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


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TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE

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## The Economics of Arms Control and Disarmament

by William C. Foster

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency<sup>1</sup>

It is indeed encouraging to observe that a group of distinguished citizens and community leaders of the north Middle West have taken 2 days from their busy schedules to study and discuss the problems of arms control and disarmament. We are grateful to the University of Wisconsin and the Johnson Foundation for sponsoring this conference. In doing so, they are contributing to public understanding of a fundamental problem that confronts us. Peace is the great unfinished business of our generation, as it has been for all preceding generations, and a just and lasting peace will eventually be achieved only if our policy proposals have the benefit of the consideration and counsel of thoughtful men and women in all sectors of our national life.

Some of my ablest associates have come here to discuss with you what we are doing in Washington, at the United Nations, in Geneva, and at research centers throughout the country. They will delve into some of our current problems and in doing so will, I am sure, gain the freshness of insight and clarity of perspective that often result from a trip outside Washington.

They have come to learn, as well as to inform, and they will give eager attention to the ideas, suggestions, and critiques which are expressed in the course of these deliberations. For this

is a developing field and the challenge is vast. We need the assistance of American businessmen and scholars, scientists and professionals. Our door is always open; we welcome new ideas. Last year we spent about \$4 million on contract studies. Over and above these, we received first-rate assistance from published and unpublished material produced under other auspices. We regard these 2 days of discussion at Wingspread as a two-way street; we expect to take home as much as we brought with us.

In discussing some of our problems, you will note that they cannot be isolated compartments but must be faced in relation to many other aspects of our foreign relations and of our defense program. Indeed, one of the reasons an independent agency was created to deal with arms control and disarmament was the fact that the subject matter with which we deal cuts across the concerns of many different Government agencies, each of which has a special responsibility and a special form of expertise. It is our job to coordinate these efforts and to develop for the President's consideration policies and programs which harmonize our long-range national desires with the steps we must take to meet immediate necessities.

I ask you to remember, however, that arms control and disarmament are not only distant and remote goals. They are also subjects of ongoing international conferences which are in the center of the diplomatic stage. These negotiations have an immediate impact upon our relations with our allies, with the nations on the other side of the bargaining table, and with nonaligned countries. Positions taken at these

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<sup>1</sup> Address made before a briefing and colloquium on arms control and disarmament sponsored by the Johnson Foundation and the University of Wisconsin, in cooperation with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at Racine, Wis., on June 6.

conferences affect these relations and sometimes affect them dramatically.

Our studies in arms control have current values to us also because they impart new insights into the management of our military resources.

I ask you to remember, too, that the arms race grows more intense every year and that, at each new stage of technology, control and disarmament become more difficult. The need for action, therefore, is urgent.

So that there will be no misunderstanding among us, I should like to make clear that I do not advocate arms control and disarmament at any price. My Agency is as much concerned with maintaining the national security of our nation as any other department or agency in Government. Indeed, the enabling act which established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states that arms control and disarmament policy, and I quote, "must be consistent with national security policy as a whole."

Obviously any agreement on measures of arms control and disarmament must be accompanied by those measures of verification that would provide us the assurance that such agreements are being adhered to.

I shall address myself today to the subject of the economics of arms control and disarmament within the framework of that understanding.

#### **Misconceptions on Role of Defense Spending**

Regrettably the subject has not often been discussed since our Agency was established. It is one which I believe has a very direct interest to all of us, including individuals and communities in this part of the country. It is my hope that increased discussion will lead to the removal of any doubt that arms reduction and disarmament are strongly to our economic advantage. We should be able as informed citizens to recognize that adjustment, even though temporarily dislocating, is not to be shunned if it clearly enhances our general welfare.

You will not be deprived of hearing from my associates developments in all other aspects of arms control and disarmament in which the Agency is involved. However, I would urge you in the question-and-response period to feel free to question me at will on any aspects of

the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I will be pleased to try to answer all questions raised in the period allotted me.

One might ask if this is the time to talk about the economics of arms control and disarmament. It has, as you know, very pertinent implications for maintaining demand, production, income, and jobs in the economy.

I think it is the time. When could it be better to consider the role of defense expenditures in the economy than when there is a sort of national searching of the economic soul? It provides a unique occasion to overcome any misconceptions which may be developing as to that role and its meaning for the economic adjustments to disarmament.

I am referring to inclinations to rationalize, in one way or another, our huge defense expenditures as necessary or desirable for the maintenance of production, employment, and incomes in the economy. To those who already may have succumbed to these inclinations, the present debate on taxes and on general economic policy offers the temptation to pose this question: If we cannot fully utilize our resources expending some \$55 billion for defense, how shall we avoid substantial additions to the unemployment of men and machines under disarmament?

This, of course, is a provocative question although it is not yet a matter of public debate or discussion. The economic consequences of disarmament as a question still lie mostly on the surface of men's thoughts and feelings. But to the extent that the issue is raised, reactions often indicate deep concern and skepticism, not relief and optimism. Does this reaction reflect simply fear of painful dislocations of adjustment? Or does it in any way reflect a more deep-rooted fear of longer range economic difficulties? Are we, in other words, in danger of developing a sense of permanent economic dependence upon large defense expenditures?

I believe we could be vulnerable to such danger. There are many reasons for this, including recent economic history. The greatest depression of our country ended only with our entrance into World War II. In the postwar period we have seen—coincidentally with huge

expenditures for defense—levels of production, employment, and income greatly exceeding those of the prewar period. Thus one might conclude that the economy is better off with a large measure of defense spending than without it.

Moreover we have been able to finance our own defense expenditures in such a way that their burden on the individual has not been too apparent. I am not suggesting that we have paid for the defense program primarily by deficit financing. We have been paying for it very largely out of current income. Our taxes are high. But we have not found it necessary or desirable for some time to increase taxes—at least at the Federal level—and we have managed to maintain stability in prices. Finally, we have been able to provide the individual with an increasing real disposable or after-tax income. This has been accomplished even with a less than satisfactory rate of economic growth. In these circumstances it is difficult for our society to sense any profound tangible denial as the result of the defense program. It is not in the nature of man to question too sharply his environment as long as things continue to get even a little bit better.

The magnetic attraction of defense spending as a supposed economic panacea is enhanced also by the extent to which a significant segment of the population has developed a fairly direct economic interest in it. Some 6 percent of the civilian labor force is employed in providing defense goods and services or in defense-related activities in the Government. In addition, in numerous areas of the Nation, the incomes of many persons depend, for the moment, quite directly on the disbursements of local defense facilities. These direct and indirect dependencies are by no means momentary; for many persons they have evolved over a considerable number of years. That these people should find it difficult to envisage an equally satisfactory economic future in a defense-free economy is quite understandable.

The relatively high wages paid in defense industry and the relatively greater prosperity of defense-oriented areas tend further to cultivate the notion that defense business is economically healthy. Geographic competitive in-

terest in defense contracts is intensifying. One can expect that areas now heavily dependent upon defense facilities or installations might find it difficult to perceive opportunities for economic development in directions other than defense.

All this suggests our vulnerability to the danger of developing a sense of permanent economic dependence upon defense spending. That danger is present. Moreover, it is of profound significance for our future welfare. It threatens our sense of economic values. It poses a threat to our capacity to recognize and deal with the real problems of the economy in this new age of supertechnology. It threatens to weaken confidence in our free enterprise system and our resistance to the evils of the so-called "warfare state." These, in turn, threaten our position of prestige and leadership in the world.

#### Alternatives to Defense Spending

What action shall we take, then, to impede the drift toward a sense of indefinite economic dependence on the arms race? Certainly much greater analysis and public discussion of the real issues are in order. Thought needs to be given to the role arms spending plays in the economy and to the alternatives to such spending in a disarmament environment.

Initially one might inquire whether there is any reason to change the view long accepted by reasonable men—and traditionally accepted in American thinking—that arms and armies do not make good economic investments. It need take no second thought to recognize that weapons and military services do not, by and large, serve our material needs and wants. Admittedly there are surface economic benefits. I certainly do not wish to minimize the contribution to the so-called "state of the arts" that derives from research and development on weapons. On the other hand, current studies suggest that caution is in order in evaluating the actual contribution which military research and development make to the evolution of new products and processes in the civilian sector. In any case, few would argue that the money spent for such research and development plus that spent for procuring and maintaining the weapons—a total amount equal to about one-

third of the entire Federal budget—is at all commensurate with that contribution.

There should be little difficulty in concluding that, if the economic returns on defense spending are marginal, such spending represents a dissipation of resources. Manpower and machines employed on defense could be employed for purposes which would provide economic returns of substance. It clearly is not true, as some of the discussion on defense spending appears to assume, that military programs absorb only manpower which otherwise would be idle. Thus military spending cannot be justified simply as a means of maintaining high levels of production, income, and employment.

For production, income, and employment are a function of demand for goods and services. Such demand arises from a capacity to spend—either by individuals, businesses, or public entities. Our capacity to spend today for non-defense goods and services clearly is limited by what we spend for defense goods and services. As I have noted, we have been financing the defense effort primarily out of current income rather than by the creation of additional debt. In the absence of defense spending we would be disposing that portion of income which goes for defense for some pattern of personal consumption and private and public investment which would create demand for the services of men and machinery. Not only would we create thereby output, income, and employment, but we would also create goods and services which would add to our general welfare.

Some may be disposed to say that the significance of defense demand is that it is certain. The past decade would seem to bear them out, although many defense producers and employees would be inclined to note that that certainty relates only to the total pie and not to its individual parts. As for myself, I see greater possibility for certainty in nondefense patterns of spending than in defense spending. There is no reason why, for example, we could not usefully devote on a continuing basis a higher proportion of our resources to such needs as education, public health and welfare, transportation and communications, natural resources, and urban development. I find a certainty of

continuous improvement in our education, health, and welfare infinitely more significant from the economic and social long-range viewpoint than an improvement in our weapons. Moreover, I see the same certainty in regard to personal consumption. The proportion of personal disposable income going for consumption has been quite consistently in the range of 92 or 93 percent in the years since the Korean war. In the years prior to that war the proportion tended to be slightly higher.

Some may wish to argue that defense spending generates greater employment than other forms of spending. I shall not endeavor to prove otherwise, but I should be interested to listen to any convincing evidence that shows that a billion dollars spent for defense produces greater employment than a billion dollars' worth of the production of nondefense goods.

#### **Limitations of Defense Spending**

It would appear, in fact, that defense spending of the type we now have has no intrinsic merit in terms of its ability to create production and income as compared to other forms of demand. For one thing, there is an inherent limitation on the widening of investment in the weapons industry in response to new procurement demands. A substantial portion of the plant and capital equipment used in the industry is already owned by the Government. It can be shifted around in accordance with the dictates of the procurement program. The uncertainty of the defense business mitigates strongly against the willingness of the weapons producer to risk large amounts of his own capital.

Defense demand also absorbs, relative to its contribution to national income, a far too high proportion of skills and talent in the economy. This is particularly true in the case of scientists and engineers, who are drawn to defense work by the higher salaries which are offered. It is unquestionably true that inability to compete for the services of these persons has affected substantially the application of research and development in the industrial sector.

There would also appear to be unavoidable economic waste in the defense effort. This results from the factors of uncertainty and in-

stability in weapons procurement. It is difficult for a weapons producer to gear his labor force to the point of optimum cost. Therefore over-manning tends to be frequent. Large amounts of money also are dissipated in competing for defense contracts. Sums over \$100 million can be spent by the "losing" firms collectively in bidding for a particularly lucrative contract. Sudden changes in military programs result in severe local economic dislocations which may take years to overcome. The geographic distribution of defense contracts itself tends to create imbalance in the economy in regard to the dispersion of employment and income and in regard to economic development.

The discussion thus far might tend to provoke the response, "All that is well and good. Yet how could we manage to replace the defense effort in the economy without serious economic repercussions?" I would reply, first, that if we can apply to the resolution of that problem only a modicum of the talent which we have applied to defense and space problems, we should manage the replacement with only minor and temporary discomforts. Defense spending either is a good thing economically or it is not. If it is not, the sooner our national security interests permit us to reduce or eliminate it the sooner shall we be able to enjoy the benefits of allocating our resources to more productive use.

Our national security interests do not now permit us to rid ourselves of defense spending. Then, how is our attitude toward it pertinent, you may ask. I am not suggesting, of course, that we bear the financial burden of defense ungraciously. Rather, I am suggesting that we should guard ourselves against developing a permanent taste for such spending. There always will be enormous difficulties in surveying our own interests objectively in disarmament. Any self-delusion on the economic aspects could only add significantly to the responsibilities of the Government to insure properly the country's interests.

I should also like to add that the sooner we fully appreciate the long-term economic benefits to be derived from disarmament, the sooner shall we be able to plan intelligently for an

adjustment process. Such a process will involve not only the conscientious efforts of the Government but the imagination, initiative, and foresight of the private sector as well. Much of the success of our post-World War II conversion was due, I believe, to the fact that it was carefully and long planned and it was carried out in an atmosphere of hope and expectation. A buoyant psychology on the part of business and consumers could, in itself, do much to facilitate the transition away from a defense-oriented economy. It is not too early for the private sector to begin serious consideration of how to use effectively the resources released by disarmament. This would be particularly appropriate in those cases where resources are now devoted exclusively to military research and development. Such consideration would facilitate greatly the rapid application of new technology in civilian industry. This, I am sure, would result in substantial improvements in products and processes.

President Kennedy has stated our willingness to engage with the Soviet Union in a "peace race."<sup>2</sup> Thus far there is little evidence that the Soviets are ready to meet this challenge. But if or when they do, it would behoove us to be adequately prepared on the all-important economic front—prepared psychologically as well as physically to make the economic adjustments such a transition would require and which are within our means to carry out successfully.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of an address by President Kennedy before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.



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# Peace and Human Rights

by Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>

For the past 2 days you have been discussing that remarkable document—*Pacem in Terris*—which has produced such interest, praise, and even excitement around the world.

The reactions were global and various. But to someone operationally concerned with the problems of peace, the most interesting thing about *Pacem in Terris* was its linkage of a philosophy about the nature of man under God and a philosophy about man's operational efforts to keep peace in the world under the United Nations.

It is not for me, either as a Government official or as a Protestant, to add another interpretation to the growing literature on Pope John's last and most intriguing state paper. But a reading of that paper does stimulate a political scientist to some secular and personal thoughts

<sup>1</sup>Address made on June 15 (press release 317 dated June 14) at a dinner concluding the Midwest Conference on Peace and World Order, sponsored by the Chicago World Peace Center and held at St. Xavier's College, Chicago, Ill.

about the nexus of peace and human rights.

Before we ask what it means to make human rights operational in a world of 100 sovereignties and several hundred thousand political jurisdictions, it is worth just a moment to recall some things which you and I first learned as long ago as we can remember—about events which you know so well they are deep in your bones—words which most Americans can almost recite by heart.

We run the risk of losing our way if we do not keep reminding ourselves of what is permanent. Mr. Justice Holmes once said: "We need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure." I doubt if there has ever been a time when that observation was more blazingly relevant than right now. So, in service to the obvious, I recite the hallowed words of the Declaration of Independence of the 13 States:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

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And the immediately following sentence says:

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Governments, then, in the view of the Founding Fathers, are constituted for the explicit purpose of securing the unalienable rights of men—men who are born equal. That is to say, our political system is built on a truth that has to do with the nature of man. A revolution was promptly fought to make that moral precept operational.

A short while later it became evident to many that the Constitution adopted by the new nation emerging from that revolution was not explicit enough about the rights of membership in the human race.

The framers of the first 10 amendments to the Constitution—the Bill of Rights—were saying that the right of all men to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” had to be protected from explicit forms of infringement by government—and *by* explicit guarantees of freedom of worship, of speech, of press, and of assembly.

Much later, our grandfathers got around to the idea that human slavery is rather inconsistent with human rights, and the practice was abolished. We even got around to the idea that if men had inherent rights, maybe women had them, too.

Still later, the idea gained ground that freedom to starve—or freedom to sleep on a park bench—or freedom to die of a curable disease—were not among the “rights” of man. And so we have seen in recent decades more and more “social legislation,” that is, political action to expand human opportunity.

These were the major breakthroughs as the occupants of our family tree converted into political action the moral precept rendered in the *Pacem in Terris* with these simple but still revolutionary words: “All men are equal by reason of their natural dignity.”

Other nations, of course, have taken comparable steps to make this moral precept operational in their own societies. Indeed, the combined influence of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights is still perhaps

the most revolutionary influence in our own postwar world. The cry for *human* freedom was briefly overshadowed by the shriller battle cry for *national* freedom. But around the world—through Asia and Africa and Latin America and back home to Birmingham and Chicago and Washington—mankind is calling for the previous question, the question of individual human rights.

### The Four Freedoms

The doctrines of Jefferson—and of the less elegant French revolutionists who were his contemporaries—were proclaimed for “all men.” But they were pursued within national societies. Only in our own time have these universals been pursued universally.

In his message on the state of the Union in 1941—11 months before Pearl Harbor—President Roosevelt looked ahead to a world “founded upon four essential human freedoms.”

As you recall, the first two—“freedom of speech and expression” and “freedom of every person to worship God in his own way”—were restatements of the first amendment.

The third was “freedom from want”—which, said President Roosevelt, “translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.”

And the fourth, of course, was “freedom from fear”—“which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”

The moral precept of an innate human equality was left implicit in the Four Freedoms. But when it came to drafting the United Nations Charter a few years later, it was made very explicit indeed.

“We the peoples of the United Nations,” says the preamble to the charter, “determined . . . to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women . . . do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.”

Now what of the linkage on the international level between precept and practice—that nexus between the plane of morality and the plane of political action?

#### Linkage Between Precept and Practice

In 1943 the Hot Springs Conference laid the groundwork for the Food and Agriculture Organization, the first international organization designed to promote freedom from want. Others followed rapidly. Some of them started out mainly to provide for the exchange of information, to conduct studies, and to arrange meetings and conferences. But gradually they all have taken on an executive function as operators of action programs—to survey resources, to help finance and staff training institutions, to wipe out malaria, to fight trachoma, to improve the diets of children, to reduce urban slums, to make pure water run in village wells, to train teachers and to teach literacy, and to do many other practical things in the world of the here and now. Millions of dollars, advanced techniques, tens of thousands of people, and several dozen new international institutions are now at work doing something about freedom from want.

Not many people stood up and took notice back in 1960 when Dag Hammarskjöld, in his typical manner of understatement, observed: “. . . born as an instrument for multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations has grown into an operational agency of significant dimensions . . .” with a “list of responsibilities . . . in the economic and social field.”<sup>2</sup> But he was pointing to a phenomenon of first-rate importance in world affairs. I prefer to put it this way: The United Nations has acquired a capacity to act in the interest of freedom from want.

A similar development has taken place, of course, in the peacekeeping field. Peacekeeping—by police action—became operational at the time of Korea. It has been intensely operational for the past 7 years in the Middle East, where members of the U.N. Emergency Force patrol the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-Egyptian border 24 hours a day by foot, jeep, and helicopter. It was so operational for 2½ years in

the Congo that 127 officers and men of the U.N. Force died to defend the territorial integrity of the Congo, to prevent civil war, to resist mob violence, and to bring near-order out of near-chaos.

Approximately 48 hours ago a United States Air Force C-130 put down at El Arvish in the Gaza Strip to pick up a contingent of soldiers serving with the Emergency Force in the Middle East and airlift them to tiny Yemen—to see that an agreement reached by mediation would be carried out on the spot.<sup>3</sup> Thus in one more case has peacekeeping passed from rhetoric to practice.

The machinery for keeping the peace is still far from extensive—and far from adequate. But it is a start in the direction of making operational the bold words of the charter about freedom from fear of war.

#### Freedom From Want, a Human Rights Issue

If you stand back and look at the United Nations system, you see that it includes noble words on three subjects. One category is peacekeeping and peaceful change, including the movement of colonies toward self-determination and independence. Another group of words focuses on economic and social development inside each country. And a third theme is the achievement and guarantee of human rights.

On the first of these, United Nations peacekeeping machinery and the decolonization of a third of the world in 17 years bear witness to much effort to match the words with action. In economic and social development, too, an impressive variety of operations marries actions to aspirations: Out of every 20 persons employed by the United Nations system, 17 are engaged trying to raise the standards of life in the world's less developed areas. While the United Nations has since developed a rudimentary capacity to act in support of freedom from fear and freedom from want, it has not so far developed such machinery to match with international action the words about individual rights.

Given the fact that human rights are suppressed *in principle* by the authorities control-

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/3394.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 71.

ling nearly one-third of humanity and that most others, not the least our own, have preferred to pursue human rights through national action, the absence of international action is not exactly surprising.

But perhaps the reason the development of the charter looks thus unbalanced is that we are used to thinking of human rights as something separable from peace and bread, something that has to do with courts and lawyers and voting rights. Now we know that when we speak of human rights henceforth we should mean not just the right to be free from racial discrimination, not just the right to be independent and choose one's own form of government, not just the rights to register and vote and speak and pray and openly meet; we are speaking also of freedom from want and freedom from fear. We cannot yet know exactly what to do about this insight. But some of the implications are surely clear.

The first implication is this: If we fail to grasp the central position of human rights in human affairs, we risk a dangerous confusion here at home.

This is the year when patience ran out for the Negro American. The barriers against exercise of his constitutional rights are now to be dismantled and carted into oblivion. The remaining "White Only" signs on public accommodations and schools in the South are to be tossed on the rubbish heaps—where they long ago belonged. And out of this ordeal we can emerge a stronger and more united nation than ever before. The fact that the national conscience is being cleansed beneath the glare of klieg lights makes the exercise excruciatingly painful; but it also will help insure that the change is thorough and final.

But is this the last lap, this effort to remove some obvious public forms of discrimination? Is it the final time around for the Bill of Rights? Is access to a good education and to good housing and to good jobs—especially in the great urban centers across the Nation—just a matter of striking out the restrictive covenants and striking down the covert agreements? What happens when they have all been stricken?

What happens will be a new form of tragedy

if there are not enough schools and enough jobs and enough housing to go around. We will have, in short, the old case of the "haves" and the "have nots"—a question of economic elbowroom for a growing population with rising expectations. And what a misadventure it would be if, having struck down the outward signs of racial discrimination, we were to find that the new economic problem looks suspiciously like the old race problem, because so many of the "haves" are white and so many of the "have nots" are not.

The precondition to domestic tranquillity is that we grasp the fact that freedom from want here at home—freedom from want of adequate schools, adequate housing, adequate job opportunities, adequate medical care—is also a human rights issue, one which requires not another round of civil rights cases but an upward spiral of economic growth.

What I have said about our internal affairs applies as well to our international affairs. What carries the label "human rights" is but a small piece of our foreign policy: the drafting of human rights conventions; U.N. seminars on human rights; the granting of fellowships for the study of civil rights law and procedure; conferences on criminal law, women in political life, labor standards, and the like.

In this whole area we are abandoning a 10-year-old tradition of aloofness. Americans are participating actively in the drafting of international recommendations and conventions in the field of human rights.

Beyond these useful, often symbolic, activities, the label "human rights" fades away, but its relevance pervades many other international operations.

We have the technical capacity to cancel out the intolerable indignity that half of mankind is still hungry; "the conviction that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity" surely requires the elimination of hunger from this planet.

The nation-building work of international agencies—the building of institutions inside the developing countries to heal the sick, grow more food, teach the illiterate, promote free trade unions, and resettle refugees—is a work of enormous import in any but the narrowest conception of human rights.

To reform ancient and burdensome taxes, to change oppressive land-tenure arrangements, are surely exercises in the politics of human rights, not merely in the science of productivity.

And who can miss the relevance to human rights of population pressure which has caused many developing countries to start debating the proper role of public policy in personal decisions about family size?

### **Klieg-Light Diplomacy**

Beyond the work of the specialized agencies, we might well search out and identify the human rights aspects of a number of issues that come before the United Nations in the guise of political problems. Of course they *are* political problems, but only because human rights are the stuff of politics.

This summer the Security Council, which is charged with keeping the peace between nations, will be called to consider as a peace-and-security issue the question of *apartheid* in South Africa and the equally burning question of Portuguese territories in Africa. But in their essence these are problems of human rights—the rights to participate in one's own government and the right to determine with others the destiny of the group—rights which in papal logic flow quite naturally from the “natural dignity” of man.

Equally the repression of captive societies, still so permanent and so repugnant a feature of Soviet policy and practice, is no less an issue of human rights for lack of a court in which the oppressed can complain of their oppression.

The United Nations Charter proclaims “the dignity and worth of the human person” and “the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” Can the United Nations as an organization do something about the validation of these values? Of course it can. It can switch on a floodlight and expose the area in question to the conscience of the world.

Let no one believe that this is a pointless exercise, unrelated to political reality. Under the klieg light of world opinion, a nation's prestige is engaged; and since national power is not unrelated to national prestige, governments are influenced by world opinion—even though it is hard to prove because they seldom admit it.

The blended conscience of men of good will may wink at injustice in the dark; but when the lights are on, a good conscience must speak or desert its possessor. No government anywhere is quite immune to the moral indignation of those—including its own citizens—who watch it at work.

Surely the further development of this still primitive organization, to which we have given the presumptuous name “United Nations,” will feature a wider and more effective use of klieg-light diplomacy.

No nation can wholly escape a roving international eye. But the maturing reaction of world opinion to Little Rock and Oxford and Birmingham and Tuscaloosa demonstrates something very important: that even the most emotional drumbeaters for civil rights, thousands of miles from the scene, are quick to perceive the difference between a country which is having racial trouble because it is unwilling to make progress and a country which is having racial trouble precisely because it is making progress—because its courts and its National Government and most of its people in most of its communities have decided that 100 years of patience is long enough.

### **Peace the Ultimate Goal of Human Rights**

Much of this Pope John XXIII saw clearly and expressed “fervently”—or was it “vehemently”?—in *Pacem in Terris*. When the rest of us, who survive him, perceive that what is going on all over the world is a struggle for peace and human rights—and that these two universal drives are intimately related to each other because they derive directly from the inner nature of man—then the artificial mental barriers which divide domestic affairs from foreign affairs come tumbling down and we see at last, in all its simplicity, the universality of our dilemma.

We see that peace and human rights are not only the related goals of mankind; we see that peace is the ultimate goal of human rights. We see that peace can be the natural condition of the world only when human rights are reasonably secure for all. And we see that progress in human rights, broadly conceived, is the longest yet surest road to peace on earth.

This philosophy is—it must be—the starting point of American foreign policy.

Just last Monday [June 10] at the commencement exercises at American University, President Kennedy put it as succinctly as it can be put: "Is not peace," he asked, "basically a matter of human rights?"<sup>4</sup>

Any nation which struggles and negotiates and relates itself to others under the banner of peace and human rights will prevail, for its goals have gone beyond nations to the nature of man himself. It will, of course, be our steady purpose to escalate the battle for peace and human rights.

I was asked to speak to you this evening about what you in your own communities can, as a practical, day-to-day matter, do about world affairs and the formulation of foreign policy. Without saying so until now, this is exactly what I have been trying to do. For when you move human rights ahead by an inch in your

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 3.

State, in your city, in your community, you have helped to formulate our foreign policy and you are up to your ears in world politics.

That was what Eleanor Roosevelt was trying to say when she was asked to help celebrate the 10th anniversary of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. She was no professor of philosophy. But to this woman of the greatest practical wisdom, it was all very clear.

"It is not just a question of getting the [human rights] covenants written and accepted," she said. "It is the question of actually living and working in our countries for freedom and justice for each human being. And I hope that is what we will dedicate ourselves to in the next ten years and that each of us will have the feeling that they must do something as individuals . . . each of us must do something because this is one of the basic foundation stones if we are ever to achieve what the United Nations was established to achieve—an atmosphere in which peace can grow in the world."

## The Challenge to Freedom in Asia

*by Roger W. Hilsman*

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am very pleased to have a part in the 1963 Conference on Cold War Education, organized in this growing and progressive State of Florida. Governor [Farris] Bryant and all who have worked on this conference deserve our lasting appreciation. The kind of future we shall have in this country, and in the world, depends in large measure on how well we understand our problems and how wisely we deploy our strength and our resources to meet them. But understanding—the goal of this conference—comes first.

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the 1963 Conference on Cold War Education at Tampa, Fla., on June 14 (press release 318, revised).

What is it that we must understand? First, obviously, we must understand the nature of the Communist threat, for it is not a simple threat, but a subtle and complicated one. And, second, we must understand what we Americans can do to meet this threat and the qualities of mind and heart we need to meet it.

What I propose to do today is to talk, first, about the nature of the threat and the way the Communists operate; second, what we can do to cope with it, including the qualities we Americans need to be successful in this; and, finally, to illustrate all of these points by two specific trouble areas on the front lines—Laos and Viet-Nam.

## Nature of the Danger

As to the nature of the danger, the ideology of communism is a threat to the United States today mainly because it is joined with the population, resources, and military strength of the countries of the Soviet Union and Communist China, because it is joined with two bases of power.

But the fact that ideology has been joined to these two bases of power should not be misinterpreted: the threat is not just military; it is also political. And of the two, the political threat is probably the more pervasive. This is true because this nation and its allies have made sure that their military defenses are adequate and up to date.

The political threat is also serious because of the Communists' skill in manipulating all the elements of power—political, economic, and psychological as well as military. They use these instruments with considerable sophistication, playing first one then another according to the opportunities open to them in any given situation. Mao Tse-tung has described this alternation of tactics and instruments as "talk/fight; talk/fight," and it describes the technique very well. This sudden alternation between talking and fighting is designed also to induce a maximum amount of confusion, instability, and trouble in the free world. One of the latest examples of their use of this tactic occurred last October in the Chinese Communist attack along the Indian border, followed by their withdrawal beginning a month later.

The immediate goal of the Communists is, of course, to capture the in-between nations, those smaller and weaker nations which today are struggling against odds to remain independent. If the Communists can capture such free nations, turning them against the United States and making them feel that it is the U.S. which poses the danger or forms an obstacle to their goals, then the Communists could win without using military power. Moreover, the Communists have waged an unremitting attack on the foundations of our way of life, just as they are a threat to freedom elsewhere in the world. Although they argue over differences in emphasis as to how the Communist world should carry out its attacks on free men, their common

goal is plain enough: to further the destruction of the values all free men cherish.

In Asia the greatest danger to independent nations comes from Communist China, with its 700 million people forced into the service of an aggressive Communist Party. We can't ignore that problem, and we don't ignore it. Communist China lies in direct contact with, or very close to, a whole series of free nations ranged in an arc from Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Nepal in South Asia; through Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in Southeast Asia; and on up through the Republic of China, on its island base of Taiwan, to Japan and Korea. Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand are also alive to the threat posed by the Communist Chinese.

All these free nations must deal with the facts of Communist China and its ambitions. No matter what response each has made, be it nonalignment or alliance with friendly nations, they all are aware that the aim of the Chinese Communists is to gain predominant control in Asia and eventually to secure the establishment of Communist regimes throughout the world. The reaction of each nation is determined by its own material circumstances and, sometimes more importantly, by its own national psychology.

The United States is determined that communism shall not take over Asia.

For this reason we do not recognize Communist China and seek in all possible ways to limit the ability of Communist China to implement its threat to obtain hegemony in the Far East. We recognize the Republic of China as the legal government of China and support its position in the United Nations. We are aware that the economic and social progress on Taiwan, carried out by free Chinese, stands in stark contrast to the failures of the mainland Communist government. Also the existence on Taiwan of a well-trained and -equipped force of 600,000 men, dedicated to the fight against communism, must have a restraining effect on any expansionist ambitions of the Communist Chinese. Furthermore the spirit of the people of the Republic of China, and of their leader, President Chiang Kai-shek, who have conducted

a 40-year struggle against Communist imperialism, is an inspiration to free peoples everywhere.

We stand ready to help peoples who want to help themselves to maintain their independence. Sometimes this involves outright alliance, as with the Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, and, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, with the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. If any of these nations is attacked the United States is committed to help defend it. Our contribution to security in the Far East also takes other forms, forms designed to meet threats of varying nature.

These threats are never simple ones; some are extremely subtle and sophisticated. If we are to meet these threats successfully, certain qualities of mind must be stressed and certain dangers avoided. Governor Bryant, in a recent address, referred to the danger that the "timid American" poses for our democracy. I think he is quite right. I have often had a similar thought, which I would like to emphasize in what I have to say today.

What has often occurred to me is that, if the United States is not only going to meet the Communist threat but carry off the difficult task of helping to create a new and stable world in the process, then Americans are going to need very steady nerves.

By this phrase "steady nerves," I mean not only not being timid but two additional qualities: first, the capacity for cold, deliberate analysis in order to know when to act and when to bide one's time; second, the unemotional self-discipline and self-control that enables one to act effectively as a result of that analysis. I mean the kind of self-control that enabled President Kennedy to use United States power with such coolness and skill as he did during the Cuban crisis. In negotiations, also, extraordinary qualities of mind and will are demanded, among which the element of cold calm in dealing with complex situations is increasingly important. President Kennedy was speaking of this in his inaugural address<sup>2</sup> when he said: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

The quality of "steady nerves" is needed in

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

both of the fundamental tasks before us. For there are two separate tasks.

One is the meeting of crises; the other is the slower, but more positive, task of nation building, of helping to build a system of stable, strong, and independent states which have solved the problem of both political and economic development.

#### **Viet-Nam and Laos**

The cases of Viet-Nam and Laos, both in the area for which I have some responsibility, provide illustrations of problems both of crisis handling and of nation building.

Laos is a small country of perhaps 2 million people. Many of its people live in remote valleys, are loyal primarily to their clans, and know little of the world. They and their country are important because they stand between the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists on the north and the independent, free countries to the south, which ardently desire to remain free. The Communists would like to gain power in this landlocked country in order to be able to apply increasingly greater pressure on the countries to the south. The tool of the Communists is an organization known as the Pathet Lao, trained, supplied, inspired, and reinforced by the North Vietnamese Communists, the Viet Cong. The problem of contact between the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong is extremely simple; one merely walks or drives a truck across the border. There are roughly 250 miles of border between Communist China and Laos and 600 miles of border between Communist North Viet-Nam and Laos.

Up to 1961 the non-Communist Lao had been reasonably successful in holding off the Communists. But, by 1961, strong military pressure from the Pathet Lao, backed up by the North Vietnamese Communists, threatened to upset the balance and to bring the flames of war to Southeast Asia. The U.S. had three choices: (1) to leave Laos to its fate, (2) to commit American troops to the defense of Laos, or (3) to seek a political settlement that would preserve Laos as an independent nation, one that could not be used by the Communists for further penetration of Southeast Asia.

In June of 1961 President Kennedy met with

Premier Khrushchev in Vienna.<sup>3</sup> The only point on which agreement was reached at this meeting was that there should be a neutral and independent Laos. This agreement was tantamount to changing the struggle for Laos from a primarily military matter to a political and psychological struggle. No one believed that the Communists would be satisfied with true neutrality for Laos or that they would stop seeking to establish Communist control. But an attempt was to be made to establish a viable government under a neutral leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and gradually to concentrate predominant military and civil power in his government. A conference in Geneva of 14 nations laid down the general outline of how this neutral and independent Laos was to be preserved.<sup>4</sup> Thus Communist China and Communist North Viet-Nam, as well as the Soviet Union, committed themselves to the concept of a neutral and independent Laos. A sincere effort by all nations concerned to cooperate with the Lao to maintain a truly neutral country would contribute significantly to peace in Asia. However, the Communist side has consistently blocked the implementation of the Geneva Agreements. If the Pathet Lao persist in their attempts to wreck the Geneva Agreements and to destroy the neutral base of the Souvanna government, a new situation of extreme danger will present itself.

The Communists are well organized and they know well the techniques of subversion. But the free world, despite the difficulties of the Lao situation, has considerable experience also in political, economic, and psychological warfare. Moreover, we have the great advantage that it is the overwhelming desire of the Lao people to be neutral and independent. The Pathet Lao can advance only by violence that is clearly in violation of the Geneva Agreements. They have betrayed this fact by their recent open attacks on the neutralist forces of General Kong Le in the Plain of Jars. The outcome of the struggle may well depend upon whether or not

the International Control Commission, set up by the Geneva Accords<sup>5</sup> to supervise the implementation of the agreements, will be able to perform its function. Even the limited success of the ICC to date has made it a primary target of Pathet Lao attack.

For those who demand clean, quick victories, Laos will pose a particularly frustrating problem. It is not a neat, tidy situation. If the goal of a neutral, independent Laos is ever to be achieved, it will only be through the unwavering endurance of all parties who genuinely support the Geneva Agreements. In this connection it is a source of satisfaction that Premier Souvanna Phouma in a recent statement denounced the Pathet Lao for the illegal introduction of Viet Cong troops and weapons into Laos. The United States will continue to do its part in respecting the Geneva Agreements, in supporting those forces which seek to promote a genuinely neutral Laos, and in trying to persuade all parties that the success of the Souvanna Phouma government is in the best interests of all the neighbors of Laos.

In South Viet-Nam the origin of the threat to a free nation's integrity is the same as in Laos: Communist North Viet-Nam, or the Viet Cong. As one condition for the Geneva settlement of the Indochina war in 1954, which set up a divided Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong, then known as the Viet Minh, was to withdraw from South Viet-Nam and cease its attempts to take over the south. Thousands of Communist troops were sent back to North Viet-Nam. But others remained in the south to continue organizing secretly for what the Communists, and many others, thought would be the early collapse of the new free Vietnamese Government under President Diem. President Diem showed considerable skill in dealing with an internal situation that was extremely complex and untidy. Various religious sects, with their own private armies, had to be pacified. A gangster-like organization, the Binh Xuyen, which had enjoyed control of the police, had to be subdued by force. President Diem had to develop a unified army, a loyal corps of civil servants, a pro-

<sup>3</sup> For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 26, 1961, p. 999.

<sup>4</sup> For texts of a declaration on the neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

<sup>5</sup> For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 775.

gram of social and economic reform with which to reach the people, and to develop a sense of national cohesion. Working for him, Diem had the renowned intelligence and energy of the Vietnamese people, their pride in their tradition and historic accomplishments. He had also a small though talented corps of officials, many of whom had left North Viet-Nam when the Communists took over. The people of South Viet-Nam wanted only to be allowed to live in peace under a progressive government. Facing the impressive political and military machine which the Viet Cong had developed, the infant Republic of Viet-Nam had need of strong external support, both moral and material. At a time when the odds seemed high against the survival of this new government, the United States stepped in to express with practical aid its confidence in the free Vietnamese.

Those who predicted doom were confounded. A unified army was developed. Steps were taken to develop a civil bureaucracy adequate for the needs of the new Viet-Nam. Social and economic programs began to be implemented. Agriculture revived. The educational system expanded. The concept of a free Republic of Viet-Nam began to be understood.

By 1958 there seemed reason to believe that the Republic of Viet-Nam before long would be able to eradicate what was left of the Communist organization in the countryside. At this juncture, a decision was made in Hanoi, the capital of Communist North Viet-Nam, that such progress of a non-Communist Viet-Nam could not be tolerated. The infiltration of terrorists who had been in training in the north was accelerated. A program of violence was begun which steadily increased in savagery. Keeping in mind Mao Tse-tung's dictum that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," these Viet Cong began a campaign of extraordinarily inhuman terrorism. The first target was the people themselves. The patient, poor farmers of Viet-Nam were given the choice either of supporting the Viet Cong by providing supplies and recruits or of suffering violence against their person or members of the family. By starting in areas where the government could not yet provide adequate protection,

the Viet Cong met with considerable success in its campaign to control the population. Along with the terrorists came the political organizers to persuade, to indoctrinate, and always to remind the people of the ugly consequences of a failure to cooperate. The inspiration for all of this came from the experiences of the Viet Minh against the French and ultimately, of course, from the example of the Chinese Communist movement of Mao Tse-tung. Another important target of Viet Cong terror was the civil servants of the republic, the teachers, health workers, malaria control teams, the village and district chiefs who were bringing the government's program for the people to the people. Hundreds of these civil servants, often working alone and virtually unprotected in the countryside, have been murdered by this Viet Cong terror. Their sacrifice must not be forgotten for it was made for all free men.

The small detachments of army troops or of self-defense corps, stationed in isolated sections, also were favorite targets of the Viet Cong terrorists. True to Mao's subversive warfare tactics, the Viet Cong invariably attacked these small outposts with superior numbers. Lack of adequate communications often prevented the lonely outpost from calling for help. If a call for help was received, lack of swift transport often precluded rescuing units from arriving before the destruction had been completed.

By 1960 the situation had so deteriorated that it seemed possible the Viet Cong would be able to establish a territorial base in South Viet-Nam, the next step in the Mao formula for a successful "national liberation movement." At this point President Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor to South Viet-Nam to confer with the Vietnamese Government and to observe the situation for himself. General Taylor reported that the Vietnamese people retained the will to fight communism and that, given more extensive support, had a chance to defeat the Viet Cong.

While this support has come predominantly from the United States, a number of other countries have provided significant support, moral and material.

The first requirement of the struggle today is to pull the teeth of the Viet Cong terrorist

campaign. This can best be done not so much by killing terrorists but by depriving them of the opportunity to coerce the farmers into providing supplies and recruits. This can only be done by providing practical protection to the farming population. The technique which has been adopted to achieve this protection is the construction of fortified villages, called strategic hamlets. This technique was used successfully in Malaya against the Communist movement there. The same concept had been applied successfully in the late 1790's by the Manchu dynasty of China against the White Lotus sect, a fanatical group whose use of terror resembled closely the methods of the present-day Viet Cong.

The fundamental purpose of a strategic hamlet is to give the farmers the means to defend themselves against terrorist attack. Instead of living in isolated houses, or groups of houses, the farmers gather together in a larger village. Strong defense works are built with the aid of the army. A village self-defense militia is organized, given training, and armed with simple weapons. Basic defense plans are worked out. Where possible, radios are installed so that a village can send out an immediate call for aid in the event of attack. The widespread use of helicopters to send out rescue missions has meant that aid has most often come in time to beleaguered villages.

Once a strategic village has been established, the government can then move in with programs of aid for the villagers, confident that a far higher degree of security can now be given the teachers, nurses, and administrative personnel sent out by the government. The villagers learn that successful resistance to the Viet Cong is possible. They see also the practical efforts of the government to improve their lot, and thus become more enthusiastic in their support of the fight against the Viet Cong.

Simultaneously, the Vietnamese Army is seeking out the terrorists, destroying their jungle training camps and crude munitions factories, going into remote swamp and forest areas where for years the terrorists have been all but immune from attack. The important role of the helicopter in all this has been publicized extensively. But an officer of an allied nation,

knowledgeable in the problems of terrorist warfare, once told me that for all the new developments in weaponry and transport this anti-guerrilla war is still primarily a war of the brains and the feet. By this he meant that as wily as the Communist terrorist is, and as hard and as injured to privation, his opponent must be able to outthink him and outlast him.

While army operations against the terrorist organization are part of the answer, the heart of the struggle is in the strategic village. Thorough and intelligent implementation of this program will leave the terrorist as a fish out of water. Rejected by the people, he will be exposed to relentless pursuit by the armed forces. All but the hard-core Communists among the terrorists will be more and more attracted to the side of the government. An amnesty program has already been instituted by the Vietnamese Government to encourage defection.

These programs are making good progress, and there is every reason to believe that the Viet Cong will be defeated. One barometer of growing GVN strength against the Communists is the increase in voluntary intelligence from the population. In one province, long a Viet Cong stronghold, government forces were actually tipped off in advance to three-quarters of the Viet Cong attacks last month. Last week the number of Viet Cong defectors reached an all-time high of 171. Vietnamese rice exports, halted completely in the fall of 1961, are now normal. We expect a long struggle, but we are confident of the outcome.

The struggle in Viet-Nam gains the headlines in today's newspapers. But throughout Asia, new nations, in varying degrees, are facing the challenge of creating progressive, yet stable, societies in a world of uncertainty. American policy aims to provide our experience, our enthusiasm, and, insofar as our resources permit, our material aid to this great enterprise of nation building.

Given the broader framework of your discussions here on the subject of cold war education, I think it might be useful to draw certain implications from what I have been saying; implications valid over the whole range of our world problems. I have set these down in the

form of five points which I want to leave with you as a conclusion and a summing up.

### **Education for the Cold War**

First, we must remain strong. Strong militarily and economically, and strong morally. Our will to sacrifice when necessary must be steadfast. We know that the Communists are led by their dogma to underestimate the strength and will of democratic peoples. As we remain strong and determined, we shall make clear to the Communists that their challenges to free men can never succeed in the long run. Equally important is the fact that the confidence of all free peoples that communism can be resisted and defeated depends to a large extent on their knowledge that our strength and will and our helping hand are equal to the task. As I stressed at the outset, steady nerves are more than ever before a vital component of this struggle.

Secondly, free-world power and diplomacy must be matched together and used in just the proper proportions and quantities, with careful thought, skill, and precision. In the prenuclear age some errors, some bumbling, could perhaps be tolerated without disastrous consequences. But ever since man has learned the secret of nuclear fire, learned this long before there is any assurance that he can control it, a major error or misstep, a serious accident, could result in the almost instantaneous incineration of the population centers of the world and the mutilation and poisoning of large areas of the earth.

Just as our power must be applied in exceedingly precise amounts, and in full knowledge of the ability and will of the opponent to bring to bear his power, so must our policy objectives be defined with the greatest care and accuracy. If these objectives are defined unwisely, unrealistically, or unclearly, we may expose ourselves to unnecessary setbacks, even to disaster.

Precision, wisdom, realism: these require the utmost in cool and unemotional judgment and what I called earlier cool, deliberate analysis. Tough minds, analytical minds, are required to carry this nation through the dangerous era in which we live. Our minds must be keen enough to recognize that no situation is simple; that untidiness is characteristic of most problems;

that there are no shortcuts to success, no neat, swift solutions anywhere. Today the critical issues we face demand of all of us the capacity to live in a complex world of untidy situations and yet do what is required of us with steady nerves and unflinching will.

Thirdly, while we are combating Communist imperialism in all its forms, we must remember that it is not enough to be against something and that in the last analysis success depends upon our ability to build, to construct, to contribute to man's spiritual and material welfare. We are cooperating with many free peoples in great efforts at nation building, while the Communists try to tear down, in order to impose their hold and their system on the world.

Fourthly, there is a larger need for tolerance in international life. Happily there is a growing understanding among us of the diverse ways by which different peoples seek to obtain happiness and security in a troubled world. In passing I also wish to observe that, remembering our own unfinished business in fulfilling the ideals of the American Constitution, we must be tolerant of the shortcomings we may see in other societies. While we are justifiably proud of our institutions and our freedoms and stand as leaders in the democratic world, our prestige and influence in the world suffer whenever we fall short of our own ideals.

Finally, we must have knowledge, deeper and wider knowledge than we have ever had before, of ourselves and of other peoples, their motives and their hopes. With knowledge we can gain the understanding and the insight on which wise policy must be based. President Kennedy expressed this idea in a speech at San Diego State College in California last week: No country can possibly move ahead, no free society can possibly be sustained, unless it has an educated citizenry whose qualities of mind and heart permit it to take part in the complicated and increasingly sophisticated decisions which are demanded not only of the President and the Congress but of all the citizens, who exercise the ultimate power.

This thought of the President is a fitting close to my observations. If American freedom is to survive and to grow in peace, it is because people like you here at this conference boldly

take the responsibility of knowing and learning and persuading others to pursue this quest. I congratulate you for the important contribution which your activities here are making to the security of our nation and to the peace of mankind.

## U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement for Direct Communications Link

### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 20

White House press release dated June 20

Today (in Geneva) the representatives of the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference signed an agreement which will establish a direct communications link between their respective capitals. This age of fast-moving events requires quick, dependable communications for use in time of emergency. By their signatures today, therefore, both Governments have taken a first step to help reduce the risk of war occurring by accident or miscalculation.

This agreement on a communications link is a limited but practical step forward in arms control and disarmament. We hope agreement on other more encompassing measures will follow. We shall bend every effort to go on from this first step.

### TEXT OF AGREEMENT

#### Memorandum of Understanding

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK SIGNED ON JUNE 20, 1963 AT GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

For use in time of emergency, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct communications link between the two governments.

Each government shall be responsible for the arrangements for the link on its own territory. Each government shall take the necessary steps to ensure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery

to its head of government of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party.

Arrangements for establishing and operating the link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof.

Done in duplicate in the English and Russian languages at Geneva, Switzerland, this 20th day of June, 1963.

For the Government of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

For the Government of the  
United States of America:

SEMYON K. TSARAPKIN -  
*Acting Representative of  
the Union of Soviet So-  
cialist Republics to the  
Eighteen Nation Commit-  
tee on Disarmament*

CHARLES C. STELLE  
*Acting Representative of  
the United States of  
America to the Eighteen  
Nation Committee on Dis-  
armament*

#### Annex to Memorandum

ANNEX TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK

The direct communications link between Washington and Moscow established in accordance with the memorandum, and the operation of such link, shall be governed by the following provisions:

1. The direct communications link shall consist of:

A. Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which communications shall be directly exchanged;

B. One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages;

C. One full-time duplex radio telegraph circuit, routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow, which shall be used for service communications and for coordination of operations between the two terminal points.

If experience in operating the direct communications link should demonstrate that the establishment of an additional wire telegraph circuit is advisable, such circuit may be established by mutual agreement between authorized representatives of both governments.

2. In case of interruption of the wire circuit, transmission of messages shall be effected via the radio circuit, and for this purpose provision shall be made at the terminal points for the capability of prompt switching of all necessary equipment from one circuit to another.

3. The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the transmission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and from Washington to Moscow in the English language. In this connection, the USSR shall furnish the United States four sets of telegraph

terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the Russian language. The United States shall furnish the Soviet Union four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one year's supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the English language. The equipment described in this paragraph shall be exchanged directly between the parties without any payment being required therefor.

4. The terminal points of the direct communications link shall be provided with encoding equipment. For the terminal point in the USSR, four sets of such equipment (each capable of simplex operation), with one year's supply of spare parts, with all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, and with all necessary blank tape, shall be furnished by the United States to the USSR against payment of the cost thereof by the USSR.

The USSR shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the United States for reception of messages from the USSR. The United States shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the USSR for reception of messages from the United States. Delivery of prepared keying tapes to the terminal points of the link shall be effected through the Embassy of the USSR in Washington (for the terminal of the link in the USSR) and through the Embassy of the United States in Moscow (for the terminal of the link in the United States).

5. The United States and the USSR shall designate the agencies responsible for the arrangements regarding the direct communications link, for its technical maintenance, continuity and reliability, and for the timely transmission of messages.

Such agencies may, by mutual agreement, decide matters and develop instructions relating to the technical maintenance and operation of the direct communications link and effect arrangements to improve the operation of the link.

6. The technical parameters of the telegraph circuits of the link and of the terminal equipment, as well as the maintenance of such circuits and equipment, shall be in accordance with CCITT [Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique] and CCIR [Comité consultatif international des radio communications] recommendations.

Transmission and reception of messages over the direct communications link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of interna-

tional telegraph and radio communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions.

7. The costs of the direct communications link shall be borne as follows:

A. The USSR shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Moscow to Helsinki and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Helsinki to London. The United States shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Washington to London and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from London to Helsinki.

B. Payment of the cost of leasing the radio telegraph circuit between Moscow and Washington shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the parties. The USSR shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Moscow to Washington. The United States shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Washington to Moscow.

## Prime Minister of Australia Visits Washington

White House press release dated June 21

The White House announced on June 21 that the Right Honorable Sir Robert Gordon Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, will pay an informal visit to Washington July 8-10.

The Prime Minister will call on President Kennedy and will be guest at a Presidential luncheon in the White House on July 8. The following day he will confer with officials at the State Department, where Secretary Rusk will host a luncheon in honor of Sir Robert and his wife, Dame Pattie Menzies. The Prime Minister last visited Washington and conferred with President Kennedy in June 1962.<sup>1</sup>

Sir Robert arrives in the United States on July 2. On July 4 he will inaugurate a new series of Thomas Jefferson Memorial Orations on the grounds of Monticello. This will be the first occasion on which an oration has been given at Monticello on Independence Day. Previous orations have been delivered by former Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.

<sup>1</sup> For text of a joint communique released on June 20, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 116.

## On Our Quarrel With Success

by *John Kenneth Galbraith*  
*Ambassador to India*<sup>1</sup>

A commencement address such as I am giving today could, at first glance, seem a rather formidable responsibility. It comes at a rather critical moment in the life of the audience. It is delivered and heard under conditions of considerable solemnity. To be at all acceptable the speech must contain advice on some fairly portentous subject—the prospect for mankind, the proper choice of a career, or, at the very minimum, the importance of repaying to a hopefully receptive society some of the investment that, however unwittingly, it has made in the listeners. This could seem a task of some unctiousness. That it is not so regarded is doubtless because no one in the whole of modern history seems ever to have been guided by what he heard in a commencement speech. Indeed it is not on record that anyone ever admitted to having remembered what was said in a commencement speech. Nor is it absolutely certain that anyone has, in fact, ever listened.

So it has come about that, although during this week and next these orations are being ground out on what amounts to an assembly line basis—here and there a stripped model or a compact, many more rich with chrome, quadruple headlights, soft upholstery, ingenious accessories, and double bumpers—it all signifies very little. For this we may be devoutly thankful. Of all the nightmares currently available to Americans, there is none so hideous as the possibility that they might one day begin to heed all the advice that their orators offer them.

Yet I am here as your commencement

speaker. I cannot escape my task even though it is so largely liturgical. So in a great commencement day tradition, I am going to say a word or two about government and the public service. This will lead me on to what I judge to be one of the more important trends in the debate on public policy in our day. My intention is analytical, not hortatory. I do not expect to influence your life or that of anyone else.

Indeed I will omit the usual plea that you consider the public service as a career. That is entirely up to you. If you are primarily interested in making money, you should go into business and make money. No one need beg for talent on behalf of the public service. At least beyond a certain minimum, money is a poor substitute for work that is interesting and engrossing, and in these respects the public service is—or can be—far superior to any private business. As compared with the public service—or, for similar reasons, colleges, universities, and research organizations—private enterprise must have a substantial income differential in its favor.

In this connection, and speaking wholly as an individual, I am dubious of recent proposals to raise salaries of top executive, judicial, and legislative officers of the Federal Government to tycoon levels. People in the lesser ranks of a private corporation think of the top company brass as separated from themselves by unimaginably high incomes. So do people at large. In the past there has been no such sense of alienation in the Federal Government, and it would be unfortunate were it to exist in the future. The upper levels of the permanent civil service and the lesser political posts are presently subject to a considerable financial pinch. This

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass., on June 9 (press release 308 dated June 7).

should certainly be relieved and generously. Elsewhere we should be more gradual. Even at present rates there is no visible shortage of candidates for the Supreme Court or Congress or, one suspects, for the Cabinet or our embassies. Nor is there evidence that higher talent would be improved proportionately with pay or at all. In senior government posts we want the kind of man who thinks that public service is worth modest standards of pay.

### **Some Hazards of Public Service**

There are some changes in the public service, or in attitudes toward public policy, which, from the limited perspective of these last 21½ years, do seem to me important. As I have just suggested, the great case for the public service is the interest of the work—the sense of accomplishment that it offers. This sense of accomplishment and the resulting public recognition are in danger. This does merit attention.

One danger comes from the overorganization of government and the excessive subdivision of tasks so that the individual no longer has any real sense of his relation to results. Increasingly, public policy is made, or anyhow considered, in vast oleaginous meetings where each participant speaks for his own bureau, office, or special area of knowledge and many serve only by being present. This is not calculated to enhance interest. Papers, telegrams, press releases are all the product of a highly organized process of group thought. The individual has, as a result, the same relation to results as a tobacco leaf to one of the new homogenized cigars. The speeches of the modern public official are a particular case in point. Their production combines the literary and other talents of a small army and they invariably sound as though they had been written by one. The homogenizing process in the public service tends to exclude the rough, controversial, and uncompromising participant for, naturally enough, he is a great nuisance.

As compared with 25 years ago, the Federal Government now lays a much stronger restraining hand on the individual who has a clear view of what he would like to accomplish and a strong desire to do it. The abrasive controversy which characterized the Roosevelt bu-

reaucrazy has all but gone. So has the art of broken field running by the man who knew precisely where he wanted to go and who was skilled at finding the holes in the formidable phalanx composed of those whose mission in life is to resist action and, where possible, also thought. Instead we have much greater emphasis on order, discipline, and conformity. In any great organization these are not wholly to be deplored. They are admirable on questions of nuclear politics. But the Federal Government has urgent need to recognize and foster individual responsibility and achievement on matters of public policy. This is the claim of the public career.

The further hazard which anyone entering the public service must face in our time is the modern compulsion to quarrel with success. This is a serious matter and one that is not well understood. Those who are associated with successful public policy need to be aware of the danger they run. Those who are not so associated will also be rewarded by understanding. They can expect that political and public opinion will now be rallied rather effectively against whatever works, and they can count themselves well out of it. Or they may wish to join the hue and cry.

### **The Risk of Accomplishment**

All students of this modern compulsion to quarrel with success must begin, I believe, with the Tennessee Valley Authority. It was the first major accomplishment of the architects of this curious form of controversy. It remains in many ways the classical example of the phenomenon I am here isolating.

The TVA was launched 30 years ago this spring. From the beginning it seemed clear that this was an innovation of prime importance. And so it turned out. Industry came to the valley. Agriculture improved. Power consumption increased. Commerce flowed on the clear waters of the once muddy and unpredictable stream. Living standards rose. And the word spread. In time a visit to Knoxville or Muscle Shoals went automatically on the agenda of every visitor to the United States. The letters "TVA" were known in Bolivia, Ethiopia, and the Ukraine. Halfway around

the world the Governments of Bihar and Bengal set up the Damodar Valley Corporation in frank imitation. Nothing undertaken by the United States in this century was quite such an unqualified success.

The reaction was highly adverse. The TVA became our most alarming phenomenon. There were formidable efforts to curb the experiment—even to sell it off, as (according to Mr. Emmet Hughes) President Eisenhower yearned to do. Of course the TVA survived these efforts. But it was firmly agreed that nothing of the sort would ever be attempted again. One such experiment, if really successful, is enough.

TVA is no isolated example of a successful quarrel with success. In the years following World War II the GI bill of rights was hailed as an inspired instance of what the Government could do to enlarge educational opportunity. Tens of thousands seized the chance; the Nation is still profiting from the investment. It worked so well and was so much praised that we strongly resolved against any permanent effort of equivalent magnitude in the field of education.

There is also the case of the farmers. In recent decades they have responded to assured prices and income with unparalleled improvements in capital plant, technology, and efficiency and output. This great agrarian success has been celebrated by men of all opinions and all parties, including quite a few who have never seen a farm. The Communists have conceded that this performance improves dramatically on their own agricultural accomplishment. The consequence has been a large-scale demand for the elimination of the price supports and controls which were the fulcrum of this achievement. This attack has been conducted with real vigor. At the moment it seems to be making some headway.

The reaction to the success of the farm economy has had a more general counterpart. Since World War II economic performance in the United States, as also in Western Europe, has been favorable. Employment has been high; the business cycle has shown little of its old violence; there has been no indication that Marx's promise of increasingly adverse per-

formance by maturing capitalism would soon be redeemed. All of this has been in marked contrast with the rather dismal economic showing in much of the period between the two wars.

There can be no serious question as to what made the difference. Capitalism did not reform itself. That reform was needed was never a major contention of the average capitalist. There was a determined public effort to correct the shortcomings of the economic system. If it did not provide needed income and employment, compensatory action was taken by the state. Individuals were assured of substitute employment or income when private opportunities were deficient. The economy was assured *pari passu* of a substitute flow of purchasing power. At the same time taxes were used to arrest previous tendencies to an excessive concentration of income, and larger state expenditures added a further stabilizing influence. Special steps were taken to bolster the position of weaker groups. Private enterprise became the beneficiary of a vast amount of state-sponsored technology.

The results once again have been predictable. The success of the economy has been much applauded. The attack on the measures responsible for the success has been unrelenting. The tax, fiscal, welfare, and other public policies promoting improved performance have been received with profound alarm. There is a widespread feeling that we cannot risk any more such accomplishment. As a result, steps to improve medical care, strengthen and extend unemployment compensation, improve fiscal management by the Government or to enlarge Government responsibility in such fields as, say, urban transport are being stoutly resisted. A friend of mine thinks that, in the great struggle of our time, we are cautious about discouraging the Russians. I doubt if this is the explanation.

#### **The Cases of Cuba and India**

However, it is in foreign policy that our modern quarrel with success becomes most intense, and I venture to think that over the next 50 years most of the Ph. D. theses on the phenomenon will deal with external events.

More than momentary attention may well be given to the recent case of Cuba. Here in the

past year the Soviets made a major step across the informal boundary which they and we (although not the Chinese) have respected since World War II. By a firm and considered policy they were persuaded to withdraw. There was no bloodshed—a matter of some significance to those who would have provided the blood. Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Washington, New York, and Chicago were not destroyed in the process. This must have been a source of satisfaction to permanent residents as well as larger taxpayers.

This success provoked an attack of unparalleled proportions. The reaction of some members of the administration of which I am a member has, I confess, struck me as a trifle untutored. They have asked the critics if they really wanted a policy which, by its sanguinary violence, would have alienated all of Latin America and most of the other smaller nations of the world. And they have wondered if nuclear conflict, which in a matter of a few hours might have reduced the United States from a great power to a distraught group of survivors dependent very possibly even for their nutrition on the bounty of other and less damaged countries, was really such a good idea. I fear my colleagues have not fully grasped the compulsion to quarrel with accomplishment. Had they done so, they would not have been so surprised.

In the last few months I have been interested in a lesser quarrel with success concerning India. For many years the policies of India have been the subject of considerable concern. We felt, particularly vis-a-vis China, that India adopted an unnecessarily easygoing attitude. Last autumn the Chinese invaded India. Indian attitudes on China and Chinese communism were dramatically revised. No other country in Asia, perhaps no other country in the world, is so passionately concerned about Chinese ambitions. We went promptly to the support of the Indians in their moment of need and earned their warm gratitude and respect. I think it fair to say that no one a year ago could have forecast such a dramatic improvement in our relations with India. Such has been the success that I am told our problems on economic and military aid to India this year will be particularly difficult. Once again success is causing us serious problems.

### The Foreign Aid Program

Our most durable quarrel with success, and one that may merit more minute examination even than the case of Cuba, is foreign aid. This has been the unique American contribution to diplomacy which, it may be added, is a frequently backward craft and one that takes frequent pride in being traditional and unprogressive. It is a contribution vitally related to circumstance. In a world where the few wealthy countries have been getting wealthy and, as a broad generalization, the many poor countries have been remaining very poor, an aid program was an indispensable solvent of tension.

One need reflect for only the briefest moment on the nature of an international society in which the people of Latin America, Asia, and Africa saw their own living standards static or deteriorating while incomes and output in the United States (for which they supplied materials and some markets) went on each year to higher and higher levels. In such a world our influence would be negligible, nonexistent, or replaced by open antagonism, and one is tempted to say deservedly so. Our influence is, in fact, very great. Instead of envy and anger, the image aroused by the word "America" throughout the world is one of generosity and compassion. We are thought to be marked, in contrast with other countries, by our capacity to grasp the problems of less fortunate people.

Our administration of foreign aid has been far from perfect. We have underemphasized education. We have thought it possible to base effective development on reactionary social structures. (Men will not produce very efficiently if they know that the product will go in any case to landlords, tax farmers, and moneylenders.) Money has on occasion been wasted. (Without making a case for waste, we may remind ourselves that it has been a regular companion piece of development. Tens of millions were borrowed by American State governments and put into canals just before the railroads made them obsolete. Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of public subsidy to the railroads found its way into private pockets.)

On occasion we have misjudged the larger purposes of our aid policy and assumed it to

be the servant of narrow ideological preferences. (If we offer a wide range of choice in economic structure as the alternative to communism, we can hardly lose. If we insist on our view of capitalism as the only alternative, our chances are far less favorable.) And, on occasion, we have assumed that questions on foreign aid could best be answered by men of inspired general wisdom who were not excessively hampered by experience in the problems of economic development or of the countries for which they prescribed.

But the test of a policy is not whether all problems are solved but whether it performs its task. The aid program has forestalled what would have been certain calamity in our relations with the poor countries. It is perhaps the principal reason why countries such as India and Pakistan have been spared the painful travail of the Chinese people. It is one of the important reasons why they remain committed to personal liberty and Western institutions. Had there been no aid programs in this last decade, the world would have been very different indeed and from our point of view much less satisfactory.

Once again we have the predictable result. In the case of the aid programs the quarrel with accomplishment is especially severe. The shortcomings are picked out like the trees. The accomplishments have disappeared like the forest. The man of sound and secure reputation, at least of a sort, is the one who tells you where you can cut a half billion, or a billion, or two billion. Even the semantics are revealing. Those who quarrel with success here do not deny the fact. They tell you where the cuts can be made with the least damage.

The notion that we should, as needed, invest more and do better is gradually receding under this onslaught. Once again the quarrel with accomplishment is going very well. However, it is not serving the United States at all well.

Were it the problem of modern government that there are few things to criticize, this tendency to quarrel with accomplishment would be forgivable. It is evident that modern man must quarrel about something. But as government is currently conducted in the United States and despite the enlightened influence of many

people from this State, there is still sufficient that is wrong and even foolish.

I would be sorry today if I seemed to be against criticism. Nothing would be further from my thoughts. I consider it vital for the effective operation of a democracy and a highly congenial personal avocation. But I find it hard to applaud this continuing discontent with accomplishment. Radicals of an earlier generation seemed often to be taking a rather lofty and even critical view of sales, production, profits, and the other symbols of business success. Businessmen fresh from some considerable industrial achievement reacted adversely to this criticism. They thought there might be more attention to results. But government is also a serious affair. The resolution of international disputes without resort to nuclear destruction, the winning of the confidence and esteem of other nations, and improvements in the welfare and well-being of our own people are also worthy of our effort and energy. I doubt that the assault on such public achievement has any more to commend it than the earlier attack on private accomplishment.

## **U.S. Makes Interim Modification of Tin Disposal Program**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 327 dated June 21

The General Services Administration announced today [June 21] an interim modification of its program for the disposal of surplus tin from the national stockpile in the form of a supplementary offering which will be effective during the period June 26-September 30, 1963. The maximum quantity of tin which the General Services Administration may sell in any week has been increased from 200 long tons to 400 long tons, and the limit on these sales for this period has been raised from 2,700 long tons under the current disposal plan to 4,700 long tons. This increase of approximately 200 tons per week in the limit on weekly sales will allow the General Services Administration more flexibility for meeting changing market conditions. No other change in the existing terms of the

current disposal plan, which was made effective April 1, 1963, for 1 year, is contemplated at this time.

In accordance with past practices this move by the United States Government followed consultations between representatives of the U.S. Government and the International Tin Council and the governments of the principal tin-producing countries in advance of the decision to adopt the supplementary program. It is also our intention to consult with the International Tin Council and interested governments before the end of the supplemental disposal period.

It continues to be United States policy to take no action in the disposal of United States stockpiles which would unduly disrupt commodity markets. The General Services Administration will continue to operate its disposal plan in the best interest of the United States Government, taking into account prevailing market prices, and in such a way as to avoid serious disruption of the usual markets of producers, processors, and consumers.

## Music Advisers Appointed for Cultural Presentations

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 320) that Assistant Secretary Battle has appointed Leopold Damrosch Mannes, president of the Mannes College of Music of New York, as chairman of the music panel which aids the selection of American performing musical artists and groups for overseas tours under the recently reconstituted Cultural Presentations Program of the Department of State, and W. Raymond Kendall, dean of the School of Music of the University of Southern California, as chairman of the academic music panel.

Following recommendations by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Advisory Committee on the Arts has been reconstituted to give general policy guidance to the program and to the panels of experts which have the responsibility of recommending the musical, dramatic, dance, and other presentations to be sent abroad.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 88th Congress, 1st Session

- Africa Briefing.** Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. February 27, 1963. 20 pp.
- Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear Weapons Tests.** Hearings before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. March 5-12, 1963. 518 pp.
- Mexican Farm Labor Program.** Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of the House Agriculture Committee on H.R. 1836 and H.R. 2009. March 27-29, 1963. 349 pp.
- To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.** Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 777, a bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for appropriations and to modify the personnel security procedures for contractor employees. April 10, 1963. 221 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.** Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 5490, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part I, April 5-10, 1963, 184 pp.; Part II, April 23-29, 1963, 207 pp.; Part III, April 30-May 7, 1963, 241 pp.
- Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive.** Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part II. April 30-May 3, 1963. 109 pp.
- Continuation of Mexican Farm Labor Program.** Report, together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 5497. H. Rept. 274. May 6, 1963. 18 pp.
- The Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments of 1963.** Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 5207, an act to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, to authorize additional appropriations, and for other purposes. May 7, 1963. 21 pp.
- Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962.** Staff report prepared for the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee. S. Doc. 18. May 9, 1963. 407 pp.
- Eighth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.** Report of the U.S. House delegation to the eighth conference of members of parliament from the NATO countries, held in Paris, November 12-16, 1962. H. Rept. 300. May 15, 1963. 40 pp.
- Amendments to the Foreign Service Building Act of 1926.** Report to accompany H.R. 5207. S. Rept. 178. May 15, 1963. 15 pp.
- Amendment to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization.** Report, together with individual views, to accompany S.J. Res. 60. S. Rept. 179. May 16, 1963. 28 pp.
- Amending Legislation Relating to International Organizations.** Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 6283, a bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act, as amended, and H.J. Res. 405, joint resolution to amend the joint resolution providing for U.S. participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. May 17, 1963. 48 pp.
- Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior To Market Power Generated at Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande.** Report to accompany H.R. 4062. H. Rept. 319. May 23, 1963. 5 pp.

## World Food Congress Meets at Washington

*The World Food Congress, sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, was held at Washington, D.C., June 4-18.<sup>1</sup> Following are texts of welcoming remarks made on June 4 by President Kennedy and an address made on June 5 by Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, who was chairman of the Congress.*

### REMARKS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JUNE 4

White House press release dated June 4; as-delivered text

Dr. Sen, President Radhakrishnan,<sup>2</sup> Secretary Freeman, members of the World Food Congress: I welcome you on behalf of the people of the United States to this country and to its Capital.

Twenty years ago, in May 1943, the first world food congress was held. Today we have gathered to rededicate ourselves to the objectives of that congress, the objective that all nations, all people, all inhabitants of this planet have all the food that they need, all the food that they deserve as human beings. We are here to renew a worldwide commitment to banish hunger and outlaw it.

At the launching of the first world food congress, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that freedom from want and freedom from fear go hand in hand,<sup>3</sup> and that is true today.

During the past 20 years there have been revolutionary changes affecting these matters in farm technology, in trade patterns, in economic development, in world trade. Today the average farmer in the United States can produce three times as much as he did in 1945. New trading blocs have been formed, blocs which can be used to strengthen the world or to divide it.

This nation and others have provided economic and technical assistance to less wealthy nations struggling to develop viable economies.

And population increases have become a matter of serious concern, not because world food production will be insufficient to keep pace with the 2-percent rate of increase but because, as you know, the population rate is too often the highest where hunger is the most prevalent.

The same central problem that troubled President Roosevelt when he called together the first world congress in '43 is unfortunately still with us today. Half of humanity is still undernourished or hungry. In 70 developing nations, with over 2 billion people, malnutrition is widespread and persistent.

So long as freedom from hunger is only half achieved, so long as two-thirds of the nations have food deficits, no citizen, no nation, can afford to be satisfied. We have the ability, as members of the human race, we have the means, we have the capacity, to eliminate hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetime. We need only the will.

In the Food and Agriculture Organization, which is sponsoring this meeting, we have the machinery. Under the able leadership of Dr. Sen, the FAO has embarked on a vigorous and

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 752, and Apr. 15, 1963, p. 583.

<sup>2</sup> B. R. Sen, Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization; President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India.

<sup>3</sup> For text of President Roosevelt's letter to the opening session of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Va., May 18-June 3, 1943, see BULLETIN of May 22, 1943, p. 455; for his address to the delegates to the Conference, see *ibid.*, June 12, 1943, p. 518.

imaginative program which is now at a halfway mark. Through thousands of projects initiated during the 2½ years that we have just passed through, the Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign<sup>4</sup> has already helped to conquer livestock diseases, increase crop yields, and multiply fishery catches.

### **U.S. Pledges Full Support**

The United States pledges its full support for this campaign through Food for Peace shipments, Alliance for Progress operations, the Peace Corps, and the international efforts directed by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Through our food-for-peace program the people of the United States have contributed more than \$12 billion of food and fiber to others during the past 9 years. These donations now bring food to 100 million people in 100 countries, including 40 million schoolchildren. We are grateful for the opportunity that nature has made possible for us to share our agricultural abundance with those who need it, but the distribution of the food to the needy is only part of the job. It can take care of the emergency needs from floods and famines. It can be used to feed refugees and needy children. It is a useful supplement to perennially short diets in many parts of the world, but it is not a permanent solution.

All of our stored abundance, even if distributed evenly throughout the globe to all of the undernourished, would provide a balanced diet for less than a month, and many nations lack the storage and the transportation and the distribution facilities. Many people are inhibited by traditional eating habits from using food that provides rich nourishment. And, perhaps most importantly, modern, efficient agricultural training and education is too often unavailable to the very nations that are most dependent upon it.

The real goal, therefore, must be to produce more food in the nations that need it. Knowledge is not the problem. For the first time in the history of the world we do know how to produce enough food now to feed every man,

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 94; July 8, 1960, p. 117; Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1020; Jan. 22, 1962, p. 50; Oct. 8, 1962, p. 534; and Feb. 18, 1963, p. 254.

woman, and child in the world, enough to eliminate all hunger completely. Farm production has undergone a scientific revolution which is dwarfing the industrial revolution of 150 years ago, but this means that agricultural departments and ministries and governments and citizens must make a greater and more systematic effort to share this knowledge. For the first time to know how to conquer the problem and not conquer it would be a disgrace for this generation. We need to help transmit all that we know of farm technology to the ends of the earth, to overcome the barriers of ignorance and suspicion. The key to a permanent solution to world hunger is the transfer of technology which we now have to food-deficit nations, and that task, second to none in importance, is the reason for this Congress.

It would be easy to say that this task is too great for any congress. Most of man has been undernourished since the beginning of man. Even today, as the death rate drops, it merely means that people live longer in hunger and misery; but a balanced, adequate diet is now possible today for the entire human race, and we are gathered to devise the machinery to mobilize the talents, the will, the interest, and the requirements to finish this job.

We realize, of course, that the problem in its great dimensions neither begins nor ends on the farm. It involves the whole economic and social structure of a nation. It involves the building of new institutions, of training young people. Above all, it involves and requires the priority attention of us all in this decade.

### **Five Basic Guidelines**

In the course of your deliberations over the next 2 weeks I would hope that we would agree on at least five basic guidelines to be kept constantly in mind.

First: The persistence of hunger during this decade is unacceptable either morally or socially. The late Pope John in his recent encyclical spoke of the conviction that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity. That same dignity in the 20th century certainly requires the elimination of large-scale hunger and starvation.

Second: We must recognize the fact that

food-deficit nations, with assistance from other countries, can solve their problem. The Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign is based on this solid premise.

Third: International cooperation, international organization, and international action are indispensable. A contracting world grows more interdependent. This interdependence requires multinational solutions to its problems. This is not a problem for a single nation. It is a problem for the entire human race, because we cannot possibly be satisfied with some nations producing too much, as the President of India said, while others produce little, even though they are both members of the great human race.

Fourth: No single technique of politics, finance, or education can, by itself, eliminate hunger. It will require the coordinated efforts of us all, all of us, to level the wall that separates the hungry from the well-fed.

Fifth, and finally: World opinion must be concentrated upon the international effort to eliminate hunger as a primary task of this generation. Over 1,900 years ago the Roman philosopher Seneca said, "A hungry people listens not to reason, nor cares for justice, nor is bent by any prayers." Human nature has not changed in 1,900 years, and world peace and progress cannot be maintained in a world half fed and half hungry.

There are many struggles, many battles, that the human race now faces. There is no battle on earth or in space which is more important than the battle which you have undertaken, nor is there any struggle, large as this may be, that offers such an immediate promise of success. No congress that Washington has seen in recent years is, I believe, more important than this.

I know that this conference will not consist merely of oration but will represent in 2 weeks a solid determination to develop the means in this decade to make a dent in this problem which will give us promise in our lifetime of making sure that all people in the world have an opportunity to eat.

Another problem will come in the next generation, and that is the problem of how to deal on a worldwide basis, as well as in this, with the problem of surpluses; but the first problem

is to produce enough for all in a way that makes all available to people around the globe. To that task I can assure you the United States of America is committed.

Thank you.

#### **ADDRESS BY SECRETARY FREEMAN, JUNE 5**

The United States, its people and its Government, extend a most cordial welcome to the World Food Congress and to each participant in these meetings.

We welcome this Congress as a fitting opportunity to pay tribute to those pioneers who launched this effort to combat hunger at the conference in Hot Springs just 20 years ago.

We welcome it as an opportunity to give an additional thrust to the 5-year Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign, the objectives of which the United States supports by a wide variety of economic assistance operations, including Food for Peace shipments, Alliance for Progress operations, Peace Corps activities, and support for the joint efforts of the FAO, the U.N., the OAS, the Colombo Plan, and other international approaches.

We welcome it particularly because of our high hopes that out of these 2 weeks of deliberations may come definite gains, among them a renewed inspiration to mobilize every appropriate available resource and dedicate it to the achievement of our common goals, a greater awareness of the problems involved, and a better understanding of effective means for solving those problems.

As chairman of the World Food Congress, I wish to pay high tribute to the many dedicated people who have done so much to prepare for this Congress and pave the way to its success.

We deeply appreciate the leadership of Dr. B. R. Sen, the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the effective work of the FAO officials and staff, the support given by the President and the Congress of the United States and the many executive departments involved. We especially want to acknowledge the contributions made by industry and by agricultural organizations, and the work of citizens, through their religious, service, and other voluntary organizations—includ-

ing the American Food for Peace Council and the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation—that have meant so much in helping to make this a real people-to-people endeavor.

Finally, may I pay tribute to the thousand individuals who are participating in the Congress. Each of you is here because of your deep concern about one of this world's major problems. Each of you is in a position to make a substantial contribution to its solution. The success of this World Food Congress depends on each one of you.

### **Heterogeneous Nature of the Congress**

As we begin our working sessions, I should like to point out the nature of this gathering, to emphasize the urgency of its purpose, and to suggest some approaches to the achievement of its goals.

Throughout my presentation I should like to urge that we commit ourselves to a determined effort to win the campaign for freedom from hunger—to win that campaign so decisively that we can proceed to enlarge and broaden our goal so that it will encompass the positive approach that is the logical corollary to the elimination of any evil or hazard. Freedom from the evil of hunger then becomes freedom for positive good—freedom to enjoy the better things of life that are possible only when hunger is conquered, freedom to develop all those human qualities that characterize man and distinguish him from the other animals of this earth that can also suffer from hunger, freedom to progress toward higher levels of living, freedom for the kind of life that can be within the reach of all the people of the world in an age of abundance.

Throughout this discussion I would ask you to keep in mind the fact that science and technology have now—in this generation—opened the door to a potential for abundance for all. In some nations this abundance has already been achieved, particularly with regard to food, to such an extent that we have not as yet learned how to use effectively all that we produce. Let us accept this challenge of abundance with a determined effort to use all abundance to create abundance for all.

The nature and makeup of this Congress is,

in my judgment, particularly suited to a consideration of this challenge. It is sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization, an international agency through which member nations seek to work together toward common goals. Yet it is truly a people-to-people meeting in the sense that participants have been invited as individuals. Scientists in many fields; representatives of governments, universities, and international organizations; leaders in farmers' organizations, industry, women's groups, and other citizen bodies; men and women from developed and developing countries—all are here encouraged to discuss common problems fully and frankly.

The heterogeneous nature of the participation in this Congress is perhaps matched by the varied nature of the kinds of effort that will be required to achieve the goal of freedom from hunger and to progress toward the use of all abundance to create abundance for all. The achievement of that goal will require more than action by governments, more than action by international organizations. It will require a high degree of public understanding and a mobilization of public opinion. It will require action by agriculture and by industry, by citizens' groups, by individual leaders.

It will require planning and coordination at many levels. It will include action by the governments of developing nations and of developed nations. It will include bilateral action as well as multilateral agreements. It will require experimentation and pilot programs. It will require flexibility. It will require the kind of exchange of information and experience that will enable us to develop, expand, extend, and adapt those methods, techniques, and programs that work the best. It will require a pragmatic and pluralistic approach.

### **The Measure of Success**

There will be no formal, binding document voted upon, signed, and sealed at this Congress. The real success of these meetings will not be measured by any piece of paper, or even by a volume of published proceedings. The measure of the success of this Congress will be determined—in part, but only in part—by the quality of the addresses and papers presented

here and the maturity, vision, and realism that will characterize the discussions that take place. Its success will be measured, most significantly, by the extent to which the individual participants—inspired and informed by their experience here—are encouraged and stimulated to take positive action after the Congress is over, each in his own nation and within his own sphere of influence, toward plans and programs that will advance the goals we seek.

These goals are among the most important and the most urgent of the many goals shared by all men everywhere. Men have sought freedom from hunger since before the dawn of human history. Long before men formulated slogans—indeed, before they had developed much use for words—they struggled in response to the primary human drive for food.

But if the desire and drive to achieve freedom from hunger is as old as life itself, there exist today two new elements of utmost importance.

#### **International Efforts To Combat Hunger**

One of these elements is symbolized by the fact that we are meeting here today in a World Food Congress to express our common concern about a universal goal. This represents one of the brightest hopes of this critical age in which we live—the hope that arises because we now seek, in a conscious and articulate manner, freedom from hunger for all men all over the world, and we seek to find ways in which we can work toward these goals in cooperation with each other.

This is something new in history. Primitive man sought food for himself or, at most, for his family. Later a tribe, still later a nation, became the unit within which members acted to achieve freedom from hunger for the group.

During much of recorded history men and nations have been forced by the prevailing fact of scarcity to seek freedom from hunger for themselves at the expense of their neighbors. They have struggled against each other for the fertile valleys and the flood plains. They migrated into new, forbidden, sparsely occupied areas of the world when population pushed too hard against the supply of food. Countless wars have been fought to gain enough territory to secure enough food to survive.

It was left to our period of history for men to develop a concern to combat hunger for all people throughout the world, to recognize that survival depends more on cooperation than on conflict, and thus to launch international efforts to combat hunger. This fact is one new element of utmost importance.

#### **The Potential for Abundance**

The second new element is likewise a product of our age. For the first time in history science and technology have progressed so far that we can envision the day when no one on earth need suffer for want of material necessities of life. We can see the possibility of the conquest of hunger and cold and other physical and natural hazards for all men everywhere. The fact of scarcity that has dominated the past can now be replaced by the potential for abundance that is the promise of the future.

This dawn of the age of abundance was recognized by those pioneers who met at Hot Springs 20 years ago. They declared that “the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for health and strength of all peoples, can be achieved.”<sup>5</sup>

Two years ago, when the FAO put out its basic study on *Development Through Food*,<sup>6</sup> this recognition was tinged with even greater optimism. That publication states: “If action which is well within our means is taken, freedom from poverty can be achieved for most of the world in one generation’s time.”

And in FAO’s publication *Third World Food Survey*,<sup>6</sup> in a discussion as to whether its targets for freedom from hunger can be reached, I find this statement: “There should be little room for doubt on one score: the world could grow enough food to meet all these needs, if we made rational use of nature’s bounty.”

Within those nations that have come to be called the “developed” nations of the world this new potential for abundance has in many respects become a reality—most conspicuously

<sup>5</sup> For text of the final act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, see *ibid.*, June 19, 1943, p. 546.

<sup>6</sup> *Development Through Food* (1962) and *Third World Food Survey* (1963); for sale by the International Documents Section, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. (\$1.50 each).

in the production of food. Here in the United States, for example, agriculture has dramatically demonstrated its productive success. Millions of our farmers, spurred by the incentive and pride of ownership inherent in the American family-farm economy, have applied new discoveries and new methods to their own operations to produce a striking increase in productivity that overshadows increases in other major sectors of our economy. We have produced food to spare and to share. And our economists point out that crop production in the United States could easily be increased by 25 percent by 1967!

Other developed nations in the world are doing likewise. Economists in the United States Department of Agriculture have produced a study entitled *The World Food Budget*,<sup>7</sup> evaluating world food needs, balancing them with world food supplies, and projecting them into the future under certain possible and probable circumstances. They have come up with the forecast that, assuming a likely rate of growth in population and income and a continued growth of agricultural productivity at the rate that prevailed between 1953 and 1960, the developed countries of the world, by the year 2000, would have a potential for food production at almost double the expected demand! This projection dramatically illustrates the potential for abundance that scientific and technological progress offers to the people of the world.

As we examine the rapidly accelerating rate of progress in these fields we can foresee the end of the physical barriers to an age of plenty. Yet for most of the people that inhabit this earth abundance is only a dream. But it is a dream that becomes more insistent and more compelling every day.

We are meeting here today because we believe that, in a world in which abundance is possible, all people have the right to aspire to make that dream a reality.

We know that in today's world the contrast between those who have enough and those who

have too little is too sharp and too disturbing to be tolerated. A little more than a hundred years ago Abraham Lincoln told the people of the United States that this nation could not long exist half slave and half free. Today, when we can circumnavigate the globe in far less time than it would have taken Lincoln to travel from the east to the west coast of this nation, it is doubtful whether the community of nations inhabiting this earth can long exist half hungry and half well-fed.

The security of the world demands that this unbalance be corrected. The security of the world demands that measurable progress be made without delay. The half of the world that is hungry is increasing in numbers faster than the other half. Unless steps are taken to accelerate the rate at which growing numbers of people in developing nations can reach satisfactory levels of living, the world must face what the Roman philosopher Seneca referred to 1,900 years ago when he said: "A hungry people listens not to reason, nor cares for justice, nor is bent by any prayers."

This is a measure of the urgency of the goals we seek here.

We meet in this World Food Congress because we recognize this urgency. Whether we live in the "developed" nations, in which abundance is sometimes called surplus, or in the "developing" nations, in which food deficits handicap both personal welfare and national economic development, we are meeting here because we believe it is in our own interest, as well as in the common interest of us all, to cooperate in a campaign against hunger throughout the world. We meet in order to learn from each other how the abundance that exists in parts of the world can be used to mutual advantage to create abundance for all.

We meet not only to consider a vision of progress that may be possible but also to study realistically and practically the problems that must be solved if that possibility is to become a reality. Each of the quotations about potential abundance that I presented earlier is a qualified one. One of them says that our goal *can* be achieved, not that it *will* be. One says that poverty can be conquered in this generation *if* we take the necessary action. One says

<sup>7</sup> *The World Food Budget, 1962 and 1966* (Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 4); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (35 cents).

we can reach our targets *if* we make rational use of nature's bounty.

The goals we seek are not easily reached. There are roadblocks in the way of our progress toward abundance. Many of them are serious. Some seem almost insuperable. Every one of the efforts made—by the FAO, by governments, singly and in cooperation with each other, by citizens' groups and voluntary organizations—every one of these efforts has helped to make us aware of the nature and magnitude of the obstacles that lie in our way. I therefore ask you to consider with me some of the most serious roadblocks, with a view to finding practical means by which they can be overcome.

### **The Role of Agriculture**

One obstacle to progress has been an inadequate recognition of the importance of the role of agriculture in economic growth. A new steel mill seems much more dramatic than an improved rice paddy! Many of the developing nations have allocated their limited resources to industrial growth at the expense of agriculture to a degree that has intensified hunger and hardship and even threatened all economic growth.

An examination of our own economic history here in the United States shows how massive has been the contribution of agriculture to economic growth, particularly when our nation was in the developing state. It released workers to industry as it became more productive. It lowered food costs in relation to income. It provided an expanding market for industrial goods. It produced large earnings from the export of farm products, sustained output during economic depressions, and met wartime needs for food and fiber. It now contributes to world economic growth by assisting in the economic development of other countries.

Agriculture can make comparable contributions to growth in all of the developing nations. In fact, it must make such contributions if development is to succeed.

Experience has shown how serious are the consequences when food and agriculture are neglected by a developing nation that is pushing rapidly for industrialization. As workers are

drawn from the farms without any accompanying increase in efficiency, an already scarce supply of food becomes scarcer. As incomes in industry rise a little, the demand for food increases, and either rationing or inflation are likely to result unless food can be provided from an outside source.

Adequate recognition of this roadblock is the first step toward overcoming it. When it is fully understood that a major factor limiting economic development is a low level of agricultural productivity, programs can be planned to increase that productivity at a proportionate rate.

The program at this Congress offers much opportunity for study and discussion of the essential role of agriculture in economic development. If, out of this Congress, could come an increased awareness of its significance, a greater familiarity with successful agricultural development programs and projects, and a determination to act to make sure that agriculture is accorded its proper place in planning and programming for economic growth, this roadblock could be eliminated.

### **The Building of Institutions**

This leads to a consideration of other roadblocks in the way of progress in agriculture and rural development. Too often, here, the major roadblock is the failure to build the kind of institutions under which agriculture can make its major contribution. It seems much easier to see the need for better seed, fertilizer, machinery, and irrigation systems than it is to develop institutions for education, effective marketing, adequate farm credit, and a sound system of land tenure and ownership.

Permit me to note, very briefly, some of the institutions that have contributed so much to agricultural progress in the United States. I do this not because I mean to insist that institutions that work best in my country are necessarily the best for all, nor because I would ignore the vast differences in conditions that prevail, but rather because I believe that some of these institutions are based on principles that are valid everywhere, that can be adapted to meet many diverse conditions.

I think I would rate, at the very top, general education for all of the people. Unless farmers are literate and informed they face almost insurmountable handicaps in achieving greater efficiency and higher levels of living. The one single "input" that has contributed the most to progress and economic growth in all fields, here in the United States, is popular education.

Higher education and research, so well illustrated by our land-grant colleges, have made contributions of immeasurable value to our agricultural development. Our extension system has brought new knowledge to farmers in their own homes and their own communities. Our land-grant colleges have already made a good start in helping the developing nations, and extension systems are being developed in many parts of the world.

