal, are not achievable.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot guarantee that such an approach would produce the results generally desired around this table. However, renewed efforts along the lines of the representative concept or some other practical proposal appear to offer the best chance for progress if our immediate objective is to bring about cooperation between Portugal and the U.N. to lessen the tensions which could threaten international peace and security in the area. For our part, we are thoroughly convinced that if in the face of frustration we resort to extremism, condemnation, or a sterile restatement of views on this question, or if an attempt is made to cast the problem as an East-West cold-war issue, we will not advance the peoples of Portuguese territories toward self-determination. I am sure that only by tenacious and patient perseverance on a realistic path toward peaceful settlement will we contribute significantly to the well-being, prosperity, and political freedom of the peoples of Portuguese territories. To this end we pledge our sincere cooperation.

## **United States To Be Host to World Food Congress**

The Department of State and the Department of Agriculture announced on April 1 (Department of State press release 165 dated March 29) that American industry and government will join forces to serve as hosts to the World Food Congress at Washington June 4-18, 1963. The Congress is being sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and is a highlight in FAO's 5-year international Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, which began in 1960. Approximately 100 nations will be represented, and the attendance target is 1,200. The Food Congress will also mark the 20th anniversary of

the founding of FAO at Hot Springs, Va., in 1943.

The World Food Congress will be an organized effort to pool existing worldwide experience in fighting hunger and malnutrition, to examine ways in which food production and use can be improved in the developing countries, and to aid in economic development. The Congress will bring together for 2 weeks administrators, scientists, and leaders in all aspects of agriculture, food, and economic development.

The program calls for 8 major addresses, plus 11 key addresses by recognized specialists. The detailed work of the Congress will be carried out in four commissions: Technical; Economic and Social; Education and Research; and People's Involvement and Group Action. Among speakers invited are: Arnold J. Toynbee, British historian; K. Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish economist; Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman; Paul G. Hoffman, Director of the United Nations Special Fund; J. Kubitschek, former President of Brazil; and V. T. Krishnamachari, National Planning Commissioner for India.

## **United States Delegations to International Conferences**

### **Southeast Asia Treaty Organization**

The Department of State announced on March 29 (press release 159) that Secretary Rusk would attend the eighth meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) at Paris, April 8-10.<sup>1</sup>

Foreign Ministers of other SEATO member countries are expected to attend the meeting, where they will exchange views on the international situation, particularly matters affecting the treaty area, as well as review the military and nonmilitary activities of the organization.

The member countries of SEATO are Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

<sup>1</sup> For a list of the members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 159.

## **Director General of UNESCO Visits Washington**

The Department of State announced on March 29 (press release 162) that René Maheu, of France, the newly elected Director General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, would visit Washington April 1-3 for talks with Secretary Rusk and other Government officials.

This will be Mr. Maheu's first Washington visit since his election by the 12th General Conference of UNESCO last November at Paris. His talks will include discussion of the future program of UNESCO and U.S. participation in it in the light of recommendations adopted by the General Conference.

## **Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography**

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### **General Assembly**

Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations. Budgetary and financial practices of the United Nations. A/AC.113/1. January 21, 1963. 92 pp.

### **Economic and Social Council**

#### **Population Commission:**

Basic considerations in national programs of analysis of population census data as an aid to planning and policymaking. E/CN.9/173. November 26, 1962. 70 pp.

Current status of demographic studies relevant to economic and social development. E/CN.9/169. December 5, 1962. 16 pp.

Progress of other demographic studies. E/CN.9/171. December 6, 1962. 11 pp.

Plans and arrangements for the second world population conference. E/CN.9/177. December 7, 1962. 6 pp.

The world population census program: evaluation and analysis of results. E/CN.9/174. December 11, 1962. 9 pp.

The world demographic situation with special reference to fertility. E/CN.9/167. December 19, 1962. 23 pp.

Regional demographic activities. E/CN.9/172. December 21, 1962. 29 pp.

Draft standards for national programs of population projections as aids to development planning. E/CN.9/170. December 27, 1962. 33 pp.

Activities in the field of demographic statistics, 1961-62. E/CN.9/179. January 17, 1963. 46 pp. Studies relating to problems of food and agriculture. E/CN.9/173/Add. 1. January 29, 1963. 7 pp. Plans for financing the second world population conference. E/CN.9/177/Add. 1. February 7, 1963. 9 pp.

Decisions taken by the Economic and Social Council at its 34th session with regard to the U.N. development decade. Communication for the Director-General of the International Labor Office. E/3700. November 28, 1962. 13 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva, September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.  
*Accession deposited:* Bulgaria (with reservations), February 13, 1963.

##### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.  
*Adherence deposited:* Jamaica, March 26, 1963.

##### Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.  
*Application to:* Bermuda, North Borneo, and Zanzibar, February 4, 1963.

##### Highways

Agreement for the termination of the regional agreement of January 2 and 6, 1958 (TIAS 3994) between India, Nepal, and the United States concerning the development of transportation facilities in Nepal. Signed at Katmandu January 10, 1963. Entered into force January 10, 1963.

##### Law of the Sea

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.<sup>1</sup>  
*Signature:* Sierra Leone, February 14, 1963.

##### Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Notification of approval:* Viet-Nam, February 13, 1963.

##### Trade

Procès-verbal extending the period of validity of the declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.

*Signatures:* Ghana, February 15, 1963; India, February 21, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Indonesia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program. Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta March 8 and 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963.

##### Norway

Agreement on the use of Norwegian ports and territorial waters by the *NS Savannah*. Signed at Oslo March 1, 1963. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes bringing the agreement into force.

### United States and Japan Sign Consular Convention

Press release 146 dated March 21, for release March 22

A consular convention between the United States and Japan was signed on March 22 at Tokyo by Edwin O. Reischauer, U.S. Ambassador at Tokyo, and Masayoshi Ohira, Foreign Minister of Japan.

The convention defines and establishes the duties, rights, privileges, exemptions, and immunities of consular officers of each country in the territory of the other country.

The convention is comparable in both text and format to the consular conventions between the United States and the United Kingdom and Ireland, signed in 1951 and 1950, respectively.<sup>1</sup> Its provisions are similar in substance to those of a more concise consular convention signed by the United States and the Republic of Korea in January 1963.

The convention will be sent to the Senate of the United States for advice and consent to ratification by the President. The convention will enter into force on the 30th day following the day on which instruments of ratification of the two Governments are exchanged.

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2494 and 2984.

**PUBLICATIONS**

**Secretary Endorses Recommendation for "Foreign Relations" Series**

*The Advisory Committee on the historical series entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States," composed of Dexter Perkins, chairman, Clarence A. Berdahl, Leland M. Goodrich, Fred H. Harrington, Richard W. Leopold, Philip W. Thayer, and Robert R. Wilson, met at Washington on November 2 and 3, 1962. The principal recommendation of the Committee was that henceforth the "Foreign Relations" volumes be published in orderly fashion 20 years behind currency, with no series undertaken out of chronological order. Following is the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to Professor Perkins acknowledging receipt of the Committee's report.*

DECEMBER 29, 1962

DEAR DR. PERKINS: Thank you for your letter of November 19, enclosing the report on the "Foreign Relations" Series. I have now had the opportunity to read this report with some care, and I should like to thank you and the other members of the Committee for the time and thought that you have generously given to the problem.

I think your recommendations that these volumes be published in regular chronological order and be kept within twenty years of currency are reasonable, and I shall so inform our Historical Office. You will understand, however, that publication of a volume may occasionally be delayed because of the current sensitivity of significant documents. I trust that such instances will be rare and that we can hold to a twenty-year line with fair regularity.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

DEXTER PERKINS, Ph. D.,  
Professor of History, Emeritus,  
316 Oxford Street,  
Rochester 7, New York.

**Recent Releases**

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Defense—Loan of Vessels.** Agreement with Spain amending the agreement of March 9, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid June 19, 1962. Entered into force June 19, 1962. TIAS 5096. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Education—Educational Foundation and Financing o Exchange Programs.** Agreement with Israel. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem June 18 and 22, 1962. Entered into force June 22, 1962. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5097. 1 pp. 10¢.

**Army Mission.** Agreement with Argentina amending the agreement of August 2, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires January 8 and June 7, 1962. Entered into force June 7, 1962. TIAS 5098. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: March 25-31**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to March 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 146 and 148 of March 21.

No.	Date	Subject
151	3/25	Manning: House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information.
*152	3/25	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*153	3/25	Annual honor awards ceremony.
†154	3/28	Loans to Argentina.
155	3/28	Rusk: Japanese membership in OECD.
†156	3/28	Cleveland: "Reflections on the Pacific Community."
†157	3/27	Johnson: "Japan, the United States, and Europe."
158	3/28	Rostow: "The Cold War—A Look Ahead."
159	3/29	Delegation to SEATO Council meeting (rewrite).
*160	3/29	Rowan sworn in as Ambassador to Finland (biographic details).
*161	3/29	Secretary Rusk visits U.S. Air Force Academy.
162	3/29	UNESCO Director General visits Washington (rewrite).
163	3/29	Firing on U.S. ship by Cuban planes.
†164	3/29	Williams: "The United Nations and the New Africa."
165	3/29	World Food Congress (rewrite).
†169	3/30	U.S. statement on raids on Cuba.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



**Agriculture.** United States To Be Host to World Food Congress . . . . . 583

**Asia.** Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (delegation) . . . . . 584

**Atomic Energy.** The Cold War—A Look Ahead (Rostow) . . . . . 551

**Brazil.** U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Economic and Financial Talks (text of joint communique) . . . . . 557

**Canada.** U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut Abstention . . . . . 574

**Congress**  
 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . . . 579  
 Foreign Policy in the Open Society (Manning) . . . . . 575

**Cuba.** U.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation of Attack on "Floridian" . . . . . 573

**Economic Affairs**  
 U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut Abstention . . . . . 574  
 U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Economic and Financial Talks (text of joint communique) . . . . . 557  
 U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in OECD (Rusk) . . . . . 572

**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** Director General of UNESCO Visits Washington . . . . . 584

**Foreign Aid**  
 The Cold War—A Look Ahead (Rostow) . . . . . 551  
 President Receives Clay Report on AID Program (Kennedy) . . . . . 574  
 The Refugee Problem in Laos . . . . . 567  
 U.S. and Brazil Reach Understanding in Economic and Financial Talks (text of joint communique) . . . . . 557

**International Organizations and Conferences**  
 Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings . . . . . 580  
 Director General of UNESCO Visits Washington . . . . . 584  
 U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in OECD (Rusk) . . . . . 572  
 United States To Be Host to World Food Congress . . . . . 583

**Japan**  
 U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut Abstention . . . . . 574  
 United States and Japan Sign Consular Convention . . . . . 585

U.S. Supports Full Membership for Japan in OECD (Rusk) . . . . . 572

Korea. United States Expresses Views on Military Rule in Korea . . . . . 573

Laos. The Refugee Problem in Laos . . . . . 567

**Military Affairs.** The Cold War—A Look Ahead (Rostow) . . . . . 551

**Non-Self-Governing Territories.** U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism and Portuguese African Territories (Yates) . . . . . 581

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The Cold War—A Look Ahead (Rostow) . . . . . 551

**Portugal.** U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism and Portuguese African Territories (Yates) . . . . . 581

**Presidential Documents.** President Receives Clay Report on AID Program . . . . . 574

**Protection of Nationals and Property.** U.S. Asks Cuba for Explanation of Attack on "Floridian" . . . . . 573

**Public Affairs.** Foreign Policy in the Open Society (Manning) . . . . . 575

**Publications**  
 Recent Releases . . . . . 586  
 Secretary Endorses Recommendation for "Foreign Relations" Series (Rusk) . . . . . 586

**Refugees.** The Refugee Problem in Laos . . . . . 567

**Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.** Eighth Meeting of Council of Ministers (delegation) . . . . . 584

**Treaty Information**  
 Current Actions . . . . . 585  
 U.S. Accepts Recommendations on Halibut Abstention . . . . . 574  
 United States and Japan Sign Consular Convention . . . . . 585

**United Nations**  
 Current U.N. Documents . . . . . 584  
 The United Nations—What It Is, What It Has Done (Chayes) . . . . . 562  
 U.S. Restates Views on Colonialism and Portuguese African Territories (Yates) . . . . . 581

*Name Index*

Bell, David E . . . . . 557  
 Chayes, Abram . . . . . 562  
 Kennedy, President . . . . . 574  
 Manning, Robert J . . . . . 575  
 Rostow, W. W . . . . . 551  
 Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 572, 586  
 San Tiago Dantas, Francisco Clementino . . . . . 557  
 Yates, Sidney R . . . . . 581

SOCIAL SERVICES  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
DSB DEC -G-

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)



**Department**  
**of**  
**State**

**TREATIES IN FORCE . . .**  
**January 1, 1963**

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

Publication 7481

\$1.75

*Order Form*

Publication 7481

\$1.75

Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *TREATIES IN FORCE—A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1963.*

*Enclosed find:*

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

\$: \_\_\_\_\_  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Street Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City, Zone, and State: \_\_\_\_\_

4



APR 22 1963

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1243

April 22, 1963

**FREE-WORLD DEFENSE AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS** ● *Message of the President to the Congress . . .* 591

**THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NEW AFRICA** ● *by Assistant Secretary Williams . . . . .* 602

**AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT** ● *Statement by Walter M. Kotschnig . . . . .* 625

**REFLECTIONS ON THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY** ● *by Assistant Secretary Cleveland . . . . .* 613

**JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE** ● *by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson . . . . .* 606

*For index see inside back cover*

AL  
Y RECORD  
D STATES  
IN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1243 • PUBLICATION 752

April 22, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
62 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

# Free-World Defense and Assistance Programs

## MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 2, 1963.*

*To the Congress of the United States:*

"Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war," wrote Milton. And no peacetime victory in history has been as far reaching in its impact, nor served the cause of freedom so well, as the victories scored in the last 17 years by this Nation's mutual defense and assistance programs. These victories have been, in the main, quiet instead of dramatic. Their aim has been, not to gain territories for the United States or support in the United Nations, but to preserve freedom and hope and to prevent tyranny and subversion in dozens of key nations all over the world.

The United States today is spending 10 percent of its gross national product on programs primarily aimed at improving our national security. Somewhat less than one-twelfth of this amount, and less than 0.7 percent of our GNP, goes into the mutual assistance program: roughly half for economic development, and half for military and other short-term assistance. The contribution of this program to our national interest clearly outweighs its cost. The richest nation in the world would surely be justified in spending less than 1 percent of its national income on assistance to its less fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of international responsibility; but inasmuch as these programs are not merely the right thing to do, but clearly in our national self-interest, all criticisms should be placed in that perspective. That our aid programs can be improved is not a matter of debate. But that our aid programs serve both our national traditions and our national interest is beyond all reasonable doubt.

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 94, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

History records that our aid programs to Turkey and Greece were the crucial element that enabled Turkey to stand up against heavy-handed Soviet pressures, Greece to put down Communist aggression, and both to re-create stable societies and to move forward in the direction of economic and social growth.

History records that the Marshall plan made it possible for the nations of Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, to recover from the devastation of the world's most destructive war, to rebuild military strength, to withstand the expansionist thrust of Stalinist Russia, and to embark on an economic renaissance which has made Western Europe the second greatest and richest industrial complex in the world today—a vital center of free world strength, itself now contributing to the growth and strength of less-developed countries.

History records that our military and economic assistance to nations on the frontiers of the Communist world—such as Iran, Pakistan, India, Vietnam, and free China—has enabled threatened peoples to stay free and independent, when they otherwise would have either been overrun by aggressive Communist power or fallen victim of utter chaos, poverty, and despair.

History records that our contributions to international aid have been the critical factor in the growth of a whole family of international financial institutions and agencies, playing an ever more important role in the ceaseless war against want and the struggle for growth and freedom.

And, finally, history will record that today our technical assistance and development loans are giving hope where hope was lacking, sparking action where life was static, and stimulating progress around the earth—simultaneously

supporting the military security of the free world, helping to erect barriers against the growth of communism where those barriers count the most, helping to build the kind of world community of independent, self-supporting nations in which we want to live, and helping to serve the deep American urge to extend a generous hand to those working toward a better life for themselves and their children.

Despite noisy opposition from the very first days, despite dire predictions that foreign aid would "bankrupt" the Republic, despite warnings that the Marshall plan and successor programs were "throwing our money down a rathole," despite great practical difficulties and some mistakes and disappointments, the fact is that our aid programs generally and consistently have done what they were expected to do.

Freedom is not on the run anywhere in the world—not in Europe, Asia, Africa, or Latin America—as it might well have been without U.S. aid. And we now know that freedom—all freedom, including our own—is diminished when other countries fall under Communist domination, as in China in 1949, North Vietnam, and the northern Provinces of Laos in 1954, and Cuba in 1959. Freedom, all freedom, is threatened by the subtle, varied, and unceasing Communist efforts at subversion in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. And the prospect for freedom is also endangered or eroded in countries which see no hope—no hope for a better life based on economic progress, education, social justice, and the development of stable institutions. These are the frontiers of freedom which our military and economic aid programs seek to advance; and in so doing they serve our deepest national interest.

This view has been held by three successive Presidents—Democratic and Republican alike.

It has been endorsed by a bipartisan majority of nine successive Congresses.

It has been supported for 17 years by a bipartisan majority of the American people.

And it has only recently been reconfirmed by a distinguished committee of private citizens, headed by Gen. Lucius Clay and includ-

ing Messrs. Robert Anderson, Eugene Black, Clifford Hardin, Robert Lovett, Edward Mason, L. F. McCollum, George Meany, Herman Phleger, and Howard Rusk. Their report stated: "We believe these programs, properly conceived and implemented, to be essential to the security of our Nation and necessary to the exercise of its worldwide responsibilities."<sup>2</sup>

There is, in short, a national consensus of many years standing on the vital importance of these programs. The principle and purpose of U.S. assistance to less secure and less fortunate nations are not and cannot be seriously in doubt.

## II. Present Needs

The question now is: What about the future? In the perspective of these past gains, what is the dimension of present needs, what are our opportunities, and what changes do we face at this juncture in world history?

I believe it is a crucial juncture. Our world is near the climax of a historic convulsion. A tidal wave of national independence has nearly finished its sweep through lands which contain one out of every three people in the world. The industrial and scientific revolution is spreading to the far corners of the earth. And two irreconcilable views of the value, the rights and the role of the individual human being confront the peoples of the world.

In some 80 developing nations, countless large and small decisions will be made in the days and months and years ahead—decisions which taken together, will establish the economic and social system, determine the political leadership, shape the political practices, and mold the structure of the institutions which will promote either consent or coercion for one-third of humanity. And these decisions will drastically affect the shape of the world in which our children grow to maturity.

Africa is stirring restlessly to consolidate its independence and to make that independence

<sup>2</sup>*The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World March 20, 1963; available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents).*

meaningful for its people through economic and social development. The people of America have affirmed and reaffirmed their sympathy with these objectives.

Free Asia is responding resolutely to the political, economic, and military challenge of Communist China's relentless efforts to dominate the continent.

Latin America is striving to take decisive steps toward effective democracy, amid the turbulence of rapid social change and the menace of Communist subversion.

The United States—the richest and most powerful of all peoples, a nation committed to the independence of nations and to a better life for all peoples—can no more stand aside in this climactic age of decision than we can withdraw from the community of free nations. Our effort is not merely symbolic. It is addressed to our vital security interests.

It is in this context that I hope the American people through their representatives in Congress will consider our request this year for foreign aid funds designed carefully and explicitly to meet these specific challenges. This is not a wearisome burden. It is a new chapter in our involvement in a continuously vital struggle—the most challenging and constructive effort ever undertaken by man on behalf of freedom and his fellow man.

### **I. Objectives for Improvement**

In a changing world, our programs of mutual defense and assistance must be kept under constant review. My recommendations herein reflect the work of the Clay Committee, the scrutiny undertaken by the new Administrator David E. Bell] of the Agency for International Development, and the experience gained in our first full year of administering the new and improved program enacted by the Congress in 1961. There is fundamental agreement throughout these reviews: that these assistance programs are of great value to our deepest national interest, that their basic concepts and organization, as embodied in the existing legislation, are properly conceived, that progress has been made and is being made in translating these concepts into action, but that much still remains to be done to improve our performance

and make the best possible use of these programs.

In addition, there is fundamental agreement in all these reviews regarding six key recommendations for the future.

*Objective No. 1: To apply stricter standards of selectivity and self-help in aiding developing countries.*—This objective was given special attention by the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World (the Clay report), which estimated that the application of such criteria could result in substantial savings in selected programs over the next 1 to 3 years.

Considerable progress has already been made along these lines. While the number of former colonies achieving independence has lengthened the total list of countries receiving assistance, 80 percent of all economic assistance now goes to only 20 countries; and military assistance is even more narrowly concentrated. The proportion of development loans, as contrasted with outright grants, has increased from 10 to 60 percent. We have placed all our development lending on a dollar-repayable basis; and this year we are increasing our efforts, as the Clay Committee recommended, to tailor our loan terms so that interest rates and maturities will reflect to a greater extent the differences in the ability of different countries to service debt.

In the Alliance for Progress, in particular, and increasingly in other aid programs, emphasis is placed upon self-help and self-reform by the recipients themselves, using our aid as a catalyst for progress and not as a handout. Finally, in addition to emphasizing primarily economic rather than military assistance, wherever conditions permit, we are taking a sharp new look at both the size and purpose of those local military forces which receive our assistance. Our increased stress on internal security and civic action in military assistance is in keeping with our experience that, in developing countries, military forces can have an important economic as well as protective role to play. For example, in Latin America, in fiscal year 1963, military assistance funds allocated for the support of engineer, medical, and other civic action type units more than doubled.



*Objective No. 2: To achieve a reduction and ultimate elimination of U.S. assistance by enabling nations to stand on their own as rapidly as possible.*—Both this Nation and the countries we help have a stake in their reaching the point of self-sustaining growth—the point where they no longer require external aid to maintain their independence. Our goal is not an arbitrary cutoff date but the earliest possible “take-off” date—the date when their economies will have been launched with sufficient momentum to enable them to become self-supporting, requiring only the same normal sources of external financing to meet expanding capital needs that this country required for many decades.

For some, this goal is near at hand, insofar as economic assistance is concerned. For others, more time will be needed. But in all cases, specific programs leading to self-support should be set and priorities established—including those steps which must be taken by the recipient countries and all others who are willing to help them.

The record clearly shows that foreign aid is not an endless or unchanging process. Fifteen years ago our assistance went almost entirely to the advanced countries of Europe and Japan—today it is directed almost entirely to the developing world. Ten years ago most of our assistance was given to shoring up military forces and unstable economies—today this kind of aid has been cut in half, and our assistance goes increasingly toward economic development. There are still, however, important cases where there has been no diminution in the Communist military threat, and both military and economic aid are still required. Such cases range from relatively stabilized frontiers, as in Korea and Turkey, to areas of active aggression, such as Vietnam.

*Objective No. 3: To secure the increased participation of other industrialized nations in sharing the cost of international development assistance.*—The United States is no longer alone in aiding the developing countries, and its proportionate share of the burden is diminishing. The flow of funds from other industrialized countries—now totaling on the order of \$2 billion a year—is expected to continue; and we expect to work more closely with these other countries in order to make the most effective

use of our joint efforts. In addition, the international lending and technical assistance agencies—to which we contribute heavily—have expanded the schedule and scope of their operations; and we look forward to supplementing those resources selectively in conjunction with increased contributions from other nations. We will continue to work with our allies, urging them to increase their assistance efforts and to extend assistance on terms less burdensome to the developing countries.

*Objective No. 4: To lighten any adverse impact of the aid program on our own balance of payments and economy.*—A few years ago, more than half of U.S. economic aid funds were spent abroad, contributing to the drain on our dollars and gold. Of our current commitments, over 80 percent will be spent in the United States, contributing to the growth of our economy and employment opportunities. This proportion is rising as further measures are being taken to this end. I might add that our balance-of-payments position today is being significantly helped by the repayment of loans made to European countries under the Marshall plan and by the Export-Import Bank. I am confident that in the future, as income in the less-developed countries rises, we will similarly benefit from the loans we are now making to them.

Our economy is also being helped by the expansion of commercial exports to countries whose present growth and prosperity were spurred by U.S. economic assistance in earlier years. Over the last decade, our exports to Western Europe and the United Kingdom have more than doubled, and our exports to Japan have increased fourfold. Similarly, we can look forward to a future widening of trade opportunities in those countries whose economic development we are currently assisting.

In addition, our food-for-peace program is increasingly using our agricultural commodities to stimulate the economic growth of developing nations and to assist in achieving other U.S. foreign policy goals. As the economies of developing nations improve, we are encouraging them to shift from foreign currency to cash sales or to dollar credit sales for these commodities.

The relative burden of our assistance programs has been steadily reduced from some 2 percent of our national product at the beginning of the Marshall plan to seven-tenths of 1 percent today—from 11.5 percent of the Federal budget in 1949 to 4 percent today.

Although these figures indicate that our aid programs cost, in relative terms, considerably less today than they did 10 or 15 years ago, we are continuing our efforts to improve the effectiveness of these programs and increase the return on every dollar invested. Personnel, procedures, and administration are being improved. A number of field missions have been closed, scaled down, or merged into embassies or regional offices. These efforts toward greater efficiency and economy are being accelerated under the new Administrator.

*Objective No. 5: To continue to assist in the defense of countries under threat of external and internal Communist attack.*—Our military assistance program has been an essential element in keeping the boundary of Soviet and Chinese military power relatively stable for over a decade. Without its protection the substantial economic progress made by underdeveloped countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery would hardly have been possible. As these countries build economic strength, they will be able to assume more of the burden of their defense. But we must not assume that military assistance to these countries—or to others primarily exposed to subversive internal attack—can be ended in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, while it will be possible to reduce and terminate some programs, we should anticipate the need for new and expanded programs.

India is a case in point. The wisdom of earlier United States aid in helping the Indian subcontinent's considerable and fruitful efforts toward progress and stability can hardly now be in question. The threat made plain by the Chinese attack on India last fall may require additional efforts on our part to help bolster the security of this crucial area, assuming these efforts can be matched in an appropriate way by the efforts of India and Pakistan.

But overall, the magnitude of military assistance is small in relation to our national security expenditures; in this fiscal year it amounts to

about 3 percent of our defense budget. "Dollar for dollar," said the Clay Committee with particular reference to the border areas, "these programs contribute more to the security of the free world than corresponding expenditures in our defense appropriations \* \* \*. These countries are providing more than 2 million armed men ready, for the most part, for any emergency." Clearly, if this program did not exist, our defense budget would undoubtedly have to be increased substantially to provide an equivalent contribution to the free world's defense.

*Objective No. 6: To increase the role of private investment and other non-Federal resources in assisting developing nations.*—In recent months important new steps have been taken to mobilize on behalf of this program the competence of a variety of nongovernmental organizations and individuals in this country. Cooperatives and savings and loan associations have been very active in establishing similar institutions abroad, particularly in Latin America. Our land-grant and other universities are establishing better working relationships with our programs to assist oversea rural development. Already there are 37 U.S. universities and land-grant institutions at work in Latin America, for example, with a substantial increase expected during the coming year. Public and private leaders from the State of California are exploring with their counterparts in Chile how the talents and resources of a particular State can be more directly channeled toward assisting a particular country. Labor unions, foundations, trade associations, professional societies, and many others likewise possess skills and resources which we are drawing upon increasingly, in order to engage in a more systematic and meaningful way, in this vital nation-building process, the whole complex of private and public institutions upon which our own national life depends. For at the heart of the modernization process lies the central problem of creating, adapting, and improving the institutions which any modern society will need.

#### **IV. Private Investment**

The primary new initiative in this year's program relates to our increased efforts to encourage the investment of private capital in the

underdeveloped countries. Already considerable progress has been made fostering U.S. private investment through the use of investment guaranties—with over \$900 million now outstanding—and by means of cost-sharing on investment surveys, loans of local currencies, and other measures provided under existing law. During the first half of this fiscal year alone, \$7.7 million in local currencies have been loaned to private business firms.

I believe much more should be done, however, both administratively through more vigorous action by the Agency for International Development, and legislatively by the Congress. Administratively, our ambassadors and missions abroad, in their negotiations with the less-developed countries, are being directed to urge more forcefully the importance of making full use of private resources and improving the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign. In particular, I am concerned that the investment guaranty program is not fully operative in some countries because of the failure of their governments to execute the normal intergovernmental agreements relating to investment guaranties.

In addition, the Agency for International Development will also strengthen and enlarge its own activities relating to private enterprise—both its efforts to assist in the development of vigorous private economies in the developing countries and its facilities for mobilizing and assisting the capital and skills of private business in contributing to economic development.

Legislatively, I am recommending the following:

(a) An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code for a trial period to grant U.S. taxpayers a tax credit for new investments in developing countries, which should also apply to some extent to reinvestments of their earnings in those countries. Such a credit, by making possible an increased rate of return, should substantially encourage additional private investment in the developing countries. The U.S. businessmen's committee for the Alliance for Progress has recommended the adoption of such a measure.

(b) Amendments in the investment guaranty provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act de-

signed to enlarge and clarify the guaranty program.

Economic and social growth cannot be accomplished by governments alone. The effective participation of an enlightened U.S. businessman, especially in partnership with private interests in the developing country, brings not only his investment but his technological and management skills into the process of development. His successful participation in turn helps create that climate of confidence which is so critical in attracting and holding vital external and internal capital. We welcome and encourage initiatives being taken in the private sector in Latin America to accelerate industrial growth and hope that similar cooperative efforts will be established with other developing countries.

#### **V. The Alliance for Progress**

In a special sense, the achievements of the Alliance for Progress in the coming years will be the measure of our determination, our ideals and our wisdom. Here in this hemisphere, in this last year, our resourcefulness as a people was challenged in the clearest terms. We moved at once to resist the threat of aggressive nuclear weapons in Cuba, and we found the nations of Latin America at our side. They like ourselves, were brought to a new awareness of the danger of permitting the poverty and despair of a whole people to continue long anywhere in this continent.

Had the needs of the people of Cuba been met in the pre-Castro period—their need for food, for housing, for education, for jobs, and above all, for a democratic responsibility in the fulfillment of their own hopes—there would have been no Castro, no missiles in Cuba, and no need for Cuba's neighbors to incur the immense risks of resistance to threatened aggression from that island.

There is but one way to avoid being faced with similar dilemmas in the future. It is to bring about in all the countries of Latin America the conditions of hope, in which the people of this continent will know that they can shape a better future for themselves, not through obeying the inhumane commands of an alien and cynical ideology, but through persona-

Self-expression, individual judgment, and the acts of responsible citizenship.

As Americans, we have long recognized the legitimacy of these aspirations; in recent months we have been able to see, as never before, their urgency and, I believe, the concrete means for their realization.

In less than 2 years, the 10-year program of the Alliance for Progress has become more than an idea and more than a commitment of governments. The necessary initial effort to develop plans, to organize institutions, to test and experiment has itself required and achieved a new education—a new dedication to intelligent compromise between old and new ways of life. In the long run, it is this effort and not the threat of communism that will determine the fate of freedom in the Western Hemisphere.

These years have not been easy ones for any group in Latin America. A similar change in the fundamental orientation of our own society would have been no easier. The difficulty of the changes to be brought about makes all the more heartening the success of many nations of Latin America in achieving reforms which will make their fundamental economic and social structures both more efficient and more equitable.

Some striking accomplishments, moreover, are already visible. New housing is being expanded in most countries of the region. Educational facilities are growing rapidly. Road construction, particularly in agricultural areas, is accelerating at a rapid pace. With U.S. funds, over 2 million text books are being distributed to combat the illiteracy of nearly half of the 210 million people of Latin America. In the countries of the Alliance for Progress, the diets of 8 million children and mothers are being supplemented with U.S. Food for Peace, and this figure should reach nearly 16 million by next year.

In trouble-ridden northeast Brazil, under an agreement with the State of Rio Grande do Norte, a program is underway to train 3,000 teachers, build 1,000 classrooms, 10 vocational schools, 8 normal schools, and 4 teacher training centers. A \$30 million slum clearance project is underway in Venezuela. In Bogotá, Colombia, the site of the old airport is becoming

ing a new city for 71,000 persons who are building their own homes with support from the Social Progress Trust Fund.

This year I received a letter from Señor Argemil Plazas Garcia, whom I met in Bogotá upon the dedication of an Alianza housing project. He writes: "Today I am living in the house with my 13 children, and we are very happy to be free of such poverty and no longer to be moving around like outcasts. Now we have dignity and freedom \* \* \*. My wife, my children, and I are writing you this humble letter, to express to you the warm gratitude of such Colombian friends who now have a home in which they can live happily." Of even greater long-range importance, a number of beginnings in self-help and reforms are now evident.

Since 1961, 11 Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela—have made structural reforms in their tax systems. Twelve countries have improved their income tax laws and administration.

New large-scale programs for improved land use and land reform have been undertaken in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and two States in Brazil. More limited plans are being carried out in Chile, Colombia, Panama, Uruguay, and Central America.

Six Latin American countries—Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela—have submitted development programs to the panel of experts of the Organization of American States. The panel has evaluated and reported on the first three and will soon offer its views on the balance.

Viewed against the background of decades of neglect—or, at most, intermittent bursts of attention to basic problems—the start that has been made is encouraging. Perhaps most significant of all is a change in the hearts and minds of the people—a growing will to develop their countries. We can only help Latin Americans to save themselves. It is for this reason that the increasing determination of the peoples of the region to build modern societies is heartening. And it is for this reason that responsible leadership in Latin America must respond to this popular will with a greater

sense of urgency and purpose, lest aspirations turn into frustrations and hope turn into despair. Pending reform legislation must be enacted, statutes already on the books must be enforced, and mechanisms for carrying out programs must be organized and invigorated. These steps are not easy, as we know from our own experience, but they must be taken.

Our own intention is to concentrate our support in Latin America on those countries adhering to the principles established in the Charter of Punta del Este, and to work with our neighbors to indicate more precisely the particular policy changes, reforms and other self-help measures which are necessary to make our assistance effective and the Alliance a success. The Clay Committee recommendation that we continue to expand our efforts to encourage economic integration within the region and the expansion of trade among the countries of Latin America has great merit. The determination of the Central American Presidents to move boldly in this direction impressed me greatly during my recent meeting with them in San José, Costa Rica;<sup>3</sup> and the Agency for International Development has already established a regional office in Central America, is giving support to a regional development bank, and has participated in regional trade conferences.

A beginning has been made in the first 2 years of the Alliance; but the job that is still ahead must be tackled with continuing urgency. Many of the ingredients for a successful decade are at hand, and the fundamental course for the future is clear. It remains for all parties to the Alliance to provide the continuous will and effort needed to move steadily along that course.

## **VI. This Year's Authorizing Legislation**

Translating the foregoing facts and principles into program costs and appropriations, based on the application of the standards set forth above and affirmed by the Clay Committee, yields the following results:

First, upward of \$200 million of economic assistance funds now available are expected to be saved and not used in the present fiscal year.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.

and upward of \$100 million of these unused funds will remain available for lending in the future;

Second, in addition to the savings carried forward into next year, close review has indicated a number of reductions that can be made in the original budget estimates for economic and military assistance without serious damage to the national interest.

Together these factors permit a reduction in the original budget estimates from \$4.9 to \$4.5 billion. This amount reflects anticipated reductions in military and economic assistance to a number of countries, in line with these standards and recommendations, and unavoidable increases to others. The principal net increases proposed in 1964 appropriations are the following:

An additional \$325 million for lending in Latin America—\$125 million through the Agency for International Development and \$200 million through the Social Progress Trust Fund, administered for the United States by the Inter-American Development Bank (for which no appropriation was needed in fiscal year 1963 because a 2-year appropriation had been made the year before);

An additional \$85 million for lending elsewhere in the world, mostly in countries such as India, Pakistan, and Nigeria which are meeting those high standards of self-help and fiscal and economic progress which permit our aid to be directed toward ultimate full self-support;

An additional \$80 million for military aid, including the increased requirements for India (but still far below the fiscal 1961 level); and

An additional \$50 million for the contingency fund, which provides a flexibility indispensable to our security. We cannot ignore the possibility that new threats similar to those in Laos or Vietnam might arise in areas which now look calm, or that new opportunities will open up to achieve major gains in the cause of freedom. Foreign aid policy can no more be static than foreign policy itself.

I believe that it is necessary and desirable that these funds be provided by the Congress to meet program needs and to be available for program opportunities. Funds which are not required under the increasingly selective pro-

gram and performance standards of our assistance programs will, as in this year, not be spent or committed.

The legislative amendments which I am forwarding herewith<sup>4</sup> carry forward the basic structure and intent of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. No fundamental changes in this legislative structure now appear to be required.

One relatively minor change I am proposing is for a separate authorization for the appropriation of funds to assist American schools and hospitals abroad. A number of these schools sponsored by Americans have been most successful in the developing countries in providing an education built upon American standards. Until now some assistance has been made available to these schools from general economic aid funds, but this is becoming increasingly inappropriate. Separate authorization and appropriations would be used to help these schools carry out long-term programs to establish themselves on a sounder financial footing, becoming gradually independent, if at all possible, of U.S. Government support.

Finally, I am requesting the Congress in this legislation to amend that section of the Trade Expansion Act which requires the denial of equal tariff treatment to imports from Poland and Yugoslavia. It is appropriate that this amendment should be incorporated in this bill since it is my conviction that trade and other forms of normal relations constitute a sounder basis than aid for our future relationship with these countries.

## VII. Conclusion

In closing, let me again emphasize the overriding importance of the efforts in which we are engaged.

At this point in history we can look back to many successes in the struggle to preserve freedom. Our Nation is still daily winning unseen victories in the fight against Communist subversion in the slums and hamlets, in the hospitals and schools, and in the offices of governments across a world bent on lifting itself. Two centuries of pioneering and growth must be

<sup>4</sup>Not printed here.

telescoped into decades and even years. This is a field of action for which our history has prepared us, to which our aspirations have drawn us, and into which our national interest moves us.

Around the world cracks in the monolithic apparatus of our adversary are there for all to see. This, for the American people, is a time for vision, for patience, for work, and for wisdom. For better or worse, we are the pacesetters. Freedom's leader cannot flag or falter, or another runner will set the pace.

We have dared to label the sixties the "Decade of Development." But it is not the eloquence of our slogans, but the quality of our endurance, which will determine whether this generation of Americans deserves the leadership which history has thrust upon us.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

## U.S. Disclaims Responsibility for Attacks on Soviet Ships

*Following is the text of a U.S. note delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Moscow on April 3.*

Press release 170 dated April 3

APRIL 3, 1963

By its notes of March 27 and of March 29, 1963,<sup>1</sup> the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented protests by the Soviet Government against what it termed "piratical attacks" on the Soviet merchant vessel "L'gov" on March 17 and the Soviet merchant vessel "Baku" during the night of March 26-27 near Cuba. The notes asserted that although the attacks were perpetrated by Cuban counter-revolutionary groups, the United States Government encourages such activities and bears full responsibility for them.

The United States Government categorically rejects this charge. It wishes to remind the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that immediately after the recent attacks on Soviet merchant vessels an official spokesman stated that the United States Gov-

<sup>1</sup>Not printed here.

ernment is strongly opposed to, and is in no way associated with, such attacks.<sup>2</sup> This position was furthermore clearly set forth by President Kennedy in his press conference of March 21. The United States Government is taking every step necessary to insure that such attacks are not launched, manned or equipped from U.S. territory.

In taking vigorous action to prevent misuse of its territory, the Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not misinterpret such action as indicating any change in United States opposition to Soviet military involvement in Cuba.

## **U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal for Direct Communication Link**

*Following is the text of a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency statement read to news correspondents on April 5 by a Department of State spokesman.*

The United States welcomes the Soviet Government's acceptance of the American proposal for improved communications between the Soviet Union and the United States. In order to reduce the risk of war occurring through failure of communications, the United States has sought to reach agreements on measures which would improve communications between governments.

The specific purpose of a direct teletype link between the Soviet Union and the United States would be to have a channel available for immediate use during times of crisis. On its part, the United States would expect to establish a central terminal point in Washington. From this terminal point, the President can always be reached immediately. Since there will be technical details to agree upon before the teletype link can be established, the United States anticipates that there will be private technical talks with the Soviet Union on this matter in the near future.

---

<sup>2</sup> For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520.

## **Cuba Expresses Regret in "Floridian" Incident**

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

In connection with the United States' demand for a full and prompt explanation involving the shooting by Cuban MIG aircraft near the motorship *Floridian* March 28, the Czech Ambassador [Miloslav Ruzek] today called on the Department to deliver a note from the government of Cuba. The Cuban government stated that the pilots of its two MIG aircraft had arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the *Floridian* was an enemy vessel. The Cuban government further stated that it had no wish to interfere with the U.S. or other international shipping in the Caribbean, that it regrets the incident of March 28, and that it is undertaking to adopt all possible measures to avoid a recurrence of the incident.

## **U.S. Acts To Prevent Raids on Cuba From U.S. Territory**

*Following is the text of a joint statement issued by the Department of Justice and the Department of State on March 30.*

Press release 169 dated March 30

The position of the United States Government regarding hit-and-run attacks by Cuban refugee groups against Soviet ships and other targets in Cuba has been made perfectly clear by the President and the Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup>

These attacks are neither supported nor condoned by this Government. The President has pointed out that they may have effects opposite those presumably intended by those who carry them out; that is, they may strengthen the Soviet position in Cuba rather than weaken it, tighten Communist controls rather than loosen them.

---

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Apr. 2 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News; for background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 15, 1963, p. 573.

<sup>2</sup> For text of a U.S. statement of Mar. 19, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520.



Our preliminary evidence suggests that these raids have not in fact been launched from the territory of the United States. However, the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with the cooperation of the Coast Guard and Customs Service, are intensifying their investigations. We intend to take every step necessary to insure that such raids are not launched, manned, or equipped from U.S. territory.

The sympathy of this Government and of the American people is with those Cubans who hope to see their country freed from Communist control. We understand that these raids reflect the deep frustration of men who want to get back to their homeland, to a Cuba that is independent.

But this understanding does not mean that we are prepared to see our own laws violated with impunity, or to tolerate activities which might provoke armed reprisals, the brunt of which would be borne by the Armed Forces of the United States.

## **King of Morocco Exchanges Views With President Kennedy**

*His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, made a state visit to the United States, March 26-April 5. At Washington, March 27-29, he met with President Kennedy and other U.S. Government officials. Following is the text of a joint communique issued on March 29 at the conclusion of King Hassan's visit to Washington.*

White House press release dated March 29

His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, has concluded today a state visit to Washington, during which he was the guest of President Kennedy.

During their stay in the capital, the King and his ministers met with the President and high-ranking officials of the United States Government and exchanged views on a wide range of subjects of mutual interest.

King Hassan II, as head of state of an important African country, made known his view-

point on the aspects of the international situation and economic development problems which are of interest to Morocco as well as to other African countries. He expressed his country's particular interest in the United States objectives in the cause of peace and liberty and in the increased importance which the Government of the United States attaches to Africa. The President outlined the United States views on the questions which divide the East and the West; furthermore, he expressed his country's desire to reach an agreement on disarmament and its concern arising from the dangers which threaten the peace and freedom of the independent nations of the two hemispheres. The President expressed his sincere interest in Africa and, in particular, in the establishment of close relations between the states of North Africa.

The President reaffirmed the agreement reached at Casablanca between President Eisenhower and His Majesty King Mohammed V on December 22, 1959,<sup>1</sup> by which it was agreed that the United States forces would be withdrawn from Morocco before the end of 1963; he confirmed that the planned evacuation would take place as had been provided and the two heads of state took note of the progress already made in this direction. The President also confirmed the desire previously expressed by President Eisenhower to help the Moroccan Government, to every possible extent, to use these bases constructively.

It was agreed that the various means by which the United States could continue to contribute in the most effective manner to the economic development of Morocco, within the framework of United States foreign policy and of the long friendship as well as the traditional cooperation which unite these two countries, would be considered through diplomatic channels.

His Majesty expressed the hope that the President and Mrs. Kennedy could visit Morocco in the near future and the President expressed his desire to accept this cordial invitation at an early opportunity.

<sup>1</sup> For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Jan. 11, 1960, p. 57.

## The United Nations and the New Africa

*by G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Your evident interest in the United Nations is highly gratifying and encouraging. This is an interest that unites you with millions of young people throughout the world and particularly with young Africans, who see in the United Nations a tangible hope both for world cooperation and for a better standard of living for the peoples of Africa.

The relationship between Africa and the United Nations has grown steadily over the nearly 18 years since the United Nations was founded at San Francisco. Then, only 4 nations in Africa—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa—were independent and eligible for U.N. membership. Today there are 33 African members of the world body, nearly a third of the total U.N. membership and a larger number of members than in any other continent. A part of this growth is due to the United Nations itself because of the direct role it played in the birth of seven former trust territories—Burundi, Cameroon, Libya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanganyika, and Togo.

The constantly growing community of African-U.N. relations can best be approached in two ways—first, in terms of the technical, social, and economic developments taking place on the African Continent under U.N. auspices; and, second, in terms of political activities both at U.N. headquarters in New York and in Africa itself.

Although the United Nations' technical, social, and economic role in Africa is not large when compared with current bilateral assist-

ance programs, it does provide important assistance in key areas and does it without any of the political associations that Africans sometimes fear are associated with bilateral programs. This assistance is made available either through U.N. technical cooperation programs—the U.N. regular program, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and the Special Fund—or through the programs of the various U.N. specialized agencies.

The United Nations' contribution to technical and preinvestment assistance has been rising steadily. At the same time an increasing amount of the U.N.'s technical cooperation effort is directed toward Africa.

The U.N. regular program in 1962 amounted to assistance of \$6.4 million in such fields as economic development, public administration, and personnel and social services. Of this amount, more than \$2 million went into economic development projects, of which more than 75 percent went to Africa.

The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance is a source of funds for activities in excess of regular United Nations and specialized agency appropriations and amounted to \$71 million in 1961 and 1962. This program has carried out such successful activities as a UNESCO project in Morocco that has installed some 1,200 radio receivers in primary schools through which 200,000 pupils are reached by educational broadcasts.

The U.N. Special Fund is the largest source of funds for U.N. technical assistance activities and in 1962 alone received pledges of some \$60 million from U.N. members. By the end of last year the Special Fund was participating

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the 17th annual model U.N. conference at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., on Mar. 29 (press release 164).

n 65 African projects totaling nearly \$55 million and had approved 11 others amounting to almost \$14 million.

Other assistance to Africa is provided through such U.N.-associated lending institutions as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation. At the end of October 1962, the International Bank had made 42 loans totaling \$942 million in nearly 20 African countries. These loans include such projects as the development of iron ore in Mauritania, port construction in Nigeria, and manganese development in Gabon. In addition, the Bank has organized international consultative groups to assist Nigeria and Tunisia in planning their development and external assistance requirements.

United Nations technical assistance activities in Africa also are concerned with such major areas of need as health and education. In the important field of health, the World Health Organization and UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund] are cooperating with Ethiopia and the United States in a school for health officers, community nurses, and sanitarians at Gondar, Ethiopia. WHO also recently surveyed the health services and sanitary conditions in the Portuguese-administered territories in Africa and helped health authorities there draw up plans to improve sanitary conditions.

Education is the most critical shortage on that continent, and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] is attempting to find ways to help meet needs in this vital field. As a first comprehensive step, UNESCO and the Economic Commission for Africa sponsored a conference on educational development at Addis Ababa in 1961,<sup>2</sup> which was attended by 34 African ministers of education. This conference agreed that educational planning must be an integral part of overall economic progress and that priorities were secondary schools, revised curricula, and trained teachers.

This was followed last spring by a meeting in Paris of African ministers of education<sup>3</sup> at

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 12, 1961, p. 936.

<sup>3</sup> For an article by J. Wayne Fredericks, see *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1962, p. 333.

which it was agreed that each African country would try to increase investment in education by one-third, or from 3 to 4 percent of gross national product by 1965.

Last fall, at Tananarive, Madagascar, a UNESCO conference on higher education continued to study educational needs. That conference focused its attention on teacher requirements, and it recognized the desirability of concentrating the training of university undergraduates in Africa, rather than sending most of them abroad as is done now.

These few examples, I believe, make it clear that the United Nations is at work in all fields of technical, social, and economic development in Africa—sometimes by itself, sometimes in cooperation with others. And I might point out here that the United States provides a considerable portion of the funds that make these development projects possible.

#### **Political Developments in Africa**

But the United Nations also has important interests in political developments in Africa, and these interests get far more attention than the quiet work of its assistance activities. It is to these political questions that I would like to turn now.

With the admission of Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in 1962, the U.N.'s African membership rose to 33 countries, and many Africans are serving the world body in important capacities.

Godfrey K. J. Amachree of Nigeria is an Under Secretary-General. Robert Gardiner of Ghana is the officer in charge of United Nations operations in the Congo and formerly was Deputy Secretary-General of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. Guinea and the Malagasy Republic held vice-presidencies in the 17th General Assembly. The chairman of the Assembly's Political and Security Committee is from Sudan, and the chairman of the special U.N. committee on colonialism is from Mali. Ghana and Morocco hold Security Council seats, Liberia is on the Trusteeship Council, and Ethiopia and Senegal are members of the Economic and Social Council.

Although Africa has 33 votes in the U.N. General Assembly, those states rarely vote

unanimously except on relatively noncontroversial issues, such as the election of U Thant as Secretary-General. On such non-African issues as Chinese refugees and representation of the two Koreas there is often a wide division of opinion among African nations. A major division of African votes was also seen on an African issue last year during the Moroccan-Nigerian contest for a Security Council seat.

On most African issues at the United Nations, however, many of which are concerned with the southern regions of Africa—that is, the so-called colonial issues—there is generally a consensus among 32 of the African states—all except South Africa. This was true in the last General Assembly on such questions as *apartheid*, Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South-West Africa, and this pattern undoubtedly will continue in the next General Assembly session.

Our own policy toward southern Africa has two chief aspects, both of which square with United Nations policy. First, we believe in and support both self-determination and racial harmony in those territories. We consider these goals both just and indispensable. Second, we believe progress toward responsible self-government is essential.

While we are largely in agreement at the United Nations with most African nations on the need for an end to colonialism, we occasionally differ on the timing and means to accomplish that goal. For example, it is not United States policy to intervene gratuitously in the important processes of constitutional transition and racial accommodation which are underway in southern Africa. We appreciate that these are the primary responsibilities of the peoples and governments concerned. In some cases, however—where our counsel is sought or where our principles demand that we make our position clear—we readily assert our belief that social, economic, and political progress must take place without racial discrimination and without derogation of the full rights of any element of the population.

When the question of *apartheid* in South Africa comes up at the U.N., we have no hesitation in declaring our unalterable opposition to that policy. We in the United States think

that *apartheid* is wrong and harmful. We oppose it from moral conviction—the same moral conviction that moves the vast majority of Americans in their determination to eradicate the unlawful vestiges of racial discrimination which have lingered far too long in our own country. And we oppose *apartheid* in clear recognition of the injunctions of the U.N. Charter.

On the Southern Rhodesian question, we are fully aware of the extremely complex issues to be resolved there. But we believe that Southern Rhodesia must move toward giving an opportunity to all the country's people to choose their own government. We would hope and expect to see constitutional changes leading to universal adult suffrage, steps ending racial discrimination, and the establishment of a government based on majority consent which can develop good relations with its neighbors. We respect the great record of decolonization that the United Kingdom has built, and we recognize the progress its efforts have brought about in Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless we respectfully urge the United Kingdom, as we did this week at the United Nations, to continue its efforts and to use its special influence to help speed self-government for all people in Southern Rhodesia.

On the question of the Portuguese territories, we believe the principle of self-determination must be applied to those territories and that Portugal has a continuing role to play in Africa. We believe that Portugal should take rapid steps to prepare the peoples of those areas for self-determination. Our policy toward the Portuguese African territories has been consistent for some years. We are encouraging the Portuguese to undertake necessary reform. We believe the Portuguese recognize the firmness of our policy and the need for reform in the African territories. You may recall that last year the United States proposed a visit of U.N. representatives to Portuguese African territories to collect information on conditions there. This arrangement was accepted by Portugal but did not come to a vote at the U.N. because the African and Asian nations did not support it. Currently, however, the special U.N. committee on colonialism has decided that

a new effort should be made in this direction and has authorized its chairman, Ambassador Sori Coulibaly of Mali, to take the matter up again with Portugal. We continue to be hopeful that rapid progress can be made in the Portuguese territories.

On the question of South-West Africa, we believe the administering authority—the Republic of South Africa—should: (1) end *apartheid*; (2) recognize the people's right to self-determination and proceed in that direction; and (3) promote the well-being and social progress of the people. To help speed those objectives the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 96 to 0 with Portugal abstaining and South Africa not voting, requested the Secretary-General to establish a U.N. presence and to appoint a U.N. technical assistance representative in the territory. The South African Government has not yet stated its position on this resolution, but we believe that its acceptance of this request would constitute a useful first step toward resolving the South-West Africa question.

#### **U.N. Operation in the Congo**

These remarks cannot be concluded without a few comments on the unprecedented U.N. activity in Africa that has been in world headlines for nearly 3 years—the U.N. Operation in the Congo. This operation was consistently supported not only by the United States but by most of the African members of the U.N. It also had the general approval of most European countries as well. Over the past 33 months, some 34 U.N. members contributed to keeping U.N. troop strength in the Congo at between 16,000 and 20,000 men. A massive airlift and sealift was coordinated by the U.N., and a dozen international agencies provided hundreds of civilian technicians to help supply essential

services to the people of the war-torn country.

As a result of this U.N. operation, secession has been halted, stability is replacing chaos, and many nations are working together to assist in the Congo's future economic, technical, and social progress. Although this does not guarantee that there will not be setbacks in the Congo, there is reason to believe that the country can now move ahead with confidence to its formidable nation-building tasks. If these hopes are realized, both the United States and the other U.N. members who supported the U.N. operation have a right to be proud of their labors.

The U.N. had a major role in this gigantic task of preventing a total breakdown of peace and order in central Africa. And it must be concluded that the interests of world peace, the entire African Continent, and the United States in this critical matter have been served well by the presence of the United Nations in the Congo.

In conclusion I want to point out one other facet of particular importance in the African-U.N. relationship—Africa's zest for U.N. activity. The U.N. is a forum where an African nation has a voice equal to that of any other nation, where African opinion ranks with that of any other area of the world. Africa brings to the U.N. a new insistence on the dignity and worth of man, and a new enthusiasm for the belief that the U.N. really is man's best hope for lasting peace, and a new desire to demonstrate the belief that the U.N. really is an effective organization for settling disputes and advancing human development. The healthy interchange between Africa and the U.N. has done much to increase the vitality of the U.N. in recent years, and it has renewed the spirit of youth in many of the older nations. For this we can all be glad, because it may do much to assure the future peace and security of all of us.

## Japan, the United States, and Europe

by *U. Alexis Johnson*

*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The subject of our discussion, "Japan, the United States, and Europe," is indeed a large one, but it well exemplifies the world in which we live. Even 10 or 15 years ago we perhaps could have talked of just Japan and the United States or the United States and Europe, but today they really must be discussed together.

This exemplifies two important facts. The first fact is that the astounding energy and development that has taken place in Japan in the short period of little more than a decade since the treaty of peace has brought Japan to the place that Prime Minister [Hayato] Ikeda could recently truly refer to Japan as one of the "three pillars of the free world"—three sources of responsibility, leadership, and strength for all.

The second fact is that we as a nation front on both of the world's great ocean basins—the Atlantic and the Pacific. In fact one of our States is literally in the Pacific and four of our other States form the greater part of its eastern and northern rim. I often tell my European friends that from this proceeds the fact that we will always look on the Pacific area in a fundamentally different way than they do even though we seem to have accepted their terminology—the Far East—for what from our vantage point is more correctly called the Far West or, in this day and age, might perhaps be called the Near West.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Chicago Conference on Agricultural Trade With Japan, sponsored by the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry and the United States-Japan Trade Council, at Chicago, Ill., on Mar. 28 (press release 157 dated Mar. 27).

I fear that we have a tendency to seek to divide the world up into neat groupings of countries and to endow these groupings with certain exclusive characteristics. Thus, in recent years, with all of the emphasis upon Atlantic partnership, there has been some tendency to equate that grouping of nations with the "industrial nations." This omits Japan, which stands as one of the major industrial nations of the world and which is unique as the only major industrial power in Asia or, indeed, in the entire free world outside of North America and Western Europe.

There are special, well-known reasons of history and sentiment which cause us to emphasize the importance of Europe. But the fact of the matter is that the free world does not stand on the two major pillars of the United States and Europe but, rather, upon the three pillars of the United States, Europe, and Japan.

As we stand on the threshold of tariff negotiations—made possible by our Trade Expansion Act—we can see clearly that the matters of greatest concern to us, the British, and the European Economic Community also concern the Pacific area, and notably Japan. If industrial tariffs are reduced, the Japanese will benefit—and make concessions too. If exports of tropical products from the less developed countries gain easier access into Western Europe and North America, they will find greater markets in Japan as well. If producers of Temperate Zone agricultural products, like the United States and Canada, gain assurances of continued opportunities for export into Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand will benefit too. The enlargement of worldwide,

nondiscriminatory, competitive trade—through removal of tariff and other obstacles—will give to Japan, whose survival depends on expanding commerce, new possibilities for growth. It will create a world economic environment favorable to an increasing volume of American exports. In this lies the primary answer to our balance-of-payments problems. Trade binds all together, East and West, North and South.

### **U.S. Investment in Japan**

In these days, when the great debate is opening on what has come to be called our "foreign aid" programs,<sup>2</sup> it is perhaps useful to look back on the experience with Japan. It, together with Europe, illustrates well that it is usually wrong to think of these programs in terms of unrecompensed charity. My own feeling is that, instead of talking of "aid," we should be talking in terms of investment in the future—investment not only for others but for ourselves as well, investment not only in broad political and military terms, important though they are in themselves, but also investment in purely economic terms.

Our investment in the form of various types of economic aid of about \$2 billion in Japan from 1946 to 1956 (\$600 million of which is being directly repaid) should be viewed against the \$18 billion of trade between ourselves and Japan in the past decade; and this trade will increase in the future. Of particular interest to you is the fact that, of the \$10.3 billion of United States exports to Japan over the past 10 years, about \$4.4 billion has been agricultural products. Moreover, it is estimated that about one-quarter of United States exports of all kinds to Japan originate in the Midwest.

In the countries starting from a less favorable base than Japan and Europe the return on our investment will, of course, normally be somewhat slower in being realized. However, there can be no doubt that there will be such a return.

If we would measure power by the yardsticks of competence and capital—and these are the yardsticks of broadest relevance to the task which the free world faces in the decade ahead—

<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's message on the foreign aid program for 1964, see p. 591.

we would have to place Japan very high on the list. Japan is first in shipbuilding, first in fishing, fourth in steel and electric power generation, and one of the top five in cement production. Japan has a highly skilled labor force and an educational system that is continuously improving its quality. Management is capable, adventurous, and alert to economic opportunity.

Japan is emerging as a major world power at a time when, as it realizes, the national power of a single nation is not a sufficient basis for action. This is the lesson we have ourselves learned and had reimpressed upon us with each new turn of events. Each nation lives and works in a complex web of diverse relationships with other nations. To act effectively requires concerted effort.

The tasks confronting the free world in the decade ahead are truly enormous. All countries are faced by important problems of improving the quality of life in their own societies. Both Japan and the United States have their share of problems of this kind. There are problems of establishing more effective economic and political relationships between the developed nations. There are critical problems of insuring the security and independence of the developing countries and of promoting their economic and social progress. Finally, there are the broad problems of creating and sustaining a world environment of security within which these other constructive tasks can go forward.

The means employed will be as diverse as the problems to which they are addressed. If Japan is to achieve the secure place in the world to which its power entitles it; if Japan is to make the contribution to solution of these problems which it can make—and which it recognizes as its responsibility to make—its ties with other free nations will have to be further strengthened in a variety of ways. This is not something which Japan can do alone; Japan requires the cooperation of the other free countries, just as they require the cooperation of Japan.

Japan's role as a major world power can be considered from a variety of viewpoints. I suggest that we look at it in terms of its role as a major industrial power, its role as a model or



example for developing countries, its role in assisting the developing countries, its role in world peace and security, and its special role in the Pacific.

### **Japan a Major Industrial Power**

Japan's postwar progress toward status as a major industrial power has come with such a rush that all who write or speak about it quickly find themselves talking in superlatives and interlarding their remarks with large quantities of fascinating statistics. The story of Japan's remarkable economic progress is so well known to this group that it does not need to be developed here in detail. However, it might be useful to review a few of the facts.

Japan's rate of growth and rate of investment are the highest in the world. Gross national product has risen at an average annual rate of 9 percent during the past decade and recently has been increasing at a rate of 13 to 14 percent. GNP has nearly doubled in real terms since 1956. Industrial production increased by 217 percent between 1953 and 1961. This growth has been sustained by the highest rate of investment in the world—a rate which has been running at about 30 percent of GNP. Many new industries have developed since the war, some with the technical and investment cooperation of American industry.

This growth is the more remarkable for having taken place in a country with very limited natural resources, except that most important resource of all—an intelligent and diligent population. Without stretching the facts too far it can almost be said that Japan has nothing to export but the labor and skills of its people. Never has it better been demonstrated that people themselves can be the most important resource.

While there were many special factors operating in the Japanese case which limit its general applicability, it is still a fascinating model for other industrial countries. It is a model of sufficient interest to have led the influential London *Economist* to examine its applicability to Britain and other countries in two long supplements last September.

As you well know, Japan's limited natural resources make expanding trade an essential

condition to continuing growth. It is less well appreciated that Japanese prosperity promotes American prosperity. After Canada, Japan is our most important customer. Over the past 5 years United States exports to Japan exceeded imports from Japan by about \$1 billion (\$6.2 billion compared with \$5.2 billion). Of the \$6.2 billion of United States exports to Japan during this period, \$2.4 billion were agricultural products (including cotton, \$760 million; grains, \$495 million; soybeans, \$450 million). During this 5-year period we also sold to Japan \$1.2 billion of machinery and vehicles, \$600 million of chemicals, \$342 million of petroleum products, and \$257 million of coking coal. There is now rightly much concern over the future of our large sales of agricultural products to the EEC countries. However, we should also not lose sight of the continuing importance of Japan as a market for our agricultural products. In fact, of course, that is why you are meeting here. Over the past 5 years our exports of these commodities to Japan alone have amounted to almost half our exports of agricultural commodities to the five EEC countries.

### **Perspective on U.S.-Japan Trade Problems**

If Japan is to buy from us, it must also be able to sell to us. We are the largest market in the world and a particularly important market for the high-quality luxury and semiluxury goods which are an important part of Japan's exports. Old ideas die very slowly. There is still a belief in this country that the Japanese are able to do so well in our markets only because theirs is a low-wage economy. This business of comparing labor costs is, of course, very difficult, and this is not the time or the place to enter into a debate on the subject. However, the practices of Japanese industry with respect to fringe benefits and the retention of workers in times of slack production or after a worker is no longer efficient, make it impossible to arrive at a picture of true labor costs solely on the basis of a comparison of hourly or daily base wages with those of the United States or Europe. Moreover, labor is only one of the production costs, and the costs of both raw materials and capital are high in Japan.

When trade is as large as our trade with Japan, it is highly likely that there will be problems. But these problems must be seen in perspective. A current controversy over that trade concerns Japanese exports to this country of certain cotton textile products. What is immediately at issue is trade of the value of a few million dollars out of a total trade approaching \$3 billion.

But cotton textiles happen to be a politically potent issue on both sides of the Pacific. Understandably, the Japanese textile industry is upset. There is a tendency to see the United States position as an indicator of restrictive trends in general United States trade policy. I can assure you and Japan that it is not. This administration is committed to a liberal trade policy and has just obtained legislation under which we are actively seeking general reductions in world trade barriers, including United States barriers. We are also actively attempting to solve the cotton textile problem in a manner which will provide Japan continuing access to our market while safeguarding the interests of the United States textile industry.

Nonetheless there is, I believe, a growing understanding in this country of the role of Japan as one of the major industrial powers and of the importance and necessity of expanding Japanese trade with the United States and the other industrial nations. There is also, I believe, an increasing understanding of the importance of Japan as a major factor in worldwide monetary and financial operations, of Japan's standing as a major contributor of assistance to the developing nations. From this follows the need for the United States and Europe to facilitate active Japanese participation in cooperative arrangements in matters of trade and finance, aid to less developed countries, and the concerting of domestic economic policies to avoid international imbalance of trade and payments.

The means by which Japan's economic relationships with the other industrial nations can be strengthened and institutionalized are several. We strongly support Japanese membership in the Organization for Economic Coopera-

tion and Development (OECD)<sup>3</sup> and expect that such membership will soon be arranged. Participation by Japan in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations for reduction of trade barriers and more rapid liberalization by Japan of its own barriers to trade are of great importance. We expect Japan to participate fully in the multilateral negotiations we are now preparing for under the authority of the new Trade Expansion Act.

In general there is need on all sides for a wider appreciation of the importance of liberal trade policies. This applies as much to Japan as it does to the United States and Europe. In Japan, as here and in Europe, there is still much high-cost, inefficient production which has avoided the rigors of competitive existence by virtue of import barriers. Adjustment of this situation is as important to the continued vigorous growth of the Japanese economy as it is to the economy of any other country.

#### **Japan a Model for Developing Countries**

As a major industrial power which has relatively recently had to face and deal with many of the problems which face the developing countries, Japan can play a powerful world role as an example to those countries. In agriculture there is certainly no comparison between Japan and Communist China, or any other Communist country for that matter. Cultivated land per person in Japan is one-third that of Communist China. Yet, while the people of China have been starving, Japan, in the face of more than a 10-percent increase in population over the past decade and with rising consumption standards, has increased its self-sufficiency in food from 80 percent to 85 percent. Rice yields, at 96 bushels per acre, are among the highest in the world—nearly twice those of Communist China. The record 1962 rice crop, the eighth consecutive bumper harvest in Japan, is in sharp contrast to the poor harvests of Communist China. Japan is today self-sufficient in rice—an achievement believed unattainable 15 years ago.

<sup>3</sup> For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see BULLETIN of Apr. 15, 1963, p. 572.

We are concerned with the well-being of the Chinese people, and their suffering gives us no sense of satisfaction. But these comparisons do indicate that the Japanese have a much better formula for agricultural development.

That formula includes land reform, which brought the natural incentives of free enterprise to Japanese agriculture; the application of modern technology to small-scale agriculture; and the building of an effective relationship between agriculture and industry. Today only 10 percent of cultivated land is tenant-farmed, as compared with 45 percent before land reform. Virtually all Japanese farm households have electricity. On 6 million Japanese farms there are 500,000 small tractors, many of which are used cooperatively. Japan uses as much chemical fertilizer on 13 million acres of cultivated land as all the remaining Far Eastern countries use on 822 million acres. The industrial system of Japan provides not only the machinery and fertilizer needed on the farms but also the consumer goods which serve to improve living conditions for the farmer. Many Japanese farm households today have washing machines, television sets, and other modern conveniences.

We are not doctrinaire on the subject of the economic systems adopted by others, but Japan is an excellent example for the developing countries of the possibilities of progress through private enterprise. This is a private enterprise system in which the Government plays an important role in setting goals and in giving general guidance to the economy. It is a system which leaves a large sphere of freedom to the vigorous private entrepreneurs. The results have included a growth in per capita income from \$261 in 1953 to \$416 in 1961, with a planned target of \$579 for 1970 (in 1958 prices). If recent rates of growth continue, that target will be considerably exceeded.

Japan is a model for the developing countries in certain aspects of social modernization. Though Japan has been an industrial country for many years, its social characteristics have basically followed traditional Asian patterns. Nevertheless, under the impact of occupation policies, urbanization, development of mass

communications, representative government, and economic progress, there has been a remarkable growth in civil freedom and in freedom from the bonds of traditional ways. Japanese society has developed an increasingly modern outlook. While the society is still in flux, the basis has been laid for an enduring democratic society.

Japan provides useful lessons for the developing countries in education. Whereas in many of the developing countries, and in some of the developed countries as well, the educational system is poorly related to the needs of the society, in Japan a quite effective effort is being made to relate education to such needs.

If Japan is in some important respects a model or example for the developing countries, a special burden of responsibility is placed upon the United States and Europe. We must demonstrate in our trade and other policies that countries which earn the right to acceptance as major industrial nations will be treated equally with other industrial nations. We must not through our policies weaken the attraction of this example by denying Japan full equality.

#### **Concept of Japan's Responsibilities**

As a major industrial power Japan recognizes that it has a responsibility to assist the developing countries by continuing and expanding economic assistance—or, as I prefer to call it, investment. It is a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, which is the principal institutional arrangement for consultation among the industrial nations on assistance matters.

We should particularly note Japan's performance to date in assisting the developing countries. In absolute terms it is, in this regard, the fifth ranking country in the world. Both official and private lending have been increasing. Japan also recognizes the need to improve the terms of its assistance and has been taking steps to this end. We hope that both the increase in volume and the improvement in terms will continue.

Japan, as a major industrial nation, also has an important role to play in world peace and security. It is increasingly recognizing that it

needs to insure the defense of its homeland through further development of a modern, high-quality self-defense force which will leave no doubt as to its determination and ability to make aggression unprofitable. In addition such a capability will be important in giving Japan that sense of security which it requires—and which any nation requires—if it is to play a larger part in the nonmilitary affairs of the world.

Apart from the provision for its own defense and provision of base facilities, Japan has chosen to play its role in world peace and security primarily through the United Nations. This is a very important and honorable role for it to play. Japan's contribution to the political, economic, and social activities of the United Nations is substantial and growing.

In view of the limitations placed by the Japanese Constitution and policy on a military role for itself outside Japan, Japan might view its role in promoting political stability and international peace as being performed in increasing measure through expanding assistance in the development of the new nations. Japan's economic assistance has up to now tended to be directly related to Japan's trade and raw-material requirements. If Japan should increasingly set its level of effort in the developing countries on the basis of a broader concept of its responsibilities, I believe that it would find that it would wish to increase its investment in economic assistance considerably above present levels.

#### **Role of Japan as a Pacific Power**

I turn now, more briefly, to Japan's role as a Pacific power. This is a special, though very important, aspect of Japan's world role which I have discussed. Much of what I have already said therefore applies. Japan has a special role to play as the only major industrial power in Asia. It is an example in a special sense to the developing countries of Asia and has particularly important trade and aid relationships with Asia.

Because it is the major industrial nation in Asia, an important part of the trade relationships of the area revolve around Japan. In 1962 Japan did 33 percent of its export trade

and 28 percent of its import trade with free Asia. Expansion of this trade cannot be viewed as a substitute for expansion of trade with the United States and Europe. But such expansion is of great potential importance to both Japan and free Asia, for Japan is a very important source of modern technology for the area.

The entire free world has a strong interest in insuring the continued independence of Asian countries against the various Communist efforts to gain control of them. But Japan has a very special interest in their continued independence and in the growth of their prosperity. Although Japan's economic assistance program is worldwide in scope, it is understandably concentrated in Asia. Thus, in 1961 about 60 percent of all official bilateral Japanese assistance was disbursed to Asian countries. Japan has engaged in various cooperative ventures with other Asian countries for the development of their resources for their mutual benefit. These ventures include, for example, the Orissa iron-ore project in India, involving Japanese assistance to the development of Indian iron-ore deposits and related transport facilities.

While Japanese experience has worldwide application, it is a particular example for Asia. Thus Japanese rice-growing techniques have been widely adopted in Asia, and Japanese handicraft industry methods are also being introduced. Japanese technology is being transferred through technical cooperation programs. In 1962, 269 Japanese experts were sent abroad and 434 trainees were received by Japan. In addition more third-country training under United States assistance programs has been done in Japan than in any other country in Asia.

Many of Japan's relations with other Asian nations are, like its relations with the industrial nations of the West, organized on a bilateral basis. But it also plays an important role in collaborating with these countries through such regional bodies and activities as ECAFE [U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East], the Colombo Plan, and the Asian Productivity Organization and through supporting the work of the Mekong River development program.

## Bilateral Relations Between U.S. and Japan

Bilateral relations between the United States and Japan are a part of Japan's role as a Pacific power, for, as I mentioned earlier, the United States too is a Pacific power. I have already spoken at some length of our trading relationship, of particular interest to this meeting, and have mentioned in passing our military security relationship. Each of these is a vital element in what we have come to call the United States-Japan partnership, for no other word describes the relationship better. The third link in this partnership chain is the flow of people and ideas. Person-to-person business, intellectual, cultural, scientific, and just plain tourist contacts have grown by leaps and bounds. At the official level, members of our two Cabinets concerned with economic affairs meet together once a year to review our economic relations. We also have committees of distinguished scientific and cultural leaders of the two countries who meet periodically to recommend ways of developing further our relations in these areas.

At the level of the individual it is difficult to estimate exactly, but well over 2 million Americans have visited or lived in Japan since the war. These include government officials, military personnel and their dependents, technicians, businessmen, students, intellectuals, and increasing numbers of tourists. The Olympics of 1964 will bring a fresh new wave of tourists to Japan. Approximately 225,000 Japanese visitors have been to the United States in the period since the war. If the restrictions on expenditures by Japanese touring abroad are eased, as expected in the near future, these numbers should increase.

The effects of these contacts on Japan have been considerable. They are reflected in all aspects of Japanese urban culture, in the role of Japanese women, in the greatly increased use of English as a second language—and even in the adoption of wide-scale advertising and installment buying. Japan has had, in return, its impact on the United States in the area of taste

and of thought. It ranges from an influence upon American movies to a deeper and more lasting influence upon art and architecture.

We and Europe must make it possible for Japan to play that increasing role as a major nation of the world and the Pacific that it seeks for itself. At the official government level this will involve Japan's increasingly active participation in a wide range of international organizations—known in the international alphabet lingo as GATT, OECD, ECAFE, ECOSOC, UNICEF, FAO, to name only a few—and finally, in plain English, the Colombo Plan. There should be increasingly close bilateral partnership relations with the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and with the developing nations. The United States places a special value on its partnership with Japan, and we are confident that this partnership will also continue to hold a special place in Japanese policy. In addition there should continue to develop on the personal level, in the business, academic, and scientific communities, as well as among just plain people, thousands of formal and informal relationships so well exemplified by this meeting today.

When I first went to Japan almost 30 years ago, it was a land that was still strange and exotic to most Americans and America was very remote to most Japanese. Then we were thrown together in the traumatic experience of war, in which our sons died by the thousands. Having won victory, we sought not revenge but what the statesmen of both of our political parties properly called a "peace of reconciliation." Japan responded with statesmanship. Today we find our present well-being and our future bound together as few nations in history—certainly as no two nations so far separated by distance and background. With equal statesmanship in the United States, Europe, and Japan for the future we can be confident that these three pillars of the free world will increasingly be able to withstand the stress of the enemies of freedom and provide the foundation on which a better world can be built for all.

## Reflections on the Pacific Community

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

All of a sudden, it seems, we have begun to talk of a "Pacific community." And when we do, we get very close to the heart of United States foreign policy. It therefore is worthwhile, I think, to begin by putting that framework around the subject of your conference.

It is easy to forget that the very possibility of any kind of human community at all is a relatively recent phenomenon. For most of man's history to date, he wandered in search of food—"a lonely gatherer and hunter of sustenance." No earlier than 10,000 years ago—a mere blinking of history's eye—man first discovered how to domesticate plants and grow his own food. It was an epic technological breakthrough; and its social fallout was the beginning of social complexity—tiny communities of human beings, beginning in the earliest "settlements" to learn to live together—by living together.

The story of man since then is the emergence of ever-widening communities—the clearing, the village, the town, the city, the city-state, the nation. At each stage new technology made possible—and stimulated—the larger community.

Now we already can say with comfortable confidence that, when future historians look back on the decades immediately following World War II, they will write it down that our present times were notable for another breakthrough—a matrix of international communities, overlapping and interacting, the most

dynamic political force of the 20th century. Suddenly—the historians will exclaim—the world was no longer made of continents and oceans but of communities. And the writers of our history will be bound to note that the nation with the closest links to most of the new commonwealths was the United States of America.

Behind the new force lies the new technology: the new technology which drives groups of nations together against the threat of thermonuclear war—the new technology which drives nations together in history's first organized war against poverty and disease—the new technology which some day must drive nations to organize international peacekeeping institutions as a substitute for war itself. In the age of jets, great oceans which once served as hostile barriers between nations become friendly inland lakes for communities of nations around their shores. And so we can begin to talk realistically about a Pacific community, for political trends cannot be far behind the technology that makes them possible—and necessary.

### **Growth of Regional Communities**

There is no major area in the whole free world where impulses toward unification, integration, or partnership among new nations are not at work; only in the so-called Communist world is the trend in the opposite direction.

The most spectacular of these regional developments, of course, is in Western Europe, where nations that have been at war with each other off and on for most of the modern era are now finding unity; Europe, where these same nations are now putting together the world's

<sup>1</sup> Address made at a conference on "Educational Investment in the Pacific Community" at Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif., on Mar. 29 (press release 156 dated Mar. 28; as-delivered text).

second greatest industrial complex to serve a market of over 300 million prospering consumers.

I hope I do not have to stress the point that the recent check to European integration is not a checkmate. Our friends the historians will see it—or so we yet believe—as a bump along a road, a road which has some hazardous passages but leads in a clearly marked direction. Today's biggest headline seems fated, like so many other headlines, to wind up as a quaint footnote in the future's books about the present.

But the new Europe is only the most advanced case of a movement which engulfs all but that reactionary world which is still struggling with the hopeless task of adapting to stubborn reality the theology of Marx and Lenin.

In Latin America aroused peoples are beginning to act as if they had something in common besides a common background—and poverty. The Organization of American States, the Alliance for Progress, the widespread resentment of Soviet intervention in Cuba—all are symbols of a new sense of community still inadequately expressed in workable institutions. There are the beginnings of two customs unions—one in Central America and one—the Latin American Free Trade Association—consisting of the principal South American countries and Mexico. In Latin America there is a new economic momentum, and common institutions for development have just been given another push in the Declaration of Central America.<sup>2</sup>

Elsewhere similar unity moves are part of the atmosphere:

In North Africa a Maghreb confederation is being talked about.

In Southeast Asia there are impulses toward regional arrangements and regional programs for economic and social cooperation.

In the Arab world it is hard to believe that the drive toward unity will not overcome the most bitter of divisions.

Even in tropical Africa, where strident nationalism has been used as a jimmy to pry new nations out of old empires, the first institutions for regional integration are coming into being.

And you have been meeting here in California

this week to explore the early outlines of a Pacific community.

Several years ago Sir Oliver Franks drew a careful bead on this postwar trend and described regionalism as “a halfway house at a time when single nations are no longer viable and the world is not ready to become one.” It would be hard to say it better.

### World of Pluralism and Color

The growth of regional communities is of course quite in line with the obligations and opportunities of every member of the United Nations.

The U.N. Charter explicitly recognizes the role of regional organizations in articles 52 and 53 and even foresees their use to help the U.N. keep the peace in emergencies. The U.N. economic commissions are themselves organized on a regional basis and spawn other regional groupings, like the Mekong River project in Southeast Asia.

Regional organizations, in short, can help relieve the United Nations of burdens which otherwise might sink the universal boat we are all in together.

But the point I want to make here is that support for and participation in these overlapping communities of the free is at the doctrinal heart of U.S. foreign policy. Our concept of an emerging new system of world order depends heavily upon the growth and health and strength of the new communities within the broader framework of the U.N. system—first they weave the fabric of order with the strong yarn of consent. They reflect our kind of world of pluralism and color—our open society, projected around the globe. They are the exact antithesis of the grey and monolithic world order—the universal closed society—of which the Communists dream.

This is why we—you and I, as Americans—carry around without embarrassment a whole pocketful of memberships and associate memberships in interlocking and mutually reinforcing regional organizations. The last time counted, which was yesterday, there were 1 of them—8 in our own hemisphere, 10 in Europe and Asia. For any member of this conference who can name all of them without a ref

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.



ence book, the Department of State will offer modest prize. It will have to be modest; the Congress gives us just enough money to help finance these organizations and none at all to finance guessing games.

### The Dependent Territories of the Pacific

In the Pacific we speak of "community"—not yet of an organization, hardly even a concept that any two nations on the Pacific rim could define alike. But if we have yet to formulate just what brings us together, except the lapping waters of this greatest and least turbulent of oceans, we Americans do share with our neighbors in the Near West one very special interest—the bits and pieces of land and small groups of people scattered on that ocean's surface.

They are dependent territories, most of them. As the great colonies of Asia and Africa wriggle free from their colonial apron strings, the 50 or 60 enclaves and island groups still regarded as colonial remnants around the world are beginning to show up clearly on the horizon of the emotional debates on colonialism in the U.N. and elsewhere.

More than a dozen of these dependencies are in the Pacific—including the smallest of them all, Pitcairn Island of mutinous memory; 146 people live there on 2 square miles of real estate which has been British for 124 years. The 3 U.N. trust territories that now remain of the original 11 are all in the Pacific: tiny Nauru and huge, primitive New Guinea, both administered in trust by Australia; and the scattering of Micronesians on the old Japanese mandate, now the Trust Territory of the Pacific, which is entrusted to us to govern under arrangements that can only be changed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

As a case study in building a Pacific community, let us consider for a moment the condition and destiny of these 78,000 island people, speaking nine different languages and unnumbered dialects, spread over an ocean expanse of 3 million square miles, on 2,100 individual islands that aggregate hardly 687 square miles of dry land.

We have left a part of our own history, and a good deal of our lifeblood, in some of those

scratches on the map—in Truk, where our aviators neutralized a powerful naval base, and in Saipan and Tinian, where the crucial land battles of the Marianas were won.

I am here to tell you that the administration in Washington is paying very special attention to these people on those islands. And none too soon.

In an era when American power and technical progress is felt in every corner of the free world, when young volunteers and middle-aged technicians are helping every free people to build the institutions of modernity, none of our foreign aid programs are available to the only foreigners who have been specifically entrusted to our care by the world community.

The Peace Corps can't operate in the islands without new authority—the islanders aren't "foreign" enough. Until last month the Voice of America had no program for the islands; the citizens of the trust territory have not been regarded as quite "foreign" enough to qualify for a rating as an audience. The Soviet radio is not as reticent: Radio Moscow can be clearly heard in Japanese in many islands of the trust territory.

Until the administration and the Congress got busy last year to increase the funds for education in Micronesia, we were spending an average of \$33 per child per year for elementary schooling. In a well-meaning but unrealistic attempt to protect the islanders from the shock of 20th-century civilization, most education has been in whatever vernacular happened to be the local language—which was nice and comfortable for the parents but hardly a golden opportunity for the children. In all honesty, we have not been equipping these people for modern living.

The small numbers of people, and the enormous distances involved, make a decent educational system extremely difficult to organize. But we can do lots better, and the United States Department of Interior, which administers the islands which the United States holds in trust under the United Nations Charter, is starting out to do just that.

A properly American attitude toward the development of the Pacific islands is surely plain, if difficult to carry into action all at once. Ignorance is not bliss, we say, not even on lovely

islands washed by the bluest of waters and cooled by the gentlest of breezes. Poverty is not picturesque, illiteracy is not Elysian, and backwardness is not the road to happiness.

As our modernization policy gathers momentum, the somehow familiar names of these remote islands—the Marianas, the Marshalls, the Carolines—will lose their recent connotation of war and death and acquire a new meaning as symbols of life, and peace, and the self-determination of peoples.

#### **A Foundation for Self-Determination**

From time to time groups of islanders have expressed an interest in becoming permanently associated with the United States. We are flattered by this interest and perhaps a little embarrassed; we are not quite sure we have entirely merited this admiration. In any event we feel these expressions of interest to be premature. We do want the inhabitants of Micronesia to exercise their inherent and inalienable right of self-determination. We do not think, however, that this choice should be made until these people have acquired a firsthand knowledge of both the benefits and the responsibilities of 20th-century civilization.

This is indeed what we have undertaken by treaty to do. The Charter of the United Nations, as ratified by the Senate, describes in these words the aims of the trusteeship system:

... to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement. . . .

Not racy language, that. But the meaning is clear: The islanders themselves will in the end determine their own future, and we shall see to it that they get the chance to learn the issues and exercise the choices.

The winds of change are blowing, still sometimes at zephyr strength, over the other island areas in the central and southern Pacific. What is to become of these bits and pieces of old trading empires—too small and too remote for meaningful nationhood, too much in the spirit of the times to remain old-style dependencies?

How much real estate is necessary to make a nation? How many persons add up to a people?

Can anyone seriously imagine dozens, even hundreds, of sovereign and independent nations fashioned from the multiple island groupings of the Pacific basin, each with its own flag, its currency and national anthem, its independence day celebration, and its seat in the United Nations? Must Pitcairn Island, for all its renown, choose a foreign minister from its 146 good people?

Wisely the General Assembly of the United Nations, in resolutions designed to hurry the decolonization process, has provided a considerable range of options for the exercise of the right of self-determination. One of the alternatives recognized by the Assembly is for a people to combine with others; another kind of self-determination is to opt for free association, on an agreed basis, with a metropolitan power.

But this constitutional no man's land that lies between sovereign independence, which is now so fashionable, and colonial dependency, which is now so rightly out of fashion, needs a great deal more exploration by the lawyers and the political scientists. For if small populations are going to be asked to determine their future, they must be offered something better than a Hobson's choice between permanent dependency and fashionable illusion.

In the Pacific islands, and in each of the major nations around the Pacific rim, a stirring of new thought and new action is more than evident. Things will be on the move, and you in California will have a ringside seat. If we think hard, and act boldly on careful plans, we will surely find ways of assisting the Pacific community in its growing interdependence with the rest of the world. And that's what we mean, isn't it, when we speak here, so late in the evening but so early in history, of a Pacific community?

In the Pacific, as elsewhere around the world, President Kennedy's words from last year's state of the Union message<sup>3</sup> still echo: ". . . our nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom's failure or the cause of its success."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

## Advisory Commission Reports on Exchange Program

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 178) that the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs had made a report to Congress on March 29 pursuant to a requirement of the Fulbright-Hays Act, which established the Commission and called for a "special study of the effectiveness" of past programs, with emphasis on "the activities of a reasonably representative cross-section of past recipients of aid."

The Commission is headed by John W. Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The other members are:

Roy E. Larsen, chairman of the executive committee, Time Inc., and vice chairman of the Commission  
Valter Adams, professor of economics, Michigan State University

James R. Fleming, publisher of Fort Wayne, Ind., *Journal-Gazette*

Luther H. Foster, president, Tuskegee Institute  
Theodore M. Hesburgh, president, University of Notre Dame

Walter Johnson, chairman, Department of History, University of Chicago

Franklin D. Murphy, chancellor, University of California at Los Angeles

Mabel M. Smythe, principal, New Lincoln High School, New York, N.Y.

The Commission's study included 3,842 professional interviews with returned grantees and distinguished citizens in 20 countries, reports from U.S. embassies in 26 countries, and a broad inquiry among leading Americans in government, in universities, and in foundations and private exchange agencies in the United States.

According to the Commission's findings, the program:

1. Does in fact increase mutual understanding. The Commission found "impressive testimony" that increased understanding is one of the most outstanding results of the program.

2. Helps to dispel among foreign visitors many misconceptions and ugly stereotypes about the American people. The program is "remarkably effective," the report said, "in communicating a favorable impression of American character and customs broadly conceived."

3. Is "outstandingly successful" in providing a valuable educational experience to foreign grantees and has a favorable effect on the careers of the great majority. Grantees reported benefiting "substantially, most notably in increased knowledge in their professional field."

4. Brings to the home countries of the grantees important benefits, including "valuable new ideas, skills, knowledge and attitudes."

5. Establishes "effective and continuing channels of communication between people in other countries and the U.S." and "broadens perspectives and outlook."

6. Effectively supports "one of the nation's most basic international objectives—of helping create and support strong, free societies able to work together, in mutual trust and understanding, on the grave issues of our time."

## U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina

Press release 154 dated March 28

The Government of the United States announced on March 28 loans and other financial assistance which it will provide the Government of Argentina in support of a renewed standby agreement concluded by the International Monetary Fund on March 27. The IMF will make available \$50 million through October 1963, which, together with the supplementary U.S. resources, will assist the Argentine Government in carrying out a series of measures designed to strengthen its financial position, to which it has committed itself under the standby agreement.

The United States Treasury is extending for an additional 4 months the life of its outstanding exchange agreement, which was due to expire on June 6, 1963. This action will make available to Argentina during the period ending October 6, 1963, \$25 million not previously drawn. The Agency for International Development will provide \$20 million for balance-of-payments assistance.

Subject to completion of Argentine bilateral accords with European governments for re-funding arrangements agreed in principle in November 1962, the Export-Import Bank will

on parallel terms refinance up to \$92 million of Argentine debts to the Export-Import Bank and other U.S. creditors.

U.S. interim assistance measures, undertaken in collaboration with the Government of Argentina, are in addition to the resources being made available to Argentina under the Alliance for Progress in carrying forward a program of economic development intended to increase more rapidly the economic and social well-being of the Argentine people.

Development loans concluded thus far this year include those for housing and highway construction; and with respect to other projects advanced by the Argentine Government, due consideration will continue to be given to the goals mutually agreed upon at Punta del Este, including that of maintaining appropriate monetary and fiscal policies which provide a sound basis for economic development.

## Unclaimed Property of Victims of Nazi Persecution

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

#### AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10587 RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 32 (H) OF THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 1 *et seq.*), and by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code (65 Stat. 713), and as President of the United States, it is ordered that sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 10587<sup>2</sup> of January 13, 1955 (20 F.R. 361) are amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. The Jewish Restitution Successor Organization, a charitable membership organization incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, is hereby designated as successor in interest to deceased persons in accordance with and for the purposes of subsection (h) of section 32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as added by the Act of August 23, 1954 (68 Stat. 767), and amended by section 204(a) of Public Law 87-846, approved October 22, 1962 (76 Stat. 1114).


"SEC. 2. Exclusive of the designation of the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization under section 1 of this Order and the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims referred to in section 3, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission is hereby delegated

<sup>1</sup> No. 11086; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 1833.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1955, p. 276.

and shall carry out the functions provided for in subsection (h) of section 32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, including the designation or refusal of designation of other organizations under the first sentence of that subsection, the payment of \$500,000 out of the War Claims Fund to the designated organization or organizations and all other powers, duties, authority and discretion vested in or conferred upon the President.

"SEC. 3. Jurisdiction over the claims filed by the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization with the Attorney General under subsection (h) of section 32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act prior to the amendment thereof by section 204(a) of Public Law 87-846 shall remain with the Attorney General pending the discharge of such claims by that organization's acceptance of payment pursuant to subsection (h), as amended, or other discharge of such claims pursuant to law."



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
February 26, 1963.

## Foreign Policy Conference Held for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department of State announced on April 1 (press release 167) that it would hold a national foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters on April 22 and 23 at Washington. Invitations have been extended by Secretary Rusk to editors and commentators of the daily and periodical press and the broadcasting industry in all 50 States and Puerto Rico.

President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and other principal officers of the Department of State and other Government agencies concerned with foreign affairs will participate. A number of the presentations at the conference will be on the record. The sessions will be held in the West Auditorium of the Department of State.

This will be the sixth in a series of national foreign policy conferences for editors and broadcasters. The conference program, begun in April 1961, is intended to assist the information media in making available to the American public the maximum possible information in depth on current foreign policy issues.

## Department Supports Bill To Establish National Academy of Foreign Affairs

*Following are texts of statements made by Acting Secretary George W. Ball and Deputy Under Secretary for Administration William I. Orrick, Jr., before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 4.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. BALL

Press release 171 dated April 4

I appear today in support of S. 865, a bill to provide for the establishment of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs.<sup>1</sup>

I have come here as an inadequate surrogate for Secretary Rusk. He was compelled to be away from Washington today and has asked me to express his regrets to this committee. He has a deep personal interest in the bill before you. His rich experience in the fields of education and of foreign affairs has convinced him of America's preeminent need for highly trained personnel to serve the objectives of our foreign policy. He has noted that we faced a "crisis of talent." Inspired by this conviction, he has devoted considerable time to the consideration and development of the proposal for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs.

The central concept of S. 865 is the establishment of an educational institution of high quality that would be an instrument of government yet autonomous in nature and interdepartmental in scope. It would provide training in the diverse aspects of foreign affairs for officers

not merely of the State Department but of other departments of the Government.

It would be administered by a Chancellor appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. A Board of Regents would "determine policy and provide guidance to the Chancellor. . . ." That board would consist of the Secretary of State and four other official members, the Chancellor, and five members drawn from private life.

The Academy would not provide preemployment training such as the service academies at West Point or Annapolis. It would be more nearly comparable to our senior professional military colleges—although broader in scope. The establishment of the Academy would not intrude upon the work of our Army, Navy, and Air Force colleges nor diminish the need for these institutions. Neither would the Academy compete with public and private colleges and universities throughout the land. We would continue to rely, as in the past, on these colleges and universities to provide the basic education for individuals entering the service of the Government in the field of foreign affairs.

The purpose of the Academy is to increase the effectiveness of personnel already on active service with the United States Government. In this way we would improve the capacity of the United States to conduct relations with other nations under the complex conditions of a complex age. There is no better means by which we can advance the national interest.

### II

I understand that I am only the first of several administration witnesses who will appear before this committee. I shall, therefore, direct my remarks this morning at a single question:

<sup>1</sup> For texts of a letter from President Kennedy transmitting a bill to the Congress and a memorandum from Secretary Rusk summarizing the principal provisions of the proposed legislation, see BULLETIN of Mar. 25, 1963, p. 427.

Why is it necessary or even useful to create a National Academy of the type we are proposing? I shall leave it to later witnesses to explain in some detail the organization and operation of the Academy and the use which other departments and agencies would make of it.

The men and women engaged in the conduct of our foreign relations must be equipped to meet the requirements of a world that has undergone—and is continuing to undergo—rapid and pervasive change. Much of that change has occurred in the brief but eventful period—little more than a decade and a half—since the end of the Second World War.

We sometimes forget that it was only 18 years ago that the Iron Curtain was erected to divide the world into two parts—half slave, half free. Today we must carry on our international business in constant awareness of an aggressive Communist bloc—a bloc that has mobilized the resources of modern technology and the manpower of two vast nations within a power system which involves one-third of the population of the world.

The adjustment to this new environment of threat and menace has not been easy. Prior to the 1950's, we Americans had no fear that a foreign power might impose great damage upon our homeland. Few foresaw that we would live, as President Kennedy has said, "on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles."<sup>2</sup>

Yet today we must conduct our international relations in the ever-present consciousness that a power intent on destroying the systems and the values by which we live possesses the ability to kill millions of Americans within the interior of our own continent—within a matter of minutes.

The Communist powers have, however, done more than master the new weapons technology. They have devised a whole new system of aggression—the subversion of men's minds by subtle means of propaganda, employing the most sophisticated methods of communications; the corruption of governments; the undermining of political systems; the employment of new

techniques of infiltration and espionage; the exploitation of weakness; systematic terrorism and insurgency; and the utilization of economic warfare.

The combating of such tactics requires us to devise and employ a new set of tools for conducting our relations with governments and peoples. It requires us to depend not merely on classical diplomatic experience but on a variety of skills and disciplines drawn from areas of experience not previously comprehended by American diplomacy.

We need a broader range of techniques and expertise even in our dealings within the free world. A quarter of a century ago our diplomats could concentrate the bulk of their time and effort on a handful of nations that enjoyed the same general standard of living and adhered to the same general standards of conduct as did America. Those nations, in turn, controlled the destinies of a large part of the world through vast colonial systems.

Today those colonial systems have been largely swept away by a tidal wave of nationalism. This has meant the progressive withdrawal from world responsibilities of the great metropolitan powers of Europe. This process of withdrawal was not always either safe or easy. It left dangerous power vacuums—vacuums into which the United States, of necessity, was compelled to move in order to preserve free-world security.

In place of the old colonial territories, some 60 new nations have emerged in the brief time-span since the end of the World War. This has imposed new strains on our diplomatic establishment. Not only have we been required to double the scope and number of our diplomatic posts around the world, but our dealings with those new nations have demanded a new dimension of skill and knowledge.

Our responsibilities in the newly emerging countries have been complex and difficult. In some cases we have had to provide training in the rudimentary operations of government. We have had to furnish technical assistance and capital to assist these countries to meet the problems of survival in a new and dangerous world. The problems presented have tested our resourcefulness and our ingenuity. Most of all they have emphasized the urgent need for com-

---

<sup>2</sup> For an address by President Kennedy on Oct. 22, 1962, on the Soviet threat to the Americas, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

ent personnel equipped with the proper languages, and understanding of diverse cultures and habits, and a variety of technical knowledge.

Our relations with the newly emerging nations have called for personnel with a broader background than that required by the traditional demands of classical diplomacy. But, for that matter, have our relations even with our European allies.

In recent years we have witnessed the beginnings of a transformation of Europe—the growing pains of a new unity. Not only has this injected a new element in the power balance, but it has required, on our side, that we adjust to a new method of dealing with certain of the major nations of Europe.

Many of the complexities that we encounter today in the conduct of international relations stem from our role of leader of the free world. In adjusting to this role we have profoundly altered our habits of thought. We have abandoned our historic policy of limited involvement—of isolationism. Faced with the common menace of aggressive Communist power, we have joined with our European friends in the NATO alliance. Elsewhere around the world we have become either a member or observer in a half dozen other alliances. We have discovered—what other nations had known before—that the conduct of alliance diplomacy is a special discipline.

The interdependence that we have recognized as an essential element in effective military defense is also the dominant fact in the economic relations among developed countries. It has compelled us to forge new instruments of cooperation, such as the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], so that we may live together without injuring one another economically, while at the same time concerting our efforts and resources for the performance of common tasks.

Finally, we have had to learn to work within new international institutions that serve a wide spectrum of purposes—not the least important of which has been to assist the achieving of world transformations with a minimum of violence. And the United Nations and such regional organizations as the Organization of

American States have required us to master a new skill—the conduct of what might be called “legislative diplomacy.”

### III

But all this is, of course, well known to this committee. I have repeated it this morning only to emphasize the variety of our international relationships and the diversity of skills that we need in order to conduct our international affairs effectively.

The State Department officer today must be far more flexible and informed than in an earlier and simpler time. It is no longer enough that he master the classical diplomacy. If he is to be fully effective—capable of serving diverse needs in a variety of posts on all six continents—he must have at least a respectable acquaintance with a wide range of disciplines and techniques. At the same time, we have a great need for highly specialized personnel who nevertheless understand the relations of their specialty to the larger objectives of American policy.

These objectives cannot be attained unless officers are, from time to time, brought up to date through systematic retraining. The average class 1 Foreign Service officer today is 51 years old. This means that he received his university education in the midthirties. One need only compare an elementary text on economics of that era with a text in use today to realize the magnitude of the efforts required to keep abreast of developments in that subject. Greater gaps exist between general scientific concepts of the thirties and those of today.

Even a junior Foreign Service officer of the grade of class 6, with an average age of 36, must perform his duties in a world that has radically changed since he graduated from college in the late 1940's.

At the moment, we are not providing sufficient retraining. We are not keeping up with the armed services in this regard. The average military officer spends approximately 12 percent of his career in formal training. The comparable figure for a State Department officer is 5 percent; for an employee of the Agency for International Development or of the United States Information Agency, it is only 2 percent.



#### IV

Yet today, the activities of the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency are vital elements in our foreign policy. International affairs are no longer the exclusive province of the Department of State. The Secretary of State is, of course, the President's principal adviser on foreign policy, and the State Department is the key agency in the field. Yet there are perhaps as many as 20 other departments or agencies that have a useful—in fact, a necessary—role to play. Let me mention only a few—the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Peace Corps, the old-line departments such as Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Labor, and so on. Representatives of all of these agencies and departments engage in activities overseas. If we are to have a coherent foreign policy, their personnel and the personnel of the State Department must understand one another's problems and work for a common objective.

I am convinced that the National Academy can be an instrument for assuring that necessary harmony of purpose and objective. It would not be established as part of the State Department. It would be an autonomous instrument of government to serve the purposes of a total foreign policy in which many departments of the Government are interested.

For this reason, the National Academy would supersede the Foreign Service Institute, which Congress authorized in 1946. That Institute was created within the State Department to meet the training needs primarily of the Foreign Service. In addition to language training, it offers a series of courses of relatively short duration designed to acquaint the Department and the Foreign Service officers with current trends, developments, and problems.

The Institute has served the Department well, but we have long recognized that the conditions under which it was established have drastically changed. Today more and more our operations abroad are conducted on a "country team" basis. Representatives of various Federal agencies serving at a post abroad act as a unit under the guidance of the ambassador. To train members

of such country teams requires an institution of greater scope. Under the provisions of S. 865, the National Academy would supersede the Institute and absorb most of the functions that the Institute now performs.

#### V

I have emphasized that the principal purpose of the Academy would be the education of personnel for the effective conduct of our foreign affairs. But the Academy would also provide a center of research that could draw freely on the foreign affairs experience of the entire Federal Government. It could thus develop a coherent body of knowledge and make more certain the application of consistent doctrines and principles to the perplexing problems that confront us in our international affairs.

In this activity the Academy would complement the work now being done by colleges and universities. It would serve as a link—a two-way bridge—between the Government and the academic community. It would afford an opportunity for scholars and research technicians to contribute their knowledge and insights to foreign affairs. It would permit them, in turn to understand more clearly the nature of the problems and obstacles that daily confront the men and women who initiate and carry out our policies.

#### VI

The proposal embodied in S. 865 is the distillation of a great deal of thought and experience. It was based largely upon the reports of two distinguished committees.<sup>3</sup> One is a report made to the Secretary of State by the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, acting under the chairmanship of the distinguished former Secretary of State, Mr. Christian A. Herter. The other is a report made by a Presidential advisory committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. James A. Perkins, the president-elect of Cornell University.

These committees substantially agreed upon the nature of the problem and upon the kind of organization required to meet it.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 971, and Jan. 14, 1963, p. 47.

Both committees were impressed by the need or the constant renewal of skill and competence in the conduct of our foreign policy—need foretold many years ago by H. G. Wells, who declared prophetically that “History is becoming more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”

S. 865, Mr. Chairman, is a proposal that should contribute to winning that race.

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. ORRICK**

Press release 172 dated April 4

I appreciate the opportunity of following Secretary Ball to explain more specifically the details of our proposal. We are convinced of the urgent need for new machinery to provide service, interdepartmental professional training to personnel of all Federal departments and agencies involved in foreign affairs. We are, in short, proposing a new and unique institution for which the President reaffirmed his support in his press conference yesterday [April 3].

In essence, this is the kind of setup we envisage:

A really topnotch institution to be known as the National Academy of Foreign Affairs.

A place where officers who conduct our foreign affairs can get advanced training and education—to help them do their jobs better. This means an Academy where the State Department and other agencies involved can send officers from time to time during their careers to update their knowledge of new problems around the world and new methods of handling them. Some courses would be only a couple of weeks; others, a year.

This Academy would not be a West Point, or a place from which the State Department, AID, USIA, or CIA would recruit new officers. It would not award degrees nor compete with the various programs offered by colleges and universities.

But it would undertake major research projects in foreign affairs, based upon access to official records, reports, and other documents available only to Government employees, as well as material from the academic community and other public sources.

The Academy would be created as an autonomous part of the Government—but it would be closely linked with the operating foreign affairs agencies.

The training and research programs would not concentrate exclusively upon any particular phase of foreign affairs but would cover the waterfront as regards all aspects of national security.

The Foreign Service Institute would be incorporated into the National Academy—except for the training it now gives in subjects exclusively for State Department people. For example, consular operations.

The Academy is designed to combine the advantages of the traditional academic environment with the advantages of direct access to governmental personnel, material, and operations. At the same time the Academy is intended to serve as a link between the operating foreign affairs agencies of the Government and the American academic community.

At the outset, I would like the committee to understand that if authorizing legislation were enacted during this session of Congress, the Academy would not be in full operation before fiscal 1968. Any estimates regarding numbers of officers or annual costs are based on long-range projections. Obviously, we can't expect this Academy to spring into being overnight.

We recognize that with a new undertaking like this we must proceed with caution. We shall, of course, rely heavily on the Congress as to how, and how fast, to proceed. Moreover, the Chancellor and the Board of Regents will have major roles in the establishment of a definite curriculum and organization.

With this in mind, this is how we view the Academy:

Organizationally, we picture the Academy as having two distinct arms—training and research. The research arm would consist essentially of three basic centers: one for the study of the global Communist menace, including its theory, practices, resources, vulnerabilities, and techniques; another for the study of how industrialized nations can live and work together for mutual benefit and security; and a third for the study of the underdeveloped nations and

their problems of economic and social development, political evolution, and internal defense.

As to the general types of training to be conducted—as distinct from subject matter—we have in mind four different kinds of courses. First, better orientation courses for new officers designated by the major agencies involved in foreign affairs. Second, special area and language courses for officers concerned with the problems of particular countries and regions. This, of course, is done now at the FSI. We hope to do it better at the NAFA. Third, a series of courses for all officers, aimed at comprehensive career development. Fourth, specialized courses—as needed—to help officers of all these agencies face and handle crises and adapt to new situations that cannot easily be covered within the framework of the regular courses.

The Chancellor would be the chief operating executive of the Academy and responsible for its day-to-day management. This would cover the selection and assignment of faculty members and staff, standards of performance and conduct, the curriculum, designing research programs, and promoting cooperative relations with universities and other private institutions. The Board of Regents would establish broad policies and serve as a two-way channel between the Academy and the operating agencies of the Government. This would assure that the Academy's training and research programs are responsive to their needs.

We plan to build the Academy in or near Washington, to assure the faculty and student body ready access to Government officials and material.

Obviously, the Academy would give high-priority attention to the purposes, problems, and techniques of waging the cold war, which, as Secretary Rusk has said, "is our main business in the State Department." We want every governmental officer actively engaged in foreign affairs to understand thoroughly the nature and magnitude of the global Communist menace; its theory, history, doctrines, and practices.

There would be courses about the United States itself—its various political, economic, so-

cial, and cultural conditions. This might well include studies of congressional attitudes and legislation. Certainly, every officer who represents America abroad should know all he can about his own country.

We expect that the Academy will greatly improve the coordination and efficiency of our policies and programs at home and abroad by enabling officers in different agencies to understand more clearly their relations with one another and their common purposes.

Now, as to cost: On the basis of our present assumptions as to the needs for professional training, which contemplate that after fiscal year 1968 there will be approximately 700 professional-level officers and approximately 150 other students—such as Fulbright scholars, Mundt-Smith recipients, Foreign Service Staff personnel, and dependents of Government officials—enrolled at the Academy at any one time, the construction and capital acquisition cost for the Academy is estimated at approximately \$17,500,000. If Congress adopts S. 865, the annual operations and maintenance cost after fiscal year 1968 is estimated to be approximately \$6,700,000.

In conclusion, let me express my belief that the estimated costs of the Academy are extremely moderate if measured by potential results. The dividends reaped from investment in education are always intangible, but this makes them no less real. During recent years we have made gigantic efforts to keep pace with the Communist bloc in total military power, space exploration, missile development, and similar matters. Because our foreign affairs officers constitute our "firstline troops" in the cold war, and are also our nation's pioneers in the continuing search for peace and freedom I am convinced we must be prepared to do whatever is necessary to guarantee America a strong corps of foreign affairs personnel fully capable of bearing the heavy burdens of world leadership and equipped to protect and promote America's international interests in the face of any possible challenge.

I am now ready to answer any detailed questions you may have.

## African Development

*Statement by Walter M. Kotschnig*<sup>1</sup>

As the sun was setting a few days ago, I visited the Stanley monument. I looked out over the land, and I was overawed by the beauty of what I saw, by the grandeur of the river below me, by the majesty of the continent which is Africa.

It is in this perspective that the importance of the Economic Commission for Africa comes into clear focus. In this Commission the governments and peoples of Africa have joined in a common effort to secure their new-found freedom through economic and social advances. It has brought you together, gentlemen, founding fathers of a new Africa, builders of new nations, guarantors of a new African unity. That is where the strength of this Commission lies, and its promise.

For the third time I have the privilege of attending one of your sessions as observer for the United States of America. Having participated in literally hundreds of international conferences, going back to the days of the League of Nations, I have learned to sense in the early life of an international body its destiny, whether it is fated to become an important element in the international community or end up as another debating society. We need have no fears for the future of this Commission. The past four sessions have pointed the way, and we can ex-

pect great and lasting accomplishments from this and future sessions.

It is significant and a good augury that we meet in this beautiful Capital of the Republic of the Congo, for it is here that the needs for national unity, for sound institutional structures, and for international cooperation have been so recently demonstrated. We are all aware of the tragic difficulties which have beset this great country since its independence in 1960. My delegation rejoices with you that with the integration of Katanga there has been heartening progress toward the resolution of these difficulties, and we warmly congratulate our distinguished hosts on their achievement.

As one country which has supported the efforts of the United Nations in the Congo, my country takes pride in the assistance which our parent organization has given to this task. We have supported the United Nations here in the Congo as elsewhere because it is the servant of the world and not the instrument of any one nation or group of nations. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I hope I shall be allowed to pay a formal and warm tribute to a man who sits right here in our midst, the Executive Secretary of our Commission, Mr. Robert Gardiner. As Officer in Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, he has made an outstanding contribution, not only to the people of the Congo but to the whole of Africa and to the peace and well-being of the world at large. He deserves our deep gratitude.

The achievements here in the Congo are indeed great. But the tasks ahead in this country

<sup>1</sup> Made at the fifth session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa at Léopoldville, Republic of the Congo, on Feb. 22. Mr. Kotschnig, who is a Special Adviser, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, was the U.S. observer at the session.

and in most other parts of Africa are even more staggering. Just as poverty may make a mockery of the freedom of an individual, so the independence of a nation that is economically weak and socially backward may be placed in jeopardy. In its program of economic assistance the United States seeks to help build strength, to give reality to the idea of national self-reliance. And, let me add, it is determined to keep the cold war out of Africa.

The needs pressing in from all sides on the African peoples are so tremendous and so urgent as almost to defy classification. Yet it is necessary to establish priorities and development plans responsive to these priorities in order to avoid needless dispersal of effort and to assure maximum use of scarce resources for optimum impact.

The secretariat has prepared a mountain of documentation for this session. It is a mountain rich in ore, and we congratulate the secretariat on its achievement. From this mountain of documentation there emerge certain priority problems and needs, certain areas which call for early and sustained action: such as the need for the establishment of country plans of development and the creation of adequate institutions and the preparation of high-level personnel to this end; the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, including latent sources of energy; the development of human resources, basic to any kind of economic and social program through the improvement of health, education, and training; rural development and industrial growth; the building up of transport facilities; and the promotion of trade within the region and beyond.

#### **U.S. Assistance to Africa**

It would be presumptuous on my part were I to speak on all these subjects. Time is one of the scarce commodities in this session, and it belongs to you, not to us who have come as observers. There are, however, a few specific points I hope you will permit me to make.

1. The United States stands ready to offer assistance in setting up planning organizations to help determine development goals, weigh the alternatives in the use of resources in the public and private sector, and to evaluate

effects of legislation, taxation, and incentives on economic activities. At the same time we recognize the special role played by the United Nations, its regional economic commissions, and its resident representatives working on behalf of the entire U.N. system of organizations, in the establishment of regional and country development plans.

2. Related to this, we are pleased with the plans for the establishment of an African Institute for Development and Planning sponsored by the Economic Commission for Africa. We will lend this project our strong support when it comes before the Governing Council of the Special Fund later this year.

3. We fully concur in the judgments expressed by so many African countries that the shortage of professional and skilled personnel is probably the most important single obstacle to an increase in the rate of economic growth in Africa. Much of American assistance offered bilaterally or through multilateral channels is aimed at overcoming present shortages.

4. We are also very much aware of the fact that more than 85 percent of the Africans live in rural areas, hence our continuing interest in the promotion of agricultural improvement, in farm and village cooperatives. We aim to coordinate our efforts in these fields with those of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Labor Organization. Under present conditions the maintenance of a strong agricultural base in the economic development of most of the African countries is necessary not only to provide food for the rapidly growing population but also because it helps to provide a large volume of exports greatly needed to secure resources for essential imports now and not at some future time.

5. The United States has been supporting and will continue to support power developments important to agricultural improvement and essential for industrial growth. From our own experience at home we know that balanced agricultural and industrial development is the best guarantee for assuring rising standards of living to all levels of the population.

6. Finally, we are keenly aware of the need for capital assistance and we are trying to

make a worthwhile contribution through grants and long-term, low-interest loans, by encouraging private investment, and through our very substantial participation in such great financial institutions as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and last but not least the International Development Association.

Speaking of financial institutions, I should like to add that the United States is sympathetic with the objectives of the proposed African Development Bank. We are prepared to consider technical assistance, if asked, to help establish and operate the Bank. The United States is also prepared to consider loans, preferably in the form of participation in specific projects, when the Bank is established and operating.

I might add at this point that American aid to Africa during the last fiscal year—in 1 year and not over the past years and years to come—amounted to about one-half billion dollars, including agricultural commodities and Food for Peace but not counting our large share in the aid made available through the financial institutions just mentioned, through the United Nations, the Special Fund, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, UNICEF, and the specialized agencies such as ILO, FAO, WHO, and UNESCO. Nor does this figure of one-half billion dollars include the provision of American Peace Corps volunteers, of whom 1,200 are at present serving in Africa. Considering the large number of requests pouring in from all sides, their number may well double by 1964.

May I be permitted to add a little footnote to what was said by my distinguished neighbor to my left—my far left. He urged that no political strings be tied to international aid. We fully agree. What is more, we *act* accordingly. We do not insist that every dollar the United States contributes to the United Nations organizations for economic assistance be spent on American experts, on fellowships to be used exclusively in America, and on American supplies. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of another assistance program in another currency, the unit of which is the ruble.

In extending all this assistance the United States has not waited for the day when internationally controlled disarmament will become effective. It is our strong hope, however—and we are indeed pledged to the proposition—that our people will be enabled to provide even more substantial aid on the basis of savings eventually made available from disarmament, which we ardently desire and for which the American people pray. When that day of disarmament will come I do not know. But I do know, and you do know, I trust, that it is not the United States which has blocked the way to effective disarmament, beginning with a nuclear test ban.

### **Increasing African Export Earnings**

While the United States has taken a prominent part in cooperation with other Western countries in providing assistance to the developing nations throughout the world, we are fully aware that by far the greater part of the foreign exchange resources so vitally needed for the development of Africa does not come—and is not likely to come—from aid or other capital flows but from your export earnings. We also recognize that these export earnings at present are all too dependent on the prices brought on world markets for a few primary commodities. The present depressed state of many primary commodity prices is damaging to African nations, as indeed it is to many other developing nations.

The longrun solution to this problem, we believe, along with many delegations which have already spoken, is to lessen dependence on a few basic products through the development of a broad range of agricultural, mineral, and especially manufacturing exports. The expansion of domestic markets and intraregional trade must be an integral part of this process.

This creation of a more balanced and diversified range of exports, as we all know, cannot be accomplished overnight. In the interim—in the period immediately ahead—action must be taken to stabilize some key commodity prices at levels and through means which permit primary commodity exports to contribute to, rather than hinder, the development effort in Africa. In this connection the United States has strongly supported the new International Coffee

Agreement.<sup>2</sup> This agreement, if effectively carried out by both exporters and importers, will be of great importance to a number of African nations. My Government is also actively participating in preparations for negotiating a meaningful international cocoa agreement. My Government is furthermore actively and sympathetically considering proposals put forward in the U.N. Commission on International Commodity Trade and in the International Monetary Fund for arrangements to provide compensatory financing for short-term fluctuations in all export receipts.

There are other actions designed to improve the trading position of the developing countries which the United States Government has taken or is contemplating. Thus we have actively participated in the efforts of the GATT Tropical Products Group progressively to remove impediments to trade in key tropical products. Our ultimate goal is for trade in tropical products to be free of import duties and restrictions. Under the provisions of the new U.S. trade legislation, my Government is empowered to eliminate a wide range of import duties on tropical products without seeking reciprocal concessions from producing nations, provided the European Economic Community will do likewise. We recognize, however, that the progressive liberalization of tropical products trade must take place under conditions which do not jeopardize the development effort of producing countries inside preferential systems.

By the same token we hope to use the authority of the Trade Expansion Act to help open up markets for other products of the developing countries and to encourage other developed countries to do the same. During the next round of tariff negotiations we would not expect the developing countries to give full reciprocity for tariff reductions by the industrialized countries, but we would expect the maximum possible participation by them in the negotiations.

Just one more point on this matter of trade. I have just come from the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development in New York. My Government fully supports the holding of this conference and trusts that it will achieve constructive results. The main point which we made in New York, and which we will continue to make, was that the conference, to be worth while, must center its attention on the trade needs and problems of the developing countries and the lift which trade can give to their economies and social development. We hope for the fullest participation of the developing countries. My country is not prepared to have the United Nations conference used as a forum for the discussion of unrelated issues such as may have arisen between the state-trading economies of Eastern Europe and the market economies of the West. There are other forums where such difficulties can be discussed without endangering the beneficial results for the developing countries which we hope will flow from the deliberations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Mr. Chairman, in my travels across the world, here in Africa, in far-off Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, I have seen untold misery, disease, poverty, and wretchedness. I have seen the swollen bellies of children and the shrunken bodies of their elders. I have seen hovels which defy description. I have seen the outer limits of the degradation of man. But I have also had the privilege of observing the magnificent, the heroic efforts of men and women throughout the world to set an end to all that misery, to all that degradation. I have met with them in this Commission, as in other regional commissions of the United Nations, and I have drawn strength and inspiration from their efforts.

My Government, the American people—for we are a government of the people—have in word and action demonstrated their determination to work as partners with men and women of good will everywhere in the building of a better world. We do not seek to strengthen the power of the few; we want the welfare of the many. We want to live with you as brothers in the same mansion, a mansion as wide as the world, in which all of us, all our people, will dwell in dignity and in freedom.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 1, 1963, p. 493.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. 58 Stat. 1169.

*Ratification deposited:* Bolivia, April 3, 1963.  
Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature at Washington December 1, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Bolivia, April 3, 1963.

##### Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Trinidad and Tobago, April 13, 1963.

##### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Congo (Brazzaville), March 11, 1963.

##### Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Uganda, March 7, 1963.

##### Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Brazil, March 4, 1963.

##### Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notification of approval:* Switzerland, February 18, 1963.

##### Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963.

*Signatures:* Belgium, December 7, 1962; Canada, March 7, 1963; France, December 13, 1962; Ghana, February 15, 1963; India, February 21, 1963; Luxembourg, December 14, 1962; United Arab Republic, December 10, 1962; United States, April 3, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

### Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Mongolian People's Republic, April 4, 1963.

### BILATERAL

#### Mexico

Agreement further extending the agreement for continuation of a cooperative meteorological program of August 23 and 29, 1957, as amended and extended (TIAS 3905 and 5139). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico, D.F., March 15, 1963. Entered into force March 15, 1963.

#### Tunisia

Agreement amending the agreement of March 17 and 18, 1959 (TIAS 4221), to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis January 22 and March 6, 1963. Entered into force March 6, 1963.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to Secretary of State

#### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, including authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799), it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Scope.* The Secretary of State (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) shall prepare national emergency plans and develop preparedness programs designed to permit modification or expansion of the activities of the Department of State and of agencies, boards, and commissions under his jurisdiction in order to meet all conditions of national emergency, including attack upon the United States.

SEC. 2. *Functions.* The Secretary shall develop policies, plans, and procedures for carrying out his responsibilities in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States under conditions of national emergency, including, but not limited to (1) formulation, negotiation, and implementation of contingency and post-emergency plans with our allies and of the intergovernmental agreements and arrangements required by such plans; (2) formulation, negotiation, and execution of

<sup>1</sup> No. 11087; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 1835.

measures affecting the relationships of the United States with neutral States; (3) formulation and execution of political strategy toward hostile or enemy States, including the definition of war objectives and the political means for achieving those objectives; (4) maintenance of diplomatic representation abroad; (5) reporting and advising on conditions overseas which bear upon the national emergency; (6) carrying out or proposing economic measures with respect to other nations, including coordination with the export control functions of the Secretary of Commerce; (7) mutual assistance activities such as ascertaining requirements of the civilian economies of other nations, making recommendations to domestic resource agencies for meeting such requirements, and determining the availability of and making arrangements for obtaining foreign resources required by the United States; (8) providing foreign assistance, including continuous supervision and general direction of authorized economic and military assistance programs for friendly nations and determination of the value thereof; (9) protection or evacuation of American citizens and nationals abroad and safeguarding their property; (10) protection and/or control of international organization and foreign diplomatic, consular, and other official personnel and property, or other assets, in the United States; and (11) documentary control of persons seeking to enter or leave the United States.

SEC. 3. *Research.* The Secretary and the Office of Emergency Planning shall cooperate in research in areas involving the Department's responsibilities under this order.

SEC. 4. *Resources Evaluation.* The Secretary shall provide for appropriate participation in the national resources evaluation program administered by the Office of Emergency Planning.

SEC. 5. *Functional Guidance.* The Secretary, in carrying out the functions assigned in this order, shall be guided by the following:

(a) *Interagency cooperation.* The Secretary shall provide to all other departments and agencies foreign policy guidance, leadership, and coordination in the formulation and execution of those emergency preparedness activities which may have foreign policy implications, affect foreign relations, or depend, directly or indirectly, on the policies and capabilities of the Department of State.

(b) *Presidential coordination.* The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning shall advise and assist the President in determining policy for the perform-


ance of functions under this order and in coordinating the performance of such functions with the total national preparedness program.

(c) *Emergency planning.* Emergency plans and programs, and emergency organization structure required thereby, shall be developed as an integral part of the continuing activities of the Department of State on the basis that it will have the responsibility for carrying out such programs during an emergency. The Secretary shall be prepared to implement all appropriate plans developed under this order. Modifications and temporary organizational changes, based on emergency conditions, will be in accordance with policy determinations by the President.

SEC. 6. *Emergency Actions.* Nothing in this order shall be construed as conferring authority under Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, or otherwise, to put into effect any emergency plan, procedure, policy, program, or course of action prepared or developed pursuant to this order. Such authority is reserved to the President.

SEC. 7. *Redelegation.* The Secretary is hereby authorized to redelegate within the Department of State the functions hereinabove assigned to him.

SEC. 8. *Prior Actions.* To the extent of any inconsistency between the provisions of any prior order and the provisions of this order, the latter shall control.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
February 26, 1963.

## Confirmations

The Senate on April 4 confirmed the nomination of W. Averell Harriman to be Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 182 dated April 8.)

## Appointments

Chester Earl Morrow as Special Adviser on Community Relations, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective March 18. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 140 dated March 18.)

**Africa**  
 African Development (Kotschnig) . . . . . 625  
 The United Nations and the New Africa (Williams) . . . . . 602  
**Argentina.** U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina Congress . . . . . 617  
 Confirmations (Harriman) . . . . . 630  
 Department Supports Bill To Establish National Academy of Foreign Affairs (Ball, Orrick) . . . . . 619  
 Free-World Defense and Assistance Programs (text of President's foreign aid message) . . . . . 591  
**Cuba**  
 Cuba Expresses Regret in "Floridian" Incident . . . . . 600  
 U.S. Acts To Prevent Raids on Cuba From U.S. Territory . . . . . 600  
 U.S. Disclaims Responsibility for Attacks on Soviet Ships (text of note) . . . . . 599  
 Department and Foreign Service  
 Appointments (Merrow) . . . . . 630  
 Confirmations (Harriman) . . . . . 630  
 Department Supports Bill To Establish National Academy of Foreign Affairs (Ball, Orrick) . . . . . 619  
 Emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to Secretary of State (text of Executive order) . . . . . 629  
**Disarmament.** U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal for Direct Communication Link (ACDA statement) . . . . . 600  
**Economic Affairs**  
 African Development (Kotschnig) . . . . . 625  
 Japan, the United States, and Europe (Johnson) . . . . . 606  
 U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina . . . . . 617  
**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** Advisory Commission Reports on Exchange Program . . . . . 617  
**Europe.** Japan, the United States, and Europe (Johnson) . . . . . 606  
**Foreign Aid**  
 Free-World Defense and Assistance Programs (text of President's foreign aid message) . . . . . 591  
 U.S. Announces Loans to Argentina . . . . . 617  
**Germany.** Unclaimed Property of Victims of Nazi Persecution (text of Executive order) . . . . . 618  
**International Organizations and Conferences.** African Development (Kotschnig) . . . . . 625  
**Japan.** Japan, the United States, and Europe (Johnson) . . . . . 606  
**Military Affairs.** Emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to Secretary of State (text of Executive order) . . . . . 629  
**Morocco.** King of Morocco Exchanges Views With President Kennedy (text of joint communique) . . . . . 601  
**Non-Self-Governing Territories.** Reflections on the Pacific Community (Cleveland) . . . . . 613  
**Presidential Documents**  
 Emergency Preparedness Functions Assigned to Secretary of State . . . . . 629  
 Free-World Defense and Assistance Programs . . . . . 591  
 King of Morocco Exchanges Views With President Kennedy . . . . . 601  
 Unclaimed Property of Victims of Nazi Persecution . . . . . 618  
**Public Affairs**  
 Foreign Policy Conference Held for Editors and Broadcasters . . . . . 618  
 Merrow appointed Special Adviser on Community Relations . . . . . 630

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . . . 629  
**U.S.S.R.**  
 U.S.S.R. Accepts U.S. Proposal for Direct Communication Link (ACDA statement) . . . . . 600  
 U.S. Disclaims Responsibility for Attacks on Soviet Ships (text of note) . . . . . 599  
**United Nations.** The United Nations and the New Africa (Williams) . . . . . 602

*Name Index*

Ball, George W . . . . . 619  
 Cleveland, Harlan . . . . . 613  
 Harriman, W. Averell . . . . . 630  
 Hassan II . . . . . 601  
 Johnson, U. Alexis . . . . . 606  
 Kennedy, President . . . . . 591, 601, 618, 629  
 Kotschnig, Walter M . . . . . 625  
 Merrow, Chester Earl . . . . . 630  
 Orrick, William H., Jr . . . . . 623  
 Williams, G. Mennen . . . . . 602

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 1-7**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 1 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 154 and 156 of March 28; 157 of March 27; 164 of March 29; and 169 of March 30.

No.	Date	Subject
*166	4/1	U.S. participation in International conferences.
167	4/1	Foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters (rewrite).
†168	4/1	Cultural exchange with Rumania.
170	4/3	Note to U.S.S.R. regarding attacks on Soviet ships.
171	4/4	Ball: statement on National Academy of Foreign Affairs.
172	4/4	Orrick: statement on National Academy of Foreign Affairs.
*173	4/4	Rusk: interview on German television.
†174	4/4	Weiss: "Readjusting United States Foreign Trade."
†175	4/5	Delegation to ECAFE study week on Tokaido Railway (rewrite).
†176	4/5	Johnson: "The United States and Southeast Asia."
†177	4/5	Tyler: "The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO."
178	4/5	Advisory Commission report on exchange program (rewrite).
*180	4/6	Harriman: Marshall Plan reunion (excerpts).

\* Not printed.  
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

A release in the new *Foreign Affairs Outlines Series* . . .

## COMMUNIST SUBVERSION in the WESTERN HEMISPHERE

the  
**Department**  
of  
**State**

This 19-page pamphlet contains the statement made on February 18, 1963, by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the outset Mr. Martin states:

The problem of extracontinental totalitarian powers trying to subvert established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II the American Republics faced the challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis Powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing with the problem of Communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba.

Mr. Martin also describes the development of communism prior to Castro, Communist efforts since the advent of Castro, communism in Latin America since 1959, steps we are taking to combat Communist subversion, steps being taken in the Organization of American States [OAS] to counter Communist subversion, and the role of the Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere's security effort.

Publication 7509

15 cents

*Order Form*

Publication 7509

15 cents

Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere*.

Enclosed find:

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

\$.....  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Street Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City, Zone, and State: \_\_\_\_\_

54

# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1244

April 29, 1963

For Public Librarian  
Inchudent of Docu

MAY 6 1963

DEPOSITOR

**THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA** ● *by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson* . . . . . 635

**EIGHTH MEETING OF SEATO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS** ● *Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Communique* . . . . . 641

**THE EFFECT OF THE PROJECTED EUROPEAN UNION ON NATO** ● *by Assistant Secretary Tyler* . . . . . 648

**READJUSTING UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE** ● *by Leonard Weiss* . . . . . 652

**THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM** ● *Statement by Secretary Rusk* . . . . . 664

*For index see inside back cover*

IAL  
LY RECORD  
ED STATES  
IGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1244 • PUBLICATION

April 29, 1963

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements in which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed current.*

# The United States and Southeast Asia

by U. Alexis Johnson

*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Ask the average person on the street to define Southeast Asia and you will probably get as many different answers as the number of people you ask. A World War II veteran will likely think of the China-Burma-India theater, and he will at least be right on Burma. A tourist might have visions of Thai or Bali dancers, and he, too, would be right on Thailand and Indonesia. Some might even mention India, but that would be stretching the elastic term, Southeast Asia, too far. Actually the term is generally accepted as comprising the mainland peninsula countries of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam, plus the Philippines and Indonesia.

Thus Southeast Asia, as we define it, is a geographic expression covering an exceedingly large area of land and water. Our frequent and common use of the term tends to give the impression that it has a certain coherence and unity. However, I do not think it an exaggeration to say that there is thus far less coherence in Southeast Asia from the standpoint of race, religion, culture, and politics than in all of Europe in the last century.

Nevertheless, the nations of Southeast Asia all have one thing in common—they are a part of a huge, roughly triangular area which historically has always been subjected to pressures from at least one of the three sides by which it is bounded—India, China, and the sea.

On the west there is India, which for many centuries had a great influence in Southeast Asia, or "Further India," as it once was called.

This influence was primarily cultural, and it was transmitted largely through Brahminism and Buddhism. Indian influence extended through Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia and into Indonesia. It is evident today in religious and cultural forms, as well as in the written languages of several of these countries, which are based on Sanskrit. On the other hand, Chinese cultural influences are more in evidence in what is now Viet-Nam.

Racially the Chinese have also contributed to the ethnic strains of Southeast Asia. In addition China at times exerted the relentless pressure of a dynamic expanding empire. The closely related Thai, Lao, and Karen peoples originally inhabited the upper reaches of the Yangtze River in west China but migrated south under expanding Chinese pressure. Large parts of Southeast Asia as far south as Cambodia once acknowledged the suzerainty of Imperial China, paying tribute to Peiping. Even today there are large Chinese communities in the Southeast Asian countries, where they play an extraordinarily important role in commerce and industry.

Despite the force of these external influences from India and China, the countries of Southeast Asia did not band together seeking strength through unity. On the contrary, like the European nations, they continued their rivalries through debilitating wars between Burmese and Thai, between Thai and Cambodians, and between Cambodians and Vietnamese. During the course of these wars, extending over many centuries, the various countries developed intense local patriotisms which stay with them today, providing the basis for both internal

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit at Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 8 (press release 176 dated Apr. 5).



strength and regional weakness. We also might note that the colonial period served even to accentuate these divisions, with the transportation, communications, education, and economy of each colony oriented toward its colonial master rather than toward its neighbors.

The third, or sea frontier, runs from the Indian Ocean, bending through the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines to the China Sea. Over the centuries the sea has been dominated by a succession of powers, each of which has made an important impression and has added to the already complex pattern of the region. The Arabs came by sea in the 10th century, carrying Islam to the Malayan Peninsula and the Indonesian islands, penetrating north to Mindanao, the large southern island of the Philippines. They superimposed the Moslem religion upon these areas, thereby adding a new factor of difference between them and the Buddhist countries of continental Southeast Asia. Magellan came to Luzon, thereby paving the way for Spanish colonization of the Philippine Islands. The Portuguese star rose and fell rapidly, to be followed by the Dutch, who came into Indonesia some 300 years ago to build one of the largest empires in the East. Meanwhile the British expanded from India into Burma and, through the East India Company, moved inland and northward from Burma and Malaya toward Thailand. The French arrived late on the scene but rapidly moved inland and northward from Cochin China, eventually reaching the Chinese border. Throughout the past four centuries the power exerted from the sea has been predominant, pushing inland and northward toward the mountains.

This latter maritime period imposed upon the already existing political and cultural pattern a new set of differences. The Spanish, English, Dutch, and French languages, each bringing with it its own different literature and world outlook, were introduced into the different countries. Each power followed a distinctive policy. In the Philippines the United States emphasized education and independence. In Burma and Malaya the British concentrated on the development of local administrative structures which would serve a

policy of decentralization and develop local autonomy. In Indochina much attention was given to culture and language under French guidance. In Indonesia the emphasis was on agriculture and the development of the country's raw material resources.

Special note must be taken of the role played by Thailand, since Thailand alone of all the countries in the region has successfully maintained its independence throughout its history. Thailand was not immune to external forces, and it has indeed absorbed many influences from India, China, and the West. It has an indelible memory of historic Chinese pressure which forced the Thai people to the south. It has also coped, in recent centuries, with pressure from the maritime frontier. Nevertheless situated as it is in the very heart of Southeast Asia, it has maintained a continuity and an independent Asian identity which are a source of pride to its people today and a source of strength in the face of the pressures which again are beginning to come from the north.

#### **Resurgence of Pressure From the North**

What is the attraction that Southeast Asia has exerted for centuries on the great power flanking it on all sides? Why is it desirable and why is it important? First, it provides a lush climate, fertile soil, rich natural resources, a relatively sparse population in most areas, and room to expand. The countries of Southeast Asia produce rich exportable surpluses such as rice, rubber, teak, corn, tin, spices, oil, and many others. It is especially attractive to Communist China, with its burgeoning population and its food shortages.

Militarily and strategically, Southeast Asia has great assets. It stands astride of east-west trade routes. It stands in a critical, strategic relationship not only to China and India but to Australia, the western Pacific, and Japan. Bearing in mind the implications of the recent Chinese attack on India, Southeast Asia takes on an additional significance, since its domination by the Communist powers would outflank the Asian subcontinent.

Although still thinly populated for the most part, the human resources of this area are considerable and growing. Taken together, the

peoples of Southeast Asia represent an important segment of the free world and a target of prime importance to Communist imperialism. There is a rhythm to the tides of history. Just as the pressures on Southeast Asia have in the past come alternately from China in the north, India in the west, and the maritime powers along the sea, so Southeast Asia is again threatened by a resurgence of pressure from the north. But today the danger from this quarter is multiplied a hundredfold by the virulence of the political doctrine which now rides in the backs of the Chinese people.

As my colleague Under Secretary Averell Harriman said recently, "I don't know how you can distinguish between Chinese communism and Chinese imperialism. Chinese communism and all communism is imperialist."

Even before World War II, Communist parties of varying strengths existed in all Southeast Asian countries, from Burma to the Philippines. After the war the signal was given for armed Communist-led uprisings, and these occurred in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines. Even Thailand, the one country in Southeast Asia that had not known colonial rule, was threatened. By 1952 the revolts were crushed in all but Malaya and Indochina. It took the British to quell the new Malay Federation until 1958 to quell Communist guerrilla forces there. This struggle, incidentally, provided valuable lessons which are now being applied in Viet-Nam. We also might note that, except for Japan, Malaya is now the most prosperous country in Asia.

The efforts of some powers following World War II to restore colonial rule along the pre-war pattern permitted the Communists more effectively to wave the banner of anticolonialism and, for example, through Ho Chi Minh, to direct that time largely to capture the nationalist movement in Viet-Nam.

After the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indochina<sup>2</sup> we took the lead in the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, an alliance of the Philippines, Thailand,

Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Great Britain, and ourselves, with the objective of providing security to Southeast Asia through collective military action if the Communists embarked on outright military aggression. The opening of the eighth meeting of ministers of this organization was attended by Secretary Rusk this morning in Paris.<sup>3</sup>

Whatever may be the criticisms of SEATO, the fact remains that, since its inception, the Communists have not attempted open military action in the area. Instead they have turned to the more subtle tactics of subversion and insurgency, the prime example being the guerrilla warfare in Viet-Nam carried on in the method made classic in China by Mao Tse-tung. Whereas the method employed by the Communists has changed, the objective remains the same—destruction of the independence of the Southeast Asian countries one by one and return to the days when they bore their tribute to Peiping. While the armed struggle is manifest now only in Viet-Nam, it ceased in Laos through the settlement reached just last year at Geneva,<sup>4</sup> after 14 months of negotiation.

#### **Implications of Struggle in Viet-Nam**

I have pointed out that Southeast Asia is not a homogeneous region but rather a geographic expression. By this same token of geographic interrelation, the security of the area is not stronger than that of its component countries. All of us who were at Geneva in 1954 recognized that Communist domination of the Red River Delta of North Viet-Nam would make it much more difficult to defend the remaining areas. This has been true. However, for the Communists to advance any further in the area would render the defense problem very much more difficult, if not well-nigh impossible. This is why the valiant struggle now being waged in South Viet-Nam has implications far beyond the borders of that troubled country.

Our massive assistance to free Viet-Nam is designed to avoid just such a catastrophe. Our

<sup>3</sup> See p. 641.

<sup>4</sup> For texts of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

<sup>2</sup> For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Asiatic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

objectives in Viet-Nam are to assist that country to regain its full freedom and independence and ability to achieve for its vigorous people that well-being and economic progress of which it is capable. Our principal objective is the same everywhere in Southeast Asia. We seek not to dictate the form of government nor to bind the countries of Southeast Asia into an alliance with us. This is a matter of their own choosing. Our sole concern is that they have the freedom to make their own choice. This objective is entirely consistent with the purposes of the free countries of the area. Thus we have a sound basis for cooperation with them.

This cooperation takes a number of forms. First is our military cooperation under SEATO, which places on us certain obligations to assist the countries embraced by the treaty in defending themselves against open attack. We take these obligations seriously and have made it clear that we will meet them whether or not other members do so. Also, importantly, we have the ability to back up our commitments.

When the Korean war broke out our forces were not battle-ready and we had to think in terms of months for the deployment of combat-ready forces from the United States.

Today the picture has sharply changed, and in Southeast Asia, as well as in other areas, our forces are fully combat-ready and prepared for prompt deployment by air and sea. This greatly increases our ability to use our military forces to prevent war rather than dribble in forces after fighting has started.