Educational institutions from both developing and developed nations are represented here at this Congress. If our deliberations here can promote greater exchanges of ideas and knowledge, increased cooperation and assistance, great strides forward can result.

Further research and new knowledge about the requirements for adequate nutrition and the efficient production of various foods to meet those requirements will always be needed to meet our constantly expanding needs and goals. But, in the allocation of scarce resources for education, it is important to remember that the foundation must rest on broad, general educational opportunity for all of the people. Early in our history Thomas Jefferson cautioned the people of this nation that if you expect to be both ignorant and free, you expect what never has been and never can be. Popular education is a basic requirement on which all other institutional development depends.

Economic institutions are also essential; and, if agricultural advance is to maximize its contribution to higher levels of living, institutions for the handling, transportation, storage, processing, marketing, and distribution of food must keep pace with progress as agricultural productivity increases. As the cultivators of the land seek to use their efficiency and productivity, they need institutions that will assure adequate credit on favorable terms.

Among the institutions that can help to meet

many development needs are cooperatives, one form of private enterprise through which members can pool their resources to help themselves. It is possible that cooperatives can contribute even more in the developing countries than they have in the United States. Laws enacted in this country since the 1920's have encouraged the development of farm cooperatives, and our foreign assistance legislation specifically provides for aid in developing cooperatives abroad.

One institution that has proved its worth by its results is the system of land tenure that is based on ownership and control by those who till the soil and which therefore provides the farmer with a most powerful incentive to improved operations. No other incentive stimulates capital improvements on the land as well as the farmer's assurance that he owns those improvements. No other system has been able to produce the abundance of food that this one has demonstrated so effectively and dramatically. I commend it as emphatically as I know how.

In emphasizing the building of appropriate social and economic institutions as an indispensable part of programs of development, I do not intend to minimize the importance of the physical and material things. These are essential. But they are also easier to come by. Without the right institutional framework, they can be, and have been, used to exploit rather than develop the people themselves. In other words, physical progress and material resources do not necessarily, in and of themselves, bring about abundance for all.

On the other hand, institutional development can bring abundance to areas where material resources are scarce. Some of the best fed people in the world live in Norway, where the proportion of arable farmland is very low. Some of the people with the highest standards of living in the world live in Switzerland, a country rich in resources of beauty and people but lacking in resources such as coal, iron, and petroleum.

If, out of this Congress, there can come a renewed awareness of the importance of institutions, a constructive sharing of experience in institutional development, and a determination

to build the kind of institutions that will most surely and effectively build for abundance for all, then indeed this Congress will have been a success.

#### **Use of Abundance**

A third roadblock along the road of progress toward plenty is the failure to make the most effective possible use of existing abundance—abundance available and at hand—to help to achieve greater abundance where scarcity still dominates. I refer to the abundance of technical knowledge as well as to the abundance of food.

We in the World Food Congress are challenged to a major effort to develop methods and consider plans and programs whereby the abundance of food that exists in part of the world can be used most effectively to promote the economic development that will create abundance for those where scarcity still dominates. In issuing this challenge I want to emphasize a clear recognition that the contribution of food as part of an assistance program is never a goal in itself. The goal of every developing nation is to be able to stand on its own feet. But food assistance can be a most powerful tool, a most effective instrument, in progress toward that goal. It is a tool that we have at hand if we will only use it to best advantage.

Many of the developed nations, including the United States, can and do produce more food than can possibly be consumed by their own people. This productivity is increasing. As I stated earlier, projections indicate that, if trends in 30 developed nations continue, by the year 2000 they will be able to produce nearly twice the food that their populations can consume. Let us contrast this with projections for the developing nations.

Such projections cannot, of course, be made very specific, because of the tremendously wide variations in the developing countries and because of the many differing and unpredictable factors that will influence rates of growth. However, it is possible to make certain generalizations on which most will agree.

The most optimistic picture for accelerated economic growth in the developing nations, in the aggregate, indicates that they can and will

increase their own domestic food production. But the most optimistic predictions fail to give any assurance that, in the generation immediately ahead, they will be able to increase it fast enough to meet the increasing demand. This demand will be exceptionally high for several reasons.

First, the rate of population increase in most of these nations is very high and will perhaps go higher before it can be expected to tend to stabilize. Production will have to increase substantially in order to just keep up with population; it will have to increase still faster if it is to meet real nutritional needs.

Second, as economic growth proceeds, real incomes will increase, and with each increase in income comes an increased demand for food. Unless enough food is available to meet the demands created by both increased numbers and higher incomes, the lack of food will become a significant factor limiting economic progress.

It is perhaps one of the most fortunate coincidences of history that at a time when the developing nations of the world are in a takeoff stage in which more food is desperately needed if they are to take off successfully—at that same period the developed nations are producing and can produce an abundance so great that it is sometimes embarrassing. It is up to us, from developed and developing countries alike, to take full advantage of this fortunate coincidence.

It will not be easy. We in the United States are eager to share with others in this conference the experience we have gained in the distribution of more than \$12 billion worth of food in our food-for-peace program during the past 9 years. We have learned that it is not easy to give away food. We have learned that careful planning and close cooperation with receiving nations is essential in order to insure that the food is used to best advantage both to allay hunger and to promote local development. We have learned of the fears of other food-exporting nations and of our own commercial exporters, who are concerned lest food that is donated might diminish commercial demand. We have learned that, however rigorously we avoid any such result, it is still difficult to allay the fear. We have also learned how much depends on the

capacity and ability of the receiving country to transport, store, distribute, and use the food it receives to best advantage.

We are only beginning to learn how effectively food aid can be used to promote economic growth directly. It has long been used, and should continue to be used, to relieve hunger in emergencies and to prevent inflation in countries going through a stage of development I described earlier. Its use in school-lunch and child-feeding programs is an investment in the health and vigor of the rising generation and is in a very real sense a capital investment in human resources. But it is only recently that we have begun to develop ways that food can be used as a direct input for economic growth.

Food is being used with dramatic success as part payment for work on labor intensive programs—irrigation, roadbuilding, the building of schools and other public facilities. It is being transformed into an investment that helps to build cooperatives and other forms of private enterprise. It is being used to help resettlement of farmers on new lands. It can be used to provide a high proportion of the capital investment required for the development of many programs essential for economic growth. Discussion, consultation, and further experience can result in the improvement and extension of these methods of using available food as capital in improving agriculture and hastening economic development.

Let us, here at this Congress, determine to find new and better ways to use to greatest advantage this instrument of abundance that we have at hand. Let us determine to overcome the difficulties that lie in the way of its maximum use. This is a challenge to both the developing and the developed nations.

The highly productive nations are challenged to find better ways and develop better methods—by national, multinational and international means—by which agricultural abundance can make its most constructive contribution to the goal of abundance for all.

The developing nations are challenged to learn how to handle and use food that they receive, as well as to produce more domestically. They are challenged to study and evaluate the techniques, methods, and institutions that have

proved effective in contributing to abundance, productivity, and economic growth and to adapt all of these to the needs of their own people.

Both are challenged to work together and coordinate their efforts toward that end.

#### **Technical Assistance and Trade**

There are other tools available to us which we must perfect and use more effectively. It is hardly necessary to emphasize to this Congress the importance of the sharing of knowledge and experience under technical assistance programs. People ranging from world-renowned scientists to young Peace Corps volunteers have done yeoman service in the campaign for freedom from hunger, through programs carried out by the United States and many other nations and through international activities carried out by the FAO and other international bodies.

And although it is not directly within the province of this World Food Congress, I believe it is in order for us all to bear in mind the importance to the overall achievement of our goal of the expansion of world commercial trade. Many of the food-deficit nations depend on the export of a single exportable food commodity, such as coffee, and to them international arrangements that would regularize and stabilize trade in that commodity are crucially important. To all nations, developed and developing alike, expanding world trade brings abundance closer to reality.

#### **Closing the Gap of Ignorance**

I would like to conclude by repeating the challenge faced by this World Food Congress, a challenge to each one of us who participates in these deliberations, a challenge to win so complete a victory in our Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign that we can fix our goal on freedom for the higher levels of living that can characterize an age of abundance—a challenge to use all abundance to create abundance for all.

I have suggested that we consider here several major roadblocks that stand in the way of advance toward our goal. I have urged that we give full recognition to the indispensa-

ble role of food and agriculture in economic development. I have tried to point out the importance of learning how to build social, political, and economic institutions under which greatest progress can be made. And I have urged that we here and now determine to make full use of the abundance we have—abundance of food and abundance of scientific and technical knowledge—as effective instruments to create abundance for all.

The challenges are not easy ones, but they are supremely important. To meet them we face not only scientific and technological problems but also the more formidable barriers that are social, political, and economic in their nature.

There are barriers of nationalism—and other isms—barriers of prejudice, of outworn customs, of misunderstanding and lack of understanding. Most important, and intertwined with all of these, is the barrier of ignorance.

I should like to emphasize that the barrier of ignorance applies not only to the illiterate, not only to those who have not yet learned how to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before, although this is serious enough. But the barrier of ignorance applies as well to the learned and the powerful—to the statesmen of the world who have not yet learned how to put into effect elements of social engineering that will make it easier to extend the potential for plenty to all people.

The gap of ignorance that cries most urgently to be filled today is the gap between man's ability to create power, on the one hand, and, on the other, his lack of knowledge of how to control that power and direct it to the well-being of all men. For the same power that can destroy a city can light a million homes.

It is our challenge and our responsibility to close that gap.

Let us accept that challenge.

Let it never be said of this generation that we were able to orbit the earth with satellites but that we were unable to put bread and rice into the hands of hungry children. Let it never be said that a generation that could literally reach for the stars was unable to reach for—and grasp—the potential for plenty and progress and peace that is at hand.

## U.S. Comments on Activities of U.N. Special Fund

*Statement by Jonathan B. Bingham*<sup>1</sup>

We are gratified to note the completion or near completion of a considerable number of Special Fund projects, as well as the fact that financing has actually been forthcoming for part or all of the development activities recommended in several completed projects. We will of course continue to watch very carefully the extent to which the Special Fund's preinvestment activity results in the necessary followup investment, since that will be the measure of ultimate achievement.

The Managing Director [Paul Hoffman] and his staff, as well as the executing agencies, are also to be congratulated on the continued improvement in the rate of implementation of projects after approval by the Governing Council. Of the 209 plans of operation concluded as of March 31, 1963, 72 percent have been signed within 1 year of approval and 29 percent have been signed within 6 months. The average is currently slightly under 9 months, and we are pleased to note<sup>2</sup> that the Managing Director believes further substantial improvements can be made. In passing, I might note that the World Bank and the United Nations itself have the best records in terms of translating approvals into agreed plans of operations.

We hope that all agencies concerned will make special efforts to improve their effectiveness in this regard, particularly those which have up to now failed to meet the 1-year target in a substantial number of instances.

As we have done previously, we should again like to urge the Managing Director to consider the possibility of retaining outside organizations, not members of the United Nations family, as the executing agents for certain projects, particularly in those fields where there has been

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Governing Council of the U.N. Special Fund on June 3 (U.S./U.N. press release 4216 dated June 5). Mr. Bingham is U.S. Representative on the Governing Council.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. SF/L. 82, par. 68.

a substantial lag and where the specialized agency concerned may be overburdened.

In connection with the timelag involved in putting projects into operation, it is worth noting that the documentation before us deals only with the lag between Governing Council approval and the signing of a plan of operations. From the point of view of a recipient country which is eager to get on with the job of promoting its own development, the time that passes from the moment a project is submitted for approval until it is actually approved by the Governing Council is just as important.

Three factors are, or may be, involved here: the degree to which modifications in the project proposal may have to be made by the recipient country in order to meet Special Fund criteria, the speed with which the Special Fund staff can process the proposal and prepare it for submission to the Governing Council, and the availability of resources in the Special Fund to finance the project, assuming it meets all the usual criteria. Thus the speed with which projects may be implemented depends on the efforts of the recipient countries themselves, the Special Fund and executing agencies, and the contributing nations. Since available resources restrict the Managing Director in the submission of projects to the Governing Council, both *in toto* and for any given country or group of countries, it is all the more important that the General Assembly's approved target of \$100 million in contributions be met as quickly as possible.

We have already complimented the Special Fund upon the successful completion of a number of projects. We believe that the Managing Director and his staff are also to be complimented for taking the hard decisions necessary in certain cases to discontinue certain projects where it is apparent that they will not lead to successful development endeavors. Such cancellation may be necessary because of unforeseen substantive difficulties, or it may be necessary because the essential commitments for the carrying out of the project on the part of the recipient government have, over a period of time, not been met. We are fully in accord with the last sentence in Document SF/L.82, in which the Special Fund comments that in the

few such cases in which these difficulties cannot be overcome the Managing Director "will have no alternative, in the best interests of the participating governments as a whole, but to recommend to the Governing Council that the projects in question be cancelled."

Finally, in connection with operations, it is also noteworthy, and should be a source of satisfaction to all concerned, that as of March 31, 1963, 848 internationally recruited experts and consultants were serving in 172 Special Fund assisted projects in 81 countries and territories, an increase of over 50 percent in 6 months.

I should like to turn now to the new program submitted for Governing Council consideration. My delegation is highly gratified that the projects show a marked increase in the industrial area. Whereas our analysis of the program submitted to the ninth session indicated a decline in emphasis on industrialization as compared to the previous session (a decline from 30 percent of the total to under 20 percent), our analysis of the current program shows an increase to 31 percent of the total. This is the first time industry has exceeded agriculture in fund earmarkings for the current approvals.

However, the industrial earmarkings are largely for education and training, while the agricultural projects are mainly for surveys and other preinvestment activities. We hope the Fund's work in industry will in due course reach a comparable stage, with more projects leading to the creation of specific opportunities for investment. The proposed project calling for feasibility studies for the establishment of an industrial estate in Iran<sup>a</sup> is noteworthy in this connection.

In this connection, I should like to call attention to a suggestion made by the distinguished representative of the Philippines at the recent session of the Committee for Industrial Development. He pointed out that the execution of any program of action for the acceleration of economic development through industrialization requires preliminary surveys analyzing the market potential, plant location, availability of raw materials, and supply of trained labor. He noted that the Managing Director of the Special Fund had earlier as-

<sup>a</sup> U.N. doc. SF/R. 7/Add. 19.

sured the Committee for Industrial Development that the Special Fund would encourage industry feasibility studies but had added that sufficient requests of that type from the developing countries have not been forthcoming. The few feasibility surveys requested of the Special Fund have been based entirely on projects whose local cost component or counterpart would be financed by governments, since private entrepreneurs were not eligible for assistance from the Fund. He therefore suggested that it might be useful to adopt a procedure whereby a member government could request a feasibility survey on the understanding that half of the expense incurred would be paid by a private entrepreneur through the government concerned, the other half to be paid by either the Special Fund or the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. Such a procedure would relieve pressure on government resources and would stimulate additional activity in the field of industrial development. He therefore proposed that the Committee should request the Commissioner for Industrial Development to consult both the Managing Director of the Special Fund and the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board to determine the ways and means by which investment feasibility surveys of particular aspects or projects in economic plans and programs could be made and to recommend what steps should be taken to bring the availability of that particular form of assistance to the notice of the developing countries.

This suggestion was warmly received by many members of the Committee for Industrial Development, and we believe there is a great deal of merit in it. We hope that the Managing Director will actively pursue the matter. If it should prove a practical and desirable activity for the Special Fund, but not for the Expanded Program, the minimum figure for Special Fund projects might have to be further reduced.

In addition, and as a possible further stimulus for Special Fund activity in the industrial development field, we should like to suggest that the Managing Director consider more active use of preparatory allocations so as to provide needed assistance to governments in preparing proposals in the industrial field.

A series of financial matters figure very importantly on the agenda of this session, and I should like now to make some preliminary comments on these subjects. During our last session the question of the cash balances of the Special Fund received considerable attention. As a result of the extended discussion, to which many delegations contributed ideas and suggestions, it was generally agreed that a study of this question was desirable. This has now been done, and we have studied with great interest the note of the Managing Director<sup>4</sup> prepared for this session. We are impressed with the care with which all aspects of the problem were considered. We concur with the conclusions that he has reached and believe that the combination of principles suggested meets the foreseeable needs of the Special Fund while preserving the financial integrity of the Fund, on which such stress was placed by most delegations last January.<sup>5</sup>

We should like especially to underscore the Managing Director's repetition of the importance of paying pledges promptly as an important element in permitting the activities of the Special Fund to proceed vigorously.

As a corollary we once again wish to urge all governments, particularly net donor governments, to make their contributions on a convertible currency basis. Only if they do so can the program be made fully responsive to the needs and desires of recipient governments.

There is one specific aspect of the matter of currency convertibility which has up to now not received sufficient attention. I refer to the administrative costs of the program, necessarily incurred by the Special Fund itself and by the executing agencies. For 1963 the approved administrative budget of the Special Fund is \$2,927,000, and the overhead cost allocation for the projects approved in January was in excess of \$3,200,000. Presumably a comparable amount will have to be set aside for the projects to be approved at this session. These are costs which should be shared by all net donors. Yet they

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. SF/L. 85.

<sup>5</sup> For a statement made by Mr. Bingham before the Governing Council on Jan. 14, 1963, see BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1963, p. 258.

are not so shared today, because these costs must be met in convertible or readily usable currencies. As a result those governments whose contributions are made in readily usable currencies are carrying an undue share of the burden of administrative and overhead costs.

These considerations would seem to compel the conclusion that all governments, or at least all net donor governments, should as a minimum make a sufficient proportion of their contributions in convertible or readily usable currencies so as to cover their equitable share of administrative and overhead costs.

## **U.N. Sends Observation Mission to Yemen**

*Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson in the U.N. Security Council on June 11, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on that day.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON**

U.S./U.N. press release 4222

I should like to explain very briefly the understanding of the United States in regard to the resolution we have just adopted, particularly in light of other statements that have been made to the Council.

Frankly, it was our hope that the Secretary-General might have proceeded promptly and without objection on the basis of his reports to the Council to the dispatch of the United Nations Observation Mission in compliance with the request of the parties. Although the resultant delay was unfortunate, it is apparent that the resolution we have just adopted is generally satisfactory.

I feel that I should emphasize, however, that the disengagement agreement between the parties involved in the Yemen situation placed no limitation upon the duration of the United Nations operation to 2 months or any other time. The reference to 2 months arose solely because the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic agreed to finance the

operation for 2 months but without prejudice to the manner of financing thereafter if a longer operation should prove to be necessary.

As to the question of the duration of the operation, we consider that the Secretary-General's report deals with this matter sufficiently and satisfactorily and that the resolution which we have adopted asks him to proceed in accordance with the plan set forth in these reports.

As to the financing of the observer operation, it is proper, in our opinion, that the Security Council resolution makes no provision therefor and merely notes that the parties have agreed between themselves to pay the costs for a limited time. Accordingly the United States delegation voted for the resolution and will welcome the prompt dispatch of observers to the area as proposed by the Secretary-General. We wish to express our thanks to him for his prompt and effective initiative to avoid international conflict in this area.

Finally, we wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the distinguished representative of Morocco for finding a satisfactory solution which permits the Secretary-General to commence immediately the disengagement to which the parties have agreed and which is of such great urgency.

### **TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>**

*The Security Council,*

*Noting with satisfaction the initiative of the Secretary-General as mentioned in his report S/5298 "about certain aspects of the situation in Yemen of external origin", and aimed at achievement of a peaceful settlement and "ensuring against any developments in that situation which might threaten the peace of the area",*

*Noting further the statement by the Secretary-General before the Security Council on 10 June 1963,*

*Noting further with satisfaction that the parties directly concerned with the situation affecting Yemen have confirmed their acceptance of identical terms of disengagement in Yemen, and that the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic have agreed to defray the expenses over a period of two months of the United Nations observation function called for in the terms of disengagement,*

1. *Requests the Secretary-General to establish the observation operation as defined by him;*

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/5331; adopted by the Security Council on June 11 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.S.R.).

2. Urges the parties concerned to observe fully the terms of disengagement reported in document S/5298 and to refrain from any action which would increase tension in the area;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this decision.

## Trade Talks Begin in Geneva

*The Office of the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations announced on June 18 the names of the U.S. delegates to the following series of negotiations to be held in Geneva in preparation for the sixth round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.*

### Trade Negotiations Committee

The May 16-21 ministerial conference of the GATT<sup>1</sup> set May 6, 1964, as the opening date of the negotiations, popularly known as the "Kennedy round." The ministers established a Trade Negotiations Committee to conduct the negotiations and to settle outstanding issues. Among these problems is the effect of tariff disparities on the procedures for across-the-board tariff cuts.

The Trade Negotiations Committee will meet on June 27. The members of the U.S. delegation will be:

#### Chairman

W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

#### Vice Chairmen

John Evans, Economic Minister, U.S. Mission, Geneva  
Robert L. McNeill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce

#### Advisers

James H. Lewis, Department of State  
Howard Worthington, Department of Commerce  
Charles Wootton, U.S. Mission, Geneva

Shortly thereafter, a Tariff Disparities Subcommittee will begin meetings. At these sessions, the U.S. delegation will be joined by Joseph Greenwald and Courtenay P. Worthington, Jr., Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 990.

## Committees on Cereals and Meats

The ministers also authorized GATT committees on cereals and meats to begin the negotiating of international commodity arrangements for these products.

The Committee on Cereals will meet on June 24 with the following U.S. delegation:

#### Chairman

W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

#### Advisers

John A. Schnittker, Department of Agriculture  
Robert Lewis, Department of Agriculture  
Anthony R. DeFelice, Department of Agriculture  
Fred H. Sanderson, Department of State  
Courtenay P. Worthington, Jr., Department of State  
Oscar Zaglits, U.S. Mission, Brussels  
John Kross, U.S. Mission, Geneva

The Committee on Meats will open discussions on July 1. The United States will be represented by:

Fred H. Sanderson, Department of State  
John Kross, U.S. Mission, Geneva

## Negotiations on Poultry and Tobacco

Geneva will also be the scene of negotiations between the United States and the European Economic Community on the Community's actions affecting imports of poultry from the United States. Another negotiation will deal with EEC actions affecting imports of tobacco.

The poultry negotiations are scheduled to start on June 25. The U.S. delegates will be:

#### Chairman

Irwin R. Hedges, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

#### Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Ioanes, Department of Agriculture

#### Advisers

John B. Rehm, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations  
Oscar Zaglits, U.S. Mission, Brussels

The negotiations on tobacco are scheduled to begin on June 24. The U.S. delegates will be:

#### Chairman

John Evans, Economic Minister, U.S. Mission, Geneva

#### Advisers

James W. Birkhead, Department of Agriculture  
Douglas W. Coster, Department of State  
Richard Mattheisen, Department of Commerce  
Charles Wootton, U.S. Mission, Brussels

## Current U.N. Documents:

### A Selected Bibliography

*Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

#### Security Council

Reports by the Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning certain developments relating to Yemen. S/5298, April 29, 1963, 3 pp.; S/5321, May 27, 1963, 3 pp.

Letter dated May 1 from the permanent representative of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning charges against the United States. S/5299. May 1, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated May 1 from the permanent representatives of Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding charges made by Israel (S/5297). S/5300. May 1, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated May 3 from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting OAS documents on the Haiti-Dominican Republic dispute. S/5307. May 7, 1963. 21 pp.

Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. S/5310. May 9, 1963. 30 pp.

Letter dated May 17 from the permanent representative of the Dominican Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning a telegram from the Haitian Foreign Minister (S/5314). S/5315. May 17, 1963. 2 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of July 14, 1960, and February 21 and November 24, 1961, concerning the Congo. S/5240/Add. 2. May 21, 1963. 19 pp.

Letter dated May 14 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of a resolution on the question of South West Africa adopted by the Special Committee on May 10. S/5322. May 29, 1963. 3 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the financial implications of the United Nations Observation Mission in Yemen. S/5323. June 3, 1963. 4 pp.

#### General Assembly

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Progress report on UNHCR regular programs for the years 1959 to 1962 and on the former UNREF programs as of December 31, 1962. A/AC.96/193. March 21, 1963. 106 pp.

International Law Commission. Second report on the law of treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, special rapporteur. A/CN.4/156. March 20, 1963, 74 pp.; Add. 1, April 10, 1963, 73 pp.

Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A/5408. April 12, 1963. 82 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

Manual prepared by the Indian National Committee for Space Research on the Thumba equatorial sounding rocket launching site. A/AC.105/10. April 15, 1963. 50 pp.

Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its

second session (April 16–May 3, 1963). A/AC.105/12. May 6, 1963. 25 pp.

Letter dated May 24 from the permanent representative of the Soviet Union addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement entitled "Dangerous United States activities in outer space." A/AC.105/13. May 28, 1963. 5 pp.

Explanatory paper prepared by the Secretary-General on measures of implementing the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. A/5411. April 29, 1963. 34 pp.

Letter dated April 30 from the representatives of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. A/5415. May 2, 1963. 2 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on cost estimates for 1963 for the U.N. operations in the Congo. A/5416. May 8, 1963. 27 pp.

U.N. financial position and prospects. A/C.5/974. May 14, 1963. 23 pp.

Letter dated May 13 addressed to the Secretary-General from the permanent representative of Albania concerning the U.N. financial situation. A/C.5/975. May 15, 1963. 3 pp.

Note verbale dated May 24 from the Chargé d'Affaires of Ghana addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the *apartheid* policies of the Government of South Africa. A/5422. May 28, 1963. 2 pp.

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Improvement of the Methods of Work of the General Assembly. A/5423. May 28, 1963. 48 pp.

U.N. Conference on Consular Relations. Vienna convention on consular relations. A/CONF.25/12. April 23, 1963. 40 pp.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.<sup>1</sup> *Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance:* Argentina, May 15, 1963; Denmark, May 21, 1963; Japan, May 10, 1963; Netherlands, May 17, 1963.

#### Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.<sup>1</sup> *Signatures:* Ceylon, December 12, 1962; China, April 4, 1963; Greece, January 3, 1963; Philippines, February 5, 1963; Poland, December 12, 1962.

#### Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914; for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

### Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. *Acceptance deposited:* Dominican Republic, May 29, 1963.

### Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

*Acceptance deposited:* Tunisia, May 20, 1963.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Tunisia, May 20, 1963.

### Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States, April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

*Signature:* Portugal, May 15, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending and amending declaration on provisional accession of Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *supra*. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4957.

*Signature:* Portugal, May 15, 1963.

Procès-verbal extending the period of validity of the declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.

*Signatures:* Australia, March 13, 1963; Czechoslovakia, April 18, 1963; Turkey, April 24, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Ethiopia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis Ababa June 11, 1963. Entered into force June 11, 1963.

### Nepal

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17, 1960 (TIAS 4477), to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new United States legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Katmandu June 4, 1963. Entered into force June 4, 1963.

### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Memorandum of understanding regarding the establishment of a direct communications link, with annex. Signed at Geneva June 20, 1963. Entered into force June 20, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Designations

Richard I. Phillips as Director of the Office of News. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 313 dated June 10.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Trade—Exports of Cotton Velvetene Fabrics from Italy to the United States.** Agreement with Italy. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington July 6, 1962. Entered into force July 6, 1962. TIAS 5186. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with Niger. Exchange of notes—Signed at Niamey February 28 and April 26, 1962. Entered into force April 26, 1962. TIAS 5187. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Postal Matters—Parcel Post.** Agreement and Detailed Regulations with Thailand. Signed at Bangkok May 31, 1962 and at Washington June 7, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5188. 24 pp. 15¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Gabon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Libreville October 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. TIAS 5189. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Tunisia. Signed at Tunis September 14, 1962. Entered into force September 14, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5190. 13 pp. 10¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Togo. Exchange of notes—Dated at Lomé August 1 and September 5, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962. TIAS 5191. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan.** Arrangement with Japan, relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo October 19, 1962. Entered into force October 19, 1962. TIAS 5192. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Turkey. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara August 27, 1962. Entered into force August 27, 1962. TIAS 5193. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Trade.** Agreement with Paraguay, postponing the termination of the agreement of September 12, 1946, as brought up to date. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción September 30 and October 1, 1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5194. 3 pp. 5¢.

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Releases issued prior to June 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 308 of June 7 and 317, 318, and 320 of June 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*321	6/17	Strong sworn in as Ambassador to Iraq (biographic details).
*322	6/17	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*323	6/19	Noto appointed consultant, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
†324	6/19	Johnson: "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East."
*325	6/20	Cultural exchange (Central America).
*326	6/21	One-millionth passport issued.
327	6/21	Interim modification of tin disposal program.
*328	6/21	Visit of Indian parliamentary delegation.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Foreign Relations of the United States 1942, Volume IV, the Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa."

In this volume there is documentation on the relations of the United States with Afghanistan, Egypt Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Morocco, Muscat and Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon. and Turkey. Nearly two-thirds of the volume is concerned with affairs in the Near East, and the rest deals with African matters. Most of the content relates to wartime problems, particularly the strengthening of the area against Axis inroads through the extension of lend-lease aid, food supplies, and technical assistance.

Copies of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa" may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25 each.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE  
DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE  
**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1255*



*July 15, 1963*

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# U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East

by U. Alexis Johnson  
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Much esoteric nonsense is often written and spoken about foreign policy. Perhaps even we in the Department of State are on occasion offenders. It is true that the issues are often complex—it is rare that there are just two sides to a problem or that the issues are black and white in good Western movie fashion—and the business of carrying out foreign policy can be complex indeed in this complex world. However, the fundamentals are really very simple. These fundamentals are not developed in the secret recesses of the Department of State or the National Security Council but rather here in Lincoln, and in Phoenix and Jacksonville, as well as in Washington, New York, and San Francisco. In other words, they are derived from what we are as a people and how we regard the other 94 percent of the people of the world.

<sup>1</sup> Address made at a conference on foreign affairs at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on June 20 (press release 324 dated June 19).

Our first goal in foreign affairs and the first responsibility of any administration in Washington is to our own security as a nation and as a people.

However, we as a people recognize that year by year, and almost day by day, we can less and less divorce our security and well-being from that of the rest of the world. Thus it is not only from the humanitarian impulses which lie so deep in our character but also from a hard-headed look at our own direct interests that we derive the fundamentals of our foreign policy. I would list first among these fundamentals a community of free and truly independent nations in which every man can live in equality and dignity, free from hunger, at peace with his neighbor, and having open opportunity to strive to attain his aspirations.

We seek these goals in Asia as elsewhere. This is not just empty rhetoric but the principles which guide our actions and programs.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1255 PUBLICATION 7577 JULY 15, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Upon superficial analysis these goals would appear to be easily attained because they are the same goals Asians seek. They are the same human goals which have sparked the wave of nationalism and the revolution of rising expectations still sweeping Asia in these postwar decades. There is no denying that Asians want national security, fuller prosperity, equality, dignity, peace, friendly relations based on freedom and justice, and opportunity for themselves and their posterity. In this they are no different from you and me.

Since there is such close identity between our goals and those of Asians, what then obstructs the easy attainment of these aspirations? First, as far as the Communist aspect is concerned, Premier Khrushchev has put one answer as plainly as I could when he said recently, "Marxist-Leninists make no secret of the fact that they want to win all the people on earth for socialism. This we regard as our most important aim on the world arena." Since, as Mao Tse-tung put it, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," the use of force to obtain Communist political control has not been ruled out. In fact, what the Communists call "wars of national liberation" are actively instigated toward this end.

This use of force is not new in Asia. In 1948 five Communist wars of terrorism to seize control were under way in Asia in addition to the civil war in China itself. They were in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and what was then called French Indochina. They were defeated in the first four countries, but in Indochina Communists were left in control of North Viet-Nam and two of the northern provinces of Laos. The aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950 was a more naked use of force, as was the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. Of present concern are Laos and South Viet-Nam and the Chinese Communist pressure along the Indian frontier.

Although aggressions and "wars of national liberation" can be, and have been, deterred or defeated in Asia, the Communist aim of "winning all the people to socialism," by force if necessary, has not been abandoned. On the contrary the Communists are actively infiltrating

their vanguards and operatives wherever they believe they have opportunity to seize power.

However, we also need to note that even if communism had never existed many of these countries would be wracked by the stresses and strains of building modern states and societies—the problems with which our own experience, past and present, has made us very familiar. Their relations with each other would also be beset by their long history of national rivalries and in some cases deep-seated hostility. In this, of course, the countries of Asia are by no means unique.

### **Combating "Aggression by Seepage"**

I trust that you will not mind my using my last foreign assignment, Thailand, a marvelous land of kindly people, as an example of what has been called "aggression by seepage" by a prominent correspondent. In the northeast provinces of Thailand live about 9 million people, nearly a third of the total population of the country. The majority of these peoples and those of Laos are very similar in culture, customs, and even language. There is also a substantial Vietnamese minority, for the most part loyal to Hanoi, living in this sparsely settled, relatively isolated area of Thailand. For the past several years Communist Pathet Lao agents, supporters of North Viet-Nam's Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, and even a few Communist Chinese "agitprop" men have been working in this area seeking to set up cells and *encadrements*. Clearly this was in preparation for further advance when Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam were to have fallen.

The Thai Government recognized the incipient danger and attempted to counter it as best it could with the very small and ill-equipped police units it had. We, for our part, cooperated with the Thai Government in its efforts to open up the area so that the people could begin to identify themselves with the nation and could begin to realize the benefits of progress. Through our joint programs roads were built opening up access not only to the hinterlands but to markets. Thousands of wells were dug, not only for potable water but also for irrigation. Training programs were enlarged. To-

day the situation in the northeast looks much more promising. The Thai border police are well officered and trained, and the routes of infiltration are no longer so open. Special mobile teams of Thai technicians and officials are energetically moving into the more remote and troubled areas. Better education is being brought to the area. Information teams are active. Communications are being extended, not just for security but also for the economic well-being of the inhabitants. Security too has been improved both by joint Thai-U.S. effort and through multinational preparedness through SEATO exercises.

The real significance of what is going on in Thailand is, I am convinced, that the free world is moving ahead with foresight, forged from bitter lessons learned elsewhere in Asia. Foresightedly, the Thais, with our cooperation, are moving toward preventing another Viet-Nam or Laos situation. They are doing so on the political, economic, and psychological plane, which calls for much more sophistication, patience, and understanding on the part of all of us than when the struggle reaches the military plane. It is always very late when the military plane is reached.

Our policies are based on the premise that nationalism is healthy and incompatible with the aims of communism. An independent national state is not always going to agree with us, but neither is it consciously going to serve the fundamental purposes of communism. We believe that government rests upon the consent of those governed, not upon the coercion of those ruled. We welcome a world of diversity and abhor enforced conformity. We seek to construct, not destroy. We seek to free men's minds so that open and honest examinations and decisions can be made, not to capture men's minds for exploitation by a single system. In short, we seek international cooperation, not world domination.

These are a few of the principles that are being rediscovered in Asia. They may sound trite to you and to me—and indeed too often we have not paid full heed to them. But as the peoples of the Far East strive to protect the independence they won and as they move ahead in exercising their responsibilities, they *are* dis-

covering that communism is not the wave of the future. They are recognizing the political, economic, and psychological appeals for what they really are.

All too often slow, steady, undramatic progress is buried in the screaming headlines of battles, scandals, defeats, and threats.

In Korea we see a strong urge to return to civilian government, and the people of Korea want to participate in the business of governing themselves. I am satisfied that they will find a way of doing so.

What of Japan? Not only has it found its rightful place in the community of free nations, but also it is helping others to do so through its development programs in Southeast Asia, through its expansion of trade with the lesser developed nations, through its responsible activities in the United Nations, and through its foreign student exchange programs. Japan is a vital example to Asia of the success of a free-enterprise system in a country with a paucity of natural resources. Japan's industrial capacity, skilled manpower, functioning democracy, and willingness to assume a role in free-world leadership will, I am sure, become even more important in the immense task of nation building all through Asia.

#### **Programs of Cooperation**

In these days when we are again having our "great debate" on foreign aid it is perhaps useful to call Japan to mind as just one example of the returns of what I think properly should be called our investment in foreign assistance. It is not possible to measure in monetary terms the political and military value of free Japan as it exists today. However, measured in just pure dollar terms, from 1946 to 1956 we invested around \$2 billion in Japan. Most of this was just plain food to keep people from starving, but a lesser part was for economic rehabilitation. As against this, there has been approximately \$18 billion of trade between Japan and the United States in the last decade, and during the past 5 years the trade balance in our favor has been over \$1 billion. I perhaps need not tell this audience that during the past 10 years we have exported \$4.4 billion of agricultural products to Japan. In addition Japan is di-

rectly repaying \$600 million of that postwar assistance.

As another example of our policy of economic cooperation with those countries of Asia seeking to move ahead, we might cite India. During the past decade approximately \$1.9 billion of United States economic assistance has been invested in India's first and second 5-year plans. During this same period other countries have invested around \$1.5 billion. India provided from its own resources around 90 percent of the financing required for the first 5-year plan and 76 percent of that required for the second 5-year plan, for a total of the equivalent of about \$11,100 million.

In this decade, while the population of India has increased by 21.5 percent, the national income has increased by 43 percent and per capita income by 17 percent. Agricultural production has increased by over 41 percent, and industrial production has nearly doubled. (We might note that during this same period per capita income, and particularly food production, has actually decreased in Communist China.) Our trade with India has increased by over 57 percent, but, above all, we and the rest of the free world are more secure and more prosperous because India has been able to move forward in freedom and prosperity.

Our policy also embraces military cooperation with countries desiring to join with us in such a relationship. We take an active role in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, embracing Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as France and the United Kingdom. We value our ANZUS treaty relationship with Australia and New Zealand as well as bilateral relationships with Japan, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the Philippines. However, this leaves room for us to assist any other free country that wants to defend itself against aggressive Communist power. As you know we have responded to the requests of India and, in cooperation with the U.K. and some other members of the Commonwealth, are assisting that country in better preparing itself to resist Chinese Communist aggression.

At this point a word is perhaps due with respect to Viet-Nam. Our policy there is based

on several premises. First is the premise that the South Vietnamese want to defend themselves. This has been amply demonstrated by the more than 5,000 men killed in action during the past year. Next is the premise that the fight must be one primarily of the Vietnamese themselves. It cannot be a war of Americans against Vietnamese. Thus, important though our role of advice, transport, communications, and supply is, it is primarily the role of an outsider assisting the Vietnamese themselves. Another important premise is that the political, social, and economic aspects of the struggle are of equal if not greater importance than the military struggle, but in any event all aspects of the struggle must be orchestrated in a unified whole. During this process both we and the Vietnamese are learning much. None of us expected or now expect that victory would be easy or quick. However, I am satisfied that solid progress is being made.

The real heart of the program in Viet-Nam in which all these various elements are brought together is in the strategic hamlet program. In these, many Vietnamese not only have the means for the first time of defending themselves but are experiencing their first taste of self-government, of participation in elections and in civic affairs. They are receiving benefits in health and education heretofore not available. They are working together. They are learning that a better life does exist and is attainable. And they are willing to work for it and have shown their willingness to protect it.

Increasing numbers of Vietnamese are now willing to furnish intelligence about Viet Cong operations and individuals; more Vietnamese are abandoning the Viet Cong cause by taking advantage of the Government's "Open Arms" campaign. The Viet Cong weapon losses are increasing, and losses of weapons to the Viet Cong are decreasing. Viet Cong strongholds are being penetrated, and less territory is under exclusive Viet Cong control.

Another aspect of our policy is the encouragement of regional cooperation among the free countries of the area. As I pointed out at the outset, this is beset with many obstacles. In any event, what we can do in this regard is fairly limited as the impulse must come from within

the area itself. However, we stand ready to help whenever we can.

In spite of the difficulties there are encouraging signs of progress. One of the most notable as well as most recent was the replacement of the frictions that have existed between Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia over the formation of Malaysia, with the announcement last week from Manila by the foreign ministers that the three countries are looking toward a confederation. The Indonesian Foreign Minister has coined the name "Maphilindo" for this future grouping, and it may well become a familiar term to us all. In addition there is the older Association of Southeast Asian States (ASA) presently consisting of Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines. This is in addition to the growing cooperation through such U.N. organizations as ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East], which is, among many activities, sponsoring the Mekong River Project among Thailand, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

#### **Shadow of Communist China**

Back of all of this hovers the shadow of Communist China. None can deny it is a formidable and dark shadow. However, at the risk of oversimplification, let me say that it no longer appears as formidable or even as black as it did a few years ago.

When I first returned to Southeast Asia in 1958, Communist China had just announced its "great leap forward." An almost literal shiver of fear went through the area that Communist China would accomplish the miracles of economic construction that it set as its goals and thus by example and influence alone overwhelm those seeking to pursue the free way. Communist China did not accomplish those miracles. Far from it. Per capita food production has been falling in mainland China as compared generally with its rise in the free countries of Asia. Industrial production lagged rather than "leaping forward," and the rates compare very unfavorably with the larger free countries, such as Japan and India, and even with some of the smaller countries. Students and others who went to Communist China wrote home very unfavorable accounts. The glowing image faded.

In the meanwhile the picture of the two stalwart giants—the Soviet Union and Communist China—marching shoulder to shoulder to conquer all that lay before them also has been fading fast. Not that both of them are not still Communist, but they no longer present that picture of shoulder-to-shoulder unity in carrying out their objectives. Their quarrels have broken into the open and are indeed deep. (However, we should remember that, as a Soviet is reputed to have said, the quarrel is in many ways over how best to bury us.)

All Soviet economic, and apparently most if not all military, assistance to China has been stopped. Soviet technicians were withdrawn, and even Soviet consulates have been closed. Peiping has been using public vituperation toward Moscow and the Kremlin that was formerly reserved for the United States. (I might mention that its vituperation toward India and its leaders is now in much the same vein.) Peiping and Moscow are eagerly cajoling or demanding, depending on the circumstances, the support of other Communist parties and regimes throughout the world. Something new and divisive has undeniably been added to the world Communist movement. This holds dangers as well as opportunities for us. As far as Asia is concerned I would not want to minimize the dangers. While cautious in its action, the public stance of Communist China is more belligerently aggressive than that of the Soviet Union. The Chinese are a people of enormous native capacity in no basic way inferior to any other people, including ourselves. The leaders in Peiping have throughout their rule shown an ability to profit by and correct their mistakes and now in fact seem to be taking some steps toward doing so.

However, I remain optimistic over the future. This is not a careless optimism but one based rather on fundamental human values that transcend geography, race, culture, and religion. I believe that the basic human values embodied in our policies toward Asia are more compatible with the aspirations of the great peoples of the area than are those of our enemies. I also believe that this is increasingly being recognized and understood by those peoples. If we remain true to those values we have a right to be confident of the outcome.

## Soviet Proposal of Nuclear-Free Zone in Mediterranean Rejected

*Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union.*

### U.S. NOTE OF JUNE 24<sup>1</sup>

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and, with reference to the note of May 20, 1963, of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, has the honor to transmit to the Ministry the views of the Government of the United States of America on the proposal that the area of the Mediterranean Sea be declared a nuclear-free zone.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Government's note appears to be devoted primarily to a propagandistic attack against the presence of United States missile-launching submarines in the Mediterranean and contains a large number of gross misrepresentations of both the position of the Government of the United States and the recent history of the Mediterranean area. In its note of May 18, 1963, the Government of the United States replied to a similar set of groundless charges contained in the Soviet Government's note of April 8, 1963,<sup>3</sup> and drew the attention of the Soviet Government to the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the reasons for its development. The remarks made in the note of May 18 apply to the Mediterranean area, as well as to all other areas covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

In this connection the Government of the United States wishes to emphasize that it was compelled to strengthen the security of its Allies in the Mediterranean only after their security had been directly threatened by the Soviet Union's deployment of an extensive array of missiles aimed at countries in the area.

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on June 24 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow (press release 331 dated June 24).

<sup>2</sup> For text of a Department statement of May 21, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1963, p. 896.

<sup>3</sup> For texts of the U.S. and Soviet notes, see *ibid.*, June 3, 1963, p. 860.

Consequently the United States and the threatened Mediterranean countries were forced in their own defense to counteract the striking power of these Soviet nuclear missiles and Soviet nuclear-equipped aircraft which were poised for attack on the region. If it had done otherwise, the United States would have failed in its duty to help its Allies to defend themselves against a form of nuclear blackmail under which the Soviet Union could have attempted to force the Mediterranean countries to succumb to Soviet dictation or Soviet domination.

This is not an imaginary danger, as may be seen from a number of provocative statements by senior members of the Soviet Government threatening devastating attacks on countries of the Mediterranean region, including threats to attack the Acropolis and the orange groves of Italy. If, as stated in its note, the Government of the Soviet Union is in fact "engaged in peaceful labor and wishes only peace and prosperity to other peoples," it has nothing to fear from the presence of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, which are stationed there solely to defend the integrity of the countries in that region.

With respect to the proposal in the Soviet Government's note to declare the Mediterranean area a nuclear-free zone, the Government of the United States wishes to recall that, being thoroughly aware of the catastrophically destructive nature of thermonuclear weapons, it has continuously sought and advanced proposals designed to eliminate or if this were not possible at least to reduce the danger that such weapons might be used. Despite a discouraging lack of progress it continues to pursue this path unflinchingly and with increased effort. In doing so, it welcomes the proposals of others. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, it must be noted that for a measure in the field of disarmament and arms control to have a beneficial rather than an unsettling and therefore dangerous effect, it must be balanced so that no state or group of states gain military advantage. To disrupt this balance can only create a condition of insecurity that would increase tension and lead to the danger the measure was designed to obviate. This principle of balance was in fact recognized in the Joint Statement of

Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961.<sup>4</sup>

The Note of May 20 of the Soviet Government seems to be designed precisely and solely to change the existing military balance at the expense of the United States and its Allies. The fact that the Government of the United States is constantly seeking ways of decelerating and halting the arms race does not mean that it is prepared to strip itself of its means of defense, or to withhold the protection of those means from its Allies, when the countries from which it and its Allies may be threatened maintain their armaments at full scale.

### SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 20<sup>5</sup>

Unofficial translation

No. 22

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to declare to the Government of the United States of America as follows:

Quite recently the Soviet Government was compelled to warn against NATO plans to create nuclear forces which would give the West German Bundeswehr access to atomic weapons and would unleash a nuclear weapons race which would know no state or geographic bounds. Today, the nations of the world are witnesses of the fact that the Government of the U.S.A. and that of some other NATO members are taking new steps in the same direction.

The question concerns the implementation of plans to place in the Mediterranean American atomic submarines equipped with the "Polaris" nuclear missile. Spanish ports and British military strongholds on Cyprus and Malta have been designated as possible bases for these submarines. There have been reports that the "Polaris" submarines will also use Turkish, Greek, and Italian ports. Two such atomic submarines have already entered the Mediterranean and are getting "the feel" of the coastal waters of Greece and Turkey.

The U.S.A. and some of its allies are thus demonstrating once again that the concern to prevent thermonuclear war or even reduce the danger of its occurrence is alien to their policy. Instead of joining in the efforts of states which, anticipating the realization of the program of universal and complete disarmament, are already striving to narrow the sphere of preparations for nuclear war, the predominant powers in NATO are drawing into the orbit of these preparations another vast area with a population of nearly 300 million people.

What does the transformation of the Mediterranean into a gigantic reservoir, filled with dozens of missiles with megatons of nuclear power, involve? What will be the effect of converting the Mediterranean basin into a sort of "missiledrome" where each mile of the sea's mirror-like surface may be used by an aggressor as a launching pad for nuclear missiles?

First of all, this will immeasurably increase the threat that the Mediterranean and the adjoining countries may become the theater of devastating military action. Even the states which have not and do not want to have anything to do with the aggressive preparations of NATO—and this means the overwhelming majority of the states in the Mediterranean area—actually find themselves in a situation where the right to control their future is appropriated by those who command the atomic submarines that ply near their shores. Their security and sovereignty is being undermined by the same dangerous policy in which are caught up the countries that made their territory available for NATO military bases. The uneasiness of the Arabs or Yugoslavs, of the Albanians or Cypriots cannot be allayed by assertions that the sending to the Mediterranean of American missile-bearing submarines is only a "technical" operation to replace the "Jupiter" missiles stationed in Turkey and Italy with other improved ones. No, the present replacement of the stationary American missile bases with floating ones involves far-reaching political and military consequences: the specter of a nuclear war, which appeared at first in those countries which actively participate in the military measures of NATO, is now being registered on the shores of the whole Mediterranean. The submarines equipped with "Polaris" missiles, navigating along the shores of the Mediterranean countries, would broaden the area from which a nuclear attack could be launched and consequently would also extend the geographic sphere of application of thus unavoidable retaliatory measures aimed at rendering harmless the bases of the aggressor.

Of course, the countries in which such submarines would be based, either permanently or from time to time, would expose themselves to the greatest danger. But there is not and cannot be any guarantee against the possibility that the atomic submarine would send its deadly missile from international waters, and then would try to hide near the shores of a state which is not in the NATO bloc, or that it would send its salvo directly from the territorial waters of such a state. It is impossible to exclude the possibility of such a course of events, all the more so since many states of the Mediterranean basin do not possess any real means to prevent atomic submarines from entering their waters, and only a few minutes are needed for something irreparable to take place.

Bringing into the Mediterranean war vessels of NATO with nuclear weapons on board forces the states whose security is threatened by the NATO bloc to implement effective defensive countermeasures in order to be able to avert any attempt on the peaceful life

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

<sup>5</sup> Delivered to the Department of State on May 20 by the Soviet Embassy at Washington.

of their peoples, and not to leave to the NATO powers a free hand to exploit the Mediterranean as a springboard for possible aggression. The peace-loving states will have no choice but to be ready to launch their means of paralyzing the travel routes of atomic submarines and also the shores of NATO members, as well as of countries which permit this bloc to use their territories for permanent or periodic bases for nuclear missiles.

It should be clear to everybody that the NATO staffs are operating in such a manner that the Mediterranean Sea, the shortest commercial sea route connecting the West with the East and a traditional area of recreation and international tourism, has become one more area of dangerous rivalry and conflict, a lair for the bearers of nuclear death.

What will happen to the countries of the Balkan peninsula, of North Africa, the Near and the Middle East—all countries situated along the perimeter of the Mediterranean Sea or even deep in the hinterland, if atomic missile-bearing submarines roam along the shores? Do you think this will increase their security and improve life for them? Is it possible to believe that the Greeks, Turks, Italians, French, Spaniards, as well as other Mediterranean people, will feel more secure if foreign missiles and atomic bombs, over which they have no power or control, are stationed on the very threshold of their homes? Even by an accidental concatenation of events the peoples of this area might become the victims of a deadly catastrophe, against their will and desire.

The Mediterranean peoples have had vast experience during their history. From the countless conflicts which shook ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Carthage down to the two World Wars of the present century, this area has suffered all the vicissitudes of the armed rivalry of states. But even during the Second World War, which quickly shifted to the African Continent and rolled on to the Near and Middle East, there was no weapon which in its destructive power could be even remotely compared with the one which is now riding in the waves of the Mediterranean, or which would be used in a retaliatory blow against the aggressor and shelter for an aggressor. If it came to the worst in our time, the Mediterranean Sea would become the Dead Sea in the full sense of the term. Many centers of civilization and culture would be threatened with a fate similar to that of Pompeii. Even people not bound by religious tenets can understand the feelings of millions of Christians and Moslems concerning the fact that, in implementing the designs of the NATO leaders, atomic weapons lie almost under the walls of the Vatican and Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina.

The governments of the Western Powers are trying to justify plans for stationing submarines with Polaris missiles in the Mediterranean Sea, by references to the fact that this is an open sea and that providing or not providing harbors for missile carriers is the domestic concern of individual states. But by what right are

four or five states engaged in NATO's policy, oblivious to the interests of the other Mediterranean countries, prepared to open the Straits of Gibraltar to the passage of atomic weapons? For example, if the governments of Turkey, Greece, Italy, or Spain permit submarines or surface vessels with atomic weapons on board to hide in their waters, then this would be trifling with the fate of not only their own country but would also threaten the security of neighboring countries.

The U.S.A. and other countries of NATO are not stinting in assurances that the American Polaris submarines are being sent to the Mediterranean for "defensive purposes" allegedly, and almost for the "defense" of the countries of this region. However, it will not be an exaggeration to say that out of all the means created for warfare the American weapon now being stationed in the Mediterranean is the least of all suited to serve defensive purposes, but instead is most suitable for any kind of provocation. The distinctive feature of the use of atomic submarines as mobile missile bases consists in the fact that they are counted on to conceal preparations and a surprise nuclear strike.

Moreover, in the Soviet Union, and also in other countries probably, people remember the recent statements of high-ranking persons in the U.S.A. with reference to the fact that under certain circumstances the United States of America may take the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government likewise could not fail to give attention to the statements of the leading military figures of the U.S.A. to the effect that the American submarines now being sent to the Mediterranean have been "allocated" to definite targets in the Soviet Union.

It would not be irrelevant to note with regard to the United States Sixth Fleet, sailing from place to place in the Mediterranean year after year, that it has been alleged more than once that its purpose is to help the Mediterranean powers defend their independence and security. In the log of the commander of this fleet, however, there is not a single notation about any operations in defense of the sovereign rights and independence of the countries of North Africa or the Near East. On the contrary, the ships of the Sixth Fleet participated in the preparation for an attack on Syria in 1957, which was blocked by the decisive action taken, particularly by the Soviet Union. With the forces of this fleet the United States occupied the Lebanese coast in the summer of 1958. American naval vessels covered foreign intervention in Jordan. Within sight of the Sixth Fleet the NATO allies of the United States—England and France, together with Israel—committed aggression against Egypt and bombed Cairo and Port Said.

Such are the facts. They throw a sufficiently clear light on the actual situation.

What, actually, are the American naval vessels seeking in the Mediterranean Sea, thousands of kilometers from the borders of the United States? What are the real aims being pursued when, in addition to the sur-

face vessels, atomic submarines are now being sent there armed with nuclear weapons? The NATO measures for spreading nuclear weapons to new areas speak for themselves. The intentions of the United States are made sufficiently clear, however, by the statement of American military leaders, who recently argued that it was essential to station American nuclear weapons in Canada on the grounds that this would permit diversion of part of the nuclear counterblows from the United States to Canada in the event of a war. This, to be sure, was said with reference to Canada, not with reference to the Mediterranean Sea. But just as there, so here too, there is now talk about preparations for an atomic war, carried out under one policy and one strategy.

Perhaps someone thinks it is almost the height of military acumen to conceal one's own nuclear missile bases as far as possible from one's own population centers and as near as possible to the borders of other nations. But can millions of people living along the Mediterranean reconcile themselves to the position of being hostages, into which the leading NATO powers are trying to place them? It is obvious that there enters into the military plans of these powers—now more than ever—the calculation that in the event of a conflict part of the nuclear counterblows that should rightly fall on the aggressor would be diverted to countries innocently involved in the conflict.

It is impossible to pass over yet another circumstance. As is well-known, the General Assembly of the U.N. adopted a resolution<sup>6</sup> declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone. The purpose of this resolution is to save the African Continent from the dangers inherent in a further spread of nuclear weapons.

Of course, no simple coincidence can explain the fact that the plans of sending American submarines with "Polaris missiles" to the Mediterranean Sea appeared simultaneously with projects of creating the so-called "multinational" and "multilateral" nuclear forces of NATO, in which a considerable role is played by West German revanchists and militarists. These are links of the same policy, of the policy of the absolutely unbridled arms race and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet people are occupied with peaceful labor and wish only peace and prosperity to other nations. The Soviet Government firmly believes in the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states. It is prepared on the basis of these [principles] to solve all questions of its relations with any nation, regardless of social differences and without any interference in the internal affairs of other states.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1652 (XVI).

True to the policy of peace and peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union has more than once proposed taking measures for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, supporting plans to create nonatomic zones in various parts of the world, liquidating foreign military bases in the territories of other states, reducing even now the armaments and the armed forces of states in areas where the possibility of a conflict is particularly great. The Soviet Government is in favor of denying the use of foreign territories and ports for stationing any kind of strategic weapons, including submarines with nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Union has presented concrete proposals on all these questions for discussion at the 18-country committee on disarmament at Geneva. Putting these proposals into practice would have strengthened mutual trust among countries and would have made possible the solution of the major problem of our time: universal and complete disarmament.

But the United States and its allies are now doing the following: creating a concentrated nuclear force under NATO and engaging in spreading nuclear missiles over new continents and new oceans; this raises new barriers on the road to disarmament.

For the sake of insuring international security, the Soviet Government proposes that the entire area of the Mediterranean Sea be declared free of nuclear missiles. It is ready to undertake the obligation not to deploy in those waters any nuclear weapons or means for their delivery, bearing in mind the fact that similar obligations will be assumed by other powers. If this area is declared to be a zone free of nuclear missiles, then, acting jointly with the United States and the other countries of the West, the Soviet Union is prepared to give reliable guarantees to the effect that in case of military complications, the area of the Mediterranean Sea will be considered to lie outside the perimeter of utilization of nuclear weapons.

The implementation of these proposals would promote mutual understanding and friendship in the relations between countries of the Mediterranean, it would enable the countries of the Mediterranean basin to devote more strength and resources to the solution of their economic and social problems. At the same time, it would represent a very substantial contribution to the lessening of overall international tension and to guaranteeing peace in Europe, Africa, and throughout the world.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will place the considerations contained in this note under careful study.

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1963.

## The United States and Eastern Europe

by Eugenie Anderson  
Minister to Bulgaria<sup>1</sup>

Let me ask you a question: Have you any idea what privileged men and women you are? I, too, have been unusually fortunate. I have had the honor to serve our country first in Denmark, one of our staunch Scandinavian allies, and now in Bulgaria, a rugged and beautiful Balkan country in a part of Europe known to few Americans. I have also lived and traveled unofficially but widely in India and Asia. Perhaps because I have lived abroad in these three sharply differing areas of our conflicted world, it seems to me that most of us are unaware of our incredibly good fortune.

You are graduating from college, and this itself is a privilege. Today most young people everywhere passionately desire an education. For most Americans this goal is attainable, while in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, higher education is but an insistent dream which comes true for only a tiny minority.

But there are other, even more basic reasons why we, as Americans, are privileged.

First, *we have inherited the treasure of freedom.*

The independence of our country and the rights of the individual were won for us by other Americans nearly 200 years ago. Yet these same liberties are those for which many peoples in the world today still strive desperately and which fewer still have achieved.

We take for granted these infinitely precious American rights: the freedom to think what you will, to say what you think, to believe, or not to believe, as you wish; the freedom to wor-

ship as you choose, to pursue the truth—wherever it may lead—in science, history, and all fields of knowledge; the freedom to create new art forms, to seek new kinds of beauty; the freedom to associate with whomever you like, to join together with others for any peaceful purpose, to petition your Government for redress of wrongs; the right to criticize, oppose, and change your Government; the right to choose your own political leaders, to vote them in and to vote them out; the right to equal justice under the rule of law; the right to a fair trial by jury; the right to own property and to pursue whatever occupation you may choose; the right to change your status in life; the right to an education in public or private schools; the right to travel, to move freely about in our own majestic and spacious land, and to see the world beyond if you will.

Less than half the people in the world today possess these rights which we hold basic and should hold sacred. For as Americans the majority of us inherited these freedoms. We live by them almost unconsciously. We accept them casually, often unmindful of their worth.

Secondly, *America has achieved a pinnacle of affluence, never before known in history.*

We are deeply privileged in our unprecedented material wealth. No other nation on earth enjoys such ease, such opulence, such riches. Even more important, our unparalleled standard of living is available to the majority of Americans and not just to those on top. True, Americans have labored with ceaseless energy, ingenuity, skill, and drive. Out of a wilderness we have created this wealth. Our own people have built this awesome power, founded

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at Carleton College, Northfield, Minn., on June 14 (press release 314 dated June 11).

on God-given natural and human resources.

Recently a Bulgarian said admiringly to me, "If there is any paradise on this earth, it is in the United States of America." I fervently agree. Yet today we are embarrassed—and we should be—by our overflowing abundance in a world where most people do not even have enough to eat. I cannot forget the deprived faces of men, women, and children in Asia, where hunger, homelessness, sickness, and hopelessness are the lifelong fate of millions.

We Americans are living in a paradise, yes, but an uneasy one, surrounded as we are by an ocean of human suffering, with rising seas of discontent, rebellion, and revolt.

American affluence is today one of our great good fortunes, but we will surely lose it unless we share it, and quickly. I would add that no other powerful nation in history has given so generously of its wealth to those in need. America has done much, but we must do more.

*Third, the American Revolution remains the hope of mankind.*

The founders of our country came here to create a new kind of society. These men and women dreamed of a system based on equality, reason, freedom, and opportunity. Their dreams are still the driving force of our democracy. The American Revolution still goes on.

We continue to be committed to American ideals. We hold an optimistic belief in our own ability to change our environment. We believe that change can be peaceful and that it must advance the general welfare of all mankind.

Fortunately for us, both as individuals and as a nation, the dynamism of American life is still a reality, not only an article of faith. Where else on this globe than in America can one find such diversity, such a pluralistic culture, and such exuberant growth? Almost as immense as nature itself—yes, and sometimes just as wild. But the point is that there must be continuing evolutionary change, experimentation, discovery, the extension of freedom to all groups, new possibilities for everyone, always new hope.

Despite our own sometimes tarnishing failures, despite years of propaganda and depths of ignorance, the vision of a dynamic, free America still prevails around the world. Rarely have I

traveled in any country and told my nationality that the stranger's face did not light up with an exclamation of wonder, "America!" Or, as a Hungarian refugee once said to me—unforgettably, "Ah, America—the country of infinite possibilities!"

### **Eastern Europe in Transition**

Now I want to talk for a few minutes about that part of Europe where I am serving. It seems fitting to discuss developments in Eastern Europe within the context of our rapidly changing times, because that area today is in transition. Most Americans have tended to think of the Iron Curtain countries in static terms. Such assumptions do not apply today to Eastern Europe. Significant changes have occurred and will continue. United States policy, too, has become more flexible and active vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.

Until recently the United States avoided a close involvement in European political affairs. We tried to remain only as interested observers in the gradual process by which European states fought for, and gained, their freedom and independence. Yet our heritage inevitably led the United States to give its encouragement to Eastern European peoples striving for freedom from foreign rule. Whether in freedom or in subjugation to a foreign power, they have retained their national memories and pride in their traditions; they have created, defended, and developed a rich cultural background; they have cherished their past successes and suffered from their failures; and they still maintain their faith in individual freedom and national independence.

Contrary to popular belief, Eastern Europe today is characterized not by homogeneity but by disparity, not by identity of policy but by contrasts. In fact, reality today in Eastern Europe underscores Moscow's loss of its former claims to monolithic unity.

Of course, the countries of the Eastern European bloc are still, in the last resort, subject to the ultimate control of Soviet military power. The bloc leaders adhere to Soviet foreign policy and ideology. They are working out with varying degrees of divergence their internal and economic development.

For example, Poland permitted in 1956-57 a reversal of the collectivization process in agriculture. Today only about 10 percent of Polish agricultural land is collectivized, while in Bulgaria the figure is 90 percent. So also in Poland, and to some extent in Hungary, consumers have fared better as a result of the events of 1956 and of conscious government policy. Throughout the bloc, including Bulgaria, some liberalization of internal rule has occurred. Poland, more than other countries in the area, shows the benefits of increased freedom. But there is mounting dissension in Czechoslovakia these days. Rumania seems to be reluctant to subordinate its economy to the planning decisions of the Soviet bloc. By way of contrast, look at Stalinist Albania's anomalous position. It supports Communist China in its conflict with Moscow. It defies the Soviet Union and has no diplomatic relations with it, yet it maintains relations with the Eastern European countries.

Great economic progress has been claimed by all the Eastern European regimes during the past years. The governments proclaim that they have overfulfilled their gross industrial production plans. Clearly the successful fulfillment of economic plans is an attractive subject to Communist propagandists. Yet, at the same time, severe, persistent, and chronic food shortages haunt most of these countries.

United States policy has been and remains consistent in its desire to see governments in Eastern European countries—as elsewhere—which will promote the full independence of their nations. We wish to see governments which will guarantee and promote all the essential internal freedoms and which will work peacefully for normal and constructive relations with all countries.

At the end of the last war, when Stalin brought down the Iron Curtain, he tried to reduce or eliminate all contacts between East and West. He hoped thus to simplify his assimilation of the nations of Eastern Europe into the Communist system. United States policy has always encouraged the drawing aside of this barrier. We want Eastern European countries to associate with us on equal terms.

We should seek new ways to remind the peo-

ples of Eastern Europe, Communists or not, that they are a part of the West and that we look forward to a day of even closer association. We want them to know how well the West has prospered with free systems. We want them to be able to see for themselves that the West is strong, dynamic, and united. We want them to know that we are completely dedicated to world peace but to understand, too, that the West is also capable of defending itself.

We want them to see how our agriculture is flourishing. We want them to compare *our* farm system with that of collectivization.

We want them, Communists and non-Communists, to see for themselves that our people work hard because our incentive under a democratic system is always before us: the opportunity for a higher standard of living, a better education for their children, more leisure, and a richer life.

It is heartening that today increasing numbers of Americans are visiting Eastern European countries. Some go as tourists out of curiosity; others to see their families and friends; still others go to exchange knowledge in professional fields under private or official arrangements. We support these contacts. They help people to understand the problems of bridging our differences. These scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges also help to keep the Eastern European intelligentsia in touch with important developments in the United States. I have found in Bulgaria a profound hunger for communication with Americans.

We, too, welcome the chance to visit with people everywhere in the world. The more Americans the world meets, the greater will be the understanding of American principles. The more we know of others, the richer we will be.

### **Economic Relations**

And what about our economic relations?

The United States permits trade in nonstrategic goods with Eastern European countries. At present it is limited, but we look forward to the day when our relations with these countries will allow such trade to be more significant. We want these people to share the benefits of our industrial and agricultural wealth and

know-how. Cultural influences invariably accompany and follow trade between nations.

Our policy toward Eastern Europe has drawn a distinction between those countries which are independent and are striving for independence and those which subordinate their interests to Moscow. Yugoslavia, while a Communist country, is not aligned with the Soviet bloc despite Khrushchev's wooing, and the policies it follows are those which it believes best meet its national interests. I have already mentioned some ways in which Poland has liberalized its internal rule. As a result of the distinctive developments in these two countries, both have most-favored-nation tariff treatment for the goods they export to the United States—that is to say, the tariff duties levied on their goods are as low as those on goods coming from any other country.

Under a provision of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress required the President to withdraw "as soon as practicable" most-favored-nation treatment from all Communist countries, in effect, from Yugoslavia and Poland since they were the only ones enjoying this status. This requirement goes completely against the policy toward Eastern Europe followed by President Kennedy and his predecessors. It would slam the door in the face of those two countries which have most emphatically rejected Stalinist-type rule and have tried to evolve policies according to their national interests. It would mean lumping them together with all the other Communist countries as if there were no differences among them. It would mean discouraging *all* Eastern European countries from developing meaningful associations with the United States. It would ignore our vital interests in the area, since it would prevent us from pursuing a constructive policy. Instead it would have the effect of reducing our relations to purely formal diplomatic contacts of the least effective kind. Instead of demonstrating our interest in the welfare of the peoples of Eastern Europe, we would appear to be writing them off.

The President has already indicated his wish to see this provision of the Trade Expansion Act amended so that he might have flexible authority to continue most-favored-nation treat-

ment for Yugoslavia and Poland.<sup>2</sup> Our vital interests in Eastern Europe require this authority for the President.

Few of us at the time of Stalin's death could have predicted that 10 years later the Soviet Union itself would be involved in a raging ideological dispute over freedom for the writer and artist, that Poland would have all but abandoned agricultural collectivization, that a Hungarian Premier could declare that "whoever is not against us is with us," and that Albania would side with Communist China against the Kremlin. Of greatest moment, however, is the impact which the Sino-Soviet conflict will have on the loyalties of Eastern European parties.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are aware of the disarray in the Communist world. And whether they know it or not, they have contributed to their own welfare by the pressure they have brought against their governments. Whether by passive resistance or occasional overt action, the people themselves have forced changes and concessions from their governments.

We believe that Eastern Europe is today in a state of flux. No one can predict what will evolve. Meanwhile we intend to maintain an active policy which will expand our contacts with Eastern Europeans. We persistently wish to demonstrate that we are concerned with the welfare of these peoples. We are interested in their national aspirations for independence. We want to keep them informed about Western thought in all areas of science and culture.

The process of change in Eastern Europe is bound to continue. The ideological rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China must necessarily have a strong impact on the Communist world. The Common Market factor in European and world trade will add some hardship to the Eastern European countries. Already they are trying to avoid the anticipated disequilibrium by integrating their own economies. At the same time they continue to be fascinated by the possibilities of trade contacts with the West. In the light of all these shifting

<sup>2</sup>For text of a statement by Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 27, see BULLETIN of June 17, 1963, p. 947.

forces, the United States must pursue a complex policy which can take account of the area's new dynamics.

We wish to respond to the aspirations of the Eastern European peoples, which are basically akin to our own revolutionary ideals. They, too, dream of being able to enrich their lives, to enjoy the responsibility of liberty, and to pursue the goal of happiness. They, too, believe in the dignity of man.

Let us maintain our confidence in these peoples, who through the centuries have endured so much. The tides of change which now encompass the globe are at work in Eastern Europe too. Meanwhile the present phase of ferment throughout the Communist world requires imaginative, active United States policies. These can be effective only if understood and supported by the American people.

### **The Responsibility of the Individual**

And what of your own personal role in these years of unremitting change? For ultimately the carrying forward of American ideals depends on individual Americans: what kind of ideas move us; what values we cherish; whether a humane morality guides us; with what courage we act; what kind of children we raise; what sort of schools and communities we sustain; what quality of arts, literature, theater, and music we create; how we nourish the sciences; what standards of excellence inspire us; whether we relate ourselves as friends and brothers, regardless of color, religion, or nationality; how we resolve our personal and national crises; and finally, whether we as individuals accept America's responsibility to the world.

There are, of course, many ways in which you can work for the triumph of American ideals. But underlying any life course you may choose must be an enduring commitment to the cause of freedom.

I would hope that many of you will discover that politics is the central means we Americans have for preserving freedom, for continuing our unfinished revolution. We *can* surmount our enormous difficulties at home and abroad, but only if enough educated men and women engage themselves in the struggle of

politics. It does not matter which party you choose. It is imperative to infuse a new responsibility in both parties. Recently a national survey showed that only 4 percent of Americans belong to any political organization. How can we hope to improve our democracy if our political parties are run by such a few!

There are many explosive and compelling needs and conflicts in America. Indeed the present confrontation in race relations is of epic proportions—certainly sharper, deeper, and broader than any since the Civil War. *Now* we must achieve full racial equality not only in civil rights but in all areas including education, housing, and employment. Progress must be accelerated in all sections of our country—North and South, East, West, and Middle West, too. Resolving this major crisis without further violence now—not tomorrow, *today*—is an imperative for us all. Our consciences as individual Americans cannot continue to carry the burden of indifference, brutality, and wrong against our fellow man. Our nation, as the leader of the free world, cannot afford more tragedies like Birmingham and Little Rock. I should add that many Americans are now working hard to eliminate segregation in those areas, as elsewhere.

Finally, I submit that American foreign policy also depends on American politics. It is important that some of you will enter the American Foreign Service, the Peace Corps, AID. Indeed I would urge you to consider giving several years of your lives to serving your country abroad. But fully as urgent is the need for inspired, courageous men and women at home to help shape American politics, which in turn molds our foreign policy.

American politics needs more young leaders who know the times into which you have been born. Our country needs more young men and women who understand the infinite worth of the individual and his freedom. We need more young Americans who want to share our liberties, our abundance, our dreams with others. For it is the unfinished American Revolution which is still the hope of mankind.

As Lincoln said so well, when pondering the meaning of our revolution:

"It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland, but that sen-

timent in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world, for all future time."

## **Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe To Discuss U.N. Affairs**

The Department of State announced on June 27 (press release 338) that Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, would leave Washington on June 28 for 10 days of meetings and consultations on U.N. affairs at London, Paris, and Geneva.

In Paris, July 1-4, Mr. Cleveland will attend special meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and of its Development Assistance Committee. In Geneva, July 5-7, he will chair a conference of U.S. representatives to various U.N. specialized agencies and speak at a dinner meeting of the Society for International Development. While in London, June 29-30 and July 7-8, he will meet with British officials and take part in talks covering a wide range of topics expected to be discussed at the forthcoming meetings of the U.N. General Assembly and other U.N. bodies. Mr. Cleveland will return to Washington on July 9.

## **King and Queen of Afghanistan To Visit U.S. in September**

### *White House Announcement*

White House press release dated June 17

As announced earlier [February 21] Their Majesties the King and Queen of Afghanistan will make a state visit to the United States in September of this year. It is expected that the royal visitors will reach Washington, D.C., on September 5. On arrival, they will be greeted by President Kennedy and high officials of the United States Government. Following several

days of discussion on matters of mutual interest in Washington between King Mohammed Zahir and the President, Their Majesties will proceed on a tour of the United States. Though their program is still under preparation, it is expected Their Majesties will travel widely in the United States and visit a number of different areas.

The people and the Government of the United States are looking forward to extending a warm and cordial welcome to Their Majesties. It is expected that the visit will serve to strengthen existing friendly ties between the two countries.

## **U.S. Warns Validated Passport Is Required for Travel to Cuba**

Press release 334 dated June 26

The Department of State announced on June 26 that it has recently received information that American students have been offered subsidized travel grants from an agency of the Cuban government—the Federation of University Students in Habana—for travel to Cuba during June and July 1963. Since their travel does not meet the established criteria, their passports have not been validated for such travel.

On January 16, 1961, the Department announced that U.S. citizens desiring to go to Cuba must obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel.<sup>1</sup> This requirement is still in effect.

Passports of U.S. citizens may be validated for travel to Cuba only when their travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, as in the case of newsmen.

The Department warns all concerned that travel to Cuba by a U.S. citizen without a passport specifically validated by the Department of State for that purpose constitutes a violation of the Travel Control Law and Regulations (title 8, U.S. Code, sec. 1185; title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, sec. 53.3). A willful violation of the law is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.

<sup>1</sup> For text of announcement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 178.

## North America, the Open Continent

by William R. Tyler

*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

This is one of the happiest events on our calendar. It is not a national holiday, nor a commemoration of a great and victorious exploit, nor is it a memorial to self-sacrifice or valor. We celebrate today a simple act of common sense—a moment of rationality in the history of nations, a moment to remember, for it contains a spark of hope for the future.

We cannot count the gain that our nations have derived from the Rush-Bagot treaty, and it is useless to speculate on the losses which might have occurred if the treaty had not been observed. We know that the gains have been great and that the agreement set the pattern for an open continent, a continent which has grown and prospered, morally and materially, because it has been an open continent.

To us who live in the shadow of modern armaments, this commemoration of common sense teaches an obvious lesson. It urges us to continue our efforts to achieve disarmament on a worldwide scale. It reminds us that a successful treaty can continue to spread its blessings over generations long after the doubts and roadblocks are forgotten.

Just 17 years ago, Mr. Bernard Baruch appeared before the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and made one of the most generous offers ever made by a nation. But, even then, it was apparent that an atomic victory would be a shallow victory. As Mr. Baruch said at that time: "Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World Destruction."<sup>2</sup>

The Baruch plan was approved by every

nation in the world except the members of the Communist bloc. But, without them, the plan could never go into effect.

The choice before mankind has grown more stark in the years that have passed. The primitive atomic weapons had a destructive force measured in kilotons—the equivalent of thousands of tons of TNT. The nuclear weapons of 1963 consist of a whole range of sophisticated weapons, the largest of which has a destructive power that is measured in megatons—millions of tons of TNT. The power to destroy has increased a thousandfold.

Even more disturbing is the increased speed of delivery vehicles. The bombers at the end of World War II had a speed of approximately 300 miles per hour. Today's supersonic bombers can travel half way around the world in less than half a day, and today's missiles can do it in about a half hour.

### Requirements for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Without adequate verification procedures, any attempt to limit or control modern weapons is useless, for violations would be easy and the party which conforms to the treaty could quickly find itself at the mercy of the violator.

However, we have not abandoned the possibility of finding mutually acceptable grounds for agreement. In this connection, it would seem to be obvious that there is one area in which the United States and the Soviet Union

<sup>1</sup> Address made at Old Fort Niagara, Youngstown, N.Y., on June 16.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

have something in common. I refer to the desire to avoid a world war. This is not to say that there appears to be any prospect of the Soviet bloc abandoning its objective of bringing the world under Communist domination. Likewise, it is also clear that the Western democracies will never allow the Communists to do this. But the resolution of this problem is not to be found in all-out war, and the Soviet Union appears to understand this critical fact. There would therefore appear to be an interest in both camps in the necessity of preventing mutual annihilation.

We have recently created a special agency of our Government to coordinate work on the disarmament problem. This agency, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was allotted over \$6 million during the fiscal year now ending. In the budget which the President has submitted to Congress for the coming year, \$15 million has been requested by the administration. Disarmament is of interest to many departments of government—the military, the State Department, and the atomic energy establishments, to name just a few. The President has final responsibility for policy in this field, and it is the purpose of the new agency to see that he is supplied with the advice that can enable him to pursue a vigorous and realistic course.

One of the primary challenges which motivates the new agency is the improvement in methods of verification which can assure us of treaty compliance. We have wherever possible formulated the necessary verification so as to minimize Soviet fears that verification will be used for purposes of espionage. For example, the Congress over the last several years appropriated \$90 million to finance improvements in nuclear test detection and identification. This research, conducted by our Department of Defense, has resulted in scientific advances which have enabled us to reduce our inspection requirements for a test ban treaty.

We are now in a position to offer the Soviet Union two alternative treaties: <sup>3</sup> alternative one, a treaty, with no on-site inspection whatsoever, banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,

under water, and in outer space—this treaty would involve no intrusion in the Soviet Union by outside inspectors (the parties would rely entirely on their own national capabilities to detect explosions); and alternative two, a comprehensive, across-the-board treaty prohibiting tests in all environments, underground tests as well as those in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water. Such a comprehensive treaty would be monitored by our national detection system, plus seven automatic seismic recording stations on Soviet territory. Because of the need for determining the true nature of underground disturbances which cannot be positively identified either as nuclear tests or natural earth shocks, the United States would require that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union accept seven on-site inspections per year on their territory. The Soviet Union insists upon limiting such on-site visits to three a year and refuses even to consider what the inspections should consist of and how they should be conducted. It is obvious that the modalities of inspections are as important as the number of inspections.

In discussions with Soviet representatives we have asked them to address themselves to methods of providing verification and at the same time preventing espionage. We have indicated a willingness to have inspectors blindfolded while in transit to the site of the inspection, to have them transported in planes in which the windows are blacked out and piloted by Soviet pilots. To these suggestions we have received no response.

The object of the forthcoming mission of Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman and Lord Hailsham [British Minister for Science] to Moscow is to convince the Kremlin leaders of the need for action now, for the hour is growing late.

I can assure you that the U.S. Government has not for one instant lost sight of the overriding need for the maintenance of security. The revisions we have made in our position are revisions which reflect new scientific knowledge. We do not seek inspection for inspection's sake. But we do demand that verification be such as to give us assurance that all parties to the treaty are observing that treaty. Anything less would

<sup>3</sup> For texts of draft treaties, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 411.

involve a dangerous risk to the security of the free world.

### U.S. and Soviet Disarmament Proposals

The test ban treaty is only one of the objectives we pursue in the field of arms control and disarmament. We have also submitted a proposal for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted at Geneva draft outlines of a treaty for general and complete disarmament.<sup>4</sup> Each proposal calls for disarmament in three stages and for the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization to supervise enforcement. However, this is where the similarity between the two proposals ends.

I shall point out a few of the major differences.

In the first place, the Soviet Union has tended too much, in our view, to stress full agreement on *all* aspects of disarmament before a single stage or measure of disarmament may be implemented. We believe that agreement on a few isolated measures first might allow us reasonably to evaluate how quickly or slowly we can prudently progress along the road to the ultimate goal, while at the same time assuring our security.

The first few steps in a disarmament program, if achieved with no mishap, should lead to confidence in taking the next. Experience remains the best guide; we learn to walk before we learn to run. If we gain assurance from experience that the other side is really fulfilling its obligations in the primary phases, we might tentatively experiment further. If such assurance is not forthcoming, there is no possibility of further progress. Since assurance cannot be based merely on promises, the United States holds that verification through inspection must be guaranteed. The Soviet Union has resolutely refused to accept this kind of verification and has insisted that, in no small part, the United States must accept the Soviet Union's word.

Secondly, the first stage of the Soviet Union's proposal calls for the almost complete elimina-

tion of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, of all foreign bases, and of the deployment of all troops abroad. In addition there would be reductions in conventional armaments, and, what is more important, such reduction would be effected within 15 months. Obviously such a proposal is a very thinly veiled assault on the entire U.S. and NATO defense system. In contrast, the U.S. plan calls for across-the-board 30 percent reduction in all major armaments over a period of 3 years, or 10 percent per year. In other words, reductions should be proportional, thereby leaving the present balance of power undisturbed.

Thirdly, the U.S. proposals call for more effective measures of control than do those of the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet society, one of secrecy, makes it imperative that adequate inspection machinery be guaranteed. Secrecy, we believe, breeds suspicion, and to allay it we must have direct access to evidence of what is occurring in the Soviet Union.

In our search for the long-range solution I have been describing we pursue a flexible course of action:

*First* of all, we desire to negotiate and agree on a total plan going all the way to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

*Second*, if this is not possible, we are willing to attain the widest area of agreement short of this that is possible at the earliest possible date.

And *third*, we are also willing to seek agreement on any single measure or group of measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and to implement such an agreement at the earliest possible date.

In this third category we include several limited measures looking toward the elimination of the danger of war by accident or miscalculation. Only one of these proposals, a proposal to provide direct and speedy communication between the United States and the Soviet Union, has found a favorable reaction. Negotiations for the so-called "hot line" have been proceeding smoothly, and an agreement may be effected shortly.<sup>5</sup>

The President of the United States, on June

<sup>5</sup> For background and text of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement signed at Geneva on June 20, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> For text of a U.S. outline of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

10, announced that the United States would refrain from conducting any nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other countries would do likewise.<sup>6</sup>

As the United States has made clear, through its spokesmen at the United Nations and elsewhere, we have no intention of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit; we will not precipitate a race for such weapons.

#### **Soviet Advantage in "Propaganda Game"**

Negotiation for disarmament has been a long and difficult process. During the last 17 years we have tried to find the key or keys that would unlock the door. While we believe that the Soviet Union will eventually come to realize that its long-range interest lies in disarmament, it is not clear that this point is yet fully appreciated in the Kremlin.

They are in an advantageous position to play the propaganda game on this subject. For the governments of the free world are under constant pressure from citizens, press, and organizations. All of these are concerned about peace, and all are alert to spur their governments on to greater efforts. Some of the more extreme groups even advocate unilateral disarmament.

On the Russian side, there is no parallel activity. There is no freedom to demonstrate, to speak, or to publish in the Communist world. The few peace organizations which exist are puppets of the state and are unanimous and vociferous in their approval of every move made by the Kremlin.

The result is that the Kremlin can get a great deal of mileage on vague and superficial proposals. It can avoid candid replies to questions at the negotiating table. Why should it bother, when the reactions of some of the more naive segments of the peace movement show that they are already ahead of the game so far as public opinion is concerned?

This is, of course, quite the opposite of what the peace movement desires to accomplish. The lesson which the peace movement must learn is that it takes two to make a bargain on disarmament and that it is just as important to place pressure on the Kremlin as on Western

governments—more important, in fact, because there are no peace movements to do the job in Russia. And acceptance, at face value, of sweeping generalities merely proves to the Kremlin that they don't have to bother to get serious.

#### **Open Society of the West**

Another unbalanced factor arises from the fact that the NATO alliance is composed of governments which are truly independent and sovereign and that, in the open society of the West, they conduct much public business openly. Across the Iron Curtain we have a quite different situation—a situation in which the Russians command, the satellites obey—a situation in which the newspapers print only the final decisions which are handed to them by state officials.

As a result, little or nothing is published about defense and military discussions in the Communist world. Even in the midst of a heavy arms program, all can be silent but the voice of the don. Here in the West, on the other hand, every new idea is reported at length in the press and debated in parliament. As a result, it is quite easy for a casual onlooker to get the impression that the free world is unduly concerned with arms questions.

We will have to live with this unbalanced situation for a long time. I, for one, would not want to see it changed. Freedom to think, to publish, and to criticize the government is a great heritage of the people, both in the United States and in Canada.

But governments must take note of this situation and must not permit the Communists to exploit it to drive a wedge between our people and our governments, or between the nations within our alliance. We must remain united in tactics as well as policy. Only thus will we be able to teach the Soviet Union that cheap propaganda victories are beyond their reach, that they must turn their efforts toward an honest pursuit of disarmament through serious negotiations.

A deeper understanding of the role of modern weapons in international relations and an understanding of initiatives we can take in their management are byproducts of our efforts to

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

reach an international disarmament agreement. Another byproduct is the fact that we have a forum in which communication lines between East and West are kept open.

We intend to persist in our efforts at negotiation, regardless of frustrations and discouragements. One obstacle to this agreement is the fact that the Soviets insist on maintaining a tightly closed society, distrustful of international organizations and opaque to international inspection. Without moves in the direction of greater openness, it will be difficult to achieve the verification which is essential if all sides are to have confidence in a disarmament treaty.

It is in this direction, the direction of openness, that the world can find great guidance from the history of our Canadian-American experience. The example of an open continent may eventually lead to the creation of an open world.

#### **U.S.-Canadian Interdependence**

Let me conclude by saying a few words about our relations with Canada. Few people realize the extent of the involvement of the two countries with each other. The situation results from geography, the magnitude of the trade between us, the size of the investments citizens of each country own in the other, the complexity of our defense arrangements, our joint water resource problems, and many other factors of interdependence. Fortunately, as neighbors, we can speak frankly to each other; and to be able to do so honestly and responsibly is priceless when the variety and complexity of our points of contact are steadily and inevitably increasing.

A proper view of United States-Canadian relations, however, must encompass not just bilateral problems which we consider together but also the problems which we face in other parts of the world. Happily, these problems do not separate us. We can take deep satisfaction that our interests and objectives and our policies are strikingly parallel. Both of our countries want a world in which trade may develop without discrimination and in accordance with sound economics. We are both disturbed over the threat to the economy and peoples of the free world represented by the

Communist system. Finally, we both need each other in terms of mutual security and defense.

We have come a long way since the Rush-Bagot treaty, and in the interim United States-Canadian relations have been, basically, an example to the world. We can be lifted in spirit by earnestly believing that our future is bright with even greater promise.

#### **Technical Cooperation Programs of U.N. System**

The Advisory Committee on International Organizations announced on June 28 the release of a report entitled "The Technical Cooperation Programs of the United Nations System."<sup>1</sup>

This report is the second in a series to be made by the Advisory Committee on International Organizations, which was appointed in July 1962 to assist the Department of State in a systematic review of U.S. participation in international organizations and in efforts to assure that these organizations carry on their work as effectively as possible. The first report, issued on April 26, 1963, was entitled "Staffing International Organizations."<sup>2</sup> Sol M. Linowitz, chairman of the board, Xerox Corp., Rochester, N.Y., and partner in the firm of Harris, Beach, Keating, Wilcox, Dale and Linowitz, is chairman of the advisory committee.<sup>3</sup>

The report on U.N. technical cooperation programs was submitted to Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland by Mr. Linowitz on June 28. It includes seven recommendations to help strengthen U.S. relations with international organizations and to assure more effective use of funds contributed by the United States for technical cooperation purposes.

<sup>1</sup> A limited number of copies of the report are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

<sup>2</sup> For an announcement, see BULLETIN of May 20, 1963, p. 809.

<sup>3</sup> For names of the other members of the committee, see Department of State press release 228 dated Apr. 26.

## Role of Individual Women in the World Community

by Mrs. Katie Louchheim  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Tonight I want to say just a few words to you who have heard almost too many words in the past 10 days. I want to speak to you about our role as individuals. But first of all I want to pay tribute to those who, as individuals, especially gifted individuals, have made this 75th conference of the International Council of Women the great success it has been. Mrs. Jacobs, the president of the National Council of Women, is what we call a "doer"; and to the doers, especially those who combine intelligence with charm, go all the plaudits we can tender them. Your outgoing international president, Mme. Lefauchaux, leaves a record of achievements that all can be proud of. We salute her for her wisdom and devotion. And we greet your newly elected international president, Craig McGeachy Schuller, with cheers and all good wishes. Mrs. Schuller and I were co-workers in the first international war relief effort of World War II, UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration]. It was my good fortune to observe at first hand her capabilities in those critical years. Your future as an International Council is in good hands.

We in the State Department are concerned with the progress and problems of women of other countries. We are anxious to see the bonds of friendship strengthened between the women of the United States and the women of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We all need to know each other better and to draw from each other new strength and fresh ideas as you have been doing at this meeting.

In order to encourage more contacts between American women and the women of your countries, we have enlarged the participation of women in State Department exchange programs. In the past 3 years more women leaders of other countries have visited the United States

as guests of the State Department and other Government agencies than ever before. More American women than ever before have been traveling to your countries, to meet your leaders and to work with them—not only in great international conferences like this one but in small groups or just woman to woman.

President Kennedy, speaking of a better life for ourselves and for our children in Frankfurt, Germany, said: "To realize this vision, we must seek, above all, a world of peace—a world in which peoples dwell together in mutual respect . . . not a mere interlude between wars but an incentive to the creative energies of humanity." Surely women possess the creative human resources of which President Kennedy spoke. We are the teachers, the hearth-tenders, and the heart-healers; we are the guardians of our heritage.

Today, in an interdependent world, all of us recognize that our roles as individuals assume an even greater importance. We have a folk saying in America which goes, "If you want to send a message that will be heard, you can telegraph, telephone, televise, or tell a woman." Folk sayings are based on fact; increasingly women are being recognized as a crucial factor in education, as opinion makers, and indeed as a major political force.

The power of women who cooperate is limitless. The voluntary contributions of women have changed the faces of their communities, urged reforms that could never have waited for the passage of law, and fought long and hard for the laws that made such reforms permanent.

But it is also as individuals that women can create a climate in which progress can take place. It is as neighbors and homemakers, as well as educators and political leaders, that we have become part of the revolution of rising expectations. It is as idealists and standard bearers in the highways and byways, in the marketplace and in the home, that we have our greatest opportunity to become the spokesmen for the rights of all mankind.

A contemporary philosopher, Scott Buchanan, has eloquently stated our case: "The human individual is responsible for injustice anywhere in the universe." If we need proof of this thesis we have but to read the headlines. Crisis

<sup>1</sup> Address made at a dinner meeting of the Joint Conference of the National Women of the United States and the International Council of Women at Washington, D.C., on June 29 (press release 345 dated June 28).

is served with the morning coffee; concern is our shadow; change and challenge our birth-right.

Mr. Buchanan's remarks should not be taken to mean that each of us is responsible for injustice anywhere, but that every one of us has the responsibility for dealing with these injustices. To set the universe as the limits of our responsibility may seem to be exaggerating the case. But if we were to ask that each individual assume responsibility for dealing with injustice in his own community, there would undoubtedly be acceptance of our proposition.

We cannot alter, perhaps, what is going on at the other limits of the globe. But the world is now the kind of place where events in our own community affect not only all of us but all of humanity, even those at the other ends of the earth. And so, for the informed, involved, participating citizen, the responsible woman leader, the community expands; it is not only her village or city, it is also her universe.

I know that each one of you, on your return home, will consider your community in its relation to your country and to the free world. On our side we hope that this great meeting here in Washington will be but the beginning of an enduring friendship and that we will be hearing from all of you.

## **Grant Awarded to American Institute of Indian Studies**

Press release 341 dated June 28

The Department of State is awarding a grant totaling \$1,959,000 in U.S.-owned Indian currency (rupees) to the American Institute of Indian Studies at Poona, near Bombay, to provide a 3-year extension of a program of research studies now completing its first year of operation. The institute, which was incorporated in 1961, provides educational facilities and opportunities to qualified U.S. scholars and students for research and training in Indian studies and for the publication of the results of such studies.

Through the grant some 150 U.S. faculty members and graduate students will receive transportation and maintenance expenses to

pursue research interests in India during the next 3 years. The individual grants provide transportation and full maintenance for faculty fellows and junior fellows except in the case of holders of National Defense Education Act fellowships, who receive international transportation only.

The institute is supported both financially and in planning aspects by a consortium of 33 American colleges and universities which have joined forces for the advancement in this country of knowledge and understanding of India. The institutions are: American, Arizona, California, Chicago, Claremont (University College), Colgate, Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Hawaii, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Michigan, Minnesota, State University of New York, Pennsylvania, Rochester, Rutgers, Sweet Briar, Syracuse, Texas, Wisconsin, and members of the Great Lakes Colleges Association (Albion, Antioch, Denison, DePauw, Earlham, Hope, Kalamazoo, Kenyon, Oberlin, Ohio Wesleyan, Wabash, and Wooster).

In 1962 the institute received a grant of \$500,000 from the Ford Foundation which, with the annual dues (\$500 to \$2,500 for member institutions), is expected to cover costs in the United States for the institute's first 5 years of operation. Also in 1962 the Department made a grant of \$500,000, in rupees, for operating expenses in India for the first year. The Department's support, through its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, is in funds generated through the sale of surplus agricultural commodities and authorized for use by the Department of State under Public Law 480.

W. Norman Brown, chairman of South Asian regional studies at the University of Pennsylvania, is president of the institute. Milton Singer, chairman of the South Asian Language and Area Center of the University of Chicago, is vice president; Henry C. Hart, chairman of the South Asian Language and Area Center of the University of Wisconsin, is secretary; and F. Haydn Morgan, director of project research and grants of the University of Pennsylvania, is treasurer. McCrea Hazlett, formerly provost of the University of Rochester, has recently been appointed director of the institute and will administer the program

in India. D. D. Karve of India is executive officer of the institute. Its Indian headquarters are at Deccan College in Poona.

Fellows of the institute are either at the post-doctoral level or the immediately predoctoral level and are selected under criteria established by the Board of Trustees. Eligibility is not limited to candidates from institutions holding memberships in the institute. Citizens of other countries who are members of teaching staffs or candidates for higher degrees at American institutions are also eligible to apply.

The broad aim of the program is to encourage the growth of foreign language and area competence in the United States as a means of promoting better international understanding. Activities made possible by the institute are intended to contribute to this goal through scholarly research, through the training of American specialists in the field, and by incorporating knowledge of India into the general education of larger numbers of Americans.

## Owners of Real Property in Iraq Notified of Legal Requirements

Press release 330 dated June 27

The American Embassy at Baghdad has been informed of an official notification recently issued by the Government of Iraq, addressed to persons not of Iraqi nationality who own or administer real property in Iraq. The notification refers to Iraqi Laws No. 38 of 1961 and No. 46 of 1962, which, in general, restrict ownership of real property by foreigners to a house for residence and an office for the practice of a profession. These laws also require foreigners to transfer to an Iraqi citizen, within a stated period ending August 15, 1963, real property in excess of what they are legally entitled to own. Property not so transferred is to be sold at public sale.

The recent notification requests foreign owners or administrators of real property, regardless of place of residence, in order to "safeguard their rights in the cost of their estates," either to transfer the legal excess of their Iraqi estate or to submit a statement describing their estate to an Iraqi embassy or consulate.

## Jointly Financed Exchange Programs Established With Austria and Sweden

### AUSTRIA

Press release 333 dated June 25

U.S. Ambassador James W. Riddleberger and Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky signed at Vienna on June 25 an agreement which will extend the Austro-American Fulbright program at present levels for at least another decade.

Under earlier agreements,<sup>1</sup> which have been in effect since 1950, all costs of the program were paid for by the United States. The new arrangement, authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, calls for bilateral financing, with the Austrian Government committing 60 million Austrian schillings (approximately \$2.4 million) for the continued exchange of professors, teachers, students, and researchers and also for the establishment of chairs of American studies at the Universities of Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck. Other cultural activities are provided for.

The new Austro-American agreement is the second to be concluded which provides for bilateral financing and the first actually to become operative. A German-American agreement signed in November 1962<sup>2</sup> will take effect upon completion of ratification procedures within the Federal Republic. Similar agreements with other countries are expected shortly.

Through the current academic year, a total of 878 Austrian teachers, lecturers, and students have traveled to the United States, and 628 Americans have gone to Austria. Thus, with the inclusion of 58 renewal grants, a total of 1,564 have been made so far.

The new bilateral agreement was foreseen 2 years ago, when United States and Austrian officials signed an agreement transferring to the Austrian Government full responsibility for the future use of European Recovery Program

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2072, 3279, and 4959.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1962, p. 923.

(Marshall Plan) counterpart funds and, in connection with that agreement, exchanged notes providing that a portion of the counterpart funds would be earmarked for future Austro-American educational and cultural exchange activities.

## SWEDEN

Press release 342 dated June 28

Representatives of the Governments of the United States and of Sweden on June 28 signed an agreement extending the Fulbright program of educational exchanges between the two countries. Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson of Sweden and U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Alfred leSesne Jenkins signed for their respective countries at Stockholm.

The revised agreement provides for the first time for joint financing of the program with Sweden. Such joint financing is authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. Similar agreements for binational financing have been concluded between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria.

The original agreement<sup>3</sup> with Sweden was signed in 1952 by the late Dag Hammarskjöld, as Acting Swedish Foreign Minister, and by the then American Ambassador to Sweden, W. Walton Butterworth.

Since the initiation of the program in 1952, the U.S. Educational Commission in Sweden has administered grants to 216 Swedish citizens who have traveled to the United States or to American schools abroad; and to 62 Americans who have gone from the United States to Sweden, as well as 163 Americans who have gone to Sweden from other European countries.

The level of program funds will be increased to at least \$100,000 a year, with Swedish financial participation. In addition to grants for graduate study and research, the program has introduced American lecturers at all four Swedish universities and teacher exchanges between Swedish and American secondary schools.

<sup>3</sup> TIAS 2653; for an announcement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 909.

## United States Provides Grain to Korea Under P.L. 480

Press release 340 dated June 27

The U.S. Government on June 27 announced that the United States will make available a total of 200,000 metric tons of grain to the Republic of Korea under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480). The commodities to be provided will satisfy the immediate needs of the Korean people arising from extraordinarily inclement weather in the 1962-63 growing period and most recently aggravated by Typhoon Shirley. One hundred and twenty-five thousand metric tons will be provided under title I (sales for local currency) of the act, the remaining 75,000 tons under title II (grant).

The United States will continue to consult with the Korean Government concerning further emergency food requirements.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 88th Congress, 1st Session

- Study of Population and Immigration Problems by Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Western Hemisphere (I): 1. Trends in Canadian Population, presentation by Dr. Nathan Keyfitz and Mr. Jacques Henripin; 2. Population Trends in Mexico, presentation by Dr. Nathan L. Whetten. Special Series No. 5; March 11, 1963; 79 pp. Western Hemisphere (II): 1. The Demographic Position of the Caribbean, presentation by Dr. George Woodrow Roberts; 2. The Growth of Population in Central and South America, presentation by Dr. T. Lynn Smith. Special Series No. 6; March 27-April 3, 1963; 106 pp.
- Study of International Housing. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on a compendium of papers prepared for the study of international housing. April 22-25, 1963. 232 pp.
- Staffing Procedures and Problems in Communist China. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. May 15, 1963. 50 pp. [Committee print]
- Report on Audit of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, Fiscal Year 1962. H. Doc. 113. May 15, 1963. 53 pp.
- Amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Report to accompany S. 777. S. Rept. 215. June 6, 1963. 13 pp.
- Authorizing the President To Proclaim Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Report to accompany H.R. 6012. H. Rept. 365. June 6, 1963. 38 pp.
- Exemption From Duty for Returning Residents. Re-

- ports to accompany H.R. 6791. H. Rept. 371, June 7, 1963, 7 pp.; S. Rept. 305, June 25, 1963, 5 pp.; H. Rept. 472, June 26, 1963, 3 pp.
- Message from the President transmitting the annual report of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, covering its activities for the calendar year ending December 31, 1962. H. Doc. 122. June 13, 1963. 27 pp.
- Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1964. Report to accompany H.R. 7063. H. Rept. 388. June 14, 1963. 45 pp.
- Continued Suspension and Reduction of Duty on Chicory. Reports to accompany H.R. 2827. H. Rept. 389, June 17, 1963, 2 pp.; S. Rept. 308, June 25, 1963, 2 pp.
- Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership—II. Staff Study prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Doc. 21. June 17, 1962. 70 pp.
- Excluding Cargo Which Is Lumber From Certain Tariff Piling Requirements. Report to accompany S. 1032. S. Rept. 261. June 19, 1963. 6 pp.
- Export-Import Bank Act Extension. Report to accompany H.R. 3872. S. Rept. 262. June 19, 1963. 23 pp.
- Continued Exemption From Duty for Certain Tanning Extracts. Report to accompany H.R. 2675. H. Rept. 424. June 19, 1963. 3 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic Acid. Report to accompany H.R. 5712. H. Rept. 426. June 19, 1963. 1 p.
- U.S. Participation in International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 405. H. Rept. 431. June 20, 1963. 3 pp.
- Amendment to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 60. H. Rept. 433. June 20, 1963. 4 pp.
- Duty on Polished Sheets and Plates of Iron or Steel. Report to accompany H.R. 3674. H. Rept. 440. June 21, 1963. 3 pp.
- Duty on Panama Hats. Report to accompany H.R. 3781. H. Rept. 441. June 21, 1963. 4 pp.
- Extending an Invitation To Hold the 1968 Winter Olympic Games in the United States. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 324. H. Rept. 444. June 24, 1963. 2 pp.
- Continued Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 4174. S. Rept. 309. June 25, 1963. 3 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During June 1963

ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services: Meeting of Operations Division.	Montreal . . . . .	May 14-June 12
U.N. General Assembly: 4th Special Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 14-June 27
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development: 2d Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 21-June 28
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 5th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	May 27-June 7
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 13th Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	May 27-June 8
2d Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	Mar del Plata, Argentina.	May 29-June 8
U.N. Special Fund: 10th Session of the Governing Council . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 3-10
3d ECAFE Study Week on Traffic Engineering and Highway Safety . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	June 4-10
World Food Congress . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 4-18
ANZUS Council: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Wellington . . . . .	June 5-6
International Labor Conference: 47th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 5-27
U.N. ECE Rapporteurs Group on Housing for the Elderly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6-7

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 25, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; EEC, European Economic Community; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Adjourned During June 1963—Continued

NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 6-8
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 6-27
OECD Preparatory Group for Meeting of Ministers of Science . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 10-11
UNESCO Executive Committee on the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments: 4th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 10-12
ECE Housing Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 10-13
OECD Industry Committee: Special Committee for Pulp and Paper . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11 (1 day)
ECAFE Ad Hoc Committee on the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	June 11-12
OECD Trade Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11-12
U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Tungsten . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 11-12
OECD Agricultural Policy Working Party . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11-14
IAEA Board of Governors . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 11-21
OECD Committee for Scientific Research . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 12-13
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 12-21
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 13-14
OECD Development Assistance Committee on Aid to Somalia . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 14-15
OECD Oil Committee: Ad Hoc Drafting Group . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 17-18
ECE Conference of European Statisticians . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 17-21
UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 17-21
FAO Group on Citrus Fruits: 3d Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 17-22
FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designations, Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 6th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 17-22
FAO North American Forestry Commission: 2d Session . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	June 17-22
ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	June 17-30
OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Working Party I . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 18 (1 day)
International Wheat Council: 37th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 18-21
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments) . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 19-20
UNESCO Preparatory Meeting for an Interdisciplinary Conference on Scientific Land Research . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 20 (1 day)
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 20-21
OECD Turkish Consortium . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 21-22
2d FAO/WHO Conference on Food Additives . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 24-25
GATT/EEC Negotiations on Manufactured Tobacco . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 24-26
Antarctic Treaty Meeting on Telecommunications . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 24-28
Caribbean Organization: 3d Meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Caribbean Plan . . . . .	San Juan . . . . .	June 24-29
GATT Cereals Group . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 24-29
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 25-27
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 25-27
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 26-28
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 27-29
NATO Science Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 28-29

### In Session as of June 30, 1963

ECAFE Training Center Seminar on Customs Administration . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	May 28-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 29-
13th International Film Festival . . . . .	Berlin . . . . .	June 21-
2d ILO Preparatory Meeting for Inter-American Vocational Training Research and Documentation Center . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	June 24-
FAO Council: 40th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 24-
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 25-
ILO Governing Body: 156th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 28-

### In Recess as of June 30, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (recessed June 21, 1963, until July 30) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification (recessed Dec. 15, 1962, until September 1963) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24, 1962-

## U.S. Replies to Soviet Charges Against Certain Space Activities

*Following is the text of a letter from Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, together with an enclosed statement on Project West Ford.*

U.S./U.N. press release 4219

### TEXT OF LETTER

JUNE 6, 1963

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I have the honor to refer to UN Document A/AC.105/13 dated May 28, 1963, a note by which the Permanent Representative to the United Nations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to Your Excellency a statement entitled "Dangerous United States Activities in Outer Space." My Government feels that the attachment to Ambassador [Nikolai] Fedorenko's note contains so many distortions and is so at variance with the facts as to require correction.

The Soviet statement deals in the main with Project West Ford, an experiment in space communications recently carried out by the United States. It implies that this experiment was undertaken without consultation with the world scientific community and over the protests of international scientific bodies. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am enclosing with this note a paper which outlines the history of Project West Ford, the thoroughgoing advance analysis of the experiment which took account of views of scientists both in the United States and abroad, and the wealth of scientific information made available to the international scientific community prior to the conduct of the experiment. My Government believes that Project West Ford clearly demonstrates the open manner in which United States space programs are conducted. As has already been announced, the scientific results of this project will be made public.

The attachment to the Soviet note alludes also to a United States high altitude test conducted in the summer of 1962. The results of

that test have similarly been made public with comprehensive scientific information disseminated to international scientific bodies. In sharp contrast, the Soviet Union has never announced the high altitude tests which it conducted in the fall of 1961<sup>1</sup> following the unilateral rupture by the Soviet Union of the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing which had been in effect since 1958, nor has the Soviet Union announced, or admitted, the three nuclear tests it conducted at high altitude in the fall of 1962.<sup>2</sup>

Finally the statement transmitted with Ambassador Fedorenko's note attempts to portray the recent meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space<sup>3</sup> as one in which Soviet positions were widely supported. In fact, as the records of the Legal Subcommittee show, the Soviet Union found no support for its positions outside the Communist bloc. Twenty of the twenty-eight members of the Legal Subcommittee were anxious to record progress in framing appropriate instruments to reflect the developing law of outer space. This was obstructed only by Soviet intransigence. The Soviet Union went so far as to try to conceal its role of frustrating progress by emasculating the Subcommittee's report. The records of the Subcommittee meeting, however, tell the story of what took place.

On a related subject, I would like to call attention to the failure of the Soviet Union on a number of occasions to comply with existing arrangements to register with the United Nations, under General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI),<sup>4</sup> the launching of all objects into orbit or beyond. In reviewing registration data submitted by the USSR, the United States has observed that a number of space vehicles launched into earth orbit by the USSR have been omitted.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1961, p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1962, p. 806.

<sup>3</sup> For text of a statement made in the subcommittee on May 3 by Leonard C. Meeker, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 923.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

These omissions occurred in the Soviet submissions of December 21, 1962 and of April 19, 1963. Now, in its latest registration on May 11, 1963, the USSR has failed to correct these earlier omissions. The proper international designations for these six space vehicles in question are as follows:

- 1962—Alpha Pi, launched on August 25
- 1962—Alpha Tau, launched on September 1
- 1962—Alpha Phi, launched on September 12
- 1962—Beta Iota, launched on October 24
- 1962—Beta Xi, launched on November 4
- 1963—1, launched on January 4

All six space vehicles listed above achieved earth orbit and clearly fall within the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1721(XVI), which calls upon states launching objects into orbit or beyond to file information promptly through the United Nations for the registration of launchings.

In the Soviet Union's first submission of information to the United Nations on March 24, 1962, it was pointed out that ". . . in the opinion of the Soviet Union, the information furnished to the United Nations for registration will be of real value if the countries concerned will register now and will continue to register all the artificial satellites of the earth placed in orbit and other objects launched into outer space." Moreover, the USSR also stated at that time its understanding that launching data would be registered ". . . in the chronological order of launchings."

The United States in its submissions for the United Nations registry therefore left gaps in the sequential numbering of international designations on the assumption that the Soviet Union would report the six space vehicles in question. To date the USSR has not done so, although all six were, in fact, launched into earth orbit by the Soviet Union.

There has been speculation in the press and in scientific publications that certain of the above objects were launched by the United States. Such is not the case. As has been stated several times by the United States representatives at the United Nations, the United States submits information to the United Nations registry on *all* objects it launches into earth orbit or beyond.

I should appreciate your having this note,

with the accompanying statement on Project West Ford, circulated as an official document of the United Nations.<sup>5</sup>

Sincerely yours,

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

Enclosure: Statement on Project West Ford.

## STATEMENT ON PROJECT WEST FORD

UNITED STATES SPACE COMMUNICATIONS EXPERIMENT  
(PROJECT WEST FORD)

Project West Ford is a United States space communications experiment involving the placing of hair-like metallic filaments (dipoles) into a relatively short-lived orbital belt around the earth. The purpose of the experiment is to investigate, under very carefully controlled conditions, the technical feasibility of using such dipoles as passive reflectors for relaying communications and to provide an opportunity for objective assessment of possible side effects of further experimentation with this technique on space activities or any other branch of science.

The first launch of a Project West Ford package took place on October 21, 1961 when a United States Air Force Atlas-Agena B carried into orbit a dispenser package containing 75 pounds of dipoles embedded in naphthalene. The package was expected to release the dipoles in such a way that they would gradually disperse to form a thin, narrow, circular orbital ring about 40,000 miles long at an altitude of about 2,000 miles only a few tenths of a degree in width. Investigation has revealed that the dipoles did not form a belt but rather remained in five or six small clumps.

A second launch of a West Ford package took place on May 9, 1963. The long narrow cloud of dipoles was first identified on May 12, 1963. The cloud is in an orbit which is at an altitude of about 2,300 statute miles and is currently increasing in length at the rate of about 1,000 miles per day. It is only a few tenths of a degree wide. Extensive computations based on the exact initial orbital elements indicate that under presently anticipated physical conditions the life of the belt will be less than three years. To date there have been no reports of interference by any scientists, with either optical or radio astronomy, although information on the orbital elements was immediately circulated to scientists around the world, including the Soviet Union. All of the major experimental equipment prepared in advance for Project West Ford has been tested and successful results have been achieved in each case for limited periods of time.

The experiment was carefully planned to avoid interference with other space activities and other scientific pursuits. In 1961 it was reviewed by a special

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/15.

panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, headed by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, which concluded that the United States could proceed with the experiment without harm to science. The Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, in an independent analysis, reached a similar conclusion.

On August 8, 1961 President Kennedy issued a policy statement<sup>6</sup> that no additional launches of orbiting dipoles would be undertaken until the results of the first successful experiment could be analyzed and that, in this analysis, the findings of foreign, as well as United States scientists, would be taken into consideration.

Facts regarding Project West Ford have been made widely known. In September 1960, a paper on the orbiting dipoles technique was presented to the International Scientific Radio Union. In April 1961 a series of technical articles on Project West Ford were published in the *Astronomical Journal*. Reprints were provided to some 800 foreign astronomers. Additional data on the expected lifetime of the belt were published in the magazine *Science*, October 6, 1961.

A memorandum by the Space Science Board on the results of the first launch and the modifications planned for the second, accompanied by a detailed report by the Lincoln Laboratory, was sent on March 8, 1962, to members of the West Ford Committee of the International Astronomical Union; to officers of COSPAR [Committee on Space Research] and the International Scientific Radio Union; and to individual scientists and scientific institutions in the United States and abroad. A further letter was sent to the same addressees by the Space Science Board on January 18, 1963, outlining plans for a launch in 1963. Still another memorandum stating that a launch was imminent was sent on May 3, 1963. Information about the experiment has also been given to the international scientific community in various scientific meetings and through articles in a number of scientific journals.

For the second launch several additional precautions were taken to assure that the experiment would not interfere with other space activities. The quantity of the dipoles was reduced to about 50 pounds; a mechanism was included to permit the dipoles to be ejected from the dispenser package only if an orbit were attained in which the life of the dipole belt would be of relatively short duration; and telemetry was included in the dispenser package to indicate the temperature, spin, and tumble rate of the package and the rate at which dispensing was taking place, enabling scientists to learn more about the behavior of the belt in its initial development.

In the initial phase of discussions on Project West Ford concern was expressed by some scientists that other scientific activities might be adversely affected by side effects of the project. This concern, which was notably present in 1961, was largely relieved by information exchanges, independent analysis, consul-

tation and the incorporation into the experiment of suggested scientific safeguards. While some scientists have continued to indicate concern about the experiment, there has been no scientifically documented protest against the experiment since the end of 1961.

The first and most widely known statement of a scientific organization about Project West Ford was the resolution of the International Astronomical Union adopted in Berkeley in late August 1961. The resolution expressed appreciation that the plans for Project West Ford had been publicly announced well ahead of launching and that further launchings would be guided by the President's Policy Statement of August 8, 1961. In the resolution, the IAU expressed opposition to the carrying out of the experiment until the question of permanence of the belt could be clearly settled in published scientific papers. Several articles were published on this subject. The general weight of the articles supported the prediction that the belt would be of short duration if a proper orbit was obtained. Among these articles was "Lifetimes of Orbiting Dipoles" by I. I. Schapiro in *Science* October 6, 1961, copies of which were sent to some 800 foreign scientists. The IAU resolution also called for the fullest observation of the belt of dipoles. The United States made every effort to assist and encourage observation by foreign and American scientists.

As a result of information furnished by the United States, D. H. Sadler, General Secretary of the IAU, stated in a letter to all members of the IAU West Ford Committee on May 9, 1962:

"I am writing to you in connection of my letter H4939 of 13 March 1962 (on Project West Ford). In that letter I suggested that the Union could take one of two, rather extreme, courses and I asked for your views as to which course it should take. I have now received 9 opinions in favour of the second course (essentially to take no action) and one strongly expressed opinion in favour of the first course. . . . I have had a long discussion with J. A. Ratcliffe, Chairman of the British West Ford Working Party, as a result of which we agreed that there was no substantial case based on the likely actual interference with radio and optical astronomy for protesting against the proposed second attempt to launch the experimental test belt of Project West Ford. In view of these opinions I am proposing to the Executive Committee that the Union should follow the second course and essentially take no immediate action."

COSPAR has established a Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Space Experiments which held its first meeting in Paris in March 1963. It is understood that the question of Project West Ford was raised at that meeting. The United States will welcome the comments of the Consultative Group on Project West Ford as it has welcomed the views of other scientific groups and individual scientists.

The United States recognizes that concern still exists among some scientists that there may be poten-

<sup>6</sup> Not printed here.

tially harmful side effects from possible future United States experiments of this type. The statement of President Kennedy on Project West Ford should make it clear that the United States will not consider the placing of any further belts in orbit until the results of the current experiment have been analyzed. The United States intends to continue to consult on experiments of this type and to avoid any harmful side effects in carrying out all space activities.

In sum, Project West Ford was undertaken only after the most thorough consideration—it has been discussed more thoroughly in advance than any other space experiment—and was undertaken only after the United States was fully confident that it would not have an adverse effect on any other activity. The United States will welcome the study and analysis of the effects of the belt by all interested scientists.

## Antarctic Treaty Countries Hold Meeting on Telecommunications

### *Final Communique*

The Antarctic Treaty Meeting on Telecommunications which began [at Washington] on June 24, 1963, came to a close on June 28.<sup>1</sup> Representatives of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as observers from the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) met in accordance with recommendations of the First and Second Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings to discuss radio communication facilities in the Treaty area (area south of 60°S latitude). After five days of discussion the representatives have unanimously agreed to submit eleven recommendations as a part of the final report to be sent to the governments who have participated.

<sup>1</sup> For background and text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911; for a statement by President Kennedy at the time the treaty entered into force, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 91.

Acting on the basis of resolutions submitted by the Government of Australia, the Meeting has agreed to recommend to the Consultative Meeting a provisional timetable of radio schedules designed to facilitate a more rapid transmission of meteorological data. It has also agreed to recommend that methods for providing reliable communications to transmit data obtained in the Antarctic Peninsula area to the United States Antarctic station at McMurdo be investigated as soon as practicable by Argentina, Chile, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that a tentative routing schedule for the transmission of meteorological data from the observing areas to the terminal stations of the Antarctic radio network would be recommended.

At that time the Meeting was notified by the United Kingdom that it is closing its station at Hope Bay this year. Belgium later told the Meeting that it intends to reopen its Antarctic station this year. Japan said it is considering doing so in the near future, while Norway mentioned that it presently has no such plans.

The Meeting has also agreed to recommend that international radio links in Antarctica be limited as far as possible to those presently agreed on. It also agreed to recommend that nations which may accede to the Antarctic Treaty and are entitled to participate in consultative meetings be invited to co-ordinate their communications with those already established in Antarctica. It was further agreed that the Meeting would recommend that two emergency routes should be maintained. These routes would be available for use if the route selected for a main link became inoperative for any reason.

Turning to the question of aerials the Meeting agreed to recommend that directive aerials should be provided as practicable for each international Antarctic link and that transmitting and receiving aerials provided on each such route should be made complementary in polarization and angle of fire by agreement between the parties concerned. The question of the co-ordination of the techniques employed at both ends of each international radio link was discussed and it was agreed to make certain specific recommendations.

The Meeting considered the question of search and rescue procedures and agreed to recommend that distress traffic would have an absolute priority over all other radio offerings at that time. It also specified the recommended radio operating procedures and recommended that stations providing the assistance shall maintain continuous communication during the search and rescue operation with the station requesting assistance until the station requesting assistance is satisfied that the operation is completed. Radio aids to air navigation were discussed and it was agreed to recommend that certain types of navigational aids be provided as soon as practicable at certain stations which provide landing facilities. It was further agreed to recommend that details concerning navigational aids installed be listed each year in the information exchanged between the Governments.

In response to a resolution submitted by the French representative the Meeting agreed that in view of radio interference to some ionospheric observations caused by radio transmissions at some stations the Meeting would recommend that the beginning of some types of radio transmission schedules be delayed five minutes past the hour to permit scientists to complete certain ionospheric observations under comparative noise-free conditions.

In response to a resolution offered by the United Kingdom and to indications given by the SCAR Observer that the Communications Working Group of SCAR may wish to limit its activities in the field of communications co-ordination, the Meeting agreed to recommend that, if it was deemed necessary at the time of the Third Consultative Meeting, the question of continued co-ordination in the field of telecommunications be discussed.

The Meeting, which was conducted under the Chairmanship of Mr. John M. Jones and which had as its Secretary Mr. Henry E. Allen, was conducted in accordance with the spirit of full cooperation and frank discussion which have come to characterize the meetings held under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Economic and Social Council

- Economic Commission for Latin America, 10th session, Mar del Plata, Argentina, May 1963:  
Report of the third special session of the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, San José, Costa Rica, July 23-31, 1962. E/CN.12/657. August 15, 1962. 83 pp.
- Report of the fourth special session of the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, November 15-16, 1962. E/CN.12/658. November 21, 1962. 21 pp.
- Provisional report of the Latin American seminar on housing statistics and programs. E/CN.12/647. February 1963. 233 pp.
- Report of the eighth session of the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, San Salvador, El Salvador, January 21-29, 1963. E/CN.12/672. March 1963. 91 pp.
- Urbanization in Latin America. E/CN.12/662. March 13, 1963. 36 pp.
- Provisional annotated agenda. E/CN.12/655/Add. 1. March 15, 1963. 13 pp.
- Some aspects of the Latin American economic situation in 1962. E/CN.12/679. March 29, 1963. 53 pp.
- The economic development of Latin America in the postwar world, volume I. E/CN.12/659. April 7, 1963. 172 pp.
- Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin America. E/CN.12/680. April 14, 1963. 155 pp.
- Note by the Secretariat on the report of the Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning of the Economic and Social Council. E/CN.12/681. May 25, 1963. 5 pp.
- Social Commission. Report on the world social situation. E/CN.5/375. March 29, 1963, 13 pp.; Add. 1. March 11, 1963, 319 pp.
- International Co-operation in Cartography. International Co-operation on the Standardization of Geographical Names. Report by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Council extracts from communications received from Hungary and Norway. E/3718/Add.7. March 20, 1963, 13 pp.; E/3718/Add.8. March 26, 1963, 3 pp.
- Committee for Industrial Development, third session:  
Financing of industrial development. E/C.5/26. March 28, 1963. 83 pp.
- Report of the Center for Industrial Development on activities in the field of industrial development. E/C.5/33. April 22, 1963. 66 pp.
- Report submitted by the International Labor Organization on activities in industrial development. E/C.5/34. April 22, 1963. 34 pp.
- Report submitted by the Food and Agriculture Organization on activities in the field of industrial development. E/C.5/34/Add. 1. April 22, 1963. 33 pp.

## U.S. Indicates Intention To Ratify International Coffee Agreement

Press release 329 dated June 24

The United States on June 24 informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it intends to ratify the International Coffee Agreement.<sup>1</sup> It is expected this notification will lead to the provisional coming into force of the new International Coffee Agreement at an early date.

For the agreement to enter into force, it requires ratification by 20 coffee exporting countries having at least 80 percent of exports and by 10 importing countries having at least 80 percent of imports. However, the agreement may enter into force provisionally when notifications by signatory governments stating their intention to ratify are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

To date, 24 exporting countries representing 88.7 percent of coffee exports and 10 importing countries representing 26.8 percent of coffee imports have ratified the agreement or formally declared their intention to do so. As the United States imports 51.7 percent of the world's coffee, today's action raises the total of importing countries to 11 representing 78.5 percent of world imports. It is understood that a number of other importing countries are in a position to quickly ratify the agreement. The prospect is, therefore, that the new International Coffee Agreement will come into force provisionally in the next few weeks and that the first meeting of the Coffee Council, administrative body of the agreement, will be held in July. This will permit quota arrangements to be made well in advance of the new coffee year beginning October 1, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667, and Apr. 1, 1963, p. 493.

The Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to ratification of the International Coffee Agreement on May 21, 1963. Implementing legislation is now before both Houses of Congress, and consideration is expected shortly.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### **Automotive Traffic**

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

*Application to:* Cook Islands, including Niue, May 21, 1963.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

*Application to:* Cook Islands, including Niue, May 21, 1963.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

#### **Coffee**

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Cameroon, May 24, 1963; Colombia, May 24, 1963; El Salvador, May 17, 1963.

#### **Cultural Relations**

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.<sup>2</sup>

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

#### **Customs**

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:*  
Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Jamaica, June 5, 1963.

### Health

Additional regulations amending the international sanitary regulations (World Health Organization Regulations No. 2) of May 25, 1951, as amended (TIAS 3625, 4420, 4823, 4896, 5156), with respect to notifications. Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1963. Enters into force October 1, 1963.

### Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 11, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS 2164.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:*  
Cyprus, May 16, 1963.

### Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Tunisia, May 23, 1963.

### Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notification of approval:* Nigeria, May 6, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Ceylon

Agreement amending the agreement of November 17, 1952 (TIAS 2652), for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended (TIAS 4376). Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo June 17, 1963. Entered into force June 17, 1963.

### India

Agreement under title III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 458; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709). Signed at Washington June 27, 1963. Entered into force June 27, 1963.

### Israel

Agreement relating to the reciprocal establishment and operation of radio facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem May 10 and 21, 1963. Entered into force May 21, 1963.

### Korea

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Seoul June 18, 1963. Entered into force June 18, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at Seoul April 28, 1950. Entered into force April 28, 1950. TIAS 2059, 4536.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Terminated:* June 18, 1963 (superseded by agreement of June 18, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 7, 1962 (TIAS 5208). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 17, 1963. Entered into force June 17, 1963.

### Panama

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 24, 1959. *Entered into force:* June 27, 1963.

### Senegal

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at Dakar June 12, 1963. Entered into force provisionally June 12, 1963. Enters into force definitively on the date of notification from the Government of Senegal that the agreement has been approved in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 24-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 24 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 314 of June 11 and 324 of June 19.

No.	Date	Subject
	329 6/24	U.S. indicates intention to ratify International Coffee Agreement.
*330	6/24	U.S. participation in international conferences.
331	6/24	Reply to Soviet proposal of nuclear-free zone in Mediterranean.
*332	6/24	Ferguson appointed Coordinator for International Aviation (biographic details).
333	6/25	Extension of Fulbright agreement with Austria.
334	6/26	Travel to Cuba.
*335	6/26	Harriman: Minnesota State Bar Association (excerpts).
*336	6/26	Washington Action for Youth Program.
*337	6/26	Junior FSO July 4 celebration.
338	6/27	Cleveland visit to London, Paris, Geneva for U.N. talks (rewrite).
339	6/27	Notification to owners of real property in Iraq.
340	6/27	Emergency food aid to Korea.
341	6/28	Grant to American Institute of Indian Studies.
342	6/28	Extension of Fulbright agreement with Sweden.
*343	6/28	Cultural exchange (South America).
†344	6/29	Negotiations with India for cooperation on nuclear power station.
345	6/28	Mrs. Louchheim: International Council of Women.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Department of State 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State 1963*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then relates in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State but also Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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THE  
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**BULLETIN**

Vol. XLIX, No. 1256



July 22, 1963

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DEPOSITORS

# President Kennedy Visits Europe

*President Kennedy returned to Washington on July 3 following a 10-day trip to Europe during which he visited the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Following, in chronological order, are texts of joint communiques released at Bonn, Birch Grove House (Sussex, England), and Rome, together with major addresses and remarks made by the President on various occasions during the trip and a brief report broadcast to the Nation on July 5.*

## THE VISIT TO GERMANY

### President's Remarks at the Rathaus, Cologne, June 23

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 23

Chancellor Adenauer, Lord Mayor [Theodor Burauen], citizens of Cologne: It is a pleasure and an honor to sign the Golden Book of this ancient city. I bring you greetings from the citizens of America, including the citizens of Cologne, Minnesota, Cologne, New Jersey, and even Cologne, Texas.

It is most appropriate that I come to this city which is so closely identified with the life and the work of your great Chancellor. It was here, for many years, that he first practiced the art of statecraft which has served the West so well. I am told that the Adenauer name continues on

active duty here in this city. In my own country it is sometimes said that there are too many Kennedys in American public life. But I am certain that no one has made that complaint about the Adenauers in the city of Cologne.

It is also appropriate that I come to a city which has long been a window to the outside world. As a citizen of Boston, which takes pride in being one of the oldest cities in the United States, I find it sobering to come to Cologne, where the Romans marched when the Bostonians were in skins. Many of my educational roots were planted in Boston, but 4 years before Harvard University was founded this was the city of Albert Magnus, who taught St. Thomas Aquinas. For Cologne is not only an ancient German city; it is also an ancient European city, a city which, since Roman times, has

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1256 PUBLICATION 7578 JULY 22, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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played a special role in preserving Western culture and Western religion and Western civilization.

The problems of the Western World are in many ways different than they were 2,000 years ago, but our obligations as citizens remain the same—to defend our common heritage from those who would divide and destroy it; to develop and enrich that heritage so that it is passed on to those who come after us. Your fellow citizen, Chancellor Adenauer, has fulfilled these obligations as a citizen of the West in full measure, and in keeping with the symbolic mosaic inside this building, he has worked for peace and freedom in this country, in all of Europe, and in all of the world. In this respect he is true to the saying that the young student in Cologne would go to Paris to learn about life, to Holland to learn to count, and to Great Britain to become a tradesman.

It is in this spirit that I come to Cologne to see the best of the past and the most promising of the future. May I greet you with the old Rhenish saying, "*Koelle Alaaf.*"

#### **President's Remarks at Inauguration of German Peace Corps, Bonn, June 24**

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 24

Mr. President, Chancellor, Mr. Ministers: I want to express our warm congratulations to the Federal Republic, to the people of the Federal Republic, for the effort that they are now undertaking.

The United States Peace Corps commenced in 1961, and I believe that it has given us an opportunity to harness the idealism which is, I think, in all free people—has given us an opportunity to be of assistance, not merely in the cold field of economic help but in the human relations which must exist for a happy understanding between people.

Western Europe and the United States really are islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty. South of us live hundreds of millions of people on the edge of starvation, and I think it essential that we demonstrate—we in the United States, we in the Atlantic community—that we demonstrate our concern for their welfare. However repugnant the Communist system is to all of us, it nevertheless has been able to

enlist the devotion of a good many people all around the globe. I hope it is possible for us to demonstrate an even greater devotion in the free society.

Nine thousand Americans will be serving overseas by the end of this year. In some countries of Africa, nearly half of the high school students are being taught by Peace Corpsmen. I cannot think of any people that can serve this cause with greater success and more devotion than the German people. Highly skilled and understanding of the great issues which tear the world apart, I believe that you are greatly needed and that you will, as the President said, find your greatest reward in a service in these very difficult times. Dante once said that the hottest places in hell are reserved for those who in a period of moral crisis maintain their neutrality. This is a moral crisis. This is an opportunity, and I am confident that the German youth and, I hope, the older citizens of this country will find their greatest reward not here, pursuing merely their private pursuit, but in some far-off country. In some small village they will lay a seed which will bring a rich harvest for us all in later days.

I hope that these Peace Corpsmen of America and the members of the German Development Service will be joined by representatives of dozens of other free countries in a great international effort in the 1960's for peace. I congratulate the people of Germany on their commitment to this cause.

#### **Exchange of Toasts, American Embassy Club, Bad Godesberg, June 24**

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 24

#### **PRESIDENT KENNEDY**

I know that all of us who have come from the United States have been very much warmed, heartened, encouraged, strengthened by the generosity of the reception we have received from all of you and from the people of the Federal Republic. I don't think that there is any substitute, however reliable, and however much we admire the press, for an opportunity to visit firsthand and see the American people as the Chancellor has done, and for us to see the German people. Everything else falls away against this opportunity to come face to face,

so that while the Chancellor and many of us will be meeting on Wednesday in Berlin, I do want to take this opportunity to express our warm appreciation to all of you, the strong feeling of confidence it has given us.

I think it renewed the life—although it didn't really need that—of our relationship, and in every way we have been made extremely happy by our visit. We are very much indebted to you all, and we are most indebted to the people whom you serve.

I want to express my special appreciation to the Chancellor. As I said yesterday, he made, as did my predecessors in the United States, the crucial and correct judgment. I think that he has been generous enough to say that perhaps the United States was the only one that made the long, right judgment in the late forties and in the fifties, and he on his part and all of you as colleagues also made the right judgment, and that entitled my predecessors and will entitle the Chancellor and those who have worked with him, it seems to me, to a very important page in the history of our times, which is going to be recorded, I think, as the most significant times of the last years, in fact, the last centuries. These are the critical days because whether the world survives or not is a matter that comes before us for judgment, at least once every year, and I suppose it is going to go on that rather delicate path, but the Chancellor in his time, meeting his responsibility, made the right judgment, and therefore he is an historic figure and one to whom all of us who believe so strongly in the cause of freedom feel privileged to come and pay him our high esteem. I hope that all of you will join in toasting with me to a distinguished leader of your country and also a distinguished leader of the West, the Chancellor.

#### CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER

Mr. President, gentlemen: I am deeply touched by what President Kennedy has just said. I am deeply moved because in my opinion it was the United States, at first Mr. Acheson and Mr. Truman, then Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower, who have helped us Germans, a conquered people, who were completely down at the time.

I don't particularly like to make such acknowledgments, but let us face it: Historic

honesty requires that we say that the war which destroyed Germany was provoked by Germany, that the United States has shown the great vision to help the defeated enemy, which was really a deed which is only very rarely found in history.

You, Mr. President, have been here since yesterday. All of us, since your arrival at the airport, have had so many impressions, so many deeply moving experiences—this is certainly true for me—that we can say that a real epoch has been characterized by this visit. You saw yesterday, as we all did, and you have heard the masses in the squares and you have seen in their eyes the real gratitude which they wanted to express. Now gratitude is a very rare virtue, and certainly it is particularly rare in politics, but you have seen it directly with your own eyes, that these masses of people who lined the streets in Cologne, in the cathedral, in Bonn, in the Market Square, were filled with a real desire to demonstrate to you, as the representative of the United States, how grateful they are for everything that the United States has done, particularly to us Germans. I feel that these impressions may, in the difficult moments which you will face in the future, at a time when you will have to make more decisions, help you a little, and if these impressions at the time you have to make such decisions will be revived in front of you, then they may help you make the decisions with that clarity and that forcefulness which statesmen require.

If we can make a little contribution in this sense, I think that would be the best result of your visit here. I want to thank you in the name of all of us Germans for coming here, and I want to emphasize between the United States and us, after all that is behind us, no split or separation or whatever you want to call it will ever happen again. We realize that the leadership is yours, not only because of your great nuclear strength but because of the great political acumen and the moral strength which you and your country have shown. It is, let me say it again, you, as the victors, gave your hand to us as the vanquished, that this is something which I think is the finest that any people can do.

May the memories of these days of your visit

to Germany remain alive, and may the thanks of the thousands contribute a little to help you make decisions in the same spirit which the United States has shown in the past and which forever has insured for the United States a golden page in history. I propose a toast in honor of the President of the United States.

**PRESIDENT KENNEDY**

Thank you very much.

**Communique Between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer, Bonn, June 24**

White House press release (Bonn) dated June 24

The President of the United States of America, John F. Kennedy, visited Bonn on June 23 and 24 and held talks with leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany. He had a private visit with Federal President [Heinrich] Lübke, and on June 24 met privately with Chancellor Adenauer for detailed discussions on the general international situation. The President and the Chancellor were later joined by Secretary of State Rusk, Vice-Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard and the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, [Gerhard] Schröder, as well as other officials and advisers of the two Governments.

President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer discussed European integration, relations between the European Community and other nations of Europe, progress toward the achievement of the Atlantic partnership, and the problems of Berlin and German reunification. In this connection, they had an exchange of views on Western policy toward the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

The President and the Chancellor were in agreement that the two Governments would continue their close collaboration in the task of developing genuine unity among the nations of Europe and fostering an integrated European Community in close partnership with the United States. On questions of economics and trade, both in their multilateral and bilateral aspects, the President and the Chancellor reaffirmed their agreement on basic aims; among these matters they stressed in particular the need for stronger participation in world trade by the developing countries. They agreed that the strength of the Free World rests in common policies and common aims pursued jointly by

all the nations dedicated to establishing peace in freedom.

The Federal Government shares the view of the United States and other allied powers that controlled disarmament and agreement on the cessation of atomic weapons tests would constitute an important step toward the avoidance of a dangerous armaments race.

The exchange of views confirmed full agreement of the principle that the North Atlantic Alliance continues to be a major instrument for the maintenance of freedom, and the President and the Chancellor agreed that every effort will be made to strengthen common defense planning and joint operation of NATO defense forces.

The President and the Chancellor discussed the proposed multilateral seaborne MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force. The multilateral organization is considered a good instrument for serving all members of the Alliance in combining their defense efforts. They reaffirmed their agreement to use their best efforts to bring such a force into being. They also agreed that discussions about the principal questions involved in the establishment of such a force should be pursued with other interested Governments.

They reaffirmed the commitment of their two Governments to the right of self-determination, as embodied in the United Nations Charter, and to the achievement of German reunification in peace and freedom. They agreed that the freedom of Berlin will be preserved by every necessary means, and that the two Governments would seek every opportunity to counter the inhuman effects of the Wall. They also agreed that the two Governments would continue to seek to reduce tension through international understanding.

Peace and freedom are prerequisites for overcoming the obstacles that still prevent the greater part of mankind from enjoying full participation in social and economic development. The President and the Chancellor affirmed that the Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are determined to assume their part in these tasks in the context of the free world's strategy of peace.

The discussions took place in a spirit of frankness and cordiality. These meetings have shown full agreement between the two Governments in assessing the international situation, and have once again demonstrated the close and friendly relations which exist between the two countries.

**President's Remarks at the Roemerberg Square, Frankfurt, June 25**

White House press release (Frankfurt) June 25

Mr. Mayor, Minister-President, Minister Erhard, ladies and gentlemen: Coming as I do from the oldest major city in the United States, I am proud to come to this city. I drove from Hanau to Frankfurt. All along the way the Minister-President pointed out those people along the street who belong to the SPD [German Socialist Party], while Minister Erhard pointed out all those who belonged to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union]. Even though I have been here for almost 3 days, I am yet unable to make the distinction or see the difference. In any case, I see friends.

I was in this city in 1948. I therefore have some idea what the people of this city have done to rebuild Frankfurt so it is now a vital place in a free Germany. There is an old saying that only in winter can you tell which trees are evergreen. I think the people of this city have proved not only their character and their courage but also their commitment to freedom and opportunity to live together with their fellow Germans in a free and peaceful society.

People from Europe came to my country for three reasons: either because of famine and a denial of opportunity, or because of their desire for religious freedom, or because of their desire for political freedom. It was mostly the citizens of Germany and of Frankfurt who came to our country because of their desire in the mid-19th century for political freedom, and therefore they have been among the most independent, the most responsible, and the most progressive of our citizens. Today in our far-off country of the United States, in 20 States of the Union, there are cities with the name of Frankfurt which were founded by citizens of this city who carried with them to the New World the strong commitment to freedom of this city and the Old.

Political leaders come and go. What I hope remains between the United States and Germany is not only a strong feeling of sympathy and friendship but also a recognition in this great struggle in which we now exist, this great struggle to which we have devoted our lives, the struggle to maintain freedom and expand it throughout the world. It is my hope that this country and my own will work in partnership and harmony in the years ahead. That is the best insurance for not only our survival, not only the peace of the world, but also for the maintenance of that commitment to freedom which I think gives hope of having it spread throughout the globe. Abraham Lincoln in the dark days before the Civil War in my own country said, "I know there is a God. I see a storm coming. If He has a part and a place for me, then I am ready." No one can tell in the future whether there is a storm coming for all of us, but what we can be sure of is that no matter what happens, we believe in God and we are ready.

Thank you very much. *Danke schön.*

**President's Address at the Paulskirche, Frankfurt, June 25**

White House press release (Frankfurt) dated June 25; as-delivered text

Dr. Gerstenmaier, Mr. President Giesinger, Chancellor Erhard, Minister-President Zinn, Mayor Bockelmann, ladies and gentlemen: I am most honored, Mr. President, to be able to speak in this city before this audience, for in this hall I am able to address myself to those who lead and serve all segments of a democratic system, Mayors, Governors, Members of Cabinets, civil servants, and concerned citizens. As one who has known the satisfaction of the legislator's life, I am particularly pleased that so many Members of your Bundestag and Bundesrat are present today, for the vitality of your legislature has been a major factor in your demonstration of a working democracy, a democracy worldwide in its influence. In your company also are several of the authors of the Federal Constitution who have been able through their own political service to give a new and lasting validity to the aims of the Frankfurt Assembly.

One hundred and fifteen years ago a most learned parliament was convened in this his-

toric hall. Its goal was a united German federation. Its members were poets and professors, lawyers and philosophers, doctors and clergymen, freely elected in all parts of the land. No nation applauded its endeavors as warmly as my own. No assembly ever strove more ardently to put perfection into practice. And though in the end it failed, no other building in Germany deserves more the title of "cradle of German democracy."

But can there be such a title? In my own home city of Boston, Faneuil Hall—once the meeting place of the authors of the American Revolution—has long been known as the "cradle of American liberty." But when, in 1852, the Hungarian patriot Kossuth addressed an audience there, he criticized its name. "It is," he said, "a great name—but there is something in it which saddens my heart. You should not say 'American liberty.' You should say 'liberty in America.' Liberty should not be either American or European—it should just be 'liberty.'"

Kossuth was right. For unless liberty flourishes in all lands, it cannot flourish in one. Conceived in one hall, it must be carried out in many. Thus the seeds of the American Revolution had been brought earlier from Europe, and they later took root around the world. And the German Revolution of 1848 transmitted ideas and idealists to America and to other lands. Today, in 1963, democracy and liberty are more international than ever before. And the spirit of the Frankfurt Assembly, like the spirit of Faneuil Hall, must live in many hearts and nations if it is to live at all.

For we live in an age of interdependence as well as independence—an age of internationalism as well as nationalism. In 1848 many countries were indifferent to the goals of the Frankfurt Assembly. It was, they said, a German problem. Today there are no exclusively German problems, or American problems, or even European problems. There are world problems—and our two countries and continents are inextricably bound together in the tasks of peace as well as war.

We are partners for peace—not in a narrow bilateral context but in a framework of Atlantic partnership. The ocean divides us less than the Mediterranean divided the ancient world

of Greece and Rome. Our Constitution is old and yours is young, and our culture is young and yours is old, but in our commitment we can and must speak and act with but one voice. Our roles are distinct but complementary—and our goals are the same: peace and freedom for all men, for all time, in a world of abundance, in a world of justice.

That is why our nations are working together to strengthen NATO, to expand trade, to assist the developing countries, to align our monetary policies, and to build the Atlantic community. I would not diminish the miracle of West Germany's economic achievements. But the true German miracle has been your rejection of the past for the future—your reconciliation with France, your participation in the building of Europe, your leading role in NATO, and your growing support for constructive undertakings throughout the world.

Your economic institutions, your constitutional guarantees, your confidence in civilian authority, are all harmonious to the ideals of older democracies. And they form a firm pillar of the democratic European community.

But Goethe tells us in his greatest poem that Faust lost the liberty of his soul when he said to the passing moment: "Stay, thou art so fair." And our liberty, too, is endangered if we pause for the passing moment, if we rest on our achievements, if we resist the pace of progress. For time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.

The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership—a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose peoples can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world. Some say this is only a dream, but I do not agree. A generation of achievement—the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Schuman Plan, and the Common Market—urges us up the path to greater unity.

There will be difficulties and delays. There will be doubts and discouragement. There will be differences of approach and opinion. But we have the will and the means to serve three related goals—the heritage of our countries, the unity of our continents, and the interdependence of the Western alliance.

Some say that the United States will neither hold to these purposes nor abide by its pledges—that we will revert to a narrow nationalism. But such doubts fly in the face of history. For 18 years the United States has stood its watch for freedom all around the globe. The firmness of American will and the effectiveness of American strength have been shown, in support of free men and free government, in Asia, in Africa, in the Americas, and, above all, here in Europe. We have undertaken, and sustained in honor, relations of mutual trust and obligation with more than 40 allies. We are proud of this record, which more than answers doubts. But in addition these proven commitments to the common freedom and safety are assured, in the future as in the past, by one great fundamental fact—that they are deeply rooted in America's own self-interest. Our commitment to Europe is indispensable—in our interest as well as yours.

It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look forward to a Europe united and strong—speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.

This is in the interest of us all. For war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, destroys peace in America. A threat to the freedom of Europe is a threat to the freedom of America. That is why no administration—no administration—in Washington can fail to respond to such a threat—not merely from good will but from necessity. And that is why we look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership—an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace.

This is no fantasy. It will be achieved by concrete steps to solve the problems that face us all: military, economic, and political. Partnership is not a posture but a process, a continuous process that grows stronger each year as we devote ourselves to common tasks.

The *first* task of the Atlantic community was to assure its common *defense*. That defense was and still is indivisible. The United States will risk its cities to defend yours because we need your freedom to protect ours. Hundreds of thousands of our soldiers serve with yours on this continent, as tangible evidence of that pledge. Those who would doubt our pledge or deny this indivisibility—those who would separate Europe from America or split one ally from another—would only give aid and comfort to the men who make themselves our adversaries and welcome any Western disarray.

The purpose of our common military effort is not war but peace, not the destruction of nations but the protection of freedom. The forces that West Germany contributes to this effort are second to none among the Western European nations. Your nation is in the frontline of defense, and your divisions, side by side with our own, are a source of strength to us all.

These conventional forces are essential, and they are backed by the sanction of thousands of the most modern weapons here on European soil and thousands more, only minutes away, in posts around the world. Together our nations have developed for the forward defense of free Europe a deterrent far surpassing the present or prospective force of any hostile power.

Nevertheless it is natural that America's nuclear position has raised questions within the alliance. I believe we must confront these questions, not by turning the clock backward to separate nuclear deterrents but by developing a more closely unified Atlantic deterrent, with genuine European participation.

How this can best be done, and it is not easy—in some ways more difficult than to split the atom physically—how this can best be done is now under discussion with those who may wish to join in this effort. The proposal before us is for a new Atlantic force. Such a force would bring strength instead of weakness, cohesion instead of division. It would belong to all members, not one, with all participating on a basis of full equality. And as Europe moves toward unity, its role and responsibility, here as elsewhere, would and must increase accordingly.

Meanwhile there is much to do. We must work more closely together on strategy, train-

ing, and planning. European officers from NATO are being assigned to Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. Modern weapons are being deployed here in Western Europe. And America's strategic deterrent, the most powerful in history, will continue to be at the service of the whole alliance.

*Second:* Our partnership is not military alone. *Economic* unity is also imperative, not only among the nations of Europe but across the wide Atlantic. Indeed, economic cooperation is needed throughout the entire free world. By opening our markets to the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, by contributing our capital and our skills, by stabilizing basic prices, we can help assure them of a favorable climate for freedom and growth. This is an Atlantic responsibility. For the Atlantic nations themselves helped to awaken these peoples. Our merchants and traders ploughed up their soils—and their societies as well—in search of minerals and oil and rubber and coffee. Now we must help them gain full membership in the 20th century, closing the gap between rich and poor.

Another great economic challenge is the coming round of trade negotiations. Those deliberations are much more important than a technical discussion of trade and commerce. They are an opportunity to build common industrial and agricultural policies across the Atlantic. They are an opportunity to open up new sources of demand, to give new impetus to growth, and make more jobs and prosperity, for our expanding populations. They are an opportunity to recognize the trading needs and aspirations of other free-world countries, including Japan.

In short, these negotiations are a test of our unity. While each nation must naturally look out for its own interests, each nation must also look out for the common interest—the need for greater markets on both sides of the Atlantic, the need to reduce the imbalance between developed and underdeveloped nations, and the need to stimulate the Atlantic economy to higher levels of production rather than to stifle it by higher levels of protection.

We must not return to the 1930's, when we exported to each other our own stagnation. We must not return to the discredited view that

trade favors some nations at the expense of others. Let no one think that the United States, with only a fraction of its economy dependent on trade and only a small part of that with Western Europe, is seeking trade expansion in order to dump our goods on this continent. Trade expansion will help us all. The experience of the Common Market, like the experience of the German Zollverein, shows an increased rise in business activity and general prosperity resulting for all participants in such trade agreements, with no member profiting at the expense of another. As they say on my own Cape Cod, a rising tide lifts all the boats. And a partnership, by definition, serves both partners, without domination or unfair advantage. Together we have been partners in adversity; let us also be partners in prosperity.

Beyond development and trade is monetary policy. Here again our interests run together. Indeed there is no field in which the wider interest of all more clearly outweighs the narrow interest of one. We have lived by that principle, as bankers to freedom, for a generation. Now that other nations, including West Germany, have found new economic strength, it is time for common efforts here, too. The great free nations of the world must take control of our monetary problems if those problems are not to take control of us.

*Third* and finally, our partnership depends on common *political* purpose. Against the hazards of division and lassitude, no lesser force will serve. History tells us that disunity and relaxation are the great internal dangers of an alliance. Thucydides reported that the Peloponnesians and their allies were mighty in battle but handicapped by their policymaking body—in which, he related “each presses its own ends . . . which generally results in no action at all . . . they devote more time to the prosecution of their own purposes than to the consideration of the general welfare—each supposes that no harm will come of his own neglect, that it is the business of another to do this or that—and so, as each separately entertains the same illusion, the common cause imperceptibly decays.”

Is that also to be the story of the Grand Alliance? Welded in a moment of imminent dan-

ger, will it disintegrate in complacency, with each member pressing its own ends to the neglect of the common cause? This must not be the case. Our old dangers are not gone beyond return, and any division among us would bring them back in doubled strength.

Our defenses are now strong, but they must be made stronger. Our economic goals are now clear, but we must get on with their performance. And the greatest of our necessities, the most notable of our omissions, is progress toward unity of political purpose.

For we live in a world in which our own united strength and will must be our first reliance. As I have said before, and will say again, we work toward the day when there may be real peace between us and the Communists. We will not be second in that effort. But that day is not yet here.

We in the United States and Canada are 200 million, and here on the European side of the Atlantic alliance are nearly 300 million more. The strength and unity of this half billion human beings are and will continue to be the anchor of all freedom, for all nations. Let us from time to time pledge ourselves again to the common purposes. But let us go on, from words to actions, to intensify our efforts for still greater unity among us, to build new associations and institutions on those already established. Lofty words cannot construct an alliance or maintain it; only concrete deeds can do that.

The great present task of construction is here on this continent, where the effort for a unified free Europe is under way. It is not for Americans to prescribe to Europeans how this effort should be carried forward. Nor do I believe that there is any one right course or any single final pattern. It is Europeans who are building Europe.

Yet the reunion of Europe, as Europeans shape it—bringing a permanent end to the civil wars that have repeatedly wracked the world—will continue to have the determined support of the United States. For that reunion is a necessary step in strengthening the community of freedom. It would strengthen our alliance for its defense. And it would be in our national interest as well as yours.

It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice. I repeat again—so that there may be no misunderstanding—the choice of paths to the unity of Europe is a choice which Europe must make. But as you continue this great effort, undeterred by either difficulty or delay, you should know that this new European greatness will be not an object of fear but a source of strength for the United States of America.

There are other political tasks before us. We must all learn to practice more completely the art of consultation on matters stretching well beyond immediate military and economic questions. Together, for example, we must explore the possibilities of leashing the tensions of the cold war and reducing the dangers of the arms race. Together we must work to strengthen the spirit of those Europeans who are now not free, to reestablish their old ties to freedom and the West, so that their desire for liberty, and their sense of nationhood, and their sense of belonging to the Western community will survive for future expression. We ask those who would be our adversaries to understand that in our relations with them we will not bargain one nation's interest against another's and that the commitment to the cause of freedom is common to us all.

All of us in the West must be faithful to our conviction that peace in Europe can never be complete until everywhere in Europe—and that includes Germany—men can choose, in peace and freedom, how their countries shall be governed and choose, without threat to any neighbor, reunification with their countrymen.

I preach no easy liberation and I make no empty promises, but my countrymen, since our country was founded, believe strongly in the proposition that all men shall be free and all free men shall have this right of choice.

As we look steadily eastward in the hope and purpose of new freedom, we must also look—and ever more closely—to our transatlantic ties.

The Atlantic community will not soon become a single overarching superstate. But practical steps toward stronger common purpose are well within our means. As we widen our common effort in defense and our threefold cooperation in economics, we shall inevitably strengthen our political ties as well. Just as your current efforts for unity in Europe will produce a stronger voice in the dialog between us, so in America our current battle for the liberty and prosperity of all citizens can only deepen the meaning of our common historic purposes. In the far future there may be a new great union for us all. But for the present there is plenty for all to do in building new and enduring connections.

In short, the words of Thucydides are a warning, not a prediction. We have it in us, as 18 years have shown, to build our defenses, to strengthen our economies, and to tighten our political bonds, both in good weather and in bad. We can move forward with the confidence that is born of success and the skill that is born of experience. And as we move, let us take heart from the certainty that we are not only united by danger and necessity but by hope and purpose as well.

For we know now that freedom is more than the rejection of tyranny, that prosperity is more than an escape from want, that partnership is more than a sharing of power. These are all, above all, great human adventures. They must have meaning and conviction and purpose—and because they do, in your country now and in mine, in all the nations of the alliance, we are called to a great new mission.

It is not a mission of self-defense alone, for that is a means, not an end. It is not a mission of arbitrary power, for we reject the idea that one nation should dominate another. The mission is to create a new social order, founded on liberty and justice, in which men are the masters of their fate, in which states are the servants of their citizens, and in which all men and women can share a better life for themselves and their children. That is the object of our common policy.

To realize this vision, we must seek, above all, a world of peace—a world in which peoples dwell together in mutual respect and work together in mutual regard, a world where peace

is not a mere interlude between wars but an incentive to the creative energies of humanity. We will not find such a peace today, or even tomorrow. The obstacles to hope are large and menacing. Yet the goal of a peaceful world must—today and tomorrow—shape our decisions and inspire our purposes.

So we are all idealists. We are all visionaries. Let it not be said of this Atlantic generation that we left ideals and visions to the past, nor purpose and determination to our adversaries. We have come too far, we have sacrificed too much, to disdain the future now. And we shall ever remember what Goethe told us, that the “highest wisdom, the best that mankind ever knew” was the realization that “he only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew.”

Thank you.

#### **President's Remarks Before Industrial Trade Union of Construction Workers, Berlin, June 26**

White House press release (Berlin) dated June 26

I am not a stranger to trade union meetings, and therefore I feel most at home here today. I appreciated the invitation which was extended to me through George Meany to join you, Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Leber, your distinguished Mayor [Willy Brandt], your distinguished Chancellor, and have an opportunity to talk to those of you whose work is essential in these very difficult and dangerous days.

Below is written a quotation in this building from Benjamin Franklin, which says, “. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty, but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, may pervade all the nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface, and say, ‘This is my country.’” West Berlin is my country.

Benjamin Franklin once said to Thomas Paine, the great American revolutionary, “Where freedom is, there is where I live.” And Paine replied, “Where freedom is not, there is where I live, because no man or country can be really free unless all men and all countries are free.”

It is no accident that during the last 40 years the prime target of the Communist movement has been the destruction of the free trade union

movement. Once the free trade union movement is destroyed, once it is harnessed to the chariot of the state, once trade union leaders are nominated by the head of the state, once meetings such as this become formalities, endorsing the purposes of the state, the trade union movement is destroyed and so is democracy.

Therefore, what you do in this country to maintain freedom, the contributions that you make to improve the welfare of your people, the great sense of responsibility you feel not only toward your members, not only toward your country, not only toward other trade unions, in other countries, but your sense of responsibility for the whole movement of freedom—so long as that exists the world can look to the future with hope.

So I am glad and proud to come here today. In the United States, in the last 30 years, all of the great efforts that were made at home and abroad—Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, President Truman's effort through Marshall Plan, NATO, Point 4, and all the rest, and the effort that President Eisenhower made—all of these great international efforts, as well as great progressive national movements, had the strong endorsement and support of the AFL-CIO, led by Mr. George Meany, who has stood for freedom in the United States and around the globe. Therefore I urge you, gentlemen, in meeting your responsibilities to those who belong to your unions, to also realize that your unions will not survive except in a world of freedom. I urge you to hold out, as we are trying to do in the United States in the AFL-CIO, a helping hand to those who seek to organize trade unions in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This is how a free society remains free, and, in addition, while freedom is an end in itself, it is also a means.

I think that nothing has been more destructive to the myth that once existed that, while communism meant a loss of personal liberty, it was a means of economic advancement. If there is any myth that has been destroyed in the last 10 years, it has been the concept that communism and economic welfare go hand in hand. I believe our times have shown that freedom is the handmaiden of economic advancement, that through a system of freedom,

through a system of progress, through a system of responsibilities within a free society, that is the best way that people can live, not only peacefully at night and in the daytime, but also can enjoy an increasingly high standard of living. That is what we want freedom for, not only so we can exist ourselves and develop our own personalities but so that our people can move ahead: the people in my country who are entitled to an equal opportunity which we are now fighting to give them, the people in this country who desire not only to be free but to make it possible for their children to live better than they lived. And here in Western Europe and in the United States, where the trade union movement has played such an important role, I hope it will be an example to those who live to the south of us, who stand on the razor edge of moving into some kind of totalitarianism or developing a free, progressive society, where, through the trade union movements, the fruits of progress, the fruits of production, can be distributed fairly to the population—not by a leader but by the people themselves.

So I regard this movement as important, this meeting as essential, and I regard it as a privilege to come here. This is a great city. It has meant a lot in the history of the last 18 years. I am proud to be here with General [Lucius D.] Clay. Americans may be far away, but in accordance with what Benjamin Franklin said, this is where we want to be today. When I leave tonight, I leave and the United States stays.

Thank you.

#### **President's Remarks Upon Signing the Golden Book, Berlin, June 26**

White House press release (Berlin) dated June 26

I am proud to come to this city as the guest of your distinguished Mayor, who has symbolized throughout the world the fighting spirit of West Berlin, and I am proud to visit the Federal Republic with your distinguished Chancellor who, for so many years, has committed Germany to democracy and freedom and progress, and to come here in the company of my fellow American, General Clay, who has been in this city during its great moments of crisis and will come again if ever needed.

Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was "*Civitas Romanus sum.*" Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is "*Ich bin ein Berliner.*" (I appreciate my interpreter translating my German.)

There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say they don't, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system but it permits us to make economic progress. *Lasst sie nach Berlin kommen.*

Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us. I want to say, on behalf of my countrymen, who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic, who are far distant from you, that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even from a distance, the story of the last 18 years. I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged for 18 years that still lives with the vitality and the force and the hope and the determination of the failures of the Communist system, for all the world to see, we take no satisfaction in it for it is, as your Mayor has said, an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together.

What is true of this city is true of Germany—real, lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. In 18 years of peace and good faith, this generation of Germans has earned the right to be free, including the right to unite their families and their nation in lasting peace, with good will to all people. You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part of the main.

So let me ask you, as I close, to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today to the hopes of tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to the day of peace with justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind. Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful glow. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the frontlines for almost two decades.

All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words "*Ich bin ein Berliner.*"

#### **President's Address at Free University, Berlin, June 26**

White House press release (Berlin) dated June 26; as-delivered text

Sir, Mr. Mayor, Chancellor, distinguished Ministers, members of the faculty, and Fellows of this university, fellow students: I am honored to become an instant graduate of this distinguished university. The fact of the matter is, of course, that any university, if it is a university, is free. So one might think that the words "Free University" are redundant. But not in West Berlin. So I am proud to be here today, and I am proud to have this association, on behalf of my fellow countrymen, with this great center of learning.

Prince Bismarck once said that one-third of the students of German universities broke down from overwork, another third broke down from dissipation, and the other third ruled Germany. I do not know which third of the student body is here today, but I am confident that I am talking to the future rulers of this country, and also of other free countries, stretching around the world, who have sent their sons and daughters to this center of freedom in order to understand what the world struggle is all about. I know that when you leave this school you will not imagine that this institution was founded by citizens of the world, including my own

country, and was developed by citizens of West Berlin—that you will not imagine that these men who teach you have dedicated their life to your knowledge—in order to give this school's graduates an economic advantage in the life struggle. This school is not interested in turning out merely corporation lawyers or skilled accountants. What it is interested in—and this must be true of every university—is it must be interested in turning out citizens of the world, men who comprehend the difficult, sensitive tasks that lie before us as free men and women, and men who are willing to commit their energies to the advancement of a free society. That is why you are here, and that is why this school was founded, and all of us benefit from it.

It is a fact that in my own country in the American Revolution that revolution and the society developed thereafter was built by some of the most distinguished scholars in the history of the United States, who were, at the same time, among our foremost politicians. They did not believe that knowledge was merely for the study, but they thought it was for the marketplace as well, and Madison and Jefferson and Franklin and all the others who built the United States, who built our Constitution, who built it on a sound framework, I believe set an example for us all, and what was true of my country has been true of your country and the countries of Western Europe. As an American said 100 years ago, it was John Milton who conjugated verbs in his library when the freedom of Englishmen was periled. The duty of the scholar, of the educated man, of the man or woman whom society has developed—the duty of that man or woman is to help build the society which has made their own advancement possible. You understand it and I understand it, and I am proud to be with you.

Goethe, whose home city I visited yesterday, believed that education and culture were the answer to international strife. "With sufficient learning," he wrote, "a scholar forgets national hatreds, stands above nations, and feels the well-being or troubles of a neighboring people as if they happened to his own." That is the kind of scholar that this university is training. In the 15 turbulent years since this institution was founded, dedicated to the motto "Truth, Justice,

and Liberty," much has changed. The university enrollment has increased sevenfold, and related colleges have been founded. West Berlin has been blockaded, threatened, harassed, but it continues to grow in industry and culture and size, and in the hearts of free men. Germany has changed. Western Europe and, indeed, the entire world has changed, but this university has maintained its fidelity to these three ideals—truth, justice, and liberty. I choose, therefore, to discuss the future of this city briefly in the context of these three obligations.

Speaking a short time ago in the center of the city, I reaffirmed my country's commitment to West Berlin's freedom and restated our confidence in its people and their courage. The shield of the military commitment with which we, in association with two other great powers, guard the freedom of West Berlin will not be lowered or put aside so long as its presence is needed, but behind that shield it is not enough to mark time, to adhere to a *status quo*, while awaiting a change for the better in a situation fraught with challenge, and the last 4 years in the world have seen the most extraordinary challenges, the significance of which we cannot even grasp today, and only when history and time have passed can we realize the significant events that happened at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties. In a situation fraught with change and challenge, in an era of this kind, every resident of West Berlin has a duty to consider where he is, where his city is going, and how best it can get there. The scholar, the teacher, the intellectual, have a higher duty than any of the others, for society has trained you to think as well as do. This community has committed itself to that objective, and you have a special obligation to think and to help forge the future of this city in terms of truth and justice and liberty.

First, what does truth require? It requires us to face the facts as they are, not to involve ourselves in self-deception—to refuse to think merely in slogans. If we are to work for the future of the city, let us deal with the realities as they actually are, not as they might have been and not as we wish they were. Reunification, I believe, will someday be a reality. The lessons of history support that belief, especially

the history in the world of the last 18 years. The strongest force in the world today has been the strength of the state, of the idea of nationalism of a people; and in Africa and in Latin America and in Asia, all around the globe, new countries have sprung into existence determined to maintain their freedom. This has been one of the strongest forces on the side of freedom. And it is a source of satisfaction to me that so many countries of Western Europe recognized this and chose to move with this great tide, and, therefore, that tide has served us and not our adversaries.

But we all know that a police state regime has been imposed on the Eastern sector of this city and country. The peaceful reunification of Berlin and Germany will, therefore, not be either quick or easy. We must first bring others to see their own true interests better than they do today. What will count in the long run are the realities of Western strength, the realities of Western commitment, the realities of Germany as a nation and a people, without regard to artificial boundaries of barbed wire. Those are the realities upon which we rely and on which history will move, and others too would do well to recognize them.

Secondly, what does justice require? In the end, it requires liberty. And I will come to that. But in the meantime justice requires us to do what we can do in this transition period to improve the lot and maintain the hopes of those on the other side. It is important that the people on the quiet streets in the East be kept in touch with Western society. Through all the contacts and communication that can be established, through all the trade that Western security permits, above all whether they see much or little of the West, what they see must be so bright as to contradict the daily drumbeat of distortion from the East. You have no higher opportunity, therefore, than to stay here in West Berlin, to contribute your talents and skills to its life, to show your neighbors democracy at work, a growing and productive city offering freedom and a better life for all. You are helping now by your studies and by your devotion to freedom, and you, therefore, earn the admiration of your fellow students from wherever they come.

Today I have had a chance to see all of this myself. I have seen housing and factories and office buildings and commerce and a vigorous academic and scientific life here in this community. I have seen the people of this city, and I think that all of us who have come here know that the morale of this city is high, that the standard of living is high, the faith in the future is high, and that this is not merely an isolated outpost cut off from the world, cut off from the West. Students come here from many countries, and I hope more will come, especially from Africa and Asia. Those of you who may return from study here to other parts of Western Europe will still be helping to forge a society which most of those across the wall yearn to join. The Federal Republic of Germany, as all of us know from our visit better than ever, has created a free and dynamic economy from the disasters of defeat and a bulwark of freedom from the ruins of tyranny.

West Berlin and West Germany have dedicated and demonstrated their commitment to the liberty of the human mind, the welfare of the community, and to peace among nations. They offer social and economic security and progress for their citizens, and all this has been accomplished—and this is the important point—not only because of their economic plant and capacity but because of their commitment to democracy, because economic well-being and democracy must go hand in hand.

And finally, what does liberty require? The answer is clear. A united Berlin in a united Germany, united by self-determination and living in peace. This right of free choice is no special privilege claimed by the Germans alone. It is an elemental requirement of human justice. So this is our goal, and it is a goal which may be attainable most readily in the context of the reconstitution of the larger Europe on both sides of the harsh line which now divides it. This idea is not new in the postwar West. Secretary Marshall, soon after he delivered his famous speech at Harvard University urging aid to the reconstruction of Europe, was asked what areas his proposal might cover, and he replied that he was "taking the commonly accepted geography of Europe—west of Asia." His offer of help and friendship was rejected, but it is not too early to think once again in

terms of all of Europe, for the winds of change are blowing across the Curtain as well as the rest of the world.

The cause of human rights and dignity, some two centuries after its birth in Europe and the United States, is still moving men and nations with ever-increasing momentum. The Negro citizens of my own country have strengthened their demand for equality and opportunity. And the American people and the American Government are going to respond. The pace of decolonization has quickened in Africa. The people of the developing nations have intensified their pursuit of economic and social justice. The people of Eastern Europe, even after 18 years of oppression, are not immune to change. The truth doesn't die. The desire for liberty cannot be fully suppressed. The people of the Soviet Union, even after 45 years of party dictatorship, feel the forces of historical evolution. The harsh precepts of Stalinism are officially recognized as bankrupt. Economic and political variation and dissent are appearing, for example, in Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union itself. The growing emphasis on scientific and industrial achievement has been accompanied by increased education and by intellectual ferment. Indeed, the very nature of the modern technological society requires human initiative and the diversity of free minds. So history itself runs against the Marxist dogma, not toward it.

Nor are such systems equipped to deal with the organization of modern agriculture and the diverse energy of the modern consumer in a developed society. In short, these dogmatic police states are an anachronism. Like the division of Germany and of Europe, it is against the tide of history. The new Europe of the West, dynamic, diverse, and democratic, must exert an ever-increasing attraction to the people of the East, and when the possibilities of reconciliation appear we in the West will make it clear that we are not hostile to any people or system providing they choose their own destiny without interfering with the free choice of others.

There will be wounds to heal and suspicions to be eased on both sides. The difference in living standards will have to be reduced by

leveling up, not down. Fair and effective agreements to end the arms race must be reached. These changes will not come today or tomorrow. But our efforts for a real settlement must continue undiminished.

As I said this morning, I am not impressed by the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout the world. I do not believe that any democrat can successfully ride that tiger. But I do believe in the necessity of great powers working together to preserve the human race, or otherwise we can be destroyed. This process can only be helped by the growing unity of the West, and we must all work toward that unity, for in unity there is strength, and that is why I travel to this continent—the unity of this continent—and any division or weakness only makes our task more difficult. Nor can the West ever negotiate a peaceful reunification of Germany from a divided and uncertain and competitive base. In short, only if they see over a period of time that we are strong and united, that we are vigilant and determined, are others likely to abandon their course of armed aggression or subversion. Only then will genuine, mutually acceptable proposals to reduce hostility have a chance to succeed.

This is not an easy course. There is no easy course to the reunification of Germany, the reconstitution of Europe. But life is never easy. There is work to be done, and obligations to be met, obligations to truth, to justice, and to liberty.

Thank you.

## THE VISIT TO IRELAND

### President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Dail and Seanad, Dublin, June 28

White House press release (Dublin) dated June 28; as delivered text

Mr. Speaker, Prime Minister, Members of the Parliament: I am grateful for your welcome and for that of your countrymen.

The 13th day of December 1862 will be a day long remembered in American history. At Fredericksburg, Virginia, thousands of men fought and died on one of the bloodiest battlefields of the American Civil War. One of the most brilliant stories of that day was written by

a band of 1,200 men who went into battle wearing a green sprig in their hats. They bore a proud heritage and a special courage, given to those who had long fought for the cause of freedom. I am referring, of course, to the Irish Brigade. As General Robert E. Lee, the great military leader of the Southern Confederate forces, is reported to have said of this group of men after the battle, "The gallant stand which this bold brigade made on the heights of Fredericksburg is well known. Never were men so brave. They ennobled their race by their splendid gallantry on that desperate occasion. Their brilliant though hopeless assaults on our lines excited the hearty applause of our officers and soldiers."

Of the 1,200 men who took part in that assault, 280 survived the battle. The Irish Brigade was led into battle on that occasion by Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher, who had participated in the unsuccessful Irish uprising of 1848, was captured by the British and sent in a prison ship to Australia, from whence he finally came to America. In the fall of 1862, after serving with distinction and gallantry in some of the toughest fighting of this most bloody struggle, the Irish Brigade was presented with a new set of flags. In the city ceremony, the city chamberlain gave them the motto "The Union, Our Country, and Ireland Forever." Their old ones having been torn to shreds by bullets in previous battles, Captain Richard McGee took possession of these flags on December 2d in New York City and arrived with them at the Battle of Fredericksburg and carried them in the battle. Today, in recognition of what these gallant Irishmen and what millions of other Irish have done for my country, and through the generosity of the Fighting 69th, I would like to present one of these flags to the people of Ireland.

As you can see, gentlemen, the battle honors of the Brigade include Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Yorktown, Fair Oaks, Gaines's Mill, Allen's Farm, Savage's Station, White Oak Bridge, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Bristoe Station.

I am deeply honored to be your guest in the free Parliament of a free Ireland. If this nation had achieved its present political and

economic stature a century or so ago, my great grandfather might never have left New Ross, and I might, if fortunate, be sitting down there with you. Of course, if your own President had never left Brooklyn, he might be standing up here instead of me.

This elegant building, as you know, was once the property of the Fitzgerald family, but I have not come here to claim it. Of all the new relations I have discovered on this trip, I regret to say that no one has yet found any link between me and a great Irish patriot, Lord Edward Fitzgerald. Lord Edward, however, did not like to stay here in his family home because, as he wrote his mother, "Leinster House does not inspire the brightest ideas." That was a long time ago, however. It has also been said by some that a few of the features of this stately mansion served to inspire similar features in the White House in Washington. Whether this is true or not, I know that the White House was designed by James Hoban, a noted Irish-American architect, and I have no doubt that he believed by incorporating several features of the Dublin style he would make it more home-like for any President of Irish descent. It was a long wait, but I appreciate his efforts.

There is also an unconfirmed rumor that Hoban was never fully paid for his work on the White House. If this proves to be true, I will speak to our Secretary of the Treasury about it, although I hear this body is not particularly interested in the subject of revenues.

I am proud to be the first American President to visit Ireland during his term of office, proud to be addressing this distinguished assembly, and proud of the welcome you have given me. My presence and your welcome, however, only symbolize the many and the enduring links which have bound the Irish and the Americans since the earliest days.

Benjamin Franklin, the envoy of the American Revolution, who was also born in Boston, was received by the Irish Parliament in 1772. It was neither independent nor free from discrimination at the time, but Franklin reported its members "disposed to be friends of America." "By joining our interest with theirs," he said, "a more equitable treatment . . . might be obtained for both nations."

Our interests have been joined ever since. Franklin sent leaflets to Irish Freedom Fighters. O'Connell was influenced by Washington, and Emmet influenced Lincoln. Irish volunteers played so predominant a role in the American Army that Lord Mountjoy lamented in the British Parliament, "We have lost America through the Irish." John Barry, whose statue was honored yesterday, and whose sword is in my office, was only one who fought for liberty in America to set an example for liberty in Ireland. Yesterday was the 117th anniversary of the birth of Charles Stewart Parnell, whose grandfather fought under Barry and whose mother was born in America, and who, at the age of 34, was invited to address the American Congress on the cause of Irish freedom. "I have seen since I have been in this country," he said, "so many tokens of the good wishes of the American people toward Ireland. . . ." And today, 83 years later, I can say to you that I have seen in this country so many tokens of good wishes of the Irish people toward America.

And so it is that our two nations, divided by distance, have been united by history. No people ever believed more deeply in the cause of Irish freedom than the people of the United States. And no country contributed more to building my own than your sons and daughters. They came to our shores in a mixture of hope and agony, and I would not underrate the difficulties of their course once they arrived in the United States. They left behind hearts, fields, and a nation yearning to be free. It is no wonder that James Joyce described the Atlantic as a bowl of bitter tears, and an earlier poet wrote, "They are going, going, going, and we cannot bid them stay."

But today this is no longer the country of hunger and famine that those emigrants left behind. It is not rich and its progress is not yet complete, but it is, according to statistics, one of the best fed countries in the world. Nor is it any longer a country of persecution, political or religious. It is a free country, and that is why any American feels at home.

There are those who regard this history of past strife and exile as better forgotten, but to use the phrase of Yeats, "Let us not casually

reduce that great past to a trouble of fools, for we need not feel the bitterness of the past to discover its meaning for the present and the future."

And it is the present and the future of Ireland that today holds so much promise to my nation as well as to yours, and indeed to all mankind, for the Ireland of 1963, one of the youngest of nations and the oldest of civilizations, has discovered that the achievement of nationhood is not an end but a beginning. In the years since independence, you have undergone a new and peaceful revolution, an economic and industrial revolution, transforming the face of this land while still holding to the old spiritual and cultural values. You have modernized your economy, harnessed your rivers, diversified your industry, liberalized your trade, electrified your farms, accelerated your rate of growth, and improved the living standard of your people.

Other nations of the world in whom Ireland has long invested her people and her children are now investing their capital as well as their vacations here in Ireland. This revolution is not yet over, nor will it be, I am sure, until a fully modern Irish economy fully shares in world prosperity. But prosperity is not enough.

Eighty-three years ago, Henry Grattan, demanding the more independent Irish Parliament that would always bear his name, denounced those who were satisfied merely by new grants of economic opportunity. "A country," he said, "enlightened as Ireland, chartered as Ireland, armed as Ireland, and injured as Ireland, will be satisfied with nothing less than liberty." And today, I am certain, free Ireland, a full-fledged member of the world community, where some are not yet free and where some counsel an acceptance of tyranny—free Ireland will not be satisfied with anything less than liberty.

I am glad, therefore, that Ireland is moving in the mainstream of current world events. For I sincerely believe that your future is as promising as your past is proud and that your destiny lies not as a peaceful island in a sea of troubles but as a maker and shaper of world peace. For self-determination can no longer mean isolation; and the achievement of national independence today means withdrawal from the

old status only to return to the world scene with a new one. New nations can build with their former governing powers the same kind of fruitful relationship that Ireland has established with Great Britain—a relationship founded on equality and mutual interests. And no nation, large or small, can be indifferent to the fate of others, near or far. Modern economics, weaponry, and communications have made us realize more than ever that we are one human family and this one planet is our home.

"The world is large," wrote John Boyle O'Reilly—"The world is large when its weary leagues two loving hearts divide; but the world is small when your enemy is loose on the other side." The world is even smaller today, though the enemy of John Boyle O'Reilly is no longer a hostile power. Indeed, across the gulfs and barriers that now divide us, we must remember that there are no permanent enemies. Hostility today is a fact, but it is not a ruling law. The supreme reality of our time is our indivisibility as children of God and our common vulnerability on this planet.

Some may say that all this means little to Ireland. In an age when "history moves with the tramp of earthquake feet"—in an age when a handful of men and nations have the power to devastate mankind, in an age when the needs of the developing nations are so staggering that even the richest lands often groan with the burden of assistance—in such an age, it may be asked, how can a nation as small as Ireland play much of a role on the world stage?

I would remind those who ask that question, including those in other small countries, of these words of one of the great orators of the English language:

All the world owes much to the little "five feet high" nations. The greatest art of the world was the work of little nations. The most enduring literature of the world came from little nations. The heroic deeds that thrill humanity through generations were the deeds of little nations fighting for their freedom. And, oh, yes, the salvation of mankind came through a little nation.

Ireland has already set an example and a standard for other small nations to follow. This has never been a rich or powerful country, and yet, since earliest times, its influence on the world has been rich and powerful. No large

nation did more to keep Christianity and Western culture alive in their darkest centuries. No larger nation did more to spark the cause of independence in America, indeed, around the world. And no larger nation has ever provided the world with more literary and artistic genius.

This is an extraordinary country. George Bernard Shaw, speaking as an Irishman, summed up an approach to life: "Other peoples," he said, "see things and say: 'Why?' . . . But I dream things that never were—and I say: 'Why not?'"

It is that quality of the Irish, the remarkable combination of hope, confidence, and imagination, that is needed more than ever today. The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by skeptics or cynics whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can dream of things that never were, and ask why not. It matters not how small a nation is that seeks world peace and freedom, for, to paraphrase a citizen of my country, "The humblest nation of all the world, when clad in the armor of a righteous cause, is stronger than all the hosts of Error."

Ireland is clad in the cause of national and human liberty with peace. To the extent that the peace is disturbed by conflict between the former colonial powers and the new and developing nations, Ireland's role is unique. For every new nation knows that Ireland was the first of the small nations in the 20th century to win its struggle for independence and that the Irish have traditionally sent their doctors and technicians and soldiers and priests to help other lands to keep their liberty alive. At the same time, Ireland is part of Europe, associated with the Council of Europe, progressing in the context of Europe, and a prospective member of an expanded European Common Market. Thus Ireland has excellent relations with both the new and the old, the confidence of both sides, and an opportunity to act where the actions of greater powers might be looked upon with suspicion.

The central issue of freedom, however, is between those who believe in self-determination and those in the East who would impose on others the harsh and oppressive Communist

system; and here your nation wisely rejects the role of a go-between or a mediator. Ireland pursues an independent course in foreign policy, but it is not neutral between liberty and tyranny and never will be.

For knowing the meaning of foreign domination, Ireland is the example and inspiration to those enduring endless years of oppression. It was fitting and appropriate that this nation played a leading role in censuring the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, for how many times was Ireland's quest for freedom suppressed only to have that quest renewed by the succeeding generation? Those who suffer beyond that wall I saw on Wednesday in Berlin must not despair of their future. Let them remember the constancy, the faith, the endurance, and the final success of the Irish. And let them remember, as I heard sung by your sons and daughters yesterday in Wexford, the words, "The boys of Wexford, who fought with heart and hand, to burst in twain the galling chain and free our native land."

The major forum for your nation's greater role in world affairs is that of protector of the weak and voice of the small, the United Nations. From Cork to the Congo, from Galway to the Gaza Strip, from this legislative assembly to the United Nations, Ireland is sending its most talented men to do the world's most important work—the work of peace.

In a sense this export of talent is in keeping with an historic Irish role. But you no longer go as exiles and emigrants but for the service of your country and, indeed, of all men. Like the Irish missionaries of medieval days, like the wild geese after the Battle of the Boyne, you are not content to sit by your fireside while others are in need of your help. Nor are you content with the recollections of the past when you face the responsibilities of the present.

Twenty-six sons of Ireland have died in the Congo; many others have been wounded. I pay tribute to them and to all of you for your commitment and dedication to world order. And their sacrifice reminds us all that we must not falter now.

The United Nations must be fully and fairly financed. Its peacekeeping machinery must be strengthened. Its institutions must be devel-

oped until some day, and perhaps some distant day, a world of law is achieved.

Ireland's influence in the United Nations is far greater than your relative size. You have not hesitated to take the lead on such sensitive issues as the Kashmir dispute, and you sponsored that most vital resolution, adopted by the General Assembly, which opposed the spread of nuclear arms to any nation not now possessing them, urging an international agreement with inspection and control, and I pledge to you that the United States of America will do all in its power to achieve such an agreement and fulfill your resolution.

I speak of these matters today not because Ireland is unaware of its role, but I think it important that you know that we know what you have done, and I speak to remind the other small nations that they, too, can and must help build a world peace. They, too, as we all are, are dependent on the United Nations for security, for an equal chance to be heard, for progress toward a world made safe for diversity. The peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations cannot work without the help of the smaller nations, nations whose forces threaten no one and whose forces can thus help create a world in which no nation is threatened.

Great powers have their responsibilities and their burdens, but the smaller nations of the world must fulfill their obligations as well. A great Irish poet once wrote, "I believe profoundly in the future of Ireland, that this is an isle of destiny, that that destiny will be glorious, and that when our hour has come we will have something to give to the world."

My friends, Ireland's hour has come. You have something to give to the world, and that is a future of peace with freedom. Thank you.