This was well demonstrated in Southeast Asia last May, when the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao suddenly resumed their attacks in Laos. Nam Tha fell on May 6, and subsequently it appeared they were continuing their advance to the Thai border. On May 13 we consulted with the Thai Government, and on May 15 our first units landed at Udorn, across the river from Laos.<sup>5</sup> The Communist advance stopped, and in July the Communists agreed to the formation of a Government of National Union in Laos. We have recently concluded an agreement with Thailand for establishing logistic facilities and prepositioning equipment that would, in case of future necessity, permit even

more rapid and effective deployment of American and other SEATO forces to that country. This will still further increase the military advantage we enjoy throughout much of the area of secure and controlled access by sea in addition to our access by air. An essential ingredient of any successful defense will, of course, always be the willingness and desire of the people attacked vigorously to do all they can in their own defense.

With overt aggression successfully deterring the threat to the area lies not so much in an invasion from without as in subversion and insurrection from within. This was defeated in Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines, contained in Laos, but now faces South Viet-Nam in very acute form. Attempts to penetrate Thailand, particularly its northeast area bordering Laos, are increasing.

This leads us to this whole question of our general approach to cooperation with countries not only in Southeast Asia but also elsewhere who are facing these problems. Each of the countries must have the ability to maintain internal order. This means efficient police forces trained in the tradition of public service and military forces able to supplement and support the police forces in case of necessity. This means less emphasis on exotic armament and massive divisions and more emphasis on the equipment, training, and organization that will enable the military force to fulfill an internal security mission within the country. It also means what is now called civic action, that is, the military force doing those things for the local population which it can do without sacrificing its primary mission, and establishing sympathetic relationships with the local population. Time does not permit me to go into the details, but I can tell you that there has been a great change in emphasis in Washington on these matters, to the degree that I feel that our economic and military assistance programs are better directed to this real and immediate threat.

However, all of this is of little use if the political, social, and economic structure of a country does not have in a minimum degree what our ancestors so aptly called "the consent of the governed." This, of course, must come from within, although we can encourage and pro-

<sup>5</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, June 4, 1962, p. 904.

rom without. This we are seeking to do, and is one of the great challenges faced by our diplomacy. We in the Department of State are not unmindful of the responsibility and are seeking to train our personnel and so organize ourselves as better to carry it out.

### **Foreign Aid, an Investment in the Future**

Our annual "great debate" is now opening on what has come to be known as "foreign aid,"<sup>6</sup> and Southeast Asia is already receiving its share of attention. First let me say that we have always had a personal aversion to the term "foreign aid," which inevitably carries with it the erroneous implications, first, of charity on our part and, second, of superiority and inferiority as between ourselves and the receiving country. I feel it more accurate to speak in terms of investment—investment in the future not only for the countries with which we are cooperating but for our future as well.

I believe that there are few who would deny that our investment in the Marshall Plan for Europe and our postwar assistance to Japan have already paid off as handsomely as any investment in our history, not only in political and military terms, important though they be in themselves, but also in direct economic terms.

Our investments in the underdeveloped areas, including Southeast Asia, coming later and starting from a less well developed base have understandably not uniformly shown as quick or yet as spectacular returns as those in Europe and Japan. But that does not mean that they are bad or foolish investments.

Admittedly some investments may, with the wisdom of hindsight, appear more prudent than others, and it is important that we learn from our mistakes. This we are attempting to do, as are the countries with which we are cooperating. However, no more than in the case of an industrial firm which seeks for itself sustained vigor does this mean that we cease investing in the future. Nor does it mean that we must invest without return indefinitely into the future. Just as industrial enterprises and projects seek for themselves self-sustaining growth, so are the countries of this area seeking self-sustaining growth and looking forward to the

time they no longer need to rely on outside resources. In this, also, our objectives and theirs are consistent. There can, and inevitably will, be differences between honest men on when this point can be reached. While among those who have recently examined the problem there are those who think it can be reached sooner than others, they all agree that that time is not yet. Also there are cases in which, given an ideal world, we might not choose to make an investment. But we are not living in an ideal world, and we often have to weigh how much more it would cost us tomorrow if we did not make a more modest investment today.

### **U.S. Investment in Viet-Nam**

As Viet-Nam is the major recipient of our assistance in the area—not only financial and material but also our men—it is fitting that we should particularly examine our investment in that country.

First let me say that I do not regard myself entirely as a theoretician or abstract observer of that situation. I was a participant in the 1954 negotiations which led to the partition and French withdrawal from that unfortunate country. Subsequently, during my service in the area and on the SEATO Council for a number of years, I became directly familiar with some of its problems and have visited it on a number of occasions, most recently last December.

In order to put its problems in perspective I think it important to look back on its recent past. When Viet-Nam was divided in 1954, after being wracked by 8 years of vicious civil war, there were few who would have given the Republic of Viet-Nam much chance of survival. In addition to all of its other problems, it was immediately inundated by about 800,000 destitute refugees from the north—about 7 percent of its population. But survive it did, as in many ways magnificently so, as pointed out in detail by Mr. Ball [Under Secretary George W. Ball] before this same audience just a year ago.

As Mr. Ball pointed out, Viet-Nam effectively integrated this vast flood of refugees into its society; a major agrarian reform plan was carried out; in the 4 years from 1956 to 1960 the elementary school population was almost quad-

<sup>6</sup> For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 664.

rupted; food production per capita was increased by 20 percent while it was falling in the north by 10 percent; and in general the south was forging ahead at a rate that would have been impressive even for a peaceful land. It was apparently this very progress, which was so conspicuous as to be intolerable to Hanoi, that brought on a major intensification of infiltration from the north and around 1959 a stepping up of a carefully planned and mounted campaign directed from Hanoi. This campaign was openly announced from Hanoi in 1960. As Mr. Ball also stated, the response to this threat could not be limited to military measures, no matter how well conceived and conducted; social and economic measures were of equal importance. He also pointed out that a quick and spectacular victory could not be expected but that it would take patient application of effort by the Vietnamese and ourselves over a long period of time—in fact, over many years.

After the passage of a year it is entirely fitting to ask the question "How are things going?" This question is increasingly being asked, and it deserves an honest and objective answer. However, the answer cannot be simple. I suppose people were asking the same thing in 1863 and in 1943, too, and perhaps not getting very satisfying answers. But the question is even more difficult in a guerrilla war. There are no frontlines moving forward or backward that can be drawn on a map; there is no clearly defined enemy territory to invade and hold; there are rarely any major engagements which can be totted up as victories or defeats. But there is no doubt that we and the Vietnamese working together have made important progress since the end of 1961, when we began to step up our assistance.

To be frank, the war was being lost fast in the fall of 1961, when General [Maxwell D.] Taylor first led a mission there. Viet Cong attacks were accelerating both in numbers and size. In September they overran a provincial capital and held it overnight, long enough to behead publicly the Chief of Province. There was a real threat that they might be able to "liberate" some remote area and hold it, possibly as the seat of a "government" which the bloc could recognize and aid. Transportation was so disrupted that Saigon, normally a big rice-

exporting port, was forced to import rice from the United States.

The situation has substantially changed since then. Viet Cong attacks declined steadily in 1962. They are now running at a rate considerably less than half the January 1962 average. No more provincial capitals have been attacked. Rice exports have resumed and are expected to be near normal this year. There are no Viet Cong areas immune to Government penetration. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that the Viet Cong have not escalated to larger units or to more conventional warfare.

### **The Strategic Hamlet Program**

There are other indicators of progress—increased voluntary intelligence from the people, increased Viet Cong weapons losses, the fact that Viet Cong strongholds are being systematically penetrated, their supplies and installations destroyed. But I think the most important reason for guarded optimism is the adoption by the Government of Viet-Nam of the "strategic hamlet" program.

The first step in setting up a strategic hamlet is largely military. A hamlet militia is trained and armed and a defensive perimeter constructed. The second step, however, is purely political. It is the election by a secret ballot of a hamlet council and the framing of a hamlet charter by the people's elected representatives.

The third step is more conventional but equally nonmilitary. This is the provision of Government services such as agricultural extension and low-interest agricultural loans, cheap fertilizer from Government-supported cooperatives, new schools, and hamlet-level medical aid. The aim is to give the farmer an economic stake which he will want to defend.

Communist guerrilla strategy is to erode Government support and isolate the Government from the people by attacks, assassinations, and threats. The guerrillas themselves are to live among the people like the fish in the sea, according to Mao Tse-tung's much-quoted statement. The strategic hamlet strategy is the opposite of this. It calls for tying the people to their Government by hamlet councils and Government services at the hamlet level, while at the same time isolating the Viet Cong from

their sources of supplies and recruits among the people. The aim, in short, is to get the guerrilla ash out of the water.

To date about half the population—nearly 7 million people—live in about 5,000 strategic hamlets. Another 5,000 strategic hamlets must be organized before the program is complete even in the first, essentially military phase.

But already the program is beginning to pay off. One result is that an estimated half million people previously under Viet Cong control are now under Government control and protection. Morale in the countryside is up, and this is reflected by increased voluntary intelligence from peasants to the armed forces, a sign the people not only think the Government is winning but are willing to take risks to help it win. Perhaps the most important result is the intangible knitting together of Government and people.

Without in any way detracting from the vital and heroic contribution of our advisers and logistic support personnel, of whom 20 were killed by Viet Cong action last year, we should in all of this be clear about one thing. The Vietnamese are fighting this war—and fighting it valiantly. About 5,000 of them were killed last year. While most of these were in the armed forces, this total also includes village officials and militia, schoolteachers and malaria workers. During the same period about 30,000 casualties of all kinds were inflicted on the Viet Cong.

I would thus say there is reason for some optimism. However, this is going to be a long, hard struggle. The Viet Cong remain very strong and very determined. There is no sign that the bloc is faltering in its support for the attack on South Viet-Nam. We are dealing with an enemy who is patient and counts on our impatience, who is willing to accept adversity and hopes we are not.

But we are satisfied that we have a sound strategy; progress is being made, and the Vietnamese have certainly demonstrated their capacity for sacrifice and their determination to survive as a free people. As President Kennedy said in his state of the Union message,<sup>7</sup> "The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam."

<sup>7</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.

The President's statement justifiably has an optimistic ring, and I think it well for me to close on that note.

I close on that note not only for South Viet-Nam but for Southeast Asia as a whole. However, I would not want this to be interpreted as any cheap or careless optimism, for this would not be justified. Rather my optimism is based on the conviction that, working in free association with free peoples, we enjoy an advantage which the Communists can never hope to emulate. This we are doing in Southeast Asia. I have no doubt that our investment is a wise one and that to it the American people will continue to give that persevering support which freedom always demands of any people.

## **Eighth Meeting of SEATO Council of Ministers**

*The eighth meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was held at Paris, April 8-10. Following are texts of a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on April 8 and a communique issued at the close of the meeting on April 10.*

### **STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK**

It is deeply significant that we meet in Paris today for deliberations concerned with the defense of freedom halfway round the globe. Our meeting here underscores our consciousness that the security and freedom of the West and security and freedom in the East are intimately interrelated. We know that the safety of us all requires resistance to Communist aggressive threats wherever they arise, whether in Asia, in Europe, or in the Western Hemisphere. SEATO, in drawing together nations from all these areas for the common defense, uniquely expresses our comprehension of this truth.

The necessity for collective security is well established. Some of us here today have learned this together in the fire of two world wars. The Manila Pact<sup>1</sup> is collective security

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on Sept. 8, 1954, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

applied to the worldwide scope of the Communist menace. Communist aggressors would be comforted by the prospect of attacking or seeking to subvert each country and each area individually. SEATO denies them this satisfaction in South and Southeast Asia. The rapid deployment of forces by SEATO nations to Thailand last year underscores our readiness and our capability to act in the common defense.

Major events affecting the treaty area have occurred since we last met. We shall be concerned with the significance of these in our discussions here.

In Laos the signing of the Geneva Agreements<sup>2</sup> has created the basis for stability, and a coalition government under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been established. The United States fully supports the objectives of these agreements and has strictly complied with their terms. We are not satisfied, however, that the other side has done so, particularly the requirement that all foreign military forces be withdrawn. This emphasizes the importance of freedom for the International Control Commission to conduct effective, unhindered investigations throughout the entire Kingdom, particularly in those parts controlled by the Pathet Lao, which are now closed to the Commission. Until there is cooperation in this respect and until the Communist-supported Pathet Lao support the coalition government, the objectives of the Geneva Agreements simply cannot be fully realized. A tragic and deplorable series of developments has increased tensions in the Plaine des Jarres. Each signatory of those agreements must, we believe, use its influence urgently to prevent further aggravation of the situation, to ease tensions, and to promote the development of an atmosphere of harmony in support of the Government of National Union. We must, therefore, continue to watch developments in Laos with the closest possible attention.

In Viet-Nam, although the struggle has intensified since our 1961 meeting,<sup>3</sup> the Viet Cong drive has been blunted, and there are some grounds for further encouragement. We believe that Viet-Nam has now found the right strategy for meeting the Viet Cong terrorism

and is applying it with increasing vigor and success. The struggle may be protracted and bitter, but we have no doubt of ultimate victory. The protocol<sup>4</sup> to the Manila Pact is an expression of the vital interest of the United States and other SEATO nations in the preservation of the integrity and independence of Viet-Nam. The readiness of my country and others to help countries to meet indirect, as well as direct, Communist aggression is illustrated by the nature and magnitude of our assistance to Viet-Nam.

Since we last met, Communist subversion in northeast Thailand has become a real and present danger. The Government of Thailand has moved with vigor and imagination to deal with it. We fully realize that the sacrifices of the people of Thailand in this effort—and in other of our joint endeavors—are all a valuable part of worldwide resistance to communism and contribute to our safety as well as theirs. We are glad, therefore, to lend our support to Thailand's countersubversion program, together with other members of this alliance, in keeping with our commitments under the Manila Pact. Thailand, a full member of SEATO, can be assured of our fullest determination.

The blatant aggression of Communist China on the Indian border has vast and historic significance. Suffice it at the moment to say that it revealed for the whole world Communist China's readiness to turn even on those who have tried to be a friend and to resort to overt aggression whenever its expansionist aims are thereby served.

Communist propaganda continues persistently to hurl invective and derision at our treaty organization. This criticism of SEATO is, in fact, a recognition of its success in obstructing Communist aggressive aims. But SEATO's role is broader than its military power. SEATO is also an expression of the determination of Asian nations to maintain their independence and to increase the economic well-being of their people. Ultimately, these are as important as military defense in assuring that independence will be preserved.

We value the Manila Pact, and we shall continue to support it as the essential instrument through which we can participate in the collec-

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 395.



ive defense of Southeast Asia for the mutual benefit of the respective peoples. It is in this spirit that my delegation enters upon these important discussions in the next few days.

## TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 187 dated April 11

The SEATO Council held its eighth meeting in Paris from April 8 to 10, 1963, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. The inaugural address was delivered by the Prime Minister of France, His Excellency Mr. Georges Pompidou.

### General Observations

The Council held an exchange of views on the international situation with special reference to developments in the treaty area. It reaffirmed that the main aim of the Manila Pact is to ensure the peaceful development, economic stability and national independence of the countries within the area. The Council expressed concern over the continuing and widening threats to the security of such countries while reaffirming their determination to maintain vigilance.

The subversive campaign against Viet-Nam has been considered. The Council took note of information given by some delegations indicating that considerable progress has been achieved in the fight against this subversion and that one may expect a new improvement in the situation thanks to the efforts made by the Government of Viet-Nam who were able to stem rebellion. The Council hopes that Viet-Nam, with the support given to it, would be in a position to maintain its advance towards internal stability and international security.

The Council reiterated its support for the cause of a neutral and independent Laos under a Government of National Union. It expressed the hope that those who have the responsibility in Laos and also the signatories of the Geneva Accords will succeed in ensuring the maintenance of peace, neutrality and national unity which the people of Laos so earnestly desire.

The members of the Council took note of their agreement on a revised procedure for taking decisions within the organization which will improve its work and increase its efficiency.

They also took note of some decisions taken since their last meeting by members of the organization, in particular the joint Thailand-United States statement of March 6, 1962,<sup>5</sup> and the deployment in Thailand in May 1962 of troops from some member countries.<sup>6</sup> They deemed that these facts could increase the capability of such countries to comply with their obligations.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.

<sup>6</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, June 4, 1962, p. 904.

### Counter-subversion

The Council emphasized that the development of effective measures to prevent and counter subversion continues to be a major task facing the member countries. It noted the steps taken during the past year to deal with this problem.

### Military Defence

The Council affirmed its continued support for the principle of collective security.

The Council noted with satisfaction that the military advisers and the military planning office have revised and refined the plans for defensive action, in the light of changing conditions and anticipated situations.

The Council examined the operation of the continuing series of military exercises, and agreed that the body of experience gained in working together was a valuable asset to the alliance for any possible defensive action the member nations might be called upon to undertake in combination.

The Council welcomed an announcement by the Council member for Australia of arrangements made by his Government with the Royal Thai Government for the establishment of a military rebuild workshop for the major repair and maintenance in Thailand of Thai military and Government vehicles.

### Economic Co-operation

The Council expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved by member countries in the sphere of economic development, and agreed that continuing advance in this field is essential to the security of the treaty area.

The Council expressed approval of the various civil projects undertaken by the organization:

(1) The Community Development Project, inaugurated in November of last year, in conjunction with the nation-wide plan of the Thai Government. This project is designed to decentralize the problem by setting up regional centres which analyze the actual conditions and train experts to meet the needs of the people of specific areas. Aid from the government and from other member nations can thus reach the people directly.

(2) Skilled labour projects in Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines which are designed to provide training for the workers in developing societies. Two new schools are being opened in Pakistan early this year. In Thailand, 19 schools are now training some 5,500 students in technical, electrical, electronic and other skills. An apprenticeship program in the Philippines has proved successful in fitting workers for industrial jobs.

(3) The Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok. This advanced engineering school fills a regional need which has not been met by other means. Enrolment is open to students of various countries from the region, whether members of SEATO or not.

(4) The SEATO Meteorological Telecommunications Project, linking Bangkok and Manila, which is scheduled for completion within two years.

### Medical Research

The Council noted with satisfaction the work of the SEATO cholera research laboratory in East Pakistan, and the SEATO general medical laboratory in Thailand. These scientific investigatory institutions have been given the task of discovering means to combat disease in the treaty area, and thus to improve the well-being of the people.

The Council welcomed the proposed establishment of a SEATO clinical research centre at the school of graduate studies of the University of Medical Sciences at Bangkok. The main objective of the proposed new centre is to gain further knowledge concerning the effects of diseases; its functions are to include professional training, education and research.

### Cultural Co-operation

The Council noted the continuing cultural interchange among member nations, and agreed that SEATO's role in this activity should be continued. The organization provides undergraduate scholarships, graduate scholarships, fellowships and professorships, and sponsors educational conferences.

The Council noted with approval the recent conference which studied the equivalence of university credits, so that scholars may more easily transfer from one country to another in furtherance of their studies.

### Appointment of Secretary-General

The Council appointed His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin for a further period of two years to terminate at a suitable date after the conclusion of the Council meeting of 1965.

### Secretariat-General

The Council expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General His Excellency Mr. Pote Sarasin and his staff for their outstanding services to the organization.

### Expression of Gratitude

The Council expressed its gratitude to the Government of France for its hospitality and the excellent arrangements made for the conference. The meeting voted warm thanks to the Chairman, His Excellency Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville.

### Next Meeting

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of the Philippines to hold its next meeting in Manila in view of the tenth anniversary in 1964 of the signing in Manila in 1954 of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

## The Divided World of Communism

*Following is the text of an interview of Secretary Rusk by NBC correspondent Elie Abel, filmed for use as part of the National Broadcasting Company's special program "An Encyclopedia of the Divided World of Communism" televised on April 10.*

Press release 188 dated April 10

*Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, how much comfort can we in the West take from this crack in what used to be called the Communist monolith?*

*Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Abel, I think that it is important at the very beginning to realize that we can't be sure about what this split means, and for a very simple reason. I'm convinced that neither Moscow nor Peiping fully understands the full relationship between the two at the present time.*

We do know that there are some very important elements in the differences that are being exhibited now between Moscow and Peiping. There is an ideological conflict: how best to get on with the world revolution. There surely must be some historical differences between the Russians and Chinese that are involved. There is a contest for the leadership of the world revolution.

I don't believe that we can afford to take comfort yet. Obviously to the extent that the Communist movement is divided, that there is confusion among Communist parties in many countries, or that there are differences of techniques between these two, that is all to the good. But, on the other hand, both of them are committed to the world revolution. Lord Home [British Foreign Secretary] pointed out that both of them want to overcome capitalism and free institutions. This is a source of danger because, if these two elements in the Communist camp enter into a rivalry as to which one of them can get on most rapidly with their world revolution, this could result in an increase of danger to the free world.

So I would think that we have to be in a position of watchful waiting—observe it closely, respond to any situation which threatens us, and be a little careful about taking premature comfort from arguments within the Communist world as to how best to bury us.

*I take it it's your feeling then, Mr. Secretary, but the West should at this moment do nothing to try to capitalize on this quarrel?*

Well, I think that it would be difficult to find major moves that the free world could make which would advance the interests of the free world in trying to insert ourselves in between Moscow and Peiping. Because if we ourselves were to, say, increase pressures on one or the other, I think that we could very likely drive these two closer together again.

You see, neither Moscow nor Peiping can afford to be without the other in a direct confrontation between either one of them and the free world. They are important to each other, and that importance has not been, I think, eliminated by the rivalries that are now apparent within the Communist world. So we have to be a little cautious about this.

*I notice, Mr. Secretary, that the Chinese in the past few days have sent trade missions both to West Germany and to Britain, apparently in an effort to build up their trade with those Western countries and in this way make up some of the deficit that the Russians have imposed on them. How would this Government look upon increased trade with China by either of these allies?*

Well, we have not been ourselves in favor of increasing trade with Communist China. We ourselves don't trade with mainland China. I think it is true that the drop in trade between mainland China and the Soviet Union and mainland China's own requirements now stimulate them to get out and see if they can't achieve markets and sources of supply elsewhere.

As you know, they bought large quantities of grain, for example, from Canada and Australia. They, I think, having less Soviet trade, are trying to stimulate their own trade relations. I suspect they will try in Latin America as well in an attempt to find markets through which they can get the foreign exchange that they need to buy in markets other than the Communist bloc itself. I think that the free world ought to be very cautious about the terms of trade, about the types of trade in which it enters in trade relations with Peiping.

*You have mentioned, sir, ideology and na-*

*tional history. I wonder to what extent one can look upon these differences as a difference of outlook between a comparatively rich and a comparatively poor Communist country, between a country whose territorial ambitions are more or less satisfied and one with dissatisfied ambitions.*

I think Mr. Couve de Murville [French Foreign Minister] pointed out there is a difference in the level of development of Communist China and the Soviet Union. This may, indeed, make some difference in power and attitude. The Soviet Union has a considerable stake in what it has been able to accomplish in the last 30 or 40 years. It has a rather sophisticated industry. It has a highly sophisticated military establishment. It knows a great deal more about the nature of modern war than the Chinese Communists do. I think that the level of mainland Chinese underdevelopment causes the Chinese to expect vast amounts of help from the Soviet Union which the Soviet Union has not been able to provide to the extent wanted by the Chinese.

On the other side, the Soviet Union still has great unfinished business in its own country, because it has had difficulty in finding the resources to do everything that it wants to do at the same time; for example, as between a military establishment and consumer needs. So I think that there are, quite apart from ideology, there are some conflicts of interest between Communist China and the Soviet Union which are a part of this present disagreement between them.

*I wonder if it's correct, as so many people seem to assume, that the Chinese are necessarily the more aggressive partner here? I'm thinking of the fact that it was the Russians who planted some missiles about 90 miles off our shore.*

Well, I think it's a matter of doctrine. The Chinese are supporting a more primitive type of Communist revolution. I think their influence in the bloc is in the direction of a more aggressive policy than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, since the death of Stalin, has attempted to develop the idea of peaceful co-existence somewhat further than the Chinese, for example.

But, nevertheless, I think we ought not to underestimate the seriousness of purpose of the Soviet Union in getting on with the world revolution. And the most dramatic and one of the most dangerous moves taken since the end of World War II has been the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and the deception that was practiced in that process. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why we can't take too much comfort out of the mere difference of doctrine between those two capitals.

*Mr. Secretary, we've had some trouble in our own alliance recently. How do you explain the fact that Mr. Khrushchev has made no apparent effort to capitalize on it?*

Oh, I think Moscow understands what is, I think, understood in the West: that is, with respect to the central commitment of NATO—the great security commitment to protect NATO against external aggression—there are no differences in the alliance.

In other words, what we have been talking about in NATO in the last several months, and in the West, has been how we move on from where we are to write new chapters, to add something to what we have. We are not talking about the dissolution of the basic commitments of the alliance. Those are strong and firm, as was illustrated in, say, October. And I think France, for example, is as firmly committed to an alliance as any other member of NATO. And I think Moscow understands that these are differences which do not affect the basic questions involving relations between, say, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

*Perhaps they understand, as you indicated in the case of their own alliance, that if they tried to fish in these waters we would pull together like that.*

Yes, I think that it would certainly be true that an increase of pressure by the Soviet Union would demonstrate promptly the unity of NATO in the face of such a threat, and I think they must understand that in Moscow.

*Are we in accord with our allies on this basic estimate of the Sino-Soviet disagreement?*

I think so, in terms of caution. I think that none of us feel that we understand all of the

elements that are involved in this fully. And I think none of us would be willing to predict with any certainty how this discussion between Moscow and Peiping will come out.

I think there is one important point of difference between ourselves and some of our allies about how to deal with these people in the Communist bloc, and that is on the trade field. There are some who feel that a fat Communist is a peaceful Communist. We ourselves believe that we ought to be careful about building up—particularly in strategic supplies—building up the strength of the Communist world until we can see in practice that the notion of peaceful coexistence means something other than getting on with a world revolution.

*Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.*

Thank you, Mr. Abel.

## **U.S. Calls for Action To Insure Restoration of Cease-Fire in Laos**

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

Our information is that the Kong Le neutralist forces have been attacked by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao; and there are indications that they (that is, the Pathet Lao) are supported by some Viet Minh military personnel. We have no detailed or late information on how serious the fighting is in the Plaines des Jarres. However, the fighting now going on not only appears to be a serious violation of the cease-fire but, if it continues, will endanger the implementation of the Geneva Accords<sup>2</sup> with all the dire consequences that such a breakdown will mean for Laos.

In these circumstances, we consider it incumbent on the cochairmen of the Geneva Accords and the International Control Commission to take prompt and effective action to stop the fighting which has been instigated by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao and to insure that the cease-fire is restored. Such action is essential in order to preserve the independence and neutrality of Laos.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Apr. 8 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

## **President Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall Plan Employees**

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to a 15th anniversary reunion dinner of employees of the Economic Cooperation Administration held at Washington on April 6. The President's message was read by Paul G. Hoffman, who was the first administrator of the Marshall Plan.*

White House press release dated April 6

Please convey my personal greetings to all those attending tonight's commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan succeeded because it was conceived and operated on a scale commensurate with the task. It was an extraordinary reply to an extraordinary challenge. All those who translated this imaginative concept into concrete results can look with satisfaction tonight on the feats they achieved and the honor which they have earned.

Now we face another extraordinary challenge—the task of helping the awakening nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America catch up with the 20th century. Here, once again, a halfhearted response will not do—and I take heart in the knowledge that many of those who helped to win the great victory over “hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos” in Western Europe are still fighting a good fight for freedom.

My very best wishes to all of you on this memorable evening.

## **Bataan Day Commemorated**

### **Department Announcement**

Press release 184 dated April 8

On the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the fall of Bataan, April 9, a joint United States-Philippine commemorative ceremony will take place at Arlington National Cemetery. At the Tomb of the Unknowns, wreaths will be laid by the Philippine Ambassador, Amelito R. Mutuc,

on behalf of the Philippine President, Diosdado Macapagal, and by Capt. Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr., USN, Naval Aide to the President, representing the President, in memory of the fallen defenders of Bataan and Corregidor.

Following the ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknowns, the Philippine Ambassador and representatives of American and Philippine veterans organizations will lay wreaths at the grave of Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, commander of all American and Filipino troops in the Philippines at the time of Bataan's fall.

### **Message From President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>**

White House press release dated April 8

Twenty-one years have passed since Filipinos and Americans on Bataan struggled to the end with magnificent valor against overwhelming odds. For the courage of those brave men we today express our gratitude. From their heroic example the people of the Philippines and the United States drew strength to carry on the fight through the days that followed. Their sacrifice sealed our dedication to our common freedoms. Their spirit sustains us still.

On this day, April 9, the people of the United States join the Philippine people in commemorating the heroes of Bataan and Corregidor.

## **Grand Duchess Charlotte and Prince Jean of Luxembourg Visit U.S.**

The Department of State announced on April 11 (press release 189) that arrangements were being completed for the state visit of Her Royal Highness Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg and His Royal Highness Prince Jean, Hereditary Grand Duke, who will visit the United States April 29-May 4 at the invitation of President Kennedy. Their Royal Highnesses will arrive at Washington from Philadelphia on April 30 for a 2-day stay.

---

<sup>1</sup>Taped on Apr. 6 for broadcast by the Voice of America to the people of the Philippines.

## The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO

*by William R. Tyler*  
*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I have been asked to speak to you tonight on a subject which requires prophecy—always a risky device. Before we attempt to foresee what the effect of the projected European Union will be on NATO, let us examine the present situation and its background.

You are all familiar with the postwar history of our bipartisan support for European efforts toward unification. We have been quite pragmatic about this. We have adjusted our views on several occasions as the Europeans themselves have modified theirs as to what seemed the best way to move forward toward their objectives. For we have always been clear that the inspiration and drive for the creation of a new Europe must come from the Europeans themselves and have widespread popular European support if it were ever to succeed.

I stress this because the popular notion of a united Europe clearly centers on the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Although these institutions have large political implications, and indeed make many basic political decisions, they are generally considered to be economic in character. But economic unification can only be a partial step toward the creation of a new Europe. We have from the beginning accepted the obvious fact that, to be successful, a united Europe would have to be a complete Europe. It would have to be united not only in the economic sphere but in the political and military spheres as well.

Our support for European unity has always taken into account this basic consideration. Let me recall for you that in the early fifties this country gave its encouragement and support to the proposed European Defense Community and European Political Community. It was only after the collapse of the EDC proposal in 1954 that steps were taken toward the European Economic Community. These were essentially an economic approach toward the political goal of European unity.

In recent years the issues of European political and defense cooperation have come to the fore again. In the summer of 1961 the Bonn Declaration proposed a Union of the European Peoples designed to take first steps forward in the political and defense fields. Europe has since then been in ferment, discussing the problems and possibilities of such a step. The one thing which stands out in this intra-European dialog is that Europe itself is not agreed within itself upon how it shall proceed. The philosophic differences between federalism and confederalism, nationalism and supranationalism, integration and cooperation are well known to all of you. They are being debated now, and no clear-cut view is likely to emerge in the near future.

There is also the question of which countries shall make up this projected European Union, and no ready answers are in sight. We are keenly aware of these differences, for much hangs on the outcome. For over a decade in NATO the United States has been in a position which it does not find congenial. We have a massive nuclear deterrent. We possess almost 60 percent of the economic production and re-

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 5 (press release 177).

sources of the NATO alliance; the remainder unevenly distributed among a number of larger or smaller nations. So, like it or not, the needs and responsibility of leadership have, up to now, fallen to the United States. Political consultation, the problems of reaching accord and consensus with all of our partners in NATO, is an extremely difficult one. There is as and is no one spokesman for Europe. There are spokesmen for 15 individual countries who represent a significant diversity of opinion. I think this is why the European Economic Community has captured the imagination of so many Americans. As the voice of six countries, the institutions of the EEC for the first time afforded a real possibility that the United States could negotiate or consult with the representative of a single European view. Where the European Economic Community finds it possible to speak with a single voice, as in the tariff field, for example, we have already found that many more things are possible between us and that we can and must set our sights higher than has ever been possible in the past.

So, as Europe itself is prepared to speak with clarity, precision, and authority on a given issue, the nature of the relationship between us must change. This change need not be adverse; on the contrary, we expect that it will be a constructive change, that it will enable us to do more and greater things together not only among ourselves but in the interests of our common leadership position in the free world.

#### **Strength of NATO Alliance**

We can also expect, for the same reasons, that there will be constructive changes in the relationships of the countries of this new Europe vis-a-vis the other countries in NATO. This relationship will be slow to develop, perhaps, but it is inevitable that countries with common economic policies will have to harmonize their political and military policies. In the long run this circumstance is bound to provide an additional unifying factor in NATO.

I say "additional" because we have many unifying factors in NATO and we have the machinery provided for us to develop additional unifying factors. I say this with awareness that the public press is replete with stories pointing

out that the alliance is in disarray, that the allies cannot agree on basic issues. But we have agreed on the basic issues. Not only have we agreed on them, but we are convinced that these basic issues are right and are important. What we have not always agreed on is how we should develop the machinery to support these issues, these aims and ideals. The part of the machinery that is constantly being overhauled, and rightly so, is the defense side of NATO. From the public point of view it is the side of NATO which receives the greater attention. There are many complicated questions involved which I will not attempt to go into this evening—questions of what type of nuclear force, what type of control and what type of command, how many fingers on the trigger, and so on. They are important questions, and the countries of NATO are grappling with these questions. How these questions are answered will have a great deal to do with the development of NATO in other fields, will condition the attitude of this projected European Union within and toward NATO. But these complicated problems must be, and will be, solved. The future of the Atlantic community may well be at stake. But the Atlantic community has confronted, and surmounted, other problems in the past. The Atlantic alliance has demonstrated its strength in the past.

The strength of any alliance rests not on its forms, procedures, or structure but on the commitment, the integrity, and dedication of its members and on the ideals and goals of its members.

While the goals of NATO are as valid today as when the alliance was created, there is nothing sacrosanct about the way in which the alliance is organized. Indeed, the relationship between the military and political aspects of the alliance has undergone a progressive change since the early days. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed just 14 years ago, there was no plan to organize an integrated military command such as that which we now have, with combined headquarters, with common supply lines and closely coordinated defense plans. Its functions were those of a traditional alliance. The treaty itself is one of the most succinct and straightforward and unhedged of international



documents. Its 99-word preamble proclaims the determination of the member governments "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

The functions of the alliance were to insure maximum, pooled strength in the event of war and to deter a potential enemy by putting him on notice that if he upset the balance he would have to face not one enemy but the combined strength of all the members of the alliance. But at its inception NATO had little that could be termed a military strategy. Today it has a fully developed strategy. This strategy has evolved over the years to meet changing conditions and varying threats. The relationships between and among the partners have changed. As European countries have increased in prosperity, in strength, and in confidence, they have increased their potential, they have strengthened their role as partners. They are no longer dependents of the United States. The alliance must reflect this change and meet the interests and needs and the ambitions of its members. The form the alliance takes should be that which provides the best possible way of meeting these interests, needs, and ambitions.

#### **Political Consultation Within NATO**

The interests, needs, and ambitions of the 15 member countries of NATO are not, of course, the same. But if the interests, needs, and ambitions of the countries of the European Economic Community are harmonized, this can only have the effect of further unifying the alliance. This is extremely important from another point of view. That is the effect this new European Union will have on the nonmilitary aspects of NATO.

There has been a great deal written about the origins of NATO and how these origins have supposedly conditioned the development of NATO. NATO was organized to meet the threat of Soviet encroachment. It was, and is, successful in that the Soviets have not advanced further on Europe. The implication here is that if the threat disappears there is no need for NATO. There is the further implication that the NATO countries hang to-

gether in the face of this threat and that the countries will go their separate ways if the threat diminishes or is made to appear to diminish. These things may have been true several years ago. They are not true today.

NATO no longer has to depend on the imminence of the Soviet threat to hold together. Over the years a climate of confidence has developed. This climate of confidence is due in great part to the political consultation which takes place within NATO. I realize that this term "political consultation" is a much-abused one, but I think that is because it is misunderstood. Many take it to mean that one member of NATO should get the concurrence of the other 14 countries before embarking on any political or military action affecting one or more of the member countries or the interest of those countries. This, we all realize, is virtually impossible. No parliament or congress would ever allow this, in any event.

There are two types of political consultation which take place within NATO. One is the more or less formal action of one government informing its 14 NATO allies that a decision has been taken. This is merely a little more than an exchange of information. It does have some virtue in that the countries—and this is true in most cases—have been informed in advance. There is also the slight possibility that particularly weighty arguments may cause the country planning the action to change its course somewhat.

The second form of political consultation involves an intergovernmental exchange of views prior to any decision, that is, during the policy-making stage. Naturally there are difficulties here in that parliaments' rights cannot be encroached upon. But there is more of this type of consultation in NATO today than there has been 5 and 10 years ago. This method of political consultation is more likely to open the way to truly coordinated policies. The development of a European Union, with its coordinated policies, can only improve this type of consultation. Looked at purely from a mathematical viewpoint, it automatically reduces the number of parties involved—and therefore the potential number of points of view—by the number of countries in the union.

## **growing Consciousness of European Unity**

This political consultation is an important piece of machinery which the countries can utilize in fields other than military and political. The existing structure of NATO provides the framework for this. Article 2 of the NATO treaty states:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

This article 2 of the charter provides another means through which ideals and policies can be harmonized. If the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization pursue common ideals and follow common policies, the development of different concepts of military strategy will not occur. There will naturally be problems and difficulties of a technical nature, but they should not present in themselves a serious threat to allied unity.

This unity is not only a goal of United States foreign policy but also is an abiding necessity.

This unity is a goal shared by the peoples of Europe—they recognize that it is vital to their interests as well as ours, that it is an immutable fact of life.

There is movement, and forward movement, toward unity in these important regional organizations. There is a growing consciousness of unity.

This unity can continue to flourish in the cooperative ventures of NATO and of the European Community. But in order that the growth should continue we must have an atmosphere and feeling of security. We are bending every effort to strengthen that security. And since our security today is so dependent on nuclear weapons with their astronomical costs, we must have nations which are economically strong and prosperous.

This prosperity in turn requires a greater degree of coordination of economic policy, a policy in which the considerations of security and unity will be overriding. Today, in nearly all sectors of the economy in Western Europe

and in North America, business is prospering in this climate of security and unity. It will prosper further if the climate of security and unity is improved.

To these three necessary factors—of unity, security, and prosperity—we need to add a fourth: responsibility. All the member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance recognize their responsibilities to their own peoples. The conduct of these countries makes this fact self-evident. When all of these countries arrive at a greater realization that responsibility to their own people is closely related to responsibility in holding together, and in strengthening, the Atlantic community, we will attain progress at a greater rate.

The rate of progress will vary from time to time. There was a slowdown when the United Kingdom was refused entry into the European Community. The word “projected” in the title of this address, which title was assigned to me by your academy, represented the hope that the United Kingdom would be a member soon. Although we continue to consider that the accession of Great Britain to the Treaty of Rome is an objective to be encouraged, we recognize that this accession may not come about for some time. So there is some slowdown in the movement toward European unity as a result of the rupture in January, as the six members of the Common Market countries sort out their relationship with one another and as the British Government determines how best to establish its bona fides as a “good European” to the extent required better to qualify for entry on the Continent. Furthermore, this pace of European unity will be affected by domestic political activities in a number of countries. The Fanfani government in Italy faces an election test this month, the Dutch go to the polls next month, and Germany will be absorbed with the question of Chancellor Adenauer’s succession for many months to come. The British also face the prospect of elections sometime in 1964. With the intensification of domestic political activity in these countries, the attention of their leaders is likely to be directed more toward national considerations than toward broader questions of European unification.

But with all this, we remain convinced that the momentum toward European integration

will continue to increase. It is therefore important that the American public and the Congress do not become so disenchanted or impatient with recent developments as to diminish American support for the European unity movement. We should not react impetuously by moving toward a political or military "Fortress America" position. Recent events have slowed, but they have not stopped, the European drive toward integration; nor have they seriously impaired the degree of integration thus far achieved through the EEC. For these reasons we intend to reiterate our support for European integration so long as the European unity movement is neither subverted as an in-

strument for the hegemony of a single nation nor directed at the establishment of an autarchic Europe which would work against the political and economic interests of the United States and other free-world countries.

If we push forward in this movement, if we achieve a greater harmonization of our policies within our regional economic and military organizations, if we develop this sense and feeling of unity, security, prosperity, and responsibility, we will have an advantage that cannot be overcome. At some point the Communists will recognize this. This recognition may make possible progress toward disarmament, stability, and peace.

## Readjusting United States Foreign Trade

by Leonard Weiss

Director, Office of International Trade<sup>1</sup>

Last year the Congress passed the most far-reaching piece of trade legislation since the original enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934. It has been considered as one of the most important achievements of the Kennedy administration to date.

The original Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was itself a landmark in the foreign economic policy of the United States. It turned the tide of depression-born protectionism and initiated a worldwide movement for the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.

This program did noble service for over a quarter of a century, but like any program it began to peter out and became inadequate to meet the new circumstances and challenges which had arisen. While the basic policy thrust of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was more

relevant than ever, the tools it provided were no longer sufficient for the task. A new approach was required. The Trade Expansion Act<sup>2</sup> was thus enacted to do the job.

It is my purpose, in accordance with the request of your chairman, to indicate the nature of the task ahead, the new problems to which U.S. trade policy must address itself, and the plans for meeting these problems with the help of the Trade Expansion Act.

### Fundamentals of U.S. Trade Policy

Perhaps the best way to begin is to consider some fundamentals of U.S. trade policy.

U.S. trade policy has been based—and still is today—on three essential elements: nondiscrimination, the reduction of tariffs, and the elimination of quantitative barriers to trade. The

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Spring Alumni College at Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa., on Apr. 5 (press release 174 dated Apr. 4).

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the act, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 656; for an Executive order on the administration of the act, see *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180.

policy of nondiscrimination—of “most favored nation” treatment—has been consistently applied in one form or another since the beginnings of the Republic. It is a policy that was written into the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934 and has been continued in every piece of successor legislation since then, including the new Trade Expansion Act.

The reduction of tariffs is, of course, the most direct expression of the old trade legislation as well as the new. Although the central feature of this legislation has been the provision of authority to the President to negotiate on a reciprocal basis the reduction of tariff barriers to trade, it has always been recognized that the potential benefits from foreign tariff reductions must be protected through commitments assuring that our exports will be given nondiscriminatory treatment—that is, most-favored-nation treatment—and that they will not unnecessarily or unjustifiably be subjected to quantitative import restrictions. Thus there is a close inter-relationship among the three basic elements of our trade policy.

Through the years quantitative restrictions have been viewed as the most undesirable of possible methods of limiting trade. While resort to them might sometimes be necessary, they have always been considered as exceptional and temporary devices to restrain trade. Tariffs have been regarded as the preferable technique where domestic protection might be needed.

Behind the three basic elements which I mentioned lay certain political, economic, and philosophic conceptions. These policies were based on the notion of the desirability of maximizing the influence of the marketplace, and minimizing the intervention of the government, in the conduct of international trade. They assumed that an international trading system based on such principles would reduce international political friction, contribute to the more efficient use of economic resources, encourage an increase in living standards, and in all these ways generally promote the interests of a free world community.

Although the three fundamental elements of American trade policy have been generally adhered to through the years, they have been occasionally qualified to meet practical realities.

Quantitative restrictions have been accepted for exceptional protective, security, and other purposes; tariffs have sometimes been raised to avoid serious injury to domestic industry; and even nondiscrimination—perhaps the most sacred of American policies—has on occasion been breached. Some of these departures from basic policy were of major importance. Nonetheless, the main thrust of American policy continues on the basis of the three principles I have described, and, indeed, the departures from them have provided the flexibility and resilience necessary to make the policies work and to adhere to the general direction they prescribe.

There is no intention to change this general direction of U.S. policy. In some respects, for example as regards the lowering of tariffs, the intention is to intensify efforts along this line. Departures may occur, but if they do they should be appraised against the overall picture so as to avoid undue distortion as to the general direction of American policy.

#### **Program Under Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act**

I should like now to sketch some aspects of the development of the trade program under the old reciprocal trade legislation so as to assess its accomplishments and also its shortcomings and thus better understand the problems now faced by U.S. trade policy and the course this policy should take.

There are five aspects of the old trade program which are particularly relevant:

1. the authority available for tariff reductions;
2. the policy of avoidance of serious injury;
3. the selective, item-by-item type of negotiation;
4. the advance from bilateral to multilateral techniques of negotiation; and
5. the internal organization of the U.S. Government for the conduct of the trade program.

To turn to the first aspect, the original Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, enacted on June 12, 1934, authorized the President to reduce duties by 50 percent of the existing level. These duties were those of the high Smoot-

Hawley tariff of 1930. In 1945 the President received authority to reduce duties by an additional 50 percent of the level existing as of January 1, 1945. In 1955 and 1958 he obtained further grants of authority to reduce duties by another 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

If the full tariff reduction authority had been used on an item (that is, a 50-percent reduction of the 1934 rate, another 50-percent reduction of the 1945 rate, and further 15- and 20-percent reductions under the 1955 and 1958 authorities), the duty would have been reduced in total by 83 percent by July 1 of this year, when the final stage of the reductions made under the 1958 authority is to come into effect. Thus a duty of 100 percent in 1934 would go down to 17 percent on July 1 of this year, and a duty of 50 percent in 1934 (not much above the average at that time) would be brought down to 8½ percent.

The fact is that the decrease in U.S. tariffs since 1934 has been almost as dramatic as the figures I have just cited would indicate. As measured by the ratio of duties collected to the overall value of dutiable imports, the average U.S. tariff on dutiable goods has dropped from 46.7 percent in 1934 to 12 percent in 1961. While a substantial part of this reduction has been the direct result of tariff negotiations conducted under the trade agreements authority, not all of the decrease is attributable to the program. A significant part of the decrease has resulted from the effect of price increases through the years on the ad valorem incidence of those duties—of which we have many—that are assessed on a specific basis.

Under the old trade legislation the United States concluded tariff-reducing negotiations with 54 countries. In the case of 31 countries the United States negotiated two or more tariff-reducing agreements in the period 1934 to date. This is an impressive performance.

As time went on, however, tariff reductions were becoming increasingly difficult to make on the basis of existing policies and procedures. Earlier reductions were to a considerable extent squeezing the water out of the tariff. Protective domestic pressures grew. The policies and procedures for tariff reductions became, as I shall indicate in a moment, increasingly restric-

tive. As a result, the authority for tariff reduction granted in the legislation was not being fully used. The United States was having less and less to put on the negotiating table, and the trade program began to sputter badly in later years.

This brings us to the second important aspect of the trade program as it has thus far been conducted, namely, the policy of avoidance of serious injury. From the very beginnings of the program the policy of the administration, both Democratic and Republican, has been to avoid serious injury to domestic industry in making tariff reductions.

Over the years this policy became more and more refined and hardened. At first the "no serious injury" policy was reflected simply in declarations by the administration of its intention to avoid serious injury in making tariff reductions. Then, in response to expressions of concern that tariff reductions had already gone too far, an Executive order—the forerunner of the escape clause—was issued to assure that tariff reductions in particular cases were withdrawn if increased imports were causing or threatening injury to the domestic industry concerned.

The critics of the program then argued that it was unreasonable to wait until the damage was done; instead the damage should be prevented in the first place. And thus was born the so-called "peril point" provision, under which the Tariff Commission was required by law to establish the precise point below which a tariff reduction would cause serious injury. If a duty were reduced below this point, an accounting had to be made to the Congress. Like the peril point, the escape clause was also embodied in the trade agreements legislation by the Congress and increasingly restrictive standards and procedures for its application were developed.

This process of refining the no-serious-injury policy and embedding it into law under standards and procedures designed to discourage tariff reductions exerted an increasingly debilitating effect on the program. Tariff reductions became more and more difficult to make.

As a consequence, in the last round of tariff negotiations the executive branch and the Tar-

iff Commission, in conformity with the legislative requirements and the policies they reflected, so pruned the list of potential U.S. tariff concessions that the United States was able to put on the bargaining table offers of tariff concessions amounting to less than 20 percent of its imports from the countries with which it was negotiating. In the case of some countries the United States as a result of this process had practically nothing to offer. The United States was able to conclude the negotiations only by making concessions on a substantial number of items below the rates established by the Tariff Commission under the peril-point procedure. The concessions so granted were those on which the possibility of serious injury was judged to be unlikely or minimal.

This experience demonstrated the bankruptcy of this approach to the process of tariffmaking. It clearly would not be possible to mount another tariff negotiation on the old basis and procedures. The Tariff Commission itself has been among the first to recognize the impossibility of predicting precisely at what point a tariff reduction might cause serious injury. Furthermore, the concept of avoidance of serious injury was being equated with that of avoidance of any adjustment whatsoever to changed competitive conditions, even where such adjustment might be possible without serious injury. Other areas of domestic economic activity were not operating on the theory that adjustment was bad. To the contrary, the most highly advertised feature of the American way of life has been its dynamic character, its willingness to accept and respond to change, its technological achievement, and its receptivity to innovation.

Now I do not mean to imply that the trade agreements program should have been operated, or should now be operated, without proper safeguards for the interests of American producers. The new Trade Expansion Act contains safeguards to provide necessary protection. The difference is that the new safeguards, because they offer an incentive to improving productive efficiency, as I shall explain, can better advance the national interest at the same time that they permit broader use of the tariff reduction authority.

Another characteristic of negotiations under

the old trade legislation was that they were conducted on an item-by-item basis. The United States prepared its lists of offers to, and requests from, countries on an individual basis. It then bargained product by product, in the most minute and painstaking detail, with the other countries concerned.

This procedure was most laborious and time-consuming. The last round of tariff negotiations took over 3 years to prepare for and complete. Other countries found it increasingly difficult to do business in this way. Notably the European Economic Community (EEC), which had the positions of six member countries to reconcile, made it clear that the only way in which it could practically negotiate in the future was on some type of linear basis, offering a more or less uniform tariff reduction across the board and, naturally, expecting a comparable offer in return.

Another important aspect of experience under the old legislation was the advance from the bilateral to the multilateral technique of negotiation. The United States originally negotiated under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act with one country at a time. To conserve bargaining power in each negotiation it would withhold concessions on items where some third country might be the principal beneficiary.

This approach was an extremely slow one and prevented the most effective use of available bargaining power. It prevented bringing to bear in a particular negotiation the benefits which the other country concerned might gain from concessions that might be granted in a subsequent bilateral negotiation with some third country. As a result the scope of the possible exchange of tariff concessions was reduced under the bilateral process.

The United States broke away from this approach in 1947 and adopted a multilateral technique in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In these negotiations the United States bargained simultaneously with 22 countries. Under this technique the United States paired off by means of individual negotiating teams with the other countries with which it was negotiating. The other countries did the same thing among themselves. In each

pair of negotiations account was taken of concessions being considered in other pairs of negotiations. The concessions concluded in each pair of negotiations were in the end put into a common pot and extended to all the other countries participating in the negotiations. Thus each country received concessions on commodities not only in which it had a principal supplying interest but also in which it might have a secondary interest. Each country was accordingly willing to grant more concessions, and the total package of concessions was far greater than would have been possible in the isolated bilateral negotiations of the prewar years.

Furthermore, the time required to conclude such a network of concessions was far less than what would have been necessary on the old bilateral basis. Thus in the original GATT negotiations of 1947 the United States concluded exchanges of tariff concessions with 22 other countries in less than 7 months as compared with the conclusion of bilateral agreements with 29 countries over the previous 13 years.

Before turning to the Trade Expansion Act, I should like to mention one further aspect of the old legislation, namely, the manner in which the U.S. Government organized itself to conduct the trade agreements program. The program was run on an interagency basis, largely under the leadership of the Department of State. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act required that the President seek the advice of the Department of State and of other agencies in the conduct of the program. Pursuant to this requirement, an interagency Trade Agreements Committee (TAC) had been established by Executive order. The Committee consisted of the Department of State, as chairman, and of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Defense, Labor, and Interior, and of the Tariff Commission. The officials on the Committee were at the technical, career level.

In 1957 the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) was established by Executive order. It consisted of the same agencies, except for the Tariff Commission, as were on the TAC. It was established, however, at the Cabinet level and was designed to provide policy guidance. This Committee was chaired by the Secretary of Commerce.

As I shall point out later, the Congress did not consider these arrangements adequate to meet the need.

### **Trade Expansion Act of 1962**

I have tried to outline some of the major characteristics of the trade agreements program as it had been conducted under legislation prior to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act. Now I should like to examine the Trade Expansion Act in relation to each of these aspects.

As regards the authority for tariff reductions the Trade Expansion Act made a major, and in one respect revolutionary, step forward. With authority under the old act practically exhausted, the new act gave the President very substantial new powers. It authorized him to reduce tariffs in trade agreements with any free world country by 50 percent of the level existing July 1, 1962.

Important as this power is, the act granted the President an additional type of authority never before extended in the legislation, namely the authority to eliminate a duty completely. To be sure, this authority was carefully defined but it established a significant new principle in the history of the trade program. The President had previously been authorized to impose a duty where none had formerly existed, but the Trade Expansion Act for the first time permitted the President to eliminate a duty completely.

Specifically the act authorizes the President to eliminate a duty in any of the following four circumstances:

1. He could eliminate a duty on an industrial product in a category where the United States and the EEC supplied over 80 percent of free world exports.
2. He could in an agreement with the EEC eliminate the duty on an agricultural product where he determined such action would tend to assure the maintenance or expansion of U.S. exports of the like product.
3. He could eliminate the duty on a tropical agricultural or forestry commodity not produced in significant quantities in the United States, provided the EEC took comparable action on an essentially nondiscriminatory basis.
4. He could eliminate the duty on product where the rate is 5 percent or less.



The first authority, the so-called 80-percent "dominant supplier" authority, was so written as to be largely contingent on the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community. The collapse of the U.K.-EC negotiations reduced this authority to only a few categories. The other zero authorities remain unimpaired.

*In toto*, notwithstanding the impairment of the dominant-supplier authority, the power granted to the President in the new act to reduce and eliminate duties is most impressive. For the first time since 1945 the President now has major bargaining authority to use to open markets for American goods and to advance other American interests, including greater access to markets for the less developed countries. The Trade Expansion Act makes another notable advance in the handling of the serious-injury problem. As I have indicated, under the old act the only thing the President could do to deal with injury to domestic industry from imports was to apply new restrictions, raise the duty, or impose quotas pursuant to the escape clause.

Such action was highly unsatisfactory. It failed in any fundamental way to deal with the problem of the domestic producer, penalized the American consumer, encouraged a misuse of domestic resources, generally impeded the healthy development of both the domestic and international economy, and created international friction.

The Trade Expansion Act gives the President a new tool to deal with such problems—trade adjustment assistance. It provides means to enable domestic firms and workers to adjust to foreign competition either by becoming more competitive in the same line of production or by moving into other fields of activity. To the firms it provides loans or guaranties of loans, tax assistance in the form of special carryback of operating losses, or technical marketing or other assistance. To the workers it provides readjustment allowances in the form of unemployment compensation, retraining of workers for other types of employment, and relocation allowances to assist families in moving to an area where employment may be available.

This approach to the problem of import com-

petition is in the best American tradition and spirit. Instead of fighting change it accepts it and provides means for new advances. It deals with competition by meeting it, not running away from it. It stimulates technical innovation and the development of new skills. It makes the most of our resources and provides higher returns to the businessman and worker alike. It encourages the future dynamic development of our economy. It promotes a sounder international trading system and contributes to healthier international political relations.

While providing a new facility for dealing with import competition, the act still retains an escape clause permitting the imposition of restrictions to correct problems of serious injury. The new escape clause, however, is a major improvement over the old one by providing sounder standards for its application. Under the new act escape-clause relief is available only when the injury relates to the industry as a whole, rather than merely a segment of it as under the old act. Furthermore, before relief can be granted under the new escape clause, there must be increased imports resulting "in major part" from tariff concessions, and such increased imports must in turn be "the major factor" in causing or threatening the serious injury. Under the old act it was not necessary in order to obtain relief to show that the tariff concessions were the cause of the increase in imports or that the imports were the major cause of the injury.

In line with the more realistic and constructive approach of the new act, it also eliminates the requirement for the Tariff Commission to establish peril points, that is, the points below which duties allegedly cannot be reduced without doing serious injury to domestic industry. Instead, the act spells out in detail the type of information which the Tariff Commission shall provide the President in order to inform him as to the probable economic effect of tariff concessions which the United States might offer other countries. In making a judgment on tariff concessions to offer, the President would take into account not only the information provided by the Tariff Commission but also that available within the executive branch.

The Trade Expansion Act also envisages an advance in the technique for negotiating tariff reductions. As I noted earlier, tariff negotiations under the old legislation proceeded on a product-by-product basis involving the most protracted and exhausting type of haggling conceivable. Progress on this basis was no longer feasible.

In requesting the new authority, the administration made clear that it intended to apply the authority on an across-the-board basis, short-circuiting the individual commodity bargaining. The Congress accepted this idea in granting the authority.

The precise form which the across-the-board technique of negotiation will take is yet to be worked out. It is clear, however, that it involves at least two characteristics: one, it involves the reduction of tariffs on a comprehensive basis; two, it involves the adoption of some mutually agreed rules pursuant to which tariffs can be reduced without individual commodity negotiation. Any such scheme would, of course, have to permit exceptions as required by the Trade Expansion Act or as deemed appropriate after careful study by the Tariff Commission and the executive branch on the basis of information provided in public hearings and otherwise.

The new act also envisages a continuation of one of the best features developed under the old legislation, namely, negotiations on a multilateral basis. As I have noted, the United States made a major advance in 1947 in negotiating simultaneously with many countries rather than with only one country at a time. The United States intends to continue to negotiate on this basis.

There has been some confusion on this point as a result of the special emphasis which the United States has given to negotiations with the EEC. It is perfectly consistent with this emphasis—indeed, essential to success—to negotiate with other countries at the same time as the United States negotiates with the EEC. Concessions exchanged between the United States and the EEC will be added to the concessions negotiated by the other participating countries; each participating country will get

the concessions made by any of them. Consistently with the most-favored-nation requirement written into the Trade Expansion Act, the United States will extend to all free-world countries the concessions it makes to the EEC or any other country and will, in turn, receive comparable treatment from other countries.

Finally, the new act makes some major changes in the organization within the U.S. Government for carrying on the trade program. Most importantly, it establishes a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. This representative is to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and will carry ambassadorial rank. He will act as the direct representative of the President and will be responsible for all negotiations under the act.

The Honorable Christian A. Herter has been appointed to this position. As a distinguished former Secretary of State, Congressman, and Governor of Massachusetts, and as a leader in many public enterprises, he comes to this position with unique qualifications, experience, and capacities. Mr. William T. Gossett, a former vice president of the Ford Motor Company and an eminent businessman and lawyer, has been appointed as deputy to Mr. Herter with the rank of ambassador. These two men can be counted on to give effective direction and impetus to the conduct of the program in the best interests of the United States.

The act also provides for an interagency committee on the Cabinet level to advise the President in the conduct of the program. The Committee, called the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee (TEAAC), is chaired by Governor Herter. The other members are the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

Under Mr. Herter's direction there are also being established three other committees, with representation from these same Government agencies. There is a Trade Executive Committee (TEC), chaired by Mr. Gossett, which is at the assistant-secretary level. This Committee will serve as the operating arm of the program. It will have under it a technical-level Trade Staff Committee (TSC), chaired by an official

Governor Herter's office and including a representative designated by the Chairman of the Tariff Commission. The TSC will, as its name implies, do the necessary staff work for the TEC. Finally, there will be a Trade Information Committee (TIC) to hold public hearings and otherwise receive views from interested parties as envisaged under the act. Like the Trade Staff Committee, it will include a Tariff Commission representative.

In addition to its participation on these latter two committees, the Tariff Commission is given many responsibilities under the act. It will provide advice to the President with respect to items put on the public list for consideration for possible concessions and tariff negotiations. It will, as at present, make investigations and advise the President with regard to requests for escape-clause relief. It is also called on to make investigations and certain determinations with respect to applications by firms and workers for trade adjustment assistance.

As regards the latter, the Secretary of Commerce is given responsibility for administering trade adjustment assistance for firms and the Secretary of Labor for workers. The act also establishes an Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board (AAAB), consisting of the Secretary of Commerce as Chairman and of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration, and such other officials as the President deems appropriate. This Committee is to advise the President and operating agencies on the administration of the trade adjustment assistance program.

In summary, the Trade Expansion Act has corrected some major deficiencies in the old program while retaining its better features. It has increased the President's authority to reduce duties and given him new powers to eliminate them. It has provided additional means to deal with problems of import competition. It has foreseen new and more effective techniques of negotiation while continuing the multilateral approach. It has strengthened the internal organization for conducting the trade program. All in all, this is a substantial achievement.

### Carrying Out the Trade Expansion Act

The next step obviously is to carry out the authority in the act and to negotiate the agreements it contemplates. The process will be a long and difficult one. It will require careful preparation at home and internationally.

What we have to contend with is a very wide gamut of trade matters going far beyond tariffs alone. The development of the Common Market has upset long-established trading patterns and relationships at the same time as it has created new ones. In addition we face many problems which would have existed and which would have had to be met even if there were no Common Market.

Trade in agriculture, for example, has always been a most difficult issue in international trading relationships. The development of the Common Market has dramatized the issue. The problem, however, is an old one, and the time is overdue for coming to grips with it.

In dealing with this problem we shall have to take a hard look at our own policies and practices. We can expect from others no more than what we can expect of ourselves.

There is also the problem of the trade of less developed countries. The need of these countries to expand their exports and earn the foreign exchange to support their development is growing more, rather than less, acute. The terms of trade of these countries have been increasingly unfavorable, and the gap between their foreign exchange earnings and their import requirements is continuing to grow. In addition to this general problem there are special difficulties as a result of the favored position which some less developed countries have over others in access to the Common Market. Ways and means must be found to meet these various problems.

There is the whole area of nontariff barriers to which we must give attention. The United States is concerned about quantitative restrictions against its trade, particularly those applied inconsistently with international commitments. The United States is also concerned about other burdensome restrictions against its trade. The Trade Expansion Act took specific note of unjustifiable restrictions against American commerce and directed the President to do

everything practicable to obtain the easing of such restrictions.

Other countries are similarly concerned about U.S. policies and practices. They are fearful that the escape clause might be used to nullify tariff concessions which they may negotiate with the United States. They find that U.S. valuation for duty purposes of certain products on the basis of American selling price renders tariff concessions on such products meaningless and are unwilling to exchange tariff concessions in this area unless the United States takes some steps to deal with this problem. They are worried about the operation of U.S. antidumping legislation and about increasingly restrictive application of "Buy American" laws and practices. They wish matters such as these to be considered in the coming negotiations.

The United States is now pointing its efforts toward a meeting of GATT ministers to convene in Geneva next month.<sup>3</sup> This meeting will consider plans for future tariff negotiations, the problem of trade in agriculture, and the problem of trade of the less developed countries. It is anticipated that at this meeting the ministers will decide to hold a tariff conference some time in the early part of next year. It is also hoped that new initiatives will be provided and decisions taken to enable concrete progress to be made with respect to trade in agriculture and the trade of less developed countries.

#### **Need for General Movement of Liberalization**

A great new enterprise is thus in the making. The difficulties which lie ahead should not be minimized. The problems which will have to be solved are many and complex. They will raise difficult economic and political issues for the countries concerned. The differing views of the countries participating in this enterprise will have to be reconciled.

Nothing less than a broad general movement of tariff and trade liberalization is required. The collapse of the negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community makes this need even more urgent. It is to be expected that the

---

<sup>3</sup> For an announcement, see *ibid.*, Mar. 18, 1963, p. 418.

trading countries of the free world, out of self-interest if for no other reason, will respond to the needs of the situation and reach constructive solutions to the problems ahead. It is to this task that we must now all turn.

## **United States Delegations to International Conferences**

### **ECAFE Study of Tokaido Railway**

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 175) that Laurence K. Walrath, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission, would be the U.S. representative and chairman of the U.S. delegation<sup>1</sup> at a Study Week of Techniques of Construction Used on the New Tokaido Railway Line, held at Tokyo April 11-18 under the sponsorship of the Government of Japan and the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Construction began on the new 315-mile high-speed railway line between Tokyo and Osaka 3 years ago and is expected to be completed in 1 more year. The new line will triple existing rail capacity between the two cities. It will serve some 40 million people and 70 percent of Japan's industry. The line, capable of handling an initial 90 trains daily each way at an average speed of 105 miles an hour, has many innovations to help solve transit problems.

The U.S. delegation will devote special attention to those economic, service, and safety features which could be incorporated into the planning of American railroad projects and transport regulations. Various Japanese railroad delegations visiting the United States have reported a similarity of problems encountered in modernizing rail facilities to meet the needs of highly industrialized and heavily populated urban areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. delegation will be the upgrading of railway equipment, development of containerization and "piggyback" service, operation of safety apparatus such as automatic signal and train control equipment, and possible economic impacts upon competing types of transport.

---

<sup>1</sup> For a list of the other members of the U.S. delegation and U.S. industry representatives participating in the study, see Department of State press release 175.

# **U.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes in Cultural and Other Exchanges**

Press release 168 dated April 1, for release April 2

## **DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT**

William A. Crawford, American Minister at Bucharest, and Pompiliu Macovei, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic, representing their governments, exchanged diplomatic notes in Bucharest on April 2 which provide a framework for arranging visits and exchanges between the two countries for the calendar years 1963 and 1964. Similar diplomatic notes<sup>1</sup> were exchanged on December 9, 1960, in Washington between representatives of both governments for calendar years 1961 and 1962. Letters setting forth some concrete provisions for visits and exchanges during calendar year 1963 were exchanged at the same time.<sup>2</sup> On the occasion of exchange of the documents, the American representative expressed the belief that expanding cultural relations would facilitate the freer flow of information between the two countries and would contribute to a truer and better understanding between the American and Rumanian peoples.

The visits and exchanges provided for in the exchange of notes will take place in the fields of graduate study, science and industry, performing arts, sports, and tourism. The notes also provide for cooperation in the fields of motion pictures, exhibits, books and publications, radio, and television.

## **EXCHANGE OF NOTES**

### **U.S. Note**

APRIL 2, 1963

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic regarding the program of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational, scientific and other fields during the calendar years 1963 and 1964.

<sup>1</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1960, p. 968.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed here.

In this connection, I wish to inform you that the Government of the United States approves the following provisions which record the understandings reached in the discussions:

#### *1. Educational Exchanges*

a. Both Parties agree to provide for the exchange of post-graduate students for purposes of advanced scholarly and scientific study between United States and Rumanian universities and other institutions of higher learning, including scientific institutes.

b. Both Parties agree to provide for exchanges between United States and Rumanian universities of professors and instructors for lectures, language instruction and study, consultations and seminars.

#### *2. Scientific, Technical and Industrial Exchanges*

a. Both Parties agree to encourage the development of exchanges in the field of science, including such exchanges as may be carried out between academies of sciences of both countries. To this end, each Party agrees to facilitate visits of scientists from the other country for the purpose of delivering lectures and addresses at scientific institutes and institutions of higher learning.

b. Both Parties favor the exchange of delegations composed of specialists and technicians who wish to study various aspects of technical and industrial activity in the other country.

c. Each Party, through diplomatic channels or appropriate authorized organizations, and on a mutual basis, shall continue to invite scientists and technicians to participate in national scientific meetings, congresses and conferences as opportunities may arise.

#### *3. Exchanges in Performing and Creative Arts*

a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to support exchanges in the field of performing arts, including artistic, musical and theatrical groups, conductors, theatrical supervisory personnel and individual artists.

(1) Both Parties agree to facilitate the attendance of invitees to national musical competitions and other similar events with international participation which may be organized in each country.

b. Both Parties agree to encourage and support exchanges in the field of creative arts, including groups of writers, composers, artists and others, as well as individuals in these categories.

#### *4. Exchanges in Sports*

a. Each Party agrees to encourage and facilitate invitations from its athletic and sports organizations in order that athletes from one country can participate in athletic and sports exhibitions and contests in the other country.

#### *5. Exchanges of Books and Publications and Cooperation in the Field of Publishing*

a. Both Parties agree to encourage and to assist in the exchanges of books, pamphlets, periodical literature, scholarly and scientific studies, microfilms and

other printed and duplicated materials devoted to educational, scientific, technical, cultural and other subjects between university, public and specialized libraries and other appropriate institutions of both countries.

(1) Educational materials and publications may include university catalogues, textbooks, study programs, curricula, syllabi, visual aids and documentary materials in various fields of study.

b. Both Parties agree to use their good offices to encourage the sale through commercial channels of books and other publications in the Rumanian language in the United States and in the English language in the Rumanian People's Republic.

c. Both Parties agree to encourage, subject to the consent of the authors or other parties in interest, the translation and publication in one country of scientific and literary works, including anthologies, dictionaries and other compilations, as well as scientific studies, reports and articles published in the other country.

#### 6. Radio and Television Exchanges

a. Both Parties agree to assist in the exchange of radio and television programs between American and Rumanian radio and television companies and organizations. The details of these exchanges will be worked out between the representatives of American radio and television companies designated by the Department of State and Rumanian radio and television organizations designated by the legal authorities, or between the Parties.

b. Each Party agrees to facilitate appearances, either recorded or in person, over radio and television by government officials, artists and public figures of the other country.

#### 7. Exhibits

a. Both Parties agree to provide for showings in several cities of exhibits from the other country during each of the two years these arrangements are in effect.

#### 8. Cooperation in the Field of Motion Pictures

a. Both Parties will encourage the conclusion of commercial contracts between American film companies approved by the Department of State and Rumanian film organizations approved by the legal authorities for the purchase and sale of mutually acceptable feature films.

b. Both Parties will encourage the exchanges of approved documentary and scientific films between corresponding organizations and assist their distribution through appropriate distribution channels.

c. Both Parties will seek to arrange annual special showings in their respective capitals and other cities of representative films to which film personalities from the other country may be invited to attend.

d. Both Parties agree that all of the films exchanged, purchased or sold in accordance with this section will be released in dubbed or subtitled versions. The contents of the films will be preserved and any changes

must be agreed to by the supplying Party. Prior to its distribution, the release version of each film must be agreed to by a representative designated by the supplying Party.

e. The Parties favor and agree to encourage, under appropriate conditions, other means of cooperation in this field, such as the joint production of feature, documentary and other films.

#### 9. Tourism

a. Both Parties favor the development of tourism between the two countries and agree to take measures, on the basis of equality of opportunity, to satisfy better the requests of tourists to acquaint themselves with the way of life, work and culture of the respective peoples.

Specific details and programs of the above-mentioned visits and exchanges will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels or by approved organizations. Except where other mutually satisfactory arrangements have been made, it is agreed that individual visitors and delegations will pay their own expenses to and in the receiving country. It is understood that the arrangements agreed upon do not exclude the possibility of additional visits and exchanges which may be mutually acceptable to the two Parties or which may be undertaken by interested United States and Rumanian organizations or private citizens, it being understood that arrangements for additional exchanges, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior agreement in diplomatic channels or between approved organizations. It is further understood that the commitments provided for above shall be subject to the constitutional requirements and applicable laws and regulations of the two countries.

The Government of the United States of America takes note of the approval by the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic of these understandings as confirmed in your note of today's date.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WILLIAM A. CRAWFORD  
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister  
Plenipotentiary of the United  
States of America*

His Excellency  
POMPILIU MACOVEI,  
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Bucharest.*

#### Rumanian Note

APRIL 2, 1963

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic and the Government of the United States of America regarding the program of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational, scientific and other fields during the calendar years 1963 and 1964.

In this connection, I wish to inform you that the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic approves the following provisions which record the understandings reached in the discussions:

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 1 through 9, as in the .S. note above.]

Specific details and programs of the above-mentioned visits and exchanges will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels or by approved organizations. Except where other mutually satisfactory arrangements have been made, it is agreed that individual visitors and delegations will pay their own expenses to and in the receiving country. It is understood that the arrangements agreed upon do not exclude the possibility of additional visits and exchanges which may be mutually acceptable to the two Parties or which may be undertaken by interested Rumanian and United States organizations or private citizens, it being understood that arrangements for additional exchanges, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior agreement in diplomatic channels or between approved organizations. It is further understood that the commitments provided for above shall be subject to the constitutional requirements and applicable laws and regulations of the two countries.

The Government of the Rumanian People's Republic takes note of the approval by the Government of the United States of America of these understandings as confirmed in your note of today's date.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

POMPILIU MACOVEI  
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the Rumanian People's Republic*

The Honorable  
WILLIAM A. CRAWFORD,  
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary  
of the United States of America.*

## **Two New Members Appointed to Advisory Committee on Arts**

The Department of State announced on April 8 (press release 185) two new appointments to the reconstituted Advisory Committee on the Arts, which gives guidance to the Department in the conduct of its program of sending cultural presentations to foreign countries.

The new appointees are Lew Christensen, director of the San Francisco Ballet, and Nina

Vance, founder and managing director of the Alley Theater in Houston. Appointment of the first 4 members of the 10-member committee was announced on March 7.<sup>1</sup> They are Roy E. Larsen, chairman, Warner Lawson, Peter Mennin, and George Seaton.

The committee is authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act (Public Law 87-256). A predecessor committee was authorized by earlier legislation but was not accorded the broad role marked out for this group as a result of the recent reorganization of the U.S. cultural presentations program. This reorganization followed a request in October 1962 by Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, for review of the program and recommendations for its future by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. This review<sup>2</sup> was made by Mr. Larsen, who is vice chairman of the Commission, and Glenn G. Wolfe, a Foreign Service officer who is at present director of the Office of Cultural Presentations. The secretariat for the Advisory Committee on the Arts is headed by Heath Bowman.

## **World Food Congress Secretariat Opens Office at Washington**

The Department of State and the Department of Agriculture announced on March 29 (Department of State press release 165) that S. Y. Krishnaswamy, Secretary General of the World Food Congress, has established an international headquarters secretariat at the Department of State.

The World Food Congress, sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, will be held at Washington June 4-18, on invitation of the U.S. Government.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 25, 1962, p. 448.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 46.



## The Foreign Aid Program

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*<sup>1</sup>

I appreciate the opportunity to meet once again with the committee to discuss one of our vital contributions to the security of the free world. One year ago I came here to discuss the President's proposals for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.<sup>2</sup> Before taking up his proposals for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963,<sup>3</sup> I should like to touch briefly on some of the changes and trends in the world situation during the last 12 months.

A year ago we were deeply concerned with crises in Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, Berlin, and Cuba. None of these has been finally resolved. But agreements were finally reached on the neutralization of Laos and a new government was installed. The situation there remains precarious: The Viet Minh controlled by Hanoi have not been completely withdrawn; the coalition remains uneasy. But certainly one element which has contributed heavily to the progress made in Laos has been the U.S. foreign assistance program. Without our aid, the supporters of Laotian neutrality and freedom would undoubtedly have lost. Our assistance program continues to provide a vital economic margin to those who would keep Laos independent.

Next door the Communist guerrilla aggression directed from Hanoi against the Republic of Vietnam remains dangerous. But it has been curbed. Generally, it may be said that the

threat to Southeast Asia has been brought under control. Our military and economic assistance programs are crucial in meeting this test of strength.

In the Congo, much remains to be done to consolidate political unity and to move forward socially and economically. But the country is no longer torn by secessionist movements; and the outlook there has measurably improved. U.S. assistance during the past year given through the United Nations has not only given the Congo its first real opportunity for independent life, but also has been instrumental in preventing a great-power confrontation.

West Berlin stands free and prosperous; and we think that everyone understands that we and our allies will do whatever may be necessary to keep it that way.

The Communist thrust into the Western Hemisphere by way of Cuba last autumn took a new and highly dangerous turn; the events of that crisis are now well known. The underlying crisis represented by the presence in this hemisphere of international communism is still with us. But I think it may be said that among the results of the crisis of last October there has been a sharp decline in Castro's prestige both in Cuba and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. The economy of Cuba continues to disintegrate.

There have been other significant events in the past months.

The Chinese Communist incursions into India had profound effects on Indian public opinion

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Apr. 5.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1962, p. 659.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

and noticeable effects on the policies of the Indian Government. Last fall in an hour of crisis, the Indian Government turned to us and other Western countries for emergency assistance. We responded promptly with munitions and supplies and with air transport to deliver them to the Northeast Frontier. More recently, at the invitation of the Indian Government, we joined Great Britain, Canada, and Australia in sending a mission to India to study the problems of organizing an effective air defense for India's major cities in the event of Chinese Communist air attacks.

The Communist Chinese invasion highlights a cornerstone of our assistance policy: that we must assist the subcontinent of South Asia in its competition with Communist China. The Communist Chinese military attack appears to confirm—in a broad sense—that the Chinese are worried by this competition and that our assistance policy combined with the forthright actions of the recipients is meeting with success in this contest.

Iraq has a new and stoutly independent government. Other countries in the Middle East and Africa which seemed to be flirting dangerously with the Soviet bloc have been moving toward a wavier independence and better relations with the West.

Within the Communist world, the dispute between Moscow and Peiping has become increasingly bitter. It has infected the Communist parties in most other countries.

Trends toward diversity—and fragmentation—are evident in the Communist movement generally. Trends toward “destalinization” are visible in all the Eastern European Communist states except perhaps Albania. Nationalism remains a vigorous force in Eastern Europe—a force which we need to take into full account in our own attitudes and policies.

Communist China remains in the grip of a severe economic crisis. It suffers from shortages in domestic food production; its industrial development has lagged seriously; many of its factories are idle for lack of raw materials and, in some cases, spare parts.

The Soviet Union and the bloc states also are having difficulties with food production. Poland, where most of the farming is done by

individual peasants on their own land, has had greater success.

The Soviet Union needs heavy investment in agriculture—at the very time that its military and space programs have become more expensive. At the same time, the Soviet people continue to press for better living standards; therefore the Soviet authorities face serious dilemmas in allocating their resources.

Failures in production, especially food production, have cost the Communist world considerable prestige, especially among the underdeveloped areas and especially in contrast with our own agricultural abundance.

We had some disappointments during the year—the failure of Great Britain to gain admission to the Common Market, for example.

But all in all, I think it may be said that the free world has fared better than the Communist world during the last 12 months. This gives us no cause for complacency. The Soviet Union controls enormous resources. Our Communist adversaries remain dedicated to the communization of the world. Despite their differences, Moscow and Peiping remain allies. There is not necessarily any comfort for us in competition between two centers of Communist power, each trying to prove that its method of “burying” us is the more efficacious.

We cannot afford to let down.

### **Foreign Aid, a Defense of Freedom**

But the record gives us ground for quiet confidence that we are on the right track, that we have a sound strategy, and in the main are doing the right things to protect the security and increase the free world's strength—economically, socially, and politically, as well as militarily. In this great and complicated task, foreign aid plays diverse and indispensable roles. Nearly all of the visible improvements in the position and conditions of the free world during the past year have been due in part to our foreign assistance programs.

As the members of this committee know well—because this committee has helped immeasurably to shape our aid policy—our foreign assistance over the years has taken many forms and served a variety of specific purposes.

In the wake of the Second World War, most

of it went into relief, rehabilitation, and repair of war damage.

We extended aid to Greece and Turkey to stop the Stalinist drive toward the Mediterranean.

In the Marshall Plan we concentrated on assisting free Europe to recover economic and political health.

For many years, military assistance has been a significant part of our program.

But in recent years we have given increasing attention to helping the peoples of the underdeveloped areas to move forward economically, socially, and politically. The wellspring of these development programs was the fourth point of President Truman's inaugural address in 1949,<sup>4</sup> when he announced ". . . a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."

Many forget that the Point 4 concept was announced during the dark days of the Berlin blockade and Communist Chinese expansion on the Asian mainland—when aggressive bloc threats were directly confronting us. Then, as now, the relationship between economic and political progress and the security of the United States was apparent. Then, as now, it was clear that our aid program must provide hope for progress through freedom as a vital instrument of our foreign policy.

As each new or newly awakened independent nation emerges into the modern world—as it moves forward economically and socially and achieves political stability—it adds to the strength of the community of free nations. The less developed nations' great thirst for progress provides the developed nations with a most demanding challenge. It provides, as well, the most useful focus for the restless energies of new or reborn nations. While the development process is neither easily understood nor easily undertaken, it serves as a natural scope of activity for the underprivileged who are concerned with improving their lot and eager to make their mark upon the world.

It is in the U.S. interest, and in its proud humanitarian tradition, to foster the modern-

ization process. Not to do so would simply assure that the growth of the less developed countries will be patterned by others.

Here lies the surest defense of freedom. For—let us be quite clear—the Communists believe the safest method of expansion open to them is to exploit the inevitable confusion and turbulence of the underdeveloped areas as they reach out to modernize their societies. Everywhere they seek to take over from within as they did in Cuba. This is a method we must head off; and foreign aid is one of our instruments for heading it off and preserving the independence of nations.

The economic aid provided by the United States and its allies should make it possible to prevent conditions of stagnation and hopeless poverty from leading to political unrest and the growth of communism. It is easier and cheaper in the long run to prevent the conditions that may lead to communism than to reverse the system once it has become established. It should not be necessary to have another Cuba in Latin America or Africa to drive home the "ounce of prevention" lesson.

There are additional reasons for extending assistance. I have noted that the Clay committee, which studied foreign assistance in the context of national and free-world security, stated that the need for development assistance would continue "even if the cold war and all our outstanding political differences with the Communists were to be resolved tomorrow."<sup>5</sup> For it is, said the committee, "part of the American tradition to be concerned with the plight of those less fortunate than ourselves." And it is the hope of the American people to see "a world which is prosperous and at peace."

#### **Basic Guidelines for 1964**

The President has requested appropriation of \$4.525 million to carry out our programs of economic and military assistance in fiscal year 1964.

<sup>4</sup> Copies of the report *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20, 1963*, are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.

This request, which is some \$400 million less than the budget estimates published in January, effects:

—the review of our assistance programs conducted by Mr. [David E.] Bell, new Administrator of the Agency for International Development, who will be before the committee early next week;

—recommendations of the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, chaired by General [Lucius D.] Clay, who, I understand, also will be before the committee; and

—savings resulting from withholding of funds programmed for use in fiscal year 1963, but not committed to some nations because of inadequate performance of self-help efforts.

Of the total request for \$4.5 billion, \$1,405 million is for the military assistance program—\$30 million more than appropriated for fiscal year 1963. \$3,120 million is requested for economic assistance. New requirements necessitate a request \$500 million greater than the fiscal year 1963 appropriation. It will be of interest to you to note that loans comprise almost 60 percent of the amount requested for economic assistance.

I have included in an annex a somewhat more detailed discussion of the fiscal year 1964 appropriation request.

The basic goal of our foreign assistance program may be simply stated: To help other countries to maintain their independence and become self-supporting. Independence and self-sustaining growth are interlocking objectives. Some countries we have aided have already achieved them. Others in many parts of the world are now approaching them. In Western Europe and Japan our postwar aid provided the margin by which these countries were able to reach, in a relatively short period, self-sustaining growth and political independence. Greece, Lebanon, Israel, Thailand, Taiwan, Colombia, and the Philippines, as well as other countries, are nearing the point of self-sustaining growth. Others, we trust, will join this growing list in the next few years.

In the present world, independence and political stability go hand in hand with reasonable economic progress. A sound, growing economy

provides the forward momentum and hope which will lessen the temptations of "quick" routes to progress through totalitarian-communism. Our foreign aid program has an essential role in providing development hope as well as capital and advice.

From experience we have developed some basic guidelines for development assistance:

*Self-help* is the most important single factor in the development process. At best, this country can provide only a small margin of the capital and skills necessary to launch sound development. If countries are to progress—economically, politically, and socially—there must be a real commitment by the people themselves to the development struggle—the difficult struggle against poverty, disease, inertia, illiteracy, and despair. United States assistance can play a crucial role in the development process only when nations take the difficult and sometimes politically risky reforms and fiscal and social measures necessary for development. Self-help by aid recipients is equally important from the standpoint of the United States, because an unending foreign assistance program would mean an unending burden on our taxpayers. Our objective—as well as the objective of the aid-receiving nations—must be self-sustaining growth.

*Selectivity*, therefore, must also be a key. We must select those countries willing to make a major self-help effort. We must focus upon those countries in which our assistance will provide the necessary margin for growth. We must give sufficient assistance to those selected countries to enable them to make headway toward that self-sustaining growth. It is less expensive for us in the long run to provide enough nourishment to produce growth than only enough to maintain life.

But we also must be selective from our point of view. Eighty percent of all economic assistance funds are concentrated in 20 countries. Our military assistance programs are concentrated even more heavily.

On the other hand, in almost one-half of the countries aided, technical assistance is perhaps the most important. In these countries, particularly in Africa, there is no U.S. aid except for technical assistance. In such cases, our ad-

visers are carefully selected to help the country address one or more critical development problems.

Approximately 18 percent of the grant funds proposed for both the development grant and Alliance for Progress sections of the act in fiscal year 1964 are earmarked for 19 countries where there are no other U.S. aid activities and 16 countries where possible development loan activity would not exceed \$4 million. In many of these countries, U.S. aid missions are not required; our technical assistance programs and personnel are supervised by one or two people assigned to the embassy.

Contributions from others is another important criterion followed by AID in determining allocation of funds to individual countries. The United States is continuing efforts to assure increasing participation by other free nations in providing both bilateral and multilateral assistance. Many of the countries of Western Europe—originally recipients of foreign aid—are now donors. Other free-world assistance to underdeveloped countries doubled between 1956 to 1961, and the United States hopes that these nations will bear an increasing burden in the years ahead. It is important also that other free nations liberalize the terms of their assistance.

### **Improving Standards of Performance**

It is obvious that it has not always been possible to manage our assistance programs on bankers' principles, although it is in this direction we are moving.

We have had to assist countries engaged in open war, such as Korea. The Republic of Korea had made economic progress by mid-1950 when the Communists launched their aggression. That war gave us a big task in relief and reconstruction.

We have had to operate in countries in the grip of Communist guerrilla aggressions. That was the situation in Greece in 1947, and Laos and South Vietnam after the truce in the Indochinese War. It is the situation in South Vietnam today. It is quite likely that the remarkable progress made by that country, with our aid, between 1955 and 1959 was an important factor in the decision of the North Vietnamese

Communists to renew and expand their guerrilla activities.

We have had to aid countries with governments which were not very efficient and not all of whose officials have been completely honest. We do what we can to improve efficiency, eliminate corruption, and promote desirable reforms. But we have, and want, no satellites or colonies. We have to use our influence, no instruments of control.

We have had to carry out our assistance programs in most countries where the cadres of trained administrators and technicians are very thin indeed. In fact, by definition, a less developed country lacks enough skilled people to administer its own affairs with maximum efficiency.

It is unrealistic to expect of every country at this time, especially when the enemies of freedom are ceaselessly at work to undermine progress, the standard of performance we expect in the United States or Western Europe. A considerable part of our foreign assistance effort is directed toward providing the technical assistance necessary to help establish trained, efficient administrators. But the development of modern standards of public administration takes time.

In conflict, there is always waste. In war the waste is terrific. But no sensible man condemns a commander for shooting too many shells, provided he accomplishes his mission. As long as the cold war continues, we should not measure the value of our aid expenditure solely by the tests of bankers' loans—although Mr. Chairman, this is the direction in which we aim to move, and have already moved substantially.

We have been trying, and will continue to try to make our aid programs as efficient and effective as possible.

During the past year and a half, AID has I believe, made important improvements in organization and personnel. I am sure there will be further improvements.

I may say I have great confidence in David Bell.

The special challenge and the special opportunity of Latin America demand the continued attention of all Americans. As you gentlemen

know well, the Alliance for Progress, to which we are committed with other free American nations, is a 10-year program of economic and social progress. It is not yet 2 years old and, as the President stated, much of this early phase has been devoted to organizing, planning, and initiating.

I shall not repeat the President's progress report on the Alliance for Progress. But I would like to set forth briefly a few general observations growing out of the events of the past year:

1. The difficulties in regard to Cuba are a continual reminder that prevention is easier than cure—that, having failed in years past to take the steps which might have prevented the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba, we had better try hard to prevent such developments in the future.

Throughout the hemisphere I have seen evidence that this lesson of the Cuban experience is ever more widely appreciated.

2. In the last 6 months, Castro's stature in the hemisphere has shrunk further. The democratic left has shifted rapidly away from him. In country after country the resistance tends to be concentrated in a hard-core Communist apparatus.

3. Although in most countries the liberal democratic elements have tended to be the most enthusiastic supporters of the Alliance for Progress, moderates and conservatives throughout the hemisphere have been manifesting an increasingly active interest. In many countries the alliance now has broad political support.

4. Finally, I would recall that in the show-down last October, the hemisphere stood united. In the hour of crisis, every member of the Organization of American States supported what had to be done.

So, despite all the difficulties, I feel encouraged about the future of the Alliance for Progress and hemispheric cooperation in general.

### **The U.S. Role in Economic Development**

In the complex business of fostering economic development, the United States has, I believe, some special assets.

(A) We have unparalleled educational facilities, especially in the fields which are essential to economic and social development. I think

of our facilities for training in public health and medicine. I think of that remarkable instrument, the system of land-grant colleges, which originated a century ago last year. Through their farm research and extension education, the land-grant institutions have literally wrought an agricultural miracle. A century ago one farm worker could produce enough food for only four or five other people, and approximately 55 percent of our population was engaged in farming. Today each farm worker produces enough food for 27 people; and only 8 percent of our workers are engaged in farming. Both the land-grant system and the peaceful revolution in which it played a central role contain lessons which are widely applicable in other parts of the world.

And some of our special problems such as the soil conservation and water development of our Western States are similar to those of several other countries.

(B) We also know, Mr. Chairman, from experience in our own country how to achieve *rapid* economic development. I emphasize the word *rapid*. The rural Georgia I knew when I was growing up was, in our modern technology, underdeveloped: It enjoyed few of the benefits of modern science, technology, medicine, public health, or education.

Forty years ago, hookworm and malaria were still among our serious problems in the South. Forty years ago only two American farms in a hundred had electricity. Now 98 percent have it—and not just for electric lights but for all sorts of services to the farmer and his wife and family.

Three decades ago, just before the Tennessee Valley Authority was created, the average per capita income in that area was only \$168, which was less than half the national average even at that low point in the great depression. Now the average per capita income in the Tennessee Valley is about \$1,500, approximately two-thirds of the national average. And it is still growing.

Anyone who examines objectively the development of our recently underdeveloped areas in our own country, and compares it with what has happened in the Communist nations, must conclude, I believe, that it is we who have demon-

strated the capacity for rapid development, we who know the shortcut to the future. And we have done it without the brutality, without the degradation of the individual human being, which are characteristic to the Communist system.

(C) We have the facilities—and perhaps a special talent—for spreading new knowledge and applying it in practical ways. The high quality of our technology is generally recognized. At one point or another, other free nations may equal or surpass it. And we concede the quality of Soviet technology in a few areas. Across the board our technological eminence is well established. And we are known as a people who like to do things with their hands, to tinker, to invent new methods of doing things.

(D) We have unrivaled experience in operating a wide range of foreign aid programs. We have made mistakes. And we have learned from others in the field as well as from our own experience. Before we started there was not much precedent to guide us. We have been the chief inventors, the leading developers, of these life-preserving and bodybuilding transfusions of economic, military, and technical strength.

(E) Over the last 15 years, we have built up a corps of public servants who know at first hand and increasingly understand the problems of the less developed nations. Until they achieved independence, our contacts with many of the peoples of Asia and Africa were very limited. American experts on some of the new countries did not exist. But with the passage of time, with experience, with the weeding out of unsuitable personnel, and with the training of others, we have developed public servants—diplomats, military men, information specialists, educators, agricultural specialists, and others—who know much about the various people of free Asia. We are moving toward the same end in Africa. And we are working at developing public servants with wider and deeper understanding of the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

In learning more about other people and giving them a helping hand, we have a fine new instrument in the Peace Corps. I hope that some of the younger graduates of the Peace

Corps will wish to make a career in our foreign services.

(F) We have important assets in the wide range of American associates with other people through voluntary, nongovernmental organizations. These range from our Councils on Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy Associations, through scores of organizations that promote better relations with particular countries or areas, to our civic clubs, which have spread to other lands. They include the wide-ranging overseas programs of our private philanthropic foundations, our churches, and other groups. They include the personal friendships with people in other lands formed by Americans who have gone abroad as teachers or students, or as businessmen, or in other capacities, including just as tourists.

(G) Perhaps even more important are the scores of thousands of persons from the less developed countries who have come to the United States for education or special training or perhaps just to learn more about us; and many more thousands who have studied under American teachers in universities, vocational schools and other training centers in their own countries. Not everyone reacts favorably to such exposures to us. But experience indicates that an overwhelming majority of the persons from the less developed countries who have studied or visited in the United States or studied extensively under American teachers abroad take away a predominantly favorable impression.

(H) Probably the most valuable asset we have is confidence in our intentions. Despite Communist propaganda, despite the criticisms to which we are often subjected, and despite occasional differences and misunderstandings between certain other free nations and ourselves, most of the leaders and peoples of the less developed nations realize that our real purpose is what we say it is—to help these nations maintain their independence and improve the lot of their peoples.

This confidence in the purpose of our aid is interlocked with a broad confidence in our deepest commitments as a nation. I strongly disagree with those who assert that we are widely distrusted or hated. My experience both as a private citizen and as a public official leads me to think otherwise. Men and women



throughout the free world—and behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains—know something about our national history. They can quote the great sentences of our Declaration of Independence, the great ideas of our Founding Fathers, of Lincoln, of Woodrow Wilson, and our recent statesmen. They know that we have fought for freedom in the past and that we are dedicated to defending and spreading it today. They want for themselves basically what we want and, in large part, have achieved for ourselves—not only material well-being but freedom, and the dignity of the individual. These ideas and ideals of human freedom have brought us allies, avowed and unavowed, throughout the world.

The price for freedom has never been cheap. Building and expanding and defending freedom have always required struggle, courage, tenacity. Often they have cost heavily in treasure—and blood. I would prefer to see freedom defended and built without the bloodshed if possible. And the dollar cost of defending and strengthening freedom through foreign aid is a small fraction of what we have to spend on military defense—and an infinitesimal fraction of the cost of a third world war.

The free world is gaining in strength, both absolutely and in comparison with the Communist world. But this worldwide struggle between freedom and coercion is far from finished. Our adversaries remain powerful and determined. They are determined to “bury” us. We must carry on until freedom prevails. Victory in this fateful contest will not go to the complainers, the faint of heart, and weak of back. We cannot win by yielding the field to the enemy. Retreat is the sure and quick road to defeat.

There is nothing that the Communists want more than to see the “Yanks go home”—not only from Western Europe, but from the Mediterranean, South Asia, the Far East, Latin America, Africa, everywhere. If we Yanks come home, the Communists will begin to take over. Why any American would want to cooperate with that global Communist strategy is beyond my understanding. But that is what sharp cuts in our foreign aid programs would mean.

Those who favor gutting these powerful and effective instruments at this juncture of his-

tory must assume an awful responsibility. Their defeatist prescription should be opposed resolutely by all who want to push until we have achieved a world in which our freedom—and the freedom of all men—is secure.

## ANNEX

### FISCAL YEAR 1964 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The President has requested appropriation of \$4,525 million to carry out our programs of economic and military assistance in fiscal year 1964.

The \$4,525 million requested is some \$400 million less than the budget estimate published in January of this year. Downward adjustments have been made in the proposed fiscal year 1964 programs as a result of the reassessment of the program by the aid agency under the new Administrator and the Clay committee's general recommendations. Moreover, funds were received from prior year programs and fiscal year 1963 funds were withheld because some nations' performance did not fully meet our expectations and criteria.

For the various funding categories of economic assistance, the executive branch has requested a total appropriation of \$3,120 million. Almost 60 percent of this amount is planned in loans both under the Alliance for Progress and development loan funding categories.

*Development Loans.* \$1,060 million has been requested for development loans outside Latin America. Development loans have become the central tool of U.S. development assistance efforts. More than half of these funds are allocated for use in the Near East and South Asia in fiscal year 1964. The great proportion of this amount would help to meet requirements in India and Pakistan. The appropriation requested will enable us to meet existing commitments to such nations as Nigeria and Tunisia, and to assist in the serious development efforts of other friendly nations.

Actual commitment of loan funds will depend on performance. Requirements for sound proposals and for broader measures of self-help must be met before loan transactions proceed. AID has withheld substantial loan funds this fiscal year because these requirements were not fulfilled. If performance should not meet conservative expectations for fiscal year 1964, loan funds would be similarly withheld.

*Development Grants and Technical Cooperation.* \$257 million in appropriations is requested for fiscal year 1964 for development grants and technical cooperation outside Latin America. These programs comprise the Point 4 element of today's foreign assistance effort, and are the principal source of direct contact with the people of the emerging nations. Basically, development grants finance efforts to provide needed technical assistance to development in developing countries.

Technical assistance, either used by itself, or in careful coordination with development loans, can provide a greater ultimate return, dollar for dollar, than any other element of the foreign aid program.

The Agency for International Development is making increasing use of the resources of other Government agencies, and of America's universities, in providing the high-quality talents needed for successful performance of these programs.

*The Alliance for Progress.* \$850 million is requested for the Alliance for Progress in fiscal year 1964:

\$550 million in AID-administered development loans;  
\$100 million in AID-administered development grants;

\$200 million for the Inter-American Program for Social Progress.

AID-administered loans will help support the increasing momentum of the Alliance for Progress. As Latin American nations take more and more of the hard decisions called for by the Charter of Punta del Este,<sup>6</sup> the United States will stand ready to provide the critical margin of capital.

Alliance for Progress grants will be used particularly to strengthen educational institutions, rural co-operatives, and other local organizations as well as to help governments develop the sound administrative practices and reforms necessary for progress.

Almost \$200 million is requested for the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American Program for Social Progress. These funds permit social advance to move forward with economic development throughout Latin America. The Social Progress Trust Fund's sound programs of land settlement, housing, sanitation, water supply, and higher education provide meaningful impact at the "grass roots" level. This year's requested appropriation would permit the Trust Fund to operate at the levels of the last 2 years. Almost \$5 million will be contributed for the grant program of the Organization of American States.

*Supporting Assistance.* \$435 million has been requested for supporting assistance in fiscal year 1964. This increase over budget estimates and over last year's appropriation reflects the shift of funding for the major part of assistance to the Congo under supporting assistance instead of through contributions to international organizations.

The major use for supporting assistance is to strengthen the economic position of countries mounting major defense efforts along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Other supporting assistance programs maintain economic stability in situations of importance to the United States, provide alternatives to excessive dependence on bloc aid, and permit access to important U.S. military bases or facilities.

*The Contingency Fund.* \$300 million is requested for the contingency fund in fiscal year 1964, to provide the U.S. with the flexibility to meet quickly certain unanticipated or unascertained political and security

needs. It is hoped that substantially less than the \$300 million appropriation request for this fiscal year will be needed. It is anticipated that the present contingency fund of \$250 million will not be fully used but sufficient funds must be available for the forthcoming year to meet unanticipated emergencies or only dimly foreseen situations. This year's evidence of responsible use of the contingency fund is a strong argument for providing the funds necessary for flexibility.

*Voluntary Contributions to International Organizations.* \$136 million is requested for funding U.S. voluntary contributions to eight international programs. Shifting of much of the assistance program for the Congo to supporting assistance has lowered this request considerably below the level indicated in the President's budget.

*Other Requests.* \$20 million is requested for an expanded program for American-sponsored schools and hospitals abroad, as well as \$2 million in local currency for a children's hospital in Poland being constructed under private American auspices. Finally, \$60 million is requested for administration expenses.

*Military Assistance* is the other major arm of U.S. foreign assistance efforts. This program, which is less than 3 percent of the amount required to support our own Military Establishment, plays a key role in protecting the security of the entire free world. The President has requested appropriation of \$1,405 million for military assistance in fiscal year 1964.

More than three-fourths of this military assistance goes to maintain the defensive capabilities and internal security of free nations along the Sino-Soviet periphery. Other uses of military assistance include smaller internal security and civic action programs in Africa and Latin America, and to meet existing NATO commitments in Europe.

*Other.* Apart from assistance requested for the children's hospital in Poland, no funds are being requested under this act for Poland or Yugoslavia. Normal trade, together with the careful use of P.L. 480, therefore assumes major importance in support of our policy toward these countries. For this reason, it is requested that discretionary authority be restored to the President to continue equal tariff treatment to Poland and Yugoslavia.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Appointments

Benjamin H. Read as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department, effective April 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 190 dated April 11.)

<sup>6</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808. *Acceptance deposited:* Jamaica, March 21, 1963.

##### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>1</sup> *Acceptance deposited:* Greece, February 13, 1963.

##### Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

*Acceptance deposited:* Italy, February 22, 1963. Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration of November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

*Acceptance deposited:* Italy, February 22, 1963. Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253. *Signatures:* India, February 21, 1963; United Kingdom, February 15, 1963.

##### Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. *Accession deposited:* Cyprus, April 11, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Colivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5047, 5121, and 5233). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 4, 1963 (TIAS 5292). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963.

##### Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement concerning the settlement of claims which have arisen through the nonduty use of private motor

vehicles of members of the United States Forces insured by the Brandaris insurance company. Effected by exchange of letters at Bonn February 18 and March 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963.

##### India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 26, 1962 (TIAS 5225). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 1, 1963. Entered into force April 1, 1963.

##### Luxembourg

Declaration for the effective protection of trademarks. Signed at Luxembourg December 23 and at The Hague December 27, 1904. Entered into force March 15, 1905. 34 Stat. 2868.

*Terminated:* March 28, 1963 (upon entry into force of treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation).

##### Paraguay

Agreement postponing termination until June 30, 1963, of reciprocal trade agreement of September 12, 1946, as amended and extended (TIAS 1601, 5000, 5194). Effected by exchange of notes February 27 and March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963.

##### Philippines

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Manila March 23, 1963. Entered into force March 23, 1963.

Agreement relating to the United States Educational Foundation in the Philippines, as amended. Signed at Manila March 23, 1948. Entered into force March 23, 1948. TIAS 1730, 1745, 1910, and 4138.

*Terminated:* March 23, 1963 (superseded by agreement of March 23, 1963, *supra*).

##### Rumania

Arrangement relating to a program of visits and exchanges in cultural, educational, scientific and other fields during the calendar years 1963 and 1964. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucharest April 2, 1963. Entered into force April 2, 1963.

##### United Kingdom

Polaris sales agreement. Signed at Washington April 6, 1963. Entered into force April 6, 1963.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

Maritime Matters—Use of Greek Ports and Territorial Waters by the N.S. *Savannah*. Agreement with Greece. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens April 23 and 24, 1962. Entered into force April 24, 1962. TIAS 5099. 6 pp. 5¢.

Tracking Stations—Continuation and Extension of Cooperative Program. Agreement with Argentina.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires March 16, 1962. Entered into force March 16, 1962. TIAS 5100. 6 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program—Use of Volunteers in FAO-Sponsored Projects. Agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Exchange of letters—Signed at Rome March 23 and 29, 1962. Entered into force March 29, 1962. TIAS 5101. 9 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 25, 1962. Entered into force July 12, 1962. TIAS 5102. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Peaceful Uses. Agreement with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), amending the additional agreement of June 11, 1960. Signed at Brussels and Washington May 21 and 22, 1962. Entered into force July 9, 1962. TIAS 5104. 30 pp. 15¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with China, amending the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962. Entered into force July 13, 1962. TIAS 5105. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ceylon. Signed at Colombo July 19, 1962. Entered into force July 19, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5106. 8 pp. 10¢.

Visas—Waiver of Fees. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul May 25, 1962. Entered into force May 25, 1962. TIAS 5107. 3 pp. 5¢.

Education—Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of September 23, 1950, as modified. Exchange of notes—Dated at Karachi July 29, 1960, and July 10 and November 13, 1961. Entered into force November 13, 1961. TIAS 5108. 4 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on Behalf of Berlin, amending the agreement of June 28, 1957. Signed at Washington June 29, 1962. Entered into force July 30, 1962. With annex. TIAS 5109. 5 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Brazil, amending the agreement of August 3, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS 5110. 2 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of July 21, 1955, as amended. Signed at Washington May 28, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS 5111. 2 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi May 31, 1962. Entered into force May 31, 1962. Operative retroactively October 28, 1961. TIAS 5113. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of December 27, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon July 5, 1962. Entered into force July 5, 1962. TIAS 5114. 3 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 21 and July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962. TIAS 5116. 2 pp. 5¢.

Boundary Waters—Saint Lawrence Seaway Suspension of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa July 3 and 13, 1962. Entered into force July 13, 1962. TIAS 5117. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia, amending the agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta July 11, 1962. Entered into force July 11, 1962. TIAS 5118. 2 pp. 5¢.

Red Cross—Termination of Agreements and Waiver of Claims Concerning Field Hospital in Korea. Agreement with Sweden. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 13 and 18, 1962. Entered into force July 18, 1962. TIAS 5119. 3 pp. 5¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, amending the agreement of July 3, 1957, as amended. Signed at Washington July 5, 1962. Entered into force August 7, 1962. TIAS 5120. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz July 14, 1962. Entered into force July 14, 1962. TIAS 5121. 3 pp. 5¢.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 8-14

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 8 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 168 of April 1; 174 of April 4; and 175, 176, and 177 of April 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*179	4/8	U.S. participation in international conferences.
181	4/8	Secretary General of World Food Congress opens U.S. office (rewrite).
*182	4/8	Harriman sworn in as Under Secretary for Political Affairs (biographic details).
†183	4/8	Ceylon credentials (rewrite).
184	4/8	Bataan Day ceremony.
185	4/8	Appointments to Advisory Committee on Arts (rewrite).
†186	4/9	Agreement with U.K. for sale of Polaris missiles.
187	4/11	SEATO communique.
188	4/10	Rusk: NBC interview.
189	4/11	Visit of Grand Duchess of Luxembourg (rewrite).
*190	4/11	Read appointed Deputy Executive Secretary (biographic details).
†191	4/12	Meeker: "Observation in Space."
†193	4/12	Rusk: interview on "Women on the Move" program.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**Agriculture.** World Food Congress Secretariat Opens Office at Washington . . . . . 663

**Asia.** The United States and Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . . . 635

**China, Communist.** The Divided World of Communism (Abel, Rusk) . . . . . 644

**Communism.** The United States and Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . . . 635

**Congress.** The Foreign Aid Program (Rusk) . . . . . 664

**Department and Foreign Service.** Appointments (Read) . . . . . 672

**Economic Affairs**

CAFE Study of Tokaido Railway . . . . . 660

The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO (Tyler) . . . . . 648

Readjusting United States Foreign Trade (Weiss) . . . . . 652

**Educational and Cultural Affairs**

Two New Members Appointed to Advisory Committee on Arts . . . . . 663

U.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes on Cultural and Other Exchanges (Crawford, Macovei) . . . . . 661

**Europe.** The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO (Tyler) . . . . . 648

**Foreign Aid**

The Foreign Aid Program (Rusk) . . . . . 664

President Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall Plan Employees . . . . . 647

The United States and Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . . . 635

**International Organizations and Conferences**

CAFE Study of Tokaido Railway . . . . . 660

Eighth Meeting of SEATO Council of Ministers (Rusk, text of communique) . . . . . 641

World Food Congress Secretariat Opens Office at Washington . . . . . 663

Japan. ECAFE Study of Tokaido Railway . . . . . 660

Laos. U.S. Calls for Action To Insure Restoration of Cease-Fire in Laos . . . . . 646

Luxembourg. Grand Duchess Charlotte and Prince Jean of Luxembourg Visit U.S. . . . . 647

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Effect of the Projected European Union on NATO (Tyler) . . . . . 648

Philippines. Bataan Day Commemorated (Kennedy) . . . . . 647

**Presidential Documents**

Bataan Day Commemorated . . . . . 647

President Kennedy Greets Reunion of Marshall Plan Employees . . . . . 647

**Publications.** Recent Releases . . . . . 673

Rumania. U.S. and Rumania Exchange Notes on Cultural and Other Exchanges (Crawford, Macovei) . . . . . 661

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eighth Meeting of SEATO Council of Ministers (Rusk, text of communique) . . . . . 641

**Treaty Information.** Current Actions . . . . . 673

U.S.S.R. The Divided World of Communism (Abel, Rusk) . . . . . 644

Viet-Nam. The United States and Southeast Asia (Johnson) . . . . . 635

*Name Index*

Abel, Elie . . . . . 644

Crawford, William A . . . . . 661

Johnson, U. Alexis . . . . . 635

Kennedy, President . . . . . 647

Macovei, Pompiliu . . . . . 662

Read, Benjamin H . . . . . 672

Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 641, 644, 664

Tyler, William R . . . . . 648

Weiss, Leonard . . . . . 652



UNITED STATES  
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
 DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
 PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
 (GPO)

A release in the new *Foreign Affairs Outlines Series* . . .

**the**  
  
**Department**  
  
**of**  
  
**State**

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION  
 in the  
 WESTERN HEMISPHERE

This 19-page pamphlet contains the statement made on February 18, 1963, by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the outset Mr. Martin states:

The problem of extracontinental totalitarian powers trying to subvert established governments in this hemisphere is not new. During World War II the American Republics faced the challenge of Fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis Powers. Through individual and collective action they successfully dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath of the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the inter-American community has been dealing with the problem of Communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba.

Mr. Martin also describes the development of communism prior to Castro, Communist efforts since the advent of Castro, communism in Latin America since 1959, steps we are taking to combat Communist subversion, steps being taken in the Organization of American States [OAS] to counter Communist subversion, and the role of the Alliance for Progress in the Western Hemisphere's security effort.

Publication 7509

15 cents

*Order Form*

Publication 7509

15 cents

Supt. of Documents  
 Govt. Printing Office  
 Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere*.

Enclosed find:

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

\$ \_\_\_\_\_  
 (cash, check, or money  
 order payable to  
 Supt. of Docs.)

Street Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City, Zone, and State: \_\_\_\_\_

\*93531430

64

# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1245

May 6, 1963

**SOME CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY** ● *Remarks by Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and Under Secretary Harriman . . . . .* 679

**INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND NONINTERVENTION** ● *by Assistant Secretary Martin . . . . .* 710

**OUR HEMISPHERE: THE LONG AND SHORT VIEWS** ● *by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson . . . . .* 704

CAL  
Y RECORD  
D STATES  
IN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1245 • PUBLICATION 71

May 6, 1963

*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements which the United States is or may become a party to and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currentl*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$9.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy

*Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and Under Secretary Harriman spoke informally before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 18. Following are transcripts of their remarks and of the question-and-answer periods which followed.*

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 202 dated April 18

Mr. Brucker [Herbert Brucker of the *Hartford Courant*, the presiding officer], ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your invitation. I understand that you wish me to open our discussion this afternoon with some brief remarks and then take your questions. I am very happy to do so. I shall be followed by two of my colleagues. I hope that the three of us will manage to cover the principal topics that you have in mind.

Let me say that it is not my purpose today to make news but to make sense. But perhaps some of you may think that that in itself is news. (Laughter.)

But in one important respect both you and we who are in the foreign policy business have a common problem: how to maintain an understanding of the context within which daily events occur. The simple but fundamental aims and objectives of American policy come to be taken for granted, and perhaps forgotten. But constant repetition invites boredom and is not newsworthy. Our common problem, therefore, is to try to organize our thinking about a turbulent world, made up of 112 states with whom we conduct our business, a world which we can strongly influence but cannot control,

and a world filled with problems into which we Americans are inevitably drawn.

But let us pause just for a moment to remind ourselves that the foreign policy of the American people aims at a decent world order of independent states, cooperating voluntarily across national frontiers on the basis of common interests, a world order in which disputes are to be settled by peaceful means and where conduct is expected to accord with the great principles set forth in the opening sections of the United Nations Charter.

It was for this purpose that we committed ourselves wholeheartedly to the United Nations at the end of World War II, for this purpose that we formed alliances with more than 40 other nations in the interest of mutual security and national independence, and for this purpose that we are deeply interested in the genuine independence and integrity of the so-called nonaligned countries.

It is the pursuit of this decent world order which makes up the main business of the Department of State. This is what the daily cable traffic is all about. This is what we are doing in more than a dozen international meetings being held somewhere in the world on every working day throughout the year. And it is widespread confidence in this basic purpose among peoples in other parts of the world which adds solidarity to our alliances, permits friendly relations with most of the nonaligned, and explains the fact that in moments of great crisis there are not nearly so many neutrals as we are inclined to think.

Now, it is true that our attention in the midst of this mass of business, most of which is dull—it is true that our attention is drawn at any

given time to certain points of crisis. I shall not call our situation within the Atlantic alliance a crisis, but I shall leave to Mr. Ball a discussion of some of the details of that particular situation.

### Points of Crisis

For our attention, for example, today is very closely turned to Laos, a country about which it has been agreed internationally that it should be left free to develop an independent and neutral existence of its own.

The problem there is that two of the so-called three factions in Laos have given loyal support to the Geneva Accords.<sup>1</sup> The third, the Pathet Lao, backed up by their coconspirators in Hanoi, have not done so. And therefore there is a crisis between the neutralist government on the one side, supported by the former government forces of General Phoumi [Nosavan], and the Pathet Lao Communist group, on the other, to determine whether these Geneva Accords will be given full effect.

Now, we do believe that those accords can meet the vital interests of all sides, that an independent and neutral Laos accords with the real requirements of the principal powers in the present world situation, and that it is not necessary to draw that country into one orbit or another.

But, on the other hand, we cannot agree that it should be drawn into the Communist orbit. And therefore we are looking to the two cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., to exert their maximum influence, through the designated international machinery, and direct with the parties concerned, to insure that those accords will in fact be carried out. For, were those accords to break down, then some very grave questions would be raised for all of us as to what next we ought to do in that particular situation.

Our attention is also riveted on Viet-Nam, a country which has been besieged for several years by subversive action and infiltration, a penetration seeking to upset the agreements of

1954.<sup>2</sup> We believe that it is in our national interest to do what we can to put the South Vietnamese in a position to win their own war. We believe that they themselves are determined and are fighting well. We believe that a corner is being turned in that struggle, that the initiative now being taken by Government forces for the past several months, improved mobility and transportation, improved communications, improved intelligence coming from the very people themselves in the countryside, improvements in political and social action at the village level—the switching, the change in ratios of arms captured, of prisoners taken, of casualties inflicted of defections recorded—that these show that important gains have been made.

And although we cannot be confident that this problem will be wound up rapidly and easily—we rather think that it will be prolonged and bitter and frustrating still—nevertheless, we believe that the South Vietnamese are now on their way and that we can approach that problem with perhaps more confidence.

In the Congo we have had a troubled and vexing situation, which now seems to be moving toward a solution. The recent constitution of the Government of the Congo, comprising elements of the major parties and major regions promises to offer some greater degree of unity and stability. It's a country which has potentially very important resources of its own which can be wealthy, compared to other African states, and which deserves a chance to work out its own future, as originally intended when its independence was negotiated with Belgium some 3 years ago.

I believe the events there have underlined the basic wisdom of the decision made by President Eisenhower not to let that particular country be caught up in a bilateral engagement between the two great power blocs in the so-called cold war but to put that problem into the hands of the United Nations, in order to keep that kind of conflict out of Africa and to give the Congolese a chance to work out their own future.

Turning to Cuba, it is the unanimous view of the governments of this hemisphere that the present Marxist-Leninist regime on that island is incompatible with the inter-American system and that our object must be to welcome a free

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

<sup>2</sup> For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

Cuban people back into the inter-American community.

This means, among other things, that a Soviet military presence in this hemisphere is not to be accepted as a normal state of affairs.

Now, the actions that are now being taken fall into three main categories: The first involves the commitment of our Armed Forces to insure that Cuba does not pose a threat to the security of the hemisphere. This means a prohibition of the return of offensive weapons to Cuba, a maintenance of surveillance to assure ourselves and others that such an offensive capability is not present, enforcement of the free use of international airspace and waters in the Caribbean, interdiction of arms shipments or other forays aimed at other countries, and insurance that there not be a Hungarian-type episode in this hemisphere.

It is sometimes overlooked that we have made and are making a major commitment of force to insure that that threat be kept within manageable bounds.

A second group of actions aims at demonstrating that there is no future for Cuba under the present regime and that the Cuban people cannot achieve success at home or normal relations with their traditional friends of the free world under a regime committed to implacable hostility toward free institutions.

This is why trade and fiscal relations with the free world have been rapidly shrinking and why free-world ships are being steadily withdrawn from the Cuban trade. We are concerned at the present moment about an increase of free-world flagships in that trade, since the low point reached in January, and are taking up that question with the governments concerned.

There are indications that some of these ships under long-term charter to the bloc have been shifted to the Cuba trade and that the numbers are temporarily influenced by the seasonal export of the sugar harvest. And although such free-world shipping in the first quarter of this year was about one-sixth of the numbers involved in the same quarter of last year, we are not content with the present situation. We do know, however, that the economy of Cuba is facing the most serious difficulties, that its support is becoming increasingly expensive to the

bloc, and that the promises of the early revolution have been denied by the present and somber reality.

A third group of measures has to do with the rest of the hemisphere. They include a strong effort within the Alliance for Progress to demonstrate that rapid economic and social development can best be achieved through free institutions. They include measures, such as those discussed by President Kennedy with the Presidents of Central America and Panama,<sup>3</sup> to interrupt the clandestine flow of funds and personnel between Cuba and other countries of the hemisphere.

They include close cooperation among the armed forces and security agencies of the Caribbean in the interest of public safety. They include a fourfold increase in our own broadcasting to Latin America since 1960 and the vigorous engagement of Latin Americans themselves in the political and propaganda battle.

We can say with confidence, I think, that the Castro revolution has been largely discredited as an answer to the hemisphere's problems, that it is more widely recognized than ever before that the answers to these problems lie in the effort of free men to improve their own lot, with the assistance and cooperation of the industrialized free nations.

#### **U.S. Policy Is Nonpartisan**

These policies and actions taken together make up a serious, sustained, and effective effort to deal with the threat of Marxist-Leninism in this hemisphere. They do not include an invasion of Cuba or acts of war against that island. Great risks are necessary to deal with great threats, and the situation remains dangerous. But I do not believe that we should, in the absence of a major threat to the security of the hemisphere, initiate armed action against Cuba. Nor am I aware of any desire that we do so among the responsible leadership of either political party.

Now, on this question of bipartisanship, or nonpartisanship, I think it is fair to say that the main lines of United States policy since World War II have been nonpartisan in char-

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.

acter: support for the United Nations, for our great alliances, for necessary actions in defense and mutual security assistance, for the energetic support of the interests of the United States and of our citizens abroad. I suppose it is correct to say that 98 percent of our business in the Department of State involves no partisan issue whatever.

And perhaps you would be interested in hearing me comment that when I sit in executive sessions with our congressional committees to discuss complicated and difficult foreign policy questions, where it is possible not under the full kleig light of publicity to get into the full range of the complexities as well as the alternative lines of action open, it has been my experience in those sessions that, although there may be differences of view about what ought to be done, those differences almost never fall along partisan lines. Because the issues are real, they are complicated, they are difficult. Our purposes are matters of common agreement. But how to move from purpose to fact is a question of judgment about which there can be differences of view.

But it is not partisanship that marks those consultations between the executive and the legislative branch in that type of session.

Now, bipartisanship in fact is easy and natural under conditions of success. It was relatively simple during the great days of the creation of the United Nations, for example, and it was, I think, relatively easy at the time of the formation of NATO and the great initiative that led to the Marshall Plan. And that bipartisanship is necessary, and fortunately for our country is forthcoming, at moments of great national danger.

But it is more difficult with problems which are complex and frustrating and uncertain. But even here, as in such cases as Laos and Cuba and the Congo, whose history did not start in January 1961, there is room for nonpartisanship, because both political parties clearly own a piece of them—are joint stockholders in unfinished business.

It is natural and proper that an administration must accept the primary and awesome responsibility of leadership and that the minority party must be in a position to criticize; other-

wise our political system would lose its vigor and the people would have no sure basis for their sovereign judgments. But I must say, as I observe other political systems in other parts of the world, that I am often reassured by the fact that, in this difficult postwar world, our partisan debates on foreign policy in due course are taken over by a sense of responsibility by those on both sides who understand the stakes involved in the great worldwide struggle for freedom.

### **Many Ways of Quitting in Struggle for Freedom**

I am concerned because here and there, again without regard to party, there are some strident voices in the land, claiming to be strongly anti-Communist, who would have us simply quit, to abandon the field, to give up the effort.

And there are many ways of quitting in this great struggle for freedom. If we will the end, if we will the success of free institutions in a decent world order, we must will the means by which we get there.

For example, there are those who somehow would not support a large and necessary national defense budget. Now, it is true that we must make every possible effort to achieve some means of turning down the arms race. Otherwise the future is gloomy and foreboding and dangerous in the extreme. But in the absence of effective and reliable arrangements in disarmament, it is necessary for us to look to our arms. And that defense budget is large and, in the absence of some new development, is likely to become larger in the years ahead as this arms race moves from sophistication to sophistication, from expense to expense.

And as Secretary of State, who must constantly take into account the intimate relation between policy and power, I feel that it is very important that our defense budget be given full and adequate support.

I feel the same way about our space effort. I had the opportunity over the past year or two to talk to a great many foreign ministers from different parts of the world, some allied, some neutral, about whether they think, as they look at the situation, it is really important for the United States to make a massive investment in the space effort, which we have been prepared

to do. I think, with perhaps one exception out of several dozen, they have all said, perhaps with a smile of sympathy, "Yes, you people must undertake that, because you dare not leave the exploration of outer space and all that that means in the hands solely of those who are opposed to freedom. You dare not leave those secrets to be discovered by one side alone. You dare not turn over to them the byproducts of that exploration in the fields of communication, miniaturization, metallurgy, systems controls, and all the other technical outputs of that enormous effort—you cannot leave that into the hands of the bloc. And, since you are the only ones in the free world that can do it, this is an obligation of yours which you dare not shirk."

We can quit this great struggle by withholding large support for foreign aid. You look at your own cities, your own counties—how many—one out of seven, one out of eight, of the people in your neighborhoods are veterans, many of them having served in far distant places in the last 20–25 years in defense of freedom. We have a million men, approximately, in uniform outside the continental United States today on that great mission. We have an obligation to get on with this great problem of building a decent free-world community by means other than military if we can. And our foreign aid program is the principal means by which we move in that direction.

We have an obligation of conscience to make that program just as effective as possible, to enlist as much self-help from the others as we can, to have it administered with integrity and with clear-sightedness and with imagination. But we cannot abandon the effort or accept deep cuts, except with deep injury to our national interest.

I'm not now challenging the motives of those who speak about this subject. I'm talking about the results. For if the American presence and influence were withdrawn suddenly from many parts of the world, our national interest would be deeply jeopardized and we would find that the hundred billions which we spent in foreign aid since about 1947 is a bargain compared to the almost six hundred billions that we have spent in defense in that same period and that our military expenditures would necessarily go up even faster.

I have heard it said from some quarters that we should get out of the United Nations if they do not adjust to our policy 100 percent of the time, instead of, as it turns out, perhaps 98 percent of the time—we should bring our troops home from Europe or from areas affected by our other alliances.

There is another way to quit: in a fit of frustration or anger or glandular reaction to toss in the effort in a great holocaust by a precipitate resort to arms, a quitting which is an abandonment of the humane requirements of the human spirit and which would simply result in a few survivors speculating upon the folly of man.

And we can quit by being negligent about the great unfinished business of our own society, because what we are here at home has an enormous amount to do with our influence in the world about us. And where there are ugly deficiencies in our own society, to repair those deficiencies is a great part of this struggle for freedom in the most distant part of the world, because we are expected to be perfect in the performance of our own commitments and our misdeeds and our shortcomings are multiplied many times to our own and to other free peoples' discomfiture wherever it might be.

### **The Underlying Issue**

And the great underlying issue of our day, that is whether we are to in fact succeed in organizing this decent world order as opposed to a world of coercion—it is true that we have our problems, but so do those who would impose their system upon all the rest. We do note a serious disunity within the bloc, a major engagement of prestige and conflict of interest between Moscow and Peiping, as well as the steady growth of nationalism within the bloc, particularly among the Eastern European countries. And we see their deficiencies in economic performance, their difficulties with their industrial as well as their agricultural production, and the discomforts which they are facing all the way from East Germany right around through to North Viet-Nam. We know their disappointments in Cuba and in the Congo, in Iraq and Syria, and in Guinea and Mali, where they have come into in many situations—come upon a rugged determination on

the part of the newly independent peoples to be genuinely independent.

I think that if we take a look at the present situation, take a look at the problems ahead, take a look at the problems which the other side has, we can be deeply confident on one point, and that is that the purposes which animate the American people in foreign policy are purposes which are deeply rooted not only in the nature of our own people but in the nature of man, and these purposes are instinctive with people—ordinary common people in all parts of the earth. And if we don't quit, if we maintain the effort, if we stay at it, if we gnaw at these problems, if we deal with them day by day in the best of our own tradition, we shall find we shall have help, we shall have allies, we shall have sympathy and understanding from peoples in all parts of the earth.

And on that basis I have no doubt on what the outcome of that great struggle for freedom will be.

Now, gentlemen, I am ready for your questions.

#### QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

*Mr. Brucker: Gentlemen, the Secretary is ready for your questions.*

*Q. Mr. Chairman, I'm Mr. Robinson from Salt Lake City. We are very much concerned, as all Americans are, Mr. Rusk, about the possibility of subversion from Cuba into some of the Latin American countries. We were just told a short time ago that the Navy is not inspecting certain small boats that travel back and forth at night between Cuba and the American Continent. I wonder if you might comment about that.*

A. Arrangements are in effect with other countries in the Caribbean area for surveillance of suspicious or unidentified traffic. Our armed forces on the spot do have authority to use searchlights and illumination in the event of any ships that are acting suspiciously, or not carrying normal identification lights, or are not known to be what they are. Inspection arrangements are laid on with countries of destination, which make it possible for us to have

a close check on what, in fact, might be in a cargo of any ship moving from Cuba to any of the other countries.

*Mr. Brucker: Is there a further question?*

#### The Foreign Aid Program

*Q. Mr. Rusk, out in the provinces, the reason the people have such a resentment against the foreign aid program is when they read about we sent 48,000 cases of Metrecal to India, and 300,000 tons of cement to India, and in the monsoon season it gets wet and turns into stone on the docks, and the sugar beet factory in Turkey, where they never even saw a sugar beet. Now, I think the people out in the country feel that a good deal of this foreign aid is essential, but when they read about that, it really roils them up. Why isn't there a better control over this?*

A. I think it's a fair question, a fair insistence, that funds that are put in trust for the use of AID should be used with a maximum possible effect and efficiency.

Now, as any of you know, the problem of administration is a constant battle against mistake and against human failure. And there have been from time to time those mistakes and human failures. But we have tried to lay on the type of inspection, the type of supervision, and the type of postaudit, as well as preexamination, which will give us maximum protection against the sort of mishap to which you refer.

There have been instances in which funds have not produced the effect requested. There have been mistakes. And there have been failures of performance on the part of companies who contracted to carry out particular jobs abroad. This is a constant battle. But we must not let those occasional mistakes or those occasional failures gut the entire program, because the performance under the entire program has been over the years magnificent and the dedication and the courage and, indeed, the gallantry of those people who are in distant and difficult, sometimes dangerous, places getting on with this job is something to which we are all deeply indebted. It is a struggle, but we are fighting that battle all the time, and I think that you are entitled to insist that the highest standards be met in that regard.



## Secretary Replies to Allegations on Aid Shipments

Press release 211 dated April 19

*Following is the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk read by Herbert Brucker, editor of the Hartford Courant, before the ASNE meeting on April 20. The Secretary's letter concerns information on questions he was asked at the meeting on April 18.*

APRIL 19, 1963

DEAR MR. BRUCKER: One of the questions asked of me at Thursday's meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors contained allegations of misuse or waste of foreign aid. These allegations were:

- 1) That 48,000 cases of Metrecal were sent to India.
- 2) That 300,000 tons of cement hardened on the docks in monsoon weather in India.
- 3) That a sugar beet factory was built in Turkey where there were no sugar beets.

Since I was not familiar with details of these charges, I commented broadly on the problems and objectives of a well-administered aid program. Subsequently, I asked that foreign aid records be checked to verify, explain or controvert the allegations. These were the findings:

- 1) There is no record of any shipment of Metrecal to India.

There are, however, two instances where Metrecal was ordered by commercial importers under commodity procurement authorizations financed under the foreign aid program. In 1961, International Cooperation Administration (ICA) auditors discovered that an order for Metrecal had been placed under a sub-allocation of the Vietnamese Government. ICA immediately initiated action to recover the cost of the Metrecal on the basis that the product was not eligible for financing under our program. The product was returned to the shipper and an eligible product was ordered.

A very small amount of Metrecal was shipped to Cambodia in 1962 through private trade channels under the foreign aid commodity import program. The product had been erroneously identified by representatives of the Cambodia Government as medicinal in nature. The Agency for International Development, upon learning of the shipment, informed the Government of Cambodia that the product was

ineligible and filed a claim for recovery of the funds involved.

- 2) Neither AID records nor inquiries directed to veteran personnel whose experience goes back many years reveals any instance of cement hardening on the docks in India.

This charge might have been confused with the fact that incidents of this kind have occurred under the foreign aid program of the Soviet Union. We know of an instance where poorly packaged Soviet cement hardened on the docks during the monsoon season in Burma, and of similar cases involving Soviet cement in Guinea, Ghana and the Sudan.

- 3) The United States has not participated in the financing of any sugar beet mill in Turkey.

The question of sugar beet mills was raised during Congressional hearings in 1961, and the allegation was that the United States had built such mills in Iran and Indonesia.

In Iran, the United States had, in 1955, contributed \$635,000—less than one-fifth the cost—to construction of a sugar beet mill in Iran after surveys had demonstrated both a sugar shortage and favorable conditions for growing sugar beets. The mill was in full production in 1957 and two other mills have been built since, also with U.S. assistance.

In Indonesia, the United States has not assisted any such project. The East Germans, however, had sent sugar beet mill engineers to Indonesia in 1955 to build a sugar mill. Since Indonesia grows only sugar cane, continuing difficulties arose because the East German engineers had had no experience with sugar cane mills, and the plant did not go into production until 1960.

These are the answers, to the best of my knowledge, to the questions raised by the editor who identified himself as being from "out in the provinces." It does not appear, in any of the instances cited, that the United States or its representatives were at fault.

This is not to say that there have not been cases where Americans were guilty of error in the conduct of the foreign aid programs. There have been mistakes and human failures, and there will be more despite our efforts to prevent them.

I hope that these explanations can be passed on to the editor who asked the question, and to any others who may have been concerned about his allegations.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

*Q. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?*

*Mr. Brucker: Sure.*

*Q. Senator Keating said at lunch—this is quoted from the, you know, his speech—that the Department of State recently played a key role in blocking Russian-language broadcasts that Radio Liberty had originally proposed to beam to Soviet personnel in Cuba. And he went on to say that all day the Latin American and Cuban broadcasts and Soviet broadcasts are beamed to South America, yet our country held back an organization that wanted to broadcast some Russian-language stuff to that personnel. Do you know anything about that, Mr. Secretary?*

A. Well, I believe that there is—there have been this week news tickers indicating that those broadcasts are going forward.

*Q. They were held up, though, weren't they?*

A. There was a problem about whether the United States Government itself would organize such broadcasts, because we did not wish to—want to—put the stamp of permanency on those Russian troops in Cuba or to take any step which would make them think we were going to let them make themselves at home there or that we are going to let them settle down and make themselves comfortable. But those broadcasts are going on at the present time and have been for, I think, about a week.

*Q. Thank you.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we have a Congressman out our way who keeps saying that there are a large number of Red Chinese in Cuba, as well as a large number of Russians. Can you say with certainty that this is not so?*

A. Well, there are some Red Chinese in Cuba. We understand there are a number there, for example, in all fields, as agricultural technicians. But there is also, I think, a large pre-Castro Chinese community in Habana—my understanding is several thousand—and some of the reports which we have received on the presence of Chinese there check out to be references to the Chinese who were there earlier. Now, there are a substantial number of Red Chinese there—exactly what figure I would use, I would

not wish to indicate, but I should think several hundred Red Chinese were in Cuba.

*Mr. Brucker: Is there a further question?*

#### **Soviet Military Presence in Cuba**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that it was the policy of the State Department not to accept the military presence of the Soviet military in Cuba. You stated that, I believe, it is the policy of the State Department not to accept the Soviet military presence in Cuba as a normal state of affairs.*

*Now, according to the public reports, Soviet troops have been in Cuba about 8 months now. I presume this is regarded as an abnormal condition. At what point would the State Department consider the presence of the Soviet troops there to become normal rather than abnormal? If they are still there a year from now, would it be considered as an abnormal condition?* (Laughter.)

A. We have been since October doing what we can to keep the outtraffic of Soviet forces moving. You recall that some weeks ago I had had a talk with Mr. Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin] on the subject and that several thousand additional troops did leave Cuba during the month of March. This is a question that it is not dead; it is not inactive. We have made it very clear to the Soviet Union that their troops in Cuba are not acceptable in this hemisphere and that their military presence there is itself a continuing source of danger and that it is in the interest of everybody concerned that they get out.

But to take up your particular question about dates—a moving from normality to abnormality, or vice versa—I wouldn't want to speculate about dates.

*Mr. Brucker: Any further questions?*

#### **Situations in Laos and South Viet-Nam**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe that we are setting forth an assistance effort in South Viet-Nam. However, in Laos we agreed to a coalition. Would you explain the difference between the South Viet-Nam and the Laotian situation, and would you answer the question of whether*

*or not you went into the coalition government in Laos with a good deal of misgiving because of the history of such agreements with the Communists?*

A. I think one of the principal differences is that Viet-Nam had been specifically divided in 1954 between North and South and that the penetrations from the North into South Viet-Nam were directly contrary to an existing arrangement that had been reached and signed by the principal governments concerned. The United States did not sign those accords, but it indicated that it would abide by them.

Now, in the case of Laos, there was a country which had not been divided, where there was an attempt made to take over that country by infiltration, where it seemed to be possible to reach an agreement that that country should be left as an independent and neutral country. Well, there were indications that the Soviet Union did believe that this would be a workable arrangement, and so a decision was made to take that course, a political course that was initiated back in late 1960 or early 1961.

There is another element, and that is that the South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well. This has not, generally speaking, been the case in Laos. And we have felt that if you could just get the Laotians left alone, get the foreigners out, leave them to their own devices, to work out their own future, they would be no threat or peril to any of their neighbors and the security of Southeast Asia would be reinforced by that situation.

Now, everything turns upon (a) what the Soviet Union now really thinks about the importance of the Geneva Accords and (b) what influence they have on the immediate situation on the ground. If the answer to both those questions is affirmative, or is positive, then I think this thing can be worked out. But if there is a failure of either one of those, then I think we are in for some rough weeks and months ahead.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does your faith in foreign aid ever lag when you get United Nations reports that the population of Latin America is increasing faster than the income, so that the capital wealth is actually declining?*

A. Well, these are issues that, in the first

place, can be dealt with by working at both sides of the ledger. I suppose that in one sense the most overpopulated period in our American history was when there were just the Indians here. There is an enormous productive capacity available in Latin America to be mobilized, to be organized, to help deal with a population increase, particularly in basic foodstuffs, for example.

But the basic social and political decision about how to approach the population question is one which each country and each people must make for themselves. We do believe that these demographic features have to be taken fully into account and in a realistic social and economic development program, and we are doing a good deal to help other governments study their population problem as an integral part of their general planning process. But we don't believe that it is up to us to tell them what their answers must be or how they would deal with it themselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary—*

*Mr. Brueker: Secretary Rusk has to go along; so we will let it go with this one more question, please.*

#### **U.S. Views on Hit-and-Run Raids on Cuba**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good bit of discussion on the administration's ban on the hit-and-run attacks on Cuba, on Soviet ships in Cuban waters. There seems to be agreement that these raids should not be mounted from these shores but disagreement as to whether they should be condoned when arranged from other lands. Could you tell us, or indicate to us, what is the thinking of our allies in this hemisphere and in Europe on this matter and this decision by the administration?*

A. Well, I would suppose that governments who are responsible for territories in the Caribbean take the same general view that we do about such hit-and-run raids. We do not believe that these raids, such as those that have occurred in the past, have added significantly to the general effort to unseat Castro or to reduce his power on the island; they do, on the other hand, raise very serious questions of armed action.

We believe that questions of war and peace and the use of arms in this part of the world should be determined by the responsible governments concerned rather than by private groups, however much one might sympathize with their own motivations and their desires about their own country. But I would suppose, in answer to your particular question, that other governments responsible for territories in the Caribbean take the same view that we do on that particular point.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

#### REMARKS BY MR. BALL

Press release 203 dated April 19

Mr. Brucker, ladies and gentlemen: I was impressed a few minutes ago listening to the exchange between you gentlemen and Secretary Rusk. I was impressed with the thought that, in any dialog between those of us who toil in the foreign policy vineyard and you gentlemen of the press, there is a common quality which we have, each in our own way: We are each preoccupied with history. We who work at the business of foreign policy are concerned with trying to shape events which become a part of the history of our time, and you have an interest and an influence not only in the shaping of history but also in recording it. I recall the comment of the dyspeptic old Scotsman, Thomas Carlyle, that "histories after all are a kind of distilled newspaper."

Now, I would suspect also that we share a common secret vice, that from time to time each of us attempts, again in his own way, to try to stand apart from the events of the day and to look at what is occurring—to try to single out the trends from the individual events, to try to identify and to understand the great forces that are at work. And I am sure you find this problem as baffling as we do, because we live in a time that is very complex and it is always very difficult because of our participation in events to know what meaning or significance those events may have in the longer ranges of history.

It is even more difficult, it seems, in the present day, when a whole new fact has been introduced into history. That fact is the fact of speed, the fact of a great pervasive speed of

change which dominates this mid-20th century in a way unknown before. So that we are constantly confronted with events, with series of events, which added together may mean a greater change, a greater transformation in the world than would normally have occurred ever in the history as we have known it, in the history even as our immediate fathers and mothers may have known it, events that would have occurred only over a period of centuries. It seems to me that, if we look at this moment in time since the end of the Second World War, we can see evidences of this, because, in this period of something less than 18 years, we have seen the transformation of the world in a way which would never have seemed possible in the period of the thirties.

#### Some Recent Historic Events

First of all, we have become almost accustomed to the idea of the "iron curtain," a phrase which was only invented in 1946, which we heard for the first time when a man who is now a new citizen made a speech out in Fulton, Missouri—Sir Winston Churchill. The "cold war" was a phrase which was not then invented; yet we have come to accept it almost as a normal part of existence.

I talked not very long ago to a group of university students. I was impressed, in talking with them and in trying to find out what they were thinking about, with the fact that in the whole of their lives they had never experienced any other time except the time of the cold war. Yet for those of us who are as old as I am, the cold war is something which has come fairly recently and it is something that, God willing, we may not always have to live with.