#### **THE VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM**

##### **Communique Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, Birch Grove House, Sussex, June 30**

White House press release (Sussex) dated June 30

During the past two days President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan have held their seventh meeting to discuss current problems. Their talks have taken place at Prime Minister Macmillan's home in Sussex and fol-

lowed on President Kennedy's visit to Germany and Eire.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council, Mr. Thorneycroft, Minister of Defence, and Mr. Heath, Lord Privy Seal, took part in the talks at various times.

During some twelve hours of discussion the President and the Prime Minister began by hearing reports from Lord Home and Mr. Rusk about conversations which the two Ministers had held in London during the previous two days. The topics covered included Laos and the Far Eastern situation, the position in the Middle East, the problems of NATO and the Western Alliance and the effort for a test ban treaty. President Kennedy and the Prime Minister took note in particular of the situation in Laos and expressed their concern at the frequent breaches of the Geneva Agreement of 1962 and at the failure of certain parties to the Agreement to carry out their obligations under it. They agreed to continue to work closely together for the preservation of peace in Laos and the independence and neutrality of that country. They also agreed to continue close general cooperation in the Far East, particularly in regard to the problems of Viet Nam. As regards the Middle East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the importance of the efforts made by the United Nations in working towards conciliation in the Yemen and pledged their support to the Secretary-General.<sup>1</sup>

The President and the Prime Minister were agreed on their policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack. They were impressed by the importance to the economic progress and defence of both India and Pakistan of whose anxieties they were fully aware, of an honourable and equitable settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries; they stood ready to help in

any way which might be desired by both countries.

President Kennedy and the Prime Minister then reviewed the problems of the Western Alliance, especially in regard to NATO. They noted with satisfaction the decisions reached at the recent NATO meeting in Ottawa<sup>2</sup> which implemented the concept which they had themselves set out at their meeting at Nassau in December 1962,<sup>3</sup> by which a number of powers assigned some or all of their present and future forces to NATO Command.

With regard to the future they took note of the studies now under way in NATO for review of the strategic and tactical concepts which should underlie NATO's military plans.

The President reported on his discussions with Dr. Adenauer in which they reaffirmed their agreement to use their best efforts to bring into being a multilateral sea-borne MRBM force and to pursue with other interested governments the principal questions involved in the establishment of such a force.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that a basic problem facing the NATO Alliance was the closer association of its members with the nuclear deterrent of the Alliance. They also agreed that various possible ways of meeting this problem should be further discussed with their allies. Such discussions would include the proposals for a multilateral sea-borne force, without prejudice to the question of British participation in such a force.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the state of East-West relations and considered in particular the possibility of concluding in the near future a treaty to ban nuclear tests. They agreed that the achievement of such a treaty would be a major advance in East-West relations and might lead on to progress in other directions. They agreed the general line which their representatives, Mr. Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham, should take during their visit to Moscow in July. The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that the conclusion of a test ban treaty at this time is most urgent and pledged themselves to do all they could to bring this about.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 43.

## THE VISIT TO ITALY

### President's Address at NATO Headquarters, Naples, July 2

White House press release (Naples) dated July 2; as-delivered text

Mr. President [Antonio Segni], Prime Minister Leone, Foreign Minister Piccione, Defense Minister Andreotti, members of the NATO Command, ladies and gentlemen: It is fitting that my travels away from home should end in this country and in this city. Italy, wrote Shelley, is the "Paradise of exiles"; and in my exile away from Washington, I have enjoyed this paradise as the last stop in Europe. I shall leave this country with regret.

It is also fitting that the final event of this European tour should take place at this NATO headquarters. NATO is one of the best and the earliest examples of cooperation between Western Europe and North America. The NATO defense treaty pledges us all to the common defense, to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, and to respond with all the force at our command. And that pledge is as strong and unshakable today as it was when it was made.

Finally, it is fitting to take this opportunity to review our findings and feelings after 10 days in Western Europe. Specifically, I return to Washington newly confirmed in my convictions regarding eight principal propositions:

First, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are committed to the path of progressive democracy, to social justice, and to economic reform, attained through the free processes of debate and consent. I sit here again to stress the fact that this is not a matter of domestic policies or politics but a key to Western freedom and Western solidarity. Nations which agree in applying the principles at home of freedom and justice are better able to work with each other abroad.

Second, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are determined to maintain and coordinate their military strength in cooperation with my own nation. In a series of briefings and reviews I have been impressed less by NATO weaknesses, which are so often discussed, and more by the quality of the men, the officers, their steadily more modern weapons, their command structure, and their dedica-

tion to freedom and peace. While we can take heart from these accomplishments, we still have much to do. Important improvements and additions are still needed, and this is not the time to slacken our efforts. But if we continue to build up our strength at all levels, we can be increasingly certain that no attack will take place at any level against the territory of any NATO country.

Third, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are committed to peace. The purpose of our military strength is peace. The purpose of our partnership is peace. So our negotiations for an end to nuclear tests and our opposition to nuclear dispersal are fully consistent with our attention to defense. These are all complementary parts of a single strategy for peace. We do not believe that war is unavoidable or that negotiations are inherently undesirable. We do believe that an end to the arms race is in the interest of all and that we can move toward that end with injury to none. In negotiations to achieve peace, as well as preparations to prevent war, the West is united and no ally will abandon the interests of another to achieve a spurious *detente*. But as we arm to parley, we will not reject any path or refuse any proposal without examining its possibilities for peace.

Fourth, it is increasingly clear that our Western European allies are willing to look outward on the world, not merely inward on their own needs and demands. The economic institutions and support of Western European unity are founded on the principles of cooperation, not isolation; on expansion, not restriction. The Common Market was not designed by its founders or supported by the United States to build walls against other European and Western countries, or to build walls against the ferment of the developing nations. These nations need assistance in their struggle for political and economic independence. They need markets for their products and capital for their economies. Our allies in Europe, I am confident, will increase their role in this important effort, not only in lands with which they were previously associated but in Latin America and every area of need.

Fifth, it is increasingly clear that nations

united in freedom are better able to build their economies than those that are repressed by tyranny. In the last 10 years, the gross national product of the NATO countries has risen by some 75 percent. We can do better than we are doing, but we are doing much better than the party dictatorships of the East. There was a time when some would say that this system of admitted dictatorship, for all its political and social faults, nevertheless seemed to offer a successful economic system, a swift and certain path to modernization and prosperity. But it is now apparent that this system is incapable in today's world of achieving the organization of agriculture, of satisfying consumer demands, and the attainment of lasting prosperity. You need only compare West Berlin with East Berlin, West Germany with East Germany, Western Europe with Eastern Europe. Communism has sometimes succeeded as a scavenger, but never as a leader. It has never come to power in any country that was not disrupted by war or internal repression, or both. Rejecting reform and diversity in freedom, the Communists cannot reconcile their ambitions for domination with other men's ambition for freedom. It is clear that this system is outmoded and doomed to failure.

Sixth, it is increasingly clear that the people of Western Europe are moved by a strong and irresistible desire for unity. Whatever path is chosen, whatever delays or obstacles are encountered, that movement will go forward, and the United States welcomes this movement and the greater strength it insures. We did not assist in the revival of Europe to maintain its dependence upon the United States, nor do we seek to bargain selectively with many and separate voices. We welcome a stronger partner, for today no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here. The cause of Western European unity is based on logic and common sense. It is based on moral and political truth. It is based on sound military and economic principles, and it moves with the tide of history.

Seventh, it is increasingly clear that the United States and Western Europe are tightly bound by shared goals and mutual respect. On both sides of the Atlantic, trade barriers are

being reduced, military cooperation is increasing, and the cause of Atlantic unity is being promoted. There will always be differences among friends, and they should be freely and frankly discussed. But these are differences of means, not ends. They are differences of approach, not spirit. Recognizing these and other problems, monetary payments, foreign assistance, agriculture, and the rest, I return to the United States more firmly convinced than ever that common ideals have given us a common destiny and that the Atlantic partnership is a growing reality.

Eighth, and finally, it is increasingly clear and increasingly understood that the central moving force of our great adventure is enduring mutual trust. I came to Europe to reassert as clearly and persuasively as I could that the American commitment to the freedom of Europe is reliable, not merely because of good will, although that is strong, not merely because of a shared heritage, although that is deep and wide, and not at all because we seek to dominate, because we do not. I came to make it clear that this commitment rests upon the inescapable requirements of intelligent self-interest. It is a commitment whose wisdom is confirmed by its absence when two world wars began and by its presence in 18 years of well-defended peace. The response which this message has evoked from European citizens and the press, and leaders of the Continent, make it increasingly clear that our commitment and its durability are understood. And at the same time, all that I have seen and heard in these 10 crowded days confirms me in the conviction which I am proud to proclaim to my own countrymen that the free men and free governments of free Europe are also firm in their commitments to our common cause.

We have been able to trust each other for 20 years, and we are right to go on. One hundred and fifteen years ago this month, Mazzini addressed a mass meeting in Milan with these words: "We are here . . . to build up the unity of the human family so the day may come when it shall represent a single sheepfold with a single shepherd . . . the spirit of God . . . Beyond the Alps, beyond the sea, are other peoples now." Mazzini said, "striving by different routes to reach the same goals . . . improvement, as-

sociation, and the foundations of an authority that shall put an end to world anarchy . . . Unite with them—they will unite with you.”

Today, Italy, the United States, and other free countries are committed to this great end, of the development of the human family. In time, the unity of the West can lead to the unity of East and West, until the human family is truly a single sheepfold under God.

Thank you.

#### **Communique Between President Kennedy and President Segni, Rome, July 2**

White House press release (Rome) dated July 2

On July 1st and 2d there took place the scheduled working visit to Italy of President Kennedy during which, in Rome, he was received by the President of the Republic Segni, and, accompanied by Secretary of State Rusk, met with the President of the Council of Ministers Leone and the Vice President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs Piccioni; and in Naples, he visited, together with President Segni, the headquarters of Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

In the Rome talks, which were carried out in that climate of cordial friendship and very close cooperation which characterizes Italo-American relations, there were examined the principal current international problems. In particular, the meetings provided the occasion for a useful and thorough exchange of views on the situation of East-West relations.

In this regard, both sides confirmed their firm intention of persevering in the search for appropriate means to alleviate international tensions. Furthermore, they expressed the conviction that in an atmosphere free from pressure and from threats, existing problems can be directed toward solutions, however partial, without at the same time altering that balance of forces which is guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance, indispensable instrument for the consolidation of peace in freedom and security.

In this context, President Kennedy explained the position of the United States with respect to the possible development of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. On the Italian side, as a consequence of the agreement in principle

formerly expressed by the Italian Government which was reported to the Chamber of Deputies immediately afterwards, there was expressed a favorable attitude toward participating in studies on this subject to be carried out subsequently among all the governments concerned.

In examining the developments of the Alliance, against the background of the current international situation, both parties again underlined the necessity of persevering in efforts to advance current negotiations for a controlled, gradual and balanced disarmament, of making every effort in order to reach an agreement in the field of nuclear test ban, and of preventing the proliferation of atomic arms.

As for the process of European unification, there was agreement as to its significant value, and on the Italian side, there was reaffirmed the will to encourage its development, increasing the efforts directed toward creation of an integrated Europe. In this connection, there was recalled the known attitude of the Italian Government favorable to European integration not only in the economic field but also in the political. Italian representatives found themselves in agreement with President Kennedy on the necessity that European unity be achieved within the framework of the hoped-for interdependence between the United States and Europe.

Both sides agreed on the desirability of working toward cooperation among the various economic areas in order to promote a greater volume of trade between the areas themselves and to draw them increasingly closer together. In this context, there were examined the results achieved in the ministerial meeting held last May in Geneva<sup>4</sup> in preparation for the GATT multilateral tariff negotiations which are scheduled to begin next year. Taking into account the complexity of the problems discussed in that meeting, the results achieved so far were considered encouraging. Particular emphasis was laid on the significance of the resolution approved at that time for expanding the commerce of the developing countries, inasmuch as such resolution provides the basis for a better coordination of the efforts of the democratic

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 990.

countries aimed at fostering the economic and social progress of the developing countries. This is in conformity with the policies of both the United States and Italy, designed to promote the strengthening of the free world through a common program in which all nations which are really free can participate.

Both reaffirmed the staunch adherence of both countries to the principles of the United Nations organization; and the firm purpose to continue to carry out within the Organization constructive work particularly with regard to the problems of disarmament, the developing countries, and the maintenance of peace. They placed special stress on the role which, in this connection, the U.N. might play at such time in the hoped-for agreement on disarmament.

In such a spirit, on the American side as on the Italian side, there was underlined the desire to continue the work which the respective governments are carrying on for the strengthening of peace in the world and for the carrying out of their obligations to this end.

## REPORT TO THE NATION, JULY 5

White House press release dated July 5

I think every American has reason to be proud of this nation's reputation and standing in Europe. Most of us are descended from that continent. Some of us still have relatives there. Some of us still have sons or brothers buried on that continent. We have close cultural and intellectual ties. We have long been linked by travel and commerce.

Today I can report an even deeper tie between the people of Europe and the people of the United States. Our steadfast role in the defense of freedom for 18 years, for peace and justice, I think has earned us the abiding trust and respect of the people of Europe. Our willingness to undertake the hard tasks of leadership, to station our soldiers and sailors and airmen far away from home—and I saw some of them in Europe—to assume the burdens of preventing another war, all this which we in America sometimes take for granted and which we think other people take for granted has earned

the American people a high reputation and brought us steadfast good will.

This trip was for me a moving experience. I saw the expressions of hope and confidence on the faces of West Berliners 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain. I heard expressions of confidence in the United States from the leaders of Germany and England, Italy and Ireland. And I felt the admiration and affection that their people had for the people of the United States. Above all, I found in every country a deep conviction in our common goals, the unity of the West, the freedom of man, the necessity for peace.

Western Europe is fast becoming a dynamic united power in world affairs. It is not the same Europe that brought our troops twice to war in 40 years. It is not the same Europe that was so dependent on us 18 years ago. There is still much progress to be made. There will still be disappointments. But today we can be more confident than ever that the Old World and the New are partners for progress and partners for peace. And so I am happy to be home.

## Soviet Attaché Accused of Improper Activities; U.S. Asks Departure

Press release 350 dated July 1

*Following is the text of a note handed on July 1 to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy by Acting Assistant Secretary Richard H. Davis.*

JULY 1, 1963

The Department of State wishes to inform the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that Attaché Gennadiy G. Sevastyanov has engaged in highly improper activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. Beginning on April 28 of this year, Sevastyanov attempted to recruit for espionage purposes an alien resident who is an employee of the United States Government. Sevastyanov in this effort tried to coerce the United States Government employee by threatening reprisal to members of his family resident in the Soviet Union if he did not cooperate.

The United States Government cannot permit such unacceptable behavior on the part of an official of the Soviet Embassy and therefore Mr. Sevastyanov's continued presence in the United States is no longer acceptable. The Embassy is requested to arrange for his immediate departure.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, D.C.

## U.S. Protests Soviet Restrictions in East Berlin

*Following is the text of a U.S. note of protest against "security strips" established by the Soviet Zone regime in East Berlin and East Germany which was delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow on July 5. Identical notes were delivered by France and Great Britain on the same day.*

Press release 357 dated July 5

JULY 5, 1963

On June 21, 1963, the East German authorities proclaimed new security measures which imposed draconian restrictions on circulation in that part of the Soviet sector in Berlin situated along the boundaries of the Western sectors.

The East German authorities have no competence for Berlin and these measures are completely illegal. They aggravate the arbitrary actions taken since August 13, 1961, by these authorities in connection with the Soviet Government which have cut the city in two by construction of the "wall". These latest illegal measures constitute a serious infringement of the quadripartite status of Berlin as established in the agreements of 1944 and 1945. They not only purport to limit the right of the Allies to circulate freely in Greater Berlin, but also, together with similar measures taken outside Berlin, constitute in their effects another brutal violation of the most elementary rights of the German population.

I am instructed to inform you that the United States Government protests strongly against

these measures. The United States Government will hold the Soviet Government responsible for the consequences which may result in Berlin or elsewhere.

## U.S. and Bulgaria Sign Agreement Relating to Financial Questions

*Following is a Department announcement of the signing of a financial agreement between the United States and Bulgaria, together with texts of the agreement and accompanying letters.*

Press release 354 dated July 2

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

An agreement relating to outstanding financial questions between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria was signed at Sofia on July 2. Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, American Minister in Sofia, signed on behalf of the United States, and Ivan Popov, Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed on behalf of Bulgaria. The negotiations which led to the signing of the agreement began on January 12, 1961.

The agreement provides for the settlement on a lump-sum basis of claims of U.S. nationals arising out of war damage, nationalization of property, and financial debts as described in article I.

The lump-sum settlement of \$3,543,398 includes \$3,143,398 in assets of the Bulgarian Government and Bulgarian corporations which were blocked in the United States during the Second World War and \$400,000 which is to be paid by the Bulgarian Government to the U.S. Government in two installments, on July 1, 1964, and on July 1, 1965.

The adjudication of certain American claims against Bulgaria, as provided in Public Law 285, 84th Congress, was completed by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States on August 9, 1955. In accordance with Public Law 285, awards of the Commission have been certified to the United States Treasury for payment and certain payments have already

been made out of the assets referred to above.

The agreement also provides for the unblocking by the U.S. Government of assets of natural persons residing in Bulgaria.

By an exchange of letters between the two Governments it was agreed that the transmission to payees in Bulgaria of United States Treasury checks will be resumed.

## TEXT OF AGREEMENT

### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA REGARDING CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS AND RELATED FINANCIAL MATTERS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria having reached an understanding on the financial matters specified herein have agreed as follows:

#### Article I

(1) The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria agree that the lump sum of \$3,543,398, as specified in Article II of this Agreement, will constitute full and final settlement and discharge of the claims of nationals of the United States of America, whether natural or juridical persons, against the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria which are described below:

(a) Claims of nationals of the United States of America for the restoration of, or payment of compensation for, property, rights and interests (direct and indirect), as specified in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria which entered into force on September 15, 1947;

(b) Claims of nationals of the United States of America for the nationalization, compulsory liquidation or other taking of property and of rights and interests (direct and indirect) in and with respect to property prior to the effective date of this agreement;

(c) Claims of nationals of the United States of America predicated (directly or indirectly) upon obligations expressed in currency of the United States of America arising out of contractual or other rights acquired by nationals of the United States of America prior to April 24, 1941, and which became payable prior to September 15, 1947.

(2) The term "claims of nationals of the United States of America" as used in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph (1) of this Article refers to claims which were owned by nationals of the United States of America

(a) for the purpose of subparagraph (a) on October 28, 1944 and continuously thereafter until filed

with the Government of the United States of America;

(b) for the purpose of subparagraph (b) on the effective date of nationalization, compulsory liquidation, or other taking and continuously thereafter until filed with the Government of the United States of America; and

(c) for the purpose of subparagraph (c) on April 24, 1941 and continuously thereafter until filed with the Government of the United States of America.

#### Article II

The sum of \$3,543,398, referred to in Article I of this Agreement, shall be made up as follows:

(a) The proceeds resulting from the liquidation of assets in the United States of America which were subject to wartime blocking controls and which belonged to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and its nationals, other than natural persons, amounting in value to \$3,143,398.

(b) The sum of \$400,000 which shall be paid by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Government of the United States of America in two equal payments of \$200,000 each. The first payment shall be made on July 1, 1964 and the second payment shall be made on July 1, 1965.

#### Article III

(1) The distribution of the lump sum referred to in Article I of this Agreement falls within the exclusive competence of the Government of the United States of America in accordance with its legislation, without any responsibility arising therefrom for the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

(2) From the date of this Agreement, the Government of the United States of America considers as settled and discharged as between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria and will not pursue or present to the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

(a) Claims falling within Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, without regard to whether all of such claims are included in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1) of Article I of this Agreement; and

(b) Claims falling within the categories set forth in Article I of this Agreement, without regard to whether the owners of such claims are compensated pursuant to legislation of the United States of America.

#### Article IV

The Government of the United States of America will release within thirty days of the date of this Agreement its blocking controls over all Bulgarian property in the United States of America.

#### Article V

The present Agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature.

Done at Sofia on July 2, 1963, in duplicate, in the English and Bulgarian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America :

EUGENIE ANDERSON

For the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria :

IVAN POPOV

## EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

### Bulgaria

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

*Sofia, July 2, 1963*

EXCELLENCY : I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the United States of America regarding the restriction contained in the regulation of the Government of the United States of America known as Treasury Department Circular 655 concerning the transfer of money from United States public funds to payees in Bulgaria.

In this connection I wish to inform you that :

(a) The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria places no obstacles or limitation preventing recipients of allowances, social security payments, military pension or other payments by the United States authorities from holding checks for such payments and from converting them at the most favorable prevailing rate for remittance to private persons, at present 1.17 leva to the dollar.

(b) The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria places no obstacles in the way of beneficiaries in Bulgaria who may have various claims against United States remitting agencies (such as the Social Security Administration, the Veterans Administration and any other agencies concerned) furnishing such agencies such information and documentation as may be required by United States law in connection with these claims and communicating directly or indirectly with respect to these matters with the American agencies and authorities concerned.

In accordance with the understanding we have reached, I will appreciate receiving your confirmation that the Government of the United States of America, taking into account the above assurances, agrees to remove the restrictions contained in Treasury Department Circular 655.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

IVAN POPOV  
*Deputy Minister*

Her Excellency EUGENIE ANDERSON,  
*American Minister, Sofia.*

### United States

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Sofia, July 2, 1963*

EXCELLENCY : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this date which reads as follows :  
[See *supra*.]

I hereby confirm that, in view of the assurances contained in your letter, the Government of the United States of America will amend Circular No. 655 issued by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America, so as to remove the restriction on the transfer of money from United States public funds to payees in Bulgaria.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

EUGENIE ANDERSON  
*Minister*

His Excellency IVAN POPOV,  
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia.*

### United States

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Sofia, July 2, 1963*

EXCELLENCY : I have the honor to refer to the Agreement signed today between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria relating to financial questions between our countries.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria put forward the proposal to include within this Agreement the dollar bond obligations issued by the Bulgarian State, owned by American nationals and payable in the United States of America.

The Government of the United States of America has not been in a position to agree to this proposal since it follows the practice of leaving such matters for negotiation between the debtor government and the bondholders or their representatives.

It is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, by putting forward the proposal mentioned above, has taken note of outstanding Bulgarian dollar bond obligations and expresses its intention to settle these obligations with the bondholders or their representatives.

I shall appreciate receiving Your Excellency's confirmation of the above understanding.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

EUGENIE ANDERSON  
*Minister*

His Excellency IVAN POPOV,  
*Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia.*

## Bulgaria

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

*Sofia, July 2, 1963*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this date which reads as follows:

[See *supra*.]

I have the honor to confirm that I fully agree with the understanding expressed above.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

IVAN POPOV  
*Deputy Minister*

Her Excellency EUGENIE ANDERSON,  
*American Minister, Sofia.*

## Department States Views on Trade Relations Between U.S. and Bulgaria

### *Department Statement*

Press release 355 dated July 2

The conclusion of an agreement on financial claims and related issues between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria<sup>1</sup> removes a significant obstacle to the establishment of more normal relations between the two countries. Conditions for the expansion of peaceful trade have therefore been improved by the signing of this agreement.

In 1959 after a 9-year hiatus the United States and Bulgaria agreed to resume diplomatic relations.<sup>2</sup> The resumption of diplomatic relations facilitated the conduct of trade between the two countries. It is the view of both Governments that the expansion of peaceful trade would be mutually beneficial and would serve to develop increasing ties between the people of the United States and the Bulgarian people.

The United States is prepared to authorize the Legation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to establish in New York a commercial office which would have the purpose of promoting trade between our two countries. Both Governments will be prepared to facilitate the travel of commercial representatives and offi-

<sup>1</sup> See p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1959, p. 866.

cially interested in increasing trade. As conditions permit, both Governments will consider further measures which will contribute to the development of expanded trade relations.

Through such efforts, the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria welcome the possibility of increasing favorable conditions for the expansion of peaceful trade, and the development of more normal trade relations should also serve as a means of increasing fruitful contacts between the peoples of the two countries.

## Minister Eugenie Anderson Speaks on Bulgarian Television and Radio

Press release 352 dated July 3, for release July 4

*Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, American Minister to the People's Republic of Bulgaria, became the first American diplomatic representative to speak on Bulgarian television and radio in Sofia when she made a brief speech on the occasion of the celebration of July 4, the 187th anniversary of American independence.*

*Minister Anderson, who was delivering her first speech in the Bulgarian language, appeared in person on Bulgarian television on the evening of July 3. The Bulgarian radio also carried her remarks on July 4.*

*Following is a translation of Minister Anderson's speech.*

Good evening. It is a pleasure to speak to you, the Bulgarian people, on the occasion of American Independence Day. I bring you peaceful and friendly greetings from the American people.

First, I wish to thank you for the kindness and hospitality so many Bulgarians have extended to me during my stay here. I have been living in your beautiful country as the American Minister, and as your guest, for nearly a year. I am learning your language and something about Bulgarian life, culture, and history.

I believe that, because Bulgaria also struggled for its independence—only in the last century—you can understand well why we Americans prize our national independence as well as our individual freedom.

On this day—July 4th—we Americans celebrate freedom, peace, equality, democracy, and justice, and these are the great ideals on which America was founded and by which we still live. These are the blessings which all mankind longs to enjoy.

President Kennedy has asked me to give you his friendly greetings and to assure you that he and the American Government and the American people are dedicated to peace, freedom, and friendship with all nations.

Thank you, and best wishes until we meet again.

## Minister to Bulgaria Opens Plastics-USA Exhibit in Sofia

*Remarks by Eugenie Anderson  
Minister to Bulgaria*<sup>1</sup>

It gives me great pleasure to present to the people of Bulgaria our exhibit "Plastics-USA." With this exhibit the American people send you their friendly greetings.

The people of my country take great interest in the swift development of the plastics industry. Less than 50 years ago almost the only plastic in daily use was celluloid, which was used chiefly for children's toys. Today, as you will see in this exhibit, there is a bewildering variety and range of use of plastics. They are used in such diverse fields as exploration of space, medicine, industry, clothing, household utensils, and, yes, children's toys. The American plastics industry is still growing, with new discoveries all the time.

I hope that this sample of American plastics development will help to promote friendship and communication between the peoples of our two countries. I believe that this exhibit will be like a little window through which the Bulgarian people can glimpse some of the practical aspects of contemporary American life.

I hope you will enjoy this exhibit. Please

<sup>1</sup>Made at Sofia on July 6 (press release 358 dated July 5). The Bulgarian state television covered the ceremony. Radio Sofia carried a report on the ceremony and included excerpts of Minister Anderson's remarks. The American Minister spoke in Bulgarian.

feel free to ask questions about plastics in the United States. The guides will do their best to answer you.

I wish to thank all of those Bulgarians and Americans who have helped to make arrangements for this exhibition.

And now I declare "Plastics-USA" open—and welcome to all.

## Netherlands Compensation Program for Nazi Victims

Press release 349 dated July 1

The Department of State has been informed that a financial treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed on April 8, 1960, and providing, *inter alia*, for payment of compensation to Netherlands victims of Nazi persecution, is expected to come into force about August 1, 1963. Approximately \$31 million will be available for this purpose.

Persons who were Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time the persecution commenced, irrespective of whether the persecution took place in the Netherlands or elsewhere, are entitled to compensation if they were persecuted because of their race, faith, or ideology, including activity in the Resistance Movement. Regardless of the persecutee's nationality at the present time, compensation is to be paid to persecutees who: (1) were imprisoned for 3 months or longer; (2) suffered disability of 70 percent or more for not less than 5 consecutive years as a result of persecutory measures; (3) were under an obligation to wear the Star of David at least 6 months; or (4) were subjected to sterilization.

Heirs of persecutees who died during or as a result of Nazi persecution may also apply for compensation. The right is limited to the non-remarried surviving spouse of a persecutee; or, in the absence of a surviving spouse, jointly to the persecutee's children who had not yet reached 21 years on May 7, 1945; or to parents of a persecutee who was not married and who left no children.

Heirs must meet the same nationality requirements as persecutees. Claims of victims of

heirs who obtained Netherlands nationality after persecution commenced may also be submitted, since additional categories may possibly be established to cover such claimants.

Persons who have reason to believe that they may qualify for compensation under this program are urged to inquire immediately at the nearest Netherlands consulate or at the Embassy of the Netherlands at Washington, D.C. A time limit has been established for applicants filing from outside the Netherlands of 4 months from the date on which the treaty shall go into force. While the Department of State expects to issue an additional press release at that time, interested applicants would be well advised to request without delay, through the Netherlands diplomatic and consular authorities herein mentioned as intermediaries, claim application forms from the Claims Office for German Compensation Payment, P.O. Box D, Amsterdam, as this office is already accepting completed applications for processing.

Consulates of the Netherlands are located at Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Galveston, Grand Rapids, Honolulu, Houston, Jacksonville, Kansas City (Mo.), Los Angeles, St. Louis, Miami, Mobile, New Orleans, New York, Norfolk, Orange City (Iowa), Paterson (N.J.), St. Paul, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland (Oreg.), Salt Lake City, San Diego, San Francisco, Savannah, Seattle, Tampa, Charlotte Amalie (St. Thomas, V.I.), and Mayagüez, Ponce, and San Juan (P.R.).

## **U.S. and India Complete Negotiations on Nuclear Power Station Agreement**

### *Joint Statement*

Press release 344 dated June 29

In the last few days representatives of the Government of India and the Government of the United States have substantially completed negotiations on the text of a proposed agreement for cooperation which would provide a legal basis for the installation and operation of a 380-megawatt nuclear power station of United States design at Tarapur, India. The availability of United States financing for the proj-

ect is now being considered by the United States Agency for International Development.<sup>1</sup>

The agreement for cooperation which has been negotiated but not signed is specifically tailored for the Tarapur project. Under the terms of the proposed arrangement, which would last for 30 years, the United States would undertake to supply India with its estimated long-term fuel requirements for the plant and information would be exchanged on matters pertaining to the design, construction, and operation of the plant as well as problems of health and safety. Unclassified information in related fields of research and development, including developments in boiling-water technology and the use of plutonium as a fuel, would also be exchanged between the parties during the period of the agreement.

In the course of the negotiations, India and the United States gave serious consideration to the nature of the safeguard arrangements that should pertain to the Tarapur station to assure its peaceful use. The agreement will contain bilateral safeguard provisions designed to assure the peaceful use of the Tarapur station. India and the United States have always agreed in principle that safeguards should be applied to enriched uranium fuel, but there has been a difference of opinion between the Governments with regard to the attachment of safeguards to equipment. In the case of the Tarapur project, it has been possible to achieve a mutually satisfactory arrangement without either Government's giving up its basic position regarding the attachment of safeguards to equipment, since the Tarapur station will be operated only on enriched uranium supplied by the United States or on plutonium produced therefrom; the United States would guarantee the supply of enriched uranium for the period of the agreement.

Another major subject that has been under careful review is the role that the International Atomic Energy Agency should play in the cooperative program. The United States and India have recognized that it would be desirable

<sup>1</sup> On July 1 the Agency for International Development announced that AID Administrator David E. Bell had authorized a U.S. loan of up to \$50 million to finance the dollar costs of the nuclear plant construction and fabrication of the initial fuel charge.

for both parties to avail themselves of the services of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The International Atomic Energy Agency is not yet in a position to apply safeguards to large-scale reactors of the size to be installed at Tarapur although the Agency is developing a system to cover such large reactors. Accordingly, the United States-Indian arrangement would include an agreement in principle that, at a suitable time, the Agency will be requested to enter into a trilateral agreement for the implementation of the safeguard provisions in the proposed bilateral agreement, subject to the following conditions:

After the Agency has adopted a system of safeguards for large reactors, and at a reasonable time to be mutually agreed, the United States and India will consult with each other to determine whether the system so adopted is generally consistent with the provisions in the bilateral agreement. If the system is generally consistent, the parties will request the Agency to enter into a trilateral arrangement covering the implementation of safeguard responsibilities. The agreement would permit deferring implementation of the arrangement with the Agency until after the Tarapur nuclear station has achieved reliable full power operation.

It is expected that the proposed Tarapur station will make an important contribution to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

## **U.S. Suspends Action on Airport Construction Agreement With Haiti**

Press release 353 dated July 3

The United States informed the Government of Haiti on July 3 that the Agency for International Development has suspended all activities to implement the loan agreement for construction of a new jet airport for Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The agreement for a \$2.8 million loan was signed with Haiti last November, but no disbursements had been made.

The United States decision to suspend action on the agreement followed Haiti's default on the last quarterly payments due on loans by the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund (AID) and notification by the

Haitian Government that it was discontinuing payments during the current fiscal year on these loans. The airport loan agreement provides that defaults under any other agreements between the borrower and the United States is a default under the airport loan agreement.

## **President of Tanganyika Visits Washington**

White House press release (Dublin, Ireland) dated June 28, for release June 28

The White House announced on June 28 that Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, will be a guest of the President of the United States July 15-16.

President Nyerere will be the guest of Secretary Rusk at dinner on July 15. He will call at the White House and, together with his party, will be a guest at a White House luncheon on July 16.

President Nyerere last visited President Kennedy on July 17, 1961,<sup>1</sup> about 6 months before Tanganyika gained independence.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **88th Congress, 1st Session**

U.S. Communist Party Assistance to Foreign Communist Governments (Testimony of Maud Russell). Hearing before the House Un-American Activities Committee. March 6, 1963. 51 pp.

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 3. March 28, 1963. 193 pp.

Castro's Network in the United States (Fair Play for Cuba Committee). Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Part 3, April 10, 1963, 68 pp.; Part 4, April 3, 1963, 40 pp.

Steel Prices, Unit Costs, Profits, and Foreign Competition. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. April 23-May 2, 1963. 762 pp.

Restrictions on Locating Chanceries in Residential Areas. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Business and Commerce of the Senate District of Columbia Committee on S. 646, a bill to prohibit the location of chanceries or other business offices of foreign governments in certain residential areas in the District of Columbia. May 3, 1963. 104 pp.

Employing Aliens in a Scientific or Technical Capacity. Report to accompany S. 1291. S. Rept. 335. June 27, 1963. 6 pp.

<sup>1</sup> For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 297.

## A Progress Report on the Status of Women

SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN  
NEW YORK, MARCH 11-29, 1963

by Gladys A. Tillett

Two outstanding accomplishments of the 17th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, which met at New York March 11-29, 1963, were a proposal for a new series of regional U.N. seminars on the advancement of women in the developing countries and the completion of a draft recommendation on marriage incorporating the principles approved by the General Assembly in the marriage convention adopted in November 1962.<sup>1</sup>

The new series of seminars on the advancement of women in developing countries will be started 2 years hence on completion of the current series on the status of women in family law. They will promote the objectives of the U.N. Development Decade, in which increased production is a major aim, and give special attention to women's educational needs, vocational and professional training, and employment opportunities. In an informal message to the Commission, the Director General of the International Labor Organization, David A. Morse, said women should be regarded as "the number one potential for the Decade of Development." The Commission's choice of seminar topic reflected the increasing importance of women in the work force of all countries and particularly in nations seeking to lift production levels.

The marriage recommendation is designed to supplement the marriage convention adopted

by the 17th session of the General Assembly. It provides for regular reports on law and practice regarding marriage from all member states, whether or not they become parties to the convention. Adoption of the recommendation by the next session of the General Assembly will encourage recognition of stable family life as the foundation for national progress.

### The U.N. Development Decade

Other agenda items, on political rights, access to education, employment opportunities, nationality, and similar matters, were likewise considered in relation to the objectives of the U.N. Development Decade. The Commission could offer practical experience on many aspects because a majority of the members this year came from developing countries—in Africa, from Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the United Arab Republic; in Asia, from China, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines; in Latin America, from Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

• Mrs. Tillett is the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women. Her advisers at the 17th session were Alice A. Morrison of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor, and Rachel C. Nason, Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1763 (XVII).

Guinea, Senegal, the Dominican Republic, and Iran sent observers. Other members, such as Australia, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, were sensitive to needs because of underdeveloped areas within their own territories.

This interest was reflected also in the choice of officers. The chairman this year was Maria Lavalle Urbina of Mexico, a former high court judge, presently in the Ministry of Justice in charge of work for the prevention of juvenile delinquency. Helena Benitez of the Philippines was elected first vice chairman and Helvi Sipila of Finland second vice chairman. Aziza Hussein of the United Arab Republic served as *rapporteur*.

### Political Rights

The session opened with the announcement of equal suffrage in Iran. In his welcome to the Commission on behalf of the Secretary-General, C. V. Narasimhan, Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for General Assembly Affairs and *chef de cabinet*, referred to the achievement in Iran as further evidence of the mounting influence and responsibility of women in public life.

Homa Yakil, the wife of the Ambassador of Iran, informed the Commission of the Shah's decree granting women full and equal political rights, thus clarifying the effect of their participation in recent elections. Women in Iran had voted in municipal elections since 1949 but had not previously been allowed to participate in national elections. I intervened immediately to present the congratulations of the United States to Iran, pointing out its good fortune in now having the benefit of the experience and the concern for human welfare which are the particular gifts of women.

My opening statement referred to the work of the President's Commission on the Status of Women in the United States. This aroused great interest; other delegates asked for material they could use in their home countries, and nongovernmental organization representatives requested copies of flyers and other publications. I pointed out that the United States Commission had brought together leaders from all aspects of national life—men and women—to re-

view the current progress of women, to determine if discriminations still exist, and make constructive recommendations for eliminating them. The fact that some of our States are now appointing similar commissions encouraged further planning in the Commission.

### Education

The discussion of education as well as of employment opportunities centered on the participation of women in the economic life of their countries. The UNESCO report<sup>2</sup> this year dealt with the educational situation in rural areas, and the ILO supplemented this with an analysis of employment and conditions of work for women in agriculture.<sup>3</sup>

The documents showed that, except for the United States, Canada, and northern Europe, the country girl is generally at a disadvantage, first because schools are "few and far between" with many providing elementary instruction only, and second because agricultural work tends to be hard and heavy and few other choices of employment are available for women. In many countries there is a preponderance of girls and women in rural areas, and illiteracy is greater among them than among men or among women in other areas. The Commission recommended that improvement of both general education and vocational training for country girls be given due priority and that provision for needed expansion be included in national development plans. The Commission also drew attention to resources available in the U.N. technical assistance programs and invited nongovernmental organizations to cooperate actively in formulating and carrying out programs to strengthen education for rural women and to overcome illiteracy.

In the United States there are rural schools within reach of girls and boys alike. My statement called attention to our record and also to our Federal labor laws forbidding the employment of children under 16 in agriculture while school is in session. I also mentioned some of the additional resources available in country areas, such as bookmobiles, radio programs, and

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.6/408.

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.6/422.

the leadership of the Federal Extension Service of our Department of Agriculture. The statement continued:

Let us be quite clear on why women need education, and why every country needs women who are educated. Without an education, a mother can offer her family far less than she desires in companionship and care; without training, a girl can expect to earn her way only by the hardest of labor at the poorest pay. Paul Hoffman, Managing Director of the Special Fund here in the United Nations, says this on the importance for education of women and its bearing on the economic development of the country:

"Denial of equal rights to women is also an obstacle to economic development. It is surprising, perhaps, but true that there is a close relationship between the way women are treated in a country and the progress that country has made toward a good life. Where women are virtual slaves, forbidden so much as to go out of the house without their husbands, given no rights whatever in society, the country is invariably primitive. Where women have been largely emancipated, as in Japan, tremendous strides are being made toward modernization.

"The reasons are clear. When a country keeps its women in bondage, half its available brain power is lost."

UNESCO also presented an account of its program activities,<sup>4</sup> as it does regularly on a biennial basis. Reports on various regional conferences on education showed how special problems of girls had been studied by local leaders in Asia and in Africa, in each case within the full context of educational development as a normal and essential part of the whole. The great difficulty continues to be in finding enough women teachers to staff schools for girls and to share in teaching where schools are coeducational. UNESCO has established some regional centers to help with training and production of materials and also with surveys of accomplishment and analysis of exchange programs and other activities. It is greatly to the advantage of women that UNESCO review all its educational programs regularly to be certain they take full account of the needs of both girls and boys.

### **Economic Opportunities**

In presenting her report, the ILO representative pointed out that women workers are becoming a more permanent and more generally recognized part of the labor force in both in-

dustrially developed and newly developing countries. To focus attention on this development, the major agenda item for the ILO conference in June 1964 will be the question of "Women Workers in a Changing World." The conference will be an opportunity to study women's needs and problems in all their broad aspects, including vocational guidance and preparation of girls and women for work life; measures to meet the needs of working women with family responsibilities; the development of administrative machinery to deal with women's problems; and other important subjects. The Commission asked the ILO for full reports and background materials from this conference.

The ILO representative also reported the decision of the ILO Governing Body to place the question of employment and conditions of work for African women on the agenda of the next African regional labor conference. The Commission welcomed this further evidence of the increasing attention to needs of women in developing countries.

In commenting on the reports, I referred to the increasing importance of education and training for women workers. ILO observations indicated that employment opportunities in the future will depend increasingly on education and training. U.S. experience confirms this trend. Our 1960 census shows that women clerical workers increased 46 percent and professional workers 41 percent in the past decade, while the proportion of women operatives in manufacturing declined. In the United States today the more education a woman has the more likely she is to be working in paid employment. In 1959 more than half of all women with a college degree were working, in contrast to only two-fifths of high school graduates and a still smaller percentage of those who did not go beyond elementary school.

Another trend noted by the ILO and confirmed by U.S. experience is the increasing employment of older women. In our 1960 census almost two out of every five women workers are 45 years or over—double the proportion in 1940. Today more than half the women in our population between 45 and 54 years of age are in the labor force. I described briefly the program of our new manpower training and development act which is designed primarily to

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN. 6/407.

retrain workers whose skills are outmoded by automation and technological developments. I also discussed the growth of community colleges as a relatively new development through which workers can obtain advance education in their home locality with little or no tuition or cost.

The ILO report on retirement age provided current information on laws in the various countries. In the several years the Commission has considered this subject, the major question has been whether the age should be the same for men and women. Today approximately a third of the countries have established a lower retirement age for women. Soviet delegates have consistently urged that the work done by women entitles them to retirement at an earlier age than men. I pointed out that in the United States the age for voluntary retirement with full benefits had always been 65 for both men and women. At the present time workers of both sexes can elect to retire at 62 with reduced benefits. Noting that the right to claim such benefits at the earlier age had originally been given only to women, I observed that this was a further instance in which U.S. laws which originally provided certain advantages for women only have later been extended to men as well.

#### **Nationality of Married Women**

In a brief review of nationality law, the Netherlands and the Philippines described proposals pending in their parliaments which will bring their legislation in line with the convention on the nationality of married women adopted by the United Nations in 1955. Their comments pointed up the value of international conventions in setting simple, definitive standards which can stabilize concepts and provide a universal basis for comparison and evaluation of progress. The convention on the nationality of married women provides that marriage to an alien shall not automatically affect the nationality of the wife, and 27 countries are already parties to it.

#### **Marriage Recommendation**

One of the great achievements by the Commission on the Status of Women has been the development of international standards to safe-

guard the entrance of women into marriage. The major part of this work was completed in November 1962 when the General Assembly formally adopted a convention as requested by the Commission, calling on governments to establish guarantees for free consent of both parties, a minimum age of marriage, and compulsory registration of marriages. At this year's meeting the Commission adopted a draft recommendation designed to supplement and give broader effectiveness to the principles established in the convention.

The U.S. statement congratulated members of the Commission on the adoption of the marriage convention. I reported that during my service with the U.S. delegation to the last General Assembly I had the great personal honor of signing the convention on behalf of the United States and that various nongovernmental organizations who had worked hard for the convention had been present at the ceremony. I also expressed my appreciation to the church groups and other organizations in the United States whose support and encouragement had contributed to the strength of U.S. leadership.

With regard to the draft recommendation, I emphasized that marriage and the home are the foundations of our free society and described some of the procedures established in our State laws to safeguard the rights of women on entrance into marriage: for example, minimum age must be proved by a birth certificate or other satisfactory evidence; free consent of both spouses must be expressed in person in the application for a marriage license and during the wedding ceremony; and compulsory registration of marriage requires deposit of a certificate or other document.

#### **Advancement of Women in Developing Countries**

As noted above, the Commission recommended that the next series of regional seminars consider the advancement of women in developing countries. The United States initiated this proposal, and it carried unanimously. This decision reflected wide recognition of the value of the women's seminars which to date have dealt with two major aspects of women's status—participation in public life and family law. In line with the objectives of the Development

Decade, this third series will stimulate practical programs to improve the economic status of women as well.

The Commission heard reports on the seminar in Tokyo last May on the status of Asian women in family law, with participation by all countries in the Far East. I attended this seminar as the observer for the United States. The participants in Tokyo included both men and women of high position in their countries. Among them were a senior judge of a supreme court, an attorney general, members of ministries, solicitors, judges, lawyers, educators, social workers, civic leaders, and experts in government service. They were representative also of four of the great religions of the world—Hindu, Buddhist, Moslem, and Christian—and the discussions brought out areas of agreement on social and religious factors affecting women and their position in the family. Many of our conversations centered on the marriage convention, which at that time had not yet been approved by the General Assembly. In the meeting of the Commission I joined with others in discussing the impact of this seminar.

The Commission considered how governments can stimulate the advancement of women in their countries through seminars, fellowships, and other aspects of the advisory services program. Recent sessions of the General Assembly have adopted resolutions, on the initiative of Afghanistan, aimed at speeding up the progress of women in underdeveloped areas. The resolution last fall urged a unified, long-term program with advanced countries and nongovernmental organizations providing new resources for this purpose. The Commission decided that a first step would be a statement listing U.N. and nongovernmental resources now available. As a further step the Commission invited the Secretary-General to explore possibilities for wider use of nongovernmental projects through participation by U.N. fellows or other appropriate cooperation.

In response, 10 of the women's nongovernmental organizations presented a joint statement assuring the Commission they would inform the United Nations at the earliest possible moment of any projects which might be useful for women in developing countries. This statement was a high point in the session, illus-

trating the warm and constructive partnership which exists between the Commission and the some 30 international organizations represented in its meetings.

The U.S. statement emphasized that the advancement of women requires the cooperation and support of men as well as women and that both men and women should join in the planning. In its resolution the Commission recommended appointment of national commissions along the lines of our President's Commission on the Status of Women in the United States, which I had described at the outset of the session.

### **Work Ahead**

The next women's seminar organized by the United Nations will be in Bogotá, Colombia, in September. This will be a regional meeting for the Western Hemisphere on the status of women in family law, and the United States will be among the participants. Since nongovernmental organizations in consultative status can send observers, this seminar will be an opportunity for wide and productive exchange among women of the Americas.

At the next session of the Commission the ILO will present a biennial progress report on equal pay for equal work. The principle of equal pay without distinction as to sex has now been accepted in a great number of countries throughout the world, and I look forward to reporting new legislative action in the United States.

The Commission will also review discriminations against women in certain aspects of family law, particularly with regard to guardianship of children and rights in dissolution of marriage, divorce, or annulment. The Commission's consideration of the latter will take account of information from member countries, including a report on U.S. law and practice prepared by the Women's Bureau in the Department of Labor.

The increasing emphasis in the United Nations on operational programs will be apparent in discussion of technical assistance, seminars, fellowships, and other training and exchange activities. My statements this year drew repeatedly on experience gained by women's and other U.S. organizations in preparation for

citizenship, community service, development of new job opportunities for women, and other fields. Our contribution to the Commission's work will be more valuable as we can provide suggestions for practical implementation. The United Nations already recognizes equality of opportunity and responsibility as the right of every woman the world over. The challenge today is to give effect to these standards in their daily lives.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Appointments

Warren B. Cheston as deputy scientific attaché at London, Paul A. Siple as scientific attaché at Canberra, and William W. Williams as deputy scientific attaché at Bonn, effective July 3. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 351 dated July 3.)

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Amendment of annex III of the 1956 agreements on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands (TIAS 4049) and in Iceland (TIAS 4048) by deletion of part C, paragraph 4 (insurance). Adopted by Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization at Montreal June 4, 1963.  
*Entered into force:* June 4, 1963.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratifications deposited:* Guatemala, June 5, 1963; Panama, June 4, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

#### Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Denmark, June 12, 1963.

#### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.  
*Accessions deposited:* Cameroon, June 18, 1963; Liberia, June 18, 1963.

## BILATERAL

#### Australia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a United States naval communication station in Australia. Signed at Canberra May 9, 1963.  
*Entered into force:* June 28, 1963.

#### Austria

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Vienna June 25, 1963. Entered into force June 25, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at Washington June 6, 1950. Entered into force June 6, 1950. TIAS 2072, 3279, 4959.

*Terminated:* June 25, 1963 (superseded by agreement of June 25, 1963, *supra*).

#### Bulgaria

Agreement regarding claims of United States nationals and related financial matters. Signed at Sofia July 2, 1963. Entered into force July 2, 1963.

#### Cyprus

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Nicosia June 18, 1963. Entered into force June 18, 1963.

#### India

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at New Delhi June 19, 1963. Entered into force June 19, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended. Signed at New Delhi February 2, 1950. Entered into force February 2, 1950. TIAS 2054, 2881, 4318, 4553.

*Terminated:* June 19, 1963 (superseded by agreement of June 19, 1963, *supra*).

#### Indonesia

Agreements amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952, 5054, 5118, 5254). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta June 21, 1963. Entered into force June 21, 1963.

#### Japan

Agreement providing for utilization of certain Japanese yen accruing to the United States under the agricultural commodities agreements of May 31, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3234, 4495), and February 10, 1956 (TIAS 3580). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 14, 1963. Entered into force June 14, 1963.

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**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 1-7**

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*346	7/1	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*347	7/1	Concert to commemorate anniversary of U.N.
*348	7/1	Statue of George Washington presented to Uruguay.
349	7/1	Netherlands compensation program for Nazi victims.
350	7/1	Note requesting Soviet official to leave U.S.
*351	7/3	Cheston, Siple, Williams appointed scientific attachés (biographic details).
352	7/3	Mrs. Anderson: July 4 remarks on Bulgarian TV and radio.
353	7/3	Airport loan to Haiti suspended.
354	7/2	Agreement with Bulgaria on financial questions.
355	7/2	Trade relations with Bulgaria.
†356	7/2	Chayes: "The Rule of Law—Now."
357	7/5	Protest against "security strips" in East Berlin and East Germany.
358	7/5	Mrs. Anderson: Plastics-USA exhibit.

\*Not printed.  
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Department of State 1963

The Department of State recently released a 152-page illustrated report, *Department of State 1963*, which describes its activities at home and abroad during the past year.

The report opens with a brief discussion of the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and then relates in some detail the different means by which the Department of State has been working for the achievement of those objectives.

In a foreword, President Kennedy expresses the view that "the men and women to whom we entrust this critical task" of promoting our foreign relations, "and the work they accomplish are too little known by the American people whose interests they serve." The President adds, "If it [this publication] helps to convey to you something of the same sense of admiration for these dedicated men and women which I share with many of my predecessors, it will truly serve our national purpose."

The book deals with the activities not only of the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State but also of Department offices less well-known to the general public, such as the Executive Secretariat, the Policy Planning Council, the Offices of Security and Protocol, and the Foreign Service Institute. It also includes sections on the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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THE  
DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE  
**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1257*



*July 29, 1963*

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DEPOSITORY

# Fulfilling Our Basic Commitments as a Nation

*Statement by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your committee to offer to you my advice about the foreign policy implications of Senate bill 1732. Let me say, at the very beginning, that I consider these foreign policy aspects to be secondary in importance. The primary reason why we must attack the problems of discrimination is rooted in our basic commitments as a nation and a people. We must try to eliminate discrimination due to race, color, religion, not to make others think better of us but because it is incompatible with the great ideals to which our democratic society is dedicated. If the realities at home are all they should be, we shan't have to worry about our image abroad.

As matters stand, however, racial discrimination here at home has important effects on our foreign relations. This is not because such discrimination is unique to the United States.

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Senate Committee on Commerce on July 10 (press release 366) during hearings on S. 1732, a bill to eliminate discrimination in public accommodations affecting interstate commerce.

Discrimination on account of race, color, religion, national or tribal origin may be found in many countries. But the United States is widely regarded as the home of democracy and the leader of the struggle for freedom, for human rights, for human dignity. We are expected to be the model—no higher compliments could be paid to us. So our failures to live up to our proclaimed ideals are noted—and magnified and distorted.

One of the epochal developments of our time has been the conversion of the old colonial empires into a host of new independent nations—some 50 since the Second World War. The vast majority of these newly independent people are nonwhite, and they are determined to eradicate every vestige of the notion that the white race is superior or entitled to special privileges because of race. Were we as a nation in their shoes, we would do the same.

This tremendous transformation in the world has come about under the impulse of the fundamental beliefs set forth in the second and third

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1257 PUBLICATION 7580 JULY 29, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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sentences of our Declaration of Independence. These universal ideas which we have done so much to nurture have spread over the earth. The spiritual sons of the American Revolution are of every race. For let us remind ourselves that the great Declaration said "all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights"—not "all men except those who are not white."

Freedom, in the broadest and truest sense, is the central issue in the world struggle in which we are engaged. We stand for government by the consent of the governed, for government by law, for equal opportunity, for the rights and worth of the individual human being. These are aspirations shared, I believe, by the great majority of mankind. They give us allies, declared and undeclared, on all the continents—including many people behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

I believe that the forces of freedom are making progress. I am confident that if we persevere in the efforts we are now making, we shall eventually achieve the sort of world we seek—a world in which all men will be safe in freedom and peace.

But in waging this world struggle we are seriously handicapped by racial or religious discrimination in the United States. Our failure to live up to the pledges of our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution embarrasses our friends and heartens our enemies.

In their efforts to enhance their influence among the nonwhite peoples and to alienate them from us, the Communists clearly regard racial discrimination in the United States as one of their most valuable assets.

Soviet commentary on racial tension in the United States has stressed four themes:

1. Racism is inevitable in the American capitalist system.

2. Inaction by the U.S. Government is tantamount to support of the racists.

3. Recent events have exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. claims to ideological leadership of the "so-called free world."

4. The U.S. policy toward Negroes is clearly indicative of its attitude toward peoples of color throughout the world.

Racial discrimination and its exploitation by

the Communists would have damaged our international position more than they have in fact done but for four circumstances. The first is that nonwhite students have encountered race prejudice in Soviet bloc countries. The second is the loyalty of nonwhite Americans to the United States and its institutions. Despite the disabilities they have suffered they have, with rare exceptions, preserved their faith in our democracy. They have fought to defend it, and they stand guard on the ramparts of freedom today—in Berlin, in West Germany, in Southeast Asia, on all the continents and seas, and in the skies.

The third reason why racial discrimination and its exploitation by our adversaries have not caused us greater damage is that we have made progress in removing discriminatory laws and practices, have advanced toward full equality.

And the fourth reason is that the power of the Federal Government—especially its executive and judicial branches—has been exerted to secure the rights of racial minorities. The recent meeting of African heads of state, at Addis Ababa, condemned racial discrimination "especially in the United States," then approved the role of U.S. Federal authorities in attempting to combat it.

If progress should stop, if Congress should not approve legislation designed to remove remaining discriminatory practices, questions would inevitably arise in many parts of the world as to the real convictions of the American people. In that event hostile propaganda might be expected to hurt us more than it has hurt us until now.

#### **Treatment of Nonwhite Diplomats**

I now turn to a special concern of the Department of State: the treatment of nonwhite diplomats and visitors to the United States. We cannot expect the friendship and respect of nonwhite nations if we humiliate their representatives by denying them, say, service in a highway restaurant or city cafe.

Under international law and through the practice of nations, a host country owes certain duties to the diplomatic representatives which are accredited to it, in order to facilitate

the discharge by those representatives of their functions. For example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which is widely recognized as codifying much of the international law on the subject of diplomatic relations, provides that a diplomat shall be treated by the receiving state with due respect and that state shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity. These obligations are not properly discharged unless diplomatic representatives have access, without discrimination or hindrance, to the public accommodations required by travelers in going about their business.

The United States Government expects that American diplomats abroad will be received in a manner appropriate to their capacity as representatives of the United States. We expect that they will be treated with courtesy and that they will be afforded the facilities necessary for the performance of their functions. Comity among the nations of the world requires that all countries act to receive foreign diplomatic representatives with courtesy and treat them with helpful consideration. We in the United States want to make sure that our conduct as a host country does not merely live up to commonly accepted requirements but indeed sets a standard for all the world.

Putting aside law, custom, and usage regarding the reception of foreign diplomats in this country, the United States has a tradition of warm and friendly reception for those who come to visit these shores from abroad. This tradition is one of the important values in the American heritage. It has been known throughout the world. We want to continue to uphold it and give it living reality in all of our actions and dealings.

One hundred and eleven nations send their diplomatic representatives to Washington and to New York City—in New York to an organization created to represent humanity. And every year thousands of other foreign nationals come to this country on official business or as visitors—professors, mayors, provincial governors, technicians, students, as well as chiefs of state and heads of government and cabinet ministers. They come with avid interest in learning more about us. We value good will.

Indeed, we enjoy much good will. And we would enjoy much more if we did not permit good will to be impaired by such senseless acts as refusing to serve a cup of coffee to a customer because his skin is dark.

Yet, within the last 2 years, scores of incidents of racial discrimination involving foreign diplomats accredited to this country have come to the attention of the Department of State. These incidents have occurred in all sections of the United States. Let me cite a few examples.

*Denial of admittance to hotels.* In one case the ambassador of one of the larger African countries was taking a trip involving a reservation at a large hotel. When the manager of the hotel realized that the ambassador was not white, he decided to cancel the reservation. It took several top-level officials the better part of a day to persuade the management of that hotel to accept the ambassador in order to avoid an international incident.

*Refusal of service in restaurants.* There have been many complaints on this score. One of the most publicized involved the representative of a West African country about to obtain its independence. He was refused service while en route from Washington to Pittsburgh. As a result of a casual remark made by him some time later, this incident was reported in our newspapers and throughout Africa. The Department worked hard to make amends for this unfortunate episode. The restaurant opened its doors to all customers regardless of color. Local authorities asked the representative to pay a return visit. But, even in this case, the damage was probably not completely undone. And in many cases there have been no amends.

One African ambassador was en route here from New York. His first experience, even before he had a chance to present his credentials to the President, was that of being ejected from a roadside restaurant.

A Caribbean country which recently became independent assigned consular responsibilities in the immediate area to its first secretary in Washington. In traveling through his area of responsibility he was recently ejected from a

restaurant which he had previously been informed was integrated.

An African ambassador who had experienced several times refusals of service in restaurants finally complained to the Department of State when his wife and 8-year-old child were denied a glass of water. The ambassador wrote to me that he had been an officer in the French Army during World War II and had led his men in battle. He said that even under battle conditions he had treated the children of the enemy with enough kindness and consideration to spare them a drink of water from his canteen.

*Denial of admittance to public beaches.* An Asian cabinet member and some of his diplomatic colleagues stationed in Washington were refused admittance to a beach nearby. An African ambassador was not only refused admittance to a public beach in this area but threatened and insulted. He now represents his country in a European country. The act of hostility he experienced here remains for him a vivid recollection.

These unpleasant experiences indicate the conditions under which foreign diplomats of color work in the Capital of the United States. I have heard it suggested that some of these representatives may be looking for trouble, that they are trying to test facilities in order to embarrass the United States for political purposes. But it has been our experience in the Department of State that these diplomats are trying to avoid incidents.

The nonwhite diplomat often prefers to keep within the confines of the District of Columbia, knowing that restaurants, swimming pools, beaches, theaters, and other establishments in a large part of the United States are potential places of trouble. If he wants to make a trip, he frequently seeks the assistance of the Department of State in order to avoid embarrassment.

Most governments expect their diplomats to travel in the host country. Most foreign countries, and particularly those in Africa, are well aware of the problems of racial discrimination in the United States. When diplomats from these countries return home they may have learned to understand the difficulties with which our Government has to cope in giving full effect

to the civil rights to which all Americans are entitled.

#### **Incidents Involving Other Visitors**

Humiliating incidents are not confined to foreign diplomats stationed in this country. They sometimes involve other visitors from abroad such as recipients of leader grants, AID [Agency for International Development] specialists who may be teachers and graduate students, and even high-level state visitors.

The head of the Civil Aeronautics Board of a West African country, brought here under the sponsorship of the United States Government, was denied service in a restaurant. He terminated his trip right then and there. The mayor of the capital city of a British possession in Africa, which is just about to obtain independence, was humiliated in a restaurant. The assistant secretary of state of another West African country was refused service at a hotel and a restaurant.

We are also aware of incidents involving foreign students who come to the United States, some under government sponsorship and others on their own. These students come here to learn not only skills which will be useful to them when they return home but about our way of life. Some of them return home disappointed and even embittered.

Sometimes these incidents involve not Africans or Asians, but Europeans. Not too long ago a German student was jailed for having eaten a meal in the colored side of a bus terminal lunch counter. The student had chosen to sit there because the white side was completely filled.

I have cited typical incidents. Now I should like to quote just a few of the comments made by nonwhite diplomats in Washington to members of the staff of the Department of State.

An African ambassador: "I am a friend of the United States and I want relations between our two countries to be as good as possible. I am particularly aware of the efforts this administration is making to improve the status of civil rights and, therefore, I shall instruct my staff to be careful not to embarrass our Government by being involved in any unpleasant

situations. Yet I have to find some sort of accommodations for my staff, and I am really at a loss as to how to avoid getting into trouble."

Another African ambassador said: "In spite of the good work this country is doing, personal relations spoil a good deal of the work done in other fields. People feel very hurt when they are treated in this way."

These comments are illustrative. Others are contained in a supplemental paper which I shall be glad to leave with you.

With respect to the presence of diplomats and other foreign visitors in the United States, the provisions barring discrimination in places of public accommodation would go a long way toward removing some of the most acute problems we have experienced in this area. These provisions would end some of the most obvious and embarrassing forms of discrimination. They would enable foreign visitors in our country to travel with much less fear of hindrance and insult. They would create a more normal and friendlier environment for our relations with other countries.

I have dwelt on the experiences and reactions of diplomats and other visitors to this country because they are of special concern to the Department of State. But I would state as emphatically as I can that I do not ask for them rights and decencies which are in practice denied to colored American citizens. One should not need a diplomatic passport in order to enjoy ordinary civil and human rights. Nor would these diplomats and other visitors be favorably impressed by efforts on our part to treat them differently from nonwhite Americans. They realize full well that they are being discriminated against, not as diplomats or as foreigners but on account of their race.

The counselor of an African embassy said: "We do not want any special privileges. We should decline them if they were offered. This is not the answer. We want what American diplomats in our country would get."

The head of government of a large West African country complained when he found that the hotel in which he had been lodged was segregated. He said he would not have stayed there if he had known it was not open to Negro Americans.

So, let me stress again, the interest of the Department of State in this bill reaches far beyond obtaining decent treatment for nonwhite diplomats and visitors. We are directly and comprehensively concerned with obtaining decent treatment of all human beings, including American citizens.

This is a problem which merits the concern and effort of all Americans without regard to any particular region of the country, race, or political party. The present racial crisis divides and weakens, and challenges, the Nation both at home and in the world struggle in which we are engaged. I deeply hope that the issues involved can be approached on the basis of genuine bipartisanship, just as are the broad objectives of this country's foreign policy.

Finally, I note that specific legislative language is being considered by the committee with the Justice Department: the Department of State is not concerned with detailed questions of legislation and enforcement. We in State are concerned with the underlying purpose of the proposed measure and the adverse effects of the present situation. What we would hope is that the Congress would join the executive and the judiciary in declaring it to be our national policy to accord every citizen—and every person—the respect due to him as an individual.

I want to reiterate most emphatically that in the fateful struggle in which we are engaged to make the world safe for freedom, the United States cannot fulfill its historic role unless it fulfills its commitments to its own people.

## SUPPLEMENT

Other comments made by nonwhite diplomats and representatives of the Office of Protocol:

A counselor of an African embassy—"The result is that a black diplomat is rather cut off, he withdraws to himself and sees only his own people. This creates constant resentment throughout our staff. Some of us are rather bitter. There is so much about America which is good. What America has done for the underdeveloped countries is wonderful. But here, in this matter, we are dealing on a personal level. When people come to our country, we try to make them feel more at home than they are in their country. Our general feeling here is that 'I am forever a stranger.' There is something about American policy which cannot be explained. It cuts through all your policy—

is the contradiction between what you say and what you do. You accuse the new countries of a double standard, but there are certain things in this country which seem false. On the one hand, ideals are pitched very high; while on the other, behavior is pitched very low. With never-ending talk of equality there is flagrant racial discrimination—we don't trust this country. If you give me what I know you think is good rate, I resent it, and I do not respect you."

An African ambassador—"I definitely feel that life in Washington is like living on an island, and that if ever travel, it should be only en route to New York. But even in Washington, things have not been easy."

A staff member of an African embassy—"Even the best friend of this country cannot be happy. One feels sad. One begins to feel all this talk of good relations, the free world . . . is farcical when in daily life this is the situation. It imposes an undue burden which ordinarily one wouldn't have. We feel humiliated."

A staff member of an African embassy—"Ever since I ran into discrimination, I am conscious that we must avert any type of incident. We go about our work with a great load on our minds. We are conscious of it all the time. One is not in the country to provoke incidents. One does not wish to embarrass the host government."

An Asian ambassador—"I realize that discrimination exists and that it cannot be completely abolished overnight. However, I cannot understand or tolerate this discrimination. Although I am not directly affected by it, it hurts me deeply because it affects some of my best friends. When my friends are insulted, I am insulted as well. The people who wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights meant well and I sincerely hope that one day soon the Constitution will be justified. The Government of the United States has shown its willingness to uphold America's boast of equality of all men. But it must act more strongly or this equality will be ridiculed in foreign countries by those who would use it as propaganda. We know that we are limited in our choice of accommodations and this creates in us an inferiority complex. We are here to do a job, but because of this inferiority we cannot do it well. It also leads to dangerous statements made by the diplomats on their return to their countries."

An African ambassador—"I have been told that I ought to wear my robes when I go out, but no, that's ridiculous. At home I dress the way Americans do, and I am not going to dress specially. After all, it's the man who counts, the person inside the suit. I will not wear special clothes in order to be respected as a person. I will be respected regardless of what I wear. When I feel like wearing robes, I will, but if you ask me to do it so everyone will know I am an African, no, I won't."

Another African ambassador—"If I have to announce that I am an Ambassador before I enter any establishment or apartment building in order not to be subjected to insults and humiliation, I will request that my Government recall me."

## Under Secretary Harriman Departs for Test Ban Talks in Moscow

The Department of State announced on July 9 (press release 363) that Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman, the President's Special Representative, would depart for London and Moscow on July 11.

Accompanying him to London and Moscow were: Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Carl Kaysen, White House staff; William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; John T. McNaughton, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Frank E. Cash, Department of State; and Alexander Akalovsky, Franklin A. Long, Nedville E. Nordness, and Frank Press, consultant, all of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

## President Kennedy and Soviet Leaders Exchange Fourth of July Messages

*Following is an exchange of messages between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the U.S.S.R.*

### President Kennedy to Soviet Leaders

JULY 4, 1963

The American people are grateful for your message of good will on the anniversary of our Independence Day. The American Revolution was based on the desire of our people to build a free nation in a world of peace. Today that desire for peace is more urgent than ever. The world has long passed that time when armed conflict can be the solution to international problems. That is why I share your desire expressed in your message of today that we move forward with understanding towards the solution of those key problems which divide us. I am hopeful that world peace, just and lasting, can be achieved.

## Soviet Leaders to President Kennedy

JULY 4, 1963

On the occasion of the national day of the United States of America, Independence Day, we convey to you and to the American people warm greetings and wishes for peace and well-being.

In our century, the century of conquering atomic energy and of penetrating in the depths of the universe, the preservation of peace has become a truly vital necessity for all mankind. We are convinced that if the governments of our countries, along with the governments of other countries, having displayed a realistic attitude, firmly set out on the path of removing the hotbeds of international tension and expanding businesslike cooperation, people everywhere will acclaim this as a great contribution toward consolidating universal peace.

## United States Blocks Cuban Assets To Counter Communist Subversion

Press release 360 dated July 8

At the request of the Secretary of State, the Treasury Department instituted blocking controls with respect to Cuba effective 12:01 a.m. July 8. This action was taken to restrict the movement of funds from Cuba in accordance with the resolution adopted on July 3, 1963,<sup>1</sup> by the Council of the Organization of American States urging member governments to implement a series of recommendations to counter Castro-Communist subversion in the hemisphere. The measure is also in accord with the resolutions to counter subversive activities adopted on April 4, 1963, at Managua, Nicaragua, by the Governments of the Central American Republics, Panama, and the United States.<sup>2</sup> This blocking action will also contribute further to the economic isolation of Cuba.

The controls instituted on July 8 are modeled generally on those which are in effect with respect to Communist China and North Korea. They will (1) block all assets in the United States of Cuba or of persons in Cuba, (2) prohibit persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from engaging in unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars to or from Cuba, and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

<sup>2</sup> For texts, see BULLETIN of May 6, 1963, p. 719.

(3) prohibit all other unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuba nationals or transactions involving property in which there is a Cuban interest. Thus Cuba will be denied the use of American financial facilities for transfers of funds to Latin America for subversive purposes.

Cuban refugees in the United States or elsewhere in the free world will be regarded as unblocked nationals unless they are acting on behalf of the Cuban regime. Where serious hardship can be proven, remittances by persons residing in the United States to members of their immediate family residing in Cuba will be authorized by special license.

## Letters of Credence

*Guatemala*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Guatemala, Carlos García-Bauer, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 10. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 365 dated July 10.

## Secretary Assigned Leadership in International Aviation Policy

*Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Secretary Rusk.<sup>1</sup>*

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, June 22, 1963.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The recommendations of the Interagency Steering Committee on International Aviation Policy, which I approved a few weeks ago,<sup>2</sup> underscored the need for a focus of leadership within the executive branch for (1) identifying emerging problems and advising me on their solution; (2) giving continuing attention to international aviation policies; and (3) assuring necessary follow-up actions. Since international aviation policies necessarily affect our over-all relations with other nations, I shall look to the Secretary of

<sup>1</sup> 28 Fed. Reg. 6489.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 20, 1963, p. 784.

State, as a part of his assigned responsibilities, to provide such a focus of leadership for this vital area of foreign policy.

In making this assignment to you, I am mindful of the statutory responsibilities vested in the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Agency for International Development, which bear importantly on the field of international aviation policy and of the contributions which these agencies are able to make. It is my desire, therefore, that you take such measures as may be necessary to assure that these agencies are appropriately consulted on all matters affecting their interests or falling within their special areas of competence. The effective accomplishment of this undertaking requires the cooperation and full utilization of the resources and skills of each of the agencies which participate in international aviation activities.

In this regard, I endorse the recommendations contained in the May 29, 1963, summary of the Bureau of the Budget study that there be established a high-level interagency Committee on International Aviation Policy, to be chaired by the Secretary of State or his representative. The other members will be the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, or their representatives, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency will serve as vice chairman.

This committee will concern itself with policy matters affecting international aviation, as distinct from the technical matters which will, in the first instance, continue to be handled through the mechanism of the Interagency Group on International Aviation. The Chairman should convene the Committee on International Aviation Policy as soon as possible.

I know that you will take the necessary steps within the Department of State to assure that there are clear assignments of responsibility and adequate allocations of staff resources for meeting the important responsibilities which

leadership in international aviation policy matters entails. Please report to me from time to time upon the significant developments under this program, including such revisions in present policy as may be indicated by changing circumstances.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## Captive Nations Week, 1963

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212) the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation, designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week", and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS the cause of human rights and dignity remains a universal aspiration and

WHEREAS justice requires the elemental right of free choice and


WHEREAS this nation has an abiding commitment to the principles of national self-determination and human freedom.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 14, 1963, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:  
DEAN RUSK,  
*Secretary of State.*

<sup>1</sup> No. 3543; 28 *Fed. Reg.* 7065.

## The Rule of Law—Now

*by Abram Chayes*  
*Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>*

Since the beginning of the 16th General Assembly in the fall of 1961 we have heard about the financial crisis at the United Nations. Of course there is a financial crisis in the U.N. The bills that the organization is incurring—largely on account of its operations to keep the peace in the Congo and in the Middle East—have been outrunning by a very large amount the funds it has been able to collect from its members. When Secretary-General U Thant first brought this problem to the attention of the organization he predicted a deficit of \$170 million by June 30, 1962. In fact, despite the bond issue and vigorous efforts to collect arrears, the U.N. deficit, largely attributable to these two peacekeeping enterprises, still amounted to \$72,400,000 at the end of this fiscal year. Although the recent successes of the Congo operations will bring a significant cut-back in current outlays there and permit us to hope that this item may be entirely eliminated in the not too distant future, the problem of financing the rest of the operation and of paying old debts remains.

Thus the financial crisis at the U.N. is a real one. But, as is often the case with controversies over the power of the purse, financial questions cover more deep-seated issues of constitutional dimensions. And in this case I believe the resolution of the financial questions

now being debated in the United Nations<sup>2</sup> will tell us a great deal about the rule of law in our world and about our ability to make it prevail.

We are met here not as national or governmental representatives but as lawyers, members of a common profession that in many ways transcends national boundaries. Our purpose is to consider how this profession, as a profession, can contribute to the maintenance of world peace. The agenda of the conference covers a familiar range of topics: strengthening the U.N., third-party settlement of international disputes, fuller use of the World Court, respect for agreed procedures in resolving international issues. All of these go to make up the ideal of the rule of law in international affairs.

Through its discussions, this conference will seek to develop ways of approaching this ideal more nearly in the future. Yet, in the question of U.N. finances, all of the elements I have listed are implicated. And if the nations of the world cannot bring themselves in this matter to act in accordance with the dictates of the rule of law, it is hard to have any very great hope for our capacity to improve and extend it in the future. For this is not a situation where international law, on either its substantive or procedural side, was rudimentary or ill adapted to the situation. The legal issues did not turn on the opinions of publicists or hypothetical reasoning. The question of U.N. finances brought into play a developed corpus of law and legal materials that were dealt with by the most advanced of international legal institutions.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the World Conference of Lawyers on World Peace Through the Rule of Law at Athens, Greece, on July 3 (press release 356 dated July 2).

<sup>2</sup>See p. 178.

### World Court Opinion on U.N. Assessments

The United Nations undertook the burdens of keeping the peace in the Middle East in 1956 and in the Congo in 1960. In each case the action represented a broad consensus of the states members as to the duties and responsibilities of the organization in the circumstances. The original resolution establishing the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East passed the General Assembly without a dissenting vote.<sup>3</sup> The Congo operation, authorized in the first instance by unanimous vote of the Security Council, was later confirmed and expanded by the General Assembly, also without a dissenting vote.<sup>4</sup>

The financing resolutions in each case, too, were the product of extensive consideration of the issues, legal as well as political, and registered broad consensus. Nevertheless, when the Secretary-General first called to the attention of the General Assembly that many members were increasingly in arrears in paying their assessments for these operations, some members questioned the legal liability to pay these assessments. A number of grounds were advanced: that the operations themselves were *ultra vires* or had not been properly authorized by the organization; that the Assembly was without power to compel money contributions in support of such operations or, in any case, had not intended to do so in its assessment resolutions.

International legal institutions provide a formal method for resolving such controversies. The U.N. Charter provides in article 96: "The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question." The Court's competence to render such an opinion is not affected by the adherence or nonadherence of any member of the United Nations to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Article 96 is a part of the charter agreed to by all signatory nations. And, by force of article 93 of the charter, "All Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of

### President Sends Greetings to Lawyers' Conference

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the World Conference of Lawyers on World Peace Through the Rule of Law held at Athens, Greece, June 30-July 6.*

It gives me great pleasure to send greetings to the distinguished group of lawyers participating in the First World Conference on World Peace Through The Rule of Law. This Conference represents five years of effort and brings together lawyers and judges from over a hundred countries in the attempt to develop and strengthen the legal machinery that must form the basis for peaceful relations among all nations. The habits of respect for the law and confidence in its effectiveness are at the root of freedom within nations. And these same habits and confidence must find their place in the relations between nations if we are to build a just and stable peace.

the International Court of Justice." Pursuant to article 96, the General Assembly, by a vote of 52 to 11, with 32 abstentions, after full and careful debate, adopted Resolution 1731 (XVI) requesting the advice of the Court. The question as put in the resolution was whether the expenses authorized in the assessment resolutions covering the U.N. operations in the Congo and Middle East were "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the charter so that, by virtue of article 17, they "shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."

As is required in such cases, the International Court of Justice gave notice of the proceedings to all states members and gave each the opportunity to submit views on the issues in writing or in oral pleadings. It was not an empty offer. In no other proceeding before the Court have so many states participated. They represented many parts of the globe and all legal systems. The official volume of the Court reporting the case includes written submissions in various forms from 20 different countries: Upper Volta, Italy, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Canada, Japan, Portugal, Australia, the United King-

<sup>3</sup> For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 793.

<sup>4</sup> For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159, and Oct. 10, 1960, p. 583.

dom, Spain, Ireland, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and Rumania.

In the oral arguments which began on the 14th of May 1962 and proceeded through the 21st, 9 of the nations pleaded orally before the Court: Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia, Ireland, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. The United Kingdom and Ireland were represented by their Attorneys General; Australia by its Solicitor General; Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, and the United States sent the Legal Advisers of their respective Foreign Offices.<sup>5</sup> The U.S.S.R. argued orally before the Court for the first time in history and was represented by the distinguished lawyer, Mr. Grigory Tunkin, former Chairman of the International Law Commission and Director of the Juridical-Treaty Branch of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Two months after the oral arguments, the Court, acting with commendable dispatch in view of the importance of the case and the difficulty of the issues, rendered its opinion. By a vote of 9 to 5 it gave an affirmative answer to the question presented. It held that the expenditures authorized in the financing resolutions were indeed "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17, with the consequence that assessment of those expenses by the General Assembly was binding on the members.<sup>6</sup>

The World Court, as all of you know, is a most distinguished panel of jurists. The Statute of the Court prescribes that it "shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults of recognized competence in international law." Members of the United Nations are enjoined, in electing judges to the Court, to "bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should

individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured." It goes without saying that members of the Court sit as independent judges and not as governmental representatives. Indeed, the votes of the judges in the *U.N. Assessments* case itself did not uniformly reflect the national positions their governments had taken on the issues.

I have said that the decision of this Court, so constituted and so composed, was rendered by a vote of 9 to 5. Some have said that this absence of unanimity somehow derogates from the force of the decision. Of course that cannot be so. The very existence of a court with more than one judge implies the possibility of differences of view among the judges. In my own country we are accustomed to seeing questions of grave public and political importance decided by narrow majorities—often a majority of one—in our highest court. The International Court itself, in the recent South-West Africa decision, decided in favor of its own jurisdiction by a single vote. In that case judges of United States and Soviet nationality found themselves together in the majority, while the President of the Court, a Polish national, and the British, French, and Australian judges were in the minority. Although the division was thus as narrow as it could possibly be, we, as lawyers, would expect that South Africa would abide by the decision and appear on the merits of the case. And she has done so.

The opinion of the Court in a case such as the *U.N. Assessments* case is characterized as "advisory." It cannot be "binding" in a juridical sense because there are no parties before the Court upon whom a judgment could operate. But for all other purposes, I would myself suppose that the opinion of the Court, in an advisory case properly before it where the issue is justiciable, is an authoritative statement of the law. In the *U.N. Assessments* case all the conditions were met. The case was before the Court at the request of the General Assembly under article 96 of the charter. The issue was a narrowly defined question of legal liability, fully matured and ripe for adjudication on

<sup>5</sup> For a statement made before the Court by Mr. Chayes, see *ibid.*, July 2, 1962, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> For a Department statement on the Court's opinion, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

concrete facts comprehensively developed before the tribunal.

But whether or not the opinion by its own force establishes the law we need not debate here. The General Assembly itself has removed any possible question about the status of the Court's advisory opinion. The opinion was transmitted to the Secretary-General and by him to the General Assembly at its 17th session. And after consideration and debate, both in the appropriate committee and on the floor, the Assembly, by a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions, declared that it "accepts the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question submitted to it."<sup>7</sup> Thus this phase of the case came to a close.

#### General Assembly Action on Court's Decision

The experience in the United Nations since the decision of the Court has not been altogether disheartening. I am informed that approximately \$16 million in arrearages has been paid by 46 countries. Although these countries are, for the most part, small and the amounts owing were correspondingly small, their action to comply with the decision of the Court represents a commendable example of the rule of law in action in international affairs.

Another development is worth noting. As you know, article 19 of the charter provides that:

A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.

Just prior to the beginning of the 17th session of the General Assembly 6 countries were in such a situation, and again just prior to the special session that began this spring, 10 countries were in arrears more than 2 full years, taking into account the Congo and Middle East assessments. In all of these cases but one, the states concerned, by appropriate payment in advance of the convening of the General Assembly, removed themselves from the scope of article

<sup>7</sup> For text of a resolution adopted on Dec. 19, 1962, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

19. And it should be remarked that these countries were not confined to any single quarter of the globe or any single political system.

The one exception was Haiti, which, as you may know, was in arrears for more than the total of 2 years' contributions when the recent special session opened. Haiti made no payments against its arrears until May 24, 10 days after the special session began. The Secretary-General, in a letter dated May 14, the day the Assembly convened, informed the Assembly President, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan, that Haiti was in arrears in an amount exceeding that specified in article 19. At the opening of the General Assembly, the Haitian delegate absented himself from the hall. Sir Zafrulla, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, replied to the Secretary-General's letter the following day. He said:

I have received your letter of 14 May 1963, informing me that, at the opening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly, Haiti was in arrears in the payment of its financial contribution to the United Nations within terms of Article 19 of the Charter. I would have made an announcement drawing the attention of the Assembly to the loss of voting rights in the Assembly of the Member State just mentioned, under the first sentence of Article 19, had a formal count of vote taken place in the presence of a representative of that State at the opening plenary meeting. As no such vote took place, and as the representative of Haiti was not present, this announcement became unnecessary.

The Secretary-General's letter and the President's reply were circulated as formal U.N. documents.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, the General Assembly, just a few days ago, in bringing to a close an intensive 7-week special review of the financing of peacekeeping operations, reemphasized the obligation of members to pay their arrearages. A resolution adopted by the overwhelming vote of the Assembly requests the member states in arrears for the Congo and Middle East operations to make arrangements with the Secretary-General "within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment by instalment, for bringing the payments of these accounts up to date as soon as

<sup>8</sup> For texts, see Note No. 2768 issued to correspondents by the U.N. Office of Public Information on May 21.

possible. . . ." The deadline for making such arrangements is set at October 31, 1963.

#### Acceptance of Prescribed Sanctions

I said earlier that the experience in the U.N. since the Court's decision is not wholly disheartening. There is a record of payment of arrearages by certain smaller nations, and in particular the record reflects a healthy respect on the part of the states members for the sanction of article 19. But, if the experience is not wholly disheartening, it cannot be said to be altogether cheering either. For a number of states remain—and, among them, the most substantial delinquents—that have as yet made no payments against their arrearages. Again I should say that this group of states is confined to no single geographical region and no single political or social system.

It must be said then that the implications of the present financial controversy in the United Nations for the rule of law remain in doubt. I hope, and we must all hope—as lawyers interested in the vindication of the processes and procedures of a system of law—that the states remaining in arrears will find some way to meet their obligations and pay the assessments which the Court has found are binding upon them. If so, the rule of law to which we all stand dedicated will have won a notable victory.

But if they persist in their refusal to pay, whatever may be the positions of our governments, I hope we as lawyers will not blink what is at stake. After the course of events that I have outlined here today, there can be no question that the obligations are lawfully owing. That issue was properly presented to a tribunal that all of us, whatever system of law we are familiar with, would recognize as a fully competent court. It was decided by that court after a hearing comporting with the highest standards of justice, a hearing in which there was full opportunity for all interested parties to participate and be heard. The decision of that court was overwhelmingly accepted by the General Assembly, to which it was reported. States may, of course, continue to persist in

their refusal to pay. But they cannot ask us to accept that their refusal is based on legal grounds. When they argue for a result different from that pronounced by the Court, they assert the right to be judges in their own case. And that, as we all know, is fundamentally at odds with the rule of law.

We must all hope that it does not come to this. But if it does, the processes of the law have not yet been exhausted. In this situation, unlike most, the international legal system provides its own sanction for breach of duty. As we have seen, article 19 provides that, when delinquency reaches a certain point, the delinquent "shall have no vote" in the General Assembly. The terms of that article are clear. It represents the considered judgment of the states that framed the charter or have since adhered to it as to the sanction appropriate to continued financial irresponsibility on the part of a member. Each member state has bound itself to the charter containing this sanction—knowingly, solemnly, and with full appreciation of its meaning. The President of the General Assembly by his official act has affirmed the import of article 19: When the arrearages of a member state exceed 2 years' contributions, that state, automatically and by operation of the charter, has no vote in the General Assembly. Specialized agencies of the U.N. have interpreted similar provisions in their own charters in the same way. The 16 member states that have paid amounts sufficient to remove themselves from the ambit of this sanction have shown their understanding of it by their acts.

If some of the states now in arrears persist in their refusal to pay, their arrearages will exceed 2 years' contributions at the beginning of 1964 and we will face the question of the application of the sanction prescribed by the charter. The issue of fidelity of law is, I submit, as much involved in this question as in the question of payment itself.

In one of the early constitutional crises in the history of the United States the Supreme Court handed down a judgment vastly displeasing to President Jackson. We are told that Jackson's response was, "John Marshall has made his decision—now let him enforce it!" The story has many lessons, but one of them

\* For text, see p. 185.

is surely that, even in the most developed legal system, the courts cannot enforce the law by their unaided efforts. For this they must depend on the more active arms of government. And if these more active branches fail or refuse in their duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, this too is an assertion of will in place of law.

Like John Marshall's Supreme Court, the International Court cannot enforce its judgment. Only the Assembly can insure that the sanction for nonpayment of assessments is applied according to its terms. This being the case, to vote against enforcement according to the terms of article 19 is to betray the rule of law as surely as to fail to pay.

Where states have agreed to instruments governing their relations and have established rational and orderly procedures for interpreting those instruments in case of doubt, where those procedures have been duly resorted to and have produced a result, we are entitled to ask that they accept and give effect to that result. And where sanctions are duly prescribed for failure to comply, we are entitled to see that they are applied according to their terms. Unless the nations are prepared to grant this measure of assent to the institutions of law, unless we as lawyers, whatever our nation, are prepared to demand it, the work of this conference will be empty. Far more important, the rule of law, one of the handful of saving ideals that man pursues, will have suffered a grievous blow.

## President Amends Order on Trade Agreements Program Administration

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11075, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 872), and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 11075<sup>2</sup> of January 15, 1963 (28 F.R. 473), as amended by Executive Order No. 11106<sup>3</sup> of April 18,


<sup>1</sup> No. 11113; 28 Fed. Reg. 6183.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 180.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, May 27, 1963, p. 839.

1963 (28 F.R. 3911) be, and it is hereby, further amended by substituting for subsection (c) of Section 2 thereof (48 CFR § 1.2(c)) the following:

"(c) There shall be in the said Office two officers, each of whom shall have the title 'Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations', with the rank of Ambassador. The principal functions of each shall be to conduct negotiations under title II of the Act, and each shall perform such additional duties as the Special Representative may direct."



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 13, 1963.

## U.S. Makes Additional Quantities of Uranium 235 Available

*Following are two statements released by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission on July 3.*

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

On September 26, 1961, I announced an increase in the quantities of enriched uranium to be made available for peaceful uses at home and abroad.<sup>1</sup> Since that time, plans for the increased utilization of enriched uranium in nuclear power plants have become more definite and widespread. In order to give assurances that enriched uranium can be supplied to meet these needs, I am announcing today a further increase in the quantities of material to be made available.

I have determined, pursuant to section 41 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, that the quantities of uranium 235 in enriched uranium to be made available are raised from 100,000 to 200,000 kilograms for domestic distribution under section 53 and from 65,000 to 150,000 kilograms for foreign distribution under section 54. These amounts have been recommended by the Atomic Energy Commission with the concurrence of the Departments of State and Defense. The new total of 350,000

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 648.

kilograms is more than double the previous total.

The material will be distributed, by lease or sale, as required over a period of years and will be subject to prudent safeguards against unauthorized use. As nuclear programs develop in the future, it will undoubtedly be necessary to make further determinations increasing the amounts of material to be available. The capacity of the United States for producing enriched uranium is sufficient to meet all foreseeable needs for peaceful uses in addition to our defense needs.

A discussion of the new determination is contained in the attached statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

**STATEMENT BY GLENN T. SEABORG  
CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION**

The President's announcement today that the quantities of enriched uranium to be made available for peaceful uses at home and abroad have been increased to a total of 350,000 kilograms of contained U-235 is another important step forward in the civilian applications of atomic energy. Of this total, 200,000 kilograms is for distribution to licensed users within the United States and 150,000 kilograms is for distribution to foreign countries under civil agreements for cooperation.

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, enriched uranium within the United States remains the property of the U.S. Government and is leased to licensed users. Legislation to permit private ownership and sale to domestic users is presently under consideration by Congress. Enriched uranium distributed to foreign nations has been leased for use in research reactors and has been sold for use in power reactors. The charges for both lease and sale of enriched uranium at home and abroad are determined by the actual cost, with appropriate allowances for depreciation and other indirect expenses. The current schedule of charges was announced by the AEC on May 29, 1962.

The enriched uranium distributed will be used in research and development and as fuel in nuclear reactors, with the bulk of it being utilized in generating electricity. The new de-

termination by the President is expected to cover allocations of material under present domestic licenses and foreign agreements for cooperation and those anticipated in the near future. Material for use in the AEC's own facilities is not included in this determination. With the growth of nuclear power at home and abroad, further increases in the quantities of material to be made available will need to be considered from time to time. The large capacity of U.S. diffusion plants for the production of enriched uranium permits them to meet both civilian and military requirements.

Allocation of enriched uranium to a reactor project includes material for the fuel loading, for fuel consumption over the period of the domestic license or foreign agreement for cooperation, and for the inventory outside of the reactor associated with the manufacture and storage of fuel elements, cooling and shipment of irradiated fuel, and chemical processing of irradiated fuel to recover the remaining uranium and plutonium. The amount of U-235 contained in enriched uranium returned to the AEC is deducted from the amount supplied by the AEC in computing how much is available for further distribution. The material allocated to a reactor project may not be completely distributed for several decades.

As of April 30, 1963, there were in effect in the United States construction permits or operating licenses for 12 power reactors, 4 test reactors, 79 research reactors, and 16 critical-experiment facilities, and 471 licenses for other uses of special nuclear material, not including the AEC's own reactors, facilities, and uses. Agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy are in effect between the United States and a large part of the free world, including 33 countries and West Berlin; 14 of these agreements provide for cooperation on power reactors. In addition, agreements are in effect with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Enriched uranium for peaceful uses is distributed abroad only under civil agreements for cooperation. All such agreements contain a guarantee by the cooperating country that the material supplied will be used exclusively for

peaceful purposes. Safeguard provisions allowing inspection of material, facilities, and records by U.S. or international inspectors are also included, as appropriate.

## Commission Urges Expansion of American Studies Overseas

The Department of State announced on July 12 (press release 369) that the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs had that day forwarded a report to Congress recommending the expansion of the use of binational commissions in other countries to assist the development of American studies overseas as well as the general academic exchange program of the United States.

The report entitled *American Studies Abroad: Progress and Difficulties in Selected Countries*<sup>1</sup> was prepared by Walter Johnson, professor of American history at the University of Chicago and a member of the Commission. It proposes that binational commissions, now operating in 44 countries, be established in as many as feasible of the some 70 other countries with which the Department of State conducts exchange programs. Dr. Johnson points out that binational commissions enhance acceptance of American studies and other exchange activities by serving a "mutuality of national interests."

Such commissions have been set up in other countries under authority of the Fulbright Act of 1946. The broader provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 authorize establishment of commissions in all of the countries with which the United States has exchange programs. Binational commissions are usually made up equally of Americans living in a foreign country and of nationals of that country.

The report praises the effort by both private

agencies and government to "nourish and stimulate an increased understanding of the United States abroad, not by furnishing information but by imparting knowledge in depth—knowledge of our history, government, culture and aspirations." Private activities cited by the report include the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University, and the programs of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils.

Dr. Johnson urges greater care in the choice of foreign institutions for the placement of American scholars and the establishment of chairs of American studies. He recommends giving preference to universities that would incorporate American studies into their required curriculum, draw visiting scholars into the full professional life of the institution, and provide instruction in American studies by their own faculty members after an initial period.

In the two years since foreign currency funds generated under Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) became available to the Department of State for chairs and workshops in American studies, the program has reached many parts of the world.

Several of Dr. Johnson's recommendations relate to secondary school teachers, including an increase in the number of special seminars on American civilization available to them and the creation of a new category of grantee to enable such teachers of American literature, history, or related subjects to undertake advanced study at appropriate American universities or at selected universities abroad.

Dr. Johnson's is the second report to Congress by the Commission. The first, a study of the effectiveness of exchange programs, was submitted in April<sup>2</sup> and is now available in booklet form under the title "Beacon of Hope."

<sup>1</sup> A limited number of copies are available upon request from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

<sup>2</sup> For a Department announcement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 617.

## President Recommends Expansion of Peace Corps

*Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate. An identical letter was sent on the same day to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

White House press release dated July 4

JULY 4, 1963

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to transmit legislation which will authorize the appropriation of \$108 million for the Peace Corps in Fiscal Year 1964. It is fitting that this request is made on the 187th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. For the Peace Corps exemplifies the spirit of that revolution whose beginnings we celebrate today.

That revolution was not only a revolution for American independence and freedom. It was, as Jefferson perceived and Lincoln proclaimed, a revolution unbounded by geography, race or culture. It was a movement for the political and spiritual freedom of man.

Today, two centuries later and thousands of miles from its origin, the men and women of the Peace Corps are again affirming the universality of that revolution. Whether expressed by the community development projects of Latin America, or the panchayati raj program of India, the determination of people to be free, to govern themselves, and to share in the fruits of both the industrial and democratic revolutions, is one of the most profound forces at work in the world. To this revolution Peace Corps Volunteers are giving the same qualities of energy and spirit which the 21 year old Lafayette and his equally youthful contemporaries gave as volunteer participants in our own revolution.

In less than two years their accomplishments have already been impressive. They constitute

more than one-third of all the qualified secondary teachers in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Nyasaland; they have saved a three-quarter million dollar rice crop in Pakistan; they have vaccinated over 25,000 Bolivians; they are teaching in 400 Philippines schools; they have created a thriving poultry industry in the State of Punjab in India; they are teaching in every rural secondary school in Costa Rica and virtually every secondary school in British Honduras; they have contributed to the creation of a system of farm-to-market roads in Tanganyika. But these are only isolated examples; all over the world Volunteers have surveyed roads, taught students and teachers, built schools, planted forests, drilled wells, and started local industries. In their off-hours they have conducted adult education classes, organized athletic teams, and launched programs ranging from music clubs to debating teams.

As important as these achievements are, they are far less important than the contribution Peace Corps Volunteers are making in building those human relations which must exist for a happy and peaceful understanding between people. The United States and a few other fortunate nations are part of an island of prosperity in a world-wide sea of poverty. Our affluence has at times severed us from the great poverty stricken majority of the world's people. It is essential that we demonstrate that we continue to be aware of the responsibility we fortunate few have to assist the efforts of others at development and progress.

With Americans, Lord Tweedsmuir wrote, "the sense of common humanity is a warm and constant instinct and not a doctrine of the schools or a slogan of the hustings." By the careful selection and training of men and women in whom that instinct is a reality, the Peace Corps has already erased some stereotyped images of America and brought hundreds of thousands of people into contact with the

first Americans they have ever known personally. "When the Peace Corps came to my country," wrote the Minister of Development of Jamaica, "they brought a breath of fresh air. They came and mixed with the people. They worked closely with the people. They closed the gap and crashed the barrier. And because they did this, they have paved the way for our own people to understand. . . ."

It is no accident that Peace Corps Volunteers have won this kind of acceptance. Nor is it a coincidence that they have been greeted—as the Ethiopian *Herald* stated—"with open arms." They have been warmly received because they represent the best traditions of a free and democratic society—the kind of society which the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America long for as the ultimate end of their own revolution.

The Communist system can never offer men optimum freedom as human beings. The people of the world's emerging nations know this. Their aspirations for a free society are being stimulated by the presence of Peace Corps Volunteers who have come not to usurp but to encourage the responsibility of local people and not to repress but to respect the individual characteristics and traditions of the local culture. "What is most remarkable about America," wrote German scholar, Philip Schaff, "is that over its confused diversity there broods a higher unity." Because Volunteers of different races and different religions nonetheless come from the same country, they represent the hope of building a community of free nations where, in each one, conscious of its rights and duties, will have regard for the welfare of all.

Already the Peace Corps idea has spread to other nations. Last week I attended the official inauguration of West Germany's own Peace Corps program.<sup>1</sup> The first group of 250 young men and women will be ready for service next year and will eventually include more than a thousand young Germans working around the world. Three other European countries—the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway—have started similar programs. Argentina and New Zealand have already established volunteer or-

ganizations. These efforts have been stimulated and assisted by the International Peace Corps Secretariat, established by the International Conference on Middle Level Manpower last fall in Puerto Rico.<sup>2</sup> The bill I am transmitting would enable the United States to continue to encourage this movement.

The first American Volunteers are already returning to the United States after two years of Peace Corps service. They are bringing home important skills and experience which will greatly enhance our knowledge of the world and strengthen our role in international affairs. More than one-third of the 700 Volunteers returning this year have indicated a desire to work in international programs. Their ability and usefulness is attested to by the action of thirty-five universities in the United States which have established two hundred scholarships for returning Volunteers. One of these scholarships was created by the donations of the foreign students studying in California. I am also recommending a provision which would authorize the Peace Corps to assist these returning Volunteers to make the most of their opportunities for further usefulness to the Nation.

The funds I am requesting will enable the Peace Corps to place some 13,000 Volunteers in training or abroad by September 1964, a significant increase over the 9,000 who are expected to be enrolled before the end of this year.

Three thousand Volunteers of next year's increase are destined for service in Latin America and one thousand in Africa. In both of these areas an historic opportunity is at hand for the United States. In Latin America, the Peace Corps can, within the span of a relatively few years, write an important chapter in the history of Inter-American partnership and kindle faith in the possibilities of democratic action on the community level. In Africa the Peace Corps will concentrate its efforts on meeting a critical teacher shortage. The opportunity to teach hundreds of thousands of African students is unparalleled in our history.

It is my hope, therefore, that the Congress will enact this legislation making it possible

<sup>1</sup> For text of President Kennedy's remarks, see *BULLETIN* of July 22, 1963, p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> For a report on the conference, see *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1962, p. 853.

for the Peace Corps to continue to share with the new nations of the world the experience of a democratic revolution committed to human liberty.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Italy, July 9, 1963.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. *Ratifications deposited:* Nigeria, June 21, 1963; Sweden, July 1, 1963.  
*Notification given of undertaking to seek ratification:* United States (with a declaration), June 24, 1963.  
*Entered into force provisionally:* July 1, 1963.

##### Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.  
*Application to:* Bahamas, Virgin Islands, April 26, 1963.

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.  
*Signatures and acceptances:* Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, July 10, 1963.  
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.  
*Signatures and acceptances:* Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, July 10, 1963.

##### Fisheries

Declaration of understanding regarding the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington April 24, 1961.

*Acceptance deposited:* Poland, June 5, 1963.

*Entered into force:* June 5, 1963.

*Proclaimed by the President:* June 20, 1963.

##### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany (including Land Berlin), July 12, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 17, 1962 (TIAS 5259). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz June 24, 1963. Entered into force June 24, 1963.  
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 4, 1963, as amended (TIAS 5292, 5323). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz June 24, 1963. Entered into force June 24, 1963.

##### Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952, 5054, 5118, 5254). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

##### Jordan

Agreement supplementing the agreement of July 10 and September 24, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3663, 4012), so as to provide for additional investment guarantees authorized by new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman June 25, 1963. Entered into force June 25, 1963.

##### Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5208). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul July 5, 1963. Entered into force July 5, 1963.

##### New Zealand

Agreement extending the supplementary air transport services agreement of December 30, 1960, as extended (TIAS 4645, 4789, 5085). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

##### Paraguay

Agreement amending the reciprocal trade agreement of 1946 as amended (TIAS 1601, 5000) and withdrawing agreement to terminate (TIAS 5322). Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción June 26, 1963. Entered into force June 26, 1963.

##### Spain

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of March 11 and 18, 1960 (TIAS 4463), for the establishment and operation of a tracking and communications facility on the Island of Gran Canaria. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid, June 27 and 28, 1963. Entered into force July 1, 1963.

##### United Arab Republic

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 29, 1963. Entered into force June 29, 1963.

## International Trade and Economic Development

*A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the first in the history of the U.N., is scheduled to be held in the spring of 1964. Its purpose is to examine ways in which international trade can be made a more effective instrument in promoting the development of the less developed countries. All members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies are expected to attend.*

*To prepare the groundwork for the Conference, a Preparatory Committee has been established consisting of 32 countries, including most of the major trading nations of the world. At the second of the three scheduled sessions of the Preparatory Committee, which was held at Geneva, Switzerland, May 21-June 29, a preliminary exploration was conducted of the various subjects included on the agenda for the Conference.*

*Following is the text of a statement made on May 27 by Isaiah Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and chairman of the U.S. delegation.*

We had intended to avoid any general *tour d'horizon*. The United States has not, however, submitted a written statement, and some preliminary expression of our views on this meeting of the Preparatory Committee and on the Conference itself would be in order.

We come here with a closed mind in one important respect; we do not want these meetings to be an empty propaganda show. It is no secret that the United States was reluctant initially to hold the Conference. We consented only after we felt that the propaganda aspects had been downgraded in favor of the practical aspects. I am happy to say that our second session is off to a businesslike start.

In all other respects we come with an open mind. We are ready to examine all proposals that aim to promote the trade and development of the developing countries. We hope to make some suggestions ourselves. We have read with

interest and appreciation the written submissions already made and are prepared to discuss seriously the proposals that are serious. We are willing to reexamine all assumptions on which the present international trade rules and the existing organizations are based. We shall not reject any serious proposal out of hand.

For the first time we are considering in a related whole all aspects of trade as a means to development of developing countries. Our draft agenda for the Conference might be improved stylistically at points, but it has the great virtue of being comprehensive, because it does include all the major trade problems of the developing countries. It is not my intention to reopen the wording of the agenda, nor would I favor rediscussing points resolved at our first session.

I do not mean to imply that all-inclusiveness is necessarily good. It may well be that talk-

ing about everything means dealing seriously with nothing. This is a danger, and I think we all recognize it. We must at some stage be selective if we are to be constructive.

We are delighted to see the focus on trade. There is a financing item on our agenda, and I realize it is an important subject. But external finance is a residual item, the gap filler, as the written presentation of the United Arab Republic put it. The normal, the desirable, way to finance imports is through exports, through trade. We are dealing with interrelated problems, but I think we all agree that trade is the key element.

#### **Internal and External Aspects of Development**

Development is not a simple process. Of all human phenomena with which we must deal, the problems of development are perhaps the most complex. They affect every phase of the economic, political, social, and psychological life of countries. The problems are neither entirely external to a developing country's own actions, nor are they entirely internal.

I think this point is important. Most of us find it easier to look outside ourselves for the root of problems. We of the developed countries are inclined at times to argue that the reason the developing countries are not progressing more rapidly is that their own domestic houses are not in order. By contrast, developing countries sometimes stress the external barriers which exist in the developed countries.

I think all of us realize that there is truth on both sides. The distinguished representative from Pakistan noted here last week that in the final analysis the growth of the developing countries depends on their own efforts. We all recognize the vital role played in this process by stable governments, honest and efficient administration, enlightened fiscal and monetary policies which among other things discourage capital flight, and the direction of resources to export industries with buoyant rather than sluggish markets. I noted at the first session of the Preparatory Committee that the removal of the church gate will not bring people into church. The removal of trade impediments may or may not bring trade to the developing

countries. Attention must be paid to internal policies, for these policies are fundamental determinants of growth.

But having said this, I also agree that we must give close attention to the impediments to growth which are beyond the control of the developing countries. The falling price of a key commodity, an import restriction against a developing country's product, an internal tax which impedes consumption of a tropical commodity (whether in free-market or centrally planned economies), a lack of foreign exchange to finance necessary imports—all these things can negate the most perfect of internal policies.

The two elements—the internal and the external measures supporting growth—are linked. It would be meaningless to assign priorities as between them. Let's not deal with the internal and external problems as adversaries. Instead, let us examine both together. A change in the structure of international trade, which is what we seek to achieve, requires changes in internal production patterns of developed and developing countries. The external changes are inextricably linked with the internal policies.

I am not stating anything original. The Economic Commission for Latin America, which until recently was headed by our distinguished Secretary General [Raúl Prebisch], has done brilliant work in relating these two aspects of development. In the recent paper of the Economic Commission for Latin America entitled "Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America,"<sup>1</sup> there is a profound discussion of the necessary domestic actions required for development, the internal bottlenecks which must be removed, and the cooperation required internally and externally. It is the necessity for this combination of actions which I also want to stress.

#### **The Practical Approach**

Finally, before dealing with the more important agenda items, I would like to endorse a comment made by our distinguished Yugoslavian colleague, namely, that we are here to be pragmatic. Our aim is to make progress.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.12/680.

This practical approach is important. Indeed, it is crucial.

I do not see much merit in passing additional resolutions which cannot be followed up by concrete actions. As one of my distinguished Latin American colleagues said to me, we have enough resolution-passing organizations already. We do not need any more. I see little sense in seeking to reach agreement on a set of principles which will be universally acceptable only when so watered down as to be meaningless in terms of operational guidance.

If my purpose were to sabotage this Conference, I would propose the immediate establishment of a body to reach an agreed set of principles as the first order of business before proceeding further with the concrete work of our Conference. This could then consume some 5 to 10 years of meaningless haggling. We already have an illustration of this fact with which all of us are familiar in the prolonged and still-continuing attempt in the United Nations to agree on words with respect to a declaration on international economic cooperation.

However, there may be a time at the end of our deliberations when we shall be able to give expression to action-directed principles that are more than mere words.

In the same way that new resolutions or new sets of universally agreed principles do not of themselves solve real world problems, neither do new organizations. Organizations are not independent, living entities. They are governments acting in concert. When a government says no in one organization, it will not say yes elsewhere only because the label of the organization is changed.

Once again, however, this is not to say that the present organizational structure is perfect and unalterable. The United States is much too young, much too dynamic, a society to place much stock in the *status quo* only because it is what we have. Let us examine our organizational structure pragmatically, and let us then suggest useful changes in a practical and purposeful way.

When I say that purposeful changes should be suggested, I have in mind that much of what we now have is in fact good. Many of the actions in process elsewhere are, indeed, soundly

conceived and need to be supported and strengthened. We are not starting *de novo* to look at all the problems of trade and development. We do not want to preserve the past for its own sake, but we do want to use it as prolog. We see no sense in repeating what we are already doing in other organizations.

I should like now to express some preliminary views on the problems we must deal with.

### **Commodity Trade**

A major aim of the majority of developing countries attending the Conference will be to have something done to assure growing markets and improved and stable prices for their exports of primary products. My Government fully supports this objective.

Commodity problems and the possible ways of dealing with them have been extensively explored in recent years within the U.N. framework and elsewhere. The ground is well prepared for our work. We can start from an advanced position. We know a lot about the problems and a lot about how to deal with them. We have taken a number of valuable initiatives in the recent past.

Up-to-date reviews of trends in commodity trade make it clear that longer term difficulties are superimposed on the problem of short-term instability in commodity markets. The longer term problem is the secular decline in many commodity prices reflecting in many cases a sluggish rate of growth in world demand. We are not as far along in knowing how to deal with the longer term problem as we are with short-term market instability.

It is now generally agreed that there can be no single device for dealing with this range of problems. We must utilize a number of tools in a concerted attack upon them.

First among these tools are various forms of joint action on the problems of particular commodities, ranging from formal commodity agreements to study groups and other consultative arrangements. Commodity agreements may be not only valuable but essential for certain commodities, coffee being the prime example of the current period. They may be impractical or undesirable in other cases. Moreover, the signing of a commodity agreement in

itself does not solve the problem. This fact is well illustrated by some of our current problem situations, with coffee again a case in point. Unless steps are taken to correct the underlying imbalance of supply and demand, through efforts to expand consumption and shift productive resources into other fields, the commodity agreement will break down. It is only a means of buying time while the necessary balance is restored between production and stocks, on the one hand, and effective demand on the other.

Among the problems involved in working out agreements for commodities in longrun oversupply, or in making such agreements work, are:

*First*, the initiation by exporting countries of the internal measures needed to discourage excess production and to enforce the production controls or export quotas required by the agreement;

*Second*, the provision of adequate returns to producing countries but not through price policies that cause eventual loss of markets and revenues to substitute products;

*Third*, the provision of fair opportunities for nations that are low-cost producers to increase their export quotas, or for efficient new producers to enter the field;

*Fourth*, the segregation by an export tax or by other appropriate means of such revenues as are needed to help shift resources away from production of the surplus commodity into other, more promising lines.

Other basic tools can supplement joint action in individual commodity situations. They include the general drive to expand demand for commodities through research and promotion, efforts to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to primary commodity exports, diversification in developing countries, and compensatory financing.

We shall be able to consider this last device in the light of the extensive studies of possible new compensatory financing facilities which the CICT [Commission on International Commodity Trade] has just concluded, and taking into account the recent establishment by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] of a new facility to offset short-term fluctuations in export earnings. The United States is one of

those governments which have seen a need for enlarging the existing resources available for this purpose. We welcome the Fund's action and share the view expressed by the CICT report that it represents a substantial step forward. The fact that the new facility could be created without delay and without the need for a new organization or new financial contributions is of particular importance. We will be prepared to reexamine the situation, if it is found that the Fund cannot satisfactorily handle the problem. We, for our part, believe that the IMF facility will in fact prove valuable. And, as a member of the Fund, we shall do our part in insuring that it will be liberally and sympathetically administered.

### **Manufactures and Semimanufactures**

Some ghosts must be laid to rest.

First, there is the ghost that we, the developed countries, want our developing-country colleagues to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water, that we want to prevent them from increasing their production and export of manufactured goods.

What we really want, of course, is the reverse. Our interest is to see more prosperous countries, not only for their sake but because we also want good customers and growing markets. We know that trade grows fastest among countries with diversified and growing economies.

Indeed, the United States recognizes that for most, if not all, developing countries a major expansion of export earnings must take place in the semimanufactures and manufactures sectors if economic development is to take place.

The second ghost is that of reciprocity between less and more developed countries in trade negotiations. This one was laid to rest in practice more than a decade ago. It was explicitly put to its final rest, or so we thought, at the time of the ministerial meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1961, when it was formally agreed in the Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed Countries<sup>2</sup> that full reciprocity would not be sought from developing countries. For some reason, this ghost keeps coming alive.

The GATT ministers put it to rest again just

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 9.

last week. Their report<sup>3</sup> states: ". . . that in the trade negotiations every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to exports of the less-developed countries, but that the developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less-developed countries."

A third ghost is the idea that, whenever developing countries build an export capacity in manufactured goods, the developed countries deny them markets. Cotton textiles are cited as evidence. In fact, this is the only case typically cited. In this unique case, a cooperative effort is being made to bring about an orderly expansion of markets in the developed countries—in some cases to build markets where there were only negligible sales before. It is being done in a pragmatic fashion, taking into account the complex social, economic, and domestic political problems involved. The aim of the cotton textile agreement is not curtailment of markets but their expansion.

The real problem of expanding exports in the general field of manufactures and semimanufactures is not the restriction of markets but the fact that for many countries markets have not as yet even been built. This is where we should put our focus.

Having spoken of ghosts, let's move to the real-life heart of the matter. As I stated, this is the establishment and expansion of markets. It requires such positive steps by developing countries as market research and export promotion. It involves appropriate financial policies in the developing countries such as the avoidance of overvalued exchange rates, and it requires the reduction and removal of barriers in the developed countries.

Activity in this field is intense. Committee III of the GATT has not solved all the problems, but it certainly has made substantial progress. The ministers of GATT countries last week agreed to reexamine the provisions of the General Agreement to see what modifications are desirable in the interest of promoting the export earnings of developing countries. In fact, the decisions taken by the ministers at the GATT meeting last week represent substantial benefits to the developing countries without any suggestion of new obligations on their part.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 995.

## Regional Groupings

The United States is not a member of any regional economic grouping and can therefore speak objectively. It is well known that we support the European Economic Community. We also favor the gradual elimination of preferences given by the EEC to its associated overseas states. However, we recognize that the preferences cannot be removed suddenly and without some compensatory benefits lest the associated countries suffer severe damage.

We support the formation of regional groupings among less developed countries.

In our view, all regional groupings should be subject to international examination to assess their trade effects on nonmember countries.

The Economic Commission for Latin America, under Dr. Prebisch's guidance, helped to launch the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association. The United States supported the former from its earliest days and is a contributor to its regional development bank. Through the Alliance for Progress we have tried to assist in the development of the Latin American Free Trade Association.

We believe the Preparatory Committee and the Conference should devote study to ways and means of promoting greater regional integration among developing countries in order to foster industries capable of taking advantage of economies of scale and therefore better able to compete effectively in export markets.

## Financing of Trade

All foreign currency loans and grants help to finance trade. We agree, therefore, that it is not possible to separate trade and finance. As in other fields, however, we are not starting anew to examine problems.

I shall not at this stage attempt to cite all the relevant aspects of this agenda item. However, I do wish to note very briefly what the United States policy and actions are with respect to this subject.

Many government submissions made to the committee refer to the need for loans on soft terms. The key development lending body of the United States is the Agency for International Development. Its loans are for as much

as 40 years with a 10-year grace period before starting repayment, with only a three-quarters of 1 percent per annum credit charge. From 1946 to the end of 1962, United States economic aid to developing countries has been about \$32 billion, of which some \$20 billion has been in grants. Since 1958 economic aid to the developing countries has been \$16 billion, half of which has been in grants and half in loans.

So far as technical assistance is concerned, all of us remember the famous Point 4 statement of President Truman which launched the modern era of technical assistance. In more recent years our Peace Corps has been the epitome of technical assistance on the part of staunch volunteers dedicated to the cause of the advancement of the developing countries.

There is general recognition today internationally of the need for soft terms for development loans. In addition to bilateral assistance, the United States is the major contributor to the multilateral aid organizations and has played an important role in the progressive softening of aid terms granted by international institutions.

I am citing the record in brief in order simply to indicate our recognition of some of the points about financing made by other delegations.

#### **Trade With Centrally Planned Economies**

All of the industrialized countries, whether they have free or centrally controlled economies, have useful roles to play in advancing growth in the developing countries. Because of the far superior strength of the free economies, they will continue to be far more prominent than the centrally controlled economies in trade with the developing countries.

I shall explain in greater detail later in our session what we think are the problems inherent in the bilateral arrangements with the state-trading organizations of the Communist countries. For the present I want only to suggest that we must examine in detail the reasons for the extremely small role which trade with the centrally planned economies plays in the economic development of the developing countries. We must deal with the barriers to expanding the trade of the developing countries with the centrally planned economies with the same de-

gree of realism we propose to employ in discussing other trade problems.

Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is brief. We have come here to work toward the accomplishment of concrete results in fostering the trade and development of the developing countries. We look forward to examining all issues relevant to this problem.

### **U.N. General Assembly Adopts Seven Resolutions on Financing**

*The fourth special session of the U.N. General Assembly met at New York May 14-June 27 to consider the financial situation of the organization. Following are statements made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) by U.S. Representatives Francis T. P. Plimpton and Adlai E. Stevenson, together with texts of seven resolutions adopted in plenary session on June 27.*

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. PLIMPTON, MAY 22**

U.S. delegation press release 4210

Mr. Chairman, in commencing this reply to the statement made by the Soviet representative this morning, I should like, first, to quote what Secretary-General U Thant said to this committee last December 3:

I believe that the financial problem of the organization, which in substance is the question now before this committee, is a vital one. A financially bankrupt United Nations would be an ineffective United Nations if, indeed, it could survive on such a basis. The financial issue is thus one which, if I may say so, transcends political controversy. In their various ways I believe all states represented in the United Nations have found that the organization is useful and, indeed, indispensable in the modern world. It is on this basis that I trust that the committee will deal with this item.

I am sorry to say, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet representative has chosen not to deal with the item on that basis, on the basis hoped for by the Secretary-General, but, instead, has chosen to indulge in the very political controversy, the very cold-war aggression which the Secretary-General hoped could be transcended.

Mr. Chairman, the words "threats" and "blackmail" were mentioned. I leave to this committee the determination as to who has made them.

I regret, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet representative made the choice that he made in dealing with this item. I will not imitate him.

In defense of the Soviet bloc's refusal to pay its just assessments for the United Nations peacekeeping operations, a refusal which is pushing the United Nations toward bankruptcy, the representative of the Soviet Union repeated exactly the same arguments as to the United Nations Charter that the Soviet Union unsuccessfully made before the International Court of Justice last summer,<sup>1</sup> and made again before this committee and the General Assembly last fall,<sup>2</sup> and made again before the Working Group last winter.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Chairman, they are arguments that were completely disposed of by the Court's Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962, completely disposed of by the General Assembly's acceptance of that opinion by the overwhelming vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions.

Mr. Chairman, that opinion and that acceptance by the General Assembly conclusively established that the costs of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) assessed by the General Assembly against member states are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of article 17 of the charter and thus are legally binding obligations of the members and are, of course, covered by article 19.

Mr. Chairman, no repetition of thrice-rejected, shopworn arguments can conceal the fact that the Soviet bloc is repudiating its clearly established charter obligations and by so doing is doing its worst to drive the United Nations toward bankruptcy.

Mr. Chairman, although I have no intention of discussing Soviet arguments that have long since been disposed of by the Court opinion and its acceptance by the General Assembly, I can-

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 30, and Aug. 13, 1962, p. 246.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 443; for the report of the Working Group (or Committee of 21), see U.N. doc. A/5407 and Corr. 1.

not help but point out one thing to the 106 members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council. Despite the fact that article 17, paragraph 2, of the charter provides "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly," in spite of that clear language the Soviet Union would have peacekeeping expenses apportioned, if you please, by the Security Council. What a result, Mr. Chairman! The 11 members of the Security Council determining how the other 100 members of the United Nations shall pay for a peacekeeping operation as to which, according to the Soviet Union, they have no say whatsoever. Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, for those 100 members, such a result is not only on its face contrary to the express wording of the charter; it has been authoritatively and conclusively rejected by the Court and the General Assembly.

Mr. Chairman, I see no need to comment in detail on the stale accusations of the Soviet representative concerning the United Nations operations in the Congo. It was the Security Council itself, with the Soviets voting yes, and the General Assembly itself that authorized and repeatedly reaffirmed the principles and procedures in accordance with which the ONUC operation has been carried out.<sup>4</sup> The two Secretary-Generals of the United Nations who were charged with the direction of their operation by the Security Council were careful and have been careful to consult the Congo Advisory Committee on the major issues arising in the Congo. The Government of the Congo itself has repeatedly expressed its strong desire to have the U.N. operations continue. And in a recent letter to the Secretary-General it refuted the Soviet contentions about the operation and specifically rejected the Soviet demand that the United Nations forever get out of the Congo.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, while the Soviet representative pretends to be attacking so-called colonialists and so-called foreign monopolies, in actual fact he has been attacking the Security Council and the General Assembly, which authorized the United Nations actions in the

<sup>4</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 384; Oct. 10, 1960, p. 583.

Congo, and is attacking the Congo Advisory Committee, which steadily has reviewed and guided the United Nations action in the Congo, and is attacking the Congo Government itself, whose urgent and repeated requests have led to the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

Mr. Chairman, it is hardly necessary to remind this committee that the Soviet Union has never made the slightest contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation and related economic and technical assistance aid projects for the benefit of the Congolese people. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has limited its efforts to trying to sabotage the United Nations Operation in the Congo simply because it could not control the operation for its own imperialistic purposes.

Mr. Chairman, no Soviet smokescreen of slanted and slanderous misrepresentation as to the effort of the United Nations to achieve peace and stability in the Congo can conceal the fact that that operation is succeeding, or the fact that the Soviet Union has consistently opposed it, or that the United States has wholeheartedly supported that operation from the very beginning.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will let me remind the committee that the United States has contributed by way of assessments and voluntary payments \$114 million to the ONUC operation and that the Soviet Union has not only contributed nothing but that it is \$32 million in arrears in the assessments that have been lawfully imposed on it.

Mr. Chairman, in the Congo, apart from these military operations, the United States has contributed or pledged \$31 million to the Congo Fund. The Soviet Union has contributed not one kopek.

Through the United Nations, Mr. Chairman, the United States has contributed another \$70 million for the Congo import-export program. The Soviet Union has contributed not one kopek.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has contributed in food under the Food-for-Peace Program in arrangement with the United Nations \$40 million for the Congo. The Soviet Union has contributed not one kopek.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union says—as do

all other members and they mean it—that it is a peace-loving country. Does it desire peace in the Middle East? The United Nations Emergency Force established by the members of the General Assembly has helped to keep that peace, but the Soviet Union continues to say that that peacekeeping operation is illegal and should be withdrawn. And they have said that they will not pay for any part of it. This makes one ask this question, Mr. Chairman: What does the Soviet Union really want in the Middle East? And why does it oppose a United Nations operation which has succeeded in keeping the peace in the Middle East?

Mr. Chairman, the United States is proud of the fact that its policies and the policies of the United Nations coincide. The United States wants a world of independent, sovereign states free to work out their destinies in their own ways, free from domination by outside powers or outside totalitarian parties. The United States wants developing states to be given all possible assistance in their task of developing their own resources, their own skills, and their own talents. So does the United Nations. I heard with astonishment our Soviet colleague say that the Soviet Union was going to refuse to share in the technical assistance projects of the United Nations which aim for exactly those aims and which the United States fully supports.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat our pride that the aims of the United States and the aims of the United Nations are the same, and our determination that despite obstructionisms our joint aims shall be realized, and despite Soviet attempts to bankrupt this organization. Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation is confident that all members of this organization who share those aims will stand fast in their determination that this organization shall not be bankrupt and shall survive.

[In a further Intervention, Ambassador Plimpton said:]

Mr. Chairman, I simply want to say that my Soviet colleague is unduly complimentary as to the difficulty of preparing in advance, at least, some replies to Soviet contentions. When one has heard the somewhat cracked phonograph record played so many times, despite the fact

that the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly have rejected the tune, one has no difficulty in remembering the same old words.

I might just add, Mr. Chairman, that I certainly hope that the remainder of our discussions in this room and the remainder of the informal conferences, which, I hope, will lead to some solution of the financial difficulties of this organization, will be held on the basis suggested by the Secretary-General. Surely all of us are interested in this organization, in its survival. And the United States delegation earnestly hopes that from now on we shall conduct ourselves in a way that will lead to solutions and not against solutions.

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, JUNE 21**

U.S. delegation press release 4224

What I shall have to say this morning will not take very long.

The time for contention and debate—for negotiation and maneuver—on the subject at hand is now behind us. Heaven knows that time was long enough!

But we meet today in an atmosphere of general relief, in a mood of sober confidence. We meet in an environment of renewed faith in the capacity of men of good will to resolve their common problems—faith in the responsibility of the vast majority of the membership of this body and thus in the future of this organization. More specifically, we can see ahead of us a way back toward financial health for the United Nations—a trip that may not be entirely smooth but one for which we at least now have a road map.

Let me contrast this atmosphere briefly with the almost desperate outlook of 1 year ago, when financial disorder threatened to give way to financial chaos.

Let me contrast this with the general feeling of pessimism which prevailed—without warrant, I always believed—when the Committee of 21 concluded its work a few months ago.

And let me contrast the mood of today with that of the early meetings of this committee, when bitter and unfounded charges were made

against my country, charges which I will ignore.

For more than a month now you have been going through the most exacting and most rewarding task of civilized man—the task of reconciling different points of view, of accommodating national positions, of producing a consensus. In the process we have all endured disappointment and frustration. There were times when the last drop of patience seemed to have drained away and the last drop of energy seemed to be expended.

But the members have been aware that much more was at stake than a fundraising formula. They have been conscious that political and constitutional issues underlay and outweighed the financial issue. They have been mindful of the integrity of the organization itself, and of the responsibility of the members for defending and preserving that integrity.

The result is that we have before us a group of resolutions which are not in the exact form in which they would have been written by any delegation here today. But the impressive list of sponsors is evidence enough of the broad consensus that has emerged from this long process. And it also is evidence of the large number of delegations which have worked so hard to find the key to a statesmanlike solution. For this they deserve the gratitude of us all.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation does not look upon the package of resolutions before us as ideal in all respects. For one thing, the reference to “special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security,” which appears as the fourth principle in the draft resolution on general principles, strikes us as a misreading of the charter. The special responsibility for decisions about peace and security on behalf of the whole organization was allocated, under the charter, not to the 5 permanent members but to all 11 members of the Security Council. Moreover, the charter does not assign responsibility for financing peace and security decisions, or for financing any other kind of decision, to the members of the Security Council but to the General Assembly as a whole.

Also, while any of the permanent members can block Security Council action, they do not

themselves, without the votes of nonpermanent members, have the power to initiate action. Furthermore, any such principle would hardly be applicable to a peacekeeping operation such as UNEF, initiated by a recommendation of the General Assembly.

It is the General Assembly—and not the Security Council—to which the charter gives the responsibility for financing the U.N.'s activities. I cannot believe that any delegation, with a few obvious exceptions, believes that the trend toward the assumption of useful responsibilities by the Assembly should now be terminated and the right to finance peacekeeping operations reserved for settlement in some small room by a few great powers.

We also feel that the next principle, in paragraph (e), which refers to the possibility of special consideration for the victims of or those otherwise involved in events or actions leading to a peacekeeping operation, may raise serious practical problems when we come to deal with the unpredictable events of the future. Nevertheless, the collective responsibility of all members is reaffirmed with pristine clarity as the first principle; and the possibility of special consideration for members covered by (e) is appropriately related to the special circumstances of each case, so that we will be free to deal realistically with each issue, as it arises, in the larger interest of peace itself.

At the same time we are well aware that the resolutions before us are not just the way any of the delegations would have preferred to see them; that accommodations to other views have been made by many of the members; that some have agreed to bear a greater share of the financial cost than they intended to a few weeks ago; and that the net result is a true consensus of the overwhelming majority reached by the democratic process of give and take.

The facts are that these draft resolutions among them establish a useful set of agreed general principles to guide us in the future; they provide an equitable basis for financing the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo for the rest of this year; they establish a deadline for working out schedules for the payment of arrearages; and they extend to the end of the year the authority

of the Secretary-General to sell the remaining part of the authorized bond issue.

In brief, they accomplish somewhat more than the minimum task we set ourselves: to resolve the immediate problem of financial support for keeping the peace in the Middle East and the Congo.

As evidence of our support, Mr. Chairman, the United States is prepared, subject to its governmental processes, to join other developed countries in making a voluntary contribution, in addition to its assessment, to help provide the funds required under the financing resolutions. It is gratifying to us that this year a number of other developed countries have also indicated their willingness to make such voluntary contributions. This is additional evidence of the general will to restore this organization to financial health.

Mr. Chairman, these resolutions testify to the underlying agreement of the great majority of the membership that the major and smaller powers share a common interest in the peace and security of the world—and share a common interest in strengthening the United Nations for collective pursuit of that interest.

It may well be, Mr. Chairman, that greater tests still lie ahead. But we can all take legitimate satisfaction from the fact that the world has once again met a severe test of its confidence in this great experiment in collective security—and the United Nations has emerged stronger than before.

With that sense of satisfaction, with renewed faith and pride in the organization, the delegation of the United States will vote in favor of the five resolutions before us.<sup>5</sup>

## TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

### Resolution I<sup>6</sup>

GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR THE SHARING OF THE COSTS OF FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS INVOLVING HEAVY EXPENDITURES

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting with appreciation the report of the Working*

<sup>5</sup> U.N. docs. A/C. 5/L. 782-786; A/C. 5/L. 787 and L. 788 were introduced on June 24.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1874(S-IV) (A/C.5/L. 782); adopted by a vote of 92-11, with 3 abstentions.

Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) of 19 December 1962,

*Recognizing* the necessity of sharing equitably the financial burden of peace-keeping operations to the extent not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements,

1. *Affirms* that the following principles, *inter alia*, shall serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing, by assessed or voluntary contributions or a combination thereof, of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures that may be initiated in the future:

(a) That the financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all Member States of the United Nations;

(b) That, whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute toward peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures;

(c) That, without prejudice to the principle of collective responsibility, every effort should be made to encourage voluntary contributions from Member States;

(d) That the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connexion with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations;

(e) That, where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation;

2. *Considers* that suitable administrative procedures should be established to ensure that provision for the financing of a peace-keeping operation is made by the General Assembly at the time the operation is authorized;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to review in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as appropriate, suitable administrative procedures designed to improve the financial procedures to be followed by the General Assembly at the time peace-keeping operations are authorized, and to report to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session on the results of this review and any recommendations he may wish to make regarding procedures to be followed in the future.

## Resolution II <sup>7</sup>

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 1089 (XI) of 21 December

<sup>7</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1875 (S-IV) (A/C.5/L.783); adopted by a vote of 80 to 11, with 16 abstentions.

1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, 1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 and 1733 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)<sup>8</sup> for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963, and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions<sup>9</sup> thereon,

1. *Decides* to continue the Special Account for the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend up to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$1,580,000 for the continuing cost of the United Nations Emergency Force;

3. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$9,500,000 for the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963;

4. *Decides* to apportion:

(a) the amount of \$2,500,000 among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

(b) the \$7,000,000 balance of the amount appropriated in paragraph 3 of this resolution, among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963, except that each "economically less developed country" shall be assessed an amount calculated at 45 per cent of its rate under the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

provided that this apportionment shall constitute an *ad hoc* arrangement for the present phase of this peace-keeping operation, and shall not constitute a precedent for the future;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of this resolution, "economically less developed countries" shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom and the United States of America;

6. *Recommends* that the Member States named in paragraph 5 of this resolution make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under this resolution in order to finance authorized expenditures in excess of the total amount assessed under this resolution, such voluntary contributions to be credited to a special account by the Secretary-General and transferred to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account as and when an "economically less developed country" has once paid to the credit of that account its assessment under paragraph 4(b) of this resolution or an equal amount, the transfer to be of an amount which bears the same proportion to the total

<sup>8</sup> U.N. doc. A/5187.

<sup>9</sup> U.N. doc. A/5274.

of such voluntary contributions as the amount of such payment bears to the total of the assessments on "economically less developed countries" under paragraph 4(b); any amount left in such special account on 31 December 1965 shall revert to the Member States that made such voluntary contributions in proportion to their respective voluntary contributions;

7. *Appeals* to all other Member States who are in a position to assist to make similar voluntary contributions or alternatively to forego having their assessment calculated at the rate mentioned in the exception contained in paragraph 4(b) of this resolution;

8. *Decides* that voluntary contributions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this resolution may be made by a Member State, at its option, in the form of services and supplies, acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connexion with the United Nations Emergency Force during the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 for which the Member State does not require reimbursement, the Member State to be credited with the fair value thereof as agreed upon by the Member State and the Secretary-General.

### Resolution III<sup>10</sup>

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO: COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1963

#### *The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the Security Council resolutions of 14 July 1960, 22 July 1960, 9 August 1960, 21 February 1961 and 24 November 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, 1583 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of 3 April 1961, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 and 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)<sup>11</sup> for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963, and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions<sup>12</sup> thereon,

1. *Decides* to continue the Congo *ad hoc* Account for the expenses of the United Nations Operation in the Congo;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to expend up to 31 December 1963 at an average monthly rate not to exceed \$5,500,000 for the continuing cost of the United Nations Operation in the Congo;

3. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$33,000,000 for the United Nations Operation in the Congo for the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963;

4. *Decides* to apportion:

<sup>10</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1876(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.784); adopted by a vote of 80 to 12, with 15 abstentions.

<sup>11</sup> U.N. doc. A/5416.

<sup>12</sup> U.N. doc. A/5421.

(a) the amount of \$3,000,000 among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

(b) the \$30,000,000 balance of the amount appropriated in paragraph 3 of this resolution, among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments for 1963, except that each "economically less developed country" shall be assessed an amount calculated at 45 per cent of its rate under the regular scale of assessments for 1963;

provided that this apportionment shall constitute an *ad hoc* arrangement for the present phase of this peace-keeping operation, and shall not constitute a precedent for the future;

5. *Decides* that, for the purpose of this resolution, "economically less developed countries" shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United States of America;

6. *Recommends* that the Member States named in paragraph 5 of this resolution make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under this resolution in order to finance authorized expenditures in excess of the total amount assessed under this resolution, such voluntary contributions to be credited to a special account by the Secretary-General and transferred to the Congo *ad hoc* Account as and when an "economically less developed country" has once paid to the credit of that account its assessment under paragraph 4(b) of this resolution or an equal amount, the transfer to be of an amount which bears the same proportion to the total of such voluntary contributions as the amount of such payment bears to the total of the assessments on "economically less developed countries" under paragraph 4(b); any amount left in such special account on 31 December 1965 shall revert to the Member States that made such voluntary contributions in proportion to their respective voluntary contributions;

7. *Appeals* to all other Member States which are in a position to assist to make similar voluntary contributions or alternatively to forego having their assessments calculated at the rate mentioned in the exception contained in paragraph 4(b) of this resolution;

8. *Decides* that voluntary contributions referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this resolution may be made by a Member State, at its option, in the form of services and supplies, acceptable to the Secretary-General, furnished for use in connexion with the United Nations Operation in the Congo during the period 1 July 1963 to 31 December 1963 for which the Member State does not require reimbursement, the Member State to be credited with the fair value thereof as agreed upon by the Member State and the Secretary-General.

## Resolution IV<sup>13</sup>

PAYMENT OF ARREARS IN RESPECT OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE AND THE AD HOC ACCOUNT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations,

*Noting* with concern the present financial situation of the Organization resulting from the non-payment of a substantial portion of past assessments for the UNEF Special Account and the Congo *ad hoc* Account,

*Believing* that it is essential that all assessments for these Accounts be paid as soon as possible,

1. *Appeals* to Member States which continue to be in arrears in respect of their assessed contributions for payment to the UNEF Special Account and the Congo *ad hoc* Account to pay their arrears, disregarding other factors, as soon as their respective constitutional and financial arrangements can be processed, and, pending these arrangements, to make an announcement of their intention to do so;

2. *Expresses its conviction* that Member States who are in arrears and object on political or juridical grounds to paying their assessments on these accounts nevertheless will, without prejudice to their respective positions, make a special effort towards solving the financial difficulties of the United Nations by making these payments;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with those Member States which are in arrears on the UNEF Special Account and on the Congo *ad hoc* Account and to work out with them arrangements as to the most appropriate modalities within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, including the possibility of payment by instalment, for bringing the payments of these accounts up to date as soon as possible;

4. *Requests* Member States who are in arrears on these accounts to make the arrangements with the Secretary-General set out in paragraph 3 of this resolution before 31 October 1963;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly on the consultations and arrangements mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this resolution.

## Resolution V<sup>14</sup>

TERMS AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE ISSUE OF UNITED NATIONS BONDS

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its decision in operative paragraph 1 of

<sup>13</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1877(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.785); adopted by a vote of 79 to 12, with 17 abstentions.

<sup>14</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1878(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.786); adopted by a vote of 93 to 12, with 4 abstentions.

General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 to authorize the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the annex to that resolution,

*Decides* to amend paragraph 8 of the annex to General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) to read as follows:

"The bonds may be sold in whole or in part from time to time until 31 December 1963."

## Resolution VI<sup>15</sup>

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE FUND

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* the purposes of the United Nations as set out in Article 1 of the Charter,

*Realizing* the need for prompt and effective action to prevent any threats to or breaches of international peace and security,

*Believing* that inadequate financial resources can seriously delay or jeopardize the success of such action,

*Desiring* to make sufficient funds readily available to the Secretary-General, thus enabling him to discharge his responsibilities under the Charter in cases of breaches of the peace without undue delay,

*Convinced* that the establishment of a Peace Fund through voluntary contributions from Member States as well as organizations and individuals is worthy of study as a means of furthering this objective,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult all Member States and other interested organizations on the desirability and feasibility of establishing such a Peace Fund;

2. *Requests further* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session.

## Resolution VII<sup>16</sup>

CONTINUATION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED NATIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1854/B (XVII)

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII),<sup>17</sup>

*Bearing in mind* the principles enunciated in resolution 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, that shall serve as guidelines for the equitable sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures that may be initiated in the future, to the extent that these expenditures will not be otherwise covered by agreed arrangements,

*Bearing in mind further* that the maintenance of

<sup>15</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1879(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.787); adopted by a vote of 91 to 12, with 2 abstentions.

<sup>16</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1880(S-IV) (A/C.5/L.788); adopted by a vote of 95 to 12, with 2 abstentions.

<sup>17</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 37.

peace and security is a primary purpose of the United Nations.

*Desirous* that ways and means should be found to arrive at working arrangements so that all Member States may feel able to share in such costs.

*Noting* that the tasks with which the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations was charged have not been completed,

1. *Decides* to continue in being the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the Working Group to:

(a) Recommend a special method for the equitable sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures to the extent not otherwise covered by agreed arrangements;

(b) Consider suggestions regarding other sources of financing future peace-keeping operations;

(c) Explore ways and means for bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement among all Member States on the question of the financing of future peace-keeping operations;

3. *Invites* the Working Group to consult as appropriate with the Committee on Contributions;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make available to the Working Group the necessary facilities and assistance for the accomplishment of its tasks;

5. *Asks* the Working Group to report on these matters to the General Assembly as soon as possible, but not later than at its nineteenth regular session.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Foreign Service Examination To Be Held September 7

Press release 368 dated July 12

Applications for the Foreign Service officer examination, to be given September 7 in major cities throughout the country, must be filed no later than July 22. Applications may be obtained by writing to the Director, Board of Examiners, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Eligible candidates are those who were at least 21 years of age or under 31 years of age as of July 1 and who have been citizens of the United States for at least 9 years as of that date. Those who have bachelors' degrees or who have successfully completed their junior year of college may take the examination at age 20.

Candidates taking the examination will be tested in English expression, general ability, and general background. In addition three options will be offered to test specific knowledge in (1) history, government, and social sciences, (2) management and business administration, and (3) economics.

The work of the Foreign Service requires a diversity of skills. Applicants with training in budget and fiscal work, management, personnel, law, labor relations, banking and finance, foreign trade, and all other aspects of economics and administration are sought, as well as those with training in political science, history, government, and the liberal arts.

The following are the 72 cities where the examination will be held:

Agana, Guam; Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Anchorage, Alaska; Atlanta, Ga.; Augusta, Maine; Austin, Tex.; Balboa Heights, C.Z.; Baltimore, Md.; Bismarck, N. Dak.; Boise, Idaho; Boston, Mass.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Charleston, W. Va.; Charlotte Amalie, V.I.; Cheyenne, Wyo.; Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, S.C.; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Des Moines, Iowa; Detroit, Mich.; El Paso, Tex.; Fairbanks, Alaska; Grand Forks, N. Dak.; Hartford, Conn.; Helena, Mont.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Indianapolis, Ind.; Jackson, Miss.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Juneau, Alaska; Kansas City, Kans.; Little Rock, Ark.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Louisville, Ky.; Madison, Wis.; Manchester, N.H.; Miami, Fla.; Montgomery, Ala.; Montpelier, Vt.; Nashville, Tenn.; New Orleans, La.; New York, N.Y.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Omaha, Nebr.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Phoenix, Ariz.; Pierre, S. Dak.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Portland, Ore.; Providence, R.I.; Raleigh, N.C.; Reno, Nev.; Richmond, Va.; Sacramento, Calif.; St. Louis, Mo.; St. Paul, Minn.; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Francisco, Calif.; San Juan, P.R.; Seattle, Wash.; Spokane, Wash.; Springfield, Ill.; Syracuse, N.Y.; Tampa, Fla.; Trenton, N.J.; Washington, D.C.; Wilmington, Del.; and Worcester, Mass.

The examination will also be held at any American diplomatic or consular post abroad at which a candidate may ask to take it.

### Appointments

Chester C. Carter as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, effective July 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 361 dated July 9.)

Allen R. Ferguson as Coordinator for International Aviation, Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective June 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 332 dated June 24.)

Carl Tolman as scientific attaché at Tokyo, Japan, effective July 7. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 364 dated July 10.)

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No.	Date	Subject
*359	7/8	U.S. participation in international conferences.
360	7/8	Blocking controls against Cuba.
*361	7/9	Carter appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (biographic details).
*362	7/9	Morris sworn in as Ambassador to Chad (biographic details).
363	7/9	Harriman departs for Moscow test ban talks.
*364	7/10	Tolman appointed scientific attaché at Tokyo (biographic details).
365	7/10	Guatemala credentials (rewrite).
366	7/10	Rusk: Senate Committee on Commerce.
†367	7/12	Rusk: "State of the North Atlantic Alliance" (as-delivered text).
368	7/12	Foreign Service officer examination.
369	7/12	Commission reports on U.S. academic exchange program (rewrite).
*370	7/12	Itinerary for visit of President Nyerere of Tanganyika.
371	7/12	Amendments to Nyerere itinerary.

\*Not printed here.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE  
DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE  
**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1258*



*August 5, 1963*

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# The State of the North Atlantic Alliance

*Address by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I notice some young people in the audience; let me just say three sentences to you. You may want to ask me: What is foreign policy all about? It's about you—your ability to walk the world in decency and confidence and peace, you and your children. Foreign policy is about building that decent world order that gives you a chance. That's what the thousand cables a day coming into the Department of State mean; that's what the 15 international meetings going on somewhere in the world every working day throughout the year mean to you young people.

We are under no illusion in the Department of State that, when we talk about international law or states or the United Nations, we are talking about abstractions. We are talking about people and what they mean to people, because we understand that foreign policy reaches into every home in the country. We have a million men in uniform outside the United States today,

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Virginia State Bar Association at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., on July 12 (press release 367; as-delivered text).

and that means that we reach into every home. We understand this very deeply, and I want you young people to know that I think we know what your relation to foreign policy is.

We are in a period of great change; we are in a period where it is not easy for a Secretary of State to declare great simple policies on particular points because there is so much flux. It is a period when we must go back to the very simple ideas on which our nation was founded—the things to which we are deeply committed.

I suggest to you that in President Eisenhower's second term and in President Kennedy's present term the responsibilities of the President of the United States have changed in kind, and not just in mass, and that these two men have faced questions of a new order of magnitude—a new order of faithfulness—never before faced by any President.

This is due to several things. One has been the explosion of states—the multiplication of states. Before World War II, 8 governments disposed of the continent of Africa. Now it's

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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about 35, and the number is growing. We do business with 112 states. Did you happen to know that in this calendar year 33 of those states have scheduled elections and changes in government in 1963 and that we have already had 6 unscheduled changes of government in this calendar year? For as far as we can see into the future, there will be 25 changes of government a year somewhere in the world and half of those will be crises because so many of these states do not have built-in constitutional means for passing power from one hand to the other.

And as these countries have become independent, they have been seized with an insistent demand for economic and social development, partly because their nationalist leaders have promised them that if you got rid of colonial rule, your daily life would be better—a connection which was not necessarily so. But there they are, with the hounds of development snapping at their heels, needing to move forward. And so this revolution of rising expectations about which you have heard is something very pressing and very urgent in our business.

And then, since about 1955–56, something else has come into the world: The Soviet Union has acquired a massive nuclear delivery capability against Western Europe and the United States—something new. The decision which President Truman made in 1950 to go into Korea and the decision which President Kennedy made last October to challenge the full power of the Soviet Union with regard to those missiles in Cuba were two utterly different decisions—decisions in kind—because  $E=MC^2$  has posed for men genuinely a new question, and that is the survival of the human race. And President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have had to think about and live with that problem as other human beings have not in our experience.

Now these are great elements which put this world in motion. There are other factors, such as the talks now going on between Moscow and Peiping, with the greatest consequences for all the rest of us, and yet talks which we have only a limited capability of influencing one way or the other; changes going on within the bloc in Eastern Europe; changes between East and West—in relationships between the Soviet bloc,

say, and Western Europe. This is a pregnant moment, a moment where many things could happen, where there could be important changes for good or for bad. That is why it is necessary for us to keep our compass bearings clear and, to use the expression of General Omar Bradley, to take our course from the distant stars and not from the light of each passing ship.

### European Growth and Unity

In a period of this sort it is very important for us to know where our allies are, who our friends are, and what those commitments mean. And therefore I should like to talk to you a few minutes tonight about the state of the NATO alliance, which joins the great continents of Europe and North America in a common effort to preserve the peace and security of the Atlantic area. I am moved to do this in part by the impressions which I formed in accompanying the President on his recent trip to Europe.<sup>2</sup>

We found Europe—and those of you who have visited Europe have found Europe—prosperous, vital, and resurgent. Its economic growth is going forward at a rapid rate; living standards are rising; the contrast with lagging Communist progress in Eastern Europe is becoming more and more marked. And this growing wealth is being more equitably distributed as a result of widespread economic and social reforms.

Side by side with this material progress we found widespread confidence that Europe's movement toward greater unity would continue. European unity has its roots too deep among the peoples of this great continent—too deep especially among the young people—not to resume its growth. There are too many Europeans who fully understand the historic importance of the Franco-German reconciliation that after several centuries a war is not going to arise in Western Europe—too many people understand that to let some of our temporary differences stand in the way of that great movement toward European unity.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 114.

Much has already been done. Progress has been made toward developing a community based on genuine equality, on common rules and institutions, and on subordination of parochial interests in the wider common needs of Europe as a whole. But much remains to be done. And one of the reasons for the President's trip was to make clear our own view about these great unfinished tasks of European unity and Atlantic solidarity. There will be delays and obstacles. We must judge the pace toward unity not by what happens in any single week, or month, or even year, but in terms of the timespan that is fitting to the historic importance of the development itself.

Certainly the United States welcomes this progress toward European unity. We recognize that only a united Europe is likely to be a strong Europe. And only a strong Europe can be an effective and fully equal partner of the United States in carrying forward the constructive and defensive tasks on which the growth and survival of the free world depend.

In this age no nation by itself can assure the defense and the welfare and the freedom of its people. But the United States and a strong united Europe, working together as equal partners, can achieve these great aims.

But these goals involve great adjustments on both sides, and difficulties are inevitable with any of these great creative enterprises. But if we have a clear view of where we are going, and if we can devote to this enterprise the dedicated effort it deserves, we can be optimistic about the outcome.

#### Unity for Defense

For the first purpose of this partnership is to strengthen the common defense.

Both in the May meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Ottawa<sup>3</sup> and during the President's recent trip, I found the members of NATO fully united in support of this purpose.

There are, of course, occasional interallied differences on means and approach. But such differences are bound to arise when an alliance

<sup>3</sup> For text of a communique adopted on May 24, 1963, see *Ibid.*, June 10, 1963, p. 895.

of free nations confronts such complex and difficult issues as evolving conditions now pose for the NATO alliance.

But the Soviet Union would make no greater mistake than to interpret interallied differences as major cracks within the alliance—cracks to be exploited by aggressive action. For the alliance is agreed on essentials. This has been proved by the successful deterrence of aggression against the NATO area for 14 years. The Cuban crisis of October 1962 proved this again, when it produced a show of unquestioned solidarity among all of the NATO partners.

Now this unity in times of crisis is not enough, for unity is also needed to avert crisis. And what Moscow thinks about these matters is of very great importance to the rest of us. This precrisis unity is sought through arrangements which provide in advance that forces shall come instantly under NATO command in the event of war. And it is important to maintain this integrated military structure of NATO, for looser forms of cooperation without solid commitment would not meet the need.

#### U.S. Commitment

Our success in maintaining NATO unity since 1949 is an achievement without precedent among peacetime multilateral alliances.

This unity reflects the full commitment of the United States, no less than that of its partners, to the defense of the entire NATO area. From our point of view—and it is important that not only the Europeans but the Americans understand this—from our point of view, this commitment does not rest in sentiment, although sentiment exists; it does not rest in amiability or in philanthropy. It is based upon the most fundamental realities of our own national interests and our own international policy. For the defense of Europe is vital to the defense of the United States.

That is why we have 400,000 military personnel in Europe: to defend the United States. With the exception of one country, this comprises the largest single national military commission to NATO in Europe. It is thus a simple fact—and this is something which Europeans must understand better—it is thus a sim-

ple fact that the United States is a principal European military power.

This American presence in Europe gives flesh and bone to the language of the NATO treaty: that an armed attack against any one country in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against us all. In 1949 that was a political commitment, but in 1963 it is a statement of plain, simple fact.

#### **Conventional Forces**

Now NATO will not remain strong and united in deterring attacks, however, merely by reaffirming faith in its purposes. We need continually to reexamine NATO's situation and to review its problems.

The military situation today differs markedly from that that was confronted by NATO in 1949. In the face of these changing conditions, the alliance needs to maintain a force which will give its members confidence in their military security to stand firm in the face of hostile threats and pressures.

In our view such a posture should include powerful conventional forces as part of a balanced conventional-nuclear force structure. Such forces are needed both to enhance the deterrent and to enable NATO to confront dangers with confidence.

Such a balanced force structure is also likely to hold the alliance together in periods of prolonged tension and crisis. For it will assure members of the alliance that they need not confront, in the event of enemy aggression, an instant choice between simple surrender or not so simple thermonuclear devastation. It will provide a range of alternative responses from which they can choose the one best suited to their military and political purposes at the time.

The NATO military authorities have proposed, and the alliance has approved, certain force goals whose attainment would represent a first step toward such a balanced military posture. As an American, I am proud that the United States is leading the way to meeting these approved force goals. The American soldiers whom the President inspected on his recent trip to Europe are among the best armed and trained in the world.

But as a citizen of the Atlantic world, I am

anxious that the alliance as a whole also meet its combined commitments. For in a genuine partnership burdens must be equitably borne; all countries must contribute their fair share to the total strength of the alliance. And I am confident that this in fact is what is going to be done.

#### **Nuclear Forces**

A truly balanced force cannot be attained without effective nuclear power and the will to use it if required. The nuclear power of the alliance must be organized so as to meet this military need. The nuclear power of the alliance is massive indeed and has risen rapidly in these more recent years. The organization of this power involves, however, vital political considerations. It goes to the heart of relations among the nations of Europe and between Europe and the United States. For this is a power of the life and death of nations and decisions to be made on a moment's notice.

But because the political framework of Europe is still evolving and because we here are grappling with highly complex military problems, we cannot pretend to offer neat and final answers simply from the United States to this nuclear question. Both this and the previous United States administration have believed that the general direction should eventually offer Europe an opportunity to make a genuine contribution to a unified Atlantic nuclear deterrent. This is the direction most consistent with the concepts of Atlantic partnership and European unity.

We have, in the last 2 years, taken some important interim steps to this end.

We have agreed with our partners on guidelines for the employment of nuclear weapons in specific military circumstances.

We are making available to our allies much more information regarding the capabilities and characteristics of nuclear weapons than ever before.

We also agreed with our allies, at the last NATO ministerial meeting in Ottawa, that a new Deputy for Nuclear Affairs should be established at Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe; that he should have a staff consisting of officers drawn from a number of NATO

countries; and that an international liaison group representing the NATO Command in Europe should be attached to our Strategic Air Command headquarters at Omaha. These Ottawa decisions, taken in conjunction with the assignment of British V-Bombers and American Polaris submarines to NATO, will increase not only the strength and reach of NATO forces but also the knowledge and professional competence of NATO staffs in the nuclear area.

We are quite aware, however, that these are only initial steps and that they alone are not enough. They do not fully meet the desire of a revived Europe—living under the gun of Soviet nuclear power—to carry a greater share of the responsibility for its own nuclear defense.

This desire has come to focus, in large part, on medium-range ballistic missiles, since these are the only effective weapons of strategic range which can usefully be deployed in the European area against similar weapons aimed at Europe.

European desires for MRBM's first made themselves manifest in 1960. There were then, and there are now, broadly three alternative ways of responding.

*One*, we could refuse to provide MRBM's to allied forces. This could well signal to our allies, facing the threat of hundreds of Soviet MRBM's, American indifference to their nuclear concerns and thus to the concept of genuine partnership in the nuclear field.

*Two*, we could deploy such missiles to nationally manned and owned forces. Whatever technical safeguards might be built against premature use, the political effect of thus establishing new nationally owned and manned strategic missile forces would be divisive within the alliance and deeply unsettling in terms of East-West relations.

The *third* alternative would be to provide MRBM's to forces jointly organized by us and our allies but not to nationally manned and owned forces. And if such forces must come into being, it can only be under multilateral manning and ownership.

After considering these three alternatives, General Eisenhower directed my predecessor, Secretary of State [Christian A.] Herter, to present the concept of a multilateral sea-based force to the NATO meeting in December 1960.<sup>4</sup>

After thorough review of the matter, the present administration also concluded that the multilateral force would be more consistent with our long-term goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership than either of the alternative responses to the missile problem that I have described.

Such a multilateral force would be open to all NATO countries on a basis of equality. It would be based on both United States and European productive resources. It could not break down into national components over time or under the pressure of sudden crises. And as Europe moved toward unity we could, as the President indicated at Frankfurt,<sup>5</sup> contemplate an increase in the collective European role and responsibility in such a force. Most important, treaty authorities, including the Supreme Committee to national nuclear proliferation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that, from a military standpoint, a mixed manned force in surface warships would be an effective part of the nuclear deterrent. The same conclusion has been reached by allied military authorities, including the Supreme Commander, General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer.

Discussions with our allies about this concept have been proceeding since the summer of 1962. We were able to get considerable "feel" of allied reactions during our recent trip.

In Germany President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer agreed that they would use their best efforts to bring this force into being and that the matter should be further pursued with other interested countries.

In the United Kingdom we found agreement that the force was technically feasible, but no decision had been made as to British participation pending their further study of the overall problem of nuclear deterrents which they wish to make.

In Italy we found a favorable response to the concept, which had been given its support by the previous Italian government, and a desire to proceed with discussion among the countries concerned.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1961, p. 39.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, July 22, 1963, p. 118.

The current level of strength and confidence in the nuclear power of the alliance will allow some time for this discussion in order to address the questions involved with the care that they deserve. If our allies then wish to proceed, the United States will be prepared to join them in creating this multilateral force. For we believe that such a force would notably enhance the strength and the cohesion of the alliance.

### Political Consultation

The object of such a force—as of all NATO forces—would be to preserve peace. But more than military strength is needed to preserve peace. We also need a concerted Atlantic political and economic strategy.

All of us realize that our security is affected not only by what happens in the NATO treaty area but also by what may happen elsewhere in the world.

How should NATO cope with this inescapable interdependence between events inside and outside the NATO treaty area? By making NATO worldwide? I think not; that would certainly be impracticable. By consultation? To the maximum extent feasible and, may I add, to the extent that each of the members is willing to accept the responsibilities involved in genuine consultation.

We are continually seeking ways to perfect these processes of alliance consultation. Few people realize how much progress has been made since about 1957. It was decided then that NATO machinery should be adapted to the new post-Stalin Soviet emphasis on political, psychological, and economic initiatives and that new procedures were to be put into effect to this end.

When the 15 NATO ambassadors now sit around the NATO Council table in Paris each Wednesday, they cover a wide range of political and economic subjects. The primary instrument for Atlantic *economic* cooperation is the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]; but NATO also provides a forum in which these issues can be weighed against *political* background which lends them the necessary urgency. I believe that the processes of consultation will continue

to gather strength as Europe itself moves toward unity and a more dynamic role on the world scene.

But consultation is not a substitute for action. Those members who have responsibilities elsewhere may at times be forced to act without the prior approval of all NATO allies and indeed, at times, without as extensive consultation as would be desirable. We had a special and difficult case in the immediate crisis over Cuba last October, although Cuba itself had been fully discussed in NATO throughout the preceding year. But the understanding and support of our allies for what had to be done in that crisis was not only gratifying but made a major contribution to a peaceful solution of that missile crisis.

### Negotiation

This process of consultation is as important in concerting actions toward the Communist nations as in the free world. For peace can only be made more secure if the West is as united in its efforts to reduce sources of international tension as in enhancing its defenses.

To reject negotiation with the Communists could be to forgo a chance of strengthening peace. But to undertake negotiation without full and intimate transatlantic consultation, on the other hand, could endanger the unity on which peace depends.

So we recognize both these needs: the need for negotiation, the need for consultation.

To meet the need for negotiation, we have been discussing the possibility of arms control with the Soviet Union for some 16 months at Geneva, where three other NATO allies participate with us. To meet the need for full consultation, we have kept the North Atlantic Council fully and currently informed about the state of these negotiations.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to set up a direct communication link, which they could use in time of crisis to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation.<sup>6</sup> We hope that agreement on other safeguards against miscalculation can follow, enhancing the effec-

<sup>6</sup> For text of agreement, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

tiveness of this initial step, because last October, something new happened in history: Nuclear powers seriously and specifically had to consider nuclear war as an active element in policy and not simply as a theoretical exercise. And it became quite clear during that period that those who are responsible for this weapon must indeed keep in touch with each other—not just despite differences but because of differences—if these weapons would be kept within human control.

Some progress has been made also toward narrowing differences on a test ban, which could help to inhibit the development of new national nuclear capabilities. Agreement has, however, eluded us thus far. Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman and Lord Hailsham will discuss the matter further in Moscow with the Soviet leaders beginning early next week.<sup>7</sup>

We should like to achieve a test ban if we can, to begin to turn down an arms race which, if not turned down, will become increasingly burdensome in terms of billions upon billions of additional resources, increasingly unpredictable and chancy in terms of results, increasingly dangerous in the process. We are keeping in the most intimate touch with our allies during these discussions. We have reaffirmed to them the commitment which the President made in his American University speech,<sup>8</sup> that "The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners but also because their interests and ours converge."

### **The OECD and Aid Coordination**

Two years ago a second great Atlantic institution was created to increase the effectiveness of the partnership on the economic side. That is the OECD, which evolved from the highly successful Organization for European Economic Cooperation of the Marshall Plan. It now has in it 20 nations of the Atlantic area.

The OECD has the power to make binding decisions by unanimous actions and to make recommendations to governments. Its greatest effectiveness, however, is as an active agency

for consultation—a place where policies still in the making in many countries can be developed in mutually reinforcing concert. The range of affairs already examined there, with fair to excellent success, includes economic policy, monetary and balance-of-payments policies, agriculture, trade, science, manpower, social affairs, and development assistance for underdeveloped countries.

This last matter—development assistance—is the special responsibility of the Development Assistance Committee. And it is here that we and the industrially developed nations of the Atlantic area, plus Japan, coordinate our efforts to assist in the development of these newly independent nations of the rest of the world.

The foreign aid provided by the European members of this Committee is really very substantial—about \$2.5 billions in 1961, of which approximately two-thirds was in grants. We expect this participation to increase. But this would not in the immediate future lessen the need for development assistance from the United States. For the total requirements are very large, if these less developed countries are to maintain their independence and move toward the goal of self-support at tolerable levels of living.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of our foreign aid programs to our own national security. Despite difficulties and disappointments here and there, they have indeed produced formidable results.

### **Popular Support for International Cooperation**

The American people have made, in the last two decades, a far-reaching choice between international cooperation and isolation—and this in the military, the political, and the economic fields. During this period a whole series of important international commitments have had the support of national leaders of both our major political parties and of large bipartisan majorities in Congress.

The U.S. Senate, for example, approved our membership in the United Nations by a vote of 89 to 2. The legislation carrying out that membership passed the Senate 67 to 7, and the House 344 to 15.

Aid to Greece and Turkey, under the Truman

<sup>7</sup> See p. 198.

<sup>8</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

Doctrine, 1947: approved 67 to 23 in the Senate, 287 to 108 in the House. The Marshall Plan: 69 to 17; 329 to 75. The ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty: 82 to 13. Six years later the ratification of SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], the Manila Treaty: 82 to 1. And last year the Trade Expansion Act was approved by votes of 78 to 8 in the Senate and 292 to 125 in the House.

In a recent Gallup poll, 82 percent of those questioned answered that they would rather the United States worked closely with other nations than pursue an independent course in world affairs. That emphatic result indicates how truly the American people have taken to heart the experiences of two world wars in this century and of a third and still greater threat to our freedom for the future.

For in this world struggle in which we are engaged, the forces of freedom have indeed been gaining in strength. The Communist system is torn by internal schisms and plagued by low food production, economic shortcomings, ideological disputes. But this world remains a very dangerous place. And the forces of coercion are still powerful and determined. If we should curtail our efforts, the present generally favorable trend could quickly be reversed.

As Secretary of State I am therefore concerned by the voices here and there who would have us give up our efforts—that is, who would quit this struggle and abandon the field to those who would destroy freedom. And, oddly, some of the most strident of these voices profess to be strongly anti-Communist, although what they would seem to want us to do is exactly what the Communists hoped that we would do. And that is to go home. Because if we come home, the Communists begin to take over.

There are many ways of withdrawing and of quitting in this great struggle for freedom. One way is to cut back our military establishment in the absence of sound and adequately inspected international agreements to reduce armaments. Another way of quitting is to cut back our foreign aid programs. Another way is to quit our alliances. Still another is to pull out of the United Nations.

We can't win this world struggle by retreating. Indeed, retreat is the sure road to defeat.

I don't believe the American people intend to take that road.

### **The Ideas That Unite Us**

I would urge you, when you go home, if you have not done so recently, to read the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. You will find some familiar language there. And you should, because that language had a very substantial American influence in its drafting at the end of World War II at a time when we were thinking long and deeply about our relations with the rest of the world, at a time when we had been chastened in the fires of a great war. We shall not have another chance to draw lessons from a world war to build a decent world order. For this time we must build that decent world order before that world war is upon us. But you will find in those simple words not only a succinct summary of the long-term foreign policy of the American people; you will also find there a reflection of the words and the ideas which are our greatest strength in this present struggle.

The simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is the most explosive political idea in the world today. You feel its force in every continent, and you feel its force as a cohesive relationship between us and other nations wherever we turn. You find in that simple notion a scarlet thread of American policy throughout the decades.

This helps to explain why we find it more easy to get along with democracies than with dictatorships, why we react instinctively as we do when great colonial issues arise, why we are so deeply disturbed about what is going on in Eastern Europe, and why we are concerned when we here at home fail to live up to the greatest aspirations and commitments of our own political system.

These simple notions unite us with other peoples because they are deeply rooted in human nature, a human nature that has expressed itself in almost every major tradition of which we know, and certainly in every continent. And these are the notions which give us allies, committed or not, at times of crisis and help to ex-

plain why it is that, when we find ourselves in crisis, there are far fewer neutrals than you might suppose. So there is great reason to move forward here in confidence, calmness, care, sobriety, but with the determination to do those things that are necessary to get on with the great unfinished business both here and abroad which will surely strengthen and stabilize the great story of freedom, which is the course of history in the story of man.

## President Reports on Progress of Test Ban Talks at Moscow

*Statement by President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>*

I have a brief statement to make on the progress of the negotiations in Moscow.<sup>2</sup> After 3 days of talks we are still hopeful that the participating countries may reach an agreement to end nuclear testing, at least in the environments in which it is agreed that on-the-ground inspection is not required for reasonable security. Negotiations so far are going forward in a businesslike way. It is understood, of course, that under our constitutional procedures any agreement will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. It is also understood by our allies that the British and American representatives are not negotiating on other matters affecting their rights and interests. Any matter of this sort which may come under discussion will be kept open for full allied consultation.

Finally, it is clear that these negotiations, if successful, should lead on to wider discussions among other nations. The three negotiating powers constitute the nuclear test ban committee of the Geneva conference, and if the present negotiations should be successful, it will be important to reach the widest possible agreement on nuclear testing throughout the world. But all of these questions are still ahead of us, and

<sup>1</sup> Read by the President at the opening of his news conference on July 17.

<sup>2</sup> For the names of members of the U.S. delegation to the talks, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1963, p. 159.

today, while the negotiators are at work, I think we should not complicate their task by further speculation, and for that reason I do not expect to respond to further questions on this subject.

## President Nyerere of Tanganyika Visits Washington

*Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, visited the United States from July 14 to 20. He was in Washington July 15-17. Following is the text of a communique released jointly on July 16 by the Office of the White House Press Secretary and the Office of the Press Secretary of the President of Tanganyika, together with a White House announcement of a new Peace Corps agreement between the two countries.*

### JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, met yesterday and today with the President. They discussed political developments in Africa as related to world developments and those developments affecting the relations of the United States and Tanganyika.

President Nyerere reviewed for the President the decisions taken by the recent African heads of state meeting in Addis Ababa and stressed the importance of the establishment at that meeting of an Organization of African Unity. President Nyerere also outlined the steps being taken to form an East African federation at an early date.

The President reviewed the United States position on world issues of interest to Tanganyika, stressing particularly the importance of promoting peace and economic progress within a framework of freedom. The President confirmed the continuing support of the United States for the principle of self-determination and expressed confidence in even greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Tanganyika.

President Nyerere thanked the President for

the warm welcome which he and his party had received on his first visit to the United States since Tanganyika's independence.

#### **PEACE CORPS AGREEMENT**

The White House announced on July 16 that there would be a short ceremony at the White House that afternoon during which President Nyerere of Tanganyika and Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver would make a joint announcement of an agreement under which 80 new volunteer teachers will be sent to Tanganyika in November. The third group of volunteers requested by the East African republic, they will teach English and other subjects in upper primary grades.

In 1961, when the Peace Corps began, Tanganyika was the first country to make a formal request for volunteers. That first group consisted of 29 surveyor-engineers and 5 geologists. They have just completed their 2-year tour of duty in Tanganyika and are returning to the United States this summer. During their stay, they mapped 7,500 square miles of Tanganyika hinterlands, worked on 525 miles of road construction, surveyed approximately 4,000 miles of road, and taught courses in forestry, road-building, and engineering.

The new contingent of teachers will join a group of 20 nurses and 2 laboratory technicians who are just starting their second year of work in the hospitals of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanga, and Moshi.

### **United States and Mexico Agree To Conclude Convention for Settlement of Chamizal Boundary Dispute**

#### **STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, JULY 18**

White House press release dated July 18

I have approved the recommendations for a complete solution to the Chamizal border problem contained in a Memorandum of the Department of State and of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Mexico dated July 17, 1963. I am pleased to note that President López Mateos has also approved the Memorandum. The Memorandum proposes the resolution of this long-standing dispute by giving effect in today's circumstances to the 1911 international arbitration award.

It is gratifying to be able to approve a proposed settlement of the Chamizal dispute and thus bring closer to a successful conclusion the constructive efforts of President Taft and all the other American Presidents since him who have sought to resolve this complex problem on a mutually satisfactory basis. I believe the solution which has been recommended to me will make a significant contribution to relations

between the United States and Mexico and will contribute to the welfare and orderly development of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua.

The Department of State will now undertake negotiations with the Government of Mexico looking to the early conclusion of a convention to carry out the recommendations in the Memorandum.

#### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT AND MEMORANDUM**

Press release 375 dated July 18

#### **Department Statement, July 18**

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico announced today their agreement to conclude a convention for the settlement of the Chamizal boundary dispute. The recommended terms of settlement which the Presidents have approved were submitted to them in identical memoranda by the Department of State and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign

Relations. According to the terms of the recommended settlement, the United States would transfer to Mexico 437 acres in the vicinity of El Paso, Texas. Conclusion of the convention will be a final step in the resolution of this controversy, which has been earnestly sought by every United States administration since 1910.

An international arbitral commission awarded to Mexico in 1911 an undeterminable part of the Chamizal zone in El Paso, Texas. The area of the zone then totaled approximately 598 acres. The Mexican claim was based on a shift in the channel of the Rio Grande. The United States Government, which had disputed the claim, rejected the award on several grounds, but in the understanding that the Governments of the two countries could proceed at once to settle their differences through diplomatic channels. Since 1911 the controversy has been a major problem in relations between the two countries. Every United States administration beginning with that of President Taft has attempted to resolve it in a mutually satisfactory manner. Proposals for a settlement have varied, and every practical means of settling the matter is believed to have been explored by the Governments at one time or another. In June 1962 President López Mateos urged that a further attempt be made, and President Kennedy agreed.<sup>1</sup> The two Presidents instructed their respective executive agencies to recommend a complete solution which, without prejudice to the juridical positions of the two Governments, would take into account the entire history of the tract. They recognized that any mutually acceptable settlement would affect many people in the city of El Paso and agreed that respect for the rights and interests of the people affected on both sides of the border should be a principal consideration in reaching a solution. The recommended settlement follows generally the solution set forth in the international arbitral award of 1911.

An important consideration in a settlement is the firm intention of the two Governments, in accordance with the treaties of 1848<sup>2</sup> and 1853,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For text of a joint communique of June 30, 1962, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> 9 Stat. 922.

<sup>3</sup> 10 Stat. 1031.

to maintain the Rio Grande as the boundary between the two countries. Maintenance of the Rio Grande as the boundary was an objective of the so-called Banco Treaty of 1905,<sup>4</sup> under which thousands of acres, formerly on the United States side of the river, have been transferred to Mexican sovereignty as shifts in the channel placed them on the Mexican side of the river, and other thousands of acres, formerly on the Mexican side, have been transferred to United States sovereignty as they were shifted by river movements to the United States side. Under a 1933 treaty<sup>5</sup> the river just below El Paso was straightened and stabilized. In that process the two countries exchanged over 10,000 acres in order that the river might remain the boundary.

In the recommended Chamizal settlement, similar transfers of territory are involved and the same problem of maintaining the river as the boundary arises. Since 1899 an enclave of 386 acres, known as Cordova Island and under the jurisdiction of Mexico, has jutted north of the river into El Paso. The transfer to Mexico of additional acres in a Chamizal settlement would have augmented the amount of territory under Mexican jurisdiction north of the river. The two Governments agreed therefore that in any settlement the Rio Grande should be relocated, completing the 1933 stabilization and restoring the river as the international boundary for its entire reach in the vicinity of El Paso.

The recommended terms of settlement to be incorporated in a convention would accordingly provide: There would be a net transfer to Mexico of 437 acres of territory now under the jurisdiction of the United States. Of this area, 366 acres would be from the disputed Chamizal zone and 71 acres would be from United States territory to the east adjacent to Cordova Island. Cordova Island itself, lying between these two areas, would be divided equally between the United States and Mexico in the process of the relocation of the river. The United States would transfer to Mexico for the 193 acres it would receive out of Cordova Island an equal acreage from the United States

<sup>4</sup> 35 Stat. 1863.

<sup>5</sup> 48 Stat. 1621.

territory just east of Cordova Island. The Rio Grande would be relocated by channelization and reconstituted as the boundary between the United States and Mexico, thus eliminating the Cordova Island enclave.

Both Governments would acquire title to all the land and improvements in the areas which would be transferred, and each Government would receive the areas transferred without encumbrances of any kind, including any private titles. No payments would be made between the two Governments for the lands passing from one country to the other. The United States would, however, be paid by a private Mexican bank for the value to Mexico of the structures that would pass intact to Mexico. The two Governments would share equally the costs of actual construction of the relocated river channel, each Government bearing the costs of compensation for the value of the improvements destroyed in the construction process in the territory under its jurisdiction prior to the relocation of the boundary. The costs of constructing the bridges which would replace the existing bridges would be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. The citizenship status of persons who are or were residents of the areas being transferred would not be affected, nor would jurisdiction over or the applicability of laws to acts in or with respect to the area, including criminal or civil proceedings decided or pending at the time of transfer, be affected. Once the convention has been approved and comes into force and the necessary enabling legislation enacted, the International Boundary and Water Commission would agree upon a period in which to effect the acquisition of the properties. The relocation of the boundary line and the transfer of sovereignty would take place when the United States Commissioner on the Commission has certified that the acquisition of the properties and evacuation of the occupants have been completed and payment for the structures passing intact to Mexico has been received, and when the Commission has certified with the approval of the two Governments that the new boundary line has been demarcated.

The Department believes that settlement of this longstanding controversy would be a nota-

ble achievement in inter-American relations and in the history of peaceful settlement of international disputes. The Department is convinced, despite the serious temporary inconveniences that it would cause for many people in El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, that the settlement would greatly benefit both communities in the solution of current municipal problems and in the planning and realization of their future development.

### **Text of Memorandum**

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF MEXICO BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR A COMPLETE SOLUTION OF THE CHAMIZAL PROBLEM**

A. The Chamizal tract is an area on the north bank of the Rio Grande, within the city limits of El Paso, Texas. When, at the end of the past century, the controversy between the Governments of the United States and of Mexico over the Chamizal began, the total area of this tract was approximately 598 acres.

B. The principal factors relating to the controversy under reference are summarized as follows:

1) Each one of the two Governments claimed international title over the entire area of the Chamizal.

2) On June 15, 1911, the International Boundary Commission, United States-Mexico, increased by the appointment of a third member, the presiding Commissioner Eugene Lafleur of Canada, ruled, by a majority vote, that the United States had international title to that part of the Chamizal which, in 1864 before the floods of that year, was to the north of the center of the channel of the Rio Grande; and that Mexico had international title to that part of the Chamizal which was to the south of said center of the channel in 1864.

3) The United States Commissioner on the International Boundary Commission challenged the validity of the majority ruling, on the ground, among others, that in the opinion of the United States, in 1911 it was impossible to determine the channel of the river in 1864.

4) In the award under reference, the Presiding Commissioner and the Commissioner of Mexico included the following statement: "They also conceive that it is not within their province to relocate that line, inasmuch as the parties have offered no evidence to enable the Commissioners to do so."

5) From the date of the award to the present the two Governments on various occasions attempted without success to settle the Chamizal controversy. On June 30, 1962, President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos announced their agreement to instruct their executive agencies to recommend a complete solution to the Chamizal problem which, without prejudice to their juridical positions, took into account the entire history of this tract.

C. A portion of land under Mexican jurisdiction,

known as Cordova Island, with an area of 389 acres, is also to the north of the present channel of the Rio Grande. The location of this land north of the river resulted from an artificial cut made in the year 1899 by common agreement between the two Governments so as to reduce the dangers of floods. Cordova Island is contiguous to the Chamizal tract. Its precise location and peculiar formation are shown on the attached map.<sup>6</sup>

D. For either country, it is undesirable to have a portion of its territory on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande. In fact, these instances of physical isolation hinder border-control measures and the best utilization of the detached areas. These problems are particularly serious in the case of Cordova Island, because it is an area the urbanization of which under present conditions would be unsatisfactory and of doubtful benefit since it is practically isolated from Mexican territory and as an enclave in El Paso constitutes an obstacle to the logical development of that city.

E. According to the calculations made by both Governments, the part of the Chamizal claimed by Mexico has an area of approximately 437 acres. The transfer to Mexico of the portion of the Chamizal which it claims, without relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande, could not by itself be considered as the complete solution called for by the Joint Communique of June 30, 1962, because a portion of territory under Mexican jurisdiction would yet remain to the north of the present channel of the Rio Grande. This area of 823 acres is composed of 437 acres in the Chamizal and 389 acres in Cordova Island.

F. Both Governments have always demonstrated their firm intention to restore the Rio Grande as the boundary between them as provided in the Treaties of 1848 and 1853, through efforts to find adequate solutions to all instances where portions of their respective territories are situated on the opposite bank of the river.

G. From the foregoing, it is clear that the complete solution of the Chamizal problem calls for incorporating into Mexico 823 acres presently north of the Rio Grande, by means of the excavation of a new channel which would restore the river as the boundary between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.

H. The excavation of the new river channel would complete the project executed by both Governments in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Valley. Under the terms of the Convention of February 1, 1933, the channel of the Rio Grande has been rectified in the sector of the river from Cordova Island to Cajonitos Canyon, a distance of 88 miles. That rectification, which has afforded an extensive border region with adequate protection against floods and, additionally, with the many benefits derived from the existence of a precise and stable natural border, could not have been carried out

had there not existed then, as now, mutual understanding and good will between the United States and Mexico, as its completion required the cutting of 86 tracts, under the jurisdiction of Mexico, with a total area of 5,120 acres in exchange for 89 tracts, cut from the United States, with the same total acreage. The ease and rapidity which characterized the exchanges of territory under reference—this task was begun in the year 1934 and terminated in 1938—indicate the advisability of following the same procedure by concluding a convention applicable to the sector of the river separating El Paso from Ciudad Juarez.

#### *Recommendation*

In view of the foregoing, the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations make the following joint recommendation for the complete solution of the Chamizal problem:

In the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez sector, the Rio Grande should be relocated into a new channel in order that south of the center of the new channel an area of 823 acres, in a single tract, be incorporated into Mexico. The center of the new channel would be the international boundary.

1. The new channel would have the following characteristics:

(a) It would commence at the point where the divergence between the present day and the 1864 channel begins (marked "A" on the attached map).

(b) The course of the new channel would be such that the areas transferred and the compensations therefor would be reduced to a minimum, with no further limitations than those imposed by the objective of contributing, in a positive manner, to the future development of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez and by technical requirements.

(c) The new channel would be concrete lined, in order that its width be as narrow as may be compatible with the technical requirements for protection against floods; that the number of persons and properties affected be minimized; that health conditions along the river be improved; that border control be facilitated; and that the project contribute to the beautification of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.

2. The recommended new channel for the river, which would comply with the criteria set forth in the Recommendation and numbered paragraph 1 above, has been delineated on the attached map of the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region by the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. The results of this relocation of the channel of the river follow:

(a) Of the 437 acres in the Chamizal tract to which Mexico claims international title, approximately 366 acres would be incorporated into Mexico in that same tract. The 71 acres in the Chamizal tract which would not be incorporated into Mexico in the Chamizal tract would be compensated for by cutting to Mexico an equal acreage from the territory under the jurisdiction

<sup>6</sup> Not printed here; for a copy of the map, see Department of State press release 375.

of the United States immediately to the east of Cordova Island.

(b) Also, 193 acres of territory under the jurisdiction of the United States in the area immediately to the east of Cordova Island would be cut to Mexico and would be compensated for by an equal acreage which would be cut to the United States from territory under the jurisdiction of Mexico in the northern portion of Cordova Island.

3. Finally, the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations have reached the following supplementary agreements:

(a) The lands in the Chamizal tract and in the zone immediately to the east of Cordova Island which would pass to Mexico would be free of any limitation on ownership or encumbrance of any kind including any private titles. The land in Cordova Island which would remain north of the new river channel and would pass to the United States would also be free of any limitation on ownership or encumbrance of any kind including any private titles. No payments would be made, as between the two Governments, for the value of the lands which would pass from one country to the other as a result of the incorporation into Mexico of Chamizal territory and of the relocation of the river channel.

(b) The transfer of lands in Cordova Island referred to in the penultimate sentence of the preceding paragraph would not require the adoption of any special measures by the Government of Mexico as these lands are not privately owned and are uninhabited.

(c) In the lands which would pass from the United States to Mexico in the Chamizal zone as well as in the area immediately to the east of Cordova Island there are some 382 structures which would pass intact to Mexico. All these structures are owned by private individuals with the exception of the Navarro School and the offices of the United States Border Patrol which are in the zone to the east of Cordova Island. Approximately 3,750 persons reside on the lands which would be directly affected by the relocation of the river.

(d) Once the required Convention is approved in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the two countries, and the necessary legislation is enacted for carrying out the provisions of the Convention, the Government of the United States in conformity with its laws would acquire the properties which would be transferred to Mexico and effect the orderly evacuation of the occupants of the areas involved within a period of time which would be agreed upon by the two Commissioners on the International Boundary and Water Commission.

(e) The Government of Mexico would communicate to the Government of the United States the names of the private individuals or corporations, of Mexican nationality, to whom the Government of Mexico may decide to convey the titles to the properties comprised of those structures which would pass intact to Mexico and the lands on which they stand. These

persons or corporations would pay the Government of Mexico for the value of said lands and they would pay the Government of the United States for the estimated value to Mexico of these structures.