The second great event besides the erection of the Iron Curtain, which made a prison for a third of the population of the earth—the second great event, fully as important, has been the movement from colonial status to some form of independence or freedom for another one-third of the world's population, about a billion people—an event again of fantastic proportions, an event which could only have been conceived of at an earlier time as something which might have gradually occurred over centuries. Yet colonialism, which was in full effect at the end

of the war, has now reached nearly the end of its existence over the world, the free part of the world.

A third event, which again I think will take its place in history as something of enormous significance, and which many of us tend to regard as perhaps the most constructive single thing which has happened in this period of the mid-20th century, has been the fact that the colonial powers of Europe have turned their attentions to the problems close at home and have succeeded in building in a very short time unity of a kind which the conquerors of old were never able to achieve. This has been done by the agreement of governments and the consent of peoples. It is a very remarkable achievement altogether.

### **Interruption in Momentum Toward Unity**

Now, in the last few weeks—particularly since the historic event of the 14th of January,<sup>4</sup> a press conference which will, I think, become itself a major event in history—in the last few weeks we have heard a great deal about the significance of what is happening in Europe and what this interruption in the processes that are going forward in Europe may mean. I think that many of us, perhaps, had begun to think of the European unity as perhaps more nearly fully attained than has turned out. We forget the fact that it was only in 1955 that our European friends first began the negotiations which led to the creation of the Common Market. That, after all, gentlemen, is only 8 years ago.

Nevertheless, what did occur on the 14th of January has had a significance, and I would suppose that that significance has been simply this: that while what has been going forward in Europe over the last few years has been a movement away from a concentration on the nation-state, what occurred on the 14th of January was a reassertion of the view that the nation-state is the only form of organization of society around which the allegiance of men can be fully coalesced. So that we are now having presented a confrontation of a very interesting

<sup>4</sup>At a press conference on Jan. 14, President Charles de Gaulle of France indicated that the French Government was at the present time opposed to British membership in the European Economic Community.

kind between the ideas of a Europe based on a concept of a greater unity and the ideas of the nation-state as the repository of the ideals of patriotism and as the kind of organization which is basically essential, which is the only kind that can endure over a long period.

I think that, for myself, I feel that it is altogether likely, in fact I would say almost certain, that the process of moving toward unity in Europe will prevail over a longer period, because I think the historic logic which is impelling them is so powerful. Nevertheless, it is clear that we have seen in the last few weeks some important things take place. We have seen, first of all, a decision which has for the time being at least interfered with the application of the United Kingdom to become a part of a great new Europe. But will this be something which will be permanent? Whether this is a process that will ultimately take place, I think, is something that only history will answer.

Again, if I may venture a view, I would believe that almost certainly the United Kingdom will at some point play a very important role in the construction of the new Europe. That is necessary and, may I say, inevitable.

There is another element which is involved in what has occurred, and that is an interruption in the process toward unity on the Continent itself, among the six members of the European Economic Community—the Common Market, as we call it. After all, the movement toward unity in Europe has been based upon a willingness of men and the nations to sacrifice some particular national interest in terms of a larger unity. This process has required a strong faith in what was being done and a strong will to do it. It has created political complications for many of the leaders who have played a part in it, but they have nevertheless gone forward. Now I think for the time being there has been an interruption in this process. Whether this can be overcome quickly is something again which we shall have to wait and see. I would certainly hope, from the interest of the United States and from the long-range interests of the whole Atlantic world, that this process can be resumed before very long.

Third, and this has been of particular interest to the United States, there have been called into

question the postulates upon which we have been proceeding with regard to the organization of the Atlantic world. The Atlantic world is a very special complex of nations, because in Western Europe and North America there are contained something like 90 percent of all the industrial power of the free world. It is essential that there be a unity of purpose and an ability to work together. What we have witnessed within the last few weeks is some doubts and questions as to what kind of arrangement should be made between the two sides of the Atlantic, between Western Europe on the one side and the United States on the other—Western Europe responding to a sense of new-found strength, and the United States being confronted with the fact that Europe had indeed succeeded in what we had very much hoped it would succeed in, becoming economically strong, and that certainly in the nature of things there would have to be a reallocation of responsibilities and a reallocation to some extent of the authority which goes along with the assumption of responsibility.

This is something which we have recognized in the Atlantic partnership all along. If the concept means anything—and I think it means a great deal—it means that on each side of the Atlantic the component parts of this partnership, the members, will assume responsibilities in accordance with their abilities, and their authority—the part they play in the management of the partnership—will have to be adjusted to the kind of responsibilities that they have assumed.

#### **Components of the Atlantic Partnership**

Now, in spite of the fact that there has been an interruption in the momentum of the movement which was under way during the last few years—an interruption which I think will be temporary—there nevertheless still exist the same compelling forces for bringing into being the Atlantic partnership about which we have talked so much and thought so much.

These compelling forces, it seems to me, are three to four in number. First of all, when you have within the Atlantic complex something like 90 percent of total industrial power of the free world, when you have industrial

economies as highly developed as are our industrial economies on both sides of the Atlantic, you have a kind of interdependence which again is something almost new in the world.

We are aware of the fact—very clearly aware of the fact—that our economic good health on this side of the Atlantic depends to a considerable extent on the maintenance of economic good health on the other side. Our European friends are very well aware of the fact that upon the economic good health and the rate of growth of the U.S. will depend to a considerable extent their own prosperity. So we have been trying more and more, through consultation within the structure of a new organization which was created only a year and a half ago—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—to bring about a unity of policy or at least a concerting of policy which has eliminated or attempted to eliminate many of the disequilibria—the distortions—which have occurred in economic relations within this Atlantic world.

Secondly, we have recognized that there had to be a pooling of effort to achieve the common task which we have faced, that the United States alone could not and should not go on trying all around the world to carry the great share of the burden, because of the fact that Europe was now becoming stronger and Europe was becoming, therefore, more competent and more capable. We, ourselves, had to move into a world system where, with the withdrawal of Europe before the rising tide of anticolonialism, power vacuums were created on almost every continent, and the U.S. of necessity, in order to provide the security and protection which the free world required, had to make commitments in those areas which it has been difficult in almost all cases to carry out. So I think one of the very big pieces of unfinished business we have in our relations with European countries is to work toward some better allocation of responsibilities which more nearly respond to the competence and the capability which exist on the two sides of the Atlantic with the coming into being of an economically strong Europe.

We have been working also toward a recognition of the developed strength of Europe by seeking ways and means to give our European friends a greater share of participation in the

common nuclear defense. This has been a matter of very great concern to us, as it has to Europeans. At Nassau we reached some conclusions in conversation with our British allies,<sup>5</sup> which are being translated into reality now, conclusions for the organization of a NATO force in Europe which would have several components: a component of national forces on the part of the nuclear powers, both forces in being and Polaris forces on the part of the United States and United Kingdom which would be contributed at a later point; and perhaps most important of all, a multilateral nuclear force which would represent an effort on our part, in consultation with our European friends, to find some solution for the management of nuclear power in a manner which would permit the non-nuclear as well as the nuclear nations to participate without resulting in or encouraging the proliferation of the national nuclear capabilities which could start us down a very dangerous road.

Finally, we have recognized that, not only in the areas of economic relations or in the areas of common defense or in the measures which we have been taking to work together toward the provision of assistance to less developed nations, but also in our commercial relations, we should try to make a serious effort to bring about a greater flow of trade and therefore a more effective allocation of resources and consequently a higher standard of living on both sides of the Atlantic.

Within the meaning of the Trade Expansion Act which President Kennedy sent to Congress last year and which the Congress passed, we are presently engaged in the initial steps which will look toward a full-fledged trade negotiation next year. Governor Herter [Christian A. Herter, Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations], as you know, is taking specific charge of this undertaking.

So I will say, gentlemen, that, while these last few weeks have been periods when it has been useful, I think, for all of us to take a look at problems confronting us, by and large the world, as we see it, remains unchanged. After the 14th of January, we still have the same problems. We still have the same com-

<sup>5</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

elling reasons for trying to work out effective institutional arrangements under which the industrialized powers on the two sides of the Atlantic can work in a common effort toward the protection of the free world and to assure the survival of the common ideals which we share.

Now I will do what I can on your questions, if you want to start the inquisition.

#### QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

*Q. What would be wrong with a Europe that had a very high tariff wall? Isn't this a tried and tested method of developing an economic entity? Didn't we do it? Didn't Britain represent a sort of leak in that wall, a possible leak, and can't they come in later, much as our colonies came in later, so that we could gain strength as we went along? Should we be afraid of this, or does that represent for us something that has ultimate security for us?*

A. Mr. Block, I would remind you, first, that we are not living in the latter part of the 18th century and that the United States no longer consists of 13 new, fledgling States, nor do the states of modern Europe bear very much resemblance to that from an economic point of view. Europe represents a highly sophisticated, highly organized, very dynamic and efficient society. It is of major importance to the United States that we have Europe for a market, as it is important to Europe that they have us for a market. So far as the United States is concerned, we sell a great part of our agricultural production to Western Europe. I would say half of our agricultural commercial exports go there. I think to the six nations of the Common Market we sell close to \$1,400,000,000 a year of agricultural products; plus Great Britain, it comes to something like \$1,800,000,000.

So far as industrial products are concerned, we sell 50 percent more to Europe than we buy from them. So, from the point of view of the United States, even from the point of view of our own rather parochial commercial interests, it is of vital importance that we work toward the liberalization of trade and the lowering of the external tariff of the European Common Market.



But it is also of great interest to them. I may say that what has come out of the events of the past few weeks, as far as the Europeans are concerned, is a realization on their part that however the trade negotiations may turn out will be a very great test for the vitality of the European community and of the new Europe. It is very important that they be outward-looking, because they are going to have to play a major role in this world. To be outward-looking means that, as far as their economies are concerned, it is important that they be subjected to the competition of the world in order to maintain their vitality.

It is important for political reasons that there not be a constant kind of economic warfare between the two halves of the free world in which the economic power of the free world is contained. I would suppose that, if we are going to work toward the most effective kind of relations with the free world—with the Atlantic world, other Atlantic nations—this process will be greatly facilitated if we can bring about a higher level of trade across the Atlantic and with the other nations and that, therefore, from the point of view, first, of the specific United States national interest and, second, from the strength and health of the free world itself, I think it is very important that there be success next year as we begin the difficult task of trade negotiation.

*Mr. Brucker: I have one question I would like to ask if it is fair. It has bothered me a long time. I understood that the movement of the Common Market had gotten over the hump and was practically irreversible. After that, you had the failure of the Outer Seven—the natural inclination to bring the two together. What is it that President de Gaulle has in the way of tools or something else that has made him singlehandedly able to defy his five-nation colleagues plus all the rest?*

A. I would think, Mr. Brucker, that the movement toward a Common Market was substantially irreversible. I see very little possibility of its being either stopped very long or reversed. I don't think this is going to occur. But, of course, this movement is based upon the agreement of the nations concerned. Now,

until recently, as I suggested a moment ago, the movement toward a stronger and more united Europe had come because of the willingness of each of those nations to subordinate its own specific national interest in the interest of this larger unit. On the other hand, the French Government at the moment has raised a question as to the kind of emphasis which it is prepared to put on the nation-state as against the creation of a stronger Europe. This is the problem, and since France is one of the members of a group which is committed to make progress by unanimity under the terms of the Rome Treaty until January 1st, 1966, when many of the difficult decisions can be taken by a qualified majority vote, for the time being at least an assertion of a French veto on a specific matter such as the admission of the United Kingdom means that that event will not occur so long as the French Government takes that view.

Now, I don't want to create the impression that I think the French Government is going to oppose all of the measures toward a greater unity in Europe. I think that there has been some exaggeration of the position that may have been indicated on this. Just what position it will take with regard to the trade negotiation, with regard to the creation of a common agricultural policy, with regard to a number of the other measures which are going forward within Europe, I think time will tell, and I would not at all want to prejudge it. I think that there are already signs of movement again—the resumption of movement toward unity within the Common Market and toward getting on with the agenda of the Common Market. I think that they will go forward. But for the moment, on the question of the accession of the United Kingdom, this has been stopped at the instance of the French Government. Whatever position the Government may take on other issues will remain to be seen.

*Mr. Brucker: I think in the interest of time we had better stop the questioning there.*

*Mr. Ball, I want to speak for the ASNE in thanking you most heartily for taking time out of a busy day and giving us an equally enlightening and incisive and confident outlook in another part of our troubled world. We thank you.*

## REMARKS BY MR. HARRIMAN

Press release 204 dated April 19

Thank you, Mr. Brucker, for your introduction. Considering the menu which you have, the number of people who have spoken to you, I will try to be brief.

I see that you have had a good lecture on bipartisanship by Kenneth Keating. You know, he came when I was up before the Congress for confirmation this last time. He was kind enough to come and sit beside me and say I was all right. I told him I was really delighted by the kind words the Republicans said about me ever since I stopped running for public office. Anyway, Kenneth Keating told you all he knows about Cuba; so I don't suppose you need to ask any questions on that subject. But I was told when you got to me you wanted to talk about the Sino-Soviet rift.

If I am correct about that, I will say a few words about that and leave some time for questions.

### Sino-Soviet Rift

Perhaps some of you know I have been in the last year and a half exiled in the Far East, but recently I have been reprieved and I am back in general circulation. But this subject of the Soviet Union and China is one of the very absorbing subjects of our time and is worth watching.

I said the other day that I did not think we were smart enough, in answer to a question, to exploit the differences between the two, and someone criticized me in the press for that because I played down our truths. I don't think anybody can exploit the difference between the two, but I think we can behave in such a way as not to throw the two together; if not, we will come to that in the end.

There has been rather a myth that there has been a monolithic international Communist bloc. That has never been so. If you go back in history in the development of the Chinese Communist Party, in the twenties, you will find that Borodin, who then represented the Comintern in China, had some rather severe differences with Mao Tse-tung, and if my history is right, Mao Tse-tung was very nearly thrown out of the Communist Party at that time because

he refused to accept the Marxist-Lenin concept that the Communist Party of China should be based on the urban industrial masses. He said China is going to be based on peasants. In any event, Mao Tse-tung won out.

Now, I received some understanding of the relationship between the Kremlin and the Chinese Communists during the war. Some of you remember I was in Moscow on and off throughout the war for two and a half years. I saw a good deal of Stalin. China was the subject of discussion on a good number of occasions. He made it very plain that he did not have too much confidence in Mao Tse-tung or the Communist Party in China. Once he called them "margarine Communists." About that time there were some Americans who were calling the Communists "agrarian reformists." Whether it was because margarine was not an agricultural product, I don't know, but somehow or other it was mixed up in butter. There was a thought that Stalin was trying to pull the wool over our eyes. He was not at all. He was very serious, because what he meant by "margarine Communists" was Communists that were not real Communists. To Stalin a real Communist was a party that accepted the Kremlin as the oracle. At that time Mao Tse-tung was not then or since ready to accept the Kremlin as the last word. That has consistently, continually, been an issue between them.

### Different Stages of Development

There are several other fundamental issues. One is the different stages in their economic development. As you well know, the Soviet Union has made extraordinary advances in industrial production, science, and otherwise, as all Communists have, and quite a failure of their agricultural production. It is a curious thing, and I hope all of you remember it, and I will be glad to see all of you repeat it whenever you have occasion to do so. Communists have always failed everywhere if they applied Communist methods to food production. But they have been in the Soviet Union successful in industrial production.

Now, Khrushchev and the present generation of Communist leaders do not want to see Russia destroyed. We saw this in Cuba, and

I think it is accepted as a fact that the Kremlin does not want to become involved in a nuclear war in which there is a chance that they would suffer terrific damage. Whereas you have all heard the stories of what Mao Tse-tung is said to have said about the nuclear war to be of advantage to China. The industrial nations would be wiped out, and China would be left as the great nation. They might lose a hundred or two million people. I am quoting what others have said: "We will lose a hundred or two million people. We will then be the great nation of the world." Therefore, there is reason to believe that China, the Chinese Communists, are ready to take greater risks.

That is one of the arguments that is going on between Peiping and Moscow. It was couched at one time in the words whether war was inevitable. The question was not whether it was. The question was whether war was desirable.

Although the Chinese Communists do not have nuclear capability now, I for one will think it will be a much more dangerous world when and if they do. It will be some years ahead. At the same time, let us hope in the meantime all people in China are educated to the appalling condition the world will be in if there is a nuclear holocaust.

Now, a third reason is the historic differences between China and Russia, which have existed through the ages. I won't try to expose my ignorance in history by explaining what happened between the two countries, but I am sure you are as well informed as I am.

These are all matters—these three differences are all matters which it is very difficult to patch over. They may attempt from time to time to paper them over, but it does seem there are some fundamental differences at the present time between the two countries, between the Communist parties of the two countries.

On the other hand, I personally believe that there is no—I will say there is no indication as yet that the Soviet Union is going to repudiate their military commitment to China; if China is attacked by Japan or anyone associated with Japan, she will come to the aid of China. It is one question to have a very serious difference within the Communist hierarchy and another to face the blotting out of an important Com-

munist country by a non-Communist. That is the question which, I think we should understand, puts the differences between them in a different dimension.

Now, there is another aspect of the difference in their economic development in that there is no doubt that China demanded of Russia that Russia give China a great deal of assistance. If Russia, they said, was to be a real Communist, they would share their production with China until China caught up and then the Communist movement could move up together.

Well, the Russians did not think that was a very good idea. As a result, Russia dumped China. Several years ago they ended all economic and technical assistance, took their advisers out of China, and trade has gone down in the last couple of years to one-half of what it was, and there seems to be a great bitterness among the Chinese Communists against the Kremlin because it deserted China just when China was having the disastrous economic reverse, when the collapse of the "great leap forward" occurred.

#### **No Difference in Objectives**

Now, it is interesting, but I do want to underline the fact, if I may, that there is absolutely no difference in their objectives. Both of them think that communism is the wave of the future. Both of them believe it is their responsibility to push communism. They believe, as has been taught them, that communism cannot be safe in the world unless the whole world is Communist. It is not a question of the objective. It is a difference in the methods by which the objective is achieved.

Khrushchev is ready to use any method, brinkmanship, local wars of liberation, subversion, and any other method of that type to move forward. Now there does seem to be a greater willingness on the part of China to take risks, for Red China to take risks, but one will have to see to judge. In the Soviet Union there has been a great difference since the end of the war, which I think is worth noting. I talked on a number of occasions with Stalin about the future of communism in the world. He said that communism would eventually dominate the world, because of the defects of capitalism, because of the failures of capitalism, because they

believed that there would be great depressions in which communism could move forward.

He also believed in the Marxist thesis that capitalist countries would battle each other, have wars, and during those periods of human misery they would be able to move forward. Once he said, rather colorfully, that communism would breed in the cesspool of capitalism.

Fifteen years later, sitting in the same room, I saw Khrushchev in June 1954—the same pictures on the wall—the furniture was rearranged a bit—Khrushchev said, “We are making such an enormous success of communism that other countries are going to have to follow our example.”

That is an amazing change, but that is indicative of the progress, the industrial progress, which has been made in the Soviet Union in the intervening period. It does indicate why they have become more conservative in terms of facing a nuclear war.

There is another interesting thing which Stalin said to me in talking of China. I asked him once why he agreed to this Soong treaty, which you will remember provided that the Soviet Union would support Chiang Kai-shek's government, the Nationalist Government. I think they used the words “military, economically, politically, morally, and no other government.” I asked him why he agreed to do that. He said, “Well, Chiang Kai-shek is the only individual that we supported before, although we did not fully agree with his ideas. We think he will be the only one who will be able to unify the country. What is more, China will need vast quantities of industrial equipment which they will only be able to get from the West, particularly from the United States.”

Then he said a rather interesting word. He said, “We”—meaning the Soviet Union—“will not be able to provide them.” It is interesting that after a number of years Khrushchev and his group tried to supply them. They made up their minds they could not do so and turned China loose on their own resources.

In any event I think it is fair to say that there are very deep-seated differences between Moscow and Peiping which are likely to last even though there may be, as I say, from time to time a papering over of their differences.

But let us not get under any illusion that if

there is a major war in which China is involved—I would be rather surprised if Khrushchev and his present generation of Communists and the Kremlin did not come to its assistance. The effect of this, of course, to the East is interesting in that we see in India Red China attacking India and the Kremlin giving at least lipservice support to the Indian Government and a gesture in terms of military assistance. As you know, they sent them a few MIG's. From the military standpoint it is not of great importance, but as a gesture it does have significance.

### **Red China and India**

Why the Chinese Reds attacked India one cannot fully tell, but it must be beyond the reason of settling this border dispute. They built a road from Sinkiang Province into Tibet, which is the best way to get into the west and, of course, part of the territory which the Indians claim and which the Chinese claim. Their attack could not only have related to that because they were winning the particular local engagement which related to that area of Ladakh. They can get in by road or the Indians get in by air or by foot. But they attacked in the NEFA, the Northeast Frontier Area, where there was no real serious difference over the border. Although there was technically, there was not a very basic difference. They must have had in mind the desire to destroy the image of India as a great country, to humiliate India, and to build up their own prestige, which they had lost to a very considerable extent by the collapse of the “great leap forward.”

Now they have gained those objectives. On the other hand I think they have been rather surprised at the violent reaction within India itself, and I think we have a right to be encouraged. Nehru himself said this is not an attack on us nor a border dispute. It is an attack on our way of life. Others have said it is an attack on our existence as a nation of freedom, and they look upon it, both the Government, Prime Minister Nehru and his colleagues, and the Indian people, as a long-term struggle, and they want to strengthen themselves in order to succeed in meeting it.

The area which Red China has perhaps the

most immediate desire to gain control of—they don't indicate that they are willing to send military but they are attempting to subvert; that is the area in Southeast Asia, in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Viet-Nam. That is the great surplus rice producing area and is an area that, with greater development of their river resources, could support a very substantially larger population. I would think that you could see increased pressure on that area from time to time as the situation develops.

Now, as I say, this difference between Moscow and Peiping is extremely interesting and one which can have a very vital effect. I think we ought to understand some of the things we should not do. There are some people who think we should not give aid to India unless they break with Moscow. I think that is a very stupid thing. I think it is pleasant to see Mr. Khrushchev on the horns of a dilemma between his friend India and his eternal brother China. Why should we relieve him of that embarrassment? I think that it is very much in our interest that the Soviet Union continue to give economic assistance to India. The Indians have indicated that they have no intention of being overrun by any outsider. They are determined to maintain their freedom and their own way of life. If the Russians want to build a steel mill or give some other assistance, that can offset the obligation the responsibility for which will otherwise rest upon us and our European associates. So that I think that we have to play this thing by ear as the situation develops, but certainly we want to avoid doing what may tend to bring the two together.

For that reason I suggest that we should in no sense attempt to interfere with India's foreign policy as it relates to Russia at the present time.

Now there are various other aspects of this struggle. You see it in Cuba. You see it in almost every part of the world. One thing is interesting—incidentally, I imagine almost every one of you have read this extraordinary letter which the Kremlin wrote to Peiping the other day listing its grievances—among others was the grievance that Peiping was attempting to use racial prejudice against her. They had the Moshi conference in Tanganyika, where

they did not invite the Russians or the European Communists to come but only the Afro-Asians. At that time they indicated that there was a real affinity of interest between the Negro and the yellow races, the nonwhite races. Moscow condemned Peiping for attempting to use such prejudice in the battle between them.

These are very interesting developments and ones which we should watch with a good deal of care to see which way eventually it develops in the relations between them. In any event, you continue to see rather vigorous comments made by one against the other, and it is becoming more and more a personal issue between the leaders of the two groups in Peiping and Moscow.

If this incites any of you to any questions, I will be very glad to answer them as it relates to this problem or anything else you care to have me comment on.

#### QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

*Mr. Brucker: We have left a maximum of 5 minutes. Do you have any questions for Mr. Harriman?*

*Q. Mr. Harriman, you mentioned agrarian reformers. I seem to recall some years ago we had an adviser in the State Department, Mr. Lattimore, who used that term. As I recall, it was his suggestion that we make it a matter of U.S. policy that the Chinese be urged to join up with these agrarian reformers. I am just wondering. Is Mr. Lattimore still connected with our State Department?*

*A. I have no idea, and I don't care to discuss the past. I don't know why you ask me that question. In some ways I rather resent it, because we are not involved in raking over the past. We think about the future. I don't know why you inquire about that. If anybody feels differently about it, I am sorry, but I think this persecution of an individual is a thing (applause) we have gotten over, thank God, and let us not go over any of the past. The people who are working for the State Department are damn good Americans. They are just as good Americans as you are. (Applause.)*

*Mr. Brucker: I told you we had an independent-minded man.*

A. I don't think I am independent. I think I express the opinion of the majority of Americans.

*Mr. Brucker: I would agree with that, Mr. Harriman.*

A. And I have a very high regard for this group in this room.

*Mr. Brucker: That is probably true, too.*

*Is there another question in the minute or two remaining?*

*Q. I would like to ask you a question. Recently I was in the Far East, and I visited Indonesia. I noted the country, the corruption, and the fact that they are broke and also the fact that they are playing footsie with the Russians as well as the Chinese. How do we stand with Sukarno?*

A. I wish I could give you a direct answer to that. I can say that Sukarno and this Indonesian Government are very strong nationalists. They have not fought for their freedom from the Dutch with the idea of giving it up either to the Chinese or to the Russians. Now, they have accepted a very large amount of economic aid and military assistance from the Soviet Union, but they have not accepted any such assistance from China. Sukarno is playing a rather careful political game in his country between the different elements within his society, but at least I think we can be sure that he is attempting to develop Indonesia for the Indonesians.

Now, he is accepting certain assistance from us which is relatively modest, and the military seem to depend upon us to a considerable extent for training and for certain types of equipment in spite of the overall equipment, large equipment, they are getting from Russia.

Incidentally, you may have noticed, if you read your papers—I have to read the papers today, because I work for a man who reads too many newspapers—you probably have noticed that Marshal Malinovsky, the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, has recently been in Indonesia, and he seems to leave in not too good a humor. But the future alinement of Indonesia is impossible for anybody fully to predict. As far as I am concerned, I think that we ought

to accept Indonesia as she is, the fifth largest nation in the world, I think, with vast economic resources, a very low standard of living as compared to the Western countries and to some other Eastern countries. But we have a great area, if you will look at a geography, running from Malaya almost touching Australia, cutting across the communications between Japan and India and the Philippines. We have an enormous interest to see that country develop within the free world. I think those who suggest that we should abandon Indonesia are unnecessarily pessimistic, and to those who think, if there are any, that we are going to have an easy time ahead, I say I think we should work as closely with the Indonesian Government as they are willing to work with us, give them a helping hand where it is to our interest to do so, and watch developments and hope that the spirit of nationalism will be stronger than the effect of Communist propaganda.

In the East, where the standard of living is low, desperately low—\$50, \$60, \$70 per capita per annum, against ours, whatever it is, \$2,500—this question of freedom does not mean a lot. But nationalism does. If we could understand that the issue is between nationalism and Chinese imperialism, rather than some ideological concept or economic concept, I think we would do better. I do believe we have a very strong ally in this feeling of national pride which comes to a nation which has just come out, and if we will work with them, with that feeling, and forget about some of the other ideals we would like to achieve, we will be more apt to achieve our objectives.

Now, I am sorry to have been so long-winded about this, but I think there are no easy answers in Indonesia. I think we have a vital interest in the country, and I hope that we will continue to attempt to find a common ground with the Indonesian Government and the people, and that over the years we will be able to find that the people of that country come closer to our concepts than those of the Communists.

What would be, I think, the most foolish thing in the world would be simply to say because they don't do everything we want we will forget about them. Then there is no doubt they will fall under the domination of the Commu-

nists. This is the kind of difficult situation, perhaps one of the most difficult, which we have to contend with in the world. It is not possible to see black and white. It is not possible to see exactly the course we have to follow. I hope that you men, if I may say so, will follow this type of situation with a great deal of care and try to get the American people to recognize that our long-term interest will best be served by standing on the sidelines at times and not necessarily applauding or condemning what may be going on in different countries. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

## Secretary Rusk Interviewed on GFWC Television Program

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by representatives of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, filmed on March 26 and released on April 13 for broadcast by independent radio and television stations as the first program in a series entitled "Women on the Move."*

Press release 193 dated April 12, for release April 13

*Mr. Granik:* This is Theodore Granik speaking to you from the John Quincy Adams Room of the United States Department of State. Here, on this premier broadcast, to ask the distinguished Secretary of State Dean Rusk the questions every American wants answered, are "Women on the Move," chosen from its more than 11 million members by the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and with the Secretary of State is our moderator, Mrs. Dexter Otis Arnold, president of the General Federation of Women's Clubs.

*Mrs. Arnold:* Mr. Secretary, our panel today on the first program of "Women on the Move" consists of Mrs. J. Kenneth Bradley, who is the president of the Connecticut Federation of Women's Clubs; and Mrs. Donald Domer, who is the secretary of the Ohio Federation of Women's Clubs; and Mrs. Fred Gast, who is the immediate past president of the Oregon Federation of Women's Clubs; and the chairman of the International Affairs Department

of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, Mrs. Joseph Paige.

I think Mrs. Bradley is going to ask the first question.

*Mrs. Bradley:* Mr. Secretary, in connection with the Cuban situation, would you define for us the difference between offensive and defensive? I think that this becomes very confusing in the minds of the average American.

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, Mrs. Arnold, let me say first how happy I am to welcome you and your colleagues here to the John Quincy Adams Room of the Department of State.

Well, it is true that in a certain sense any weapon can be offensive or defensive, depending on where it is and on which end of it you are. But insofar as a Cuban military threat to the hemisphere is concerned, offensive weapons are those which could strike significantly at the hemisphere or at Cuba's neighbors.

Now, at the present time President Kennedy has made it utterly clear that we would not accept a reintroduction into Cuba of weapons which could strike at its neighbors, including the United States; that we would not permit any arms that are in Cuba to be used outside of Cuba; that we would enforce the right to use international airspace and international waters freely by ourselves and others; that we would enforce the necessity of keeping a careful watch over what is going on in Cuba; that if any attempt were made to launch forays against any other countries, those would meet the armed forces of the hemisphere, including those of the United States. So that these are the present military commitments of the United States with respect to Cuba.

*Mrs. Paige:* Then these are the acts of aggression that would provoke us to war?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I hesitate to use this word "war" because that is a very small word that encompasses a good deal. What I would say is that there is no question whatsoever that the United States will give the fullest support to the Rio Treaty, which guarantees the security of this hemisphere, and other steps which are necessary to insure that Cuba does not itself launch an aggression in any way against its neighbors.



## The Costa Rica Conference

*Mrs. Paige:* Well, would you tell us, please, Mr. Secretary, what importance you attach to the Costa Rica conference?

*Secretary Rusk:* Yes. I think that there were three points of major importance in the Costa Rica conference.<sup>1</sup> The first is that the very presence of the Presidents of the seven states represented there brought great public attention upon those particular countries and in effect moved the Central American Republics and Panama to the front of our attention as a nation and registered the fact that we look upon what is happening in Central America as of the utmost importance to us, not as just part of the backyard or forgotten part of this hemisphere.

Secondly, we were very much encouraged to see how rapidly the Central American Republics are moving toward economic integration. These are for the most part small countries with relatively limited populations. There are many things which they cannot achieve one by one—for example, monetary stability, questions of university education, the training of qualified personnel, cooperation in the development of superior techniques in agriculture, things of that sort, public-health measures—all can best be done on a regional basis in that area, and President Kennedy was able to give powerful support to the growing sense of unity among the Central American Republics.

And third were those measures that I have mentioned, about interrupting the subversive flow of funds and personnel from Cuba into these countries. I think that those were the result of the conference.

I must say that the warm welcome which the public gave to the President itself was most extraordinary and, I think, one of the most exciting parts of the visit.

*Mrs. Gast:* Mr. Secretary, then do you feel that, through our alliance and this meeting in Costa Rica, we are showing sufficient evidence of helping to show our way of life to Latin America, and through this aid helping these countries to build up their own economies?

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.

*Secretary Rusk:* I think that this is a matter in which there will always be unfinished business, but I think that a great deal has been done in the recent months—in the last year or two—to improve what is happening on our side in Latin America. For example, in 1960 we were engaging in only 1 hour a day of broadcasting to Latin America. That has now gone up to 13 hours a day, 9 in Spanish and 4 in Portuguese. That is one major area of improvement.

I think also that we are making headway, although slowly, on some of the steps which have to be taken by the countries themselves if our relatively small investments in the Alliance for Progress are to pay off in real development. You see, the total Alliance for Progress involves only 2 percent of the gross national products of the countries involved. The real job is to be done by the 98 percent of the resources contributed by the countries themselves to their own effort. That is how development comes about—

*Mrs. Domer:* Land reform is such a—

*Secretary Rusk:* —land reform, improved tax systems, administration, improved health measures—all the rest of it. So I think that this is moving. One of the problems—you mentioned impatience.

*Mrs. Domer:* Yes.

*Secretary Rusk:* One of the problems is that we would like for them to move fast, but we would like for them to move fast under democratic processes. Now, when we look back over some of the controversial periods through which we have lived in our own country in bringing about the great reforms which have had so much to do with our own development, we can understand that, in some of these countries, if they move democratically they have problems at home in getting their congresses and legislatures to take the steps that we and they both think will be necessary; so it will take a little time.

*Mrs. Bradley:* Mr. Secretary, this suggestion that what we need in Latin America is a good, sound middle class—which they don't have. They have the two classes, the few and the wealthy class, and then of course the poor class,

because the military I suppose comes closest to the middle class—

*Secretary Rusk:* I think that there is a very important point there, that we do see evolving what might be called the moderate middle class, but this depends upon education, it depends upon the gradual development of the capital required for such a middle class to come into existence. It requires opportunities for trade among those who would become the middle class, but also I think it involves some recognition on the part of the privileged classes to accept the public responsibilities which wealthy people in our country have begun to accept more and more over, say, the last 50 years and, on the other side, the responsibility on the part of the so-called lower classes in recognizing that you cannot really lift the standard of living of an entire country by leveling down—you level up, you increase production so that those at the bottom themselves find that they themselves are earning more through their own production.

#### **Basic Commitments of NATO Unchanged**

*Mrs. Paige:* Mr. Secretary, might we move to another part, because the General Federation's study program is concentrated more or less in our mutual security alliances and we are emphasizing that particularly. Could you tell us, please, whether or not the new French attitude has changed—made or forced a basic change in our foreign policy?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I think that it is important to understand what the recent discussion has been all about. Let me say at the beginning that it has not been about the basic commitments of NATO. Those commitments with respect to the security of NATO over against the Soviet bloc are just as simple and direct and firm as they have ever been. Back in October there was complete unity in NATO at that moment of great crisis, and France made it very clear that, if the Cuban situation resulted in general war, France would be with the United States—no if's, no hesitations, very simple.

And it is very important for Moscow to understand that this is so, because we are not

talking about cracks in the basement of the alliance. What we are talking about is how to build the second story, how do you write the next chapter, where do you go from here. And it had been our hope and the hope of many people on the European side that there would be, first, the United Kingdom's accession to the Common Market, that the Treaty of Rome would be developed on a basis of a unified Europe, that we and unified Europe would move together not only on security questions in NATO but in trade questions in connection with our Trade Expansion Act, and that there would evolve a unified Europe and a great Atlantic partnership.

Now, the details of how this was to be worked out have been discussed, and there have been disagreements, as you know, but I have no doubt that this is the inevitable mainstream of policy for the West and that what we are confronted with is a pause, a realignment, a readjustment of thinking, a reconsideration of techniques; but the alliance itself is just as solid as it can possibly be and is significantly stronger than it has ever been in the history of the alliance. For example, our own defense budget has grown about 25 percent in the last 2½ years.

*Mrs. Arnold:* Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us about the Berlin situation that would be comforting?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I would have to say that I do not at the present time see any major change in the Berlin situation. This is a point of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western countries. We have the most vital interests at stake there. We would prefer to see a question of this sort resolved without a high crisis or without conflagration. But these are utterly fundamental questions; I think they understand that in Moscow. But they are so difficult and complex that I do not see that we will have Berlin off of our agenda for some time to come.

*Mrs. Domer:* They have indicated their willingness to resume the talks—whatever that means.

*Secretary Rusk:* Yes, those talks have been begun. Whether anything will come out of them, it is too early to say right now. But this is a problem that has been with us since 1945.

I don't myself see any easy and automatic solution, but it is one that we ought to try to find some answers to, if possible, but only on the basis of the full insurance of the security and the freedom of the people of West Berlin, of the American interests there.

### **U.S. Relationships With Common Market**

*Mrs. Gast:* Mr. Secretary, what changes will have to be made in our tariff regulations in order to compete in the Common Market?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, at the present time, the changes that we made under the Tariff Adjustment Act, the simplification procedures, are now being considered by the EEC [European Economic Community] countries in Europe to see what adjustments, what concessions, are required as a result of that procedure.

Then, after that, Mr. Herter [Christian A. Herter, Special Representative of the President for Trade Negotiations] and his colleagues will be holding hearings, in which private American interests can come in to state their situations, as a result of which then we can go into the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations next year and bargain hard for mutual reductions of tariffs on both sides of the Atlantic, so that we can have an expansion of trade throughout the Atlantic community.

This is a very complex procedure. It will take a good deal of time. We are delighted that Secretary Herter has been willing to take on this responsibility. But my own view is that the result of it will be an expansion of trade and economic activity, both here and in Europe.

*Mrs. Bradley:* Mr. Secretary, what effect did the Common Market crisis have on our American-English relationship?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, we have had for a very long time indeed a close relation with Britain. Some people call it a "special" relationship.

During World War II we were the most intimate of allies and partners. We have supposed that, if Britain goes into the Common Market, that same intimacy will exist between us and a unified Europe. But I would not suppose that our close cooperation with Britain would, in any way, be weakened by the events of the past several weeks. We will continue to co-

operate with Britain as well as our European allies in whatever way is possible, given the problems we have to deal with.

*Mrs. Domer:* Back to this Common Market thing. Won't the Common Market affect, though, the United States sales of poultry and dairy products? I mean, hasn't this really been established—that these will be affected?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, when trading partners are exchanging billions of dollars in each direction each year, I think there will always be specific trading questions that will have to be ironed out. It is in the very nature of an expansive and vigorous private trading community that this should be so. We have been working very hard in the past several months on insuring a market for American poultry in Europe. Now they have some problems about markets in this country. They are concerned about, for example, glass or textiles or other things in which some of our operations here feel pinched.

But we will never be in a situation where there are not specific trading questions that have to be talked about and worked over, because we are too expansive and explosive in our economies in the West ever to have a completely serene situation. But we do believe that the vast trade that even now exists between both sides of the Atlantic can be significantly expanded to the mutual profit of both sides.

### **Aid to Viet-Nam**

*Mrs. Bradley:* Could we move into the Viet-Nam area?

*Secretary Rusk:* Right.

*Mrs. Bradley:*—because I think this is something we are all terribly interested in, of course, as we are interested in all the other areas.

How far do you think the United States should go there, Mr. Secretary, in supporting the buildup of the guerrilla warfare in Viet-Nam?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think we have to start from the underlying proposition that the peoples in Southeast Asia do not wish to be absorbed either by communism or by the Chinese. And this means that they are particularly concerned about being absorbed by Chinese communism.

We do believe that the people of South Viet-Nam are fighting their own battle. Our effort has been to put them in position to win that battle. Guerrilla war is one of the most difficult, most frustrating kinds of wars to fight. The means are: a vanishing enemy, hard to locate, hard to pin down. You never know exactly when a victory has been scored, because the total result in the immediate day-to-day operation is not so clearly evident.

But we feel that an important corner has been turned in recent months in South Viet-Nam: the ratio of arms captured by one side or the other, of casualties inflicted, great improvement in intelligence resources. For example, the villagers are now coming forward in great numbers to give information to the Government in a way that they have never done before—a very important thing. And the village development program in the strategic hamlets has been moving forward, and more and more villagers are able to till their crops and go about their normal duties with a sense of security. So our principal purpose is to put them in a position to win their battle.

Now, if the other side steps up the effort, or if this drags on unduly, then some very serious and possibly harsh decisions will have to be made. But we have been encouraged by what has been happening in the last several months.

*Mrs. Paige:* Mr. Secretary, what evidence have we that the administration aid program for Southeast Asia is justified?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I think you would start, first, with the question of what the situation would be in Southeast Asia had we not provided very substantial aid. I think that the answer would be that the world would be split in two by the Communist bloc.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia would, perhaps, long since have become a part of that bloc. These are people who I do think want to be free and independent. They need help. And I think it is in our interests to provide them that help.

Since 1945 the principal powers in the West have agreed that the security of Southeast Asia is very important to the free world. I think that is the sense, not only among our own people but throughout the non-Communist world.

So although the aid looks rather extensive it

is not really large in relation to the stakes at issue. And I would suppose that if we can put those people in a position to win their fight, that cost to us, even large as it is, is small.

*Mrs. Domer:* Would it not be possible that, if we encouraged and aided a little more, we might find the Chinese Communists reacting more vigorously, too, in some of these spots?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I don't believe that we could withhold help from someone on the ground—on the basis that the other side might step up the effort. I think that would probably be a mistake.

But what we ought to try to do is to find ways to help these people to get on with their job without necessarily precipitating a major struggle in the process. And this is what we are trying to do now in South Viet-Nam.

### **Moscow-Peiping Relationship**

*Mrs. Bradley:* Mr. Secretary, are we expecting recognition of Red China?

*Secretary Rusk:* I see no prospect of that at the present becoming an active question. Quite apart from our own attitude toward Red China, and its policy, and its sharp and hostile attitude, and even in its own discussions with Moscow at the present time—

*Mrs. Domer:* That's what I wondered.

*Secretary Rusk:*—there is not the slightest indication from Peiping they are interested in normal relations with other people, because they keep saying that the basis for normal relations is the surrender of Formosa, and we are not going to do that. I don't see any prospect of that becoming a live question.

*Mrs. Domer:* You are giving more or less serious consideration to that Sino-Soviet split.

*Secretary Rusk:* This is a matter that we can't help but follow with the greatest possible interest. But I have been cautious about trying to interpret it, because I am not at all sure that either Moscow or Peiping fully understands that particular relationship at the present moment.

*Mrs. Bradley:* Is it then just wishful thinking for us at the moment?

*Secretary Rusk:* Not really. What they are arguing is about how best to get on with the world revolution—their world revolution. And I am not sure that it is in our interests neces-

sarily for them to go into competition to see who can move on more rapidly with the Communist world revolution. But, on the other hand, this difference has injected uncertainty and confusion in the Soviet world: and that is all to the good.

I think we had just better watch that one out a little bit. I don't think there is much we can do to contribute to that division, because if we were to try to move in and exploit it in some way, that would tend to drive the two together again: and that we don't want.

*Mrs. Arnold:* Will the news continue to be unfortunate as far as the Geneva conference is concerned?

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, this is a question that requires, I think, just about as much patience and persistence as any question I know.

When I was much younger, I was involved in the disarmament discussions in 1945, just after World War II: we have been with it ever since. We can't stop the effort. But, on the other hand, we can't take measures of disarmament that are not consistent with our own security and the security of the free world. I do not see immediate and dramatic results coming out of Geneva, but nevertheless we can't abandon the efforts; we have to stay with it.

*Mrs. Arnold:* Mr. Secretary, what is the hope for peace in our time?

*Secretary Rusk:* Oh, I think diplomacy has to work on the basis of optimism. And I personally am deeply optimistic that, in the longer run, there is a real chance that these great purposes that are rooted in the nature of man will themselves be sustained and that we can work these things out by peaceful means. Because I don't believe there is any people (and I include the Russian people)—I don't believe there is any people who wants the kind of war that modern war would be, if we, in fact, have war.

Now there are some dangers. There are some shoals to get through: questions like Berlin, Southeast Asia. But if we get through those,

over the short run, it is my belief that the type of world represented by the U.N. Charter has a very good chance of coming into being.

*Mrs. Arnold:* Thank you, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for allowing us to visit with you on this, the first broadcast of "Women on the Move." And I want to thank the members of the panel for their very penetrating and provocative questions.

## Letters of Credence

### *Ceylon*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ceylon, Merenna Francis de Silva Jayaratne, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on April 8. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 183 dated April 8.

## United States Extends Recognition to New Government of Guatemala

### *Department Statement*

Press release 199 dated April 17

The Department of State announced today [April 17] that the United States Government has extended recognition to the new government of Guatemala headed by Col. Enrique Peralta.

This action has been taken by the Government of the United States after having ascertained that the new government in Guatemala is in full control of the country and has pledged itself to respect Guatemala's international obligations.

The recognition of the new government in Guatemala has been extended following consultation by the United States with other governments in this hemisphere.

## Our Hemisphere: The Long and Short Views

by Adlai E. Stevenson

U.S. Representative to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

I am delighted to be here—even though a bit breathlessly.

Yesterday on Easter Sunday I was in the Cathedral of Seville in a new community called Europe. This morning I am in an older community called Pan America—and on Pan American Day at that. These two communities of free and independent nations, along with others still aborning, represent the real wave of the future. And there is no better time to point that out than on Pan American Day.

This is the 73d anniversary of the First International Conference of American States, which created the International Union of American Republics. This is the 30th anniversary of the good-neighbor policy; and it is the 15th anniversary of the Charter of the OAS. Less than 2 years ago we joined in the Declaration of Punta del Este<sup>2</sup> with its exhilarating promise of things to come; and less than a month ago seven nations joined in the Declaration of Central America,<sup>3</sup> heralding a hopeful trend toward economic integration in that region.

Between 1890 and 1963 there have been many other landmarks—bearing such names as Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Habana, Rio de Janeiro, and Chapultepec—at all of which we moved forward toward the goal of an inter-American community that works like a functioning, healthy community ought to work.

Along the way, the International Union of American Republics has become the Organiza-

tion of American States. The Council has acquired three dependent organs, six specialized organizations, and six more special agencies and commissions. And at long last we established, a few years ago, the much-needed Inter-American Development Bank. So over the years we have erected, bit by bit, the institutional underpinning of an inter-American community.

### Observations on the Cuban Crisis

Just how effective that machinery is in time of peril was demonstrated to all the world last October. At the height of the debate during the first meeting of the United Nations Security Council on the Cuban crisis, I was passed a small slip of paper. It told me—and I quickly told the others—that the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, had unanimously condemned the clandestine and provocative installation of Soviet missile bases within the Western Hemisphere and was taking immediate action to bring about a quarantine of Castro's satellite island.<sup>4</sup> I can tell you that in that fleeting moment I rejoiced mightily in the result of our work over the past 72 years. And so, some day in the not distant future, will the stricken and subjugated people of our sister nation in the Caribbean.

And if I may digress for a moment here, I should like to say that during my recent journey in Europe and Morocco I received emphatic and universal assurances of support for the Cuban policy we have pursued, both during and since the October crisis. There is particular appreciation of the coolheaded, persevering determina-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Organization of American States at Washington, D.C., Apr. 15 in observance of Pan American Day and Pan American Week, Apr. 14-20 (press release 192).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 720-740.

tion that has characterized the response of the American governments to that crisis and its aftermath.

As President Kennedy has pointed out, there is no instant, easy solution for communism in Cuba—or anywhere else, I could add. Those who would provoke us into extreme and reckless measures are not serving the best interests of either the United States or the solidarity of our hemisphere—or, for that matter, the long-suffering Cuban people, whose thirst for freedom Castro cannot quench. “In times like the present,” as Abraham Lincoln once said at another critical moment, “men should utter nothing for which they would not willingly be responsible through time and in eternity.” That is still good advice.

Cuba’s freedom will be restored, and when it is, it will be our challenging task to make sure that Moscow will never again succeed in converting the tyranny of a Batista into the tyranny of a Castro. And no less will it be our task to make sure that freedom will continue to flourish in this hemisphere long after Castroism has passed into history.

I have one other observation to offer on the Cuban crisis. After our experience with it, it is incomprehensible to me that anyone still thinks of the United Nations and the OAS as alternative instruments of security and peacekeeping. The coordinated and complementary use of both instruments was indispensable in the Cuban crisis, which eloquently demonstrated that the regional system and the universal system each have their separate roles in such threats to the peace.

#### **Growth of the Inter-American Community**

The same point is valid with respect to economic and social affairs as well as to security affairs: The U.N. agencies and the inter-American agencies work hand in glove as one pursues the Decade of Development and the other the Alliance for Progress.

The global agencies and the regional agencies are no more in conflict than are the regional communities of nations in conflict with each other. And I dare say that in the years ahead we shall all be constructing an even wider Western community embracing us all.

And why not? The new Europe can no more look inward than the separate nations which comprise it; nor can the inter-American community. Already the Europeans are showing an increased interest in playing an active and constructive role in the Alliance for Progress—and an awareness of the problems posed by the Common Market for raw-material producing countries of this hemisphere. The interaction between these communities, once separated and now joined by the Atlantic Ocean, will continue and grow until we see the still wider Western community not as a dream but as an imperative.

In any event, as we look back over the story of the growth of the inter-American community, we can see that Simón Bolívar was right 137 years ago when he first wrote of his vision of an alliance of American states. The Great Liberator, of course, was to be disappointed during his own lifetime; but he took the long view, and history has shown how profoundly right he was.

For as we look around at the postwar world, it is clear that the emergence of regional communities of free nations is the historic trend of the 20th century and a dynamic political movement. The American Republics have shown the way; now regionalism is highly advanced in Western Europe; it is stirring in Southeast Asia and in north and central Africa; and it will come to pass—if slowly—elsewhere. These regional communities are the structural framework of an eventual system of world order within the larger frame of the United Nations.

But even while celebrating the fact of our community, it would not be prudent to recall all the virtues and forget all the faults of the past. This would make it seem all too easy when, in fact, it is extraordinarily difficult; for all that holds our community together is free consent. And while this is the best, indeed, the only durable way to build workable communities, it also is the most difficult method of construction.

So it is worth mentioning in passing that in the process of building an inter-American community we have tended too often to consider a conference as a substitute for action. We have been better at writing declarations than in car-



rying them out. We have been slow, at times, to modernize our doctrines and our institutions. And until the quite recent past my own country has not been entirely innocent of the charge that we tended to take Latin America for granted. And at times we have seemed to be rather more united in what we are *against* than what we are *for*.

Not so today. I like to think that the Charter of Punta del Este was much more than another inter-American declaration of high ideals—much more than just another milestone in the unfolding story of the inter-American community. I like to think that this was the point at which we reached agreement on what we are *for*—and went forth to do something big about it.

But that was 20 months ago. And now we hear complaints that enough has not happened, that progress has been too slow.

#### **The New Europe and the Alliance for Progress**

I was thinking of this last night as I flew across the Atlantic. Behind me lay a Europe which has some temporary political disabilities—some doubts, some disagreements, which have imposed a pause on the steady and dramatic trend toward widening unity in the post-war European world.

But I was in a Europe which also is prospering as never before, which knows by far the highest standard of living in its history, which is competent, bold, and renescent; so much so that one wonders whether it is relevant any more to refer to it as the Old World, for there is so much that is young and fresh and vital about it.

Perhaps inevitably, as I flew home across the Atlantic, my thoughts drifted back to the Europe of the immediate postwar period. I recalled that it was on another flight over the Atlantic, on the way back from a frustrating foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in 1947, that General [George C.] Marshall first discussed with his staff the need for a major international effort to help Europe get back on its feet after the hammer blows of history's worst war.

I thought back to that Europe of 1947—lying in ruins: a Europe only partly fed, partly

clothed, partly housed, and partly employed; a Europe half-frozen in the grip of a bitter winter, plagued by an alarming rise in the tuberculosis rate, doing too much of its business on the black market; a Europe struggling hopelessly to solve its economic problems, nation by nation, by imposing more embargoes, more quotas, more duties, more restrictions, more controls: a Europe in desperate need of almost everything and without the foreign exchange with which to buy it.

To many it seemed that Europe was prostrate, deathly sick, and ready to be gathered in by communism—that eager scavenger of human disasters. To shortsighted people—and there were as many of them then as there are now—the situation seemed hopeless. Yet with the blessing of hindsight we see that it was not at all hopeless, that something like a miracle occurred.

But was it really such a miracle? What happened is that a partnership of nations was formed for the great and constructive purpose of restoring Europe to health. The one nation that could afford to contribute the critical margin of external aid agreed to do so—and did. The rest of the partners agreed to put forth their maximum efforts to help themselves and to help each other—and did. A new international organization was created to perform an international job—which it did; and from this experience grew other international organizations until the institutional framework existed for a strong community of nations no longer dependent on anyone.

What's more, a profound revolution in attitudes took place on the European side of the partnership. An obsolete traditionalism which had kept European economies stagnant in the years between the two World Wars broke down and gave way to new attitudes. The practice of low-volume, high-cost industrial production gave way to high-volume, low-cost production. Artificially restricted and protected markets gave way to an expanding, competitive mass market. Food production based on peasant farming gave way to food production based on modern agriculture and labor mobility. The concept of low wages and high profits gave way to the idea of management, labor, and consumers sharing the fruits of higher productivity.

And restrictive trade policies gave way to liberal trade policies.

Above all, the habit of looking inward for solutions yielded to the habit of looking outward beyond national frontiers. As the nations joined together for the purpose of recovery built up their common institutions—one leading to another—they acquired, in the words of one of the pioneers, the “habit of cooperation.”

All this did not happen at once, nor did it happen to everyone. But it happened fast enough—and it dominated enough of the thinking of management and labor and governments alike—to add up to a revolutionary break with old attitudes. No wonder recovery was followed by renaissance; no wonder Western Europe is coalescing into a great mass market serviced by a dynamic and growing economy, that a new social mobility is breaking down the barriers of the old social structure, and that Western Europe is finding out what the North American States had discovered earlier—that in unity there is strength. Call it a miracle if you like, but it was a manmade miracle—inspired by high purpose, guided by liberal principles, and carried out by hard work.

I am not here to tell you on Pan American Day that Latin America’s problems are just like Europe’s problems a decade and a half ago—for they are vastly different; nor that North Atlantic solutions are necessarily inter-American solutions—for we must devise our own solutions.

But I *am* suggesting that common enterprise calls for common institutions, that a functioning community functions through the machinery it has built to service the community. I am suggesting, too, that in Western Europe an objectively hopeless situation was converted into a great success story by the application of physical resources, human energy, international organization, and modern ideas.

And I think there may be an analogy in this: The pessimistic view of European prospects in 1947 turned out to be wrong, and I am confident that the pessimistic view of inter-American prospects eventually will turn out to be just as wrong.

This brings us up against the question of how to look at the Alliance for Progress. From

what vantage point do we survey and assess the state of our progress? Is it more revealing to take the short view or the long view, the impatient or the patient? My own answer is that we need both points of view—and at one and the same time.

In the long view of history, the growth of the inter-American system, though it is the oldest international political organization in the world, represents a sudden and dramatic surge forward, an historical phenomenon of the very first order, a breakthrough in the technology of social organization. Within less than two centuries of gaining national independence—a mere moment in the long history of man—we have recognized the interdependence of nations and begun to learn to live together and work together in a larger community—to the vast benefit of all.

And not just passively either. For we have, in truth, just joined together in a true Alliance for Progress. We have committed ourselves deeply and formally to a common crusade against the root cause of political unrest, which is human want and social injustice. We are engaged in nothing less than a massive fight for decent conditions of life for every last man, woman, and child in the whole hemisphere—a project which, a short time ago, would have been rightly considered a cruel hoax upon all of us.

#### **Equal Parts of Vision and Realism Needed**

So, in history’s long view, this moment in time is one of forward momentum at a dizzy pace. But in the short view, is it yet fast enough for 1963?

Sudden knowledge that poverty no longer is the natural condition for most of mankind has as suddenly banished fatalism and apathy as props for an outmoded social system: Impatience is the order of the day for the millions of dispossessed.

At the same time, groups of ruthless men, organized in tiny but disciplined cells and armed with false answers to fair questions, work desperately to turn impatience into chaos, unrest into violence; for violence is the order of the day for Communist agitators in our midst and off our shores.

Meanwhile, democratic governments are caught dangerously in the squeeze between the enormity and complexity of their commitments, on the one hand, and justified impatience, fanned by antidemocratic enemies, on the other.

Add to this the ossified traditionalism which tugs at the brake on social change, and you have a fair sketch of our predicament and peril.

Under the circumstances it seems to me to be a matter of some importance for us to somehow embrace both the long view, which reveals the dramatic progress of our times, and the short view, which insists that tomorrow is too late to deal with the hunger of today. Somehow it seems to me that we must learn to see both the forest and the trees—and simultaneously; that we must act in urgency but think in perspective; that we must acquire a vision which is neither myopic nor hyperopic. And this must be done not by compromising the long and short views but by bringing both within our field of vision.

I am trying to say, I suppose, that we must learn to look upon our progress for what it is but never to be satisfied with it—whatever it is. And this will demand a point of view concocted from equal parts of vision and of realism.

Such a viewpoint would show us that development should be orderly and therefore planned—but we can start at once on elements that would be part of any sensible plan; that sound development programs are essential—but worse than useless unless they are turned quickly from paper to projects in being; that a land reform law cannot be expected to increase the very next harvest—but not many more harvests can be expected unless such a law is passed in the first place and then carried out.

Such a viewpoint would inform us that large progress is the sum of many small actions; that frustrations are predictable—and so are breakthroughs; that we can manage somehow to wait for the payoff—if there is momentum today, sustained tomorrow.

Such a viewpoint would make clear that 20 months is not a very long time to organize and plan and set things in motion—but that time is nonetheless short, and we are in a hurry.

If we can just learn to see the woods and trees simultaneously, we will recognize both that the Alliance for Progress is part of a great progres-

sive trend in human affairs and that its future course will be a year-to-year story of some goals made and others missed—some hopes dashed and others fulfilled.

If we maintain both our pressure and our perspective, we shall see, above all, that our direction is profoundly right and the imperative is to keep going, whatever the obstacles and the short falls may be next month or next year.

#### **“We Must Be Inventive and Adaptable”**

I would enter only one reservation. If we are to make haste, we must be inventive and adaptable in our plans, our programs, and our institutional arrangements; for as I said once before, after a trip to Latin America, development is learning by doing.

Yet I have no doubt about our capacity to experiment and create new forms of partnership to further and hasten the Alliance for Progress. Even now we await with considerable expectation the advice of the two eminent statesmen<sup>5</sup> who have been studying the adequacy of existing inter-American machinery for administering the Alliance for Progress.

And I think we already can detect a new and exciting dimension of our partnership. It lies in the involvement and commitment of an expanding sector of our private society in the common task of creating that medley of institutions upon which any modern society depends. Our land-grant colleges and universities, our co-operatives, our credit unions and trade unions, our voluntary agencies, and others are now being drawn increasingly into the job. Soon we expect to launch a novel and challenging experiment: a new kind of partnership between Chile and the State of California. If this movement succeeds—this matching up of opposite-number institutions in joint institution-building ventures—then an alliance which was made among governments will grow into a deeper alliance among people. And this is the ultimate dimension of the international community and the ultimate strength of our system.

Now I know there has been justified hand-wringing lately over abrupt changes in govern-

<sup>5</sup> Juscelino Kubitschek, former President of Brazil, and Alberto Lleras Camargo, former President of Colombia.

ment in Latin America. Frankly, there have been setbacks, here and there, to the electoral process. But one can be concerned over this—and its effect on democracy—without becoming discouraged. Just as economic advance, as represented by the Alliance for Progress, cannot be measured on a short-term basis, so political advance must be seen in the perspective of time.

And in that perspective I suppose it is valid to ask whether democracy can prevail at all in the great upheaval of our epoch. Certainly it has met with formidable challenges all over the world from Fascist, Nazi, and Communist authoritarians, and from a variety of dictatorships.

But the important thing is that it *has* survived as succeeding brands of dictatorships come and go. And today even the most absolute of the absolutists masquerade as democrats; even the military and quasi-military dictatorships claim to manage the public business in the name of democracy. And mark you, all of them say that authoritarianism is only a necessary transition to democracy.

Why? Because democracy is the most popular form of government yet devised; because, as Jefferson said, it is the “only form of government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind.”

I have, therefore, no doubt that democracy will withstand the wild winds wherever they blow—if, and I repeat *if*, we who are its custodians fight continually to defend its principles and just as continually adapt its methods to the changing needs of our changing times.

So I am persuaded that, if we have the stability and the maturity and the endurance to see our Alliance for Progress through setbacks and triumph, through good days and bad, Latin America at the end of this decade will be well down the road which Western Europe took a decade or so ago. And those who are faint-hearted about Latin America today will be as wrong as those who were faint-hearted about the Europe that once lay prostrate in the ruins of World War II. Miracles will not just happen to us; but miracles have been made by men before—and will be again.

This is my hope, my belief, and my prediction for this Pan American Day, 1963.

## Department Replies to Statements by Dr. Miró Cardona

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 15

Press release 195 dated April 15

The statement which the Department of State made on April 9, 1963,<sup>1</sup> said, in part, that we shared with Dr. [José] Miró Cardona “the aim of restoring freedom to the Cuban people.”

That continues to be the aim and purpose of the United States. Let there be no doubt on that central point.

Now a statement has been published purporting to be the reasons given by Dr. Miró Cardona for his decision to resign as chairman of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The statement seeks to discredit several individuals in the Government and to question the good faith and integrity of them, as individuals, and of the United States Government in dealing with the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

While appreciating the urgent desire of the Cuban exiles to return to a free and independent Cuba at the earliest possible date—a desire which is fully shared by the people and the Government of the United States—the Department considers this statement a gross distortion of recent history and of this Government’s policy with respect to the elimination of Castro communism from this hemisphere.

The statement of Dr. Miró Cardona as it relates to conversations with the President and others in the Government is highly inaccurate and distorted. The Government is in possession of memoranda of conversations detailing the discussions between the President and other United States officials and Dr. Miró Cardona on all occasions, and a review of these memoranda of conversations indicates that Dr. Miró Cardona’s recollection of the events does not coincide with the record of the talks as made at the time they took place.

The United States Government, under existing conditions, is not prepared to enter into “alliances” or undertakings that would essentially give exile leaders authority to determine United States policies and plans regarding Cuba, or that would promise at least \$50 million

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

to permit exile leaders to recruit an army and wage a war, the unforeseeable consequences of which would almost certainly have to be borne ultimately by United States Armed Forces, or that would engage the United States now to wage a war. All of these commitments were demanded by Dr. Miró Cardona.

The United States cannot coexist with a Soviet satellite in this hemisphere. This does not mean we can permit publicized expeditions which have no tangible effect on the future status of Cuba, which are in clear violation of United States law, and which are followed by highly colored press conferences.

The Department will wish to continue consulting with leaders of the Cuban exile community concerning suitable methods for achieving our common objectives. In determining these methods, policies of the Government in the

field of foreign affairs, particularly those which carry the risk of war, will continue to be determined by the Government and the people of the United States.

#### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APRIL 18**

Press release 208 dated April 18

Concerning the statement made public today by Dr. Miró Cardona, the Department of State reiterates its comment of April 15. Dr. Miró Cardona's version of his conversations is a distortion.

To repeat, this Government shares with Cubans and others in the hemisphere the desire for a return of freedom to Cuba, but the issue of war or peace in this hemisphere is one to be decided by the governments of the hemisphere and by their peoples.

## **Interdependence and the Principles of Self-Determination and Nonintervention**

*by Edwin M. Martin*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Today we celebrate the 73d anniversary of the founding of the inter-American system. The date—April 14, 1890—is taken from the day on which the 18 governments participating in the First International Conference of American States approved the establishment of the International Union of American Republics. The purpose of the association as then conceived was limited to “the prompt collection and distribution of commercial information,” a function to be discharged through the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, comprised of 10 people.

As we look back over almost three-quarters

of a century of development, we see how greatly our regional system has expanded both as to size and function. The evolution also shows how flexible the system has been in adapting itself to the needs of the member governments and the changing currents of international affairs.

We can likewise point to another important fact: An expanding community of mutual interests gives our regional grouping unique character and strength. This community of interest has two facets. One is our interdependence as member states of the inter-American system rooted in geography, history, and tradition. The other is the interdependence of the objectives we pursue. For example, we know that we cannot forge ahead in strengthen-

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Pan American Society of the United States at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 16 (press release 196, revised).

ing the practice of representative democracy without corresponding progress in economic development and social justice, and vice versa. The range of our common interests is never static, but constantly increasing, developing, and drawing us into a closer interdependence.

This process of interdependence has come into sharp focus within recent years as we grapple with the problems of economic and social development under the Alliance for Progress and at the same time deal with the rising threat of Castro Communist subversion.

In the short time at my disposal I want to focus on one area of our hemispheric relations where I see the need—and I hasten to add the promise—of change to meet the challenge of our times. I refer specifically to necessary adjustments in traditional attitudes toward the principles of self-determination and nonintervention. These adjustments are necessary to place the hemisphere in the strongest position to move forward with its tasks of promoting material welfare and strengthening representative democracy, while at the same time repelling the attacks of hostile forces at both extremes of the political spectrum.

I want to make clear that I am not advocating any basic alteration of these concepts which we fully endorse. Rather what is sought is a modification of governmental attitudes regarding how they should be interpreted and applied to serve the best interests of the inter-American community in these critical times.

In a speech before the Council of the Organization of American States last year, the President of Panama noted that in the application of the two principles the hemisphere ran the risk of “drifting toward a new formula of *eyes shut* and *hands off*” resulting in an “almost complete indifference to the fate of brother peoples who, within their own national boundaries, are deprived by force of all chance of self-determination, and for whom the principle of nonintervention, carried to its most extreme interpretation, becomes a universal condemnation to live forever subject to the oppression that incurably affects them.” He went on to say that “it is necessary carefully to review these concepts in order to find clear definitions for them that, while reaffirming their primary philosoph-

ical bases, would not close the door to possible collective measures intended to assure all the peoples of the Americas, within their own boundaries, of their freedom, their right to control their own destiny, and their right to reestablish, when they have been deprived of it by force, the rule of representative democracy, which is the essence of the American regional system.”

## Two Great Challenges

The hemisphere today confronts two great challenges. One is to bring about, within a democratic framework, the economic development and social reform necessary to provide a better way of life for millions of restless, underprivileged persons. The second is to defend and perfect our democratic institutions against the attempts of Castro communism to undermine and destroy them.

These challenges are closely interrelated. It is an obvious fact that communism breeds on economic and social discontent. It is equally evident that the most effective long-term defense of democratic institutions is to raise the levels of education and material well-being of the population at large while efforts are continued to promote greater respect for human rights and observance of constitutional procedures. And finally it is becoming increasingly clear that it is free people under democratic governments who are most rapidly increasing their material well-being.

Our interdependence in the economic and social fields is fully recognized and increasingly practiced. It is the underlying premise of the Alliance for Progress. Governments do not hesitate to discuss their domestic problems with other countries, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, and seek assistance from abroad. They prepare national plans for review and approval by international panels of experts and international lending institutions. They invite technicians from other countries to work with them in improving governmental procedures and services in a wide area of economic and social activities. Increasingly, producer and consumer countries are entering into commodity agreements regulating such internal matters as levels of production and price. There is grow-

ing recognition of the importance of common tariff and customs arrangements as an aid to national economic development programs. These few examples serve to demonstrate how the American governments have come to realize that their national welfare in economic and social matters is intimately linked with the welfare of the community as a whole. In the process they have not permitted dogmatic interpretations of self-determination and nonintervention to distract them from seeking a better way of life for their peoples.

In the political-security fields, the American governments have not achieved the same level of recognition of their interdependence. But the trend is encouraging. The obstacles are deeply rooted in history. While the circumstances which gave rise to Latin American emphasis on the concepts of self-determination and nonintervention are no longer present, national attitudes embodying those concepts, forged in another era, remain and are slow to change.

Two main problems confront the inter-American community in the political-security field, making necessary a reassessment of these attitudes. One is the danger of indirect aggression in the form of Communist subversion currently aided by the present regime in Cuba. The second is insuring that the efforts toward economic and social development are accompanied by a more effective exercise of representative democracy. Recognizing the interrelation between material progress, social justice, and political stability, we should find it disturbing indeed to see a retrogression in the practice of democracy at the time that the hemisphere is making real advances on the economic and social fronts.

With respect to the problem of Cuba and of Communist subversion, a great deal of progress has been made during the past 18 months. The turning point was the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este, which tackled both questions.<sup>2</sup>

On Cuba the foreign ministers decided to exclude the Castro regime from further participation in the various bodies of the inter-American system and to provide for economic sanctions against it. As interesting and important as the measures taken is the premise on which

the action was based. This was that the internal system of government adopted by the Castro regime—the Marxist-Leninist system—was and is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system and that any member of the OAS which accepts that form of government excludes itself from the Organization.

I want to point out that this action was taken under the Rio Treaty and is in full conformity with it and with article 19 of the Charter of the OAS, which provides that collective measures taken for the maintenance of peace and security in the hemisphere do not constitute a violation of the principles of nonintervention and inviolability of national territory.

On the threat of Communist subversion the foreign ministers made clear that, in order to deal effectively with the threat, individual and collective action was necessary. To this end they prescribed in Resolution II of that meeting three measures. First, they directed the Council of the OAS to maintain all necessary vigilance against acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in the hemisphere and to make recommendations to the governments for dealing with such acts. Second, to advise the Council in the maintenance of this vigilance, and the governments should they also desire, they authorized a Special Consultative Committee on Security. This Committee has been operating effectively for a year, assisting the Dominican Republic on one occasion and more recently the Council of the OAS. And third, the foreign ministers urged the member governments to take appropriate steps for their individual or collective self-defense and to cooperate as necessary to strengthen their capacity to counteract the threats arising from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers. This recommendation clearly was intended to cover the furnishing of material and training assistance to member governments to strengthen their internal security capabilities in anticipation of resort to violence by subversive elements. This type of help we are providing to many Latin American countries today. It also covers the provision, upon request, of military forces to maintain

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.



surveillance against threatened aggression from abroad or otherwise to help a government threatened by a Communist takeover. Certainly the United States, and I am sure many other members of the inter-American system, are prepared to respond to any such call for help in preserving the peace and security of the hemisphere, as more than half of them did during the missile crisis last fall.

### **A New Sense of Urgency**

Events since the Punta del Este meeting—the Cuban arms buildup, the missile crisis, Castro's open encouragement of violence—have served to give a new sense of urgency for action to counteract Communist subversion in the hemisphere. This is reflected in the attention being paid by governments to improving their security forces and keeping closer watch over Communist subversive elements as well as working out cooperative arrangements with other governments.

Since the meeting of OAS foreign ministers early last October<sup>3</sup> a committee of the Council of the OAS has been studying three important aspects of Communist subversion: use of Cuba as a base for training in subversive activities, the flow of Communist propaganda, and the transfer of funds for Communist subversive purposes. This report has now been virtually completed, and I expect it will be presented to the Council this week. Meanwhile, seven of the American governments—the five Central American countries, Panama, and the United States—have moved ahead in a cooperative effort to bolster their defenses against Castro Communist subversion. Pursuant to a decision reached at the San José Meeting of Presidents last month,<sup>4</sup> high-level representatives with primary responsibility in the security field from these seven countries met in Managua just a few days ago and agreed on a series of specific, practical steps to deal with Communist subversive activities.<sup>5</sup> Central to the recommendations contained in the OAS study, as well as in the Managua decisions, is recognition that, while individual action is the first line of defense, cooperation among

states is indispensable if individual measures are to achieve maximum effectiveness.

From this brief summary I think it is fair to conclude that the Communist threat in this hemisphere has given the American governments a new appreciation of their interdependence in political matters. It has brought a further recognition that the principle of non-intervention cannot be permitted to serve as a cloak behind which a member state or domestic subversive forces can threaten the peace and security of the continent or of individual countries by associating with and receiving aid from hostile extracontinental powers and serving as their beachhead. And it has been demonstrated that an effective means for fighting Communist intervention is to confront it with the collective action of the inter-American community.

The mutuality of interest in promoting representative democracy in this hemisphere is widely accepted as a general proposition not only for its own sake but in recognition of the fact that a strong democracy is the best defense against communism. However, appropriate collective action to promote its observance remains a sensitive issue for some governments, which fear it would undermine the principles of self-determination and nonintervention.

I believe such fears to be unfounded. If governments accept the fact that political problems are interlocked with economic problems and it is impossible to solve the latter without finding an adequate solution to the former, and that progress must be made on both fronts to defeat international communism, I think they should be as concerned about the practice of democracy as about the levels of public education, health, industrialization, and world trade. By the same token, if the inter-American community can discuss and make recommendations on how to improve economic and social conditions, it should be able under proper circumstances to consider the conditions of the democratic process of the hemisphere and the means for improving it. Efforts at this have been made at recent inter-American conferences, particularly the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959.<sup>6</sup> The decisions reached at

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 598.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 719.

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1959, p. 299, and Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

these meetings, however, have not gone beyond general exhortations and provision for studies. They have not entered into an analysis of specific problems impeding fuller exercise of the democratic process and how the community might work together to resolve them.

In my opinion our interdependence makes it important that we in this hemisphere put to one side traditional attitudes which are obstacles to promoting representative democracy. We must recognize that failure of the democratic process in any one of the member states is a matter of concern to the entire community, that interruptions of democratic and constitutional governments in one country inevitably encourage anti-democratic elements elsewhere.

We need to give the principle of self-determination its true and vital meaning: freedom for the people periodically to decide through elections who their leaders should be and the policies they should follow. It has been said that we should not concern ourselves with changing the present regime in Cuba for that would violate the principle of self-determination. Until that regime is ready to seek the sanction of a free election, as Castro often promised to do in the early days, it has no claim for the protection of this great principle. And we should come to the realization that the active pursuit of ways for improving the quality of democracy in our respective countries does not constitute a violation of the principles of non-intervention.

#### **Promotion of Representative Democracy**

While we wait for hemispheric opinion to crystallize around a more positive approach to the promotion of the exercise of representative democracy, we can derive satisfaction over some of the progress being made in this direction. I would mention these examples:

1. The increasingly categorical reaffirmation of respect for human rights and the exercise of representative democracy emanating from recent inter-American meetings not only in connection with the Cuban situation but with regard to problems arising in our own hemisphere. In this connection I would mention specifically the paragraph in the declaration<sup>7</sup> accompany-

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

ing the Charter of Punta del Este establishing the Alliance for Progress which reads:

This Alliance is established on the basic principle that free men working through the institution of representative democracy can best satisfy man's aspirations, including those for work, home and land, health and schools. No system can guarantee true progress unless it affirms the dignity of the individual which is the foundation of our civilization.

2. The active and vigorous role being played by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the promotion of respect for human rights.

3. The example set by the Dominican Republic in making use of services provided by the OAS in its difficult transition from dictatorship to democratic government.

4. The increasing use being made by governments in inviting outside observers selected from panels furnished by the OAS to witness elections.

5. The growing manifestations of concern by governments when forcible and unconstitutional seizures of power take place in one of our countries.

6. The fact that the American governments have agreed to consider the general problem of the effective exercise of representative democracy at the Eleventh Inter-American Conference when it is held.

While these achievements may seem small in the context of the objectives sought, they augur well for the future.

In closing I want to repeat what I said at the outset: that after working together in this hemisphere for close to three-quarters of a century, we have developed a large community of mutual interests which give the inter-American system a unique character and strength. It is now being tested on the one hand by the grave peril of Communist subversion and on the other by the challenge of bringing about a social and economic transformation of our hemisphere within a democratic framework. In meeting both tests we should not allow ourselves to be paralyzed into immobility by inapplicable dogmas of yesterday. As time and circumstance change we must reexamine basic concepts to make sure that they are interpreted and adapted meaningfully to changing requirements. We

must each zealously guard our independence, but in doing so we should not let it stop us from enriching and strengthening it by acting fully and jointly upon the challenging 20th-century truth of our interdependence.

## **Sir Winston Churchill Becomes Honorary Citizen of United States**

*Sir Winston Churchill was proclaimed an honorary citizen of the United States by President Kennedy at ceremonies at the White House on April 9. Participating in the ceremony with the President were Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador to the United States, Randolph Churchill, Sir Winston's son, and George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State. Following is their exchange of remarks and the text of the President's proclamation.*

### **EXCHANGE OF REMARKS**

White House press release dated April 9

#### **President Kennedy**

Ladies and gentlemen, Members of Congress, Members of the Cabinet, His Excellency the British Ambassador, Ambassadors of the Commonwealth, old friends of Sir Winston led by Mr. Baruch, ladies and gentlemen: We gather today at a moment unique in the history of the United States.

This is the first time that the United States Congress has solemnly resolved<sup>1</sup> that the President of the United States shall proclaim an honorary citizenship for the citizen of another country, and in joining me to perform this happy duty the Congress gives Sir Winston Churchill a distinction shared only with the Marquis de Lafayette.

In naming him an honorary citizen, I only propose a formal recognition of the place he has long since won in the history of freedom and in the affections of my, and now his, fellow countrymen.

Whenever and wherever tyranny threatened, he has always championed liberty. Facing

firmly toward the future, he has never forgotten the past. Serving six monarchs of his native Great Britain, he has served all men's freedom and dignity.

In the dark days and darker nights when Britain stood alone—and most men save Englishmen despaired of England's life—he mobilized the English language and sent it into battle. The incandescent quality of his words illuminated the courage of his countrymen.

Indifferent himself to danger, he wept over the sorrows of others. A child of the House of Commons, he became in time its father. Accustomed to the hardships of battle, he has no distaste for pleasure.

Now his stately ship of life, having weathered the severest storms of a troubled century, is anchored in tranquil waters, proof that courage and faith and the zest for freedom are truly indestructible. The record of his triumphant passage will inspire free hearts all over the globe.

By adding his name to our rolls, we mean to honor him, but his acceptance honors us far more. For no statement or proclamation can enrich his name now; the name Sir Winston Churchill is already legend.

[At this point the President signed and read the proclamation.]

#### **Ambassador David Ormsby Gore**

Mr. President, I have been asked to hand over to you a letter from Sir Winston Churchill expressing to you and through you to the people of the United States his gratitude for the unprecedented honor which has been conferred upon him this day.

#### **President Kennedy**

I would ask Mr. Randolph Churchill, Sir Winston's son, who is accompanied by Sir Winston's grandson, Winston Churchill, to read the letter.

#### **Randolph Churchill**

Mr. President, Members of Congress and the United States Government, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen:

Mr. President, I have been informed by Mr. David

<sup>1</sup> H.R. 4374.

Bruce that it is your intention to sign a Bill conferring upon me Honorary Citizenship of the United States.

I have received many kindnesses from the United States of America, but the honour which you now accord me is without parallel. I accept it with deep gratitude and affection.

I am also most sensible of the warm-hearted action of the individual States who accorded me the great compliment of their own honorary citizenships as a prelude to this Act of Congress.

It is a remarkable comment on our affairs that the former Prime Minister of a great sovereign state should thus be received as an honorary citizen of another. I say "great sovereign state" with design and emphasis, for I reject the view that Britain and the Commonwealth should now be relegated to a tame and minor role in the world. Our past is the key to our future, which I firmly trust and believe will be no less fertile and glorious. Let no man underrate our energies, our potentialities and our abiding power for good.

I am, as you know, half American by blood, and the story of my association with that mighty and benevolent nation goes back nearly ninety years to the day of my Father's marriage. In this century of storm and tragedy I contemplate with high satisfaction the constant factor of the interwoven and upward progress of our peoples. Our comradeship and our brotherhood in war were unexampled. We stood together, and because of that fact the free world now stands. Nor has our partnership any exclusive nature: the Atlantic community is a dream that can well be fulfilled to the detriment of none and to the enduring benefit and honour of the great democracies.

Mr. President, your action illuminates the theme of unity of the English-speaking peoples, to which I have devoted a large part of my life. I would ask you to accept yourself, and to convey to both Houses of Congress, and through them to the American people, my solemn and heartfelt thanks for this unique distinction, which will always be proudly remembered by my descendants.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

#### President Kennedy

Mr. George Ball, Acting Secretary of State.

#### Mr. Ball

Mr. President, I hand you an honorary citizen's passport for Sir Winston. This is the only document of its kind in existence and is a unique document for a unique citizen.

[The President handed the document to Mr. Randolph Churchill.]

#### Mr. Churchill

Thank you very much.

## TEXT OF PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

### A P R O C L A M A T I O N

WHEREAS Sir Winston Churchill, a son of America though a subject of Britain, has been throughout his life a firm and steadfast friend of the American people and the American Nation; and

WHEREAS he has freely offered his hand and his faith in days of adversity as well as triumph; and

WHEREAS his bravery, charity and valor, both in war and in peace, have been a flame of inspiration in freedom's darkest hour; and

WHEREAS his life has shown that no adversary can overcome, and no fear can deter, free men in the defense of their freedom; and

WHEREAS he has expressed with unsurpassed power and splendor the aspirations of peoples everywhere for dignity and freedom; and

WHEREAS he has by his art as an historian and his judgment as a statesman made the past the servant of the future;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, under the authority contained in an Act of the 88th Congress, do hereby declare Sir Winston Churchill an honorary citizen of the United States of America.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this ninth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:  
GEORGE W. BALL,  
*Acting Secretary of State.*

## Mrs. Louchheim Keynote Speaker at Women's Organizations Seminar

The Department of State announced on April 19 (press release 210) that Mrs. Katie Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, would be the keynote speaker at a seminar of national women's voluntary organizations on April 24 at Washington, D.C.

The conference, sponsored by the Association of American Foreign Service Women, brought together representatives of eight large national

<sup>1</sup>No. 3525; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 3517.

women's organizations, the United States Information Agency, the Department of State, and the Women's Association to discuss the work of women's organizations at home and abroad.

The purpose of the seminar was better to equip Foreign Service wives, through their organization, to contribute to the community, whether at home or at foreign posts, as leaders in the work of women's organizations. Wives of U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. Information Agency personnel were invited to participate, along with Foreign Service wives.

The nongovernmental organizations participating in the seminar were the Young Women's Christian Association, the Association of Junior Leagues of America, the League of Women Voters, the Overseas Education Fund, the Girl Scouts of America, the American Association of University Women, the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, and the General Federation of Women's Clubs. In addition to Mrs. Louchheim, speakers at the seminar included Mrs. Mildred K. Marey, women's activities adviser, USIA; and Mrs. Katharine D. Pringle, women's special projects officer, Department of State.

## **New York State Asks Permission To Remove Niagara Shoal**

Press release 201 dated April 17

The Department of State announced on April 17 that on April 11 it had transmitted to the United States Section of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, an application from the Power Authority of the State of New York for the Commission's approval to the removal of a shoal in the Niagara River upstream from the American Falls. The approval of the Commission is being sought pursuant to article III of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. The Commission was established by the treaty of 1909 to provide for the settlement of questions and to make recommendations concerning the use of boundary waters between the United States and Canada.

In support of its application the Power Au-

thority states that the removal of the shoal is required to permit the free flow of ice down the Niagara River and over the Niagara Falls and to avoid blockage of ice and the detrimental effect of such blockage which was experienced during the winter of 1962-63.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **88th Congress, 1st Session**

- Report on Audit of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation for Year 1961. Letter of transmittal from the Comptroller General of the United States. H. Doc. 74. February 26, 1963. 61 pp.
- Activities and Procedures of UNESCO. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 4, 1963. 35 pp.
- Test Ban Negotiations and Disarmament. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 11, 1963. 50 pp.
- Study of Certain Aspects of National Security Operations. Report to accompany S. Res. 13. S. Rept. 27. March 11, 1963. 4 pp.
- Investigation of Immigration and Naturalization Matters. Report to accompany S. Res. 60. S. Rept. 34. March 11, 1963. 8 pp.
- Review of the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Report to accompany S. Res. 65. S. Rept. 41. March 11, 1963. 6 pp.
- Export-Import Bank Act Extension. Report to accompany H.R. 3872. H. Rept. 86. March 11, 1963. 23 pp.
- International Coffee Agreement, 1962. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive H, 87th Congress, 2d session. March 12, 1963. 104 pp.
- Review of United States Participation in the United Nations. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 13, 1963. 42 pp.
- A Report on the Alliance for Progress, 1963. Conclusions of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey submitted to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. March 13, 1963. 38 pp. [Committee print]
- Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. Report by members of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. March 14, 1963. 13 pp. [Committee print]
- 1963 Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Economic Committee on the January 1963 economic report of the President, with minority and other views. S. Rept. 78. March 14, 1963. 114 pp.
- Study Mission to Southeast Asia, November-December 1962. Report by Senators Gale W. McGee, Frank Church, and Frank E. Moss to the Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Foreign Relations, and Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the Senate. March 15, 1963. 17 pp. [Committee print]
- Providing for the Settlement of Claims of Certain Residents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 1988. H. Rept. 110. March 21, 1963. 5 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Scheduled May Through July 1963

Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Labor . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	May 5-
Pan American Highway Congress: 7th Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Washington . . . . .	May 6-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session.	Moscow . . . . .	May 6-
ILO Textiles Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 6-
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 10th Session .	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . . . .	May 6-
9th Pan American Highway Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 6-
16th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 7-
16th International Film Festival . . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	May 9-
NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 10-
U.N. Committee on Outer Space: Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.	Geneva . . . . .	May 13-
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development: 3d Session.	New York . . . . .	May 13-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 14-
ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Operations Meeting.	Montreal . . . . .	May 14-
GATT Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 16-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Symposium on Peak Load Coverage.	Venice . . . . .	May 20-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 36th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	May 20-
ITU CCITT/CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Development of the International Network in Latin America: 2d Session.	Bogotá . . . . .	May 20-
NATO Ministerial Council . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	May 21-
IMCO Council: 8th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	May 21-
Inter-American Commission of Women: Special Assembly . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 21-
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development: 2d Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 21-
Second Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . . . .	May 22-
Inter-American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	May 23-
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems: 2d Session.	London . . . . .	May 27-
ILO Governing Body: 155th Session (and its committees) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 27-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 27-
CENTO Scientific Council . . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	May 28-
WHO Executive Board: 32d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 13th Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	June 3-
World Food Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 4-
ITU Panel of Experts: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4-
ANZUS Council: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Wellington . . . . .	June 5-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 24th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5
International Labor Conference: 47th Session. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
CENTO Economic Experts . . . . .	Ankara . . . . .	June 6-
GATT Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 10-
FAO Government Experts on the Code of Principles and Designations, Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 6th Meeting.	Rome . . . . .	June 10-
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 11-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 9, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting.	Brussels . . . . .	June 11-
10th International Electronic, Nuclear and Motion Picture Exposition.	Rome . . . . .	June 15-
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 17-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 11th Session .	Geneva . . . . .	June 17-
UNESCO Preparatory Meeting for an Interdisciplinary Conference on Scientific Research.	Paris . . . . .	June 20-
13th International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 21-
FAO North American Forestry Commission: 2d Session . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	June 24-
Meeting of Experts on Antarctic Communications . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 24-
GATT Working Party on Relations with Poland . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 24-
FAO Council: 40th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 24-
ILO Governing Body: 156th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 28-
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea.	London . . . . .	July 1-
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa . .	Nairobi . . . . .	July 1-
Victoria International Film Festival . . . . .	Victoria, B.C . . . . .	July 1-
International Whaling Commission: 15th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 1-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic.	Paris . . . . .	July 2-
3d International Film Festival . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	July 7-
IMCO Subcommittee on Code of Signals . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 8-
16th International Film Festival . . . . .	Locarno . . . . .	July 17-

## Ministers of Seven Governments Meet in Nicaragua

*The Ministers of Government, Interior, and Security of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States met at Managua, Nicaragua, April 3 and 4. The U.S. delegation was headed by Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Following is the text of the final act adopted at the close of the meeting.*

### RESOLUTION I

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America<sup>1</sup> signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

#### AGREES

To recommend to their Governments that they adopt, within the limitations of their respective constitutional provisions, measures to be put into effect immediately, to prohibit, restrict and discourage the movement of their nationals to and from Cuba. To this end, they propose the adoption of the following measures:

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.

1) Provide, as a general rule, that every passport or other travel document which may be issued carry a stamp which indicates that said passport is not valid for travel to Cuba.

2) Declare officially that nationals who are permitted to travel to Cuba should have the permission duly inscribed in their official travel document.

3) Promulgate regulations restricting the granting of visas to foreigners who have travelled to Cuba within a stipulated period of time.

4) Notify travel agencies and transport companies of these measures for due compliance; and inform the governments of other countries through the most appropriate means.

5) Request the Governments of the Hemisphere:

a) not to allow the nationals of signatory countries to travel to Cuba unless they possess a valid passport or other document issued by their country of origin valid for such travel;

b) not to accept visas, tourist cards or other documents issued to their nationals for travel to Cuba which do not form an integral (non-detachable) part of their passports or other travel documents;

c) to observe the limitations placed in the passports or other travel documents of the na-



nationals of signatory governments and not allow them to depart for Cuba;

d) to inform the signatory countries through appropriate channels of refusals to allow one of their nationals to depart for Cuba; and

e) to provide the signatory governments the names of their nationals which may appear on the passenger list of any airplane or ship going to or coming from Cuba.

#### RESOLUTION II

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

##### AGREES

To recommend to their Governments that they enlist the cooperation of financial institutions to report on the transfer of funds which persons or groups catalogued as Communist subversive elements make, within their respective countries, for subversive purposes; and to establish surveillance of Communist-controlled businesses and other activities to identify the transfer of funds through such establishments for subversive purposes or activities; and impound such funds, or take preventive measures, compatible with each country's legislation, so that they may not be used for purposes that would tend to destroy democratic governments.

#### RESOLUTION III

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

##### AGREES

To recommend that their Governments take action to impede the clandestine movement of arms into the Isthmian countries, including specific instructions to border control forces to intensify port, airfield and border inspection of incoming and outgoing cargo in order to prevent contraband traffic in arms; and establish strict security and accountability with respect to arms

and ammunition issued to their armed forces and law enforcement agencies.

#### RESOLUTION IV

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

##### AGREES

To recommend to their Governments action to prevent the introduction of subversive Communist propaganda materials into the Isthmian countries from abroad, adopting laws as necessary to provide severe penalties for persons knowingly engaged in the introduction or dissemination of such propaganda; and report to the diplomatic missions of the signatory countries the identity of any person discovered introducing or disseminating such propaganda material in the country.

#### RESOLUTION V

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

##### AGREES

To recommend to their Governments that they adopt as soon as possible for immediate implementation effective measures to prevent subversive activities that may be instigated by Castro-communist propaganda or agents in each of the Central American countries and Panama.

#### RESOLUTION VI

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

##### AGREES

To recommend to their Governments that in order to impede the clandestine movement of

persons, propaganda materials and arms for subversive purposes a cooperative system be established involving:

a. surveillance by each country of its own coastal area, and interception of suspicious craft within its territorial waters; and

b. cooperation of the Central American States, Panama and the United States to carry out such surveillance and interception, upon the request of any of the governments concerned.

#### RESOLUTION VII

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

#### AGREES

To recommend to the Governments of Central America and Panama the establishment, as soon as possible, of an organization in each State, with the sole purpose of counteracting Communist subversion in the Central America-Panama area. This organization will be staffed by specialized personnel to whom privileges will be extended for travel in the above-mentioned area. These organizations will be primarily responsible for:

a) detecting, controlling and counteracting actions and objectives of the members, instrumentalities, sympathizers and collaborators of the Communist Party; and

b) lending mutual support to each other and constantly exchanging information regarding movements of persons or groups, propaganda, funds and arms for Communist subversive purposes.

#### RESOLUTION VIII

The Meeting of Ministers of Government, Interior and Security convoked pursuant to the pertinent section of the Declaration of Central America signed by the Presidents of the seven countries in San José, Costa Rica on March 19, 1963

#### AGREES

1. To recommend that their Governments:

a) hold periodic meetings of representatives of Isthmian countries and the United States to review progress made and problems remaining in the control of movements of persons, arms, funds and propaganda, for subversive Communist purposes;

b) hold bilateral discussions among the signatory countries regarding requirements for technical, materiel assistance and training support; and

c) furnish information on a continuing basis to the Council of the Organization of American States on Communist subversive activities in their respective countries.

2. To inform the Organization of American States of the agreements taken at the present meeting requesting of that Organization and the Member Governments the indispensable backing and support required to achieve their effective implementation, thereby strengthening the inter-American system.

### **Atlantic Policy Advisory Group of NATO Meets in United States**

The Department of State announced on April 19 (press release 209) that W. W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, would be the U.S. representative on the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which met in the United States April 20-22 to continue discussion of long-term policy issues of interest to the alliance.

The establishment of the advisory group was approved by the North Atlantic Council at its 1961 spring session in Oslo, Norway,<sup>1</sup> and the group held its first session at Paris in July 1962. The present meeting, which was the third, was under the chairmanship of R. W. J. Hooper, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. The meetings provide an opportunity for a general and informal exchange of views on matters of mutual concern which are not of an immediate operational character.

<sup>1</sup> For text of a communique issued on May 10, 1961, see BULLETIN of May 29, 1961, p. 801.

In addition to briefings on U.S. planning operations within the Departments of State and Defense, sessions were held at Airlie House, Warrenton, Va. The President received those attending the meeting on April 23.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Agreement on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Iceland.

Agreement on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4048 and 4049, respectively. *Accessions deposited:* Japan, March 28, 1963.

##### Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Tanganyika, March 26, 1963.

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

*Accession deposited:* Uganda, March 8, 1963.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notifications of approval:* Chad, March 2, 1963; Cyprus, February 23, 1963; Guatemala, February 22, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

*Notifications of approval:* Cyprus, February 23, 1963; Guatemala, February 22, 1963.

##### Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Algeria, April 4, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> With a reservation.

Agreement on North Atlantic ocean stations. Done at Paris February 25, 1954. Entered into force February 1, 1955. TIAS 3186.

*Accession deposited:* Japan, March 28, 1963.

##### Weights and Measures

Convention for the creation of an international office of weights and measures. Signed at Paris, May 20, 1875. Entered into force January 1, 1876. 20 Stat. 709.

*Adherence deposited:* United Arab Republic, October 15, 1962.

Convention amending the convention relating to weights and measures of May 20, 1875, *supra*. Done at Sèvres, October 6, 1921. Entered into force February 10, 1923. 43 Stat. 1686.

*Adherence deposited:* United Arab Republic, October 15, 1962.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 15 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 183 of April 8 and 193 of April 12.

No.	Date	Subject
192	4/15	Stevenson: Pan American Day.
*194	4/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.
195	4/15	Reply to statement by Miró Cardona.
196	4/16	Martin: "Interdependence and the Principles of Self-Determination and Nonintervention" (revised).
*197	4/16	Ball: interview on Voice of America.
*198	4/16	Harriman: Anti-Defamation League (excerpts).
199	4/17	Recognition of Government of Guatemala.
*200	4/17	Blair House Fine Arts Committee formed.
201	4/17	Removal of shoal in Niagara River.
202	4/18	Rusk: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
203	4/19	Ball: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
204	4/19	Harriman: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
†205	4/19	Mrs. Louchheim: "The Contribution of Women in a Changing World."
*206	4/19	Visit of Grand Duchess of Luxembourg.
†207	4/19	Gardner: "Space Meteorology and Communications: A Challenge to Science and Diplomacy."
208	4/18	Reply to statement by Miró Cardona.
209	4/19	Meeting of NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (rewrite).
210	4/19	Seminar of national women's voluntary organizations (rewrite).
211	4/19	Rusk: letter to chairman of ASNE meeting.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**American Republics**

**Interdependence and the Principles of Self-Determination and Nonintervention (Martin)** . . . . . 710

**Ministers of Seven Governments Meet in Nicaragua (text of final act)** . . . . . 719

**Our Hemisphere: The Long and Short Views (Stevenson)** . . . . . 704

**Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Canada. New York State Asks Permission To Remove Niagara Shoal** . . . . . 717

**Ceylon. Letters of Credence (Jayaratne)** . . . . . 703

**China, Communist. Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy** . . . . . 717

**Cuba**

**Department Replies to Statements by Dr. Miró Cardona** . . . . . 709

**Ministers of Seven Governments Meet in Nicaragua (text of final act)** . . . . . 719

**Secretary Rusk Interviewed on GFWC Television Program** . . . . . 698

**Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Department and Foreign Service. Mrs. Louchheim Keynote Speaker at Women's Organizations Seminar** . . . . . 716

**Economic Affairs**

**Secretary Rusk Interviewed on GFWC Television Program** . . . . . 698

**Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Europe. Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Foreign Aid**

**Our Hemisphere: The Long and Short Views (Stevenson)** . . . . . 704

**Secretary Replies to Allegations on Aid Shipments (Rusk)** . . . . . 685

**Secretary Rusk Interviewed on GFWC Television Program** . . . . . 698

**Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Guatemala. United States Extends Recognition to New Government of Guatemala** . . . . . 703

**India. Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**Indonesia. Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**International Organizations and Conferences**

**Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings** . . . . . 718

**Ministers of Seven Governments Meet in Nicaragua (text of final act)** . . . . . 719

**Laos. Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Atlantic Policy Advisory Group of NATO Meets in United States** . . . . . 721

**Presidential Documents. Sir Winston Churchill Becomes Honorary Citizen of United States** . . . . . 715

**Public Affairs. Mrs. Louchheim Keynote Speaker at Women's Organizations Seminar** . . . . . 716

**Recognition. United States Extends Recognition to New Government of Guatemala** . . . . . 703

**Treaty Information. Current Actions** . . . . . 722

**U.S.S.R. Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

**United Kingdom. Sir Winston Churchill Becomes Honorary Citizen of United States (Ball, R. Churchill, W. Churchill, Kennedy, Ormsby Gore, and text of proclamation)** . . . . . 715

**Viet-Nam**

**Secretary Rusk Interviewed on GFWC Television Program** . . . . . 698

**Some Current Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ball, Brucker, Harriman, Rusk)** . . . . . 679

*Name Index*

Arnold, Mrs. Dexter Otis . . . . . 698

Ball, George W . . . . . 688, 715

Bradley, Mrs. J. Kenneth . . . . . 698

Brucker, Herbert . . . . . 679

Churchill, Randolph . . . . . 715

Churchill, Winston . . . . . 715

Domer, Mrs. Donald . . . . . 698

Gast, Mrs. Fred . . . . . 698

Granik, Theodore . . . . . 698

Harriman, W. Averell . . . . . 693

Jayaratne, Merenna Francis de Silva . . . . . 703

Kennedy, President . . . . . 715

Louchheim, Mrs. Katie . . . . . 716

Martin, Edwin M . . . . . 710

Ormsby Gore, David . . . . . 715

Paige, Mrs. Joseph . . . . . 698

Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 679, 685, 698

Stevenson, Adlai E . . . . . 704

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)



the  
Department  
of  
State

## OUR SOUTHERN PARTNERS

### The Story of Inter-American Cooperation

One of the most encouraging developments in the direction of increasing free-world strength and unity is the concerted effort of the peoples of the Americas to perfect a community of fraternal trust, common purpose, equality, and widespread economic and social opportunity.

The land and the people of the 20 nations of Latin America and their political, social, and economic development with particular emphasis on their common problems are described in this 59-page illustrated booklet. Other subjects covered are United States relations and economic assistance to Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps operations in several South American countries, foreign trade and regional trade arrangements, and the Organization of American States (OAS).

Publication 7404

30 cents

---

#### Order Form

Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

#### Enclosed find:

\$.....

(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Please send me ..... copies of—

*Our Southern Partners: The Story of Inter-American Cooperation*

Name: .....

Street Address: .....

City, Zone, and State: .....

# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1246

May 13, 1963

**THE STAKE IN VIET-NAM** • *Address by Secretary Rusk* . . . . . 727

**THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE** • *by Under Secretary Ball* . . . . . 736

**FOREIGN STUDENTS IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS** • *by Assistant Secretary Battle* . . . . . 752

**SPACE METEOROLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS: A CHALLENGE TO SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY** • *by Richard N. Gardner* . . . . . 740

**OBSERVATION IN SPACE** • *by Leonard C. Meeker* . . . . . 746

L  
RECORD  
STATES  
N POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1246 • PUBLICATION

May 13, 1963

*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements which the United States is or may become a party to and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed current*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 Issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.



## The Stake in Viet-Nam

press release 213, revised, dated April 22

### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK<sup>1</sup>

There are many subjects which I would be tempted to discuss this evening. Many of these could be the basis for encouragement and confidence, for the free world abroad is getting on with its job. Others would cause concern and anxiety because they remain difficult and dangerous.

I could skip rather lightly over a number of subjects, but I would rather, if you will permit me, speak in my opening remarks, before your questions, on one particular subject, partly to illustrate the fact that each one of our serious problems has a history of its own and an anatomy of its own, is related to an important purpose, and involves the relationship between ends and means. But in this foreign policy business, there is no free-lunch counter. You select your policy, you pay the cashier, and if you will the end, without being prepared to furnish the means, you haven't got a policy. You simply have an illusion.

And therefore I should like to address myself to a seemingly remote sector of the great worldwide struggle between freedom and coercion, a sector often poorly understood if not sometimes deliberately misrepresented, but a sector of vital importance to the future health and security of the free world. And I refer to Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is a narrow strip along the South China Sea, nearly as large as California, with a population of some 30 million people—about 16 million in the North and 14 million in the South.

With Cambodia and Laos, Viet-Nam formed what was formerly known as French Indo-

china. During the Second World War, the Vichy regime yielded control of French Indochina to the Japanese. In the spring of 1945 the Japanese proclaimed the independence of Viet-Nam. And in August of that year they permitted the Communist-oriented Viet Minh to seize rule.

In the Indian subcontinent and in Burma and the Philippines, Western countries recognized at war's end that national demands for independence would have to be met promptly. But this was not the case with Indochina. Instead, we ourselves were somewhat at a loss for a policy with regard to that particular part of the world. So our people in charge of war plans in 1944 sent a colonel out there who sent a cable back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying, "Request policy guidance on American policy toward Indochina, because we are beginning to get military access to that country and we need direction."

Well, there ensued a vast silence which lasted for months. We sent staff officers back to try to find the answer. We sent cables out there, and after about 6 months the reply came and it said, "When asked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a statement of American policy toward Indochina, the President"—that was President Roosevelt—"replied, 'I don't want to hear any more about Indochina.'"

Well, now the result of no significant Allied policy at that point was that the French did return and take over where they left off at the time of the Japanese occupation, and they encountered therefore a militant resistance movement. For 8 years, with material help from the United States, they sought to pacify the country. At the same time they granted increasing autonomy to non-Communist Vietnamese. But the Viet Minh,

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Economic Club of New York at New York, N.Y. on Apr. 22.

with help from the Chinese Communists—help which was augmented after the cease-fire in Korea—managed to maintain and strengthen their military capabilities.

It is worth remembering that we, Britain, France, and others had agreed since 1945 that the security of Southeast Asia crucially depended upon the security of the Red River Valley of North Viet-Nam. The inability of the leading Western Powers to concert a course of action to prevent the loss of that valley in 1953 and 1954 cast a long shadow across the future. The fall of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954 led to the Geneva Agreements ending hostilities and to the end of French rule in Indochina. Viet-Nam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, with a Communist regime entrenched in the North.

Neither South Viet-Nam nor the United States signed the Geneva Agreements of 1954. However, we made it clear that, while we would not use force to disturb the agreements, we would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of those agreements as a serious threat to international peace and security. As a further deterrent, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was formed. And by protocol, its protective umbrella was extended over the newly independent states of Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam.

In South Viet-Nam much of the countryside was controlled by armed Communist cells or by armed religious sects. Thousands of peasants had sold their stock and moved into the cities. Vast areas of rice land in the Mekong Delta were untended. South Viet-Nam was not producing enough food to feed its own people. Rubber production had declined drastically. Railway bridges had been dynamited and railway tracks torn up by the retreating Viet Minh.

The capital city of Saigon was largely under the control of a secret society of pirates and gangsters who ran the opium dens, gambling houses, red-light districts and exacted protection money from legitimate merchants.

Nominally, the leader of South Viet-Nam was the Emperor Bao Dai, absent much of the time from his country. The Prime Minister was a Vietnamese nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem. He was not well known at the time to most of his own countrymen, at least compared with a name

like Ho Chi Minh. He had to build a government and create a national administration out of almost nothing. And he was surrounded by enemies. The Communists hated him. So did many of the local French, who had not yet become reconciled to a genuinely independent Republic of Viet-Nam. So did some of the South Vietnamese politicians. Rejecting both Communists and collaborators with the former colonial regime, his political base was narrow and able assistants were not easy to find.

Very few observers either in the West or in Asia gave either Prime Minister Diem or the Republic of South Viet-Nam much chance of survival. Many expected the Communists to take over within a few months.

Into this chaos poured nearly 1 million refugees from North Viet-Nam. Many were diseased, many suffering from starvation; some bore scars from Communist torture. They brought nothing but the clothes—or the rags—on their backs and the will to work and to live in freedom. These were the intrepid people whom Dr. Tom Dooley wrote so movingly: *Deliver Us From Evil*—who led him to devote the rest of his all too short life to helping the peoples of Viet-Nam and Laos.

In that book Dr. Dooley said of the people of Viet-Nam: “Americans never fail to like the Vietnamese when they get to know them. It is impossible not to respect their driving compulsion for freedom. . . .”

Despite the long odds against success, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were wisely resolved to assist South Viet-Nam. The United States provided economic assistance, military training mission, and weapons.

#### **History of the Republic of Viet-Nam**

What happened in South Viet-Nam during the next 5 years deserves to be listed near the top of the success stories of the postwar period. By plebiscite, the Emperor Bao Dai was replaced by a Republic, with Ngo Dinh Diem as President, with an elected National Assembly and a written Constitution. The independent armies of the religious sects were dissolved. The nearly 1 million refugees from the North were resettled and resumed earning their own living. A land-reform program, patterned on the lan-

reforms in Japan and on Taiwan, was pressed forward—123,000 heads of families became small landowners. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of Vietnamese were moved into the highlands to raise industrial crops. Rubber production rose, and new plantings of better varieties promised still higher production for the future. Sugar production doubled in 1958. South Viet-Nam was soon producing enough rice to resume exports on a rising scale. Various small industries were established. Textile production rose from near zero to near self-sufficiency. Electric power nearly doubled. Per capita national income rose by 20 percent.

Thousands of new schools were built. Between 1956 and 1960, enrollment in the elementary schools rose from 400,000 to 1,500,000. The expansion of health facilities included new hospitals and 3,500 village health stations. Rail transportation was restored. Roads were repaired and improved, and three new major highways were built.

The Communists were not completely eliminated—especially along the land and sea frontiers, where they could be supplied—but most of South Viet-Nam became, for a period, safe for travel.

Although North Viet-Nam inherited most of the industry of Viet-Nam, and although its population is larger, it fell rapidly behind South Viet-Nam in food production, the number of children in school, and in standards of living. While per capita food production rose 20 percent in the South, it fell 10 percent in the North. This was competition which the Communists apparently could not endure. Very likely it was one of the reasons why they decided in 1959 to renew their assault on South Viet-Nam. And in 1960 the Lao Dong Party—that is, the Communist Party—ordered the “liberation” of South Viet-Nam.

According to Communist propaganda, the war in South Viet-Nam is a civil war, a local uprising. The truth is that it is an aggression organized, directed, and partly supplied from North Viet-Nam. It is conducted by hardened Communist political organizers and guerrilla leaders trained in North Viet-Nam, who, upon their arrival in the South, recruit local assistance. This has been done in a variety of ways,

including terror and assassination. Schoolteachers, health workers, malaria eradication teams, local officials loyal to the Republic—these were the first targets of the assassins. But many ordinary villagers who refused to cooperate with the Communist guerrillas likewise have been ruthlessly killed.

### **Strategic Importance of South Viet-Nam**

This assault on South Viet-Nam was a major Communist enterprise, carefully and elaborately prepared, heavily staffed, and relentlessly pursued. It made headway. In 1961 President Diem appealed for further assistance and President Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively.

The strategic importance of South Viet-Nam is plain. It controls the mouth of the Mekong River, the main artery of Southeast Asia. The loss of South Viet-Nam would put the remaining states of Southeast Asia in mortal danger.

But there are larger reasons why the defense of South Viet-Nam is vital to us and to the whole free world. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of 14 million people who have fought hard against communism—including nearly 1 million who fled their former homes to avoid living under Communist tyranny. Since we went to the aid of Greece and Turkey 16 years ago, it has been the attitude of the United States to assist peoples who resist Communist aggression. We have seen this form of attack fail in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. The South Vietnamese are determined to win their battle, and they deserve our help.

Critics have complained that South Viet-Nam is not a full constitutional democracy and that our aid has been subject to waste and mismanagement. Let us be clear that these criticisms are not merely alibis for inaction. For in passing judgment, let us recall that we are talking about a nation which has been responsible for its own affairs for less than a decade, about a people who have had no peace since 1941 and little experience in direct participation in political affairs. Their four national elections, their thousands of elected hamlet councils, and their forthcoming village council elections show steady movement toward a constitutional system resting upon popular consent.

But let us also recall that Viet-Nam is fighting a war—a mean, frustrating, and nerve-racking struggle—and fighting it with courage and determination. The overriding unfinished business is to achieve public safety in order that the country can resume its march toward peace and prosperity. This in itself requires the utmost effort in good administration, in the effective use of available resources, as well as dedicated leadership of an aroused people. I do not defend mistakes or failures which can be put right; but I do wish to enlist your understanding for an effort which includes perseverance and gallantry and sacrifice. And I have no doubt about the ability of South Viet-Nam to take an honored place among modern nations as it rids itself of the enemies gnawing at its vitals.

#### **Development of Winning Tactics**

Our role in South Viet-Nam is a limited and supporting role. We provide technical, logistical, training, and advisory assistance. We have no combat units as such in South Viet-Nam, although many of our military personnel—and some civilians—come under fire in combat situations and we have suffered some casualties. The some 12,000 men we have there are among our finest; their skill and courage and dedication make debtors of us all.

I would point out that we are not alone in assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam. Ten other nations are helping in one way or another in this struggle. We hope that they will do more and that many other non-Communists will contribute. For the whole free world has a vital interest in the defeat of this Communist aggression against South Viet-Nam.

Understandably there are occasional differences of view between the Government in Saigon or Vietnamese officers in the field and their American advisers. But they and we are all committed to success for the Republic of Viet-Nam. It is the Vietnamese who are waging the war. Some 4,000 Vietnamese soldiers were killed and some 6,000 wounded in action during the past year. And they exacted nearly 30,000 casualties in return.

Colonel Serong, the Commander of the Australian advisers in Viet-Nam, has said: "The

typical Vietnamese soldier is as good as you will find. He is brave and he is tough."

We believe that the Vietnamese, with our help, have developed winning tactics.

With the assistance of helicopters, airplanes and radios the Government forces are able to maintain the initiative and, increasingly, to achieve the advantage of surprise.

The "strategic hamlet" program is producing excellent results. A strategic hamlet is hamlet with a defensive perimeter and a trained and armed militia. Usually it also has a radio with which to call for help if it is under attack.

As the Communist attack is political and economic as well as military, so is the response. The Government of Viet-Nam—and we—at attach the greatest importance to the civic action side of the strategic hamlet program. The hamlets are governed by councils elected by secret ballot. In addition—and not least important—the Government is supplying the hamlets with schools, medical aid, cheap fertilizer from Government-supported cooperatives, low interest agricultural loans, and other agricultural extension services.

Already approximately 7 million Vietnamese live in well over 5,000 strategic hamlets. The program calls for the completion of another 3,000 by the end of this year. Morale in the countryside has begun to rise. An estimate half a million people formerly under Viet Communist control now have increasingly effective Government protection.

The strategic hamlet system provides strength against the Communists in the countryside. The Communists are no longer, in Mao's figure of speech, fish swimming in a sea of peasant. Every bush is no longer their ally. They are getting hungrier. To the Vietnamese peasant they look less and less like winners.

The villagers are fighting when attacked and are volunteering all-important information on their own initiative to the Government forces.

Thousands of the *montagnards*—the hard mountain tribesmen—have been armed and trained to fight.

Rice production is up, and rice exports have been resumed. Defections from the Viet Communist have risen—though these are mostly locally recruited auxiliaries, not the hardened Communist

nist cadres. The Viet Cong is losing more weapons than are the Government forces. Viet Cong attacks are running at less than half the rate of January 1962. Several Viet Cong strongholds have been penetrated and supplies and installations destroyed. The Viet Cong has been unable to carry out its plan to escalate to larger military units and to more conventional warfare.

The Communists have a lot at stake in this struggle and will not quit easily. But the men and women who were deceived, exploited, or enrolled by force by the Communists now have a chance to rally to the side of the national government. Last week, on the first anniversary of the initiation of the strategic hamlet program, President Diem proclaimed "Campaign Open Arms." This is an offer of clemency and assistance and jobs to all who desert the Communists. And even those who have trespassed against the law and have already been condemned, or who are subject to court trial, may redeem themselves by "meritorious patriotic acts."

We applaud this statesmanlike offer. It is similar to the one the late great Ramon Mag-saysay used with such good effect in breaking the power of Huks in the Philippines a decade ago.

#### **Laos and the Geneva Accords**

Communist aggression against South Vietnam is, of course, intimately related to the refusal of the Communists to give full support to the Geneva Accords on Laos. Although it was not my intention to speak of Laos this evening—and anything I might say about that country might be disproved by the tickers which you will read on the way out of the hall—the most recent events in that unhappy landlocked country call for brief comment. The Pathet Lao, with strong backing from Hanoi and other Communist countries, have refused to give Prince Souvanna Phouma and his coalition the support and cooperation which were pledged at Geneva. The international machinery established by those accords has not been allowed to function with full effect. The writ of the Central Government has not run in Pathet Lao controlled areas. Viet Minh mili-

tary personnel have not, we believe, been fully withdrawn.

We are making every effort to ascertain whether all signatories of the Geneva Accords are prepared to support those agreements or whether some are moving to destroy them. If those agreements collapse, most serious and dangerous issues will arise and once again we shall have to determine what steps can be taken to insure that the Laotian people are left alone in peace and not overrun and exploited by those who would commit aggression.

Returning to Viet-Nam: We cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there. The enemy is elusive and determined, and relatively small numbers can disrupt the normal processes of a going society. It took 8 years to wipe out the Communist terrorists in Malaya—and they were far from a major Communist base.

But there is a good basis for encouragement. The Vietnamese are on their way to success and need our help; not just our material help—they need that—but our sympathetic understanding and comradeship. I can understand the discontent which surrounds any important task still unfinished. I cannot understand anyone who would quit, withhold our resources, abandon a brave people to those who are out to bury us and every other free and independent nation. That we cannot and will not do.

Because this is a battle to the end between freedom and coercion. There are many signs that the other side is involved with difficulties and disappointments. This is no time for us to relax our effort. There are many ways to quit: by refusing us the defense budgets we need; by refusing us the foreign aid resources we need; by refusing to pursue energetically our own great private enterprises abroad; by withdrawing our full support from the United Nations and from our several alliances. There are many ways to quit.

But this is no time to quit, because it is being demonstrated right around the world that this great international community of independent states has seized the commitment of peoples in the most unsuspecting places and that those who have become independent are stubbornly resolved to remain so. And as we work with them toward that kind of a decent world community, of independent states cooperating

across national frontiers, we shall find allies right around the world; in moments of great crisis there are not nearly so many neutralists as you might have supposed.

Thank you very much.

#### QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

*General Kenneth Royall:* Mr. Secretary, no comment is really needed. The response of this audience and their enthusiasm, their intense interest while you talked, would be enough. But I cannot help feeling that this statement you made today is an important one, not only as to the countries you referred to but it's a call to the courage and stability which has rarely been equaled in these recent years. And we all thank you again for your presentation.

We now come to the question period, for which we have about 28 minutes. Questions will be asked alternatively by Mr. Armand Erpf, partner of Loeb, Rhoades and Company, who will question Mr. Hayes,<sup>2</sup> and from Mr. J. Wilson Newman, chairman of Dun and Bradstreet, who will question Mr. Rusk. Mr. Erpf, will you first proceed and be followed by Mr. Newman?

[Question by Mr. Erpf and answer by Mr. Hayes.]

*Mr. Newman:* Mr. Secretary, first is a preliminary inquiry to my main question. In these troubled times, when all of us have become very mindful of the importance of the public interest, and being aware of the seriousness of the talk which you have just delivered, I would like to know first, sir, if I should raise a few selective questions, is there any risk that I may say something prejudicial to national security?

*Secretary Rusk:* There is nothing embarrassing about questions. The answers might be embarrassing. [Laughter.] But you leave that to me. You go right ahead.

*Mr. Newman:* Well, now, Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that you have devoted practically all of your remarks to Viet-Nam and Laos, does this mean that these subjects rank highest in importance facing this nation? Or

does it mean that such matters as Cuba, Berlin, and South America are further down the line, or you would rather not talk about it?

*Secretary Rusk:* No, not at all. I indicated earlier that I do not wish to inhibit the questions in any way. I elected to use my 20 minutes to talk about a particular subject because I think that it's too easy to skip right across an entire range, and I wanted to dig into at least one of them and one that is far away and not very well understood in this country, in order to get into some of the anatomy of the problem. But I would welcome questions on any of these subjects you would want to get into. You shoot the questions.

*Mr. Newman:* Well, obviously I thought I would have a few minutes to think it up, sir. [Laughter.] But, to begin with, I wonder if you would state, sir, your understanding of the Monroe Doctrine and what the policy of the United States is just now with respect to it.

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I think all of us know the tradition behind the Monroe Doctrine. We are more interested in half of it these days than we are in the other half, because we are deeply involved in European and other affairs which were eschewed by the Monroe Doctrine. But what is even more important today is the treaty structure of the hemisphere, the security arrangements of the hemisphere and such things as the Rio Pact.

Now, as a matter of policy, as a matter of policy objective, the hemisphere has unanimously agreed that a Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the institutions of the Western Hemisphere and that the aim must be to welcome a free Cuban people back into this hemisphere.

Now, as I pointed out just a few days ago in another place,<sup>3</sup> the actions that are now being taken fall into three main categories. The first has to do with the commitment of the Armed Forces of the United States and other armed forces of this hemisphere to accomplish certain purposes: one, to insure that there not be introduced back into Cuba offensive weapons which will threaten the security of this hemi-

<sup>2</sup> Alfred Hayes, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, spoke before Secretary Rusk on "Strengthening the U.S. Balance of Payments."

<sup>3</sup> For text of remarks made by Secretary Rusk before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 18, see BULLETIN of May 6, 1963, p. 679.

sphere; secondly, to keep the kind of eye on Cuba, the watchfulness on Cuba to assure us that that is the case in that particular island—to insure that there is the safe and free use of international waters and airspace in the Caribbean area without interference from the island of Cuba; to insure that there will not be arms shipped from Cuba to other parts of the hemisphere illicitly against inter-American orders, or any other type of foray from Cuba against those other countries; and also to insure that there not be repeated in Cuba the situation which was demonstrated in Hungary some time ago about the use of Soviet arms to impose a political solution against the will of Cubans on the spot.

A second course of combination of actions has to do with insuring that this Marxist-Leninist regime does not offer any future for the Cuban people, or any example for the rest of the hemisphere in terms of economic and social development. There has been a drastic reduction in normal relations, economic, fiscal, and otherwise, between Cuba and the rest of the free world. This has to do with trade, with shipping, with all the transactions which have to do with the economy of the island. That is having an important impact upon the country inside the island and is raising the price rapidly for the other side if they try to maintain the present position there.

And a third set of actions has to do with the rest of the hemisphere: to insure that any attempt from Cuba to send funds, personnel, agents, into other countries will be interrupted and also—and most important of all—to insure that these other countries of the hemisphere and their peoples really understand that economic and social development, and rapid economic and social development, is something that is to be undertaken through free institutions and that it is the free world that has the more adequate answer for that solution.

I think the result of all these steps in the hemisphere has been sharply to cut down on Castro's—the bloom of Castro's original revolution. I think he has been abandoned throughout the hemisphere by all but the hard-core Communist apparatus in country after country. By and large there are few organizations that still pay him some attention.

Now, there remains the question of the presence of Soviet forces, which we have indicated to the Soviet Union, and have declared, cannot be accepted as a normal state of affairs in this hemisphere. Those forces have been moving out. It is our purpose to see that they do continue that movement out. And the question is how, when, under what circumstances. The presence of those forces here is itself a source of danger, itself a major intrusion into the possibilities of relations between the West and the East on any kind of a normal basis, and is an irritant which ought to be removed.

Now, there still remains the question of invasion or a major act of war in dealing with that situation. Let me say to you that if someone says to me, "I want to invade Cuba and take all the consequences of that step, whatever they are," I will honor you for an idea which at least has some integrity. But let's not kid ourselves that waving missiles is going to cause the other side to roll over and play dead. If you want to do all sorts of drastic things on the assumption that no shooting will result, just don't entertain any such illusion. It is necessary to incur very great risks in order to meet great threats. And that was demonstrated last October. And if anyone is under the impression that there was not a very great risk involved last October, then you must catch up to date with the facts.

But it is not my judgment that the threat in Cuba at the present time warrants the escalation of violence which would be involved in direct military action against that island. And direct military action of that sort is something for which we must remain responsible and which we must not put in the hands of those who do not carry the responsibilities which we do for our own people and for situations in other parts of the world.

So I would like to have those who want to do more about Cuba be more precise than the use of general language, because practically everything that can be done, short of the use of armed forces, is being done and is having very considerable effect. Thank you.

[Question by Mr. Erpf and answer by Mr. Hayes.]

*Secretary Rusk:* Mr. Chairman, may I buy just a little piece of that one? [Laughter.]



*General Royall:* Yes, sir. Go right ahead.

*Secretary Rusk:* There is no question whatever in Washington; we do look upon the balance-of-payments problem as a matter of major and urgent concern. It is also true that a good part of the problem seems, from the bookkeeping point of view, to be involved in our defense and aid commitments abroad.

Now, there are a good many things that can be done on both those items. We can, we believe, get our allies to take more and more of a share, both in defense and in foreign aid. They have been improving their own performance in both those steadily. European aid, for example, to the continent of Africa is more than twice our own. France's commitment in foreign aid is larger, in relation to her gross national product, than our own at the present time, and they are showing considerable improvement in their own effort.

We, in the meanwhile, in foreign aid are trying to move as rapidly as possible to the proposition that what we have to offer in aid is goods and services originating in the United States, that free dollars—that is, dollars that are involved in the type of the gold flow problem—are not to be considered a part of our foreign aid program. It takes a little time to adjust to that, but we are working at it from that particular point of view.

But this is not something in which we can meet it by simply reducing these commitments abroad, because all sorts of other things begin to unravel; and I would like to urge the point that to the extent that we can increase our own exports of goods and services from this country on trade or capital, we are thereby contributing directly to our security requirements abroad and to the other great burdens that we have to undertake.

I think that it is fair to say—and this is no new comment—that both business and government, since 1945, went through a period of a somewhat relaxed attitude toward these matters. We were in a sellers' market. Now we are moving into a new period of competition and the necessity for greater effort. We ourselves, some months ago, went to all of our embassies, to our own ambassadors personally, and reminded them that the promotion of trade

was the first obligation of American diplomacy when Benjamin Franklin first set out on his trip to France in the 18th century, and that this is something which the ambassadors and everybody in the embassies must get hold of. Similarly a new energy, an additional energy on the part of business can help to win these credits that we need so badly for our major commitments.

We are not at the point yet where we need to establish priorities. And I do not wish in any way to throw any—to anticipate anything which is not in the minds of people in Washington. But I would add quickly, as a matter of priority, if you had to choose between withdrawing our American forces from Europe, for example, and imposing some limitations on free decisions about private investments in Europe, which in the national interest would be more desirable?

*Mr. Hayes:* I'd like to twist the question a little and say if the question were between withdrawing independent forces in Europe or putting controls over capital exports, which would be true?

*General Royall:* We have time for two brief questions, one from each of our questioners.

*Mr. Newman:* Mr. Secretary, I feel it necessary to proceed very deliberately. Lest the candor of this forum be misinterpreted as hostility, let me hasten to say that businessmen as a group and businessmen in this room have a deep, heartfelt sympathy for the heavy responsibilities you have and which you bear so well. But businessmen are exhorted from time to time in generalities—increase your exports; work with the people abroad. And I think it would be, indeed, very helpful, sir, if some of these generalities could be broken down into specifics and to enumerate a few specific things that businessmen could do and a few specific things which they are doing now that they should not do. Thank you, sir.

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, I'd be glad to do that, provided it is understood that if I point one finger at you I have three fingers pointed at myself about things we might do on our own side to help out.

I do think that we need to shorten the time-lag between the discovery of a business oppor-



tunity abroad and a serious consideration by an American business which might be able to do something about it. I'm not at all sure that we get this news around, either through governmental or business circles, fast enough. Now, one is simply in trouble if we hear of a business opportunity in a particular country and, on the basis of a cable, we pick up the phone and call a company and say, "Look, here is this opportunity. Why don't you go after it?" We get into deep trouble because there are such things as competitors. And so this information has to be circulated in trade journals. We don't have the freedom of moving fast on this. This is circulated generally throughout industry, so that we do not become involved in getting in direct touch with one company rather than another in regard to a particular piece of business. Whether there is anything that can be done about that, I don't know.

But I think also—and here let me go back to a period when I was a customer of American business in a good many countries overseas. I think there have been indications that we have been somewhat slow to respond in such things as service, sales, spare-parts attention, taking advantage of such things as air deliveries and things of that sort compared to some of the other competitors in countries that are freshly arrived on the scene in the postwar period, such as Germany and Italy and Japan. I think there are some improvements possible here.

To give you an example which I know of, one exporter has found that the very packaging of materials for shipment abroad has been so deficient that when he buys for foreign export he brings them into his own warehouse and repackages before he ships them abroad.

Well, I think we can do better. You asked for specifics. I think there are some specifics we can get into. But I think, Mr. Chairman, what we might very well do—and I have talked to Luther Hodges about this—is to try to sit down with a group of people who are extremely involved operationally on this on both sides

and have a hair-shirt talk in which each side can talk to the other one about how we can get on—how both of us can get on with this job more effectively. I think there are things we can do to help in both directions. I'm sure you can tell us where we have failed, and we can point out some of the problems we see cropping up here and there.

I do think this: There has been an enormous recovery of attitude, shall I say, on the part of American enterprise with regard to foreign service in the last few years as competition has arisen from other sources. But it's going to require continual application of a dynamism which is characterized by our free society if we are to keep up with the fast-growing competition which is coming in from other countries.

*Mr. Hayes:* I want to add one certain specific. It seems to me we have taken encouragement from the obvious fact that American business is more conscious of the need for remaining a competitor and also conscious of the cost structure. I hope that labor is becoming more conscious of it too. But it seems to me that the consciousness on the part of those two big elements—of the vital significance of cost and this whole export question—is absolutely crucial.

*Secretary Rusk:* Mr. Chairman, in the event you are not aware of it, we have established in the Department of State with close cooperation with the Department of Commerce, a business advisory group under Clarence Randall, whose job it is to help us follow through fast on situations in which American businesses find themselves in difficulty abroad.<sup>4</sup>

Now, this has been working out, to my own personal knowledge, very well over the past 3 or 4 months. It has been possible for us to come in in a timely fashion and give significant and serious assistance to a business that finds itself in some difficulty in a foreign country. And at the same time the other countries realize that we are going to be moving promptly on these things. And their own attitude toward American business, I think, has shown some improvement.

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 296.

## The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance

by *Under Secretary Ball*<sup>1</sup>

I understand that your meeting is in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Woodrow Wilson's arrival in Washington. He came here on a sunny day in March 1913 by train from Princeton. He found, of course, a very different Washington from the burgeoning Capital we know today, and he assumed the Presidency of a nation that, at the beginning of the second decade of this 20th century, differed profoundly from the United States as we know it in this seventh decade. During the long span of years that have intervened, America has changed, not merely in appearance but in its national state of mind. It has lost its serenity, some of its Panglossian optimism. In 1913 we were preeminently an exuberant nation with an almost innocent faith in the ability of peoples to live in harmony with one another—a faith that led Woodrow Wilson to remark on the “growing cordiality and sense of community interest among the nations, foreshadowing an age of settled peace and good will.”

Such euphoria was not, as we now know, to last more than a moment of time. Sixteen months later a bomb was thrown at an archduke of whom few Americans had ever heard in a dusty town in Bosnia which few Americans had ever visited. Millions of men were precipitated into a bloody war—an all-encompassing war that set in train a long sequence of events which, over the course of a half century, has changed the face of the world.

That war came as a bitter surprise to Woodrow Wilson, who had looked forward to his

years in office as an uninterrupted golden age of sweeping domestic reform—a period in which the intrusion of foreign problems could be only an unwelcome distraction. Yet he had a foreboding this might happen. Shortly before he took office he had remarked to a friend: “It would be the irony of fate if my Administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs.” It is significant that his inaugural address contained no reference whatever to any international issue.

In the years since that time, of course, the United States has had to pay progressively more attention to foreign affairs. Our influence has expanded around the earth, and events have compelled us—first in one obscure outpost, then another—to fill power vacuums created by the withdrawal of other Western nations.

### Maintaining the Nuclear Deterrent

Today the world no longer appears to Americans as certain and uncomplicated. Our nation has, of necessity, moved to the center of the stage, as Woodrow Wilson, with precocious prescience, had foretold it would as early as 1902, when he said, in his Princeton inaugural “A new age is before us, in which, it would seem, we must lead the world.”

In assuming world leadership we Americans have not, of course, been able to avoid involvement—direct involvement—in the central conflict of our time. As the free-world leader, we have long since abandoned the neutrality “in fact as well as in name” that Woodrow Wilson so eloquently recommended in a simpler time. Others have taken over the role we briefly and rather naively played of benevolent spectator, and we are now a fully committed participant in a most dangerous and complicated contest

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Princeton National Alumni Association at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 26 (press release 224).

between the two parts of a world divided.

Today, as never before, we are conspicuously on the frontlines. The protective moat of a vast ocean no longer has much meaning. In a nuclear age all four corners of the earth are exposed and vulnerable. Our country, which has known no hostile enemy action on its own soil since 1812, must now live in the constant knowledge that we are, as President Kennedy has said, "on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles"<sup>2</sup> and that a decision made by a government 5,000 miles away—the pressing of a button in a far-away capital—could lead within a half-hour to the destruction of millions of our countrymen.

Our major protection—and the protection of the whole free world—is, of course, our deterrent strength. We can be quite certain that, if the Soviet Union were to strike an aggressive blow against America or any other part of the free world, we could respond by imposing far greater destruction on the Communist bloc.

Our security, therefore, depends upon the maintenance of what that new American citizen, Sir Winston Churchill, has called the "balance of terror," and it is in the constant awareness of that balance that we must make our major decisions of foreign policy.

Such a situation makes great demands on our minds and on our nerves. It requires not merely that we maintain our strength but that we be ready to employ it. We must be continually on guard against any event that might serve to upset this precarious balance—as did the action of the Soviet Union in surreptitiously introducing offensive missiles into Cuba last October. When that occurred, of course, we moved promptly to reverse the action. And, again, we must be alert that events taking place half a world away—as, for example, in Southeast Asia—could also disturb this very delicate power balance.

The massive deterrent nuclear power which the United States has built serves more than our narrow national interests. We hold that force as trustee for the security of free men and free institutions everywhere. The manner in which

we manage and discharge that trusteeship will have a direct bearing on our chances of survival.

Our choice in the matter is conditioned by the fact that the NATO alliance is composed principally of nations that are individually small in relation to the magnitudes of the nuclear age. Collectively, the European members of the alliance are a reservoir of vast talents and resources, but political power is still divided among national governments. Although they have made great strides toward unity, they have not yet established common political institutions to which they can entrust the power to make common decisions of war or peace, of life or death. If the momentum toward unity continues, such institutions may well come into being some day, but they do not exist now—and that makes the problem of nuclear management much more complicated.

For if the effective nuclear defense of the free world is, in fact, indivisible, then how can the indivisibility of that defense be secured within the present political framework and in such a way as to promote useful progress within that framework?

#### **Dangers of Proliferation**

In seeking an answer we should start, I think, by recognizing that there are basically only three ways in which the Atlantic nations can manage their nuclear defense.

One way would be the continuance of the present situation. Today the effective management and control of the free world's nuclear defense are predominantly in the hands of the United States. Since the bulk of free-world nuclear power is thus under the control of one government, and that government is our own, we Americans are satisfied that the power will be responsibly used to defend and protect the vital interests of the free world.

But we cannot assume that all members of the Atlantic alliance will be forever content to accept this as a permanent solution. I am not suggesting that the United States is regarded as irresponsible or untrustworthy, for I think that our nation and our Government enjoy an almost unparalleled degree of trust on the part of our allies. But it is only natural that vigorous peoples should wish to play an effective role

<sup>2</sup> For President Kennedy's address to the Nation on the Soviet threat to the Americas, see BULLETIN OF Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

in their own defense, and, if no alternative is provided, the political pressures for the multiplication of national nuclear deterrent systems will make themselves felt.

This is, I think, very likely to happen if we simply let nature take its course. In one country after another these pressures may become irresistible. Moreover, the process will feed upon itself, since the decision to build a national deterrent in one country will almost certainly increase pressures for a similar decision in others.

Such a course would reflect the natural desire of patriotic peoples to make a self-respecting contribution to the strength of the Western deterrent. Nonetheless, it would start us down a road beset with dangers.

*First*, the development of national nuclear systems, by one nation and then another, could not help but heighten the feelings of mistrust within the alliance. At the same time it would increase the tensions between the free world and the bloc.

*Second*, the multiplication of national deterrents would multiply the chance that, at some point, nuclear weapons might fall under the control of an irresponsible government.

*Third*, the multiplication of national deterrents would render progressively more difficult the achievement of an ultimate agreement to control or limit nuclear armament.

#### **Concept of Multilateral Sea-Based Force**

But if the proliferation of national deterrents is full of dangers, then what is the alternative?

Quite obviously the alternative to concentrating nuclear power under one government or proliferating power among many must lie in some arrangement for the pooling of effort on a basis of international management and control. We have, therefore, made known our willingness to join our NATO partners, if they wished, in attempting to design and build a new multilateral force that could supplement the national forces already in existence.

Since such a force would be intended to serve the purposes of free-world defense, it should be organized within the framework of the Western alliance. To represent a truly international

force, it has seemed to us that it should meet four conditions:

*First*, it should be assigned to NATO by the participating countries—which may be four, five, or six in number—and not by any one country.

*Second*, it should not be predominantly based on the soil of any one nation.

*Third*, it should be managed and operated by nationals of all participating countries in such a way as to be unavailable for withdrawal to serve the national uses of any participating government.

*Fourth*, the use of the force should be politically controlled by a collective decision of the participating nations.

It was with these considerations in mind that this administration has maintained and elaborated the concept of a multilateral sea-based MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force, first put forward by the Eisenhower administration.

This multilateral force, as it has been conceived, would be designed to meet the four requirements I have just described.

*First*, the principle would be recognized that it was a force collectively assigned to NATO by the participants—not by a single nation-state—and all the participating nations would share in the costs of creating and maintaining it.

*Second*, it would be sea-based, consisting of Polaris-type missiles mounted on surface ships. Thus, the force would be deployed in international waters and not on the soil of any nation.

*Third*, it would be committed to NATO, and the ships themselves would be manned by mixed crews of nationals of the participating nations. The force could clearly, therefore, not be withdrawn to serve the purposes of any one member nation or government. The U.S. Navy has indicated that an efficient first-class force can be created in this fashion.

*Fourth*, political control would be exercised through some form of executive body representing the participating nations. The United States would, of course, be one of the participating nations and would, like other major participants, have an authoritative voice in any decisions concerning the use of the force.

We wish to go forward with such a force only

if it is strongly desired by our allies and if they are willing to pay the greater part of its costs. We are now in the process of ascertaining Allied views. Before any final action is taken, whatever specific proposal emerges from this consultation will, of course, be submitted to the Congress for approval.

At the moment it appears likely that several major European countries will be interested in the development of a multilateral force along the lines I have discussed. They see it as an effective way of deploying MRBM's in the European area and thus offsetting Soviet MRBM's arrayed against Europe, while at the same time enhancing Allied cohesion and avoiding the divisive concerns attendant on national manning and ownership of nuclear-tipped strategic missiles. They also see it as a way of securing self-respecting and effective participation in strategic nuclear deterrence on a basis of essential equality among the nuclear and nonnuclear participating countries. And they see in such a nuclear association with the United States a means of reinforcing the assurance that we will remain deeply involved in the nuclear defense of Europe.

#### **Advantages of Multilateral Force**

The multilateral force represents a novel approach to a novel, yet essentially practical, problem. There is no doubt that nuclear weapons could most easily be managed and controlled by a single government. But unless our allies will continue indefinitely to accept exclusive nuclear management by the United States, such an ideal solution cannot be achieved. For the dilemma in which we find ourselves is that Western political institutions have not evolved in pace with the advance of our technology.

When we face the problem squarely, it seems clear enough that there can be no perfect answer to the management of the nuclear power of the West until the West has achieved a far greater political unity than it possesses today. But events will not wait, and in this imperfect world we must deal with conditions as we find them. I see little future in letting nature take its course, and there is no use pretending that the problem does not exist.

The kind of multilateral force I have de-

scribed has much to commend it. Not only is it the best means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity to work toward greater unity in Europe and closer partnership between Europe and the United States.

The striking progress achieved toward these goals in the past decade and a half has, to a considerable extent, come about from necessity—from the fact that governments were required to cope with specific and immediate problems in Europe and the Atlantic area. And as we seek to cope with the problem of nuclear management, I have no doubt that we shall, of necessity, make further strides toward a greater political unity in the years ahead.

For it will not be abstract principle but importunate necessity—the urgent need to get hard things done in order that we may survive and flourish—that will move us toward the attainment of that ultimate objective of which Woodrow Wilson spoke with such controlled passion—the “universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”

#### **Secretary Visits Five Capitals on CENTO Trip**

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 225) that Secretary Rusk would visit Ankara, Tehran, New Delhi, and Belgrade in connection with his trip to Karachi as head of the U.S. delegation to the 11th session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization, which met at Karachi April 30–May 1.<sup>1</sup>

En route to Karachi Mr. Rusk stopped at Ankara April 27 and at Tehran April 28, where he had discussions with officials of the Turkish and Iranian Governments.

Returning from Karachi he stopped at New

---

<sup>1</sup> For the names of the members of the U.S. delegation, see Department of State press release 225 dated Apr. 26.

Delhi May 2-3 and at Belgrade May 4-5 for meetings with officials of the Indian and Yugoslav Governments.

The Secretary's visit to Belgrade, at the in-

visitation of the Yugoslav Government, returns the official visit to this country of the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Koca Popovic, in May 1962.

## Space Meteorology and Communications: A Challenge to Science and Diplomacy

*by Richard N. Gardner*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Outer space is not a new subject—only a new place where all the old subjects come up.

Recent events have demonstrated the aptness of this statement. Our national space program and our international efforts at space cooperation have raised questions long familiar in our earthly activities. In space, as on earth, there seems to be a tendency for social invention to lag behind scientific invention. The astounding progress in space science has not yet been matched by comparable progress in international cooperation.

One of the aims of the United States has been to close this "space cooperation gap"—the gap between that degree of cooperation which scientific developments justify as being in the self-interest of all nations and that degree of cooperation which is permitted by political circumstances.

To help close this gap President Kennedy laid before the General Assembly on September 25, 1961,<sup>2</sup> a four-point program of space cooperation under United Nations auspices. The program was subsequently incorporated in a resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Address made before a meeting of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 19 (press release 207).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

Let us take an inventory tonight on where we stand with respect to two aspects of that program: first, international cooperation in weather forecasting and weather research and, second, international cooperation in the establishment of a global system of communication satellites.

### Benefits From Weather Satellites

The space age has brought revolutionary advances in the meteorological sciences. Before the development of weather satellites, you and your colleagues throughout the world developed mathematical models for use in weather prediction and weather research. You had computers capable of processing weather observations from all over the world. And you had earth-based instruments for observing the atmosphere—weather stations, balloons, and sounding rockets.

On April 1, 1960, Tiros I was launched. This gave you a space platform from which to observe weather phenomena on an unprecedented scale. For the first time you could observe the entire atmosphere as a single physical system.

It is important not to promise too much from any new scientific development, and this one is no exception. But surely it is no exaggeration to say that the weather satellite portends a revolution in meteorology, a peaceful revolution which can benefit all peoples on this earth,

particularly in the less developed regions which presently lack adequate weather information.

The benefit from weather satellites which has made perhaps the greatest impact on the popular mind is the saving in lives and property resulting from storm warnings. In 1961 Tiros III photographed 20 tropical storms and gave the first warning of Hurricane Esther, sighted in the South Atlantic.

But, as you are well aware, this is only one of many applications. Satellites will increase our knowledge of the forces that shape the weather and help us forecast storms, floods, rainfall, drought, and climate with greater accuracy. This will make possible the more efficient use of limited water resources, increases in agricultural yields, and more efficient use of fuels and raw materials. And increased knowledge of the atmosphere may lead eventually to some control over climate and rainfall.

These benefits from weather satellites are of value to all nations. Moreover, they will be hastened and enhanced through cooperation by all nations. No country—including our own—can achieve the full benefits of weather prediction and weather research by acting alone. Each country wants to know the weather that is coming at it, so to speak, from the territory of other countries.

Every country can benefit by sharing the cost of earthly weather stations with other countries. The two great space powers can both benefit by coordinating their efforts in the orbiting of weather satellites. With weather there is not—and should not be—an Iron Curtain separating East and West.

Moreover, given the long-term possibility of weather control, the development now of international cooperation may reduce the risk that this power might some day be used by one nation to achieve military or economic advantage at the expense of another.

In recognition of these common interests a significant effort of international cooperation is now under way. The General Assembly resolution passed unanimously in December 1961 called upon the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to develop two kinds of proposals.

The first is for an international weather service program—a global network to receive, proc-

ess, and transmit meteorological information from orbiting weather satellites as well as earth-based instruments.

The second is for an international research program to yield information essential for improved weather prediction and perhaps eventually weather control.

#### WMO Report

Following passage of the General Assembly resolution, the WMO invited experts from the United States and the Soviet Union to Geneva to help develop proposals in these two areas. In response to this invitation the late Dr. Harry Wexler, Director of Meteorological Research of the Weather Bureau, and Dr. V. A. Bugaev, Director of the Soviet Central Weather Forecasting Institute, produced a draft which, with some modifications, was approved by the WMO's Executive Committee last June.

As you know, the WMO report<sup>4</sup> recommended five principal steps:

1. Development of an internationally coordinated plan for meteorological satellites.

2. Establishment of a World Weather Watch, combining satellite observations with expanded conventional observations to bring improved weather services to every country of the world. World weather centers were proposed for Washington and Moscow, with a third world center envisaged for the Southern Hemisphere. In this connection it is hoped that world centers in Washington and Moscow will be in operation before 1965. Arrangements are already under way to enlarge the Weather Bureau's National Meteorological Center in Washington into a world center in which meteorologists from other nations can participate. The U.S.S.R. has expressed its intention of establishing a world center. These two centers will be connected by telecommunications systems, and their international activities related to this program will be coordinated by the WMO.

3. Filling the gaps in the present network of conventional meteorological observations on land and sea.

4. Improvement of telecommunications networks for the exchange of satellite data and conventional meteorological observations.

---

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. E/3662.



5. Establishment of a WMO Advisory Committee to promote research in the atmospheric sciences. The committee would include representatives of WMO, the International Council of Scientific Unions, the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization].

The WMO report has now been received and noted by the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Economic and Social Council, and the General Assembly.

In December 1962 the General Assembly adopted another resolution.<sup>5</sup> This expressed appreciation for the prompt response of the WMO and called upon member states to strengthen weather forecasting services and to encourage their scientific communities to cooperate in the expansion of atmospheric research.

The new resolution also recommended that the WMO, in consultation with other U.N. agencies and governmental and nongovernmental organizations, develop in greater detail its plan to strengthen meteorological services and research. It asked the International Council of Scientific Unions, through its unions and national academies, to develop a complementary program of atmospheric research. The resolution called upon the WMO to report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space following the WMO Congress now under way in Geneva.

As most of you know, some important studies have been undertaken here in the United States to assure adequate U.S. leadership in this international effort. Mr. Jerome Weisner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, asked the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council to prepare proposals on the atmospheric sciences and hydrology for consideration by the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government. The President of the Academy appointed for this purpose an *ad hoc* Committee on International Programs in Atmospheric Sciences and Hydrology known as CIPASH.

The CIPASH report was referred to a new Interagency Group for International Programs

in the Atmospheric Sciences (IGIPAS). This group, composed exclusively of governmental officials, is chaired by Dr. Herbert Hollomon, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology, and includes representatives of the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the President's Office of Science and Technology.

#### **U.S. Proposals for Atmospheric Research Program**

This interagency group has now reached agreement on the nature of the program which the United States Government should support. Our objectives, the programs necessary to achieve them, and the financial implications of these programs are set forth in the final report of the group.

The United States delegation to the Fourth Congress of the WMO, which is now under way in Geneva, is proposing a major international effort in accordance with the recommendations of the interagency group. The following are the major elements in the proposed international program:

1. The initiation of a study of a global weather system in the light of recent satellite and other technological developments.
2. The establishment of a WMO group on operations and research with respect to meteorological activities and atmospheric sciences, which would work closely with a similar group which it is hoped will be established by the International Council of Scientific Unions.
3. The establishment in the WMO, under its regular assessed budget, of an operational and technical assistance fund in the amount of \$3 million to assist in the financing of the proposed system analysis study of world weather needs and to fill gaps in present global observation facilities. This proposal was put forward by the WMO's Secretary General, David Arthur Davies. If it is adopted, the total WMO budget for the period 1964-67 would increase to about \$8 million, in contrast to the budget of \$3 million for the period 1960-63.

To supplement the proposed international program under the auspices of WMO, the U.S. interagency group further proposes to increase

<sup>5</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 28.

our national meteorological effort. This would include a system analysis for the common global system by the U.S., supplementing the WMO study, the development of instrumentation, research planning, and the stimulation of education and training in other countries.

The bilateral agreement on weather satellites concluded recently by the United States and the Soviet Union<sup>6</sup> will give increased significance to this international effort. The agreement calls for the coordinated launching of U.S. and Soviet weather satellites starting in 1964 and for the exchange of information derived from the satellites.

In the recent followup negotiations in Rome, Soviet and American scientists reached agreement on the precise type of information to be exchanged, on the establishment of a communications link between Moscow and Washington for the transmission of this information, and on the exchange of techniques of interpretation and analysis. A further meeting will be held before the end of 1963 to discuss launching schedules and orbits for the satellites themselves.

#### **Global System of Communication Satellites**

A second major area of international cooperation called for in President Kennedy's speech to the United Nations was in the establishment of a global system of communication satellites.

The dramatic success of Telstar has focused public attention on the vast possibilities which space technology holds for world communications. It will be technically possible within the next few years to have in operation a global communication system for television, radio, telephone, telegraph, and data transmission.

The communication satellite will have a profound impact on the future of mankind. With the aid of satellites, telephone communication between continents will become immeasurably easier. Communication satellites can offer many times the number of telephone channels available in our existing undersea cables. If intercontinental telephone communication increases sufficiently to fill this huge capacity, it may some day be possible to place a call to any

place in the world for approximately the same charge as to another city in the United States.

Intercontinental radio and television open even more dramatic prospects. According to the U.S. Information Agency, there are now some 100 million television receivers in use in 75 countries of the world. By the end of this decade, when a communication satellite network could be operating, there will be double that number. Programs will have a potential audience of nearly one billion people.

This fundamental breakthrough in communication could affect the lives of people everywhere. It could enable people to see and hear news events in other parts of the world at the very moment of their occurrence. It could provide a new means to improve literacy and education in remote areas. It could enable leaders of nations to talk on a convenient and reliable basis.

The General Assembly resolution unanimously adopted in December 1961 declared that "communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis." It called upon the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to report on ways of promoting cooperation in space communications.

The Administrative Council of the ITU is now meeting in Geneva to conclude preparations for the special ITU conference to be held in October to allocate frequencies for use in outer space. Agreement on the reservation of an adequate part of the frequency spectrum for space communication, and the establishment of ground rules which will assure noninterference of space communications of different countries with each other or with other services on earth, are an obvious prerequisite to progress. For this reason, the October ITU conference may well be one of the most important communication conferences ever held.

#### **U.S. Objectives in Space Communications**

The objectives of the United States in space communications have been made clear in the communication satellite legislation passed last year by the Congress and in the statements of U.S. representatives in the United Nations and elsewhere. These objectives are:

<sup>6</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 963.

—To get a communications satellite system operating as soon as possible.

—To realize the economic and technical benefits inherent in space communications through more voice channels, intercontinental television, and possibly lower costs.

—To achieve the political gains resulting from increased international communication.

—To augment the economic development of less developed countries and our political relations with them by means of a global system which links low-traffic areas as well as the main industrial countries.

—To make the most efficient use of the limited number of radio frequencies available for space communications.

The United States believes that our national interest and the national interests of other countries will best be served by establishing a single civilian system for all nations of the world rather than competing systems between contending political blocs. Economic, technical, and political considerations all point clearly to the desirability of a single system:

—From the *economic* point of view a single system would avoid wasteful duplication of expensive satellite and ground facilities.

—From the *political* point of view a single system would enhance the possibility for the fruitful exchange of communication between all countries and would avoid destructive competition to tie different countries into the communication systems of political blocs.

—From the *technical* point of view a single system would facilitate technical compatibility between satellites and ground terminals, would assure the best use of the scarce frequency spectrum, and would promote operational efficiency and flexibility in routing.

If we are to achieve our objective of a single civilian system, it should be a truly international venture open to all countries. In recognition of this fact the United States Government has responded to initiatives from other countries to discuss international cooperation in the establishment of a global satellite system.

Last October we held talks in Washington with representatives of the United Kingdom

and Canada. In December U.S. representatives talked with officials of countries of continental Europe individually and then collectively at the European Conference of Postal and Telegraph Administrations (CEPT) meeting in Cologne. These meetings confirmed the interest of other countries in participating fully in the ownership and operation of a satellite communications system. Some countries expressed a strong desire to participate in ownership not only of ground stations but of the satellites themselves.

In the months ahead we will continue discussions looking toward a single global satellite communications system for civilian purposes, organized and operated so as to realize economic and political benefits to all nations.

One of the principal functions of the discussions which lie ahead with other countries will be to identify the main questions on which international cooperation may be required. One overriding question is the type of system to be established. This will have important consequences on coverage and burden-sharing—the availability of satellites for communication between and within countries, and the cost of ground installations which nations will have to build.

The establishment of global satellite communications will involve international discussions of other questions: the handling of research, development, manufacture, and launch; participation in ownership of ground terminals and satellites; allocation of satellite channels between uses and users; means of determining the number and location of ground terminals; technical standardization; ratemaking; assistance to less developed countries; possible public uses of the system by government information agencies or the U.N.; and means of facilitating the exchange of programs between nations.

Although many of these problems are analogous to those that have been solved in connection with conventional communications, others raise questions that are quite new. In seeking solutions we need an approach that is not doctrinaire but functional. These problems may require different kinds of arrangements—bilateral, regional, and multilateral.

We do not envisage an operational role for the U.N. or the ITU; the ITU should continue to play its traditional role of frequency allocation, coordination of operating procedures, determination of technical standards, and providing technical assistance. We should also explore additional ways in which the ITU could be helpful.

Eventually the achievement of a single global satellite communications system may require the establishment of a new organization. Any decision on this subject would be premature, however, until we have had further opportunity to define with other countries the major technical and institutional issues.

Our progress in dealing with the problems inherent in international cooperation in satellite communications will be greatly assisted now that the U.S. satellite corporation has been organized. We look forward to close and cooperative working relations with the corporation in the period which lies ahead.

Under the legislation establishing the satellite corporation,<sup>7</sup> the President is directed to "exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation with foreign governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the United States." The legislation also directs the President to "insure that timely arrangements are made under which there can be foreign participation in the establishment and use of a communications satellite system."

The Department of State has the principal responsibility to insure that these objectives are achieved.

Through close cooperation between government and business, and between the United States and foreign countries, we hope to realize the objective recommended unanimously by the members of the United Nations—"that communication by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis."

<sup>7</sup> Public Law 87-624.

### Value of U. N. Space Cooperation Program

It should be clear from this review that the U.S. Government is making a determined effort to close the space cooperation gap in those two applications of space technology which promise the most immediate benefits for mankind—meteorology and communications.

It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their ideology, that worldwide weather services be developed and that communications among nations be improved. Recent meetings have emphasized this common interest to scientists and technical experts from many countries, including the Soviet Union.

We recognize that the deep political differences of our time place an upper limit on cooperation. We are not about to send a Soviet and an American astronaut together on a single spaceship to the moon. But we do hope to develop cooperative projects with the Soviet Union, if not in the form of joint ventures at least in the coordination of activities. Moreover, we have achieved, and will continue to seek, cooperation on a free-world basis even if universal agreement is not achieved.

Obviously the United Nations and its specialized agencies are not the only institutions to promote cooperation. But a program of space cooperation under U.N. auspices has value in at least three respects:

In the *first* place it may help to stimulate affirmative Soviet actions and fit cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union into a broader framework which recognizes the interests of other countries.

In the *second* place it helps to widen and deepen cooperation on a free-world basis. For certain countries and for certain activities, cooperative projects may be easier to achieve if they are multilateral and bear United Nations endorsement.

In the *third* place a program of space cooperation has deep significance for the United Nations itself and for its specialized agencies. Activities in such fields as meteorology and communications cannot fail to strengthen the U.N. system as a force for peace by binding its members to it through ties of common interest.

Our efforts to make available to mankind the

vast benefits which the space age opens in meteorology and communications will not only require new forms of cooperation between nations; it will also require new forms of cooperation within nations between leaders in the natural and social sciences. If we are to close the space cooperation gap, diplomats will be learning more about science and technology. The scientists will also be learning more about international diplomacy, particularly about the international organizations of the U.N. family.

The record of the last 2 years testifies to what can be done by the successful harnessing of science and diplomacy. We look forward to even better things in the years ahead.

## Observation in Space

*by Leonard C. Meeker  
Deputy Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>*

Man has been concerned with observation in space since the days of the ancient world. The first astronomers were looking outward from the earth to see what they could learn of the stars beyond. In the 20th century, sounding rockets, earth satellites, and other space vehicles offer the possibility of greatly extending our knowledge of the universe over and above what can be gained from observatories on earth.

Impressive discoveries have resulted from space observations made during and since the International Geophysical Year 1957-58.<sup>2</sup> Outstanding among these is the contribution made by the Explorer series, which first indicated the existence of two radiation zones in space around the earth. Another discovery substantiated the theory that sunlight exerts pressure.

The United States now has in preparation a series of projects for observation of the moon.

---

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, on Apr. 13 (press release 191, revised, dated Apr. 12).

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1956, p. 880, and May 11, 1959, p. 682.

The Surveyor project of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is designed to effect a soft landing on the moon, with instruments. The initial launching under this project is planned for the 1963-64 period. As Surveyor approaches the moon, television cameras will begin to operate and transmit back to the earth pictures of the lunar surface. After landing, Surveyor will collect fragments at and near the surface of the moon and distribute them for analysis to various instruments on board the vehicle. This operation will be televised to scientists on the earth.

Other, more ambitious projects are planned as a follow-on to Surveyor. Still later programs are expected to launch into orbit astronomical observatories, which would scan and study the heavens and send their data back to earth.

From the beginning of the space age, observation in space has also been directed to learning about the earth itself. An early example was the evidence produced by the Vanguard series showing that the earth is essentially pear-shaped with its stem end at the North Pole, rather than a sphere flattened at both poles. Since then, a rapidly progressing development of space science has proceeded with experiments and projects for making many other kinds of observations of the earth.

It is to this subject in particular—observation of the earth from outer space—that I wish to address myself this morning.

Observation of the earth may take many forms. Most broadly understood, such observation means the acquisition of data about the earth from outer space by any means, whether optical—by means of photography—or through the use of other systems of perception which can give data about the earth and its immediate environment. It is my intention this morning to give principal attention to optical observation by photographic means.

Such observation of the earth may be carried out for a wide variety of purposes, and I shall want to speak about various purposes now being pursued. At this stage I should like to advance a general proposition relating to all kinds of observation from space, covering the various means and comprehending the various purposes of observation.

My general proposition is that observation of the earth from outer space is a legitimate and permissible activity in the peaceful exploration and use of space. Observation neither works nor threatens injury or damage to any persons or things on earth.

The United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution 1721 (XVI), set forth the following statement as one of the principles which the Assembly then commended to the countries of the world:<sup>3</sup>

Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.

It is my conclusion that observation from space comes within the freedom which the General Assembly has recognized in this statement of principle.

#### Weather Satellites

Let us turn now to some of the purposes for which observation of the earth from outer space may be undertaken. To begin with, there is weather reporting and prediction. The first weather satellite, Tiros I, was launched 3 years ago, on April 1, 1960. The name Tiros arises from the description of this series of spacecraft as Television and Infra-Red Observation Satellites. The principal Tiros instrumentation consists of television cameras which take cloud pictures and infrared sensors which measure reflected solar radiation and emitted terrestrial heat radiation. The Tiros satellites are typically about 19 inches high and 42 inches in diameter, weighing between 260 and 290 pounds. Their tops and sides are covered with solar cells which convert sunlight into electricity and thus recharge the satellite batteries.

Tiros orbits range from about 450 to 500 miles above the surface of the earth. Typically, a Tiros satellite contains two cameras. When looking straight down, one of these takes a picture of an area approximating an 800-mile square and the second covers a 450-mile square and thus provides greater detail. The pictures are kept on a tape recorder, and when the satellite comes within range of a ground station, such

as the NASA stations at San Nicolas Island in California and Wallops Island in Virginia, picture signals are transmitted from the tapes and, if conditions are optimum, directly from the cameras. On receipt, these signals are converted into photographs. The infrared sensors aboard Tiros measure the quantity of solar heat bounced back into space, thus providing another variety of information of significance to meteorologists. Six Tiros satellites have been successfully launched to date.

The United States has made the output of the Tiros family available to the scientific participants in the organized international community. Data from Tiros satellites have been made available by radioteletype and radio facsimile broadcasts. We have sent out special advisory bulletins by radio in order to alert countries which may be affected by such specific events as tropical storms. The devastation of the coasts of many maritime countries by tropical storms having hurricane intensity, particularly in the Americas, the western fringes of the Pacific area, and the northern edges of the Indian Ocean, is age-old. What is new is the warning which Tiros satellites can help provide long in advance of that obtained from conventional weather observation services.

Tiros satellites are particularly useful in providing information on weather in the southern half of the globe, where, in general, weather services are at a very early stage of development and where seaborne weather stations are practically nonexistent because of their high cost.

Lastly, Tiros pictures provide a valuable adjunct to weather prediction in oceanic landing areas in advance of manned orbital flight. Such pictures were in fact used in advance of the orbital flights of U.S. astronauts Glenn, Carpenter, and Schirra.

NASA is now developing a new generation of meteorological satellites. The Nimbus series will represent a distinct advance. Its cameras and infrared sensors will always face the earth, thus overcoming the handicap of Tiros cameras, which look obliquely at the earth or out into space.

Nimbus will be launched toward the poles, achieve a 500-mile orbit, and observe every portion of the earth twice a day. During daylight

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

observations will be made by a television system and at night by an infrared measuring system. It is hoped that an initial Nimbus flight will take place late this year.

In the longer range there lies ahead the promise of the synchronous meteorological satellite, which would be stationary in relation to the earth. Three of these satellites orbiting at about 22,300 miles from the earth would provide constant worldwide weather coverage.

On the initiative of Canada, Australia, Italy, and the United States, the General Assembly in 1961 asked the World Meteorological Organization, in consultation with UNESCO and the International Council of Scientific Unions, to prepare a report on arrangements to advance the state of atmospheric science and technology and to expand weather forecasting capabilities in the light of new space techniques. The WMO subsequently invited an American and a Soviet scientist to participate in preparing this report, an invitation which was accepted and resulted in a series of draft recommendations. The WMO, which is now meeting in Geneva, is considering these and other recommendations.

In addition to this multilateral effort the United States has proceeded bilaterally to explore with the Soviet Union cooperative meteorological projects. In an exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev during February and March last year,<sup>4</sup> the President proposed that steps be taken by the Soviet Union and the United States to contribute toward the joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system. The President proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide other meteorological services for all countries; the two satellites might, the President suggested, be placed in such orbits as to supplement each other's observations and thus provide maximum coverage of all areas.

On December 5 Ambassador [Adlai E.] Stevenson and the Soviet representative, Platon Morozov, announced in the General Assembly<sup>5</sup> the conclusion of an agreement between the United States National Aeronautics

and Space Administration and the Soviet Academy of Sciences which spells out in some detail a cooperative program in coordinated launchings of meteorological satellites and exchange of the resulting data. The agreement also outlines two further areas of cooperation, namely, the coordinated launchings of satellites to map the earth's magnetic field, and experiments in space communications by means of an American reflector satellite, with consideration to be given to future cooperation in experiments using active repeater communications satellites.

Last month an American scientific team headed by Dr. Hugh Dryden, the Deputy Administrator of NASA, under whose guidance the original agreement had been reached, and a Soviet team headed by Dr. A. A. Blagonravov, of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, met in Rome to draw up detailed plans for implementing this general agreement. On March 20 they announced that a joint working group had defined terms for carrying out a weather satellite program, including the establishment of a communications link for exchanging weather data received with the use of artificial satellites. Agreed arrangements prescribe the types and characteristics of data to be exchanged. These arrangements are subject to a 60-day period during which either side may propose changes; if none are made, the arrangements become effective and will be made public.

#### **Protection of Economic Resources and Activities**

Apart from the field of meteorology, there is a wide range of purposes for which observation in space can be carried out. For example, satellites carrying photographic and other observation equipment should, in the near future, be able to detect promptly forest fires and other large-scale fires. We in Canada and the United States are well aware of the woeful loss caused by forest fires every year, a loss having a magnitude of some hundreds of millions of dollars. We are told that upwards of 90 percent of this loss is occasioned by that very small percentage of fires which are not readily visible from inhabited areas but which smolder unseen on the forest floor for as long as a week. The United States Weather Bureau and our Forest Service are currently studying the possibility of using

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411, and Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 962.



special sensors which, when put in earth orbit, could develop a capability of detecting the heat generated by floor forest fires and thus give early warning to forest rangers.

Another example of the use of observation satellites relates to snow cover. Hopefully, measurement of the extent of snow on the ground will be practicable in the near future, particularly in well-irrigated zones like those in which we live. A more accurate estimate of melting conditions would be of significant aid in maximizing existing water supplies. In certain areas, photographs of snow cover obtained by satellites may have a contribution to make to flood prediction with a consequent decrease in the suffering and loss of resources which serious flooding causes.

Again, we hope to be able to develop an earth satellite capable of taking pictures of icefields. Precise and detailed photographs of large icebergs and, more important, of their rate of movement and melting, would be a valuable addition to the existing facilities in the northern seas for the protection of commercial and naval shipping. This kind of information would be extremely useful to those who, like the members of the Atlantic community, engage extensively in year-round shipping. Closer to home, icefield data will be able to add to the accuracy of ice forecasts, which would be particularly valuable where, as in the St. Lawrence, shipping is often slowed or prevented by drifting ice.

A further use of photographic satellites arises in connection with devastation wrought by insects. Many varieties of these insects, of which locusts are a familiar variety, appear as dense clouds. We are now trying to determine whether these clouds can be distinguished from ordinary clouds. If this should prove to be the case, a valuable contribution could be made to insect control by charting the movement of locust clouds and thus perhaps reducing to an important degree the human misery and losses which they annually cause.

Observation from space has already performed some useful work in the field of earth measurement. We may expect this development to be carried further, with benefits to be derived in the mapping of remote and inaccessible areas. It seems also possible that ob-

servaion satellites will be able to conduct resource surveys which could be of value in the economic development of a number of countries.

### **Observation To Promote International Security**

Another important potential use of observation in space is the possibility of acquiring information about military preparations and thus helping to maintain international peace and security. One of the great problems in today's world is the uncertainty generated by the secret development, testing, and deployment of national armaments and by the lack of information on military preparations within closed societies. If in fact a nation is not preparing surprise attack, observations from space could help us to know this and thereby increase confidence in world security, which might otherwise be subject to added and unnecessary doubts.

We in the United States believe that openness serves the cause of peace. In arms control and disarmament negotiations the Soviet Union has recognized, at least in principle, the need for verification and inspection, but it continues to resist Western efforts to secure adequate verification and inspection arrangements. The Soviet Union has so far seemed to place a higher premium on maintaining its policy of secrecy than it does on reaching agreement on steps to insure a peaceful world.

Observations from space may in time provide support of arms control and disarmament arrangements, although they could not eliminate the need for ground inspection. Of perhaps greater significance at the present time, however, is the fact that the progress of science, to which the Soviet Union itself has made dramatic contributions, decrees that we are all to live in an increasingly open world. The Soviet Union's attitude up to this time toward verification and inspection is as inconsistent with this trend as it is with the achievement of arms control and disarmament.

It is obvious from any discussion of observation in space that there is no workable dividing line between military and nonmilitary uses. Weather satellites are of significance to the armed forces just as they are important to civilian populations. Similarly, heat-sensing

devices aboard earth satellites might be developed to detect not only the heat from forest fires but also the heat generated in the launching of ballistic missiles.

In respect of the impossibility of separating decisively the military and nonmilitary applications, observation of the earth from space is not different from other uses of space. A navigational satellite can guide a war vessel as well as a merchant ship. A communications satellite can serve a military establishment as well as civilian communities. The instruments which guide a space vehicle on a scientific mission may also guide a space vehicle on a military mission. American and Russian astronauts have been members of national armed forces, but this has afforded no reason to challenge their activities.

The fact that observation satellites clearly have military as well as scientific and commercial applications can provide no basis for objection to observation satellites. International law imposes no restrictions on observation from outside the limits of national jurisdiction. Observation from outer space, like observation from the high seas or from airspace above the high seas, is consistent with international law.

#### Armaments and Outer Space

In saying what I have this morning, I should not wish to create any impression that the United States is unconcerned over a possible extension of the arms race into outer space. For several years the United States has consistently adhered to the view that outer space should only be used for peaceful—that is, nonaggressive and beneficial—purposes. However, pending the achievement of disarmament agreements, the test of any space activity cannot be whether it is military or nonmilitary but whether it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of international law.

Even in the absence of comprehensive disarmament agreements, the nations of the world are not precluded from taking meaningful measures of arms control and disarmament in space. On the contrary, there are some things that can be done immediately to prevent an extension of the arms race into space.

In the first place, a prohibition could be agreed and carried into effect to halt the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space as well as in other environments. The United States continues to bend its efforts to this end. In the second place, nations can refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Even though it is now feasible to do so, the United States has no intention of placing such weapons in orbit unless compelled to do so by actions of the Soviet Union. While disarmament negotiations continue for the actual elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, it is important to do everything now that can be done to avoid an arms race in outer space, for it is clearly easier *not to arm* an environment that has never been armed than to *disarm* one that has been armed. It is the earnest hope of the United States that the Soviet Union will likewise refrain from taking steps to extend the arms race into space.

#### Standards of Conduct in Space

The dangers to peace which exist and which may exist in the future stem from the threat or use of force in violation of international legal obligations. The standards which must be used in determining and controlling exertions of national power have not been altered by the new world which outer space activities have opened. This was recognized by the United Nations General Assembly when it declared in 1961 that "international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies."<sup>6</sup>

The standards of judgment remain those set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2, paragraph 4, imposes the obligation to "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 2, paragraph 3, imposes the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. The principles laid down in the charter set the limits of permissible state con-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

duct, and they express a fundamental goal of the organized international community.

Earlier this morning I have spoken of various uses of observation in space which can contribute positive benefits to man's life on earth. These have included satellites for mapping, for resource surveys, and for weather forecasting. International cooperation in these fields can enhance the benefits to be derived.

Later I spoke of uses of observation satellites designed to afford a greater degree of security against the risks of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or accident. The winds of openness are blowing with increased strength in this troubled world, and we should welcome this.

I would close by saying that in both of these areas—affirmative cooperation in uses of an economic character and efforts to give assurance against threatening military preparations—observation in space can promote progress in achieving the largest and most important purposes of the community of nations.

## Letters of Credence

### *Bolivia*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Bolivia, Enrique Sánchez de Lozada, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on April 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 218 dated April 24.

### *Ghana*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Ghana, Miguel Augustus Ribeiro, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on April 25. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 221 dated April 25.

### *Iran*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Mahmoud Foroughi, presented his credentials

to President Kennedy on April 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 216 dated April 24.

### *Japan*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Japan, Ryuji Takeuchi, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on April 25. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 222 dated April 25.

## U.S. Rejects Soviet Accusations Regarding Berlin Judges Law

Press release 215 dated April 23

*Following is the U.S. text of identical notes delivered on April 23 at Moscow by the three Western allies, Great Britain, France, and the United States. The note is in reply to a Russian note of March 14.<sup>1</sup>*

The "Berlin Judges Law" of January 18, 1963, which entered into force on March 1, 1963, replaces earlier Berlin laws in this field, in particular the Judges Law of June 19, 1958. The administrative status of the judges and the form of oath prescribed by the new law on Berlin judges are substantially the same as the oath under the 1958 law which was approved by the Allied Kommandatura which holds supreme authority in Berlin. The reference in this oath to the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany does not imply an extension of the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to Berlin.

The law in no way affects the legal status of Berlin which the United States Government has maintained in the past and will maintain in the future. It can therefore only reject the accusations expressed in the Soviet note since they are entirely without foundation.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

## Foreign Students in America: Problems, Progress, and Prospects

by *Lucius D. Battle*

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It brings me a great deal of pleasure to be able to meet with this very distinguished fraternity. I spent several exciting years of my life with the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who said he belonged to a trade union, as he called it, of foreign ministers—with some of the most exacting requirements known to man. One was to have a “cast-iron stomach.” The other was to have “enough laundry to last 3 weeks.” Hopefully, your admission requirements are not so specific nor demanding. But the demands on your membership are great in other ways, and I am delighted to have the opportunity this conference affords to consult with you about some of them.

I began my life as Assistant Secretary of State with NAFSA. I was announced as a potential incumbent of my current job—the Senate willing—when you last met in Washington a year ago. I had the privilege of attending briefly your last session there. It is my hope that now, during these few days here, we can actually get to know each other. Let's both come in for a closer look.

I appear here as the representative of the Government's role with foreign students. You are the experts in guiding and counseling these students on our campuses, in knowing them as human beings. We share the same concerns, hold the same high hopes, seek the same broad ends.

But, when you look at our relationships across the board, you won't—as I often say to foreign

students visiting the United States for the first time—you won't, I say, like everything you see. I don't either. Nonetheless, those of us in Government and those of you in the private sector are part and parcel of a program we both believe in. We have been “partners in progress” for a good number of years now and will need to continue to be for a good number to come.

So let's have some frank talk aimed at keeping open the free flow of information on which our mutual understanding depends.

The year ahead looks difficult enough, and the projected increases in enrollments for the decade ahead look truly staggering. Let's clear away at the outset any items that can readily be disposed of, so that we can get on to the items—and they are numerous—that don't yield so easily to ready answers. Toward that end, let me first of all clear up a few possible misunderstandings—and in the process kill off a few rumors and false reports:

No. 1. The Fulbright-Hays Act—imaginative, farsighted, and helpful though it is—does not automatically solve all our problems. To have new legislative authorities, needed though they are, is not necessarily to have all the required means, including money, to implement them.

No. 2. To ask for money from the United States Congress is not necessarily to get it. The rumor that we had, or have, \$4 million for services for nonsponsored students for this year is totally unfounded. We asked for it. We did not get it. This is all roughly the equivalent of saying “to have a need and know it is not necessarily to meet it.”

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers at Pasadena, Calif., on Apr. 24 (press release 217 dated Apr. 23).

No. 3. We do understand that to maintain a fully adequate foreign-student program may be a costly undertaking for each institution and that meeting these costs is a problem for many. In relation to the total cost, nationwide, our funds will never be enough. The ideal Government program would be catalytic—supportive, if you like—but would never attempt so much that its success would amount to an intrusion into the academic community.

No. 4. We want and need NAFSA's help and advice. We are all looking for the answers—the best answers, in educational terms and in terms of American foreign relations. If you concede, as I think you must, that we are inseparably bound together by common interests in this whole process, you will agree we must find a way to communicate and cooperate more effectively in asking the right questions and finding the right answers.

#### **Student Exchange and Foreign Relations**

Now, before taking a more detailed look at where we stand and some of the directions of progress, let's try to fit this whole subject into its world context and into its time frame. Here in California—the State that leads all others in foreign-student enrollments—we are keenly aware of the increasing numbers from all parts of the world who look to America as a land of educational opportunity. Here in California, too, we see some of the more imaginative efforts being made in higher education and in the communities to help meet the numbers problem. NAFSA chose well, on many counts, when it decided to come here for this year's significant conference.

In all parts of the country foreign students today are *news*. They may be, and are, only a part of the broad spectrum of international educational and cultural exchange. But it is a segment of great significance and one that cannot and must not be neglected from the point of view of national policy.

The significance of having foreign students here lies, first of all, in the traditional American faith in the power of education to improve man and his world. Especially since World War II, we in this country have had historic new opportunities to exercise this faith. One has been the

opportunity to open our unparalleled system of higher education to increasing numbers of students from other countries, including more and more prospective leaders of new and developing nations.

Such an activity clearly belongs in the framework of our foreign relations. And I am pleased to be able to say that in the last year, more than in any preceding year in our history, there has been clear public and private recognition that educational and cultural affairs do in fact constitute an important element of our long-range foreign relations.

I recall standing just a few weeks ago at a ceremony at which new members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships were being sworn in by Secretary Rusk and hearing him say that the programs we conduct within the Fulbright-Hays Act "provide one of the most powerful, although quiet, elements in our foreign policy."

And the recent report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs—about which I will have more to say later—further underscores this idea.

These activities—including the exchange of foreign students—are not aided by the Government solely as nice things to do; they are *necessary* things to do. Man's survival on this troubled planet will, in fact, ultimately turn on what goes on in men's minds. And the whole exchange effort is concerned with just that—with enabling men to broaden and deepen their knowledge and understanding of other countries and other cultures, and of the deep underlying interests and aspirations that unite men, instead of dividing them.

I might add that in many other parts of the world foreign students are news, too. How they fare is increasingly seen as a barometer of how free, or how restrictive and repressive, the society in which they are studying may be. It is in the nature of things that foreign students cannot be quietly tucked away in an academic corner. Our free and open society is uniquely suited to providing the kind of atmosphere and environment most of them want. Nevertheless it is truly a significant and sobering responsibility, in the world context, which we undertake when we receive them.

In the vast and complex foreign-student pic-

ture, there are, as we all know, real and immediate problems.

Are they *new* problems? Let me quote from a paper that crossed my desk just recently. It spoke of the importance of reviewing "the nature of the cooperative relationship that has obtained between Government and private agencies in this field of educational exchange and to project that relationship a little way into the future."

When was this written? *In 1948. Who* said it? George Allen, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, before the Conference on International Student Exchange at the University of Michigan that signaled the birth of NAFSA.

Or let's look at another item brought to my attention recently: "Those who have had extensive dealings with foreign students know that many of the individuals who have come here have not been wisely selected" and that "many have received training which has left them ill-fitted to deal with problems in their own countries."

When was this written? *In 1952—in Foreign Affairs*—by John Gardner, now president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York and chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.

So, fortunately, in a sense, most are not new problems. But they are immediate and insistent. Their insistence arises largely because of the increasing numbers and variety of foreign students, and because of the increasing proportion of those who come from cultural backgrounds markedly different from our own. "The Cultural Dimensions of International Education" is indeed a meaningful theme for your conference.

The problems with which we must deal differ, then, more in degree than in kind from those that have been with us for many years. They are for the most part continuous operating problems, of a kind not really susceptible of solution in the sense of final elimination. The problems of wise selection, optimum placement, best possible educational programs, as well as that of government-private cooperation, are problems of constant adaptation and improvement. It would be a delusion to think we will

ever be able to check many of these off as being solved and requiring no further effort.

They are problems that have been responding to treatment, so to speak, but they are still with us. And they are greatly complicated throughout by the increasing number of students and the greater variety of cultural backgrounds of which we have been speaking.

### **Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs**

Now, what of the current content of these problems as far as the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is concerned? What have we in the bureau been doing? What progress are we making and what are the prospects ahead? What of the broad spectrum of activities in the year since we met?

A great deal has happened. In June the Executive order implementing the Fulbright-Hays Act was issued.<sup>2</sup> For the first time a clear mandate existed for coordinating Government programs. The Secretary of State—kindly or unkindly, depending upon your view of the situation—delegated to my office the quite formidable responsibility for coordinating the activities of some 20 agencies of the United States Government that have a part in educational and cultural exchange. We have made some progress in this field. We still have a long way to go.

The difficulties of achieving this kind of directional impact on such a vast governmental machinery are very great. But many new relationships and arrangements have been developed, which at least give promise of greater progress to come. And during the year we have adjusted our own operations to the new Fulbright-Hays legislation and advised the posts abroad, contract agencies, and other agencies and organizations of its meaning for them. NAFSA has of course been closely in touch with us on various provisions of the new act.

Our own working relations with some of the private effort have been improved. Last summer, for example, we began a series of meetings with all the Government agencies concerned with education in Africa and with all the private foundations working in this field. From

<sup>2</sup> For text of Executive Order 11034, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 138.

these several sessions, lasting a day or so at a time, came clarity in some respects and new and searching questions in others. These questions are being tackled, and we believe progress is being made.

In this connection—the area of public and private relationships—we look with favor on the recent establishment of Education and World Affairs, Inc. (EWA), to serve as a central repository of knowledge, as a channel of communication, and, we hope, as an initiator and catalyst of constructive action. The creation of this distinguished group is a hopeful and a helpful manifestation of progress.

My own bureau—which, incidentally, many of you will be surprised to learn, is the second largest in the Department of State—has been drastically reorganized during the year. The essential difference is that we are no longer on a functional basis—that is, with an office for students, another for professors, etc. We are now organized geographically, following the Department of State pattern in its basic structure and gearing ourselves much better to the role of coordination that we must play. We now have area offices with country desk officers, whose job is to know what we are trying to accomplish as a nation in the various areas and countries, and how these goals and needs can be met through educational and cultural programs. A natural and effective mechanism has thus been created for dealings between ourselves and other governmental and private agencies, which are, for the most part, geographically organized.

In this reorganization there is a sixth “area,” so to speak, which is the concern of the Office of U.S. Programs and Services, headed by John Netherton, a former professor and dean, who is here with us. His office is concerned with what happens to the foreign students or exchangees of other kinds while they are here and with domestic arrangements for the outward flow of American exchangees.

Last November the entire bureau moved to the main State Department building, where space is at a premium. We are now set up in vastly improved quarters. I cite this because I know you are interested in evidences of recognition that come to this activity both in terms of its environmental factors, such as office space,

and, more importantly, in terms of the role educational and cultural affairs are being expected to play in the foreign relations of the United States in these troubled times.

### Active Role of Commissions

Our organizational arrangements have been greatly strengthened, too, by the enlarged and more active role being undertaken under the Fulbright-Hays Act by three commissions.

The U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, headed by John Gardner, an old friend of educational exchange and of NAFSA, has recently submitted to the Congress its report on the effectiveness of past exchange programs.<sup>3</sup> This report, growing out of a congressional mandate contained in the Fulbright-Hays Act, is the most searching effort made thus far toward a full assessment of the value of the various programs you and I are concerned with. It is, in my opinion, an excellent report and one which will have its effect on the thinking of all of us for a long time to come. In the next 2 to 3 weeks, when the printed report is available, copies will be sent by the Commission to all NAFSA members listed in the current directory. I commend it to you. I trust you will give it the time and attention and thought it deserves.

While highly favorable for the most part, the report gives us many suggestions for improvement. In the positive way it establishes clearly and beyond question the overall effectiveness of the Department's exchange programs since 1949, the report is a landmark in exchange history. In its own words, the success of educational exchange is “a beacon of hope” in the mid-20th century.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships, with John Stalmaker of the National Merit Scholarship Corporation as chairman, now exercises wider program functions with respect to academic exchanges of all kinds, as well as a broader charter for public reporting. The Advisory Committee on the Arts has been reconstituted with Roy E. Larsen of Time, Inc., as chairman and with the primary role of advising and assisting the new cultural presentations

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 617.



program now taking shape following careful study and recommendations.<sup>4</sup>

We have recently tackled in a rather major way several projects which may be of interest to you. One is the teaching of English as a second language. You of NAFSA are well aware of the worldwide desire to learn English. Our language is one of our most important exports and one which we have for far too long either taken for granted or dealt with in a haphazard fashion. The programs, if one includes all of the executive branch, are large, but they are sprawling and uncoordinated. Big though they are, they are not adequate to the opportunity available to us. New directives have therefore gone to the field, placing responsibility for the teaching of English squarely on the ambassador in each of the various countries. He is to make sure a program is developed adequate to local needs and also to be certain that overlap between U.S. agencies, working in this same range of problems, is kept to a minimum. I return to Washington to meet in the next few days with senior representatives of the British Foreign Office, the British Council, and others to ascertain how we can best work together in one of the basic areas uniting us—our common language.

We have recently created a Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs, which includes leading representatives of the publishing industry on whom we have called to help solve various specific problems relating to American Books Abroad—problems of distribution, of translation, and of cost.

I could tick off many other examples of work in progress and coordination in progress. Putting the cultural presentations program on a better footing—both as to guiding principles and as to operating procedures—has been a major labor of the last year. I think we have real progress to show for our effort, as we have in other parts of the broad spectrum—in American studies abroad, American-sponsored schools abroad, UNESCO relations, “human resource development” through educational assistance to other countries, American specialists, and foreign leaders. These are only some of the parts of the whole panorama of activities bound to-

gether under the not very enlightening label of “educational and cultural affairs.”

### Progress in Coordination

I should like to return in my concluding remarks to that highly significant segment—foreign students. And I should like at this point particularly to recall the “10 points” which Phil Coombs outlined to the Greater New York Council on Foreign Students in December 1961. I know we all feel this was a most useful formulation, one that laid out helpful long-term guidelines for the private sector as well as for Government, and one that should be kept constantly on your agenda and mine. Without rehearsing the “10 points” in detail, let me now focus on some of the more significant developments of the last year that relate to them.

As I indicated earlier, the action of the Congress on our budget request for 1963 did not permit the kind of increases we had hoped for to provide services for the nonsponsored foreign student. Nevertheless we have over the past months taken fairly sizable sums from other projects for this purpose, including \$125,000 so that the Department can initiate an orientation program for nongrant students this coming summer. We are putting this year approximately \$200,000, mostly in foreign currencies, into overseas screening and counseling for nonsponsored students. We are concerned about the foreign students in the United States who are without jobs, financing, or even adequate food and shelter in some instances during the summer months. We have put some \$108,000 into a program of job development for such students for this summer. A clearinghouse is being created from these funds through the Institute of International Education in New York. This should give us a better grasp of the situation and coordinate the various efforts at solution of the problem of summer employment. A number of staff-support grants are being made to community groups in several large cities which have substantial numbers of students needing employment during the summer months.

We have done much to stimulate private initiative and private effort to help us with this problem and have had good results.

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 46.

We have also given \$200,000 to meet emergency first- and second-term needs of particularly deserving foreign students without funds to meet expenses in connection with their continuing study. These have primarily been partial grants directly related to need and have largely been administered by the Phelps-Stokes Fund.

Our program for overseas counseling, language teaching, and orientation, I might point out, calls for building upon existing facilities and not creating new ones. We are a long way from adequate resources to permit ourselves the luxury of new organizations and institutions where existing ones will suffice, and we must content ourselves at this time with imaginative ways of meeting our problems through increasing the capacity of our embassies, USIS [United States Information Service], Fulbright Commissions, and private groups already operating in this field.

We have taken one specific action which I especially want to mention and describe briefly. NAFSA came to us this last year with a very interesting proposal, as many of you know. It was that an *ad hoc* Committee of Consultants be set up to develop and circulate a statement of standards and criteria for institutions admitting foreign students, particularly those with comparatively small numbers of students and only part-time advisers. Minimum standards of organization and service, by categories of institutions, would first be set. Then a NAFSA field service director would organize a training and field service program designed to help raise all foreign student services at least to these minimum standards.

Our enthusiasm for the carefully outlined plan presented to us is shown in the grant of \$36,500 we have made from fiscal '63 funds for the NAFSA field service program. I would like to take this opportunity to cite the leadership of Howard Cook and your other officers in developing this imaginative and promising program. It is a splendid example of joint public-private effort. And I see it as of a piece, too, with the report on "The College, the University and the Foreign Student" which NAFSA generated through the appointment of a special committee on which Frank Colligan of our bureau served,

and through the grant by the Dean Langmuir Foundation. This report deserves the wide reading it is having. It will, I believe, prove a real contribution to the continuing effort we are all making to get a better view of what the future for foreign students in this country should be.

The Government's efforts for foreign students can never, by themselves, be adequate. That we know. Our funds will not stretch far enough to do all that it would be appropriate for government to do. But we have made a beginning. And we have a request pending before the Congress now for fiscal '64 appropriations which would go a little farther toward meeting the needs.

Last year, as I said, the funds allowed us were not adequate to enable us to undertake the greater services for the nonsponsored foreign student we had hoped to start. This year's presentation to the Congress is more realistic, both in terms of total request and the fully detailed program plans and costs supporting the item. As the first presentation looking to such expanded services, last year's proposals were not advanced by hearing time to a point where they could be outlined in as full detail as has been possible this year.

We have made the presentation as I have described it. I am not at all sure, however, that we can expect better results this year than we had last. And even if we get what we ask for, the problem will at best be only partly solved, and there will remain all that can be done only through awareness and determination in the private sector. The best efforts of all of us will continue to be needed and will, I know, be offered to the fullest.

One place where we all need to help is in providing more light on the shape of things to come. There is not yet nearly enough illumination of facts and trends to permit a satisfactory general philosophy, covering, among other subjects, the projected numbers problem of the next decade or more and the respective roles the Government and the private sector should play.

In the absence of more hard facts than we have, I do not see how blueprints can now be drawn for the long term.

We must encourage and assist in every way

we can the development and assessment of such data on future needs and opportunities and possible means of meeting them. We have the necessary mechanisms and agencies of long standing in the field to help do the job. EWA can be an important new force in this field.

Of two things, at least, I am completely confident: (1) that we can only meet the future effectively, as we have the past, on a *partnership* basis—by sharing our common concerns and working together to find solutions; and (2) that one of the keys to better partnership is better *coordination of effort* by each partner and, by mutual agreement, of joint efforts.

As I said earlier, my office has been given the responsibility for coordination of Government-wide efforts in the whole field of educational and cultural affairs. This is not an uncongenial task to me, because I believe deeply in the need to work together on these vast efforts that no one sector of our society can deal with effectively alone. Nowhere is this need for combined operations more evident than in the matter of improvement of services for foreign students.

While the President's Executive order of last June authorizes me to give "policy guidance" (or coordination) in the governmental field, it obviously could not and should not give me such authorization toward nongovernmental organizations such as NAFSA. Here we have only the free play of common interest and common concern and common sense to bring us together.

I can only ask your continued understanding and help in our joint endeavor, your continued initiatives and suggestions on our national effort. Only in this way can we as a nation realize more fully, now and in the future, the great potentials we know this effort holds.

I look forward to working closely with you. I believe such close liaison will over time—though not overnight—assure improvements in the quality of the experience foreign students have in our country and that it will assure a *total* activity in the foreign student field that will contribute even more substantially—and significantly—to the kind of world of peace and freedom we all want so much to achieve.

Thank you very much for inviting me to be with you at this conference and for the opportunity to talk with you here today.

## World Trade Week, 1963

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS the United States recognizes that international commerce through reciprocal world trade is a principal means to peace and prosperity; and

WHEREAS a successful United States commercial policy requires the profitable sale of United States goods in other countries to insure a favorable balance of international payments; and

WHEREAS the great American marketplace must meet, encourage, and welcome competitive challenges from the vigorous new nations not only to achieve a favorable balance of payments but also to serve as inspiration and strength for all countries; and


WHEREAS, although increasing the sale of United States goods abroad is vital to the United States domestic economy, private enterprise must nevertheless continue to practice the fundamental American belief that initiative and competition in business must be exercised with responsibility and morality toward all people:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 19, 1963, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agriculture, educational and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twentieth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:  
DEAN RUSK,  
*Secretary of State.*

<sup>1</sup> No. 3532; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 4079.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement on Sale of Polaris Missiles

#### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 186 dated April 9

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have reached agreement on the sale by the United States to the United Kingdom of Polaris missiles (less warheads), equipment, and supporting services. The agreement affirms the Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems<sup>1</sup> agreed at Nassau on December 21, 1962.

The details of the arrangements are contained in an agreement signed April 6, 1963, at Washington by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on behalf of the United States Government and by Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador to the United States, on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom.

The United States negotiating team was led by Rear Adm. W. C. Mott, Judge Advocate General of the Navy; the British delegation was led by J. M. MacKay, Deputy Secretary of the Admiralty.

#### LETTER FROM SECRETARY RUSK TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Press release 223 dated April 25

*Following is the text of a letter dated April 6, from Secretary Rusk to the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir David Ormsby Gore, concerning the U.S.-U.K. Polaris sales agreement. On the same date the Ambassador replied confirming the understanding contained in the Secretary's letter.*

APRIL 6, 1963

EXCELLENCY: In the Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems of December 21, 1962, the President and Prime Minister agreed that the

United States would make available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles (less warheads) for British submarines and would also study the feasibility of making available certain support facilities for such submarines. They also agreed that they would use their best endeavors for the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies.

It was agreed in the Statement that the United Kingdom Government would construct submarines in which the Polaris missiles would be placed, and that these British forces would be assigned and targeted in the same way as the existing forces described in Paragraph 6 of the Statement and would be made available for inclusion in a NATO nuclear force. It was also agreed in the Statement that except where Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, the forces referred to in Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Statement will be used for the purposes of international defense of the western alliance in all circumstances.

The possibility has been discussed that for reasons beyond the control and decision of either Government one or more elements of the plan contained in the Statement, apart from the provision of Polaris missiles and support facilities, might prove incapable of fulfillment. I am now writing to confirm the understanding of our two Governments that if, contrary to our expectation, this should happen it would not in any way affect the undertakings of the United States Government in Paragraph 8 of the Statement concerning provision of Polaris missiles and support facilities or the arrangements for

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

the supply of these missiles and associated equipment contained in the agreement signed between our two Governments on April 6, 1963.

DEAN RUSK

## TEXT OF AGREEMENT

### POLARIS SALES AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, recalling and affirming the "Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems" included in the joint communique issued on December 21, 1962 by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

1. The Government of the United States shall provide and the Government of the United Kingdom shall purchase from the Government of the United States Polaris missiles (less warheads), equipment, and supporting services in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.

2. This Agreement shall be subject to the understandings concerning British submarines equipped with Polaris missiles (referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Nassau "Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems"), agreed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at their meeting held in the Bahamas between December 18 and December 21, 1962.

#### ARTICLE II

1. In recognition of the complexity of the effort provided for in this Agreement and the need for close coordination between the contracting Governments in giving effect to its terms, the two Governments shall promptly establish the organizational machinery provided for in the following paragraphs of this Article.

2. The Department of Defense, acting through the Department of the Navy, and the Admiralty, or such other agency as the Government of the United Kingdom shall designate, will be the Executive Agencies of their respective Governments in carrying out the terms of this Agreement. Appropriate representatives of the Executive Agencies are authorized to enter into such technical arrangements, consistent with this Agreement, as may be necessary.

3. A Project Officer will be designated by each Government's Executive Agency with direct responsibility and authority for the management of the activities of that Government under this Agreement. Each Project Officer will designate liaison representatives, in such numbers as may be agreed, who will be authorized to act on his behalf in capacities specified in technical

arrangements and who will be attached to the Office of the other Project Officer.

4. A Joint Steering Task Group will be established by the Project Officers to advise them, *inter alia*, concerning the development of new or modified equipment to meet specific requirements of the Government of the United Kingdom, and concerning interfaces between the equipment provided by the two Governments respectively. The Joint Steering Task Group will comprise the Project Officers (or their representatives), and principal liaison representatives, and may include selected leaders from among the scientists, industrialists and government executives of the United Kingdom and of the United States. The Joint Steering Task Group will meet approximately every three months alternately in the United Kingdom and in the United States under the chairmanship of the resident Project Officer.

#### ARTICLE III

1. The Government of the United States (acting through its Executive Agency) shall provide, pursuant to Article I of this Agreement, Polaris missiles (less warheads), equipment, and supporting services of such types and marks and in such quantities as the Government of the United Kingdom may from time to time require, and in configurations and in accordance with delivery programs or time tables to be agreed between the Project Officers. In the first instance the missiles, equipment, and supporting services provided by the Government of the United States shall be sufficient to meet the requirements of a program drawn up by the Government of the United Kingdom and communicated to the Government of the United States prior to the entry into force of this Agreement.

2. The missiles, equipment, and supporting services referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are the following:

- a. Polaris missiles (less warheads but including guidance capsules);
- b. missile launching and handling systems;
- c. missile fire control systems;
- d. ships navigation systems;
- e. additional associated, support, test, and training equipment and services including, but not limited to:

(i) Test and check-out equipment, specialized power supplies, power distribution systems and support equipment associated with the items enumerated in subparagraphs a, b, c, and d of this paragraph and adequate in type and quantity to meet the requirements of installations both aboard ship and ashore;

(ii) specialized equipment including the types specified in subparagraphs a, b, c, d, and e.(i) of this paragraph for use in such support and training facilities as may be provided by the Government of the United Kingdom;

(iii) construction spares and spare parts adequate in scope and quantity to ensure the continued maintenance

nance of the equipment specified in subparagraphs a, b, c, d, e.(i), and e.(ii) of this paragraph;

(iv) (a) latest available United States technical documentation including specifications, blueprints, and manuals covering the missiles and equipment listed in subparagraphs a, b, c, d, e.(i), e.(ii) and e.(iii) of this paragraph in sufficient scope and quantity to cover safety requirements and permit successful transport, installation, operation, and maintenance by the Government of the United Kingdom of all equipment purchased under the terms of this Agreement;

(b) latest available United States technical documentation, as may be necessary from time to time in individual cases, to permit manufacture by the Government of the United Kingdom to the extent necessary for the maintenance, repair, and modification of the items listed in subparagraphs a, b, c, d, e.(i), e.(ii) and e.(iii) of this paragraph;

(v) services, including:

(a) use, as appropriate, of existing support and missile range facilities in the United States;

(b) assistance in program management techniques, and, in addition, those engineering and lead hipyard services required to ensure proper system integration, installation, and check-out in the United Kingdom; to the extent required and available, appropriate modification, maintenance, and overhaul of the equipment listed in subparagraphs a, b, c, d, e.(i), e.(ii) and e.(iii) of this paragraph;

(c) research, design, development, production, test, or other engineering services as may be required to meet specific United Kingdom requirements;

(d) training of naval and civil personnel in the service of the Government of the United Kingdom and United Kingdom contractors to the extent to which they are involved in the inspection, installation, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of the equipment listed in subparagraphs a, b, c, d, e.(i), e.(ii) and e.(iii) of this paragraph.

#### ARTICLE IV

Future developments relating to the Polaris Weapon system, including all modifications made thereto, by the Government of the United States or the Government of the United Kingdom shall, in the areas enumerated in Article III, be made reciprocally available through their Executive Agencies in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, reciprocally applied.

#### ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will provide the submarines in which will be installed the missiles and equipment to be provided under this Agreement, and will provide the warheads for these missiles. Close coordination between the Executive Agencies of the contracting Governments will be maintained in order to assure compatibility of equipment. Information concerning the hull, auxiliary machinery, and equipment of United States submarines transmitted under the authority of this Agreement will be such as is

necessary to obtain a satisfactory interface between the equipment provided by the two Governments respectively. This Agreement does not, however, authorize the sale of, or transmittal of information concerning, the nuclear propulsion plants of United States submarines.

#### ARTICLE VI

1. In carrying out this Agreement, the Government of the United States will use, to the extent practicable, established Department of Defense contracting procedures and existing Polaris contracts. In any event contracts for production or work for the Government of the United Kingdom will be incorporated in or placed on the same terms as those for the Government of the United States. When appropriate the United States Project Officer will direct that amendments be sought to existing contracts and that terms be incorporated in new contracts to safeguard any special requirements of the Government of the United Kingdom in the contract subject matter which may arise in connection with this Agreement, for example, to provide for any alterations or any reduction of quantities which may be necessary.

2. The missiles and equipment provided by the Government of the United States under this Agreement shall be fabricated to the same documentation and quality standards as are the counterparts for the United States Polaris Program.

3. The missiles and equipment provided by the Government of the United States under this Agreement will be integrated with the scheduled United States Polaris Program and will be fabricated on a schedule which will make the most efficient and economical use of existing United States production lines. Deliveries will be made upon a schedule to be defined by the Government of the United Kingdom, but which is consonant with the above fabrication schedule.

#### ARTICLE VII

1. The Government of the United States shall ensure that all supplies (which term throughout this Article includes, but without limitation, raw materials, components, intermediate assemblies and end items) which it will provide under this Agreement are inspected to the same extent and in the same manner (including the granting of waivers and deviations) as are the counterparts for the United States Polaris Program. The United Kingdom Project Officer or his designated representative may observe the inspection process and offer his advice to the United States Government Inspector regarding the inspection, without delay to, or impairment of the finality of, the inspection by the Government of the United States.

2. The United States Project Officer through appropriate procedures will notify the United Kingdom Project Officer when final inspection of each end item will take place, and will furnish a certificate or certificates upon completion of each such inspection stating that this inspection has been made and that such end item

has been accepted as having met all requirements of the relevant acceptance documentation (subject to any appropriate waivers and deviations). Copies of acceptance documentation and quality standards, together with reports required thereby, will be furnished to the United Kingdom Project Officer or his designated representative.

3. The Government of the United Kingdom will take delivery of the supplies as agreed pursuant to Article X following inspection, acceptance and certification by the Government of the United States. Delivery to the Government of the United Kingdom shall not relieve the Government of the United States from continuing responsibility for using its best endeavors thereafter to secure the correction or replacement of any items found not to have been manufactured in strict accordance with the documentation and quality standards referred to in Article VI or to be otherwise defective. Such corrections or replacements will be at the expense of the Government of the United Kingdom to the extent they are not covered by warranty or guaranty or otherwise recoverable by the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of the United States will use its best endeavors to obtain for or extend to the Government of the United Kingdom the benefit of any guarantees or warranties negotiated with United States contractors or subcontractors.

#### ARTICLE VIII

The Government of the United Kingdom shall indemnify and hold harmless the Government of the United States against any liability or loss resulting from unusually hazardous risks attributable to Polaris missiles or equipment identifiable, respectively, as missiles or equipment supplied or to be supplied to the Government of the United Kingdom under this Agreement. Unusually hazardous risks, for the purposes of this Agreement, are those defined by applicable statutes of the United States, or by any appropriate administrative act under the authority of such statutes, or held to exist by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Government of the United States shall give the Government of the United Kingdom immediate notice of any suit or action filed or of any claim made to which the provisions of this Article may be relevant. Representatives of the United Kingdom may be associated with the defense, before a court of competent jurisdiction, of any claim which may be borne in whole or in part by the Government of the United Kingdom. In procurement contracts for supplies and services made pursuant to this Agreement the Government of the United States is authorized to include unusually hazardous risk indemnification provisions substantially similar to those included in its own corresponding contracts.

#### ARTICLE IX

1. The Government of the United States will follow its normal procurement practices in securing all rights it considers to be essential to enable it to provide the missiles and equipment to be supplied to the Govern-

ment of the United Kingdom under this Agreement. In addition, the Government of the United States shall notify the Government of the United Kingdom of any claim asserted hereafter for compensation for unlicensed use of patent rights alleged to be involved in the supply of such missiles and equipment to the Government of the United Kingdom, and the two Governments will consult as to the appropriate disposition of such claim.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom shall reimburse the Government of the United States for any payments made by the Government of the United States in settlement of liability, including cost and expenses, for unlicensed use of any patent rights in the manufacture or sale of the missiles and equipment supplied or to be supplied to the Government of the United Kingdom under this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE X

1. Delivery of equipment other than missiles to be provided under this Agreement for installation in submarines or supporting facilities to be provided by the Government of the United Kingdom shall be the responsibility of the Government of the United States and shall be made to those locations within the United Kingdom where the equipment is required. In addition to delivery of such equipment, the Government of the United States shall, subject to reimbursement for costs incurred, be responsible for providing such technical installation and testing services as are required by the Government of the United Kingdom for the satisfactory installation, check-out and testing of that equipment in submarines and supporting facilities of the United Kingdom.

2. Delivery of all missiles shall be made to appropriate carriers of the United Kingdom or, if it is agreed, of the United States, at such United States supply points as are agreed by the Executive Agencies of both Governments. The Government of the United States shall be responsible for the initial check-out of all missiles provided under this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE XI

1. The charges to the Government of the United Kingdom for missiles, equipment, and services provided by the Government of the United States will be:

a. The normal cost of missiles and equipment provided under the joint United States-United Kingdom production program integrated in accordance with Article VI. This will be based on common contract prices together with charges for work done in United States Government establishments and appropriate allowance for use of capital facilities and for overhead costs.

b. An addition of 5% to the common contract prices under subparagraph 1.a of this Article for missiles and equipment provided to the United Kingdom, as a participation in the expenditures incurred by the Government of the United States after January 1, 1963, for research and development.

c. Replacement cost of items provided from United



States Government stock or, with respect to items not currently being procured, the most recent procurement cost.

d. The actual cost of any research, design, development, production, test or other engineering effort, or other services required in the execution of this Agreement to meet specific United Kingdom requirements.

e. The cost of packing, crating, handling and transportation.

f. The actual costs of any other services, not specified above, which the Project Officers agree are properly attributable to this Agreement.

2. Payments by the Government of the United Kingdom in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be made in United States dollars. Payments to United States agencies and contractors shall be made, as they become due, from a trust fund which will be administered by the United States Project Officer. All payments out of the Trust Fund shall be certified to be in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. The Trust Fund will consist initially of a sum to be paid as soon as possible after entry into force of this Agreement and to be equivalent to the payments estimated to fall due during the first calendar quarter of program operations. Before the end of that quarter and of each succeeding quarter deposits shall be made by the Government of the United Kingdom with the object of having sufficient money in the Fund to meet all the calls which will be made upon it in the succeeding three months.

3. If at any time the unexpended balance in the Trust Fund established pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article falls short of the sums that will be needed in a particular quarter by the Government of the United States to cover:

a. payment for the value of items to be furnished from the stocks of, or services to be rendered by, the Government of the United States;

b. payment by the Government of the United States to its suppliers for items and services to be procured for the Government of the United Kingdom; and

c. estimated liability or costs that may fall to be met by the Government of the United States as a result of termination of such procurement contracts at the behest of the Government of the United Kingdom;

the Government of the United Kingdom will pay at such time to the Government of the United States such additional sums as will be due. Should the total payments received from the Government of the United Kingdom prove to be in excess of the final total costs to the Government of the United States, appropriate refund will be made to the Government of the United Kingdom at the earliest opportunity with final adjustment being made within thirty days after determination of said final costs.

4. The United States Project Officer will maintain a record of expenditures under this Agreement in accordance with established Navy Special Projects Office accounting procedures which record will be available for

audit annually by representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom.

## ARTICLE XII

1. The provisions of this Article concerning proprietary rights shall apply to the work referred to in subparagraph 1.d of Article XI of this Agreement (hereinafter called in this Article "the work").

2. The Government of the United States shall ensure that the Government of the United Kingdom will receive a royalty-free, non-exclusive, irrevocable license for its governmental purposes:

a. to practice or cause to be practiced throughout the world, all inventions conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of the work; and

b. to use or cause to be used throughout the world, all technical information first produced in the performance of the work.

3. In addition, the Government of the United States shall take the following steps to ensure the right of the Government of the United Kingdom to reproduce, by manufacturers of its own choice, items developed in the performance of the work. In respect of those elements of this right not included in subparagraphs 2.a and 2.b of this Article, the Government of the United States shall:

a. to the extent that it owns or controls such elements, accord free user rights to the Government of the United Kingdom;

b. obtain the agreement of contractors and subcontractors performing the work to make available to the Government of the United Kingdom, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, those elements which the contractor or subcontractor owns or controls at the commencement of the work or acquires during the performance of the work;

c. use its best endeavors to obtain for the Government of the United Kingdom or to assist the Government of the United Kingdom to obtain directly or through its own manufacturers, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, elements of this right not covered by subparagraphs 2.a and 2.b of this Article.

4. The Government of the United States shall also ensure that the Government of the United Kingdom will receive the same rights as those referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article in respect of any material now or hereafter covered by copyright produced or delivered in the performance of the work.

5. The Government of the United States shall furnish to the Government of the United Kingdom, in such quantities as may be agreed:

a. all documentation obtained by the Government of the United States under contracts placed for the performance of the work;

b. all documentation, owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, necessary for reproduction, by or on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom, of items developed during the performance of the work.

6. It is understood that the Government of the United States will obtain for itself such of the rights referred to in subparagraphs 2.a, 2.b, and 3 of this Article as it may require for its governmental purposes.

7. The term "owned or controlled" as used in this Article means the right to grant a license without incurring liability to any private owner of a proprietary or other legal interest.

8. The Government of the United States will use its best endeavors to ensure that there will be made available by United States manufacturers to the Government of the United Kingdom, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, such technical assistance—for example, loan of engineers, or training—as the Government of the United Kingdom desires in order to permit the production by manufacturers of its own choice of the items developed in the performance of the work.

9. The Government of the United States will insert suitable provisions in all prime contracts for the work to ensure the availability to the Government of the United Kingdom of the rights set forth in this Article, including a requirement that similar provisions be placed in subcontracts.

#### ARTICLE XIII

1. The Government of the United States, to the extent that it can do so without incurring liability to any private owner of a proprietary or other legal interest, shall grant to the Government of the United Kingdom: (i) the right to reproduce and use, royalty-free, the technical documentation referred to in subparagraph 2.c (iv) of Article III for the purposes stated in that subparagraph; and (ii) a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to practice or cause to be practiced any invention for these purposes.

2. In respect of any part of the technical documentation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article which the Government of the United States cannot furnish to the Government of the United Kingdom without incurring a liability to a private owner of a proprietary or other legal interest, the Government of the United States will use its best endeavors to assist the Government of the United Kingdom in securing for the Government of the United Kingdom on fair and reasonable terms and conditions the right to use such documentation for the purposes stated in subparagraph 2.e (iv) of Article III.

#### ARTICLE XIV

1. The Government of the United Kingdom shall not, without the prior express consent of the Government of the United States, transfer, or permit access to, or use of, the missiles, equipment, services, or documents or information relating thereto which are provided by the Government of the United States under this Agreement, except to a United Kingdom officer, employee, national or firm engaged in the implementation of this Agreement.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom shall undertake such security measures as are necessary to

afford classified articles, services, documents or information substantially the same degree of protection afforded by the Government of the United States in order to prevent unauthorized disclosure or compromise.

#### ARTICLE XV

Annually, on or before the first of July, the Project Officers will prepare a formal joint report to the contracting Government of action taken and progress made under this Agreement and a forecast of schedules and costs for completion. In addition, other more frequent joint reports will be submitted, as agreed upon by the Project Officers, to the heads of the Executive Agencies.

#### ARTICLE XVI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this sixth day of April, 1963.

For the Government of the United States of America:  
DEAN RUSK

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:  
DAVID ORMSBY GORE

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Open for signature at Vienna April 24, 1963, through October 31, 1963; subsequently until March 31, 1964, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Enters into force on 30th day following date of deposit of 22d instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

*Signatures:* Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Cuba, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Ghana, Holy See, Iran, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, *United States*, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, April 24, 1963.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations, relating to the settlement of disputes. Open for signature at Vienna April 24, 1963, through October 31, 1963; subsequently until March 31, 1964, at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

*Signatures:* Argentina, Austria, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ire-

land, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, *United States*, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, April 24, 1963.

## Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Niger, April 24, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Niger, April 24, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

*Signature and acceptance:* Niger, April 24, 1963.

## Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

*Ratification deposited:* Cuba, October 31, 1962.

*Adherences deposited:* Tanganyika and Upper Volta, March 29, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Australia

Agreement amending the agreement of December 19 and 31, 1956 (TIAS 3729), relating to the furnishing of certain supplies and services to naval vessels. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra March 28, 1963. Entered into force March 28, 1963.

### Belgium

Agreement concerning certain communications facilities. Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963. Entered into force April 19, 1963.

### Colombia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes of March 29 and April 15, 1963. Signed at Bogotá March 27, 1963. Entered into force March 27, 1963.

Agreement amending the agreement of January 9, 1957, as amended (TIAS 5236), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá March 15 and April 8, 1963. Entered into force April 4, 1963.

### Ecuador

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Quito April 5, 1963. Entered into force April 5, 1963.

### Gabon

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Libreville April 10, 1963. Entered into force April 10, 1963.

### Iceland

Agreement amending the agreement of February 23, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3787 and 4159), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik February 19 and April 5, 1963. Entered into force April 5, 1963.

### Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 21, 1963 (TIAS 5303). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara April 4, 1963. Entered into force April 4, 1963.

### Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 21, 1962 (TIAS 5256). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon April 4, 1963. Entered into force April 4, 1963.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### New Consulate Opened at Bukavu in Republic of the Congo

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 230) that a new consulate was established at Bukavu, Kivu Province, in the Republic of the Congo on April 25 upon the arrival there of Consul William E. Schaufele, Jr. The consulate will perform protective and general consular services. It will not be equipped until later to issue visas or to renew or issue passports. The American Embassy at Léopoldville will continue to perform these functions.

### Confirmations

The Senate on April 24 confirmed the following nominations:

David Elliott Bell to be Alternate Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of 5 years and until his successor has been appointed.

Roger Hilsman, Jr., to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Walter M. Kotschnig to be the representative of the United States to the 18th plenary session of the Economic Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to be the representative of the United States to the 10th session of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

George C. McGhee to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Brewster H. Morris to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Peaceful Uses.** Agreement with European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), amending the agreement of November 8, 1958. Signed at Brussels and Washington May 21 and 22, 1962. Entered into force July 9, 1962. TIAS 5103. 36 pp. 15¢.

**Cultural Relations—Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1962-1963.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed at Washington March 8, 1962. Entered into force March 8, 1962. Operative retroactively January 1, 1962. With annexes Nos. I and II. TIAS 5112. 67 pp. 25¢.

**International Wheat Agreement, 1962.** Agreement with Other Governments. Formulated at the United Nations Wheat Conference at Geneva March 10, 1962. Open for Signature at Washington April 19-May 15, 1962. TIAS 5115. 190 pp. 55¢.

**Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses.** Agreement with Thailand, amending the agreement of March 13, 1956, as amended. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962. Entered into force August 16, 1962. TIAS 5122. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Economic, Technical and Related Assistance.** Agreement with Colombia. Signed at Bogotá July 23, 1962. Entered into force July 23, 1962. TIAS 5123. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Trade—Termination of Agreements of November 17, 1938, and October 30, 1947.** Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London June 27 and 28, 1962. Entered into force June 28, 1962. TIAS 5124. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses.** Agreement with Argentina. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5125. 11 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Guinea, amending agreement of February 2, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Conakry June 29, 1962. Entered into force June 29, 1962. TIAS 5126. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Furnishing of Military Equipment, Materials and Services.** Agreement with Senegal. Exchange of notes—Signed at Dakar July 20, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS 5127. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses.** Agreement with France, amending agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended. Signed at Washington June 22, 1962. Entered into force August 10, 1962. TIAS 5128. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses.** Agreement with South Africa, amending the agreement of July 8, 1957. Signed at Washington June 12, 1962. Entered into force August 23, 1962. TIAS 5129. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Trade.** Interim agreement with Sweden, relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva March 5, 1962. Entered into force May 18, 1962. TIAS 5130. 12 pp. 10¢.

**Economic Cooperation—Modification of Counterpart Deposit Requirement Under Agreement of September 26, 1953.** Agreement with Spain. Exchange of notes—Dated at Madrid May 22, 1962. Entered into force May 22, 1962. TIAS 5131. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with Ethiopia. Signed at Addis Ababa August 13, 1962. Entered into force August 13, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5132. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Honduras. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tegucigalpa July 16 and 20, 1962. Entered into force July 20, 1962. TIAS 5142. 6 pp. 5¢.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 22 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 186 of April 9, 191 of April 12, and 207 of April 19.

No.	Date	Subject
*212	4/22	U.S. participation in international conferences.
213	4/22	Rusk: "The Stake in Viet-Nam" (revised).
†214	4/23	Johnson: Yale Political Union.
215	4/23	Reply to Soviet note of March 14 on Berlin judges law.
216	4/24	Iran credentials (rewrite).
217	4/23	Battle: "Foreign Students in America: Problems, Progress, and Prospects."
218	4/24	Bolivia credentials (rewrite).
†219	4/24	Schwebel: "The United Nations and the Challenge of a Changing International Law."
†220	4/24	Bowles: "Why Foreign Aid."
221	4/25	Ghana credentials (rewrite).
222	4/25	Japan credentials (rewrite).
223	4/25	Rusk: letter to U.K. Ambassador on Polaris sales agreement.
224	4/26	Ball: "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance."
225	4/26	Secretary Rusk visits five capitals on CENTO trip (rewrite).
*226	4/26	Battle: U.S. National Commission for UNESCO (excerpts).
*227	4/26	Farland: "The Moment for Decision."
†228	4/26	Report on staffing international organizations released (rewrite).
†229	4/26	Gardner: "The Development of the Peacekeeping Capacity of the United Nations."
230	4/26	Consulate opened at Bukavu in the Congo (rewrite).
†231	4/25	McGhee: "The Atlantic Partnership: A Vital Force in Motion."
†232	4/27	Plimpton: American Society of International Law.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**Asia.** Hilsman confirmed as Assistant Secretary . . . . . 765

**Bolivia.** Letters of Credence (Sánchez de Lozada) . . . . . 751

**Chad.** Morris confirmed as Ambassador . . . . . 765

**Congo (Léopoldville).** New Consulate Opened at Bukavu in Republic of the Congo . . . . . 765

**Congress.** Confirmations (Bell, Hilsman, Kotschnig, Martin, McGhee, Morris) . . . . . 765

**Cuba.** The Stake in Viet-Nam (Rusk) . . . . . 727

**Department and Foreign Service**

Confirmations (Bell, Hilsman, Kotschnig, Martin, McGhee, Morris) . . . . . 765

New Consulate Opened at Bukavu in Republic of the Congo . . . . . 765

**Disarmament.** Observation in Space (Mecker) . . . . . 746

**Economic Affairs**

The Stake in Viet-Nam (Rusk) . . . . . 727

World Trade Week, 1963 (text of proclamation) . . . . . 758

**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** Foreign Students in America: Problems, Progress, and Prospects (Battle) . . . . . 752

**Europe.** The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance (Ball) . . . . . 736

**Germany, Federal Republic of**

McGhee confirmed as Ambassador . . . . . 765

U.S. Rejects Soviet Accusations Regarding Berlin Judges Law (text of note) . . . . . 751

**Ghana.** Letters of Credence (Ribeiro) . . . . . 751

**India.** Secretary Visits Five Capitals on CENTO Trip . . . . . 739

**International Organizations and Conferences**

Kotschnig confirmed as U.S. representative to ECE . . . . . 765

Martin confirmed as U.S. representative to ECLA . . . . . 765

Secretary Visits Five Capitals on CENTO Trip . . . . . 739

**Iran**

Letters of Credence (Foroughi) . . . . . 751

Secretary Visits Five Capitals on CENTO Trip . . . . . 739

**Japan.** Letters of Credence (Takeuchi) . . . . . 751

**Laos.** The Stake in Viet-Nam (Rusk) . . . . . 727

**Military Affairs**

The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance (Ball) . . . . . 736

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement on Sale of Polaris Missiles (Rusk, text of agreement) . . . . . 759

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance (Ball) . . . . . 736

**Presidential Documents.** World Trade Week, 1963 . . . . . 758

**Publications.** Recent Releases . . . . . 766

**Science**

Observation in Space (Mecker) . . . . . 746

Space Meteorology and Communications: A Challenge to Science and Diplomacy (Gardner) . . . . . 740

**Treaty Information**

Current Actions . . . . . 764

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement on Sale of Polaris Missiles (Rusk, text of agreement) . . . . . 759

**Turkey.** Secretary Visits Five Capitals on CENTO Trip . . . . . 739

**U.S.S.R.** U.S. Rejects Soviet Accusations Regarding Berlin Judges Law (text of note) . . . . . 751

**United Kingdom.** U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement on Sale of Polaris Missiles (Rusk, text of agreement) . . . . . 759

**United Nations.** Space Meteorology and Communications: A Challenge to Science and Diplomacy (Gardner) . . . . . 740

**Viet-Nam.** The Stake in Viet-Nam (Rusk) . . . . . 727

**Yugoslavia.** Secretary Visits Five Capitals on CENTO Trip . . . . . 739

*Name Index*

Ball, George W . . . . . 736

Battle, Lucius D . . . . . 752

Bell, David Elliott . . . . . 765

Foroughi, Mahmoud . . . . . 751

Gardner, Richard N . . . . . 740

Hilsman, Roger, Jr . . . . . 765

Kennedy, President . . . . . 758

Kotschnig, Walter M . . . . . 765

Martin, Edwin M . . . . . 765

McGhee, George C . . . . . 765

Mecker, Leonard C . . . . . 746

Morris, Brewster H . . . . . 765

Ribeiro, Miguel Augustus . . . . . 751

Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 727, 759

Sánchez de Lozada, Enrique . . . . . 751

Takeuchi, Ryuji . . . . . 751

SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPT  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
DEC 1952 -G-

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$30  
(GPO)



the  
Department  
of  
State

# OUR SOUTHERN PARTNERS

## The Story of Inter-American Cooperation

One of the most encouraging developments in the direction of increasing free-world strength and unity is the concerted effort of the peoples of the Americas to perfect a community of fraternal trust, common purpose, equality, and widespread economic and social opportunity.

The land and the people of the 20 nations of Latin America and their political, social, and economic development with particular emphasis on their common problems are described in this 59-page illustrated booklet. Other subjects covered are United States relations and economic assistance to Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps operations in several South American countries, foreign trade and regional trade arrangements, and the Organization of American States (OAS).

Publication 7404

30 cents

*Order Form*

Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

*Enclosed find:*

\$.....

(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Please send me ..... copies of—

*Our Southern Partners: The Story of Inter-American Cooperation*

Name: .....

Street Address: .....

City, Zone, and State: .....

*Mc A*

# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1247

May 20, 1963

**THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: A VITAL FORCE  
IN MOTION** ● *by George C. McGhee* . . . . . 771

**WHY FOREIGN AID** ● *by Chester Bowles* . . . . . 777

**THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN IN A CHANGING  
WORLD** ● *by Mrs. Katie Louchheim* . . . . . 801

**THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW** ● *by Stephen  
M. Schwebel, Richard N. Gardner, and Francis T. P.  
Plimpton* . . . . . 785

IAL  
LY RECORD  
ED STATES  
IGN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1247 • PUBLICATION 754

May 20, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

*Note:* Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

# The Atlantic Partnership: A Vital Force in Motion

by George C. McGhee

*Ambassador-designate to the Federal Republic of Germany*<sup>1</sup>

The dynamic resurgence of Western Europe in the past decade has been one of the major success stories of our era. It is a story that needs little repetition; its broad outlines are well known and understood throughout the world.

We in the United States have welcomed the restoration to its rightful place of the European Continent, whose several societies have given us much of what now constitutes our way of life. Our identity with Europe has been so close throughout our own brief history that it is difficult today to conceive of any tremor of activity in Europe that would not have an immediate effect on us.

I wish to address some thoughts this evening to this subject—the relationship between ourselves and Europe. I want to talk, first, about where we stand and, second, about where we go from here.

## Where We Stand

Let us recall those things, past and present, that have made our post-World War II relationship with Europe so close.

First, of course, there is the bond of shared cultural values and basic principles upon which we and the Europeans order our lives.

Second is the common challenge of Marxist totalitarianism, to which so much of our energy has, unfortunately, had to be directed during the past decade and a half.

---

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the National School Boards Association at Denver, Colo., on Apr. 28 (press release 231 dated Apr. 25). Mr. McGhee was sworn in as Ambassador on May 8.

Third there is the goal toward which both Europe and the United States are striving: material progress and a fuller life for our peoples in conditions of freedom.

Finally, there is the opportunity for us, together, to fulfill our obligations to help the peoples of the lesser developed nations achieve a reasonable standard of living—to complement their newly won political freedom.

It is in this setting that I would like to discuss our outlook toward the other nations in the North Atlantic area and our hopes for the establishment between us of the Atlantic partnership which President Kennedy foresaw in his Independence Day address in Philadelphia last July 4.<sup>2</sup>

For over 15 years three administrations of both our political parties have worked for an Atlantic partnership. The foundation stones of this structure are the values and principles to which I have just referred. But these are human and social rather than political, military, and economic imperatives. It is to the latter that we must turn to understand the growing superstructure of this partnership. And here I refer to a fact of mid-20th-century life that confronts us at every turn—that the well-being and the security of the United States is indivisible from that of continental Europe.

The programs that are needed to sustain peace and progress in the free world involve heavy burdens. These burdens cannot—and should not—be carried by the United States alone. A partner of roughly equal strength is needed to share in the free world's defensive and constructive tasks. Such a partner is at hand in

---

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

Western Europe. In this rich industrial area exist the resources and the skill and the will which are essential to building and defending a community of free nations.

### *European Drive for Unity*

These resources are more likely to be generated and mobilized by a uniting than by a fragmenting Europe. Individual European countries see their national contributions, in isolation, as being too small to be worth while; a resulting sense of futility may discourage them from additional effort. A uniting Europe, on the other hand, can organize its resources and energies in ways that give it the worldwide role to which it is entitled. This would enable Western Europe to share the worldwide responsibilities which have, since World War II, fallen disproportionately on the United States.

This European drive for unity has achieved greater success than anyone dared to predict in the late 1940's. It represents one of the great victories won by the forces of freedom in our time.

The realization in the midfifties by six sovereign nations of Europe that there was infinitely greater strength in unity than in the perpetuation of traditional rivalries as nation-states was a historic milestone. The fruition of this dream has been the three European Communities, still in the making but now past what its builders like to call "the point of no return." These Communities—the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community—represent a tangible realization of the dream of Jean Monnet and the other leaders of the European unity movement who have seen so clearly what could be achieved through the collective effort of free men of good will.

We must recognize that the European integration movement suffered a setback with the denial of Britain's application for admission to the European Economic Community. We must not make the mistake, however, of thinking that this turn of events spells the end of progress toward a united Europe. The momentum of this force is too great. What has been lost, we believe, is but the opportunity for immediate

gain. The Common Market is no less than it was before; it has only lost for the present the chance to become considerably more.

The failure of negotiations for British membership marked a pause in the progress that has characterized the Common Market for the past 5 years. Those of us who see the importance of a unified Europe to the entire free world can deplore the pause. At the same time we can take heart from the fact that the same forces of history that brought about the Treaty of Rome are still there pressing for its fruition.

The vast majority of Europeans, and, with only isolated exceptions, the leaders who represent them, realize that the Common Market is a true European movement and must be open to all who are prepared to adhere to its principles. It cannot be used to serve purely particular national interests. It was created precisely to replace national policies with European policies.

The process of European integration will continue because it is solidly grounded in both European *needs* and European *thinking*. Europe *needs* unity to enhance its security, its well-being, and its sense of purpose on the world scene. These needs we recognize in the *thinking* of the broad mass of European peoples, for whom nationalistic goals in the traditional sense have lost much of their appeal in the wake of two disastrous world wars.

The desire to create a common European identity is deeply felt by millions of European men and women, particularly those of the younger generation. The trend may, at times, be slowed or reversed—as it was after defeat of the proposal for a European Army in 1954. Many thought then that the movement had suffered a deathblow. But sooner or later it will inexorably resume its forward course, as the European Defense Community's defeat was eventually followed by creation of EURATOM and the Common Market in 1958.

### *Building a Transatlantic Partnership*

Progress toward European unity will, moreover, be paralleled, I am confident, by the forging of a closer partnership between Europe and the United States. That partnership responds to the basic interests of both. In our world,

neither European nor American purposes can be assured separately. Only if these two giants work closely together can they realize their true potential and fulfill their destinies.

The success with which this transatlantic partnership has been advanced reflects the soundness of the underlying vision that was first glimpsed, in this country, by General [George C.] Marshall and the men associated with him in the Marshall Plan. It also reflects the steadiness with which that vision has been pursued. The Marshall Plan, NATO, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]—all these have been milestones in carrying the policy forward.

I have no doubt that this policy—our efforts to build both a united Europe and a transatlantic partnership—will encounter further obstacles. I have no doubt that there will be a natural temptation, in the face of such obstacles, to look about for easy solutions which will see us painlessly and rapidly through rough waters. I do not believe that such solutions can be found; there is no easy shortcut. We are sailing on the right tack, and we must have the patience to see it through.

#### **Where We Go**

What does this mean in specific terms?

As I see it, our immediate task is to press ahead with the Atlantic partnership in three fields:

First, on the economic front: We continue to believe that arrangements will eventually be made for Great Britain's full membership in the EEC. Recent events have demonstrated a substantial body of European opinion in favor of Britain's participation in a uniting Europe. The British Government has made known its own desire to play a full role in this development.

But while we continue to regard the ultimate accession of Great Britain to the Rome Treaty as an objective to be encouraged, we recognize that it is unlikely to occur soon. Meanwhile it is in the interests of the whole free world that the European Economic Community develop in a liberal manner and that it not acquire antarkic characteristics. We will use our influence to this end.

We will use to the full the powers granted to the President under the Trade Expansion Act to improve access to the Common Market as well as other major world markets for products of United States farms and factories. We have here an opportunity to develop trading patterns from which all countries concerned can benefit. The advantage of one nation will not be served at the expense of another. Each of the countries will be free to give full scope to its resources and abilities, and to their use in advancing its own welfare and the welfare of others.

The program for increased Atlantic trade has been subject to many misinterpretations. One sometimes hears, on the one hand, that what we are doing is joining the Common Market. On the other hand, one sometimes hears we are destroying the Common Market. These interpretations are obviously inconsistent, and both indicate a lack of understanding of the same basic facts.

We are not joining the Common Market, because the Common Market is a great deal more than a trading arrangement. It is a comprehensive organization with strong political implications, based on the special needs and characteristics of a group of economically advanced but geographically limited countries that want to escape the drawbacks of isolation.

We do not need to join this organization, because we already have the broad economic base that Europe is now creating. Our purpose is rather to maintain and promote trade between us both, so that we and the new Europe can mutually strengthen each other and derive the maximum benefit from our respective resources and talents. This is what the Trade Expansion Act was designed for, and this is what it will do.

Our purpose in the Trade Expansion Act is certainly not to destroy the Common Market. It is ironic indeed that this interpretation should be given to the very piece of legislation that was intended to help us create a partnership with the Common Market. The Common Market is held together by much more than a common external tariff. It is difficult to believe that the tariff reductions that would result from the Trade Expansion Act negotiations

would destroy, or even appreciably weaken, the ties that now bind together the member countries.

The strength of these ties has been well illustrated by events in Europe this year: We have seen five of the member countries disagree in the sharpest manner with the sixth. Still, strong as the disagreement has been, the ties that bind these countries together have proved stronger. We are pleased that this is so. This is the democratic way of doing things—through discussion, through agreement where possible, through consideration of the views of others even where there is sharp disagreement. It is more difficult, and takes longer, to create an organization this way rather than by authoritarian fiat. But once created, an organization based on freedom of choice rests on a much more enduring foundation.

During the past 3 months, suggestions have been put forward for the United States to join in special commercial relations with one or another group of nations to form a trading bloc competitive with the European Common Market. We do not believe that this would be sound policy. For 30 years the United States has consistently adhered to the most-favored-nation principle and to the expansion of trade on a nondiscriminatory basis. For us to enter into preferential trading relations with any nation or group of nations would mean discrimination against all other nations. Such a policy would be inconsistent with our position as the leader of the free world.

Our economic partnership must include more than trade, however. We propose to continue to develop techniques to improve the cooperation of the major industrialized powers in providing assistance to the less developed countries. This does not mean the abandonment of national programs of assistance but rather their more effective coordination. We shall try to assure a greater contribution to this common effort on the part of the European countries.

We shall also seek to advance the arrangements for close economic cooperation with Europe through the OECD to deal with problems of Atlantic economic growth. We will seek to develop close cooperation in the monetary field through the International Monetary

Fund, the Committee of Ten,<sup>3</sup> and Working Party III of the OECD.

In all these ways we hope to add new dimensions to the economic aspect of the partnership.

I turn now to its political aspect.

### *Improving Political Consultation*

We are working steadily to improve the processes of political consultation between the United States and our NATO allies. This effort finds expression in several different forums. We seek to use NATO ministerial meetings to resolve issues which have been discussed in the North Atlantic Council. In that Council we also hope increasingly to discuss problems which might lead to crises, thus helping to set the stage for wider allied understanding of actions that we might later propose or undertake.

In *ad hoc* NATO groups we will meet increasingly with policymaking officials of other governments on specific problems for which we and they share a responsibility, in order to identify areas of common interest and outline possible lines of concerted action. In NATO's new Atlantic Policy Advisory Group<sup>4</sup> we join planning officials of allied governments in studying specific problems which might later be discussed at more responsible levels.

We intend to press, in all these ways, to strengthen our political partnership with Europe in the period ahead. We recognized, when we first encouraged the creation of a strong and united Europe, that it would not always be in complete agreement with us. We knew, moreover, that disagreements would not necessarily always be resolved in our favor. We could not have had a Europe worthy of being a partner that did not have the capacity for independent views.

Just as we were not concerned at this prospect when Europe was weak, neither are we concerned when Europe is strong. We may have temporary differences and setbacks in our relationship, but the main thrust of our efforts will be along parallel lines, reinforcing each other. In many cases we will learn from the

<sup>3</sup> For background on the Committee of Ten, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, May 6, 1963, p. 721.

wisdom and experience of our European partners. In other cases we can perhaps give a guiding hand to them.

### *Nuclear Power of the Alliance*

Finally, I turn to the Atlantic partnership's military dimension. A Europe reviving in strength and confidence may not wish to accept indefinitely exclusive U.S. management of alliance nuclear power. It will want a larger share in decisions basic to its security. If Europe should, however, seek to share that responsibility through spreading national nuclear programs, new barriers would be raised to the process of European unification on which so much depends.

An alternative approach is for us to try to share that responsibility on a multination basis. Such an approach has been favored by this and the preceding U.S. administration, and by many of our allies. It finds expression in the concept of a sea-based MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force under multilateral manning and control.

Multilateral manning would insure that such a force could not break down, over time or under the pressure of crises, into national components. Multilateral control would insure that the force was used for common purposes, by common consent.

Such a force would meet allied desires for a self-respecting nuclear status, without contributing to politically divisive national nuclear programs. It would permit deployment of MRBM's to offset Soviet MRBM's arrayed against Europe, under procedures more consistent with allied cohesion than national manning and ownership. And it would give our allies a share, on the same basis as the United States, in the ownership, operation, and control of these strategic nuclear weapons. Such a force could, over time, grow and evolve in ways agreeable to the participants.

Whether such a force comes into being will depend on the desires of our allies. We are ready to join them if they wish to go ahead. Needless to say, no action would be undertaken without the full approval of the Congress.

In all these ways we seek to add new dimensions—economic, political, and military—to the

Atlantic partnership, as we wait for progress toward European integration to be renewed. When that progress begins again, a uniting Europe will find that new patterns of transatlantic cooperation have been achieved and wait only for European unification to take on still deeper meaning. For the arrangements that could be achieved in the present period might well take on new forms when that unification is attained.

But all of this will take time. It will take time to work out the new arrangements with Europe of which I have spoken. It will take time for European unification to resume its forward march.

During this period we will need to renew our confidence in the policies which Europe and the United States have been carrying forward for many years. That confidence will be rudely tested. There will be delays and difficulties. But our course is clearly marked; it is the right course; and, if we stay with it, it will prevail. It is, after all, the hallmark of a great power to be willing to hold to policies that are sustained by past achievements and future promise—in the face of present problems.

The period ahead may well be the most creative and exciting yet in the long history of the European peoples and may see the realization of the true Atlantic partnership we seek.

## **Premier Khrushchev Reaffirms Support for Neutral Laos**

*Following is the text of a joint communique between the United States and the Soviet Union released at Moscow on April 26.*

Premier Nikita Khrushchev today [April 26] received U.S. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman at the latter's request. Harriman handed Nikita Khrushchev a message from U.S. President Kennedy on the situation in Laos.<sup>1</sup> Nikita Khrushchev and Averell Harriman then had talks on the same topic.

Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy reaffirm that the two Governments fully support the Geneva Agreement on Laos.<sup>2</sup> Nikita

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

Khrushchev and John Kennedy had an exchange of opinions and reached mutual understanding on the agreement in Vienna.<sup>3</sup>

Present at the talk were Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs [Andrei A.] Gromyko and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. G. Lapin. Averell Harriman was accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. F. D. Kohler and counselors M. Forrestal and W. Sullivan.

## **Grand Duchess of Luxembourg Meets With President Kennedy**

*Their Royal Highnesses Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg and Prince Jean, Hereditary Grand Duke, made a state visit to the United States April 29-May 4. Following is the text of a joint communique issued by President Kennedy and Their Royal Highnesses at the close of discussions held at Washington April 30-May 1.*

White House press release dated May 1

Their Royal Highnesses Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg and Prince Jean, Hereditary Grand Duke of Luxembourg, are in the United States on a State Visit. Following their visit to Washington, they will visit Chicago, Illinois, and Cape Canaveral, Florida. Their Royal Highnesses were entertained at a State dinner given by the President and Mrs. Kennedy at the White House on April 30, and Their Royal Highnesses gave a State luncheon at the Embassy of Luxembourg on May 1 in honor of President Kennedy. The President and Their Royal Highnesses met twice at the White House for a discussion of subjects of mutual interest between the United States and Luxembourg in the presence of the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Mr. Pierre Werner, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Eugene Schaus. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. George Ball, also took part in these discussions.

The President and Their Royal Highnesses noted with satisfaction the wide areas of agree-

ment existing between their two countries. They recalled the close and friendly ties which have traditionally bound their two peoples in peace as in war. The President and Their Royal Highnesses expressed pleasure that these ties had been strengthened through the entry into force on March 28 of a Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation,<sup>1</sup> as well as by the signature on December 18, 1962 of a Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income.<sup>2</sup>

The President and his guests noted with satisfaction the progress made toward the unification of Europe. They further agreed that at the same time ever firmer ties should be established and maintained among the members of the Atlantic community. The President noted with appreciation the constructive role of Luxembourg in support of European integration and her determination to promote the objective of an Atlantic partnership.

The President and Their Royal Highnesses reaffirmed their strong support of the NATO Alliance. They recognized that it is imperative, as a prerequisite for the peaceful solution of disputes through negotiation, for the West to maintain its strength.

Both the President and Their Royal Highnesses expressed the belief that all nations, large and small, should work together in the cause of freedom and justice. The President stressed the important role which Luxembourg could play in furthering this goal. The President and Their Royal Highnesses conducted their conversations in perfect accord and were pleased to have had the opportunity personally to reinforce the warm sentiments of friendship which have so long bound the peoples of their two nations together.

Their Royal Highnesses expressed the hope that the President and Mrs. Kennedy would be able to visit the Grand Duchy and the President said that he and Mrs. Kennedy would look forward with pleasure to the opportunity to do so on some future occasion.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 437; Sept. 24, 1962, p. 467; and Mar. 18, 1963, p. 403.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, June 26, 1961, p. 999.



## Why Foreign Aid

by Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps it is fitting that my subject tonight is one on which we Americans have lately expended all too little common sense. I refer to foreign aid—the program of U.S. assistance to less developed nations.

This spring the foreign aid program is once again undergoing its annual drubbing on Capitol Hill and in certain elements of the Nation's press. As has become their custom, many frustrated legislators and editorial writers are once again attacking the program on every possible score, while many others who have been among its most loyal friends appear to be on the defensive.

Yet there is a paradox in this situation. On the basis of recent Gallup polls, the program's popularity in the country as a whole is at the highest level since its inception. According to Mr. Gallup, 58 percent of the American people are in favor of it, with only 30 percent opposed.

What is more, most of those who remain opposed to foreign aid grossly overestimated its cost, with the majority of guesses ranging anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of our budget. In fact, of course, foreign assistance amounts to less than one twenty-fifth of our annual Federal expenditures, and even this percentage may be reduced further as our national wealth increases and our loans are repaid.

---

<sup>1</sup>Address made at the University of Texas, Austin, Tex., on Apr. 24 (press release 220). Mr. Bowles was the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs; on May 1 his nomination to be Ambassador to India was confirmed by the Senate. For President Kennedy's message to Congress on Apr. 2, 1963, on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591; for a statement by Secretary Rusk, see *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1963, p. 664.

Now, how are we to explain this paradox: the clear contradiction between apparent public approval and vocal political opposition?

I believe that the answer lies largely in our inadequate efforts in the last 10 years to explain the real objectives of our aid program to the American people and to their Congress. The official reasons offered in support of the program during the 1950's were often contradictory, inaccurate, or irrelevant. The upshot has been widespread public confusion on the program's real objectives and widespread disillusionment when it fails to achieve the false goals so often proposed.

For instance, the program has been most widely presented in terms of simple anticommunism. Since a major U.S. objective is to stop communism, this implies that, if communism did not exist, there would be little or no reason for the program itself. For many years this negative perspective was actually written into the preamble of the enabling foreign aid legislation through language suggesting that the program would be necessary only as long as the Communist conspiracy threatened U.S. interests.

For developing countries seeking aid, such a view also ironically turned communism into a valuable natural resource, such as oil or uranium. By the logic of the argument, any developing nation devoid of a powerful Communist neighbor or a noisy Communist minority becomes *per se* a poor candidate for U.S. economic assistance. It has been suggested sardonically that a developing nation which lacked a Communist minority should plant and nourish a small but vocal Communist movement—and then implore the U.S. to provide the funds to squelch it.

Since even Communists are sometimes blessed with a sense of humor, it is not surprising that Soviet spokesmen talking to the people of Asia and Africa have said: "The Soviet Union offers you loans and technicians to speed your development. For this you are grateful. But you should be equally grateful to Moscow for whatever aid the *Americans* give you. They are quite frank in saying that if they were not so frightened of us Communists, they would give you nothing."

In 1959, as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I introduced an amendment to the preamble of the foreign aid bill which outlined the purposes of the aid program in the affirmative terms of our traditional dedication to freedom and opportunity. Although my amendment was approved overwhelmingly, our thinking on aid is still bound in major degree by the same narrow, self-limiting, anti-Communist obsession.

A second fallacy in our past presentation of foreign aid is the claim that the program will bring us military allies, win us votes in the United Nations, or gain us support against Cuba and the Red Chinese. In other words, it is assumed that the program's primary objective is to make friends and buy votes. This argument is equally hollow and futile. It is no more possible to buy the long-term loyalty of a nation than it is to buy the enduring loyalty of a friend. To attempt to do so can lead only to frustration and antagonism.

Suppose a wealthy resident of the Texas town in which you live should offer to build a swimming pool for your children, a new library, and an extension to your town hall—provided only that you and your neighbors agree to support his political views on public questions. What would you do? You would invite him to take his money and go live elsewhere.

Unfortunately, in the past we Americans have inadvertently placed ourselves often in the position of the richest man in the world community, naively trying to buy friends and supporters for our views. Yet common sense and a knowledge of human nature should tell us that foreign aid will not make us love our neighbors, make our neighbors love us, or win international popularity laurels for us—and we should not expect it to do so.

Finally, it has often been wrongly assumed that the success or failure of the aid program should be judged purely and simply by the rate of economic growth in the recipient country.

Obviously, increased agricultural and industrial production is of the utmost importance. Yet the record shows that, when the added production is badly distributed, it only widens the gap between rich and poor—and, in the process, inevitably erodes the political stability which we are striving to create.

There are many examples. Some of the most productive countries of Latin America, for instance, already have per capita incomes greater than several European countries. Yet because the privileged minority at the top may be getting rapidly richer while the impoverished, embittered masses at the bottom of the ladder are making little or no progress, these nations can be as *politically* explosive as the poorest African or Asian country whose per capita income may be no greater than \$100 a year.

In view of our past failure adequately to explain the program it is a tribute to our national common sense that so many Americans have continued to give tacit support to foreign assistance for basically humanitarian reasons.

#### **Purpose of U.S. Aid Program**

This leads us back to the basic question: If the purpose of our aid program is not simply to combat communism, and if it cannot be expected to buy friends or votes, and if faster economic growth alone is no sure cure-all, what exactly is foreign aid good for? What will it do?

The answer to this question is deceptively simple to state: A wisely administered U.S. aid program can help build nations that are increasingly prepared to defend their independence against totalitarian enemies—external or internal, overt or covert—and increasingly willing to work with us as partners on common projects which may lead the world a little closer to peace.

In other words, the purpose of our aid program is to develop independent nations, able and willing to stand on their own feet—and thereby to share with us a dedication to peace and freedom.

To put the question more sharply, we have a critical choice: We can help to guide the economic and social upheaval now sweeping Asia, Africa, and Latin America into constructive, peaceful channels; or we can sit back nervously and ineffectually while the revolution of rising expectations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America slips into the hands of reckless extremists who despise everything we stand for—and a succession of Red Chinas and Red Cubas comes into being.

### **Our Postwar Investment in Europe's Recovery**

Within this more realistic framework of achievable objectives, let us now consider to what extent our aid program has thus far succeeded—and to what extent it has failed.

In the years since 1946, the most dramatic success of the foreign aid program has come, of course, in Western Europe. Following World War II a political and economic vacuum existed in Europe. Bombed-out industries lay in ruins, and each nation's economy was scarred by inflation, vast unemployment, and utter hopelessness. In the United States, meanwhile, shortsighted political leaders of both parties led a mad scramble to disband our victorious armies and draw back into our isolationist shell.

With most of Eastern Europe already overrun by the Red armies, with large and well-organized Communist parties in France, Italy, and elsewhere, and with nearly 200 battle-tested Soviet divisions still under arms, Stalin was confident that communism could quickly fill the entire European vacuum.

Yet his efforts failed. Soviet pressures toward the Mediterranean through Greece and Turkey were forestalled by the prompt counteraction of a massive military and economic assistance program under the Truman Doctrine. Within months, Marshall Plan aid was provided to rebuild the war-torn economies of Western Europe, followed by the creation of NATO as an effective military shield between our allies and the Communist world.

Although the Communist danger was obviously on our minds, Secretary of State [George C.] Marshall was careful to present our aid effort within an affirmative framework. Its objective, he stressed, was not negatively to op-

pose some other ideology or ism or to win subservient satellites but positively to create prosperous, independent European nations capable of standing on their own feet and making their own decisions.

It is noteworthy that in the 15 years since the Marshall Plan got under way—and quite contrary to Stalin's confident expectations—there have been no Communist territorial gains anywhere on the European Continent. Indeed, Western Europe has achieved a measure of political stability and economic prosperity unparalleled in its history.

There were many of our fellow citizens who chafed at the time that the \$13 billion we invested in the Marshall Plan was a "giveaway"—just as there are many today who describe our present aid program in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a "giveaway." Yet the wisdom of this investment becomes all the more apparent when one compares the dismal Soviet record in Eastern Europe with the booming economic and political conditions of Western Europe today.

While the Kremlin is still forced to bolster many of its East European satellites with economic loans, U.S. economic aid to Western Europe has ceased, and we are now selling well over \$6 billion worth of American goods each year to former recipients of Marshall Plan aid. Even the diehards must admit that that is a remarkably good return on our postwar investment in Europe's recovery.

What we have witnessed in Europe—what our foreign assistance program has helped to create there—is nothing less than a new economic and political renaissance.

To be sure, for the moment some of the symptoms of Europe's new vitality can be irritating to us. Nevertheless, our aid program to Europe brilliantly accomplished what it set out to do, and today we are dealing with prosperous, independent allies. Would any thoughtful man prefer that we deal instead with the chaotic Europe of 1947?

### **Successful Aid Programs in Other Areas**

In many other parts of the world foreign aid has also been a major success.

Let us consider, for example, what has happened in less than a generation in India, an

underdeveloped country of 450 million people, equaling the combined population of Africa and Latin America—a country which I know well.

Since I left India as U.S. Ambassador in 1953, Indian national income has increased by 42 percent, with food-grain production up by 56 percent. In 1947 it was estimated that 100 million cases of malaria developed annually; now this debilitating disease has nearly disappeared. Life expectancy in India in 1947 was 27 years; it is now 42.

In a country that was only 10 percent literate 15 years ago, 60 percent of all Indian children under 12 now go to school. Indian industrial production is expanding by 10 percent annually, one of the highest rates in the world.

In its first years of independence India developed a constitution that combined features of both the U.S. and British experience. Since then India has held three national elections—each the largest exercise of the democratic privilege in the world—in which a higher percentage of people voted than in the United States.

India has freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and a private-enterprise sector that has been chalking up sizable gains.

India's success has been in large measure due to its own efforts. The Indian people have worked hard, developed able leadership, learned by hard experience, and maintained a sound civil service based on solid British training. But the Indians would be the first to agree that the outlook for the success of Indian democracy would not be so bright today had it not been for generous assistance from the United States.

In the last 15 years we have granted or loaned India \$3.9 billion in economic aid. Approximately 55 percent of this assistance was in the form of surplus commodities—wheat, cotton, corn, etc. Another 42 percent was in dollars for the purchase of materials—steel, railroad transportation equipment, and machinery, manufactured mostly in the U.S. and produced by American workers. The remainder went for technical advice and instruction.

India's record of achievement is of great significance to that nation's future and security.

Yet this record is also profoundly important to our own security.

Only through a free India, with growing strength and confidence, can we expect to see the development of a political and military balance to Communist China in Asia. What is more, a successful, expanding India demonstrates to all of the doubters and the faint-hearted in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that democracy is more than an impractical Western political luxury; it is a realistic political and economic system that actually works in practice, that produces results.

The Indian third 5-year plan proposes that within the next 10 years the need for foreign assistance will begin to be reduced; and it foresees its eventual end as India's takeoff point of self-sustaining growth is finally reached.

But India is by no means the only dramatic example of successful aid use outside Western Europe. In the same subcontinent, Pakistan is taking equally impressive strides toward national development with U.S. assistance. Together, these two nations hold the key to the future security of South Asia against pressures from Communist China.

These South Asian examples, moreover, are matched in other parts of the world. In Japan, Greece, Formosa, and Israel our aid program has either accomplished its purpose and been terminated or is in the process of being phased out. Indeed, Japan and Israel are already extending such assistance to others. In Nigeria, Colombia, Tunisia, and many other countries steady progress is being made.

Therefore the record shows that foreign aid, when handled wisely, can succeed in doing what it sets out to do—it can help to create viable independent nations.

#### **Tightened Standards for Aid Distribution**

On the other hand, where the program has not been handled wisely, the results have naturally not been so good. Similarly, where our expectations have been unrealistic and grandiose, we have inevitably met disappointment.

In regard to the wise handling of economic assistance, we have learned some hard lessons from our Latin American experience in recent

years; and today we are now attempting to apply these lessons through tightened standards for aid distribution through the Alliance for Progress.

The primary lesson that we must learn from Cuba is that the United States cannot afford to support, or even to tolerate, corrupt, oppressive regimes, of whatever ideological base, which deny the basic aspirations of their own people for human dignity and a better life. As President Kennedy has himself pointed out on more than one occasion, we wouldn't have Castro if it had not been for Batista.

Reactionary right-wing governments constitute the weakest defense against totalitarianism of the left. They are sitting ducks for the Castro Communists because they deny the dignity and rights of the majority of people—and their eventual overthrow through violence is inevitable as the economic and political pressures intensify.

What is the nature of these pressures? Consider these facts:

In Latin America today 1½ percent of the people—those with 15,000 or more acres each—are said to own half of all agricultural land. Only a handful of countries have an effective income tax. In several countries local capital is being accumulated in Swiss banks for safekeeping at the same time that U.S. aid is requested, while scarce foreign exchange goes for perfume and Cadillacs instead of for machinery, tools, and fertilizer plants.

In many Latin American countries the reforms needed to produce prosperity and stability are dangerously overdue. Yet, because the essential economic and social revolution in many cases has not yet taken place, great wealth continues to exist explosively side by side with abject poverty.

What is important about the new AID [Agency for International Development] program is the fact that its administrators now have the will to use it as a lever to induce reform and not, as so frequently happened in the past, as a backstop for the doomed *status quo*. In the broadest political and human sense we intend to use this program to prevent situations getting so far out of hand that we are forced to make the impossible choice be-

tween the Castros and the Batistas of this world.

Those countries that are unable or unwilling to curb luxury spending, to stop the flight of capital, and to undertake far-reaching social and economic reforms should be dropped as aid recipients; or in some cases I believe our assistance should be limited to a modest U.S. presence through the Peace Corps and technical assistance programs.

There will, of course, be inevitable exceptions in those situations where overwhelming strategic or political considerations make continuance of a dole necessary for our own security. In such exceptional instances, however, let us at least frankly admit that our purposes are political and not confuse these exceptions with the constructive development policies, operations, and standards of the rest of the program.

#### **Five Basic Considerations**

So much for the lessons of our 15-year aid program. What must we Americans do here and now, as the annual aid debate begins to rage again?

What we need to do now, as citizens and as a Government, is to strengthen the program, to support it and explain it, and to recognize it as a basic arm of American foreign policy without which we would be sorely, perhaps fatally, handicapped.

In this regard I believe that we should keep in mind five clear sets of objectives:

First, we have an overriding responsibility to explain to ourselves and to others what the program can and cannot do. We should never fall prey to the tired old fallacies that have previously distorted our views of aid's possibilities.

Properly administered foreign assistance can do one thing and one thing only: It can help to build independent nations capable of standing on their own feet and making their own free choices. And if we can do that, we can help create a rational world in which communism is steadily declining in influence—a world that holds some prospect of peace.

Second, we are now establishing and publicizing clear working criteria for the distribu-

tion of economic aid. The need for such criteria has been strongly implied in the Act for International Development as passed by Congress,<sup>2</sup> and the recent Clay report<sup>3</sup> has reemphasized this need.

Let us remember that the Congress has directed us to do precisely what experience has taught us must be done if our overseas assistance effort is to succeed. For instance, the act says:

Assistance shall be based upon sound plans and programs; be directed toward the social as well as economic aspects of economic development; be responsive to the efforts of the recipient countries to mobilize their own resources and help themselves; be cognizant of the external and internal pressures which hamper their growth; and should emphasize long-range development assistance as the primary instrument of such growth.

In the spirit of the congressional legislation we are now posing for ourselves some searching questions in regard to all requests for assistance from abroad. These questions relate to:

—the applicant's present per capita income and its distribution;

—the competence of the government, and its sensitivity to the needs of the population;

—the existence of a well-conceived, long-range national economic development plan;

—the adequate distribution and collection of the nation's tax burden;

—the priority given to the vast majority of citizens who live in the rural areas; the development of equitable land distribution and the creation of an integrated approach to community development;

—the existence of a favorable climate and adequate incentives for foreign and domestic private investment; and

—the maintenance of effective controls over the expenditure of foreign exchange for luxury imports.

Most important of all, we are asking ourselves whether a government which seeks our

assistance exists with at least the general consent of its own population. In other words, is it sufficiently rooted in public support to assure the broad backing of its people necessary for a bold program of economic and social development?

Although obviously no nation could respond affirmatively on all these counts, these are objectives that we must stress in developing priorities and standards for distribution of assistance.

Now let us consider a third general objective: the need for improvement in the planning and integration of the foreign aid program, not only within our own Government but in connection with the wide and complex variety of international agencies and other countries that also operate in this field.

The United States Government provides unilateral aid through the Export-Import Bank, which helps the underdeveloped nations finance the purchase of industrial goods in the United States; the Development Loan Fund, which provides long-term loans on easy terms payable in both dollars and soft currencies; U.S. technical assistance, which offers a wide range of specialists in planning and technology; the Peace Corps, which provides several thousand volunteers trained in teaching, nursing, rural development, and the like; and Food for Peace, which distributes U.S. surplus farm products, including wheat, rice, powdered milk, and cotton.

But economic assistance for the developing nations is not solely an American enterprise. Loans and technical assistance are available from many international agencies. These include the World Bank, which provides loans payable in "hard currencies"; the International Development Association, which provides "soft loans"; the International Monetary Fund, which helps stabilize currencies; and the so-called specialized agencies of the U.N.—the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization].

Finally, West Germany, France, Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, and

<sup>2</sup> Public Laws 87-195 and 87-565.

<sup>3</sup> A report by a committee of private citizens, headed by Gen. Lucius D. Clay, entitled *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World*, March 20, 1963, is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (price 15 cents).

Israel also provide unilateral economic assistance on a generally similar basis.

The staggering number of sources to which the developing nations can turn for assistance inevitably creates confusion and some overlapping of effort. This suggests the need for careful planning to make sure that the right kind of aid is made available and that its use is effectively coordinated with the resources of the developing country itself.

Now let me emphasize a fourth basic consideration of particular importance: Orderly political growth in the developing nations is dependent in large measure upon what happens in the rural areas, where 80 percent of the people live. When the rural areas are oppressed with poverty, exploitation, and injustice, they are easy targets for Communist infiltration. Moreover, it is impossible for any developing nation to increase its industrial output rapidly if four-fifths of its people lack the purchasing power to buy its factory-produced goods.

Our aid program therefore should be more and more closely related to the improvement of agriculture, the encouragement of land reform, the creation of rural extension services, and the building of rural schools, roads, and clinics.

Fifth and last, let us take an imaginative approach to questions of public and private ownership, developing new mixed forms to meet management problems.

This question is one of practicality, not morality. We Americans are wedded to a system of private ownership, which has done so much for us. However, as a matter of pure realism, the overburdened governments of the developing nations have enough to do without taking on the multiplicity of economic problems inherent in government management of production. Twenty years of government service have made me increasingly aware of the limits of government. As long as they are getting results, it is not our prime responsibility to impose our ideas on the recipients of our aid. To do so would be to open a Pandora's box of imperialistic charges and to contribute to a less effective utilization of our own aid.

In summing up, there is no question but that our foreign aid program is an absolutely vital

instrument of American foreign policy and that it has already made an enormous contribution to our national security.

The frustration that so many Americans seem to feel with this program has resulted partly from inevitable mistakes in new areas of effort, partly from the complexities of the cold war, but more than anything else from the unbalanced presentation in recent years of what the aid program can and cannot do.

Yet it would be folly to allow our frustrations to thwart our capacity to deal with the present-day world. The fact is the program in spite of many errors has on the whole been a brilliant success, and its continuance is essential if we are to develop the kind of peaceful world community in which we ourselves can prosper.

We Americans have one peculiar national habit: We tend to *act* much better than we *sound*. Why this is so I shall leave to the psychologists. However, the fact of the matter is that we are likely to give the worst reasons for some of our most noble acts.

Thus we argue that the time has come to grant our Negro citizens first-class citizenship, not because they have been waiting 180 years since the Declaration of Independence asserted that "all men are created equal" but because the colored majority of mankind in Asia and Africa is said to be breathing down our necks.

In order to win public support for urgently needed scholarships to our universities we call the legislation the National Defense Education Act and we fit it out with reassuring anti-Communist disclaimers.

Through our fears and frustrations of this disorderly new world, we have come to act as though our chief national purpose is not to maintain and extend our basic American commitment to human dignity but to thwart the Russians and Chinese in whatever they decide to do.

And while we strive to outfox the Communists abroad, we concentrate on keeping up with the Joneses at home. Politicians, journalists, businessmen—even college professors—increasingly give the most cynical reasons for their most high-minded activities.

We smile with a knowing self-assurance as we explain that scandals in high places and the



misuse of positions of national trust simply go to prove that politics is politics.

Northern officeseekers assure their Southern colleagues that they vote for Negro rights only because of the political pressures back home.

Businessmen contributing to boys' summer camp funds and hospital building drives rush to cover up their decent motivations by pointing out that it is good publicity for their business—and after all, isn't it tax-deductible?

In regard to foreign aid we indulge ourselves in the same labored, cynical rationalizations instead of proudly presenting this crucially important program for what it is: an earnest, unprecedented effort to help new nations ease poverty, illiteracy, and disease so that they can remain free within their own cultures. We explain that our real purpose is to buy friends and supporters in the United Nations, or to keep restless peasants and workers from asking hard questions, or to fill empty bellies on the mistaken assumption that well-fed peasants will more easily tolerate the injustices and harassments of the feudal societies in which they live and thus joyfully join us in support of the *status quo*.

The constructive leadership of America is now challenged, not simply to stand up to the Russians but to understand the nature of our revolutionary world, to explore the forces at work in Communist societies, and to put itself in touch with the aspirations of the people in between—the men, women, and children of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who see our planet as something more than an arena for Soviet-American conflict.

As we move to meet this challenge, we may be reminded of the words of Woodrow Wilson, who once told a graduating class at Annapolis:

“There have been other nations as rich as we; there have been other nations as powerful; there have been other nations as spirited; but I hope we shall never forget that we created this nation, not to serve ourselves, but to serve mankind. . . . No other nation was ever born into the world with the purpose of serving the rest of the world just as much as it served itself.”

## Air Transport Policy Approved by President

White House press release dated April 24

The President on April 24 approved a statement of U.S. international air transport policy<sup>1</sup> submitted to him by an interagency steering committee.

The President appointed the committee in September 1961 to determine whether U.S. air policies developed since 1944 can adequately serve U.S. interests in the future. In approving the new statement of policy, the President said:

The United States air transport policy takes into account all of the U.S. interests: the health and growth of our carriers, the contributions which air transport can make to our national security, and, above all, the needs of the consumer—the traveler and shipper. It does so in a way which considers the legitimate needs of other nations and the basic principles under which we conduct our international relations. I am directing the officials of this Government concerned with air transport to be guided by this policy statement in carrying out their statutory responsibilities.

The steering committee was assisted in developing its report by a basic study conducted by two research firms, Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., and Systems Analysis and Research Corp. U.S. international flag carriers, the Air Transport Association, labor unions, and other organizations concerned with the policy also contributed to the study. In addition, these groups gave the committee members directly the benefit of their views on the proposed policy.

The members of the steering committee were: N. E. Halaby, Federal Aviation Agency, *chairman*; Kenneth R. Hansen, Bureau of the Budget, *executive secretary*; Alan S. Boyd, Civil Aeronautics Board; Hollis B. Chenery, Agency for International Development; G. Griffith Johnson, Department of State; C. Daniel Martin, Jr., Department of Commerce; Frank K. Sloan, Department of Defense.

Representatives of the Council of Economic Advisers also participated in the work of the committee.

---

<sup>1</sup> A limited number of copies are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

## The Case for International Law

*Following are the texts of addresses made by Stephen M. Schwebel, Assistant Legal Adviser, Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, and Francis T. P. Plimpton, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C.*

### ADDRESS BY MR. SCHWEBEL, APRIL 25

Press release 219 dated April 24

#### THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW

Our theme is the legal accommodation of contending systems. The principal forum for such accommodation is the United Nations. Whether the United Nations is more than a forum for international accommodation is in fact one of the main subjects of dispute among contending systems. The dispute over the function of the United Nations is important in itself and as an indicator of the approach of states to the development of international law. Let us measure contending systems against their attitude toward international organization, with this caveat: that the systems are not systematic. It is plain that, if one speaks of a Western approach to the United Nations, or an unaligned approach, or the approach of the less developed countries, or even a Communist approach, one speaks in general terms which admit of exceptions.

By the way, I use the word "Communist" advisedly. I note that the advance program of this distinguished society, in its panel on "The Status of Competing Claims To Use Outer Space," had these entries: "Professor Taubefeld: An American Viewpoint"; "Signor Florio: A Small-Country Viewpoint" (from

San Marino); and "Speaker to be announced: A Socialist Viewpoint." Who was that to be? Not Norman Thomas, since we already have an American viewpoint. Harold Wilson perhaps? Gunnar Myrdal? Or Paul-Henri Spaak? Or could it be that the use of the word "Socialist" was a euphemism, as it is in the present title of the entry, "Some Comments on the Socialist Position"? Recalling the homage that is paid to virtue by what is not virtuous, perhaps we should take comfort in the practice of the Communists calling themselves Socialists. At any rate, while I may have to pull some punches this evening, I boldly propose to call Communists Communists.

An element of the Communist approach to the United Nations is what Dag Hammarskjold called "the conference concept." In the introduction to his last annual report,<sup>1</sup> the Secretary-General put it this way:

... certain Members conceive of the Organization as a static conference machinery for resolving conflicts of interests and ideologies with a view to peaceful co-existence, within the Charter, to be served by a Secretariat which is to be regarded not as fully internationalized but as representing within its ranks those very interests and ideologies.

Hammarskjold contrasted with what clearly was and is the Communist approach the view of other members:

Other Members have made it clear that they conceive of the Organization primarily as a dynamic instrument of Governments through which they . . . should seek such reconciliation but through which they should also try to develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf of all Members, and aiming at forestalling conflicts and resolving them . . . in a spirit of objectivity and in implementation of the principles and purposes of the Charter.

These other members take the conference concept

---

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/4800/Add. 1.

. . . only as a starting point, envisaging the possibility of continued growth to increasingly effective forms of active international cooperation, adapted to experience. . . .

and served by a genuinely international secretariat which is responsible to the organization alone.

#### **Support for "Executive Concept" of U.N.**

Now, a vital fact is that what Hammarskjöld describes as the "executive concept" of the United Nations is a concept that is shared among the Western Powers and the unaligned, among the more developed and less developed countries. There are few facts of more importance to the future potential, as well as the present-day effectiveness, of international law.

The significance of that fact is that the bulk of what is loosely termed the free world is following a policy and practice which is progressively developing international law through the development of international organization. The policy is not coherent, the practice is not pervasive, the progress is not steady. But the trend is there. It can hardly be denied that, for the most part, the United States has given its strong support to the "executive concept" of the United Nations and that the great majority of the smaller countries of the world have as well.

The Congo is a case in point. The Security Council adopted decisions of a far-reaching character, decisions which carry the force of law, or, at least, such force as international law possesses. Those decisions, of course, bind not only the members of the Council but all members of the organization, if not nonmembers. The General Assembly, for its part, adopted binding decisions for the financing of the organization's operations in the Congo and various recommendations which the Security Council rendered binding by incorporation by reference in its own resolutions. The Secretary-General was entrusted with large powers which he implemented with vigor and, on the whole, with success. The outcome of the enterprise is as yet unsettled. Aspects of it are disquieting: for example, the poor response of the membership in meeting its financial obligations flowing from the Congo effort. Yet it is clear that the Congo represents a progressive development in the powers of international organization, that it

is an innovation in collective intervention which obviated the necessity of application of collective security. Moreover, it represents a victory in the preservation, as well as the development, of the powers accorded the organization by the charter, for it marked the rejection of the Soviet attempt to destroy the international character of the Secretariat.

#### **Newer States' View of International Law**

Now granting that, by and large, the free world stands together in developing the law of international organization, is it split apart in its appreciation of the remainder of international law? In particular, do the less developed countries tend to view much of customary international law as colonialist and obsolete, as a Western creation which does not, or at least should not, bind those who often had little and in many cases nothing to do with its creation?

There is unquestionably sentiment of this kind. There is even some thought of this kind, though more sentiment than thought. As a rule, questioning of whether the newer states should be bound by the rules and institutions of the international community to which they have acceded is on a high level of generality. When one comes to specifics, one finds that the newer states and the less developed countries, some of which are not "new," do not offer a great deal which illustrates such vague feelings of discomfort as they may have or are alleged to have.

It is all very well to say that that Western creature, international law, is colonialist and obsolete, but, when one takes a closer look at the body of international law, there is less certainty about what in the Western legacy one should discard and what in another tradition one should add. We can all do without letters of marque and reprisal and without a regime of capitulations. In fact, we do do without them. Now what else? Someone is certain to say: the minimum standard in international law, particularly as it applies to the treatment of foreign property; surely here we have an area in which the less developed countries challenge the rule of customary international law, and with some precision.

For the most part, that is true. What is equally true, however, is that, in this area as in

others, the less developed countries approach international law with a pragmatic self-interest (which does not characterize their approach alone). Consider the resolution<sup>2</sup> which the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its last session on the subject of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Having its source in one of their favorite themes—self-determination—the resolution incants another favorite theme of the less developed countries—sovereignty. The real issue posed by the resolution, however, is not whether nations have sovereignty over the resources within their jurisdiction—obviously they do—but how that sovereignty shall be exercised. The Communist bloc maintained, in the words of the delegate of Hungary, that the state “was sole judge in the matter and could brook no outside interference whatever in the exercise of its sovereignty.”<sup>3</sup>

Essentially its view was that there is no international law governing the treatment of foreign property. The Western members naturally took a contrary stand. What did the less developed countries do? Joining with the West, they adopted, by a vote of 87 in favor, 2 opposed, and 12 abstentions, a resolution which, the delegate of Bulgaria complained, comprised “a charter of foreign investment.”<sup>4</sup> The resolution provides that, where foreign property is taken, the owner “shall” be paid “appropriate compensation”—a standard which the United States delegation defined as prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The resolution further provides that: “Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith,” thus placing the authority of the General Assembly behind the view that contracts between states and foreign investors are made to be upheld.

Now, it could be true, as Professor Oliver Lissitzyn suggests in his perceptive paper on “International Law in a Divided World,” that this happy result stemmed largely from “fear of offending states that extend economic . . . assist-

ance” and from the desire to achieve the largest possible majority for an affirmation of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, “rather than solicitude for the existing norms of international law.”<sup>5</sup> If this be the case, this shows that the less developed countries, while not responding to existing international norms for their own sake, nevertheless uphold them because, in this case at any rate, they believe that their content makes sense—sense for their self-interest in attracting foreign capital. Such an enlightened sense of the national interest is no mean basis for a progressive and meaningful international law. Presumably it was an aspect of what gave birth to the rule of the minimum standard in the first place.

Differences between the approach to international law of the less developed countries and of the West and Japan should not be minimized. But neither should they be exaggerated. Customary international law is largely Western in origin. But much of it, such as the law of diplomatic immunities, springs not from a specifically Western tradition but from the necessities of a law regulating states. Other elements of it, such as the minimum standard in the treatment of aliens, have close connections with the rule of law and respect for human rights—elements of the Western tradition of which every man may be proud and which have, or should have, universal appeal. As the states of the world join together in the continuing United Nations process of codification and progressive development of international law, newer as well as older states should be afforded a sense of participation in the refinement and growth of international law which should conduce to its relatively universal acceptance and application.

#### **Soviet Attitude Toward United Nations**

What of the Soviet bloc? Its attitude toward the United Nations is straightforward in its backwardness. It takes a profoundly restrictive view of the charter, of the powers of United Nations organs, of the effect of United Nations resolutions. As a rule it accentuates national sovereignty and depreciates international responsibility. Not only is its approach

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII).

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.2/SR. 846, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.2/SR. 849, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Oliver Lissitzyn, “International Law in a Divided World,” *International Conciliation*, March 1963, p. 47.

to the charter conservative; it is reactionary, for it would destroy the charter's farthest advance toward internationalism, which is found in article 100's provision for "the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff" and substitute the notorious troika.

At the same time, Soviet policy is not so rigid as to exclude a more expansive interpretation of the organization's authority, when on occasion Moscow judges the exercise of that authority will promote Soviet interests. Cases in point are the Soviet support of a broad view of the Secretary-General's powers at a time when Moscow apparently entertained misplaced hopes about Trygve Lie; its support of the Security Council's undertaking extensive responsibilities of a kind not expressly foreseen by the charter in the case of the Trieste statute; and its support, at various stages, of the plan for the partition of Palestine and of United Nations action in Suez and the Congo.

Moreover, Soviet jurists display a touching paternalism toward the United Nations Charter. It is Korovin who has discovered that the origins of the United Nations are to be traced to the Soviet-Polish Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Aid, concluded in Moscow on December 4, 1941. It is he who asserts that, at San Francisco, "it was due to the Soviet Government that the most progressive provisions [of the charter] were introduced: sovereign equality of states, the right of self-determination, human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . the development of colonies 'towards self-government or independence' . . . not to mention the red thread, running through the entire U.N. Charter, of the principles of peaceful coexistence. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

### Soviet Approach to International Law

And what of the Soviet approach to international law more generally? With a view toward finding out, I read a book published under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, written by a collegium of Soviet scholars, entitled *International Law: A Textbook for Use*

<sup>6</sup> Y. A. Korovin, "The United Nations Charter and Peaceful Coexistence," *Soviet Yearbook of International Law*, 1960 (as translated by E. M. Sohn).

*in Law Schools.*<sup>7</sup> Its title might better have read: "International Law, Chiefly as Misinterpreted and Misapplied by the U.S.S.R."

The book is interesting. It rings all the changes about peaceful coexistence, sovereignty, unequal treaties, and so forth. It contains a large dose of Russian nationalism and of Communist parochialism. I had not realized that the prerevolutionary contribution of Russia to international law was so substantial. I had not begun to realize that the postrevolutionary contribution of the Soviet Union to international law was so paramount. If I may sum up the impression with which the book leaves me, I would say that it attempts to demonstrate that a great progressive international lawyer of the 20th century was not Lauterpacht but Lenin.

Now, the Soviet Union does not place itself wholly outside the reach of international law. It acknowledges the universally valid character of much of it, while leaving itself free to interpret its contents freely, as, for example, by its doctrine of "unequal treaties." Not only is the Soviet Union a member of certain international organizations; it conducts itself in some respects in routine accordance with much of international law, such as diplomatic immunities. Where the sanction of reciprocity may be brought into play, the Soviet Union tends to comply with international law. More important principles of international law, and the ones it most loudly proclaims, it honors in the breach: for example, nonintervention (as in Hungary); nonaggression (as in Finland); and, assuming it to be a principle of international law, self-determination (as in the Baltic countries). Its scorn for international adjudication is well known.

However, we have peaceful coexistence. "Peaceful coexistence," the Soviet branch of the International Law Association assures us, "is a qualitatively new and higher stage in the development of interstate relations. . . ." "Naturally," it points out, "international law could not remain aloof from the triumphant march of this idea which is so vitally essential to the nations." Of what does this new revela-

<sup>7</sup> Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of State and Law, *International Law: A Textbook for Use in Law Schools*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow (no date).

tion consist? Of this, says the Soviet branch: "There is no longer any right to war, but each state possesses the right to peace. This is the major content of the principle of peaceful coexistence in the framework of present-day international law."<sup>8</sup>

To my mind, this "qualitatively new and higher stage" in international law, which, mind you, is the contribution of no less a personage than Lenin, ranks with Korovin's discovery of the origins of the United Nations Charter.

Of course, one may say that if, as Communist spokesmen themselves often indicate, "peaceful coexistence" is no more than a phrase which sums up the essence of the charter, albeit passively, it is harmless enough. Obviously all of us hope that the nations of the world will exist in peace. If the Communists—or rather, some Communists—concede that much, we should welcome it.

We should indeed, while at the same time recognizing the content of the concept of peaceful coexistence as it is authoritatively expounded not in the United Nations but, for example, before the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties on January 6, 1961, by N. S. Khrushchev:

Peaceful coexistence helps to develop the forces of progress, the forces struggling for socialism, and in capitalist countries it facilitates the activities of Communist Parties and other progressive organizations of the working class. It facilitates the struggle that the people wage against aggressive military blocs, against foreign military bases. It helps the national liberation movement to gain successes. Thus, the policy of peaceful coexistence, as regards its social content, is a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena.

All this is not to say that such present degree of communication and understanding as we have with the Communist world should not be encouraged and developed. To the extent that the Communist world, or part of it, is willing to cooperate in the construction of a more effective, and genuinely universal, international law, we should of course cooperate with it. Our true mutual interest in a more meaningful international law need not be elaborated.

<sup>8</sup> Soviet Association of International Law, *Report by the Committee on Peaceful Coexistence*, Brussels, 1962, pp. 1, 3.

Nor can hope for better things be abandoned. As Professor Lasswell reminds us:

"... the doctrines of any political system are open to changes of many kinds, particularly in the intensity with which they are held and the specific interpretations to which they give rise. Considering the sobering realities of the world picture, it is well within the range of possibility that totalitarian leaders will come to believe . . . that the common peace is to be preferred to common disaster, and that the conditions of at least minimum public order can be achieved at bearable cost."<sup>9</sup>

#### ADDRESS BY MR. GARDNER, APRIL 26

Press release 229 dated April 26

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

In his latest book, *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, Herman Kahn imagines a nuclear war with "millions, perhaps tens of millions of people killed," which is suddenly called off when President Kennedy sends Chairman Khrushchev a copy of *World Peace Through World Law* by Louis Sohn and Grenville Clark and proposes that they adopt the book's proposals forthwith.

Kahn has the President say to Khrushchev:

There is no point to your reading this book; you will not like it any more than I did. I merely suggest you sign it right after my signature. This is the only plan which has even been roughly thought through; let us therefore accept it.

Thereupon Kahn has Chairman Khrushchev "accepting the offer and signing."

Like this charming allegory, much current discussion about the control of violence in the nuclear age is at once apocalyptic and utopian. We are told that unless a particular brand of utopia is accepted—whether it be called "world peace through law" or "general and complete disarmament"—we are doomed to incineration in a nuclear holocaust.

Too often the spokesmen for a particular brand of utopia are satisfied merely to state the stark alternatives. Few of them stop to answer

<sup>9</sup> McDougal and Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (1961), introduction by Harold D. Lasswell, pp. xxii-xxiii.

the question: "How do we get from here to utopia?"

I do not pretend to know the answer to this question. But I suspect it is composed of a number of elements, among them, the maintenance of our deterrent capacity, the building of the material basis of freedom through aid and trade, and the development of the political cohesion of the free world through regional and functional organization.

Tonight I should like to emphasize another element of the answer: the development of the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations.

There are two sides to the U.N.'s peacekeeping coin:

The first side, which corresponds roughly to chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, is preventive diplomacy—measures of pacific settlement to keep disputes from erupting into violence.

The second side, which corresponds roughly to chapter VII of the charter, is international policing action to contain violence and prevent it from widening into a global conflict.

### **Avoiding Global Conflict**

How do these peacekeeping functions of the United Nations help us get "from here to utopia"? They do so in two principal ways:

In the *first* place, they help avoid global conflict and preserve the values of a free society during the dangerous ideological, political, and military confrontation in which we now find ourselves. This value of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role is fairly well understood.

—The U.N. serves as a *forum* for ventilating grievances and for mobilizing public opinion and political pressure against breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

—The U.N. serves as a center of *negotiation* in which the settlement of disputes can be sought through quiet diplomacy, with the special advantage of a "third man" in the person of the Secretary-General to get negotiations started where neither side is willing to take the first step.

—The United Nations is an *action* agency able to mount economic, administrative, and policing operations in situations where action by one country or even a group of countries

might prove politically inexpedient. The United Nations has special advantages of acceptability and noninflammability because its actions are taken in the name of the community of nations as a whole.

It is often said in criticism of the United Nations that it has not been able to keep the great powers together. The point is, however, that the U.N. has been able on numerous occasions to keep the great powers apart.

In disputes between small states, or in areas where the withdrawal of a colonial regime has left a power vacuum, the involvement of the United Nations through debate, negotiation, or a peacekeeping "presence" has helped insulate a potentially dangerous situation from the cold war.

And even in confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States, the United Nations has demonstrated its value as a vehicle for great-power disengagement. In the recent Cuban crisis, for example, the United Nations offered a valuable channel of negotiation which helped keep Soviet ships clear of our quarantine fleet. It also indicated future potential, when both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to U.N. inspection in Cuba to verify the withdrawal of Soviet missiles.

### **Creating a Disarmed World Under Law**

In the *second* place, and beyond these immediate benefits, the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations are an indispensable element in plans to escape from the balance of terror and to create a disarmed world under law.

This value of the U.N. as a peacekeeping agency is less well understood. But in getting us from here to utopia it is scarcely less important. For if general and complete disarmament is ever to be achieved, there will have to be a major buildup in the U.N.'s peacekeeping role—its capacity for peaceful settlement and for controlling international violence by all means, including the employment of international peace forces.

The fact is that nations will never be willing to eliminate their arms until they have some substitute means of protecting their territorial integrity and vital interests. As President



Kennedy told the U.N. General Assembly in September 1961:<sup>10</sup>

To destroy arms . . . is not enough. We must create even as we destroy—creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons.

The United States draft outline of a disarmament treaty<sup>11</sup> recognizes the inescapable relationship between peacekeeping and disarmament when it states at the outset that the objective of the treaty is to insure that disarmament is accompanied

. . . by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The outline goes on to specify a number of measures for the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role—among them, the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the improvement of nonjudicial methods of peaceful settlement, the establishment of a U.N. peace observation corps for information and factfinding, and the build-up by the end of the disarmament process of a U.N. peace force with "sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it."