(f) The Commissioner of the United States on the International Boundary and Water Commission would certify as to the completion of the acquisitions and arrangements cited in 3(d) as well as of the action provided for in the last part of 3(e) and would so inform the Commissioner of Mexico. Both Commissioners would then proceed to demarcate the new boundary line, recording this in a Minute. The relocation of the boundary line and the transfer of lands provided for in the Convention would take place upon approval of this Minute by both Governments in accordance with established procedure.

(g) The costs of constructing the new river channel would be borne, in equal parts, by the two Governments. However, each Government would bear the costs of compensation for the value of the improvements or structures destroyed in the process of constructing the new channel of the Rio Grande in the territory under its jurisdiction at the time the Convention enters into force.

(h) The costs of constructing the bridges which would replace the six that are presently in use would be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. The legal status of the four bridges that presently are international bridges would not be altered by the provisions of the convention and, therefore, the agreements now in force which relate to them would apply without change to the new bridges which replace them. The bridges which would replace the international bridges on Stanton-Lerdo and Santa Fe-Juarez Streets would be located on the same streets. The international bridge or bridges which would replace the two to Cordova Island would be toll free unless the two Governments should agree to the contrary. The location of the free bridge or bridges would be subject to agreement between the Commissioners of the United States and Mexico on the International Boundary and Water Commission to be reached and recorded in accord with established procedure.

(i) The International Boundary and Water Commission would be charged with the relocation, improvement, and maintenance of the river channel, as well as the construction of the new bridges.

(j) The relocation of the boundary and the transfer of lands resulting therefrom would not affect in any way: the legal status, with respect to citizenship laws, of those persons who are present or former residents of the lands transferred; the jurisdiction over legal proceedings of either a civil or criminal character which are pending at the time of, or which were decided prior to, such relocation; or the jurisdiction over or the law or laws applicable to acts or conduct performed within or with respect to the lands transferred prior to their transfer. The Convention would contain provisions to give effect to these principles.

The Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations are certain that the final solution of the Chamizal problem will be of great value to the future harmonious development of the cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. But even more, the solution of this controversy will serve as a notable example to the world at large and will contribute to world peace by again demonstrating that all differences among nations, regardless of how complicated they may be, can be resolved through friendly negotiations.

July 17, 1963

WASHINGTON, D.C. and MEXICO, D.F.

## President Moves To Facilitate Use of Foreign Currencies

White House press release dated July 8

The President transmitted to Congress on July 8 an amendment to the general provisions of the 1964 budget which would ease the United States balance-of-payments situation by permitting foreign currencies to be used more flexibly.

The amendment will facilitate the use of foreign currencies through a change in Treasury banking and accounting arrangements. It will help to improve the United States balance-of-payments position without making any change in the system of congressional control of foreign currencies or in the availability of foreign currencies for programs for which they are reserved under existing law. The proposed language would accomplish these purposes by enabling currencies on hand to be used for current needs and to be replaced as required later.

The new provision would free for immediate U.S. Government use foreign currencies restricted under three programs—the market development and research programs of the Department of Agriculture and the educational exchange program of the Department of State. When currencies are reserved under these programs, they are set aside, even though they may not be used for several years. Therefore, when the United States requires currencies for other programs in a given country, as it does in many countries, the currencies must be purchased commercially with dollars, even though at the same time identical currencies may be idle in Treasury accounts. By using these idle cur-

rencies to meet current needs, U.S. dollar payments abroad would be reduced by an equivalent amount and the U.S. balance of payments would be benefited accordingly. Approximately \$75 million of administratively reserved currencies could be made available, with \$35–40 million to be used in the first year following enactment of the amendment. As currencies are needed for the three programs later, the Treasury would supply them from subsequent receipts or buy them if necessary.

## Department Releases First Volume of Digest of International Law

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on July 15 (press release 373) that a new *Digest of International Law*, the first since the beginning of World War II, is now being published by the Department. On that day the first volume was formally presented to Secretary Rusk by Assistant Legal Adviser Marjorie Whiteman. The *Digest* is being prepared by and under the direction of Miss Whiteman.

A successor to Hackworth's *Digest of International Law*, published in 1940, the new *Digest* will contain the first official and comprehensive treatments of the new areas of international law that have developed in the past two decades, such as the law of outer space, disarmament, Antarctica, and the continental shelf. Other areas of international law, such as aviation and international organizations, which were in their infancy when Hackworth's *Digest* was published, will be dealt with at length in the new *Digest*. An entire volume will be devoted to the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the international banking ventures, and other international organizations which have grown up since the war.

Eventually the *Digest* is expected to run to 15 or 16 volumes, roughly twice the size of its predecessor. Present printing schedules call for at least three more volumes during the com-

ing winter, with the rest following as quickly as possible.

Volume I, which runs to practically 1,000 pages, contains two chapters—"International Law" and "States, Territories, and Governments." Hackworth's *Digest* covered the same material in 160 pages. The birth of more than 50 states, the postwar evolution of the British Commonwealth and the postwar history of the French Community, the development of the United Nations trust territories, and the recent history of the League of Nations mandates are all recorded in this volume.

The *Digest* is the fifth digest of international law to be published by the Department. The first was published in 1877. Prepared by John L. Cadwalader, Assistant Secretary of State, it was titled *Digest of the Published Opinions of the Attorneys-General and of the Leading Decisions of the Federal Courts, with Reference to International Law, Treaties, and Kindred Subjects*. This *Digest* was a single volume of less than 300 pages, with the subjects arranged in alphabetical order rather than under chapter headings.

The second *Digest of International Law* was prepared by Dr. Francis Wharton, Chief Examiner of Claims for the Department of State, and published in 1886. Wharton's *Digest* was a three-volume work, which set the pattern for succeeding digests insofar as the general format and table of contents were concerned. John Bassett Moore prepared the third *Digest*, which ran to eight volumes. It was published in 1906 and incorporated much of Wharton's *Digest*. The *Digest* by Green Haywood Hackworth, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, published in 1940, was the fourth.

Work on the present *Digest* began formally in 1957, when Legal Adviser Herman Phleger asked Miss Whiteman to undertake the task. Material for the *Digest*, however, has been collected by Miss Whiteman during the preceding two decades.

Copies of volume I are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at \$4.25 each.

## REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

I am delighted to receive the first volume of the new *Digest of International Law*. This is our first comprehensive treatment of public international law by the Department since Hackworth's *Digest*, which was published at the beginning of World War II.

The 23 years which have passed since the publication of Hackworth's *Digest* have been years of unprecedented growth and development for international law, both in its procedural and substantive aspects. This growth and development are no more than a reflection, and a consequence, of the increased collaboration and cooperation among nations on a rapidly shrinking planet. In this sense these volumes will be a documentary record of the complexity and compactness of our world and of the interrelationship of its nations and people.

This volume, and the ones to come, will fill an important gap in the legal materials available to the United States Government, to the bar and to the public in this country, and to governments and scholars throughout the world. We are grateful to you, Miss Whiteman, for undertaking the preparation of the *Digest of International Law* and for the intensive work you have done and have directed over several years, to see the task through to completion. We look forward to the other volumes in this important project.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 88th Congress, 1st Session

- Antitrust Developments in the European Common Market. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Part I. March 8-14, 1963. 262 pp.
- Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Part 5. March 29, 1963. 67 pp.
- Training of Foreign Affairs Personnel. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 15 and S. 865, bills to establish a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, S. 32 and S. 99, bills to establish a U.S. Foreign Service Academy, and S. 414, a bill to establish a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy. April 4-May 1, 1963. 492 pp.

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES**

**Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>**

**Scheduled August Through October 1963**

Inter-American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Aug. 4-
UNESCO/BIRPI African Study Meeting on Copyright . . . . .	Brazzaville . . . . .	Aug. 5-
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Geochemical Prospecting Methods and Equipment . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 5-
U.N. Seminar on the Rights of the Child . . . . .	Warsaw . . . . .	Aug. 6-
BIRPI African Seminar on Industrial Property . . . . .	Brazzaville . . . . .	Aug. 12-
17th International Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 18-
ICAO International Conference on Air Law . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Aug. 20-
International Criminal Police Organization . . . . .	Helsinki . . . . .	Aug. 21-
U.N. International Conference on Travel and Tourism . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 21-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Cardiff, Wales . . . . .	Aug. 26-
Centenary Congress of the International Red Cross . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 27-
U.N. ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the Conference on Trade and Development . . . . .	New York . . . . .	August
ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 9-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Extraordinary Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Sept. 10-
U.N. Human Rights Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Sept. 10-
52d Conference of the Interparliamentary Union . . . . .	Belgrade . . . . .	Sept. 12-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 16-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 8th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 16-
5th FAO Conference on Wood Technology . . . . .	Madison, Wis . . . . .	Sept. 16-
U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 17-
ICAO Limited Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 17-
12th Pan American Child Congress . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Sept. 22-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 23-
IAEA General Conference: 7th Regular Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 24-
ITU CCITT Working Parties of Study Group IV . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on the Measurement of Abundance of Fish Stocks . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 25-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 10th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 9th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 30-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 30-
ILO Technical Conference on Employment Policy . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 30-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	September
Caribbean Organization Council: 4th Meeting . . . . .	San Juan . . . . .	September
PAHO Executive Committee: 49th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 14th Session . . . . .	Port Moresby, Papua . . . . .	September
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
U.N. Conference on Cocoa . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . . . .	New York . . . . .	September
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	September

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 18, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; IMCO, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IPU, International Parliamentarism Union; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Communica- tions Panel . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	September
OECD Ministers of Science . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ICEM Executive Committee: 22d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ICEM Council: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-
IMCO Assembly: 3d Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 16-
11th Pan American Railway Congress . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Oct. 18-
U.N. ECE Committee on Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
BIRPI: Committee of Experts on Problems of Less Developed Countries in Field of Industrial Property . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECA Conference on African Electric Power Problems . . . . .	Addis Ababa . . . . .	Oct. 21-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Management Council . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 28-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 28-
ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 28-
IMCO Council: 9th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 29-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October
South Pacific Commission: 25th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	October
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	October
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Annual Meeting at Ministerial Level . . . . .	São Paulo . . . . .	October
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Annual Meeting at Expert Level . . . . .	São Paulo . . . . .	October

## The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

*Following are statements made in the United Nations Trusteeship Council by M. Wilfred Goding, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council, and Vincente N. Santos, President, Marianas District Legislature, Saipan, and adviser to the U.S. Special Representative.*

### OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. GODING, JUNE 5

U.S./U.N. press release 4212

It is a privilege to be here again this year as Special Representative for the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.<sup>1</sup> I am especially grateful for the opportunity to report to members of the Council at this particular time. The past year has been a very eventful year—the most eventful year, I am convinced, since the territory became a

trusteeship area. It has been a year of unusual progress as well as one of major trial.

A full record of our activities of fiscal year 1962 is given in the written report<sup>2</sup> which already has been placed in your hands. In this oral report, therefore, I shall summarize only briefly the major advances and setbacks that have occurred within the past year, especially as they relate to the programs and plans that have been discussed at these sessions during the past 2 years. I shall then be glad to attempt to answer any questions you may wish to ask. As always, the Administering Authority looks forward to receiving comments and suggestions of the members of the Council.

Before I begin a résumé of the past year's activities, I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Micronesian people. I am constantly and increasingly reminded of their innate abilities, of their kindness and generosity, of their loyalty and devotion to demo-

<sup>1</sup> For a statement made by Mr. Goding in the Trusteeship Council on May 31, 1962, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 264.

<sup>2</sup> *Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1962* (Department of State publication 7521); for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (75 cents).

cratic principles, of the rising generation's capacity to accept the responsibilities of their chosen professions and to provide the leadership that should enable them to decide their own destiny in the world of nations in the reasonably near future, and perhaps sooner—more rapidly than would have been thought possible a few decades ago.

It is these qualities of the Micronesian people which are mainly responsible for the splendid human relations existing in the Trust Territory, which was so well expressed by a recent visitor from Fiji who, after traveling through the islands, remarked that although good race relations prevailed elsewhere in the Pacific, they could not be compared with the easy relations and complete acceptance of all races by each other which is so apparent in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

At this point I would also like to say that one of the most gratifying experiences of the past year has been the vastly increased and growing interest and effort in Micronesia that has taken place among all segments of the U.S. Government, as well as among many private agencies and individuals, not only in the United States but, indeed, in many areas of the world.

Not only the interest but the active support and direct aid of those agencies in a position to help was forthcoming when needed. This willingness, or indeed this eagerness, to help was demonstrated time and again during the past year. It was demonstrated when the Administering Authority sought, and was successful in acquiring, new legislation and greatly increased funds with which to intensify its efforts in all fields of endeavor. It was demonstrated when an outbreak of poliomyelitis occurred in the Marshall Islands, with the result that the disease was checked before it could spread to other areas of the territory. Again, it was demonstrated recently when Typhoon Olive swept over the Marianas District, leaving in its wake a great deal of damage and destruction.

The interest of the U.S. Government in the islands of the Trust Territory has made itself apparent in many other ways. An Interdepartmental Task Force comprised of members of various Federal agencies, which had been set up the year before, was active during this period

in working for needed legislation and providing other assistance. The 87th U.S. Congress passed a bill which included the Trust Territory in those areas which could receive Federal assistance in case of disaster, and this became law last June when President Kennedy approved it.

Had it not been for this last-named action, the Trust Territory administration would have been sorely pressed to provide emergency needs and permanent repairs resulting from the recent typhoon. My colleagues and I have just come from the island of Saipan, to which we moved our headquarters a year ago and over which the eye of the typhoon passed. This was the first major storm to strike Saipan in 49 years and one of the most severe in the island's recorded history. Miraculously, no lives were lost. But the storm damaged or destroyed homes, farms, schools, hospitals, churches, commercial garden crops, and Government installations of all types in Rota and Tinian as well as in Saipan.

Because of the Congress' and the President's action last June, assistance was available immediately. The President declared the stricken Marianas a major disaster area, and within 24 hours needs had been surveyed and plans made for assistance. The American Red Cross, together with the Department of Agriculture, will dispense food as long as the need exists. With the aid of nurses from the U.S. Navy hospital in Guam, typhoid inoculations were given to all residents in the stricken areas. A representative from the President's Office of Emergency Planning surveyed damage to public facilities such as schools, power plants, water plants, dock facilities, and other Government buildings and estimated the damage at over \$2 million. Rehabilitation work already has begun. Assistance also has been given to help replace houses and local businesses.

#### **Administration**

When I appeared before this body a year ago, I presented a reassessment of our needs in the fields of education, economic development, public health, and major construction. This analysis highlighted the fact that we need to set a much more rapid pace in the development of

the Trust Territory. To do so meant vastly increased appropriations.

Accordingly, a budget of \$15 million was requested for the current fiscal year. It is with a great deal of gratification that I am able to report that the full amount of the request was approved by the Congress. This is an increase of over 100 percent over the prior year's appropriation and compares with annual appropriations which had approximated \$7 million for all functions of government for the previous several years.

Active support for the increased appropriation came from all levels of government—from the Office of the President, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the Bureau of the Budget, the congressional committees concerned, and the U.S. Congress itself. All agreed wholeheartedly that the Administering Authority could meet the challenge it faced only by launching a vastly accelerated program.

Enactment of a new law was necessary before the increased appropriation could be approved, since a statutory limitation of \$7.5 million for Trust Territory administration had earlier been set by Congress. Our first step thus was to have the appropriation ceiling lifted. This was accomplished with the passage by Congress of a new authorization law in July 1962,<sup>3</sup> which enabled us to request \$15 million for our 1963 operations.

Because the new law did not become effective in time for the increased appropriation to be included in the general appropriations bills for fiscal year 1963, it was necessary to submit a supplemental request for consideration of the newly authorized appropriation. Accordingly we submitted a supplemental budget to bring our 1963 appropriation up to the total of \$15 million authorized. Enactment was carried over to the 88th session of the U.S. Congress, and on May 17 of this year we received the second half of our increased appropriation.

Although this delay temporarily held up some aspects of our accelerated construction program, the intervening period was used to good advantage in the perfecting of our plan-

ning. When the money became available we were able to move more expeditiously into our construction program.

Other administrative events of major and far-reaching import took place during the year under review. The first was the unification of all the territory under civilian administration. By Executive order of the President,<sup>4</sup> the former Saipan District was placed under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior on July 1, 1962.

The turnover of the former Saipan District to us by the Department of the Navy was accomplished in a smooth and exemplary manner and the naval administration is to be commended for the cooperation we received during this complex operation. The integration of Saipan District also enabled us to bring about another long-sought amalgamation—that of unifying all the Mariana Islands into one district. On July 1, 1962, the Marianas District was created from the former Rota and Saipan Districts. Two events, long sought by the people of the Mariana Islands as well as by recent visiting missions and the Trusteeship Council, thus were brought to successful culmination at the beginning of the year under review.

Along with the unification of Saipan Island and the Northern Mariana Islands with the rest of the territory went another historic event, that of the transfer of the headquarters of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to Saipan Island, thus establishing a provisional capital of the territory for the first time within its own boundaries. These two historic events have brought about increased cooperation amongst the people of the territory and have stimulated greater political cohesion. The establishment of headquarters on Saipan has also enabled us to utilize to the maximum the services of qualified Micronesians on the headquarters staff as well as to make easier our program of inservice training. In every headquarters department there are now Micronesian staff members, with all districts being represented.

Last year I set forth in detail the range of headquarters staff positions occupied by Micronesians, and I will not repeat here except to say

<sup>3</sup> For a statement by President Kennedy, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 272.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, May 28, 1962, p. 887.

that in most areas the number has appreciably increased. Additionally, more than 50 clerical and other positions formerly held by U.S. citizens when we were located on Guam now are filled exclusively by local citizens.

The replacement program continued also at the district level. In Palau, Mr. Takeo Yano became the first Micronesian to be appointed assistant district administrator in administration affairs on a permanent basis. Altogether, during the past year, some 65 Micronesians were placed in professional and senior executive positions in the Trust Territory, an increase of 150 percent over the previous year. There are 100 Micronesians holding senior positions, making up approximately half of all the professional and top-level positions in the administration.

We are also continuing the analysis of wage scales in the territory. Because of budgetary limitations we have been unable to make a complete wage-scale readjustment, although a start was made last October, when a substantial salary adjustment was made covering most of the lower and middle pay rates. An additional salary adjustment is scheduled for July, soon after the beginning of the new fiscal year. This wage increase will be instituted at all levels, with special attention being given to the elimination of any inequities that still exist.

A wage adjustment was also put into effect during the year for the Kwajalein area, and in January 1963 the differential paid to Micronesians when they are employed in districts other than their own was raised from 15 percent to 25 percent.

#### **Political Advancement**

Under the guidance of the new headquarters Political Affairs Office, the political development program was speeded up considerably. This section is composed of a political affairs officer, who is both a political scientist and lawyer, and two Micronesian assistant political affairs officers, both holding degrees in political science. As each district congress met, it received technical advice from the Political Affairs Office, thus aiding immeasurably in legislative drafting and in the improvement of legislative procedures.

The political highlight of the year was the

Council of Micronesia session held in late September and early October in Koror, Palau. This was the first time that the Council of Micronesia had met within the territory's boundaries, and its deliberations resulted in recommendations and resolutions which will profoundly affect the future political development of the territory. The Council resolved that a true legislative body be created as soon as possible and, to achieve this end, established a Legislative Drafting Committee to begin preliminary work on the drafting of a constitution.

At a meeting last fall the Council adopted an official Trust Territory flag in order that the territory might have a symbol of unity and identity. This flag, a miniature set of which I am pleased to present to members of this body with the compliments of the Council of Micronesia, consists of a circle of six white stars on a field of blue. Representing the six districts of the territory, the white stars also stand for peace, with the blue background symbolizing freedom and loyalty.

The Council also voted to hold a special session in March 1963 at the provisional capital in Saipan to consider the preliminary report of the Legislative Drafting Committee. This special session resulted in preliminary recommendations on the part of the Council as to the makeup of a legislative body. These recommendations are currently under study. While there are many steps still to be taken before a true territorial legislative organ can come into existence, I am more than ever confident that well before 1965 we shall have an effective territorial legislative organization operating in the territory.

Political progress continued also on the municipal and district level. The most important political event of the year on the district level was the formation and chartering of the Marianas District Legislature. Chartered on January 7, 1963, the new body convened its first session on March 4, 1963. With the creation and chartering of the Marianas District Legislature, the people of the district for the first time through their chosen representatives have a forum for the solution of problems facing the entire district, since only municipal legislative bodies existed previously in Saipan, Rota, and Tinian.

Two significant events of general social and political import occurred this past year. On August 2, 1962, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service announced that visas for entry to the United States on the part of Trust Territory citizens no longer would be required when a citizen was proceeding in direct and continuous transit from the Trust Territory to the United States. All that a Trust Territory citizen now needs to enter the United States as a nonimmigrant is sufficient official identification. Certain minor regulations, such as security of official acceptance by a school, however, still are in effect for Trust Territory residents who are applying for entrance as students.

A very significant event was the Executive order signed by President Kennedy on August 21, 1962, which, among other things, directed that regulations relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands be revised to facilitate free entry of United States citizens, United States investment, and United States-flag vessels into the area with the exception of Eniwetok, Bikini, and Kwajalein, which will continue to be under the control of the Department of Defense. In ending his message, the President stated: "I intend that these actions I have taken will foster responsible political development, stimulate new economic activity, and enable the people of the islands to participate fully in the world of today."<sup>5</sup> This step, I believe, will do much to aid us in accomplishing the President's stated objectives.

### **Economic Development**

Without question the economic highlight of the year was the signing of a basic agreement with a major United States seafood company under which the company will establish a commercial fishery industry in the Palau District. Several other commercial fishery concerns also conducted surveys in the territory during the year, exploring possibilities for similar or related commercial fishery projects. The opening of the territory to outside private investment has drawn much attention from industrial

concerns. Surveys have been conducted by representatives of the pineapple and sugar industries, as well as by other industries.

An Economic Development Loan Fund established by the Administering Authority, in which was placed an initial increment of \$100,000 this past year, has stimulated the development of small business and small-scale business enterprises. This loan fund is an addition to the present chartered trading company loan fund, out of which loans were also made during the year. The rules governing this latter fund, however, restrict loans to chartered trading companies. We are now seeking the removal of the present restrictions and plan to merge this fund with the general Economic Development Loan Fund.

Additional funds for the Economic Development Loan Fund have been requested for this forthcoming year. To date, the fund has granted outright loans as well as served as guarantor for commercial bank loans. By this latter method, the use of the loan fund has been expanded considerably. Loans made or achieved during the year ranged through a variety of small-scale business enterprises. It is hoped that the fund can be rapidly expanded to make or underwrite large-scale development loans.

The year witnessed continued rapid expansion in credit unions and cooperatives, the number more than doubling that of the previous year. Others have submitted charters and by-laws for consideration or are in the preliminary stages of organization. Training in cooperative principles and procedures also was carried out through district conferences, and a major training session was held last fall in Saipan for delegates from all districts.

Five districts now have branch banks, the latest branch having just this month been opened in the Ponape District Center. Only Yap District now lacks a branch bank. The growth of the local banks, as well as the flourishing of credit unions, is eloquent witness to increased economic development. A few of the Council members present today may recall that the Special Representative 6 years ago reported on the results of a territory banking survey conducted for us by a banking concern. That survey was very pessimistic and reported that there appeared to be little opportunity for establish-

<sup>5</sup> For texts of a White House announcement and a statement by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1962, p. 354.

ment of branch banks in the foreseeable future. We now have five branches and indications of more to come.

Although our outlook for commercial fishery development at long last appears promising, we are not neglecting our own fishery development projects. A small school of fisheries completed the first year of operation in Palau, and some 25 young men are undergoing training in tuna fishing methods at the present time on tuna boats in Hawaii. Our pilot fishery project at Palau moves forward steadily. A boatbuilding expert was hired this past year to serve as a consultant to the Palau Boatbuilders Association, and a loan was made to this group as well as technical assistance and aid given to enable the group to erect a boatyard.

Our production of copra now is reaching the level found before the disastrous typhoons of 1957-58 which so drastically cut production in the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, and Yap. Well over 13,000 tons of copra were produced during the last fiscal year, even though only some 11,700 short tons had been sold at the close of last year. There was a sizable overall increase in copra revenue to producers, compared with the preceding year, as a result of increased production. The Copra Stabilization Fund shrank considerably, since the fund maintained a constant price throughout the year in spite of falling market prices. The copra picture has brightened somewhat recently. Prices are slightly higher, and decreased shipping costs enabled the fund a few months ago to realize the first profit on sales in over 2 years. If this trend continues, we hope to be able to bring the fund balance up to a more normal level and to raise prices paid to the copra producer.

Revenue from fish exports and vegetable produce again showed appreciable increase. Fish export revenue for the year was \$85,000, a small figure but one that is annually increasing as seen by comparison with last year's figure of \$65,000. When local and interdistrict sales are added, revenue from this source is close to \$200,000. Vegetable produce revenue, almost exclusively going to the islands of Rota, Tinian, and Saipan, increased to \$95,000 in fiscal 1962 as compared to \$68,000 for the previous year. Local farmers markets have expanded. Events

such as the opening of the Majuro road in the Marshalls have made possible the local sale of large quantities of fresh produce to the District Center in Majuro. In other districts, also, as road improvement has occurred, farmers have been able to get their produce to the central markets, where there is a constant demand.

Increasing reliance on local fresh produce, local meat, fish, and other local supplies is seen by comparing the volume of commodities imported in the territory. In 1961, with a population of some 77,913 people, total food imports came to \$2,329,181. In fiscal year 1962, although the population had increased to 80,980 people, food imports were reduced to \$1,883,190. Food imports still are high, but it is encouraging to note a downward trend. Canned fish is still imported in quantity, and it is our hope that this import can be cut considerably when the commercial fishing operation gets under way in Palau, since indirectly that operation will spur local production and consumption.

Coconut rehabilitation and replanting continues as do other developmental programs in subsistence and cash crops. Details of the agriculture program are given in full in our annual report. The cacao program is proceeding beyond expectations. Trees are beginning to bear, and barring any unforeseen calamity, commercial production of cacao as a major crop will become a reality within the next few years. The cacao subsidy program described in our report has been an unusual success. Through this program, as well as private plantings, there are now estimated to be close to 2 million cacao seedlings and trees growing in the territory, most in the Districts of Ponape, Truk, Palau, and Yap.

Ramie production also is showing unusual promise, and it is anticipated that the pilot project in Palau need be continued only for another year before local commercial development can take over. To enable the copra producer to make use of coconut-husk byproducts, coir fiber processing is being developed through a pilot project in Truk. The Farm Institute in Ponape concluded its first year of operation, and plans for expansion of this agricultural extension training are under way.

Continued emphasis is being placed on pro-

essional agricultural training at the university level abroad. This past year, 2 young graduates returned to the territory with degrees in tropical agriculture. Additionally, some 8 students have returned with advanced training ranging from 2 to 5 years in the field of agriculture. Six additional scholarship students are leaving this month for university training to join a group of some 12 other agricultural students already in school. Of this group, 4 are working toward advanced degrees while the rest are still on the lower level of undergraduate work. Special training in forestry methods and rice growing techniques also were offered Micronesian agricultural extension agents during the year.

The operation of the Micronesian Products Center resulted in an approximate doubling of handicraft income during the past year, mainly for the woodcarvers of Palau. The Center also indirectly sparked the formation of the Woodworkers Guild in that district. In the other districts the promise of an immediate and steady market stimulated women's organizations as well as individuals to develop better handicraft. Handicraft selection boards have been established in all districts; all handicraft is screened and evaluated prior to being sold to the Center. The result has been a marked increase in quality of product. An interesting side development has been the remaking of traditional artifacts and ancient objects by older craftsmen. Many of these traditional objects have never been seen before by the younger Micronesians. These copies have sold exceedingly well, and some are of a quality that exceeds even the original counterparts now to be found only in the museums of Europe.

The past year saw the beginning of tourism for the territory. While only a handful of true tourists managed to get to the Eastern Carolines or to Palau due to limited passenger capacity on our amphibious airplanes, which still must be used on these flights, a few nonetheless did manage. The Marianas, however, has a small but flourishing tourist business. Our DC-4 plane, which is depicted on page 82 of the annual report, has a seating capacity of 57 and makes three flights a week from Guam to Saipan and, I might say, in the past few months

almost always has been filled to capacity or near capacity. Additionally, two small private charter airlines located in Guam also fly between Guam and Rota-Tinian-Saipan carrying tourists as well as businessmen. A number of subsidiary business establishments already have resulted, and plans are under way for greatly increasing hotel accommodations.

Conditions have changed from those which prompted the distinguished former delegate from Bolivia in 1961 at the 27th session to express rather serious doubts about the future of tourism, when he rather ruefully complained that it seemed to him the only people who had access to the territory were members of the U.S. Navy, the administration, Spanish nuns, anthropologists, and United Nations representatives! The reverse is now true. His list, I assure him, is now a small minority. Tourists of various nationalities are now a frequent sight on Saipan. With the completion of land airfields in all districts and the use of larger land-based planes, we expect tourism to become an important aspect of the local economy.

#### Transportation

Several major advances can be recorded in the transportation area. The year saw the completion of the Truk dock and final dredging of the Truk harbor. A 3,500-ton motor vessel, the *North Star*, was acquired from the Department of the Interior and is now in service, renamed the *MV Pacific Islander*, thus providing a second major logistic vessel. We will be able to provide 35-day service between the district centers, Guam-Saipan, and Japan. This will more than double the frequency of passenger and logistic services to all districts. We plan also to retire the remaining uneconomical AKL-class vessels now operated in our field-trip service from service as soon as feasible and replace them with smaller, more economical, and practical-type vessels. Two such new vessels already have been built to our specifications, the *MV Militobi* and the *MV Kaselehlia*, and are in service. Funding for an additional smaller field-trip vessel has been requested in our budget for the coming year.

As I previously indicated, on July 1, 1962, a DC-4 aircraft was placed in regular service be-

tween Guam and Saipan. Carrying 57 passengers and appreciable cargo, this plane also is used to fly to Angaur in Palau and to Truk on a monthly basis or as need demands. Flights can now be made to Yap, with the opening of the new airfield there. When necessary, the DC-4 can also fly from Truk to Kwajalein-Majuro and back to Guam-Saipan by overflying Ponape.

Airfield construction is being accelerated, since movement of additional staff and essential supplies is going to be essential in support of our accelerated programs. Full utilization of DC-4 airplanes cannot be made until there are adequate land airfields at Koror and Ponape. A major accomplishment of the year was the completion of a 4,800-foot airstrip at Yap. Hazardous water landings now can be dispensed with there, and, equally important, more essential air cargo and greatly increased numbers of passengers can be carried. Work also has been started on the Palau airfield. We hope to put this field in operation before the end of the next fiscal year, which will permit conversion of service to the Western Carolines by DC-4 and other land-based planes. Improvements were made to the Truk and Majuro airfields as well as to airfields in Saipan. Ponape District, thus, is the last missing link in the needed chain of land airfields in the territory. The unusual ruggedness of Ponape Island poses special difficulties for airfield construction, but engineering surveys made last year have indicated that an airfield project is feasible. Additional engineering studies now are being conducted for the purpose of making a final site selection.

Considerable road improvement occurred during the year, some brought about completely through community-directed efforts while others were started as offshoots of major construction programs. The Marshall Islands District again demonstrated that roadbuilding on a coral atoll could be accomplished by determination, willingness to work on the part of the people, and minimum assistance from the administration. With the example of a 35-mile road built the previous year by the people of Majuro before them, the people of Arno Atoll

requested similar assistance from the administration in the form of a loan of a bulldozer and other equipment and constructed an 18½-mile road. Dedication took place a week ago, and Arno Atoll now, like its sister atoll of Majuro, has all the tiny islands of its atoll linked by a road. The Marshalls District now has some 44 miles of road that did not exist a little over a year ago.

On Yap Island, the Yapese people, through community effort, have achieved magnificent results in rehabilitating roads and bridges. This came about through assistance from the Yap airfield project. Using equipment on a loan basis whenever this could be made available, the people of Yap have rebuilt many miles of roads on their own initiative during the year. This is in addition to the road to the new airfield constructed by the administration. Bridges have been repaired, and within a very short time it will be possible to traverse the entire length of Yap Island by road.

Living as we do in a tropical climate, our physical facilities are subject to more rapid deterioration than is elsewhere normal. Our area also suffered greatly from the ravages of war. A limited budget in the past also kept our rate of new construction at a slow pace. The result was that, although a few new facilities were always being constructed, the majority of the territory's physical facilities such as roads, utilities, schools, hospitals, and public buildings were aged and often worn beyond the point of repair. To support our accelerated education effort and to provide the needed assistance to raise the territory's economic level, it is necessary that we accelerate almost every phase of our operating and maintenance activities.

For the year that is just drawing to a close, we requested and were granted \$7½ million for construction purposes. Four million dollars of this will be used in the accelerated elementary school construction program and \$3,300,000 in other construction activities. We have had well over a fivefold increase in our construction funds for this type of support activities.

For this coming fiscal year, due to start July 1, we have requested another \$6 million for accelerated construction; \$4 million to carry on

aspects of the accelerated school construction program; and an additional \$2 million to continue our construction program in such vital areas as public health, economic development, and the construction or improvement of airfields, roads, utilities, and transportation facilities. With this increase in our overall construction programs, we feel we shall be able to make a very great advance in all aspects of our work.

## **Education**

### *Elementary Education*

As I have already indicated, we are placing major emphasis on greatly expanded support of public elementary education in the territory. Of the present year's budget of \$15 million, over \$4 million is being used to construct some 240 classrooms and some 100 housing units for an approximate 140 American elementary school teachers. The bulk of the elementary school classroom construction and teacher housing must of necessity in most districts for the first year be in or near the district center, but our plans call for extension of the program until all public elementary schools are included. For the coming fiscal year, starting July 1, we have requested an additional \$4 million to continue the elementary school construction program. Thus, this coming year we hope to construct 248 additional new classrooms, making a grand total of 488 new elementary school classrooms. Some 128 additional teacher housing units will be erected to make a total of 228 teacher houses.

For education program operations for the coming year we have requested \$2,280,000, which is an increase of \$1,200,000 over the present level of education funding. Most of this program increase will be utilized in employment of approximately 140 elementary school teachers to staff the elementary schools which we are building in our accelerated education development program. The following year funds will be requested for an additional 100 American teachers to reach a total of 240. Within the next 2 years there will be at least one American teacher teaching in English in every public elementary school in the territory. Concurrently, a program of upgrading present Micronesian elementary teachers will be carried

out. This program will include inservice training on the job, special summer training sessions in the districts, attendance at our teacher institute in Ponape, and a vastly increased program of college training for present and prospective teachers in Guam, Hawaii, and mainland United States.

The scope and magnitude of the accelerated elementary education program is such that it is not possible in this brief exposition to convey details. For those members of the Council who may be interested in specific details as to implementation, as to degree and rate of speed of penetration into the outlying areas, I shall be pleased to furnish such details during the question period.

This tremendous increase of support of elementary school education will, of course, have great impact on all our other educational programs.

Many recommendations made by this Council over the past several years are incorporated in our accelerated education program and are either in the process of implementation or soon will be. One of these to which a great deal of attention has been given is that of the teaching of English and of using English as the medium of instruction in the elementary schools. This program already is being implemented at selected elementary schools in the various districts, and it will become a reality for all of our public elementary schools as American teachers arrive and start teaching. We intend to have as many as we can of the 140 American schoolteachers slated for the first year of operation on the job in the elementary schools with the opening of the school year this September. A crash program of classroom construction, teacher housing, and teacher recruitment currently is in full swing.

The vastness of our area, the differences inherent between the tiny low coral atolls and the sizable, mountainous, high islands, the difficulties of transportation, will mean a faster pace of development in some areas than in others. I assure the members of the Council, though, that no area will be overlooked and that the children in the remote coral atolls far from the district centers will as promptly as

possible have the same elementary school opportunities as will their cousins in the more urban district centers.

Concern was expressed at last year's meeting by some members that the entrance age of elementary school children, which we had lowered to 7 years, still was high and that the entrance age should be set at 6 years. It is intended to lower the compulsory age of entrance to 6 years as our facilities permit. To set the compulsory school age at 6 years before we have sufficient teachers or classrooms would gain little. I am confident, however, that we will be able to place the entrance age at 6 years during this coming year. Currently there are hundreds of children of 6 years of age in our public schools. I might further add that our thinking on the elementary school level is going beyond this. Under study is the feasibility of eventually establishing a preprimary year of school which would concentrate on teaching children oral English before they enter first grade.

#### *Junior and Senior High Schools*

Implementation moved steadily forward on the establishment of consolidated junior-senior high schools. In all districts, other than Yap, the 10th grade was started in September 1962 and the 11th grade will be opened this coming September. Yap will start the 10th grade this fall. This past year some of the 10th-grade Yap students enrolled in the Pacific Islands Central School in Ponape, while a number went to Palau to take the special vocational arts course in the Palau high school. By the fall of 1964 all districts should have full 4-year high schools in operation.

Replanning of junior-senior high school building needs indicated the need for additional classroom buildings and dormitories for all districts. Some of these additional high school buildings had been completed or were nearing completion at the close of the fiscal year. A new classroom building was completed at Truk, and a vocational shop building was under construction; in the Marshalls two new classroom buildings and a school administration building were added to the high school unit; a new classroom building and a vocational arts building were completed at the Palau District high school.

The Pacific Islands Central School continued in Ponape but with a somewhat changed makeup, since most of the entering freshmen, other than Yapese students, were 10th-grade students from Ponape. Within another 2 years, the main student body at PICS will be predominantly Ponapean, and the original Pacific Islands School will have become the Ponape District high school. A new post-high-school unit, however, was added during the year. This was the interdistrict teacher training institute, which combines high school and postgraduate high school work with specialized training in teacher education. The teacher training institute was established at PICS due to this high school's somewhat central location and the established facilities already there. Additionally, a boys' dormitory and classroom building were constructed on the PICS campus for the institute. The aim of the institute is to upgrade schoolteachers. Teachers who do not have a full high school degree can work toward high school accreditation as well as earn credits in the teacher training institute.

Increased emphasis was given during the year to students in the field of higher education who were studying outside the territory. Some 239 students were in high school outside the territory, with all but 13 of these being in Guam schools. Most were on sponsorship arrangements whereby a student lived with a private family. The Trust Territory administration provided a full-time student counselor to look after their welfare, set up a system of reduced fares on the territory's planes and ships, and, additionally, in January 1963 the administration agreed to provide free transportation to Guam for all bona fide sponsored students.

Some 126 students also were studying in institutions of college level on Guam or abroad during the year. Of these, 65 were on full scholarship from the administration. During the year work began on a college dormitory at the College of Guam. Although primarily for scholarship students, the dormitory will be open to other Trust Territory students as well. A major increase in scholarships for the forthcoming school year 1963-64 will come about, since the number of district scholars has been increased from three per district to five per dis-

trict starting with the college term which opens this month. Thus there will be a 60-percent increase in the number of government scholarships this coming school year.

### Public Health

Two new, modern hospitals were put into operation in the Trust Territory during the past year, one in Majuro in the Marshall Islands and the other in Saipan in the Mariana Islands. These, together with the new hospital that was opened in Palau 18 months ago, provide modern hospital facilities in three of our six districts.

New hospitals in the other three districts will be constructed within the next 2 or 3 years. Planning for hospital units in Truk and Ponape is now under way, and construction of the new Truk District hospital should be initiated during the next few months. Also, site studies for a new hospital in Yap have started, although actual construction will not be undertaken for another 2 years.

Some additional facilities are required on the three new hospitals already in use. The \$900,000 hospital complex that was opened in Saipan last September received considerable damage during the recent typhoon. Repair of the buildings was started immediately after the storm under the rehabilitation program of the Office of Emergency Planning and is expected to be completed within the next month. The hospital in the Marshalls is completed except for the construction of a few minor subsidiary buildings; and a new kitchen and dining hall wing is nearing completion in the hospital in Palau.

In addition to district hospitals our public-health expansion program calls for field hospitals to be located in key spots of population concentration away from the district centers. Three such subhospitals are now in operation at Rota, Kusaie, and Ebeye in the Kwajalein Atoll. The latter facility was completely renovated and modernized during the past year. These, together with nearly 100 outlying island dispensaries and the increased personnel needs of the new district hospitals, require the training of additional medical personnel—doctors, technicians, and nurses. In fact the shortage of trained personnel, especially nurses, is af-

fecting not only our hospital needs but our plans for improved outisland health services.

Various steps are being taken to meet those growing demands. Our medical scholarship program is being increased. Presently 10 medical scholars are attending schools in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the United States working toward medical degrees. Also in process are programs for inservice and outside postgraduate training for our present medical officers. The recruiting of six doctors from the States is now under way, each to be a specialist in a different field of medicine. These will provide further and continuing inservice training in their special fields to our Micronesian doctors, one to be stationed in each of the six districts and to be rotated at intervals.

The Trust Territory continues to be faced with an acute shortage of graduate nurses. Not only do we not have enough graduate nurses, but there is a constant attrition in the ranks, for evidently the young men of the territory have found that nurses make excellent wives and mothers. We need at least 20 new graduate nurses a year for the next 5 years merely to meet the minimum expansion needs in all districts.

To meet this demand, the Trust Territory School of Nursing, presently located in Palau, will be moved next month to the island of Saipan, where temporary buildings will be occupied until permanent buildings can be constructed. Work already has started on the first of the new permanent School of Nursing buildings, which are to be an adjunct to the new Saipan hospital. The immediate move to temporary buildings will make it possible to double the present enrollment from 15 to 30, and further expansion to 50 or 60 students will be possible as soon as new buildings are finished.

In the field of dental services one of the most important events of the year was the graduation of 10 students from the School of Dental Nursing in December 1962. This was the school's first graduation. A new class of 10 students enrolled for the 2-year course in January of 1963. Preventive dental treatment was expanded not only at district centers but in all outlying areas during the year.

During March and April 1963 a public-health task force team under interdepartmental spon-

sorship visited the territory to study and observe our public-health program. This visit was the result of one of the recommendations of the President's Task Force on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The team, consisting of a U.S. public-health expert, a sanitary engineer, and a nurse consultant, was accompanied by the program officer of the Office of Territories and is now engaged in preparing a report on their findings. We are looking forward with much interest to the team's report and recommendations, since we are seeking at all times to improve the health service in the territory.

It is with regret that I must report on two events in public health that were severe blows to the Trust Territory. The first of these tragic events was an outbreak, in early January 1963, of type I virus polio at Ebeye, Kwajalein Atoll, in the Marshall Islands District. More than 200 cases of poliomyelitis, with 11 deaths, resulted in the district; 88 percent of the cases were children under the age of 7 years. Some 50 patients, nearly all below the age of 7, were left with significant residual paralysis.

An immediate mass vaccination program using Sabin oral vaccine and application of strict quarantine regulations confined the epidemic to the Marshall Islands. A mass oral vaccination program also was at once launched throughout the rest of the territory for type I polio, and in all districts the final stage of the mass inoculation program for type II and III polio currently is under way. When this is finished sometime next month, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands will be one of the very few areas in the world where a hundred percent polio vaccination coverage has been accomplished.

Again, when our need was urgent, we received prompt and generous support and assistance from the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Navy, the Transport Company of Texas in Kwajalein, the Communicable Disease Center of the U.S. Public Health Service, from other agencies, and from many generous individuals.

Equally important is the aid that has been pledged for the long-range rehabilitation program that will be needed for the afflicted chil-

dren. Special polio clinic facilities will be constructed at the new Majuro hospital, special equipment is being procured, and staff are receiving specialized training.

To help us meet the costs of long-range rehabilitation, we are receiving the unstinting support of the American Red Cross, which is providing a physical therapist, and the National Foundation, which is providing services of specialized polio treatment teams, as well as transportation funds and funds to provide braces for children who will need special care and treatment in Honolulu. The Shriners Crippled Childrens Hospital in Honolulu, for its part, has offered to provide hospitalization for those children who must be sent to Honolulu for specialized treatment. The bulk of the affected children, however, will be cared for and treated at the polio clinic we are adding to the new hospital in Majuro.

The other tragic event was the loss a month ago of our Director of Public Health, the late Dr. Harrie E. Macdonald. More than any other person, he was responsible for the solid foundation of our present public-health system. He had confidence and pride in the competence of our Micronesian doctors and in their ability to conduct public-health programs in the districts. Having brought the territory's Public Health Service to this point, he was working at the time of his death on the first phase of an expanded program of training for our Micronesian doctors.

#### **Land and Claims Settlement**

With the appointment of a Land and Claims Administrator on the headquarters staff, land matters of all types have been expedited during the past year.

The land dispute involving the entire island of Angaur in the Palau District and dating from 1908 through the administrations of the Germans and Japanese as well as ours was brought on June 8, 1962, to a successful conclusion. Some 1,980 acres of land formerly held in public domain were deeded to private owners. A similar dispute of 20 years' duration involving all of Arakabesan Island in Palau was settled in August 1962. Over 90

percent of Arakabesan Island was returned to private ownership, and private claims to the remainder of the island were released. Homesteading in Palau also was expedited, with over 1,700 acres being homesteaded, and an additional 4,000 acres were opened for homesteading on Babelthuap and Koror Islands.

In the Marshalls, eminent domain cases were heard by the High Court concerning government use of land on three small islets in the Kwajalein Atoll. Judgment was entered in two cases and compensation allowed in the amount of \$40,359.46 for use rights to 71.1 acres.

As the U.S. representative has already informed you,<sup>6</sup> legislation which would provide a means for judicial settlement of the land claims on Kwajalein Island and Dalap Island of Majuro Atoll presently is under consideration by the U.S. Congress. The bill, in brief, would permit the claimants to file a petition with the United States Court of Claims for just compensation. It provides also for administrative settlement by the High Commissioner if the claimants desire to seek this procedure within limits of payment which are set by funds already appropriated. The bill was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and is scheduled for hearing by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs next week.

In Ponape District the active land release and homestead program continued at a rapid pace during the past year. Of special interest is the program whereby former holders of Japanese leases, who still occupy the land they leased under the Japanese administration, are eligible to receive quitclaim deeds for their land. Over 200 such quitclaim deeds have been issued, and many hundreds more are being processed. Hundreds of Ponapeans who have held land of this nature on tenuous leases for several decades at long last are receiving title to this land.

In the new Marianas District vast areas of land formerly held as in use by the Administering Authority are being released. Since July 1962, over 7,600 acres have been released from this category and placed in the public domain

<sup>6</sup> For a statement by Sydney R. Yates, U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council, on June 5, see U.S./U.N. press release 4217.

and are available for homesteading purposes. Additional releases currently are being sought.

### **Status of Displaced Rongelapese**

The annual Rongelap survey was conducted in March 1963 by a joint AEC[Atomic Energy Commission]-Trust Territory medical team and reported the general health of the Rongelapese to be satisfactory, with no further discernible aftermaths of the fallout found. A bill to compensate the people of Rongelap was passed by the United States House of Representatives on April 1 and is now under consideration in the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

### **Conclusion**

Acceleration of education and construction activities is under way, and we intend to press forward with programs of acceleration in public health and in political, social, and economic development fields. We have the wholehearted support of the people of the territory. With this, and the continued aid of the Administering Authority, I have confidence that our programs will move forward with ever-increasing speed on all fronts.

I am grateful to have the opportunity to present this brief report, and I will endeavor to provide, as far as I am able, any additional information members of this Council may desire.

### **STATEMENT BY MR. SANTOS, JUNE 5**

U.S./U.N. press release 4218 dated June 6

It is an honor for me to attend this meeting of the Trusteeship Council. I consider this an unusual honor due to the fact that this is the first time I have traveled outside of the Pacific Trust Territory area. I would like to extend to the Council warm greetings from the people of the Trust Territory. At the same time I feel certain that I will gain a very profitable experience during my stay and participation at this meeting.

I am very grateful to the Government of the Trust Territory and the United States for this

opportunity to serve as an adviser to the United States delegation. For the past 10 years I have been engaged closely in teaching on the purpose and functions of the United Nations and its various organs. My students have spent many hours studying the activities of this body, and they recognize that the United Nations and this particular Council is an important instrument for helping the progress of humanity everywhere on the face of the world.

I am pleased to inform the Council that the people of the Trust Territory are very conscious of the functions of the Trusteeship Council and the activities which this Council has undertaken in the past to assist the territories to meet their needs. Our people look toward the United Nations as a great organization to bring about good relations among nations, to help bring freedom to all peoples, and to keep the peace and security for the enjoyment of all mankind. Perhaps we are more conscious of the need for peace, since our island was one of the major battlefield areas of World War II. We have seen what war does; we have had our homes destroyed and lost our loved ones. We do not want this to happen again in any place in the world.

I am from Saipan, having been born in Garapan, Saipan, in 1933. I started my schooling during Japanese administration but had only 1 year of schooling before the end of the war. After the war I entered an American school and in 1951 graduated from the Pacific Islands Teacher Training School, which was then at Truk.

I started teaching immediately after graduation, first in one of our elementary schools. In 1952 I became a teacher in the district junior high school and have been teaching in the junior high school since that time. By profession I am a social science and history teacher and have been concerned mainly with civics, a field which is very important in our new and developing political life. Currently, in addition to handling social science classes, I serve as assistant principal for the new public high school of the Marianas District.

I am a Member of the Council of Micronesia and also a Congressman in the new Marianas District Legislature. Prior to this, I had the

privilege of serving as a Congressman in the Saipan Municipal Congress, as Legislative Secretary from 1960 to 1961 and as Vice Speaker in 1962.

I am fortunate to have traveled and visited all of the district centers except that of Yap. These trips have given me firsthand information on the political movements and aspirations of each district. The trips were made under the auspices of the Council of Micronesia, which formed three subcommittees—political, economic, and social—to study conditions in the territory. I was elected to serve as a member of the political subcommittee for 1961-62. Our committee visited each district, meeting with the district congresses' officials and other important leaders.

I had the privilege to sit with the Ponape, Palau, and Marshall Congresses while they were in session. I was astonished at the performance and the ability of the men who were striving to better the living conditions of their people. It was through education that these men acquired the necessary knowledge to help them proceed and move forward toward a certain goal in which they believe men ought to live. These men, of course, are the leaders in their own communities. Many have left their homes in order to obtain the required knowledge to assist their people. We believe that education makes the dream of these men come true. It is education that makes everything possible in our modern civilization.

People in the Trust Territory feel that education is a vital necessity to procure better living. More and more young men and women all over the Trust Territory are interested in getting higher education; they are forever in search of ways to acquire higher levels of education. The Government of the Trust Territory is aware of this particular matter and has increased scholarships this year to meet the need. District congresses also are appropriating funds for additional scholarships and special training.

Parents in the Trust Territory today understand the importance of education. They have come to a point where they have to modify the old traditional beliefs that sons and daughters should always stay at home with the family.

Today many of our children are away from their parents—either attending school on Guam, PICS on Ponape, in the United States, and elsewhere. Because of this change on the part of the parents also, many Micronesians are now holding many important positions both in the district centers and at headquarters in Saipan. These positions fall in all categories—political, economic, social, education, judiciary, et cetera. This is quite evident, especially in the Public Health Department, where all the hospitals in the districts are headed by Micronesians.

It is perhaps worth mentioning the person responsible for the progressive movement which has been achieved in the field of health, for he is a man who will always be remembered in the hearts of the Micronesians. He is the late Dr. Macdonald. We owe him our respect and honor for his untiring efforts and devotion toward the improvement of health in the Trust Territory.

In the Department of Education two districts are headed by Micronesians. There are two young men working now in the Political Affairs Office at headquarters, and each district has political affairs officers. I believe the Council is aware of the gradual improvement of Micronesian employment conditions in the Trust Territory. Many important jobs are held by Micronesians today. This is possible because of advanced training and schooling offered by our Government.

One of the most significant events which took place on July 1, 1962, was the unification of the administration of the Trust Territory under civil government. I know that the Council is pleased with this result. With the new change in administration, Rota District was incorporated with Saipan District and a new district formed: the Marianas District. Immediately, the leaders in the Marianas, with the assistance of the political affairs personnel from headquarters, initiated the creation of a District Legislature. After several weeks of preparation and planning, the members of the Charter Convention adopted the District Legislature Charter for the Mariana Islands.

In March of this year the Marianas District Legislature convened its first session in the his-

tory of the Marianas. This is a manifestation of the political progress which is taking place in the Trust Territory. I was honored to be elected its first President.

An important event was the transfer of Trust Territory headquarters onto the soil of the territory. This transfer will bring the people of the territory closer together. It will bring more understanding and cooperation among the people of the Trust Territory and at the same time strengthen the feeling of political unity. This unity was manifested during the special session of the Council of Micronesia, which was held at headquarters, Saipan, this past March, when the major issue of formation of a Territorial Congress was discussed. The primary objective of the session was to decide whether the body should be a bicameral one or unicameral. After a lengthy discussion on this matter the Council finally decided, by a majority vote, to recommend for consideration the bicameral system. Personally, I favor the unicameral system. At this stage of our development, such a body would, I feel, be less complicated.

Another item worthy of mention is the interest of people in their government. This is manifested through the many elections held in the past. More and more people are participating during the elections. It used to be that a candidate needed only a handful of voters to be elected; very few people were interested in the affairs of their government. But today, at least in my district, a candidate must work day and night for his election. People are aware of the importance of good government, and they judge a candidate's ability and performance accordingly.

In the Marianas, where we have political parties, especially on the island of Saipan, people are very conscious of their government. The political leaders who hold seats in the Municipal Congress and the District Legislature must accomplish results or else they will not be re-elected at the next election. Personally, I would like to see other districts adopt political parties. I know that political parties are new in our territory, but they are not new in the world. Political parties, I feel, help insure that qualified candidates run for office and provide better public officials.

Social conditions in the Trust Territory are progressing rapidly. People are gaining better understanding and appreciation of the 20th-century civilization, and health conditions are improving under the supervision of public-health personnel. Trust Territory students are studying for medical degrees. Nurses are also playing a very important part in the improvement of health. Without their assistance, the doctors would find it difficult to accomplish their tasks. A few months ago a polio protection program for the whole Trust Territory was initiated.

Perhaps this is an appropriate time to mention the typhoon which hit the Marianas. Typhoon Olive, with winds of 115 miles and gusts up to 123 knots, smashed into Saipan on April 30 of this year. Saipan was severely damaged. Among the major damages was the destruction of part of the new district hospital. The supply warehouses and public works buildings suffered great damages. Power lines were down. About 95 percent of all houses on Saipan had suffered some damage, with about 30 percent total destruction of local buildings. Three villages suffered damages, the worst being Tanapag, then Chalan Kanoa and San Roque. No lives were lost, however, and only one minor injury resulted during the typhoon.

The people are very grateful for the generous assistance from different groups and organizations. The U.S. Navy in Guam provided transportation for inspection teams, shipment of medical supplies, and naval hospital personnel to help in administering typhoid inoculations. The American Red Cross and other agencies gave immediate assistance. As a resident of Saipan, and on behalf of my people, I wish to extend to all the people, groups, agencies, and organizations who have extended their assistance to us in one way or another our appreciation, which also goes to the Government of the Trust Territory for its quick and generous assistance during the time of disaster.

In the field of economic development, the territory is progressing also. Many business enterprises, both large and small, are helping to boost the economy of the territory. At the same time, the Government is providing experts in the field of economics, both in the districts and at headquarters level.

We are trying our best to share in the development of these problems of our islands. We look toward the Council for advice and guidance.

Before I withdraw, I wish to extend my appreciation for this opportunity to appear in the presence of this Council. And, lastly, for this great organization, the United Nations, I pray that the many hours of meetings and debates will bring success in the maintenance of happiness, peace, and security for all mankind.

#### **CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. GODING, JUNE 17**

U.S./U.N. press release 4223

May I first express my appreciation and that of my colleague, Mr. Santos, for the many courtesies shown to us by members of the Council during this meeting. Mr. Santos, who cannot be with us today, will take back to Micronesia a deeper understanding of the role of this body and a new appreciation of the interest and concern of the Council in the affairs of our islands.

For my part, this year's review has been a most stimulating one. As High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, I am deluged, if I may use this term, during the year with the minutia of our many-sided activities. I find it refreshing and rewarding to have the opportunity to receive the analytic comments and views of the members of the Council, many of whom have devoted years to working on problems of administration not dissimilar in broad outline to those we face in the Pacific Trust Territory. Seen through your eyes, certain of our problems take on new aspects, new dimensions, and different meaning. I can assure you that my staff and I give careful and serious consideration to the recommendations that emanate from this body.

I am particularly appreciative of the many encouraging comments made during the closing statements on the progress achieved during the past year and on our new accelerated program of development. I say "appreciative," not in a personal sense, but in terms of my staff, Micronesian and American, who have worked together as a team under trying conditions to

put this accelerated program into action. The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom commented on how the "bounding energy of the New Frontier" had been applied to the Pacific area. I might add that we have met an equal response on the part of our Micronesian people. If our programs succeed, it is in large measure due to the cooperation, the patience, the willingness, and the energy of the Micronesians themselves.

The distinguished representative of Australia has noted that in our political development program we have been guided by the concept that political advancement should be an evolutionary process which evolves through the will, the needs, and desires of the people of the territory. That this is the pattern desired by our people is shown over and over in the debates of the district legislatures, in the deliberations of the Council of Micronesia, and in the discussions of local municipal councils. One of our younger and highly respected political leaders expressed this concept with the words: "We must learn to walk before we can run."

I have participated for the past 2 years in the Council of Micronesia deliberations and have had the privilege of sitting as an observer at several of our district congress sessions. I have been deeply impressed by the political growth that has taken place, at the maturity of judgment that is being demonstrated by elected officials, and by the willingness of our Micronesian leaders not only to accept the privileges but also to assume the responsibilities of democratic self-government. I cannot at this point predict exactly when in the near future the present Council of Micronesia will become a functioning territorial legislative organ. I can assure the Council though that a sound and representative legislative body is in the making and that I regard it as a great honor and privilege to participate in its formation.

At a previous session the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom commented that in any area the touchstone of political advance must be the will of the people. Here in the Pacific Trust Territory I feel that there is a legislative body which is evolving through the will of the people and at the pace desired by them. There is no question that political ad-

vancement on a territorial level is entering the final stage; we have learned to walk, and soon we will be running. Thus, at the risk of repetition, I repeat again that I have every confidence that well before 1965 a truly representative territorial legislative body will be operating in our territory.

It was pointed out by the distinguished representative of New Zealand that the shape of the new legislature has been discussed and defined at some length by the Council of Micronesia. The Council's recommendations are now under study. We have been able to obtain the complete text of the Council of Micronesia recommendation on the framework of a proposed territorial legislature, and this has been distributed to all members of the [Trusteeship] Council. The other resolutions and recommendations of the October 1962 and of the March 1963 sessions of the Council of Micronesia will be made available to the 1964 visiting mission. These recommendations also will be treated in detail in our next annual report, which will be examined at next spring's session of the Trusteeship Council. The distinguished representative of New Zealand is correct when he noted that the steps that remain are largely technical ones.

### **Local Participation in Government**

The past year witnessed major strides of the Council of Micronesia toward its eventual destiny and has also seen other major political advances. The adoption of a Trust Territory flag as a political symbol has done much to strengthen the unity of the people of our several districts. For the first time in the long history of the islands, the people have a flag which is theirs—a flag designed by one of them and chosen by their elected representatives. This may seem a relatively small thing, but it is nonetheless of tremendous significance in welding a widely separated group of island people together and creating a sense of "national unity."

The deliberations of the Council of Micronesia during its two sessions this past year reveal a significant trend from political parochialism of a district level to a broader "national" feeling. Whereas in earlier meetings

specific district problems tended to dominate the sessions, the sessions of the past year stressed common problems and joint ways of solving them. One district congress president in writing to his counterpart in another district stated this feeling of "oneness" in these words: "Divided we cannot proceed, united we cannot fail." There is no question that a "Micronesian self," in the terms described by the distinguished representative of New Zealand, is emerging in the territory.

Through charter change and technical assistance we have strengthened district legislatures to enable them to function more efficiently in a more representative and democratic fashion and to take over larger lawmaking responsibilities at the district level. Technical assistance also has been given to local governments and local officials. At all levels election supervision has been provided, and our political affairs section has given advice and aid in the formation of political parties.

I would like to assure the distinguished representative of China that we are giving careful attention to political development on the municipal level. Our program of chartering is progressing satisfactorily, and, through our expanded political affairs staff at both the district and headquarters level, we are now able to provide training sessions for local officials. The formal chartering of a local municipality is important, but equally important is the need for trained local officials who understand how to conduct the functions of municipal government within the framework of its charter. The people themselves must not only be willing to accept the privileges of self-government, but they must be prepared to shoulder the responsibilities that go along with these privileges.

I am most appreciative of the penetrating comments made by the distinguished representative of New Zealand in his closing remarks. He rightly pointed out that though a territorial legislature must be the focus of political consciousness, the "Micronization" of the executive side is no less important. He noted that preparation of schedules for replacement of expatriates is one way of achieving the goals of a replacement program. This in essence is what we are doing. A manpower review committee was established this past year to screen all new

hires as well as renewal of contracts of all present non-Micronesian employees to insure that Micronesians are being placed in posts for which they qualify.

I can assure the distinguished representative of Liberia that with the unification of all the territory under civilian control on July 1, 1962, most of the disparities noted by the 1961 visiting mission as between the former District of Saipan and the rest of the territory have been removed. With the second increment of our wage-scale adjustment scheduled for next month, wages for administration employees will be uniform throughout the territory. Our accelerated elementary education program will provide equal elementary schools and equally qualified teachers in all districts. The former Saipan Copra Stabilization Fund has been merged with the larger Trust Territory Copra Stabilization Fund.

#### **Economic Potential of the Territory**

A very important as well as provocative question was posed by the distinguished representative of Australia when he asked what is the proper point of balance between social development, economic development, and political development in an area such as ours. That political advancement is not necessarily dependent upon economic self-sufficiency has been dramatically illustrated over and over by the birth of new nations during the past 10 years. Nonetheless, neither political advancement nor social development will mean much if the economic growth lags too far behind. The distinguished representative of Australia has also noted that our territory, in common with other island areas of the Pacific, possesses certain unique characteristics—the small land area, the tremendous ocean distances that must be traversed, and the relatively small populations which provide only limited sources of manpower. Often it is hard to see, given these limiting factors, how economic self-sufficiency can ever be attained in an island area such as ours. Perhaps the islands of the Pacific Trust Territory may never reach self-sufficiency, but as the distinguished representative of New Zealand commented, who can say what possibilities exist until all have been explored?

That our great economic potential lies in the sea is unquestionable. Here lies the hidden wealth of Micronesia; here lies the great hope of its future. Farming the sea must be achieved if the islands of the Pacific are to achieve a sound economic base. The opening of the area to commercial fishing concerns is only the beginning step in the development of an intensive local fishing industry which in time should provide livelihood for thousands of our people. I assure the distinguished representative of Liberia and the distinguished delegate from China that we fully share the feeling that this major resource must be protected for the Micronesians. This is a paramount feature in all our considerations, and, I might add, this aspect is fully accepted by every American industry which has demonstrated interest in our area. Provisions for training of Micronesians, for them to hold stock, and provisions for eventual purchase of equipment and plants by local investors are an essential feature of any negotiations we undertake.

The taming of the sea in other respects will be equally important to our islands. Paramount here are the worldwide experiments of desalination of sea water. Many areas of the world will have vast new horizons open to them once this barrier has been breached and low-cost and simple methods of desalination have been achieved. To us it will mean that hundreds of tiny islands now not habitable can be put to use. It will mean vastly increased production of all types of crops in our world of island atolls.

Another area in which we have keen interest is that of the use of solar energy. We are investigating all possibilities of how solar energy experiments can be put to use in our region. Pilot projects using simple solar devices for cooking purposes, for small-scale refrigeration units, and for solar batteries for power uses are under consideration for certain of our islands.

#### **Agricultural Diversification**

Hope has been expressed here that more effort will be made to diversify our present agricultural export crops, i.e. copra and cacao, in order that the local agricultural

economy will not be completely dependent upon the fluctuating world market of these two products. Through experimental pilot projects and through subsidy programs we are encouraging the development of other crops which have commercial value. The production of ramie fiber, coir fiber and its byproducts, limited lumber production, papain, tapioca starch export, export of bananas, and many other items, all have real economic potential. While I do not envisage any of these becoming a major source of income, combined with a major cash crop such as copra or cacao they can provide an important secondary source of income. Thus I hasten to assure the distinguished representative of France that we are in agreement with his viewpoint that we must strive for economic diversification.

Many other aspects in the economic field are receiving careful attention. Serious attention, for example, is being given to the possibility of ricegrowing in our area. Three of our districts, Ponape, Palau, and the Marianas, have good potential for ricegrowing, and next month we are starting a pilot project to demonstrate that ricegrowing, both by the wet as well as dry method, is economically feasible for these three districts. While we cannot look forward to completely supplying all of our local rice demands, I feel confident that in time we can greatly cut down rice imports, which now average close to a half million dollars a year.

The potential of meat producing is great. Our high islands should be able to supply almost all of our fresh meat requirements. Saipan, Rota, and Tinian Islands of the Marianas District, Ponape Island, and Kusaie Island have the most potential for development of a livestock industry, and already many thousand head of cattle are found in these islands. With faster and better means of transportation, adequate freezing and storage facilities, a local meat industry meeting our own consumption, as well as exporting considerable quantities of beef to Guam, should become an important segment of the economic life of the above three districts.

Potentials exist for many small-scale industries which could provide products and commodities now imported from outside. Much of

our clothing could be manufactured locally; our soap production could be vastly increased.

I am indebted to the distinguished representative of Liberia for her very helpful comments on economic development and am particularly grateful that she pointed out that we had made no mention of Micronesian participation in economic planning. This was an omission on my part, since we do have considerable Micronesian participation in present economic planning. It is my strong conviction that the territory's economic development will not be meaningful unless Micronesians participate to the fullest extent on all levels of economic activity and planning. Each district now has active economic development boards. The Subcommittee on Economic Development of the Council of Micronesia plays an important role in assessing economic needs, and its recommendations have been carefully considered by us.

The assistant economic development officer in the headquarters economic section is a Micronesian. Two Micronesians serve on the Copra Stabilization Board, and this coming year several Micronesian members will be appointed to the board of directors which will be formed to control the economic development fund. Thus I can assure the Council that Micronesians are closely associated with economic planning in the territory. We look forward to the recommendations which will be forthcoming after the new economic, social, and political survey is completed. From the recommendations of this group, plus our present economic plans, I feel we will be able to draw up, as suggested by the distinguished representative of New Zealand, a long-range, comprehensive economic development guide for the territory.

#### **Programs in Educational and Social Fields**

The representative of UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] drew attention to one of the major problems in the field of elementary education—that of the inability of many of the municipalities to bear the local costs of education. We are devoting major attention to this aspect in our accelerated education program, and I have already described our proposals in

detail in my opening statement as well as during the questioning period. However, I would like to add that in addition to building new schools, the recruitment of American teachers, the training of Micronesian teachers, there are several other equally important aspects to which we are devoting attention. The first of these is a program of equipping elementary schools with suitable school furniture and teaching aids and the furnishing of free books and supplies for all public school students. Formerly only minimum aid was extended in this field, and here a major change is being made. This coming year, for example, the expenditure for elementary school equipment and supplies will run into several hundred thousand dollars.

In cooperation with the district legislatures we have instituted a system of subsidizing elementary school teachers salaries. While the basic salary is still being paid out of district revenues, the central government now provides a considerable subsidy which is added to the salary of all elementary school teachers who meet minimum certification standards. Further, during this coming year it is our intention to review present elementary school teacher salary levels and to bring them in line with salaries which are paid in our Micronesian Title and Pay Plan. Since the district legislatures desire to continue their support of elementary schools, the raising of teachers salaries at all levels will mean an increased subsidy on the part of the central government.

I am also pleased to assure the distinguished representative of Liberia that we are providing additional opportunities for study in the metropolitan country. This year, for example, some 10 to 12 additional students will be going to the University of Hawaii; others will be going to universities in the mainland United States, while others will be attending the College of Guam.

The College of Guam, a month or so ago, received accreditation as a 4-year college, and greatly expanded programs in all academic fields are now under way. The College of Guam has many potentials for our use. It is strategically located with respect to the Western Carolines, the Marianas, and the Eastern Carolines region. It has an imposing campus and a physi-

cal plant whose eventual cost will run into several million dollars. Its staff is well qualified, and many are specialists on the Pacific area. The College of Guam can well become a center for Pacific studies. It has the added attraction of being close enough to all our districts to enable our students to return home at regular intervals to visit their families. This is an aspect which means a great deal to our students, particularly those who are married. Thus, although in general I would agree with the distinguished delegate from Liberia on the value of an institution of higher education within the territory, it is my feeling that it would be somewhat premature and uneconomical for us to attempt to build a college when we have such ready access to the College of Guam.

This does not mean, however, that we will not continue to expand higher education facilities in certain selected fields of study within the territory. I have already indicated our expansion plans for our nursing school, as well as our teacher training institute. These will be further expanded. Similarly, our School of Dental Nursing will be strengthened, as will our farm institute, which provides extension training on a post-high-school level for local agricultural agents.

There appears to be some misunderstanding with respect to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands' not using the United Nations scholarship programs. Over the past 10 years there has been an average of two United Nations fellowships received annually by Trust Territory citizens. These have covered a variety of fields ranging from study of radio broadcasting in New Zealand and Western Samoa to public-health activities in Japan and the Philippines, to community development study in the Philippines, Burma, and Jamaica, and social development grants in Hawaii and elsewhere.

Most of the Council members have remarked favorably on our greatly increased appropriations, particularly in the field of elementary education. I am indebted though to the distinguished representative of New Zealand for pointing out that provision of additional money does not remove all the stumbling blocks. He has rightly noted that all educational progress

in a sense consists in the replacement of one set of problems for another. This, indeed, Mr. President, can be said to be an aspect of all progress and growth—problems are never completely solved, for new and different ones constantly arise.

What we are attempting in all our education programs is to equip our Micronesian young people to better solve the problems which inevitably will face them in their changing world. It is our contention that the most immediate problem lies in expanding and improving education at the elementary school level. This belief has brought about the launching of a vast, accelerated program in this field.

Our next stage will be acceleration in secondary school education and in the vital field of adult education. Here also is a great challenge to be met, for, unless we can bring the older generation within the orbit of the changing world, our accelerated education program on the elementary and secondary level could serve to create a gulf between the young and old. There is great eagerness among our adult population for education—education for their children and education for themselves. For our part we intend to provide facilities to meet the educational needs and desires of this vital portion of our population.

We share the concern expressed by the distinguished representative of Liberia on the needs of the tuberculosis control program. We are endeavoring to strengthen the program of tuberculosis control in all districts. BCG vaccination continues, new and more potent drugs are constantly being introduced, and we are stressing preventive aspects as well as treatment of this disease. TB control teams have been established in each district and will be greatly strengthened under our accelerated public-health program. The special assistant to the Director of Public Health devoted full time this past year to organizing tuberculosis control work in the Marshalls District. Our expanded medical program calls for a tuberculosis specialist to be added to our staff. We are determined that this dreaded scourge will be brought under control in the Pacific Islands. Funds for public-health activities for the year we are about to enter on July 1, that is fiscal

year 1964, have been appreciably increased over funds of the past year. For the next fiscal year, an even greater acceleration is planned and expansion of all aspects of our public-health program will be carried out.

#### **Problems Connected With the Outer Islands**

We still have unique problems connected with the provision of education, health services, social services for the inhabitants of those small islands we have come to term the "outer islands." I would be among the first to admit that these problems have not been adequately met in the past, mainly because of insufficient transportation services. These outlying islands with their small populations, however, represent only a small fraction of our total land area and only a small minority of our population. We must, of course, meet the demands of the outlanders and fully intend to do so, but there is a point at which economic practicability must enter into the picture. The distinguished representative of China touched on this point when he suggested that it might be worth while for the administration to consider ways and means of encouraging small isolated groups to move to more populated areas and join larger communities. In certain of our small islands, the total population consists of only 10 to 30 individuals, and the islands on which they live often are a hundred miles or more from the district center or other populated areas. In the main, these islands have little to offer economically, and the young adults increasingly move to the district center or other populated regions. Thus we are left with small, isolated groups made up of elderly people and young children. There is no question but that eventual amalgamation of tiny groups of this nature will come about.

The question as to how to achieve a proper balance between the programs at headquarters, the district centers, and the outlying areas is one to which we have given a great deal of thought. I agree with the distinguished representative of China that more attention needs to be given to decentralization, not only to insure that our programs reach into the isolated out-island areas but also into the hinterland region surrounding the district center area in which the great bulk of our population reside. Much

of the problem of attracting and keeping our educated young people in the village level will disappear as we open these hinterlands to the conveniences of modern life possible under local resources. It is not enough simply to station a well-trained teacher, a doctor, a nurse, or an agriculturist in an outlying area. They must be able to put into practice what they have learned, and they, as well as the people of the outlying region, should be able to participate in improved standards of living.

It is this goal that we are striving for in our accelerated education program by providing the means whereby an elementary school far from the district center will have equal facilities and as well trained teachers as do the schools in the urban centers. Our public-health program calls for expansion of hospital service to the population centers outside the district centers through the building of field hospitals. The building of roads, the extension of public utilities insofar as this is feasible, into the hinterland area must be an important phase of any program of development. These items have high priority in our present program, and even greater emphasis will be placed on them in our expanding program, which calls for acceleration in all fields of endeavor.

I am pleased to be able to report at this time that the typhoon rehabilitation program for the Mariana Islands is progressing most satisfactorily. On June 11 President Kennedy allocated \$1,300,000 for the special rehabilitation program I described in detail in my opening statement, and this will enable us to move forward rapidly in the reconstruction of damaged facilities in Saipan, Rota, and Tinian. The Administering Authority shares the hope expressed by members of the Council that a speedy solution to the longstanding problem of the Kwajalein land claims, as well as compensation for the people of Rongelap, will soon come about. My administration earnestly hopes that these two areas of doubt and uncertainty can be cleared up well before this Council convenes next spring.

It has been our practice, Mr. President, each year to circulate immediately upon the return of the Special Representative to the territory the summary records of the Trusteeship Coun-

cil, in order that the people of the territory may read for themselves the complete transcripts of the meetings here. Not only are these summary records distributed in considerable quantity, but our local radio stations use them in special broadcast programs. I can assure the Council that the deliberations of this body are followed with keen interest by the people of the Trust Territory. Before the 1st of July records of this meeting will be distributed throughout our territory.

In closing, Mr. President, may I express again my appreciation for the many helpful comments brought forth at this meeting and thank you and the members of the Council for the interest expressed in the affairs of the Trust Territory.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mincographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Economic and Social Council

Fifteenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Council an extract from the report of the 19th session of the Commission on Human Rights. E/3737. April 1, 1963. 19 pp.

Report of the *ad hoc* committee established under Council resolution 851 (XXXII) on coordination of technical assistance activities. E/3750. April 18, 1963. 24 pp.

Economic and social consequences of disarmament. E/3736, May 13, 1963, 12 pp.; Add. 1, May 10, 1963, 21 pp.; Add. 2, May 13, 1963, 12 pp.; Add. 3, May 13, 1963, 14 pp.

Technical assistance activities of the United Nations. E/3757. May 13, 1963. 77 pp.

Provisional agenda for the 36th session of ECOSOC. E/3755. May 14, 1963. 17 pp.

World campaign for universal literacy. E/3771. May 15, 1963. 84 pp.

U.N. conference on the application of science and technology for the benefit of the less developed areas. E/3772, May 21, 1963, 91 pp.; Corr. 1, June 10, 1963, 1 p.; and Add. 1, June 3, 1963, 173 pp.

General review of the development, coordination, and concentration of the economic, social, and human rights programs and activities of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency as a whole: report of the Special Committee on Coordination. E/3778. May 27, 1963. 13 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Signed at New York September 28, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.

*Notification received of undertaking to seek ratification:* Nicaragua, June 26, 1963.

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

*Signature:* Upper Volta, May 2, 1963.

*Acceptance deposited:* Upper Volta, May 13, 1963.

##### Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Dated at Montreal October 9, 1946; entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.

*Admission to membership:* Algeria, October 19, 1962; Burundi, March 12, 1963; Jamaica, December 28, 1962; Rwanda, September 18, 1962; Trinidad and Tobago, May 27, 1963; Uganda, March 28, 1963.

##### Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas;<sup>1</sup>

Convention on the continental shelf;<sup>1</sup>  
Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

*Ratification deposited:* Australia, May 14, 1963.

Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone.  
Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Australia (with reservations), May 14, 1963.

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

*Ratification deposited:* Australia (with reservations), May 14, 1963.

Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.<sup>2</sup>

*Signature:* Australia, May 14, 1963.

##### Maritime Matters

Inter-American convention on facilitation of international waterborne transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata). Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 11th ratification or adherence.

*Signatures:* Argentina, Bolivia, Chile (with reservation), Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Uruguay, June 7, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4631.

*Application to:* Guam, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and Virgin Islands, July 7, 1963.

## Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules, and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

*Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence):* Chad, July 4, 1963.

## Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

*Acceptances deposited:* Argentina, July 16, 1963; Dominican Republic, July 12, 1963.

*Accession deposited:* El Salvador, July 17, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement of June 30, 1958 (TIAS 4067), relating to the use of the Veterans Memorial Hospital and granting aid for medical care and treatment of veterans. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

### Portugal

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 28, 1961 (TIAS 4904). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon June 5 and 26, 1963. Entered into force June 26, 1963.

### Sweden

Agreement amending the agreement of November 20, 1962, as amended (TIAS 2653, 4359), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Stockholm June 28, 1963. Entered into force June 28, 1963.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Appointments

Howard H. Haugerud as Deputy Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, effective July 14. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 381 dated July 22.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

#### Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Chile. Signed at Santiago August 7, 1962. Entered into force August 7, 1962. With exchanges of notes—Dated at Santiago August 7 and October 3 and 4, 1962. And amending agreement effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago August 29 and September 10, 1962. Entered into force September 10, 1962. TIAS 5195. 18 pp. 10¢.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. Agreement with Paraguay. Signed at Asunción September 26, 1961. Entered into force September 26, 1961. TIAS 5196. 7 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Furnishing of Articles and Services. Agreement with Bolivia. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz April 26, 1962. Entered into force April 26, 1962. TIAS 5197. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Burma. Signed at Rangoon November 9, 1962. Entered into force November 9, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5198. 8 pp. 10¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Chile. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago October 3 and 4, 1962. Entered into force October 4, 1962. TIAS 5199. 5 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program in North Borneo. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962. TIAS 5201. 5 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program in Sarawak. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London October 25, 1962. Entered into force October 25, 1962. TIAS 5202. 5 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Military Assistance to India. Agreement with India, supplementing the agreement of March 7 and 16, 1951, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington November 14, 1962. Entered into force November 14, 1962. TIAS 5206. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Korea. Signed at Seoul November 7, 1962. Entered into force November 7, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5208. 8 pp. 10¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Colombia. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bogotá October 5, 1962. Entered into force October 5, 1962. TIAS 5210. 3 pp. 5¢.

Experimental Communications Satellites—Intercontinental Testing. Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo November 6, 1962. Entered into force November 6, 1962. TIAS 5212. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India. Signed at New Delhi November 26, 1962. Entered into force November 26, 1962. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5225. 9 pp. 10¢.

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**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 15-21**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to July 15 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 367 of July 12.

No.	Date	Subject
*372	7/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.
373	7/15	Publication of <i>Digest of International Law</i> (rewrite).
*374	7/15	Guest list for dinner for President Nyerere of Tanganyika.
375	7/18	Agreement with Mexico on the Chamizal.
†376	7/16	Rusk: Department's appropriation for 1964.
*377	7/17	Visit of Dominican Republic parliamentary delegation.
*378	7/18	Visit of Afghanistan parliamentary delegation.
†390	7/18	Fredericks: "Our Policy Toward Africa."

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*, by Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest*, published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relationship to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information as to origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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## The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Step Toward Peace

*Following is an address to the Nation by President Kennedy on July 26 concerning the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water which was initiated by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at Moscow on July 25, together with texts of an agreed communique and the treaty, which were released simultaneously at Washington (White House press release), London, and Moscow on July 25.*

### ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY :

Good evening, my fellow citizens: I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle

<sup>1</sup> Delivered from the White House by television and radio on July 26 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.

In these years the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently communicated suspicion and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Washington and in Moscow, in Geneva and at the United Nations. But too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord, or disillusion.

Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the at-

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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mosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control—a goal first sought in 1946, when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.

That plan and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground tests. This nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water. For such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can pick up.

### Limitations of Treaty

The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection, no international body.

We should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right of self-defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war.

Nevertheless, this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who sign it from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope.

For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this nation from testing underground, or from being ready to conduct atmospheric tests if the acts of others so require,

it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear tests.

This treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have made clear—most recently in Berlin and Cuba—our deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any form of aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race. In three administrations our soldiers and diplomats have worked together to this end, always supported by Great Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962.

But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side—it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing.

This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from war.

Here is what this step can mean to you and to your children and your neighbors.

### An Opportunity To Reduce World Tension

First, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The Moscow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made it clear that any nonaggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require.

No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if any, can be built

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on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and type of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.

But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol—if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another—if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration—then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.

Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all people may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot lead toward that end, but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.

I do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Communists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent.

But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiraling arms race and a collision course toward war. Since the beginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and as peace-loving as our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the last two years and a half I have been required to report to you as President that this nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military confrontation—in Laos, in Berlin, and in Cuba.

A war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold

numbers elsewhere. And the survivors—as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, "The survivors would envy the dead." For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.

#### **Freeing World From Fear of Radioactive Fallout**

Second, this treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout. Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under conditions which restricted such fallout to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and the yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe.

Even then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard, and it is not a statistical issue. The loss of even one human life or the malformation of even one baby—who may be born long after we are gone—should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.

Nor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

### **Preventing Spread of Nuclear Weapons**

Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today.

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries, large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive power on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the second World War.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great obligation—all four nuclear powers have a great obligation—to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce such weapons.

This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It provides that none of the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens the door for further agreements on the control of nuclear weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign; for it is in the interest of all nations, and already we

have heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.

### **Strengthening Our Nation's Security**

Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing. For, in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase when its adversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland.

We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher than that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred-megaton bomb of which they spoke 2 years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic power. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.

### **Risk of Secret Violations Not Overlooked**

It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries. We have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that deep in outer space, hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth, illegal tests might go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far

out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violation, moreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and the worldwide consequences for the violator.

Secret violations are possible and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty—and such risks in this treaty are small—the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new nuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war.

#### **A Responsibility of All Americans**

This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consultation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document which may mark an historic and constructive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate.

It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is

particularly for our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve military, scientific, and political experts, but it must be not left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours.

If we are to open new doorways to peace, if we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as we have been in their invention, then let us now show all the world on this side of the wall and the other that a strong America also stands for peace.

There is no cause for complacency. We have learned in times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now that there are shortcuts on the road to peace. At many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentration of nuclear and conventional arms must still be deterred.

The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict, are still there, in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance that we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been achieved and that our strength and unity were no longer required.

But now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time has come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin. According to the ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."

My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, get back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is one thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step.

Thank you and good night.

## COMMUNIQUE

The special representatives of the President of the U.S.A. and of the Prime Minister of the U.K., W. A. Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States, and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science for the United Kingdom, visited Moscow together with their advisers on July 14. Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham were received by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, who presided on July 15 at the first of a series of meetings to discuss questions relating to the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and other questions of mutual interest. The discussions were continued from July 16 to July 25 with A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. During these discussions each principal was assisted by his advisers.

The discussions took place in a businesslike, cordial atmosphere. Agreement was reached on the text of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This text is being published separately and simultaneously with this communique. It was initialed on July 25 by A. A. Gromyko, Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham. Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham together with their advisers will leave Moscow shortly to report and bring back the initialed texts to their respective Governments. Signature of the Treaty is expected to take place in the near future in Moscow.

The heads of the three delegations agreed that the test ban treaty constituted an important first step toward the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and they look forward to further progress in this direction.

The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three Governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organisations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussion on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement sat-

isfactory to all participants. A brief exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, directed at a relaxation of tension.

## TEXT OF TREATY

### TREATY

banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

#### Article II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall

be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

#### Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

#### Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary

Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the day of \_\_\_\_\_, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of the United States of America  
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Mr. Rusk and Mr. Harriman Discuss Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

*Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Harriman by Martin Agronsky on a National Broadcasting Company television program on July 28.*

Press release 394 dated July 28

*Mr. Agronsky:* Mr. Secretary, this week in Moscow we came to the turning point in a long, hard road. You began traveling it long before you assumed your present duties. I wonder if you could put it in historical perspective for us and look back to the beginning.

*Secretary Rusk:* Well, Martin, I hope that what the President has called an important first step will in fact prove to be a turning point. But that, of course, is for the future.

When I heard from Averell Harriman that it seemed possible that we could initial an agreed test ban treaty for the three environments, my mind went back to the summer of 1945, when I was a colonel on the War Plan Section of the General Staff, when the news of the first bomb first came in. One of my colleagues, a Regular officer, instantaneously commented that "War has devoured itself. We cannot settle disputes by this means any longer."

I also think of the Acheson-Lilienthal report,<sup>1</sup> which pointed out that nature does not yield up its secrets on the basis of political favoritism, that the basic scientific knowledge involved in these weapons would become generally known to mankind, and that it was im-

<sup>1</sup> For background and excerpts from the report, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1946, p. 553.

portant for us to try to commit this great power to peaceful purposes rather than to war.

I think of the Baruch proposals,<sup>2</sup> in which we tried to put the lid back onto Pandora's Box and to find a way to bring this great power under control.

I think of the prolonged negotiations in which I took part to try to organize United Nations forces under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the hope that the United Nations forces could somehow be a substitute for national competitive armaments.

And then, during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations, one can recall how we in the West have been gnawing at this problem, in trying to find some answer to the unrestricted, unlimited arms race in the nuclear field.

You will recall that in the midfifties the United States and United Kingdom monopoly in nuclear weapons was broken effectively when the Soviet Union achieved delivery systems that could deliver devastation against Western Europe and the United States. Therefore these weapons came to be competitive, and one can recall last October that perhaps for the first time in history great powers had to think operationally about the prospect of a nuclear exchange.

Now, these are sobering events. It is important for us to try to make some small movement to bring them under control. I do believe that this limited agreement is very useful and constructive from that point of view.

It does not do a great deal. All that it does is to eliminate testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under the water. It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles. It does not eliminate nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. It does not prevent an arms race.

But, nevertheless, it does help to impose some limitations and some ceiling upon the arms race. And it saves, I think, mankind from the kinds of testing about which they are in deep disaccord, to which they have very deep objections.

And it may be the turning point that you mentioned—opening the door. Because here is something which both sides have apparently

found in their self-interest. It may be a turning point at which other questions could be taken up for further explorations.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Governor Harriman, perhaps you could discuss the turning point aspect of it.

You went to Moscow with a double mission, in effect. First, to bring back the nuclear test ban treaty—which you did. Secondly, Governor Harriman, you were empowered to discuss with Premier Khrushchev a number of other issues beyond the test ban, going to unresolved problems between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Can you tell us what issues you raised with Mr. Khrushchev? What issues he raised with you? What progress was made in that area?

#### **Possibility of Breakthrough**

*Under Secretary Harriman:* There was one thing that Mr. Khrushchev said to the press on Saturday morning [July 27] when I left Moscow. He said this might be a breakthrough, which confirms what Dean Rusk has just said. If it is a breakthrough, it will mean the heralding of other steps. I wouldn't want to venture a guess as to whether there would be other steps. But he seems to feel that there will be; otherwise he would not have said so.

Certainly within the Soviet Union this agreement has been hailed as a great event, and of course the Russian people long for a relief from the tensions and fear of war. They have had a great deal of it, as you well know—a great deal of war and have suffered a great deal.

What he has in mind for the future is very hard to tell. The only subject which he put forward as a major subject to discuss and come to an agreement on at once was a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and those that belong to the Warsaw treaty. This of course would be a limited step in itself because from the outline of what he suggested it is really a reaffirmation of the obligations that we have all taken to the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means.

But he seems to want to have—he seems to be pressing for some sort of agreement. It was not clear to me just what he had in mind, because I was not authorized to negotiate. We made it very clear to our allies that we were

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057, and Dec. 15, 1946, p. 1088.

going there to negotiate a test ban treaty, which was proposed by the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, and Mr. Khrushchev accepted it. He later on proposed that we sign two agreements at the same time, a test ban and also a nonaggression pact.

*Mr. Agronsky:* He did propose that?

*Under Secretary Harriman:* Yes, he did propose that in the July 2 speech. That, of course, was utterly impossible for us to do. We were only two countries of NATO, and we would never think of discussing a problem that would affect all of our partners and our allies without coming to an understanding with them beforehand.

So therefore this was just explored, and, as the communique said,<sup>2</sup> we agreed to take this matter up with our allies, consult with them, and see what the next move should be.

So I cannot tell you what is going to be in the future.

The other matters which he mentioned to us—he also said to the press or said publicly in his speech—he suggested that we get on with some of the things which have been suggested to make surprise attack more difficult: the establishment of control posts at the ports and the railroad centers and the airfields and the road junctures, and that sort of thing, and also a limitation on budgets, and also limitations on the level of forces. But those, I think, he spoke of in connection with a nonaggression pact.

Now, I don't know where that will carry us, but I am quite sure that he wants us to discuss that with our allies, and that is the only subject which he put forward as of importance for the immediate future. If we get through that step, and if there is some value in it for us, which is not clear yet because we don't know what the provisions will be, then possibly something else may happen.

But he seems to have in mind that this is only one step forward. I think that there are certain aspects of this, Dean, which you can mention. I think that the world as a whole, the people of the world, look upon this as ending a great threat—that the Soviet Union and the United States, which have been the ones that have done most of the testing, will no longer

test under this treaty. We have agreed to stop testing, and that will end radioactive fallout, which had in the minds of many people threatened the health and welfare of the human race.