This recognition of the importance of developing the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity in order to get us from here to utopia is one of the major points separating the Western countries and the Communist bloc.

It is an unhappy fact of life that the Soviet Union has never accepted this concept of a disarmed world under law. The most highly publicized difference between ourselves and the Soviets has been on the subject of inspection. But our difference on the peacekeeping role of the United Nations has been no less wide and no less fundamental.

Some 18 months ago, during the summer of 1961, we engaged in lengthy negotiations with the Soviets in Washington, Moscow, and New York on a draft statement of principles governing general and complete disarmament. At the end of the negotiations we did achieve an agreed

statement<sup>12</sup> which noted, among other things, that the goal of negotiations is not only general and complete disarmament but also

. . . the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

As a matter of fact, the joint statement not only provided for the establishment of a United Nations peace force but specified:

Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

As a result of this agreement, some people were encouraged to believe that the Soviets had at long last accepted the need for the building up of worldwide law and law enforcement as an accompaniment to general disarmament.

These hopes were quickly destroyed. In the negotiations which followed in Geneva Soviet spokesmen attacked the emphasis placed by Western delegations on the relationship between disarmament and peacekeeping. Indeed, the Soviet delegate, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, had this to say:

In the statements of the Western representatives a definite distortion of view is discernible. The fact that disarmament itself will be the surest and most certain means of securing peace and the security of States is disregarded. When the means of waging war are destroyed, when States dispose of neither armies nor armaments, no one will be able to start a war and no one will be able to apply force or the threat of force in international relations.

This Soviet position, of course, is sheer nonsense. The magnitude of the nonsense is revealed when one notes that under the Soviet disarmament plan nations would be permitted to maintain, even at the end of the disarmament process, national forces for the "safeguarding of frontiers." Without effective international measures for settling disputes and suppressing aggression, it is only too obvious that these forces, and even citizens armed with ordinary firearms, could be used to threaten the security of other nations.

Indeed, bloc spokesmen in the disarmament negotiations have clearly reserved the right of

<sup>10</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

<sup>11</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

<sup>12</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

Communist countries to continue to pursue their goals of world domination in a disarmed world through indirect aggression and subversion and so-called "wars of national liberation."

To be sure, the Soviets pay lipservice to the concept of peacekeeping. But their concept is devoid of substance. The disarmament plan tabled by the Soviets proposes a United Nations peace force operating under the Security Council (where they have a veto) and controlled by a military troika (where they would have another veto).

The informed public is reasonably well aware of one obstacle to progress on disarmament—the refusal of the Soviets to accept effective inspection. We should do much more to develop public understanding of the second obstacle to progress—the Soviet approach to the peacekeeping issue.

Khrushchev has made great play of his 4-year plan for general and complete disarmament. But no one is entitled to a hearing on his brand of utopia unless he has a serious proposal on how to get there. The Soviets have steadfastly shut their eyes to the peacekeeping problem. They cannot claim sincerity about general and complete disarmament until they are prepared to face up to it.

### Aspects of U.N. Peacekeeping Role

In the 17 years of its existence the United Nations has demonstrated a significant capacity for keeping the peace. Some aspects of its peacekeeping role have followed lines clearly anticipated at San Francisco. Others have taken directions which the framers of the charter did not anticipate.

In the field of *pacific settlement*, the Statute of the International Court of Justice approved together with the charter provided impressive machinery for judicial settlement. In addition the charter itself offered pacific settlement through nonjudicial machinery, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, resort to regional arrangements, and discussion by the Security Council and General Assembly.

Looking back over the last 17 years, I think we must admit candidly that the original hopes

for judicial settlement were somewhat exaggerated.

The International Court has had comparatively little business—about two cases a year on the average. Few countries have been willing to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court without reservations. And the adversary proceedings brought to the Court as a result of voluntary agreement between the parties have been relatively few.

The main reason for this has not been, as some people assert, that international law is too vague or ambiguous. It is rather that there are relatively few disputes which both parties are willing to have decided on the basis of the existing law.

The major conflicts of our time are typically "nonjusticiable" in the sense that at least one party is challenging the legal *status quo*. The disputes between the Soviets and the West over Berlin, between Red China and the Republic of China over Formosa, and between the Arab countries and Israel over Israel's existence, are obvious examples. Clearly these are not disputes which are susceptible to solution by judicial settlement.

This is not to say that the role of the International Court has been insignificant. The Court has performed a useful function in a number of adversary proceedings. It could render further useful service if states could be persuaded to be more forthcoming in taking justiciable disputes to it. Moreover, in its advisory jurisdiction the Court has acted with distinction as a kind of "constitutional court" for the United Nations system. In this latter function its recent opinion affirming the binding character of peacekeeping assessments more than justified its existence.<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, the primary means of pacific settlement in the last 17 years has been through nonjudicial machinery. The principal U.N. successes in this area are well known:

—In 1947 a U.N. Commission for Indonesia was able to help arrange a political settlement which gave independence to that country.

—In 1948 the U.N. Commission for India and

<sup>13</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30, and Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.

Pakistan helped achieve a cease-fire in Kashmir.

—In 1947–49 Count Bernadotte and Ralph Bunche served as U.N. mediators to help bring about an armistice between Israel and the Arab countries.

—In 1958, and subsequently, a U.N. “presence” in Jordan helped ease tensions between Jordan and her neighbors.

—Within the last year a U.N. mediator played a central role in bringing about a settlement in West New Guinea.

—And only in recent months U.N. intermediaries have helped ease relationships between the new Yemen Arab Republic and its neighbors.

Looking back across 17 years of U.N. experience in pacific settlement, one major theme is unmistakable. This is the impressive development of the political role of the Secretary-General.

The Security Council and the General Assembly have, as anticipated in the charter, made important contributions in pacific settlement. What the drafters at San Francisco perhaps did not fully anticipate was the potential importance of articles 98 and 99—the Secretary-General’s progress, to use Michel Virally’s apt description, from “moral authority to political authority.”<sup>14</sup> For some of the major accomplishments of the U.N. in pacific settlement have resulted from political initiatives taken by the Secretary-General or his agents.

#### U.N. Policing Actions

With respect to *policing*, the growth of the U.N. has been no less significant. Here the landmarks of accomplishment are equally well known:

—In 1950 the Security Council, assisted by the voluntary absence of the Soviet Union, authorized the defense of South Korea against Communist aggression.

—In 1956 the General Assembly established the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and made possible the resolution of the Suez crisis.

<sup>14</sup> Michel Virally, “The Political Role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” *L’Annuaire Français de Droit International*, IV, 1958.

—In 1958 the Security Council dispatched a U.N. observer group to Lebanon to help prevent the illegal infiltration of arms and personnel across the borders of that country.

—In 1960 the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in the Congo to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of that country.

These U.N. policing actions have involved personnel from 54 countries. In the Congo alone there were 20,000 U.N. troops contributed by 21 different members.

Just as in pacific settlement, the U.N.’s development in policing has also taken courses not fully anticipated at San Francisco. The framers of the charter placed primary emphasis on article 43 and the conclusion of agreements which would have made available to the U.N. contingents of national military forces for use in dealing with aggression.

As everyone knows, these agreements never came into existence. In their place the principal instruments for U.N. policing were two:

The first was the Uniting for Peace Resolution,<sup>15</sup> enacted in 1950, which provided for the calling of an emergency special session of the General Assembly at 24 hours’ notice upon the vote of any seven members of the Security Council in the event that the Council was prevented from exercising its primary responsibility for international peace and security. Under this resolution the General Assembly can make appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures including, if necessary, the use of armed forces. This was the instrument for the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

The second instrument for the U.N.’s policing role has been action of the Security Council. But, in the absence of the armed forces made available to it under article 43, the Council has called upon members to supply forces on an *ad hoc* basis, with much of the responsibility for directing those forces resting on the Secretary-General.

The Soviets have challenged the legality of carrying out the U.N.’s policing responsibilities. They have cited the so-called “principle of una-

<sup>15</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

nimity," by which they mean the U.N. can undertake and maintain policing action only with the agreement at every step of the way of all five permanent members of the Security Council. Such an assertion, of course, is a perversion of the U.N. Charter and of the veto provision. Certainly it was originally hoped that there would be sufficient unanimity among the great powers to enable the organization to require the mandatory action of all the members to repel aggression. But, in the absence of that unanimity, resort has been made to other provisions of the charter enabling the United Nations to maintain security through the voluntary action of its members.

The United Nations Charter does provide that a major power can prevent its own forces from being used for policing actions with which it does not agree. It does not provide that a major power can prevent *other* powers from using *their* forces in a course of action to which *they* have agreed. To put the meaning the Soviets do on the "principle of unanimity" is justified neither by history nor reason. It would condemn the United Nations to impotence and frustration—to being a debating society devoid of executive capacity.

It is true that U.N. policing actions have been carried out in ways which may not have occurred to the draftsmen at San Francisco. But this is no basis for challenging their legality or propriety. As Oscar Schachter has put it:<sup>16</sup>

There are certainly no logical reasons why the admittedly vague and imprecise language of the Charter must be restricted in meaning. The Charter is surely not to be construed like a lease of land or an insurance policy; it is a constitutional document whose broad phrases were designed to meet changing circumstances for an undefined future.

Some time ago Mr. Justice Stone noted in our domestic context:<sup>17</sup>

If we remember that "it is a Constitution we are expounding" we cannot rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its words, that which will defeat rather than effectuate the Constitutional purpose.

The principal constitutional purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of interna-

tional peace and security. The accomplishments of the U.N. during the last 17 years, both in pacific settlement and in international policing, have implemented that purpose through measures consistent with the charter and have provided a firm foundation for future efforts at building a stable world order.

### Plan To Strengthen U.N. Peacekeeping Role

Despite the considerable progress made during the last 17 years in the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping ability, we have no cause for complacency. Indeed, the accomplishments are still inadequate when weighed against the needs. This is true whether we measure the needs in terms of keeping the peace in the dangerous present or facilitating future progress toward general and complete disarmament.

There is no lack of proposals for strengthening the U.N.'s peacekeeping role. The problem is to select those which represent significant steps forward and which have some chance of political acceptance in the world in which we live. The following is a 10-point program which meets both tests and for which we shall seek support in the months ahead:

1. *The Political Role of the Secretary-General.* The continuing political role of the Secretary-General is a vital element in the U.N.'s effectiveness as a peacekeeping agency. To maintain this role, the Secretary-General should continue to use his senior aides and resident country representatives as agents in missions of peaceful settlement. Continuing efforts will also be needed to maintain the efficiency and political independence of the international Secretariat, without which effective peacekeeping cannot take place.

2. *Rapporteurs.* The League of Nations made successful use of rapporteurs or conciliators in contentious cases to report on the facts and recommend possible solutions. Greater use should be made of this device in disputes before the General Assembly and Security Council.

3. *International Court of Justice.* The present administration, of course, continues to support repeal of the Connally amendment, which provides that our acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court

<sup>16</sup> Oscar Schachter, "Review of Kelsen," *Law of the United Nations*, 60 Yale L.J. 189 (1951).

<sup>17</sup> *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 316, 320 (1941).

does not apply to matters within United States domestic jurisdiction as determined by the United States. It would be desirable to secure the acceptance by free-world nations of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, at least with respect to the interpretation of international agreements—matters which are clearly not within a nation's domestic jurisdiction. This is a possibility which merits careful consideration.

4. *International Law Commission.* Consideration also should be given to reconstituting the International Law Commission on a full-time basis. The Commission now meets only about 10 weeks each year. At its present rate of progress, it may well take 10 years to complete the three subjects which the General Assembly has assigned it on a priority basis—the Law of Treaties, State Responsibility, and the Succession of States and Governments—and at least 25 years to get through these and other important topics on the Commission's agenda. The codification and progressive development of international law is too urgent a matter to be dealt with on a part-time basis if it can be better dealt with. While the difficulties of putting the Commission on a full-time basis may be substantial, we are now in the process of taking a good look at the possibilities of overcoming them.

5. *U.N. Institute.* The General Assembly last December called upon the Secretary-General to study the feasibility and desirability of establishing a U.N. institute.<sup>18</sup> The institute would arrange programs to train personnel for service in the U.N. system in both diplomatic and development operations. It would also serve as a center for operations research in major areas of U.N. activity. Distinguished persons from member countries associated with the institute as faculty members, research fellows, lecturers, or seminar participants could be selected, on occasion, by the Secretary-General for important special missions. The United States warmly supports the establishment of the institute.

6. *Analysis of Peacekeeping Experience.* The Congo presented the U.N. with peacekeeping problems of unprecedented difficulty. It raised questions about the training, supply, in-

telligence, public relations, military command, and political control of U.N. peacekeeping operations. An intensive review and analysis of the Congo experience would help the U.N. do better in the future.

7. *U.N. Military Staff.* To promote the success of future peacekeeping operations, the Secretary-General needs an expanded military staff unit at U.N. headquarters. The recent appointment by the Secretary-General of a permanent military adviser is a step in the right direction.

8. *Earmarking and Training of National Forces for U.N. Use.* In future peacekeeping emergencies we must avoid the dangerous vacuum which might arise from delays in assembling U.N. forces. We must also avoid the erosion in the U.N.'s authority which would result from thrusting into peacekeeping actions national forces without special training in situations unique to the purposes and methods of the U.N. U.N. members should therefore be encouraged to train and maintain in readiness special forces which could be employed by the U.N. in peacekeeping emergencies. We welcome the decisions just taken by Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to establish a 3,000-man Scandinavian force available for U.N. service.

9. *U.N. Observer Corps.* The U.N. already has a Peace Observation Commission which was created in 1950. Observer corps have demonstrated their utility in the past and will continue to be needed in the future. For example, the U.N. is expected soon to undertake important observer functions in Yemen.

10. *Financing Peacekeeping Operations.* The decision of the International Court of Justice, accepted overwhelmingly in December by the General Assembly,<sup>19</sup> affirmed that peacekeeping assessments are binding on all members of the U.N. But the principle of collective financial responsibility has not yet become a fiscal practice as well as a legal theory. As of March 31, 1963, arrearages owed on the Middle East and Congo operations amounted to about \$100 million, of which \$63 million was owed by the Soviet bloc and \$14 million by France. Although some countries have started paying up on the peacekeeping accounts since the Interna-

---

<sup>19</sup> For text of a resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

tional Court ruling, there are still 46 countries who have paid nothing for the Congo and 24 countries who have paid nothing for UNEF. The minimum condition for maintaining the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity is the prompt liquidation of these arrearages, the application of article 19 against defaulting countries who are subject to its provisions, adequate provision by the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly for financing the Congo and UNEF operations during the last half of 1963, and sensible *ad hoc* financial arrangements for future peacekeeping operations which will accompany rather than follow the decisions to authorize such operations.

### Common Interest in Collective Security

The 10 points outlined above represent the commitment of the United States to the progressive strengthening of the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity. We can expect a large measure of support on many of these proposals from other countries of the free world. The same cannot be said, of course, of the Soviet bloc.

In recent years the Soviet Union has

—rejected in both principle and practice the independent character of the international Secretariat which is essential to effective peacekeeping,

—attacked as illegal the U.N. peacekeeping actions in the Congo and the Middle East, and

—refused to pay its assessed share of these peacekeeping operations.

These Soviet actions are disquieting. But they do not doom the U.N. to frustration as a peacekeeping agency.

The whole history of the organization—in Korea, the Congo, and elsewhere—proves that the contrary is the case. This will continue to be so as long as the United States and other free nations work together to maintain and strengthen the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency on the basis of the common interest of the vast majority of U.N. members in peace and freedom.

Communist obstruction alone will not destroy the U.N. as a peacekeeping agency. But the peacekeeping role of the U.N. could be jeopardized by a failure of support within the free world.

The fact is that the Soviet leaders are not the only ones who oppose the buildup of the U.N.'s capacity to keep the peace. There are even some Americans who proclaim that the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role, and particularly the peacekeeping provisions of our disarmament treaty, are a threat to our national security.

These American critics are prisoners of dangerous illusions which prevent them from understanding the thoroughgoing transformation in international relations wrought by the advent of modern weapons. In an age when the Soviet Union and the United States have in their arsenals weapons each of which has the destructible power of all the bombs dropped in the Second World War, in an age when no matter how many weapons one side may build neither side can escape unimaginable destruction in a nuclear holocaust, in an age when the danger of war by accident or miscalculation grows with the increasing complexity of weapons systems—in such an age there is no rational alternative but to develop a civilized system of collective security under the aegis of the United Nations.

Obviously the difficulties involved in building a disarmed world under law are enormous. But the difficulties of failing to do so are even greater. We must continue to struggle with the problem of getting from here to utopia.

Men who describe themselves as “realists” regard the peacekeeping provisions of the United States disarmament plan as visionary. They are mistaken. It is those who look forward to a world several decades hence without disarmament and effective peacekeeping who are the real visionaries. It is those who work untiringly for disarmament and the strengthening of the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency who are the down-to-earth realists.

### ADDRESS BY MR. PLIMPTON, APRIL 27

Press release 232 dated April 27; as-delivered text

#### THE UNITED NATIONS—VOTING PATTERNS AND FINANCING

The first fact I want to point out is a grammatical one. There is no more plural word than “nations,” yet we say “the United Nations is.” We can and should say “the United States *is*,”

for this is *a* state and *a* government, but the United Nations *are*—and I say “are” advisedly—emphatically not *a* state or *a* government and still less the superstate or super-government that some of our fellow citizens have conjured up by rubbing Aladdin lamps that shed more heat than light. As Stephen Leacock said, “It isn’t what people don’t know that causes all the trouble; it’s what they do know that isn’t so.”

I do not see how anyone—certainly not anyone in this room—can deny that, if civilization is to survive, international lawlessness must be supplanted by international law and governments themselves governed. But I think we just confuse our thinking if we accept the thesis—to some a Holy Grail and to others a sinister hobgoblin—that the U.N. is a super-government.

What the U.N. is is an association of 110 governments—plural—each somewhat jealously sovereign and independent and each, in the General Assembly, having an equal vote. I realize that the whole sometimes is greater than the sum of its parts, and I believe that this is true of the U.N.; but the U.N. cannot be much greater than the sum of its parts, and its parts are 110 governments, each working for its own national interest and each with one vote.

Let me pause on this matter of the equal vote in the General Assembly. I am sure that you have seen calculations to the effect that a majority of the votes in the General Assembly can be cast by countries that pay less than 7 percent of the U.N.’s budget and that you know that 55 of the 110 votes are Afro-Asian and that the Republic of Gabon, with 410,000 inhabitants, has the same one vote that the U.S. does with 180 million.

I remind you, by the way, that in the U.S. Senate, Nevada, with some 285,000 inhabitants, has the same two votes that New York does with 16,800,000 and that, with, to be sure, some assistance from the House of Representatives, the country does manage to survive. Were I not subject to confirmation by the Senate, I would be tempted to recall President Theodore Roosevelt’s request of Carl Akeley, the famous African hunter, that he bring back from Africa a couple of lions to be turned loose in the Senate.

“But,” asked Akeley, “aren’t you afraid they’d make a mistake?” “No,” said T.R., “not if they stay there long enough!”

The “one member, one vote” provision has been in the charter from the very beginning—indeed it is likely that the U.N. could never have been organized without it. It is even more likely that it will stay there, for it is hard to imagine a change getting the necessary two-thirds majority from 110 individual members proud of their sovereign equality.

But more important, the United States is getting along very well without such a change. Over the years the position of the majority of the U.N. members has generally coincided with that of the United States. We have generally been successful in securing the necessary two-thirds majority for recommendations we want and in preventing a two-thirds majority for recommendations we could not accept.

I must not give the wrong impression. The General Assembly has, particularly in the area of anticolonialism, adopted resolutions which we wish had been differently worded and some, recommending sanctions against South Africa, which we have opposed, and it is certainly true that the attitude of some of my colleagues toward colonialism is emotional to a degree that has to be heard to be believed.

Indeed, I am reminded of the small boy who wrote that the penal laws of the State of New York are very severe because they provide for death by elocution, and it is true that there are U.N. delegates who do not realize that a speech, to be immortal, does not have to be eternal.

But we must remember, I think, not only that we Americans were the very first anticolonialists, the very first revolutionaries (although the Daughters of the American Revolution seem to have forgotten it), but also that for a very long time every American politician felt it his duty to give a periodic anticolonialist twist to the British lion’s tail. We must likewise remember, in our occasional irritation with the uncommitted, that the slogan that governed our Government for generations was “no entangling alliances” and that we were not only the first anticolonialists but the first neutralists—now, if you please, a dirtyish word.



What we must and can and do hope is that Afro-Asian attitudes will broaden and mature as time goes on and that preoccupation with the dying issue of colonialism will be succeeded by occupation with the living issues of today and tomorrow.

#### **Facts About the "Afro-Asian Group"**

There *is* at the United Nations such a thing as an Afro-Asian group, just as there is a Latin American group, a British Commonwealth group, an Arab group, et cetera, and just as in our own Congress there is a farm group, a beet-sugar group, a silver group, et cetera. (You will notice that I do not say farm "bloc"—these days the Communists seem to have captured that noun for themselves.) Indeed, I have never understood why people who are thoroughly familiar with the political groups in our own legislatures should be surprised at the existence of similar groups in the parliamentary body that is the General Assembly of the United Nations.

When one has said "Afro-Asian group," one has not said very much. The term includes such firm friends as Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand; such varying kinds of monarchies as Morocco, Cambodia, and Saudi Arabia; such varying democracies as India, Tunisia, and Liberia; such varying neutrals as Burma, Somalia, and Ceylon; and the variations that come from the differences between former British and former French rule—in short, a many-colored patchwork quilt, in appearance one piece but in fact a loosely tied together miscellany of disparate and often conflicting interests and viewpoints, tending to vote together on any issue which has the tinge of colonialism but approaching most other issues with the diversity that characterizes their own dissimilarities.

The U.N. groups do play a leading part in U.N. elections, but here there comes into play the generally benign principle of rotation in office and in geographical distribution. Last year the President of the General Assembly was to be an Afro-Asian, and the majority of the Afro-Asian group nominated and supported that very experienced and distinguished Pakistani, former Foreign Minister and Judge of the International Court of Justice Sir Zafrulla

Khan, who with skill and determination performed the unprecedented miracle of getting the 17th General Assembly to finish its 96-item schedule some 28 hours ahead of schedule.

This year the Latin American group is to provide its nominee for the Presidency, and we are confident that an equally outstanding candidate will be forthcoming from that distinguished aggregation.

The groups, then, perform a useful purpose when it comes to elections.

As to other matters, I once made a tabulation of the votes of the Afro-Asians on every important political issue that came before the 16th and 17th General Assemblies. These included the Soviet attempt to make the office of the Secretary-General into a troika, the election of U Thant, the Soviet attempts to substitute Communist China for Nationalist China in the United Nations, the South Korea-North Korea question, atomic radiation, nuclear testing, disarmament, a decolonization target date, Tibet, Hungary, Cuban charges against the U.S., the U.N. bond issue, and the General Assembly's acceptance of the International Court of Justice opinion that the U.N.'s Middle East and Congo peacekeeping expenses are mandatory on its members, et cetera. In virtually every case (other than recommendations of sanctions against South Africa and Portugal) the majority of the Afro-Asians voted the same way as the U.S. did, the Soviet bloc to the contrary notwithstanding.

Those occupants of the extreme right-field bleachers in the American political scene who seem to think that the Communist states have somehow, with an Afro-Asian assist, captured the 110-nation General Assembly and are leading the U.S. around the East River by the nose simply do not know the box score. The box score I have given you is a fact, and I submit that the Daughters of our Revolution, when they try to evaluate the performance in the U.N. of the sons of other revolutions, should recognize that fact.

#### **The Financial Facts**

The next facts I would like to discuss with you are financial facts—the facts as to the finances of the U.N. and what the United States should do about them.

First, as to the facts.

The U.N. is in a financial crisis. As you all know, the trouble does not come from its ordinary operations, which are paid for from the so-called ordinary budget of some \$90 million a year. This covers Secretariat salaries, the expense of operating the headquarters building in New York, the costs of meetings and conferences, et cetera, and also smaller peacekeeping operations such as U.N. supervision of the Palestine, Kashmir, and Korean truces and cease-fires.

This regular budget is met by yearly assessments on the U.N. members made according to agreed percentages, determined by the General Assembly every 3 years as recommended by a Contributions Committee of experts on the basis, broadly speaking, of relative capacity to pay. The present U.S. percentage is 32.02, down from 39.89 in 1946.

A word as to the mystic figure of 32.02. Some of our best friends in the U.N. argue that the U.S. should be paying much more than that figure, on the ground that the Contributions Committee experts presently calculate our national income at 39 percent of that of the total U.N. membership and that that figure should be increased to some 44 percent after the allowances made (and they are made) to countries with very low per capita incomes.

The U.S. delegation has never accepted these contentions. The U.N. has recognized the sound principle that no organization should let itself get in the position of being financially dependent, preponderantly, on any one nation and has duly adopted a resolution that in principle no one country should be assessed more than 30 percent of the budget. Toward that figure the U.S. percentage has been dropping from its initial 1946 assessment of 39.89 percent.

As I have said, the U.N.'s financial troubles do not come from the regular budget assessment. These are pretty well paid up, and the arrears are not serious. The trouble is with the assessments for the U.N. forces in the Middle East patrolling the Gaza Strip armistice line and the U.N. forces seeking to bring peace and stability to the Congo.

The expenses of these two operations have been running at the rate of \$140 million a year. Serious opposition to assessing such amounts at

the regular budget rates developed, and, to get the General Assembly to pass any assessment resolutions at all for these operations, it proved necessary to assess the smaller members at much less than their normal assessment percentages. Because the U.S. was convinced that it was necessary in its interest to have the operations continue, it has made, pursuant to due congressional authorization, voluntary contributions over and above its regular 32.02 percent, covering virtually all the difference. This meant that its total contributions, assessed and voluntary, amounted to some 48 percent of the aggregate costs.

Even so, a substantial number of members failed to pay the assessments.

The Communist bloc refused to pay on the ground that such peacekeeping operations can be authorized and the expenses assessed only by the Security Council. (The Congo operation was authorized by the Security Council, but the Soviets claim that its mandate has not been complied with. The expenses of both operations were assessed by the General Assembly.)

The Arab countries, South Africa, France, and others refused to pay for at least one of these operations because they disapproved it.

Others, including many of the less developed countries, refused on the ground that they were too poor to pay.

Many claimed that the assessments were not legally binding and that therefore they didn't have to pay them.

As a result of all these refusals the arrears in the assessments for the Middle East and the Congo mounted alarmingly.

To meet the crisis, two principal steps were taken. First, the General Assembly authorized a \$200 million bond issue, repayable from regular budget assessments over a 25-year period, to permit the peacekeeping operations to be carried on during a breathing spell.<sup>20</sup> Second, the General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to whether the peacekeeping assessments are mandatory and binding on members.

As to the bond issue, only about \$74 million has been subscribed for by 58 countries other

---

<sup>20</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311, and July 23, 1962, p. 142.

than the U.S., which makes a total, including the U.S. matching subscription, of \$148 million.

On July 20 the International Court of Justice handed down its advisory opinion<sup>21</sup> that the Middle East and Congo expenses are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the U.N. Charter, which means that assessments to pay them are legally binding on the members. The General Assembly "accepted" the opinion on December 19th by a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions.<sup>22</sup> I emphasize the "accepted," for an amendment supported by the Soviet Union and France, whereby the Assembly would merely have "noted" the opinion, was defeated, with 28 votes for, 61 against, and 14 abstentions, thus clearly showing that the Assembly intended the Court's opinion to be its operating rule.

This means that article 19 of the charter is applicable and that a member will lose its vote in the General Assembly if its arrears amount to its last 5 years' assessments for all accounts lumped together—regular budget and peace-keeping. The formula works slowly, for most countries are pretty well up to date on their regular budget assessments, but as from January 1, 1964, the Soviet Union stands to lose its Assembly vote by what we regard as the automatic working of article 19, if it pays nothing for the Middle East and Congo operations before that time.

Despite the progress that has been made in recent months, the principle of collective financial responsibility confirmed by the International Court as a legal theory has not yet become a fiscal practice. There are still 46 countries which have paid nothing for the Congo and 24 countries which have paid nothing for the Middle East operation.

All countries, large and small, have a common interest in maintaining and strengthening the U.N. as a dynamic instrument of collective security in a dangerous world. If the U.N. is to

surmount its present financial crisis, the overwhelming majority of its members will have to accept the financial consequences of this fact. I am confident that they will.

#### **U.N. Benefits Are Worth the Cost**

But our difficulties with U.N. financing do not derive entirely from the attitudes of other members. There are some Americans who say that membership in the U.N. is too expensive for the U.S.

I have never been able to understand this argument. The total annual budget of the U.N. system—including the regular U.N. budget, the budgets of the U.N. specialized agencies, the U.N. voluntary programs, and the U.N. peace-keeping operations—amounts to something like \$500 million. The U.S. share of this is something like \$200 million a year.

Is this too high a price to pay for peace? It amounts to a little more than \$1 a year for every man, woman, and child in the United States. It is less than one-half of 1 percent of what we spend each year for military defense. It is less than the cost of one B-70 aircraft—a weapons system which the Congress has been urging the President to procure.

The real test of the validity of any expenditure is not its size or its proportion but whether it is justified in terms of what you get for it.

It is difficult to put a dollar sign on what the United States gets from the U.N. But I believe sober consideration of the record of the U.N. leads to the inescapable conclusion that its activities—in building the material basis for freedom around the world, in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes, and in containing brush fires which might trigger a nuclear holocaust—are clearly worth the cost to the people of our country.

It is not perfect, for it is a human institution, and, like all human institutions, it has its virtues and its faults. But when we contemplate what might be the cost if it were not there, I think we should be grateful that it is there to cost what it does cost.

<sup>21</sup> For a Department statement, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

<sup>22</sup> For text of a resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

## The Contribution of Women in a Changing World

*by Mrs. Katie Louchheim*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is a great pleasure to be with you today and to have this opportunity of speaking to District III of Zonta. I have long admired your clubs for your record of community service and for the imagination which prompted you to establish scholarships for women in aeronautics.

The choice of this field reflects your conviction that there is no area of man's knowledge, or of man's exploration, to which women cannot contribute. The point was proved by your fellow Zontian, Amelia Earhart, to whom the scholarships are a fitting memorial. Further proof can be seen every year in the young scholars from all over the world who have been winning Earhart awards since 1938.

Still further proof, if it is needed, can be found in this year's winners of the Federal Woman's Award. For 2 years I have had the privilege of presiding over the selection committee. Of the six award winners this year, two are in aeronautics. Mrs. Blanche Noyes of the Federal Aviation Agency, a brilliant flier, a winner of air races, is responsible for the Government's airmarking program. Mrs. Eleanor Presley of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, a physicist and mathematician, is a pioneer in the development of sounding rockets. One of last year's Federal Woman's Award winners, Miss Nancy Roman, a 36-year-old astronomer, designed the instruments for the orbiting solar observatory to be launched later this year.

These women, like your Earhart award winners, are riding the wave of the future.

To come back to earth, for most of us must be earthbound, I would like to talk with you about women's responsibilities and contributions on our own planet. Fortunately you members of Zonta are as deeply concerned with your own communities and with communities in other parts of this world as you are with outer space. Fortunately—because there is so much to do.

The Zonta Clubs are part of a great American institution. The clubwoman has come to be a permanent fixture on the American scene. She may be caricatured sometimes, but what would we do without her? In my years of traveling through this wonderful world, I have acquired a solid respect and admiration for the organized woman. What she can accomplish, and has accomplished, makes me wonder how civilization could have got beyond the Stone Age without a band of leopard-skin-clad ladies marching the populace out of the caves to a Cave Dwellers' Community Cleanup Council.

It is a fact that American women through their organizations have changed the faces of their communities. They have seen needs, and they have done something about the needs. They have buttonholed mayors and city councilmen and congressmen. They have wangled the money for hospitals and school buildings out of hornyhanded businessmen and paid part of the price out of their own pockets. They have given themselves in volunteer service to those hospitals, to school libraries, to clinics and camps for handicapped children, to activities centers for older people. You know this because you do all these things, and more, yourselves.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before Zonta International at Paterson, N.J., on Apr. 20 (press release 205 dated Apr. 19).

This kind of voluntary effort is an old American tradition. It grew and flourished in the peculiar circumstances of American history, in the sturdy atmosphere of pioneer settlements where neighbors had to help each other in order to survive. As you may realize, it is not a tradition in most other countries. Our American zeal for joining a multiplicity of organizations, especially women's organizations, has long astounded foreigners and even amused them. But this is a new era: Newly developing nations are looking for solutions to overwhelming problems, and it has occurred to the leaders of many of these nations that women's organizations can play a useful part.

You are probably aware that the American women's voluntary organization has become as much an object of earnest study by visitors from abroad as a Detroit assembly line, the National Institutes of Health, supermarkets, or the public school system. A meeting with a major women's group is an indispensable part of a well-balanced program for a visiting leader from a new nation, along with Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, or Disneyland. Women—and men, too—all over the world have heard about this unique institution of the American women's club. Many come to the United States expressly to find out how our women deal with school problems through the PTA, or float a bond issue, or raise money for medical research, or help get out the vote. They want to see how we recruit, train, and organize volunteers for community service.

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, we American women should be flattered, for in the past decade or so women's organizations have sprung up in other parts of the world, some of them more or less like our own or even direct offspring. When I visited Japan a year ago to meet with women's groups, I found myself surrounded by familiar labels. There are, for example, Japanese Leagues of Women Voters, Japanese Business and Professional Women and University Women, Japanese Girl Scouts—and, of course, Japanese Zontians. While Americans might not always recognize themselves in their counterparts, these transplants have adapted to different conditions and are contributing in their own way to the progress of women in other lands.

### Changing Status of Women

The rise of women's organizations in many of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America is one sign of revolutionary change—the swift or gradual change in the status of women. Those of you who attended last year's annual convention of Zonta heard the illuminating panel discussion led by your second vice president and my good friend, Marguerite Rawalt, on the kinds of discrimination which women still face—even in advanced countries. But, as Dr. Rawalt pointed out, much progress has been made.

In countries where they were held by tradition to a subservient role, women are emerging to play a larger part in national life. Girls and women have new, or larger, opportunities for education. With education, with economic development, with the relaxation of traditional barriers against their working outside the home, more women are earning money. They are acquiring economic rights and a degree of personal independence previously denied them.

In the field of political rights the changed status of women has been phenomenal. Of the 110 nations which are members of the United Nations, 95 give women full and equal rights. In 8 countries women have partial rights; in only 7 do they have no rights. And 66 of these nations have acted to assure women of political rights since the U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945.

Generalizations are misleading, of course, for these changes are taking place over a vast area, in many continents and countries. The rate of change varies from one country to another, and within countries, depending on history, religion, tradition, local attitudes; on whether the area is urban or rural, isolated or open and susceptible to influences from outside. But even in the most conservative Moslem nations, perhaps the most closed of societies, the winds of change are blowing.

There was an interesting illustration of this in Yemen a short while back, before the Republic was established. When the United States opened a legation in Yemen about 5 years ago, the only schools were Koranic schools, open only to boys. The wife of our chargé d'affaires organized a few classes in her house, for her own children and other children of the diplomatic

corps. Within 3 months a Yemeni Government official came to her and begged her to take his three daughters into her school. These three were followed by more Yemeni children, both boys and girls. The first Yemeni father's explanation for entering his daughters was illuminating. He said: "Unless our children, especially our girls, can be assured a modern education, our country has no future. We know that the Middle Eastern countries which have progressed in the last 50 years are those where schools have been established and where eventually women have been allowed to learn as well as men."

The reasons for the changing status of women are many and complex. One is the reason given by the Yemeni official. The leaders of the developing countries realize that a modern nation cannot exist with a backward female population. If they are to develop their resources, they need all their man- and woman-power, and they need it *trained*.

There is also an element of national pride. Officials from the newly independent nations of Africa, for example, who have visited more developed countries are impressed with the capability of the women. They are quick to grasp that a capable female population is a characteristic of development; therefore they want it at home. There is, too, a more personal and private source of pressure for the emergence of women—or at least for their education; that is the boredom of the younger educated men with uneducated wives.

The major pressures for the emergence of women come from the women themselves—from their own awareness that a better life is possible for them; from their own need to fulfill their potential. Women are part of the "revolution of rising expectations." They are coming to realize that they don't have to starve, or lose their babies, or be illiterate. They have discovered that other women—in Europe, or the United States—have more status and independence. They are tired, as an East African woman put it, "of being led like mules by our men."

In Africa, in Asia, in Latin America with its Moorish-influenced Spanish culture, women are casting off their social indifference and taking part in civic and political activity. Take

Venezuela, for example. Our Ambassador has written me: "Only a few years ago, women would not have dreamed of appearing on the streets offering anti-Communist propaganda for sale. Today women from the highest levels of the social hierarchy seem willing to come out and express themselves about the things they feel strongly for and against." They are forming organizations for self-education, self-improvement, and assistance to others. A good case in point, as you well know, is the Zonta Club of Guatemala. Its vital and dedicated career-women members have roused public interest in Guatemala City's neglected children and have made themselves personally responsible for a rehabilitation program in the detention home for adolescent girls. This is in the best tradition of community service.

#### **Widening Horizons of American Women**

We American women have always acknowledged that we were our brother's or sister's keeper. Recently our horizons have widened a thousandfold. American women are living and working all over the world. And as you know, perhaps from your own experience, an American woman who is transplanted from New York to New Delhi or from Wilmington to Ouagadougou puts the skills she acquired at home at the service of her new community. Like a good guest, she helps quietly with the host country's housework. She may help in a clinic or hospital. She may teach English in a local school. She may show a group of volunteers how to work together more effectively, simply by doing these things herself. Or she may organize a service club.

Here at home many of our large women's organizations have begun or expanded overseas programs. For some, foreign aid is a new frontier of service. One major American women's group raises funds to support community development and literacy programs in Central America and the Caribbean. Another shares its techniques of civic education with women in South America. A third conducts training seminars in voluntary organization for African women. You members of Zonta have helped build a village for refugees in West Germany. Now you are making possible vocational training for refugee Arab girls in Jordan.

But women's organizations are making an important contribution to foreign aid on their own doorstep. For they are the pillars of hospitality to visitors who come to the United States, under government or private auspices, to observe our techniques of business, industry, government, our schools and colleges, or our health and welfare services. To me the most interesting of these visitors are the women, relatively few in number, from the developing countries. Almost every one of these nations now has at least a few women strategically placed to influence their country's progress. They are the pioneering educators, doctors, social workers, and leaders of women's organizations. They are women who are helping to mold the changing pattern of life, women who will teach new ways to the masses of other women. These are the women who have been coming here as guests of our Government for a short period of travel and observation. As just one example let me mention Señora Marta de Lusky, a leader in many welfare activities in Guatemala, who visited us last year—and who happens to be a member of the Guatemala Zonta Club.

The foreign leader on such a tour has a glimpse of many American institutions—schools, factories, and farms; hospitals; juvenile courts; state and local governments—not to mention the scenery. (A recent ambitious visitor from India drew up in advance a long list of her interests, which included the Metropolitan Museum, a foam rubber plant, Antoine's restaurant in New Orleans, voting machines, and a Las Vegas gambling casino.) But the institutions which make the greatest impact are our voluntary organizations and the American home.

These study tours have proved to be an effective way not only to show our techniques and to demonstrate democracy at work. Many foreign visitors have a mental picture of America as a place where the living is easy and of Americans as spoiled, superficial, and immature. I remember, as typical of this view, a Japanese local political leader who was very critical of us when she arrived. After 2 months in the United States she confessed to

me: "Somehow I thought God had just given you Americans everything on a silver platter. Now I know that you work very hard for what you have."

There was a group of Latin American social workers who were prepared to find us "essentially complacent, homogeneous, and standardized." They were astonished and delighted, they said, to discover "a perpetual soul-searching and astringent self-analysis, and a great diversity of opinion on practically everything."

It also comes as a pleasant surprise to our visitors to find the widespread assumption abroad that segregation is practiced everywhere in our country is equally far from the truth. This was brought home to me in a poignant moment at a tea party I gave to welcome some newly arrived African schoolteachers. As they were leaving, one of the African women asked to say a few words. "Before taking off for America," she told me, "we all had grave hesitations about whether we should come. We were not sure that you really wanted us; we did not know how we would be received. But today you have convinced us that we are truly welcome."

To many of our visitors the American woman and American family life are the greatest surprises of all. "I supposed," a young Nigerian newspaperwoman admitted, "that the typical American housewife moved leisurely around in the morning, wearing a beautiful housecoat and pressing buttons for everything she wanted. After staying with a few families, I realize that she works as hard as any Nigerian housewife."

The American woman's sense of public responsibility, and the efficiency of her volunteer service, arouses the visitors' admiration no less than her devotion to her private life. But they discover, too, that the sharing of household burdens is what makes her community service possible. More than New York skyscrapers or our vast distances, visitors remember that the American husband mows the lawn and helps with the marketing; that the children set the table and wash the dishes; that babysitters make it possible for young American couples to spend an evening out together, whether at the movies or at the PTA.



## Hospitality of American Homes

It is through the warm hospitality of American homes that our visitors make these discoveries. And generally the homes are opened to them through the generosity and interest of community organizations such as your own Zonta Clubs. You are, I am sure, also supplementing the Government's programs through exchanges of visits with Zontians of other countries. You are doing so much that I would hesitate to ask you to do more. But if you are inspired to stretch your hospitality further, I have a suggestion. It is a suggestion I have passed along to Marguerite Rawalt, but I would like to take this occasion to mention it to you.

Most of the personnel of the various national missions to the United Nations never have a chance to see anything of the United States except New York City. Their view of our country is limited to the steel and concrete canyons of Manhattan; or perhaps they get as far afield as the closely built suburbs of Queens or Jackson Heights, where many of them live. A committee of the Conference Group of U.S. National Organizations for the United Nations is trying to work out a plan to give the U.N. mission staff people a little summer vacation and a glimpse of our picturesque and varied landscape—our hills and mountains, our lakes and seashores—and a feel of our small towns and villages in the country beyond the Hudson.

The idea would be that local chapters of organizations such as yours might invite one or two or three people to be their guests for a week. The U.N. guests could stay with a family, see the local sights, swim, walk, relax, and get a sense of the real America. Chapters could invite nationals of the country which most interested them. It would be a learning experience for hosts as well as guests. I leave the thought with you. I hope you will want to consider it.

Here is another opportunity for building bridges of understanding between Americans and other people. Women, I submit, have a special talent for building these bridges. They have a feel for the human element, for the

simple things which people have in common. They have imagination and sensitivity. And you, as women of an international organization, are particularly well equipped for this job of spiritual engineering. I salute you for what you are already contributing to friendship and understanding and for what I know you will be doing in the future.

## Clark Clifford Named Chairman of Intelligence Advisory Board

President Kennedy announced on April 23 (White House press release) the appointment of Clark Clifford as chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, effective April 24. Mr. Clifford succeeds James R. Killian, Jr., whose resignation as chairman and member of the Board was recently accepted by the President.<sup>1</sup>

Established by Executive order dated May 4, 1961,<sup>2</sup> the Board, in the performance of its advisory duties to the President, is responsible for conducting a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the several Government departments and agencies having responsibilities in foreign intelligence and related fields. Based on such continuing review and assessments it is the responsibility of the Board to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interest of foreign policy, national defense, and security.

In addition to Mr. Clifford the present membership of the Board is as follows:

William O. Baker, vice president for research, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J.  
Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, USAF (retired), Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Redondo Beach, Calif.  
Gordon Gray, Washington, D.C.  
Edwin H. Land, president, Polaroid Corporation, Cambridge, Mass.  
William L. Langer, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Dr. Killian, see White House press release dated Apr. 23.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of May 22, 1961, p. 774.

Robert D. Murphy, president, Corning Glass International, New York, N.Y.

Frank Pace, Jr., General Dynamics Corporation, New York, N.Y.

J. Patrick Coyne continues to serve as executive secretary of the Board at the direction of the President.

## Secretary Rusk Urges Americans To Join "Books USA" Campaign

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*

Press release 239 dated May 1

There is a great and growing curiosity about the United States throughout the world. Men and women of all nations want to learn more about this country—its history, its beliefs, its people, and the way they live.

The United States Information Agency tries to help satisfy this curiosity by stocking libraries abroad and supporting translations of American books into foreign languages. It cannot, however, supply enough books to meet the requests of foreign libraries, schools, and other institutions. Nor, I believe, should this country, built as it is so largely on voluntary organizations and private actions, expect the job to be done solely and completely by a Government agency.

Seven paperback publishers have undertaken a project to help fill this demand abroad for American books. It is called "Books USA." Under this plan, the publishers have made up packets of representative American books which they are offering for sale to the public at no profit. Four dollars will deliver, in the name of the donor, a packet of 10 books to a school, library, or other institution overseas.

The job of better informing peoples abroad about our land and its way of life represents a great challenge to all Americans, and "Books USA" offers a way of meeting this challenge. I urge every American to share in the responsibility of informing the world about our country by joining this campaign. An inquiry to Books USA, Box 1960, Washington, D.C., will bring you full details.

## United Nations Day, 1963

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS the United Nations symbolizes man's eternal quest for enduring peace with justice, and provides us with our most promising means for achieving that high purpose; and

WHEREAS the United Nations has, on numerous occasions during its brief life, clearly and forcefully demonstrated its value as a vital diplomatic forum in times of international crises; and

WHEREAS the United Nations, through its participation in programs for social and economic development, has provided significant material assistance and leadership throughout the world in efforts to raise standards of life; and

WHEREAS the United Nations actively sponsors and advances the cause of human rights; and

WHEREAS the United Nations serves the interests of this Nation by promoting humanitarian principles which we share; and

WHEREAS citizens of the United States should recognize the aims and accomplishments of the United Nations; and


WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the anniversary of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter, should be dedicated each year to making known the purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the United Nations;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby urge the citizens of this Nation to observe Thursday, October 24, 1963, as United Nations Day by means of community programs which will demonstrate their faith in the United Nations and contribute to a better understanding of its aims, problems, and accomplishments.

I also call upon the officials of the Federal and State Governments and upon local officials to encourage citizen groups and agencies of the press, radio, television, and motion pictures to engage in appropriate observance of United Nations Day throughout the land in cooperation with the United States Committee for the United Nations and other organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed,

DONE at the City of Washington this twentieth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-seventh.



By the President:  
DEAN RUSK,  
Secretary of State.

<sup>1</sup>No. 3533; 28 Fed. Reg. 4081.

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES**

**Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>**

**Adjourned During April 1963**

United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Consular Relations.	Vienna . . . . .	Mar. 4-Apr. 19
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 19th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 11-Apr. 5
ICAO Legal Subcommittee . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Mar. 18-Apr. 4
GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 18-Apr. 10
ICAO Facilitation Division: 6th Meeting . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Mar. 19-Apr. 6
ITU Administrative Council: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 23-Apr. 26
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-Apr. 5
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session of Special Working Group.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-Apr. 5
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources and Development.	Manila . . . . .	Mar. 27-Apr. 4
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Community Development.	Bogotá . . . . .	Mar. 27-Apr. 6
GATT Working Party on Relations with Less Developed Countries . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 28-Apr. 5
Inter-American Commission of Women: Executive Committee . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 1 (1 day)
OECD Agriculture Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 1-2
GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 1-5
International Sugar Council: 14th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 1-5
OECD Fisheries Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 1-5
WMO Fourth Congress . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 1-27
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Meeting on Terms of Aid.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 2-3
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 35th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 2-19
Central American Ministers of Government, Interior, and Security . . . . .	Managua . . . . .	Apr. 3-4
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Education and Training . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Apr. 3-6
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Regional Meeting on Certain Latin American Countries.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 4-5
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Antidumping Action . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 4-5
Meeting on Planning Methods of Accelerating the Alliance for Progress in Central America and Panama.	Managua . . . . .	Apr. 4-6
OECD Energy Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group on Energy Price Statistics . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 5 (1 day)
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 8-9
SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 8-10
ECAFE Study Week on Techniques of Construction Used on the New Tokaido Line.	Tokyo . . . . .	Apr. 11-18
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: 15th Annual Meeting . . . . .	Panamá . . . . .	Apr. 16-17
FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease: 10th Session.	Rome . . . . .	Apr. 17 (1 day)
Intergovernmental Meeting on Tuna Conservation . . . . .	Panamá . . . . .	Apr. 18-19
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 9th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 18-19
WMO Regional Association III (South America): 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 20 (1 day)
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 22 (1 day)
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices and <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party of Experts on Relation of Wage Differentials to Labor Mobility.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 22-23
OECD Energy Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 22-23
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 15th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 22-25
GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 22-25
GATT Council of Representatives . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 22-26
GATT Working Party on Procedures for Tariff Reduction . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 22-26

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 26, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Adjourned During April 1963—Continued

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Special Working Party.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 22-26
Inter-American Development Bank: 4th Meeting of Board of Governors.	Caracas . . . . .	Apr. 22-28
PAIO Executive Committee: 48th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 22-29
ICEM Executive Committee: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-26
OECD Energy Committee: Special Committee for Oil and Its General Working Party.	Rotterdam . . . . .	Apr. 24-26
IA-ECOSOC Regional Conference of Governmental Representatives at the Technical Level (Compensatory Financing).	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 24-26
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 29-30

### In Session as of April 30, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: 14th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 15, 1963-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting .	Bangalore . . . . .	Apr. 16-
U.N. Committee on Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 16-
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 18-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Special Meeting of the Council.	Colombo . . . . .	Apr. 22-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session and Committee on Illicit Traffic.	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 24-
WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-
IMCO Group of Experts on Facilitation of Travel and Transport: 2d Session.	London . . . . .	Apr. 29-
ICEM Council: 19th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-
ECAFE Working Party on Small-Scale Industries: 7th Session . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Apr. 29-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 11th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 29-
UNESCO Executive Board: 65th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 29-
IAEA Diplomatic Conference for Concluding a Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.	Vienna . . . . .	Apr. 29-

### In Recess as of April 30, 1963

GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. 15, 1962, until mid-1963).	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24, 1962-
---	------------------	-----------------

## United States Delegations to International Conferences

### 16th World Health Assembly

The Department of State announced on May 3 (press release 244) that President Kennedy had appointed Dr. Luther L. Terry, Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to be chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 16th World Health Assembly held at Geneva May 7-24.

The President also appointed Nathaniel McKitterick, director, Office of International

Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, and Dr. James Watt, Assistant Surgeon General and chief of the Division of International Health, U.S. Public Health Service, as delegates to the Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

The World Health Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations with headquarters at Geneva. Its work embraces international programs on a wide variety of public health questions. The Assembly meets annually to review the past year's work and to approve the budget and program for the coming year.

<sup>1</sup> For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, see Department of State press release 244 dated May 3.

## Improving U.S. Recruitment for International Staffs

The Department of State announced on April 28 (press release 228 dated April 26) the release of a report entitled "Staffing International Organizations"<sup>1</sup> prepared by its Advisory Committee on International Organizations.

The committee, made up of independent citizens prominent in business, industry, and the professions, was appointed by the Department in July 1962 to seek ways to improve the management of U.S. participation in international organizations. Chairman of the committee is Sol M. Linowitz, chairman of the board, Xerox Corp., Rochester, N.Y., and partner in the firm of Harris, Beach, Keating, Wilcox, Dale and Linowitz.<sup>2</sup>

The report includes 15 major recommendations to improve policies and practices followed by the Government in making U.S. citizens available for assignment to international organizations.

## Caribbean Press Secretaries To Meet at Oaxaca in August

White House press release dated April 23

Alfonso Salazar, Press Secretary to the President of El Salvador and chairman of the planning committee for the meeting of press secretaries and information ministers of the Caribbean countries, has announced a postponement of this meeting until August. The meeting was scheduled to take place in Oaxaca, Mexico, May 6 and 7.

Postponement came on the request of Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary to the President of the United States and secretary of the planning committee, who will be involved during the dates of the Oaxaca meeting in making advance preparations for the visit of the President of the United States to Italy, Germany, and Ireland.

<sup>1</sup> A limited number of copies of the report are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

<sup>2</sup> For names of the other members of the committee, see Department of State press release 228 dated Apr. 26.

The planning committee expressed its deep appreciation to the Government of Mexico for its agreement to hold the informal meeting in Mexico.

## Under Secretary Harriman To Head U.S. Delegation to ANZUS Meeting

*Department Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

As announced by the Government of New Zealand today [April 26] in Wellington, the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have agreed to hold the annual meeting of the ANZUS Council in Wellington on June 5 and 6, 1963. The last meeting was held in Canberra in May 1962.<sup>2</sup> Governor W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, will head the U.S. delegation. The ANZUS Council meets periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest under the terms of the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States which was signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

Letter dated March 2, 1963, from the permanent representative of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions on the Congo. S/5249. March 2, 1963. 5 pp.

Letter dated March 4, 1963, from the permanent representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding recent events inside the borders of South Arabian Federation. S/5250. March 4, 1963. 3 pp.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Apr. 26 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of May 28, 1962, p. 864.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Upper Volta, May 2, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Upper Volta, May 2, 1963.

##### Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone;<sup>1</sup> Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas;<sup>1</sup>

Convention on the continental shelf;<sup>1</sup>

Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

*Accession deposited:* South Africa, April 9, 1963.

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

*Accession deposited:* South Africa, April 9, 1963.

##### Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail, with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

*Adherences deposited:* Burundi and Rwanda, April 6, 1963.

##### Trade

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.

*Signature:* Norway, April 2, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Belgium

Agreement on the visit of the NS *Savannah* to Belgian ports, with annex. Signed at Brussels April 19, 1963. Enters into force on the date on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

##### Brazil

Agreement providing for a grant for assistance in obtaining materials and equipment for use in developing the Instituto de Biofisica de Universidade do Brasil radiobiological and research program. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro October 10, 1962, and March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963.

##### Colombia

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington April 9, 1962. *Entered into force:* March 29, 1963.

##### Greece

Agreement amending the agreements of July 2, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1786, 2025, 2238, 3139), and April 21 and 23, 1952 (TIAS 2568), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens April 19, 1963. Entered into force April 19, 1963.

#### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 29-May 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 29 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 205 of April 19, 219 and 220 of April 24, 228 and 229 of April 26, 231 of April 25, and 232 of April 27.

No.	Date	Subject
†233	4/29	Bowles: University of North Carolina.
*234	4/29	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†235	4/30	Blumenthal: Commission on International Commodity Trade.
*236	5/1	Morgan: "The Continuing Pursuit of Diplomatic Excellence."
*237	5/1	Rostow: statement on National Academy of Foreign Affairs.
†238	5/1	McGhee: "Foreign Policy and the Rule of Law."
239	5/1	Rusk: "Books USA" program.
*240	5/1	Hillsman: Philippine Foreign Service Conference.
†241	5/1	Rostow: "The Nationalization of 'Takeoff.'"
†242	5/1	Chayes: "International Organization and Space Law."
†243	5/3	Gardner: "The Politics of Population: A Blueprint for International Cooperation."
244	5/3	Delegation to 16th World Health Assembly (rewrite).
*245	5/3	Cieplinski: Polish Constitution Day.
†246	5/2	Travel to Haiti.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**American Republics.** Caribbean Press Secretaries To Meet at Oaxaca in August . . . . . 809

**Australia.** Under Secretary Harriman To Head U.S. Delegation to ANZUS Meeting . . . . . 809

**Aviation.** Air Transport Policy Approved by President . . . . . 784

**Economic Affairs.** The Atlantic Partnership: A Vital Force in Motion (McGhee) . . . . . 771

**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** The Contribution of Women in a Changing World (Louchheim) . . . . . 801

**Europe.** The Atlantic Partnership: A Vital Force in Motion (McGhee) . . . . . 771

**Foreign Aid.** Why Foreign Aid (Bowles) . . . 777

**Health, Education, and Welfare.** 16th World Health Assembly (delegation) . . . . . 808

**Intelligence.** Clark Clifford Named Chairman of Intelligence Advisory Board . . . . . 805

**International Information.** Secretary Rusk Urges Americans To Join "Books USA" Campaign . . . . . 806

**International Law.** The Case for International Law (Gardner, Plimpton, Schwebel) . . . . . 785

**International Organizations and Conferences**

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings . . . . . 807

Improving U.S. Recruitment for International Staffs . . . . . 809

16th World Health Assembly (delegation) . . . 808

Under Secretary Harriman To Head U.S. Delegation to ANZUS Meeting . . . . . 809

**Laos.** Premier Khrushchev Reaffirms Support for Neutral Laos (text of U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique) . . . . . 775

**Luxembourg.** Grand Duchess of Luxembourg Meets With President Kennedy (text of communique) . . . . . 776

**Military Affairs.** The Atlantic Partnership: A Vital Force in Motion (McGhee) . . . . . 771

**New Zealand.** Under Secretary Harriman To Head U.S. Delegation to ANZUS Meeting . . . 809

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The Atlantic Partnership: A Vital Force in Motion (McGhee) . . . . . 771

**Presidential Documents**

Grand Duchess of Luxembourg Meets With President Kennedy . . . . . 776

United Nations Day, 1963 . . . . . 806

**Public Affairs.** Caribbean Press Secretaries To Meet at Oaxaca in August . . . . . 809

**Treaty Information.** Current Actions . . . . 810

**U.S.S.R.** Premier Khrushchev Reaffirms Support for Neutral Laos (text of U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique) . . . . . 775

**United Nations**

The Case for International Law (Gardner, Plimpton, Schwebel) . . . . . 785

Current U.N. Documents . . . . . 809

United Nations Day, 1963 (text of proclamation) . . . . . 806

*Name Index*

Bowles, Chester . . . . . 777

Clifford, Clark . . . . . 805

Gardner, Richard N . . . . . 789

Grand Duchess Charlotte . . . . . 776

Kennedy, President . . . . . 776, 806

Louchheim, Katie . . . . . 801

McGhee, George C . . . . . 771

Plimpton, Francis T. P . . . . . 796

Prince Jean . . . . . 776

Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 806

Schwebel, Stephen M . . . . . 785



SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPT  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
DSB DEC -G-



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)

the  
Department  
of  
State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE • 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State, 1963*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then relates in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Publication 7530

\$1.50

Order Form

Publication 7530

\$1.50

Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *Department of State, 1963*

Enclosed find:

Name: -----

\$-----  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Street Address: -----

City, Zone, and State: -----

*Ac Ac*

9353 251



Vol. XLVIII, No. 1248

May 27, 1963

**PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER PEARSON OF CANADA HOLD TALKS** ● *Text of Joint Communique* . . . . . 815

**NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES' WORLD RELATIONSHIPS** ● *by Chester Bowles* . . . . . 817

**THE NATIONALIZATION OF TAKEOFF** ● *by W. W. Rostow, Counselor* . . . . . 824

**AID—INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE** ● *by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson* . . . . . 829

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SPACE LAW** ● *by Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser* . . . . . 835

*For index see inside back cover*

AL  
RECORD  
STATES  
N. POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1248 • PUBLICATION 75

May 27, 1963

*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson of Canada Hold Talks

*Following is the text of a joint communique issued on May 11 by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson of Canada at the close of their meetings at Hyannis Port, Mass., May 10-11.*

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated May 11

During the past two days the President and the Prime Minister have met together in this historic State where so many of the currents of the national life of the two countries have mingled from early times.

2. Mr. Pearson's visit to Mr. Kennedy's family home took place in the atmosphere of informality and friendliness which marks so many of the relations between the people of the United States and Canada. There was no agenda for the talks. It was taken for granted that any matter of mutual interest could be frankly discussed in a spirit of goodwill and understanding.

3. In this community on the Atlantic seaboard, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their faith in the North Atlantic Alliance and their conviction that, building upon the present foundations, a true community of the Atlantic peoples will one day be realized. They noted that questions which would be under discussion at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa would give both countries an opportunity to demonstrate their belief in the Atlantic concept.

4. Their Governments will continue to do everything possible to eliminate causes of dangerous tensions and to bring about peaceful solutions. In this task, they will continue to support the role of the United Nations, and to make every effort to achieve progress in the negotiations on nuclear tests and disarmament.

5. In the face of continuing dangers, the

President and the Prime Minister emphasized the vital importance of continental security to the safety of the free world and affirmed their mutual interest in ensuring that bilateral defense arrangements are made as effective as possible and continually improved and adapted to suit changing circumstances and changing roles. The Prime Minister confirmed his government's intention to initiate discussions with the United States Government leading without delay towards the fulfilment of Canada's existing defense commitments in North America and Europe, consistent with Canadian parliamentary procedures.

6. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson reaffirmed the desire of the two Governments to cooperate in a rational use of the continent's resources; oil, gas, electricity, strategic metals and minerals, and the use of each other's industrial capacity for defense purposes in the defense production-sharing programs. The two countries also stand to gain by sharing advances in science and technology which can add to the variety and richness of life in North America and in the larger world.

7. The President and the Prime Minister stressed the interest of both countries in the balance of payments between them and with the rest of the world. The Prime Minister drew particular attention to the large United States surplus in the balance of current payments with Canada and noted the importance of allowing for this fact in determining the appropriate policies to be followed by each country. It was agreed that both Governments should always deal in a positive and cooperative manner with developments affecting their international trade and payments.

8. The Prime Minister and the President

noted that encouraging discussions had recently taken place between Governor Herter [Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] and Canadian Ministers about the prospects for general trade negotiations and that these talks would be continuing with a large number of other countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva next week. The two Governments will cooperate closely so that these negotiations can contribute to the general advantage of all countries.

9. While it is essential that there should be respect for the common border which symbolizes the independence and national identity of two countries, it is also important that this border should not be a barrier to cooperation which could benefit both of them. Wise cooperation across the border can enhance rather than diminish the sovereignty of each country by making it stronger and more prosperous than before.

10. In this connection the President and the Prime Minister noted especially the desirability of early progress on the cooperative development of the Columbia River. The Prime Minister indicated that if certain clarifications and adjustments in arrangements proposed earlier could be agreed on, to be included in a protocol to the treaty, the Canadian Government would consult at once with the provincial Government of British Columbia, the province in which the Canadian portion of the river is located, with a view to proceeding promptly with the further detailed negotiations required with the United States and with the necessary action for approval within Canada. The President agreed that both Governments should immediately undertake discussions on this subject looking to an early agreement.

11. The two Governments will also initiate discussions shortly on the suitability of present trans-border air travel arrangements from the point of view of the traveling public and of the airlines of the two countries.

12. On the great waters that separate and unite the two countries—the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes—it is essential that those who own and sail the ships should be free to go about their lawful business without impediment of harassment. The Prime Minister and

President shared a common concern at the consequences which could result from industrial strife on this central waterway. They urged those directly concerned to work strenuously for improvement in the situation, and to avoid incidents which could lead to further deterioration. To help bring about more satisfactory conditions they have arranged for a meeting to take place in the near future between the Canadian Minister of Labour, Allan J. MacEachen, the United States Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz, the President of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, and the President of the Canadian Labour Congress, Claude Jodoin.

13. On the oceans that surround the two countries, while there has always been healthy competition, there has also been a substantial similarity of sentiment among those who harvest the sea. The need for some better definitions of the limits of each country's own fishing waters has long been recognized, particularly with respect to the most active fishing areas. The Prime Minister informed the President that the Canadian Government would shortly be taking decisions to establish a 12-mile fishing zone. The President reserved the long-standing American position in support of the 3-mile limit. He also called attention to the historic and treaty fishing rights of the United States. The Prime Minister assured him that these rights would be taken into account.

14. The President and the Prime Minister talked about various situations of common interest in this hemisphere. In particular they expressed a readiness to explore with other interested countries the possibility of a further cooperative effort to provide economic and technical aid to the countries in the Caribbean area which have recently become independent or which are approaching independence, many of which have long had close economic, educational and other relations with Canada and the United States. Such a program could provide a very useful supplement to the resources which those countries are able to raise themselves or to secure from the international agencies which the United States and Canada are already supporting.

15. Our two countries will inevitably have different views on international issues from time to time. The Prime Minister and the President

stressed the importance of each country showing regard for the views of the other where attitudes differ. For this purpose they are arranging for more frequent consultation at all levels in order that the intentions of each Government may be fully appreciated by the other, and misunderstandings may be avoided.

16. These preliminary discussions between the President and the Prime Minister will lead to a good deal of additional activity for the two Governments over the next few months. It is

expected that there will be almost continuous exchanges of views during that period as work progresses in resolving many matters of concern to the two countries. Then, in the latter part of the year, meetings will be held of the Joint Cabinet-level Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs and on Defense.

17. The Prime Minister and the President look forward to a period of particularly active and productive cooperation between the two countries.

## **New Perspectives on the United States' World Relationships**

*by Chester Bowles*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to return to Chapel Hill, where in fair weather and foul a dynamic liberal tradition has shown a continuing capacity to survive the fear and forebodings of the fainthearted.

These are decisive years involving unprecedented changes and challenges. Here at home the extent of these changes may be dramatized by the fact that half the jobs Americans are working at today did not exist when today's college seniors entered first grade 16 years ago.

Even more overpowering is the rush of events overseas. Let us consider the five most important.

First, there is the sudden, dramatic collapse of the old imperial system of colonial-mother country association, over which Europe had presided for almost 300 years. In the process one-third of mankind has broken its ties with the former colonial powers. Of the 110 nations in the United Nations, 43—nearly one-

half—have been created in this brief historical period and several more are moving in the direction of independence.

In the most remote villages of Asia, Africa, and Latin America old ways are being challenged and new pressures for change—political, economic, and social—are being generated. Major decisions affecting the people of Asia and Africa, which a few years ago were made in London, Paris, Brussels, or The Hague, are now made in new capitals such as New Delhi, Karachi, Rangoon, Djakarta, Lagos, and Dakar.

The realization that old life patterns so largely associated with illiteracy, political subservience, poverty, and injustice can be changed is a heady brew which, once tasted, cannot be recorked. The peoples of these awakening continents now know that the means exist by which their lives can be improved, and they are determined to improve them.

A second major change in our postwar world has been the growth of Soviet power. From the ashes of World War II the Soviet Union has risen from a second-class nation to an industrial, military, and nuclear complex of considerable strength.

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on Apr. 29 (press release 233). Mr. Bowles was the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs; on May 1 his nomination to be Ambassador to India was confirmed by the Senate.

Inevitably many frustrated Asian and African leaders have looked to Moscow with a mixture of awe, fear, and expectation. This is not stargazing. Anyone who *doesn't* look at Moscow today with the same sense of restraint with which one considers a heavyweight boxer of proven capacity and doubtful intentions is unrealistic.

The Soviets still graduate twice as many engineers as we do. They have made exceptional progress in the exploration of space. Their scientists are among the ablest in the world. And their conventional military power is second to none.

The hard fact is that both we and the Russians not only have the power to destroy each other but most of the world along with us. In this situation it behooves us to recall that the first 60 years of the 20th century have already produced an expansionist-minded Kaiser, a Hitler, a Stalin, a Mao Tse-tung, a Mussolini, a Tojo, and several dozen assorted Quislings, Trujillos, and Batistas. It is not a reassuring thought.

The third major change in the past 16 years has been the emergence of Communist China as the paramount power in East Asia, a dynamic, land-hungry, resource-hungry nation with an exploding population and clearly expansionist aims.

If this powerful new China cannot be persuaded to adopt a more moderate course, can it at least be *contained*? Or will a head-on conflict become inevitable? If the Chinese should push into the fertile valleys of Southeast Asia, such a conflict would almost certainly develop. The construction of an effective counterweight to China in this region should be given urgent priority on our national agenda.

The fourth major change of the postwar era has taken place here in the United States—our sudden emergence from World War II as the most powerful country in the world.

Our once-isolationist nation accepted this role with the greatest reluctance. Indeed, historians may report that we were in effect hauled kicking and screaming upon the world stage by the harsh pressure of events, much against the will of many of our fellow citizens.

Whatever the circumstances, we may take pride in the way we learned, almost overnight,

to adapt ourselves to an utterly new and unwanted role through such means as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, NATO, Point 4, Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps.

The fifth and final element in our new postwar world is the development of incredible technological, industrial, and military capabilities that are transforming the physical and moral environment of the entire human race. The speed with which new scientific discoveries are being turned to practical use—in ways often awesome in their destructive potential—is almost beyond our comprehension. Yet these advances have also opened up untold opportunities for constructive progress in medicine, industry, agriculture, and scores of other fields.

These, then, are the five major currents that underlie our world transformation. Wherever we turn, we see events being shaped and crises created by these five forces, either singly or in combination. We will ignore them at our peril.

#### **Interpretations of U.S. Role**

The question is not only what shape the new world will take as these forces act and react against each other. The question is, what will be our role? Indeed, will we *have* a role?

Historians will find it odd that in 1963 millions of presumably well-informed, contemporary-minded Americans were still wondering why we should be concerned by all this. How many doubtless are asking, do these distant turbulent continents, with all their built-in confusions and frustrations, affect the security of the United States?

The answer to any literate person should be clear: If the United States should be cut off from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it would face political and economic isolation. Deprived of such essential raw materials as manganese, tin, copper, zinc, and rubber and an overseas market for our manufactured goods, much of American industry would grind to a stop. With only 6 percent of the world's people in an increasingly antagonistic world, we would rapidly become a garrison, backwater state in full retreat from the future.

The decline of our European allies would be even more abrupt, for the new, burgeoning



Common Market is even more dependent than our industries on free access to the markets, minerals, and petroleum of the developing continents.

In the coming months we shall be called upon to make some critically important decisions on how to deal with this new world. If we choose the negative path of high tariffs, of disdain for the United Nations, of impatient attempts to impose our will on others as a requirement for American assistance, we shall run the grave danger of national destruction; at the very best we will see our great country, with its long tradition of democratic government, becoming increasingly isolated from the dynamic new world which might have been shaped along constructive, peaceful lines.

Another widely held view accepts the critical importance of our world relationships but assumes that in some magic way we can order the world to our way of thinking. In effect they see this current world struggle as a kind of gigantic football game between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., in which there must ultimately be a "loser" or a "winner," with the whole world sitting in the grandstand cheering or booing according to their democratic inclinations.

These paradoxical and somewhat arrogant interpretations differ dramatically from those of most peoples with whom we share this uneasy planet. Viewing the world situation in much more complex terms, they are particularly sensitive to the economic, political, and social changes to which I have referred. They contemplate the future in terms of infinitely new opportunities and infinite dangers, too—dangers for which, rather unreasonably, they believe the great-power conflict to be in large measure responsible.

In this context, one hot summer night 2 years ago in an Asian capital city, an embittered Cabinet minister described the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. struggle as a contest between two bull dinosaurs, each in his own way doomed to ultimate extinction by the physiological forces that determine the capacity to survive, but each presently acting as an all-powerful force with little regard for the rest of the animal kingdom.

Still other observers draw analogies to the long-drawn-out conflicts between France and Britain, or Britain and Spain, that occupied the

world in previous centuries. In a more sophisticated view the struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is often compared to that between Christianity and Islam, noting how the overt warfare of the great Crusades slipped gradually into the safe backwater of ideological disputes and finally into mutual acceptance, if not toleration, of the *status quo*.

### **Roadblocks in Communist Path**

Such reactions or explanations, however cynical, plausible, or learned, fail to go to the heart of the matter. Let us therefore see if we cannot bring the present conflict into a realistic perspective that will stand the test of time.

First of all, what is the Soviet Union striving to do?

In one form or another the objective has been stated by every Communist leader to be the building of an integrated Communist world society: in other words, ultimate domination of the world by one system of control.

In my opinion there is no conceivable way by which the world Communist movement can achieve this objective. The reasons that the Communists cannot win, whether led by the Soviet Union or any other Communist nation, are clear.

As a matter of simple fact the world is refusing to act as Communist ideology said it would or should—and the Communists can't cope with it.

In the Soviet Union and its European satellites a presumably classless society is producing a series of new classes—and they show up just as badly or worse than the former "imperialists." Indeed it is increasingly apparent in much of the world that the appeal of anti-imperialist slogans is most legitimate in the East European countries still occupied by Soviet troops.

As colonialism loses its relevance as an issue, the most vulnerable targets for Communist activity, particularly in Asia and in Latin America, are the peasant majorities that have been the victims of feudal-minded landlords for generations. The squalor of the rural slums that have resulted from long injustice rivals that of the city slums which shocked Karl Marx more than a century ago.

Yet even in this apparently promising area of political manipulation the Communist persuaders have been handicapped by the increasing awareness of the harsh experience which the Russian and Chinese peasants have experienced under communism.

In the meantime the basic conflict between political control and individual incentive for agricultural production remains unresolved, not only in the U.S.S.R. but in Communist China and every East European satellite. As a result, inefficient Communist agriculture is a drag on Soviet Russia, a threat to the very existence of China as a world power, and, hopefully, a warning to the underdeveloped countries, 80 percent of whose people live in the rural areas.

In the meantime vigorous pressures and help by the United States and by U.N. agencies toward the distribution of land on a more equitable basis are helping to undermine the lingering appeal of the Communist agrarian vision. When U.S.-sponsored land reform turns 94 percent of all peasant families into landowners, as happened in Japan, a formidable dilemma is posed for Soviet propagandists. If the Communists support such reforms, the result will be to douse the sparks of revolutionary discontent; if they obstruct them, they go against the recognized interests of the people whom they have promised to help.

Nor is the "bourgeoisie" a hopeful revolutionary vehicle in underdeveloped nations. The middle class is often a strongly nationalist element, and the Communists cannot afford to oppose nationalism. Usually, too, the local bourgeoisie in these countries is too small to be either an agent or a target of revolution.

The search for a "proletariat" on which to base a revolution has been no more rewarding. At their present stage of growth, most of the developing nations in Asia and Africa do not have enough proletarians worth summoning to unite.

These are among the many ideological reasons why I do not believe that the Soviets can succeed. However, the most fundamental roadblock in the Communist path is the simple fact that the world, with its scores of proud new nations, does not want to be controlled by any one

power; and it is far too complex and diversified a world for any nation to control by force alone.

After hundreds of years of colonial domination, the last thing the new nations want is to swear allegiance—and even less to *submit*—to some new foreign group. It is their very nationalistic individuality that makes them so hard to draw into a common world power structure under the aegis of Moscow or anyone else.

Admittedly, if the Soviets were to adopt more flexible views of Communist social relationships with each member or partner, they might make more progress. But this would mean giving up the basic Leninist objectives of international communism. It would also make their ideological pretensions to knowing the whole truth patently ridiculous.

### What Does the U.S. Seek?

If the Soviets cannot achieve what they set out to achieve, what about the United States?

Again, let us start with the primary question: What, precisely, do *we* seek in this world? There is only one realistic answer, and it is deceptively simple to state:

Our objective is the creation of a world community of peaceful states, each free to develop its own future within the framework of its own culture and its own history, each dedicated to concepts of individual and national liberty, each willing to defend its independence against totalitarian enemies, external or internal, overt or covert. Within such a free world community we hope that we may cooperate with those other nations that are willing to work with us as partners—equal partners—on common projects that will lead the world closer to peace.

Our central national purpose, in other words, is to help the people of this world toward expanding economic security and opportunity, toward greater social justice and orderly political growth, so that they will have maximum freedom of choice through which to create their own prosperous and independent futures.

The logic of this objective is clear: Only as active partners and participants in such a world community can we Americans be safe, happy and secure.

## Factors of Success or Failure

Now let us examine the factors upon which our success or failure will depend.

### *Understanding the Limitations*

First, in the context of this new world we Americans must understand our limitations as well as our opportunities; this has never been easy for Americans to do. For instance, we cannot shape the world precisely to our own liking any more than Russia can, and, happily, we have no desire to do so.

This gives us a major advantage at the outset: Our goal is not world regimentation but world diversity. And therein lies a major political strength. What *we* want for the people of the world is precisely what *they* want for themselves: freedom of choice, opportunity for development, and an increasing measure of individual dignity.

When other nations do not see things as we do, we may feel a sense of deep frustration. But let us never forget that in a world of independent peoples, free to choose their own futures within the framework of their own culture, history, and way of life, such differences are inevitable.

### *Understanding the Challenge*

Second, we must create a much deeper and more realistic understanding of the nature of the political, social, economic, and cultural movement that is now lighting the hopes of hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In these great continents, people for generations have been accustomed to exist in need of food, shelter, medical care, essential education and skills, without individual dignity or the barest justice. What is *new* is the sudden awareness, spreading like a prairie fire, that their plight need no longer be accepted as part of God's plan for the unfortunate. They now know that the means exist vastly to improve their lives, and they are determined to do so—either with our help and understanding or without it.

How do we Americans face this challenge? How well have we succeeded thus far? What else do we need to do?

In view of our vast inexperience and the awesome magnitude of the challenge, we have thus far responded with considerable wisdom, restraint, and effectiveness. Largely unfettered by doctrinaire rigidities, we have been able to draw pragmatically on the rich resources of our own pluralistic society to pursue our objectives in a variety of ways.

For instance, through the delicate channels of diplomacy we have worked for the peaceful transformation of remaining colonies into independent nations.

Through the United Nations we have contributed to the preservation of the peace and sovereignty of new nations.

Through our information and cultural exchange programs we have developed ties of understanding and respect between our own people and those of the developing countries.

Above all, through our economic and technical aid programs we have provided the essential resources and skills needed to encourage scores of nations on the road to self-sustaining growth.

Whether we like it or not, whether we understand it or not, concern with internal development has a much higher priority in these countries than does taking sides in the cold war. Although most of them are instinctively friendly to us, they are inclined to tread carefully between the two great power blocs and to get as much help as they can without entangling commitments.

Our exasperation may be tempered by the realization that in this respect they are following much the same concepts of "neutrality" that shaped our own policies when we were a fledgling nation.

A clearer perspective will not eliminate our differences. But it should improve the chance for mature and responsible U.S. policies. In particular it should give us a deeper understanding of the critical importance of assisting the people of the great developing continents—to the extent that their own planning and willingness to work enables us to help effectively.

### *Understanding the New Leaders*

At this point let me interpose a warning:

Although we Americans find it easy and natural to talk in terms of world liberalism, of land reform, tax reform, fair distribution of wealth, individual dignity, and so on, we often find it difficult to understand the kind of Asian, African, and Latin American leaders who are most likely to make these phrases meaningful. Even the most ardent anti-Communist leaders who advocate an income tax, or a breakup of the big estates, are often denounced as dangerous radicals or at least visionary reformers. Because they challenge the *status quo*, they frighten the privileged groups with the greatest stake in the *status quo*, and these fears spill over on us.

It may help restore our perspective to remind ourselves that Tom Paine frightened many of our ancestors, and not just the antecedents of the John Birch Society. Jefferson frightened them too with all his talk of economic justice and the dignity of man. So did Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and F.D.R.

Reformist ideas and liberal objectives in world development do not *require* activist, nationalist leaders who are critical of the United States—but in practice many of them are likely to be precisely that.

For harassed American policymakers the situation is likely to be further confused by the fact that such leaders are less likely to take orders from us than is some right-wing despot who sees U.S. assistance primarily as a means of maintaining himself in power.

All of this makes for complex conflicts in unfamiliar settings that lead to confused news reporting and frustrated speakers on the floor of Congress. Do we Americans have enough sophistication to understand it all and to come to grips with the realities? This, in my opinion, is an open question.

#### *Understanding the Power of Ideas*

A third factor upon which America's success or failure will depend is our understanding of military power—its importance, the need for the will to use it, its limitation, and its built-in dangers.

Without an ample supply of modern military hardware in the hands of competent military men, U.S. foreign policy would be doomed to

fail. Yet military preparation is only one aspect of modern power. Equally important is the power of *people* and the power of *ideas*. Through these primary human forces hundreds of millions of people, eager for greater opportunity and freedom, can be organized into movements capable of bringing overwhelming pressures upon *status quo* governments.

Although military power is vital, it cannot always be expected to produce a peaceful, rational solution to essentially political problems. This is the meaning of the Nationalist failure on mainland China, the Soviet failure in Eastern Europe, the debacle at Suez, the French defeat in Indochina, and the 8-year tragedy in Algeria.

In the last 15 years one-half of the people of the world have managed to change their form of government, although preponderant military "power" lay in the hands of the supporters of the *status quo*.

As long as ideas influence the minds of men, and as long as men and their aspirations are a major component of power, ideas—both good and evil—will continue to upset nations, defy armies, and write history.

#### *Understanding the Aid Program*

Fourth, we Americans must develop a far better understanding of the purposes and priorities of our economic aid program. This means not only a sensitive awareness of the complexities and difficulties of national development but an understanding of the motivations of the recipients of our aid.

In this regard we face a critical choice. The United States can help guide the upheaval that is sweeping the underdeveloped world into constructive, peaceful channels. Or we can sit back nervously and ineffectually while this revolution of rising expectations slips into the hands of reckless extremists who despise everything we stand for—and successions of Red Chinas and Red Cubas come into being.

To work effectively with the more affirmative forces of change will also require extraordinarily able ambassadors, good representation at the lower levels of diplomacy, and an enormous amount of patience. It is worth mentioning that patience is not a quality for which Americans are noted.

Fifth and last, but not least, we Americans must come to grips with the urgent need to improve and strengthen our own society. If we do not do better at home, we will almost certainly fail abroad. We can no longer afford to tolerate a racial divisiveness that saps the very essence of our democracy. Nor can we afford a growth rate that is the lowest of any major industrialized nation.

Among the questions relating to our slow rate of growth are the following:

How can we speed up the replanning and rebuilding of our cities so that by 1973 our thousands of square miles of urban slums may be wiped out?

How can we make the best medical attention available to those who are in the greatest need?

How can we strengthen our public educational system to insure that every American boy and girl can receive all of the education that he can profitably absorb?

Above all, how can we persuade the two-thirds of the world which is colored that the land that revered Thomas Jefferson still believes in what Thomas Jefferson said?

Such questions would be vitally important at any period in our history. Yet today, when our society is facing the challenge of totalitarian concepts of growth and development, they are closely related to our capacity to survive as a great nation and as a continuing force in world affairs.

Our economy is the essential instrument through which we must achieve greater opportunity and security for all our citizens, assure an adequate defense system, and still provide the resources with which to ease the growing pains of new nations that are striving to relieve their poverty through democratic institutions.

Only a confident, expanding, dynamic America can meet this challenge. Yet right now built-in obstacles of communication, tradition, and ignorance keep us from surging confidently forward.

## **Answering the Questions of the Future**

It is a critical moment in history. All over the world an old generation is passing. Within the next few years Khrushchev, Mao, De Gaulle, Adenauer, Nehru, Salazar, Franco, and many more will pass from the world scene.

For each of this generation of world leaders history will write its epitaph. They have accomplished much, and they have failed in much. In their defense it may be said that they were called upon to preside over political, economic, and social changes that no previous generation could ever have envisaged.

The need now is for the ablest members of the new generation to step forward, to establish new voices, to propose new concepts, to develop fresh thinking, to find new ways to express itself. Old habits of mind are waiting to be challenged, old dogmas to be discarded, new paths to be charted, new gains in behalf of human dignity to be achieved.

Those of you who choose to participate in this struggle will be drawn into bitter areas of controversy which sometimes appear to produce only frustration and defeat. Yet the goal is the achievement of a meaningful future for man on this earth, to establish man's capacity to control his destiny through the application of willpower, hard work, and faith. It is a goal worthy of the best efforts of the ablest among you.

In this struggle dedicated young Americans will be called upon to work shoulder to shoulder with the young people of every continent, to exchange their ideas, and to search for common ground. In this key area the present generation has failed abysmally. And in that failure lies as good an explanation as any for the giant stalemate in which the civilized world now finds itself.

The most crucial questions involving the future of our nation and of the great universal alliance in behalf of human dignity, brotherhood, and progress are waiting to be asked and answered. The way in which you answer them will be decisive, I believe, for centuries to come.

## The Nationalization of Takeoff

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*<sup>1</sup>

I have taken the liberty of altering the subject you assigned me—"The Challenge of Development"—to "The Nationalization of Takeoff." I did this because I assumed that there is no one in this room who could not write as satisfactory a speech as I on the first theme, and because I thought it might be of greater interest to share with you a few specific reflections, relatively new to me, on the development problems that lie ahead in the Middle East and elsewhere.

As what I have to say unfolds, it will be clear to you that the concept of nationalizing the takeoff has nothing to do with an expanded role for government in the economy of underdeveloped areas; if anything, the opposite is the case. The concept does have a good deal to do with where the bulk of the developing nations now stand in the growth process.

In preparing this year our foreign aid presentation for the Congress, the Agency for International Development grouped the various developing nations in a most interesting set of categories from which the following broad conclusions emerge.

About 5 percent of the population of the developing nations now live in societies approaching self-sustained growth. In the relatively near future their requirements for abnormal international assistance should come to an end and they should be in a position to acquire the external capital they need from hard loans, either public or private.

About 50 percent of the population of the developing nations live in societies which, overall,

have demonstrated a capacity for growth and which are moving forward more or less regularly with their programs in tolerable balance. Whether they demonstrate in the years ahead a capacity to withstand the inevitable structural adjustments that regular growth requires and emerge into self-sustained growth remains to be seen. What can be said is that they are exhibiting, before this full demonstration, most of the characteristics of a nation in successful takeoff.

Fifteen percent of the population of the developing nations live in countries which are experiencing one or another kind of serious vicissitude but which, essentially, appear to have most of the essential assets necessary for takeoff or even some more advanced stage of self-sustained growth; for example, Argentina. What they lack is either the essential political stability and national commitment to the growth process which sustained forward momentum requires, or they are suffering from structural distortions that must be overcome if tolerably balanced growth is to proceed; for example, Brazil.

The balance of the population of the developing nations—about 30 percent—fall into two categories.

The first consists of societies at a relatively early stage of what I would call the preconditions period. Their essential tasks are to build the infrastructure of modernization in education, transport, power, administration, et cetera. Some quite considerable period may be required before takeoff can begin.

The second category within the residual 30 percent consists of nations under one form or another of acute external pressure—usually

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the 17th annual conference of the Middle East Institute at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., on May 2 (press release 241 dated May 1).

Communist pressure—which threatens their stability and prevents an effective development effort at the present time.

These figures are of interest in several respects, but they dramatize an important fact, central to this particular discussion: Something like 70 percent of the population of the developing areas are already living in societies which have either demonstrated quite definitely a capacity to grow regularly or with some political stability and luck they ought to be emerging into that category in the years ahead. While many nations are further back down the line, in terms of stages of growth, the fact is that growth itself, in the form of a demonstrated capacity to produce a rate of increase in total output substantially greater than the rate of increase of population, is becoming the normal condition of a good part of the developing world.

#### **Lag in Rural Development**

In the face of this fact I would suggest that the problem that we confront and shall confront in the developing nations is not merely the problem of developing and sustaining a sufficient rate of investment to produce a regular rise in income per capita; it is the lack of regional and sectoral balance in the growth process.

The simplest way to state the problem I'm getting at is that, with very few exceptions, what we see in the developing nations is, as one would expect, that growth has taken hold in certain regions and certain urban sectors, with a marked lag in the development of the rural areas.

It is, of course, nothing new for growth in the first instance to center in certain key sectors or regions. In the United States, for example, the takeoff began in New England, rooted in the cotton textile revolution, which can be roughly dated between 1820 and 1840. Something like a national takeoff only occurred as we went beyond the Appalachians with the railroads in the pre-Civil War generation. And, indeed, the Nation as a whole can only be said to have completed its takeoff in this generation, with the gathering of momentum in the South since the mid-1930's.

And the problem of regional stagnation is evidently not confined to our own experience, as the evolution of Italy and even France suggests.

So far as the developing nations are concerned, it is not accidental that rural development should have been generally slighted in the first phase of growth. Typically the modernizing governments are urban coalitions: in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. As urban men, reacting against the traditional rural societies, their first thoughts turned to the more glamorous symbols of industrialization, whether they be modern weapons or steel mills; and, indeed, a serious modernization of rural life does depend on the existence of an initial industrial base and an urban administrative apparatus of some competence.

Moreover, as politicians it is natural that their minds should turn in the first instance to their constituency, which has been primarily urban; and from this loyalty have tended to come subsidized services of various kinds, beyond the capacity of their economies and their national budgets easily to bear.

Thus, if one attempts to generalize the situation in most of the developing countries, one can see quite remarkable enclaves of industrial and modern urban activity coincident with stagnation or very slow progress in the countryside.

Rural development is proving, however, not merely a social duty to the less advantaged portions of the population but a fundamental condition for the maintenance of a high rate of development for the society as a whole, including especially its industrial development.

In the early postwar years there was debate about industrial versus agricultural development. Some representatives thought that emphasis on agricultural development was somehow a denial of the crucial role of industrialization—a kind of neocolonialism. The lesson of experience—long urged to their credit by the aid organizations in our Government—is that sustained industrialization requires the modernization of the countryside.

There are, in fact, three distinct major roles that agriculture must play in the early stages of the development process. First, obviously, agriculture must supply the food necessary to



meet the inevitable rise in population, without yielding either starvation or a depletion of foreign exchange to buy food at the expense of purposes essential to industrial growth. This requirement is heightened by the typically disproportionate rise in urban populations, which demand either an increased transfer from the countryside or the acquisition of food from abroad. Second, agricultural expansion is required as working capital for nonagricultural development: to generate raw materials for industry or to earn foreign exchange. Finally, a rise in agricultural incomes can provide important direct stimulus to other aspects of development: It can provide expanded markets for chemical fertilizers, agricultural equipment, and manufactured consumers goods, and it can provide a critically important source of increased tax revenues.

The world about us offers a number of illustrations of what happens to societies when these dynamic interactions between industrial and agricultural development are ignored or inadequately respected.

The most remarkable example is, of course, the situation inside Communist China. There a regime committed itself to a program of heavy industrialization, linked explicitly to the modernization of its military establishment. It was prepared to substitute for peasant incentives the massive power of its control system and substitute for an adequate level of agricultural investment—notably investment in chemical fertilizers—only labor-intensive investment, carried out substantially by forced labor. The upshot, carried to a rare extreme by a purposeful and unified group of wrongheaded men, was this: first, a breakdown in agricultural supplies, such that the whole vast Chinese nation is living at a substandard diet and a third of its foreign exchange—about \$500 million—must now be allocated to buy food for the coastal cities; second, a breakdown in its capacity to supply industrial materials from agriculture to its industry and in its capacity to earn foreign exchange from its agricultural sector (Chinese Communist exports dropped by about 25 percent between 1959 and 1962); third, a reduction in total resources available for the industrialization process itself. Industrial output in Communist China radical-

ly declined between 1959 and 1962, perhaps by 30 percent.

The measures taken to correct this gross distortion in the Chinese Communist development process have not succeeded in producing anything like a sustained industrial revival, although disintegration has been halted. Many plants are idle or working under capacity; and millions of men and women have been thrust out of the cities to fend, as best they can, back in rural areas where, with private incentives only partially restored, the Chinese peasantry are struggling to keep their heads barely above water.

There has been no failure in the free world quite as dramatic as that of Communist China, but one can see a pattern of severe structural distortion in a good many countries. In parts of Latin America, for example, industrialization is damped because of a lack of a sufficiently wide popular market. An excessive amount of industry is producing goods for the relatively small urban middle class; consequently industry works with idle capacity, prices and tariffs are excessively high, and profits are not plowed back into industry. At the same time the potentialities of modern technology and agriculture are not being rapidly diffused, and many rural regions have not moved away from the fatalism and low productivity methods of traditional life.

With a melodramatic gap between rural and urban life, the more enterprising flock from the countryside to the bright lights and cinemas of the cities, where the rate of industrial growth is not sufficient to absorb them fully in regular employment, while they impose on the public authorities heavy claims for social overhead capital (housing, schools, et cetera) which inadequate budgets cannot fully meet, in part because tax systems are ineffective, in part because income is not rising fast enough.

Further, since the potentialities of modern agriculture are not being applied, some of these countries are unnecessarily sliding into dependence on imported food and they are not exploiting the possibilities of agricultural products as a source of commercial crops for industry or for export.

Finally, as an Egyptian friend pointed out to

me, the lack of industry working to a mass market limits industrial productivity and prevents the development of manufactured or processed export products which can compete in international markets and relieve the dependence on exports of traditional products with a limited future in world trade. It is no accident that the classic initial manufactured product of a developing area, capable of marketing abroad, has been cotton textiles, where generally a mass domestic market can be developed and industrial efficiency attained.

### **Role of Agriculture in Development Process**

In the broadest sense, what I am asserting is that the present state of a good part of the underdeveloped world requires that we take seriously two of the oldest propositions in economics, to be found, for example, in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* which, read afresh, is a relevant handbook for a developing nation, not merely a free-trade pamphlet. One of these propositions is that agricultural output is, in the widest sense, the basic working capital of development of a nation in its early stages of growth. The other proposition is that industrialization depends for its profit and momentum on a progressive widening of the market, with the specialization and efficiency that widening permits.

Although various schemes for creating international common markets among developing nations commend themselves on various grounds—and deserve encouragement and support—I suspect that the most important task in most developing nations is to learn how to widen the domestic market.

In emphasizing the critical importance in the next stage of development of the agricultural sector, I am, of course, saying nothing very new. The role of agriculture in the development process has been emphasized by a good many of those concerned with the development process, not least by one of your distinguished speakers, Douglas Ensminger, who has worked so effectively for the Ford Foundation in India. Interesting and useful efforts have gone forward in many parts of the developing world, designed to accelerate the pace at which modern science and technology are brought effectively into both

the production methods of rural life and into its standards of welfare. The brute fact is, however, that the diffusion of modern methods and attitudes in rural life is going too slowly for the good of the developing nations; and it may be useful for those concerned to attempt to take stock of what we have learned out of our experiments in various parts of the world and to consider explicitly how the diffusion process, now rather laboriously and expensively proceeding, can be accelerated.

It is a fair question to ask, for example, whether the terms of trade—the relative prices of urban and rural goods—are such as to stimulate the kind of agricultural development required to give momentum to the national development process as a whole.

### **Accelerating Rural Modernization**

Beyond this exhortation for a critical review of our experience and a search for methods for accelerating rural modernization, I have one limited suggestion of my own to put into the pot.

It struck me some time ago that in certain of the developing areas it might be helpful to encourage a purposeful effort to manufacture locally and to market in the rural areas on a more effective basis both cheap agricultural equipment and the kinds of consumers goods likely to constitute, at rural levels of income, an incentive to accept and to apply modern methods of agricultural productivity.

This kind of effort could make a contribution to all four of the structural weaknesses to be found in many developing nations which I have described.

It could put the private industrial sector into the production and marketing of goods on a mass market basis, even in poor countries. I have in mind not merely textiles but canvas shoes, flashlights, household equipment, transistor radios, and the classic first-phase durable consumers goods—bicycles and sewing machines, as well as pails, hand tools, fertilizers, and other basic agricultural equipment.

Second, these goods, if cheaply and effectively brought into the rural areas, could provide an important incentive to rural families to increase output as well as a part of the means to do so.

Third, by bringing something of modern life to the countryside and permitting rural areas to share at least some of the fruits of the more modern sectors of a developing society, it might help damp the excessive flow from the countryside to the urban slums. An Indian friend recently suggested that mobile film projection units in rural areas could significantly reduce the incentive of villagers to move to the cities.

And, finally, by developing efficient production on the basis of mass markets of goods of this kind, additional items for export could be generated.

In short, I am proposing that we consider seriously whether the experience pioneered in this country by the mail-order houses, pioneered abroad in urban areas by Sears Roebuck and in rural areas by the Singer Sewing Machine Company, might have a real relevance to the structural problems now confronted in the underdeveloped areas.

I am, of course, conscious of the care with which any lesson of our own development experience should be applied in other societies with problems of a different kind. It is clear, for example, that there are very few developing areas where one could actually use the mail-order catalog, given the state of literacy and the postal services. But I have always felt that of all our experiences in development there were three which might prove of quite general significance: the 19th-century role of the Army Corps of Engineers in what is now popularly called civic action; the role of the Federal Government in stimulating the development of schools of agriculture, mining, and industrial technology under the Morrill Act, passed a century ago; and the role of the mail-order houses, which, along with the county agents, constituted a powerful complementary team imparting great vitality to the American farming communities.

In any case, I think we ought to experiment with our friends in the developing countries to see if it would work.

What is required essentially, I would say on the basis of a preliminary examination of the practical problems, is that some foreign enterprise experienced in mass production and marketing link closely with local manufacturers

and distributors and arrange for appropriate market surveys and new methods of distribution—probably mobile stores, transported in trucks. Arrangements must be made for a maximum volume of local manufacture, and financing must be organized in such a way as to provide something like 3 to 5 years for the concept to take hold and profits to be made on a purely commercial basis.

Aside from the general experience of the United States (and the special experience in the Tennessee Valley), Puerto Rico suggests all this is possible and constructive, as well as certain other regions within developing countries.

This proposal is, I suspect, more than a gimmick. It is rooted in the most fundamental things we know about the way in which human action changes. Action represents a choice among perceived, realistic alternatives. In many tradition-bound parts of the underdeveloped areas the possibility of acquiring modern consumers goods is not a realistic choice, given the lack of economical methods of distribution, where, indeed, methods of distribution exist at all. Nor do peasants in many areas perceive it as a realistic possibility for them to change their methods of production. The objective of this exercise would be both to dramatize the possibilities of new methods and to widen the range of choice that rural families perceive open to them.

Our task is to change action—what people do in rural areas—and this seems one tool for achieving that objective.

#### **Maintaining the Momentum of Development**

I would make one additional observation: I can think of no form of foreign private enterprise less likely to raise difficulties in developing nations than an enterprise which, in association with local people and institutions, aims to enlarge the production and distribution of consumers goods for the poor citizens and to provide them efficiently the means for enlarging their agricultural output.

But evidently this proposal is not a sufficient answer to the basic structural problem I have tried to define today. Moreover, in judging whether it is practical in particular cases, it will be necessary to assess whether the resources

exist within the society to generate this kind of production and commerce and to weigh what economists call the opportunity cost of doing so. In addition, of course, we must press on with rural development on a wide basis, accumulating all the lessons that we can acquire from what is now almost a generation's postwar experience in the development business.

My basic point is, then, that the time is past when we can afford to regard industrial and agricultural development as simply competing for scarce capital resources. In many parts of the developing world the initial basis for take-off has been established in industry and in urban

areas, but the maintenance of that momentum requires that the diffusion of modern technology, with all that it carries with it, be extended on a national basis and especially to the lagging rural areas, which are, at once, a relatively untapped source of food, industrial working capital, foreign exchange earning capacity, industrial markets, and taxes.

Having established in the first postwar decade the foundations for takeoff in the developing areas, representing most of the relevant population, we must move on to nationalize the process if we would not risk frustrating the momentum already achieved.

## Aid—Investment in the Future

*by U. Alexis Johnson*

*Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I have been asked this evening to keynote your debate on the topic, "Resolved: That United States Economic Aid Should Be Substantially Reduced." Perhaps a keynote speaker at a debate should attempt a pose of Olympian detachment from the topic to be expounded. But I shall not even pretend to do so. Because of my experience in this field and the nature of my present responsibilities, I cannot pretend to be indifferent on the subject. Thus I welcome the opportunity of this discussion with you this evening. At the same time I want as objectively as possible to set forth a few of the facts which must be taken into account.

First, let me make my own position clear by entering an objection to the use of the term "foreign aid." This phrase, in my judgment, carries with it the erroneous implications, first, of unrecompensed charity on our part and, second, of superiority and inferiority as between

ourselves and the countries with which we are cooperating in these programs. I consider it much more accurate to speak in terms of investment—investment in the future—in the future of the cooperating countries and in our own future as well. Let us also remember that when we talk of 17 years of the program in this field we are really talking about a series of programs which have differed from one another quite broadly, as our immediate objectives have changed with changing circumstances.

In the years immediately following World War II, our foreign investment program was launched as the Greek-Turkish aid program. These programs were the crucial element that enabled both of these courageous but dangerously situated nations to resist heavy Soviet pressures. Greece emerged from a so-called "civil war" which was a thinly veiled act of Soviet aggression, and both countries have shown remarkable forward progress in the direction of economic and social growth, while

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Yale Political Union at New Haven, Conn., on Apr. 23 (press release 214).

simultaneously making substantial contributions to the military strength of the free world. In this investment program our aims were limited and they have been realized. Our investment has clearly paid off.

In the same period our first great experiment in broad-scale, primarily economic investment was undertaken. I refer, of course, to the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was designed to enable the war-devastated nations of Western Europe to rebuild their shattered economies and to do so without turning to totalitarianism. Western Europe, as the most casual glance at today's economic statistics will show, has recovered and has surpassed the fondest expectations of the optimists of 1947 and 1948, and this recovery has been carried out to the accompaniment of continuing Soviet pressures and threats at the very gates of Western Europe—carried out in Berlin, for example, to the point where the practitioners of the pseudoscience of Marxism-Leninism have had to wall their captives in in order to keep them from fleeing to the West's tempting combination of individual freedom and prosperity. It is appropriate and it is deeply satisfying that the countries which benefited from Marshall Plan investment are themselves now among the major contributors to the development of countries of the developing world.

Seen from the point of view of the alternatives that were all too possible in 1947, the miracle of European economic and military reconstruction and self-sustained growth has been a clear and undisputed plus for the people of the United States—and a superb return on their investment of the forties and fifties.

It is not possible to measure in monetary terms the political and military value of the free Europe that exists today. However, I think it useful to note that measured in pure dollar terms the amount of economic assistance to Western Europe under the Marshall Plan was approximately \$13 billion. Against this, our total trade with the Western European countries in the decade from 1952 has been \$86 billion, of which \$53 billion has been United States exports, compared with imports of \$33 billion, or a trade balance in our favor of \$20 billion. In addition, \$1.5 billion of the Marshall Plan program was in loans, which are now

in the course of repayment and constitute a growing corrective to our present balance-of-payments situation.

Let us look at another example, that of Japan. From 1946 to 1956 we invested over \$2 billion in economic assistance to Japan. Most of this was just plain food to keep people from starving to death, but a lesser part was also for economic rehabilitation. Again, as in the case of Europe, the political and military value of a prosperous, peaceful, and independent Japan is incalculable. However, again just in plain dollar terms, our trade with Japan during the past decade has been \$18 billion, and during the past 5 years the trade balance in our favor was over \$1 billion. In addition, Japan is directly repaying \$600 million of that economic assistance.

In the case of these areas I am sure that there is no one that could now say that we could not afford those investments; clearly we could not have afforded not to have made them.

#### **U.S. Programs Today**

However, the subject that you are debating tonight is not those programs but our programs as they exist today. I presume that, as the subject suggests that economic aid should only be reduced rather than eliminated, the essential importance of the program is accepted. I also presume that as the term is confined to "economic aid" we are not discussing "military aid" or its importance, although in many cases the two things go very much together.

As a keynoter I feel that one of my tasks is to define and clarify the terms. As it has come to be used today, the term "economic aid" has come to embrace a wide variety of activities, in a large number of countries. What appears as the aid figure in newspaper headlines is not just some abstract figure but rather the sum of these many activities and many countries. Thus when you debate aid it cannot be done in broad generalities, but rather the discussion must be in terms of what programs in what countries.

As far as the underdeveloped world is concerned, the oldest program of all is that of technical assistance. In the strict use of the term it is perhaps not "economic assistance," although it is now embraced in what has now come to be

called "economic aid." This program of course goes back to President Truman's famous "Point 4" of 1949.<sup>2</sup> I think it useful to recall some of his words for they are still valid:

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and despair.

We now have technical assistance programs in some 78 countries involving approximately 5,000 American technicians abroad. An important aspect of this program is also the bringing of foreign technicians to the United States for advanced training. During the past 10 years approximately 55,000 foreign technicians and officials have received training under this program in American institutions in every field of human endeavor having a relationship to economic development. You have many such students here at Yale as does every other major university and college in the United States. All of this amounts to less than 15 percent of the current program.

In my own service abroad I have of course seen this program in operation increasing rice yields, wiping out malaria, improving public administration, assisting in the establishment of a medical school, and so on. I have not the slightest doubt that it is a sound investment. It is not only sound; it is successful.

The Peace Corps is, of course, an imaginative extension of this concept.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of President Truman's inaugural address of Jan. 20, 1949, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.

The next aspect of the program could be embraced in the broad category of what can be called grants. Through the years this category has been known by various names, and I will not attempt to trace the details for you. However, in general, I embrace within the term "grants" primarily economic funds used for the purchase of commodities and for which direct repayment is not required. I say primarily economic because a large part of these funds have also been used for essentially military purposes on behalf of both the receiving country and ourselves. I refer to such things as the construction of military airfields, defense roads, and so forth. Such grant funds are now received by only 20 countries, and the largest part—in fact about two-thirds—goes to maintain the economies and assist in the support of the military forces of just four countries—Korea, Turkey, Laos, and Viet-Nam—which are facing direct military threats or, as in the case of Viet-Nam, are engaged in active hostilities. They are countries which are in the very real sense on the front line and whose defense is clearly our defense. As the Clay Committee report<sup>3</sup> stated: "Dollar for dollar, these programs contribute more to the security of the free world than corresponding expenditures in our defense appropriations." These programs have been sharply reduced during recent years, and the program for this fiscal year is less than \$500 million.

The other broad category is direct loans of various kinds. The proportion of these as contrasted with grants has in recent years increased from 6 percent to 60 percent, and all of them are now on a dollar-repayable basis. During the past year such loans were made to 25 countries, most of them for specific projects whose economic and technical soundness had been independently determined.

Another aspect of our foreign assistance programs has been our Food for Peace Program, in which our surplus agricultural commodities are used not only to give direct food relief but also to stimulate economic growth. These programs, which are not included in the AID [Agency for International Development] appropriations, range from direct disaster or

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 574.

famine relief through payment in local currencies to direct dollar repayment.

### **Question of What U.S. Can Afford**

An aspect of all of these programs that is often discussed is that of how much can we "afford." I feel that a few facts in this connection are pertinent. First we might note that, whereas our appropriations in 1949 for economic assistance to Europe amounted to approximately 2 percent of our gross national product, the amount appropriated for economic assistance last year—this includes all economic grants, loans, and contributions to international economic organizations—amounted to just about one-fourth of that, or about one-half of 1 percent of our gross national product, that is, about one-half cent per dollar of gross national product. Another pertinent fact is that, again referring back to the Marshall Plan days, our total appropriations for economic assistance in 1949 amounted to over 40 percent of our appropriations for defense, while in 1963 they amount to only 5 percent of our defense appropriations.

In these days of concern over our balance of payments I believe it pertinent to note that approximately 80 percent of all commitments for foreign economic assistance are now for goods and services purchased in the United States. This does not mean that all of the other 20 percent constitutes a net drain on our balance of payments for, as you students of economics know, much of the remainder indirectly also returns to the United States for purchases of goods and services. In this connection we might also note that there are thus far approximately \$2 billion outstanding AID economic assistance loans, repayable in dollars, which in future years will be coming back to us. We have already benefited in our balance of payments by the substantial advance repayments of the postwar loans made to Germany and France.

Another aspect of this question is what the other developed countries are contributing to economic assistance to less developed countries. Economic assistance to these countries from the Western European countries, Japan, and Canada rose from about \$1.2 billion in 1956 to ap-

proximately \$2.5 billion in 1961 and were thus equal to our own AID economic assistance appropriations for this purpose in fiscal year 1962. In this connection we might note that France is, in absolute terms on a per capita basis, contributing somewhat more to foreign economic assistance than is the United States and, in relation to GNP, more than twice that of the United States. However, this does not mean that we do not hope that the developed countries will increasingly contribute. We are working together to this end in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development].

Our investments in the underdeveloped areas, coming later and starting from a less well developed base, have understandably not shown as quick or as yet as spectacular returns as those in Europe and Japan. But that does not mean that they are bad or foolish investments. Admittedly some investments may, with the wisdom of hindsight, appear more prudent than others, and it is important that we learn from our mistakes. This we are attempting to do, as are the countries with which we are cooperating. However, no more than in the case of any other enterprise which seeks for itself sustained vigor does this mean that we cease investing in the future. Nor does it mean that we must invest without return indefinitely into the future. Just as with anyone else, these countries are seeking for themselves self-sustaining growth and looking forward to the time when they no longer need to rely on outside resources. In this also, our objectives and theirs are consistent. There can, and inevitably will, be differences between honest men on when this point can be reached. While among those who have recently examined the problem there are those who think it can be reached sooner than others, they all agree that for the most part that time is not yet. (In this connection we might note that the United States was a net importer of capital up to the First World War.) Also there are cases in which, given an ideal world, we might not choose to make an investment. But we are not living in an ideal world, and we often have to weigh how much more it would cost us tomorrow if we did not make a more modest investment today.



## Returns on Investments

However, we can already say some things on this question of returns on our investments in these countries. While our economic cooperation is only a varying part of the reason, we should note that of the 46 free countries which have thus far become independent since the end of the Second World War not a single one has chosen communism. They remain free and independent. I do not know how you can translate this into terms of dollars and cents or what it is worth in terms of a percentage of our GNP, but it seems to me to be of great worth.

Now, to turn to the example of a few specific countries. I trust that you will pardon my first turning to a country in which I have recently had some personal experience—Thailand. In the decade from 1952 some \$300 million of economic assistance in various forms has been made available by us to Thailand. In part this has built about 550 miles of road opening formerly inaccessible regions, built 945 bridges to make existing roads passable throughout the year, reduced the death rate from malaria by 86 percent, dug 4,500 wells, brought over 1,600 Thai technicians for advanced education in the United States. A variety of corn introduced by American technicians resulted in corn exports rising from nothing to the fourth-ranking export in 5 years. A single-spaced typewritten list of such projects which I had prepared while I was in Bangkok covers some 10 pages. As American Ambassador in Bangkok I was proud of the program and did all I could to encourage our visitors to see all they could of it. I was proud of it, not in any softheaded “do-gooder” sense, but because I felt it was an excellent example of cooperation between a foreign people and ourselves for common purposes that benefited both of us.

Just in the 6 years from 1956 to 1962, Thailand's GNP increased 29 percent and our exports to Thailand increased 60 percent. However, beyond all this, Thailand was and is a stout anchor of the free world in Southeast Asia. It was among the very first to offer forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, and it is the site of SEATO headquarters.

As another somewhat different but important example in Asia, we might choose the vast

country of India. During the past decade approximately \$1.9 billion of United States economic assistance has been invested in India's first and second 5-year plans. During this same period other countries have invested around \$1.5 billion. India provided from its own resources around 90 percent of the financing required for the first 5-year plan and 76 percent of that required for the second 5-year plan, for a total of the equivalent of about \$11,100,000,000.

In this decade, while the population of India has increased by 21.5 percent, the national income has increased by 43 percent and per capita income by 17 percent. Agricultural production has increased by over 41 percent, and industrial production has nearly doubled. (We might note that during this same period per capita income, and particularly food production, has actually decreased in Communist China.) Our trade with India has increased by over 57 percent, but above all we and the rest of the free world are more secure and more prosperous because India has been able to move forward in freedom and prosperity.

## Importance of Human Resources

Before I close I want to say just a few words on this whole subject of development and what it means to us. As the President has said:<sup>4</sup>

... our basic goal ... [is] a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future ... so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others. ... We can welcome diversity—the Communists cannot. For we offer a world of choice—they offer a world of coercion. ... freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future.

These new countries face enormous problems. Broadly these might be expressed as the external problem of defending themselves and the internal problems of governing themselves and developing themselves. It is this latter problem with which we are primarily concerned this evening. I make no profession of being a student or theoretician in this field. However, out of some experience abroad with these problems I would like to make a few personal observations.

First, in all the theory on this subject we cannot lose sight of the fact that the most im-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

portant resource of all is the human resource; without it all else is of no avail. To the degree that the population of a country really wants to do something about it, it can, with varying degrees of difficulty and external assistance, improve its lot.

However, it is the people of the country that have to do it. Foreign assistance and investment, no matter how generous, can at the best make up only a marginal factor. The impulse, the will, the greater part of the resources must come from within a country itself. For example, even the \$20 billion of outside resources contemplated for the Alliance for Progress for Latin America over a 10-year period would make up less than 5 percent of the gross national product of the receiving countries.

While Latin American countries received slightly over \$1 billion in aid from the U.S. Government last year under the Alliance for Progress, it should be pointed out that these countries have had a real problem in making the desired contribution to their own development because their principal export products have been declining in price, some at a rapid rate. Coffee prices after reaching an alltime high in 1954 have been falling and today are only about 33 cents a pound compared with double that figure a decade ago. Latin American exports will buy 14 percent less in goods in the American market today than they would have 5 years ago, and this in spite of an increase of 16 percent in *volume* of exports. The tide is turning now, and some of their principal exports—sugar, cocoa, most metals, and bananas—will bring much larger returns this year than last.

However, to return to this question of development, we can only add a marginal increment to what the country itself is willing and able to accomplish for itself. This increment can, however, be of the greatest importance. Ideally it can act as the catalyst to spur the country's own efforts or supply the missing element without which a country's own efforts would be unavailing.

We have no desire or need for positions of special influence. Our interests are truly served if these countries are able to stand on their own

feet and be truly independent. This is their aspiration as well, and thus we have a sound basis for mutual cooperation with them.

I can think of no more fitting words with which to close than those used by the President in his message<sup>5</sup> to the Congress on foreign assistance just 3 weeks ago in which he said: "Around the world cracks in the monolithic apparatus of our adversary are there for all to see. This, for the American people, is a time for vision, for patience, for work, and for wisdom. For better or worse, we are the pacesetters. Freedom's leader cannot flag or falter, or another runner will set the pace."

## **U.S. Citizens Urged To Avoid Travel to Haiti**

Press release 246 dated May 2

The Department of State on May 2 urged all United States citizens to avoid unnecessary travel to Haiti because of the disturbed conditions existing in that country.

## **Dependents of U.S. Employees Ordered To Leave Haiti**

Press release 247 dated May 7

The Department of State announced on May 7 that it has ordered the departure from Haiti of all dependents of U.S. Government employees stationed there. Private U.S. citizens now in Haiti are also being urged to depart.

The departure from Port-au-Prince will start on May 8 by commercial air carriers to Miami. The number of dependents of U.S. officials to be evacuated will be approximately 220; the number of private citizens wishing to take advantage of the airlift cannot be determined at this time.

The continued deterioration of the situation in Haiti and the difficulty of insuring the lives and safety of U.S. citizens led to the Department's decision to order the withdrawal of U.S. citizens.

---

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

## International Organization and Space Law

by Abram Chayes  
*Legal Adviser*<sup>1</sup>

The first earth satellite, Sputnik I, was launched on October 4, 1957, less than 6 years ago. The space age began within the lifetime of every one of us sitting in this room. I remember a certain sense of awe with which I watched from the deck of our home in Lexington, Massachusetts, the thin white line that marked the orbit of man's first venture into space climb toward the zenith.

It is worth the effort to recollect your own reactions of those days. In the intervening half a decade, space activity has become, if not a commonplace, at least a familiar feature of our world. Since the early months of 1962, when a United Nations registry of space flights was established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI),<sup>2</sup> 127 launches of objects into orbit and beyond have been registered, 6 of them involving manned flight.

Now it is perhaps not quite as awe-inspiring that today, 5½ years after the first space flight, Northwestern University Law School has been able to assemble a 2-day conference on space law covering a half dozen or more detailed topics to be discussed before an informed audience by a score of men who have already attained the status of experts. But I think it does deserve remark. The most familiar of clichés has it that the ills our modern flesh is heir to derive in large part from the fact that man's social, political, and legal institutions have failed to keep up with the breakneck pace

of developing technology. But conferences like this one exemplify an effort to subject this new domain of action to the rein of law, an effort that may seem wholly natural, even instinctive, but that in fact reflects attitudes that are historically very recent.

I would suggest that if man's law has not overtaken his science, at least it is gaining on it. I am very sure that 6 years after the invention of the wheel there was no such conference on legal implications. And one wonders what the course of human history would have looked like if at that time there had been even a verbal consensus that the wheel should be devoted to peaceful uses.

Perhaps you will think it is farfetched to hark back to prehistory for evidence that the gap has narrowed between the power of man's technology and the power of his institutions of social control. Let me direct your attention then to the three centuries from 1500 to 1800, the last great era of exploration, when again our ancestors penetrated and subdued a new environment—unknown, mysterious, hostile, forbidding.

Then as now the technologies of exploration and of weapons were closely associated. The conquest of the new world provided adventure, employment, reputation for men, and probably, on the whole, deficits for states. Then too the barometer of national prestige followed closely upon success or failure in exploration, exploitation, and colonization.

Seen in the perspective of history, this was a joint European effort and brilliantly successful. But examined in detail it was marked by ruthless competition among the states involved and

<sup>1</sup> Address made before a Conference on the Law of Space and of Satellite Communications at the Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Ill., on May 1 (press release 242).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

by almost continuous war. It is certainly too soon to say that we will be able to avoid such hazards in our contemporary venture into the unknown. After all, at the turn of the 16th century, Thomas More, Erasmus, and their fellow humanists foresaw the dawn of a golden age of universal peace and harmony, a vision that was to be bitterly betrayed before many decades were out.

Yet there are features of the contemporary effort that we may regard as hopeful and that contrast sharply with the situation four centuries ago. In the first place, the technology of space itself imposes an important degree of interdependence and cooperation among states. Second, and most important, there is the setting of international institutions in being and the considerable experiences with international organization, both of which bear directly on the development of space law and the regulation of activities in space.

#### **Acceptance of Principles of U.N. Resolution**

In the last age of exploration there was little law and what there was derived from custom. In a world of monadic nation-states, the principal teaching of custom was "hands off." Each state was left free to pursue its own activities as it willed, subject, perhaps, to a not very effective limitation that first in time was first in right. The papal effort to organize rights and opportunities by dividing the New World between Spain and Portugal seems to us, and must have seemed even then, a peculiarly ineffectual gesture.

Custom has had its role in the development of space law, as this morning's discussion testifies. Perhaps its most important contribution thus far has been the notion that activities in space may be carried on without the consent of the sovereign of the subjacent territory, at least in the absence of harm or threat of harm.

But there has been a remarkable thrust for codification and for explicit formulation in this newest branch of law. The traditional mechanism of bilateral and multilateral agreement, fashioned through negotiation and embodied in conventional form, is ill-adapted to meet this demand under existing circumstances. The demand has both been able to make itself felt

and to get itself satisfied to a certain extent, largely because of the existence of the United Nations General Assembly as an international forum. The most important action of the Assembly in this connection has been the adoption of the well-known Resolution 1721 (XVI) which commended certain principles to states for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space. They were, first, that "International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies"; and, second, that "Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation."

These principles are of course very general. They were intended to be so, and at this stage of space exploration it is appropriate that they should be. They are obviously not self-executing. Their application to specific space activities is already the subject of considerable exegesis, both political and scholarly. They do, however, provide a basic and, I think, a sound legal framework for the conduct of space activities at this stage.

There are certain things about the statement of guiding principles that are noteworthy:

1. They were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly, although this action was not forthcoming until agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. had been achieved.

2. They involve one very significant and quite specific substantive innovation: the principle of nonappropriation. There is no solid customary basis for this rule, and of course it directly contradicts the bulk of prior human experience with exploration.

3. They look toward a freely developing pattern of activity in exploration and use of space limited only by relevant provisions of international law and the charter.

In the legal subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, now meeting in New York, work is going forward on the articulation of additional general principles. Discussions in the legal subcommittee have revealed a wide area of consensus on such matters as liability for damage caused by space vehicles,

obligation to assist and return space vehicles and personnel in distress or landing by accident and mistake, the principle that jurisdiction over a space vehicle and personnel in transit shall be retained by the state or international organization which had it before launching, and the obligation to conduct space activities in such a way as to minimize the possibilities of contamination. There is little doubt agreement on these points could be reached were it not for the insistence of the Soviet Union that a number of controversial provisions also be included, on a package basis, in any agreed statement of principles to emerge from the legal subcommittee.

The United States recognizes the principles announced in Resolution 1721 as stating existing law. And I believe it would so regard any principles that came from the legal subcommittee and were unanimously approved by the Assembly. I will leave it to jurists to tell us what the source of law is in this case. I suppose it would have been possible to argue for the principles *a priori*, though that would have been difficult in the case of nonappropriation. Moreover, we have here an explicit formulation that is exceedingly hard to reach by a process of pure ratiocination. There is no formal international agreement establishing consensual obligations. Of course we all know that the Assembly is not a legislature; so we can discard enactment as a source of law. Perhaps the unanimous assent of the United Nations membership to Resolution 1721 can be taken as denoting common acceptance of the principles expressed, though here again the existence of a specific verbal formula is not wholly consistent with that notion.

Whatever the source may be, the United States, as I have said, accepts these principles as stating the law, and I suspect most other states would also. I think we must recognize then that we have witnessed in this field a significant and novel kind of lawmaking activity that has established a sound and useful base for more intensive legal development and that is attributable in large part to the presence and action of international organization.

Familiar administrative processes also have their analogies in the activities of international organizations in the field of space law.

The U.N. Secretariat, pursuant to Resolution 1721, has established a registry of space launches. The resolution calls upon states launching objects into orbit to furnish information for the registration of such launchings. Although it does not really serve as a traffic control, it does tend to encourage a pattern of openness in space activity that is very much in the interests of the United States. The impact of disclosure requirements and the various intricacies of this administrative technique are of course well known to all of you on the basis of a wide range of domestic experience with it.

Even more comfortably familiar are the administrative developments in the field of space communications. In space, as on the earth, the limits of the spectrum of radio frequencies are inexorable. Unless an allocation of frequencies among users is accepted and respected, the result will be that no one can use the facility at all. The International Telecommunication Union, established in 1865, has of course no compulsory jurisdiction in the allocation of frequencies. Its function is essentially coordination, and its method is essentially recommendation. Yet, the necessities of the case being what they are, the member states have no choice but to accept the allocations made by the ITU. In 1959 the Union assigned certain radio frequency bands for research activities in outer space, including tracking and communication. This October the ITU will convene an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference for fundamental allocation of frequencies for operating space communications. The United States, as well as other nations, recognizing the importance of this conference, is now intensively preparing for it.

#### **Developing Standards of Conduct in Space**

I think it can be shown that the existence of the United Nations and associated international organizations has had a manifold and a decisive influence on early developments in the field of space law. I believe this influence will continue. Nations engaging in the conduct of space activities will wish to do so, in general, in accordance with standards that are accepted internationally. This is so not only because of the international political consequences of con-

duct in space. Space flight is global. States conducting space programs need the cooperation of other countries for tracking and like purposes. Even the Soviet bloc is not autarchic in this respect. Existing international organizations will continue to provide the major forum for arriving at and articulating consensus on standards of national conduct in space.

But in space, as in other environments, the decisive questions will be associated with the control of the use of force. The United States has frequently expressed its view that outer space should be devoted to peaceful uses. And it has so conducted its own space programs. The United States has no intention of placing nuclear weapons in orbit. Disarmament negotiations continue for the actual elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, as well as for dealing with other types of armaments. But it is important to do everything now that can be done to avoid an arms race in outer space. It is clearly easier not to arm an environment that has never been armed than to disarm one that has been armed. It is the earnest hope of the United States that the Soviet Union will likewise refrain from taking steps to extend the arms race into space.

More generally, it is well to be precise about what is meant when we talk of *peaceful* uses of outer space. It is perfectly clear that the dividing line cannot be drawn on the basis that a particular space activity has military applications or is carried out by military personnel. A navigational satellite can guide a naval vessel as well as a merchant ship. A communications satellite can serve a military establishment as well as civilian communities. Photographic observation from space may be used for mapping or for military planning. The instruments which guide a space vehicle on a scientific quest may also guide a space vehicle on a military mission. American and Russian astronauts have been members of national armed forces, but this has afforded no reason to challenge their activities.

The dangers to peace which exist and which may exist in the future stem from the threat or use of force in violation of international legal obligations. The standards which must be used in determining and controlling exertions of na-

tional power have not been altered by the new world which outer space activities have opened. This is explicit in the United Nations General Assembly declaration that "International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies."

The standards of judgment remain those set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2, paragraph 4, imposes the obligation to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 2, paragraph 3, imposes the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. These principles laid down in the United Nations Charter bind nations in space as on earth. In the celestial, as in the terrestrial sphere, they represent the judgment of the organized international community.

It is commonplace to say that we are only at the very threshold of space law. But, as with many commonplaces, this one is true. Nevertheless I think we have made an encouraging beginning. A prominent feature of that beginning has been the part played in developing standards and in administrative regulation by the ordinary machinery of the international community, that is to say, the United Nations and its associated bodies. The capacity these bodies have shown in these directions is an important asset for the rapid development of law to govern the conduct of man in outer space.

## **Surinam Leaders Visit Department of State**

The Department of State announced on May 9 (press release 258) that Johan Pengel, Minister President-designate of Surinam and leader of the National Surinam Party, visited the Department on May 8 for discussions with U.S. officials regarding problems of mutual interest. He was accompanied by J. Lachmon, Member of Parliament and head of the United Hindustani Party, and Walter Lim-A Po and

Christian Calor, both Members of Parliament. Mr. Pengel conferred with Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and with William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Among the subjects discussed was the offer of the United States, announced in Surinam on May 6, to lend Surinam \$1 million for development projects.

## President Issues Order on Trade Agreements Program Administration

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

#### PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM AND RELATED MATTERS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 872), Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351), and Section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 11075<sup>2</sup> of January 15, 1963 (28 F.R. 473), be, and it is hereby, amended as follows:

SECTION 1. Amend the heading of the order to read "ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM".

SEC. 2. In Section 1, substitute "Definitions. (a)" for "Definition.", and add the following new subsection (b):

"(b) As used in this order the term 'the trade agreements program' includes all activities consisting of, or related to, the negotiation or administration of trade agreements (other than treaties) concluded pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution, Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, or the Act."

SEC. 3. Amend Section 2 to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. *Office of Special Representative.* (a) There is hereby established in the Executive Office of the President an agency which shall be known as the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

"(b) There shall be at the head of the said Office the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations provided for in Section 241 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as the Special Representative), who shall be directly responsible to the President.

"(c) There shall be in the said Office a Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations with the rank of Ambassador, whose principal functions shall be to conduct negotiations under title II of the Act, and who shall perform such additional duties as the Special Representative may direct."

SEC. 4. In Section 3, amend subsection (b) to read as follows:

"(b) The Special Representative shall advise and assist the President in the administration of, and facilitate the carrying out of, the trade agreements program. In addition, the Special Representative shall advise the President with respect to nontariff barriers to international trade, international commodity agreements, and other matters which are related to the trade agreements program."

SEC. 5. In subsection (c) of Section 3, substitute "trade agreements program" for "Act" in each place that word appears.

SEC. 6. In Section 3, delete subsection (i), redesignate subsection (h) as subsection (i), and insert the following new subsection (h):

"(h) After the President has entered into a trade agreement which provides for any new tariff concession, the Special Representative shall submit to the President, for transmission by him to each House of Congress, copies of such trade agreement, together with a draft of the statement relating thereto provided for in Section 226 of the Act. In addition, the Special Representative shall transmit to each House of Congress copies of agreements supplementary to trade agreements which do not provide for any new tariff concession, and of such other documents relating to the trade agreements program as he considers appropriate, together with a brief statement describing each such supplementary agreement or other document."

SEC. 7. In Section 3, add the following new subsection (1) at the end of the section:

"(1) The Special Representative shall prepare or have prepared for consideration by the President, in a form suitable for inclusion in title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, any proclamation which relates wholly or primarily to the trade agreements program. Any such proclamation shall be subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 11030 of June 19, 1962 (27 F.R. 5847), except that such proclamation need not be submitted for approval to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget as provided in Sections 2 (a) and (b) of that order but may be transmitted directly to the Attorney General for his consideration as to both form and legality."

SEC. 8. In Section 4, redesignate subsection (f) as subsection (g), and insert the following new subsection (f):

"(f) Before making recommendations to the President under Section 242(b)(2) of the Act, the Committee shall, through the Special Representative, request the advice of the Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board, created by the provisions of Section 361 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, concerning the feasibility of adjustment assistance to workers and firms."

SEC. 9. In Section 9, insert "or this order" after "the Act".

SEC. 10. Substitute "13(b)" for "12(b)" in Section 12(a), renumber Sections 11 and 12 as Sections 12

<sup>1</sup> No. 11106; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 3911.


<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180.



and 13, respectively, and insert the following new Section 11:

"SEC. 11. *Redelegation.* Delegations of authority made by this order to the Special Representative, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor, and other assignments of authority made by this order to the Special Representative, shall be deemed to include the power of successive redelegation."

Section 2 of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963 (28 F.R. 473), as amended by Section 3 of this order shall be deemed to have become effective January 15, 1963; and said Executive Order No. 11075 as amended shall be codified under title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.



JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
April 18, 1963.

## U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks

Press release 250 dated May 7

Delegations representing the Governments of the United States and Mexico are meeting in Washington, D.C., for a preliminary discussion of the U.S.-Mexican air transport agreement<sup>1</sup> which was concluded in August 1960 and which will expire on August 14 of this year. It is expected that these exploratory talks will be followed by negotiations in Mexico City at a date to be agreed upon.

The U.S. delegation includes Edward A. Bolster, director, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State, *chairman*; Chan Gurney, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board; Charles P. Nolan, special adviser, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State; Richard J. O'Melia, associate director, Bureau of International Affairs, Civil Aeronautics Board; James J. Ferretti, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; and Harvey Wexler, an observer.

<sup>1</sup>Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675.

The Mexican delegation includes Alberto Acuña Ongay, Director General of Civil Aeronautics, Ministry of Communications and Transport, *chairman*; Fernando Ongay Mendez, Sub-Director of Civil Aeronautics; Julián Sáenz Hinojosa, Minister of the Mexican Embassy in Washington; and Jorge Palacios Treviño, chief, Department of International Air Transport.

## George Szell and Theodore Roszak Appointed to Committee on Arts

The Department of State announced on May 10 (press release 259) two new appointments to the reconstituted Advisory Committee on the Arts, which gives guidance to the Department in the conduct of its program of sending cultural presentations to other countries. They are George Szell, musical director of the Cleveland Orchestra, and Theodore Roszak, sculptor.

The previously announced appointees are: Roy E. Larsen, chairman of the Executive Committee of Time, Inc., and vice chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; Lew Christensen, director of the San Francisco Ballet; Warner Lawson, dean of music, Howard University; Peter Mennin, composer and president of the Julliard School of Music; George Seaton, motion picture writer, producer, and director; and Nina Vance, founder and managing director of the Alley Theater in Houston. Mr. Larsen has been designated to serve as chairman of the committee.

The committee and the Department are assisted by several panels of experts, each concerned with a particular field of the performing arts and each evaluating and recommending performers within its field.

## Central Treaty Organization Holds 11th Ministerial Meeting

*The 11th session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Karachi April 30–May 1. Following are texts of a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on April 30 and a final communiqué issued at the close of the meeting.*

### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

The United States observer delegation and I take the greatest possible pleasure in associating ourselves with our colleagues and in extending our appreciation to our hosts for their gracious welcome—generous reception of us—to President Ayub for his inspiring message of confidence which was read to us this morning, and to the Secretary General and his colleagues in the secretariat, who, week in and week out, have given this CENTO alliance leadership and dedicated service.

It is also our privilege to join with our colleagues in recalling the memory of Mr. Mohammed Ali, the distinguished late Foreign Minister of Pakistan, a man who served not only his own country with great distinction but his region and the world community as a whole.

I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, that the 11th Council session is being held in Karachi, because it gives me a chance to visit once again a country which I had known on more than one occasion before and in which I had spent considerable time during the war and also has enabled me to visit two of our colleagues en route to this meeting.<sup>1</sup>

I have had the most stimulating discussions with the leaders of Turkey and Iran and look

forward to the opportunity of further talks with Pakistani leaders during our stay here. I don't think one can assess these matters exactly, but I am quite sure that the personal, informal discussions in the corridors are at least as valuable as the things we say to each other around the table.

Now, while it is the business of foreign ministers to focus their attention on external relations, I should like to say that the United States has noted with great pride and pleasure, as your allies, the remarkable progress which our CENTO friends are making domestically in the economic, cultural, social, and political spheres. It's not just a matter of statistics. I think visiting in the regional countries betrays or brings forward a sense of movement and a sense—a prospect for the future—which is most encouraging. Such major events as the promulgation of a new constitution, the restoration of parliamentary government, and a far-reaching reform in land tenure which have taken place recently in the treaty area are but the latest examples. And so I should like to bring to our friends in the region the congratulations and admiration of the American people on these achievements and to extend to you our best wishes for your continued progress.

### Insuring the Common Defense

In the year since we met last in London<sup>2</sup> several new challenges have been made to the security of the free world. Certain of these have dramatically underscored the validity of one of the basic principles underlying CENTO and other free-world security arrangements,

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of May 13, 1963, p. 739.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 859.

namely, the fact that our security is truly indivisible, as has been pointed out by others here at this table today. I refer particularly, of course, to the crisis over the introduction of Soviet offensive weapons into Cuba, to the Chinese Communist aggression on the Indian frontier of this very subcontinent, and to the persistent and continued aggressive pressures in Southeast Asia.

These events, so widely separated in geographic terms, illustrate the unrelenting worldwide threat of Communist aggression, not only in the usual cold-war terms of trying to undermine the principles and institutions of the free world but also on the plane of direct threats to the physical security and integrity of our homelands. Although the major offensive threat from Cuba has been removed, all free-world peoples remain "under the gun." Modern technology in the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-borne missiles of shorter range cancel the advantages which geography formerly gave to some of us.

Today our security, the security of all of us, that of the free world, depends not on our distance from an enemy but on his certain knowledge that all the damage he might inflict on us in a surprise attack would receive a devastating response.

I was very pleased, Mr. Chairman, to hear several of my colleagues here in the middle of a discussion of the CENTO alliance refer to disarmament, because I think we must be quite realistic about the fact that we can have no sure safety down the trail of devastation alone. Man is too frail and willful to trust terror as a basis for building the peace. We have a security interest in turning down the arms race if possible. It is in the interest of our safety to try to find agreed and workable programs of disarmament if possible, because the prospect for an unlimited arms race is not eventually the prospect of sure safety or peace.

But our security is, in truth, indivisible. Prudence requires that we continue to concert our efforts to insure this common defense. And in the absence of effective arrangements for disarmament that begin to turn this race down, it is only behind the shield of an adequate defense that we shall be permitted to pursue the more

rewarding effort of promoting the general welfare of our peoples.

I have remarked on previous occasions in this CENTO forum that a defensive alliance is its own excuse for being. By that I mean that the essence of this or any other collective defense arrangement is that it constitutes a clear *declaration of intent*, a warning to any potential aggressor of the determination of the participants to cooperate for their mutual security.

It has been the experience of the United States that such declarations of intent are among the most effective instruments available for the preservation of peace and the prevention of war by miscalculation on the part of the aggressor.

We place particular value on our relationships with CENTO, NATO, SEATO, the OAS, and ANZUS, as well as on certain other bilateral defensive commitments, precisely because they are the embodiment of a common intent, of an association based on our allegiance to certain inalienable rights and principles which we are prepared to defend. Not only do these organizations, by their very existence, provide the best deterrent to war, but, should war be forced upon them, they provide the strength and the institutional arrangements through which victory can be achieved, if one can possibly talk about victory in modern times.

And there are, of course, additional values: In our mutual efforts to strengthen our defenses we have also found the means, the will, and the capacity to cooperate in the more constructive areas of national economic development.

I want to say to my colleagues that the United States is prepared to continue its interest in these regional economic problems, a number of which have been named here today. But I think that perhaps CENTO is somewhat underplayed before our public opinions if we seem to think that it is only these formally adopted CENTO economic projects for which CENTO has the responsibility or for which it deserves any credit. Our relations with our CENTO friends is a part of the total relationship of common interests and concern which makes it possible for us to arrange and support and invest in very substantial bilateral assistance programs as far as the regional members are con-

cerned. So I would hope that it would be well understood that CENTO has something to do with this business of development over and beyond these regional projects.

### Validity of Collective Action

The participation of our five nations in CENTO is both an endorsement of the concept and a demonstration of the validity of collective action for defense. As Lord Home has pointed out, no member of NATO, SEATO, or CENTO has been subjected to aggression since joining one of these defensive organizations. But other members of the free world have not been so fortunate.

I think the validity of some of these concepts that I have pointed to recalls the response enunciated by President Truman in somewhat similar circumstances of aggression 16 years ago. In effect, he said that, in the interests of the security of the free world, in the interest of humanity, and even in our own individual national interests, we must come to the aid of the victim against the aggressor. And this remains the policy of the United States today.

For if peace and security are indeed indivisible, then any breach of the peace menaces the security of us all. And if the Communist aggressor succeeds in his aggression anywhere, he thereby gains strength for further aggression, indeed gains an appetite, and the free world is correspondingly weakened, both morally and physically.

We shall in my delegation, Mr. Chairman, take full advantage of this opportunity to talk problems over with our colleagues to find those elements of common interest on which we can build a common policy, to identify certain points of difference, and try to resolve those if possible. For it is the function of diplomacy, both in CENTO and elsewhere, to work toward the common purposes which drive the great peoples represented here at this table.

### FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Eleventh Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held in Karachi on April 30 and May 1, 1963. The delegations from countries participating in this meeting were led by:

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram	Foreign Minister of Iran
H.E. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	Minister for External Affairs, Pakistan
H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin	Foreign Minister of Turkey
The Right Honourable The Earl of Home, K.T.	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
The Honourable Dean Rusk	Secretary of State, United States of America

The Minister of External Affairs of Pakistan, as host, was in the Chair.

The Session was inaugurated by a message of welcome from the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, which was read by Mr. Bhutto.

The Council of Ministers expressed profound regret at the untimely death of Mr. Mohammed Ali and paid tribute to the outstanding contributions he had made to his country in particular, and the free world in general. They also expressed pleasure at the presence of Mr. Bhutto at his first CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting since becoming Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan.

The Council of Ministers then reviewed the international situation in their traditional free and frank manner. While recognising the serious dangers and problems to be overcome before there could be any real prospect of a reduction in world tension, they reiterated the determination of their Governments to explore all means of achieving the aim of promoting peace and security. The ultimate objective was world disarmament, with clear, specific, and adequate safeguards. Meanwhile, the alliance in pursuance of its aims, must exercise constant vigilance, firmness and restraint, fortified by the mutual support and encouragement of the participating countries.

The Council stressed the importance of continuing economic development and social progress in the region. They noted with satisfaction, from the report of the Economic Committee, the progress in CENTO joint communications projects, on which about twelve thousand persons were currently employed. In particular, they were pleased to note that the development of the port of Trabzon had recently been completed, thereby providing an improved outlet for regional trade. Good progress had been made in the development of the Turkish-Iran road link, which should be open to traffic by the end of the year. In the field of telecommunications, the Council took note of the good progress being made with the microwave system and the CENTO Airway navigational aid project, both of which will link the three countries of the region and should be completed by the first half of next year. Since the Council met last, the completion of the high frequency system linking London and CENTO capitals had been extended to Pakistan.

In considering the report of the Military Committee, the Council took note of suggestions for further im-

proving the defensive value of the alliance. By maintaining its strength the alliance would continue to play its part in the general efforts toward the solution of world problems.

The Council further agreed that the gathering momentum of the multilateral technical cooperation and the cultural relations programmes made a valuable

contribution to the development of the region and to better understanding among the peoples.

The Council found their consultations invaluable both for assessing world and regional problems and for taking stock of the achievements of the alliance.

The Council decided that the next Ministerial meeting should be held in Washington in early 1964.

## Commodity Trade and Economic Development

*Statement by W. Michael Blumenthal  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to have the honor of representing my Government for the third consecutive year at the annual session of the United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade. Looking back over the past 2 years, I think we have made considerable progress in taking a constructive approach to commodity problems. Though moving ahead, we are, however, still far from our goal: a pattern of commodity trade that will lead to the most rapid economic development and will benefit both producers and consumers. As we all know, to accelerate progress toward this goal is the prime purpose of the CICT.

The United States for its part attaches the utmost importance to rapid regenerative economic development. Our aid, commercial, and commodity policies are all geared to helping the developing countries help themselves to progress. To the extent that we facilitate higher foreign exchange earnings by them, they have a greater possibility of carrying out the structural reforms requisite for sustained growth. The United States is prepared to make its fair contribution through cooperation

<sup>1</sup>Made at the 11th session of the Commission on International Commodity Trade of the U.N. Economic and Social Council at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 30 (press release 235). Mr. Blumenthal was U.S. representative at the 11th session.

in international commodity price stabilization agreements where they are appropriate; through support of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] compensatory financing arrangement; through reduction and elimination in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] of trade barriers; and through the stimulus given to economic diversification by our programs of economic assistance.

But let me make it clear at the outset that our efforts will bear little fruit if the developing countries take the position that they should do little or nothing while they ask the advanced countries to open their markets, to buy their exports at stable prices satisfactory to producers, to expand their aid efforts, to compensate them for both short-term fluctuations in export earnings and for long-term declines in the terms of trade. Aid is of use only to the extent that it supports rational development policies and major self-help efforts to modernize social and economic structures. Commodity agreements offer a chance for developing countries to stabilize their earnings and in some instances to increase them, but such agreements will be pointless if the developing countries do not practice self-discipline in restraining production of commodities in oversupply, such as coffee, and channeling increased receipts not into consumption or capital flight but into diversified productive investment. Moreover, even uni-

lateral trade concessions by the advanced countries will yield little if the developing countries do not follow commercial policies calculated to further their eventual integration into the world trading community.

Considerations like these raise a number of questions which must in time be answered. For example:

Have the developing countries taken full advantage of the economic assistance made available to them?

Have the developing countries played their full and proper role in GATT?

Have they faced up to their responsibilities to participate effectively in a world commodity policy?

### **Elements of a World Commodity Policy**

Last year I sketched for the consideration of this Commission the elements of a world commodity policy.<sup>2</sup> You may recall that I made six points.

First, a world commodity policy should focus on long-term structural issues affecting individual basic products. The complexities of commodity production and trade require a commodity-by-commodity approach. The long-term problem requires measures to stimulate consumption and also measures to control supply. The supply problem is typically more severe. It requires a concerted effort to limit excess exports and production of certain key commodities. On the demand side, tariffs, internal taxes, and other consumption restraints still exist. Clearly these anachronisms must be progressively removed. However, removal of consumption restraints alone will usually not be enough: effective limits on production may be necessary, particularly for those few commodities subject to international agreements.

My second point last year was that we should recognize the close connection between commodity trade and economic growth. I would like to elaborate on this point somewhat further than I did last year. If we were only concerned with the producers and consumers of such products as coffee and cocoa, our task would be far

simpler. For example, if future technological advances provide improved varieties of trees, more efficient production methods, and even greater yields, supply and demand for coffee could conceivably balance at a price of perhaps 15 cents a pound. I am assuming that at this price efficient producers, because of lower production costs, would make an entirely satisfactory profit. The difficulty—indeed the unrealism—of such a calculation is that 15-cent coffee, unaccompanied by the growth of diversified exports, could be disastrous to the foreign exchange earnings and development programs of producing countries. Our efforts to improve commodity trade require not only balancing of supply and demand but a balance which takes into account the foreign exchange needs of producing countries. In short, commodity policy is made more complex by the need to achieve a threefold equilibrium embracing supply, demand, and the export earnings of producing countries.

Third, the approach to commodity problems should be in a worldwide context, not a narrowly regional one. Limited solutions which may temporarily benefit some developing countries at the expense of others should generally be avoided, particularly since they are unlikely to endure.

Fourth, there is, nonetheless, a valuable place for regional cooperation in the improvement of world commodity trade as long as regionalism is outward-looking and strengthens global commodity approaches.

My fifth point last year was that long-term efforts to improve commodity trade should be supplemented by devices to offset short-term fluctuations in export earnings of primary producing countries. I will return to this point in a moment.

Sixth, and finally, last year I warned against proliferation of international commodity activities and dissipation of effort. This matter has taken on new urgency in light of the impending United Nations Trade and Development Conference. I will also comment on this issue in more detail in a few minutes.

I thought it well to review what I had said last year, because in fact the essence of United States commodity policy has not changed, al-

<sup>2</sup> For a condensed version of Mr. Blumenthal's statement before the 10th session of the CICT, see BULLETIN of June 18, 1962, p. 997.

though we are continually learning by experience; our approach is evolving and adjusting to meet new problems as they arise.

Now, what have we accomplished since this Commission last met in Rome, and what lies ahead? How can we harness commodity trade to the imperatives of economic development and the legitimate interests of both producers and consumers?

Three major developments during the past 12 months stand out in the commodity field: first, the negotiation of the International Coffee Agreement; second, the calling of a negotiating conference for an International Cocoa Agreement; and third, the announcement by the International Monetary Fund of a special compensatory financing facility for temporary export shortfalls of primary producing countries.

### **International Coffee Agreement**

The objective of the International Coffee Agreement<sup>3</sup> is to bring about improved market conditions and thus to create a climate in which the difficult problems of overproduction and burdensome stocks may be attacked. This improvement and the expected growth of consumption should bring about a gradual increase in foreign exchange earnings and thereby establish a stable base from which to plan long-range economic development programs. It also means that many countries should no longer see their efforts, and substantial amounts of aid, quickly offset by falling prices for their principal foreign exchange earner.

The negotiation of the coffee agreement represents a landmark in international cooperation in commodity trade. We believe that it provides the basis for the growth of world coffee trade at fair and stable prices. Unfortunately the agreement is more like an arrow pointing out our future route than a comfortable park bench. The agreement is not a solution of the coffee problem. Like all treaties, constitutions, currencies, and even speeches, it is worth no more than what the signatories are willing to do to carry it out.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see S. Ex. II, 87th Cong., 2d sess.; for background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

Our task now under the coffee agreement—and this responsibility falls especially heavily on the producing countries—is to implement the agreement effectively. If producing countries hope to increase export earnings from coffee, they must agree to reduce quotas. Price objectives are meaningless unless exporters zealously adhere to realistic export quotas. Holding back exports admittedly is difficult and in some respects painful. At the same time it is incumbent upon the consuming countries to cooperate in policing the agreement and to expand consumption by progressively eliminating taxes and duties.

Faced with the imperative of development, and the dependence on primary-product export earnings, exporting countries have no choice but to curtail excess production and to shift to alternative uses labor, land, and capital now devoted to production of surplus coffee. We in the United States stand ready to cooperate to make this effort a success.

For cocoa producers the situation is in many respects considerably more favorable than that in coffee. There are no large stocks overhanging the market; prices have recently strengthened from the lower levels prevailing during 1962; and at present supply and demand are roughly in balance at what appear to be remunerative prices. Nonetheless, in the recent past cocoa price fluctuations have adversely affected export earnings of producing countries. We should continue the progress made thus far toward a negotiating conference and work out a meaningful agreement beneficial to producers and to consumers. This agreement must aim at the maintenance of a price range which is at the same time remunerative to producers and not so high as to discourage the growth of consumption. Exporting countries must be prepared to resort to sales or export quotas and production limitations if conditions dictate such action. Such limitations will be less necessary as duties and taxes on raw and semiprocessed cocoa are eliminated. As in the case of coffee, the negotiation of an agreement will not automatically solve the cocoa problem. Price objectives cannot be attained simply by decree. They can only be achieved through the cooperation of the participants in the agreement.



## Compensatory Financing

I come now to compensatory financing. This Commission has played a central role in focusing world attention on ways and means of dealing with this issue and can be proud that its efforts have led to the recent major decision taken by the International Monetary Fund in creating a special compensatory financing facility.<sup>4</sup> For our part we welcome this development; we would propose that the CICT endorse it; and we would call on the Fund management to implement the decision in an imaginative and liberal fashion.

For years, in this forum and elsewhere, we have discussed the problems created for primary producing countries by sharp fluctuations in their export receipts. We have made progress in limiting price fluctuations for some key commodities, and now we have a valuable mechanism to offset short-term fluctuations in export earnings. The new facility has been created without the delays and uncertainties which would have had to be faced in negotiating the terms of either a Development Insurance Fund or an Organization of American States scheme and in securing authorizing legislation and appropriations. I should stress this point. The IMF facility is available now; it is not a future idea but a present reality.

The immediate effect is to make available to primary exporting countries some \$800 million of potential credits to compensate for temporary export shortfalls.

We view the Fund's decision as a significant accomplishment; it should be tested by experience before there is further examination of other possible approaches to the problem of compensatory financing for short-term fluctuations.

The situation seems quite clear to us. The additional \$800 million that primary producing countries can draw on is an ample amount with which to start operations. If, however, it should be found that with the new facility the Fund is not able satisfactorily to deal with the problem, we would have to reexamine the situation. For my part I am optimistic that the IMF scheme will prove itself in practice. If there are doubters here today, I trust that they will be numbered among the converts next year.

---

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.

I should also reiterate that the IMF scheme is only a part of our overall approach to the improvement of commodity trade—an approach which also includes international agreements, removal of restraints on trade and consumption, and industrialization and diversification of exports.

In these circumstances the United States delegation believes that the new work program of the CICT should be focused on a study of long-term commodity problems and on possible ways for dealing with them. This work should be so conducted as to contribute to the success of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

I would like to conclude my remarks with a few observations about international commodity trade cooperation. In addition to negotiation of a cocoa agreement, two other particularly significant events lie ahead in the next 12 months: a general round of GATT trade negotiations and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

## GATT Trade Negotiations

I will comment first on the prospective GATT trade negotiations. Virtually all trading nations, whether industrialized or developing, have a great stake in the broad reductions of trade barriers and stimulation of trade which will stem from successful GATT negotiations. We foresee these negotiations as by no means limited to industrialized countries, and their success requires wide participation of all nations which stand to benefit by trade expansion. We expect industrialized nations to move toward a policy of major tariff cuts, minimum exceptions, and satisfactory global arrangements for the hard core of agricultural trade not susceptible to traditional tariff bargaining. The United States does not expect any commitments in the form of automatic tariff cuts from the less developed countries in response to linear tariff cuts by the advanced countries. Instead, we wish to take our reciprocity in the form of advancing the economic development of the less developed countries and thus improve our trading relations with them.

To this end we are proposing that GATT establish a multilateral consultative procedure

whereby developing countries participating in and benefiting from the general trade negotiations can systematically review and test their commercial policies against economic development criteria. This could well lead to changes in their policies, including probably changes in the levels of some of their tariffs—changes designed to promote both their development and a more rational world trading system. We consider this approach to be in the interest of all trading nations. Developing nations are not requested to grant reciprocity in the traditional sense. Industrialized countries, nevertheless, will gain as expanding exports of developing nations enable these countries to increase their overall level of trade. We find such a solution preferable to suggestions for new systems of preferences which stand to benefit some nations at the expense of others.

#### **U.N. Conference on Trade and Development**

Turning now to the United Nations Trade and Development Conference, I would like to reiterate the concern I expressed last year as to the proliferation and overlapping of international activities dealing with trade and commodity problems. The U.N. conference can perform a valuable function in focusing world attention on trade problems of the developing countries, in stimulating the examination of possible new approaches, and in generating support for more enlightened trade and commodity policies. But our common interest is certainly in getting early results, and the conference must avoid throwing the baby out with the bath water—by which I mean that it must avoid diverting energy and support from existing valuable institutions such as the CICT, the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], and the GATT, which are working on these same problems, in favor of some grandiose new projects which might or might not succeed and which would in any event take years to begin to operate.

We have to recognize that there are no simple answers, no cure-alls which magically whisk away world commodity problems. No super commodity agreements, no sweeping enunciation of principles, no streamlined, elaborate new organizational arrangements, can change the

hard and complex facts which must be dealt with if we are to improve commodity trade and help the developing countries move away from their present dependence on commodity trade. Obviously there is room for improvement in what we are now doing in this field, but it should be done in ways which improve our chance of solving the basic problems as quickly as possible. We are making progress through the combined action of the CICT, GATT, various commodity agreements and study groups, and through specialized measures such as the IMF facility for compensatory financing. We must move ahead not by sabotaging the progress we are now beginning to make but by building on and perfecting our existing activities directed toward international cooperation in solving the trade problems of the developing countries. A major function of the Commission at this session will be to prepare documentation for the Preparatory Committee to the U.N. conference and otherwise facilitate its work. We for our part trust the conference will discharge its functions in a way that strengthens the authority and competence of the Commission to continue to lead the international effort to solve the problems of commodity trade.

### **DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

#### **Confirmations**

The Senate on May 1 confirmed the following nominations:

Chester Bowles to be Ambassador to India. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated April 6.)

E. Allan Lightner, Jr., to be Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Libya. (For biographic details, see White House press release (Palm Beach, Fla.) dated April 12.)

Adm. Jerauld Wright, U.S. Navy, retired, to be Ambassador to China. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 261 dated May 13.)

#### **Designations**

John W. Coffey as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications in the Bureau of Administration, effective March 18.

Thomas L. Hughes as Director of Intelligence and Research, effective April 28. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 132 dated March 13.)

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. *Acceptance deposited:* Dahomey, April 23, 1963. Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. *Adherence deposited:* Algeria, May 7, 1963.

##### Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 15, 1911, and May 4, 1949; for the United States August 14, 1950. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS 2164. *Accession deposited:* Madagascar, April 10, 1963.

##### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>1</sup> *Acceptance deposited:* Japan, April 23, 1963.

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892. *Accession deposited:* Spanish Provinces in Africa, April 25, 1963.

##### Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. *Signatures:* Italy (subject to ratification), January 25, 1963; Netherlands, April 8, 1963; Norway, January 16, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Congo (Léopoldville)

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes and aide mem-

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

oire. Signed at Léopoldville February 23, 1963. Entered into force February 23, 1963. Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes and aide memoire. Signed at Léopoldville February 23, 1963. Entered into force February 23, 1963.

##### El Salvador

Agricultural commodity agreement. Signed at Washington May 7, 1963. Entered into force May 7, 1963.

##### India

Agreement concerning the use of meteorologically instrumented research aircraft of the U.S. Weather Bureau and of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute of the U.S. to collect data for meteorological research in connection with the Indian Ocean expedition. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi February 15 and April 22 and 23, 1963. Entered into force April 23, 1963.

Agricultural commodity agreement. Signed at Washington May 9, 1963. Entered into force May 9, 1963.

##### Israel

Agreement providing agricultural commodities for the improvement and expansion of the school feeding program in Israel, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem February 28 and March 21, 1963. Entered into force March 21, 1963.

## PUBLICATIONS

### “Department of State 1963”

Press release 252 dated May 9, for release May 10

The Department of State published on May 10 a 152-page illustrated “report to the citizen” on its activities at home and abroad during the past year. Entitled *Department of State 1963*, the report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of United States foreign policy and then describes in some detail the different means by which this Department has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that “the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task” of promoting our foreign relations, “and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve.” The President adds, “If [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I

share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

Secretary Rusk describes the report in an introduction as "one small part of our total effort to make our policies and our actions known to the public."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State but also of Department offices less well known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Service Institute.

Most of these sections also contain brief accounts of the experiences of individual Foreign Service officers, biographic sketches of senior personnel, charts, and other illustrative material. A special section is devoted to the work of our "unpaid public servants," the Foreign Service wives.

The publication concludes with sections on the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps—agencies within the Department of State—and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a separate agency whose Director reports to the Secretary of State.

Copies of *Department of State 1963* are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$1.50.

## Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Economic Cooperation—ERP Counterpart Settlement.** Agreement with Austria. Signed at Vienna March 29, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Vienna on March 10 and 28, 1961. Entered into force July 12, 1962. TIAS 5133. 18 pp. 10¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with Ethiopia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Addis Ababa August 3, 1962. Entered into force August 3, 1962. TIAS 5134. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Aviation—Transport Services.** Agreement with France, relating to the agreement of March 27, 1946, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris April 5, 1960. Entered into force April 5, 1960. TIAS 5135. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Economic Development—Commitment of Funds to the Revised Pakistan Second Five-Year Plan.** Agreement with Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at

Karachi July 25, 1962. Entered into force July 25, 1962. TIAS 5136. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with British Honduras. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belize July 26 and August 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962. TIAS 5137. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Postal Matters—Money Orders.** Agreement with Thailand. Signed at Bangkok January 12, 1962, and at Washington February 21, 1962. Entered into force July 1, 1962. TIAS 5138. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Weather Stations—Cooperative Meteorological Program.** Agreement with Mexico, extending and amending the agreement of August 23 and 29, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mexico August 8, 1962. Entered into force August 8, 1962. TIAS 5139. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Technical Cooperation—Industrial Productivity Program.** Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Dated at Mexico February 21 and November 15, 1961. Entered into force November 15, 1961. TIAS 5140. 7 pp. 10¢.

**Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessels.** Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of November 7, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lisbon March 8 and July 27, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962. TIAS 5141. 3 pp. 5¢.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 6-12

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 6 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 214 of April 23; 233 of April 29; 235 of April 30; 241 and 242 of May 1; and 246 of May 2.

No.	Date	Subject
247	5/7	U.S. dependents ordered to leave Haiti.
*248	5/7	Cleveland: 9th Pan American Highway Congress.
*249	5/6	U.S. participation in international conferences.
250	5/7	Air talks with Mexico.
*251	5/8	McGhee sworn in as Ambassador to Germany (biographic details).
252	5/9	<i>Department of State 1963</i> released.
†253	5/8	Cleveland: "Two Kinds of Politics."
†254	5/9	Foreign Relations volume on American Republics.
*255	5/9	Hitsman sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (biographic details).
†256	5/9	Rostow: "The Atlantic Community: An American View."
*257	5/9	Cultural presentations attractions for 1963-64.
258	5/9	Visit of Minister President-designate of Surinam (rewrite).
259	5/10	Appointments to Advisory Committee on Arts (rewrite).

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**American Republics.** Aid—Investment in the Future (Johnson) . . . . . 829

**Asia.** Aid—Investment in the Future (Johnson) . . . . . 829

**Aviation.** U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks . . . 840

**Canada.** President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson of Canada Hold Talks (text of communique) . . . . . 815

**China.** Wright confirmed as Ambassador . . . 848

**Congress.** Confirmations (Bowles, Lightner, Wright) . . . . . 848

**Department and Foreign Service**

Confirmations (Bowles, Lightner, Wright) . . . 848

“Department of State 1963” . . . . . 849

Designations (Coffey, Hughes) . . . . . 848

**Economic Affairs**

Commodity Trade and Economic Development (Blumenthal) . . . . . 844

The Nationalization of Takeoff (Rostow) . . . 824

New Perspectives on the United States’ World Relationships (Bowles) . . . . . 817

President Issues Order on Trade Agreements Program Administration . . . . . 839

**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** George Szell and Theodore Roszak Appointed to Committee on Arts . . . . . 840

**Europe.** Aid—Investment in the Future (Johnson) . . . . . 829

**Foreign Aid**

Aid—Investment in the Future (Johnson) . . . 829

The Nationalization of Takeoff (Rostow) . . . 824

New Perspectives on the United States’ World Relationships (Bowles) . . . . . 817

Surinam Leaders Visit Department of State . . . 838

**Haiti**

Dependents of U.S. Employees Ordered To Leave Haiti . . . . . 834

U.S. Citizens Urged To Avoid Travel to Haiti . . 834

**India.** Bowles confirmed as Ambassador . . . 848

**International Law.** International Organization and Space Law (Chayes) . . . . . 835

**International Organizations and Conferences**

Central Treaty Organization Holds 11th Ministerial Meeting (Rusk, text of communique) . 841

Commodity Trade and Economic Development (Blumenthal) . . . . . 844

**Libya.** Lightner confirmed as Ambassador . . . 848

**Mexico.** U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks . . . 840

**Middle East.** Central Treaty Organization Holds 11th Ministerial Meeting (Rusk, text of communique) . . . . . 841

**Presidential Documents**

President Issues Order on Trade Agreements Program Administration . . . . . 839

President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson of Canada Hold Talks . . . . . 815

**Protection of Nationals**

Dependents of U.S. Employees Ordered To Leave Haiti . . . . . 834

U.S. Citizens Urged To Avoid Travel to Haiti . . 834

**Publications**

“Department of State 1963” . . . . . 849

Recent Releases . . . . . 850

**Science.** International Organization and Space Law (Chayes) . . . . . 835

**Surinam.** Surinam Leaders Visit Department of State . . . . . 838

**Treaty Information**

Current Actions . . . . . 849

U.S. and Mexico Hold Air Talks . . . . . 840

**U.S.S.R.** New Perspectives on the United States’ World Relationships (Bowles) . . . . . 817

**United Nations**

International Organization and Space Law (Chayes) . . . . . 835

New Perspectives on the United States’ World Relationships (Bowles) . . . . . 817

*Name Index*

Blumenthal, W. Michael . . . . . 844

Bowles, Chester . . . . . 817, 848

Chayes, Abram . . . . . 835

Coffey, John W . . . . . 848

Hughes, Thomas L . . . . . 849

Johnson, U. Alexis . . . . . 829

Kennedy, President . . . . . 815, 839

Lightner, E. Allan, Jr . . . . . 848

Pearson, Lester B . . . . . 815

Rostow, W. W . . . . . 824

Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 841

Wright, Jerauld . . . . . 848

SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPT  
PUBLIC LIBRARY  
COPLEY SQUARE  
BOSTON 17, MASS  
DSB DEC -G-



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)

the  
Department  
of  
State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE • 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State, 1963*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then relates in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Publication 7530

\$1.50

Order Form

Publication 7530

\$1.50

To: Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *Department of State, 1963*

Enclosed find:

Name: -----

\$:-----

Street Address: -----

(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

City, Zone, and State: -----

541



Vol. XLVIII, No. 1249

June 3, 1963

**THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: AN AMERICAN VIEW** ● *by W. W. Rostow, Counselor* . . . . . 855

**WESTERN POWERS REJECT SOVIET CHARGES ON NATO NUCLEAR DEFENSE** ● *Texts of U.S. and Soviet Notes* . . . . . 860

**FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RULE OF LAW** ● *by George C. McGhee* . . . . . 867

**COMMUNISM'S IMPACT ON AFRICAN NATIONALISM** ● *by Assistant Secretary Williams* . . . . . 877

**TWO KINDS OF POLITICS** ● *by Assistant Secretary Cleveland* . . . . . 871

*For index see inside back cover*



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1219 • PUBLICATION 7

June 3, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 16, 1961).

*Note:* Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

# The Atlantic Community: An American View

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*<sup>1</sup>

I should like to lay before you a broad picture of the view in Washington of the Atlantic alliance. We stand at a moment in its evolution here we face at the same time both considerable problems and considerable possibilities for creative forward movement.

Both our problems and our possibilities are best viewed in a long perspective; for the Atlantic alliance is not a new concept. It has come to its present stage after almost a generation's hard work on both sides of the Atlantic. In recalling the evolution of our policies it is, perhaps, wholesome for an American to begin by acknowledging how badly our diplomacy toward Europe performed between the two World Wars. By failing to join the League of Nations and by failing to meet the French desire for an unambiguous long-term American security commitment to the European Continent, the United States set the framework for the inward tragedy of Europe. And elements in European diplomacy also left Paris without ready support and failed to build a policy which would maintain the viability and independence of the new states of Eastern Europe and support those in Germany who wished to pursue a moderate and constructive course.

In the end, of course, our perhaps retrievable errors of the 1920's were rendered disastrous by the Great Depression, which drained away a good part of the energy and capacity of the West to pursue effective policies on the world scene; and so we had to fight what Churchill

has properly designated as an unnecessary war.

I recall these events—at once distant and part of our lives—because on the American side our policy toward Europe and the Atlantic community has been colored by an assessment of where and how we failed in an earlier generation. It was a notable feature of American policy during the Second World War that President Roosevelt was almost obsessively concerned to insure that this time the United States would have the political base to enter the new world organization which succeeded the League of Nations. And from 1946 forward our approach to European problems has been strongly colored by the need to avoid the kinds of mistakes we had made earlier, as we interpreted them, notably with respect to the European Continent.

As it became clear in the winter and spring of 1946 that the Soviet Union would not permit the unification of Germany on the basis of political freedom, we began to shape a policy that still stands; namely, a policy of helping to build a prosperous and united Western Europe which would be closely linked in military and other great affairs to the United States and Canada and which would move back onto the world scene as a great power, broadly in concert with North America.

Four elements converged to produce this policy:

First, there was Germany. It was judged essential that we create a strong, unified European structure which could receive as an equal partner a Germany that was bound to be split for some time to come, a structure which would

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Belgo-American Association at Brussels, Belgium, on May 9 (press release 256).

give to Germans an opportunity to mobilize their great energy and resources along constructive lines in the face of the inevitable strains that history and geography have placed upon them.

Second, there was Moscow. Europe faced a unified adversary consolidating his empire up to the Elbe, seeking to exploit every schism or lesion he could find in the West. A united Europe linked to the United States appeared the only tolerably safe framework of organization to deal with this centralized, increasingly powerful locus of active hostility.

Third, there was the perception to which many men had come on both sides of the Atlantic as the major historic lesson of the Second World War; namely, that in the world of the second half of the 20th century the individual nation-states of Europe could only execute effectively a major role on the world scene if they were to unite. The arena of world affairs had widened out to embrace the whole of the planet; and the technology of effective power had outstripped the scale of the old states of Europe. The historic competition for power and status among them could only be pursued at the cost of their common effectiveness as a voice in world affairs, as well as at the risk of their common security.

And finally, there was the economic argument: The full economic potentialities of Europe could only be developed on the basis of a spacious, highly competitive, continental market.

As a minor official in the Department of State when these matters were first debated, early in 1946, I can recall vividly that the dangers of this policy for the United States were laid on the table: How could we be sure that a united Europe would, in fact, pursue policies consonant with American interests? Would it not be safer to conduct a bilateral set of relations with Europe which, given the potentialities of our bargaining power, might permit us to assure United States influence in European affairs over a longer period?

We decided that the larger interests should prevail. And in the Marshall Plan and beyond we went forward in support of European unity. Behind this decision was an act of

faith—faith that the ultimate logic of the Atlantic connection, already tested in two World Wars and then under a third test by Stalin would prevail, and that a united Europe would build its policy on the fundamental overlap of our respective interests, not on the potential cross-purposes and divergencies, which we and are, evident enough.

We have never looked back on that decision and we are confident at the present time and the face of contemporary problems and difficulties that it remains the right basis for American policy.

### Improving Political Consultation

It is also true, however, that we are now in the midst of a decade which will test whether that policy is, in fact, viable.

We are in the midst of the most complex and delicate piece of international architecture ever undertaken at a time of peace; namely, the transition in the relations between Europe and the United States from dependence to partnership and a simultaneous realignment in the relations of the European states to one another centered on the question of European unity.

The fact is, of course, that in the postwar years the United States had to pick up around the world one area of responsibility after another, either to fill vacuums left by the Second World War—as in Korea and Japan—or to cope with situations where the European power withdrew. If one examines the map in the vacuum are from, say, Korea to Greece, and observe where American fighting men, money, and political commitments are emplaced, at every point it is clear we moved in to fill a gap which would otherwise have been filled by chaos or the Communists.

It is our hope and expectation that this abnormal preponderance in the American role in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa—and, would add, in Latin America—will give place to a new balance. Europe has the resources, the latent energy, and, if it unites, I believe the political energy and will to return to the world scene on a new basis.

We do not regard the relationships which grew up *ad hoc* after the Second World War between the United States and these regions as

inal or appropriate pattern. We look toward the emergence of a general relationship of the more advanced nations of the northern part of the free world with the developing nations to the south in which the role of Europe and Japan relative to the United States would gradually expand. We believe this return of Europe and Japan to the world scene would be good for the United States, good for Europe and Japan, and good for the nations and regions now caught up in the adventure of modernizing their societies.

This vision poses for the alliance a question of how such a transition in the distribution of responsibility is to be organized. In the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] we can already consult on common problems of economic aid. But there is more involved here than aid. We must find the machinery to concert within the alliance at the highest level of responsibility our political policies toward these regions—a task that was impossible to conceive of when colonial disengagement dominated the scene but which becomes more realistic as our interest in these southern regions comes to rest on the problem of helping them maintain their independence, modernize their societies, and settle peacefully their differences with one another and with us to the north.

It is certain that in the years ahead one of the major tasks we confront is the improvement of our machinery of political consultation, not merely with respect to confrontations with the Communists but in carrying forward a more effective, constructive policy in the developing areas to the south.

#### Partnership in Nuclear Matters

A second great area of partnership lies, of course, in the field of nuclear weapons. The story begins, as we all know, with the Manhattan Project, in which the scientific talent of the West was organized in the United States to produce the first nuclear weapons. From this experience flowed the special nuclear relationship between the United States and Great Britain; and then, with the failure of the Baruch proposal in the United States, there emerged

the McMahon Act, in which American policy sought to protect from the Communists the store of nuclear knowledge of which we were the major custodian.

As the 1950's proceeded, however, and the Soviet Union acquired thermonuclear weapons, the character of the problem, as seen from Washington, changed. The special nuclear relation to Great Britain was reinforced in 1958; and the need for security in certain nuclear matters remained—and remains—a real issue for the United States and the West, despite increasing Soviet virtuosity. But a new and great issue gradually came to the surface: How should nuclear affairs be organized within the Atlantic alliance at a time when the resurgent wealth, confidence, and power of Western Europe no longer made a simple reliance on American nuclear power and the Anglo-American connection acceptable? The French *force de frappe*, initiated around 1956, represented an understandable impulse on the Continent to play some meaningful role in shaping their own destiny in a nuclear age, as well as an effort to achieve a nuclear status vis-a-vis the United States equivalent to that of Great Britain.

What are the solutions open to us? How can a community of sovereign nations, bound together by treaty, organize to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent in a period of cold war and for the use of nuclear weapons should their use be required in their common interest?

Theoretically one could conceive of a solution in which the European nations, having measured the full cost of national nuclear deterrents and the great advantages of a single, unified, unambiguous command over those weapons, should consciously forgo the production of weapons and means of delivery and leave the job to the United States, while joining with us in intensive consultative arrangements for their operation and management. This is obviously a matter for the European nations to decide; for it raises fewer problems for the United States than any other solution. Moreover, no solution is conceivable that does not draw the European nations more deeply into the targeting, planning, and design of strategy for nuclear weapons.

But as we faced the facts, in the late 1950's

and early 1960's, we were inclined to believe that this solution—of a mixed-manned committee working with the American nuclear force in an intimate consultative arrangement—was an insufficient answer. Great Britain and France were already launched on another path; and their science, technology, industry, and military establishments were increasingly caught up in nuclear affairs. Beyond that, it has been easy for us to understand why proud and free men, now fully recovered from the economic consequences of the Second World War—men who have been threatened by Moscow over the past several years as hostages to the Soviet medium ballistic missiles lined up in Western Russia—would wish to play a larger, rather than a smaller, role in the deterrence of a nuclear attack. We understand why our friends in Europe may not be content, when threatened, merely to say to Moscow: Washington will protect us.

A second solution has been suggested by some on the European side of the Atlantic. They argue that the consequences of nuclear war are such, in the face of current and prospective Soviet capabilities, that one nation cannot rely on any other nation to come to its defense in the face of the danger of nuclear attack. Therefore the only secure and dignified position for each nation is to command its own nuclear capability. Among our NATO allies a certain number have the industrial and technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons and some kind of delivery system. But if we were all to accept this theory, which denies the possibility of collective security arrangements in a nuclear age, two consequences would directly follow. First, the alliance would fragment into a series of national nuclear capabilities, the European components of which would be inefficiently produced, unsystematically targeted, and quite unpersuasive in Moscow. Second, we would be proclaiming in the alliance that no effective protection could be afforded to those among our allies who did not command a national nuclear capability. We would be inviting Moscow, in effect, to put diplomatic and military pressure on these smaller powers, one by one, in the face of a doctrine which asserted that no other nation would rationally protect them.

The acceptance of this doctrine could or mean the end of the North Atlantic alliance in fact the whole system of American alliances—opening the way for the fragmentation and piecemeal diplomatic or military defeat of Western Europe and other now free regions of the world.

In the light of these two marginal alternatives, it has been the policy of the American Government, beginning with the latter days of the Eisenhower administration, to look toward arrangements which would increase the effective degree of partnership and participation in nuclear matters within the Atlantic community, without diminishing the effectiveness and unity of our collective security deterrent. This is no simple matter in a world where 15 nations are committed to a system of mutual defense but in which no unified sovereign institutions exist.

It has been natural for newspaper and other commentators to focus sharply on this ultimate problem: Whose finger will be on the trigger whose finger on the safety catch? Could the European forces fire their atomic weapons without the agreement of the United States? Could the United States fire without the agreement of Europe? Could individual nations within the alliance veto firing by others? It has been our view that these ultimate questions could not and should not now be settled immediately and finally. The terms of the Atlantic partnership which evolve over coming months and years will depend on many factors, including, in particular, how the process of European unification, now temporarily frustrated, will proceed.

The nuclear matter within the alliance is not only a question of Europe's relation to the United States but, at least equally, a question of the relative role and status of European nations vis-a-vis one another. It may prove difficult to settle firmly the transatlantic nuclear relationship until the intra-European relationship takes clearer shape; and this problem is evidently, linked to that of European unity.

It has been our view that four more immediate courses of action should be considered urgently, which would move toward Atlantic partnership in nuclear matters: First, that we all commit ourselves to work toward a solution

which would maintain the unity of the alliance, with a unified nuclear deterrent at its core. Second, that we devise and agree on general guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in the face of Soviet attack. Such agreed guidelines now exist for the defense of the NATO region. Third, that we take active steps to bring our European partners more deeply and directly into the nuclear business with respect to problems of targeting, control, and the strategic relationship between nuclear and conventional forces. Measures to this end are actively under way within NATO. Fourth, that we provide within this framework for active European (and Canadian) participation in the operation and control of strategic as well as tactical nuclear weapons. Out of the process of shared operational experience, consultation, and debate thus set in motion it has been our belief and our faith that a rational and sensible resolution of the control issue would emerge, acceptable to the peoples and parliaments of our allies and to our own people and the Congress. Moreover, we believe that this widened common experience may be essential for the development of a solidly agreed Atlantic military doctrine.

We would hope that the interallied nuclear force, now in an advanced stage of negotiation, will contribute to this end.

#### **Proposal for Sea-Based Multilateral Force**

The major new instrument my Government has suggested to carry forward this process of intensified partnership is, as you know, a mixed-manned multilateral nuclear force to be based at sea. This proposal, first made by Secretary Herter at the NATO meeting of 1960,<sup>2</sup> was reaffirmed by President Kennedy at Ottawa in May of 1961.<sup>3</sup> In the autumn of 1962 an American technical mission, representing both the civil and military parts of our Government, discussed how such a force might work with our NATO allies. As part of the Nassau agreement of December 1962,<sup>4</sup> we stated that we would present this concept at a high political level to our allies. Acting as the President's personal rep-

resentative, Ambassador Livingston Merchant has been engaged in discussions at the North Atlantic Council itself and in a number of European capitals.

The fate of this proposal is in the hands of our European friends, who may find it a useful way to move forward. We would hope that this path would come to commend itself not merely to the nonnuclear powers in NATO but to those who now command or are building a national nuclear capability. We are convinced it is a technically viable way to widen the circle of participation in nuclear matters in a form which enhances the unity of the alliance. It is also responsive to an important technical requirement of NATO: the need in the 1960's for an MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force to counter that now zeroed in on Western European targets from Russia. We are prepared to put into it our own men and money and let its future evolve on the basis of shared experience and the evolution of thought and politics on both sides of the Atlantic.

As the most powerful member of the North Atlantic alliance, bearing special responsibilities in the field of nuclear arms, we felt that we had a duty to lay before our friends a proposal which would permit an enlarged participation in nuclear matters within the alliance in a form which would increase the unity of the alliance rather than fragment it; and, in a tradition we share, we felt the way to begin was to begin, and not debate and attempt to settle the now insoluble questions which are inherent in the sharing of nuclear responsibility in an alliance of multiple sovereignty.

Our discussions with our European friends have already had two important and useful effects. First, the European nations concerned have begun to come to grips with the real problems of the joint management of a nuclear deterrent. The discussions have been candid and mature. A matter which is bound to be the subject of heated and sometimes superficial debate is now being gripped in high seriousness by the NATO governments. Second, these discussions have suggested that there is an overwhelming commitment within the alliance to move forward on a collective-security basis. The dangers of fragmentation are now widely understood, and there is, in Ben Franklin's old phrase,

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, June 5, 1961, p. 839.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

a growing sense that in this decisive area we must hang together or we will hang separately.

The issues of political consultation and nuclear partnership do not, of course, exhaust the agenda of the Atlantic alliance. We face major unsolved problems in the fields of trade, assistance to the underdeveloped areas, and the management of the free world's currencies and reserves. Building on the unsung but quite remarkable experience of intergovernmental cooperation, which has thus far helped keep us together in the face of Khrushchev's pressures on Berlin, we must learn better to concert our policies with respect to East-West relations. And down the line we shall have to think and work together in facing the implications for us all of the Chinese Communist effort to acquire nuclear weapons.

In all of these matters the instinct of American policy is to move forward pragmatically where we can, gathering experience and building up the most important asset an alliance can have: the confidence that comes and can only come from having solved real problems—even limited problems—together and successfully.

Undoubtedly, as progress is made, old machinery will have to be modified and, perhaps, new machinery created. But the forums available to us now are ample, if the will to use them is effective.

All of us are, of course, wholly conscious of the difficulties we now face in the development of collective solutions within the Atlantic alliance. The power of old-fashioned nationalism is, evidently, still considerable; and it is easy to understand how men, living in nations now miraculously revived and energetic, should hanker for a simpler world where nations form their policies on their own and concert them, where necessary, by the traditional means which diplomacy, as we have known it at an earlier time, could afford.

But the facts of the world in which we live and shall live do not permit us safely to indulge this nostalgia. We in the United States, who are caught up in a formal alliance with 42 nations—and intimately bound to many more—know this perhaps better than most. Every move we make must take into account the implacable facts of interdependence. The nature of weapons, the immediacy of modern com-

munications, the scope and the weight of the thrusts against us by the Communists, and, perhaps above all, the fact that virtually the whole of this planet is for the first time in history an intimate interacting political community, all make it clear that there is only one way for us to go if we are to preserve the values and interests of Western civilization and that is toward the building of an Atlantic community of which an increasingly united Europe is an integral part.

We have come a long way since 1946, against great obstacles—much further than the most optimistic among us believed possible. We have, evidently, a long, hard road ahead. But every lesson of this generation's experience, every major common interest we can define, every projection forward of the problems we may confront—indeed, the implications of every argument of those who would design another course—lead us to believe that our task is to persist—and to persist in good heart.

## **Western Powers Reject Soviet Charges on NATO Nuclear Defense**

*Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the organization of nuclear defense forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*

### **U.S. NOTE OF MAY 18<sup>1</sup>**

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's Note of April 8, 1963, which sets forth views of the Soviet Government in connection with plans now under discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization relating to evolution in the organization of nuclear defense forces of NATO.

The Soviet Government, in the course of its

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow (press release 273 dated May 18). Similar notes were delivered by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.



observations, makes a series of groundless charges concerning the measures which the free countries of Europe and North America have been obliged to take to protect their security. It characterizes these actions as lacking in justification, as increasing the threat of outbreak of thermonuclear war, and as nullifying in advance any progress in the field of disarmament negotiations.

The United States rejects these charges. It is important to recall once again the need to judge the activities of NATO in the light of the circumstances which gave birth to the Western Alliance and of its purely defensive character, both in conception and in fact. The facts of postwar history show incontrovertibly that NATO came into being in 1949 as a free and spontaneous effort among the free countries of Europe in association with the United States and Canada to organize jointly their self-defense. The motivation of these countries was to insure that they would avoid the fate of those nations which, in the period before NATO was organized, fell one by one under Soviet domination. Since that time, the countries of Western Europe and NATO have successfully preserved their freedom and national independence without changing the purely defensive and unaggressive character of the Alliance.

The United States believes that the NATO Alliance has both the right and the responsibility to insure the continued preservation of the freedom and independence of its members. This right and this responsibility includes the maintenance of the modern armaments required to counter any threat from a nation or nations possessing similar armaments. The United States rejects any implication that an alliance including countries of Europe which are within striking reach of hundreds of Soviet nuclear missiles and nuclear-equipped aircraft should be denied similar forces. It is preposterous to maintain that the Soviet Union should itself be privileged to deploy nuclear weapons in positions which threaten the cities of Western Europe and to hold that reciprocal defensive measures cannot properly be taken by NATO.

NATO's decisions in 1957 to arm itself with nuclear weapons were made only in response to repeated threats by the Soviet Union to use nuclear arms, and in the face of tremendous ef-

forts of the Soviet Government to build up its armory of nuclear weapons and missiles. The Soviet Government has since not given any indication that it intends to slow down its buildup of nuclear strength and has continued its unwarranted and dangerous threats to use its nuclear potential and to destroy the NATO countries. To cite but one example, the United States draws the attention of the Soviet Government to the speech made by its Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky on the occasion of the 45th Anniversary of the Soviet Army on February 22, 1963. His speech is one example of the justification for the efforts of the NATO countries to build up their defensive strength in order to safeguard peace and to protect their freedom. The Note of the Soviet Government seems to imply that only the Soviet Union has the right to build up its military and in particular its nuclear strength while corresponding efforts of the NATO countries to improve their defensive potential are a "threat to world peace" and an expression of the "policy of cold war." It is obvious that the United States cannot accept such an argument, which is contrary to the professed desire of the Soviet Government to establish relations of trust and mutual confidence with the NATO countries.

The statements in the Soviet Note concerning the policy of the United States on the question of nuclear weapons are as baseless as the charges concerning Western defense measures in general. The United States has steadfastly opposed the spread of nuclear weapons to the ownership of individual nations and has taken numerous steps to prevent such a development in the context of disarmament negotiations, defense policy and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Unfortunately, United States efforts to reduce the possibilities of war by accident or error pursued in disarmament negotiations have so far been for the most part rebuffed by the U.S.S.R., although the United States is encouraged by Soviet acceptance of the proposal for a direct communications link.<sup>2</sup> Attempts to organize safeguards on atomic programs through the International Atomic Energy Agency have been rejected by the U.S.S.R. However, as regards steps for

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 600.

reducing the risks of war which can be taken unilaterally by the United States and its partners in defense, the most stringent safeguards have been instituted against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons and ensure responsible control over atomic weapons at all times.

All defense programs with which the United States has been or will be associated, whether within NATO or any other free world alliance, are wholly consistent with these long-standing objectives. The Soviet Government has raised the question of the multilateral force which is now under discussion within NATO. Such a force would be fully consistent with the objective of preventing the development of new national nuclear weapons programs. Such a force would be multilaterally owned and manned and not at the disposal of any one government. The organization of such a force would tend to prevent, rather than encourage, the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities. It would be subject to the same safeguards as other NATO nuclear forces to prevent its use in an unauthorized or accidental manner. In this connection it is necessary to clarify that, contrary to the Soviet charges, vessels would not be "disguised" as merchant ships. They would be warships, in law and in fact, clearly identified as part of the Western defensive armory and no attempt would be made to camouflage these vessels as commercial ships.

The United States notes that the Soviet Union has once again made a series of unrestrained and unfounded accusations against the Federal Republic of Germany, whose democratic, freely elected government has joined with the other free nations in collective self-defense. The defense framework of the Federal Republic has been conceived and executed within the framework of NATO and is designed for the sole purpose of contributing to the Atlantic Alliance's defensive requirements to meet any possible threat to members of the Alliance. All objective observers understand that tensions and dangers in Europe do not result from the policies of the Federal Republic but, rather, from the unnatural division of Germany which is manifested in its most grotesque and inhuman form by the wall through the center of Berlin; and

from the refusal of the Soviet Government to agree to grant the German people their inherent right of self-determination. It is to the correction of these injustices that the Soviet Government should devote itself, if it genuinely seeks a normalization of the situation in Central Europe.

The Soviet Government lists a number of problems in whose settlement it professes interest. The opportunities open to the Soviet Government to demonstrate a genuine willingness to achieve equitable solutions to international problems are manifold. To cite but one example: An agreement on a treaty to end the testing of nuclear weapons would have a profound effect on the international scene, would contribute materially to the slowing up of the arms race, and to the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. Other fully practical steps to reduce the risk of war could be taken without delay along with the establishment of a direct communication link. The United States for its part will persevere in its efforts for progress in disarmament and a nuclear test ban.

The United States and its allies cannot and will not be diverted by threats from taking all steps necessary to safeguard their security. At the same time, the United States remains determined to pursue all paths which offer promise of reducing tension and of enlarging the prospects of peace.

### **SOVIET NOTE OF APRIL 8<sup>3</sup>**

Unofficial translation

The Government of the U.S.S.R. deems it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States:

For some time now, members of the North Atlantic alliance—NATO—have been working out plans for the establishment of an integrated nuclear force of the bloc. As can be seen from the published official statements, it is proposed to gather into a single list, known as a "multilateral force," the nuclear formations of the United States and Britain, together with corresponding contingents of the German Federal Republic and, probably, several other NATO members. It is further meant to establish special naval and

<sup>3</sup> Handed to U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler at Moscow by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

rocket nuclear forces under multilateral possession and multilateral control. Special stress is being made on the establishment of naval forces equipped with atomic weapons, including surface vessels armed with Polaris missiles and disguised as merchant ships. Moreover, the Government of the United States has announced its intention to station American nuclear submarines with Polaris rockets in the Mediterranean and in other European and Asian waters even now, without waiting for the establishment of an integrated NATO nuclear force.

All these plans are being tied in with an accelerated buildup of conventional armaments, above all in West European NATO countries, including small ones. Thus, armament programs are being worked out by NATO for decades to come in which it is stipulated, down to the smallest details, who should supply NATO with nuclear, rocket, and other formations and in what numbers, what additional means each country should spend on preparations for war, and so forth.

Whatever the final form plans for the establishment of NATO nuclear forces may take—whether they will be “multinational” or “multilateral,” or combined—the information already divulged makes one thing perfectly clear: The United States and other NATO powers are planning to give the Bundeswehr and the armed forces of other countries access to rocket-nuclear weapons, further broaden the preparations for thermonuclear war, and launch a race in rocket and nuclear armaments transcending all national and geographical boundaries.

In the age of rocket-nuclear weapons, concern for universal peace is the first commandment of mankind, and this puts a great responsibility on the governments of a power. It is to them that the peoples address the universal demand: Prevent thermonuclear war; do not allow it to flare up.

For many years the Soviet Government has been pressing for the adoption of agreed decisions which would eliminate the threat of rocket-nuclear war and extinguish the sources of possible conflicts. The Soviet Union offers to all countries and peoples peace, good-neighborly cooperation, and economic competition. It is ready to advance consistently and unswervingly toward the establishment of relations of trust and mutual understanding.

How do the NATO powers reply to the peace-loving policy of the socialist countries? They counter it with a policy of the cold war, a policy aimed at undermining international cooperation and at extending both in depth and in breadth the rivalry between states in developing and stockpiling ever more lethal means of warfare. Suffice it to turn to the events of the past few weeks only to see to what a dangerous path the NATO powers are pushing the world.

Ignoring the will of the peoples and the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly, the United States, later followed by France, resumed testing of nuclear weapons. The Government of France concluded an openly militaristic pact with the German Federal Republic.

The Federal Republic Government, for its part, has once more demonstrated that the interests of peace and security in Europe are deeply alien to its policy.

In recent weeks the world witnessed new and hostile acts on the part of the United States against the freedom-loving Republic of Cuba, new breaches of the principles of the U.N. Charter and of universally recognized principles of international law with regard to freedom of navigation. Dangerous provocations by German militarists follow one another in West Berlin.

It is true that the governments of the United States of America and other NATO countries, taking part in international negotiations on the settlement of problems at issue, infrequently vote in the United Nations for the adoption of constructive decisions. Unfortunately, however, this does not determine by far the main direction of the policy of the Western powers.

Facts show that in their strategic calculations the governments of the Western powers rely not on a peaceful settlement of the main problems that sustain international tension, but on achieving some kind of a superiority in the arms race, and ultimately on the use of force. The plan for creating a multilateral NATO force is a modern expression of the “from a position of strength” policy, a policy of pressure and diktat, with nuclear weapons being proclaimed the main factor and core thereof.

It is known that the former American government of Eisenhower, not long before it stepped down from the political scene, promoted vigorously the idea of turning NATO into some kind of a nuclear power. At that time, there was much talk about each of the 15 participants in this bloc being able to keep its finger at the pushbutton of a rocket-nuclear war.

The U.S. Government, in point of actual fact, was accepting the spread of nuclear weapons within NATO and was close to satisfying the demands of the German Federal Republic Government which was clamoring for “equality” in nuclear armaments.

At one time there were grounds to think that the present U.S. Government was aware of the dangers involved in putting into effect the plans to make NATO a nuclear power. It had repeatedly assured that it attached exceptional significance to the achievements of an agreement on the nonspreading of nuclear weapons and that in conformity with its national policy the United States would not turn over nuclear weapons to any country. However, by every indication, neither its own assurances, nor warnings sounded by many states, including a number of NATO countries, concerning the dangerous consequences of the spreading of nuclear weapons, have deterred the U.S. Government.

At the Nassau meeting of the heads of government of the United States and Great Britain, it was decided to establish the NATO nuclear force on almost the same pattern as was advocated three or four years ago. One can only wonder that the Nassau decision,<sup>4</sup> which makes the states plunge deeper into the vortex of

<sup>4</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

rocket-nuclear armaments, is described by those who have accepted it as all but a service to their peoples, and even to the world.

The governments of the United States and certain of its allies pretend that the plans for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force do not contradict the principle of the nonspread of nuclear weapons. What is more, it may be heard from the most high-ranking representatives of NATO countries that the plans for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force are in themselves the product of a desire to eliminate concern over the "unlimited spread of nuclear weapons to all states."

But only two sharply delimited approaches are possible here: either abide unswervingly by the principle of the nonspread of nuclear weapons, and consequently prevent any access to these weapons for other states, or take the way of supplying nuclear weapons to one's allies, and then the question of the form in which it is done—bilateral or multilateral—would not play any essential role. No "intermediate" approach is possible without starting a chain reaction with all attendant dangerous consequences. Western statesmen cannot be so naive as to fail to understand this.

It appears that those who see one of the reasons for the submission of plans for a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the striving of the U.S. Government to gear the economic resources of West European countries more fully to the arms race and make the West European allies ante up another 6 to 10 billion dollars are not far from the truth. But, however complicated the bookkeeping concerning the distribution among the NATO members of the expenditures involved in the arms race may be, the full 100 percent of these expenditures will, in the final analysis, fall on the peoples. It is they, too, who would have to pay for the consequences of this race—should matters come to the worst—by an incalculable toll of life, and by cities and villages reduced to ashes.

What other arguments are advanced to justify the plans for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force? The first argument called upon to sanctify and legalize everything is that of security requirements. But apart from the fact that nobody threatens the NATO countries, the establishment of multilateral and multinational nuclear forces cannot change anything in the existing balance of power in the world. The sides have stockpiled so many nuclear weapons that, to use a comparison, they have enough to churn up the earth and make the oceans leave their shores.

The moving by the NATO powers of some nuclear weapons from one arsenal to another—which would be controlled, among others, by Bundeswehr generals and the warlords of some other countries—would merely greatly increase the danger of a thermonuclear conflict.

In addition to the existing ones, new drive belts would extend to the war machine, enabling it to be set into motion. And so, will the security of the member states of the North Atlantic alliance gain anything from the fact that some new corporal would

be able to touch off the conflagration of a third world war? Will the peoples of West Europe feel more secure if submarines and chameleon ships carrying nuclear rockets lurk at the shores of their countries if a multilateral NATO nuclear army should take up quarters on their territories, if they knew that NATO strategists intend to make the whole world the battle field of a new war?

To every sane person, it is clear that with the realization of the plans of NATO leaders, nuclear weapons with their inevitable corollary, the war danger, would spread over our planet as oil spreads over water.

The extension of the area from which a nuclear attack could be undertaken would naturally extend the geographical sphere of the use of retaliatory measures inevitable in such cases. May no one seek a threat in this statement of the Soviet Government? All this is almost copybook truth, a simple acknowledgment of what can already be accurately assessed today. In this connection, the Soviet Government feels itself dutybound to raise a warning voice.

In the case of conflict, the laws of modern warfare would make it incumbent to apply all means to immediately subdue the aggressor, and, in particular, to render harmless the stationary and mobile bases aimed at the vital centers of peace-loving states.

Ports used as anchorages for submarine and surface rocket carriers, be they in the North, Mediterranean, Baltic, or other seas, would not survive the very first minutes of the war. The consequences of this to the entire territory of such states are clear without any comments.

The countries against which the military preparations of the North Atlantic bloc are directed would be compelled to continually keep the sights of their means of retribution focused also on the busiest sea lanes, where ships carrying nuclear rockets might lurk disguised as peaceful mercantile vessels. Incidentally, The Hague Convention forbids, even in wartime, the secret arming of a mercantile ship which would thus convert it into a warship.

But NATO staffs want to practice such insidious methods even now in peacetime. Thus, in the plans for a multilateral NATO force, the morals of medieval pirates are interwoven with the latest achievements of nuclear missileery. Had NATO warships, using the mercantile flag as a cover, started poking about the seas, this would be practically tantamount to an undeclared state of war.

The opinion is broached in the West that the plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force are also designed to put pressure on the Government of France, whose position on a number of military and economic problems does not coincide with that of the powers which determine policy within NATO. The Soviet Government does not intend to go into the question of the principles on which the relations between the members of the North Atlantic bloc are based.

But it cannot overlook the fact that, within NATO, the Government of the United States, on the one hand,

and the Government of France, on the other, are playing up to West German imperialism—although for motives which do not fully coincide—and, to make certain of its support, connive at the most aggressive aspirations of the ruling circles of the German Federal Republic. And these circles are only waiting to open either the French or American gates to nuclear arms, or both simultaneously.

It is to satisfy the ever-growing demands of the German Republic that the plans for the establishment of a multilateral NATO nuclear force have, in effect, been conceived. The Government of the United States is trying to resolve the differences within NATO by concessions to the militarist and revanchist circles of the German Federal Republic.

Whenever the Soviet Union calls attention to the dangers of encouraging militarism in the German Federal Republic, the Western powers as a rule hasten to throw up a smokescreen of talk about the Soviet warnings being dictated by excessive suspicion in regard to West Germans. It is hard to find anything further from the truth than these claims. It is by concrete facts, and only facts, that the Soviet Union is guided in its policy.

Revision of the results of World War II, revision of the existing German state, the German Democratic Republic—such are the officially proclaimed foundations of the foreign policy of the German Federal Republic. This is a policy of revenge, a policy of war. Hence the striving to be on a par with the other NATO powers in the field of armaments, and above all nuclear armaments.

Does the Government of the United States not know this? Or has it any other explanation of why it is precisely the Federal Republic of Germany that enthusiastically welcomes any plan for the spread of nuclear weapons within NATO?

The Government of the German Federal Republic voted with both hands for earlier plans of the rocket-nuclear equipping of the NATO forces. It also was the first to sing praises to the Nassau agreement and now encourages the governments of the United States and Britain to broaden the "multilateral" atomic armaments in NATO and to station them not only on the seas, but also on land. The Government of the German Federal Republic has announced its readiness to provide German crews for ships armed with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles and to include Bundeswehr air units capable of nuclear delivery into the nuclear force without delay.

Reports have appeared in the foreign press that the United States and the German Federal Republic are now considering the use of West German ports in the Baltic and in the North Sea as bases for American nuclear submarines.

The Government of the German Federal Republic has declared that it can assume a third of the expenditures involved in the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force. And it insists, according to published reports, that the say of each member country in questions concerning nuclear weapons be determined by its financial

contribution to the multilateral NATO force. And this demand, it appears, is viewed favorably by influential circles in the United States and certain other NATO countries. Consequently, as in a joint stock company, decisions will be determined by the size of the capital of the shareholders.

Only this time methods of struggle with commercial rivals will not be put to the vote, but questions of war and peace, while the dividends will be expressed not in dollars, pounds, or marks, but in millions of human lives. The rivets have not yet been fitted into the hulls of the NATO missile-launching vessels, but the West German military has already reached out for the trigger of the NATO nuclear mechanism, crushing those who have a smaller purse and less adventurist spirit.

The Western powers, meeting step by step the German Federal Republic's demands present the case every time as though this is the last concession. After the setting up of the German Federal Republic, the governments of the United States, Britain, and France tried to convince everybody that this creature of theirs would not have an army altogether and would be provided only with police units.

But a plan appeared only two years later to set up a "European army" with the inclusion of a half-million West German contingent in it. Many words were then wasted in the West to prove that the purpose of this plan was to keep under control the arming of West Germany and to prevent the setting up of independent Federal Republic's armed forces.

The same motives were advanced also when the Paris agreements were signed in 1954, agreements which paved the way to the German Federal Republic's accession to NATO. The Paris agreements were described in the parliaments and from rostrums of international conferences as a guarantee that the arming of West Germany would be limited strictly and that the Bundeswehr would not be provided with many types of conventional arms, let alone means of mass annihilation.

And what happened is that a 400,000-strong Bundeswehr is now under the command of former Hitlerite generals. Plans are being prepared to raise its numerical strength to 750,000. Relying on its growing military might, the Federal Republic is seizing one position after another in NATO. Restrictions on the building of warships, heavy arms, and several categories of missiles, were forgotten long ago. Now, advancing the plan for a multilateral NATO nuclear force, the Western powers are ready to permit the Federal Republic to obviate the last obstacle to the actual possession of nuclear arms.

Thus, having started with police formations 13 years ago, the Federal Republic's Government is now loudly knocking at the door of the atomic club. "We want," Chancellor Adenauer stated in the Bundestag on 6 February of this year, "to bear full responsibility together with others for effective NATO nuclear deterrent forces."

More than 100 U.N. members do not possess nuclear arms, and nevertheless they do not regard this as a

hiatus in their sovereign rights. In the German Federal Republic, however, the possession of nuclear arms has been declared a criterion of its sovereignty.

Apparently a concession to militarist forces entails new concessions. And, of course, nobody will guarantee that the present plan for a NATO nuclear force will be the last "yes" in reply to the demands of the most adventuristically minded quarters of West Germany. The case resembles very much the days preceding World War II, when those who made the policy of the Western powers sacrificed the security and freedom of one country after another for the sake of "pacifying" Hitlerite Germany. The appetites of the Hitlerite militarists only grew from this, and the World War II catastrophe came closer and closer.

The expansion of the circle of nuclear powers planned in NATO and facilitation of the German Federal Republic's access to nuclear arms may greatly impair the prospects that reason in international affairs will triumph. A favorable outcome cannot be expected whenever new impulses to the arms race are provided and its forms are diversified endlessly. Such a course of events prods mankind to the fatal line.

The Western governments claim that they agree to the idea of general and complete disarmament, that they are ready to seek ways to an international agreement on disarmament. The Western powers protest when the peace-loving states accuse the NATO countries of using the disarmament talks as a screen to cover up the arms race.

But how else can the position of the Western powers be assessed if they put on the brake with one hand, preventing the 18-nation committee from making progress in Geneva, and draw up plans for NATO nuclear forces with the other, plans whose implementation would rule out disarmament talks for at least 10 years in advance? The purpose of this policy obviously is to win time and confront the peace-loving states with the implementation of NATO plans for the spread of nuclear arms.

If the United States, Britain, and France were to embark upon the road of spreading nuclear arms, the Soviet Government naturally would be compelled to draw a corresponding conclusion and take, with due account for the new situation, measures which would insure the maintenance at a proper level of the security of the Soviet Union, its friends and allies. The Soviet Government is confident that such defensive actions would meet understanding on the part of all states and peoples which cherish the cause of peace.

U.S. representatives present matters in such a way as if the alternative to multinational and multilateral NATO nuclear force is the creation by the German Federal Republic of its own nuclear potential. Well, the inference is that the United States and its allies even now cannot control the course of the armament of the German Federal Republic and resist pressure and blackmail coming from that country. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that after gaining access to nuclear weapons the militaristic circles of the German

Federal Republic would all the more heed no one within NATO.

The genuine alternative to the atomic armament of the German Federal Republic and to any spreading of nuclear weapons is quite different. It is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; the banning of nuclear weapons, including their removal from national armaments and destruction of their stockpiles; dismantling of foreign military bases and discontinuation of nuclear test explosions of all kinds for all time.

It is elimination—by agreement between the sides—of the remnants of World War II, and the conclusion of a German peace treaty, with the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis. It is the taking of measures to ease international tension and to increase trust among states, and, as the first measures among these, the signing of a nonaggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. The realization of each of these proposals and, all the more, of all of them together would strengthen the foundations of peace on earth.

The Soviet Government urges the Government of the United States to contribute also to the settlement of the indicated problems and to stop by joint efforts the nuclear missile arms race. The Soviet Union is for the settlement at a conference table of questions put to the fore by the development of international relations.

The Soviet Government would like to hope that the U.S. Government will treat with due attention the considerations advanced in the present note.

Moscow, April 8, 1963.

## Atlantic Undersea Test Center To Be Set Up in Bahamas

Press release 264 dated May 14

An understanding has been reached by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, with the concurrence of the Bahamas Government, regarding the establishment of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) in the Bahamas. Steps are being taken to implement the project.

The center will provide the U.S. Navy with facilities for the precise evaluation and testing of equipment of underwater defense. The Royal Navy will participate in the use of the center, thereby continuing the cooperation between the two navies in this important field of defense.

The land being made available for the center

is partly land belonging to the Crown and partly land in private ownership which is being acquired by the British Admiralty. In addition the Admiralty will deposit in a special account with the U.S. Treasury £150,000 (\$420,000) a year for 20 years but otherwise will not be

charged for the use of the center by the British Navy.

Aside from this, the U.S. Government will pay the cost of establishing, constructing, and maintaining the center. The center will cost approximately \$95 million.

## Foreign Policy and the Rule of Law

*by George C. McGhee*

*Ambassador-designate to the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>1</sup>*

I would like to talk to you today about the role of international law in world politics. International law is often discounted because it is, on the whole, a system without sanctions. We are accustomed to a domestic legal system in which rights and remedies are inseparable. In our civil law we are concerned with the remedies available to an individual for a breach of his rights much more than with the fact of the breach itself. Even within the area of our criminal law, we realize the primary importance of meaningful sanctions adequately enforced.

In the realm of international law, however, the nonviolent remedies for violations of rights are all too few. We do have an International Court, and it has been involved in a number of crucial cases. International claims commissions are an accepted part of our international legal system, though they are generally concerned with only a narrow range of problems. *Ad hoc* arbitration is also available as a means to settle international disputes, and the United States is now engaged in its first such arbitration since World War II.

The forums for the adjudication of international disputes, however, are all too few. Even

more significant, no sanctions exist for the enforcement of their judgments. This is perhaps the real problem to many people. We have international tribunals, but they have no bailiffs or marshals. And because our system of international law has no enforcement apparatus, many believe that it is no system at all.

It is a mistake, however, to think of law solely in terms of its compulsive aspects. Law in its most creative sense organizes the activities and relations of human beings so that they may operate with a minimum of friction. Professor Henry Hart of Harvard Law School has said that the greatest legal invention that he knew of was the white line painted down the middle of highways, and that this did more than anything else to permit us to travel. Without some such organizing mechanism, all the policemen and judges one could summon would not be able to organize highway traffic. The international legal system helps to organize the activities of nations in much the same way.

Through the end of the 19th century, the role of international law was much more limited than it is today. The contacts between nations were sporadic. The most highly developed areas of international law, such as diplomatic relations and sovereign immunity, were designed to regulate these contacts. Even war was a peripheral endeavor, fought by relatively professional people and apart from the life of

<sup>1</sup> Address made before a joint meeting of the Dallas Council on World Affairs and the Southwest Legal Foundation at Dallas, Tex., on May 3 (press release 238 dated May 1). Mr. McGhee was sworn in as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany on May 8.



society as a whole. It was sufficient that international law prescribed certain rules for the conduct of war. It did not impose meaningful restrictions on the choice of war as an instrument of national policy but sought mainly to limit the effects of that policy.

In dealing with the intermittent contacts between nations, the characteristic response of international law was "when you come in contact, keep hands off." There was no need for cooperative endeavor in the system. The rules of navigation on the high seas were typical. They were evolved from precedents to cover relationships which were episodic, and they reflected this fact. They were adequate for their purpose because there was no need for common undertakings.

### **Interdependence and Cooperation**

Today, however, both the military and the nonmilitary activities of any nation necessarily involve the cooperation and support of other nations. Collective action has become a part of international life. Collective decisionmaking has replaced the separate struggle for national goals. The present array of international institutions is striking evidence of this cooperation. There are world organizations, among which the United Nations is primary, and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States. These institutions are meaningful forums where collective decisions can be formulated.

As a result of the great increase in world populations, and through technological advances particularly in the fields of transport and communications, the nations of the world can no longer, whether they desire to or not, hope to promote their interests individually and without regard to the needs of other nations. In a very real sense the nations and the peoples of the world need each other. This is true no less for the large and powerful nations than it is for the smaller, weaker nations.

Interdependence—the acknowledgment that no nation is self-sufficient but depends in a variety of ways upon other nations for its well-being, even for its survival—is a self-evident fact of life of our times. The trade of the world itself, which aggregates over \$100 bil-

lion a year, is only one aspect. No nation, except the two most powerful nations in the world, the Soviets and ourselves, can afford an effective nuclear defensive system. This means that it is impossible for smaller nations, alone, to assure their own defense. They must, if they wish to assure their defense, group themselves in collective security systems with other nations.

The nations of Western Europe offer the best illustration of a closely related group of sovereign states who have openly acknowledged the fact of their interdependence. Since the end of World War II there has been a consistent drive within Western Europe toward integration. This has resulted in the creation of the three European communities—the Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Community], and the Common Market. Western Europe understands that if it is to realize its great potential, perhaps even if it is to survive, it must pool its human and material resources in a common effort.

United States policy has consistently supported this movement. The reason for this support is simple. It is our firm belief and basic policy that we need Europe and Europe needs us. We need a partner with the potential of a united Europe to help us with the defensive and constructive tasks of the free world. There have been four distinct though overlapping phases in the evolution of our support for postwar European integration: the Marshall Plan, the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the Common Market, and the most recent, the multilateral NATO nuclear force.

In a wide variety of significant ventures large numbers of nations have chosen to recognize their interdependence and join together to achieve a common goal. The communications satellite program is a typical example. Unless we accept an international organization's allocation of frequencies for use in space communication, we will have no space communications at all. This organization will not be a sovereign and will have no enforcement capacity. Yet the United States and other nations will have to accept its regulations even though

they will not wholly conform to the wishes of any one nation.

Similar cooperative efforts are required in the field of trade. A multilateral coffee agreement, for example, has recently been concluded.<sup>2</sup> The framework of the international coffee trade is established by rules and regulations with which all important producing and consuming nations must comply. And their compliance is without the sanction of a bailiff or marshal. There are interesting retaliatory mechanisms built into the agreement that provide some degree of enforcement, but the basic reason why such an agreement works is that trade is otherwise impossible. Those countries which grow coffee and those countries which buy it need each other. Only by operating within the framework of the agreement can these needs be met.

### **Collective Responsibility for Peace**

In the area of defense, it is even clearer that collective arrangements are essential. In an age of thermonuclear weapons, noninvolvement is no longer a realistic option. A threat to the peace of any nation is now a threat to the peace of all nations, and the maintenance of peace has therefore become a collective responsibility.

We have met this responsibility through a series of multilateral collective security agreements—NATO, the OAS, SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], and others. The condition of effective defense is cooperation, and this requires a formal relationship regulated by law. We may give up some freedom of action when the time comes to apply these agreements, but we realize that the law which regulates our relations with our allies by means of the agreements must sometimes be weighed against freedom of action on any particular item.

It is in the framework of our efforts to achieve both a nuclear test ban and an agreement on general and complete disarmament that the need for international cooperation is the most sharply focused. For these efforts necessarily involve the Communist bloc countries as well as our allies. We have pressed hard for both a test ban treaty and a disarmament agreement.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 218.

But we have consistently maintained that these agreements must include realistic legal machinery for verification.

In our test ban negotiations we have insisted upon on-site inspection. In our disarmament discussions, we have made it clear that any agreement must include arrangements to insure that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded. Legal procedures for verification would not provide a means for enforcement. But verification would enable us to determine whether any state had violated the agreements. We can only enter into such agreements if they provide a way for us to learn by legal means whether we should continue to comply with the terms of the agreements or disregard them on account of violations by others. These legal procedures for organizing the means of verification are thus crucial.

When we look at international law in this way, as an organizing force, we see the question of enforcement as essentially a side issue. But if enforcement is not a central problem, control of the use of force undoubtedly is. It is perhaps the prime concern of the international legal system. The basic rules are found in the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) provides that each nation undertakes not to use or threaten force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 51 provides that nothing in the charter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" if an armed attack occurs against a United Nations member. A review of our collective security treaties will reveal explicit acceptance of these obligations.

Looking back over the years since the charter was drafted, one must say that the effectiveness with which these obligations have been observed has been less than perfect. We have seen Korea, an act of aggression in violation of the charter; we have seen Hungary, another act of aggression, across state borders and with organized troops. Outside of the Communist bloc, we have seen the Suez crisis, the employment of organized armed force which the United States declared was in violation of the charter. We have seen the Goa incident, and again the

United States took the position that an aggression of this kind, by organized armed forces, across state borders, constituted a violation of the charter. More recently we have seen the invasion of Indian territory by Chinese troops and the clandestine introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba by the Soviet Union.

We had hoped that when in Korea the United Nations responded with vigor to punish aggression, that course of action would never again be followed. We must admit that subsequent experience has not fully borne out our hopes.

#### **Framework for Solving Political Problems**

It cannot be said, however, that our efforts to control force by law have been wholly without success. Law is unquestionably an element both in determining what a nation's interests require in a particular situation and in determining the freedom of action available to the nation in protesting these interests. The framework of international law—its norms and its procedures—is always an element in the essentially political problems of asserting and defending national interests. And the ultimate sanction of international law is found in the acceptance of the legal framework as the one in which the solution to these political problems must be found.

This is not to say that law is determinative in the solutions to these problems. But one of the factors in determining national interest and the freedom available to a nation in defending national interests is the effectiveness with which a proposed action can be justified under a system of international law designed to control the use of force. The reason for this, of course, is that the realization of any national interest requires the help and support of other nations. And their help and support will not be rendered unless there is sufficient justification in terms of the legal order.

An obvious example was the position of the United States in the Suez crisis. France and England, among our closest allies, acted to protect what they conceived to be their national interests. We did not support them basically because we did not believe that their action could be legally justified and because the long-

term interests in the system of law outweighed the short-term interests in Alliance solidarity. We supported a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, and this was eventually achieved through the legal processes of the United Nations together with the enforcement machinery of its Emergency Force.

The situation in Berlin offers another example of the reality and importance of law in the major political battlefields of our time. West Berlin is an exposed island within Soviet-controlled territory. The Soviet Government has the physical force to cut off and crush that garrison of freedom, if it wishes to apply such force and bring on retaliation from our side. This physical situation will not be altered by the constant Soviet pressures and harassments against the three Western Powers. Russia cannot unilaterally change legal rights and obligations in such a manner. Yet the whole pattern of these Soviet maneuvers is designed to modify the legal situation, or to at least muddy its elements, so that Russia may have more freedom in the use of force and to minimize our legal basis for response. But we have remained constant in the stand that our legal position is sound and that we will resist any Soviet efforts to alter our rights.

In this connection it is worth noting that our resolution resulted in a dramatic shift in the Russian position on the question of legal rights in Berlin. In November 1958 the Soviet Government referred in a note to "the illegal occupation of West Berlin."<sup>3</sup> By the next spring, however, in the face of continued affirmation of our position, the Soviets fully admitted the legal rights of the Western forces to remain in the city.

Our response to the October Cuban crisis presents a more recent example. A legal position was obviously not the sole determinant of our action to meet the threat of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil. But our action did have a meaningful basis in law. It was authorized by the Rio Treaty of 1947 and fully consistent with the United Nations Charter. This legal position was not formulated after the decision was made to institute the quarantine. From the

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1959, p. 81.

outset of the crisis, law and lawyers were intimately involved in defining and shaping the form of our reaction. And our effective deployment of force and our successful appeal for world support depended in significant degree, I think, on our legal position.

In many foreign policy discussions such as those I have mentioned, international law is not the deciding factor. But it is always an important element in the final judgment of what can be done and how far to go. As the world grows

closer together, more and more national activities in the defense field and elsewhere will require international support and cooperation. The pressures to submit to the legal system will grow on all nations. Perhaps they will grow more rapidly on those nations which have always operated in a legal tradition—a tradition which respects law as a condition of human freedom. But in the future the pressures of the law must make themselves felt on all nations if any of us are to survive.

## Two Kinds of Politics

*by Harlan Cleveland*

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

“Like nailing jello to a tree trunk”—that is the way one of my colleagues describes the management of American foreign policy. I like the description because it describes so well the part of the State Department which is my parish and my preoccupation. It is the part called “United Nations affairs” or “parliamentary diplomacy” or “international organization.”

You and I, as Americans, belong to 52 different international clubs, contribute to 73 different international programs, and have attended, by proxy, 474 intergovernmental conferences this last year. When E. B. White predicted “a bright future for complexity,” when Albert Einstein said that every proposition should be as simple as possible but not one bit simpler—they must have foreseen the new world of multilateral diplomacy.

We belong to these many organizations, we support these many programs, we attend these many conferences for quite reasonable reasons. It is more efficient than doing everything in bi-

lateral, *tete-a-tete* relationships. It is more dignified for small countries to deal with a great power like the United States in clubs, where every nation is juridically equal. It is often cheaper for us to handle aid through international agencies, because other countries contribute to them too. And, on the whole, this way of doing our business is very popular, not only abroad but here at home as well. You would not guess the degree of its acceptance if you were to spend your days reading the stacks of impolite letters which reach the mailrooms in Foggy Bottom and Capitol Hill.

It is true on every public issue that the people who object to a policy are much readier with the pen than those who applaud. Every editor, every legislator, every public servant, can bear witness. The hardest letters to take are naturally those that try to be funny. I am often tempted to reply with the mathematical equation suggested by Herman Mankiewicz: “The part-time help of wits is no better than the full-time help of half-wits.”

On matters of foreign policy there is today, and there always has been, a minority in our society which distrusts the democratic process,

---

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., on May 8 (press release 253, revised).

rejects the virtue of free debate, and fears the open society—especially as the open society spills out across international frontiers, as it is now doing to a striking degree. The frightened defeatist mail—the mail that is always so sure that America is going to the dogs—does not come from the merely old-fashioned folk who quaintly believe that foreign affairs are exclusively the foreigners' affairs and therefore no business of ours. The letters come from people who are willing to peddle long-discredited canards, people whose fright at their own fears makes them determined to unstick the glue of mutual trust among Americans that holds our society together and makes it strong before the world.

We are not the only country with a violent minority of political beatniks who are unprepared to live with the consensus worked out by open debate and democratic process. From time to time our embassies abroad are stoned by foreign zealots, who share with our domestic critics a consuming hatred of the U.S. Government. They, too, have little faith in the open society at work.

The antidote to the mail we get from "true believers" is to keep track of what the best of the pollsters are saying about our work. Dr. Gallup and his colleagues may not have invented the ultimate in scientific method, but they are better barometers of public opinion than the daily take of our mailroom.

By their testimony, support for vigorous U.S. leadership in the United Nations has always been impressive. It is a fact—some people find it a curious fact—that this support is greater today than it has ever been. According to George Gallup, 83 percent of the people think it is "very important" that we try to make the United Nations a success. That's up from 77 percent 10 years ago. And on top of the 83 percent there are another 9 percent who think it is "fairly important" to make the United Nations a success. There are very few political issues in our society—and, I suspect, *no* domestic political issues—on which there is a 92 percent consensus. Of the other 8 percent, 4 percent are against and 4 percent have no opinion. That 4 percent must be the lowest "no opinion" score on any major opinion poll.

If the question about the United Nations is asked in a different way, the result seems to be about the same. In November of last year the Minnesota poll (which is certainly one of the best of the regional polls) asked people whether, after 17 years, they were "well satisfied," "fairly well satisfied," or "not at all satisfied" with the job the United Nations has been doing up to now. Eighty-eight percent said they were either well satisfied or fairly well satisfied. (Personally, I would only describe myself as fairly well satisfied. Whether we can, after another 17 years, describe ourselves as well satisfied depends on the vigor and quality of U.S. leadership in the meantime.)

In spite of this overwhelming consensus—or else *because* it betokens a widespread interest—the United Nations is more of a domestic political issue in the United States than it has ever been before. The reason is, of course, that the United Nations is doing more interesting things, on a larger scale, more vital to the U.S. national interest than it has ever done before. And this rising relevance has brought with it a rising irritation with the United Nations. It was easy to be a United Nations supporter when it was doing less and costing little. It was easy, once upon a time, to think of the United Nations as a noble aspiration and not to worry about it as a form of politics.

#### **Similarity Between U.N. and American Politics**

Quite apart from the noises on the fanatic fringe, there is a growing amount of grumbling about the United Nations. It can be traced, I think, to our national tendency to think of the United Nations, this highly political organization, as practising a brand of politics fundamentally different from the politics with which we are so familiar here at home. Anybody who deals with United Nations affairs is often exposed to Americans who think of United Nations politics as though the people who engage in it must be purer or more reasonable, or less subject to pride and prejudice, than those in politics elsewhere. But the more you study the politics of the United Nations, the more clearly you see how similar it is to our homegrown American brand.

In both kinds of politics, domestic and inter-

national, political leaders sometimes talk primarily for home consumption. If an African political leader speaks in the United Nations General Assembly in a way designed to make him a hero at home in Africa, is that really so surprising—or so different from American practice?

In both kinds of politics, domestic and international, the irresistible force of executive logic meets the very resistant body of legislative process. If no country gets precisely the results it seeks every time at a United Nations conference, consider whether your Congressman ever gets through Congress precisely the ideal bill he starts by sponsoring. In both kinds of politics we see the collision of too many principles elbowing each other in the crowded corridors of policy.

In both kinds of politics, domestic and international, there are problems of apportionment. I occasionally encounter an American who is quite relaxed about the presence in the Senate of two Senators from each State, regardless of size, yet is appalled to find that the United Nations Charter gives each country, regardless of size, one vote in the General Assembly. Today's complaints about the apportionment of votes in the General Assembly can be matched by the early complaints about the Great Compromise in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. But what looked grotesque to the contemporaries of Madison and Jay looks pretty good after 174 years. And the apparent grotesquerie of "one country, one vote" doesn't look bad after 17 years in the United Nations.

There is a temptation, which many commentators do not resist, to recommend that the United Nations operate according to some system of weighted voting. When it comes to financial decisions, there must eventually be some way to take formally into account the fact that 16 free countries put up 61 percent of the resources which convert the United Nations from a debating society to an important operating system that spends more than half a billion dollars a year. But there has been so much talk about weighted voting in the General Assembly that we decided several months ago to take a look at the facts.

We developed 15 different systems of weighted voting, factoring in the scale of U.N.

assessment, population, and national income, singly and in combination. Then, with the help of a computer, we applied those 15 systems of weighted voting to the 178 key votes taken in the General Assembly from 1954 to 1961. We found some sobering facts. Almost without exception, those key votes would not have gone as well under the weighted voting formula, from the point of view of the United States' national interests, as they did in fact go under the "one country, one vote" system.

The reason, of course, is clear. Almost any system of weighted voting you want to select will lift the voting power of the Communist bloc in the General Assembly from 10 to 20 percent or more. Almost any system of weighted voting you want to select will downgrade the voting power of a great many countries which are indeed quite small but whose voting behavior strikingly coincides with our own—because both they and we are willing to base our foreign policy on the same United Nations Charter. The next time you hear someone complain about the "one country, one vote" principle, ask him to let me show him some computer tabulations in my office in Washington.

In both kinds of politics in which you and I are deeply engaged—the domestic kind and the international kind—we have to apply the elementary things we know about political life, from instinct and from personal experience. We know that politics is the art of the possible; we know that it involves the hardest kind of homework. We know that success attends the efforts of those who are not afraid to repeat themselves until they are sure they are understood and those who will listen to the views of others beyond the point of screaming boredom. We know that the political leader, like Dr. Conant's turtle, makes progress only when he sticks his neck out.

And thus we know that the responsible executive in international politics, as in community or State or national politics, must try as best he can to take everything and everybody into account, must constantly be asking those four classic questions that Paul Appleby terms the precondition to any political act: "Who is going to be glad?" "How glad?" "Who is going to be mad?" "How mad?"

## U.N. Actions in Critical Areas

The United Nations, then, is an arena of practical politics, a tool of growing sharpness for economic and social development, for peaceful settlement of incipient disputes, and for restoring the peace after it has been breached. As such, from our point of view, it is an instrument of American foreign policy, made complicated by the efforts of every other member country in the United Nations to use it as an instrument of *its* foreign policy too.

But if the United Nations is a political organization, working partly for us, we have a right to ask the ultimate political question—to paraphrase Alben Barkley: “What has it done for us lately?”

Well, two of the crises that have lately stirred our souls and enlivened our politics have been Cuba and the Congo. What did the United Nations do in those crises that was important to us?

In the case of the Cuban crisis the United Nations first provided a forum in which we could demonstrate the credibility of our facts about the Soviet missiles and explain to the world why we and our Latin American allies had to act on those facts.<sup>2</sup>

Then the United Nations, through its Secretary-General, served as a middleman in parts of the dialog between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which led to a peaceful solution. It was an appeal from U Thant which Chairman Khrushchev was answering when he said that his ships would not challenge the quarantine line.

The United Nations also was ready, at our suggestion, to provide inspectors to examine missile sites in Cuba to make sure the missiles were gone. Castro would not allow U.N. inspectors into his island fief. But by refusing to cooperate with the United Nations, Castro branded himself an outlaw and convinced practically all the vocal bystanders that this was no case of little Cuba versus the big United States; this was a case of an intransigent Cuba thumbing its nose at the world community.

In the case of the Congo, the United Nations was dispatched to keep a chaotic country with

a mutinous army from sucking in the great powers to confront each other in the middle of Africa. The United Nations mission there can be expressed in words straight out of the United Nations Charter: to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of that large and strategic country, a new nation with nine international frontiers, whose destiny will deeply influence the destiny of a continent.

The objective of the United Nations was to sit on the lid and conciliate the contending forces. A few of the contending forces, however, preferred to contend rather than talk; so the United Nations force helped the Central Government deal with a Communist-supported secession in Orientale Province in the north, another secession in the diamond-smuggling area of South Kasai, and a third secession based on copper revenues in South Katanga. Now, hopefully, the contending factions can find some way of operating together, and the United Nations can revert to the more normal function of coordinating economic aid and providing technical people to help the Congolese administer their large, rich, but still disorganized economy.

United States policy in the Congo was to help restore peace and order in the heart of Africa. By supporting the United Nations we did just that.

So these are two things—two supremely important things in Central Africa and the Caribbean—which the United Nations has done for us lately. There have been others in the year just past.

In the Middle East, truce supervisors policed for the 15th year the armistice by which the State of Israel was created; and the United Nations Emergency Force, the first truly international peace force, operated for the 6th year since the Suez crisis to keep that web of tension from exploding in spontaneous combustion.

In the Southwest Pacific, mediation by the United Nations recently helped avert a war over West New Guinea. On Wednesday of last week [May 1] a special United Nations team of civilian administrators, backed up by a battalion of Pakistani troops, completed the delicate and dangerous task of transferring the territory to Indonesian administration, while reserving the

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 715-746.



right of the Papuan people to decide their own destiny later on.

In Rwanda and Burundi, in the darkest middle of the Dark Continent, the United Nations helped two more nations to make the transition from trusteeship to independence. A United Nations administrator on the ground is now helping these newest African nations to get used to nationhood.

Even that doesn't complete the inventory: In Cambodia, Yemen, and the Malaysia area, United Nations conciliators have worked quietly in recent weeks to substitute talk for fighting as a means of settling disputes.

### **U.N. Financial Problem**

Each month, each week, almost each day brings a new piece of business for the world's only general-purpose peace agency.

The handling of trouble is never without cost. But neither is the cost of overwhelming dimensions. This year the U.N. system spent rather more than half a billion dollars in all currencies. Total U.S. contributions to all U.N. activities, including specialized agencies and special programs like Palestine refugees and the Children's Fund, was \$235 million in 1962.

It seems—and it is—a great deal of money. Yet it would buy only one-half of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; it would pay for storing less than one-half of our surplus food and fiber for 1 year; it would cover less than 2 percent of the cost of the Marshall Plan and less than one-half of 1 percent of our defense budget for next year. It is instructive to reflect that the total cost of the UNEF in the Middle East, in the 6½ years since Suez, is just about the same amount—\$120 million—that it cost us to put U.S. armed forces ashore in Lebanon during a few weeks in 1958.

There is a financial problem in the United Nations, of course, and a most serious problem it is. Too many countries are not paying their dues on time; too many countries have made no payments to the Congo operations. The biggest delinquents, of course, are the Soviets and their satellites; they figure the U.N. has cut across their vital interests, and they may be right in their analysis. Thirty-three other countries are also delinquent. We have said repeatedly that

we will take a very narrow view of our "fair share" of U.N. operations as long as the other members of the group are not paying the shares they themselves have voted to pay.

Yet there are some curious and disturbing themes in the public debate on this important issue of U.N. financing. There is, for example, the notion that we should never pay more for any international activity than the 32.02 percent we pay for the regular housekeeping budget of the U.N.

There are two kinds of cases to which this notion cannot, in conscience, be applied.

One is the case of an international aid program, where the cost cannot of course be shared by all members of the U.N., since most members of the U.N. are recipients, not contributors. That is why our contribution to enterprises like the U.N. Special Fund, the Expanded Technical Assistance Program, and the Children's Fund are typically around 40 percent rather than 32 percent.

The other case, under debate at this moment, is major peace and security operations. Many members of the U.N. feel, and not without reason, that the U.N. Charter made the larger countries largely responsible for peacekeeping. They resist paying their regular budget share for operations remote from their own interests which do touch the interests of great powers like ourselves. It is an unattractive position on their part, perhaps, considering the "all for one and one for all" philosophy which permeates the charter. But it is a political fact of life in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

An equally immutable fact of political life is a vocal concern in our own country, as reflected in the Congress, that the United States is being "had" and that we should not pay as large a portion of the U.N. peacekeeping costs as we have been paying. The actions of U.S. delegates to the U.N. reflect this growing sentiment.

Our task is to find a solution to this complex problem that takes into account both the strong American desire to reduce the American share and the strong desire of the poorer countries to have the richer countries pick up the check. We will have to find a way of reconciling the realities of international politics with the realities of American domestic politics. For if we

do not, we will force the U.N. to abandon the Congo and Middle East operations. With a stroke of our dry fountain pen we could thus open another opportunity for the Soviets in the Congo and remove at great peril the cooling hand of the United Nations on the feverish brow of Middle Eastern politics.

I cannot say what the U.S. position eventually will be. But one thing I do know: It would be plain silly to cease participating—a proposal that has been seriously made by people who see in the U.N.'s financial crisis another handle for their permanent and unremitting hostility to the development of international institutions. It was even seriously proposed last year in Washington that we should not make any payments to the U.N. unless the Soviets did. It would be hard to contrive a quicker or more effective way to deliver the U.N.'s future, and our own foreign policy, into the hands of the Communists.

We also see a growing discussion in this country of instances where a U.N. agency failed to do precisely what we wanted it to do. There is a curious and, so it seems to me, unnatural assumption in some quarters that if we join a club and contribute one-third or two-fifths of its resources, that should give us 100 percent of the control over everything it does. I am not aware of any club, group, or association here in the United States that operates on this "40 gets you 100" theory. Yet we have heard it seriously proposed that if the U.N. Special Fund approves a single project for Cuba, we should vent our quite understandable spleen, not on Cuba or the Communists, but on all our friends around the world, by removing support from a U.N. agency which is mostly helping our friends. (We should also consider that, in the Special Fund as in the Children's Fund, the political balance of payments is still quite favorable. The "developed" countries of the Soviet bloc have put considerably more money into both these U.N. funds than the "less developed" Communist countries have got out of them in the form of technical aid projects.)

I certainly share, as I am sure we all do, the deep sense of frustration and embarrassment

that has produced the Cuba pathology in our politics this year. But surely we cannot afford to be so naive as to think that we can make fractional contributions to international agencies and have total control of every decision these agencies make. And even if we were that naive, we are surely not ready to throw in the sponge and abandon these useful organizations because, taking the U.N. Special Fund as an example, they only help the people we are also helping in 286 cases out of 288.

#### **American Ability in International Politics**

These matters are well worth discussing. They go to the root of responsible action in international affairs. The world of international organizations has never been an easy one; it just happens to be absolutely necessary that we build a web of international institutions if we are going to establish, as we must for elementary reasons of survival, a growing sense of international community with law and operating agencies to match.

Because there are more countries than ever, and more of them are acting more independent than ever, we just have to be brighter and more effective politicians than ever in this tough and endlessly fascinating game of multilateral diplomacy. It is time for us to stop having a crybaby reaction on those very few occasions when, in the international free-for-all, somebody lands one on us.

We know as much—we know more—about politics than any other people in the world. We should; we have so much of it in our own communities and in our States and in our national government. We therefore have excellent training for international politics. So let us hear no further suggestions that Americans should quit in the middle of the game, no further defeatist proposals that Americans should withhold their support from the U.N. until the Soviets decide it is in their interest to support it, no further strategies based on the false notion that Americans are not at least as bright, at least as tough, and at least as fast on their feet as the other peoples who practice politics in the same world with us.

## Communism's Impact on African Nationalism

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

It is an honor and a privilege to deliver the Leo Franklin Memorial Lecture at Wayne State University. I am proud to speak under the auspices of a man who represented so much in this community. This forum at an institution dedicated to free inquiry and the open pursuit of truth is a particularly appropriate setting in which to examine how the battle goes between those who believe in an open and free society and those who seek to stifle inquiry and subvert truth.

One of my significant tasks at the Department of State is to scrutinize and evaluate Communist attempts to infiltrate and subvert the efforts of the peoples of Africa to achieve their aspirations for freedom, independence, and social and economic progress. I am pleased to say that Communist efforts have not achieved any substantial success in Africa, and this evening I propose to review recent Communist bloc activities throughout that continent. There are, however, incipient opportunities for Communist penetration in the southern regions of Africa, as the forces for independence and self-government in those regions collide with the forces determined to hang on to the *status quo*. We are aware of such dangers and are watching them closely, and tonight I also will examine further the question of how the southern African situation could invite Communist attention.

Two years ago the Communists had hopes of reporting success on their Party Congress resolutions to penetrate Africa. But today the Communists have little to show for their not inconsiderable efforts. Two years ago they had

a foothold in the Congo and hoped to capture the heart of Africa. Through the determination of Congolese leadership and the success of the United Nations in reuniting Katanga with the rest of the country, those hopes have been dashed. Despite heavy investment in West and North Africa, the Communists have failed to subvert African countries to their way of thinking.

While the Communists have made many mistakes and while the free world has continued to offer Africans the alternative of freedom and progress, the main reason for Communist failures is Africa's spirit of independence. The peoples and countries of Africa guard their newly won independence jealously and refuse to submit to any ideology who seeks to fit them into an alien mold under foreign direction.

The past year, however, also has shown clearly that there is no inclination by the Communist bloc to relax its efforts in Africa. In fact, there have been continuing and diligent efforts by the Communists, despite setbacks they have encountered, to extend their influence throughout the continent. There is little effort to evangelize the Communist ideology. The principal thrust of Communist activities, at the present time and for the near future, continues to be destruction of the Western position in Africa and insinuating their way into African good graces by the establishment of an identity of Communist bloc-African positions on major international issues. Their long-range goal, however, remains the creation of Communist governments in Africa.

The bloc continues to press for every opportunity to widen its influence in Africa wherever and whenever it can. It has made offers of

<sup>1</sup> Address made at Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich., on May 13 (press release 260).

financial and arms assistance to various subversive and nationalist organizations and has attempted to foment unrest by offering to provide, or actually providing, arms aid to countries which have present or potential disputes with their neighbors. It continues, in spite of difficulties with African students, to encourage young Africans to come to the bloc, thus hoping to develop future cells of Communist agents. Even if 90 out of 100 students should defect, the Communists plan to have the remaining 10 return to Africa to form Communist cells in the areas of greatest sensitivity.

### **Communist Propaganda Activities**

In 1962 Africa continued to be a most important target for Communist bloc propaganda. There were important increases in most of the media in use—publications, radio broadcasts, films, cultural exchanges, and scholarships.

Although four pro-Communist papers were suspended in Africa last year, 16 others had an estimated circulation of 100,000, and Communist-oriented material appeared regularly in several government-controlled newspapers. Inexpensive Communist publications sent into Africa increased their coverage of African affairs and improved their distribution channels.

Bloc broadcasts to Africa increased by approximately 50 percent during the year, rising from about 200 hours a week to nearly 300 hours. Almost 20 percent of the total broadcast time to sub-Saharan Africa was in Amharic, Hausa, Somali, and Swahili, four important indigenous languages.

Bloc production of documentary films on African subjects appears to have declined in the past year, but the number of showings of films in existence increased significantly.

Cultural agreements of various kinds with African governments rose 40 percent in 1962, and the number of African countries involved in such agreements doubled from 7 to 14. Eleven countries were visited by bloc cultural groups, and Communist athletic teams visited 9 African countries.

The number of African students in bloc institutions increased by 55 percent over 1961, rising to a new high of some 4,700 by the end of 1962

from a previous total of about 3,000. Student disaffection, however, also rose sharply, as the Bulgarian incident has shown, and a growing number of students left the Soviet Union and other Communist countries during the year. By comparison, there are about 5,000 African students in the United States and 4 to 5 times that many in Britain and Europe. In Europe the Communists seek out and try to subvert African students there too.

The bloc is continuing to expand its diplomatic establishment in Africa. The number of missions has risen from only 4 in 1955 to more than 80 today. The Soviets are now represented in 20 countries; the Czechs in 15; the Red Chinese in 10; and the Poles, the East Germans, and the Bulgarians in 7. There is also some representation in Africa of the Hungarians, the Rumanians, the Cubans, the North Koreans, and the North Vietnamese.

Moscow and the more important satellite capitals were more active in propaganda activities than Peiping because of their greater number of missions in Africa. Long-range goals of the two giants of the Communist world were generally similar, but some differences in tactics were reflected in their approaches to still-dependent African areas. Moscow stresses "peaceful coexistence"—which means any measures short of armed conflict—and deals mainly with established governments, while Communist China advocates violence and deals openly with any sympathetic faction within an African territory.

### **Checks to Communist Aspirations in Africa**

The increasing size of the Communist presence in Africa, together with certain Communist blunders, contributed to a heightened African awareness of the disparity between the bloc's feigned and real objectives. There was growing recognition that Communist deeds and goals conflicted with African desires to develop independently of both East and West. Communist interference in local politics, efforts to elicit African support for bloc cold-war policies, and the increased publicity given to African student problems in bloc schools also contributed to this added awareness.

It was further reflected in the bloc's failure in

many countries to buy influence with lines of credits. Only about one-sixth of the \$678 million in grants and credits it has extended to African countries since 1954 has been used, and as often as not the negotiation and carrying out of these projects has engendered considerable ill will.

It was also reflected in growing African uneasiness with Communist-front organizations, such as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, which met at Moshi, Tanganyika, last February. While the Communists scored some successes at Moshi, their tight control of the proceedings and many of the delegates was disillusioning to many Africans.

In terms of Communist gains, the conference expanded bloc influence in a general sense among some young African nationalists who were impressed with the Communist show of power and with the free way in which they made funds available. The conference also endorsed African aspirations in resolutions which were favorably received by many Africans, and it increased Communist contacts among Africans.

On the other hand, the Communists lost important ground in at least three respects:

1. The conflict between Soviet and Chinese Communists could not be suppressed, and the infighting was not lost on Africans.

2. Their persistent attempts to try to spread the organization to the Western Hemisphere showed African participants that the bloc was more interested in propaganda than in the welfare of Africa.

3. The blatant way in which the Communists used delegates who were not really representative of African organizations or governments gave Africans firsthand evidence of the dangers of Communist intervention in Africa.

It is clear that many African governments are becoming increasingly aware of the divergence of their national interests and the aspirations of international communism. For example, the Soviet bloc made a massive effort to turn Guinea into a showplace of Soviet development techniques and to use it as a base for expansion of Communist influence in Africa. Bloc credits for at least \$116 million were extended, and there were as many as 1,500 bloc technicians in Guinea. However, rate of deliv-

eries, high costs, poor quality, as well as arrogant Soviet meddling in Guinean internal affairs, soon disillusioned the Guineans. At the same time, the U.S. presence in Guinea, with an able Ambassador and country team plus our modest aid program there, has offered a successful alternative to Sino-Soviet bloc overtures.

In the neighboring country of Mali, African leaders have encountered somewhat similar disillusionment and are tending to enlarge their confidence in the United States and the West. In Algeria the Communist Party was banned by the Government only a short time after independence, and in Tunisia the Communist Party was suppressed early this year.

Such checks to Communist aspirations in Africa do not permit any complacency on our part. Although there is reason to hope that the countries of North and West Africa will continue to develop institutions that will be increasingly immune to bloc subversion, there are still many Communist personnel throughout these areas.

#### **Bloc Strategy in Southern Africa**

Bloc strategy seems to be turning to the potentially explosive situations in southern Africa. Here the ever-increasing demand of black Africans for self-government runs into stubborn resistance from those who cling tenaciously to minority rule. Elsewhere on the continent, the transition to independence and majority rule has generally accommodated indigenous African aspirations and European interest. But the tragic potential in large parts of southern Africa lies in the fact that there is already a profound cleavage between the Europeans—living or ruling in those areas—and the Africans. The whites seek to hold on to long-standing privileges, while the blacks will no longer passively accept a subordinate role.

It is here that the bloc watches and seeks to feed the fires of trouble. The Communists are waiting for what they hope will be a cataclysmic struggle in which the free world could find itself maneuvered into protecting privilege and the Communists would seem to back freedom—even though they may be actually promoting chaos in order to permit a Communist takeover. It is this strategy that endangers the position

of the free world, not only in southern Africa but on the whole continent.

There are four bloc diplomatic missions in Dar-es-Salaam, where there are also to be found representatives of 14 nationalist organizations in eastern and southern Africa. It is evident that these bloc missions are attempting to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of these organizations and their leaders and the degree to which they can be influenced or used. Unless swift political and social progress is made in these areas, the looming confrontation of white and black in southern Africa can open new Communist opportunities to penetrate and influence events.

To date, Communist penetration of the southern regions of Africa has not been considerable, but the number of students from the area going to bloc schools is rising steadily. At present, estimates indicate that there are some 250-300 in the bloc from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, South Africa, the Portuguese territories, and the High Commission territories. There also has been a sharp rise in the number of Africans from these areas going to the bloc for training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage. The number of hours of Portuguese-language broadcasting from the bloc has increased. In addition arms have been made available to various insurgent groups through independent African nations.

The Communists' principal aim in southern Africa appears to be to dominate all nonwhite opposition elements to the existing government in the Republic of South Africa. Although the South African Communist Party has been outlawed, it continues to exploit the tensions and frustrations generated by the Government's *apartheid* program. The party's membership is relatively small—only an estimated 800 hardcore members—but it has some 6,500 sympathizers. Its importance is not found in its size, however. Its importance lies in its long history of support for the African nationalist movement.

Since 1959, Communist efforts have met strong opposition from the Pan-Africanist Congress, which, partly because of its racial outlook, has opposed the white Communist

leadership and is resentful of its efforts to direct protest movements toward strengthening the Communist apparatus rather than toward the organization of a nonwhite nationalist movement.

During recent months, the South African Government has moved to curb alleged Communists more severely and prevent further outbreaks of organized sabotage. In its zeal, however, it has failed to make a distinction between Communists and genuine liberals and nationalists and, as a result, has sharply restricted the freedoms of all South Africans.

The Government has placed some 30 persons under house arrest for violation of the harsh and extremely broad "Sabotage Act," and it has published a list of more than 400 "named Communists" who are banned from political activity under the new act. Statements made by any banned or restricted person may not be published anywhere in the country. This stricter Government surveillance has not materially diminished Communist activity in South Africa, which has operated clandestinely since 1950. In addition the Communists have moved part of their base of operations outside the country.

One of the more unfortunate aspects of South Africa's tighter control of Communist activities is its refusal to distinguish between Communist opposition and legitimate opposition to the South African Government. In their zeal to brand all opposition "Communist," they appear to be lending strength to the Communist cause. The editor of the *Rand Daily Mail*, a liberal, non-Communist newspaper, made this point very clear in a front-page editorial directed to the Minister of Justice. He wrote:

Communism has never had wide support among non-Whites in South Africa. . . . You are giving it the stature of a mass movement. . . . Do not hand to the Communists a monopoly of fighting for the rights of non-Whites. For if you do these things . . . you will have sealed South Africa's fate . . . having delivered a great country into the hands of the Communists.

The attitude that opposition to the governments in power in southern Africa automatically is Communist-inspired could lead to the very type of penetration that we seek to prevent in Africa.

## West's Responsibility in Africa

This brings me to one of the paradoxes the West faces today. Throughout the southern part of Africa there are a number of movements directed toward racial accommodation and self-government. These movements seek Western assistance and do not desire a commitment from the Communist world. The response of the West traditionally is to call for peaceful transition by both the disenfranchised majorities and the ruling minorities. However, if hopes for achieving legitimate demands for racial and political equality through such peaceful methods are disappointed and the question becomes one of survival for these political movements, any compunctions they might have about accepting Communist aid could be expected to disappear.

Such an eruption of African frustrations in the southern part of the continent is what the Communists are counting on in the long run. They believe that this could so maneuver the Western nations that the West's influence and political credit among Africans will rapidly diminish.

Unless there is a discernible movement toward more progressive policies in those parts of southern Africa not enjoying majority rule, and unless there appears to be vigorous leadership from the West to accomplish such progress, there is a good possibility that Western influence could be replaced by that of the Communists. Aided by a deterioration of the Western position, the Sino-Soviet bloc could become the leading outside influence in the painful transition in southern Africa and in the minds of Africans everywhere.

It seems to me, then, that this is a grave problem to which the entire West must give a more urgent priority. I am certain that the actual time we have left to work on this problem is really much shorter than we anticipate today.

At the present time Communist tactics in Africa are not such that they have led to a direct confrontation of East and West, as in Berlin. Rather, those Communist activities must be considered in the light of how they can exploit the opportunities offered them by retrogressive obstruction to Africa's drive for independence and how they can put the West in

the position of being opposed to black Africans as such.

The basic answer the West must give to the Communist challenge in Africa is a program of action which responds to the pressing political, economic, and social needs of the peoples of Africa rather than simply an attack on communism. The best way to stop communism is to eliminate the conditions in which it flourishes—conditions not only of poverty, illness, illiteracy, and malnutrition but also of lack of self-expression and self-government.

Viewed in this light, the impact of communism on African nationalism is a sharp challenge for the West. It is up to the West to meet this challenge with new determination and imagination. We bear a great responsibility to the peoples of Africa, to ourselves, and to future generations to help the peoples of southern Africa achieve and develop self-government so that they will have a freedom and a government they will want to protect as their own against any kind of alien subversion. America has an historic role to play to help the African people attain and enjoy the values to which they aspire, values which, by and large, are the same as the ones we cherish.

## AID Summarizes Position on 1964 Budget Figures

*Following is the text of a memorandum to Secretary Rusk from David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development.*

MAY 7, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
SUBJECT: Congressional Presentation: Justification of FY 1964 Foreign Aid Budget Figures

Pursuant to our discussion this memorandum summarizes the present position of A.I.D., the Department of State, and the Department of Defense in supporting the President's \$4.5 billion foreign aid budget figure for FY 1964.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For excerpts from the President's budget message for fiscal 1964, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 224; for text of his message on the foreign assistance program, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.



We are now testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of appropriations totalling \$4.5 billion, which represents a reduction of \$420 million from the President's initial budget estimate in January of \$4.9 billion. The \$420 million cut in the appropriations request was made possible by reduced FY 1964 programs and estimates and by tighter administration of program funds available in FY 1963 which can be carried over for use next year. Except for one element in these reductions—an estimated \$78 million of increased recoveries from unused prior year funds—the reductions cannot be described as “paper cuts.” The President's revised program and budget explicitly took into consideration the report of the Clay committee,<sup>2</sup> and General Clay subsequently expressed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee his committee's gratification with this fact and his view that the revised program is “very closely in compliance with the recommendations” of his committee.

In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 25, General Clay stated he believed \$4.3 billion should be authorized and appropriated for FY 1964, even though he believed that \$300 million of this amount, related to the Alliance for Progress, would not actually be needed and that \$4 billion, therefore, would be the rock bottom figure for this year's appropriation. With respect to this \$300 million, while he stated his committee's doubt that the Latin American nations would manifest a sufficient degree of self help and internal performance to justify the commitment of the full \$907 million appropriation sought for the Alliance, General Clay stated that he believed the full amount should be authorized and appropriated in order to manifest the continued serious U.S. commitment to the Alliance, to avoid giving ammunition to Latin American leftists who would exploit a sharp cut to prove U.S. fickleness toward Latin America, and to avoid prejudging Latin American performance. General Clay stated his confidence that A.I.D. would not expend these funds if there was not a sufficient degree of Latin American performance and pointed out that the recent U.S. agree-

ment with Brazil concerning the phased commitment of funds in step with recipient country performance indicated a proper pattern of increased firmness on our part.

While General Clay has thus expressed the support of his committee for a \$4.3 billion figure, we are, of course, continuing to support the full \$4.5 billion request. We do not agree that any cut from this point is desirable. We think the \$4.5 billion figure is what is needed for U.S. and free world security. We believe the reductions already made by the President reflect a proper application of the tighter criteria on which the President and the Clay Committee are in agreement. There are a very few cases of countries in which we propose to do more than the Clay committee may think minimally necessary, and we will defend those cases on their merits. In general, we consider that any cut in the President's request would entail corresponding costs to the program's contribution to free world security and progress. We do not agree that funding needs for the Alliance are likely to be no more than \$600 million; we think A.I.D. lending under the Alliance is likely to be heavier than General Clay believes, especially with many new project requests beginning to flow in; and we consider that a sharp cut in the Social Progress Trust Fund appropriation would raise great concern among the Latin Americans.

General Clay indicated that \$200 million in cuts could be made in Development Loans outside of Latin America, MAP [military assistance program], Supporting Assistance, Development Grants, and the Contingency Fund. We consider that the Development Loan category outside of Latin America is extremely tight, as is Supporting Assistance, which has been reduced by one half in the last three years. Also the figure for Contributions to International Organizations is firm, and there is a great need for the military strength provided through MAP and for adequate technical assistance provided under the Development Grant category. We will continue to support the full appropriation of \$300 million for the Contingency Fund despite the fact that we expect to turn back unused a substantial amount of funds from this year's Contingency Fund appropriation. Our

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 574.

principal justifications here are that the average annual requirement for Contingency Funds for 1961 and 1962 was \$288 million, and that our management of this year's Fund indicates we may be trusted again to return any appropriations that are not clearly required during next year.

While indicating in our testimony our differences with General Clay's \$4.3 billion figure on the grounds mentioned above, we expect to state our satisfaction that he has reached the \$4.3 billion figure after his critical review of our proposed country aid programs. His careful look brought him out at a figure considerably higher than many others who, without the benefit of a similarly extensive review, have expressed the judgment that an aid appropriation of \$3.5 or \$3.7 billion is all that is needed this year. We have a tight program to defend and General Clay's judgment helps prove it.

I am distributing copies of this memorandum to senior officers within A.I.D., State, and the Defense Department so that they may have this information and are aware of our plans with respect to supporting the President's FY 1964 foreign aid program.

DAVID E. BELL

## **Foreign Relations Volume on American Republics, 1942**

Press release 254 dated May 9, for release May 18

The Department of State released on May 18 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume VI, The American Republics*. This publication is the second of two volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series dealing with relations between the United States and the other American Republics during 1942. Volume V, published last year, contained the section on general multilateral relations and on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. Volume VI covers bilateral relations with the remaining 17 American Republics.

Subjects documented in this volume chiefly relate to military and economic cooperation in the war against the Axis Powers.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume VI, The American Republics* (ix, 773 pp.) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25.

## **President Radhakrishnan of India Visits the United States**

The Department of State announced on May 15 (press release 265) that arrangements were being completed for the state visit of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of the Republic of India, who will visit the United States June 2-11 at the invitation of President Kennedy.

President Radhakrishnan will arrive at Washington from Williamsburg, Va., on June 3 for a 2-day stay.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **88th Congress, 1st Session**

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting the Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the Period July 1-December 31, 1961. II. Doc. 69. February 14, 1963. 82 pp.

The East Bering Sea Halibut Fishery. Joint hearing before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce and the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Serial 7. Seattle, Wash., February 14-15, 1963; Juneau, Alaska, February 17-18, 1963. 329 pp.

Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments, 1963. Hearing before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, to authorize additional appropriations, and for other purposes. February 27-March 12, 1963. 216 pp.

Message from the President transmitting the Seventeenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as Amended, Outlining Operations Under the Act During the Period July 1 Through December 31, 1962. II. Doc. 79. March 4, 1963. 126 pp.

U.S. Information Agency Budget Decrease. Communication from the President transmitting amendments to the budget for fiscal year 1964 involving decreases in the amount of \$8,994,000 for the U.S. Information Agency. II. Doc. 92. April 1, 1963. 2 pp.

Our Foreign Assistance Act. Message from the President. II. Doc. 94. April 2, 1963. 15 pp.

## Kuwait Becomes 111th Member of United Nations

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson  
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*<sup>1</sup>

My distinguished colleagues who have preceded me this afternoon have already said everything that I had intended to say. So I must content myself with welcoming and endorsing the application of Kuwait for membership in the United Nations for the second time.

My Government reaffirms its recognition of the sovereignty and the independence of Kuwait. The membership of Kuwait in the United Nations seems to us a very logical outgrowth of the increasing scope of its international activities as reflected by its participation in several organizations of the United Nations family.

In addition to enlightened constitutional development and its energetic and effective steps for improvement of the standards of living and of education of its people, Kuwait has, as we all know, initiated a program of foreign financial assistance that over the years will make a major contribution to economic development in the Middle East.

In its most recent application for membership in April 1963,<sup>2</sup> the distinguished Foreign Minister of Kuwait, His Excellency Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, has reaffirmed his Government's previous acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations. My Government has long held the view that the Government of Kuwait is able and willing to carry out these obligations and that, therefore, it is fully qualified for membership in this organization. Hence we welcome Kuwait's application and look forward to useful and to agreeable cooperation with its representatives in

the United Nations. It is, therefore, with great satisfaction that we shall vote for the admission of Kuwait.<sup>3</sup>

## U.S. Delegates to Special Session of General Assembly Confirmed

The Senate on May 14 confirmed the nominations of the following to be representatives of the United States to the fourth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Adlai E. Stevenson  
Francis T. P. Plimpton  
Charles W. Yost  
Jonathan B. Bingham  
Sidney R. Yates

## President Sends Message to Bogotá Conference of Labor Ministers

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor on the Alliance for Progress, meeting at Bogotá, Colombia, May 6-11. Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz was chairman of the U.S. delegation.*

White House press release dated May 7

I look to the Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor as among the most important events of this second year of *la Alianza para el Progreso*. The essence of the Charter of Punta del Este<sup>1</sup> is that ours shall be an alliance

<sup>1</sup> The Council on May 7 decided, without objection, to recommend to the General Assembly to admit Kuwait to membership in the United Nations. On May 14 the General Assembly admitted Kuwait by acclamation.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of the Declaration to the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta del Este, signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on Aug. 17, 1961, see BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Security Council on May 7 (U.S./U.N. press release 4201).

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. S/5294.

of peoples as much as of governments; an alliance of men of good will within the borders of our separate countries, as well as across them.

The first goal established by the Declaration of the Peoples of America adopted at Punta del Este is "To improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people." The fifth goal is "To assure fair wages and satisfactory working conditions to all our workers; to establish effective systems of labor-management relations and procedures for consultation and cooperation among government authorities, employers' associations, and trade unions in the interests of social and economic development." These goals are the immediate concern and in many ways the first responsibility of the ministries and departments of labor of all our nations. Much attention has been paid to the technological revolution that has transformed the means of material production in the modern world and for the first time given to men the prospect of liberation from the ancient bonds of scarcity and want. But far less attention has been paid to the administrative revolution that has made it possible to transmit the benefits of technology evenly and equitably throughout an industrial society. I give you the thought that modern technology without the science of social welfare administration would be a barren and negative thing, eliminating jobs and widening the gap between wealth and poverty, rather than creating a shared abundance.

It is equally clear that technology cannot be forced on a people, save by a tyranny that destroys as much as it creates. The full cooperation of workers, through their trade unions, must be achieved. This is a rule of economic development, and equally a fundamental tenet of a free society. It is not coincidence that wherever political democracy flourishes in the modern world there is also a strong, active, responsible, free trade-union movement. The Americas will be no exception.

We have a larger vision and a better understanding than those who persist in the sterile conviction that left to itself technology will eventually produce a social justice as well as material abundance. We have also a higher sense of our responsibility before God and our

peoples, holding with José Martí that "to foresee is a duty of those who undertake to lead."

There could be no more appropriate setting for your meeting than the site of the Act of Bogotá, the third of the three great declarations of principle on which *la Alianza para el Progreso* is based. I wish every success to your deliberations. Your nations look to you and to the high purposes for which you assemble.

## United States Delegations to International Conferences

### GATT Ministerial Meeting

The Office of the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations announced on May 13 that the following delegation would represent the United States at a meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at the ministerial level, held at Geneva May 16-21:

#### *Ministerial Representative*

Christian A. Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

#### *Vice Chairman of Delegation*

William T. Gossett, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

#### *Advisers*

Ben Dorfman, Chairman, Tariff Commission

G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State

Roland R. Renne, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Jack N. Behrman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce

George L-P Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor

John W. Evans, United States Mission, Geneva

W. Michael Blumenthal, Department of State

Evan B. Hannay, Office of International Economic Activities, Department of the Treasury

Irwin R. Hedges, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

Ralph Hirschtritt, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury

Raymond A. Ioanes, Department of Agriculture

Paul Kaplowitz, General Counsel, Tariff Commission

Robert L. McNeill, Department of Commerce

Walter I. Pozen, Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior

John B. Rehm, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

Robert Schwenger, Department of Labor

Charles Wootton, U.S. Mission to the European Communities, Brussels

The Geneva meeting is expected to set the stage for the most important tariff-cutting conference in history—the sixth round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, popularly known as the “Kennedy round.”

Some 75 nations will be present at the meeting, including most of the 50 in the GATT. The ministerial level of representation will add to the possibility of reaching final decisions on a series of important questions affecting the eventual negotiations.

The ministers will try to agree on a firm date for the beginning of negotiations.

In order for the United States to use the tariff-cutting authority contained in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,<sup>1</sup> there must be time for the completion of procedures required by the act. These would permit the Kennedy round to begin in the spring of 1964.

The negotiations are likely to involve more countries and more products than any previous round, and differences of opinion must be resolved on new procedures for lowering trade barriers. The last meeting of the GATT endorsed the principle of cutting rates on an across-the-board basis. However, a series of working party meetings has left to the ministers the difficult questions of how to apply this principle and to allow for the necessary exceptions.

The challenge of nontariff barriers to trade will also be before the meeting. Such barriers have become increasingly important as tariff levels have moved downward. Strong views are expected on the need to retain some and remove others.

The ministers must also face the complex and politically sensitive question of how to reduce barriers to trade in agricultural products as well as in manufactured ones. The importance of agriculture to world trade and the many and

varied forms of protecting domestic farmers from foreign competition will make this problem one of the hardest to settle.

Another major decision that may come out of the meeting concerns measures to assure that the expansion of trade assists the economic growth of the less developed countries.

### **Second Session of Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference on Trade and Development**

The Department of State announced on May 17 (press release 268) that Isaiah Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, would be the U.S. representative to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which convened at Geneva on May 21. Clarence Blau, Assistant Director of the Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce, will serve as alternate U.S. representative.

The Preparatory Committee, consisting of representatives of 32 countries, was established by the U.N. Economic and Social Council to plan for the conference, which is scheduled for early 1964. The purpose of the conference is to examine comprehensively the trade problems of the developing countries.

At the forthcoming meeting the Preparatory Committee will begin consideration of the topics included in the agenda for the conference recommended at its first meeting in New York in January. The committee will review the trends and prospects for the trade of the developing countries, consider various proposals for stabilizing commodity markets and foreign exchange earnings and for diversifying and expanding the exports of manufactures of developing countries, explore the place of export planning in the overall development plans of the developing countries, and generally examine the scope and organization of international activities bearing on the foreign trade of these countries.

Other members of the U.S. delegation are: Morris Crawford, Virginia McClung, Nathaniel McKittrick, Spencer Miller, and Sidney Weintraub, Department of State specialists in international trade and U.N. affairs.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 656, and Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847; for texts of Executive orders on the administration of the act, see *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180, and May 27, 1963, p. 839.

# Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

## Scheduled June Through August 1963

U.N. Special Fund Governing Council: 10th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 3-
World Food Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 4-
ANZUS Council: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Wellington . . . . .	June 5-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 24th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
International Labor Conference: 47th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-
U.N. ECE Rapporteurs Group on Housing for the Elderly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6-
CENTO Economic Experts Meeting of the Parties to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean . . . . .	Ankara . . . . .	June 6-
FAO Government Experts on the Code of Principles and Designations, Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 6-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 10-
OECD Trade Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 10-
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11-
10th International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Exposition . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 11-
OECD Committee for Scientific Research . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 15-
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 17-
UNESCO Preparatory Meeting for an Interdisciplinary Conference on Scientific Land Research . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 17-
13th International Film Festival . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 20-
Meeting of Experts on Antarctic Communications . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 21-
FAO North American Forestry Commission: 2d Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 24-
FAO Council: 40th Session . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	June 24-
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 24-
ILO Governing Body: 156th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 26-
OECD Fisheries Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 28-
GATT Working Group on Printing Costs and Related Matters . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 1-
U.N. ECOSOC Cartographic Conference for Africa . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 1-
International Whaling Commission: 15th Meeting . . . . .	Nairobi . . . . .	July 1-
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 1-
Victoria International Film Festival . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 1-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic . . . . .	Victoria, B.C . . . . .	July 1-
OECD Committee for Manpower and Social Affairs . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 2-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 2-
FAO Group on Grains . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-
OECD Committee for Agriculture . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	July 4-
3d International Film Festival . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 4-
IMCO Subcommittee on Code of Signals . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	July 7-
OECD Economic Policy Committee . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 8-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 10-
OECD Maritime Transport Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 16-
U.N. ECA Ministers of Finance: Meeting on African Development Bank . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 16-
16th International Film Festival . . . . .	Addis Ababa . . . . .	July 16-
Intergovernmental Meeting on Yellowfin Tuna Conservation . . . . .	Locarno . . . . .	July 17-
Inter-American Conference on Biology Education . . . . .	Costa Rica . . . . .	July 18-
International Coffee Council . . . . .	San José . . . . .	July 21-
17th International Film Festival . . . . .	London . . . . .	July
International Criminal Police Organization . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 18-
U.N. International Conference on Travel and Tourism . . . . .	Helsinki . . . . .	Aug. 21-
Joint ILO/IAEA International Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 21-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 26-
ICAO International Conference on Air Law . . . . .	Cardiff, Wales . . . . .	Aug. 26-
ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	August
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	August
FAO Conference on Wood Technology: 5th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	August
	Madison, Wis . . . . .	August or September

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 15, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1945. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

*Ratifications deposited:* Cuba, October 29, 1962; Malagasy Republic, December 7, 1962.

Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to increase membership of the council from 21 to 27. Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

*Ratifications deposited:* Cuba, October 29, 1962; El Salvador, January 22, 1963; Ethiopia, January 23, 1963; France, November 20, 1962; Honduras, December 20, 1962; Malagasy Republic, December 7, 1962; Philippines, November 12, 1962.

Amendment of article V of agreement for joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands (TIAS 4049) by increasing assessment limits. Adopted by council of the International Civil Aviation Organization at Montreal April 10, 1963.

*Entered into force:* April 10, 1963.

##### Fisheries

Amendment of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of the annex to the international convention for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean of May 9, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2786, 4992). Adopted at Seattle November 17, 1962, at the ninth meeting of the International North Pacific Ocean Fisheries Commission.

*Acceptances deposited:* Canada, May 8, 1963; Japan, February 26, 1963; United States, March 23, 1963.

*Entered into force:* May 8, 1963.

##### Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement to supplement the agreement of June 19, 1951 (TIAS 2846), between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Belgium, May 15, 1963.

Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Belgium, May 15, 1963.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1951. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Acceptance deposited:* United Arab Republic, April 22, 1963.

##### Trade

Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, with annex. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Brazil, March 21, 1963.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Brazil, March 21, 1963.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

*Signature:* Brazil, March 21, 1963.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Brazil, March 21, 1963.

Protocol for accession of Cambodia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, March 25, 1963.

##### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

*Acceptance deposited:* Liberia, May 13, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Chile

Agreement amending the agreement of October 3 and 4, 1962 (TIAS 5195), setting forth certain understandings concerning the agricultural commodities agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5195, 5252, and 5304). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago March 1 and 27, 1963. Entered into force March 27, 1963.

##### El Salvador

Agreement extending the army mission agreement of September 23, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3144, 4146, 4206). Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador March 27 and May 3, 1963. Entered into force May 3, 1963.

##### Japan

Agreement relating to cost-sharing of United States furnished equipment for one Nike and two Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 26, 1963. Entered into force April 26, 1963.

##### Ryukyu Islands

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of January 22 and February 6, 1963 (TIAS 5310). Signed at Naha April 17, 1963, and at Washington May 1, 1963. Entered into force May 1, 1963.

##### Thailand

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of a SEATO Clinical Research Center at the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Medical Sciences, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok April 1 and 25, 1963. Entered into force April 25, 1963.



## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Appointments

George C. Denney, Jr., as Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, effective April 28. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 267 dated May 16.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Department Publishes Fourth Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations

Press release 263 dated May 13

The Department of State on May 13 published volume IV of its analysis of United States negotiations in the 1960-61 tariff conference<sup>1</sup> held under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at Geneva, Switzerland.

Volume IV<sup>2</sup> is an unofficial English translation of the Common External Tariff of the European Economic Community (EEC), showing in one column the original duty rates and in a second column the rates as revised in the Geneva negotiations.

The Common External Tariff will apply to imports into the European Common Market area at the end of the present transition period. During the transitional period the tariffs of the individual member countries (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the customs union of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) are being aligned in progressive stages toward the common tariff rates. The revised

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

<sup>2</sup> *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations, Volume IV* (Department of State publication 7529): for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.; price \$1. Also available from the Superintendent of Documents are volume I (Department of State publication 7349, price \$1.25) describing the agreements with the EEC and the reciprocal agreements for new concessions; volume II (Department of State publication 7350, price 35 cents) describing the compensatory negotiations; and volume III (Department of State publication 7408, price 45 cents) describing U.S. concessions granted in reciprocal tariff negotiations during the course of the conference.

rates shown are not only those negotiated with the United States but also those which the EEC negotiated with other countries.

Although the Geneva tariff conference formally closed on July 16, 1962, some negotiations which were initiated in the course of the conference were not completed until approximately 6 months later, and the results of these negotiations are also included in this publication.

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses.** Agreement with Sweden, amending agreement of January 18, 1956, as amended. Signed at Washington July 20, 1962. Entered into force September 6, 1962. TIAS 5143. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Administrative Expenditures.** Agreement with Norway, amending Annex C to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo August 7 and 15, 1962. TIAS 5144. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito August 3, 1962. Entered into force August 3, 1962. TIAS 5145. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Nepal. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kathmandu August 24, 1962. Entered into force August 24, 1962. TIAS 5146. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of May 3, 1958, as supplemented and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik August 20, 1962. Entered into force August 20, 1962. TIAS 5147. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Use of Wideawake Airfield in Ascension Island by United Kingdom Military Aircraft.** Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington August 29, 1962. Entered into force August 29, 1962. TIAS 5148. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with United Arab Republic, amending the agreement of February 10, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo September 1, 1962. Entered into force September 1, 1962. TIAS 5149. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessels.** Agreement with China. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei August 15, 1962. Entered into force August 15, 1962. TIAS 5150. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with China. Signed at Taipei August 31, 1962. Entered into force August 31, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5151. 15 pp. 10¢.

**Defense—Grant of United States Vessels.** Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962. TIAS 5152. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with Agreement of October 23, 1957, as Amended, and Payment of Adjustment Refunds.** Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at Mexico July 6, 1961 and August 9, 1962. Entered into force August 9, 1962. TIAS 5153. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Economic Assistance—Settlement of Postwar Economic Assistance.** Agreement with Japan. Signed at Tokyo January 9, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1962. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 5154. 21 pp. 15¢.

**Economic, Technical and Related Assistance.** Agreement with Costa Rica. Signed at San José December 22, 1961. Entered into force September 7, 1962. TIAS 5155. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Health—Additional Regulations Amending WHO Regulations No. 2—Yellow Fever.** Adopted by the Eighth World Health Assembly at Mexico May 26, 1955. Entered into force October 1, 1956. TIAS 5156. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes.** Agreement with Belgium. Signed at Brussels May 17, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962. TIAS 5157. 13 pp. 10¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala August 9, 1960. Entered into force August 29, 1962. With related exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala August 23 and 27, 1962. TIAS 5158. 14 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Republic of the Congo, amending the agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Léopoldville May 23 and June 8, 1962. Entered into force June 8, 1962. TIAS 5159. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Migratory Workers—Mexican Agricultural Workers.** Agreement with Mexico, amending and extending the agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended, and including joint interpretations of 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at México December 29, 1961. Entered into force February 1, 1962. TIAS 5160. 43 pp. 20¢.

**Treaties—Continued Application to Congo (Brazzaville) of Certain Treaties Concluded Between the United States and France.** Exchange of notes with Republic of Congo—Dated at Brazzaville May 12 and August 5, 1961. TIAS 5161. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Closing of Accounts in Connection with Certain Agreements.** Agreement with Israel. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv June 14 and August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962. TIAS 5162. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Continuation of Child Feeding Program.** Agreement with Italy. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome August 28, 1962. Entered into force August 28, 1962. TIAS 5163. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Republic of the Congo, amending the agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Léopoldville July 27, 1962. Entered into force July 27, 1962. TIAS 5164. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Continued Operation of Communications and Other Facilities at the Long Range Proving Ground.** Agreements with the Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santo Domingo March 31 and July 25, 1962. Operative retroactively March 31, 1962. Entered into force July 25, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santo Domingo November 13 and 20, 1961. Entered into force November 20, 1961. TIAS 5165. 7 pp. 10¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Cyprus. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nicosia August 23, 1962. Entered into force August 23, 1962. TIAS 5166. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Furnishing of Articles and Services.** Agreement with Costa Rica. Exchange of notes—Signed at San José May 21 and June 18, 1962. Entered into force June 18, 1962. TIAS 5167. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Disposal of Former USS *Canopus*.** Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Dated at Manila May 29 and August 21, 1962. Entered into force August 21, 1962. TIAS 5168. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Afghanistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul September 6 and 11, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1962. TIAS 5169. 5 pp. 5¢.

**International Civil Aviation.** Protocol with Other Governments, relating to an amendment to the Convention of December 7, 1944. Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Cameroon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Yaoundé July 23 and September 10, 1962. Entered into force September 10, 1962. TIAS 5171. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Outer Space Cooperation—Space Science Research Program.** Agreement with Italy. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome September 5, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962. TIAS 5172. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Defense—Furnishing of Articles and Services.** Agreement with Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala May 25 and August 2, 1962. Entered into force August 2, 1962. TIAS 5173. 4 pp. 5¢.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 13 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 238 of May 1, 253 of May 8, and 254 and 256 of May 9.

No.	Date	Subject
260	5/13	Williams: "Communism's Impact on African Nationalism."
*261	5/13	Wright sworn in as Ambassador to China (biographic details).
*262	5/13	U.S. participation in international conferences.
263	5/13	Publication on 1960-61 GATT tariff conference.
264	5/14	Understanding with U.K. on Bahamas undersea test center.
265	5/15	Visit of President of India (rewrite).
*266	5/16	Visit of Italian Incontro Club.
*267	5/16	Denney appointed deputy director. INR (biographic details).
268	5/17	Delegation to U.N. conference on trade and development (rewrite).
†269	5/17	Delegation to NATO Council meeting (rewrite).
†270	5/17	Williams: "Germany's Role in Modern Africa."
*272	5/18	Bowles: "Domestic Prerequisites for an Effective Foreign Policy."
273	5/18	Reply to Soviet note of April 8 on NATO defense forces.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

<b>Africa.</b> Communism's Impact on African Nationalism (Williams) . . . . .	877	Atlantic Undersea Test Center To Be Set Up in Bahamas . . . . .	866
<b>American Republics</b>		Western Powers Reject Soviet Charges on NATO Nuclear Defense . . . . .	860
Foreign Relations Volume on American Republics, 1942 . . . . .	883	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>	
President Sends Message to Bogotá Conference of Labor Ministers (text of message) . . . . .	884	The Atlantic Community: An American View (Rostow) . . . . .	855
<b>Bahamas.</b> Atlantic Undersea Test Center To Be Set Up in Bahamas . . . . .	866	Western Powers Reject Soviet Charges on NATO Nuclear Defense . . . . .	860
<b>Communism.</b> Communism's Impact on African Nationalism (Williams) . . . . .	877	<b>Presidential Documents.</b> President Sends Message to Bogotá Conference of Labor Ministers . . . . .	884
<b>Congress</b>		<b>Publications</b>	
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . . .	883	Department Publishes Fourth Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	889
U.S. Delegates to Special Session of General Assembly Confirmed . . . . .	884	Foreign Relations Volume on American Republics, 1942 . . . . .	883
<b>Department and Foreign Service.</b> Appointments (Denney) . . . . .	889	Recent Releases . . . . .	889
<b>Economic Affairs</b>		<b>Treaty Information.</b> Current Actions . . . . .	888
Department Publishes Fourth Volume on U.S.-GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	889	U.S.S.R. Western Powers Reject Soviet Charges on NATO Nuclear Defense . . . . .	860
GATT Ministerial Meeting (delegation) . . . . .	885	<b>United Kingdom.</b> Atlantic Undersea Test Center To Be Set Up in Bahamas . . . . .	866
Second Session of Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (delegation) . . . . .	886	<b>United Nations</b>	
<b>Europe.</b> The Atlantic Community: An American View (Rostow) . . . . .	855	Kuwait Becomes 111th Member of United Nations (Stevenson) . . . . .	884
<b>Foreign Aid.</b> AID Summarizes Position on 1964 Budget Figures (Bell) . . . . .	881	Second Session of Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (delegation) . . . . .	886
<b>India.</b> President Radhakrishnan of India Visits the United States . . . . .	883	Two Kinds of Politics (Cleveland) . . . . .	871
<b>International Law.</b> Foreign Policy and the Rule of Law (McGhee) . . . . .	867	U.S. Delegates to Special Session of General Assembly Confirmed . . . . .	884
<b>International Organizations and Conferences</b>			
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings . . . . .	887		
GATT Ministerial Meeting (delegation) . . . . .	885		
President Sends Message to Bogotá Conference of Labor Ministers (text of message) . . . . .	884		
<b>Kuwait.</b> Kuwait Becomes 111th Member of United Nations (Stevenson) . . . . .	884		
<b>Labor.</b> President Sends Message to Bogotá Conference of Labor Ministers (text of message) . . . . .	884		
<b>Military Affairs</b>			
The Atlantic Community: An American View (Rostow) . . . . .	855		
		<i>Name Index</i>	
		Bell, David E . . . . .	881
		Bingham, Jonathan B . . . . .	884
		Cleveland, Harlan . . . . .	871
		Denney, George C., Jr . . . . .	889
		Kennedy, President . . . . .	884
		McGhee, George C . . . . .	867
		Plimpton, Francis T. P . . . . .	884
		Rostow, W. W . . . . .	855
		Stevenson, Adlai E . . . . .	884
		Williams, G. Menmen . . . . .	877
		Yates, Sidney R . . . . .	884
		Yost, Charles W . . . . .	884

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$3.00  
(GPO)



the  
Department  
of  
State

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942, Volume VI  
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume VI, The American Republics*.

This publication is the second of two volumes in the Foreign Relations series dealing with relations between the United States and the other American Republics during 1942. Volume V, published last year, contained the section on general, multilateral relations and on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. Volume VI covers bilateral relations with the remaining seventeen American Republics.

Subjects documented in this volume chiefly relate to military and economic cooperation in the war against the Axis Powers.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume VI, The American Republics* (Publication 7513) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25 each. Copies of *Volume V for 1942, The American Republics* (Publication 7373) at \$3.00 per copy, are still available from the same source.

Order Form

To: Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics*:

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1942, Vol. VI, Publication 7513 | \$3.25 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1942, Vol. V, Publication 7373  | \$3.00 |

Enclosed find:

\$.....  
(cash, check, or money  
order payable to  
Supt. of Docs.)

Name: .....

Street Address: .....

City, Zone, and State: .....

864

# Bulletin

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1250

June 10, 1963

**NATO COUNCIL HOLDS 1963 SPRING MEETING AT OTTAWA** ● *Text of Communique* . . . . . 895

**THE PHILIPPINES—A NEW ERA** ● *by Assistant Secretary Hilsman* . . . . . 897

**GERMANY'S ROLE IN MODERN AFRICA** ● *by Assistant Secretary Williams* . . . . . 901

**THE POLITICS OF POPULATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION** ● *by Richard N. Gardner* . . . . . 906

**TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT** ● *Statement by Assistant Secretary Martin* . 918

IAL  
Y RECORD  
ID STATES  
IGN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1250 • PUBLICATION 7558

June 10, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 10, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## NATO Council Holds 1963 Spring Meeting at Ottawa

*The North Atlantic Council held its regular semiannual ministerial meeting at Ottawa, Canada, May 22-24. Following is the text of a communique adopted at the final meeting, together with a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.*

### TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 27S dated May 24

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Ottawa from 22nd to 24th May, 1963.

In their review of the international situation, the Ministers emphasized that in the world of today peace is indivisible. The enduring character of the North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of interdependence and common defence, constitutes a basic guarantee for the maintenance of peace.

The Council noted with regret that the Soviet Union had so far shown little interest in seeking equitable solutions for outstanding problems.

With regard to Germany and Berlin, the threat has not disappeared. Thanks to the firm attitude maintained by the West, however, developments detrimental to the interests of Berlin and the Alliance have been effectively discouraged. In this connection, the Alliance abides by the terms of its declaration of 16th December, 1958, on Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

Outside the treaty area too, tensions and difficulties continue to exist which have a profound effect on the Alliance. Soviet military personnel remain in Cuba; and the situation there, with its repercussions in the region generally, still gives cause for concern. Ministers also expressed their disquiet over recent events in Laos, and stressed the importance of sustained efforts to secure respect for the Geneva Agreements.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.

The Ministers reaffirmed the importance, in building a peaceful world, of progress towards general and complete disarmament by stages and under effective international control. In this connection, they noted that agreement in principle had been reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on measures to improve communications designed to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.<sup>2</sup> They expressed the hope that the Soviet Union's attitude would evolve sufficiently to permit genuine progress to be made on key disarmament questions.

The growing scope and complexity of the problems facing the Alliance make it imperative for the Council to ensure that its political consultations are as prompt and effective as they can be made. The Ministers noted the progress already achieved in this direction and expressed their determination to secure still further improvements.

The Ministers discussed NATO defence policy and approved the steps taken to organize the nuclear forces assigned or to be assigned to the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR).

These include notably:

(A) Assignment of the United Kingdom V-Bomber force and three U.S. Polaris submarines to SACEUR;

(B) Establishment by SACEUR on his staff of a deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs;

(C) Arrangements for broader participation by officers of NATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in co-ordination of operational planning at Omaha;

<sup>2</sup> For text of a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency statement of Apr. 5, 1963, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 600.



(D) Fuller information to national authorities both political and military.

Ministers welcomed these measures to increase the effectiveness of the nuclear capability at the disposal of the Alliance and to improve co-ordination and control of its nuclear deterrent forces.

The Ministers recognized the need to achieve a satisfactory balance between nuclear and conventional arms. They directed the Council in permanent session to undertake, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, further studies of the inter-related questions of strategy, force requirements and the resources available to meet them.

The Council noted progress made in the implementation of earlier resolutions concerning the defence problems of Greece and reaffirmed its interest in the effective application of these resolutions.

The North Atlantic Alliance seeks peace. It deplores the diversion into the military field of resources which might be used for the betterment of mankind, and in particular for increased efforts to raise living standards in developing countries. But the Free World remains faced with a continuing threat and the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have both the right and the duty to protect their freedom and independence.

The next Ministerial Meeting will be held in Paris in December 1963.