Now, we cannot tell whether other countries will test or what the eventual future will be. But I have found in both the Soviet Union and in Europe it was welcomed as a very important step in many ways and started hope. As to whether that will eventuate, I would not want to predict.

*Secretary Rusk:* Averell, I am sure you would want our listeners to know that, when you talk about ending testing, this ends tests in the atmosphere, and under the water, and in outer space. Underground tests would still be permitted, so long as fallout does not extend beyond the country in which these underground tests are to take place.

But we do have at times, it seems to me, a sort of vicious circle between arms and political problems. On the one side, arms themselves—particularly modern and sophisticated arms that can be launched with devastating destruction at a few moments' notice—arms themselves create tension. It is very hard to disarm until some of the great political issues separating the East and the West are themselves resolved. So we feel it is important not to think just in terms of disarmament, although we think it is important to do what we can in this field, but to try to resolve such issues as Laos and Vietnam and Berlin and the German questions; these are the real divisions.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Mr. Secretary, since you raised these points, and you, Governor Harriman, since you have dealt with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow on this matter, can you be more specific about what was done in terms of dealing with these problems? Can you tell us anything about the future in the sense, or about the past, Governor Harriman, in your conversation?

*Under Secretary Harriman:* No. The matter which Mr. Khrushchev wanted to talk about most was this question of the nonaggression pact. He was thinking of Europe and Germany, and he was not too much interested in discussing other matters. Of course, I did raise Laos, as I said I would.

*Mr. Agronsky:* What did he say?

<sup>2</sup> See p. 239

*Under Secretary Harriman:* We had a useful exchange, but we didn't get very far because his information is somewhat different. The British have talked in much detail with the Soviets, because the British and the Soviets are cochairmen of the agreement that was made in Geneva and they are responsible for the carrying out of the agreement and responsible for the activities of the International Control Commission. There is a difference of information, and it was agreed we would try to get closer together. In any event, it started some discussions which we will certainly carry on, and the discussion was useful.

But what was mostly on Mr. Khrushchev's mind was the situation in Europe, and he seemed to want to move ahead with some sort of further understandings, and we cannot tell what they will be until we begin to negotiate, and we can only do that with our allies, with their approval.

*Secretary Rusk:* I want to point out that Mr. Harriman's recent mission in Moscow was aimed at the test ban in the three environments. He was not there for the purpose of discussing all of the problems between ourselves and our allies on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other. By concentrating on the test ban I think he was able to reach an agreement without injecting a great many other questions that would have complicated the problem.

*Mr. Agronsky:* And, Mr. Secretary, a week from now you yourself are going to Moscow with a congressional delegation to sign the treaty. Will you at that point, with the test ban behind you, carry on these conversations with Mr. Khrushchev that Mr. Harriman has started?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think you can assume that when foreign ministers get together, they always talk. And that has been the case on every occasion when I have met Mr. Gromyko thus far, and I have no doubt that we will explore rather broadly the question as to where it might be possible to find other points at which agreement is possible.

This will not be easy or simple. It may take some time because many of these points do involve the interests of other nations. The President has made it quite clear that we are not

going to negotiate the interests of other nations without the participation of those other nations.

#### **Question of Nonaggression Treaty**

*Mr. Agronsky:* Mr. Secretary, is it too soon to ask you what the thinking of our Government is on a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think that this is something that has to be talked out thoroughly in NATO. From one point of view, NATO itself has made clear from its beginning that it considers itself organized within the framework of the U.N. Charter, that it is organized for defensive purposes, that it is not planning to conduct armed attack against anyone, that it is prepared to settle disputes by peaceful means.

Now, these are the basic elements of the treaty structure of NATO itself. So from that point of view, as a matter of principle, there is no great problem. But, given the absence of understanding on some of the great issues that are involved in the relations between East and West, what would such a nonaggression pact mean? What would it mean to all the parties? How would it be used? These are things that need exploration.

If we could move toward an agreed resolution of some of these larger questions, this would fall into place very easily.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Mr. Secretary, one question that is automatically raised in connection with the Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty is this one: Our allies have already indicated that they have some doubts about the credibility—about our commitment to defend with nuclear weapons Western Europe against a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact nations, a massive conventional attack. Might not our allies feel that this would lessen still further the credibility of an American nuclear response to such a Soviet attack?

*Secretary Rusk:* Martin, that doubt that you express comes largely through the gossip channels and not through the solid opinions of governments in direct discussions of these great issues of war and peace within the alliance. I do not believe that there is any doubt whatever in the alliance that the defense of the alliance is indivisible and that the United

States will do whatever is necessary to do its part in making the defense of NATO impregnable.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Well, such a pact would not undermine, then, the NATO alliance?

*Secretary Rusk:* Not at all. This pact in no way affects the commitments of all of the allies within NATO for its mutual defense. And, indeed, the nuclear strength of NATO has been enormously increased in recent years, and our allies know about that and fully understand its implications. And I think perhaps the other side does too.

#### **What Was Soviet Objective?**

*Mr. Agronsky:* Governor Harriman, you indicated at Hyannis Port, after you had spoken to the President, that one of the questions, one of the reasons that led Khrushchev to sign this nuclear test ban treaty was his concern at Russian relations with Communist China. Can you elaborate on that in any way?

*Under Secretary Harriman:* Well, the question was, what was Russia's objective in signing this treaty? I said I didn't know. But certainly one of the preoccupations, if you have been reading the Soviet press lately, is their relations with Peiping. And they have been writing each other letters. You know, each one wrote the other about a 50,000-word letter, which is perhaps a world record for exchange of information. So we know pretty much what their differences are. But it does seem as if the Soviet Union wanted to make this agreement for some reason because of the conflict which quite obviously exists.

But I do think that there are other reasons.

I said also that the Russian people are longing for some break in tensions. They have had a tough, hard war; 20 million people were killed in the war, as you know. I was there during most of the war. And they feel very deeply the desire for peace. And since the war there have been the tensions that have existed, which have been discussed this evening. So I do not know of any people in the world that have any greater desire for peace than the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev is becoming more and more a political leader than the dictator that Stalin

was. Even though there is only one party, it is necessary for him to keep a certain popularity with the Russian people in order to maintain his leadership within the party. And he certainly has a desire in his relations with them—I saw him talking to the Russian people on several occasions. Right after the American-Soviet track meet, he went out and talked with the people. I was with him. He shook hands with them, and he patted the children on the head. He might have been an American politician. There is such a tremendous difference. You know, Stalin would never—never—go out in public. He rushed through the streets at 60 miles an hour, the windows of his car were closed, the curtains drawn. So that it is quite a change between the two.

So that you have got to think in terms of what is useful for the Kremlin leaders in connection with controlling their own people.

*Mr. Agronsky:* Mr. Secretary, do you think that the Sino-Soviet split has the effect of bringing the United States and Russia closer together and improving the prospects of resolving outstanding U.S.-Russian differences?

*Secretary Rusk:* I think we have to take account of the fact that the Soviet Union has said in the field of ideologies there is no coexistence, and we have to bear in mind that their aim is still to establish a Communist world. But, on the other hand, I think that in this nuclear field we and the Soviet Union do have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war.

Those who have developed nuclear weapons understand that a one-megaton weapon—and we are now talking about weapons of tens of megatons—that a one-megaton weapon is 50 times the size of the weapon that fell on Hiroshima. And those who have these weapons in their possession have a much more direct and operational sense of what a nuclear war means than those who have not really felt deeply about these great issues of war and peace.

So I think that there may be here some element of common interest based upon the nature of these weapons and the nature of the nuclear exchange on which we might find certain points of agreement that might open the way for the future.

*Mr. Agronsky:* And I am sure you will at-

tempt to explore them when you go to Moscow.

Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for a very interesting insight into the meaning of the nuclear test ban.

## **U.S. Protests Ceylon's Decision on Oil Legislation**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 383 dated July 23, for release July 24

Early in June the Government of Ceylon announced its decision to give the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation a monopoly of the internal distribution of petroleum products as of January 1, 1964. On July 5, 1963, the American Ambassador to Ceylon [Frances E. Willis] acting under instructions presented a note<sup>1</sup> to the Prime Minister of Ceylon. The attention of the Government of Ceylon was invited to the fact that the proposed action would be contrary to assurances given in 1962 that the private oil companies would be permitted to operate in Ceylon on the basis of fair competition. To date no reply to this note has been received.

On July 3 the Government of Ceylon issued a communique announcing its intention to introduce in Parliament legislation to enact into law its decision to have the internal distribution of petroleum products assigned solely to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The communique also stated that "the amending act would have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the principal act or any undertaking given by the government in regard to the import, sale and distribution of petroleum." On July 17 the government in fact introduced such a bill.

The Government of the United States does not question the right of a sovereign nation to nationalize property belonging to American citizens or companies, provided adequate and effective compensation is promptly paid in accordance with international law. The United States Government, however, regrets this most recent decision of the Government of Ceylon on

two principal grounds. First, as indicated above, this action is at variance with assurances given earlier by the Government of Ceylon. Second, compensation has not yet been paid to the American companies for their properties which were taken over in 1962. The proposed action of the Government of Ceylon will deprive the companies of the use of the remainder of their properties throughout the island and therefore will give rise to further and more complicated questions of compensation.

The United States Government is continuing its endeavors to obtain compensation for the fair value of the properties of the American oil companies taken over in 1962. It will also continue to seek in Ceylon and elsewhere to make it possible for American citizens and companies to conduct their business on the basis of fair competition.

## **U.S. and India Sign Agreement To Strengthen India's Air Defense**

Press release 379 dated July 22

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and India have reached agreement [July 22] on certain measures to strengthen India's defenses against possible future air attacks from Communist China. These measures include the following:

1. The Government of the United States will provide the Government of India with radar and related communications equipment, initially in the form of mobile units, subsequently in the form of fixed radar installations. The United States will retain title to the mobile units, which will be withdrawn when the fixed radar installations are provided. Equipment for the fixed radar installations will be furnished to the Government of India under the terms of the agreement of November 14, 1962,<sup>1</sup> between India and the United States regarding assistance to the Government of India for the purpose of defense against Chinese Communist aggression.

2. The United States will provide training for Indian technicians in the operation and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>1</sup> For text of a Department statement and an exchange of notes, see BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1962, p. 837.

maintenance of mobile and fixed radar installations and related communications equipment.

3. Elements of the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force will join with the Indian Air Force in periodic, joint training exercises in India.

The above measures follow the findings of the Commonwealth U.S. Air Defense Mission which visited India earlier this year in response to the request of the Government of India.

In the event of renewed Chinese Communist aggression against India the United States has agreed, pursuant to the present agreement, to consult with the Government of India regarding possible measures to strengthen India's air defenses in the light of the situation existing at the time. The agreement does not, however, involve any commitment on the part of the United States Government to come to India's assistance in the event of a renewed Chinese Communist attack.

## Department Notes Anniversary of Korean Armistice

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

Tomorrow [July 27] marks the 10th anniversary of the Military Armistice Agreement<sup>2</sup> which brought a conclusion to the tragic struggle in Korea. Although the people of Korea have since been spared the horrors of war, they have been denied the full fruits of the peace by the continued necessity of maintaining burdensome defenses against the threatening Communist forces in the north that were augmented almost from the moment the armistice was signed. The intransigence of the northern regime, with its Communist allies, has further frustrated the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people for the reunification of their country under a free act of self-determination.

The United States Armed Forces, as part of the United Nations Command, stand today, and

will continue to stand, with their Korean friends and allies in protecting the lives of the Korean people until lasting peace with justice can be attained. Two of their members, Captains Ben W. Stutts of Florence, Alabama, and Carleton Voltz of Frankfort, Michigan, have been under unwarranted detention by Communist forces since May 17. This anniversary would be an especially fitting time for their release in reflection of the concern for human welfare which brought about the armistice of 1953.

## U.S. and Panama Announce Results of Canal Zone Talks

Press release 384 dated July 23

*President Kennedy and President Roberto F. Chiari of the Republic of Panama agreed, during President Chiari's visit to Washington on June 12-13, 1962,<sup>1</sup> to appoint high-level representatives to discuss points of dissatisfaction concerning certain aspects of the treaties between the United States and Panama governing the Panama Canal. The results of these discussions, held in Panama, have been summarized in a joint communique and aide memoire issued as State Department press release 17 on January 10, 1963,<sup>2</sup> and in the following final joint communique issued by the two Governments on July 23.*

The representatives designated by the Presidents of the Republic of Panama and of the United States of America to discuss points of dissatisfaction between the two countries with regard to the Canal Zone, in terminating their sessions, wish to make public that, since the issuance of the last communique on January 10, 1963, the following results have been obtained with the authorization of their respective Governments:

1. Agreement has been reached on the creation of a Bi-national Labor Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of Panama and of the United States, which will consider labor dis-

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on July 26 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1963, p. 131.

<sup>1</sup> For text of joint communique, see BULLETIN of July 9, 1962, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 171.

putes which may arise between Panamanian employees and the authorities of the Canal Zone and will advise the Government of Panama and the Governor of the Canal Zone thereon.

2. The United States Government has prepared a draft bill for presentation to the Congress of the United States which would make available to Panamanian employees of the United States Government in the Canal Zone the same governmental health and life insurance benefits as are available to the United States citizen employees.

3. There has been full discussion of the steps taken by the Canal Zone authorities to implement treaty obligations with regard to equal employment opportunities. Various aspects of the wage scale have been discussed. The minimum wage in the Canal Zone, which was increased to 60 cents per hour on April 1, 1962, was increased again to 70 cents per hour on July 1, 1963, and will be increased to 80 cents per hour on July 1, 1964, together with proportionate increases in the entire wage structure for all employees. The Panamanian representatives have requested greater increases.

4. The United States has agreed to deduct, withhold and remit to the Government of Panama the sums owed for income tax by employees who are required to pay income tax to the Republic of Panama and who work for the Panama Canal Company or any other agency of the United States Government in the Canal Zone.

5. The Panamanian representatives, with the object that there may be continuous jurisdiction from the capital city to the rest of the territory of the Republic, have requested that the jurisdiction over a corridor comprising Fourth of July Avenue, the bridge over the Canal and the road to Arraijan, be transferred to Panama. The United States representatives indicated that the United States is preparing proposals to submit to Panama for consideration for an agreement covering this matter.

6. The Panamanian representatives have requested that piers 6 and 7 in Cristobal be licensed to the Colon Free Zone. The United States representatives have indicated that the United States Government is preparing the terms of an agreement for consideration by Panama.

## U.S. Views on International Air Rate Policy

Press release 392 dated July 25

*Major features of the views of the U.S. Government concerning international air rate levels were reiterated through the release on July 25 by the Department of State of a statement made by the U.S. delegation at a conference in Ottawa on governmental relations with the International Air Transport Association. The statement, as presented at the conference on July 18 by Alan S. Boyd, chairman of the delegation, follows.*

The United States Government bases its views on international air rates on statutory considerations of public interest. Of first importance is facilitating the freedom of international movement for the people and for their commerce to the fullest extent possible consistent with the requirement of operational safety and the dictates of sound economic conditions and rate-making principles. The fulfillment of this objective requires safe, convenient, rapid air transportation, taking efficient advantage of modern technology and performed at a price which is reasonable to the passengers and shippers and which meets the economic needs of the carriers for the continuation and expansion of air services.

In spite of its disadvantages the most practicable method of setting international rates still appears to be the IATA mechanism. So long as IATA moves in a direction consistent with the public interest, the United States Government will continue to support the operation of IATA as the machinery for determining rates, subject to Government approval.

An integral part of reasonably satisfactory functioning of IATA, in the United States' view, is the setting of rates which are consistent with the public interest. The United States Government criteria for such rates have evolved over a quarter century of domestic air carrier regulation and are now well documented in the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board's decisions. It is not the intention of the United States Government to attempt to impose its views of public interest on the international

community. However, to be satisfactory to the Government of the United States, rates set by private agreement among the carriers must not be substantially inconsistent with the standards of justice and reasonableness to both the public and the carriers.

When, from time to time, the United States determines the broad characteristics of a rate level or structure that should in its view be in effect, it will advise American carriers of its views and will engage in discussion with other nations with the hope of securing their agreement to, or at least understanding of, its rate policies. Finally, recognizing that interairline ratemaking is a bargaining process which does not always result in furthering the public interest, the United States Government will, whenever the issue demands it, have no alternative but to use its power to disapprove rate resolutions.

It is the view of the United States that rates on the North Atlantic and on the Pacific are, by its standards, too high under the Chandler agreement<sup>1</sup> and that they were too high prior to the Chandler agreement.

It is considered useful to indicate some general types of rate changes which the United States would favor:

1. A substantial general reduction in tariffs, with or without altering the structure of tariffs.

2. A supereconomy service, such as, for example, the "thrif" service recently proposed by Pan American; such a service might or might not have "no reservation" characteristics.

3. Sharp reductions in off-season rates.

4. Directional rates, introducing, for example, a substantial reduction in fares for westbound transatlantic travel during May, June, and July and for eastbound travel during August and September. This would serve partially to counteract the great imbalance in traffic during the summer months, most of which originates in and returns to the United States.

5. Further extension of group fares on scheduled flights.

The views herein expressed are based on pub-

<sup>1</sup> A rate agreement reached by the International Air Transport Association at Chandler, Ariz., in 1962.

licly reported cost and revenue figures. Our policies and our philosophical approach to civil aviation dictate that, given economic and efficient operation and management, air carrier operations should be profitable at sharply reduced fare levels.

## Passamaquoddy-Saint John Report Received by President Kennedy

*The White House on July 16 released the following text of remarks made by President Kennedy on that day upon presentation to him by Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall of a report on the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project and the Upper Saint John River Hydroelectric Power Development Project for Canada and the United States.*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to meet today with Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives from New England to discuss the report on the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Project submitted by Secretary Udall. Two years ago I asked Secretary Udall, in cooperation with the Corps of Engineers, to restudy the proposed project and the hydroelectric potential of the St. John River in Maine to determine whether recent developments in electric power technology had enhanced the economic feasibility of these projects.<sup>2</sup>

This report has been presented to me this morning, and its major conclusions are most encouraging. The report reveals that this unique international power complex can provide American and Canadian markets with over a million kilowatts for the daily peak period in addition to 250,000 kilowatts of firm power. Electric power rates in the New England region are among the highest in the United States, and the survey indicates that a massive block of power can be produced and delivered at a cost of about four mills per kilowatt hour, approxi-

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the report are available upon request from the Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. 20240.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of letters dated May 20, 1961, from President Kennedy to Secretary Rusk and Secretary Udall, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1961, p. 969.

mately 25 percent below the current wholesale cost of power in the region.

I am pleased to note also that the development plan proposed would preserve the superb recreational areas of the Allagash River from flooding and that an area suitable for a new national park would be preserved in this scenic part of Maine.

Any proposed resource development project must, of course, meet the national interest test. It must strengthen the economy of the whole Nation and enable America to better compete in the market places of the world. I understand that, measured by the customary feasibility standards, the Passamaquoddy-St. John project now meets the national interest test.

During the last three decades American taxpayers, through their Federal Government, have invested vast sums of money in developing the water resources of the great rivers of this country—the Columbia, the Missouri, the Colorado, the Tennessee, and others. These investments are producing daily dividends for our country, and it is reasonable to assume that a similar investment in conserving the resources of New England will also benefit the Nation. It is also reasonable to assume that a New England development will stimulate more diversified industry, increase commerce, and provide more jobs.

Our experience in other regions and river valleys shows that private utility customers as well as public agency power users benefit from lowering the basic cost of electric energy.

Harnessing the energy of the tides is an exciting technological undertaking. France and the Soviet Union are already doing pioneering work in this field. Each day over a million kilowatts of power surge in and out of the Passamaquoddy Bay. Man needs only to exercise his engineering ingenuity to convert the ocean's surge into a national asset. It is clear, however, that any development of this magnitude and new approach must also be considered in the context of the national energy study currently being undertaken by an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Dr. [Jerome B.] Wiesner.

These projects involve international waters,

and equitable agreements must therefore be reached with the Canadian Government. Therefore I am requesting the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations immediately with the Government of Canada looking toward a satisfactory arrangement for the sharing of the benefits of these two projects. Also, to insure full consideration of these proposals, I am directing that the Interior Department and the Corps of Engineers accelerate their work on the remaining studies of details.

The power-producing utilities of the United States are second to none in the world. The combined effort of science, private industry, and government will surely keep this nation in the forefront of technological progress in energy and electric power.

I think that this can be one of the most astonishing and beneficial joint enterprises that the people of the United States have ever undertaken, and therefore I want to commend the Department of the Interior for its initiative in working on this matter the past 2 years, the congressional delegation from Maine which has been interested in this for many years, and the Members of Congress from New England who have supported this great effort. I think it will mean a good deal to New England and a good deal to the country.

## Letters of Credence

### *Colombia*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Colombia, Eduardo Uribe Botero, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 387 dated July 24.

### *Yemen Arab Republic*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Yemen Arab Republic, Mohsin A. Alaini, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 385 dated July 24.

## The Balance of Payments

### SPECIAL MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Soon after my inauguration, I reported to the Congress on the problems presented to this Nation by 3 successive years, beginning in the late 1950's, of mounting balance of payments deficits accompanied by large gold outflows; and I announced a program designed to restore both confidence in the dollar and eventual equilibrium in our international accounts.<sup>2</sup> The challenge posed by those pressures was heightened at that time by the need to halt and reverse the spread of unemployment and revive our faltering economy. Rejecting a choice between two equally unpalatable alternatives—improved employment at home at the cost of a weaker dollar abroad or a stronger dollar at the cost of a weaker economy and Nation—we sought a new course that would simultaneously increase our growth at home, reduce unemployment, and strengthen the dollar by eliminating the deficit in our international payments. It is appropriate now—nearly 2½ years later—to look back on the problems faced, to review the progress made and to chart the course ahead.

There is much from which to take heart. Our economy has resumed its growth and unemployment has been reduced. The dollar remains strong, bulwarked by nearly 40 percent of the free world's monetary gold stock as well as by a newly constructed network of bilateral and

multilateral financial arrangements. Our gold outflow has been halved. There are signs of longer run improvement in our world competitive position, as our prices and costs hold steady while others are rising. The deficit in our balance of payments has been reduced—from \$3.9 billion in 1960 to \$2.4 billion in 1961 and \$2.2 billion in 1962.

Our basic strength, moreover, is vast, real, and enduring. Our payments deficits, measured in terms of our loss of gold and the increase in our short-term liquid liabilities to foreigners, have consistently been equaled or exceeded by the growth of our long-term, high-yielding foreign assets—assets which have been and will continue to be an increasing source of strength to our balance of payments. Today, Americans hold more than \$60 billion of private investments abroad, and dollar loans repayable to the U.S. Government total over \$11 billion. At the end of 1962, all of these assets exceeded our liabilities to foreigners by an estimated \$27 billion. And they have shown an increasing strength over the years: our total income from these sources in 1959 was \$3 billion; in 1962 it had risen to \$4.3 billion; and we expect further substantial increases in the coming years.

These are all signs of progress. But unemployment is still too high; our growth rate is still too low; and it is now clear that, despite the favorable forces at work over the long run, more remains to be done today to eliminate the continuing payments deficit.

A significant portion of our progress so far

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 111, 88th Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on July 18.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's message of Feb. 6, 1961, see BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1961, p. 287.

has been due to special agreements with friendly foreign countries—for debt prepayments, advance payments for military equipment, and U.S. borrowings abroad. While similar arrangements may once again prove capable of covering a substantial amount of the gross deficit in 1963, such special transactions cannot be relied upon for the indefinite future. Moreover, while our commercial trade balance and Government expenditures overseas have shown modest improvement, capital outflows, both short term and long term, have increased.

Although there is urgent need for further effort I want to make it clear that, in solving its international payments problem, this Nation will continue to adhere to its historic advocacy of freer trade and capital movements, and that it will continue to honor its obligation to carry a fair share of the defense and development of the free world. At the same time, we shall continue policies designed to reduce unemployment and stimulate growth here at home—for the well-being of all free peoples is inextricably entwined with the progress achieved by our own people. I want to make it equally clear that this Nation will maintain the dollar as good as gold, freely interchangeable with gold at \$35 an ounce, the foundation stone of the free world's trade and payments system.

But continued confidence at home and cooperation abroad require further administrative and legislative inroads into the hard core of our continuing payments deficit, augmenting our long-range efforts to improve our economic performance over a period of years in order to achieve both external balance and internal expansion, stepping up our shorter run efforts to reduce our balance of payments deficits while the long-range forces are at work and adding to our stockpile of arrangements designed to finance our deficits during our return to equilibrium in a way that assures the continued smooth functioning of the world's monetary and trade systems.

Before turning to the specific measures required in the latter two categories, I must emphasize once again the necessity of improving this Nation's overall long-range economic performance—including increased investment and modernization for greater productivity and profits, continued cost and price stability, and

full employment and faster growth. This is the key to improving our international competitiveness, increasing our trade surpluses, and reducing our capital outflows.

That is why early enactment of the comprehensive *tax reduction and revision* program previously submitted is the single most important step that can be taken to achieve balance abroad as well as growth here at home. The increased investment incentives and purchasing power these personal and corporate tax reductions would create, combined with last year's actions giving special credits for new investment and more favorable depreciation treatment, will promote more employment, production, sales, and investment, particularly when accompanied by the continued ample availability of credit and reasonable long-term rates of interest. A prosperous, high-investment economy brings with it the rapid gains in productivity and efficiency which are so essential to the improvement of our competitive position abroad.

To gain new markets abroad and retain the gains of new growth and efficiency here at home, we must continue the *price-cost stability* of recent years, limiting wage and profit increases to their fair share of our improving productivity. That is why we have, for 2 years, been urging business and labor to recognize and use reasonable wage-price guideposts for resolving the issues of collective bargaining. Our success in holding down our price level relative to that of our major competitors is a powerful force working to restore our payments balance over the longer run. This fact should not be obscured by current short-run developments.

While these long-range forces are taking effect, a series of more immediate and specialized efforts are needed to reduce the deficit in our international transactions and defend our gold reserves:

### **1. Export Expansion**

Our commercial sales of goods and services to foreign countries in 1962 exceeded our purchases by \$4.3 billion, and they are continuing at about the same rate this year. This is our greatest strength, but it is not enough. Our exports of goods have risen only moderately over the past 3 years, and have not kept pace

with the rapid rise of imports which has accompanied our domestic expansion. As a result, rather than furnishing increased support for our other transactions, 1962 saw a decline in our commercial trade surplus.

The primary long-term means for correcting this situation is implementation of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is preparing to use to the fullest extent the authority given to me by the act, in an across-the-board drive for lower tariffs and against other barriers to trade. This should open new markets and widen existing markets for American exports.

As mentioned above, our whole long-range domestic program—including increased investment, improved productivity, and wage-price stability—is designed to better the competitive position of our products both at home and abroad. Continued price stability at home, contrasted with the upward trend in prices abroad, will create an increasingly favorable climate for American exports; and this administration is concentrating on six immediate measures to help American businessmen take advantage of our export potential.

*First*, the Export-Import Bank has created a wholly new program of export financing which now provides U.S. business with credit facilities equal to any in the world. The major element in this new program is the guarantee of short- and medium-term export credits by the Foreign Credit Insurance Association, composed of more than 70 private insurance companies in conjunction with the Export-Import Bank. I urge the Congress to act promptly to restore the Bank to full operating efficiency by renewing its charter and authorizing adequate financing.

*Second*, the Departments of State and Commerce have strengthened and expanded efforts overseas to probe for new markets and promote the sale and distribution of American products.

*Third*, the Department of Commerce has developed a broad program of education and assistance to present and potential American exporters. I have requested a relatively small amount of additional funds to strengthen the Department's efforts to stimulate our exports. These funds, amounting to \$6 million, were not approved by the House of Representatives. It

is essential, if we are to increase our trade surplus, that they be included in the final appropriation bill. This modest sum would pay for itself many times over in increased exports, lower payments deficits, and protection for our gold reserves.

*Fourth*, the Department of Agriculture announced last March a new auction program for direct sales of cotton abroad. It is expected that this new technique will insure competitive pricing for our cotton in export markets and will increase exports by as much as \$100 million over last year's levels.

*Fifth*, present ocean freight rates discourage our exports as compared to imports. The freight charges on Atlantic crossings are far higher for eastbound freight than for comparable items bound for our shores. A similar situation prevails on other trade routes. While these substantial differentials may have been acceptable in the immediate postwar period of the dollar shortage when Europe was struggling to get on its feet, their magnitude is clearly unjustified today. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to take corrective action through the Maritime Administration; and I am urging the Federal Maritime Commission in its role as an independent regulatory agency to question those specific export rates which appear unduly high. Should legislation prove necessary, it will be sought.

*Sixth*, in order to give further momentum to the expansion of our export performance, I will convene a White House Conference on Export Expansion on September 17 and 18, to alert American firms, whether or not they are now exporting, to the opportunities and rewards of initiating or expanding export efforts. We shall use this opportunity to emphasize to American businessmen that vigorous action to increase their exports would serve their own private interests as well as the national interest.

## 2. Tourism

Another element that requires attention in our commercial transactions is the increase in our unfavorable net tourist balance. With increasing prosperity encouraging American travel abroad, total tourist spending in foreign countries rose another 10 percent last year, to

nearly \$2½ billion. This was partially offset by increased foreign tourist expenditures in the United States, but the net result was an outflow of \$1.4 billion, or two-thirds of last year's overall balance of payments deficit. This year the cost is estimated to be still greater. That is why we have had to limit the duty-free exemption for returning tourists to \$100 per person. Last year this measure achieved a saving of more than \$100 million, and I am gratified that Congress has extended the limitation for another 2 years. We have also sought, through establishment of the U.S. Travel Service, to increase our income from visitors coming to our country. To further that effort, I strongly recommend that Congress approve the full amount of the appropriation requested for the U.S. Travel Service.

In addition, in cooperation with the appropriate Government agencies, I am asking the domestic travel and tourism industry to launch a more unified drive to encourage Americans to learn more about their own country and the glory of their heritage. A "See America Now" program, to be in full operation by the spring of 1964, will make the most of our magnificent resources and make travel at home a more appealing alternative to travel abroad.

### **3. Federal Expenditures Abroad**

Federal expenditures abroad go largely for defense and aid. These represent the obligations which flow from our position of world leadership and unrivaled economic strength. With the recovery of other economically advanced nations, particularly our allies in Western Europe, we have made vigorous and increasingly successful efforts to work out with them a better sharing of our common responsibilities. These efforts—combined with rigorous scrutiny of offshore expenditures—have enabled us, in spite of mounting worldwide requirements and costs, to reduce the overall total of our own overseas expenditures while we increase the security of the free world and maintain a high level of assistance to developing countries.

A continual process of modernizing our Armed Forces and increasing efficiency, resulting in heightened defense effectiveness, is reducing the requirements for overseas dollar

expenditures. At the same time, by tying our aid more effectively to domestic procurement and cutting civilian expenditures sharply, we should be able to achieve further savings. In fact, by January 1965, these processes should result in a reduction of the rate of our Federal overseas dollar expenditures by approximately \$1 billion from that of 1962.

#### *(A) Military expenditures*

The Defense Department has, since the beginning of this administration, been making vigorous efforts to restrain overseas expenditures, without reducing military effectiveness.

Thus, despite the Berlin buildup of 1961 and rising costs overseas, gross expenditures abroad by the Defense Department have been held below 1960 levels. As a result of the desire of our allies to acquire from us modern military equipment, which they need to strengthen free world defenses, at lower cost than they could produce the equipment themselves, substantial offsets to these expenditures have also been achieved, so that our net outlays abroad for defense have declined from \$2.7 billion in 1960 to \$1.9 billion in 1962.

In line with these continuing efforts, the Secretary of Defense has informed me that the annual rate of expenditures abroad by the Department of Defense will be reduced—by measures to be put into effect before the end of calendar year 1964—by more than \$300 million from the 1962 level. At the same time the Department of Defense will continue to seek arrangements with major allied countries to increase their military procurement from the United States so as to reduce the net outflow still further. The Secretary has further assured me that this reduction will be accomplished without any reduction in the effectiveness of our military posture and with no impairment in our ability to meet our commitments to our allies in all parts of the world.

In addition to direct expenditures by the Defense Department, our defense expenditures abroad have for many years been increased by the cost of programs for the acquisition of strategic materials from foreign sources. The cost of these programs is now steadily declining since they have largely fulfilled their purpose and are no longer needed. Within 2 years they

will be reduced by over \$200 million as compared to 1962, insuring a total reduction in defense dollar expenditures well in excess of \$500 million.

#### *(B) Agency for International Development*

During 1960 only about one-third of AID program expenditures were in the form of U.S. goods and services. Last year that proportion had risen to about 50 percent. But during the fiscal year which ended last month, fully 80 percent of AID's commitments were "tied" to the export of U.S. goods and services. The balance was virtually all committed for purchases in the less-developed countries rather than in the developed nations where the payments surpluses exist which give rise to our deficit. During fiscal year 1964, for which funds are now being considered by the Congress, AID commitments tied to U.S. exports will rise beyond 80 percent of the total. I have directed the Administrator of AID to continue and intensify this policy so that AID expenditures entering our balance of payments in fiscal year 1965 may be further reduced by about \$500 million as compared to fiscal year 1961, from about \$1 billion to not over \$500 million, the lowest practicable minimum.

#### *(C) Other departments and agencies*

The oversea disbursements of all other departments of government have also been brought under special review and control by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Total Federal expenditures abroad (excluding Defense, AID, Treasury payments on foreign-held debt, and Federal pension payments) coming within the scope of this review now amount to approximately \$600 million per year. The Director of the Budget has assured me that vigorous screening of expenditures abroad by these other Federal departments and agencies will achieve further substantial balance of payments savings. These savings, together with those which may be expected from revisions of programs under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, should amount to some \$100 million a year. This includes my request to the Congress to enact legislation per-

mitting freer use of our present holdings of the currencies of a number of other countries.

#### **4. Short-Term Capital Flows**

By skillful use of the tools of debt management and monetary policy, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System have substantially reduced the outflow of short-term capital through a series of carefully managed increases in short-term money rates, while maintaining ample credit availability and keeping both long-term rates and bank loan rates low and, in many cases, declining. Experience in the recovery underway over the past 2½ years provides a solid basis for expecting that a determined effort can succeed in keeping long-term investment and mortgage money plentiful and cheap while boosting short-term interest rates. From February 1961 through July 12, 1963, the rate on newly issued 3-month Treasury bills rose 76 basis points, while the rise in long-term Treasury bond yields was held to only 22 basis points and the yields on high-grade corporate bonds and mortgages actually declined.

However, the recorded outflows of short-term funds, together with unrecorded net outflows, a large portion of which undoubtedly represent short-term capital movements, still amounted to approximately \$1.6 billion in 1962 and have continued on a substantial scale so far this year. A sizable reduction in this drain would do much to strengthen our overall balance of payments. It is for this reason that the Federal Reserve has decided to increase the rediscount rate from 3 to 3½ percent. At the same time, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have raised the interest-rate ceilings on time deposits payable in 90 days to 1 year, in order to enable our banks to compete more effectively with those abroad and thus attract funds that might otherwise leave the country.

While none of us welcomes higher interest rates at a time when our economy is operating below capacity, an increase in short-term rates—at a time when liquid savings are growing rapidly, and when there are no accompanying restrictions on credit availability nor paral-

lel increases in the interest rates on bank loans, home mortgages or other long-term obligations—should have little, if any, adverse effect on our economy. The unprecedented flow of liquid savings should largely insulate the longer term markets from the effect of higher short-term rates. I have been assured by both Treasury and Federal Reserve officials that they intend to do everything possible through debt management policy and open-market operations to avoid any reduction in domestic credit availability and any upward pressure on long-term interest rates while the economy operates below capacity without inflation. Other agencies of the Federal Government will work to maintain continued ready availability of private mortgage loans at stable interest rates. Nevertheless, the situation lends increased urgency to the fiscal stimulus that would be provided by the prompt enactment of the substantial tax reductions I have recommended.

#### **5. Long-Term Capital Outflows**

Long-term capital outflows consisting of direct investment in productive plants abroad appear to have leveled off in recent years, whereas portfolio investments in the form of long-term loans or securities purchases have been rising rapidly. While our long-range program should increase the attractiveness of domestic investment and further reduce the outflow of direct investment, the rising outflow of long-term capital for portfolio investment abroad shows no sign of abating. It is up from \$850 million in 1960 to \$1.2 billion in 1962, and so far this year is running at an annual rate of well over \$1.5 billion.

In view of the continued existence of direct controls and inadequate capital market mechanisms in many foreign countries, and the wide differential between the long-term rates of interest in the larger industrial countries and the United States, there appear to be only three possible solutions to this problem, two of which are unacceptable under present circumstances:

A substantial increase in our whole long-term interest rate structure would throw our economy into reverse, increase unemployment, and substantially reduce our import require-

ments, thereby damaging the economy of every free nation.

The initiation of direct capital controls, which are in use in most countries, is inappropriate to our circumstances. It is contrary to our basic precept of free markets. We cannot take this route.

A third alternative—the one which I recommend—would stem the flood of foreign security sales in our markets and still be fully consistent with both economic growth and free capital movements. I urge the enactment by the Congress of an interest equalization tax, which would, in effect, increase by approximately 1 percent the interest cost to foreigners of obtaining capital in this country, and thus help equalize interest rate patterns for longer term financing in the United States and abroad. The rate of tax should be graduated from 2.75 percent to 15 percent of the value of debt obligations, according to the remaining maturity of the obligation, and should be 15 percent in the case of equity securities. This tax should remain in effect through 1965 when improvements in both our balance of payments and in the operation of foreign capital markets are expected to permit its abandonment.

Under this alternative, the allocation of savings for investment in securities will continue to be the result of decisions based on market prices. There will be no limitations on the marketing of foreign issues and no governmental screening of borrowers. Reliance will be placed on price alone to effect an overall reduction in the outflow of American funds for stocks, bonds, and long-term loans—both new or outstanding, whether publicly marketed or privately placed.

The tax would not apply to direct investment. It would not apply to securities or loans that mature in less than 3 years. Nor would it apply to the loans of commercial banks. These exemptions will assure that export credit will remain fully available. Furthermore, purchases of the securities of less developed countries or of companies operating primarily in such countries will not be taxed.

Nor will the tax apply to transactions in for-

## Joint Canadian-United States Statement on Proposed Interest Equalization Tax<sup>1</sup>

Representatives of Canada and the United States met in Washington during the weekend to appraise the impact on the Canadian financial markets of the proposed United States "interest equalization tax."

The two Governments recognize the need for effective action to improve the balance-of-payments positions of both countries and both are equally determined that such action shall not impair the intimate economic relationships between the two countries, nor impede the growth essential for both economies.

For many years the capital markets of the two countries have been closely interconnected, and U.S. exports of capital to Canada have financed a substantial portion of the Canadian current account deficit with the U.S. This need continues. A portion of these flows must be supplied through the sale of new issues of Canadian securities in American markets. U.S. officials had considered that ample flows for these needs would continue under the proposed "interest equalization tax." However, Canadian representatives stated that this would require a very substantial rise in the entire Canadian interest rate structure. It was recognized by both Governments that such a development would be undesirable in the present economic circumstances.

<sup>1</sup> Released simultaneously at Ottawa and Washington on July 21 (Treasury Department press release).

In the light of this situation U.S. officials agreed that the draft legislation to be submitted to the Congress would include a provision authorizing a procedure under which the President could modify the application of the tax by the establishment from time to time of exemptions, which he could make either unlimited or limited in amount. The President would thus have the flexibility to permit tax-free purchases of new issues needed to maintain the unimpeded flow of trade and payments between the two countries, and to take care of exceptional situations that might arise in the case of other countries. U.S. officials made clear that this did not modify their proposals regarding the taxation of transactions in outstanding securities; over the past year such transactions between Canada and the U.S. have not been a major factor.

The Canadian authorities stated that it would not be the desire or intention of Canada to increase her foreign exchange reserves through the proceeds of borrowings in the U.S., and it is the hope and expectation of both Governments that by maintaining close consultation it will prove possible in practice to have an unlimited exemption for Canada without adverse effects on the United States.

It was agreed that active consultations would continue to strengthen the close economic relations between the two countries and at the same time facilitate measures for making the maximum practicable contribution to economic expansion and the strength and stability of both currencies.

foreign securities already owned by Americans, or to the purchase of securities by foreigners. Underwriters and dealers would be exempted from the tax on stock or securities resold to foreigners as part of the distribution of a new issue. But all Americans who purchase new or outstanding foreign securities from foreign issuers or owners would be subject to this tax. In order to avoid unfair burdens on transactions which are nearly complete, the tax should not apply to offerings of securities for which active registration statements are now on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Purchase commitments which have already been made should also not be affected.

The Secretary of the Treasury is submitting the details of this proposal to the Congress; and I have been assured that the House Ways and Means Committee will be prepared to give high

priority to this proposal after action has been taken with respect to the overall program of tax reduction and reform now before it. Since the effectiveness of this tax requires its immediate application, I am asking Congress to make the legislation effective from the date of this message.<sup>3</sup> The Internal Revenue Service will promptly make available all instructions necessary for interim fulfillment of the provisions of this recommendation, pending the enactment of legislation by the Congress.

<sup>3</sup>The Treasury Department announced at 6:15 p.m. on July 18 that "purchasers of foreign securities traded on a national securities exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission would not be subject to the Interest Equalization Tax proposed by the President in his Message to the Congress today on purchases made on such exchanges prior to and including August 16, 1963."

## **6. Investment by Foreign Savers in the Securities of U.S. Private Companies**

Investment by foreign savers in the securities of U.S. private companies has fallen rapidly to less than \$150 million in 1962. The better climate for investment that will flow from enactment of the program for tax reduction and reform now before the Congress will do much to improve this situation but a direct action program is also needed to promote oversea sales of securities of U.S. companies. Such a program should also be designed to increase foreign participation in the financing of new or expanded operations on the part of U.S. companies operating abroad.

To meet these two facets of a single problem, a new and positive program should be directed to the following areas of effort:

(a) The identification and critical appraisal of the legal, administrative and institutional restrictions remaining in the capital markets of other industrial nations of the free world which prevent the purchase of American securities and hamper U.S. companies in financing their operations abroad from non-U.S. sources;

(b) A review of U.S. Government and private activities which adversely affect foreign purchase of the securities of U.S. private companies; and

(c) A broad and intensive effort by the U.S. financial community to market securities of U.S. private companies to foreign investors, and to increase the availability of foreign financing for U.S. business operating abroad.

Such a program will necessarily involve a pooling of the know-how and efforts of the Government and the financial community. I have asked the Treasury Department, in consultation with the State Department, to develop an organization plan and program.

The increased freedom of capital movement and increased participation by foreign citizens and financial institutions in the ownership and financing of American business, toward which these efforts are directed, will serve to strengthen the economic and political ties of the free world as well as its monetary system. Securities of U.S. private firms could be and should be one of our best selling exports. An

increasing foreign investment in these securities will encourage a more balanced two-way capital traffic between the United States and other capital markets and minimize the impact of net long-term capital outflows from the United States on our balance of payments.

## **7. Special Government Transactions**

Special Government transactions covered \$1.4 billion of our deficit in 1962. These included prepayment of debt by foreign countries, advance payments on military purchases here, and the issuance by the Treasury of medium-term securities to foreign official holders of dollars. Further debt prepayment is expected in 1963—France has just announced a prepayment of \$160 million—but it is clear that these are temporary gains which cannot be repeated for very long. Nor is it likely that advance payments on military purchases will again be large, as the pace of deliveries against purchases is now rising.

Therefore, as our continuing balance of payments deficit leads to accruals of dollars by foreign central banks, exceeding the size of the dollar balances which they normally carry, it has been particularly helpful that a number of foreign governments and central banks have begun purchasing a new type of nonmarketable, medium-term Treasury security, denominated either in dollars or in their own currencies, as a convenient alternative to the purchase of gold. Some \$610 million of such securities have been newly issued thus far in 1963.

Further debt prepayments and further sales of these securities during the remainder of this year will reflect the unprecedented degree of cooperation now prevailing in international finance and the growing recognition that correction of payments imbalances is a responsibility of the surplus as well as the deficit countries. In this spirit we shall also continue to press for a fuller and fairer sharing of the burdens of defense and aid and for the reduction or elimination of the trade barriers which impede our exports.

## **8. Gold Sales and Increased Dollar Holdings**

Gold sales and increased dollar holdings serve to finance what remains of our deficit after spe-

## United States Authorized To Make Drawing From IMF

The International Monetary Fund announced on July 18 that it had entered into a standby arrangement that authorizes the United States to draw the currencies of other members of the Fund up to an amount equal to \$500 million during the next 12 months. The quota of the United States in the Fund is \$4,125 million, of which \$1,031 million has been paid in gold. The amount of the standby arrangement represents a little less than half the amount the United States could draw on a virtually automatic basis under Fund practice.

The United States has not previously made use of the Fund's resources. Drawings of U.S. dollars from the Fund by other members have amounted to approximately \$4.2 billion since the Fund's operations began in 1947. In recent years Fund policy has encouraged drawings in non-dollar currencies and repayments to the Fund in U.S. dollars. This policy has provided assistance in financing the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. As a result of repayments, the Fund's dollar holdings are now almost at the subscription level, which is 75 percent of quota or about \$3 billion, and the Articles of Agreement prevent repayment to the Fund with U.S. dollars beyond that level. In these circumstances the standby arrangement, which is available for general balance-of-payments needs, is intended to facilitate repayments by other members. This would be accomplished through United States drawings of other convertible currencies, which would be sold to Fund members for dollars and used by them to make repayments to the Fund.

cial governmental transactions. In 1962, this deficit amounted to approximately \$2.2 billion. It was financed by the sale of \$890 million in gold and \$17 million of our holdings of foreign exchange as well as by an increase in foreign holdings of dollars and U.S. Government securities amounting to \$653 million, and an increase of \$626 million in the holdings of dollars by the International Monetary Fund.

The total outflow of gold for the 2 years 1961 and 1962 combined only slightly exceeded the outflow in the single year 1960; and the outflow in 1963 is running at a rate well below last year. Since the rise in short-term interest resulting from the recent action of the Federal Reserve will make it considerably more attractive for foreigners to hold their assets in dollars, in-

cluding short-term U.S. Government securities, prospects are improved that increased foreign holdings of these assets instead of gold will finance a still larger share of our deficit.

## 9. The International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund, however, presents a different situation. Last year the Fund's dollar holdings increased as other countries paid off their debts in dollars and concentrated new borrowings in other convertible currencies to the extent practicable. But the Fund's rules provide that, except in the case of a drawing—that is, a borrowing—it cannot hold more of any currency than was paid in at the time of original subscription (in effect, 75 percent); and the Fund's holdings of dollars have now nearly reached that level.

To meet this situation, the United States has requested, and the Executive Board of the IMF has approved, a \$500 million standby arrangement which authorizes us to draw on the Fund from time to time during the coming year. It is our intention to utilize this authority for the purpose of facilitating repayments which are expected to total about \$500 million during the course of the next 12 months. When a country desires to repay the Fund, we will draw convertible foreign currencies from the Fund, paying for them with dollars. The country making the repayment will use its own dollars to buy these foreign currencies from us in order to repay the Fund. All transfers will take place at par. Thus the Fund will continue to finance a portion of our deficit by increasing its holdings of dollars and its various debtors will continue to have a simple and costless method by which they can redeem their obligations to the Fund. The alternative under present circumstances, now that they cannot pay off directly in dollars, would have been either to buy gold from the United States with which to repay the Fund, or to purchase other convertible currencies in the market with their dollars at extra cost and inconvenience.

Drawings by the United States under this new arrangement will be repayable in 3 years, with a 2-year extension available if needed. No interest will be payable, but the drawings will be subject to a one-time service charge of one-half of 1 percent.

## 10. Evolution of International Monetary System

During the past 2 years great progress has been made in strengthening the basic fabric of the international monetary system upon which the whole free world depends. Far closer cooperation among the central banks of the leading industrial countries has been achieved. Reciprocal credit arrangements have been established to meet instantly any disruptive disturbance to international payments—arrangements which successfully contained the monetary repercussions of the Berlin crisis in 1961, the heavy pressure on the Canadian dollar in the spring of 1962, the Cuban crisis last autumn, the reaction that followed the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the Common Market, and a number of less striking events that might, in other years, have set off dangerous rounds of currency speculation. An informal but highly effective operating relationship has grown up among a number of the same countries with respect to the London gold market, ruling out for the future any repetition of the alarming rise in the price of gold which created such uncertainty in October 1960. Finally, 10 of the leading industrial countries have established a \$6 billion facility for providing supplemental resources to the International Monetary Fund, which will be available in the event of any threat to the stability of the international monetary system.<sup>4</sup>

The net result has been to provide strong defenses against successful raids on a major currency. Our efforts to strengthen these defenses will continue. While this process is taking place, the United States will continue to study and discuss with other countries measures which might be taken for a further strengthening of the international monetary system over the longer run. The U.S. interest in the continuing evolution of the system inaugurated at the time of Bretton Woods is not a result of our current payments deficit—rather it reflects our concern that adequate provision be made for the growth of international liquid-

ity to finance expanding world trade over the years ahead. Indeed, one of the reasons that new sources of liquidity may well be needed is that, as we close our payments gap, we will cut down our provision of dollars to the rest of the world.

As yet, this Government is not prepared to recommend any specific prescription for long-term improvement of the international monetary system. But we are studying the matter closely; we shall be discussing possible improvements with our friends abroad; and our minds will be open to their initiatives. We share their view that the problem of improving the payments mechanism is one that demands careful joint deliberation. At the same time, we do not pretend that talk of long-range reform of the system is any substitute for the actions that we ourselves must take now.

### The Promise of the Future

Full implementation of the program of action I have outlined today should lead to substantial improvement in our international payments. The rate of Government expenditures abroad will drop by \$900 million over the next 18 months, and the combined effect of the increase in short-term interest rates and the interest equalization tax should equal, and more probably exceed, this figure. Gains of this magnitude—approximately \$2 billion—will give us the time our basic long-term program needs to improve our international competitive position, and increase the attraction for investment in the United States.

These two objectives must be the basis of any permanent closing of the payments gap, and this program will achieve them without threatening our growth at home. It will also do so without compromising our adherence to the principles of freer trade and free movements of capital. It will, in fact, help prevent pressures for more restrictive measures. In short, while we must intensify our efforts, we can do so with full confidence in the future.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 18, 1963.*

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187, and Nov. 19, 1962, p. 795.

## Secretary Rusk Discusses Appropriation Request Before Senate Committee

*Statement by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you in support of the appropriation request of the Department of State for fiscal year 1964. The Assistant Secretaries and other principal officers of the Department will appear before you later to discuss the details of the budget estimates for their respective areas of responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, first I would like to present a brief statement concerning our 1964 budget estimates and then, if the committee is agreeable, to discuss in executive session some of the more important aspects of the international situation.

Unsettled world conditions continue to add to the work of the Department and therefore to its costs of operation. In the past year the placement of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, the India-China border dispute, forceful as well as peaceful changes in foreign governments, continued problems in the Congo, as well as a number of major problems in the NATO alliance and other areas of our international relations, have strained the Department's resources of people and money. Our budget for 1964 was drawn up after careful analysis of our needs and after we had taken a number of steps to improve the organization and management of the Department to promote greater efficiency and economy of operations.

Together with Under Secretary Ball and other senior colleagues, I held hearings in my office extending over a number of weeks this past year on the budget estimates submitted by

the Assistant Secretaries. We did not look solely at costs in their areas but reviewed critically their management practices and the manner in which their work was being carried out. The result of this review, I believe, has been an across-the-board improvement in the efficiency of the Department's operations. We gave special attention, of course, to those items for which added funds were requested, trimming them down to the lowest levels consistent with program needs.

The budget<sup>2</sup> presented to the Congress last January reflected these efforts to tighten our administrative processes, at home and abroad, to adjust our organization to the highest priority needs, and to use our resources prudently.

In our continuing search for economy we have been able to take a number of actions to reduce the cost of operations. For example, we expect to announce shortly the closing of a number of consular posts in several countries abroad. We have established a new tour-of-duty policy to lengthen the duration of assignments to both hardship and nonhardship posts. We are using economy air accommodations for travel within the United States, and between the United States and Western Europe and the Caribbean area. State, AID [Agency for International Development], and USIA [U.S. Information Agency] are jointly engaged in establishing consolidated administrative organizations to provide common services to all

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 16 (press release 376).

<sup>2</sup> For excerpts from the budget dealing with international affairs, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 224.

agencies at a number of posts abroad. We have a regional finance center in Paris which performs payrolling and other fiscal services for posts in 41 countries of Europe and Africa.

As this committee knows, the House did not approve a substantial portion of the increase we requested in our appropriations for 1964. Realizing that the House action indicates a desire to restrict expansion to a minimum, we have reviewed our original estimates and have further trimmed them to eliminate those items of increase which we believe can be deferred. However, we find it necessary to urge the Senate to amend the appropriations as passed by the House. The presentation now before you requests increases in several appropriations which I consider necessary in the national interest.

The Department requested appropriations for 1964 totaling \$359,721,000. The House in H.R. 7063 approved appropriations totaling \$305,051,000.

Their action reflected a failure to appropriate \$27,000,000 for the foreign buildings program because new authorizing legislation had not been enacted. The request submitted to this committee in the amount of \$26,040,000 is based on authorizing legislation approved by both the House and the Senate, but on which final action is still pending.

The House action also involved a reduction of \$13,725,000 in our request for educational and cultural exchange. We ask that the amount approved by the House be increased by \$11,130,000, primarily to permit expansion of the exchange-of-persons program.

Finally, the House action involved reductions of a total of \$13,945,000 for all other appropriations, including the ordinary operations of the Department. In this category we request restoration of \$9,680,000 for the following items:

Salaries and expenses . . . . .	\$6,818,000
Acquisition, operation, and maintenance of buildings abroad (special foreign currency program) . . . . .	1,150,000
Missions to international organizations . .	225,000
International conferences and contingencies . . . . .	197,000
International fisheries commissions . . .	143,000
Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West . . . . .	1,147,000

## Salaries and Expenses

The House bill provides \$153,000,000, an increase of \$5,451,500 above amounts appropriated for 1963, but a reduction of \$9,800,000 below our estimates.

The House allowance, as indicated in the committee report,<sup>3</sup> will cover mandatory increases in the costs of doing business—such items as pay-increase costs, within-grade promotions, overseas wage and price increases, and pay in excess of 52-week base. It will also provide operating funds—but no new positions—for eight new posts and most of the funds requested for home leave and transfer travel.

The amount in the House bill does not, however, provide funds for any of the new positions requested or for any of the nonmandatory but highly desirable increases requested for operating expenses.

We are requesting your consideration of increases above the House bill totaling 435 positions and \$6,818,000. The material which has been furnished to the committee shows the distribution of this request by major organization unit, and each Assistant Secretary concerned will present his own case during the course of these hearings. But I would like to highlight briefly the main elements of our request.

Last year the Department held the line on positions; we did not ask for a single additional position. Our concentration was on the urgent need to obtain a better balance in resources—to obtain adequate support for our personnel to enable them to get the best job done in the Department and in the field. This is still our goal.

The decision to absorb our increased workload without increasing our staff was taken with the knowledge that we would have to shift personnel to meet the new requirements. We have done this. However, current developments are such that I believe we have reached, for the present, the limit in this direction. This does not imply a change in policy. It simply means that increased workloads and new requirements which have been assigned to us and which we have had to assume require additional people.

<sup>3</sup> H. Rept. 388, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

We are requesting, therefore, funds for 435 additional positions—132 in Washington and 303 overseas.

Many factors contribute to make up the increased staff requirements. We have scaled down our original request for 570, but we believe that additional manpower is required to meet important and high-priority needs.

*Commercial staff (129 positions).* The Departments of State and Commerce are engaged in an intensive effort to develop export markets and expand our trade to reduce the gold outflow. Secretary [Luther H.] Hodges and I join in endorsing this request to increase the capability of our posts abroad to assist American businessmen in finding new markets. A representative of the Department of Commerce will discuss this matter further during the course of these hearings. The request includes 48 officers, 5 American clerks, and 76 local nationals.

*Specialized attachés (11 positions).* The Departments of Labor, Interior, and Commerce have submitted urgent requests for assignment of additional officers at a few key posts abroad to enable us more adequately to represent United States interests in science, minerals, labor, fisheries, and civil aviation matters. The request includes 6 officers and 5 American clerks.

*New posts (58 positions).* Funds are requested to put us in position to open and staff five new posts in Africa and three in the Far East. The proposed locations of these posts, and the need for them, will be discussed with the committee in executive session. The request includes 15 officers, 10 American clerks, and 33 local nationals.

*Consular workload (80 positions).* The passport and visa workload continues to rise at home and abroad. Requests for passports have increased by more than one-third since 1958. In fiscal year 1963 more than 1 million passports were issued, exceeding our estimates. A further increase is expected in 1964, and additional personnel is necessary so that we may continue to satisfy the public demand for prompt service. Increases in visa workloads at posts for which additional personnel are requested ranged from 15 to 40 percent in fiscal year 1962. The request includes 20 officers and

30 clerks for work in the United States and 9 officers and 21 local nationals overseas.

*Intelligence and research (35 positions).* These positions are requested to help the Bureau of Intelligence and Research meet the demands made upon it, especially in view of the heavily increased work entailed by our relations with 111 countries and the increased pace of events related to critical areas and problems. The request includes 22 officers and 13 clerks.

*Public information (15 positions).* Additional staff is required for the Bureau of Public Affairs to improve our public information operations and meet rapidly increasing public demand for information about United States foreign policy problems. The request includes 8 officers and 7 clerks.

*Special Latin American program (30 positions).* Additional personnel are needed to strengthen our ability to deal with critical problems in Latin America, in such areas as tax reform, political organizations, and rural affairs. These positions will give us a pool of manpower to deal with critical areas for relatively short periods of time without the necessity of permanently increasing the staff at a particular post. Despite shifts of positions among posts, our resources have not been adequate to meet the recurring and difficult crises that face us in many areas of Latin America. The request includes 4 officers and 2 clerks in Washington and 20 officers and 4 clerks overseas.

*Training (31 positions).* This increased staff will improve our training program, particularly in African and South Asian languages. The request provides for linguists to develop instructional material in several languages for which we do not now have an adequate program of instruction, and the assignment of additional officers for full-time training in hard languages as a further step toward overcoming our present shortage. The total request includes 6 officers and 6 clerks for the staff of the Foreign Service Institute and 19 training positions.

*Security (17 positions).* Our security staffs in Washington and abroad should be strengthened. The request includes 7 officers to meet increased investigative workload in the United States and 8 officers and 2 clerks overseas, pri-

marily for regional offices and posts in Africa where security staff has not kept pace with expanded operations in the new African countries.

*International organization affairs (7 positions).* Our participation in the United Nations and other international organizations continues to grow. The U.N. is deeply involved in the problems of disarmament, peacekeeping machinery, outer space, and economic and social developments; the specialized agencies of the U.N. and other international organizations are continually expanding their diversified programs; international conferences continue at an ever increasing pace. The request includes 4 officers and 3 clerks to strengthen the staff of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs dealing with these subjects.

*Overseas staff (22 positions).* This request includes 5 officers, 7 clerks, and 10 local nationals for slight strengthening of the staffs at 16 posts in Africa, the Near East, and the Far East.

Of the total increase of \$6,818,000 requested above the House bill, \$3,453,646 is required for salaries and expenses for the 435 positions. The remaining \$3,364,354 is to provide increases in travel, equipment replacement, and other support funds to give our people at home and abroad better facilities to work with.

#### **Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities**

Our request for mutual educational and cultural exchange was \$55,975,000. The House approved \$42,250,000, a reduction of \$13,725,000. However, since we anticipate the availability of \$1,100,000 in reserve funds already on hand in binational commissions and foundations, the House action represents an effective cut of \$12,625,000. I strongly urge restoration of \$11,130,000.

This amount would provide our full budget request for an expansion of our exchange-of-persons programs for Africa, the American Republics, Eastern Europe, the Far East, and the Near East and South Asia.

These programs should go forward to meet the expanding needs and opportunities in countries all around the world. Exchange-of-persons programs have unique utility in our relations with the rest of the world. They play an

essential role by forming the kind of positive, constructive relationships on which peace and security depend.

That these programs are effective was documented by the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs in a report<sup>4</sup> to the Congress earlier this year. This distinguished group of citizens was appointed by President Kennedy a year and a half ago, under authorization of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. In that act the Congress asked the Commission to make a special study of the effectiveness of past programs. On the basis of extensive interviews with former exchangees and others with special knowledge, in the United States and in other countries, the Commission said the exchange-of-persons program over the last 15 years has demonstrated clearly and beyond question its rewarding effectiveness.

I believe we have in the exchange programs that the Fulbright-Hays Act makes possible one of the most powerful, although quiet, elements in our foreign policy. We are asking the Congress to strengthen exchange-of-persons programs as a proven and powerful force for mutual understanding and for peace.

#### **Foreign Buildings**

The House did not approve any funds for the foreign buildings program because new authorizing legislation had not been enacted. Our request was for \$27,000,000.

We now request an amendment to the House version of the bill to provide \$26,040,000 for this program, the amount recommended in the conference report<sup>5</sup> on the authorizing bill (H.R. 5207), which the Senate has approved. We shall be happy to discuss this request, Mr. Chairman, if the committee desires. However, since final action has not been taken by the Congress on H.R. 5207, perhaps this should be deferred for the time being.

We are requesting restoration of \$1,150,000 in the foreign buildings special foreign-currency

<sup>4</sup> H. Doc. 93, 88th Cong., 1st sess.; for a Department announcement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 617.

<sup>5</sup> H. Rep. 497, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

program for the proposed U.S. Information Service building in New Delhi, a project deleted by the House but which we believe is of high priority.

#### **Missions to International Organizations**

The Department requested \$2,745,000 for the expenses of the missions which represent us in the international organizations in which the United States participates. The House approved \$2,500,000, a reduction of \$245,000.

We are requesting restoration of \$225,000, primarily for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York and the U.S. Mission to International Organizations at Geneva. The increase in recent years of United Nations membership and the complexity and number of General Assembly agenda items require strengthening of our mission in New York.

Of particular urgency is the need to strengthen the staff of our mission at Geneva during the period of preparation for negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act and to improve its administrative facilities to better support our delegations to the numerous international conferences which meet there.

#### **International Conferences and Contingencies**

The budget request for expenses of participation in international conferences was \$2,170,000. The House approved \$1,943,000, a reduction of \$227,000. We are requesting restoration of \$197,000 primarily for four areas of conference activity: the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development scheduled for the spring of 1964; telecommunications conferences, particularly the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference for Space Allocation; inter-American conferences; and conferences of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

#### **International Fisheries Commissions**

We requested \$2,053,000 for the United States share of eight international fisheries commissions. The House approved \$1,910,000, a reduction of \$143,000. We request restoration of the full amount, which will provide the United States share of the planned programs for next

year which have been approved by the commissions.

#### **East-West Cultural Center**

The 1964 request for the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West in Hawaii was \$5,690,000. The House approved \$4,460,000, a reduction of \$1,230,000.

Our present request is for an increase of \$1,147,000 above the amount in the House bill, distributed by major projects as follows:

\$534,000 in additional operating expenses for staff salary increments, increased costs, and support to the programs of the Institute of Advanced Projects;

\$313,000 to permit continuation at the 1963 level of the senior scholar program; and

\$300,000 for preparation of construction plans for a building for the Institute of Advanced Projects and for a residence apartment for married students.

That concludes my statement concerning our 1964 budget needs, Mr. Chairman, and now, if it would be of interest to the committee, I should like to discuss some aspects of the international situation in executive session. This may assist you in understanding the role of the Department and in evaluating our budgetary requests during the hearings which will follow.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **88th Congress, 1st Session**

Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part 4, March 13 and June 20, 1963, 177 pp.; Part 6, June 14, 1963, 67 pp.; Part 7, March 25, 1963, 149 pp.

Government Information Plans and Policies (Part 1). Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. News Media Panel Discussion, March 19, 1963; Department of State-Department of Defense, March 25, 1963. 174 pp.

Make Counterpart Funds Available for Agricultural Conferences. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 4914 and H.R. 5350. Serial M. May 7 and 8, 1963. 32 pp.

Problems of the Domestic Textile Industry. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee. May 22-23, 1963. 250 pp.

## An Emerging Consensus on Economic and Social Development

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson*

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome this opportunity to join again for a few days in the work of the Economic and Social Council. I wish that no other need existed for the United Nations but the work of this Council for the betterment of man's life.

To me, therefore, it is regrettable that the economic and social work of the United Nations, like an iceberg, all too often is submerged in the political seas that rage around us. And even in those relative moments of calm when the world sees the submerged iceberg, I don't think it realizes its depth or magnitude and that, out of every 20 persons employed by the United Nations system, 17 are involved in raising the standards of life on our planet.

The fact, however, that our sights are focused in this Decade of Development on attaining today the expectations of tomorrow is apparent from the rich variety of the agenda. It runs the full gamut of the world's economic and social problems.

But what we—any of us—say here will be as nothing unless what we do here enhances the dignity of man and offers real opportunities to him and to his children to share the abundant blessings of our earth.

The range and variety of our agenda is, of course, a reflection of the world around us. It may belabor the obvious to say that ours is a world of multiple revolutions, of vast ferment,

of pervasive change, of political turmoil. A great American jurist—Oliver Wendell Holmes—(who was quoted here only yesterday) once said: "We need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure." And I suspect that this observation has never been more apt than it is today. So let me begin, if I may, by taking a few moments to embroider the obvious.

Within the very recent past, discovery of some of the secrets of the atom has put such destructive force into the hands of great powers that the whole purpose of armed struggle is becoming meaningless and the conventional wisdom about national security which has instructed the leaders of all states in all times past has suddenly become obsolete.

Within the very recent past, scientific discoveries have so extended the average span of life that the population expansion threatens to cancel out our best efforts to improve living standards.

Within the very recent past, nearly half a hundred new nations have gained independence—and with it the risks and perils of self-government.

Within the very recent past, we have become grimly aware of the intolerable contradiction of want in the midst of plenty, of surplus food in the midst of hunger, of burgeoning knowledge in the midst of ignorance. And we have become aware too, only very recently, of the complex ways in which our nations are inter-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 36th session of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 10 (U.S./U.N. press release 4227 dated July 12).

dependent. Science, transport, communications, economics, and politics have all become international concerns.

For these and other reasons, our age is one of contradiction, paradox, and crisis, and there are good and sufficient reasons for all the ferment and turbulence of our times, for all the complexity and danger of our affairs, and, therefore, for all the variety of the agenda before us.

I believe we should try to identify what is common within the diversity, what is simple beneath the complexities, what is lasting within the tides of change. It would be well to take our bearings and let such clarity as there is shine through the confusion. And I like to believe, Mr. President, that clarity is, in fact, beginning to shine through confusion in at least five important areas.

### **Complexity of Development Process**

To begin with, in the area of economic and social development, we are beginning to see the job as a whole. As nation after nation struggles to come to grips with the hard realities of national development, as we together seek to transform the United Nations Decade of Development from slogan to reality, we sense an emerging consensus along these lines:

First, there is no one formula for the organization of developing societies to speed them from traditional to modern economies. Each society must be organized in the light of its own history, culture, resources, and stage of development.

Second, there is no one sector of the economy which, by forced-draft growth, will carry automatically the rest of the economy along with it. The interrelationships between agriculture and industry and transport, between these and education or health or housing, between all these and political action plus institution building—all these relations are direct enough and complex enough for us to see now that development depends on more or less simultaneous growth in all major sectors of economic and social activity. There are relative priorities, but there are no absolute priorities.

Third, science and technology have no inherently magical qualities; nor can they be dug up from one cultural setting and transplanted

intact to another. What works in one place may need adaptation before it will work in another, and the process of adaptation requires scientific and technological institutions in the developing countries, which in turn require specialists, and specialists in turn require training. And every community also requires social conditions which will make people receptive to scientific thought and technical progress.

Fourth, external assistance is vital; but it is also useless except as a critical supplement of a national effort that engages the material and human resources of the whole developing nation.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that we are approaching a consensus of these basic points about the development problem. If their net meaning is that the development process is a very complex affair, it is nonetheless clarifying to dispel false dogma and be done with illusion. These basic points raise practical questions for us about the adequacy and relevance of the plans and the programs of the United Nations system of agencies, about organization and coordination, about staffing and training, to make good the promise of the Development Decade to which we are all pledged.

We cannot work effectively on these gigantic tasks in isolation from one another, nor can we make progress with blind optimism, fatuous oversimplification of our difficulties, or with cynical resignation. We are dealing with people. And man is not just an economic factor, nor are all his motives material. He is complex, capricious, selfish, yet at times incredibly noble. Our approach to making the most out of what we have must therefore be a comprehensive approach to profound international problems. And we dare not give up in impatience as the struggle becomes dreary or protracted.

### **Peaceful Change in Human Affairs**

The second area in which I believe that clarity is emerging through confusion is in our thinking about peace—and not only peace in the negative sense of the absence of war but peace in the positive sense of peaceful change in human affairs, which is our concern here in the Economic and Social Council.

Last month President Kennedy said:<sup>2</sup>

Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. . . . World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor; it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement.

Thus does clarity begin to emerge on the subject of peace itself—a method of peace, a way to make peace operational in an imperfect and changing world, as we make peace operational within imperfect and changing national societies.

This is why the United Nations can succeed where the League of Nations failed: because it has some capacity for securing peaceful change—by peaceful settlement of disputes, by helping to guide nations peacefully from dependence to independence, by helping to promote economic and social change, and by helping to lift peacefully the stifling weight of custom, law, tradition, and prejudice which suffocates the rights of the individual in so many parts of the world.

Yet even today there are those who seem to favor peace but object to peaceful change—and those who favor change even at the risk of breaking the peace. So the test of the United Nations is whether it can acquire a sufficient authority to bring about peaceful change—in political affairs, in economic and social affairs, and in human rights. This realization, this understanding, which is spreading gradually, also helps to let clarity through the apparent confusion of our affairs.

And this is why, Mr. President, my Government supports, and will continue to support, every sound move not only to extend and improve the machinery of the United Nations for preventing war but for insuring peaceful change in human affairs.

### **Central Role of Human Rights**

The next and third area in which I feel a new clarity emerging is in human rights—in the rather sudden discovery, that is, of the central role of human rights in all our affairs. Perhaps it is not even enough to speak of a central

role for human rights; for the real point is that human rights are the heart and the core of nearly everything we do and try to do.

To be more explicit, I feel we have put much too narrow a construction on the term "human rights." The subjects we have dealt with under that rubric include what we refer to in my country as the "civil rights" guaranteed by our Constitution: the right to vote, the right to free speech and free press and free assembly and freedom of religious practice. These rights, of course, are at the heart of the democratic system—the first freedoms of a society built upon respect for the inherent dignity and equality of all men.

Parenthetically I want to say that in my country too many of our Negro citizens still do not enjoy their full civil rights—because ancient attitudes stubbornly resist change in spite of the vigorous official policy of the Government. But such indignities are an anachronism that no progressive society can tolerate, and the last vestiges must be abolished with all possible speed. Actually in the past few years we have made more progress in achieving full equality of rights and opportunities for all of our citizens than during any comparable period since Abraham Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipation freed our Republic and our national conscience from a heavy burden 100 years ago.

The very struggles which now call worldwide attention to our shame are themselves signs of a progress that will be increasingly visible in the months ahead. The sound and fury about racial equality that fill our press and airwaves are the sounds of the great thaw; the logjam of the past is breaking up.

And the attainment of equality for all in America should give the cause of human rights a great impetus throughout the globe. I would hope that it would also set an example of how democracy seeks a solution of its most stubborn ills—not secretly or furtively but openly for all to hear and see.

Turning from civil rights in the United States, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of human rights—with its symbols of courts and laws, speeches and meetings, churches and periodicals—has been broadened in both theory and practice in recent times.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

This expansion of the human rights idea grew out of the rising conviction that freedom to starve, or to sleep without shelter, or to die for lack of medical care, are not among the inalienable rights of men.

When in 1941 President Roosevelt looked forward to a world "founded upon four essential human freedoms," the first two—"freedom of speech and expression" and "freedom of every person to worship God in his own way"—were restatements of freedoms already guaranteed by many constitutions. But the third was a more recent idea. It was "freedom from want," which, said President Roosevelt, "translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world."

And the fourth, of course, was "freedom from fear," which means a worldwide reduction of armaments so that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

I need not dwell on the point that nearly everything we deal with in the Economic and Social Council has to do with freedom from want and that we are, then, dealing basically with human rights. Nor need I stress that wherever disarmament is under discussion, wherever the subject is machinery for keeping the peace and managing peaceful change, there too the underlying issue is freedom from fear—and thus human rights.

What I want to emphasize is this: As we come to see that, beneath the various functional labels like agriculture and health and education and labor, lurks the human rights issue of freedom from want, as we begin to realize that, behind the technical language about disarmament and truce supervision and mediation and such, lies the human rights issue of freedom from fear, we are seeing through the complexity of our affairs, we are glimpsing what is simple and raw and permanent in the swirling events of our times, and we are revealing the link that binds together nearly everything we are discussing—the human being and his rights as an individual. President Kennedy made the ultimate point last month when he said: ". . . is not peace . . . basically a matter of human rights?"

#### The Directions in Which We Want To Move

Mr. President, I believe that clarity is emerging on another point. In the midst of all the turmoil of our multiple revolutions, our high tides of change, we are beginning to see what counts is the direction in which we are moving. The directions in which we want to move, of course, are:

- toward self-determination for all peoples.
- toward freedom from want,
- toward freedom from fear,
- toward acceptance and guarantees of full human rights for the individual human being.

It is important to note here that the goals are distant, that they are relative and not absolute, that they keep changing and will change again, and that, as a practical matter, some have to be reached before others.

I need only mention that political independence for a nation as a whole does not by itself bring political rights to the individual citizen of the country, and that even if the political rights of the last citizen have been secured, this does not by itself bring him freedom from want or freedom from fear.

To dream of securing human rights at one fell swoop is as great a fantasy as to dream of securing peace by the single act. For the securing of human rights, like the inseparable task of securing the peace, is not a single step but a long process—and like peace it is the "product of many nations, the sum of many acts."

The key question, I repeat, is whether we are moving in the right direction—toward self-determination, toward freedom from want, toward freedom from fear, toward guaranteeing the rights of the individual person. Once we are moving in the right general direction, once change is impelling us toward those distant, relative, and shifting goals, then reasonable men can dispute the question of whether the movement is too slow or too fast, too erratic or too steady.

There is no slogan or banner or name or ideological formulation that will tell us just what kind or what degree or what rate of change is most desirable in all situations. What we do know is that movement must be fast enough to

prevent a buildup of pressure to an explosion point and not so fast that all order is swept away in the process. To find that balance, and to keep the rate of change within these limits, is the most challenging task of the United Nations and of leaders of good will everywhere; indeed, this is exactly the purpose and the meaning of the whole system of world order we have been trying to construct for the past 16 years: to promote changes for the better in the condition of mankind and to do so peacefully.

Surely this is within our reach. But surely the whole system is threatened when change is promoted at such breakneck speed that order breaks down and the peace is endangered. And even more surely is the whole system threatened when there is adamant opposition to any change at all.

Historically, we have seen both extremes. We have seen a world—not so very long ago—of which it could be said that every regime in power was devoted basically to the perpetuation of the *status quo*, to the prevention of change. We have seen a period—and we are not yet out of it—in which loud voices were raised on behalf of massive change by massive violence. There is no peace—and no human rights—in either extreme.

Peace and human rights—peace with freedom from want and freedom from fear and freedom for the individual—can come only through steady, persistent, manageable, peaceful change in the direction of these goals.

### **Responsibilities of U.N. Membership**

Finally, Mr. President, I like to believe that there is a fifth area of clarity emerging; at least I hope this is the case. And this is awareness of the responsibility that goes with membership in international organizations, a sense of loyalty to the agency itself, a recognition that the lasting integrity of the institution is more important than temporary political advantage, a feeling that we all have to play by the rules of the game.

No organization can long endure without the loyalty of its membership; the institution itself is something more than a collection of its members, as the whole is more than a sum of its

parts; and the game has no form or shape or purpose without established rules and no order unless the rules are followed until changed.

Of course, we pay a price for membership in international organizations. In exchange for access to any orderly system for conducting our affairs, we agree to be bound by the rules and procedures of that system; in exchange for the rights of membership, we acknowledge the same rights for all other members; in exchange for privileges, we assume duties.

All this is difficult, often exasperating, and sometimes frustrating to all of us. Everyone prefers his own way to the way of accommodation with others; no one enjoys sitting still to hear another give voice to views which he abhors; we all find it difficult from time to time to respect procedures which seem to be getting in the way of our purposes.

But this, after all, is the democratic system at work, and the United Nations was founded as a forum in which opinions could be expressed and argued fully and freely, in which all decisions could be democratically arrived at. If that tradition should be altered now, we threaten not only the political future of the U.N. but its economic and social aims.

That would be a tragedy from which the developing countries would be the first to suffer. It is no accident that among the first acts of all the new states that have emerged in recent years is the application for membership in the United Nations. While we are all partners in this great enterprise, the first and foremost objective of the entire system of U.N. organizations in the economic and social field is to help the developing countries in their struggle for modernization. The U.N. is their instrument to accelerate their growth and to achieve a better life for their people. Nothing, therefore, should be done to blunt that instrument. Its effectiveness must not be impaired by attempts to enforce change by acts of impatience in violation of democratic principles and orderly procedures.

There are those who stubbornly resist change and uphold doctrines that are not in keeping with some of the basic principles of the charter. We deplore and reject such attitudes. We are also confident that they will not be able to

impede the growth of the U.N. and the achievement of its objectives. Moreover, one ignores the winds of change at his peril.

We believe, Mr. President, that we all have a responsibility for preserving and strengthening the great tradition of the charter and the system of international organization. And therefore we fervently hope that its constitutional integrity and the principle of full and free debate on which its survival depends will not be undermined, however great the provocation.

#### Specifics of Development Programs

Turning for a moment to the specifics of our development programs, let me say, Mr. President, that, in the opinion of my Government, attaining the objectives of the Development Decade will not only be the greatest possible achievement in this decade but it will also strengthen the United Nations in the other vital areas of peace and human rights. Habits of international cooperation developed in one area will spread to the others.

To achieve this great objective our organizations have taken many encouraging steps. Major emphasis has been put on the development of human resources, and the United Nations system expects to concentrate a great part of its activities during the decade on education and training of all types and all levels and on the more effective transfer of scientific and technical knowledge to the less developed countries.

WHO [World Health Organization] is becoming more and more effective in extending the foundations of public health.

ILO [International Labor Organization] plans to increase its activities in the fields of vocational training and management.

UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] has given new impetus to education and science.

The World Bank has expanded its economic development activities and enhanced its ability to provide advice.

The Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning, started a year ago, is already making notable contributions to development planning and the training of new leaders to translate plans into action. We look forward

to the establishment of similar institutions in Africa and Asia.

At United Nations headquarters the Economic Projections and Programming Centre will offer help with a great awareness of the relation of international developments to national economic policies.

The impressive speeches we have heard here confirm that the followup on the Conference on Science and Technology<sup>3</sup> will be a critical factor in the future of the Development Decade.

The course of hunger and malnutrition still afflicts more than half of mankind, and the great World Food Congress in Washington last month<sup>4</sup> expressed alarm at the extent to which the growth of population intensified human needs. Hence, my Government supports wholeheartedly and with high hopes the FAO's [Food and Agriculture Organization] Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign.

Our task in the Decade of Development involves social as well as technical change. For, as we know, sustained economic development cannot occur unless rural populations are brought forward along with the rest of the country. In developing countries four-fifths of the people live in the rural area. They must develop the purchasing power to buy factory-produced goods if industrial development is to go forward. The United Nations-FAO World Food Program, which is exploring new ways of using surplus food for purposes of development, has made a most encouraging start, and we look forward with hopeful interest to the further development of this experimental program.

But perhaps the most significant development during the past year has been in the field of international trade. I shall not dwell on preparations for the Conference on Trade and Development,<sup>5</sup> but I do want to mention two significant actions by my Government. Last year I expressed the hope that the Congress of the United States would approve the Trade Expansion Act. It did, and with good luck and co-

<sup>3</sup> For a statement by Secretary Rusk regarding the Conference, see *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 188.

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 58.

<sup>5</sup> For a statement by Isaiah Frank, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

operation on all sides, the effects might be more far-reaching than the Marshall Plan.

The United States will make full use of the new authority to widen markets for the raw materials and manufactures of the developing nations and to strengthen our efforts to end discriminatory and preferential trade agreements, which, in the long run, can only make everyone poorer and the free world less united.

Of particular significance to some of the developing countries is the authority to reduce or eliminate duties or import restrictions on tropical commodities. The Trade Expansion Act is also designed to afford greater access to our markets for the manufactured and semimanufactured products of these countries.

The United States has taken an increasingly active role in measures designed to stabilize and improve markets for primary commodities. An historical milestone was the negotiation last September of the International Coffee Agreement,<sup>6</sup> since coffee is the most important agricultural commodity in international trade. The coffee agreement recognizes a mutuality of obligations of producers and consumers, and some developed countries could help by removing obstacles to consumption. But it is clear that in the long run good prices for coffee can be assured only if some producing countries take more promising steps to break the bonds of one-crop economies and develop all sectors of their economies.

Although we believe that exports must provide the major part of the foreign exchange required by developing countries, the United States remains committed to a program of assistance through both private enterprise and government aid. We have reexamined our assistance programs, and searching questions are now being asked of recipients with regard to per capita income and its distribution; the competence of the government, its sensitivity to the needs of the population; well-conceived, long-range economic development plans; the distribution and collection of taxes; the priority given to citizens who live in rural areas; land distribution and community development; the

<sup>6</sup> For a statement by Ambassador Stevenson at the U.N. Coffee Conference on Sept. 28, 1962, see *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667.

climate and incentives for private investment, both foreign and domestic; and the effectiveness of controls over the expenditure of foreign exchange for luxury imports.

In the United States we are now placing increasing emphasis on the international institutions. The success of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the United Nations Special Fund, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association has encouraged us to urge their further development. And we are prepared to join with other countries in subscribing additional resources to IDA.

It is gratifying to note that the flow of financial assistance to the developing countries has increased substantially. The net flow of long-term capital to the developing countries rose from \$5.3 billion in 1959 to \$7.2 billion in 1961, a figure about twice as high as the annual average in 1951-1955. More than nine-tenths came from the members of OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], which is actively concerned with increasing the volume and effectiveness of such aid and capital.

We believe that one of the major contributions the United Nations itself can make to the success of the Development Decade is through the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. My Government hopes that at the next pledging conference in October the goal of \$150 million set for these two programs will be reached—at long last. We expect to continue our pledge of \$60 million, subject to the condition that it shall not exceed 40 percent of the total pledge. Moreover, we welcome the suggestion of the Secretary-General to rationalize the top management of these two programs which are so closely related and complementary. While we should like to know more about this proposal, it strikes us as a first step in the right direction. We trust that thereafter we shall be able to move toward their closer integration.

I have talked of trade, industrial and food production, and aid. But economic advancement cannot long continue unless its fruits are shared widely and masses of people are motivated to participate in its success. I have heard

it argued that the secret of all development is steel and kilowatts. That might do for a mechanical world of robots but not for a flesh and blood world of men, a world—as the Secretary-General tells us in his shocking report on the world social situation<sup>1</sup>—in which the homeless, the unemployed, the halt and blind, the orphans, the delinquents, the aged derelicts, the unfortunate of every land, are larger in number than 13 years ago. And though educational opportunities are greater by far than ever before, in many areas the quality of teaching has declined and there are more illiterates today than 10 years ago.

I think, too, of the miraculous scientific advances that the world has seen in this generation—advances that have bypassed nearly a billion people who are suffering from a variety of diseases. While we in the United States, for example, look forward to refinements in cancer research, millions of people in Asia and Africa still die each year from dysentery.

Finding a solution to all these problems is a staggering task for the Decade of Development. And it poses a crisis—a social and economic crisis—more menacing, I would say, than even the spread of nuclear weapons.

But people are bound together not alone by mutual fears but by mutual hopes for the common good. And I think we have made some other promising beginnings. For example, much of value will be learned through the Research Institute for the Study of the Interaction of Economic and Social Factors in Development, made possible through the generosity of the Netherlands Government. We also note with great interest the proposal to establish a United Nations training and research institute. The Secretary-General has expressed his support for the proposal, and we emphatically agree with his appraisal. Such an institute could supply not only trained personnel but a better understanding of the operational potentials and limitations of the United Nations family of organizations.

To conclude these comments in the area of economic and social work, I repeat what I said at the outset: We are beginning to see the problem of development as a whole. We see that

many of the items on our agenda are not isolated projects but part and parcel of our efforts to deal with economic and social development as a whole. We see that our specialized agencies are not working in wholly separate fields of endeavor—not dealing with compartmentalized techniques and disciplines—but are coping with one or another part of a problem which is of a piece.

After 15 years of economic and social work we begin to see more clearly:

—that the development process involves all major sectors of economic and social life, all relevant technologies, and a combination of internal effort and external aid;

—that peace is a process, a system of resolving disputes and managing change through international institutions;

—that human rights are the ultimate business of nearly all that we do;

—that since our goals are never final, what counts is that change is taking place and that the trend is in the right direction; and finally

—that once we adopt the goals of peace and human rights, we are committed to peaceful change and to the responsibilities that go with it for orderly democratic procedures.

Mr. President, if the present meeting of the Economic and Social Council is guided by an emerging consensus on those points, it not only will deal with the items of our agenda but will help to illuminate and clarify the present state of human affairs. One could ask no more than that of this meeting.

## International Coffee Council Meets

The Department of State announced on July 26 (press release 393) that Jerome Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, would head the U.S. delegation to the first meeting of the International Coffee Council, which will be held at London beginning July 29 for a period of 4 weeks.

The Council is the highest authority of the International Coffee Agreement, which came provisionally into force on July 1, 1963. It is expected that representatives from at least 27 exporting countries accounting for 90 percent

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN. 5/375 and Adds. 1 and 2.

of world coffee exports and some 14 importing countries accounting for more than 80 percent of all imports will attend the meeting.

The chief purpose of the meeting will be to elect key officers of the new coffee organization, establish export quotas for the coffee year beginning October 1, 1963, and make the necessary administrative arrangements for the operation of the agreement.

The U.S. delegation is listed below:

#### *Delegate*

Jerome Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

#### *Alternate Delegates*

Henry Brodie, Director, Office of International Resources, Department of State

Paul E. Callanan, Assistant Chief, Foodstuffs Division, Department of State

#### *Government Advisers*

Henry Bashkin, Department of Commerce

David Stoner, Department of State

#### *Industry Advisers*

John F. McKiernan, President, National Coffee Association, New York, N.Y.

George V. Robbins, Director of Green Coffee Operations, Maxwell House Division, General Foods Corporation, New York, N.Y.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol (relating to harp and hood seals) to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Open for signature at Washington July 15-29, 1963. Enters into force on date all parties to the Convention have deposited instruments of ratification or have given written notification of adherence.

*Signatures:* Canada, July 15, 1963; Denmark, July 26, 1963; Iceland, July 22, 1963; Italy, July 26, 1963; Norway, July 19, 1963; Poland, July 16, 1963; Spain, July 25, 1963; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 18, 1963; United Kingdom, July 20, 1963; United States, July 26, 1963.

Protocol (relating to the place for holding Commission meetings) to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at

Washington June 25, 1956; entered into force January 10, 1959. TIAS 4170.

*Adherence deposited:* Poland, July 25, 1963.

### Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

*Adherence deposited:* Trinidad and Tobago, June 15, 1963.

### Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

*Accession deposited:* Kuwait, May 28, 1963.

### Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

*Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence):* Cyprus, July 8, 1963.

### War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, 3365, respectively.

*Accession deposited:* Saudi Arabia, May 18, 1963. *Notifications given that they consider themselves bound:* Senegal, April 23, 1963; Tanganyika, December 12, 1962.

### White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.

*Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Cyprus, June 12, 1963.

### BILATERAL

#### Pakistan

Agreement relating to the loan of a submarine to Pakistan. Effected by exchanges of notes at Karachi April 22, June 9, 14, and 29, 1963. Entered into force June 29, 1963.

#### Saudi Arabia

Agreement relating to the loan of 11 F-86 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda November 10 and 13, 1962. Entered into force November 13, 1962.

Agreement relating to the loan of one additional F-86 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda May 1 and 22, 1963. Entered into force May 22, 1963.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Designations

Benjamin H. Read as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department, effective July 22. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 380 dated July 22.)

### Appointments

Jerome Jacobson as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective July 25. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 391 dated July 25.)

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.*

**Fact Sheets.** These pamphlets contain information on the land, people, government, politics, economy, and foreign policy of the following:

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**Viet-Nam.** Pub. 7469. Far Eastern Series 116. 17 pp. 10¢.

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**The Philippines.** Pub. 7480. Far Eastern Series 122. 12 pp. 10¢.

**Laos.** Pub. 7481. Far Eastern Series 123. 13 pp. 10¢.

**You and the United Nations (Revised).** Answers to 21 of the most frequently asked questions on how the U.N. works, what it has done, and its value to the United States. Pub. 7442. International Organization and Conference Series 35. 55 pp. 25¢.

**Your Department of State (Revised).** Pamphlet describing the organization, functions, and scope of the Department's operations in developing U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 7443. Department and Foreign Service Series 109. 17 pp. 15¢.

**The Newly Independent Nations.** A brief description of the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of the following states which have become independent since 1943:

**Somali Republic.** Pub. 7453. African Series 27. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Republic of Chad.** Pub. 7494. African Series 29. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Gabon Republic.** Pub. 7495. African Series 30. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Cyprus.** Pub. 7503. Near and Middle Eastern Series 70. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Islamic Republic of Mauritania.** Pub. 7504. African Series 31. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Jamaica.** Pub. 7506. Inter-American Series 84. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).** Pub. 7514. African Series 32. 6 pp. 10¢.

**Tanganyika.** Pub. 7515. African Series 33. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Profiles of Newly Independent States.** A concise reference guide on the status of 49 sovereign states which have become independent since 1943. Pub. 7488. *Geographic Bulletin No. 1.* 26 pp. map. 25¢.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to July 22 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 376 of July 16.