#### MEMBERS OF DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on May 17 (press release 269) that Secretary Rusk would leave Washington on May 20 to attend the Ministerial Council meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which will be held at Ottawa May 22-24. Members of the delegation are:

##### *United States Representatives*

Dean Rusk, *chairman*, Secretary of State  
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense

##### *U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council*

Thomas K. Finletter

##### *Advisers*

John W. Auchincloss, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Willis C. Armstrong, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State

W. Walton Butterworth, U.S. Ambassador to Canada  
Elbridge Durbrow, Deputy U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Brig. Gen. Samuel K. Eaton, USA, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

William E. Knepper, Staff Assistant to the Secretary of State

Robert H. Kranich, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Lawrence Levy, Defense Adviser and Defense Representative, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

David H. Popper, *deputy coordinator*, Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

J. Robert Schaetzel, *coordinator*, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Ronald I. Spiers, Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State  
Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Christopher Van Hollen, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State

## U.S. Studying Soviet Note on NATO Nuclear Forces in Mediterranean

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet note on nuclear defense forces of NATO in the Mediterranean, delivered to the Department of State last night [May 20], is being studied but appears to be typical of the moves that the Soviet Union is in the habit of making on the eve of NATO meetings. What the Soviets are proposing is that we eliminate our seaborne nuclear capacity in the Mediterranean, which is one of NATO's most effective

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on May 21 by Joseph Reap, Office of News.

counters to repeated Soviet threats to use their own nuclear weapons against members of the NATO alliance.

Neither the Soviet Union nor any other country has anything to fear from any defensive measures of the NATO countries. The Soviet

Union could contribute more to the cause of peace by a positive attitude in disarmament talks than by propaganda notes and threats against its peaceful neighbors, most recently for example in Marshal Malinovsky's speech of February 22, 1963.

## The Philippines—A New Era

*by Roger Hilsman*

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is a great pleasure for me to be here with you today and to share with you some of our common experiences in the Philippines. Like many of you, I have been a second-generation resident in the Philippines; so I too have known and enjoyed the warmth of Filipino friendship and hospitality. It is my feeling that these values are as important today as they were 35 years ago when my family went out to the Philippines. I look forward eagerly to the opportunity of visiting the Philippines again when there is a chance to do so. There have been many vital changes in the Philippines since my early experiences there, and it is some of these changes which I should like to discuss with you today.

During the past 30 years we have seen the Philippines move from the status of an American territory to a semi-independent Commonwealth and then, after the war, to complete political independence. Since the war we have proudly seen the Philippines, a true friend and ally in international affairs, assume an important position in the United Nations and a far more significant role in regional Asian affairs. We have watched these developments with great interest and satisfaction.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce at New York, N.Y., on May 23 (press release 276).

The stakes for the United States and the Philippines in Asia are vital. The Philippines is building on an enduring democratic heritage to promote greater economic and social progress. Other countries in Asia, perhaps more handicapped in some respects, are attempting simultaneously to build both free and prosperous societies. It is worth while for Americans, in moments when the thought of the foreign burdens that touch every family seem overwhelming, to think of the thousand years of history that went into building the basis for our freedoms, and the 200 or more years of the hardest labor that went into creating the economic power that we have today on this continent. All that we have achieved may be diminished, even lost, if we fail in our patience with the slow but solid progress the free world is making in the Far East or relax in our determination to help the independent countries of Asia.

In Viet-Nam the Communist enemy allows no peace, for he feels that if he can bring the Government to its knees, the extension of his regime elsewhere in Southeast Asia will be the more easily accomplished. Despite this continuing threat, however, 18 years of war there have not deprived the Vietnamese of their will to be free.

In Laos the basis of our policy, as you know,

rests on the Geneva Agreements,<sup>2</sup> which provide for a neutral, unified, and peaceful Laos, supported by the pledges of 14 signatory countries. The trouble in Laos is that the Communist side has not fulfilled its pledges. New Communist threats and challenges arise daily to test and strain this agreement on which the prevailing cease-fire and the immediate course of events in Southeast Asia depend.

In Indonesia, beset by the psychological and social residue of a colonial past, the task of nation-building has been made difficult by the all-consuming effort toward creating national unity among diverse peoples and regional interests. Thousands of Communist Party cadres are quietly organizing and planning for the day when President Sukarno, the nationalist leader whose authority they first challenged in 1948, is no longer there to frustrate them. They are determined to reap the harvest of the poverty and ignorance which Marx and Lenin said would lead to their victory. As with the other countries, it is in our national interest to assist Indonesia as best we can to establish a unified, independent, and prosperous nationhood consonant with the efforts she takes in her own behalf.

Korea, Burma, Thailand—the list is long; each has particular opportunities and difficulties, but all have one problem in common—how most quickly to raise their economies to meet the legitimate expectations of their people. And in each situation the enemies of freedom are standing on the sidelines waiting to move in fast enough, big enough, and with sufficient blandishment to exploit any void we leave them. History has taught us that when that happens the road back is a hard and long one indeed. In my mind, those who overlook the economic element of our battle for freedom, in the name of quick, easy—and temporary—domestic saving or whatever, have not profited from history's hardest lessons. They would put in jeopardy the gains of centuries of building democracy for what amounts to about 1 percent of the annual amount of our gross national product.

Reduced to its simplest dimensions, we are

---

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259; for text of a U.S.—U.S.S.R. communique, see *ibid.*, May 20, 1963, p. 775.

working in the Far East to help with knowledge and assistance to build nation-states faster, in many cases where they have never before existed, against an enemy that is marshaling its full efforts to subvert them to communism.

Since destruction is so much easier than construction, some would say that we have embarked on a monumental, possibly a hopeless, task. But one of the most interesting phenomena in recent years has been the mounting accumulation of evidence that patience and generosity, combined with a will toward freedom, are of extraordinary effectiveness, no matter how great the challenge. Japan, the Republic of China, Malaya, Thailand, and the country we are primarily concerned with today—the Philippines—have overcome the main trials and disasters stemming from the war to the point of abandoning red ink for black in their economic as well as their political ledgers. The bright spots in Asia did not get that way automatically—many years of hard work, including our continuing help and effort, brought it about. In view of the continuing challenges and opportunities for nation-building in Asia, we cannot rest on our laurels.

#### Recent Economic Developments

Our efforts directed toward keeping up the momentum of free-world policy abroad must mesh with the programs our friends and allies have undertaken in their own behalf. What is the outlook as concerns the Philippines?

We are now observing the Philippines move to a status of more complete economic independence, and it is this move with which you are particularly concerned. We in the Government recognize your concern and wish to work closely with you in preparing for the adjustments which will have to be made. Our economic relations with the Philippines are close and go back many years. The first American ship sailed into Manila harbor in 1792, and there have been regular commercial relations since 1796. Since the last war we have conducted our trade through a special trade agreement<sup>3</sup> which expires in 1974. We are now preparing for the day when we should think of a successor com-

---

<sup>3</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348.

mercial arrangement to replace the Laurel-Langley agreement.

But let us first review some of the recent economic developments and draw out their meaning for our future economic relations. With the election of President Macapagal we have seen a new era ushered in. We have been impressed by his decisiveness, and we feel that the major steps that he has taken have done much to contribute to the present dynamism of the Philippine business community and to put the Philippines more squarely on their own feet economically.

The immediate step of devaluing the peso and freeing the country from its shackles of import controls has been immensely effective in inspiring confidence of both foreign and domestic investors. It is significant that the peso only required 14 weeks to reach a fixed level and has remained firm ever since. We appreciate the significance of the wise measures that the Filipino leaders took in creating a stabilization fund to cushion against any undue fluctuations. The success of their management is shown in the fact that it was only necessary to use a small part of the stabilization fund.

Another promising development has been the formulation of a well-worked-out, 5-year, integrated, socioeconomic program to encourage economic development. We find that the Philippines have set for themselves the goal of attaining a target increase in overall domestic production of about 6 percent per annum from fiscal year 1963 to 1967, which will insure that some 330,000 to 360,000 new jobs are provided annually. Furthermore, it is intended that the greater portion of this annual increase in employment is to be absorbed in industrial production.

The functioning of the Program Implementation Agency, and the careful planning that has gone into the coordination of this year's budget and the legislative proposals submitted by President Macapagal this spring have been an important step forward. We are interested in the outcome of those proposals which are intended to stimulate foreign investment. Likewise, we are confidently awaiting the publication at the end of this fiscal year of the results of the first year of the 5-year program. We anticipate

that the Philippines will reach most of the first-year target goal it has outlined for economic growth, increased investment and savings, improved agricultural output, and its other goals. It was over a century ago that the American naval explorer, Charles Wilkes, first extolled the ideal situation of the port of Manila. Today we believe that Manila stands on the threshold of becoming the trading center of one of the great industrial areas of the Far East.

It is essential to remember that this 5-year program is the harbinger of an important economic transformation. This was borne out in the speech of President Macapagal at the opening of the 19th ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] conference in Manila this spring, when he exposed the myth that the God-given specialty of Asian countries like the Philippines is the production of rice, sugar, copra, lumber, rubber, coffee, and tea. The President stressed that industrialization alone is the hope for advancement of economic development for the Philippines.

Unfortunately this increased industrial production has also brought increased demands for protection for the new industries. Our mutual trade relations have suffered, and we have pointed this out to the Philippine authorities. While we understand the need of infant industries for protection, we fear that steep increases may not only mar the existing trade relationships but also put off the day when these new industries will be able to stand on their own.

#### **U.S.-Philippine Economic Relationship**

As I have already noted, the Laurel-Langley trade agreement will expire in 1974 and it is time for us to start thinking about a successor arrangement. We realize the importance of the existing agreement to both countries, and we are anxious to take the necessary steps which will safeguard mutual interests. In the modern commercial world this type of preferential tariff arrangement is becoming increasingly rare. It was drawn up for the purpose of giving the two countries a transitional period during which they could reduce their usual economic interdependence. It has always been the objective of both countries to move toward a more normal economic relationship, and this

goal is being achieved by the gradual phasing out of the preferential tariffs and by the gradual reduction of the duty-free quotas. These arrangements have still 11 years to go, but it is not too early to start thinking of new arrangements which will be mutually satisfactory. As a basis, we shall look to the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation which have been negotiated recently with other Asian countries. We shall count on your advice and support in preparing for these negotiations.

We are also getting ready to implement the Trade Expansion Act, which has the objective of an even more open multilateral trading system. This month Governor Herter [Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] and his assistants have been meeting in Geneva with the ministers of the other GATT member countries to work out the ground rules for the "Kennedy round" of international tariff negotiations.<sup>4</sup> This Kennedy round will open next spring, and there are already 50 GATT member nations who will participate in the discussions and enjoy the full benefits of the negotiations. It is for this reason that we hope the Philippines will become a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We feel certain that the Philippines has much to gain from such membership and will make a valuable contribution toward the creation of a new global trading policy.

Before leaving the field of trade it is necessary to note the sharp drop in our exports to the Philippines during the past year. U.S. exports fell by \$64 million, and our share of the Philippines import market went below 50 percent. As you know, the United States has a balance-of-payments problem, and every decrease in exports counts. We recognize such causal factors

---

<sup>4</sup>For background, see BULLETIN of June 3, 1963, p. 885.

as devaluation, shrinking preferences, higher tariffs, and increasing competition from other Asian countries, but nevertheless we hope to maintain a high level of trade. In view of the \$300 million growth that is projected for the Philippines over the next 5 years, I am certain that your companies will rise to the occasion and make the necessary sales efforts.

During the past several months there have been several problems of interpretation of the Laurel-Langley agreement which have arisen, but I am confident that they will be resolved soon. In this connection I should mention that the Embassy has worked closely with the Philippine authorities in establishing "treaty trader" and "treaty investor" visa status for American businessmen and technicians. We are also planning to enter into negotiations this fall to put an end to double taxation and thus further promote private investment. The suggestions of members of this distinguished group have always been useful when such legal problems arise.

As the 5-year program goes forward and new economic strength is developed, we can expect the pace in our special economic relationship to quicken. We must be prepared to adjust to the increased importance of other nations as investors and trading partners of the Philippines. American business has proven its great strength in its almost infinite adaptability to changing technology and changing circumstances.

I have every confidence that, with all the opportunities and challenges that will arise in the years ahead, the Philippine-American economic partnership will grow and flourish on the new foundations we are now preparing. And within that larger sphere of international relations, in the vital interests which are shared by the United States and the Philippines, we shall persevere together in extending the frontiers of freedom everywhere.

## Germany's Role in Modern Africa

*by G. Mennen Williams*

*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is always a great pleasure to be back among my old and good friends of the Steuben Society, particularly when we meet to pay tribute to General von Steuben and mark the significant contributions made to America by those of German blood. We have shared many happy moments over the years, and I am glad to be with you once more. Unfortunately we have had far less time together since I entered African affairs than we did when I was Governor of Michigan, and it occurred to me that this might be a good occasion for a few remarks on Africa, particularly on the role Germany is playing in modern Africa. In recent months, I have twice had the honor to visit Bonn to discuss our common objectives with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

This would be a good occasion to repeat President Kennedy's greetings to the fifth annual Steuben parade, when he said:

We are pledged to defend the freedom of all peoples of the world, including the people of West Berlin. We will not fail to fulfill that commitment, just as a Von Steuben did not fail to fulfill his commitment to American independence.

The freedom of Berlin is a matter in which I constantly try to interest my African friends, pointing out that freedom is indivisible and in the long run their freedom is linked with Berlin's. To many of them this concept seems farfetched, as they are immersed in the question of independence for African areas not yet free and feel that Europeans and Americans

do not have sufficient interest in those problems. But with the passage of time and heightened appreciation of our interest in African freedom, they begin to understand increasingly the importance of the freedom of Berlin, especially when they have had an opportunity to visit that tragically divided city. In time I would hope that Africa will become an important source of strength in the struggle to preserve the freedom of Berlin, just as African votes in the United Nations have been significant in keeping Red China out of the U.N. and African nations refused the Communists overflight and landing rights during the Cuban crisis.

The recent and rapid growth of freedom in Africa is one of the most exciting phenomena of our century. After many years of being isolated from the mainstream of world affairs, Africa today is taking its rightful place in the world community. This transition is of much interest to the Western community of nations, which is anxious to assist the successful growth of free and peaceful African states.

Both the United States and West Germany, as prominent members of the Western community, have a strong desire to see the development of societies of free choice in Africa. We share with the new and emerging states themselves a common interest in the growth of African freedom and the development of economically strong countries on that continent. And we both have ample resources to help promote economic development.

Furthermore, as the United States has no

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Steuben Society of America at New York, N.Y., on May 18 (press release 270 dated May 17).

## President Sends Message to Conference of African Leaders at Addis Ababa

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the Conference of African Heads of State, which convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 22. The President's message was read at the opening session of the conference by the chairman, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.*

White House press release dated May 21, for release May 22

MAY 22, 1963

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to express to you, the representatives of the peoples of Africa, my best wishes and those of the United States Government and the American people.

Africa's continuing march toward independence, unity and freedom—principles revered by the American people since the earliest days of our own nationhood—is a vital part of man's historic struggle for human dignity and self-realization. This unprecedented gathering of Heads of States in Addis Ababa clearly attests your devotion to these principles, and provides a dramatic illustration of African prominence in world affairs. As you seek to achieve the dignity and freedom of the human individual and the rights of men, we share your desire that these objectives may be realized and safeguarded for men everywhere. From your actions other nations may draw renewed inspirations to continue their search for improved ways to understand each other and to cooperate in peace.

The United States and the American people wish you success as you commence your deliberations. It is our sincere desire that the high purposes of this Conference shall achieve fulfillment in an atmosphere of integrity and harmony.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

colonial record in Africa and Germany has not had one there for nearly half a century, we both are in the position of being able to provide the new African nations with non-African associations in addition to those they would quite naturally have with their former rulers. This ability to associate with noncolonial countries makes these African nations feel more truly independent and, hence, better able to resist Communist blandishments.

Although the continent of Africa is more than three times as large as the United States and its widely scattered 265 million people

speak some 1,000 languages and dialects, Africans in all parts of the continent possess several aspirations that spiritually unite them.

Of these aspirations, the most important is the desire of all Africans to become masters of their own destinies and remain free and independent of colonial rule. This is a goal with which the United States and Germany can and do sympathize. In the last dozen years 29 new nations have come into being in Africa, and others are on the road to self-government and independence. Africans and Europeans alike can take great pride in the fact that the greatest part of this transition has taken place peacefully.

The acceptance of Africans, both personally and nationally, on an equal basis with the rest of the world is a second continentwide aspiration. This desire is of the highest importance to Africans, who feel color bars are being lowered too slowly in many parts of the world. We in the United States have a particularly heavy responsibility in this regard. Although many Africans are aware that the U.S. Government and many of its citizens are doing all they can to eliminate discrimination from the United States—not simply to please Africa but because it is right—the stories from Birmingham and the pictures of police using dogs and firehoses against Negro Americans have been carried on the front page of every African newspaper. These tend to undo much of the understanding created by our vigorous efforts to end discrimination.

Pan-Africanism, or African unity, is another of the aspirations of the peoples of that continent. This aspiration has an almost mystical aura surrounding it, but it also is firmly based in a number of regional political and economic associations of much worth. And next week [May 22], in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a very important conference of more than 30 African heads of state will assemble to discuss ways of achieving Africa-wide cooperation. We believe that further cooperation among the nations of Africa can help their social and economic development materially.

A fourth African aspiration is nonalignment, which generally means that the new nations do not wish to form any ties that will make them active partners in the East-West struggle.

Guinea is one of the strongest African proponents of a nonaligned policy. Following its independence in 1958, Guinea initially developed extensive relations with Communist bloc countries, but more recently it has considerably expanded its relations with the West. Thus, a few months ago, it happened that a trade mission from East Germany was dining in the Hotel de France in Guinea's capital city, Conakry, feeling rather smug with the way affairs were going in Guinea. Right in the middle of their dinner, however, a uniformed West German military aid mission, which had arrived at the request of the Guinean Government unbeknownst to the East Germans, strode into the dining room. I am advised that the loser of this East-West confrontation was the East German trade mission, whose surprise was reflected by the clatter of forks which literally dropped from their hands.

The fifth major African aspiration is an urgent desire to improve living standards. Although the continent is rich in resources, the full benefits of Africa's bounty have not yet reached the bulk of the population. As a result, the per capita income of Africans is only about \$130. This is lower, for example, than the Near East's average of \$215 and Latin America's \$295—and it is far below our annual per capita income of \$2,500. These figures readily illustrate why the peoples of Africa are calling on their leaders for higher living standards and rapid social and economic development.

#### **West German Aid to Africa**

The United States and Germany share a common interest in desiring to help Africa develop economically and socially—especially in education and health—and both of us have programs of assistance in most African countries. By the end of 1962 Germany had either provided or planned for development loan programs amounting to almost \$250 million in 30 African countries and technical assistance of nearly \$70 million. This is approximately 14 percent of Germany's worldwide aid program, and, while it is smaller in dollar volume than U.S. aid to Africa, Germany puts 0.81 percent of its gross national product into foreign aid, compared

with our 0.74 percent. Germany is also participating in the Development Fund of the European Common Market, which is planning to provide \$800 million in aid to Africa in the next 5 years.

West German aid to Africa has become increasingly important because it is needed badly and it permits the African nations to diversify their sources of foreign assistance, and we are encouraging the Germans to continue making such aid available to Africa. I was in Bonn only 2 months ago discussing this matter with officials of the Federal Republic, and I was pleased to find a strong interest in helping Africa with its development needs.

Germany's interest in Africa is reciprocated by a lively interest among Africans in Germany. Both in areas where German programs are already in operation and in areas where German economic missions have visited, Germany's reception in Africa has been pleasant and friendly. This is particularly true of those areas of Africa which were German colonies a half century ago. For example, the last German Governor of Togo, the Duke of Mecklenburg, returned to independent Togo in 1961 after having been away since 1914. He was warmly greeted on his return visit by a number of Togolese who had known him when he was Governor.

Interestingly enough, a half-century's absence has not erased Germany's imprint on Africa. There are still older people in such countries as Togo and Cameroon who speak German, and there are practicing doctors in Togo who were trained by Germans before World War I. The late President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio—whose fluent German I have heard used with German visitors—delivered part of his address in German when he visited Bonn in 1962. The father of Togo's current President, Nicolas Grunitzky, was German. The former President of Togo's Legislative Assembly, Jonathan Savi de Tove, uses German as his household language. In parts of former German African territories there are still many towns and villages with German names. And one of Germany's most important cultural contributions to Africa—the development of a written Ewe language before the turn



of the century—has given Togo some of the highest areas of literacy in Africa. This cultural *Bruderschaft* between Germans and Africans is encouraged today by a Goethe Haus in Lomé, Togo's capital, and some dozen additional German cultural institutes in other African countries.

In the economic field much of Germany's aid is concentrated in countries in which Germany formerly had a colonial interest. In Togo, for example, the German program is rather extensive. They have agreed to build a port at Lomé, and its cornerstone already has been laid. Germany has provided doctors for Lomé Hospital, X-ray equipment for several Togolese hospitals, and mobile water purifiers. The Germans also have made donations of cash and foodstuffs for famine and refugee relief in Togo, and they have made available a considerable number of scholarships for technical and university training in Germany. As a matter of fact, several young Togolese who left Bulgaria in the general exodus of African students early this year went to Germany to complete their educations.

Actually, Germany is playing a very significant role in the education of Africans. They have not only put a number of student defectors from Communist countries in their schools, but they have a sizable number of African students who have come to Germany through direct channels. I have met with many of these students, who seem to be intelligent and well adjusted.

In Tanganyika, also a former German administrative area, Germany is now helping with the extension of a railway trunkline, road and building construction, agricultural machinery, and water supply plants. In the field of technical assistance the Germans are planning to help Tanganyika with geological services, teachers and equipment for a business training center, and instructors for technical training schools. In Cameroon the Germans are providing technicians for the country's development bank and are going to help finance small- and medium-sized agricultural and industrial development projects.

### Range of German-African Relationships

But German interests are not limited to areas which were part of German Africa many years ago. They have active interests in countries such as Guinea, where they have helped build a new water system for Conakry, have provided railroad equipment, and have helped with a fish drying and smoking plant, a fishing boat for research, and a mobile health clinic. They have also provided technical assistance in road construction, health, agricultural research, and photography, and they have provided 30 scholarships for Guineans in West Germany. In Ghana, where Germany purchases nearly 20 percent of the country's cocoa exports, which contributes much to the nearly \$100 million in trade between the two countries annually, Germany is providing technical assistance and is building an important bridge. German assistance to Kenya includes tea cultivation, road construction, water supply and sewage treatment installations, smallholder settlement projects, and small agricultural loans. And in the Malagasy Republic a German program of road-building, construction of a power plant, and the provision of coastal patrol boats and maritime training is being worked out.

Germany also has been an important contributor to the United Nations Congo fund and has assisted that country with economic aid, in which foodstuffs have played a significant role. Continued German participation in an international aid effort will be very important to help the Congolese build a viable nation.

One particularly valuable part of the German aid program is their assistance in communications. Lack of adequate communication facilities in Africa is a serious roadblock to the spread of information among the peoples of Africa. The West Germans are providing the latest communications equipment and helping to train African technicians to operate radio, telegraph, and other facilities so urgently needed by many African countries.

This range of German-African relationships underscores the growing importance of Africa in the world today and the developing community of interest between Africa and the older

free-world nations. The rising number of contacts between Germans and Africans have expanded the horizons of both parties. Germany has a heightened awareness of the importance of freedom and social and economic development to Africa and of the urgency with which that continent must meet its aspirations in those areas. Conversely, Africa's contacts with Germany, particularly through visits to Berlin and observation of the Berlin wall, as I have said, have given many Africans a new appreciation of East-West differences and a clearer understanding of what Berlin represents to the free world.

This type of healthy interchange is of great importance to the growth of societies of free choice in Africa. The future of Americans, Germans, and all free peoples is directly related to the question of whether the peoples of Africa can successfully develop societies in which they can enjoy the blessings of freedom and a more abundant life. And if, together, we can help Africa attain its aspirations in peace and freedom, we will have taken a major stride toward building a world of security and order for generations to come.

## **U.S. Owners of Bulgarian Property Must File Tax Forms by June 15**

Press release 277 dated May 24

The Bulgarian Ministry of Finance issued a regulation on April 12, 1963, requiring all private owners of buildings, house yards, and sites to file declarations in connection with determining the amount of Bulgarian taxes which may be payable. Proof of ownership of the real property must be submitted together with the declaration. Foreign owners must file their declarations through their authorized representatives in Bulgaria. Owners who fail to file a declaration by May 31, 1963, are subject to a fine of 20 leva (approximately \$17.00).

The Department of State has endeavored to obtain an extension of this deadline for American citizens who are property owners in Bulgaria. The Ministry of Finance has agreed

to an extension of the deadline only to June 15, 1963.

The regulation, No. IV-7, was published in the Bulgarian official gazette, *Durzhaven Vestnik* No. 30 of April 16, 1963. Declarations (forms #1) can be obtained from the fiscal section or service of any People's Council (*Finansoviyat Otdel ili Finansovata Sluzhba pri Narodniyat Svet*). After the declaration has been filled out, it is to be filed, together with proof of ownership, with the People's Council of the town, region, or village where the real property is located. The clerk receiving the declaration is to verify the information contained in it by checking it against one of the documents of ownership specified in article 112 of the Property (Ownership) Law (published in *Izvestiya* No. 92 of November 16, 1951).

Article 112 reads as follows:

Subject to registration are:

- a. all deeds transferring ownership rights or institutionalizing, transferring, changing or invalidating other rights to real property;
- b. contracts conveying an inheritance which includes real property;
- c. deeds renouncing rights to real property;
- d. petitions by creditors of a testator or by legatees for the distribution of the real property of the testator;
- e. real property lease contracts covering a term of more than one year;
- f. agreements concerning disputes relating to deeds subject to registration; and
- g. court verdicts having the force of law which amend deeds under letter "a", as well as decisions affirming the existence of deeds subject to registration under the preceding letters.

Persons filing the declaration are given a dated receipt.

Foreigners must file the required declarations through their authorized and appropriately empowered representatives in Bulgaria. Alternatively, the Law Office for Foreign Legal Matters, Alabin 31, Sofia, Bulgaria, can file declarations on behalf of American citizens if it receives the necessary information and power of attorney from the property owner concerned.

Any American citizens holding title to property in Bulgaria who may have questions relating to this regulation should address themselves to the Office of Special Consular Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

## The Politics of Population: A Blueprint for International Cooperation

by Richard N. Gardner

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>

December 18, 1962, marked a turning point in the recognition by the international community of the world population problem. On that day the United Nations General Assembly concluded the first debate in its history devoted entirely to the subject of population. It adopted, with 69 affirmative votes (including that of the United States), 27 abstentions, and not a single negative vote, a major resolution calling for an intensified program of international cooperation in the population field.<sup>2</sup>

Except for the members of the Soviet bloc, all of whom abstained, countries of every major political, economic, cultural, religious, and geographic identification were among those voting in the affirmative. In the presence of an issue of such incalculable importance to the future of mankind, the many divisions which are so characteristic of debates on most international problems dissolved, giving way to a broad consensus on the importance of the population problem.

It may be useful for this first American Assembly devoted to the subject of population to consider in some detail the significance of these recent developments in the United Nations. Specifically, there are at least four questions that come to mind:

Why was the population problem on the agenda of the United Nations?

What exactly did the United Nations decide to do about it?

What did the United Nations debate reveal about international attitudes to this question?

What program of international cooperation in population should we be seeking in the future?

### Growing Concern With Population Problem

The short answer to why population was on the agenda of the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly was that the Government of Sweden, supported by a number of other countries, decided to put it there. But obviously this is not a satisfactory answer. Ten years earlier, a full-scale debate in the United Nations devoted entirely to the population question would have been unthinkable. The wide support that developed in the interim for the inscription of an item on the population question and for a resolution calling for action to deal with it reflected a growing international appreciation of the significance of the population question for the future of mankind.

Until very recently, at least, Western thought has been characterized by an optimistic faith in the inevitability of progress. Despite two terrible wars, a great depression, and the revolutionary ferment which is currently shaking our civilization, many of us still cling to the assumption that the fate of man on earth is destined to improve as time goes on.

This confident assumption is somewhat undermined by the realization that despite all the progress of science and technology in recent years there are more people living in misery and deprivation today than there were at the turn of the century. Of course, there are also more

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Assembly on "The Population Dilemma" at Harriman, N.Y., on May 4 (press release 243 dated May 3).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 19.

people enjoying adequate living standards. But the increase of the underprivileged has probably exceeded the increase of everyone else. Whether such a development can be considered progress is, to say the least, an open question.

To be sure, some people cite as evidence of progress the upward trend of aggregate statistics. But progress cannot be measured merely by increases in gross national product.

The object of economic development is the welfare and dignity of the individual human being. We must concern ourselves, not with aggregate statistics, but with the progress made in assuring each person a full and satisfactory life—adequate levels of personal consumption, including food and housing, health and education, and also satisfaction of those political, cultural, and spiritual needs that are fundamental to all men.

If the condition of the individual, and not gross statistics, is to be the measure of our progress, then it is absolutely essential that we be concerned with population trends. So long as we are concerned with the quality of life we have no choice but to be concerned with the quantity of life.

There are today some 3 billion people in the world. It required hundreds of thousands of years, from the beginning of life on earth to the beginning of this century, to reach 1½ billion. Within the last 60 years we have doubled that number. According to United Nations estimates we will double that number again to 6 billion by the end of this century.

It is obvious from these statistics that the world's population is not merely growing in *absolute numbers*. The *rate* of population growth has increased at an extraordinary pace. The annual growth rate has doubled from 1 percent in 1945—itself an unprecedented high in world history—to 2 percent today. It is expected to go even higher. But even if the present rate of growth of world population is maintained at its present level, the numbers we have to contemplate are staggering.

Whether the growth of world population continues at its present rate, whether a reduction in that rate is brought about by increases in the death rate or decreases in the birth rate, and whether, to reduce the birth rate, measures are

found which are consistent with the economic, cultural, ethical, and religious circumstances of individual countries—these are all questions of paramount importance.

It was considerations such as these which led to the inscription of the population item at the 17th General Assembly. But the inscription of this item did not reflect just a generalized concern with the population problem; it reflected a particular concern for the dilemma facing the less developed countries.

The nature of this dilemma can be succinctly stated. For reasons which are well known, the rate of population growth tends to be higher in the less developed countries than in the developed countries—about 70 percent higher on the average. In many less developed countries the rate of population growth exceeds 3 percent a year.

About 80 percent of the one-half-billion growth in the world population in the last decade took place in the less developed areas. In the years ahead the highest rates of growth are likely to continue to be in these areas. It is estimated, for example, that if present rates of growth were to continue, between now and the year 2000 the population of North America would grow from 200 to 300 million, while the population of South and Middle America would grow from some 200 to 600 million.

It is bad enough that less developed countries tend to have a faster rate of population growth than developed countries. But the problem is compounded further by the fact that the less developed countries are less able to cope with the consequences of rapid population growth.

The problem for developed countries is to increase already high per capita income levels and to devote increasing portions of already large national savings to services such as medical care, health, and housing. But less developed countries whose economy is at the subsistence level may be able to save little or nothing at existing income levels for improvement in social infrastructure.

It is all many of the developing countries can do to enlarge the total economic product as fast as the added people. Yet they have not merely to provide additional facilities for increased

population but to create new and adequate facilities for the existing population as well.

For newly developing countries the problem of population growth is not, as some people think, the problem of avoiding starvation or finding standing room. It is the problem of finding sufficient savings after current consumption needs are met to assure a tolerable rate of progress toward modernization and higher standards of living based on self-sustaining economic growth.

In some of the world's poorest areas population increase is outpacing the increase in gross national product. As a result there are no resources available for capital formation and no increases in living standards. The prospect is for more and more people to have less and less income.

Just a year and a half ago the United Nations General Assembly set as its goal for the United Nations Development Decade the achievement by 1970 of an annual growth rate of 5 percent a year in aggregate national income in each of the developing countries. The achievement of this goal will require enormous efforts.

It has been estimated that in the decade of the 1950's the developing countries overall had a growth rate of 3 percent a year and a population growth of 2 percent a year, with annual per capita increases of income of 1 percent a year. Making the generally accepted assumption of a capital-output ratio of three to one, these countries will have to increase their savings and investment from 9 to 15 percent of gross national product in order to achieve the goals of the Development Decade. This is obviously a formidable task at present levels of population growth.

Assuming that the goals of the Development Decade are achieved, prospective increases in population will greatly dilute the impact of overall increases in income on individual levels of welfare. For example, gradual progress toward the 5-percent annual growth goal during the Development Decade would, by the end of this decade, increase a \$100 per capita income to \$123 in a country with a 2-percent rate of population growth and \$111 in a country with a 3-percent rate of population growth.

Obviously there is much that we do not know about the relationship of population growth to economic and social development. But from an examination of these and other facts one conclusion seems inescapable—that in certain less developed countries it may be virtually impossible at the present time, even with maximum external assistance and maximum self-help, to bring about a rate of economic growth which will provide the rate of improvement in individual living standards which the country seeks to attain and which, more fundamentally, is essential to the proper exercise of the individual's human faculties.

In the light of these hard realities it was scarcely surprising that a large part of the impetus to discuss the population problem in the United Nations came from the less developed countries themselves. In recent years a growing number of these countries have adopted population policies of one sort or another—policies in accord with their particular economic, social, cultural, and religious circumstances.

In July 1962, shortly before the opening of the 17th General Assembly, the Cairo Conference of Developing Countries, including countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, unanimously adopted a declaration which contained the following significant statement:

Countries that suffer from the pressure of population on resources available should accelerate their rate of economic development, and in the meantime take appropriate legitimate measures to deal with their population problems.

It was against this background of growing concern that the United Nations General Assembly began its historic debate on the population problem.

#### **U.N. Involvement in Population Field**

While the resolution on "Population Growth and Economic Development" was the first of its kind ever passed by the General Assembly, the United Nations had not previously been inactive in the population field. In the 17 years of its existence the United Nations has:

—established a population unit in the Secre-

ariat (now the Population Branch of the Bureau of Social Affairs),

—created the Population Commission, a group of government representatives meeting once every 2 years,

—held a World Population Conference under U.N. auspices in 1954,

—encouraged regional economic commissions located in the less developed areas—the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Economic Commission for Africa—to become increasingly active in the population field,

—and organized regional demographic research and training centers in Bombay, Santiago, and Cairo to provide advisory services to countries of these regions.

Through activities such as these the United Nations has been making a major contribution to an understanding of the population problem:

In the field of *information* it has encouraged and assisted member governments to obtain factual information on the size, composition, and trends of their populations and the interrelation between population growth and economic and social development.

In the field of *training* it has helped develop a whole range of skills in the demographic field—in census taking, population projections, and economic analysis.

In the field of *discussion* it has promoted a full and responsible exchange of ideas on all aspects of the population problem.

These contributions of the United Nations should not be underestimated. When the Population Commission met for the first time in 1947, demographic statistics, including census and vital statistics, were so incomplete that it would scarcely have been possible to speak knowledgeably of *world* population trends or *world* population problems. It is easy to overlook the fact that if it were not for the devoted labors of the population and statistical sections of the U.N. Secretariat, both operating under the guidance of the Population and Statistical Commissions, we would even now not be able to discern the outlines of the world population problem or the problems of most major regions.

Seventeen years of slow, careful accumulation of basic factual information helped lay the groundwork for enlightened consideration of the economic and social implications of population trends. At this conference there are a number of people who played significant roles in the development of this important work.

Building on this solid record of achievement, the General Assembly resolution on “Population Growth and Economic Development” was designed to increase the level of U.N. involvement in the population field. The resolution called for action under five main heads:

*First*, the Secretary-General was requested to conduct an “inquiry” among member states “concerning the particular problems confronting them as a result of the reciprocal action of economic development and population changes. . . .”

This inquiry will help focus the attention of responsible officials in all countries on the implications of population trends for economic and social planning, open up channels of communication between policymakers and local demographic experts, and encourage governments without competent experts of their own to seek outside assistance. Such assistance will be available not only from the United Nations but from various foreign governments and private institutions—in the case of the United States, from such agencies as AID [Agency for International Development], the U.S. Census Bureau, the Ford Foundation, and the Population Council.

*Second*, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations was asked, in cooperation with the specialized agencies, regional economic commissions, and the Population Commission, to “intensify its studies and research on the interrelationship of population growth and economic and social development, with particular reference to the needs of the developing countries for investment in health and educational facilities. . . .”

The intensification of studies and research called for under this section will involve not only a substantial increase in the program of work of the population section at U.N. head-

quarters, the demographic staffs of the regional economic commissions, and the regional demographic research and training centers, but also correlative studies in the educational and health fields conducted in cooperation with UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] and the World Health Organization.

*Third*, the Economic and Social Council was directed to report its findings with respect to all of the foregoing to the General Assembly not later than at the Assembly's 19th session in 1964.

*Fourth*, United Nations agencies were asked to encourage and assist governments, especially of the less developed countries, "in obtaining basic data and carrying out essential studies of the demographic aspects, as well as other aspects, of their economic and social development problems. . . ."

*Fifth*, the World Population Conference scheduled for 1965 was requested to "pay special attention to the interrelationships of population growth with economic and social development, particularly in countries that are less developed. . . ."

As noted earlier, the resolution containing these five action paragraphs was approved overwhelmingly with no negative votes. A good deal of controversy developed, however, over another section not included in the resolution as finally adopted which read:

. . . and that the United Nations give technical assistance as requested by governments for national projects and programs dealing with the problems of population.

This section was widely interpreted as calling for United Nations technical assistance in the actual implementation of family planning programs. It was approved by a narrow margin in committee, but in the plenary, where a two-thirds majority is required on important questions, it failed of adoption by a vote of 34 in favor, 34 against, with 32 abstentions.

As a practical matter the defeat of this paragraph did not alter the authority already possessed by the United Nations as a result of previous resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council to

grant technical assistance upon request to member nations.

The momentum generated by the General Assembly resolution was maintained at subsequent meetings of the United Nations which have taken place in the last few months.

A resolution on "Intensification of Demographic Studies, Research and Training" introduced by the United States in association with Japan and the United Arab Republic was unanimously adopted by the Population Commission in February and the Economic and Social Council in April. This resolution spelled out some of the practical implications of the General Assembly resolution and contained other important provisions as well.

Among other things, the resolution:

—invited the regional economic commissions to intensify their demographic work,

—requested the United Nations to accelerate preparation of technical manuals for use in demographic work, hasten revision of certain basic demographic publications, and study the use of electronic computers in the analysis of demographic data,

—requested adequate budgetary provision for this and other work,

—and urged the developed countries to "consider the value to the developing countries" of initiating or expanding research on the interrelationship between population trends and economic and social development, research related to population such as on health and education, training of experts in the less developed countries in demography and statistics, and providing technical assistance to the developing countries in census taking, vital statistics, and utilizing demographic data in social and economic planning.

Since the passage of the General Assembly resolution the U.N. Secretariat has also begun work on the inquiry to member governments.

This inquiry will take the form of a questionnaire which will be sent to each member of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies. When the answers to this questionnaire are compiled and analyzed and laid before the General Assembly in 1964, the United Nations will have before it the most comprehensive informa-



tion yet assembled on the attitudes and policies of governments on the population problem.

### Principal Viewpoints Revealed in U.N. Debate

The debate in the General Assembly which preceded the passage of the resolution on "Population Growth and Economic Development" provided a striking illustration of the unique value of the United Nations as an international forum. It was an enlightening experience for all of us who had the privilege to participate on behalf of our respective governments. It is tempting to describe this fascinating debate in detail, but time will permit only a brief (and inevitably oversimplified) summary of the principal viewpoints which emerged.

The *first* viewpoint was represented by the Government of Sweden and the other sponsors of the resolution—Ceylon, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and the United Arab Republic. These supporters of the resolution argued that population growth posed grave problems for economic and social development and that urgent action was required to deal with it. They advocated a major increase in United Nations activity in the population field, including technical assistance in the field of family planning. Support for this viewpoint was expressed by most Moslem countries (e.g. the United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, and Pakistan), some countries of Asia (e.g. India, Nepal, Thailand, Malaya, and Japan), and some countries of Africa (e.g. Ghana, Guinea, and Uganda). This viewpoint found only scattered support in Latin America.

A *second* viewpoint was put forward by Argentina and Ireland, with support from a few other countries, principally in Latin America. These countries questioned the existence of a population problem, challenged the right of the United Nations to discuss it, and were particularly outspoken in opposing a U.N. program in family planning financed from technical assistance funds to which they were contributing.

A *third* viewpoint was expressed by a substantial number of countries including France and other countries of continental Europe,

some French African countries, and some Latin American countries. These countries conceded the existence of population problems in some areas but argued that action by the United Nations should be deferred pending further study. This group opposed the controversial technical assistance section and took the initiative in introducing the proposal for an inquiry on member countries' population problems.

A *fourth* viewpoint was that expressed by the members of the Soviet bloc. During the General Assembly debate, the Soviet Union and some of its satellites expounded the traditional Communist position that Western discussions of the population problem were based on "neo-Malthusian fallacies" and that population problems ceased to exist under communism.

This Communist line was poorly received by the Assembly. At least one representative of a less developed country chided the Soviets for favoring planning in all sectors of economic life except the human sector—the one most important in its implications for economic and social growth.

The negative Soviet statement in the population debate was followed by a significant shift in the Communist line. When it came time to vote, the Soviet bloc did not oppose but merely abstained on the General Assembly resolution.

What is even more surprising, the Soviet representative at the recent meeting of the Economic and Social Council commended the United Nations for its work in the population field, agreed that population growth is an urgent problem for less developed countries, and announced the willingness of the Soviet Union to provide technical assistance in the demographic field.

This change in the Soviet position on population in the United Nations follows reports of increasing resort in recent years to birth control and abortion within the Soviet Union and some other bloc countries and of Khrushchev's personal interest in a recent publication stressing the economic dangers of overpopulation.

The recent discussions at the United Nations may signal a new era of Soviet propaganda on



the subject of population. Whether because of internal problems, or a desire to cultivate the favor of less developed countries, or both, the Soviet Union now appears ready to exercise leadership in action programs in the population field.

As for the United States, our position in the United Nations debate is already known to you. We made a strong statement<sup>3</sup> underlining the importance of the population problem, the need for more knowledge about it, and the necessity for each country to determine its own population policy in accordance with its economic, social, cultural, and religious circumstances.

More specifically, we expressed support for the resolution on "Population Growth and Economic Development" in its original form, which included the controversial section on technical assistance. We abstained, however, in the separate vote on this section for two reasons:

—first, because it was superfluous, neither adding nor subtracting from the authority already possessed by the United Nations to grant technical assistance upon request to member nations;

—second, because of our belief that, in the light of the views expressed in the General Assembly debate, United Nations activity should emphasize those three areas in which there was broad agreement among the members, namely, information, training, and discussion in population problems.

I shall have more to say about this second consideration in a moment.

#### **U.S. Program for International Cooperation**

What conclusions can we draw from the United Nations debates on the population problem? What forms of international cooperation should we be seeking on this subject in the years ahead?

I believe we can identify an emerging consensus on the subject of population. My re-

<sup>3</sup> For text of statements made by Mr. Gardner in the Economic and Financial Committee on Dec. 10 and 13, 1962, see *ibid.*, p. 14.

view of the recent United Nations debate has emphasized the differences between the member countries. Yet this debate, just as recent discussions within our own country, also revealed a large measure of common ground.

To begin with, the desire for increased knowledge about population trends, particularly in relation to economic and social development, is now nearly universal. We have passed, almost without noticing it, from a period in which the major uncertainty concerned the existence of the world population problem to a period in which the major uncertainty is what can and should be done about it.

Moreover, even in the matter of what should be done about the population problem, it is possible to see:

—that there is no significant body of responsible opinion among people of any major religious, ethical, or ideological persuasion which advocates totally unplanned or unregulated fertility, although there are sincere differences of opinion about the means which are morally permissible and the effectiveness of the means which are available;

—that there is virtually universal agreement, on both ethical and practical grounds, that decisions about responsible parenthood can be made only by individual parents themselves in the light of their responsibilities to their children and their society, and to the moral values which govern alike parents, children, and societies.

The time has come to develop out of this consensus a blueprint for international cooperation which takes account of the politics as well as the economics of the population problem.

The fundamental concept in such a blueprint should be the principle of free choice. Despite the growing consensus on the matters already mentioned, differences continue to exist between religious groups on specific methods of family planning. When it comes to implementation of population policy, the views of all groups should be respected. Participation in programs of family planning should be contingent upon the agreement of the country concerned.

As we noted in the Assembly, the United Na-

tions already has authority to grant technical assistance in the population field upon request to member governments. From a practical point of view, however, it is unnecessary to earmark United Nations funds for those particular activities in the population field on which members are seriously divided. The potential resources of the United Nations, both in terms of funds and personnel for the implementation of family planning programs, are minuscule compared to the resources in member countries. In the pluralistic society of the free world there is a wide variety of sources of assistance from governments, foundations, universities, and even private business firms, as well as international organizations.

All of these have something to contribute in the field of population. All can make more substantial contributions in the future than they have in the past. What we need is an international division of labor, taking account of the comparative advantage, from the political as well as the economic and technical point of view, of the different sources of potential assistance.

The following is a rough blueprint of a program of international cooperation which the United States will be supporting in the months ahead with respect to the key elements of the population problem:

### *1. Information and Analysis*

There is, as noted earlier, a need for more demographic information and analysis, particularly on the interrelation between population growth and economic and social development. Since there is universal agreement on this need, all governments and international organizations, as well as private institutions, can play a significant role.

The United States will continue to support the expansion of United Nations activities in the demographic field. Moreover, the Agency for International Development will respond to requests for assistance from developing countries in preparing, executing, and analyzing population censuses and in utilizing demographic data and analyses in social and economic planning. It will do this both by mak-

ing United States advisers available and by training experts from the developing countries themselves.

### *2. Medical Research*

There seems to be widespread agreement on the need for more knowledge about the basic life processes which govern childbearing. As President Kennedy pointed out at a recent press conference, we need to know more about the whole reproduction cycle, and this information should be made more available to the world so that everyone can make his own judgment.

Paradoxical as it may seem, we need more knowledge on how to overcome both involuntary childlessness and involuntary parenthood through measures which are consistent with different religious, cultural, and economic circumstances. We need particularly a great deal more study of human fertility and reproduction.

We support studies to this end through our own National Institutes of Health. Moreover, we favor the conduct of such studies through the United Nations, specifically through the medical research program of the World Health Organization.

### *3. Health and Social Services*

The major obstacle to the implementation of family-planning policies in the less developed countries is the lack of a network of health and social services to implement policy at the village level. The development of such an institutional infrastructure is desirable for its own sake as well as for the implementation of family-planning policies. It commands widespread endorsement and should be the object of intensified efforts by governments and private institutions as well as by United Nations agencies.

### *4. The Implementation of Family-Planning Programs*

This is the only area in which major disagreements exist and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. Countries seeking help in the implementation of family-planning pro-

grams should have access to the wide variety of sources of assistance available throughout the world.

While the United States will not advocate any specific family-planning policy to any other country, we can help other countries, upon request, to find potential sources of information and assistance on ways and means of dealing with population problems. The provision of materials for this purpose can best be done by those governments whose citizens are not divided on this question, by private foundations, and by business firms.

The implementation of this blueprint in the years ahead will require flexibility and imagination. The members of this Arden House conference have distinguished themselves in arousing the world's concern with the population problem. The further challenge is to devise programs of action founded on the principle of free choice which make sense in political as well as in technical and economic terms.

## U.S., Canada, and Japan To Discuss North Pacific Fisheries

Press release 275 dated May 21

Delegations of Canada, Japan, and the United States will meet at Washington, D.C., beginning June 6 to discuss the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.<sup>1</sup> The meeting is expected to last 2 or 3 weeks. Benjamin A. Smith will head the U.S. delegation, with the rank of ambassador. The delegation will include advisers from the U.S. Congress, as well as from government and industry.

The tripartite treaty which will be the subject of discussion entered into force in 1953. Its objective is to insure the maximum sustained productivity of the fishery resources of the North Pacific Ocean. The treaty has a minimum duration of 10 years, which will have elapsed on June 12, 1963. Following this date, any one of the three Governments may terminate the treaty upon 1 year's notice. The June meeting originated from a request by the Japanese Government for such discussions.

<sup>1</sup>Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786.

## Delegation of Authority Under 1949 Wheat Agreement Act

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the International Wheat Agreement act of 1949, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1641 *et seq.*), hereinafter referred to as the "Act," it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Scope.* The Secretary of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as "Secretary") shall exercise the power, authority, and discretion conferred on the President by the Act, and to this end the Secretary is authorized, among other things, to:

(a) Make available or cause to be made available, through the Commodity Credit Corporation, such quantities of wheat and wheat-flour and at such prices as are necessary to exercise the rights, obtain the benefits, achieve the objectives, and fulfill the obligations of the United States under the International Wheat Agreement.

(b) Prohibit or restrict the importation or exportation of wheat or wheat-flour and issue such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the implementation of the International Wheat Agreement.


(c) Require, in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, the making of such reports and the keeping of such records as he finds necessary to enable him to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(d) Examine such books, papers, records, accounts, correspondence, contracts, documents, and memoranda as are relevant to transactions under the International Wheat Agreement and are within the control of any person required to make reports or keep records under such regulations.

(e) Take such other action as may be necessary in his judgment in the implementation of the International Wheat Agreement.

SEC. 2. *Interagency Cooperation.* The Secretary, in exercising the authority delegated herein, shall consult with the Secretary of State, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and other officers or agencies of the Government as may be appropriate.

SEC. 3. *Reddelegation.* The Secretary is hereby authorized to redelegate within the Department of Agriculture the authority hereinabove delegated to him.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
May 22, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> No. 11108; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 5185.

# The Role of Music in Cultural Exchange

by Lucius D. Battle<sup>1</sup>

I am honored by the invitation to participate in your meeting and I am delighted to be here.

You doubtless saw a couple of Sundays ago—and what a joy it is to have the New York papers again!—the remark attributed to Camille Saint-Saens: “Nothing is more difficult than to speak about music. The attempt is very arduous for musicians themselves and nearly impossible for the others.”

I am definitely one of the “others”: I doubt if I would recognize an augmented sixth in broad daylight, and the Ionian mode is *really* Greek to me. But I am, thank Heaven, a music lover. Moreover, it is my business to know something about music as an American export, and I feel very much at home with my subject today: “The Role of Music in Cultural Exchange.” I need not say that I shall be speaking only of the Government’s activity in this field.

Actually there are two programs for which my bureau is responsible in which music plays a part. Let me speak first of the one that I think is the more familiar to you.

## Cultural Presentations Program

The cultural presentations program, as we call it, dates from 1954. It involves the sending abroad of the most representative examples of America’s performing arts: music, drama, and the dance. (Parenthetically and just for the record, sports are included—for administrative convenience.)

By demonstrating to people of other countries the depth and richness of our cultural life, the program contributes significantly to our foreign relations in the broadest sense of the term—to what has well been called “total diplomacy.” Its purpose was restated in a fine way recently as follows: “. . . to reflect abroad the state of the performing arts in America, both in terms of creative cultural vitality and

of the desire and capacity of a free people to support the development of a flourishing national culture.” This is quoted from a report<sup>2</sup> of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, which went on to say: “A nation can disclose important aspects of its total character through the manner in which it seeks to develop the highest peaceful arts.”

In a program so conceived, the reflection of our American musical life must play an important role. And it does. Of the 159 attractions sent overseas since the program’s inception, 62 were solo performers and 52 were instrumental or choral groups. That is, 114—or more than 70 percent of the total—were in the field of music.

In making our selections, we draw on our nation’s vast artistic resources for exponents of the best in classical and contemporary serious music, folk music, and jazz. One of our aims is to show that the New World has amalgamated the best of the Old World’s heritage with new forms, approaches, and musical thought. Another is to demonstrate that America enjoys a cultural climate in which the people’s interest and support have led to the achievement of the highest standards of excellence. No group has done more than American musicians to convey our cultural maturity and to give the lie to the diehard cliché that America is a materialistic and culturally underdeveloped nation.

Just in the past 2 weeks we have had a striking illustration of what an outstanding American artist can do for us as a country and as a culture. Eugene Istomin gave recitals in Bulgaria and in Turkey. In Sofia there was wild applause by an audience made up chiefly of young people, who clamored for encores. When he left the concert hall, the youngsters cheered him to the echo, shouting: “We’ve never heard such music” and “Long live Americans.” When Mr. Istomin replied in Russian, expressing his thanks, many yelled: “Say it in English!” At his performance with the Sofia Philharmonic he met again with a tremendous

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the National Music Council at New York, N.Y., on May 22 (press release 271 dated May 21). Mr. Battle is Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> A limited number of copies of the *Report of Survey of Cultural Presentations Program*, dated Dec. 17, 1962, are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

ovation. He was equally successful in Turkey, where he gave a recital in the conservatory and, on invitation, instruction to music teachers. Our Embassy in Ankara reported Mr. Istomin's visit had a definite political importance, quite apart from its artistic value.

To give you an idea of the quality and variety of the attractions we have selected to go abroad in the coming year, I would like to run over the schedule we recently announced:

*To Africa*—the Dorian Quintet and the Claremont Quartet.

*To Latin America*—the University of Illinois Symphony Orchestra, the Robert Shaw Chorale and Orchestra, and the Roger Wagner Chorale.

*To Western Europe*—the American Chamber Orchestra under Alfred Wallenstein, the North Texas State University A Cappella Choir, and the University of Southern California Chamber Singers.

*To Eastern Europe*—the Baird Marionettes and the Clarion Concerts Orchestra.

*To the Far East*—José Limon and his dance company, the Peabody Singers (of Nashville), and the University of Kansas Brass Choir.

*To the Near East and South Asia*—Duke Ellington and Orchestra and the University of Maryland Madrigal Singers.

You will share our satisfaction, I am sure, at the balance between professional and academic groups. I believe no country can match ours in the breadth and quality of the musical life flourishing in colleges, universities, and conservatories. Constantly noted in the reports from our embassies is the impression our young people make on foreign audiences. So often maligned as shallow, spoiled, and materialistic, they in fact demonstrate unanswerably a love for, and dedication to, music that stuns their critics—both professional and amateur. These are our modern-day cultural pioneers—teenagers, many of them, who tour under strenuous conditions, without pay, and with the prospect on their return of hours of study at nights and in summer school to catch up with their studies. For chapter and verse on all this, I refer you to your distinguished president, who I think may not be averse to talking about life abroad with the Eastman Philharmonia.

I should like to turn now to the other program I mentioned at the outset. There is in the bureau that I direct an office known as the Division of Americans Abroad. It administers what we call the American specialists program. In the first three quarters of the current fiscal year this division has selected and given assistance to 170 prominent Americans, in 19 professional, educational, and cultural categories, to go abroad, usually to meet specific needs designated by our embassies. Of these 170 persons, 22 were from the field of music. While the Office of Cultural Presentations sends persons to perform, the 22 musicians under the American specialists program went out not primarily to perform but to share their talents with their counterparts in other countries through lectures, master classes, and other means. This is a quiet, unpretentious, but effective program. These are truly music missionaries, imparting their experience in teaching methods, organization, and the upgrading of the tools of the trade. They also bring to others the rich intangibles: dedication, inspiration—all those things that, here in this country, helped them to the top of their profession.

This intimate mingling of men of music, their ideas and their ideals, is an investment that will bring forth dividends beyond measure.

Gifted as he is, pianist Joel Rosen, for instance, did not go to Latin America with the principal purpose of giving recitals but to share his gifts—with groups of promising young musicians, with teachers at all levels of education, with government leaders eager to improve the standards of their countries' arts. Howard Mitchell, of the Washington National Symphony, is known and revered in Montevideo, Uruguay, for spending two summers helping the Sodre Orchestra become one of the finest on the continent. Robert Stevenson, authority on Latin American music and fluent in Spanish, was one of our most effective specialists in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. In Tunis, Anis Fulbeihan helped establish the Tunisian International Cultural Center. At the same time one of his colleagues, Herbert Pomeroy, was being hailed for his help in organizing Radio Malaya's orchestra. To Europe went Henry

Cowell, Aaron Copland, Virgil Thompson, Elliott Carter, Gunther Schuller—all exchanging ideas and knowledge with leaders, young and old, in the field of composition, particularly America's.

The names of those asked to participate in the American specialists program come from many sources—sometimes from the posts requesting their services, sometimes from professional organizations, or from former grantees, or our extensive biographic files. Since the program is modest and tends to reflect specific requests from our overseas missions, we do not solicit formal applications from the public. But the Department is, of course, always glad to know or hear of outstanding musicians who may be available to help in this important work.

I have given you but a few examples of our men of music who go abroad not so much to display their talent as to show whence it came and how it was nourished in its country of origin—and why, perhaps, it can work equally well for any country with a like desire to find music's highest meaning for its own people.

#### **Support of Music Council**

I have expressed my gratitude for the opportunity of being with you today. Let me say now that I am even more grateful that *you* are with *us*. Your indispensable contribution is symbolized by your membership in the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, which works in an interlocking field in which my bureau has an active interest. The National Music Council is represented by your own archivist, Dr. [Harold] Spivacke. One of your member organizations—the Music Educators National Conference—also has a voice in the Commission's work. Perhaps Dr. [Wiley L.] Housewright is here today?

Dr. [Howard] Hanson and Mr. [Edwin] Hughes, and again Dr. Spivacke, are all members of the Music Advisory Panel, to which our program owes so much. Seventeen of your 54 member groups are engaged in the international aspects of music. And so it goes.

I know we can count on your continuing, and even increased, support for our programs. They must keep pace with the ever-accelerating developments in a world of change. For the 5

years before I assumed my present duties, the cultural presentations program, as measured by its share of appropriated funds, did *not* keep pace. Difficulties in organization and procedures had tended to offset and obscure the contribution of dedicated exponents of all the performing arts.

This situation was one of my earliest concerns as Assistant Secretary. As soon as feasible, I requested the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs to undertake a thoroughgoing survey. Some of you are familiar with its findings and recommendations. We have followed through. Some of the constructive changes we have made have already paid dividends; others will bear fruit only in the months and years ahead; still others are being held in readiness—to be effected, one by one, as the untrammelled growth of the program calls for them.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have made a fresh start. We are on our way.

Mr. President, on behalf of the Government and through your colleagues here, I wish to thank the more than 1,200,000 members you represent for their faithful stewardship of a priceless heritage and to bespeak their continued help in the inspiring mission of sharing our cultural treasures with an expectant world.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **88th Congress, 1st Session**

- U.S. Information Service Activities in Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 5, 1963. 33 pp.
- Administration of National Security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 1. March 11-25, 1963. 128 pp.
- Marking of Imported Articles. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 2513. March 21, 1963. 144 pp.
- Message from the President transmitting the Fourth Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, covering the period from December 31, 1961, to December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 88. March 28, 1963. 105 pp.
- Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. Part I. March 28-April 3, 1963. 130 pp.

## Trends in Latin American Economic Development

*Statement by Edwin M. Martin  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman, fellow delegates: On behalf of my delegation I wish to express our great pleasure in being able to participate in this important conference in this truly delightful setting at Mar del Plata. This is a particularly significant conference in that it marks the end of the long tenure of Dr. Prebisch as the head of the ECLA secretariat.

In paying tribute to our distinguished Executive Secretary we can scarcely separate the man from his visible attainments. "An institution," said an American philosopher, "is the lengthened shadow of one man." Without overlooking the contributions made by others to the Economic Commission for Latin America, we must nevertheless recognize that in its many accomplishments Dr. Raúl Prebisch has played a most formidable role.

The power of his influence has issued from a vigorous spirit and a searching mind. Above all else, he has demonstrated that the conditions of society and the stage in development must be taken into account when applying basic economic and social truths. Even in his most recent statements we read an implicit warning that each new day lays on us the harsh imperative to begin our search for truth again. May we continue to face each new problem with comparable vigor, insight, and tenacity of pur-

pose. The qualities Dr. Prebisch exemplifies become increasingly valuable as the world shrinks and events move at an ever faster tempo. The United States, with a strong frontier tradition, has always valued independence of thought and, above all, intellectual integrity.

Through the dynamic leadership of Dr. Prebisch, ECLA has contributed much to its membership. No other regional economic commission of the United Nations has had such continuity of leadership, and none other has produced so distinct a body of economic theory. We must account ourselves fortunate that Dr. Prebisch will continue to be available as the Executive Director of the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning and that he will serve as Secretary General of the highly important United Nations Conference on Trade and Development next year. We know that he brings to these tasks the same vitality he has given so generously to ECLA.

I should like, therefore, to join with other speakers here to extend our warmest gratitude to Dr. Prebisch for his years of distinguished service. At the same time we also wish to join with others in expressing our pleasure over the willingness of Dr. [José Antonio] Mayobre to take over this great task and responsibility.

We look forward to the secretariat, even without Dr. Prebisch, continuing to strengthen and expand its cooperative relations with other inter-American bodies, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank and the Pan

<sup>1</sup>Made before the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America at Mar del Plata, Argentina, on May 8. Mr. Martin was head of the U.S. delegation to the 10th session of ECLA, held at Mar del Plata, May 6-18.



American Union, in their joint efforts to advance the Alliance for Progress. We look forward to the secretariat continuing its outstanding work in basic long-range studies and evaluations of economic and social developments in Latin America.

### **Suggestions for Future Studies**

Of special significance in the years ahead will be studies concerning the facts of population characteristics and their implications for economic and social policies. The secretariat has already laid sound foundations for implementation of recent recommendations of the General Assembly and ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] in the demographic field through its excellent studies, such as the report on the "Geographic Distribution of the Population of Latin America and Regional Development Priorities," through the outstanding work of the Regional Center for Demographic Training and Research in Latin America established at the University of Chile, and through the work of its regular staff. We believe that ECLA is in a particularly good position to identify and analyze population problems of the region and to provide demographic advisory services to member governments in the context of the particular economic, social, and cultural characteristics of Latin America.

Considerably more might helpfully be done by ECLA with regard to investigating the means by which constructive, forward-looking private enterprise can contribute more importantly to the development of Latin America. Studies might be undertaken which would seek increasingly effective policies and incentives to promote initiative and enterprise in the private sector. In the context of carrying out the overall goals of the Alliance for Progress, we agree fully with the statement of the Council of Finance Ministers of the Latin American Governments in Mexico City last October:<sup>2</sup>

Taking into account the limitations to the availability of public funds, it is clear that the objectives of the Alliance cannot be achieved without the full participation of the private sector and adequate measures must be taken to assure maximum contribution to growth by the private sector.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1962, p. 897.

Other examples of basic studies to which the secretariat might devote special effort include studies concerning ways and means of advancing the economic integration of the region and studies concerning basic improvements in the implementation of tax programs and fiscal policies.

### **Economic Gains in 1962**

As we look back over the past year certain events stand out. First, for the region as a whole, total export earnings, according to International Monetary Fund figures, reached record levels and were 6 percent better than in the previous year. Most countries experienced gains in their exports, and only three showed declines. Exports both to the United States and to Europe were up. Inasmuch as there were only limited changes in the average of prices, the gains in export earnings were due mainly to an expanded volume of sales.

Second, even though the average increase in gross national product estimates for the entire region was not particularly gratifying, growth rates in 1962 in several countries, particularly Colombia, Panama, and Peru, were in excess of the target level adopted in the Charter of Punta del Este,<sup>3</sup> and several other countries showed quite satisfactory progress. Admittedly, the estimates of gross national product are crude, but the figures seem at least to reflect major trends.

Let us hope that the gains of 1962 can be maintained and increased in 1963.

You will recall that at the IA-ECOSOC [Inter-American Economic and Social Council] meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1961 the United States delegate agreed that the United States Government would provide from public sources a substantial part of the funds which Latin America would require from all external sources over the next 10 years, in order to supplement the efforts of Latin American countries under the Alliance for Progress.<sup>4</sup>

During the calendar year 1962, United States public assistance to Latin American countries,

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

<sup>4</sup> For text of remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon on Aug. 17, 1961, see *ibid.*, p. 460.



in terms of new obligations and loan authorizations, exceeded \$1 billion. These funds came from several sources, including about \$220 million from Food for Peace, \$156 million from Eximbank long-term loans, \$206 million of loans from the Social Progress Trust Fund, which, as you know, is administered by the Inter-American Development Bank under a trust agreement, and about \$450 million from AID [Agency for International Development]. These figures represent new commitments entered into during the calendar year and do not represent disbursements of funds. Based upon past experience with development loans, the disbursement of funds is commonly spread out over a period of 2 to 4 years, depending primarily upon the nature of the project being financed. Periodic summaries of disbursement figures are therefore likely to appear to be somewhat erratic; for example, from these sources disbursements for fiscal year 1962 exceeded \$1 billion, but for calendar year 1962 they were about \$750 million.

#### **U.S. Private Investments Continue Active**

The latest figures for 1962 also show that U.S. private companies continued a very active program of investments in Latin America. While there was an overall net return flow of capital to the United States of about \$20 million, if we eliminate the special circumstances of investments in Venezuela, we find a net flow to other Latin American countries of about \$160 million.

We must remember, however, that these figures for net capital flows are not a full measure of the scope of investment decisions by U.S. firms, since they do not show the amount invested out of earnings and other resources. In 1962, for example, the companies reported expenditure programs totaling some \$750 million to expand or modernize productive facilities; this, as you know, would be a substantial part of total capital formation in the area.

Continuing investment by U.S. companies is especially important when we consider the necessity of broadening the range of exports from Latin America, because such companies, in partnership with local industry, can contribute greatly to this kind of expansion. We may note,

for instance, that the Latin American manufacturing plants of U.S. companies raised their production in the area from \$2.4 billion in 1957 to nearly \$4 billion by 1962.

#### **Production Diversification Lagging**

If we look back still farther at the trends of economic development over the past decade, two features assume particular importance. The first concerns the failure to diversify production for export, and the second concerns the failure to expand production and productivity in the agricultural sector at a more rapid rate. The region has continued to depend for its export earnings upon the sale of primary products; trade figures show little evidence of any trend toward diversification, particularly in the export of manufactured products. With respect to agricultural production, over the past decade, and in fact for an even longer period, the region has shown almost negligible increases in output on a per capita basis. Here, too, diversification, especially to meet local needs, has lagged. The average figures, moreover, mask substantial declines which some countries have experienced. Even imports of agricultural products into the region, according to ECLA estimates, have been increasing and now amount to some \$450 million. If local agricultural production were expanded, much of this sum of scarce foreign exchange could doubtless be used for import of essential capital goods.

We must consider the overwhelming significance of these two sectors: export trade because it provides the major part of the foreign exchange with which to import essential development goods, and agriculture because it provides employment to nearly half the population and constitutes a potential internal market of great magnitude. To achieve more dynamic growth in both these sectors is essential, and it can be done. However, the manner in which such growth is achieved, and just how determined the effort will be, is for individual countries to decide. Here are challenges of enormous proportions for their planning organizations.

With your permission, I should like to peer into the future and to offer a few comments with respect to this challenge.

## GATT Tariff Negotiations

In order to reduce the heavy reliance on primary products for export trade, in order to diversify exports and promote industrialization, advantage should be taken of a unique opportunity. The unique opportunity to which I refer is the upcoming series of tariff negotiations among GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] members resulting in large part from United States trade expansion legislation adopted last year.

Under that legislation the United States Government is authorized to negotiate deep tariff cuts over nearly the entire range of items entering into external trade. The reductions in trade barriers that we expect to be made, especially in European countries and in the United States, may very well be broader in magnitude and in scope than heretofore. These reductions will apply to most manufactured products; therefore they will present to countries of Latin America a golden opportunity to diversify exports. Large new markets will be placed within reach.

But it must be remembered that the opening up of new potential markets alone is not enough. The big task lies with the countries and the industries of Latin America. Industries must be progressive; they must be efficient; they must produce quality products; and they must expand their knowledge of how to export, how to break into new markets. They will not only face competition from similar industries in other countries also looking for export markets; more importantly they must face competition, too, from domestic producers in those countries in which they wish to sell. Through these tariff negotiations the potential external markets for manufactured products could be multiplied. It is up to the Latin American countries themselves to make something of this potential.

I should like to note that last year for the first time in the history of United States trade legislation, the new Trade Expansion Act<sup>5</sup> established a principle that a portion of U.S. tariff-reducing authority should be used, not to open up new markets for U.S. goods but to expand markets for certain tropical products of the de-

veloping nations. The act provides the authority for the United States to eliminate its tariffs on certain tropical agricultural products, and, in order to help persuade some of our European friends to do the same, this authority is conditioned upon similar tariff reductions being made by the European Common Market.

In the light of the upcoming tariff negotiations how can Latin American countries obtain maximum benefit from tariff cuts which may be agreed and, where feasible, participate constructively in these negotiations?

Perhaps the most important measures Latin American countries could take to expand their trade, both exports and imports, are those designed to promote economic growth on an efficient, low-cost basis. In the context of trade expansion such measures would add enormously to the value of tariff reductions. Among less developed countries the major limiting factor in determining the volume of imports is, of course, the volume of export earnings. Therefore measures to expand exports will also expand the capacity to import.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to suggest that the countries of the region begin to consider possible ways in which they might constructively benefit from these tariff negotiations and particularly to consider in this connection specific measures which they might undertake to accelerate their development and trade.

### Latin American Common Market

A most important measure (or series of measures) has already been suggested by Dr. Prebisch. His proposal is presented in document E/CN.12/680, "Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America," which is a very stimulating discussion of the problems of Latin America. In discussing the obstacles to a Latin American common market, Dr. Prebisch has proposed in effect that LAFTA [Latin American Free Trade Association] members change the present system of tariff reductions—that of periodic selective negotiations—to a system of mandatory quantitative reductions on a definite time schedule.

We wish to associate ourselves with the objectives of this proposal by Dr. Prebisch to speed and development of a Latin American

<sup>5</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 655, and Dec. 3, 1962, p. 847.

common market, and we applaud the Central American countries which have bound themselves together under a common market treaty which embodies this principle.

We believe that the establishment of mandatory provisions for periodic tariff reductions will have the effect of persuading investors that a common market will surely materialize. If investors are convinced of this, their entry into the competitive arena will be hastened and thereby the pace of development will be accelerated. This has been demonstrated in the European Economic Community.

A sound integration movement can be a powerful force to promote efficiency and to assure the development of industries competitive in world markets. Such an integration movement must concentrate upon the reduction of restrictions within the area rather than upon the increase of restrictions against outside competition. As Dr. Prebisch has so forcefully shown, customs protection must not be carried to excess.

#### **Attaining Adequate Agricultural Growth**

With respect to the slow growth which has occurred in the agricultural sector, the problem primarily requires a general increase of productivity as a basis for dynamic growth. It is important to realize that more than half the people of Latin America live in rural areas and the great majority of these depend upon farming for a livelihood. Perhaps 45 percent of the entire population is dependent upon agriculture. Yet agriculture contributes only about 20 percent to the gross national product of the region. Here then is the largest and most depressed part of the Latin American scene.

Taking into account the large numbers of people and their relatively low income, together with the very great potential for expanded output, we must conclude that the agricultural sector merits a top priority in development planning and in providing appropriate incentives for private initiatives. Among these incentives are public policies which promote a competitive cost-price structure for agriculture though avoiding both excessive protection of local industries and exchange-rate policies which discriminate against agriculture.

Essential as they are in many parts of the region, land tenure and other institutional changes alone are not enough to attain adequate growth in agriculture. Agriculture also needs a spurt in investment activities and in basic governmental services. In most countries of the region government budgets for agriculture are very small, amounting to perhaps 3 or 4 percent of the total budget. It is small wonder, therefore, that government services to agriculture are of only a token nature.

A more rapid and diversified growth in agricultural output will almost certainly follow new or expanded programs of supervised credit, training, improved management, community development, extension, research, improved marketing facilities, et cetera, provided such programs are undertaken on a substantial rather than a token scale. Expanded programs and increased output would raise the levels of income and consumption for the farm population, as well as provide them greater employment opportunities.

Of tremendous importance also would be the expansion in demand for manufactured goods generated by increased investments in agriculture and by larger incomes to the farm population.

Latin America's hope for rapid and sustained growth depends upon the expansion of both the internal market and the external market. For this reason it is all the more necessary to give priority attention in development plans to those programs, particularly in agriculture, which promise to stimulate growth of internal demand and production on a sustained basis.

In order to initiate and carry out an expanded and comprehensive program in agriculture, designed to achieve a spurt in farm investment and output, the planning organizations face a formidable task. The absolute necessity of preparing specific programs and projects cannot be overemphasized. Mere availability of funds for a greatly expanded effort is not enough. I can assure you that it is very difficult indeed to spend large amounts of money constructively and purposefully. It is impossible to do so without careful preparation and organization.

Most importantly, particularly for a comprehensive program in agriculture, skilled man-

power in fairly large numbers will be needed; before a proper program can be fully launched, such manpower must be trained and organized.

Planning programs for sustained growth is not simply a task preliminary to the development effort. It is a continuing task in which programs are modified in the light of experience and changing circumstances. Planning must be concerned with policies, as well as specific projects and investment programs, for the development process is effected by policies, institutional changes, legislative actions, et cetera, just as much as by investment funds. It must also deal positively and aggressively with the human resources needed to implement its programs, a factor which is too often underemphasized.

The trends in economic development over the past decade may be characterized in another way, namely, the inability to expand markets, both internal and external, with sufficient rapidity. What I have suggested earlier concerning programs and policies to promote both diversification of exports and increasing productivity of agriculture has been aimed precisely at these market weaknesses. What I have suggested is a series of efforts and policies deliberately designed to expand and seize market opportunities both for exports and for domestic sales. The success of our mutual efforts to do so is fundamental to the achievement of sustained economic growth.

## **U.N. Subcommittee Debates Law for Outer Space**

*Statement by Leonard C. Meeker  
U.S. Representative*<sup>1</sup>

Yesterday the distinguished representative of Canada in his statement invited the members of the Legal Subcommittee to give their assessments of the series of meetings we have been holding these past 3 weeks. I should like to take this occasion to present the U.S. viewpoint.

When the second session of this subcommittee began in mid-April, the membership of the United Nations looked to us to make and record

substantial gains in the building of law for outer space. The discussions we have engaged in have been valuable and have carried us forward from the point where the Legal Subcommittee left off last year.

Our discussions have gone farther into the substance of many questions than we had gone at any time previously. Clarifications have been obtained on some issues. In a number of cases virtual agreement has been reached. In others differences have been narrowed. With respect to a relatively small number of questions we all recognize that wide divergences remain.

Let us look for a moment at the picture following our 1962 session in comparison with the situation at the close of the 1963 session. One year ago a consensus existed that we should have an agreement on liability for space-vehicle accidents. There was also agreement that the international community should express itself in some appropriate form on the matter of assistance to astronauts in distress and the return of space vehicles, or parts, and the personnel of space vehicles.

Today the consensus extends over a considerably larger area. For example, members of this subcommittee quite generally agree on the appropriateness of a formal international instrument covering the subject of assistance and return. They also agree on the desirability of a declaration setting forth basic principles of law to guide states in their exploration and use of outer space. Even the contents of such a declaration are largely agreed.

To be specific, there is a consensus on the freedom of outer space for exploration and use by all states, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law; on the unavailability of celestial bodies for national appropriation; on the applicability of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, to relations among states in outer space; on retention by the launching authority of jurisdiction over and ownership of space vehicles; on

---

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at New York, N.Y., on May 3 (U.S./U.N. press release 4198). Mr. Meeker is Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.

assistance to astronauts in distress and return of space vehicles and their personnel; on liability for injury or damage caused by space-vehicle accidents.

With respect to certain other questions of principle, our debates in the last 3 weeks have clarified points of view and narrowed differences. For example, a number of delegations, including the United States, have endorsed the idea of appropriate international consultation to study the problems of interference and contamination in outer space and to provide for discussion in relation to particular proposed projects. We have welcomed the establishment of a consultative group by the Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions. We think the working of this group, which held its most recent meeting in March 1963, represents a sound approach.

Another area in which the debate of the second session has carried us forward is the question of what entities may engage in outer space activities. Here it may be observed that no one could expect the international community to impose the tenets of a single economic and social system on outer space and restrict activities in space to governments alone. At the same time our debates have disclosed a widely shared recognition that governments bear responsibility and are accountable for national activities in space.

At this point I should like to refer to the statement yesterday of the distinguished representative of the United Arab Republic, when he spoke of the working paper which was introduced by his delegation during the session of the full Committee last September. In the view of the U.S. delegation, the introduction of this paper was a constructive step. In his statement Mr. [Ismail] Fahmy mentioned specifically several paragraphs of the U.A.R. working paper. Putting aside, for the present, questions of drafting and formulation—which of course would require very careful consideration—I should like simply to record that the basic ideas embodied in these elements of the U.A.R. draft represent propositions to which the U.S. Government has been committed from the beginning of the space age. Declarations in legislation enacted by the Congress and state-

ments by the President and by high officers and representatives of the United States have made this clear.

I have spoken thus far about the positive aspects of this year's session of the Legal Subcommittee. I should also note at the same time that we have not made optimum use of the opportunity afforded by our meetings. We have failed to take the further step of preparing agreed texts and formulations which we could forward to the full Committee and to the General Assembly for adoption in appropriate form.

In order for the subcommittee to succeed in completing its task, it is necessary for all members to be ready and willing to engage in the give and take of international discourse, to modify previous positions, and to make the adjustments necessary for the achievement of consensus. It is necessary to refrain from insisting that all of one's original demands must be satisfied before there is agreement on a particular instrument. It is necessary to refrain from insisting that a declaration of general principles must be agreed and completed in a particular mold before progress is made, or indeed before work is done, in other areas, such as the practical questions of liability and assistance and return.

Ordinarily in the General Assembly and its subordinate bodies, when sustained negotiating effort has not resolved a difference of opinion on a subject under debate or on the best procedure for dealing with it, a vote is taken to dispose of an issue or to determine what the next steps shall be. We have not yet done this in the Outer Space Committee or its subcommittees. When the full Committee was organized in 1962, the chairman made the following statement on procedure:

I should like to place on record that through informal consultation it has been agreed among the members of the Committee that it will be the aim of all members of the Committee and its sub-Committees to conduct the Committee's work in such a way that the Committee will be able to reach agreement in its work without need for voting. . . .

The United States continues to support this aim. Up to the present, the Legal Subcommittee has been proceeding on this basis and has sought to go forward in its work without resort

to formal voting. Special efforts have been made by most members of the subcommittee to arrive at agreed conclusions and to make progress without voting. It is necessary that such efforts be made on all sides. If they are not, we are confronted by an attempt to import the veto into a forum where it was never intended to operate and where the members of the United Nations have not agreed to accept it.

It has sometimes been urged that there are only two space powers and that, therefore, satisfaction of all the positions of each of them in all matters before the subcommittee is essential if progress on any matter is to be achieved. The United States does not believe that such a claim is likely to be accepted by the members of the United Nations. Questions of outer space law are of deep concern to all the United Nations—whether in their capacity as members of the international community or as present and future participants in man's venture forth into space.

World events are moving—not least of all in the new realm of space exploration. We cannot allow our interest or our effort to falter, and we will not permit ourselves to be discouraged by a temporary lack of progress. With intelligence, patience, and good will, the international community will be able to order its efforts in space so as to benefit all mankind.

## **United States Delegations to International Conferences**

### **Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference**

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 279) that the United States would be represented at the Second Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference, which will meet at Mar del Plata, Argentina, May 29–June 8, 1963, by a delegation composed of the following representatives of U.S. Government agencies and of private associations concerned with port administration and maritime transportation:

#### *United States Representative*

Howard J. Marsden, Port Development Officer, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce

#### *Alternate United States Representative*

Charles P. Nolan, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State

#### *Advisers*

Ralph B. Dewey, President, Pacific American Steamship Association, San Francisco, Calif.

Robert O. Foerster, American Merchant Marine Institute, New York, N.Y.

Joseph P. Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

Harold Jackson, American Institute of Marine Underwriters, New York, N.Y.

Capt. Archibald H. McComb, Jr., USCG, Chief, International Maritime Safety Coordinating Staff, United States Coast Guard

William F. Mohan, Regional Director, River Plate Activities, Moore-McCormack Lines, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Robert V. McIntyre, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Marine Administration, Department of the Treasury

Charles B. Smith, United States Coast Guard

Joseph L. Stanton, President, American Association of Port Authorities, Baltimore, Md.

The conference will deal with a wide range of problems concerned with the development of port and harbor facilities and the improvement of port operations in the Americas.

The First Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference was held at San José, Costa Rica, April–May 1956.

## **Current U. N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography**

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### **General Assembly**

Letters from the permanent representative of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General regarding objects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.28, March 5, 1963, 5 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.29, March 8, 1963, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.30, March 13, 1963, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.31, March 22, 1963, 2 pp.

Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Political and Constitutional Information on African and Adjacent Territories Under United Kingdom Administration. Notes by the Secretary-General on: Gambia, A/5401/Add.1, March 12, 1963, 5 pp.; Northern Rhodesia, A/5401/Add.2, March 12, 1963, 6 pp.; Aden, A/5401/Add.3, March 12, 1963, 8 pp.; A/5401/Add.4, March 29, 1963, 10 pp.; Zanzibar, A/5401/Add.5, March 15, 1963, 7 pp.; Kenya, A/5401/Add.6, March 12, 1963, 8 pp.; St. Helena, A/5401/Add.7,

March 12, 1963, 4 pp.; Seychelles, A/5401/Add.8, March 15, 1963, 4 pp.; Mauritius, A/5401/Add.9, March 15, 1963, 5 pp.; Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, A/5401/Add.10, March 20, 1963, 11 pp.

Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Political and Constitutional Information on Asian Territories Under United Kingdom Administration. Notes by the Secretary-General on: Hong Kong, A/5402/Add.1, March 18, 1963, 6 pp.; Singapore, A/5402/Add.2, March 29, 1963, 6 pp.; Brunei, A/5402/Add.3, March 20, 1963, 4 pp.

Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Political and Constitutional Information on Pacific Territories Under United Kingdom Administration. Note by the Secretary-General on Pitcairn Island. A/5404/Add.1, March 18, 1963, 2 pp.

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Letter dated March 19, 1963, from the permanent representative of the U.S.S.R. supporting steps to end *apartheid* policy. A/5405, March 21, 1963, 2 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.

*Acceptance deposited:* Yugoslavia, May 22, 1963.

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, Mexico, Peru, Spain, Tanganyika, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, September 28, 1962; Rwanda, October 2, 1962; Sweden, October 5, 1962; Gabon, Lebanon, October 12, 1962; Canada, October 16, 1962; Ivory Coast, October 24, 1962; Nicaragua, October 29, 1962; Panama (with declaration), November 8, 1962; Central African Republic, November 16, 1962; Federal Republic of Germany, November 19, 1962; Luxembourg, November 20, 1962; Indonesia, Uganda, November 21, 1962; Australia (including Territory of Papua and Trust Territory of New Guinea), Austria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with declaration), November 23, 1962; Congo (Léopoldville), November 27, 1962; Ecuador, November 28, 1962; Denmark (subject to ratification), India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, November 29, 1962; Chile (with declaration), Cuba (with declaration), Netherlands, Norway,

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

Sierre Leone, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, November 30, 1962.

*Ratifications deposited:* Gabon, November 14, 1962; Canada, November 20, 1962; Tanganyika, November 27, 1962; Burundi,<sup>2</sup> December 4, 1962; Rwanda,<sup>2</sup> December 10, 1962; France, Peru, April 4, 1963; Uganda, April 16, 1963; United Kingdom, April 25, 1963.

*Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance:* Italy, September 28, 1962; Brazil, October 17, 1962; Colombia, November 15, 1962; Mexico, November 26, 1962; Trinidad and Tobago, November 30, 1962; Madagascar, Venezuela, January 29, 1963; Cuba, February 1, 1963; Sierra Leone, February 7, 1963; Indonesia, February 8, 1963; El Salvador, March 1, 1963; Guatemala, March 5, 1963; Nigeria, March 12, 1963; Ecuador, April 1, 1963; Australia, April 3, 1963; Belgium, Portugal, April 8, 1963; Central African Republic, April 23, 1963.

*Ratification advised by the U.S. Senate:* May 21, 1963.

### Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

*Accession deposited:* Tanganyika (with reservation), November 28, 1962.

### Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Philippines, February 5, 1963.

### United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

*Admission to membership:* Kuwait, May 14, 1963.

### BILATERAL

#### Australia

Agreement concerning the status of U.S. forces in Australia, with protocol. Signed at Canberra May 9, 1963. Entered into force May 9, 1963.

Agreement relating to the establishment of a U.S. naval communication station in Australia. Signed at Canberra May 9, 1963. Enters into force on the date notifications of approval are exchanged.

#### Mexico

Agreement providing for the continued and broadened use of the space vehicle tracking and communication station located at Guaymas, Sonora, Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at México May 16, 1963. Entered into force May 16, 1963.

#### Netherlands

Agreement on public liability for damage caused by the NS *Savannah*, with annex. Signed at The Hague February 6, 1963.

*Entered into force:* May 22, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> The Governments of Burundi and Rwanda declared that they are joining the International Coffee Organization as a member group.



**Africa**  
 Germany's Role in Modern Africa (Williams) . . . 901  
 President Sends Message to Conference of African Leaders at Addis Ababa . . . . . 902

**Agriculture.** Delegation of Authority Under 1949 Wheat Agreement Act (text of Executive order) . . . . . 914

**American Republics**  
 Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference (delegation) . . . . . 925  
 Trends in Latin American Economic Development (Martin) . . . . . 918

**Bulgaria.** U.S. Owners of Bulgarian Property Must File Tax Forms by June 15 . . . . . 905

**Canada.** U.S., Canada, and Japan To Discuss North Pacific Fisheries . . . . . 914

**Congress.** Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . . . 917

**Economic Affairs**  
 Germany's Role in Modern Africa (Williams) . . . 901  
 The Philippines—A New Era (Hilsman) . . . . 897  
 The Politics of Population: A Blueprint for International Cooperation (Gardner) . . . . 906  
 Trends in Latin American Economic Development (Martin) . . . . . 918  
 U.S., Canada, and Japan To Discuss North Pacific Fisheries . . . . . 914

**Educational and Cultural Affairs.** The Role of Music in Cultural Exchange (Battle) . . . . 915

**Germany, Federal Republic of.** Germany's Role in Modern Africa (Williams) . . . . . 901

**International Law.** U.N. Subcommittee Debates Law for Outer Space (Meeker) . . . . . 923

**International Organizations and Conferences**  
 Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference (delegation) . . . . . 925  
 Trends in Latin American Economic Development (Martin) . . . . . 918

**Japan.** U.S., Canada, and Japan To Discuss North Pacific Fisheries . . . . . 914

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**  
 NATO Council Holds 1963 Spring Meeting at Ottawa (text of final communique) . . . . . 895  
 U.S. Studying Soviet Note on NATO Nuclear Forces in Mediterranean . . . . . 896

**Philippines.** The Philippines—A New Era (Hilsman) . . . . . 897

**Presidential Documents**  
 Delegation of Authority Under 1949 Wheat Agreement Act . . . . . 914  
 President Sends Message to Conference of African Leaders at Addis Ababa . . . . . 902

**Protection of Property.** U.S. Owners of Bulgarian Property Must File Tax Forms by June 15 . . . . . 905

**Science.** U.N. Subcommittee Debates Law for Outer Space (Meeker) . . . . . 923

**Treaty Information**  
 Current Actions . . . . . 926  
 U.S., Canada, and Japan To Discuss North Pacific Fisheries . . . . . 914  
 U.S.S.R. U.S. Studying Soviet Note on NATO Nuclear Forces in Mediterranean . . . . . 896

**United Nations**  
 Current U.N. Documents . . . . . 925  
 The Politics of Population: A Blueprint for International Cooperation (Gardner) . . . . 906  
 U.N. Subcommittee Debates Law for Outer Space (Meeker) . . . . . 923

*Name Index*

Battle, Lucius D . . . . . 915  
 Gardner, Richard N . . . . . 906  
 Hilsman, Roger . . . . . 897  
 Kennedy, President . . . . . 902, 914  
 Martin, Edwin M . . . . . 918  
 Meeker, Leonard C . . . . . 923  
 Williams, G. Mennen . . . . . 901

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 20-26**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 243 of May 3 and 269 and 270 of May 17.

No.	Date	Subject
271	5/21	Battle: "The Role of Music in Cultural Exchange."
*274	5/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
275	5/21	Delegation to North Pacific fisheries talks (rewrite).
276	5/23	Hilsman: "The Philippines—A New Era."
277	5/24	Declarations to be filed by owners of Bulgarian property.
278	5/24	NATO communique.
279	5/24	Delegation to Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference (rewrite).
*280	5/25	Rusk: Death of Orvil E. Dryfoos.
†282	5/25	National foreign policy conference for nongovernmental organizations.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.





UNITED STATES  
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
 DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
 PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
 (GPO)

**Foreign Relations of the United States**

**1942, Volume VI  
 THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS**

**the  
 Department  
 of  
 State**

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume VI, The American Republics*.

This publication is the second of two volumes in the Foreign Relations series dealing with relations between the United States and the other American Republics during 1942. Volume V, published last year, contained the section on general, multilateral relations and on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. Volume VI covers bilateral relations with the remaining seventeen American Republics.

Subjects documented in this volume chiefly relate to military and economic cooperation in the war against the Axis Powers.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume VI, The American Republics* (Publication 7513) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25 each. Copies of *Volume V for 1942, The American Republics* (Publication 7373) at \$3.00 per copy, are still available from the same source.

*Order Form*

Supt. of Documents  
 Govt. Printing Office  
 Washington 25, D.C.

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republics*:

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1942, Vol. VI, Publication 7513 | \$3.25 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1942, Vol. V, Publication 7373  | \$3.00 |

*Enclosed find:*

\$.....  
 (cash, check, or money  
 order payable to  
 Supt. of Docs.)

Name: -----

Street Address: -----

City, Zone, and State: -----

364

# Annals

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1251

June 17, 1963

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF  
MAY 29 . . . . . 931

FOREIGN AID: THE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR  
SUCCESS ● *by Chester Bowles* . . . . . 939

DEPARTMENT SUPPORTS DISCRETIONARY  
AUTHORITY FOR PRESIDENT ON TRADE  
WITH POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA ● *Statement  
by Assistant Secretary Tyler* . . . . . 947

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN EDUCATION,  
SCIENCE, AND CULTURE ● *Article by Assistant  
Secretary Battle* . . . . . 954

CIAL  
KLY RECORD  
ED STATES  
IGN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1251 • PUBLICATION 7561

June 17, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 Issues, domestic \$8.60, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29

Press release 288 dated May 29

*Secretary Rusk:* I should like at the beginning to express our great pleasure at the news from Tehran that Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to resume diplomatic, consular, and trade relations. We hope that this step by two great neighbors in the Middle East will open the way to the further strengthening of friendly relations between them.

I wish to congratulate President Ayub Khan and His Majesty King Zahir Shah for their resolution of this problem and to express our appreciation to His Majesty the Shah of Iran for his skillful and statesmanlike efforts which brought this successful result.

Now I am ready for your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Prime Minister Macmillan said in London that some sort of new message to Mr. Khrushchev is about to go out—is being sent by Macmillan and the President. What is the aim of this exchange, and what is the timing of this schedule he is talking about?*

*A.* Some weeks ago President Kennedy made it very clear that he thought that we must keep trying to achieve agreement on nuclear testing. This is, we believe, objectively in the interest of both sides.

The primary purpose of a nuclear test ban would be to take a first step to put a ceiling on and, if possible, to turn down the arms race. So we would like to keep this subject alive.

We should like to clarify any points which are subject to factual clarification. I have in mind, for example, the repeated Soviet position that nuclear detection means are adequate to

the job. We don't think so. But we think this is something which can be explored scientifically and technically to get to a positive result.

The Soviets have repeatedly said that international inspection of underground testing would be tantamount to espionage. This we also do not believe, because the arrangements which could be effective for nuclear testing would have no relation to espionage.

So we do believe that we cannot drop this subject, that it is in the interest of both sides to pursue it, and that we ought, in the interest of both the arms race and for humanitarian reasons, to pursue it to the end.

As far as the actual timing of any further discussion of this matter is concerned, that is a matter for continuous discussion.

In connection with the resolution introduced by a group of Senators the other day<sup>1</sup> that we offer an atmospheric test ban—well, that is something which has been a continuous position of the United States Government for some time.

Indeed, as early as April 1959, President Eisenhower offered to begin with a ban on tests in the atmosphere.<sup>2</sup> And in September 1961 President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan proposed a ban on atmospheric tests.<sup>3</sup> In August 1962 we and the British proposed a draft treaty banning tests in the atmosphere and

---

<sup>1</sup> Senators Thomas J. Dodd and Hubert H. Humphrey introduced in the Senate on May 27 a draft resolution (S. Res. 148) in support of a ban on all nuclear tests that contaminate the atmosphere or the oceans. Thirty-two other Senators joined in sponsoring the resolution.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 18, 1959, p. 704.

<sup>3</sup> For text of a joint U.S.-U.K. proposal of Sept. 3, 1961, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

outer space and under water, as well as a comprehensive draft treaty including underground tests.<sup>4</sup>

As a matter of fact, this notion that we ought to begin with an atmospheric test—a test ban—was mentioned no later than a week ago Saturday in my discussions with Ambassador [Anatoliy] Dobrynin before he went back to Moscow for consultation. In other words this is a continuing position of the United States and the United Kingdom. We feel that it would be an important step to get a test ban on atmospheric tests straight away, because we see no obstacle to that, while we continue to discuss the more difficult problem of underground tests.

So we will continue to gnaw at this, Mr. Hightower [John M. Hightower, Associated Press], and the exact timing and stages or particular moves, I think, are of relatively less importance than the fact that it is our consistent and concerted policy to try to move in this field if we can.

#### **Multilateral Nuclear Force**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Admiral [Claude V.] Ricketts is going over to London Monday, I believe, to discuss some of the details of the multilateral nuclear force. Can you give us any idea of the administration's timetable on this, that is, when you believe that you are going to have to have some decision one way or other from the British and from others?*

A. Well, he is going to talk further about a number of technical and practical and operational questions that are necessarily involved in what is really a new concept, this multilateral force. This is not the first time that these matters have been discussed with the representatives of the United Kingdom and with other governments. Admiral Ricketts has himself had several discussions, and he will have more.

We would think that within the next few weeks there would be joint consultation among those members of NATO interested in the multilateral force, in order to get into these practical, necessarily complicated questions of organization, of finance, of manning, of equip-

ment, so that we can all make a joint decision about going forward with it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, the West German Defense Minister has been quoted as saying that, while West Germany would go along at the outset with a veto on the use of a nuclear fleet, eventually the fleet would not be militarily effective if the United States veto remains. What is the United States position on this view?*

A. Well, I would not wish to comment on a partial report of an interview or statement made by a minister that I have not myself seen. But I think it is elementary that those countries that are bearing the heaviest responsibility for defense must act together for the defense of the West. This is not a new idea. It is inherent in the NATO treaty itself. We do believe that in the nuclear field, where we carry a very heavy portion of the responsibility and the power, we should be involved with the decisions that are made.

Now, if Europe at some stage organizes itself and makes arrangements by which it makes its voice heard collectively in these matters, then we can take that question up. But under present circumstances I feel quite confident that everyone would understand that in these nuclear matters the United States must participate in the decisions.

#### **Alliance Unity on Defense Commitments**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the suggestion by such people as Governor Rockefeller and Senator [Frank] Church that the United States should give nuclear aid to the creation of a European nuclear force, or perhaps to individual nuclear forces, in order to help Europe create such a force, with or without an American veto?*

A. Well, I think the central principle here is that the defense of Western Europe and North America is indivisible and that any arrangement which looks to an attempted separate action within the alliance cuts across the basic commitments made by the alliance in 1949. So that I would be very skeptical about any arrangements which would look toward separate decisions in the alliance on these great defense issues. And I am not at all convinced

<sup>4</sup>For background and texts of draft treaties, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 403.

that these views represent a deep study of the situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, well, does that mean you are opposed to any conceivable scheme under which we would give Europe nuclear information, even though it were tied in the sense of which you speak?*

A. No, I think that in the field of nuclear information there is an enormous amount of information which has been given, is being given, to our allies, in order that they might participate fully with us in these nuclear problems. But if the question is what I could conceive of at some future date, obviously I can't comment very accurately on that. But I would think that for all present purposes the unity of the alliance requires the commitment to the notion that the defense of Western Europe and North America is indivisible and that we should proceed on that basis.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the French today seem to be saying that President de Gaulle owes President Kennedy a visit and that he is more likely to come here than the other way around. In view of that statement and Mr. Couve de Murville's [Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister] weekend visit, how would you now define the state of understanding or misunderstanding between us? Are we getting closer together with the French?*

A. Well, first, on the question of the visit, it has been our hope that, at some stage since the President visited President de Gaulle in Paris, he would return that visit here, and he will always be welcome here. There are no present plans for such a visit.

On the more general question, I think there are some points in which we and the French are not agreed, as far as NATO is concerned and in terms of the structure perhaps of the North Atlantic alliance. But these are matters of organization internal to the alliance. They are not relevant to the basic commitments of NATO as they bear upon our relations with the Soviet bloc or any security threat to the NATO area.

So I think that there is a very wide range of common interest and solidarity between ourselves and France but that it is not surprising

that we might have different views on certain points.

Indeed, with all of our allies, when you think of the thousands of telegrams that go back and forth, there are points that need further discussion and resolution.

So I would think that in general we and France are members of the same alliance, we take that alliance seriously, and it would be very important for Moscow to understand that any discussions we have between ourselves have no bearings upon the basic commitments we have for our mutual security.

#### **Maintenance of East-West Contacts**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Communist leaders are about to begin a series of meetings in Moscow. What prospect do you see that these meetings can further improve or worsen relations with the West?*

A. Well, of course, we are very much interested in the fact that a series of consultations will be going on in Moscow in the weeks ahead. Important leaders of the Communist parties, say in Europe, are visiting Moscow. There will be an important meeting of the Communist Central Committee in mid-June, I believe, and discussions with Peiping in early July.

It would not be, I think, for me to try to predict what the outcome of those discussions will be, because I am not sure that the participants in those discussions know what the outcome will be. But I do think that in this period of perhaps reexamination it is important for us to maintain contact with the Soviet Union to determine whether there are points on which the Soviet Union and the West could reach agreement.

So we do believe that there should be such possibilities—cooperation in a nuclear test ban, for example; we would hope on the matter of the nontransfer of nuclear weapons; we hope that the Geneva agreements on Laos<sup>5</sup> can be faithfully carried out by all signatories; we would be prepared to expand our cooperation in outer space. As you know, we have discussed

---

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259; for text of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique, see *ibid.*, May 20, 1963, p. 775.

the hot-line communication between Moscow and Washington.<sup>6</sup> Those discussions on a technical level seem to be going well.

It is important for us to maintain the contacts because, if there are major decisions being made, we ought to let them know that on the one side we are united and determined to secure the free world and to maintain our vital interests but on the other side that we are prepared to find points of agreement if possible.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to the earlier question about the new efforts by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to break this nuclear test ban deadlock, reports from London say that the Prime Minister is willing to perhaps have a summit meeting to further this effort. Do you think that there is a possibility of such a meeting, or do you think that it would be effective in breaking the nuclear test ban deadlock?*

A. Well, I would think that the deadlock would have to be broken before a summit could be profitable, because there are some very stubborn points here that have to be resolved in some way. This question of inspections is a fundamental question. The question of relationship between inspection and so-called espionage is a pretty far-reaching question. So that unless there is more movement toward agreement, I would not think that a summit would itself produce such an agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President at his last news conference [May 22] indicated representations had been made to Moscow about the removal of the Soviet troops in Cuba. Could you tell us, sir, whether in your conversations with Mr. Dobrynin or in any other matter you have had any encouraging word along that line?*

A. Well, I wouldn't wish to comment on the content of my discussions with Mr. Dobrynin at this stage. I think that the Soviet Union does understand that from our point of view a Soviet military presence in Cuba is a major obstacle to normal or good relations between ourselves and the Soviet Union and is a major

obstacle between Cuba and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The other great obstacle is any attempt by Cuba to interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in this hemisphere.

It is our policy that this Soviet military presence should disappear. We of course are watching that situation closely, and we think that there has been a significant reduction in Soviet forces in Cuba (as indicated in April by the President), but I think that is perhaps all I should say today on that point.

#### **Economic Aid to Brazil**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Governments of the United States and Brazil are about to start reviewing the economic aid agreement reached here about 3 months ago. It was agreed at that time this thing would be reviewed every 3 months. Are you confident that during this period the Brazilian Government has done everything in its power to solve some of the economic problems of Brazil?*

A. I would not wish to anticipate the results of that review. It is important that our commitment for aid to Brazil go hand in hand with steps taken by Brazil. We were very much encouraged by the agreement reached some months ago about this point.

We do recognize that there are difficulties in Brazil about moving on particular points, because these involve important domestic actions to be taken there and, of course, do raise pointed political questions for the Government. But it is our hope that we will both proceed on a basis of the agreement reached 3 or 4 months ago and that Brazil will stay on the path of steady economic and social improvement. We shall certainly do our part. We hope and expect that Brazil will do their part. But I would not want to anticipate the results of this present review.

#### **Effect of Racism on U.S. Foreign Relations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate a connection in the immediate future between our posture in world affairs and the civil rights battle internally in this country?*

<sup>6</sup> For text of a U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency statement of Apr. 5, 1963, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 600.

<sup>7</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 557.

## Problems of Discrimination and U.S. Foreign Policy

Press release 284 dated May 27

*Following is an excerpt from remarks made by Secretary Rusk, which was authorized for direct quotation, before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Nongovernmental Organizations at the Department of State on May 27.*

Let me make a comment, before I take some of your questions, about our situation here at home. I do think that we ought all to recognize that this nation is now confronted with one of the gravest issues that we have had since 1865 and that this issue deeply affects the conduct of our foreign relations. I am speaking of course of the problems of discrimination in this country, in whatever part of the country, based upon race or religion or national origin.

I believe that in general the free world is in a position to move forward with confidence if we do not let up, if we maintain our effort, and continue to support the great causes of freedom. But in this country we are running this race with one of our legs in a cast. Let me say in the beginning that I think for me to speak to you on this subject in terms of foreign policy is only the secondary reason why we should get on with it. The first reason is rooted in our own commitments, the character of our own society, the necessity to respect the dignity of our fellow citizens, and the kind of life we want to lead here at home.

I give that first priority, because this is a compulsion of our own commitments in our own society. But let's not underestimate, at the same time, the

difficulties which this problem is causing for us in other parts of the world—and indeed in the conduct of our own foreign relations here in this national capital.

The readjustment of relationships between the races is upon us internationally as well as at home. There are those who look to this country to carry the torch of freedom, of human rights, of human dignity, and who want nothing better than to have a strong leadership from the people of the United States in this direction because they would like to reject what is being offered by the other side—and indeed they are rejecting it.

But our voice is muted, our friends are embarrassed, our enemies are gleeful, because we have not really put our hands fully and effectively to this problem at every level of our national life, beginning with the local community.

Now there are many things that can be done and are being done. I leave this with you simply to suggest that, if you are in contact with your own membership in your local communities, there is a job to be done in the local communities—quietly, sympathetically, decently—which will avoid the kind of confrontation that is not representative of America, should not be necessary in our kind of society, and does us deep injury abroad.

And if there is anything which you in your national organizations can do to pass the word down to those who represent you in local communities to put their prayerful and sympathetic attention to this, I don't know any better way that you can make a better contribution to our foreign relations in the next 12 months than just on this point.

A. Well, there is a necessary connection. I would like to emphasize, however, that the foreign relations aspect of our problems here in this country in the field of discrimination are secondary. The real reason why we should move on with these problems is because of our own fidelity to our own Constitution, our own basic commitments to a free people.

It remains, however, that this has a major influence on our foreign relations, because the United States is expected to be the leader of freedom. We are called upon to set an example, and although there are problems of discrimination in many countries in other parts of the world and although there is racism in other countries which deeply affects their problems and their relations with their neighbors, it is true that a great deal is expected of the United

States because we are looked upon as a leader in this great struggle for freedom.

Therefore our failures in this field are multiplied, exaggerated. And therefore I do hope that in every community across the country where these matters, these problems, exist, we can give it the most sober attention, work at it quietly and effectively with real dedication, first, because of our own needs in our own society but also because it deeply affects our ability to carry the leadership in this great worldwide struggle for freedom.

I made a statement on this 2 days ago, to which I would call your attention. I feel, I must say, very strongly about this.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes?



*Q. Could you give us your appraisal of the situation in Laos? Great Britain and the Soviet Union joined today to call for an immediate cease-fire, and yet just yesterday Poland was blaming the United States for the increase of tensions there. And there seems to be an aura of confusion over the whole area.*

A. Well, I would hope that the joint statement by the two cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, would mean that the full weight and resources of the Soviet Union are being thrown in behind faithful adherence to the Geneva Accords. I don't myself understand the attitude of the Polish Government as expressed in the last day or two. I must confess that I think they may be misinformed by their representatives on the spot.

But Poland is a member of the ICC [International Control Commission]—not to represent the Pathet Lao but, as one of three governments members of the ICC, to represent all the signatories of the Geneva Accords. They have responsibilities under those accords which we think should be carried out. And if the two cochairmen—who have also special responsibilities—the ICC, the coalition government, and the signatories all put their full weight behind the Geneva Accords, there is no reason why the independence and neutrality of Laos cannot be effected and properly guaranteed.

So we are watching this very closely and expect and hope that the Soviet Union will do everything that it can to assure those accords.

I think there is a question back here. (Indicating.) No?

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes?

*Q. The State Department was reported to be studying a diplomatic break with Haiti. Can you tell us anything about that story, and did you come to any conclusion?*

A. I understand in the old days Mr. Cordell Hull held a daily press conference with some 10 or 12 of you and that more than half the time he would say to them, "Gentlemen, you can say that that particular matter is under the most active consideration by the Department of State." (Laughter.) So I think I will rest

on that as far as Haiti is concerned this morning.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes, Miss Higgins [Marguerite Higgins, *New York Herald Tribune*]?

*Q. Since the Italian elections, have you any clue as to whether the Italians are still interested in the multilateral force? Will they join in the consultations?*

A. Well, it's a little difficult to speak for them during this period in which they are forming a government. But we have every indication that the Italians remain very much interested in the multilateral force.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported that the United States is seeking to base a number of U.S. jet interceptors in Canada under the NATO, the NORAD [North American Air Defense Command] agreements,<sup>8</sup> but that Prime Minister Pearson's government apparently is balking or raising objections to it. Have there been discussions between the two Governments on this?*

A. Well, now, I'm not going, in public comment, to create artificial difficulties where none now exist. These nuclear questions that are important to both countries—we are approaching them with the fullest spirit of cooperation.

The attitude of Canada on this has been made known by the Prime Minister and in Parliament. We are discussing these matters fully between us, and when we have something to announce we will announce it. But I think the background of this particular question suggests that we ought not to create problems but work toward mutually agreed solutions.

#### **Disengagement Agreements on Yemen**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question on Yemen. The fighting continues there, and we understand the Egyptians are rotating troops in as well as out of Yemen. Yet about a month ago the State Department was saying that within a few days the Egyptian troops will be pulling out.*

<sup>8</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1958, p. 979.

*I have two questions: One, when are the Egyptian troops supposed to be pulled out of the Yemen, and, second, is Egypt living up to its pledge under the agreements worked out by [Ambassador Ellsworth J.] Bunker?*

A. I think the implementation of the disengagement agreements in regard to Yemen does turn on the early presence in Yemen of the U.N. observers. And we would very much hope that the U.N. observers could arrive promptly. We have indications from the U.N. that this would be the case, and it would be our expectation that in the very next few days the disengagement agreements will be fully effected.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been said by Cuba's official press that an American plane fired machinegun shots on the north coast of Cuba. Have you any comment on that or any confirmation of it?*

A. This is simply not true. The planes did not even have machineguns on them.

#### **GATT Negotiations at Geneva**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, satisfaction has been voiced over the first outcome of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations in Geneva. What forecasting do you make for the resolution of those negotiations?*

A. Well, I think it was important that the large number of governments represented at those Geneva discussions could reach an agreement on the basis on which they would begin negotiations next May for a reduction of impediments to trade—not just tariffs but other barriers to trade. But, in a real sense, this agreement was a license to look for the answers in May. These are going to be prolonged, difficult, complex negotiations. But I do believe that the result in Geneva last week was a very gratifying result, because had there been a breach in the arrangements at that time then we would not have the opportunity to pursue these arrangements next May.

This, I think, was a major step, but it is not yet an answer to the problem of trade barrier reduction. I think we can be encouraged but recognize that there is a very difficult problem still ahead of us. Of course, this is exactly

what was anticipated when we began the Trade Expansion Act discussions with other governments.

#### **U.S. Attitude on National Nuclear Capabilities**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go back to the question of Governor Rockefeller's comments about nuclear policy.*

A. Yes.

*Q. I would like to ask whether you were saying in your reply to the question that the United States should not provide information or assistance to the development of national nuclear forces?*

A. This is quite correct. The consistent attitude of the United States has been that we do not favor the proliferation of a national nuclear capability and that we will not make contributions in that direction. This, however, means that on a matter like the multilateral force we do believe that it is possible for nations to join in what is really a genuine partnership in the nuclear field without involving the further spread of national nuclear capabilities.

I have no doubt at all about the wisdom of that policy, as one looks across the next 10 or 20 years. I think it is possible to have an alliance partnership without the addition of national nuclear capabilities among the members of the alliance, or indeed among states outside of the alliance.

*Q. After your talks with the French Foreign Minister last weekend, do you have any basis for believing that at some point France would participate in such a partnership?*

A. Well, I think France considers the Atlantic alliance to be fundamental to the security of the West. But they have reservations, as you know, about the degree of integration which the rest of us have discussed in the NATO framework.

I think that they would anticipate that when their national nuclear force is in being there would be—as President de Gaulle indicated in his January 14 press conference—there would be close strategic coordination with others in the alliance. But I could not report that there

is any common view at the present time as to just how that should occur.

#### **Soviet Reluctance To Discuss Test Ban**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you suggested to Ambassador Dobrynin before he went home that the West and the Soviet Union perhaps begin with this atmospheric ban. From what his reaction was, are you at all encouraged on this point?*

A. No, I think at this point one could not say there are any signs that the Soviet Union is ready to accept this idea, any more than they have been for the past 3 or 4 years. But we do believe that it would be a substantial step if we could achieve an atmospheric test ban which does not involve some of the complexities of inspection as a first step. I would have to say that I see no indication yet that the Soviet Union would accept that view.

*Q. Do you see any indication to resume atmospheric testing in the Soviet Union?*

A. This is, of course, speculation as far as we are concerned. I must say that I have wondered why there has been so much reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to sit down and talk in more detail about some of the possible arrangements in connection with the test ban. One of those reasons may be that they do have in mind further testing. Another might be that while discussions are going on among members of the Communist bloc in these next several weeks and months they may not think it timely to pursue these discussions. But there has been a demonstrated reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to enter into detailed discussions about the possibilities of a test ban. But why, I think, remains speculation.

*Q. What do you think of that passage in the Dadd-Humphrey resolution which would withhold American atmospheric testing unless the Soviet Union were to resume in the atmosphere?*

A. Well, I think for the present that is more theoretical than practical. We do not have in

mind for the immediate future further atmospheric tests. But we would like to use this period for real and realistic discussions with the Soviets on the possibility of a test ban. But I think this is an idea that we must consider further.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go back to the question on Laos. In view of the Polish statement yesterday, do you feel there is any chance that the ICC for Laos can work effectively?*

A. Well, I think we must not abandon the hope and expectation that this is possible. And it may be that the joint statement of the two cochairmen may have some influence in Warsaw.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, several times here you have suggested that you consider it at least possible that Poland is acting independently of Russia. Is this really your idea?*

A. No. I am not suggesting an answer one way or the other on that. But I think that the statement of the two cochairmen ought to be put alongside of the statement of the Polish Government. And my guess is that the Polish Government will be doing the same thing.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## **Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia To Visit U.S. in October**

White House press release dated May 29

The President of the United States announced on May 29 that His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, has accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States. His Imperial Majesty will be in Washington for a 2-day state visit beginning October 1.

The invitation, extended by the President several months ago, is a mark of the continuing friendly relations between the United States and Ethiopia. The Emperor last visited the United States in May-June 1954.

# Foreign Aid: The Essential Factors for Success

by Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>

This spring the foreign aid program is once again undergoing its annual drubbing on Capitol Hill and in certain elements of the Nation's press. Yet the situation is paradoxical. In spite of a nagging uncertainty about the nature of its objectives and policies, the program's public support, according to Gallup, is at an alltime high, with 58 percent of the American people in favor of it and 30 percent opposed. This is substantially greater than F.D.R.'s 1936 margin over Alf Landon in the greatest political landslide of our century.

Unless I am mistaken, however, this widespread statistical support reflects not so much knowledgeable public understanding of the program's objectives and accomplishments but rather a kind of public hunch that any national effort that has been supported by every President, every serious candidate for President, and every Secretary of State since the war must be better than its critics say it is.

This is a dangerously unstable base for such an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Unless it can be greatly strengthened, the program will continue to be vulnerable to the axes of its political critics and to the often unpredictable swings of public opinion.

There is urgent need, therefore, for some thoughtful, down-to-earth stocktaking by those who recognize the critical importance of this effort; and this conference is an excellent place to start. As I leave for India, where much the

largest U.S. aid program is now operating, I should like to contribute my own analysis to this review of what may be missing.

Let me preface my remarks by saying that in my opinion the program now has the most experienced management since the days of Paul Hoffman. Dave Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development] is an outstanding economist, with deep respect for people as well as for the arithmetic of development. Equally important, he has had many years of experience in practical, down-to-earth administration in what we here in Washington refer to as "the field." Under his leadership I believe we can expect to see the continuous, rapid improvement of administrative procedures, a lessening of flagrant errors of omission and commission, and greatly improved morale.

What, then, about the program itself? In my opinion a large measure of our success or failure in the next few years will depend on public and congressional understanding of what the program can and cannot do, on the emphasis within the program itself, and on the extent to which we can relate our efforts abroad to our own traditions and to the essentials of our own society.

## Clarifying Basic Objectives

More specifically, there are six essential elements which will largely shape our capacity to do what we have set out to do.

1. *We must clarify public and congressional thinking as to the basic objectives of the aid program.*

Let us start by making it clear what the program won't do:

---

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development at Washington, D.C., on May 28 (press release 286). Mr. Bowles was the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs; on May 1 his nomination to be Ambassador to India was confirmed by the Senate.

—It won't enable us to control events in other countries.

—It won't enable us to buy allies and votes in the U.N.

—It won't insure us first place in a global popularity contest.

The reasons why our development effort won't do these three things should be clear by now; but since it obviously isn't clear to many observers, let us briefly explore the point.

Most of the recipient nations are either recently emerged from colonial rule or striving, as in the case of Latin America, to establish their own proud, individualistic identity. Consequently they are in no mood to jump through political hoops to please any other nation, however rich or right it may be. We may therefore expect to see the emergent nations frequently going out of their way, noisily and sometimes irrelevantly, to assert and reassert their independence.

While this may be exasperating to many Americans, it should be recognized as a human reaction to a long and humiliating colonial experience—a reaction similar in many ways to that of our own young, nationalistic country in the 19th century. When did the founders and early Presidents of our nation ever hesitate to tell the older nations of Europe where to get off?

Nor will our development program ever be fully understood by the Congress and public—nor will it be effective in its operations—if we continue to present it as a negative stopgap effort shrewdly designed to thwart the Communists.

This narrow view implies that if the Communist movement did not exist, there would be no valid reason for the United States to continue to help the less fortunate nations. For the developing countries this, in turn, ironically transforms a noisy Communist minority into an absolutely invaluable natural resource. Indeed, the unearthing of a local Communist underground might be expected in such circumstances to produce more American dollars than the discovery of oil or uranium.

This poses the basic question: If our foreign aid program cannot be expected to buy friends or votes and if its purpose is not simply to com-

bat communism, what exactly is it good for? What will it do?

Although the answer to this question is well known to this audience, it is essential that it be understood in every community in America, as well as in every congressional committee.

Let me state it briefly: A wisely administered U.S. aid program can help create nations that are increasingly prepared to defend their independence against totalitarian enemies—external or internal, overt or covert—and increasingly willing to work with us as partners on common projects which may lead the world a little closer to peace.

Judged against this realistic yardstick, the program has rolled up an extraordinary record of achievement.

Consider Europe in 1945, dispirited, destitute, and totally vulnerable to organized Communist minorities. Today, thanks in large measure to a wisely conceived program of U.S. Marshall Plan assistance, Europe is a roaring political and economic success with a total production second only to that of our own country.

Consider India in 1947, newly independent, fragmented by deep-rooted internal differences, with a wobbly government, grossly inadequate food resources, a disrupted transport system, and the bare beginnings of industrial development.

In the last 16 years that same India, with a population greater than Africa and Latin America combined, has created a democratic constitution, run three democratic elections, placed three times as many children in school as before, nearly doubled her agricultural production and more than doubled her industrial production, tripled her electric power, vastly improved her transport system, and, above all, has awakened its Indian people so that today they stand united in defense of their nation against the blatant aggression of their giant Chinese neighbor.

In India, as in Europe, American loans, grants, and technical assistance played a major role. Yet here is the essential point: This aid was not given to force either Europe or India into a satellite relationship to the United States or to purchase good will or votes in the United Nations. Naturally, no country—whether In-

dia, France, or any other country in Europe—is happy to feel it is in any way dependent on the United States. Rather, the aid program's objective has been to help establish independent countries able and willing to stand on their own feet and prepared to defend what they believe to be *their* interests—interests that by and large coincide with our own.

### **“What Happens to People Is Decisive”**

2. Now let us consider a second factor which grows inevitably from the first: *The success or failure of an aid program in helping to create independent nations depends not only on the rate of economic growth but at least equally as much on what happens to people in the process of growth.*

Many observers measure the success or failure of “development” by such purely economic criteria as increases in per capita income, in kilowatt-hours of electricity, in miles of railroad, numbers of irrigated acres, and so on. Yet such standards of judgment can lead to some harsh surprises.

Cuba, just before Castro took over, had the third highest per capita income in Latin America. Indeed, when we compare those Latin American countries with the highest per capita incomes, some of which are higher than several European countries, with those that are most politically stable, we find that there is almost no consistent relationship.

A feeling of national purpose and independence can only be created if the people are given a sense of involvement in their own development, a sense of belonging, and a growing sense of justice. Without these *social* gains, a booming per capita income, if badly distributed, can actually widen the gulf between rich and poor and lead to a political explosion.

As a case in point, I recall two letters I received from friends of mine working in Iraq in the spring of 1958. The first was from a young American engineer in Baghdad, who reported with great excitement his contribution to the damming of the Tigris and the Euphrates. He listed the exciting industrial development that would soon grow from these power projects as an indication of Iraq's successful development.

That same week, by coincidence, I received a letter from a former associate of mine in India, whose letter in effect was a reply to the engineer, although neither one knew the other. “In the Iraqi village where I live,” he wrote, “we often hear that things are going remarkably well in Baghdad, that the Tigris and the Euphrates are being dammed, and that great industries will soon be coming into being. Undoubtedly, this is a grand accomplishment. But out here in the countryside, where most of the people of Iraq make their living as farmers and herdsmen, everything remains much the same. Indeed,” he continued, “the only evidence of change here is in the fact that the landlords and the money lenders who formerly came riding out on horseback to collect their rent or interest now arrive in Buick cars.”

Obviously something must have changed somewhere, but it hadn't affected many of the people of Iraq. I may add that this was shortly before the political explosion of 1958, when the Iraqi Government came apart at the seams.

In our presentations and our speeches I believe that this second point deserves particular emphasis. Economic growth is critical to national development, but what happens to people in the process is decisive.

### **Importance of Rural Development**

3. Now let me turn to a third basic consideration: *Orderly political growth in the developing nations is impossible unless it improves the living standards of the 80 percent of the people who live in the rural areas and simultaneously gives them a greater sense of personal involvement.*

In November of 1917, when Lenin announced that the great feudal estates of czarist Russia would be divided among the peasants who tilled the land, he knew that the climax of his effort had been achieved. “Now,” he said, “the Revolution has become irrevocable.”

In China, Mao Tse-tung's primary appeal was to the peasants. Aroused by Mao's false promises of land and freedom, it was they who provided the mass manpower of his Red army.

As long as the rural areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are oppressed with poverty, exploitation, and injustice, they, too, will con-

time to be targets for Communist infiltration.

The need for greater emphasis on rural development, however, is economic as well as political. This is so because no developing nation can increase its industrial output rapidly if the four-fifths of its people who live in the rural areas lack the purchasing power to buy its factory-produced goods.

This means that our aid program should be increasingly related to the improvement of agriculture, the encouragement of land reform, the creation of rural extension services, and the building of rural schools, roads, and clinics.

As this sophisticated audience well knows, such things are easier to say than to do. Most of us Americans are now urban-oriented. Even our farmers, with their advanced soil technology and their thousands of dollars worth of investment in complex farm equipment, are now largely out of touch with the grassroots farming techniques that are most readily applicable to the rural development of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In many countries I have seen our people make an earnest effort to develop effective rural programs, only to become bogged down in the face of the practical difficulties. The heat becomes awfully tiresome, the local people appear more and more apathetic, and new ideas are hard to communicate. The most conscientious of AID administrators may thus find themselves wondering if country *x* is really ready for a rural program; isn't the more immediate need for a cement factory? After all, *every* developing country needs more cement.

Yet the overriding, urgent challenge of rural development in Asia, Latin America, and Africa must be faced and mastered.

The economic interdependence of urban and rural areas has always been basic to every country, including our own. Here in the United States one of the first signs of a national recession is usually decreasing sales of farm and household equipment in our great agricultural States—a decrease that is quickly reflected back into our industrial centers.

Moreover, in line with my previous point, it is essential that the rural majorities be given not only greater economic opportunity but also an increasingly personal stake in national development.

This takes us beyond the simple question of who owns the land. Although in many cases "land reform" may be no more than a political slogan, wisely planned and administered it can open the door to vast new opportunities for the human spirit and for economic, social, and political development.

Let us consider two cases in point: Country *x*, where the original land reform program ran into difficulties, and country *y*, where from every standpoint it was a substantial success.

In country *x* millions of acres of land were distributed to the former tenant farmers. Although the enthusiasm of the peasants was great, agricultural production in many areas dropped sharply, and soon right-wing groups who opposed broader land distribution were pointing to the reform program as a failure.

That the program did not fulfill expectations was not a result of land distribution to those who till it but rather an outgrowth of the fact that a coordinated rural development program to back up the land reform measures was missing. What was needed was an extension service, adequate rural credit, rural marketing cooperatives, better transportation facilities, and a massive effort to educate the new landowners in the techniques of farming and community organization.

In country *y*, in contrast, the land reform program was a comprehensive and, therefore, highly successful effort. As a result, the distribution of land to the farmers led to a sharp increase in production per acre, an increasing measure of political stability among the rural population, and also to a spectacular increase in the prosperity not only of the rural but also of the urban areas where the added rural purchasing power created many additional jobs and large profits.

May I add that a successful, integrated rural development effort also calls for a high degree of local cooperation among the various government agencies involved—the ministries of health, agriculture, education, welfare, transportation, labor, and all the rest. When their lines of communication and administrative control each run straight down to the village, the result is often chaotic, with each ministry competing for the attention of the village leadership in behalf of its particular program.

In my own experience the method which has been most successful in eliminating this confusion is a coordinated community development operation in which the Prime Minister or the President acts as the chairman of a national rural development board which sets priorities as to resources and manpower. The programs agreed to by this board are then assigned to a rural development administrator who sees to it that each ministry gets its full share of resources at the local level and supplies its services at the proper time and in the proper sequence.

Without an integrated administrative organization of this kind, the various ministries are rarely able to agree on anything. The result is waste of both resources and trained people.

Another critically important facet of rural development that has largely been ignored is the function of the provincial towns in relation to the surrounding countryside. The development program for India, for example, which was originally proposed in 1952, called for groups of approximately 300 villages set around a central provincial town. Here it was planned to create a central marketplace with a high school, technical training school, agricultural training centers, and a sizable sprinkling of light industries.

Unfortunately the initial cost of this program was far beyond the resources which were available. And because after 5 years of independence the 350 million Indian villagers could see little improvement in their lot, it was felt that highest priorities should be given to their welfare. The result was a 10-year village community development program which now covers most of India's 550,000 villages. The next step, many Indian developers believe, is to tie in the provincial towns as centers of consumer industry, education, and administration.

#### **Realistic Criteria for Economic Aid**

4. Let us now consider a fourth major factor which will help determine the success of our development effort: *the need for clearly worded, realistic criteria for the distribution of economic aid which reflect the requirements of the first three factors.*

The need for such criteria was recognized in

the Act for International Development itself. Indeed, in this legislation Congress directed us to do precisely what experience has taught us must be done if our overseas assistance effort is to succeed. For instance, the act says:

Assistance shall be based upon sound plans and programs; be directed toward the social as well as economic aspects of economic development; be responsive to the efforts of the recipient countries to mobilize their own resources and help themselves; be cognizant of the external and internal pressures which hamper their growth; and should emphasize long-range development assistance as the primary instrument of such growth.

In the spirit of this congressional mandate and direction, some searching questions are now being asked in regard to all requests for assistance from abroad. These questions relate to:

—the applicant's present per capita income and its distribution;

—the competence of the government, and its sensitivity to the needs of the population;

—the existence of a well-conceived, long-range national economic development plan;

—the adequate distribution and collection of the nation's tax burden;

—the priority given to the vast majority of citizens who live in the rural areas; the development of equitable land distribution and the creation of an integrated approach to community development;

—the existence of a favorable climate and adequate incentives for foreign and domestic private investment; and

—the maintenance of effective controls over the expenditure of foreign exchange for luxury imports.

Perhaps most important of all, we are asking ourselves whether a government which seeks our assistance is sufficiently rooted in public support to assure the broad backing of its people necessary for a bold program of economic and social development.

Although no nation on earth could respond affirmatively on all these counts, I believe that these are the objectives we must stress in developing priorities and standards for the distribution of our assistance.

Let us face the fact that, in some instances, courageous adherence to these standards may lead us to refuse aid to friendly governments which have assumed that their unquestioning



support of our political views in the United Nations would assure them, willy-nilly, a continuing flow of U.S. development dollars—even though their persistent failure to put their domestic houses in order means that we are in fact pouring U.S. funds down a rathole.

What is the better alternative? In my opinion there is none. If the economic development effort in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is to succeed, and if our aid program is to maintain the essential support of the American people and their Congress, we must insist as a general rule on the necessary domestic reforms as a precondition of continuing U.S. Government assistance.

There is nothing in what I have said, however, that requires us to be foolhardy. In our complicated and divided world, overriding strategic considerations in specific situations may occasionally cause us to throw away the book, to exercise our own *ad hoc* judgment, and temporarily to relax our pressures for reform.

The important point is that we keep the number of such exceptions to an absolute minimum consistent with our national interests and that we do not allow temporary compromises to become permanent policy.

As for the inevitable charges of "Yankee interference in our domestic affairs," we should take them in our stride. Whatever we do in regard to giving or withholding economic aid constitutes "interference" of one kind or another.

For instance, when the United States Government provides capital and technicians to governments that are unwilling or unable to create the internal conditions necessary for their own economic development, it is in effect subsidizing the forces of the past. This in itself is "interference"—but in this case interference on the wrong side of what history will surely judge to be a central issue of our times.

#### **Coordinating International Aid Programs**

5. This brings us to a fifth consideration: *the need for improvement in the planning and integration of each foreign aid program in which we are involved, not only in regard to the resources provided by our own Government but in connection with the complex variety of*

*international agencies and donor nations that also operate in this field.*

The United States Government provides unilateral aid through the Export-Import Bank, which helps the underdeveloped nations finance the purchase of industrial goods in the United States; long-term development loans on easy terms payable in both dollars and soft currencies; U.S. technical assistance, which offers a wide range of specialists in planning and technology; the Peace Corps, which provides several thousand volunteers trained in teaching, nursing, rural development, and the like; and Food for Peace, which distributes U.S. surplus farm products, including wheat, rice, powdered milk, and cotton.

These U.S. sources of development assistance should be more carefully integrated with the loans and technical assistance available from the international agencies. These include the World Bank, which provides loans payable in "hard currencies"; the International Development Association, which provides "soft loans"; the International Monetary Fund, which helps stabilize currencies; and the so-called specialized agencies of the U.N.—the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization].

Finally, West Germany, France, Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, and Israel also provide unilateral economic assistance on a generally similar basis.

The staggering number of sources to which the developing nations can turn for assistance inevitably creates confusion and some overlapping of effort. This suggests the need for careful planning to make sure that the right kind of aid is made available and that its use is effectively coordinated with the resources of the developing country itself.

Here the World Bank and the Special Fund of the United Nations can play an effective role.

#### **Role of Nongovernmental Agencies**

6. The sixth and final factor upon which the success of the program depends is the *greater involvement of the American people in the program, together with a bolder and more substantial effort to explain its objectives to an*

*often critical public and to an increasingly antagonistic Congress.*

First of all, it is essential that we speak frankly and clearly to the American people. At present very few of them have a clear idea of what the aid program can do, what it cannot do, and why it is an absolutely essential instrument in creating a more rational and peaceful world.

In the last 10 years I have discussed this program in detail before audiences in 42 of our 50 States. As a result, I am convinced that once the people are given the basic facts, once they understand the principles which Congress has laid down and the ways in which the President and AID are carrying out Congress's wishes, they will give this effort the support that it deserves and must have if U.S. policy is to be effective in today's world.

Yet we face a serious roadblock: In this effort to explain the program on a mass basis the public information unit of the foreign aid agency has been refused the funds necessary for its task. As a result, it has been able to provide no more than a bare minimum of the information to which all of us as citizens and taxpayers are entitled.

More than that, our congressional and public presentations throughout the 1950's were in large measure negative and in disregard of the factors which I have described. Too often false and expedient reasons were advanced by the administration in power in a desperate effort to gain the necessary votes—only to find themselves forced at a later date to defend the program when it failed to achieve what the public and Congress had been led to expect of it.

In this regard our task will be made easier by a greatly expanded people-to-people effort by nongovernmental agencies to assure much greater involvement of individuals and organizations, both in the recipient countries and in the United States.

For instance, Rotary International, the League of Women Voters, Lions, parent-teachers' associations, labor unions, chambers of commerce, and similar organizations have even greater contributions to make in the process of overseas nation-building than they are now making. There are 1,150 Rotary Clubs in Latin America alone.

U.S. business and labor groups have a particularly important role to play in helping to shape development plans on terms acceptable to the developing countries and profitable to the individual corporations.

In addition the spectacularly successful Peace Corps can be an increasing factor in creating the necessary basis of understanding, not only in the recipient countries but in the United States itself, as a steady stream of volunteers return.

### **The Challenge to American Leadership**

The task of our foreign aid program is to help release the energies of the people of the developing nations so that they can work effectively toward economic progress, increased justice, and a sense of individual fulfillment and participation.

Its purpose, in other words, is to help them create prosperous societies which they are willing and able to defend. Only in such a world can we ourselves be safe, happy, and secure.

The constructive leadership of America is therefore challenged to understand the nature of the revolutionary forces that are reshaping our world and to put ourselves in touch with the aspirations of the vast majority of mankind who see this planet as something more than an arena for the Soviet-American conflict or the maintenance of an American way of life which is remote from their own.

If civilization is to mean anything, it must be bolstered as well as protected by democratic people with dynamic ideas and the skill and boldness to put those ideas into effect. The future of all mankind may depend on our willingness to accept this challenge which our hungry, chaotic, but infinitely promising world presents to us.

### **United States and Thailand Sign Educational Exchange Agreement**

Press release 283 dated May 27

Officials of Thailand and the United States signed on May 24 an agreement in Bangkok extending the educational and cultural exchange program between the two countries. The orig-

inal agreement was signed in 1950 under the Fulbright Act.<sup>1</sup>

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Todd Young, Jr., signed the agreement for their respective Governments. Luang Sukhum Nayapradit, chairman, and other members of the United States Educational Foundation in Thailand attended the signing.

The new agreement is the first with Thailand under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, which was passed by Congress late in 1961. It provides broader and more flexible authority for visits and interchanges by professors, students, and research scholars.

Since 1951 more than 300 Thai nationals have been awarded grants under this program for teaching and study in the United States. Eighty percent of these received advanced degrees in the United States before returning to Thailand. During the same period 131 Americans have gone to Thailand under similar grants.

## **U.S. Survey Mission To Visit Pacific Islands Trust Territory**

The White House announced on May 23 that a U.S. Government survey mission will go to the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in the near future to review the major political, economic, and social problems facing the people of that territory. The mission will gather information and make recommendations needed in the formulation of U.S. policies and programs for a greatly accelerated rate of political, economic, and social development in line with the obligations of the United States under the U.N. trusteeship agreement to prepare the people of the trust territory to exercise eventually their free and informed choice concerning their political future.

The U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is one of the three remaining areas in the world administered under the U.N. Trusteeship Council and the only one so administered by the United States. It consists of some 2,100 islands, of which 96 are inhabited, the entire

area covering 3 million square miles and frequently referred to as Micronesia. It includes the Marshall Islands, the West and East Caroline area, and the Marianas.

Anthony M. Solomon has been appointed as consultant to the President to head the mission. Other members of the mission will include individuals from U.S. Government agencies having a responsibility to the trust territory and other experts in development and international problems.

The mission will begin its work in Guam on July 3 and will travel throughout the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands during the following 6 weeks. From Guam it will proceed to the headquarters of the trust territory at Saipan for intensive conferences with the High Commissioner, M. Wilfred Goding, and his staff preparatory to visiting the other islands of the territory.

## **Annual Foreign Policy Briefing Held for Nongovernmental Organizations**

The Department of State announced on May 25 (press release 282) that its annual National Foreign Policy Conference for Nongovernmental Organizations would be held on May 27 and 28.

The purpose of the conference is to provide opportunity for discussion of international affairs between leaders of nongovernmental organizations and senior Government officials. By means of these conferences the membership of nongovernmental organizations, and through them a much broader public, gain deeper understanding of international issues.

## **Letters of Credence**

### *Bulgaria*

The newly appointed Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Lyubomir Popov, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 1. For texts of the Minister's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 294 dated June 1.

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2095.

## Department Supports Discretionary Authority for President on Trade With Poland and Yugoslavia

*Statement by William R. Tyler  
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee in support of section 402 of H.R. 5490. This provision is intended to amend section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 so as to provide discretionary authority to the President to continue nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to Poland and Yugoslavia. The amended provision would require the President to determine, first, that such treatment was important to the national interest and, secondly, that such treatment would promote the independence of such country or area from domination or control by international communism. The President would be obliged to report his determination and the reasons therefor to the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to explain briefly to the committee why the administration feels this amendment is so important and how the administration would hope to utilize the authority if granted by the Congress.

Section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act requires the denial of most-favored-nation tariff treatment to all countries dominated or controlled by communism, irrespective of whether such a country may or may not be independent of the international Communist conspiracy, or whether or not that country is seeking to establish or maintain its independence. Section 231

thus runs counter to a policy of long standing maintained during the past three administrations—a policy which seeks to exploit opportunities within the Communist world to pursue more active relations in economic, cultural, and political fields, in order to increase the presence and influence of the United States within this area. The record shows conclusively that we can in this way stimulate and support courses of action in this area more favorable to us.

In denying to the President any discretion, the effect of section 231 is to repudiate existing policy and to leave us as an alternative a policy of withdrawal by the United States from the area. This would not isolate Eastern Europe from communism, but would isolate us from Eastern Europe and abandon the field to whatever forces may be at work there. Such an alternative would be a policy of retreat to the detriment of our overall national interests and security.

The developments of the past decade and a half have demonstrated that the situation in Eastern Europe is in increasing flux. Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet bloc in 1948, the events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956, and the more recent evidence of dispute and dissension within the Communist world all point to the need for imaginative, energetic, and flexible policies which are designed to take advantage of developments to further our interests. If we close our eyes to the changes which

<sup>1</sup>Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 27 during hearings on H.R. 5490, a bill to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

have taken place and are taking place in Eastern Europe, we do so in disregard of the vital security interests of the United States.

#### **Limited Alternatives in Eastern Europe**

The only Communist countries which presently are accorded most-favored-nation tariff treatment are Poland and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has enjoyed such treatment continuously for more than 80 years by virtue of the Treaty of 1881 with the Kingdom of Serbia, which remains valid. Poland was denied most-favored-nation status in 1951, but it was restored by President Eisenhower in 1960<sup>2</sup> following an agreement whereby Poland agreed to pay \$40 million over a 20-year period as compensation for claims of American nationals.

The extension of most-favored-nation treatment to these two countries is an essential ingredient of our policy toward these countries by offering them an alternative to dependence upon the U.S.S.R. In so doing, we demonstrate that those countries which have a will and a capacity to assert and defend their independence can have normal and fruitful relations with the United States.

If, however, we ignore the real and important differences between Poland and Yugoslavia on the one side, and other Communist countries on the other, if we fail to distinguish in our treatment between governments which seek to defend their independence and those which place their country willingly at the service of the international Communist movement, and if we fail to take advantage of significant progress toward autonomy, then we must recognize that we are foreclosing possibilities for promoting independence and freedom through evolutionary means. Such a policy on our part would inform the peoples of Eastern Europe that there is no future in their relations with the United States until they are able to throw off their Communist masters. In present circumstances, this is not likely to be accomplished nor would it be furthered by actions which tend to isolate the United States from Eastern Europe.

We must recognize the limited nature of the alternatives which face us in Eastern Europe

at the present time. They are not between communism on the one hand and democracy on the other. Rather, the choices are between governments dominated by and participating in the international Communist conspiracy and, on the other hand, governments that may continue to be Communist but which are independent, pursuing their own national interests. In this latter range of choices, which are the only realistic choices available to us now or for the foreseeable future, we believe that the United States interest demands that we support efforts to achieve national independence. This does not in any sense imply approval of or support for communism per se. It does, however, reflect our conviction that the cause of freedom is better served when countries are independent than when countries are subservient to international communism.

#### **Economic Effects on Poland and Yugoslavia**

I have so far described some of the political effects of section 231. The denial of most-favored-nation benefits would also have serious effects on Polish and Yugoslav trade and economic relations with the United States. An analysis of the statistics on trade with Yugoslavia indicates that more than 90 percent of Yugoslavia's exports to the United States would be subject to significantly higher duties. Poland has enjoyed MFN benefits only since the end of 1960 and thus has only recently begun to develop a market here. But the loss of dollar earnings by these countries, whether current or potential, would be the same. Our exports to Poland and Yugoslavia would suffer, and both these countries would have difficulty in servicing their substantial financial obligations to the United States Government and to American citizens in the absence of dollar earnings. Yugoslavia's dollar obligations to the United States this year are about \$10 million and will increase to \$13 million next year. Poland's obligations to the United States over the next several years are in excess of \$13 million annually and will rise to over \$20 million in 1967. Included in the Polish obligation are payments of \$2 million annually to be paid to American nationals for claims compensation. In this connection, I would draw attention to the fact,

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1960, p. 863.

which I mentioned earlier, that Poland was restored to MFN status late in 1960 following its agreement to a \$40 million claims settlement. Termination of MFN status would thus call into question the continuation of these claims payments. I would also like to point out that both Poland and Yugoslavia have since the end of World War II faithfully observed their financial obligations to the United States.

I have tried to describe why we believe it is essential to the pursuit of United States objectives in Eastern Europe to obtain enactment of the amendment proposed by the President. I would now like to make clear how the administration would propose to make use of the discretionary authority provided by the amendment.

As I have pointed out, the amendment would require the President to determine that the extension of MFN benefits would promote the independence of the country from domination or control by international communism. In present circumstances, the only Communist countries which we believe can satisfy this requirement are Poland and Yugoslavia.

#### **Yugoslavia Pursuing Independent Policy**

Yugoslavia, it is clear, is pursuing an independent policy. While its foreign policy, in many instances, appears close to Soviet positions, Yugoslav policies are in fact independent and unaligned. This is shown by the fact that Yugoslavia does not give constant and unvarying support to Soviet foreign policy. There are important instances in which the Yugoslavs have opposed Soviet policies, such as on the question of the reorganization and financing of the United Nations.

In the years since Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet bloc in 1948 it has been transformed from a model Soviet satellite to a country which has extensive economic and cultural ties with the West. One need only consider the following examples to illustrate this fact:

(1) About 77 percent of Yugoslavia's trade in 1962 was with the West;

(2) Yugoslavia's institutions have evolved to the point where Yugoslavia today can participate with little difficulty in Western-style international organizations such as the GATT [Gen-

eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the IMF [International Monetary Fund], and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]. It is an observer in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development];

(3) English has replaced Russian as the second language of the country;

(4) In 1960 there were published in Yugoslavia 86 books in the English language, 57 in French, 49 in German, and 31 in Russian;

(5) Yugoslavia is tied in with the Western European radio and television networks. It participated in the first exchange of Telstar transmissions;

(6) The Voice of America is, of course, not jammed in Yugoslavia and has a very large audience there;

(7) Of a total of 1,300,000 persons visiting Yugoslavia in 1962, only some 50,000 came from Soviet bloc countries.

We are aware, of course, that evidence of an improvement in Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union has raised questions in the minds of many people whether Yugoslavia has not returned to the Soviet fold or whether it makes any difference that Yugoslavia is independent, since it appears to support many Soviet positions on international questions. I would like to say to this that information developed independently by this Government, as well as the actions and statements of the Yugoslavs and the leading powers of the Sino-Soviet bloc themselves, make it plain that Yugoslavia has not returned to the Soviet fold. The improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union reflects a change in Soviet policy, perhaps for tactical reasons, in recognizing Yugoslavia's position as an independent socialist country.

Yugoslavia meanwhile has proceeded to promulgate its new constitution, which represents a codification and institutionalization of the unorthodox system and independent policies which have evolved in Yugoslavia since 1948, and which have been consistently regarded as heretical by the Sino-Soviet bloc. The New China News Agency on May 9, in commenting on the new Yugoslav constitution stated that:

The new constitution . . . openly abolishes the dictatorship of the proletariat and negates the leading

role of the working class. . . . In foreign policy, the new constitution makes no mention at all of imperialism, but zealously calls for the establishment and development of every form of international cooperation. . . .

On May 10, *Peoples' Daily* of Peiping commented further that the Yugoslavs could not possibly "cover up their revisionist features and the fact that capitalism has been restored in Yugoslavia."

It is clear that it makes a great deal of difference to United States interests whether Yugoslavia is an independent country or whether it is a full-fledged participant and partner in the international Communist conspiracy. Indeed, it is a matter of obvious strategic importance to us whether Soviet military power is on the Adriatic and whether Soviet-controlled forces are menacing Greece and Italy. The gains to the West accruing from the independent policies of the Yugoslavs are well documented and are as important in today's international situation as they were in the years immediately following Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform.

#### **The Polish Situation**

The Polish situation is, of course, less clear than the case of Yugoslavia. Out of the upheaval in 1956 in Eastern Europe emerged the Gomulka regime, a regime which was loyal to Marxism, a full participant in Soviet bloc councils, but one which sought to travel a peculiarly Polish road. The Gomulka government was able to assert a considerable measure of autonomy, particularly in matters of internal policy, but also in pursuit of bilateral relations with the West. Several members of this committee have traveled to Poland and other Eastern European countries and have seen for themselves the extent to which Polish policies differ from those of other Communist countries in the Soviet bloc. They have reported to this committee on the extent of the United States presence in Poland. They have drawn attention to the information program we operate in Poland and the fact that the Voice of America is not jammed in Poland. The contacts we have established with many elements of Polish society are well known. Attention has been drawn to the fact that Polish agriculture re-

mains essentially free—the only country in the Soviet bloc where this is so. All of these factors have had important effects of interest to the United States in Poland as well as within neighboring Communist countries.

We have always recognized that our efforts in Poland represented something of a gamble, much more of a gamble than has been involved in our efforts in Yugoslavia, which after all has been and remains an independent country. But we have sufficient confidence in our own cause to believe that the gamble is worth while. Where we have a real and effective presence in a country, we can directly advance our interests. We cannot pursue our interests by a policy of isolation and withdrawal.

#### **U.S. Relations With Poland and Yugoslavia**

In concluding my statement, I would like to quote from President Kennedy's message of April 2 to the Congress,<sup>3</sup> transmitting this bill, in which he said,

. . . it is my conviction that trade and other forms of normal relations constitute a sounder basis than aid for our future relationship with these countries.

The only assistance which has been programmed for Poland or Yugoslavia, apart from Public Law 480 sales, in the current fiscal year will be in support of the privately sponsored children's hospital project in Poland. It is our expectation that Public Law 480 assistance will also diminish sharply in the future as these countries become increasingly able to purchase agricultural commodities from the United States on commercial terms.

The extension of most-favored-nation treatment to Poland and Yugoslavia does not involve any cost to the United States. The dollars which these countries earn in their trade with the United States are ultimately spent here, either for goods or services, or in payment of financial obligations to the United States Government and its nationals. This, I would like to emphasize, is not a request for aid, but for discretionary authority to the President to pursue trade relations beneficial to the United States.

The development and maintenance of normal

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.



trade relations with Poland and Yugoslavia is essential if we are to preserve the gains of our past policies toward these countries as well as to advance further United States objectives in Eastern Europe.

In an article in the *New York Times* last year Governor [Christian A.] Herter stated:

Surely this is not the time to walk away from the competition. I can think of few actions on our part that would be more welcome in Moscow than that. If I were Mr. Khrushchev, I would surely heave a sigh of relief if I knew that Poland's and Yugoslavia's windows to the West were being bricked over. Never have the signs of international disarray been more obvious within the Soviet empire than they are today. Never have the forces of autonomy and independence been more evident.

I believe this quotation from Governor Herter's article aptly summarizes the issue which faces us in this matter.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 88th Congress, 1st Session

Immediate and Future Problems in the Congo. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 14, 1963. 22 pp.

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization pursuant to S. Res. 263, 87th Congress, 2d session, as extended. S. Rept. 85. April 1, 1963. 6 pp.

Proclaiming Sir Winston Churchill an Honorary Citizen of the United States of America. Report to accompany H.R. 4374. S. Rept. 86. April 2, 1963. 4 pp.

A Special Study on the Effectiveness of the Past Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the U.S. Department of State. A report to Congress from the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, also constituting the first annual report of the Commission. H. Doc. 93. April 2, 1963. 46 pp.

Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, To Authorize Additional Appropriations. Report to accompany H.R. 5207. H. Rept. 194. April 4, 1963. 12 pp.

Castro Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. Report by Representatives Selden, O'Hara, Fascell, Farbstein, Beckworth, Mailliard, Whalley, and Gross of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,

submitted pursuant to H. Res. 55. H. Rept. 195. April 4, 1963. 13 pp.

Arab Refugees From Palestine. Report of a special study mission to the Near East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, by Hon. Leonard Farbstein, pursuant to H. Res. 55. H. Rept. 196. April 4, 1963. 9 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5490. Part I. April 5-10, 1963. 183 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee To Examine and Review the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War Claims Act of 1948, together with supplemental views, pursuant to S. Res. 268, 87th Cong., 2d sess., as extended. S. Rept. 128. April 9, 1963. 10 pp.

Proposed Amendments to the Budget for the Department of State. Communication from the President transmitting proposed amendments to the budget for the fiscal year 1964 in the amount of \$80,000 for the Special Representative of Trade Negotiations and a decrease of \$445,000 for the Department of State. H. Doc. 100. April 11, 1963. 2 pp.

Amendments to the Budget Involving a Decrease for Foreign Assistance. Communication from the President transmitting amendments to the budget for the fiscal year 1964 involving a decrease in the amount of \$419,700,000. H. Doc. 101. April 11, 1963. 3 pp.

A Report on the Alliance for Progress, 1963, by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, to the Senate Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations. S. Doc. 13. April 11, 1963. 38 pp.

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part 2. April 18, 1963. 98 pp.

Assuring Payment of Just Compensation for the Use and Occupancy of Certain Lands on Kwajalein and Dalap Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 2072. H. Rept. 221. April 22, 1963. 19 pp.

Special Study Mission to Latin America: Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica. Report of special study mission comprising Representatives Selden, Mailliard, Church, and Curtis of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 60, 87th Congress. H. Rept. 223. April 23, 1963. 66 pp.

Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 347 and H.J. Res. 387. April 24, 1963. 23 pp.

Conditions Behind the Iron Curtain and in Selected Countries of Western Europe. Report of the special study mission to Europe, comprising Representatives Monagan, McDowell, and Broomfield of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 60, 87th Congress. H. Rept. 234. April 24, 1963. 19 pp.

Authorizing the Issuance of Certificates of Citizenship in the Canal Zone. Report to accompany H.R. 5175. H. Rept. 239. April 25, 1963. 4 pp.

Report on Hearings on Captive European Nations by the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 60, 87th Congress. H. Rept. 253. April 29, 1963. 24 pp.



**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES**

**Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>**

**Adjourned During May 1963**

U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: 14th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 15-May 10
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 22d Plenary Meeting.	Bangalore . . . . .	Apr. 16-May 1
U.N. Committee on Outer Space: Legal Subcommittee . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 16-May 3
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 18th Session . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 18-May 4
ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 18th Session . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 17
ECOSOC Social Commission: 15th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 24-May 10
IMCO Group of Experts on Facilitation of Travel and Transport: 2d Session.	London . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 3
ICEM Council: 19th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 3
WMO Executive Committee: 15th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 4
ECAFE Working Party on Small-Scale Industries: 7th Session.	Bangkok . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 6
ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 11th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 10
UNESCO Executive Board: 65th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 17
IAEA Diplomatic Conference for Concluding a Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.	Vienna . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 17
FAO Eastern Desert Locust Control Committee: 2d Special Meeting.	Rome . . . . .	May 1-3
Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Labor . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	May 5-11
Pan American Highway Congress: 7th Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Washington . . . . .	May 6 (1 day)
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 2d Session of Bureau and Consultative Committee.	Moscow . . . . .	May 6-8
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 8th Session . . . .	Rome . . . . .	May 6-10
ILO Textiles Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 6-17
9th Pan American Highway Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 6-18
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America: 10th Session.	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . . .	May 6-18
16th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 7-24
OECD Industry Committee: General Working Party . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 8-9
Permanent International Fisheries Convention 1946: 11th Meeting.	London . . . . .	May 8-11
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices.	Paris . . . . .	May 9-10
16th International Film Festival . . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	May 9-22
OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee for Textiles.	Paris . . . . .	May 10 (1 day)
NATO Civil Defense Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 10-11
NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee. . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 10-11
OECD Fisheries Committee: Working Party of Officers . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 13-14
FAO World Food Program: 3d Session of Intergovernmental Committee.	Rome . . . . .	May 13-18
U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 3d Session.	New York . . . . .	May 13-31

<sup>1</sup>Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 29, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

U.N. Committee on Outer Space: Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.	Geneva . . . . .	May 13-31
OECD Maritime Transport Committee: Working Party . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 14 (1 day)
International Rubber Study Group Management Committee: 73d Meeting.	Paris . . . . .	May 14 (1 day)
GATT Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 16-21
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 8th Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Lima . . . . .	May 20-21
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Symposium on Peak Load Coverage.	Venice . . . . .	May 20-23
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Statistics of Financial Assets and Liabilities.	Geneva . . . . .	May 20-24
Preparatory Meeting of Experts in the Field of Scientific Hydrology.	Paris . . . . .	May 20-29
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 36th Session . . .	Rome . . . . .	May 20-31
ITU CCITT/CCIR Plan Subcommittee for Development of the International Network in Latin America: 2d Session.	Bogotá . . . . .	May 20-31
OECD Greek Consortium . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 21-22
IMCO Council: 8th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	May 21-24
Inter-American Commission of Women: Special Assembly . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 21-30
NATO Ministerial Council . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	May 22-24
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: Board of Directors.	Lima . . . . .	May 22-26
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 4th Meeting.	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . . . .	May 27-28
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems . .	London . . . . .	May 27-30
CENTO Scientific Council . . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	May 27-30
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Braking Problems: 8th Meeting.	Venice . . . . .	May 27-31
WHO Executive Board: 32d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-30
PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting.	Brussels . . . . .	May 28-31
NATO Medical Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 30-31

### In Session as of May 31, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
U.N. General Assembly: 4th Special Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 14, 1963-
ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services: Meeting of Operations Division.	Montreal . . . . .	May 14-
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development: 2d Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 21-
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	May 27-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 13th Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	May 27-
ECAFE Training Center Seminar on Customs Administration.	Bangkok . . . . .	May 28-
Second Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	Mar del Plata, Argentina . . . . .	May 29-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 29-

### In Recess as of May 31, 1963

GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. 15, 1962, until September 1963).	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24, 1962-
---	------------------	-----------------

## International Cooperation in Education, Science, and Culture

12TH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF UNESCO, PARIS, NOVEMBER 9-DECEMBER 12, 1962

*by Lucius D. Battle*

The 12th General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, held at Paris from November 9 to December 12, 1962, grappled with a number of significant issues in the field of the organization's particular competence—education, science, and culture—as well as in the field of general political affairs.

The increasing challenge facing UNESCO was reflected in the admission of six new nations to the organization just prior to the opening of the conference. The six new members—Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda—brought membership to 113. All member states were represented with the exception of Bolivia, Haiti, Iraq, and Yemen.

The position of the United States at the conference was primarily shaped by the need of these new and developing countries for massive programs of education and training to develop their human resources. This need was also at the heart of the resolution proposed by the United States and unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly last year designating

the 1960's as the U.N. Development Decade.

The United States went to the General Conference with the firm intention to have UNESCO play its full part in the U.N. Development Decade. To do so, the U.S. delegation made it clear that UNESCO must concentrate its resources on tasks which it is eminently qualified to undertake—such as educational planning and development—and eliminate marginal activities which, if allowed to grow further, would continue to sap its strength, contributing neither to the Development Decade nor to other legitimate objectives of the organization in the fields of education, science, and culture.

In line with this position to cut nonessential parts of the program in favor of increased activities in the field of economic and social development, the United States favored: (1) a reduction in the number and length of meetings; (2) a review of subsidies to nongovernmental organizations; (3) the phasing out of support to UNESCO-sponsored institutes and centers; (4) the shifting of UNESCO activities which primarily concern other U.N. specialized agencies; and (5) the elimination of publications, seminars, and projects which lead to polemics rather than scholarly results. The United States was also interested in initiating a management survey to improve the operations and effectiveness of the organization.

The United States found solid support for its position not only in the political debates but

• *Mr. Battle is Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. He was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 12th General Conference of UNESCO.*

in the program discussions as reflected in the critical vote on the budget and the program as finally adopted. The United States can find satisfaction, too, in the action taken by the General Conference on the thorny question of saving the temples of Abu Simbel, and in the election of new members to the Executive Board, which supervises the UNESCO program between the sessions of the General Conference. The United States proposal for a management survey was also approved in a modified form.

The UNESCO Conference at its opening rejected by a vote of 48 to 33, with 17 abstentions, a move to admit Communist China. The fight to seat the Peiping government was sparked by Cuba, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, and Byelorussia, while the United States took the lead with Britain, France, and Nationalist China to vote the motion down. Similarly, a move to seat as observers five organizations made up of nongovernmental organizations within the Communist nations was rejected. The vote was 40 to 25, with 11 abstentions.

Before tackling the budget, the General Conference elected René Maheu of France as the new Director General. Mr. Maheu, who had been nominated by the Executive Board, was elected by a vote of 89 to 10, with 4 abstentions.

As for the budget, the United States was interested in establishing a level compatible with the capacity of the organization to operate effectively. Specifically, the United States strongly supported a budget ceiling of \$38 million recommended by the Executive Board as opposed to the Director General's budget of \$40.8 million, not including mandatory increases. When it became apparent that neither of these budget levels could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority, the United States agreed to a compromise of \$39 million, partly because of the requirement of meeting mandatory increases not budgeted for in the \$38 million.

The General Conference reaffirmed its adherence to the objectives of the Decade of Development and pledged the organization to assume its full role. A resolution to that effect specified that UNESCO's participation in the Decade should be based on the strict order of priority of the programs within its competence.

In the more detailed aspects of the program, the United States was successful in having its major objectives approved and in thwarting Soviet bloc efforts to make any significant changes in the program for propaganda purposes.

Highlights of the approved program follow:

### **Education**

In line with educational priorities of the U.N. Development Decade, the General Conference approved a proposal, strongly supported by the United States, for the establishment of an International Institute for Educational Planning in Paris to fill the demand for high-level training and research in educational planning and development. This semiautonomous institute, to be financed by UNESCO, the World Bank, foundations, and fees, would also coordinate and strengthen existing programs of the UNESCO regional centers and other public and private institutions working in the field of human resources development.

UNESCO's assistance to member states will be concentrated on the four regional programs (extension and improvement of primary education in Latin America; assistance to Africa, the Arab states, and Asia). This part of the program for 1963-64 includes regional conferences to review progress made in regional development plans drafted in recent years in Addis Ababa, Beirut, Karachi, and Santiago. UNESCO will also try to adapt new techniques of education to the educational needs of underdeveloped countries. Plans call for a pilot project in teacher training in these techniques in 1963-64.

In response to a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly calling for a world literacy campaign, the General Conference pledged UNESCO's readiness to support such a campaign but called the Assembly's attention to the fact that much of UNESCO's share will have to come from extrabudgetary sources. It was estimated that UNESCO would have to spend \$10 million a year. The conference, however, agreed to set up a commission of experts to survey the problem of illiteracy throughout the world and work out concrete and effective measures for a campaign.

## Natural Sciences

UNESCO will move into the next biennium with an impressive natural sciences program focused largely on the problems of the developing countries. At the same time, this program will involve increased efforts to utilize the opportunities offered by science as an instrument of peaceful cooperation among nations.

The principal innovation in this section is the program in scientific hydrology, for which the General Conference authorized \$117,000 for 1963-64. This program, originally proposed by the United States in recognition of the increasing need for available water resources in many areas of the world, will prepare the way during the next 2 years for an International Hydrological Decade (1965-1974). UNESCO will convene an intergovernmental meeting of experts in 1963, which will lay the groundwork for an intergovernmental conference to be held the following year, to consider and approve plans for the Decade. In the meantime UNESCO will initiate a program of fellowships and exchanges of hydrological information to help overcome the serious shortage of trained hydrologists.

The oceanographic program, which was also established on United States initiative in 1960, will emphasize assistance to national and regional laboratories in Southeast Asia, Latin America, West Africa, and the Indian Ocean region. UNESCO will also award 16 fellowships in marine sciences under its regular program.

In the field of scientific documentation, plans call for four working parties to examine specific technical problems in preparation for a final working group in early 1964. This latter group will define specific recommendations to improve coordination in the field. An important part of the effort will be activities designed to make more scientific documentation available to scientists in the developing countries.

In the space-related sciences, UNESCO will concentrate on the training of specialists in such fields as satellite tracking and telemetry reception, paying particular attention to the needs of the emerging nations for these kinds of personnel. UNESCO will also participate in the planning of international research programs in

this field (most particularly the International Year of the Quiet Sun).

## Social Sciences

In the field of social sciences, UNESCO will concentrate on the problems of the developing nations, with emphasis on teaching, research, and the application of the social sciences to problems of social and economic development.

In teaching and research, UNESCO will conduct field operations designed to aid member states in the development of their institutions of higher education and research centers. At the request of member states, UNESCO will send advisory missions and experts, organize scientific meetings and seminars, and award fellowships for the training of specialists in the various branches of the social sciences. Most noteworthy will be increased support in the way of teachers and fellowships to the Latin American Social Science Faculty at Santiago de Chile.

As for the application of the social sciences to practical developmental problems, UNESCO's new Analysis Unit will seek better methods for assessing the impact of education, science, technology, and mass communication in countries at different stages of development. Such assessment will guide member states in educational planning and international aid. On request, the Analysis Unit will provide advice to member states and international organizations on the relations between different patterns of development and educational needs.

Finally, UNESCO will continue its substantial support of the Research Center on Social and Economic Development in Southern Asia (Delhi) and the Latin American Social Science Research Center (Rio de Janeiro).

## Mass Communications

UNESCO's 1963-64 program in mass communications will be concentrated on four areas of activity: development of mass communication media, the use of mass communication techniques in education, free flow of information, and public information about UNESCO and the rest of the U.N. family. This program represents an initial answer to the challenge of the

"information famine" which afflicts 2 billion people today. UNESCO has completed a survey of the needs of the underdeveloped areas for information media development. Three regional meetings were held, the first at Bangkok in 1960 for Southeast Asia, the second at Santiago de Chile in 1961 for Latin America, and the third at Paris in 1962 for Africa. Mindful of the importance of mass media in the overall process of social and economic development, UNESCO will attempt to help member states make the most effective use of their own national facilities and of international aid through expert meetings and fellowships.

The General Conference also approved a proposal involving the use of communications satellites in UNESCO's work. Following the 1963 International Telecommunication Union Conference on Space Frequency Allocation, UNESCO will convene a meeting of experts to discuss the uses of satellite communications for education, the free flow of information and ideas, and the promotion of understanding among nations.

In the exciting new field of education through mass communication techniques, UNESCO will carry out several highly interesting projects in adopting the use of such new devices as programmed instruction, educational television, and other new audiovisual materials which could conceivably revolutionize education in developing countries.

### **Cultural Activities**

UNESCO will also strengthen its efforts to integrate its cultural activities into the general framework of the U.N. Decade of Development. Indicative of this trend is the marked expansion of the program for the production of reading materials for new literates in Asia. This project will give particular attention to the improvement of methods of distributing books and to the development of central institutions for coordination and promotion, as well as of appropriate professional organizations.

The greatest regional emphasis will be on tropical Africa. Among other activities in the area, there will be several projects in library

and museum development. This is in line with a new emphasis on the development of institutions for cultural dissemination to stimulate broader popular participation in cultural affairs by the people of the emerging nations.

In order to promote the balanced development of the emerging societies, UNESCO will initiate humanistic studies in the modern sociocultural problems of tropical Africa. Subjects for consideration will include the present position of African culture, communication between African cultures and those of other continents, and mass participation in cultural activities.

Besides providing valuable subventions to nongovernmental organizations, the program in arts and letters will feature the expansion of the *UNESCO World Art Series*. New albums, color slides, and pocket books will be issued, and member states will be encouraged to increase their exchanges of works of art.

The General Conference was marked by a vigorous discussion of a proposal to finance the preservation of the temples of Abu Simbel by commercial loans, to be repaid from the program budget. In effect, the proposal would have shifted the voluntary campaign to a mandatory one. This arrangement would have heavily obligated UNESCO (and therefore its member states) for many years beyond the 1963-64 budget period, with adverse implications for other educational, scientific, and cultural programs. Although this proposal was finally rejected, the organization is continuing its efforts to secure voluntary contributions for Abu Simbel as part of the International Campaign To Save the Monuments of Nubia.

In addition to these major matters, the General Conference approved a protocol to the convention on the elimination of discrimination in education, a recommendation concerning the safeguarding of the beauty and character of landscapes and sites, and a recommendation on technical and vocational education. The General Conference also authorized the Director General to prepare the text of an international recommendation designed to prohibit and prevent the illicit export and sale of cultural property, which will be submitted to the next General Conference in 1964.

## **U.S. Urges Security Council To Await OAS Action on Haiti**

*Statement by Charles W. Yost*<sup>1</sup>

I should perhaps say at the outset that I am always gratified by the faithfulness and attention with which our Soviet colleague reads the American press and can only recommend that he continue to do so hopefully with somewhat more thoroughness and objectivity. However, Mr. President, I do find it most unfortunate that he so often insists on introducing the cold war with its familiar baseless accusations into the deliberations of this Council. Such behavior together with the extravagant Soviet use of the veto is hardly likely to strengthen public confidence in the dignity and seriousness of this Council, to the successful functions of which the United States, for its part, attaches such outstanding importance.

Now, Mr. President, to turn to the business before us, the situation which confronts the Council has been fully presented, and I shall be brief. The distinguished representative of Venezuela has given us an excellent analysis of the juridical questions involved, particularly as to the rights and obligations of members of the Organization of American States. The distinguished representative of Brazil has described how the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Charter of the Organization of American States complement and complete each other.

On May 5 the Government of the Republic of Haiti requested<sup>2</sup> that the Security Council be convened urgently to examine the matter before us. It has been the traditional policy of the United States that, except in unusual situations, requests by a member state for meetings of the Security Council on threats to the peace should be honored. For this reason my delegation supported the adoption of the agenda.

The attention of the Council has been invited, however, by several previous speakers to the

provisions of article 52 of the charter, and particularly to paragraphs 2 and 3 of that article, which provide that members of the United Nations shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or regional agencies, and which asks the Security Council to encourage such practice.

Furthermore, article 33 of the charter states that parties to any dispute likely to endanger peace and security shall "first of all" seek a solution by various peaceful means, among which is included "resort to regional agencies or arrangements." Also, consistent with these provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States provides in its article 20, as has been pointed out, that international disputes that may arise between American states should be submitted to the peaceful procedures of that organization before being referred to the Security Council.

The provisions I have just referred to do not, of course, derogate from the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations. But they do prescribe the procedures and the priorities under which the authors of the two charters envisaged that local disputes would be normally dealt with.

Pursuant to these procedures envisaged in both charters, we strongly believe that the proper agency for action in this particular situation is the Organization of American States, especially since that organization has promptly and effectively seized itself of the problem.

As the Council is aware, after being seized of the problem, the [OAS] Council appointed a committee of five members to make an immediate, on-the-spot study of the events cited by the Dominican Republic. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador were designated members of this committee.

The committee left on the night of April 29 for Port-au-Prince, where it was received by the Haitian Government. During its 3-day visit, the committee received full assurances that the Government of Haiti would guarantee that foreign diplomatic missions, their personnel, and those who have availed themselves of diplomatic protection would be respected and safe-conduct documents would be granted so that

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Security Council on May 9 (U.S./U.N. press release 4204). Mr. Yost is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. S/5302 dated May 6.

persons in asylum in certain embassies could leave Haiti. The investigating committee then continued to the Dominican Republic, and four members of the committee returned to Washington on May 5 to report to the Council of the Organization of American States. The chairman and another remained in the Dominican Republic to maintain close watch over developments in the dispute.

As a result of an informal session of the Council of the Organization of American States on May 6, the chairman of the Council sent cables to the Governments of both states re-emphasizing the importance of refraining from any action which would aggravate the situation or constitute a breach of peace.

I am pleased to note that in response to these appeals the Government of Haiti has indicated it has taken certain steps to reduce tensions, such as assuring the safe departure of individuals seeking political asylum, and that the Government of the Dominican Republic has assured the Organization of American States it will heed the obligations of the charter of that organization and the resolutions adopted by the Council.

At its meeting on May 8 the Council of the Organization of American States adopted a further resolution which has been read to this Council and with which we are familiar.

I believe that the prompt and energetic measures taken by the Organization of American States have already gone far toward preserving the peace and restoring calm in the area and that they have prevented actions which might have aggravated the situation. The Organization of American States continues, moreover, to keep the situation under its active attention and to report fully and promptly to the Security Council on this dispute, pursuant to article 54 of the charter.

In closing I should once again like to stress the harmonious interrelationship between this Council and the Council of the Organization of American States in dealing with important questions affecting the maintenance of peace and security. Prompt action by the latter in a regional dispute is appropriate and is clearly the procedure envisaged by the United Nations Charter. In the opinion of my Government, for the reasons we have put forward, the proper

course is for the Organization of American States to continue the laudible and effective efforts it is now making to resolve this dispute.<sup>3</sup>

## United States Delegations to International Conferences

### International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on May 29 (press release 287) that the following persons would be the principal U.S. representatives to the 47th session of the International Labor Conference at Geneva June 5-27.<sup>1</sup>

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
*Delegates*

George L-P Weaver, *chairman*, Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs

George P. Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

*Substitute Delegate*

John F. Skillman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce

*Congressional Advisers*

William H. Ayres, House of Representatives

Adam Clayton Powell, House of Representatives

*Senior Adviser*

Roger W. Tobby, Ambassador, U.S. Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES  
*Delegate*

Richard Wagner, Chairman of the Board, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and Chairman of the Executive Committee, Champlin Oil and Refining Co., Chicago, Ill.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES  
*Delegate*

Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, International Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.

---

<sup>3</sup> On May 9 the President of the Security Council, Roger Seydoux, concluded the debate with a consensus statement to the effect that a majority of the members seemed to prefer to leave the initiative to the regional organization, the OAS, which was trying to bring about an amicable settlement of the dispute. The question remained formally on the Security Council agenda.

<sup>1</sup> For names of the advisers to the tripartite delegation, see Department of State press release 287 dated May 29.



The principal items to be discussed are: (1) termination of employment; (2) benefits in the case of industrial accidents and occupational diseases; (3) prohibition of sale, hire, and use of inadequately guarded machinery; and (4) hygiene in shops and offices.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

- Letter dated March 11, 1963, from the acting permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General regarding aggressive acts committed by Israel. S/5258. March 11, 1963. 2 pp.
- Letter dated March 11, 1963, from the deputy permanent representative of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting a letter dated March 4 from the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs on U.N. negotiations on Caribbean crisis. S/5259. March 13, 1963. 16 pp.
- Exchanges of letters between the permanent representative of Venezuela and the President of the Security Council regarding publication and circulation of Security Council documents. S/5260, March 14, 1963, 2 pp.; S/5266, March 19, 1963, 1 p.; S/5268, March 22, 1963, 2 pp.; S/5269, March 25, 1963, 1 p.; S/5272, March 27, 1963, 1 p.; S/5273, March 28, 1963, 1 p.
- Note verbale dated March 15, 1963, from the permanent representative of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General regarding the Syrian allegations contained in document S/5258. S/5261. March 15, 1963. 3 pp.
- Letter dated March 16, 1963, from the Chargé d'Affaires of the delegation of India addressed to the President of the Security Council commenting upon and enclosing the text of a Sino-Pakistan border agreement. S/5263, March 18, 1963, 14 pp.; S/5263/Corr. 1, March 19, 1963, 3 pp.
- Letter dated March 30, 1963, from the permanent representative of China addressed to the President of the Security Council stating his Government's position on the "so-called border agreement" referred to in document S/5263. S/5275. April 1, 1963. 1 p.

### General Assembly

- Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Political and Constitutional Information on Caribbean and Western Atlantic Territories Under United Kingdom Administration. Notes by the Secretary-General on: Bahamas, A/5403/Add.1, March 15, 1963, 4 pp.; Bermuda, A/5403/Add.2, March 15, 1963, 6 pp.; British Honduras, A/5403/Add.3, March 15, 1963, 4 pp.; British Guiana, A/5403/Add.4, March 15, 1963, 9 pp.; Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, A/5403/Add.5, March 15, 1963, 5 pp.; Barbados, A/5403/Add.6, March 15, 1963, 6 pp.;

- Cayman Islands, A/5403/Add.7, March 15, 1963, 4 pp.; Falkland Islands, A/5403/Add.8, March 18, 1963, 4 pp.; Turks and Caicos Islands, A/5403/Add.9, March 18, 1963, 4 pp.; Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, A/5403/Add.10, March 18, 1963, 9 pp.; British Virgin Islands, A/5403/Add.11, March 20, 1963, 3 pp.
- Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. A/5406. March 22, 1963. 4 pp.
- Territories Under Portuguese Administration. Exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the permanent representative of Portugal, dated March 20 and March 31 respectively. A/AC.109/36. April 1, 1963. 6 pp.

### Disarmament Commission

- Official Records. Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962. New York, 1963. 275 pp.

### Economic and Social Council

#### Commission on Human Rights:

- Draft principles on freedom and nondiscrimination in the matter of political rights. E/CN.4/837, December 12, 1962, 20 pp.; E/CN.4/837/Add. 1. January 10, 1963, 19 pp.; E/CN.4/845, January 17, 1963, 46 pp.
- Advisory services in the field of human rights. E/CN.4/834. December 20, 1962. 12 pp.
- Comments of governments on the study of the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, and draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. E/CN.4/835. January 2, 1963. 79 pp.
- Work of the Council in 1963. E/3702. December 13, 1962. 15 pp.
- Social Commission:
- Report on the World Social Situation. Chapters XI-XIV, regional chapters on Social Developments in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. E/CN.5/375/Add.2. March 4, 1963. 192 pp.
- Analysis of Comments From Governments and Specialized Agencies on the Report on the Organization and Administration of Social Services. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/374. March 5, 1963. 18 pp.
- Evaluation of United Nations Technical Assistance Activities in the Field of Rural Community Development. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/373. March 6, 1963. 98 pp.
- Proposed Subject for the 1965 Report on the World Social Situation. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/378. March 6, 1963. 3 pp.
- Housing, Building and Planning. Note by the Secretary-General summarizing the recommendations of the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning. E/CN.5/376. March 7, 1963. 5 pp.
- Progress Made by the United Nations in the Social Field During the Period January 1, 1961-December 31, 1962, and Proposals for the Programme of Work 1963-1965. E/CN.5/377. March 13, 1963. 98 pp.
- Report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts on Community Development. E/CN.5/379. March 14, 1963. 80 pp.
- Methods of Determining Social Allocations and Administrative Arrangements for Social Planning:

An Interim Report. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/380. March 15, 1963. 6 pp.

International Co-operation in Cartography. United Nations Technical Conference on the International Map of the World on the Millionth Scale. Report of the Secretary-General transmitting to the Council the texts of the 13 articles of the specifications adopted by the Conference at Bonn August 3-22, 1962. E/3715/Add.1. March 18, 1963. 12 pp.

Commission on the Status of Women. Report of the Inter-American Commission of Women. E/CN.6/419. March 19, 1963. 50 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Ivory Coast, May 6, 1963.

##### Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. Adopted by the International Labor Conference at its 46th session, Geneva, June 22, 1962.  
*Entered into force:* May 22, 1963.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914; for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.  
*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Senegal, May 2, 1963.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.  
*Accession deposited:* Upper Volta, April 26, 1963.  
*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Senegal, May 2, 1963.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force for the United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Upper Volta, April 26, 1963.  
*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Senegal, May 2, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Jordan, May 8, 1963.

##### Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.  
*Notifications received that they consider themselves bound:* Senegal, May 2, 1963; Ghana, May 3, 1963.

##### Status of Forces

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces. Signed at London June 19, 1951. Entered into force August 23, 1953. TIAS 2846.

*Accession deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, June 1, 1963.

Agreement to supplement the agreement of June 19, 1951 (TIAS 2846), between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, and protocol of signature. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.

*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, June 1, 1963.

*Enters into force:* July 1, 1963.

Agreement to implement paragraph 5 of article 45 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.

*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, June 1, 1963.

*Enters into force:* July 1, 1963.

Administrative agreement to article 60 of the agreement of August 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.

*Enters into force:* July 1, 1963.

Agreement on the abrogation of the convention on rights and obligations of foreign forces and their members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the agreement on the tax treatment of the forces and their members, and the finance convention, all of May 26, 1952 (TIAS 3425), as amended by the protocol of October 23, 1954 (TIAS 3425), on the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.

*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, May 21, 1963.

*Enters into force:* July 1, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

*Ratification deposited:* Ceylon, April 4, 1963.

*Accession deposited:* Algeria, May 3, 1963.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> The date of termination of the agreements referred to is July 1, 1963.

Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notifications of approval:* Dahomey, April 11, 1963; Yugoslavia, April 8, 1963; Singapore-British Borneo Group (Brunei, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore), March 26, 1963.

## Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.

*Signatures:* Czechoslovakia, April 18, 1963; Turkey, April 24, 1963; United Kingdom, May 2, 1963.

## Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Jamaica, May 29, 1963.

## Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

*Accession deposited:* Western Samoa, May 24, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement on the settlement of disputes arising out of direct procurement. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.

*Enters into force:* July 1, 1963.

Agreement on the status of persons on leave. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959.

*Enters into force:* July 1, 1963.

### Guinea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Conakry May 22, 1963. Entered into force May 22, 1963.

### New Zealand

Agreement concerning a program of research on aerospace disturbances, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Wellington May 15, 1963. Entered into force May 15, 1963.

### Niger

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Niger. Effected by exchange of notes at Niamey July 23, 1962. Entered into force July 23, 1962.

### Philippines

Agreement regarding radio broadcasting facilities, with protocol and exchange of notes. Signed at Manila May 6, 1963. Entered into force May 6, 1963.

### Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 28, 1962 (TIAS 5224). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade April 19 and May 9, 1963. Entered into force May 9, 1963.

## PUBLICATIONS

## Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Defense—Furnishing of Assistance To Increase Air Transport Capability of Paraguayan Air Force.** Agreement with Paraguay. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción August 25, 1962. Entered into force August 25, 1962. TIAS 5174. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Construction of Scatter Wave Radio Facility in Vicinity of Yangmingshan, Taiwan.** Agreement with Republic of China. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei August 6, 1958. Entered into force August 6, 1958. With related letter. TIAS 5175. 19 pp. 15¢.

**Defense—Construction of Communications Facility in Vicinity of Kaohsiung, Taiwan.** Agreement with Republic of China. Exchange of Memoranda—Dated at Taipei April 15, 1960. Entered into force April 15, 1960. TIAS 5176. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Construction of Scatter Wave Control Facility in Vicinity of Yangmingshan, Taiwan.** Agreement with Republic of China. Exchange of Memoranda—Dated at Taipei February 28, 1962. Entered into force February 28, 1962. TIAS 5177. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Patents—Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes.** Agreement with Sweden. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. TIAS 5178. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of May 3, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 12 and 16, 1962. Entered into force October 16, 1962. TIAS 5180. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessel.** Agreement with Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn September 19 and 25, 1962. Entered into force September 25, 1962. TIAS 5181. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Republic of the Congo, amending the agreement of November 18, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Léopoldville August 31, 1962. Entered into force August 31, 1962. TIAS 5182. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with Republic of Congo. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brazzaville July 26 and September 1, 1962. Entered into force September 1, 1962. TIAS 5183. 5 pp. 5¢.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.** Declaration on Provisional Accession of Argentina to Agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force with respect to the United States and Argentina October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara October 11, 1962. Entered into force October 11, 1962. TIAS 5185. 2 pp. 5¢.

**American Principles.** Problems of Discrimination and U.S. Foreign Policy (Rusk) . . . 935

**Atomic Energy.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Brazil.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Bulgaria.** Letters of Credence (Popov) . . . 946

**Canada.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Congress**  
 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . 951  
 Department Supports Discretionary Authority for President on Trade With Poland and Yugoslavia (Tyler) . . . 947

**Cuba.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Disarmament.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Dominican Republic.** U.S. Urges Security Council To Await OAS Action on Haiti (Yost) . . . 958

**Economic Affairs.** Department Supports Discretionary Authority for President on Trade With Poland and Yugoslavia (Tyler) . . . 947

**Educational and Cultural Affairs**  
 International Cooperation in Education, Science, and Culture (Battle) . . . 954  
 United States and Thailand Sign Educational Exchange Agreement . . . 945

**Ethiopia.** Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia To Visit U.S. in October . . . 938

**Foreign Aid.** Foreign Aid: The Essential Factors for Success (Bowles) . . . 939

**France.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Haiti.** U.S. Urges Security Council To Await OAS Action on Haiti (Yost) . . . 958

**Human Rights**  
 Problems of Discrimination and U.S. Foreign Policy (Rusk) . . . 935  
 Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**International Organizations and Conferences**  
 Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings . . . 952  
 International Cooperation in Education, Science, and Culture (Battle) . . . 954  
 International Labor Conference (delegation) . . . 959

**Labor.** International Labor Conference (delegation) . . . 959

**Laos.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Non-Self-Governing Territories.** U.S. Survey Mission To Visit Pacific Islands Trust Territory . . . 946

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Poland.** Department Supports Discretionary Authority for President on Trade With Poland and Yugoslavia (Tyler) . . . 947

**Public Affairs.** Annual Foreign Policy Briefing Held for Nongovernmental Organizations . . . 946

**Publications.** Recent Releases . . . 962

**Thailand.** United States and Thailand Sign Educational Exchange Agreement . . . 945

**Treaty Information**  
 Current Actions . . . 961  
 United States and Thailand Sign Educational Exchange Agreement . . . 945

**United Nations**  
 Current U.N. Documents . . . 960  
 U.S. Urges Security Council To Await OAS Action on Haiti (Yost) . . . 958

**U.S.S.R.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Yemen.** Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 29 . . . 931

**Yugoslavia.** Department Supports Discretionary Authority for President on Trade With Poland and Yugoslavia (Tyler) . . . 947

*Name Index*

Battle, Lucius D . . . 954  
 Bowles, Chester . . . 939  
 Popov, Lyubomir . . . 946  
 Rusk, Secretary . . . 931, 935  
 Tyler, William R . . . 947  
 Yost, Charles W . . . 958

**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 27-June 2**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.  
 Release issued prior to May 27 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 282 of May 25.

No.	Date	Subject
*281	5/27	U.S. participation in international conferences.
283	5/27	U.S.-Thailand educational and cultural exchange agreement extended.
284	5/27	Rusk: problems of discrimination and U.S. foreign policy.
*285	5/29	Program for visit of President of India.
286	5/28	Bowles: "Foreign Aid: The Essential Factors for Success."
287	5/29	Delegation to International Labor Conference (rewrite).
288	5/29	Rusk: news conference of May 29.
†289	5/29	Delegation to ANZUS Council meeting (rewrite).
†290	5/31	Foreign Relations volume on Near East and Africa.
†291	5/31	Treize: "The United States and the European Economic Community."
†293	6/1	Dominican Republic credentials (rewrite).
294	6/1	Bulgaria credentials (rewrite).

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



UNITED STATES  
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
 DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
 PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
 (GPO)

the

# The Newly Independent Nations

Department

The following Department of State pamphlets, in the form of fact sheets describing the people, land, history, government, and economy of the newly independent nations, are now available:

of

State

Country	Pub. No.	Price
Republic of Chad . . . . .	7494 . . . . .	5 cents
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) . . . . .	7514 . . . . .	10 cents
Cyprus . . . . .	7503 . . . . .	5 cents
Gabon Republic . . . . .	7495 . . . . .	5 cents
Jamaica . . . . .	7506 . . . . .	5 cents
Islamic Republic of Mauritania . . . . .	7504 . . . . .	5 cents
Somali Republic . . . . .	7453 . . . . .	5 cents
Tanganyika . . . . .	7515 . . . . .	5 cents

*Order Form*

Please send me copies of pamphlets in The Newly Independent Nations series as indicated below:

Chad                       Gabon                       Somali Republic  
 Congo (Brazzaville)     Jamaica                     Tanganyika  
 Cyprus                       Mauritania

*Enclosed find:*

\$.....  
 (cash, check, or money  
 order payable to  
 Supt. of Docs.)

Name: .....

Street Address: .....

City, Zone, and State: .....

364

# Annals

Vol. XLVIII, No. 1252

June 24, 1963

**ANZUS COUNCIL MEETS IN NEW ZEALAND** ● *Text of Communique* . . . . . 967

**U.S. OUTLINES POLICY TOWARD CUBAN REFUGEES** ● *Statement by Assistant Secretary Martin* . . . . . 983

**THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY** ● *by Philip H. Trezise* . . . . . 971

**GATT MINISTERS REACH AGREEMENT ON TARIFF NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES** ● *Statements by Christian A. Herter and Text of Resolution on Trade Negotiations* . . . . . 990

**NEW DIMENSIONS FOR THE COLOMBO PLAN** ● *Article by Matthew J. Marks* . . . . . 977

SPECIAL  
DAILY RECORD  
UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XLVIII, No. 1252 • PUBLICATION 7563

June 24, 1963

---

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25  
Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

# ANZUS Council Meets in New Zealand

## FINAL COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 6

The ANZUS Council met in Wellington on the 5th and 6th of June, 1963. Australia was represented by the Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General, the United States of America by the Honourable W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and New Zealand by the Right Honourable Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. The Ministers expressed satisfaction that the Council had met in Wellington for the first time, and in successive years in the capitals of two South Pacific ANZUS countries.<sup>1</sup>

The cordiality and frankness of the discussions this year, as in the past, served to emphasize the essential character of ANZUS: The Treaty is a forthright recognition of the fact that anything which happens in the Pacific area is of vital concern to all three and that a threat to any of the partners in the area, metropolitan and island territories alike, is equally a threat to the others. The ANZUS Treaty declares in simple and direct terms that in matters of defence Australia, New Zealand and the United States stand as one. In reviewing the course of East-West developments during the past year, particularly those affecting the Pacific area, the Ministers noted with concern the Communist Chinese aggression against India and the continuing threat against that country, the renewal of fighting in Laos, and the persisting Communist assault in South Vietnam. These, and the continued statements of implacable hostility by Communist Chinese leaders, made it clear that the principal threat

to the peace and security of South and South-East Asia and the Pacific region continues to come from the Communist powers, particularly Communist China. The Council reaffirmed the determination of the three ANZUS partners to work together, and with other countries equally determined to preserve their national independence, in promoting the peace and security of the area.

They recalled that in May 1962 the three ANZUS partners, together with the United Kingdom, in order to be in a position to fulfill speedily their SEATO obligations, had deployed forces to help ensure the territorial integrity of Thailand.<sup>2</sup>

They were agreed that the situation in Laos continued to be critical: The Geneva Agreements of 1962 were threatened by Pathet Lao attempts to undermine the Government of National Union. They reaffirmed their support for the independence and genuine neutrality of Laos and the principles of the Geneva Agreements.

The Ministers noted that South Vietnam continued under attack from Viet Cong guerillas, directed and supported from North Vietnam. It was agreed that the Vietnamese Government had, in recent months, seized the initiative from the Communist Viet Cong but that, although the capabilities of the Vietnamese armed forces had improved substantially and the strategic hamlet programme was extending physical protection to a large and increasing proportion of the rural population, the road to the future peace and stability of the country was likely to be a long and difficult one, calling for continued vigorous and unremitting effort on the part of the Government and people of the country and of their friends in the free world.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the communique released at the close of the meeting at Canberra, Australia, May 8-9, 1962, see BULLETIN of May 28, 1962, p. 864.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 4, 1962, p. 904.



It was a source of satisfaction that the improving military position in South Vietnam was accompanied by further social and economic progress by large numbers of Montagnard refugees, the social benefits accompanying the strategic hamlets scheme, the measures to improve the rural economy, and the offer of welcome and rehabilitation for those among the Communist forces who wished to return to a peaceful life.

The three Ministers, recalling their respective Governments' expressions of support for the concept of Malaysia at various of the preparatory stages, noted with satisfaction that the final steps were now being taken for the early formation of the new state. They welcomed the establishment of Malaysia as a major event in the orderly decolonization by which several British territories will gain and exercise their independence as constituent members of a federation. It is the earnest hope of the three countries that the diplomatic discussions going on between the neighbouring nations of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines will promote renewed relations of mutual friendship and regional stability on which economic developmental planning can be securely and successfully based.

The Council strongly emphasized the importance the ANZUS partners attach to economic and social progress in the countries of South and South-East Asia. The ANZUS Governments will do all they can to supplement the efforts of the Asian peoples in their struggle for a better life.

The Council reviewed recent developments in the islands of the Pacific. The Council reaffirmed the need to move steadily forward with the political, economic and social development of the islands so that they might progress to the stage where their peoples could choose their own forms of government and international relationships. The South Pacific Commission could, it was felt, in close association with the island peoples, make a significant contribution to the social and economic progress of the area, and should be given the necessary support for this purpose. The Council agreed that there should be closer liaison and consultation about Pacific questions among the Governments concerned.

The Australian and New Zealand Representatives expressed support for the efforts of the United States and Britain to secure an effective international agreement to end nuclear tests and to bring about general and complete disarmament. In the absence of such an agreement, and in the face of an undiminished threat from the Soviet Union and Communist China, there was no alternative to collective defence.

The Ministers stressed their anxiety to see progress made in the test ban treaty negotiations. There was an urgent need to check the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not at present possessing them. A treaty, adhered to by all nations, providing for the cessation of nuclear tests, with adequate supervision and inspection, would be a promising step towards agreement on general disarmament.

However, the Ministers noted that notwithstanding long years of negotiation agreement on necessary inspection and control, even on the great land masses of the world, had not yet been achieved. In this connection the Ministers referred to proposals which had been made for the exclusion of nuclear weapons from certain designated zones. They considered that until the practicality of providing and maintaining adequate inspection and safeguards for the area of Asia and the South-West Pacific, including as it does vast international waterways, had been demonstrated, the application of this approach to that area would not only be illusory but be positively dangerous, would disturb the existing strategic balance and would increase the risks of aggression.

Reference was made to the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations looking to the entry of Britain into the EEC, and to subsequent discussion on future arrangements for international trade. The vital importance to the three partners of satisfactory access to world markets for primary products was stressed and fully understood. They emphasized that expansion of international trade in both agricultural products and manufactured goods was a major aim of the three Governments.

The Council's discussions were both wide-ranging and intensive. The Ministers were convinced that this regular exchange of views at a high level and the close personal relationships thus established had much to contribute

to the continued strength of the ANZUS association. The intention was expressed to arrange the next meeting within twelve months in the United States.

## **U.S. DELEGATION**

The Department of State announced on May 29 (press release 289) that W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, would serve as U.S. Representative to the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) Council Meeting at Wellington, New Zealand, June 5-6. Advisers to the delegation were:

Anthony B. Akers, Ambassador of the United States to New Zealand

Ruth Bacon, *secretary of delegation*, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Wellington

William C. Battle, Ambassador of the United States to Australia

Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

David C. Cuthell, *coordinator*, Deputy Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Col. R. Fuller, USMC, Office of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu

John J. Czyzak, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Adm. Harry D. Felt, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu

Rear Adm. Luther C. Heinz, USN, Regional Director for Far East, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Capt. Thomas K. Kimmel, USN, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense

Edwin W. Martin, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu

Frank K. Sloan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Col. R. F. Fackler, USAF, Office of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu

## **U.S. Recognizes Government of Republic of Togo**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 305 dated June 6

The Government of the United States has received a request for recognition from the Provisional Government of the Republic of Togo. In this request the Provisional Government stated that its first goal was to "re-establish legality" rapidly by organizing general elections.

On May 5 the Togolese people adopted a new Constitution, chose deputies representing all political parties to the National Assembly, and elected a new President and Vice President. The Togolese Government has also stated that it is prepared to respect its international obligations.

Believing that these declarations and events provide a basis for democratic rule in Togo and expressing the hope that all of the elements in Togo will cooperate toward that end, the United States has decided to recognize the Government of the Republic of Togo. The United States has instructed its representatives in Togo to confirm this decision in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Togo.

## **U.S. and India Reaffirm Agreement on Basic Values and Objectives**

*Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of the Republic of India, made a state visit to the United States June 2-11 at the invitation of President Kennedy.<sup>1</sup> Following is the text of a joint communique released by President Kennedy and President Radhakrishnan after their discussions at Washington on June 3 and 4.*

White House press release dated June 4

At the invitation of President Kennedy, Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of the Republic of India, is paying a State Visit to the United States from the second to the eleventh of June. During his stay in Washington, Dr. Radhakrishnan met the President and members of the United States Government, including members of Congress, and had a frank and friendly exchange of views with them on matters of mutual interest.

In their discussions during the past two days President Kennedy and President Radhakrishnan have reaffirmed that relations between the United States and India, the world's two largest democracies, are based on a large measure of agreement on basic values and objectives.

---

<sup>1</sup>For President Radhakrishnan's itinerary, see Department of State press releases 285 of May 29 and 299 of June 4.

The Presidents of the United States and India agree that the striking advance in science and technology has put enormous power in the hands of men which can be used either for the benefit of humanity or for its destruction. It is, therefore, necessary for all concerned to see that international cooperation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is promoted, that peace is maintained and that the enormous power which science and technology have given is used for the betterment of humanity. The two Presidents express the hope that the Governments and peoples of the world will dedicate themselves to economic and social betterment, particularly in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The President of India spoke of the determination of the Government and the people of India to preserve India's territorial integrity and of their efforts to improve the living standards of the people within the framework of a liberal parliamentary democracy. The President of the United States reiterated the deep interest of the Government and the people of the United States in these endeavors, and reassured President Radhakrishnan that India could count on the warm sympathy and effective assistance of the United States in its development and defense. They agreed that their two countries share a mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against the subcontinent. Both Presidents recognized the vital importance of safeguarding the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of India for peace and stability not only in Asia but in the world.

President Kennedy voiced the admiration of the American people for the great accomplishments already achieved and for the spirit of sacrifice and dedication displayed by the people of India.

President Radhakrishnan expressed the gratitude of his nation for the generous assistance provided by the United States to the Indian people in support of their development and defense.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of their peoples to the cause of peace and freedom in the world. They are confident that their two countries will continue to cooperate in the

future, as in the past, in the attainment of these common objectives. President Kennedy and President Radhakrishnan consider that their highly satisfactory talks have contributed to closer understanding between their two countries and their two peoples.

## **Greek Minister of Coordination Ends Talks With U.S. Officials**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 307 dated June 7

In the course of a visit to the United States to inaugurate the New York office of the International Development Corporation of Greece, opened with a view toward attracting American capital investment, Mr. Panagiotis Papaligouras, Minister of Coordination of Greece, is concluding a week of talks with United States officials. These have included the President, the Secretary of State, other members of the Cabinet, and senior United States Government officials. These talks were held in the atmosphere of trust and friendship which has always characterized relations between our two countries.

The talks covered a series of topics of mutual interest, with particular emphasis upon the economic development program of Greece. Mr. Papaligouras expressed the gratitude of the Greek people and nation for United States assistance and pointed out his Government's belief that Greece has a need for continuing external assistance to achieve a sustained rate of economic growth. The Minister reaffirmed his hope that the efforts to mobilize multilateral assistance in NATO and in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Greek Aid Consortium would be successful. The President and other United States officials expressed their admiration and satisfaction with Greece's efforts in the defense of the free world within the North Atlantic alliance and with the noteworthy rate of Greece's economic progress. The United States interest in Greek defense and economic development was reaffirmed. Mr. Papaligouras was assured that United States understanding and help in both the military and economic fields would continue.

# The United States and the European Economic Community

by Philip H. Trezise

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

You have given me a large topic within which to maneuver. The whole question of the United States' relations with the European Economic Community could occupy much more time than you have given me. I would like, therefore, to limit myself to three aspects of the subject. First, I propose to take a few moments to suggest the perspective in which the Common Market needs to be viewed. Second, I will take up the considerations that operate to pull ourselves and the Common Market countries together. Finally, I will discuss in some detail the issues that are currently giving us difficulty with the Common Market.

## Perspective on the Common Market

As to the matter of perspective, it is just as easy to expect too much from the European Common Market as it is to expect and ask for too little. We are going to need a measure of restraint and wisdom in dealing with what is, after all, a brandnew development in world affairs.

We should remember that ever since the fall of imperial Rome—that is, for a period of about 16 centuries—Western Europe has been broken up into rival national states. In this small piece of land, where physical barriers between regions are much less forbidding than in our own country and where people share a common culture and background, there developed over the years the most appalling and sanguinary dif-

ferences of policy and interest between neighboring countries. Our histories are full of accounts of the military struggles that took place in Western Europe. Even our legends find their inspiration mainly in Europe's endless series of wars.

Until only a few years ago, efforts to unify Western Europe were confined almost entirely to adventures in military conquest. It is helpful to recall that only three of the conquerors—Charles the Great, Napoleon, and Hitler—even came close to success. Their failures were attributable to the strength of national feelings in Europe.

Now, after a millennium and a half of separatism, Western Europe has taken the first steps to accomplish what the military conquerors could not do. We must look at the Common Market against this kind of background.

In the United States we are given to comparing the development of the Common Market with the creation of the federal union of the United States under the Constitution in 1787. This is a natural comparison, and there are in fact certain likenesses. But the differences between these two situations are very great. These differences help us to understand the character of recent European events.

The 13 States of our original confederation had just completed a successful revolutionary war against a common enemy. There were almost no significant differences of language or historical experience among them. Sectional interests had not yet become deeply established. The period during which each of our States had acted as sovereign republics had been so short

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the National Association of Purchasing Agents at Atlantic City, N.J., on June 3 (press release 291 dated May 31).

and so unsatisfactory that very few people had any compelling reason to wish to continue a system of separate economic and political units on this continent. On the contrary, the political and intellectual leaders of that time were acutely aware that we could have neither prosperity nor security without federation and unity.

By contrast, the six countries which form the nucleus of a united Europe have been divided in countless ways. They have behind them individual national histories and a tradition of devastating national rivalries. The two principal members, France and Germany, were bitter enemies for almost a century. Instead of having just emerged from a war against a common enemy, the Six had been engaged in a savage war with one another only a short time ago. In each of the six countries, businessmen and farmers had long been accustomed to separate national economic systems. Within the Six, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg were low-tariff, free-trading countries. West Germany, and particularly France and Italy, were in one way or another high-tariff and protectionist. In terms of living standards there were wide disparities as between, say, southern Italy at one extreme and Holland at the other. When the Common Market began to be talked about, many people in Europe could reasonably have expected to lose or, at least, to be exposed to unwelcome competition, if their countries proceeded to merge their economies with the other European states.

In these circumstances it was not in prospect that union in Western Europe was going to be accomplished in one single stroke, as was done in Philadelphia in 1787. Unlike our Constitution, the Treaty of Rome did not create a sovereign nation of its signatories. At the most, it set in motion a process of unification. That process has already gone some distance. As we see, however, it is subject to interruption and delay. National interests have not by any means been generally subordinated to the common interest.

It would be unreasonable, realistically speaking, to expect that they would have been. At this point, however, the continued existence of the Common Market is not in doubt. The prog-

ress toward unification obviously is not going to be as fast as seemed possible only a few months ago. Equally, the durability of the existing structure is not in serious question.

### **U.S. Interest in European Unity**

The movement toward unity in Europe has had consistent and powerful support from the United States. General [George C.] Marshall's historic speech at Harvard in 1947 made it clear that we believed that European recovery would have to be organized as a common effort. In the Congress there was strong pressure throughout the years of the Marshall Plan for European integration. It is fair to say that at every point in time the attitude of the administration in power in Washington has been one of benevolence and encouragement toward the drive for unification in Europe.

Our interest in European unity has been impelled by motives of self-interest, but self-interest in the most enlightened sense. Originally it seemed to us that Europe could not overcome the economic and political consequences of World War II unless national barriers were reduced and national differences moderated. The threat to European freedom from the East obviously could not have been resisted by individual countries standing alone. We were concerned that the longstanding enmity between France and Germany should not reappear and become the source of another intra-European struggle that might set the world on fire.

These were and are sound reasons for promoting the integration of Western Europe. As time has passed, moreover, we have come to see that we have other interests which engage us closely with Europe, interests that can be prosecuted more effectively in partnership with a united Europe than in relationship with a series of individual national states.

One of these lies in the problem of dealing with the poor countries of the world, the so-called less developed areas. Possibly the most complex and difficult task that the world now faces is that of achieving a satisfactory level of economic and political progress in Africa, Asia, and Latin America over the next two or three decades. This is something we cannot back

away from, for it bears directly on the question of peace and war. At the same time, its magnitude and its sheer complexity are such that nobody at this point can know how and when a measure of success can be attained.

Almost the entire burden of financial aid for the less developed countries inescapably falls on the countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. These same areas must provide the largest part of the market for an expanding volume of exports from the less developed countries. It is a real question whether the richer countries can find the political genius to assure that aid and trade will be forthcoming in sufficiently generous measure to give the less developed countries a chance for satisfactory economic progress. A strong and prosperous Europe can make an immense contribution in these respects. We need Europe as a partner in this enterprise; Europe in turn needs us.

A second field of increasingly mutual interest is that of financial and monetary affairs. The Common Market countries together have monetary reserves of about the same magnitude as our own. At the present time Europe is in a very strong balance-of-payments position, while we are not. Our balance-of-payments deficit, in fact, finds its reflection mainly in the large European surplus. Flows of capital from the United States to Western Europe have been large. Counterflows have been, comparatively, small.

These relative financial positions could be changed very rapidly. It was not so very long ago that the overriding problem was the shortage of dollars in Europe. And, although a new dollar gap appears remote enough, a net European deficit could certainly reappear within a few years.

The central point, in any case, is that we both stand in need of an international monetary system which will enable countries to handle temporary deficits without imposing undue limitations on trade or on internal economic growth. We have made some progress in this direction in the form of the new \$6 billion borrowing arrangement within the International Monetary Fund.<sup>2</sup> It ought not to be beyond the wit of

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.

man to move from there to further measures for international financial cooperation among the chief monetary and trading nations, which is to say the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Japan. Here again, the Common Market, when and as it reaches its goal of a common monetary policy, can be a more effective partner than can six key European nations operating individually.

As we have known all along, the Common Market offers a potential trading partner of great consequence. Even now the Common Market comprises the largest single element in world trading. Last year, when our imports and exports taken together amounted to about \$35 billion, the Common Market total was in excess of \$40 billion.

Potentially this new trading unit could be an exceedingly expansive one. Incomes in Europe have been rising very rapidly as a result of high rates of economic growth. The possibilities for a new pattern of consumption are obviously very great. For example, the United States has four times as many radios, five times as many automobiles, seven times as many TV sets, four and a half times as many refrigerators and washing machines as Europe. In some things, such as telephones installed, Western Europe is where we were in 1912.

There is already under way a great expansion of consumer demand in Europe. This takes the form of demand for consumer durables and for variety and upgrading in food (packaged and precooked foods) and clothing. Somebody is going to have to produce these things, as well as the machinery and raw materials that are needed for them.

It is most important, therefore, that the Common Market should be an outward-looking, liberal trading community. If it were to elect to live behind a high tariff wall, the result would be to encourage European producers to take over the new areas of demand, even though outsiders could provide many of these things more cheaply and efficiently.

Already progress toward a common tariff is affecting other countries. Take electric computers: The French duty on German computers has been cut to 10 percent from an original 20 percent. On American computers, thanks to our negotiations in 1961, it is down to 17.3

percent. Eventually, if nothing is done about it, the external tariff will be 14 percent against everybody, while there will be no internal duty. In short, the producers within the Common Market will enjoy an advantage of \$14 per \$100 of product to add on to lower transportation costs and other advantages. In some lines a tariff differential of this kind can be prohibitive. In all cases it will hurt the exports of outside producers.

Our concerns on this score go beyond our own exports. A commercially restrictive, inward-looking Europe would have a disastrous impact on the attitudes of Latin America, Japan, the British Commonwealth, and many others. The inevitable tendency among these areas would be to set up rival trading blocs. This is not the way to make the free world richer. Nor is it the road to political well-being and cooperation.

#### **Present Problems With the Common Market**

As you all know from the newspapers, our chief present problems with the Common Market are precisely in the field of trade. There are three matters on which we have had differences of more or less serious proportions.

One is agriculture. We need to be clear that everybody is a sinner in agricultural trade. No country in the world has shown any disposition to allow market forces to work on agriculture. We all have some form or another of special supports and subsidies for agricultural producers, and we all in turn have devices for insulating the domestic producer from import competition. We are not the worst offender in these respects, although we have not on the whole provided a shining example either. Now, however, we have undertaken to try to check and, if possible, to reverse the whole postwar trend toward restrictionism in agriculture. We have served notice on Western Europe and on our other trading partners that another round of tariff negotiations is going to require that agricultural trade be an integral part of the process.

This is a matter of no small direct consequence to our own producers. We have been selling more than a billion dollars of agricultural goods to the Common Market countries,

almost a quarter of our total agricultural exports. A third or more of these exports could be endangered immediately or over the longer run by Common Market agricultural policies. It is our interest, of course, to hold this market if we can. It is the European interest, one might add, that the cost of its basic foods should not be unnecessarily high, and this in turn depends on reasonable freedom for efficient producers to sell in Europe.

Apart from our own direct and commercial interest, it has become increasingly apparent that a world trading system which has one set of rules for industrial products and a radically different set for agricultural products is not a tolerable or tenable one for the agricultural exporters. Countries which depend heavily on agricultural exports for their foreign exchange earnings—and these include most of the less developed countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—have become more and more vocal in their complaints about the way in which the system operates. Even if our own trading interests were not so directly engaged, it would be the part of leadership for us to seek to remedy this state of affairs. For our larger concern must always be with the construction and expansion of an orderly and efficient international trading system as an indispensable part of the structure of a peaceful and prosperous world.

At Geneva a few days ago we managed to move ahead in respect to agriculture.<sup>3</sup> The Common Market negotiators agreed that agriculture would be a part of the next round of trade negotiations. We shall be starting this month to examine in more detail the possibilities for general understandings on trade in cereals and meats. These are going to be very difficult discussions and negotiations. It would be exceedingly rash to predict their outcome. All that can be said so far is that we have made a beginning.

Another difference between ourselves and the Common Market had to do with trade with the less developed countries. At Geneva we considered a proposal for substantial and rapid reductions in barriers to trade in primary prod-

---

<sup>3</sup> See p. 990.



ucts and agricultural commodities from the less developed countries. This proposal included the suggestion that high consumption taxes imposed on such commodities as coffee and tea also be reduced or eliminated. On our part, we took the position that special tariff and trade preferences to some less developed countries should be phased out. We all agreed that we should not ask the poorer countries to provide full reciprocity in tariff reductions.

The outcome of our discussions on these matters was, frankly, not entirely satisfactory. The Common Market countries, for reasons which we can understand even if we do not agree with them, are disposed to go much more slowly than we think is necessary. The whole subject has been set aside for further study and discussion at the technical level in Geneva. It is evident that the supporters of our position have their work cut out for them in moving the matter ahead. But we must persevere, for this is an issue of abiding significance.

The third of our differences with Western Europe had to do with the basic character of the next tariff negotiation. In simplest terms, we took the position that it was in everybody's interest for us to be able to use the tariff negotiating authority contained in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, that is, to cut tariffs generally by up to 50 percent. This, as a practical matter, implied that tariff reductions would be linear or across the board.

The initial reply of the Common Market was to the effect that the main problem lay in the wide range of our tariff levels. It is the case, of course, that we have a good many more duties above 30 percent, say, than does the Common Market, where tariffs have been averaged as a part of the movement toward a common commercial policy. The Common Market's counterproposal to our suggestion of a general linear cut was that tariffs should be harmonized. By harmonization it was meant that we would establish common tariff levels toward which all trading nations would move by degrees. On industrial products, for example, the suggested goal was a 10-percent level. Everybody would be asked to cut tariffs in excess of 10 percent by one-half, as a kind of first installment toward the eventual goal.

The European counterproposal had two fatal disabilities from our point of view. For one, it could not be reconciled with the plain intent of Congress in passing the Trade Expansion Act, since we would thereby have been required to cut more deeply than the Common Market on most items but would not be entitled to credit for our rates that already were below 10 percent. For another, it would have resulted in very modest reductions in trade barriers, in the order of a 10-percent or 12-percent tariff cut rather than something up to 50 percent.

As you know, our differences were negotiated out after some very strenuous bargaining. We have an understanding in principle on our linear approach, with provision for special rules to take account of trade distortions that might be caused by very wide tariff differences. Here, too, we have a difficult technical job to do in translating this generalized agreement into detailed negotiating rules. Once again, however, we have passed the first and perhaps the chief obstacle.

#### **Pressures for Resolving Differences**

Coming back to my earlier comments, it is clear that our relations with the Common Market are not going to be free of differences any more than will be the case in our relations with other parts of the free world. We are impelled by reasons of interest, including domestic political interest, in certain directions. It is necessary to recognize that Europe is similarly impelled, and sometimes in directions different from those that we consider binding. There is no reason to expect that this state of affairs will be radically changed in the years ahead.

On the other hand, there are the strongest kinds of pressures operating to make both ourselves and the Europeans find bases for resolving our differences. Together with the United Kingdom and a few other countries, we make up the bulk of the free world's economic power. Working in reasonable harmony, we are able to command and deploy most of the resources—whether you look at them from the point of view of total output, monetary reserves, or trading potential—of the world. If we can operate in cooperation, many of our domestic problems can be managed more easily.



More than that, of course, is the omnipresent threat of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. The truth is that our cherished institutions, which we have in common, are mutually endangered by Soviet ambitions. We have had to find means for military collaboration against Communist expansionism. It is just as much in our common interest that we use our combined economic capacities to strengthen the economic base on which, in the end, our survival as free peoples depends.

## Letters of Credence

### *Dominican Republic*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, Enriquillo Antonio del Rosario Ceballos, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on June 1. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 293 dated June 1.

## U.S. Seeks Solution to Problem of Tuna Fishing Off Ecuador

### *Statement by Secretary Rusk*

Press release 303 dated June 5

As you know I have been personally involved in the problem of the tuna boats detained in the port of Salinas, Ecuador.<sup>1</sup> Last week I sent a message to the Ecuadorean Foreign Minister, and I later telephoned him in an effort to effect the release of the boats and to move the whole problem into diplomatic channels where some overall settlement of the fishery question might be achieved. The Foreign Minister responded that the Ecuadorean executive had no choice

---

<sup>1</sup> On May 25 the Government of Ecuador took into custody two U.S. tuna boats, the *White Star* and the *Ranger*, at a point on the high seas off the coast of Ecuador, for alleged illegal fishing. Some 21 other U.S. tuna boats, in a demonstration of unity against the Ecuadorean claim to extended fishing jurisdiction, followed the two arrested vessels into the Ecuador port of Salinas.

but to apply the pertinent laws which in their view had been violated.

Although my initial approach was not successful, we are pursuing the matter urgently. I am sending Ambassador [Maurice M.] Bernbaum back to his post. He will take with him advisers from the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior and the Navy. They will proceed to Salinas to confer with the fishermen, and the Ambassador will confer with the Ecuadorean authorities. We shall try to reach some temporary *modus vivendi* which will enable the fishing boats to leave Salinas and return to work, and at the same time we shall lay the groundwork for negotiations with the Government of Ecuador leading to a definition of fishing rights off the Ecuadorean coast which will protect the interests of both parties for the future.

While I realize the fishermen have joined together in an effort to bring about changes in the previous indeterminate situation, and to this end are remaining together in Salinas despite the fact only two of their members are being detained, I believe that the best way to achieve a new definition of their rights is for them now to rely on their Government to find a just solution through government-to-government representations.

## United States To Furnish Jamaica Defense Articles and Services

### *Department Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

An agreement was concluded today [June 6] in Kingston under which the United States will furnish the Government of Jamaica with defense articles and defense services for its legitimate self-defense, internal security, and participation in regional or collective defense arrangements, or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Details of the defense articles and defense services mentioned in the agreement will be announced at a later date.

---

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on June 6 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News.

## New Dimensions for the Colombo Plan

by Matthew J. Marks

Since its inception 13 years ago, the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia has undergone considerable change in its methods of operation and approach. Recent developments give reason to believe that this process of gradual, evolutionary development is a continuing one and that further changes may be in store in the not too distant future.

The idea of the Colombo Plan was born in January 1950 at a conference in Colombo of Commonwealth foreign ministers, who met to exchange views on world problems and particularly on the needs of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. A Consultative Committee was set up to survey the needs, to assess the resources available and required, to focus world attention on the development problems of the area, and to provide a framework within which an international cooperative effort could be promoted to assist the countries of the area to raise their living standards.

The original meeting of the Consultative Committee, the senior Colombo Plan body which now meets once annually in one of the member countries, took place at Sydney in May 1950 and was attended only by representatives of Commonwealth countries. However, it was contemplated from the beginning that all countries in the area should be invited to participate in the Plan on equal terms. Moreover, it was hoped that other countries from outside the area would wish to assist in the area's economic development, which, it was recognized, would require resources considerably greater than the Commonwealth itself could make available.

From a Commonwealth grouping with nine

members the Colombo Plan has since grown into an organization which encompasses in its membership the great majority of the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The regional members of the Colombo Plan now comprise Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Federation of Malaya, Nepal, North Borneo, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sarawak, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The nonregional members are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The United States became a member of the Consultative Committee in 1951. Since that time United States economic assistance to the regional member countries has become one of the most important pillars of support for the Colombo Plan and its objectives.

Initially it was envisaged that the Colombo Plan would focus on all aspects of economic development. It was agreed at the first Consultative Committee meeting in Sydney that the Commonwealth countries in the area should

• *Mr. Marks is chief of the Regional Organizations Division, International Development Organizations Staff, Agency for International Development. He was alternate U.S. representative at the Officials Meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee at Melbourne, Australia, October 30–November 17, 1962, and U.S. representative at a special meeting of the Colombo Plan Council at Colombo, Ceylon, on April 24, 1963.*

## Colombo Plan Day, July 1

July 1, 1963, is being observed in the United States and in other member countries as Colombo Plan Day, commemorating the official beginning of the organization 13 years ago. In recognition of this occasion, Mr. Marks has prepared the accompanying article, which traces recent developments that foreshadow possible significant changes in the Colombo Plan approach to technical assistance activities in South and Southeast Asia.

draw up development programs covering a 6-year period. At the second meeting, at London in September 1950, these programs were considered and incorporated into a report.

From the early days of its development, however, the Colombo Plan has tended to concentrate more intensively on technical assistance than on economic development in general. To coordinate technical assistance two bodies were set up: the Colombo Plan Council for Technical Cooperation in South and Southeast Asia, which meets in Colombo periodically during the year, and the Bureau for Technical Cooperation, a small agency located in Colombo which reports to the Council. The Bureau, with its local staff and two internationally appointed officers, has become largely a central point for information on the bilateral technical assistance efforts of the 23 member governments; the Council, of which the United States became a member in 1958, provides a forum for discussion of bilateral technical assistance activities but gives only passing emphasis to the coordination of such activities. In brief, as the membership of the Colombo Plan has broadened, the scope of its activities in the economic development field has become more restricted.

It now appears that the Colombo Plan may revert to some of its original concepts with a view to having the Bureau more directly involved in fomenting and catalyzing the members' technical assistance efforts. Whether such a development will, in fact, take place depends upon the reactions of the Council and Consultative Committee to the report of an 11-government Council Working Party which met at Colombo April 24-30, 1963, and recom-

mended a number of measures designed to increase technician training within the region.

The Working Party agreed that a renewed, common effort to augment technician training should be sparked by intraregional training liaison officers appointed by each of the regional members, who would work closely with a Colombo Plan Bureau adviser on intraregional training, a senior international official whose post would be established in the Bureau for an initial period of 1 year.

In order to understand the significance in the overall Colombo Plan context of these and the other Working Party recommendations, it is useful to sketch out in some detail the recent history of Colombo Plan efforts to increase intraregional training.

### Recent Efforts To Increase Regional Training

For many years Colombo Plan members have underscored the urgency of expanding and improving technician training institutions in South and Southeast Asia, and there has been general agreement on the need for action. This has been based on the assumption that, unlike professional engineers or other persons in need of advanced training, technicians can be trained in the region not only more effectively but in greater numbers for the same expense as compared with training imparted outside the region. As noted by Senator J. G. Gorton, the Australian representative at the Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo in 1960:

There are obviously considerable advantages, from the point of view of efficiency and return from effort expended, in training a student in the environment to which he is used and in which he is to practice his trade or profession.

In 1958 the Director of the Colombo Plan Bureau highlighted in his report to the Council the urgency of expanding and improving training institutions in the region. This was followed in 1959 by a general recommendation of the Council that every effort be made to promote the development and exploitation of suitable training institutions in the region. In 1960 the Subcommittee on Technical Cooperation of the Consultative Committee, meeting in Tokyo, likewise emphasized the need for greater use of the region's training facilities.

The Bureau was authorized in 1960 to arrange, with the help of financing from the Ford Foundation, for a survey of training facilities at the technician level in the Colombo Plan region. The director of this survey, H. R. Mills, a British national who had spent a considerable part of his life in South and Southeast Asia, submitted a report in mid-1961 which had considerable impact on the Colombo Plan members. Among other things it brought out that, despite the serious shortage of trained technicians in South and Southeast Asia and general acceptance of the fact that technician training can be more efficiently and economically provided by institutions within the region, existing technician training facilities within the region were nevertheless not being fully utilized. The Mills report suggested specific ways for increasing the training of technicians within the region and included a directory of technical training facilities in South and Southeast Asia. The latter was designed to correct the general paucity of information in much of the Colombo Plan region regarding the training facilities available.

The recommendations of the Mills report were considered later that same year by the Subcommittee on Technical Cooperation of the Consultative Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur. One of the principal recommendations to emerge from the Kuala Lumpur meeting was that the member governments should examine their needs for trained technicians and have recourse to the directory in the Mills report, which should be kept up to date.

In light of the unanimous agreement of the Colombo Plan member governments on the need for augmenting technician training within the region and the high-level attention which had been devoted to the problem over a number of years, it is interesting to note that the Council's statistics reflecting what was actually accomplished during this same period showed a decline in training places utilized in the region. In 1958-59, 321 training places were supplied within the region. In 1959-60, 12 less training places were supplied, and in 1960-61, 35 less training places were supplied than in 1958-59. So it became obvious that despite numerous high-level discussions, studies, surveys, and general resolutions commending the problem to the

member governments, the potentials of training within the region were still receiving inadequate attention.

### **Australian Proposal**

Although more than one of the member governments were by now convinced of the need for more effective action, it was the Australians who took the first step. The Australian Government in the course of the Consultative Committee meeting at Melbourne, October 30-November 17, 1962, outlined a number of suggestions which were later to become familiarly known as the Australian proposal. Drawing upon several of the recommendations in the Mills report, the Australian Government proposed a series of concrete measures. These included a recommendation that the Bureau be authorized to pursue a more active role in stimulating intraregional training offers and responses thereto by assisting in putting potential aid donors in touch with potential recipients.

To carry out these activities, the Australians proposed that the Bureau's staff of two international officers be increased by two training officers assigned to the headquarters staff in Colombo and four field officers each assigned to a group of countries in the region. In addition the Australians suggested the possibility of a program of grants for technicians within the region to be administered by the new Colombo Plan Bureau placement organization and its field staff, and organization by nonregional members of the Colombo Plan of third-country training programs similar to those presently being sponsored by the United States under which U. S. funds are used to train nationals of country *a* in country *b* with additional financial participation from countries *a* and *b*.

In his statement at the closing session of the 1962 Consultative Committee meeting, Sir Garfield Barwick, Australian Minister of External Affairs, chairman of the conference, and leader of the Australian delegation, noted that one of the main themes of the conference had been the need for greater efforts to promote intraregional training. Sir Garfield promised that the Australian Government would submit a specific proposal for consideration in depth by the Colombo Plan Council.

### **Special Council Meeting and Working Party**

It was against this background that the special meeting of the Council was held at Colombo on April 24, followed by the week-long deliberations of its Working Party. The Australian representative, B. C. Ballard, Australian High Commissioner in Colombo, noted in his opening address that his Government had no pride of authorship in the Australian proposal and that, on the contrary, it had been put forward primarily with a view to stimulating consideration of measures that might appropriately be taken to obtain the increase, desired by all, in intraregional technician training.

The comments which followed reflected this spirit. While the Australian proposal provided the initial stimulus, other alternatives developed in the course of the discussion. Therefore the recommendations which finally emerged from the Working Party are in essence a joint product representing the thinking of all the Working Party members.

Indicative of the member governments' interest was the heavy attendance of special government representatives at the meeting. Normally Colombo Plan Council meetings last 1 or 2 days and are attended by officers from the local diplomatic missions with a sprinkling of outside representation limited for the most part to those governments not having diplomatic representation in Ceylon. On this occasion eight governments—Australia, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, New Zealand, and the United States—sent special representatives. It was one of the first Council meetings in the past few years to be attended by a representative of one of the three French-speaking members of the Colombo Plan. As this representative noted in his address to the Council, his Government was interested in any proposal which would increase possibilities for technicians from his country to be trained in neighboring countries of the region, where a common language and culture minimizes adjustment problems both during and subsequent to the training period.

The special Council session benefited from the presence of H. R. Mills, author of the Mills report, and S. Matsui, incumbent director of the Colombo Plan Bureau.

In accordance with traditional Colombo Plan procedure, the recommendations reflect the unanimous views of all representatives sitting on the Working Party. Six representatives of regional member governments and five of non-regional members were appointed to the Working Party by the President of the Council, Eduardo L. Rosal, Philippine Minister to Ceylon. Representatives of all governments which had sent special representatives to the Council meeting were included among these. The Working Party was chaired by A. L. Perera, Ceylon's representative on the Council. In light of the broad representation on the Working Party, its conclusions are of considerable significance.

### **Working Party Recommendations**

While recognizing the importance, as pointed out in the Mills report, of making maximum use of existing regional training facilities, the Working Party stressed the need for further establishing and expanding regional training facilities for technicians in South and Southeast Asia. The Working Party welcomed the readiness of the governments outside the region to contribute, subject to the availability of finances, toward this end.

Although the Working Party members were all persuaded that concrete, affirmative measures would have to be taken to augment intraregional training, they were nevertheless reluctant to recommend any step that might be construed as a departure from existing Colombo Plan procedures calling for bilateral negotiation of economic assistance. Accordingly the original proposal for a Bureau field staff developed into a recommendation for the appointment of intraregional training liaison officers by each of the member governments of the region. At the same time, however, it was agreed that the Bureau should play an important role in focusing governmental attention on the many obstacles which have been blocking increases in intraregional training. Accordingly the Working Party recommended appointment to the Bureau of a senior-level adviser on intraregional training, supported by a research assistant. In order that the adviser might have maximum contact with the intraregional train-

ing liaison officers and government officials concerned with training problems, and thus become familiar at first hand with the obstacles to increased intraregional training, the Working Party recommended that the adviser be given a substantial allowance for travel within the region. The recommendations likewise suggested the desirability of periodic meetings between the adviser and the liaison officers to exchange views on the current effectiveness of training facilities within the region.

The Australians had originally suggested that all governmental applications for technical training be filed with the Bureau. Under this procedure the Bureau would have put the applicant directly in touch with the government of the country with the required training facilities after first matching the application with information in its files regarding training availabilities in the region.

The Working Party expressed preference, however, for a procedure that would adhere more closely to the existing bilateral tradition of the Colombo Plan. It recommended that applications for technician assistance continue, as in the past, to be filed by the applicant country directly with the proposed donor. In the future, however, copies of such applications would be sent simultaneously to the Bureau. This would allow the Bureau to examine the applications and, where necessary, to draw the attention of the governments concerned to cases in which technician training was being sought outside the region despite the fact that adequate facilities were already available for the purpose within South and Southeast Asia. It was urged that both the countries requesting training and those to whom requests were addressed should themselves carefully examine all applications for technician training with a view to insuring that the fullest use would be made of available regional training facilities.

In its report to the Council the Working Party emphasized that expansion of technician training within the region was not intended to bring about a reduction in training provided outside the region but, on the contrary, a change in the direction of such training. It was considered that the provision of facilities for more advanced training outside the region would,

under the Working Party's approach, be a more appropriate use of available funds.

Where inadequacy of financing was an obstacle to the increased use of available training places within the region, it was felt that increased third-country training could help to overcome such inadequacy. Hope was expressed by the Working Party that member countries would give this matter further consideration.

Because of the progressive adoption of various national languages of the region as the principal media of instruction at the technician level, the Working Party considered it essential that greater emphasis be placed on the importance of training technician instructors with a sound knowledge of, and fluency in, their own national languages as well as one or more of those languages currently being used as media of instruction in technical training institutions. In view of the high priority placed by the Working Party on training technician instructors, it recommended that in this instance an exception should be made to the general rule calling for the training of technicians within the region and that such training should be carried out both within and outside the region.

The Working Party was of the opinion that special efforts would have to be made to bring about fuller use of facilities for on-the-job training within the region. It felt that the adviser on intraregional training should have an important role to play in exploring such possibilities and in making appropriate recommendations for providing and expanding such facilities.

The Working Party was, of course, fully cognizant of the fact that, despite high-level Colombo Plan attention to the problem over a number of years, technician training within the region had not expanded as had been hoped. It was also recognized that the Working Party recommendations were, to some degree, experimental and that it would therefore be desirable to provide for periodic reexamination of the problem. Accordingly the Working Party recommended that there be a regular review of the progress made in the expansion of intraregional technician training and of the difficulties that might be experienced. The Working Party was of the view that the Council and pos-

sibly the Consultative Committee should, from time to time, discuss these matters.

### Obstacles to Intra-regional Training

Because of the initial focus of the Working Party discussion on the Australian proposal, the talks tended in considerable degree to revolve around procedural questions. However, the Working Party never lost sight of the basic problems which its recommendations were intended to correct. Among these are questions such as: the increasing tendency of countries of the region to favor national languages, thereby rendering it more difficult to use languages such as English or French as a *lingua franca* for the instruction of technicians from neighboring countries; the lack of parity in living allowances paid by different countries to trainees, and the generally lower levels of allowances paid by countries within the region as compared with those in countries outside the region; the greater prestige accorded to training in countries outside the region, often leading to strong preferences by prospective trainees to seek training outside the region; and the need for manpower surveys pointing up those areas where training requirements are greatest.

It was the thought of the Working Party that problems such as these could more easily be resolved if the countries of the region, in close cooperation not only with each other but also with member countries from outside the region, worked jointly in an effort to surmount them. The Working Party chose to concentrate its deliberations on finding a mechanism within the Colombo Plan to bring this about.

### A Look Ahead

The Colombo Plan has developed over the 13 years of its existence into an organization which is unique. Multilateral in its organic structure, it is nevertheless bilateral in orientation. Some have even accused the Colombo Plan of being a body without true substance; yet it has indisputably focused attention on the needs in South and Southeast Asia for technical development and in doing so has added to the sum total of the development that has taken place.

J. K. Galbraith describes as follows the re-

lationship which should exist between donor and recipient countries:<sup>1</sup>

To see the countries of the world not as divided between the developed and the underdeveloped, but as spaced along a line representing various stages of development is essential for obtaining an accurate view of the problem of assistance. For when development is so regarded we see that no group of countries is uniquely qualified to extend assistance and no other group is similarly condemned to the role of recipients. Rather each country has something to gain from those that are in front. And it has something to offer those that follow. The provision of aid is seen, as it should be seen, as a cooperative endeavor in which all countries may participate.

The Colombo Plan is the organization which perhaps best personifies this kind of partnership. All members, large and small, have an equal voice. Moreover, a majority of the members are both donors and recipients. Some of the regional members may be in a position to expend only a few thousand dollars for assistance—in one case less than a thousand dollars—but they are nevertheless donors. The terms “donor” and “recipient” are therefore considered inappropriate in Colombo Plan discussion and are customarily avoided.

In furnishing economic assistance abroad the United States places considerable emphasis upon the ability and readiness of recipient countries to adopt self-help measures. U.S. aid is intended as a catalyst for progress, not as a handout. The concern of the Colombo Plan with increasing technician training in the Colombo Plan region would indicate that the member governments are aware that the principal key to progress lies with their own efforts to help themselves.

It is unlikely that the basic bilateral orientation of the Colombo Plan will ever be abandoned. Nevertheless, if the Working Party report is a criterion of the views of all Colombo Plan members, it would appear that the members now wish the Bureau to play a more active role, somewhat analogous to that originally contemplated when the Colombo Plan was established. Whether this will actually take place depends upon approval of the Working Party report by the Council and approval of the

<sup>1</sup>J. K. Galbraith, *Economic Development in Perspective*, Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 19.

Council's action by the Consultative Committee meeting in Bangkok this fall.

The United States is of the view that the new trend which appears to be developing in the Colombo Plan is a healthy sign of the organi-

zation's ability to conform to today's problems. In the final analysis the future of the Colombo Plan lies in the hands of the member governments of the region. They can make of the organization what they wish.

## THE CONGRESS

### U.S. Outlines Policy Toward Cuban Refugees

*Statement by Edwin M. Martin*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to you and to the other members of the subcommittee for giving me this opportunity to discuss recent activities of Cuban refugees in the United States and the attitude of the Department of State toward these activities in the light of their foreign policy implications.

Before addressing myself to developments in the past 2 months and their consequences for our policy, I should like to review briefly, in the interests of providing perspective, the history of the Cuban exile community in the United States, its political attitudes and activities, and the relations of the community with the United States Government.

Since the emigration of Cubans began—even before the January 1, 1959, assumption of power by Castro—the United States, and principally the Miami area, has been hit by successive waves of refugees which have varied in size and in their social and economic composition. The movement of Cubans into exile can be divided, I believe, into four reasonably distinct waves.

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on May 22.

The first wave, numbering perhaps 3,000, began to flow into Miami late in 1958 and continued into early 1959. It consisted in part of persons who were concerned by the generally unsettled conditions within Cuba and in part of political leaders, high government officials, and military officers of the Batista regime and private individuals whose political and economic well-being had been closely tied to the fortunes of the Batista government.

After a pause of several months, while Castro was consolidating his grasp on Cuba, the second wave of refugees began, this one about 7,000 strong. It consisted largely of the upper economic and social strata of the island and entered Miami in the latter part of 1959 and the first 10 months of 1960.

Members of the first two waves were, by and large, able to bring out of Cuba or sell there most of their movable property and to a considerable extent were able to exchange a substantial amount of Cuban currency, in addition to the bank accounts which many of them maintained in the United States and Europe.

After October 14, 1960, when the Castro regime began in earnest to nationalize and ex-



propriate most of the big and medium-sized industrial and commercial enterprises—Cuban and American—and after it had proclaimed its punitive Urban Reform Law, a third wave of Cuban refugees began to arrive. This group was composed of upper and middle economic and social classes: professional men, top and middle-level business executives, owners of smaller plantations, persons whose income was derived from rental property, and others who had begun to be disillusioned or frightened by the course of events in Cuba. This third wave, the members of which were still able to bring out many of their personal belongings, lasted until about the middle of 1961 and totaled about 40,000.

The fourth wave, which began in the summer of 1961 and continued until the suspension of regularly scheduled flights at the time of the October 1962 crisis, was of substantially different economic and social composition in that the estimated 150,000 persons in this group included large numbers of office and factory employees, skilled and semiskilled workers, small merchants, and some fishermen and peasants.

Beginning in June 1961, when Castro drastically tightened the regulations governing legal departures from Cuba, a refugee normally arrived in the United States with very few possessions, usually one or two changes of clothing.

Even so, these arrivals were enormously better off than the approximately 4,000 men, women, and children who have risked the dangers of crossing more than 100 miles of the Florida Straits in small and medium-sized boats. These were the poorest—and the bravest—of all those who have fled the Castro tyranny.

Since October 1962, as you know, there has been no normal traffic between Cuba and the United States. Arrivals in the past 7 months have reached the United States by occasional special Red Cross planes or ships returning from the delivery of goods exchanged for the Bay of Pigs prisoners or by small boats transiting the Straits of Florida.

From this quick survey of the successive waves of emigration to the United States, it is

apparent that of the approximately 215,000 Cubans we currently estimate to be in this country the majority come from the middle and lower middle levels of the Cuban population, with the extremes less well but still significantly represented.

Another important fact from the political point of view has been the concentration of the great bulk of the Cuban refugees in the Miami area, despite the success to date of the resettlement program, which has moved out of Miami more than 35 percent of the 165,000 persons who have registered at the Cuban Refugee Center. Current estimates indicate—and all these figures are subject to some margin of error—that about 125,000 to 135,000 of the refugees reside in Miami, with the remaining 80,000 scattered throughout the other 49 States, with the single biggest aggregation outside of Miami being in New York. Miami, then, has become the center of exile activity. Moreover, its close proximity to Cuba has tended to make it a jumping-off place for movements directed against the Castro regime.

#### **Complications in Exile Community**

Now, the Cubans have historically been a highly political and individualistic people. Under the pressure of an urgent goal—the return to a free Cuba—and as a result of the inevitable artificialities of life in exile, these traits have been accentuated. Exile organizations have proliferated; they have formed, split, and reformed as alliances have been made and broken. It has been impossible to keep track of the total number of organizations. The size and complexity of the problem are indicated by current estimates that there are between 400 and 600 groups in existence. Many, of course, exist only on paper and have been frequently used as bargaining counters among political leaders jockeying for position against the day of the return to Cuba.

A not inconsiderable factor in the maneuverings of some of these leaders has been the desire for U.S. support, governmental, private, or both. I do not wish to give the impression that all or most of the leaders of the Cuban exiles have acted or are acting from unworthy motives; not at all. Most of them are admirable

men, dedicated and patriotic in the pursuit of the freedom of their betrayed and subjugated country. I would be less than candid, however, if I obscured the fact that subjective considerations of personal advantage have sometimes influenced exile political activity.

In addition to the interplay of personal ambition, other factors have tended to complicate the political scene within the exile community. Naturally enough, the political spectrum within the community, which ranges from left to right, produces controversy and dispute. But this normal give-and-take has been distorted and intensified by the special circumstances of exile, and political discussion within the community has been often marked by excessive heat and violence. The personal attacks launched by one leader or group against another have bordered on irresponsibility. Furthermore, the political scene has been characterized by a conflict between the generations, with some younger political leaders striving to displace their elders, whom they accuse of representing the unsatisfactory past, and some older political figures considering the newer elements as inexperienced, unreliable, and too ready to break with the past. In the exile atmosphere of frustration and insecurity, the individualistic and fragmenting tendencies which have usually been present in Cuban politics have been magnified.

Until the very recent past, the only organization with any claim to represent the exile community at large was the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which developed out of the Democratic Revolutionary Front shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Council, which had the support of the U.S. Government and which was headed by Dr. José Miró Cardona, was a rather loose framework within which a number of political organizations, individuals, and functional groups clustered. The Council carried out a variety of propaganda activities which were, in many cases, quite effective in Latin America, and Dr. Miró in certain respects was the spokesman for the exile community before various international organizations and meetings.

Despite its position as the nearest thing to an organized body representative of broad exile

opinion, the Council always suffered from its failure to obtain broad popular support among the refugees. The Council tended to take a rather passive line, which subjected it to bitter attacks from some organized political sectors of the community, especially those affiliated with the former dictator, Batista. By and large, the mass of the refugee population assumed an attitude of indifference and apathy toward the Council.

Perhaps even more significantly, the Council failed to arouse any significant response among the groups and individuals within Cuba who were in the frontline fighting against the Communist dictatorship of Castro. In point of fact, this gulf between the exile community and elements combating Castro from within Cuba has been a disturbing aspect of the political development within the refugee community. Some political organizations, both within and outside the Council, have had ties with counterpart groups within Cuba, but the inevitable contrast between those in exile and those within Cuba enduring the difficulties and dangers of life under Castro has, if anything, tended to grow over the years.

#### **Exiles' "Foreign Policy" Activities**

I have been describing here the internal political life, if I may call it that, of the exile community. There is another, and from the point of view of the U.S. Government, a more important side of exile politics. I refer to the "foreign policy" activities of the community. We must recognize, I believe, that the exile community, particularly the concentration in Miami, has quite naturally sought to influence the U.S. Government, and to a lesser degree other free-world governments, into taking positions on Cuba which would serve the immediate objectives of the exiles. Very understandably, the exiles, considered as a group, have had but one goal: the immediate liberation of their country from Communist domination. All other considerations have been subordinated to that single end.

The exile perspective on the Cuban problem, again quite understandably, has been narrow. There has always existed a tendency on the part of the exiles to ignore, brush aside, or

minimize any obstacle which might appear to them to impede the most direct and rapid course toward the freeing of the island republic from the Castro tyranny. There has been a persistent failure to acknowledge the worldwide complexities of the Cuban problem and the necessity on the part of responsible governments to take into account a broad variety of interacting factors in seeking a solution.

In carrying out their efforts to inform the American public and officials of their views of the Cuban situation and to influence U.S. policy toward Cuba, many of the exile organizations and individuals have operated in the same way as other pressure groups. They have used various information media, particularly the press and the radio, to get their message across. They have engaged in fundraising campaigns. They have developed ties with like-minded groups in the United States, and they have lobbied with Members of Congress and the executive branch in their efforts to gain support for their solutions. Many of the groups and individuals engaged in this kind of activity have unfortunately indulged in exaggerations and distortions which have not only complicated the execution of our policy but also have reduced the credibility of the groups themselves.

### **The Resettlement Program**

I know that you are interested in the effectiveness of any efforts by exile leaders and representatives of organized groups within the community to affect the content and execution of the Cuban refugee program of the U.S. Government. Although I am sure you will wish to pursue this question with the representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare who will be testifying before you, I should like only to say that so far as I am aware the pressures from exile sources in this sector have been principally directed against the resettlement effort of the HEW program.

As you know, the resettlement program has never been popular among the refugees. Almost unanimously the political leaders of the Cuban community have taken a negative attitude toward the program. In some instances, particularly with respect to elements believed

to be associated with Batista, the attacks on resettlement have been very strong and have had an adverse influence on the responsiveness of the Cubans to resettlement. The majority of exile leaders, however, have not been so strident in their attacks on resettlement, although their attitude has not been helpful.

In spite of this lack of cooperation by exile leaders on the resettlement issue, this Government has not deviated from its determination—which dates from the very beginning of the refugee program—to pursue vigorously our resettlement efforts. In short, we have been aware of, but not influenced by, the negative attitudes of the leadership on this matter.

### **Hit-and-Run Raids by Exile Groups**

Against this background I should like to turn to the developments that have occurred in the exile community in the past 2 months. On March 17 and March 26 two so-called hit-and-run raids were conducted by exile action organizations, the first by the Alpha 66-Second National Front group against a Soviet ship anchored at Isabel de Sagua and the second by the L-66 or Commandos-L group against a Soviet ship in the port of Caibarién.<sup>2</sup> These attacks were followed by rather highly colored press statements in the United States by spokesmen for the two groups, who made exaggerated claims about the effectiveness of the operations. Now, these two raids had been preceded in the previous 7 months by five attacks of a somewhat similar type: one in August 1962 by elements of the Revolutionary Student Directorate, who shelled a hotel on the Habana waterfront; one in September 1962 by an Alpha 66 group which fired on a British ship near Caibarién; one on October 8, 1962, which involved a raid by about 10 Alpha 66 men against personnel in the Isabel de Sagua area; one on October 12, 1962, in which a small group of anti-Castro elements machinegunned a Cuban patrol craft; and the fifth on December 4, in which elements of the Second National Front raided Caibarién.

As early as the August 1962 attack, the Government had made known publicly its belief that such raids were ineffective and could pro-

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1963, p. 520, and Apr. 22, 1963, p. 599.

duce results contrary to those sought by the groups executing them and called attention to the violation of U.S. laws which might be involved in a repetition.<sup>3</sup> The basic justifications advanced for the usefulness of such actions have been that they do a certain amount of damage, that they embarrass the Castro regime by revealing its inability to prevent them, and that they constitute encouragement to anti-Castro forces within Cuba. Although we recognize the raw courage that such raids require, we doubt that, on balance, they contribute to the attainment of the objective which is shared by us and the proponents and executors of the raids, that is, a truly free Cuba. We simply do not consider that this type of raid represents an effective method of bringing about the collapse of the Communist regime in Cuba.

The fact that the two raids in March involved Soviet ships was an especially complicating circumstance. One of our prime objectives has been to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. These actions, in our judgment, could give the Soviet Union additional incentives to maintain their personnel in Cuba. In addition, the raids raised the possibility of reprisals and thus an escalation of the uneasy situation in the Caribbean.

### U.S. Control Measures

In late March, therefore, we were faced with a situation in which, by accelerated action programs, elements of the exile community seemed to be approaching the point where they, and not the United States Government, were in effect determining foreign policy issues of grave and fundamental importance. We were facing the risk that, through a series of uncontrolled actions and counteractions precipitated by exile

<sup>3</sup> On Aug. 25, 1962, Department press officer Robert McCloskey read the following statement to news correspondents in connection with evidence that the Department had received that the Revolutionary Student Directorate in Miami had been involved in the shelling in Cuba on Aug. 24:

"A spur-of-the-moment raid such as this does not weaken the Communist apparatus. While we appreciate the strong feelings of this free student group and their hostility to this most oppressive regime, we cannot approve of the use of U.S. territory as a base for such action. The Coast Guard intends to impound the boats, and we must inform the participants that any repetition of such action by any group could involve the provisions of the Neutrality Act."

groups, our right and obligation to reserve these basic decisions to ourselves, as the government carrying the burden of responsibility, were being placed in jeopardy. As the President put it [at his news conference on April 3]:

... when these issues of war and peace hang in the balance . . . the United States Government and authorities should—and when American territory is being used—should have a position of some control on the matter.

As a result of these considerations, the Departments of State and Justice announced on March 30<sup>4</sup> that every step would be taken to insure that hit-and-run attacks by Cuban refugees against Soviet ships and other targets in Cuba were not launched, manned, or equipped from U.S. territory. Two weeks later, on April 15, the Department of State reiterated that the United States Government could not "permit publicized expeditions which have no tangible effect on the future status of Cuba, which are in clear violation of United States law, and which are followed by highly colored press conferences."<sup>5</sup>

To carry out these decisions, various operating and enforcement agencies of the Government—the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, and FBI—have undertaken a series of measures, including increases in their personnel and equipment strengths, to assure that U.S. laws are not violated. Various suspect small craft have been seized and others kept under surveillance. About 25 exiles believed to be associated with the mounting of the kind of unacceptable actions in question have had their parole amended to restrict them to Dade County (that is, the Miami area). Other steps designed to improve our information on illegal or potentially illegal activities have been taken.

Since the institution of these control measures, there have been two possible hit-and-run raids, one on April 25 reportedly involving an intended bombing attack by a light aircraft against refinery installations in the Habana area, and another on last Sunday, May 19, said to have been directed against a Cuban militia

<sup>4</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 600.

<sup>5</sup> For text of a Department statement of Apr. 15, see *ibid.*, May 6, 1963, p. 709.

post on a beach near Habana. I want to emphasize that the facts on both these reported attacks are still obscure.

The impact of the control measures of March 30 on the exile community was immediate and sharp. The emotional reaction to what many considered the thwarting of legitimate anti-Castro activities gave rise to a variety of absurd accusations and rumors that the United States was betraying the Cuban people, that the United States had embarked upon a policy of coexistence with Castro, that the measures were the result of a deal between Khrushchev and President Kennedy, that the entire Cuban community in Miami was to be restricted to the city, et cetera, et cetera. Excesses on the part of certain Cuban radio commentators and newspapermen in Miami contributed to the uproar.

The highly charged atmosphere, in which only a few voices of responsibility and moderation were heard, contributed largely, I believe, to the decision of Dr. Miró to resign and to issue the statement in which he sought to discredit several persons in the United States Government and to question their good faith and the good faith of the Government in dealing with the Cuban Revolutionary Council he headed. The central issue was described rather succinctly in the following paragraph of the statement on Dr. Miró's charges, made on April 15 by the Department of State:<sup>6</sup>

The United States Government, under existing conditions, is not prepared to enter into "alliances" or undertakings that would essentially give exile leaders authority to determine United States policies and plans regarding Cuba, or that would promise at least \$50 million to permit exile leaders to recruit an army and wage a war, the unforeseeable consequences of which would almost certainly have to be borne ultimately by the United States Armed Forces, or that would engage the United States now to wage a war.

As time has passed since the first impact of the March 30 measures and their immediate aftermath, the bitterness and tension in the exile community have diminished as sobering and more responsible second thoughts have taken effect. At the present time there is considerable ferment within exile groups which has been created by a still somewhat vague and confused desire for devices or organizations that

might bring about, or at least symbolize, unity. There are several persons and organizations engaged in efforts directed toward finding a broad formula for unity.

The search for a single organization stems in part from a psychological need to fill the vacuum created by the decline of the Revolutionary Council following the resignation of Dr. Miró and others and our own decision not to continue to support the Council, even though that body did not represent more than a part of exile opinion. In part, the striving for unity is based on a desire to have a single exile voice which can address governments, international bodies, and public opinion. This might raise, of course, the question of a government-in-exile, to which I will address myself later.

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

Before turning to my concluding remarks which I will devote to our policy toward Cuba and the outlook for the future, I wish to note briefly that I have been informed by HEW and the Miami office of the State Department Coordinator of Cuban Affairs that the turmoil in the exile community in the past 2 months has had no appreciable effects on the operation of the Cuban refugee program. Specifically the rate of resettlement out of Miami has shown no significant changes.

#### **U.S. Policy Toward Cuba**

In moving to a brief outline of our present Cuban policy I wish to express it in terms related to some of the arguments raised by the exiles. It is *not* coexistence. We want to get rid of Castro and Communist influence in Cuba. It is *not* passive. We are engaged in a variety of measures, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral, which are designed to increase the isolation of Castro; to increase his serious economic difficulties; to prevent by military means, if necessary, any export of aggression from

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

Cuba; to thwart Cuban-based and -supported subversion of Latin American governments; to increase the costs to the Soviets of their maintenance of Castro; to persuade the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse; to effect the withdrawal of Soviet military forces in Cuba; and to maintain surveillance of Cuba to insure that it does not again become a military threat to the United States or its allies in this hemisphere.

Our actions go well beyond Cuba itself. Through the Alliance for Progress we are endeavoring, in cooperation with the Latin American governments, to eradicate the social, economic, and political conditions in which communism flourished before Castro and in which, unless corrected, it will continue to flourish long after Castro is gone. By enhancing the internal security capabilities of police and military forces in Latin America, we are helping those governments meet and overcome the threat of Communist subversion and violence.

To sum up briefly, we are executing essentially a two-front policy with respect to Cuba: On the one hand, we are moving to weaken Castro with a view to his eventual collapse; on the other, we are strengthening the Latin American countries which he and his Soviet masters are intent upon capturing. I can say that in the net our policy is progressing. We face a long, hard road and I would mislead you if I were to say that the end is in sight, but we are advancing.

As you can see, the differences between this Government and the Cuban exile leaders do not involve the basic objective of a Cuba truly free of Castro and communism. Our differences lie in methods and the pace of the execution of methods. Our divergences are perhaps inevitable, because the weight and extent of our responsibilities are vastly different.

As we and the exiles move toward our common goal, we intend to maintain close relations with them, to consult them, and to take into full account their proposals and their plans. At the same time, however, we are obliged to maintain control of our own foreign policy, and we intend to prevent the violation of our laws. We will continue to impress upon exile leaders the need for looking at the Cuban problem in the

light of the worldwide confrontation between freedom and communism. We will continue to give particular attention to those groups in exile which have ties with and the support of anti-Castro elements inside Cuba, for those who have stayed behind to fight Castro directly must have a major share of the responsibility for returning Cuba to the free world.

This last consideration, I should point out, is one of the principal reasons for the opposition of the Department of State to the establishment and recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile at this time. We believe that it would be a serious mistake to give those in Cuba who are struggling against communism the idea that they are being disregarded and that they have no role to play in determining how Cuba will be governed.

There are other reasons why we do not favor a government-in-exile. The problem of finding a government which could unite the majority of the exiles behind them is a most difficult task. Our consistent policy has been to recognize governments-in-exile only when they have a direct constitutional connection with the last legally constituted government of the country, usually when they have actually exercised power in the country just prior to being forced out. We would be reluctant to abandon this legal position.

There is a final legal point involved here, and that is that, while we have broken diplomatic relations with the Castro regime, we still recognize it as the Cuban Government and as such responsible for its international obligations, including the protection of U.S. citizens and the recognition of our rights under the Guantanamo treaty. To recognize a government-in-exile might put those rights in legal jeopardy. These are facts of some importance.

One final word: As time goes on there will undoubtedly continue to be differences of opinion between us and the exile groups and leaders on the methods and tactics to achieve our common ultimate objective. The depth of feeling on the question of Cuba among both Americans and Cubans, the complexity of the world situation of which Cuba is a part, the disproportionate responsibilities borne by us and the exiles—all these elements make it inevitable that the

calculation of risk and advantage in determining methods will differ as between this Government and the Cuban exiles. But so long as each of us recognizes that we both are moving to-

ward the same goal and so long as each of us keeps his eye on that goal, our difficulties can be kept within the bounds of honest and constructive difference.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### GATT Ministers Reach Agreement on Tariff Negotiating Procedures

*The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade met at Geneva for a ministerial meeting May 16-21. Following are statements made by Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, who was the U.S. representative,<sup>1</sup> together with a resolution on trade negotiations unanimously adopted by the conference on May 21.*

#### STATEMENT ON AGENDA ITEM I, MAY 16<sup>2</sup>

No task this meeting faces is more important than that of finding ways to improve the export opportunities of less developed countries. If we do not succeed in this task, much of the time, effort, and money that the countries represented here have put into economic and technical aid will have been wasted and we will have failed in our common purpose of enabling less developed countries to move forward with their economic development.

The United States hopes to make toward this objective at least as great a contribution as that of any other industrialized country.

Regarding the recommendations under the heading of "Duty-Free Entry for Tropical

<sup>1</sup> For names of the other members of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of June 3, 1963, p. 885.

<sup>2</sup> Item I read as follows: "Measures for the Expansion of Trade of Developing Countries as a Means of Furthering Their Economic Development."

Products"—which is item I.B of our agenda—my Government joins in urging that the ministers accept the recommendations of the majority of the countries participating in the work of the Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products. We understand that it was not possible for all countries to join in those recommendations at the time they were originally formulated, but we hope that it may be possible to reach unanimous approval of them at the meeting or to lay the groundwork for such unanimity at an early date.

Concerning the six points to which paragraph I.A.3 of the agenda directs our attention, the United States has taken a positive position on all of them. In certain cases, along with other industrialized countries, we have accepted the points recommended by the less developed countries with certain minor qualifications. For example, in the case of the recommendation for the elimination of tariffs on the tropical products which have been studied in Committee III, the elimination or substantial reduction of those few tariffs we maintain on those products can take place only in connection with the forthcoming round of tariff negotiations. I can at a later point in this discussion, if this proves necessary, comment in more detail on each of these points.

I have already indicated that we endorse the recommendations of the Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products. This includes the



recommendations concerning individual commodities such as cocoa, coffee, et cetera. Here again I will be glad at a later date, if this proves necessary, to indicate our position more specifically.

As concerns item I.C of the agenda—covering other measures to facilitate the efforts of less developed countries to diversify their economies, strengthen their export capacity, and increase their earnings from overseas sales—the United States supports the proposal that industrialized countries, in framing their policies affecting the pattern of production, take into account the need for providing larger outlets for the exports of the less developed countries.

In paragraph 9(b) on page 10 of the agenda there is the suggestion that the Executive Secretary be instructed to make arrangements for a study of the possibility of establishing preferences in favor of the products of developing countries. While I would not conceal the fact that the two proposals that have been made in this respect would raise serious questions in our minds, we are happy to agree that the matter be studied further and will be glad to cooperate in that study.

Finally, we fully endorse the proposal in paragraph 11 on page 11 of the agenda that the ministers should recognize the need for an adequate legal and institutional framework to enable the Contracting Parties to discharge their responsibilities toward less developed countries and agree that a working party should be appointed to study this question urgently and report to the 21st session of the Contracting Parties this fall.

### STATEMENT ON AGENDA ITEMS II AND III, MAY 17<sup>3</sup>

Items II and III of the agenda, to which I now wish to address myself, deal with the two most central issues in our determination of the framework for the forthcoming negotiations. I say this because I am sure we are all agreed

<sup>3</sup> Items II and III read as follows: Item II, "Arrangements for the Reduction or Elimination of Tariffs and Other Barriers to Trade, and Related Matters"; Item III, "Measures for Access to Markets for Agricultural and Other Primary Products."

that our choice of the basis on which the reduction of tariffs is to be carried out and of the manner in which agricultural trade is to be included in the negotiations will have much to do with the success or failure of the negotiations.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make the position of the United States Government with regard to these issues as clear as possible.

In 1962 our Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act. That act was designed to enable the United States to do its share in achieving the objective agreed to by the GATT ministers in 1961<sup>4</sup>—that is, the maximum liberalization of trade. In fact the purposes of the act as stated therein are to permit the President to conclude trade agreements "affording mutual trade benefits." I repeat—"affording mutual trade benefits." The legislation gives the President far-reaching powers to reduce, on a reciprocal basis, virtually the entire range of our tariffs by as much as 50 percent spread over a 5-year period. In certain cases it enables the President to eliminate our tariff barriers entirely. Furthermore, the act empowers the President to engage in a linear approach to tariff reductions instead of item-by-item negotiations, an idea that was advocated by many of our major trading partners for some years. You will recall that in the "Dillon round" the European Economic Community in fact made their offer on a linear basis.<sup>5</sup> Our legislation at that time did not enable us to negotiate in this way, but the Trade Expansion Act now provides such an opportunity and we fully recognize the linear approach to be a more fruitful means of achieving major tariff reductions.

In the history of United States trade legislation the Trade Expansion Act stands as a vital landmark—perhaps exceeding in importance our first reciprocal trade legislation of 1934. The powers of the President are greater than ever, the negotiating flexibility has been

<sup>4</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1960, p. 453; Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561; May 21, 1962, p. 848; and June 25, 1962, p. 1036; for bibliographical details on a four-volume series published by the Department of State on *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations*, see *ibid.*, June 3, 1963, p. 889.



increased, the rules governing exceptions have been tightened, the trade interests of the less developed countries have been specifically taken into account, peril points have been eliminated, and the escape-clause procedures have been redefined.

You are no doubt all familiar with the details of the Trade Expansion Act. I have referred to them briefly because, in my view, the act embodies the firm commitment of the United States to a liberal trade philosophy. We are convinced that a substantial lowering of trade barriers will add new strength to the economies of the trading nations of the world and will contribute materially to the greater well-being of all of our peoples. I am speaking here not merely of trade between the large trading partners. But I have in mind as well the effect of lower trade barriers on the trade within Europe and on the trade between the advanced and the developing countries. As our debate on item I of the agenda has clearly shown, we are at one in our view that the latter point—the importance of improving the trading opportunities of the less developed countries—is a vital determinant of the ability of those nations to promote their economic development.

#### **The Negotiating Plan**

The views of the United States regarding the negotiating plan are guided by the philosophy embodied in the Trade Expansion Act that lower trade barriers are a key to a healthy and prosperous free-world community. It is for this reason that we are convinced that the fundamental objective of the conference must be to bring about the greatest possible reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade. Any plan that does not achieve such an objective is less than adequate in our view. By the same token, any plan that does not permit us to use the powers of the Trade Expansion Act as fully as possible contributes a loss of opportunity for achieving maximum trade liberalization.

In the view of the United States the discussions which have already taken place in the Working Party on Procedures for Tariff Reductions have been most useful. The report of the Working Party indicates fundamental agreement on certain important principles. I

assume that the ministers will be able without much difficulty to confirm that agreement so that we can quickly proceed to attempt to resolve those points which remain open.

But agreement on the general principles is only a beginning, for the Working Party had before it certain additional propositions with which we must now deal.

One determination which we feel it is vital for ministers to make at this conference relates to the specific underlying rule on which the negotiating plan will be based. The United States had made certain proposals in this regard to the Working Party, proposals designed to achieve the objective of a maximum liberalization of trade. We were gratified that there was substantial support for these proposals and for the ideas we put forward to implement them. I, therefore, urge that the ministers reach agreement that the maximum liberalization of trade can best be achieved by a negotiation which begins with across-the-board, equal-percentage, linear cuts, with limited and narrowly defined exceptions. The working hypothesis adopted in the Working Party was based on linear reductions of 50 percent. While we think this is a good working hypothesis, the actual figure would of course have to depend on the decisions reached later regarding the other aspects of the plan. To state this hypothesis differently, we would base our negotiation on an effort to make an equal-percentage movement in reducing our individual tariffs toward zero.

If we can obtain agreement on the concept of equal-percentage linear cuts as the basis for the formulation of the more detailed plan, we are prepared to consider in its elaboration the special problems that have been mentioned in the Working Party:

The problem of obtaining reciprocity for countries with specially low tariffs;

The problem of countries who may have difficulty in obtaining reciprocity because of their economic structures and the nature of their trade;

The effect on reciprocity of disparities between the tariff level of different countries on the same products; and

The problem that countries who are largely

dependent on the exports of agricultural products may have in achieving reciprocity.

We have considered alternatives to a basic rule of equal linear cuts but come up against immediate difficulties with any of them. One difficulty is that any formula based on unequal linear cuts imposes a serious limitation on the amount by which the average tariff will be reduced. Another is that, in an effort to avoid inequality of benefits, it is almost sure to create inequalities which will increase the difficulties of the final negotiations.

Just by way of illustration of these difficulties, I must refer to the alternative suggestion that was made during the meeting of the Working Party. You are all familiar with the suggestion and with the illustrative tariff targets that have been used in connection with it. We have quite carefully calculated what would be the effect on the tariff of the United States under that plan. While these calculations have not been completed for all three of the major categories—i.e. raw materials, semiprocessed goods, and finished manufactures—they have been completed for finished manufactures, which is the group in which I feel sure the greatest reductions would occur. But even in that group, the reduction in the United States tariff on finished products on the basis of a weighted average would be only 12 percent from present levels. The tariffs of some other important trading countries would be reduced even less than that.

I feel sure that any other automatic formula which is based on an objective other than that of obtaining the maximum reduction of tariff rates, and hence the maximum liberalization of trade, would produce a similar result. Harmonization of tariff rates is, in our view, very much a subsidiary problem for, in itself, harmonization does not achieve increases in trade. Nevertheless, equal-percentage tariff cuts also have the effect of reducing disparities in the tariff structures of individual countries. Under the hypothesis of an equal 50-percent cut, for instance, we calculate that 98 percent of United States tariff positions would be below 30 percent; 80 percent of our tariff positions would be at rates of less than 20 percent.

Quite apart from the achievement of maxi-

mum trade liberalization, the United States has another real problem with a plan the very essence of which is stated in terms of unequal-percentage tariff cuts. Our calculations show that "equal trade benefits," as understood in our act, could not be achieved in this way.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me state one point very clearly, for I think it is of vital importance and I do not wish to be misunderstood on it. We recognize that the basic concept of equal linear percentage cuts can be only a basic concept and that there will have to be exceptions to take account of special problems. It will be the task of the Trade Negotiations Committee to elaborate the plan so that it provides for all the special situations to which I have referred previously. We hope that they will be able to do this so as to make the plan acceptable to all.

#### **Negotiations on Agricultural Products**

Now, Mr. Chairman, I turn to a second crucial issue that was left unsettled in the Working Party, the question of how the negotiations are to cover agricultural products.

It is, of course, the firm position of my Government that negotiations must include agricultural products. This means that my Government will not be prepared to conclude the negotiations until equitable tariff and trade arrangements have been developed for agricultural products. This is necessary for the United States as a major agricultural exporting and importing nation. I would not presume to speak for any other country, but I think it should be quite obvious that countries whose exports consist primarily of raw materials and agricultural products could not participate in the forthcoming negotiations unless they are assured of acceptable access to world markets for their exports.

I am gratified to note that, in the recommendations of the Working Party before us, there was general agreement on the necessity of including agricultural products in the trade negotiations. While this is significant, it does not go beyond the decision of the ministers at the last meeting in November 1961.

If we are to progress beyond the point reached in our last meeting, we must go further

and elaborate at least the objectives of agricultural trade liberalization and the broad outlines of the means of obtaining these objectives. The objective, in the view of my delegation, can be stated very simply. It should be to assure a degree of liberalization of trade in agricultural products comparable with that achieved in the negotiations for other products. The report of the Working Party indicates there was considerable agreement on the manner for including agricultural products in the negotiations to the end that this objective might be realized.

These recommendations are found in item III.2(v), page 14, of our agenda and are of sufficient importance for me to summarize them here. The report indicates there was agreement that agriculture presented special problems and that for certain products—for example, cereals and meats—international commodity arrangements would be required and that the negotiation for removal of trade barriers should take place in the context of negotiations of such arrangements. In this connection my Government is prepared to negotiate, within the context of such agreements, its production, price, export, and import policies on a reciprocal basis.

There was further substantial agreement that machinery should be established at an early date within the framework of the Trade Negotiations Committee to consider, in the first instance, which products should be dealt with through international commodity arrangements and which by other methods. It is also suggested that the ministers be invited to direct that the Groups on Cereals and Meats should henceforth operate within the framework of the Trade Negotiations Committee and meet promptly to work out a basis for commodity arrangements.

My delegation fully endorses the proposals and in addition would propose that the frame of reference of the Meat and Cereals Groups be expanded to include a directive to work out, in the first instance, interim arrangements which would prevent any increase in effective trade barriers which might limit access to major world markets during the period while commodity arrangements were being nego-

tiated. We do not think this proposal introduces a new principle to trade negotiations.

It is customary that, in negotiating reductions in trade barriers, the negotiations use as a point of departure the barriers which exist at a particular point of time. In asking for interim arrangements for certain major agricultural products we are merely proposing that this basic principle be recognized, since negotiation of international commodity arrangements will be a time-consuming process. Also, we have seen in recent months the trade disruptions which can occur when levels of protection are raised and the difficulty of getting barriers lowered once they are increased.

My delegation believes that the most effective way of assuring that agricultural products are included in the trade negotiations in a comprehensive manner is to include agricultural products to the maximum extent possible in the automatic linear reduction formula which is adopted. We recognize that agricultural products in certain instances present special problems which prevent them from being included in an automatic formula. Nevertheless, these special problems should not blind us to the fact that substantial reductions in agricultural tariffs have been successfully negotiated in the past and, where fixed tariffs are the only form of protection, this technique is quite feasible. The United States, for example, imports approximately \$2½ billion of agricultural products annually that compete with domestic production. These products, with the exception of cotton, wheat, peanuts, sugar, and certain dairy products, are subject to moderate fixed import duties and no other barrier. The report of the Working Party contains a further suggestion that those agricultural products subject to mixed forms of protection, such as quotas, state trading, flexible tariffs, variable levies, et cetera, should be subject to concessions which would afford a degree of liberalization comparable with that achieved for other products. The United States fully supports this proposal.

My delegation recognizes that at this meeting we cannot hope to agree on more than the broad outline of the plan for including agricultural products in the negotiations. If there can be agreement on the objectives and the broad out-

lines, we are prepared to have referred to the Trade Negotiations Committee, and a subsidiary body on agricultural products, the job of working out the detailed plan for agriculture negotiations. This task would include determining which negotiations should take place in the context of commodity arrangements, which should be included in the linear reduction plan, and which products require the development of other arrangements to assure trade liberalization.

### U.S. Views on Other Points

There remain three other points which the ministers were asked to consider, on which I will attempt to give our present views as briefly as possible.

First, with respect to exemptions, we made a suggestion in the Tariff Working Party concerning a formula for their limitation. Some other members of the Working Party had difficulty with this formula, and we are quite willing to have this question referred to the Trade Negotiations Committee. There we will be glad to seek a generally acceptable solution consistent with our legislative requirements.

Second, concerning the negotiation of non-tariff barriers, we believe that there should be a working party established under the Trade Negotiations Committee to make a further study of the way in which the negotiations on these barriers can be incorporated into the overall negotiations.

Third, concerning the participation of less developed countries, I think this question also will need much more detailed examination in another working party established under the Trade Negotiations Committee. We believe that adequate participation by less developed countries in reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers is both directly and indirectly in their own interests. I am hopeful that general agreement can be reached on a form of participation which will help them to find an equitable solution for this special problem.

I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that although these remarks have taken a long time, they have not nearly exhausted the subject. I hope, however, that they have made clear the position of the United States. I likewise sincerely

hope that the Contracting Parties understand that the authority of the Trade Expansion Act was requested so as to give us the greatest authority possible to liberalize trade and that the method of negotiation proposed is aimed at exercising that authority to the maximum for the mutual benefit of all.

### RESOLUTION ON TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

The Ministers agreed—

#### A. Principles

1. That a significant liberalization of world trade is desirable, and that, for this purpose, comprehensive trade negotiations, to be conducted on a most-favoured-nation basis and on the principle of reciprocity, shall begin at Geneva on 4 May 1964, with the widest possible participation.

2. That the trade negotiations shall cover all classes of products, industrial and non-industrial, including agricultural and primary products.

3. That the trade negotiations shall deal not only with tariffs but also with non-tariff barriers.

4. That, in view of the limited results obtained in recent years from item-by-item negotiations, the tariff negotiations, subject to the provisions of paragraph B 3, shall be based upon a plan of substantial linear tariff reductions with a bare minimum of exceptions which shall be subject to confrontation and justification. The linear reductions shall be equal. In those cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application.

[NOTE: The Chairman offered paragraphs A 4 and B 3(b) as amendments to paragraphs A 4 and B 3(b), respectively, in the U.S. proposal. In presenting this amendment, the Chairman established the following two interpretations for the record:

“In paragraphs A 4 and B 3(b) ‘significant’ means ‘meaningful in trade terms’ and this is accepted by the Conference.”

“The purpose of the special rules mentioned in paragraphs A 4 and B 3(b) is, among other things, to reduce such disparities, and this is accepted by the Conference.”]

5. That in the trade negotiations it shall be open to each country to request additional trade concessions or to modify its own offers where this is necessary to obtain a balance of advantages between it and the other participating countries. It shall be a matter of joint endeavor by all participating countries to negotiate for a sufficient basis of reciprocity to maintain the fullest measure of trade concessions.

6. That during the trade negotiations a problem of reciprocity could arise in the case of countries the general incidence of whose tariffs is unquestionably lower than that of other participating countries.

7. That, in view of the importance of agriculture in world trade, the trade negotiations shall provide for acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products.

8. That in the trade negotiations every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to exports of the less-developed countries, but that the developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less-developed countries.

#### B. Procedures

1. That a Trade Negotiations Committee, composed of representatives of participating countries, shall be set up, and that it shall be the function of the Trade Negotiations Committee, directly or through committees (including the Special Groups referred to in paragraph 3(d) below) :

(a) To elaborate a trade negotiating plan in the light of the principles in paragraphs A 1-8 above, with a view to reaching agreement on the details of the plan of tariff reductions referred to in paragraph A 4 above by 1 August 1963, and to completing the remainder of the task by the date of the beginning of the twenty-first session of the Contracting Parties.

(b) To supervise the conduct of the trade negotiations.

2. That the trade negotiating plan will have to take into account the issues raised by the Ministers, and that the acceptability of the trade negotiating plan, from the point of view of individual countries, will depend upon the degree to which it succeeds in dealing with such issues.

3. That the Trade Negotiations Committee, in elaborating the trade negotiating plan, shall deal *inter alia* with the following issues and special situations :

(a) The depth of the tariff reductions, and the rules for exceptions.

(b) The criteria for determining significant disparities in tariff levels and the special rules applicable for tariff reductions in these cases.

(c) The problem for certain countries with a very low average level of tariffs or with a special economic or trade structure such that equal linear tariff reductions may not provide an adequate balance of advantages.

[NOTE: The Chairman offered paragraph B 3(e) as an amendment to paragraph B 3(c) in the U.S. proposal. In presenting this amendment, the Chairman established the following interpretation for the record:

"Under this language, the Trade Negotiations Committee will consider the case of certain countries where it is established that their very low average level of tariffs or their economic or trade structure is such that the general application of equal linear tariff reductions would not be appropriate to achieve an adequate balance of advantages. For such countries the objective shall be the negotiation of a balance of advantages based on trade concessions by them of equiv-

alent value, not excluding equal linear reductions where appropriate."

In response to a question by the Australian Delegation, the Chairman established the following additional interpretation for the record :

"The reference to 'special trade structure' includes countries whose exports consist predominantly of agricultural or other primary products, and this is accepted by the Conference."

(d) The rules to govern, and the methods to be employed in, the creation of acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade in such products. Since cereals and meats are amongst the commodities for which general arrangements may be required, the Special Groups on Cereals and Meats shall convene at early dates to negotiate appropriate arrangements. For similar reasons a special group on dairy products shall also be established.

(e) The rules to govern and the methods to be employed in the treatment of non-tariff barriers, including *inter alia* discriminatory treatment applied to products of certain countries and the means of assuring that the value of tariff reductions will not be impaired or nullified by non-tariff barriers. Consideration shall be given to the possible need to review the application of certain provisions of the General Agreement, in particular Articles XIX and XXVIII, or the procedures thereunder, with a view to maintaining, to the largest extent possible, trade liberalization and the stability of tariff concessions.

## U.S. and EEC Hold Talks on Poultry Import Fees

*Following is a statement of May 31 by Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, together with an announcement released by his office on June 7.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. HERTER

The U.S. Government deplores the reported action of the EEC [European Economic Community] Council which will raise total import charges on U.S. poultry from about 13 cents per pound to 14¼ cents. We are particularly shocked by this action since we have been working patiently for a reduction rather than a hike in tariff walls at this meeting of the Council.

The Council had before it two proposals. The first was a Commission recommendation to lower the gate price and levy by nearly 2 cents per pound. This proposal, which would have

provided a measure of relief to U.S. exports, has been pending for 2 months and has been in the process of development for several additional months. We regret that this remedial action was put aside by the Council for further study.

The second was a recommendation to increase the present supplemental gate price levy of 2.27 cents per pound to offset the effects of reported low-priced imports. This action was approved by the Council to become effective June 10, 1963. It will raise the supplemental levy to about 3½ cents per pound, thus hiking total charges against U.S. poultry to about 14¼ cents.

We have made it quite clear that a step by the Council in this direction would compel us to change the type of approach we have been following. We have tried repeatedly to obtain modifications in the existing system to make it less restrictive. These efforts have not succeeded. Now we are compelled to invoke our rights under the protocol signed with the EEC at the time the "Dillon round" tariff negotiations<sup>1</sup> were concluded last spring. Under that protocol the U.S. retained the negotiating rights it had on poultry as of September 1, 1960. The invoking of that protocol means that we will endeavor to reach prompt agreement with the EEC on a method of satisfying these rights. Our primary aim, of course, will be to obtain improved terms of access for our poultry in the EEC market. But it must be recognized that failure to obtain this objective would call for our insisting on balancing compensation elsewhere in our trade exchanges.

#### **ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEETING**

Christian A. Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, announced on June 7 that negotiations are envisaged for June 20 in Geneva between the United States and the European Economic Community on the Community's actions affecting imports of poultry from the United States.

The United States requested the negotiations after the recent decision by the EEC Council to raise import charges on U.S. poultry. The United States acted under the terms of a so-called standstill agreement signed with the

EEC at the conclusion of the last round of tariff negotiations, which provides for further negotiations on the situation of U.S. exports of poultry.

### **DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

#### **Confirmations**

The Senate on June 4 confirmed the following nominations:

William J. Crockett to be a Deputy Under Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 309 dated June 7.)

Robert C. Strong to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 321 dated June 17.)

### **TREATY INFORMATION**

#### **Current Actions**

##### **MULTILATERAL**

##### **Atomic Energy**

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284. *Ratification deposited:* Syrian Arab Republic, June 6, 1963.

##### **Coffee**

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.<sup>1</sup> *Ratification deposited:* Dominican Republic, May 8, 1963.

##### **Copyright**

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Greece, May 24, 1963.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Greece, May 24, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see p. 991, footnote 5.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Greece, May 24, 1963.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

*Accession deposited:* Greece, May 24, 1963.

### Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Senegal, May 2, 1963.

### Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

*Ratification deposited:* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, March 21, 1963.

*Adherence deposited:* Tanganyika, April 2, 1963.

### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts II to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

*Acceptance deposited:* Venezuela, May 31, 1963.

### White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Senegal, May 2, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Argentina

Protocol supplementing the agreement of December 22, 1959 (TIAS 4799), relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Washington, June 5, 1963. Entered into force provisionally June 5, 1963. Enters into force definitively on the date of the notification from the Argentine Government that the protocol has been approved in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

### Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected

by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo April 18 and 22, 1963. Entered into force May 22, 1963.

### Thailand

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Bangkok May 24, 1963. Entered into force May 24, 1963.

### United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 4078), for cooperation on the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 5, 1963. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 3-9

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 289 of May 29, 291 of May 31, and 293 of June 1.

No.	Date	Subject
*292	6/3	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*295	6/3	Battle: commencement address, Fisk University.
†296	6/3	Cleveland: "The Toasted Breadcrumbs of the Future."
*297	6/3	Name of McKinnon added to FSO memorial plaque.
*298	6/3	Rusk: death of Pope John XXIII.
*299	6/4	Program for visit of President of India.
†300	6/5	Henkin and McDougal appointed to Permanent Court of Arbitration.
*301	6/7	Mrs. Louchheim: commencement address, Ohio University.
†302	6/5	Yost: credentials of Hungarian U.N. delegation.
303	6/5	Rusk: tuna boats detained in Ecuador.
†304	6/6	Rusk: aid to Pakistan from New Orleans, La.
305	6/6	Recognition of Togo Government.
*306	6/7	White appointed Consul General at Melbourne (biographic details).
307	6/7	Greek Minister of Coordination talks with U.S. officials.
†308	6/7	Galbraith: commencement address, University of Massachusetts.
*309	6/7	Crockett sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (biographic details).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**Agriculture**

GATT Ministers Reach Agreement on Tariff Negotiating Procedures (Herter, text of resolution) . . . . . 990

U.S. and EEC Hold Talks on Poultry Import Fees (Herter) . . . . . 996

Asia. New Dimensions for the Colombo Plan (Marks) . . . . . 977

Australia. ANZUS Council Meets in New Zealand (text of communique) . . . . . 967

**Congress**

Confirmations (Crockett, Strong) . . . . . 997

U.S. Outlines Policy Toward Cuban Refugees (Martin) . . . . . 983

Cuba. U.S. Outlines Policy Toward Cuban Refugees (Martin) . . . . . 983

**Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations** (Crockett, Strong) . . . . . 997

**Dominican Republic. Letters of Credence** (Del Rosario Ceballos) . . . . . 976

**Economic Affairs**

GATT Ministers Reach Agreement on Tariff Negotiating Procedures (Herter, text of resolution) . . . . . 990

Greek Minister of Coordination Ends Talks With U.S. Officials . . . . . 970

New Dimensions for the Colombo Plan (Marks) . . . . . 977

U.S. and EEC Hold Talks on Poultry Import Fees (Herter) . . . . . 996

The United States and the European Economic Community (Trezise) . . . . . 971

U.S. Seeks Solution to Problem of Tuna Fishing Off Ecuador (Rusk) . . . . . 976

Ecuador. U.S. Seeks Solution to Problem of Tuna Fishing Off Ecuador (Rusk) . . . . . 976

**Europe**

U.S. and EEC Hold Talks on Poultry Import Fees (Herter) . . . . . 996

The United States and the European Economic Community (Trezise) . . . . . 971

Greece. Greek Minister of Coordination Ends Talks With U.S. Officials . . . . . 970

**India. U.S. and India Reaffirm Agreement on Basic Values and Objectives** (text of joint communique) . . . . . 969

**International Organizations and Conferences**

ANZUS Council Meets in New Zealand (text of communique) . . . . . 967

GATT Ministers Reach Agreement on Tariff Negotiating Procedures (Herter, text of resolution) . . . . . 990

New Dimensions for the Colombo Plan (Marks) . . . . . 977

Iraq. Strong confirmed as Ambassador . . . . . 997

**Jamaica. United States To Furnish Jamaica Defense Articles and Services** . . . . . 976

**Military Affairs. United States To Furnish Jamaica Defense Articles and Services** . . . . . 976

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Meets in New Zealand (text of communique) . . . . . 967

**Presidential Documents. U.S. and India Reaffirm Agreement on Basic Values and Objectives** . . . . . 969

**Recognition. U.S. Recognizes Government of Republic of Togo** . . . . . 969

**Refugees. U.S. Outlines Policy Toward Cuban Refugees** (Martin) . . . . . 983

**Togo. U.S. Recognizes Government of Republic of Togo** . . . . . 969

**Treaty Information**

Current Actions . . . . . 997

United States To Furnish Jamaica Defense Articles and Services . . . . . 976

*Name Index*

Crockett, William J . . . . . 997

Del Rosario Ceballos, Enriquillo Antonio . . . . . 976

Herter, Christian A . . . . . 990, 996

Kennedy, President . . . . . 969

Marks, Matthew J . . . . . 977

Martin, Edwin M . . . . . 983

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli . . . . . 969

Rusk, Secretary . . . . . 976

Strong, Robert C . . . . . 997

Trezise, Philip H . . . . . 971





UNITED STATES  
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
 DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.  
 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
 PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
 (GPO)

the  
 Department  
 of  
 State

The Newly Independent Nations

The following Department of State pamphlets, in the form of fact sheets describing the people, land, history, government, and economy of the newly independent nations, are now available:

Country	Pub. No.	Price
Republic of Chad . . . . .	7494 . . . . .	5 cents
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) . . . . .	7514 . . . . .	10 cents
Cyprus . . . . .	7503 . . . . .	5 cents
Gabon Republic . . . . .	7495 . . . . .	5 cents
Jamaica . . . . .	7506 . . . . .	5 cents
Islamic Republic of Mauritania . . . . .	7504 . . . . .	5 cents
Somali Republic . . . . .	7453 . . . . .	5 cents
Tanganyika . . . . .	7515 . . . . .	5 cents

*Order Form*

Please send me copies of pamphlets in The Newly Independent Nations series as indicated below:

To: Supt. of Documents  
 Govt. Printing Office  
 Washington 25, D.C.

- Chad                       Gabon                       Somali Republic  
 Congo (Brazzaville)     Jamaica                     Tanganyika  
 Cyprus                       Mauritania

*Enclosed find:*

\$: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (cash, check, or money  
 order payable to  
 Supt. of Docs.)

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Street Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City, Zone, and State: \_\_\_\_\_



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 06352 774 9