No.	Date	Subject
379	7/22	Air-defense agreement with India.
*380	7/22	Read designated Special Assistant to Secretary and Executive Secretary (biographic details).
*381	7/22	Haugerud sworn in as Deputy Inspector General for Foreign Assistance (biographic details).
*382	7/22	U.S. participation in international conferences.
383	7/23	Nationalization of private oil companies in Ceylon.
384	7/23	U.S.-Panama communique on Canal Zone talks.
385	7/24	Yemen credentials (rewrite).
*386	7/24	25th anniversary of cultural exchange program.
387	7/24	Colombia credentials (rewrite).
†388	7/24	Algeria credentials (rewrite).
*389	7/24	Ethiopian parliamentarians visit U.S.
*391	7/25	Jacobson appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
392	7/25	U.S. statement on international air rate policy.
393	7/26	Delegation to International Coffee Council meeting (rewrite).
394	7/28	Rusk-Harriman NBC interview on test ban treaty.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE  
DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE  
**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1260*



*August 19, 1963*

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DEPOSITORY

# Negotiating a Limited Treaty for Banning Nuclear Tests

by Under Secretary Harriman<sup>1</sup>

Thank you, Mr. President.<sup>2</sup> This is very nice to have a kind introduction. I have had some pretty rough ones from former presidents, and I never know when I come here what kind of reception I will have. I hope that this is a sign that the rest of you will give me as polite a treatment.

But in any event, one of the remarks that the president made about my having gone to the Soviet Union at the age of 8 and landing on the Siberian Coast—I happened to tell that to Stalin one evening when we were discussing other matters. I said, "Mr. Marshal, the first time I ever came to Russia I came without

a passport." He looked at me very sternly and said, "When was that?" I said, "Well, that was a long time ago. That was 1899." "Oh," he said, "that was under the Czar. You couldn't do it now."

But it is true that I did go to Russia again in 1926, and that was when I first learned to have a great respect for foreign correspondents. I don't know how many of you foreign correspondents know what I am talking about, but I tried to find out from the embassies, our embassies in Europe, and from the foreign offices of a number of governments—I was then pursuing the nefarious business of being an international banker—and I got the same answer from everybody, more or less: The Soviet regime will last for 5 years. Well, that 5 years was movable. The answer was always the same, but it was 1 year later the same answer as you got the year before—5 years.

But when I got to Moscow I found some men that are now giants of Soviet reporting—I can't remember all of them, but I remember Duranty

<sup>1</sup> Remarks made before the National Press Club at Washington, D.C., on July 31. Mr. Harriman led the U.S. delegation to the test ban talks at Moscow July 15-25. On July 25, with representatives of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, he initialed a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water (for text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239).

<sup>2</sup> Bryson Rash, president of the National Press Club.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1260 PUBLICATION 7586 AUGUST 19, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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and Knickerbocker and others—and they gave me the best inside understanding of what was going on in the Soviet Union. And ever since that time, whenever I go to a capital, as soon as I can get away from the diplomats I go and find out what our press has got to tell, and I have learned a lot.

I am not suggesting that all of your foreign correspondents are—I am not commending them all, but I am certainly commending the overwhelming majority of American reporters who go abroad and stay long enough and go with an open mind. So that I come to you with appreciation of what your responsibilities are and what you are doing.

#### **No Illusions About Relations With U.S.S.R.**

This business of dealing with the Soviet Union as such goes back quite a while.

In 1941 I went there first with Lord Beaverbrook, and it is interesting to note the changes that have taken place since that time. That was when the Nazi armies were at the gates of Moscow.

I remember in 1945 in San Francisco a meeting with some of the members of the press. I think I had three groups, one reporters and then two groups were among those that are in the rarefied atmosphere known as columnists. And I made the unfortunate statement from the standpoint of reaction that—it seems very trite today—that we had to recognize that our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives were irreconcilable but we would have to find some way to live on this small planet and try to avoid war.

Now that word "irreconcilable" offended a certain number of people. They got up and left the room and said I was unfit to be Ambassador to the Soviet Union, should be recalled, and it was one of the few times that a background off-the-record talk was abused; they were so offended by it. Some of them apologized afterward, because it seems now such a normal thing to say. And I still say that.

I find no difference between Khrushchev and Stalin in terms of determination to communize the world. There is a material difference in the methods by which they go about it, and that is important in itself. But Mr. Khrushchev be-

lieves that communism is destined to rule the world, just as Stalin did.

I think I can sum it up quite quickly by a few sentences perhaps. Stalin used to talk about the advances of communism through the failures of capitalism, and those of you who know the Marxian dialectics know just exactly what he meant by that. Once he said very colorfully that communism breeds in the cesspools of capitalism.

Khrushchev, 15 years later, sitting in the same office—this was in 1959 when I was there—the same pictures on the wall, presumably the same chair, said: "We are making such an enormous success of communism in the Soviet Union that other countries are going to have to follow our example."

Now I say that our objectives are still irreconcilable. As the President so wittingly said in his speech before The American University on June 10,<sup>3</sup> if other countries would leave their neighbors alone and permit the people of those countries to develop a government of their own choosing in their own way we would be closer to peace. We haven't arrived at that point at the present time.

Some day I hope that a leader of the Soviet Union will say, "We have Russia for the Russians." But the leadership of the Kremlin still believes that it is part of their responsibility to push and force and compel the advance of communism through every means they can, short of nuclear war. They believe still in wars of liberation, as you well know. So don't let's have any illusions about our relations with the Soviet Union.

#### **Areas of Common Interest**

On the other hand, despite this irreconcilability of our objectives, there are some areas in which we have common interest, and when I was sent by the President to Moscow we were dealing in one of those areas.

It has become increasingly clear, perhaps underlined by the manner in which Mr. Khrushchev withdrew his offensive weapons from Cuba, that he does not want to face nuclear war, and it is very easy to understand why.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

They have had really a fantastic success in the development of their industry, the development of their education and their science. They still are way behind in agriculture, as all Communist countries are. And, of course, the life of the people is not as free as we would believe it should be, but at the same time, the life of the people is better than it was before; and Khrushchev wants to catch America in that respect, as you well know, and he wants to avoid nuclear war. He doesn't want to see this destroyed, and the people of Russia don't want it.

Of all the people in the world, there are no peoples that are more conscious of war than the Soviet Union, the people of Russia, because they have suffered so much and because the problems are always held before them by what they get from the press. Therefore I think we can say with assurance that when we talk about a test ban treaty as a first step toward the control of nuclear weapons and when Khrushchev speaks of it, as he did in his *Pravda* interview on the Saturday morning I left, he is sincere in that.

It is interesting that he selected July 15th. The President and Prime Minister Macmillan, as you know, wrote to Mr. Khrushchev on June 8 and suggested a meeting to consider a test ban, and Mr. Khrushchev said, "All right, come on July 15th," which was just a short time after the meeting was arranged between the Chinese Communists in Moscow with a delegation representing the Soviet Communists, and that had been going on for a week or so before we arrived.

#### **Major Issue Between Moscow and Peiping**

I think we have to understand in the motivations of Mr. Khrushchev's colleagues that their great preoccupation is this challenge of Peiping for leadership in the Communist international movement.

Now even in Stalin's time I talked to him many times about China. He had never thought a great deal of Mao Tse-tung, and we haven't got time to go into that this morning, but this difference between them is of long duration. It came out rather more rigorously from 1960 on, when the Soviets withdrew their tech-

nical assistance and withdrew their credits and trade. As Mr. Khrushchev himself said, "We cut 60 percent—only 40 percent of what it used to be a few years ago."

Their relations have been strained. But now they have come to a great bitterness because since Cuba the Chinese Communists are making greater efforts, greater inroads in the Communist parties around the world, first in the Far East, and you notice in minority groups in some of the Communist parties in a number of countries. And that is an unheard-of thing to do. It was written in the book and was accepted that Moscow was the center of all wisdom as far as communism is concerned. The world was going to be dominated by communism with a center and seat in Moscow.

Although there has been a challenge before, it has been unimportant. But now it has made some progress, and Mr. Khrushchev said, "I am a man of peace, and this removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba indicates that I want to preserve the peace and preserve mankind." Peiping said, "No, you aren't fit to lead the Communist movement. You haven't got the vigor and the determination and courage."

Now that was pretty shocking. And since that time there has been an increasing feeling between the two countries, and those of you who follow the Communist press know that both Peiping and Moscow have said some pretty rough things about each other—and some more this morning about this test ban treaty. The Chinese called it a fraud and speak of it as being Khrushchev's selling out to the imperialists.

In any event, if any of you want to take the trouble to do it, I suggest you read the exchange of letters that they have had recently. They are only 50,000 words each; so it won't take you very long to read them—probably the longest single letters of correspondence in history.

But there is no mystery about it. Those of you who want to understand it can see it before you. The issue now has been made. Khrushchev and the Communist Party of Russia are maintaining that they are the ones that are going to preserve the peace of the world; they are going to lead the world to communism, but avoiding nuclear war, and they are just as vig-

orous, just as determined, but they are going to do it without endangering the peoples of the world, whereas China is the one that is dangerous—the Chinese Communists are the ones that are going to lead the world to nuclear holocaust, and that is what is the major issue between them. There are many others.

But don't make any mistake about a division between them in terms of repudiating each other or breaking—if there is major trouble—breaking the front between them. They have not done so, and there is no indication that they will.

### **Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

Now this treaty is a good treaty. It is clear. Every paragraph was discussed. We understand each other. Some of the wartime agreements were written so hurriedly that the words concealed the meaning of the principals, and that was some of the trouble that came from them. Naturally it would be so. We spent 10 days at this. The treaty we tabled was the one that Mr. Foster [William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] and his group had tabled in 1962 in August in Geneva<sup>4</sup> and was thoroughly considered by all of the people, the advisers of the administration, and they tabled that treaty. We went through it with great care.

One of the difficulties was that Mr. Khrushchev, as you remember, in his July 2d speech said that two treaties should be signed simultaneously, a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries as well as a nuclear test ban.

Now this, of course, is a test ban limited to three environments: outer space, in the atmosphere, and under the water, and it excludes underground. And because underground is excluded, we were able to come to an agreement, because in these three environments it is the consensus of knowledgeable opinion that it can be policed; the identification—the detection and identification—is reasonably assured.

When Mr. Khrushchev made his July 2d speech in East Germany he brought that out,

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

and then it became more clear that there could be an agreement.

In our 10 days' discussion the United States and the United Kingdom were very firm on removing a treaty for nonaggression away from the test ban treaty, and that they acceded to. You notice in the communique<sup>5</sup> there was reference to it in a paragraph in which we have agreed to consult with our allies and to see how and whether and on what conditions and what objectives we would carry on further—well, the objective is clear—but the conditions in which we would carry forward discussions about a nonaggression pact.

We could not discuss that in Moscow. The United Kingdom and the United States could not discuss that question without our NATO allies, and we had not consulted them in advance.

Khrushchev wants for some reason or other to continue discussions and is very anxious to make some progress in that field. I was not able to explore very thoroughly what his reasons were. But I am quite ready to say that he made it plain he was not going to demand a recognition of East Germany as one of the conditions of the test ban. He recognizes that the countries of Western Europe don't intend to recognize what we call the East German "regime," but still known as the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany. We are for the reunification of Germany and support the Germans in that context.

Now, the provisions of the agreement are clear. They are limited, of course. There is a withdrawal clause, which is also clear, and the other provisions, if you have taken the trouble to read it. We were able to go through paragraph by paragraph and exchange views as to the interpretation of the meaning of the words, and we agreed that we understood each other. There is no secret agreement; there is no gimmick in this agreement and no secret understandings.

Now, it has a limited objective, of course. But it is the first step to reduce the risk of war, as the President said the other night,<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

and I won't run through what it does not do. But it is the first step in bringing under control nuclear power in connection with weapons, and if it is followed by further steps it may be a signal event.

Mr. Khrushchev called it a breakthrough in his press conference published in *Pravda* the morning I left, but of course he pointed to the fact that there had to be further steps.

The other importance of it, of course, is that the people of the world do not want to see further testing in the atmosphere. They are gravely concerned over the contamination of the atmosphere. And if any of you have traveled, you know that particularly the underdeveloped countries—I wouldn't say particularly, but since they have nothing to do with nuclear weapons—they are enormously concerned. This isn't in connection with their weapons, but they are concerned over the health of their children, and I think that is true of this country, and the reports we get from abroad show that it is overwhelmingly true around the world.

Now I am very much interested—I have in my hand—I was just given this as I came in—the Federation of American Scientists, which I understand is a distinguished group of 2,500 members, has come out in support—or the board of directors have come out for very important reasons with the statement "The Federation of American Scientists believes that it would be a national catastrophe if the pending test ban agreement was not ratified," and so forth.

Now I think you will find more and more people speaking in this vein. There are those who legitimately want to know the effect on our security, and I can say this unequivocally as far as my judgment is concerned—I am not asking you to say that everybody agrees with it—but it is my judgment that if we continue to spend the money that is necessary on scientific development, the development of our missiles, the capability of delivery, and keep up with our underground testing, spend the money on energy, and if we maintain our Military Establishment, there is no reason to doubt that we can maintain the kind of predominance in the nuclear field which is necessary as a great deter-

rent; and so to turn away from this, I think, would be a very great tragedy. It couldn't be better expressed than by this statement of the directors of the Federation of American Scientists.

## **U.S. Recognizes Military Junta as Government of Ecuador**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 399 dated July 31

The Department of State has cabled our Ambassador in Quito, Maurice M. Bernbaum, directing him to acknowledge the note of July 12<sup>1</sup> from the military junta of Ecuador. By means of this acknowledgment we are resuming relations with Ecuador and are recognizing the military junta as the provisional government of Ecuador. This action was taken after consultation with other hemisphere governments in the light of the following factors:

The United States Government has ascertained that the authority of the military junta has been accepted and recognized throughout the national territory and has noted the junta's stated intention to respect Ecuador's international obligations.

The note of July 12 declared that a military junta constituted by the combined command of the Armed Forces of Ecuador has assumed the responsibility of governing the nation until such time as it would be possible to organize elections in which the people of Ecuador would be able to exercise their will freely within the provisions of a new constitution.

The United States Government has noted with special satisfaction the solemn assurances offered by the military junta of its determination to restore Ecuador to constitutional government at the earliest possible moment. In public statements the junta has indicated its belief that this goal can be achieved in substantially less than 2 years. The junta also has declared its intention to provide a new constitution and lay the basis for the return to civilian government via constitutional procedures.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

While these assurances offered by the junta have lessened the concern which naturally arose in the United States following the events of July 11, the United States Government reiterates its firm belief, shared elsewhere in the hemisphere, that military seizures of political power should not become an acceptable substitute for constitutional procedures.

## **U.S. Comments on Communist Inspired Incidents in Korea**

*Two U.S. soldiers were killed and a third wounded on July 29 in an ambush by North Korean infiltrators on the southern edge of the Korean demilitarized zone about 20 miles north of Seoul. On the following day some of the same group of infiltrators were pursued by U.S. soldiers and Korean police and one American serviceman, one Korean police officer, and two North Koreans were killed. Following are Department statements regarding the two incidents which were read to news correspondents by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.*

### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 29**

We are outraged by this latest incident, which is reminiscent of the Communist grenade attack on a guard post on our side last December, in which one U.S. soldier was killed and another wounded. There have been similar attacks on ROK [Republic of Korea] Army personnel as well. We are calling an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to confront the Communist side with these latest murders.

In the latest case, the ambush took place close to the southern edge of the demilitarized zone against a jeep carrying Ninth Regiment, First Cavalry, personnel to a guard post in the demilitarized zone. Automatic weapons, which are banned in the demilitarized zone, were used in the attack.

In addition to calling an early meeting of the MAC, we will have to consider what other actions we will take. It is this kind of deliberately planned and executed violation, as well as the unjust detention of persons like Captain [Ben W.] Stutts and Captain [Carleton] Voltz,<sup>1</sup> which reminds us that the Korean and Chinese Communists keep the peace in Korea only insofar as deterred by the continued presence of U.N. strength.

### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 30**

The facts of today's encounter, so far as we know them, are as follows:

At 9:00 a.m. this morning, Korean time, an estimated group of five North Korean infiltrators were seen by South Korean police near Munsan-ni, about 7 miles south of the point of yesterday's attack.

Fifteen U.S. soldiers were dispatched from a nearby First Cavalry Division unit to assist in running them down. In the ensuing fire fight, one American serviceman, one Korean police officer, and two of the North Korean agents were killed. At this point, the investigation of the facts is still going on.

As far as countermeasures are concerned, these are under discussion here and with our people in Korea.

Today's incident is one result of the intensive alert and search operations now under way.

I would like to repeat what I said yesterday: that these incidents remind us that the peace in Korea is kept only by U.N. strength and determination to resist Communist aggression.

At this point, these attacks appear to be a reflection of the North Korean Communist activities in connection with the 10th anniversary of the armistice. However, I would not want to exclude the possibility of their being linked to wider developments in Asia.

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<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 246.

## Our Policy Toward Africa

by J. Wayne Fredericks  
*Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is a pleasure to appear again on the Africa studies program sponsored by the Social Studies Institute of St. Paul. I want to pay special tribute to the St. Paul public schools for having had the vision to initiate this type of program, which has already led communities in other parts of the country to start similar African summer courses for adults and students interested in African affairs. It is gratifying to know of the increasing public interest in this area in African developments.

The United States has an interest in the newly independent countries of Africa. It has an interest in the still nonindependent areas of Africa. And it has an interest in South Africa, too. It is not only political, economic, and social interests that bind us to the African Continent but the self-interest of maintaining peace and stability there as well as throughout the world.

A year ago when I appeared on this platform, I asserted that America's vital interest was peace for ourselves and our children and that this depended on stability and satisfaction around the world. The sudden emergence of African nations and the startling upsurge of African influence in the U.N. and its specialized agencies have placed the concerns of Africans before the American people in a dramatic way and demand an understanding of them as they relate to our national security.

Let's review briefly the basic African concerns. All over the continent Africans con-

tinue to give the highest importance to five requirements: (1) freedom, (2) dignity, (3) a more abundant life, (4) African unity, and (5) freedom from cold-war involvement.

The United States respects the desire of the Africans to remain free of cold-war entanglements, and we support these other goals which the Africans have set for themselves.

We are interested in African development, and our program is making a substantial contribution. Our policy is to help Africans because we believe that their independence will be strengthened by undertakings contributing to a more rational use of scarce human and material resources.

Our desire is to maintain and strengthen the mutually beneficial relationships which exist between European and African nations in many parts of the African Continent. Europe's assistance to Africa is greater than our own, and we look to European countries to continue to play a principal role in financing African assistance.

There can be no doubt about the necessity for the United States to prevent Communist penetration for subversion through providing new nations an alternative source of aid to the often still-suspect former colonial metropolises. At the same time, the recent Clay Committee report asserted, "... the need for development assistance and U.S. interest in providing it would continue even if the cold war and all our outstanding political differences with the Communists were to be resolved tomorrow."

In the interval since I last appeared on this

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the St. Paul Social Studies Institute, Como Park Junior High School, St. Paul, Minn., on July 18 (press release 390).

platform, the people of Algeria in cooperation with France have achieved their freedom, and France continues to provide vital assistance to this area despite the violence which occurred at the end of French rule. In the Congo the United Nations aided in the reintegration of Katanga, permitting the Congolese the first real opportunity since independence to concentrate on their complex nation-building problem. The resumption of relations between Belgium and the Congo now permits Belgium to assist the Congo in many fields.

But the most urgent problem moving African nationalists today remains the application of self-determination in the Portuguese territories in Africa and for the nonwhite populace of South Africa.

### **The Cause of African Unity**

African influence in the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the past year has grown startlingly. We have the best examples of this influence today in their actions in the International Labor Organization, in the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and in the UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] education meeting in Geneva in the past month as the African nations have sought to expel Portugal and South Africa from these organizations because of their inflexible positions.

A new degree of effectiveness of African organization is traceable to the meeting of African chiefs of state in Addis Ababa in May, where they, among other things, established an African Liberation Committee. The committee is already functioning in Dar-es-Salaam in support of African nationalist movements in the still dependent areas of the continent.

At Addis Ababa also the cause of African unity was advanced with the signing by 30 heads of state of a charter establishing an Organization of African Unity. The charter has already been ratified by more than two-thirds of the signatory states and will, therefore, formally enter into force in the near future.

In my opinion the establishment of the OAU is indeed a significant and historic event. It indicates that Africa is on the threshold of an exciting new chapter in the advance toward

unity, a unity which was denied to them because of long years of colonial domination.

The United States, as in Europe and Latin America, heartily supports the establishment of institutions which will promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation in Africa. Among the institutions called for in the OAU is the establishment of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means. Other important commissions to be established by the OAU are for economic and social affairs, education and culture, defense, and health, sanitation, and nutrition.

The establishment of a workable OAU could give further impetus to the activities of important regional organizations already functioning, such as the African and Malagasy Union, comprising 13 French-speaking states, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the East African Common Services Organization, which provides a considerable degree of economic integration in that area of Africa.

Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda are reported to be negotiating for the establishment soon of an East African federation with strong central powers to more effectively pool their national resources for the common good. Zanzibar, a self-governing British territory, is also considering joining this East African federation. Tanganyika and Uganda are independent, while Kenya, which only recently elected an African government, is expected to obtain her independence soon. Such a federation, if successful, could also have a powerful influence upon neighboring African areas where the African people have not yet obtained self-determination and self-government.

Nothing in the past year has altered my conviction that one-party government in Africa does not exclude the practice of democratic principles like free discussion and universal adult suffrage, although in some places freedoms we cherish are restricted. Independence-minded Africa remains determined to be free of both Soviet bloc controls and undue Western influence. In the past year the Communists have initiated a review of their African policies because of the clear rebuffs administered by the Republic of Guinea and newly independent Al-

geria. Communism, which demands uniformity, has made no enduring friends in Africa; the Western World of free choice tolerates, indeed welcomes and thrives on, African national individuality.

The United States must remain a progressive, dynamic, democratic nation, and it must avoid identification with reaction if it is to maintain its leadership and win the cooperation of Africa. In recent weeks the United States has faced a special test, not in the foreign field but in its domestic racial crisis. President Kennedy's honest recognition of our racial injustice and his expression of determination to see this wrong righted have, initially at least, maintained Africa's respect.

The past year, therefore, in summary has witnessed important advances in the area of African political freedom, individual dignity, and African unity. African nations have maintained, indeed strengthened, their freedom from cold-war involvement while progress toward a more abundant life has proceeded less spectacularly in the day-to-day expansion of economic development activities.

At the same time the higher degree of African organization reflected in the Addis Ababa conference and its aftermath have brought to crisis stage the problems of Portuguese and South African inflexibility where self-determination and the political franchise are concerned.

#### **U.S. Policy and Southern Africa**

Before turning to consider this crisis in southern Africa and to its special relation to our own Afro-American problem, let me review what U.S. policy has been toward this area of Africa. Our policy, simply stated, is to support the aspirations for freedom of parts of Africa still not independent. The United States supports the continuing tide of self-determination and the expeditious preparation for self-government in the dependent areas.

On Portuguese Angola the United States voted for a U.N. resolution<sup>2</sup> reaffirming the "inalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence" and urging

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1742 (XVI); for background and text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 385.

Portugal "in particular to set up freely elected and representative political institutions with a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola." But the United States opposed a resolution recommending "immediate" independence for Angola, in the belief this would be counterproductive in Angola rather than promote social and economic progress for the Angolan people in view of the desperate shortage of educated and trained people.

On another dependent area, South-West Africa, the United States voted for a U.N. resolution<sup>3</sup> to have Secretary-General U Thant establish an "effective U.N. presence" in that territory, which the Republic of South Africa administers. The United States maintained that South Africa still had international obligations in South-West Africa and should abandon *apartheid* in that territory, recognize its people's right to self-determination, and "proceed to move in that direction."

With respect to *apartheid* in South Africa, our view is clear. We are unalterably opposed to *apartheid*. Our traditions and our values permit us no other position. We believe that the continuation of *apartheid* can lead only to profound human tragedy for all races in Africa. We are firmly committed to use our best efforts to encourage South Africa to abandon these policies and to live up to its obligations under the U.N. Charter.

You should understand that the African leaders are fiercely determined to win freedom for all the peoples of Africa. Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda during a commencement address at Long Island University on June 14 expressed this thought in these trenchant words:

The African leaders expect the West to practice those ideals of Christianity and democracy that they preach. We are disappointed to find the West compromising on the very principles they value so much in their countries whenever they are faced with African problems. In the case of South Africa and even Angola and Mozambique, the West preaches one thing and prac-

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1805 (XVII); for statements made by U.S. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham in Committee IV (Trusteeship), see U.S. delegation press releases 4094 dated Nov. 13 and 4098 dated Nov. 19, 1962.

tices another. The Western knowledge, thought and ideals which the West advances with one hand are at the same time being withdrawn by the other.

### Civil Rights and Foreign Relations

As the African people are busily engaged in building up their new states and properly utilizing their hard-won independence, they at the same time are not unmindful that American Negroes are seeking to gain equality of citizenship in our own country. Examples of racial discrimination and acts of violence in the United States have been widely reported abroad. Soviet propaganda organs have been inundating the world with pictures and lurid stories about hostile acts committed against Negro demonstrators in Birmingham and elsewhere.

Secretary Rusk, commenting upon this situation,<sup>4</sup> said that we ought all to recognize that "this nation is now confronted with one of the gravest issues that we have had since 1865 and that this issue deeply affects the conduct of our foreign relations." In our effort to support the great causes of freedom in the world, Mr. Rusk noted, we in this country "are running this race with one of our legs in a cast."

Until the present, the internal question of civil rights—with all it involves for the American Negro—and the international question of United States and Africa have only occasionally been directly related. For example, the 1954 Supreme Court decision with respect to segregation helped improve our image in Africa, just as Little Rock made our position more difficult. At the same time, American Negro interest in Africa has been sporadically increasing, with ensuing implications for American policy. But because avowed Federal Government policy has been on the side of integration and equality of treatment the pressures on governmental leaders were neither intense nor prolonged as far as African policy was concerned, and the foreign reaction to events in this country was blunted.

In my opinion the situation is rapidly changing. The consequences of this change for United States policy toward Africa need searching examination. The principal reason for this change lies in the fact that our racial crisis

coincides with the new confrontation of forces in Africa over colonialism and *apartheid*.

At home Negroes are clearly not going to put up with further delay on the civil rights issue. This means there may be more incidents, with pictures such as that of the Birmingham policeman with a dog leaping at a Negro. Our strife will remind people of strife in South Africa.

As tension mounts the Negro elements of the population become a more articulate force in the public life of this country. As a matter of practical politics, they may be expected to exercise this force in other fields than domestic civil rights. This trend is both an opportunity and a problem in the conduct of policy toward Africa, for if Negro opinion is well informed it will be helpful but if it is merely a reflection of its frustration at home it could easily be harmful to our long-term interests in Africa.

### Drive for Self-Determination

The significant developments in Africa which may bring about a dangerous situation are these:

We have increasingly endorsed self-determination in Africa and have welcomed the emergence of the independent African nations. With one exception this transformation has been amazingly peaceful. However, we are down to the hard core of dependent Africa. We have been hopeful that Portugal and South Africa will find it in their interest to cooperate in peaceful political change. There has been little evidence that this is their intention, and African nations demand that the world choose now to support more positive actions.

In our relations with the rest of Africa we may find ourselves having to acquiesce in more extreme action or face sharply reduced influence, to the detriment of other important objectives. At the U.N. we shall more and more be branded as hypocrites by the Afro-Asians and branded as traitors to the West by their opponents.

As I indicated earlier, at Addis Ababa African leaders organized themselves for a concerted assault on these pockets of resistance. Conference resolutions condemned racial discrimination everywhere and set up a special fund to assist in the liberation of southern

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of June 17, 1963, p. 935.

Africa. The conference also adopted resolutions on decolonization, urging the great powers to cease aid to colonial governments which use that aid to suppress nationalist liberation movements.

In the weeks since Addis Ababa the Africans, in an impressive demonstration of their new-found unity, attempted at the annual Geneva meeting of the International Labor Organization to obtain the expulsion of South Africa and, failing that, withdrew from further conference participation. In a subsequent meeting the governing body of ILO recommended to the United Nations that it take up the question of the expulsion of South Africa from the world organization.

At the UNESCO education meeting a resolution expelling Portugal was adopted, and Portugal withdrew protesting the resolution's illegality.

This week in Geneva also, where the United Nations Economic and Social Council is meeting, South Africa voluntarily withdrew from participation in the work of the ECOSOC regional Economic Commission for Africa. South Africa had been prevented from participating effectively in that organization's work and withdrew in the face of the certainty of a vote formally to expel her.

President Nyerere<sup>6</sup> made clear African feeling on Monday [July 15] in his speech at the National Press Club when he said:

Although we have as much to gain as anyone [from participation in international bodies], we break up useful technical meetings because we will not cooperate with South Africa and Portugal.

Many people do not understand these things. They ask us why we do not get on with the job of dealing with the social and economic problems facing our own countries, and why we do not leave the other matters alone until we have done so. . . . Our nationalist motivation . . . means that continuing colonialism anywhere—but particularly in Africa—is an affront to those of us who have won independence. . . . Tanganyika cannot rest content while alien rule continues in the south of our continent.

<sup>6</sup> Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanganyika, made an official visit to the United States July 14-20; for text of a joint communique by President Kennedy and President Nyerere, see *ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 198.

## Problem of Political Stability

The problem of maintaining political stability in a newly independent nation is an extremely complicated and delicate task. The people demand much, and often there is relatively little to give. And the task of providing what little there is satisfactorily calls for a high degree of statesmanship.

In most African colonies only a limited number of indigenous civil servants were trained. Therefore the new governments have had to choose between continuing all or part of a trained European civil service or employing untrained or partially trained indigenous people. This choice has been and remains a hard one between governmental efficiency and the political pressure of rapid Africanization. There is no question but that Africans can be trained to do the job, but this cannot be done overnight. Schools of public administration, therefore, become a tremendously important part of any African program.

In the larger countries with well-developed tribal loyalties there is the added problem of making the power of the central government effective in the remoter regions.

It is challenges such as these that tend to encourage the development of vigorous, often one-party systems to provide order and direction during the transition from strong centralized colonial rule to the yet-to-be-developed African national norms. According to a recent analysis of political systems in 32 African nations, the one-party system prevails in 15 countries and the multiparty system flourishes in another 15 states, while in 2 African countries (Libya and Sudan) no elections have been held in some time.

Much as we would prefer systems more in keeping with the particular kind of democratic tradition we are accustomed to, it is important to understand Africa's one-party systems. First of all, they normally bear little resemblance to the monolithic Nazi and Communist models that the term "one-party system" immediately evokes in this country. There is a varying amount of internal discussion and plurality in decision-making inside the one-party framework. Furthermore, it can be hoped that the

present phase is transitional. We must remember there was no two-party system in this country immediately after our Revolution. Most of today's African political leaders are the revolutionary fathers of their countries, and widespread formal opposition to them is probably not to be expected in the early days of independence.

An explanation of the party system and democracy in Africa was recently given by Tom Mboya, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in Kenya and Secretary-General of the recently victorious Kenya African National Union. He said:

Democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people. The supporters of the party system argue as though the word "people" in this definition read "party." A government which gives all citizens the right to vote, the right to contest elections, and the right to express themselves freely inside and outside parliament is not undemocratic.

### **Concern With Living Standards**

While Africa is making progress toward improving its political societies, its leaders are increasingly concerned with the urgent necessity of improving the standards of living of their people, which are abnormally low when compared with Europe or the United States. The average annual per capita income is only \$90 for sub-Saharan Africa, and for Africa as a whole, \$132. Compare that with the \$2,500 per capita income in the United States. The average African farmer—and most Africans are farmers—can produce only about 4 percent of the output of his North American counterpart. Such statistics as these give some indication of Africa's imperative needs.

Foreign capital investments have played an important role in the development of African enterprises and should continue to do so in the future. The Africans have said that they welcome private capital investment with the caveat that it should contribute to the economic well-being of the country as a whole and not be merely for the benefit of "outsiders." The days of colonial exploitation in Africa have virtually come to an end.

If the African people over the long term are to obtain a higher standard of living, they must

look primarily to their own resources to develop their economic and social potentialities. African leaders, faced with a paucity of university-educated people and a literacy rate averaging only about 10 percent, therefore are deeply concerned with developing educational and technical training facilities that will provide the professional and skilled personnel so urgently needed in all sectors of their society.

American programs of assistance, encompassing all levels of formal education as well as technical and professional courses and internships in Africa and overseas, are helping to fulfill this need. Our assistance also includes health programs designed to improve the productivity and general well-being of individuals.

Private American philanthropic organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Phelps-Stokes Fund are engaged in vitally needed educational and health projects in various African areas. Through the activities of Operations Crossroads about 300 students from American colleges paid their own passage to Africa to work on worthwhile projects alongside young Africans. Their goal was to improve relations between Africa and the United States and to help Africans help themselves.

One of the most heartening developments in the African training program has been the outstanding success scored by the Peace Corps. These trained and dedicated volunteers are excellent "ambassadors of good will" for the United States. The volunteers, besides helping to build better societies in Africa, are giving the Africans a glimpse of American idealism in action. Nearly 1,500 American men and women are serving as Peace Corps volunteers in 16 African countries.

The United Nations programs in Africa, which the United States is supporting, are providing substantial assistance to the well-being of Africa. The U.N. through its specialized agencies has been especially active in the fields of education and health. The U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization has given high priority to projects for improving agriculture to bolster the economic development of the African nations.

American leadership in world affairs re-

quires us to take a positive role in Africa. We must keep our eyes on the long-term future of Africa, which I regard as bright with promise.

Therefore let us not be dismayed by temporary disappointments, misunderstandings, and perhaps setbacks. In the formulation of United States foreign policies toward Africa, we see these nations as important members of the world community, having their own dignity and sharing with us in the great aspirations of human rights, freedom, and independence.

## Ambassadors Asked To Report on Activities in Promoting Exports

Press release 401 dated August 2

*The Secretary of State on August 2 signed a letter to American ambassadors abroad concerning the strong emphasis which the export drive continues to require for balance-of-payments reasons. The text of Secretary Rusk's letter follows.*

AUGUST 2, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: You will recall that in my letter of October 19, 1962,<sup>1</sup> I emphasized the role which our Chiefs of Mission and their senior staff members would need to play in order for us to succeed in our joint efforts to expand adequately the volume of American exports.

I am sure you are aware that our balance-of-payments situation remains a very real and stubborn problem, even though our current export volume constitutes some improvement over the recent past. The facts are that imports in 1962 increased by \$1.7 billion while exports increased by \$800 million (from \$20.1 to \$20.9 billion). Hence our net surplus on merchandise trade declined. International payments of all types, which include military expenditures and foreign aid, of course, continued to exceed receipts and our balance of payments remained in the red by some \$2.2 billion.

As a companion piece to the export drive, the Administration is taking all actions which it believes are currently possible—consistent with our foreign policy objectives and position of

leadership in the free world—to moderate the balance-of-payments impact of our governmental activities and programs abroad.<sup>2</sup> Clearly these actions need to be kept within those bounds which will neither impair our national security and other foreign policy objectives nor circumscribe the latitude which our citizens enjoy in their trade and financial relationships abroad. If the United States can push its exports to a substantially higher plateau, many elements of our balance-of-payments problem will disappear without resort to actions which would be unpalatable both domestically and internationally. The rough road of restrictive retrogression is the last thing that we would wish to contemplate.

Since I wrote to Chiefs of Mission last fall on the importance of their personal participation in the support of export promotion, I have had many gratifying reports as to what they and their senior staff members have been doing to further this vital activity.

Because of the special emphasis which we in Washington attach to the Export Expansion Program for balance-of-payments reasons, I should appreciate it if your Embassy would prepare for my guidance and that of the Secretary of Commerce a summary of your Mission's recent activities in line with the concepts expressed in my earlier letter. I should like such a report to cover the specific ways in which the Embassy has found it possible to give support to this program. I would also like to know of the particular difficulties encountered in promoting United States exports, what the Embassy thinks needs to be done to solve these problems, as well as any suggestions for improving our export expansion work as a whole. Material already submitted need not be repeated but only brought up to date.

I look forward to receiving such a report and I am confident that it will reflect that degree of participation and support necessary to ensure the success of our export drive.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK

<sup>1</sup> For text of a special message of President Kennedy to the Congress dated July 18, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1962, p. 682.

## The Kennedy Round—Progress and Promise

by William T. Gossett

Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations<sup>1</sup>

A little over 9 months ago the Trade Expansion Act was launched, upon a tranquil sea and with a favoring wind. Since then, it has been buffeted by high winds of protectionism and of nationalism, sometimes mounting to gale force. Despite all that has happened, we have kept afloat—and we have even made some headway.

Certainly—and this has been a source of great strength to us—the dedication of President Kennedy to the principles and goals of the act has not weakened or even wavered. The negotiations authorized by the act, already known as “the Kennedy Round,” are, he said in Frankfurt last month,<sup>2</sup> “a test of our unity.” And he added, very pertinently: “While each nation must naturally look out for its own interests, each nation must also look out for the common interest. . . .”

I shall give you this evening a short account of our voyages and adventures so far. I shall also take a look at what lies ahead of us before we can hope to make harbor. I do so with the warning, inspired by experience, that we must expect the unexpected and be prepared to adjust to it.

Indeed, it was while Governor Herter [Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] and I were on our initial exploratory mission to Europe that we had our first painful surprise—the collapse of the negotiations for British entry

into the Common Market.<sup>3</sup> Apart from its many other unfortunate consequences—with which we shall have to live until Britain takes her rightful place in Europe, as I am confident she will—this made the “dominant supplier” provision of the Trade Expansion Act virtually ineffective. Under this provision, as you know, the President has authority to bargain for the complete elimination of tariffs on items for which the United States and the EEC [European Economic Community] account for 80 percent of the free world's exports. With Britain in the EEC, this would have embraced a very wide range of trade; without her, it applied only to aircraft and possibly one or two other items.

Even so, the President has unprecedented bargaining authority. He has the basic authority to reduce tariffs by 50 percent over a 5-year period. He also can cut tariffs by any amount on any item the current duty on which is 5 percent or less, and on agricultural commodities and tropical agricultural and forestry products under certain circumstances. I stress these points because it is often forgotten that, despite the Brussels breakdown, the Trade Expansion Act still has these liberal provisions for slashing tariffs down to zero.

“It Takes Two To Tango” was the theme of a popular dance tune. And it takes two to make a success of the coming trade negotiations. The United States, as I have indicated, is willing and able to negotiate on a wide front. Much depends upon whether our principal trading

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Koppers Company Business International Roundtable at Pittsburgh, Pa., on July 17.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 237.

partner, the European Common Market, is equally able and willing. This is what we explored during the spring months of this year, culminating in the GATT ministerial meeting in May.<sup>4</sup>

### The Concept of "Ecrêtement"

Those of you who have taken an interest in trade union negotiations in the United States over the years will recall that able and resourceful union spokesmen sometimes raise an issue—like the demand to "open the books" in the automobile industry—as a talking point preliminary to actual bargaining. By its novelty, such a talking point can attract favorable publicity and keep management on the defensive. Sometimes, when such an issue has been squeezed dry of all the tactical advantages it offers, it is dropped; sometimes it is pressed at the bargaining table in a watered-down and more readily negotiable form.

Whether it was so planned or not, a suggestion made by the EEC, called *écrêtement*, turned out to be just such a gambit to the GATT meeting in May. Like "open the books," it had an attractive sound and a plausible content.

The U.S. tariff schedule, while it averages about the same as the Common Market's, has more high rates and more low rates; EEC tariffs, in the process of being averaged among the six member nations, are bunched in the middle. It was suggested—first through friendly journalists and then formally at a preliminary working party—that *écrêtement*—roughly translatable as "de-peakng"—was the magic answer. Instead of the across-the-board, linear tariff cuts for which we had been preparing for many months—and which the Six have been practicing among themselves—an entirely new and complex negotiating formula was put forward. It was proposed that the industrialized countries should move toward uniform tariffs—one level for raw materials, another for semimanufactures, still another for manufactured products. During the forthcoming round of tariff negotiations, according to the plan, each country would lower its tariffs by half of the dif-

ference between its present tariff rates and the target figures for the various categories. The effect, of course, would be to require deeper cuts in high tariffs than in medium or low tariffs.

The concept of *écrêtement* was, one must admit, a fine flower of the subtle Gallic mind. The main drawback to it is that it does not take us very far along the way to the reduction of tariffs and the promotion of international trade. Indeed, when we put our slide rules to work and brought *écrêtement* down out of the clouds into mundane figures, we found that—as originally proposed—it would have resulted, on the average, in 10-percent cuts in the Common Market's tariffs and 12-percent in ours. In view of our long-proclaimed goal of a 50-percent tariff cut, Shakespeare's "Much Ado About Nothing" would have been a more entertaining fantasy to play at Geneva.

### Achievements at GATT Ministerial Meeting

The EEC spokesmen did not actually press for *écrêtement* at the GATT ministerial meeting, May 16 to 21. They chose rather to stress the "disparities" presented by high U.S. tariffs and to seek some formula by which to bring them under attack. This was the issue that was debated long and vigorously, and finally resolved. It emerged as the fourth of the "Principles" listed in the ministerial resolution<sup>5</sup> and reads in part as follows:

... the tariff negotiations . . . shall be based upon a plan of substantial linear [across-the-board] tariff reductions with a bare minimum of exceptions which shall be subject to confrontation and justification. The linear reductions shall be equal. In those cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of general and automatic application.

In presenting this language, the conference chairman added for the record that "significant" disparities are construed to be "meaningful in trade terms." This is, in our view, an essential part of the compromise that was hammered out at Geneva.

There have been a variety of verdicts on the Geneva meeting. I note for example that *Trade Talk*, published by the Committee for a National Trade Policy, declared editorially:

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, June 24, 1963, p. 090.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 095.

Many were disappointed that there seemed to be so little substantive progress at the recent negotiations. It seemed that, after monumental preparations by the EEC and the USA, the mountain had given birth to a mouse.

I understand the reasons for such a feeling, and I suspect that some of you may share it. I think, however, that we have some solid reasons for satisfaction at the outcome.

At the very least, we avoided a crackup of the Kennedy Round. When Ulysses sailed his boat between Scylla and Charybdis, he may have negotiated only a few hundred yards—but without surviving that passage he never would have reached Ithaca.

Moreover, the Ministers showed a willingness to make firm decisions, rather than to put them off—notably in tackling the thorny problem of rules for the negotiations, and in setting a definite date, May 4, 1964, for the actual beginning of the talks.

Also, the Ministers made remarkable progress in other matters. They did much to recognize the needs of the less developed nations in the field of trade. They made important decisions about the inclusion of agriculture in a general lowering of trade barriers. And they determined that *all* barriers to trade—not merely tariffs—must be attacked.

We consider these to be very substantial achievements, although they left formidable problems to be resolved—the precise way in which the tariff disparities question is to be dealt with and the manner in which agriculture can be involved in the negotiations.

Speaking of the disparities question, the German Vice Chancellor, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, aptly commented: “We are agreed on the shell of an egg. What will be in the egg, we do not know.”

While agreeing with Dr. Erhard that only the shell was settled—that is, very general rules of procedure with vitally important details still to be spelled out—we take considerable satisfaction in the shape of the shell. It provides for a full measure of reciprocity between the U.S. and the EEC. It places no arbitrary limits on reductions in tariffs and upholds the important principle of equal reductions. It provides the means for dealing with disparities whenever they make a real dollar difference to any nation.

And it endorses linear tariff reductions and provides safeguards against unjustified exceptions.

### Question of Agricultural Trade

In the longer run the question of agriculture is likely to be crucial. From the beginning we have made it clear that the negotiations we seek cannot be confined to industrial goods. The level of U.S. exports depends heavily upon markets for agricultural commodities, especially in the EEC.

We have already had a sharp warning, in the form of the prohibitive tariffs imposed upon our poultry exports,<sup>6</sup> of protectionist tendencies in the common agricultural policy of the EEC. Let me dwell a bit on this poultry question, because we consider it an excellent illustration of the case for freer trade among nations.

Modern American methods of producing broilers are so efficient as to amount to a genuine technological breakthrough. Between 1948 and 1962, while virtually all other prices of consumers' goods were rising, the prices received by our producers of broilers actually dropped from 32.3 cents per pound to 15.2 cents.

Through international trade, the benefit of this breakthrough was widely shared by consumers in many countries—and particularly in Germany, where cheap broilers created what was virtually a new market. Between 1956 and 1962 the per capita consumption of poultry meat in West Germany almost tripled—from 4.6 pounds to 12.3 pounds. Thus the average German family could look forward to chicken every Sunday—instead of every 3 weeks, as in the past.

They are not getting such a bargain at present. Between mid-1962 and the present, the total duty on U.S. broilers imported into West Germany has been stepped up from less than 5 cents per pound to about 13½ cents.

Poultry—although an important test case—is only a small portion of our total agricultural exports to the Common Market. They amounted to \$1.2 billion in 1962, as compared with only \$200 million in U.S. imports of EEC agricultural products. They account for almost all our trade surplus with the Common Market,

<sup>6</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, p. 996.

out of which our vital military commitments there are financed.

These exports are in grave danger of being drastically slashed if the EEC common agricultural policy takes the protectionist path that it did in poultry. Crucial to this question is the level at which the Common Market target price for grain is set. If it is set at or near the highest price levels prevailing in the Common Market—those in Germany—French agriculture will become immensely profitable. Output will be expanded greatly.

This decision is imminent—among other things, because the French have made it clear that the EEC's common agricultural policy must be implemented before they will engage in serious tariff negotiations. And, once the decision is made, it will, because of the slowness with which agricultural systems change and the special political compulsions to which they give rise, affect the world's economy for many years to come.

It is not only our interests that are involved. The Common Market's agricultural policy, even at its present early stage of implementation, has already brought on an economic crisis in neighboring Denmark so grave that drastic austerity measures have been taken by its Government to cope with it. If a high target price for grain stimulates French production, exporting nations like Australia and Canada will be increasingly plagued by the problems of unmanageable world surpluses.

It is for this reason that we are seeking, in the coming round of GATT talks, what we call "arrangements" for cereals, meats, and dairy products.

We recognize the political problems in each of the participating countries. We have our own political problems as well. But, as a manifestation of the seriousness of our intentions to tackle these problems on a worldwide scale, we are willing to discuss our own agricultural system at the bargaining table.

#### **Technical Problems**

Apart from the serious and difficult issues at stake, negotiations with the EEC present challenging technical problems. At this stage in their coalescence, the six member nations find

achieving a common outlook—and hence endowing the EEC Commission with negotiating authority—a long and difficult process. Decisions are hammered out only after prolonged discussion and tend to come very late in the day.

For example, as I speak now, the EEC Commission has yet to be granted authority to negotiate on commodity arrangements for meats and cereals, on nontariff barriers to trade, and even on poultry.

Even when the Six *do* endow their Commission spokesman with negotiating authority, the representatives of the member nations ride very close herd on him and are quick to jog his elbow when questions of national interest are at stake.

It is precisely for this reason that the responsibility for setting a sensible pace, for moving "with all deliberate speed" toward the target date of May 4, 1964, rests squarely upon us. We have important homework to do. By getting ahead with it, we can help and inspire—and perhaps even prod—the Common Market to get ahead with theirs.

By early September we hope that the President will be able to submit to the Tariff Commission a list of the articles on which we contemplate negotiating. The length and depth of this list will, we believe, be more than adequate to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States is fully dedicated to the policy of freeing trade. Our list, I believe, will challenge the EEC to enter this phase of the negotiations in the same spirit.

The Trade Expansion Act requires the Tariff Commission to advise the President as to the probable economic effect of any proposed trade agreement concession on any article. The Commission is required to hold hearings in the course of its investigations and to give all interested persons an opportunity to present their views. It must render its advice to the President within 6 months of the time he submits the list to it.

In addition, the Trade Information Committee—an interagency committee—will hold hearings roughly during the same period. At these hearings any interested person may present his views on any matter relevant to the proposed trade agreement. These hearings will focus largely upon determining which foreign tariffs and trade restrictions are most burdensome to

U.S. exporters, and I hope that the exporters among you will be forthcoming with this vital information, which only you, really, are in a position to give.

In any program of linear tariff cuts, there must be exceptions. Indeed, the EEC nations have made exceptions to the tariff cuts among themselves. The Trade Expansion Act itself specifically reserves certain items from the negotiations. In addition, the President has complete discretion to reserve additional items, taking into account the advice of the Tariff Commission. We expect this discretion to be used sparingly and that other nations will show equal self-restraint.

### **Prospects for Kennedy Round**

The question recurs, however—will this mountain of effort produce only a mouse of tangible achievement?

I begin by sounding a cautionary note. Some commentators have accused us of taking what they call the "hard line" with the EEC. I prefer to call our line flexible but firm.

We are flexible in our recognition of the legitimate needs of other nations and in our willingness to seek means, within the framework of an agreement which is generally equitable, to accommodate them. We do not consider this the kind of negotiation in which one side must lose if the other wins.

As we see it, both sides stand to gain—and can gain.

But we are firm in our determination not to make an imprudent agreement for the sake of appearances, or for public relations purposes, or merely to paper over the cracks without really closing them. We are prepared to sit at the bargaining table so long as an agreement fair to both sides seems even remotely possible of achievement. But we are also prepared to walk away from the bargaining table if no such agreement is feasible.

So much for the cautionary note. Now I shall give reasons for optimism—a prudent optimism—about the outcome of all our efforts.

In the aeronautical industry they used to describe the airplane as "a machine so complicated that it almost doesn't work." Sometimes these trade negotiations likewise seem so complex and

so beset with difficulties of all kinds that it seems just barely possible that they will work out.

What makes the airplane fly is the power of its engine. What can make these trade negotiations succeed is the motive power provided by the needs—and the hopes—of many nations and of most of mankind.

First, a few facts about the urgent need for success in lowering tariffs and other barriers to trade.

There is need for it within the EEC itself. Since the door was closed—temporarily, we hope—on Britain, the gulf between Europe's two great trading blocs, the EEC and the European Free Trade Association, has widened and deepened. Each expects to eliminate all internal tariffs by 1967. The EEC has already gone 60 percent of the way, and EFTA will reach this point by the end of the year.

The tariff discriminations thus created will cut squarely across traditional channels of trade. To take one example: West Germany's world trade surplus is estimated at \$500 million for last year, but with EFTA alone it was \$1.4 billion. Without its markets in EFTA—which will be increasingly threatened by tariff discrimination—Germany would have suffered a trade deficit of \$900 million in 1962.

The EFTA nations likewise will suffer from this widening trade gap. Sweden's trade with Belgium, for example, was considerably reduced last year, and Swedish authorities have described the prospects after the latest EEC internal tariff cut as "even more unpromising." They have warned that the tariff gap between the EEC and EFTA has reached the point where it menaces intra-European trade.

The ultimate solution, and one to which the United States looks forward with long-term confidence, is the economic integration of Europe. Since the breakdown at Brussels, such integration is not imminent, but success at GATT in lowering tariffs can keep the split from deepening and may even help to heal it.

The impact of the EEC is not confined to Europe but is worldwide in character. I have already referred to the grave concern of nations, like ourselves, which export Temperate Zone agricultural products, a concern which the

developing pattern of the EEC's common agricultural policy fully justifies.

The less developed nations are also deeply worried over the possible disruption of traditional patterns of trade. This is one of the chief forces behind the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, scheduled for next year. It is a warning too that GATT must work effectively, in the general interest of *all* its members, or the pressure to establish alternative trade machinery will be irresistible.

All these pressures already converge upon the EEC, and they will increase in the coming months. As we are, the EEC is a world force, and it is in the process of facing up to world responsibilities. Its officials have publicly recognized this fact. President Walter Hallstein of the EEC Commission said last month:

The two aspects of our nature—that we cohere internally and are open to the world and turned toward the world—are inseparable from each other.

It is not only the needs of much of the world but the hopes as well that focus upon Geneva. There are the hopes of the great majority of Europeans for the "fully cohesive Europe" of which the President spoke at Frankfurt. There are the hopes of men of good will on both sides of the Atlantic for a fruitful partnership. There are the hopes of the less developed nations, mostly in the southern half of the world, for the opportunities in trade that will enable them to earn a better living for their peoples.

#### The "Grand Design"

These are the same hopes which make up what has been called the "Grand Design."

A regiment of self-appointed Cassandras has been in full cry in recent months. We have been told that Europe is in outright rebellion against the United States—against "Governess America," as one columnist put it. We have been told that neutralism is sweeping Europe—or, alternatively, that Europe is seeking to become a "third force," playing the United States off against the Soviet Union and vice versa. These "waves of the future," it is predicted, will sweep the Grand Design away like a castle in the sand.

There even seems to be a tendency to belittle the phrase itself—a tendency which I am unable to understand. Ours is a great nation, and grand objectives become it better than petty ones.

There is one feature which is common to all this babble of voices. They purport to tell us what Europeans are thinking, but they seldom quote what influential Europeans have been saying.

To mention a few, Lord Home, Britain's Foreign Secretary, has called the idea of a European unity excluding America "profoundly mistaken." And, just to make it unanimous for Britain, Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labor Party, said during his visit to Washington this spring that his party has as its goal "an Atlantic—and wider than Atlantic—Community."

The self-same sentiments are widely and deeply held within the Common Market, as evinced, for example, by the insistence of the German Parliament that its approval of the Franco-German treaty should in no way diminish its dedication to a wider European unity and to an Atlantic partnership with America.

Different sentiments may occasionally be expressed in some German *schloss* or some French salon. But they are minority voices, voices of the past. The debates of recent months have only underlined the fact that those who look to the future look to the Atlantic. They prefer the Grand Design of the future to the *grandeurs* of the past. Indeed, the words of Governor Herter 2 days after the collapse of the British talks<sup>7</sup> today are as true as when they were spoken:

Regardless of the setbacks that it may meet now and then, I am confident that the development of this [Atlantic] partnership represents the true course of the history of our countries.

Necessity compels, hope inspires. Both necessity and hope, deeply and widely felt, will be sitting at the table in Geneva next year, and they will be mighty forces working on and through the delegations of many nations toward the success of the Kennedy Round.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1963, p. 298.

## **U.S.-Canadian Economic Committee To Meet at Washington**

Press release 397 dated July 30

The eighth annual meeting of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs will be held in Washington September 20-21.

Representing the Government of Canada will be the Honorable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Honorable Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance; the Honorable Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce; and the Honorable Harry Hays, Minister of Agriculture.

The United States will be represented by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; the Honorable Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable Luther H. Hodges, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; the Honorable Charles S. Murphy, Under Secretary of Agriculture; and the Honorable John A. Carver, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

The annual meeting of the Joint Committee which was inaugurated in 1953 provides an opportunity for Cabinet officers of both governments to consider economic and trade matters of common concern to the two countries. Previous meetings have been beneficial in furthering understanding between the two governments on economic and trade matters. The last meeting was held in Ottawa January 12-13, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

## **AID Closes Mission in Haiti**

The Agency for International Development on August 1 announced the closing of its mission in the Republic of Haiti. The action culminates the phasing out of AID programs and services over the past year. The three remaining employees in the Port-au-Prince office will be assigned to other duties.

With two exceptions AID has now suspended all its projects in Haiti. Reflecting the abiding interest of the United States in the welfare of

the island's people, AID will continue its support of a malaria-eradication project and a Food-for-Peace program serving 160,000 Haitians, including many children.

The malaria project, financed with the help of a U.S. grant, employs Haitian nationals supervised by four U.S. and seven Pan American Health Organization technicians. In the future the malaria project will be administered by that agency.

The United States will continue to donate food commodities to CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service, which distribute the food under contract agreements with Haiti.

## **W. M. Blumenthal Confirmed Deputy for Trade Negotiations**

The Senate on July 31 confirmed W. Michael Blumenthal to be a Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador.

## **Members of Advisory Commission on Cultural Affairs Confirmed**

The Senate on July 31 confirmed Walter Adams and Mabel M. Smythe to be members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, each for a term of 3 years expiring May 11, 1966, and until a successor is appointed and has qualified.

## **Letters of Credence**

### *Algeria*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Algeria, Cherif Guellal, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on July 24. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 388 dated July 24.

<sup>1</sup> For text of a communique issued at the close of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 168.

## President Recommends Revision of Immigration Laws

*Following is the text of a letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate. An identical letter was sent on the same day to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

White House press release dated July 23

JULY 23, 1963

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am transmitting herewith, for the consideration of the Congress, legislation revising and modernizing our immigration laws. More than a decade has elapsed since the last substantial amendment to these laws. I believe there exists a compelling need for the Congress to re-examine and make certain changes in these laws.

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am recommending relates to the national origins system of selecting immigrants. Since 1924 it has been used to determine the number of quota immigrants permitted to enter the United States each year. Accordingly, although the legislation I am transmitting deals with many problems which require remedial action, it concentrates attention primarily upon revision of our quota immigration system. The enactment of this legislation will not resolve all of our important problems in the field of immigration law. It will, however, provide a sound basis upon which we can build in developing an immigration law that serves the national interest and reflects in every detail the principles of equality and human dignity to which our nation subscribes.

### Elimination of Discrimination Based on National Origins

Present legislation establishes a system of annual quotas to govern immigration from each country. Under this system, 156,700 quota im-

migrants are permitted to enter the United States each year. The system is based upon the national origins of the population of the United States in 1920. The use of the year 1920 is arbitrary. It rests upon the fact that this system was introduced in 1924 and the last prior census was in 1920. The use of a national origins system is without basis in either logic or reason. It neither satisfies a national need nor accomplishes an international purpose. In an age of interdependence among nations, such a system is an anachronism, for it discriminates among applicants for admission into the United States on the basis of accident of birth.

Because of the composition of our population in 1920, the system is heavily weighted in favor of immigration from northern Europe and severely limits immigration from southern and eastern Europe and from other parts of the world. An American citizen with a Greek father or mother must wait at least 18 months to bring his parents here to join him. A citizen whose married son or daughter, or brother or sister, is Italian cannot obtain a quota number for them for an even longer time. Meanwhile, many thousands of quota numbers are wasted because they are not wanted or needed by nationals of the countries to which they are assigned.

I recommend that there be substituted for the national origins system a formula governing immigration to the United States which takes into account (1) the skills of the immigrant and their relationship to our needs, (2) the family relationship between immigrants and persons already here, so that the reuniting of families is encouraged, and (3) the priority of registration. Present law grants a preference to immigrants with special skills, education or training. It also grants a preference to various relatives of United States citizens and lawfully resident aliens. But it does so only within a national origins quota. It should be modified so that

those with the greatest ability to add to the national welfare, no matter where they were born, are granted the highest priority. The next priority should go to those who seek to be reunited with their relatives. As between applicants with equal claims the earliest registrant should be the first admitted.

Many problems of fairness and foreign policy are involved in replacing a system so long entrenched. The national origins system has produced large backlogs of applications in some countries, and too rapid a change might, in a system of limited immigration, so drastically curtail immigration in some countries the only effect might be to shift the unfairness from one group of nations to another. A reasonable time to adjust to any new system must be provided if individual hardships upon persons who were relying on the present system are to be avoided. In addition, any new system must have sufficient flexibility to allow adjustments to be made when it appears that immigrants from nations closely allied to the United States will be unduly restricted in their freedom to furnish the new seed population that has so long been a source of strength to our nation.

Accordingly, I recommend:

*First*, that existing quotas be reduced gradually, at the rate of 20 percent a year. The quota numbers released each year would be placed in a quota reserve pool, to be distributed on the new basis.

*Second*, that natives of no one country receive over 10 percent of the total quota numbers authorized in any one year. This will insure that the pattern of immigration is not distorted by excessive demand from any one country.

*Third*, that the President be authorized, after receiving recommendations from a 7-man Immigration Board, to reserve up to 50 percent of the unallocated quota numbers, for issuance to persons disadvantaged by the change in the quota system, and up to 20 percent to refugees whose sudden dislocation requires special treatment. The Immigration Board will be composed of 2 members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 2 members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and 3 members appointed by the President. In addition to its responsibility for

formulating recommendations regarding the use of the quota reserve pool, the Board will make a continuous study of our immigration policy.

#### **All Quota Numbers Used**

But it is not alone the initial assignment of quota numbers which is arbitrary and unjust; additional inequity results from the failure of the law to permit full utilization of the authorized quota numbers. While American citizens wait for years for their relatives to receive a quota, approximately 60,000 quota numbers are wasted each year because the countries to which they are assigned have far more numbers allocated to them than they have emigrants seeking to move to the United States. There is no way at present in which these numbers can be reassigned to nations where immense backlogs of applicants for admission to the United States have accumulated. I recommend that this deficiency in the law be corrected.

#### **Asia-Pacific Triangle**

A special discriminatory formula is now used to regulate the immigration of persons who are attributable by their ancestry to an area called the Asia-Pacific triangle. This area embraces all countries from Pakistan to Japan and the Pacific islands north of Australia and New Zealand. Usually, the quota under which a prospective immigrant must enter is determined by his place of birth. However, if as much as one-half of an immigrant's ancestors came from nations in the Asia-Pacific triangle, he must rely upon the small quota assigned to the country of his ancestry, regardless of where he was born. This provision of our law should be repealed.

#### **Other Provisions**

In order to remove other existing barriers to the reuniting of families, I recommend two additional improvements in the law.

*First*, parents of American citizens, who now have a preferred quota status, should be accorded nonquota status.

*Second*, parents of aliens resident in the United States, who now have no preference,

should be accorded a preference, after skilled specialists and other relatives of citizens and alien residents.

These changes will have little effect on the number of immigrants admitted. They will have a major effect upon the individual hardships many of our citizens and residents now face in being separated from their parents.

In addition, I recommend the following changes in the law in order to correct certain deficiencies and improve its general application.

1. *Changes in the Preference Structure.* At present, the procedure under which specially skilled or trained workers are permitted to enter this country too often prevents talented people from applying for visas to enter the United States. It often deprives us of immigrants who would be helpful to our economy and our culture. This procedure should be liberalized so that highly trained or skilled persons may obtain a preference without requiring that they secure employment here before emigrating. In addition, I recommend that a special preference be accorded workers with lesser skills who can fill specific needs in short supply in this country.

2. *Non-quota status for natives of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago should be granted.* Under existing law, no numerical limitation is imposed upon the number of immigrants coming from Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or any independent country in Central or South America. But the language of the statute restricts this privilege to persons born in countries in the Caribbean area which gained their independence prior to the date of the last major amendment to the immigration and nationality statutes, in 1952. This accidental discrimination against the newly independent nations of the Western Hemisphere should be corrected.

3. *Persons afflicted with mental health problems should be admitted provided certain standards are met.* Today, any person afflicted with a mental disease or mental defect, psychotic personality, or epilepsy, and any person who has suffered an attack of mental illness, can enter this country only if a private bill is enacted for his benefit. Families which are able and will-

ing to care for a mentally ill child or parent are often forced to choose between living in the United States and leaving their loved ones behind and not living in the United States but being able to see and care for their loved ones. Mental illness is not incurable. It should be treated like other illnesses. I recommend that the Attorney General, at his discretion and under proper safeguards, be authorized to waive those provisions of the law which prohibit the admission to the United States of persons with mental problems when they are close relatives of United States citizens and lawfully resident aliens.

4. *The Secretary of State should be authorized, in his discretion, to require re-registration of certain quota immigrant visa applicants and to regulate the time of payment of visa fees.* This authority brings registration lists up to date, terminates the priority of applicants who have refused to accept a visa, and ends the problem of "insurance" registrations by persons who have no present intention to emigrate. Registration figures for oversubscribed quota areas are now inaccurate because there exists no way of determining whether registrants have died, have emigrated to other countries, or for some other reason no longer want to emigrate to the United States. These problems are particularly acute in heavily oversubscribed areas.

## Conclusion

As I have already indicated the measures I have outlined will not solve all the problems of immigration. Many of them will require additional legislation: some cannot be solved by any one country. But the legislation I am submitting will insure that progress will continue be made toward our ideals and toward the realization of humanitarian objectives. The measures I have recommended will help eliminate discrimination between peoples and nations on a basis that is unrelated to any contribution that immigrants can make and is inconsistent with our traditions of welcome. Our investment in new citizens has always been a valuable source of our strength.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

## Department Welcomes Amendment to Philippine War Damage Act

Press release 400 dated July 31

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

The Department of State on July 31 welcomed the passage by the House of Representatives of the Fulbright-Hays amendment to the Philippine War Damage Act of 1962. The amendment provided equitable settlement of all outstanding claims based on a \$25,000 limitation on any individual claim. This ceiling would permit 99.6 percent of the 86,000 claimants to be paid in full. Balances of claims over \$25,000, which previously would have gone to \$7 large claimants, would be paid into a special account to be used for educational programs in the Philippines and educational exchange programs agreed upon between the President of the Philippines and the President of the United States.

It is estimated that this special educational fund would amount to approximately \$20 million to \$30 million. Senator Fulbright made clear in his comments to the Senate describing the amendment that the educational programs that could be covered could be broadly conceived. As examples, Senator Fulbright noted the fund could be used in the Philippines for school construction; assistance to teachers salaries; providing training, salaries, and equipment of community development specialists, to provide support for the educational aspects of the youth movement; vocational training and agricultural extension work.

### REMARKS BY MR. HILSMAN<sup>1</sup>

The amendment to the Philippine War Claims Bill which has just passed the American Congress seems to me to be a symbol of the unique relationship between the United States and the Philippines. It is also, I might say, a

tangible vote of confidence in President Macapagal's administration and in the ability of his administration to get things done.

You will note that the amendment provides for a full settlement of the mass of the claims. Ninety-nine point six percent of the 86,000 claimants will be compensated to the maximum permitted under the original 1946 legislation. But, in addition, this compromise legislation provides a special educational fund which will amount to some \$20 million or \$30 million, which will be available to the Philippine Government for educational programs and exchange. It is not just for educational exchange.

Senator Fulbright stressed that it was the intent of the American Congress that these programs could be most broadly conceived. Sympathetic consideration is given in Senator Fulbright's statement to training and educational assistance, to teachers salaries, to whatever serves to promote education in the Philippines.

It is up to the Government of the Philippines to determine which programs it wishes to use this money for. The fund can be geared to and be an integral part of President Macapagal's 5-year social economic program and Land Reform Act. We in the United States will cooperate to the fullest extent permitted under the legislation to make this money have a broad impact on the whole of the Philippines. The Government of the Philippines can then redirect its own appropriations from the educational field into other areas of economic and social development.

Thus the amendment insures that the smaller claimants will be paid in full. At the same time, the Filipino people as a whole, who suffered as a nation through the war, will receive the benefits of rehabilitation payments. Not just a narrow segment of society but the whole of the Philippines will benefit by this special fund set up under the compromise legislation.

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<sup>1</sup> Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES**

**Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings <sup>1</sup>**

**Adjourned During July 1963**

U.N. ECAFE Training Center Seminar on Customs Administration.	Bangkok . . . . .	May 28-July 2
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 30th Session	New York . . . . .	May 29-July 1
ILO Inter-American Vocational Training Research and Documentation Center: 2d Preparatory Meeting.	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	June 24-July 2
FAO Council: 40th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 24-July 3
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 25-July 3
GATT Working Group on Printing Costs . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 1-2
OECD Industry Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 1-2
OECD Fisheries Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 1-3
IMCO Working Group on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea.	London . . . . .	July 1-5
International Whaling Commission: 15th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 1-5
GATT Meats Group . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 1-6
GATT Tariff Reduction Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 1-6
26th International Conference on Public Education . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 1-12
IBE Executive Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 1-12
U.N. ECOSOC Regional Cartographic Conference for Africa . . . . .	Nairobi . . . . .	July 1-15
OECD Committee for Manpower and Social Affairs . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 2-3
OECD Energy Committee Working Party . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 2 (1 day)
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Group on the International Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic.	Paris . . . . .	July 2-5
U.N. ECAFE Regional Symposium on Flood Control, Reclamation, Utilization, and Development of Deltic Areas.	Bangkok . . . . .	July 2-9
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Meeting on the Congo.	Paris . . . . .	July 3 (1 day)
U.N. Sugar Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 3-4
OECD Committee for Agriculture . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 4-6
FAO Group on Grains: 8th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	July 4-12
3d International Film Festival . . . . .	Moscow . . . . .	July 7-21
OECD Joint Working Party on Apples and Pears . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 8 (1 day)
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 8-12
South Pacific Commission: Exploratory Talks . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 8-12
GATT Working Party on Relations With Poland . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 9-11
OECD Maritime Transport Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 9-10
OECD Economic Policy Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 10-11
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III (Balance of Payments).	Paris . . . . .	July 12-13
Conference of Aeronautical Authorities . . . . .	Ottawa . . . . .	July 15-20
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris . . . . .	July 16-17
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Planning and Project Formulation: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 16-24
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Fiscal and Financial Policies and Administration: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 16-24
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Agricultural Development and Agrarian Re-form: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 16-24
U.N. ECA Meeting of Experts on Establishment of an African Development Bank.	Khartoum, Sudan . . . . .	July 16-26
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Meeting on East Africa.	Paris . . . . .	July 18-19

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 2, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization.

Inter-American Conference on Biology Education . . . . .	San José . . . . .	July 21-28
OECD Tourism Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 22 (1 day)
Working Party on Costs of Production and Prices of the OECD Economic Policy Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party of Experts on the Relation of Wage Differentials to Labor Mobility.	Paris . . . . .	July 23 (1 day)
OECD Oil Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 23-25
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 24-25

**In Session as of August 1, 1963**

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2, 1963-
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Industrial Development and Financing of the Private Sector: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 26-
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Commu- nity Development: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 26-
U.N. ECA Conference of African Finance Ministers for the Estab- lishment of a Development Bank.	Khartoum, Sudan . . . . .	July 27-
International Coffee Council . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 29-
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 31-

**United States Explains Position on Portuguese Territories**

*Following are statements made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, on July 26 and 31, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on July 31.*

**STATEMENT OF JULY 26**

U.S./U.N. press release 4230

The question which the Security Council has been discussing for the past week has, as we all know, troubled and concerned the United Nations for several years. This concern has been as deeply felt by my Government, I believe, as any other.

The question of Portuguese territories has been considered in the United Nations during this period of time from three separate but very much related aspects. The General Assembly has examined the question in its relationship to chapter XI of the charter and has unequivocally declared itself.<sup>1</sup> The General Assembly has examined the question in relationship to Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and again has unequivocally declared itself.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the Security Council has examined at least part of the question—the situation in Angola—in its relationship to inter-

national friction and the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>3</sup>

And now once again the Security Council at the request of 32 African nations has taken up consideration of this question, and this time in the broader framework of all of the Portuguese territories in Africa.

The position of the United States and our convictions on each of these aspects of the question of Portuguese territories have been set forth both in the Assembly and in the Security Council. However, in order to make entirely clear the starting point or, better perhaps, the broad basis from which the United States approaches our current deliberations, I would, with the indulgence of the Council, like to review very briefly our position with regard to each of these aspects.

First of all, the General Assembly has found the territories under Portuguese administration are non-self-governing territories within the meaning of chapter XI of the charter and, therefore, are subject to the provisions of that chapter. We supported that view in the General Assembly, and we have urged Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations and to fulfill the obligations under chapter XI both as regards the administration of the territories

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1542 (XV).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 497, and July 10, 1961, p. 88.

themselves and also the submission of information to the Secretary-General.

Second, we have steadfastly supported the principle of self-determination. I might add what you already know that this position long antedates the declaration contained in Resolution 1514, that it was first expounded as a universal doctrine by Woodrow Wilson at the end of the First World War. At that time it was still a new idea—though persuasive enough to contribute to the creation of many independent nation-states both in Europe and in the Middle East as successors to the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires. The right of peoples to choose the terms of their political, economic, and social destiny is written into our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution, as it is written into the Charter of the United Nations.

Hence the United States delegation has continuously supported in the United Nations, since the initial consideration of Angola in the Security Council, measures calling for Portuguese recognition of this principle and for an acceleration of political, economic, and social advancement for all inhabitants of Portuguese territories toward the full exercise of this self-determination. Consistent with this belief we have publicly and privately and continuously urged Portugal to accept this principle and give it practical effect for the peoples of Portuguese territories.

We believe the United Nations as an organ devoted to the reduction of international friction, the maintenance of peace and security, and dedicated therefore to peaceful change, must relentlessly strive for a solution to this problem through the creative paths of peace, difficult though these paths may often seem. This principle is fundamental not only to the charter but to the very concept of the United Nations and is one which we shall not abandon. To this end we have supported measures in the Council and in the Assembly. We have also undertaken bilateral efforts, some of which are not unknown to the members of the Council, and we shall continue to do so as long as the source of friction presented by the situation in Portuguese territories continues to exist.

#### Peaceful Self-Determination

Mr. President, up until now I have delayed in participating in this discussion. I have done so because I wished to define the situation within the terms of the charter and the functions of the Security Council. To this end I have studied carefully the letter and accompanying memorandum<sup>4</sup> submitted to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of 32 African nations. I have carefully and attentively considered the presentations of the four African foreign ministers representing the African chiefs of state and heads of government who met so recently at Addis Ababa. I have listened with equal attention and studied just as carefully the Foreign Minister of Portugal's statement to the Council. And after hearing the subsequent statements of the members of the Council, I believe we have a clearer idea of the problem facing the Council and how the Council might act to resolve what is both a stalemate and a dispute. It is a stalemate because we have perceived no progress. It is a dispute because there is a fundamental difference of opinion.

Stalemates are of course a dangerous condition in human affairs. They are the powder kegs of history, and unless they are resolved they may explode at any time into violence with unpredictable consequences for the peace of the world. Change will come in the Portuguese colonies; the present temporary stalemate of forces will be broken one way or another in the not too distant future.

The pace of decolonization in the last 18 years has been phenomenal. When World War II ended there were just over 50 independent nations in the world. Today—less than a generation later—hardly 2 percent of the world's population still live in dependent territories. More independent nations have been created in that period than existed in all the world at the close of World War II. Here is a record to satisfy the most impatient of us. No one can complain that there has not been action and progress—indeed action and progress far beyond what the most optimistic could have expected in 1945.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. S/5317.

Most of this great achievement was accomplished with very little or no bloodshed. This I think is also something of which all of us, liberated and liberators alike, particularly we the members of this great peacekeeping organization, can be proud. We have achieved freedom and we have kept the peace, and we have many members of this organization, both liberated and liberators, to thank.

Now that should also be our goal in the case of the Portuguese territories. Change will come, self-determination will come. There can be no question about that. The only question is whether it will come peacefully or with a violence and bloodshed which will reflect on the prestige of the United Nations and on the loyalty of its members to the charter and which will cause suffering and hardship to the peoples in whose interests we profess to act, the peoples of the Portuguese territories.

There is no conflict of principle before this house. The only issue before us—complex as it may be—is to discover and to agree upon the most practical way open to this organization to help bring about peaceful change, in the interests of the people of the Portuguese territories, in the interests of the Republic of Portugal, and of the independent states of Africa and the peace of the world.

The core of the problem is the acceptance and the application of the right of self-determination, as the preceding speakers have said. Dr. [Alberto Franco] Nogueira, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Portugal, has contended that the criteria and procedure defined by the United Nations for the exercise of this concept cannot justifiably or realistically be considered the only criteria for valid self-determination.

I hope he does not fear that any of us are seeking to deprive Portugal of its proper place in Africa. Many African leaders around this table and elsewhere have emphasized that, once Portugal has granted self-determination, it will, in the interest of the inhabitants of its present territories as well as in its own interest, have a great role to play in the field of economic and cultural development and progress. The United States has in the past offered to give sympathetic consideration to any request by

Portugal for material assistance in fulfilling certain aspects of that responsibility. No doubt others would likewise be prepared to assist. But in any case, with or without help, Portugal's role in Africa will be ended only if it refuses to collaborate in the great and the inevitable changes which are taking place. If it does collaborate, its continuing role is assured, and I for one, sitting here in my own behalf, should like to express with pride the gratitude of my Government for the progress that Portugal is attempting to make to improve the conditions of life among the inhabitants of its territories.

However, the overwhelming majority of the United Nations, which have been most effectively represented by the African ministers present at the Council table, do not agree that the self-determination of which the Foreign Minister of Portugal speaks is sufficient. And this disagreement has been the subject not only of this discussion here during the past week but of many decisions in the United Nations. We must persevere, I suggest, as the charter requires in peaceful efforts to establish this principle and to get it carried out. We believe the African states have shown a sense of responsibility in coming to the Council with such a clear and such a reasonable objective.

For our part, the United States cannot accept and must emphatically reject the concept suggested to the Council that an acceptable means of solving such a problem is to aggravate the situation until it does indeed become a threat to international peace and security, as my distinguished British colleague has said here a moment ago. This concept is a contradiction of the provisions and the spirit of the charter itself to which we and our governments are pledged to conform. We are not here to create threats to peace and security but to prevent them; we are not here to endanger the peace but to guard it. We are here to strengthen and not to burn the moral and the legal foundations of a peaceful world order.

Unfortunately the problem is that there is no dialog going on and thus little chance for the voice of reason to prevail. There is a kind of vacuum in which emotions can only continue to become embittered. But we believe—based

on the statements of the four foreign ministers, who in the first instance seek a peaceful solution and have appealed for Portuguese cooperation, and on the statement of the Foreign Minister of Portugal, who suggested conversations with African leaders without reservations or restrictions—that the grounds exist for these channels to be reopened in the interests of the people of the Portuguese territories.

### **Getting Parties Together**

This then, it seems to us, is the place to start. The second essential is to make sure that they are talking about the right things, including the means of exercising self-determination. Now, Mr. President, third parties cannot speak for Portugal, nor can they speak for the people of the Portuguese colonies, nor for the African leaders. Yet it is plain that the principals in this dispute need help in getting together, in breaking down the barriers which prevent any discussion at all from even beginning. And this is one place where I suggest that the Security Council can play an effective role.

The United States is convinced that it would be useful to designate a special representative of the Security Council whose task it would be to facilitate a meaningful dialog between the Government of Portugal and appropriate African leaders. Such a representative would visit the territories, would consult with all concerned, would take appropriate steps to open consultations to bring about a real exercise of self-determination and the reduction of international friction. If that can be done, the right people will be talking about the right subject.

It is our belief that this Council must make every possible effort to get significant consultations started. And in this connection we note with gratification that the Foreign Minister of Portugal has invited the African foreign ministers or their representatives to visit Portuguese territories. He has placed no conditions or limitations on these visits. And this seems, too, a most valuable offer made in a spirit of cooperation. Though this invitation is obviously only a partial step, we hope that it will be accepted and that it will contribute to the achievement of the objectives we all approve.

We have seen the end of apparent stalemate

many times in the course of history—frequently, I remind you, when the outlook seemed darker than ever and, on occasion, just in the nick of time. I need only refer by way of example to the news that came to us only yesterday that the long, dreary, frustrating stalemate in the nuclear testing issue appears to be broken.<sup>5</sup> It was broken because men declined to surrender to despair, because men worked patiently and imaginatively to break that deadlock.

### **Obligations of U.N. Members**

Finally, Mr. President, there is even more, I would like to suggest, at stake here than the course of events in the Portuguese colonies in the next few years.

There is, I believe, an obligation on the part of the United Nations to do its utmost to see that the great story of national liberation—to which the United Nations has already contributed so much—ends on a note of peaceful change and not in a bloodbath.

There is, I believe, an obligation to prove that this democratic institution, the Security Council of the United Nations, possesses the central virtue of a democratic institution and that is the capacity to support and to stimulate peaceful change, which is the only alternative to violence and war in a world of rapid change.

And there is, I believe, a heavy obligation on each of us to strengthen the United Nations by a realistic appraisal of its limitations as well as its capacities—and working day in and day out to expand these capacities until the day comes when the United Nations is fully equipped to keep the peace of the world and to manage and enforce peaceful change.

In these respects our actions here will echo in the history of the years to come.

### **Three-Power Resolution**

Now in the draft resolution<sup>6</sup> before us submitted by Ghana, Morocco, and the Philippines, there is little of substance with which my delegation disagrees. Our aims are very close to its aims, and we shall be happy to support them if

<sup>5</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. S/5372.

they are couched in a form and language which we can accept and which are consistent with the charter, which is the sovereign law of all of us.

But the present language of the resolution we cannot accept, and we could not vote for the resolution in its present form. Though we agree that the situation in the Portuguese territories in Africa gives rise to very serious international friction and might, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, we do not agree that a threat to the peace already exists. We do not agree, therefore, that the situation falls within the scope of chapter VII of the charter or that the language of any resolution we adopt should so suggest.

Moreover, some of the language of the resolution before us is almost certain not to promote but to inhibit the consultations to which we have referred and which we consider the most hopeful approach toward a peaceful, prompt settlement of this problem on the basis of the principles every member of the Security Council has endorsed.

Let us not surrender to the emotion and frustration that this issue has generated, no matter what the provocation, but rather carefully select the tone and the words most likely to further the ends we so earnestly seek.

The restriction on the sale and the supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in its African territories, which appears in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, is a policy which the United States has in fact, as we have frequently stated in the United Nations, been pursuing for some years. We would, therefore, see no reason for objecting to such a recommendation based on the fact that such sales might contribute to increasing international friction in the area in a resolution otherwise satisfactory.

Finally, we must not impose an impossible burden on the Secretary-General or on any representative he may name to deal with this problem. It cannot under the best of circumstances be solved overnight. Let us assign him reasonable goals to be achieved without undue delay and also without unrealistic time limits which would only arouse false hopes. I have already suggested that an alternative to imposing this

burden directly upon the Secretary-General might be to ask him to appoint someone to serve as a special representative of the Security Council who would be able to devote himself exclusively to this case and whose mandate in the implementation of self-determination might be spelled out more extensively in a resolution.

We believe that, through further consultations among members of this Council and the four African ministers who are visiting us, a draft can be produced which could command general acceptance and could enable the Council to adopt a resolution by a large majority. It is far better, it seems to us, to take joint action by an impressive degree of unanimity, even though it does not go as far as many would like, than to fail to reach agreement and find ourselves unable to take any effective action at all on this great issue.

#### STATEMENT OF JULY 31

U.S./U.N. press release 4232

It is the very sincere hope of the United States delegation that the resolution<sup>7</sup> which has just been adopted by the Council will not hinder but will contribute to the peaceful solution of the situation in the Portuguese territories.

The United States abstained on the resolution primarily because we do not believe that it is drafted in either language or form best calculated to achieve the results which we all seek as quickly and as harmoniously as possible.

In my earlier statement before the Council, I remarked that the aims of the resolution originally proposed by Ghana, Morocco, and the Philippines were very close to our aims and that I thought that, through further consultations among the members of this Council and with the African foreign ministers, a resolution could be produced which would command more general acceptance. Consultations did take place, and I should like to express appreciation for the spirit of reasonableness, of cooperation and accommodation of the sponsors of the resolution, of the African foreign ministers and the other members of the Security Council.

<sup>7</sup> U.N. doc. S/5380.

As a result of these consultations, some welcome modifications which in our judgment improved the resolution were suggested and accepted by the sponsors. They have been proposed as amendments<sup>8</sup> by the distinguished representative of Venezuela and have now been adopted by the Council. These changes have helped to relieve the apprehensions of the United States about the use of language which, in our opinion, clearly fell within the terms of chapter VII of the charter. We welcome the statement of the distinguished delegate of Ghana that even the wording in the resolution draft was not intended to invoke chapter VII. And we are glad to see that the language has now been further changed to leave no doubt on that score.

We regret that other objections which we had to the original text, however, still remain and that, accordingly, it was not possible to produce a full agreement among us.

I repeat in this explanation of our abstention what I have already said. While the United States cannot agree with some of the provisions of the resolution just adopted, we do agree with much of the substance of the resolution and have from the very infancy of our Republic believed in the principle of self-determination of peoples. The heart of this resolution and the settlement of the danger posed by the situation in the overseas territories of Portugal in Africa is the recognition and the application of that right of self-determination for the peoples of these territories. The Council has called on Portugal to recognize this right and to undertake negotiations on this basis. We firmly believe that the developments we all want can be achieved and can only be achieved in an orderly, peaceful manner and without further violence and suffering on both sides as a consequence of such negotiations conducted in good faith.

By its action the Council has also requested the Secretary-General to furnish such assistance as he may deem necessary to this end. This we believe is a significant provision, and the assistance of a third party may be helpful, if not indispensable, to a peaceful solution. The task

could be time consuming and heavily tax the patience, the resourcefulness, and the skill of such a third party. We hope he will draw on the many resources and methods available to him in a persistent and continuing effort to insure progress. We are confident that the Secretary-General and his representatives in pursuing this formidable mission will also in accordance with his charter authority and responsibility take every possible step to reduce friction and to bring about the change in a peaceful setting. But ultimately he must count on the spirit of cooperation and accommodation of the parties. Without it there can be no satisfactory sequel to the Council's action here today.

The resolution also asks that member states refrain from the sale or the supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa. The United States has felt that arms supplied to Portugal for other purposes and used in its overseas territories might well contribute to an increase in friction and danger. With these considerations in mind, the United States has for a number of years followed a policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in these territories. And with these same objectives in mind, we have also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese territories. The United States will continue to adhere to this policy. We trust, Mr. President, that other states will exercise a similar restraint, avoiding actions of any kind which could further increase the tensions in the area and that they will cooperate fully to assure that the solution will be achieved through peaceful means.

To resolve the longstanding controversy about the future of these territories in a manner consistent with the course of history, with the wishes of all of the inhabitants, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations would be a great boon to this troubled world. And my Government earnestly hopes that the interested parties, with the help and the encouragement of the United Nations and all of the friends of peace, will arrive at that destination. They can count on the help, if wanted, of the Government of the United States.

<sup>8</sup> U.N. doc. S/5379.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>9</sup>

### *The Security Council,*

*Having examined* the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration as submitted by the thirty-two African Member States,

*Recalling* Security Council resolution S/4835 of 9 June 1961<sup>10</sup> and General Assembly resolutions 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and 1819 (XVII) of 18 December 1962,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960 which declares the Territories under Portuguese administration to be Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, as well as General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, by which the General Assembly declared *inter alia* that immediate steps be taken to transfer all powers to the people of these Territories without any conditions or reservations in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, without distinction as to race, creed or colour in order to enable them to enjoy complete freedom and independence,

1. *Confirms* resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of 14 December 1960;

2. *Affirms* that the policies of Portugal in claiming the Territories under its administration as "overseas" territories and as integral parts of metropolitan Portugal are contrary to the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council;

3. *Depricates* the attitude of the Portuguese Government, its repeated violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter and its continued refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council;

4. *Determines* that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration is seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa;

5. *Urgently calls upon* Portugal to implement the following:

"(a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;

(b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;

(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;

(d) Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of

<sup>9</sup> U.N. doc. S/5380 and Corr. 1; adopted by the Council on July 31 by a vote of 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions (U.S., U.K., France).

<sup>10</sup> BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 89.

power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);

(e) The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;"

6. *Requests* that all States should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese Government;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of this resolution, to furnish such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council by 31 October 1963.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on latest developments concerning the proposed Yemen observation mission. S/5325. June 7, 1963. 1 p.

Note verbale dated June 7, 1963, from the U.S. representative addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the appointment of Gen. Hamilton H. Howze as commanding general of the military forces made available to the unified command. S/5327. June 19, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated June 10, 1963, from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General regarding alleged violation of the armistice agreement by Israel. S/5329, June 10, 1963, 1 p.; note verbale dated June 11, 1963, from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General in reply. S/5332, June 11, 1963, 2 pp.

Letter dated June 14, 1963, from the representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the Secretary-General enclosing a summary of alleged Egyptian air raids on Saudi Arabian territory. S/5333, June 17, 1963, 3 pp.; letter dated June 20, 1963, from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General in reply. S/5336, June 21, 1963, 2 pp.

Letter dated June 22, 1963, from the representative of the Yemen Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General regarding alleged armed aggression by British forces. S/5338, June 24, 1963, 2 pp.; letter dated July 1, 1963, from the deputy permanent representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council in reply. S/5343, July 2, 1963, 4 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.

*Ratification deposited:* Turkey, July 15, 1963.

##### Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol (relating to harp and hood seals) to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington July 15, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* France and Portugal, July 29, 1963.

##### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Signed at Moscow August 5, 1963. Enters into force after deposit of ratifications by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Signatures:* United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

##### Trade

Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* United States, July 26, 1963.

#### BILATERAL

##### Brazil

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3949, 4636), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro May 20 and June 6, 1963. Entered into force June 6, 1963.

##### Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's financial contributions for United States administrative and related

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1963 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 19, 1963. Entered into force July 19, 1963.

##### Malagasy Republic

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Tananarive July 26, 1963. Entered into force July 26, 1963.

##### United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078), for cooperation on the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 5, 1963.

*Entered into force:* July 31, 1963.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on July 31 confirmed the following nominations:

George W. Anderson, Jr., to be Ambassador to Portugal. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 21.)

Howard Rex Cottam to be Ambassador to the State of Kuwait. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 405 dated August 6.)

Donald A. Dumont to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Burundi. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 26.)

Henry Cabot Lodge to be Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

James I. Loeb to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated June 21.)

Claude G. Ross to be Ambassador to the Central African Republic. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 13.)

### Appointments

Samuel Z. Westerfield, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective July 28. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 398 dated July 30.)

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 29 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 388 of July 24 and 390 of July 18.

No.	Date	Subject
*395	7/29	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†396	7/29	Modernization of consular operations (rewrite).
397	7/30	U.S.—Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.
*398	7/30	Westerfield appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
399	7/31	Relations with Ecuador resumed.
400	7/31	Department statement on Philippine war damage legislation.
401	8/2	Rusk: letter to ambassadors on export drive.
†403	8/3	Gardner: "Human Rights—Some Next Steps" (as-delivered text).

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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*Vol. XLIX, No. 1261*



*August 26, 1963*

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# Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Signed at Moscow, Transmitted to Senate for Advice and Consent to Ratification

*A treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was signed by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at Moscow on August 5.<sup>1</sup> Following are texts of remarks made by Secretary Rusk at the signing ceremony and a joint communique released simultaneously by the three Governments, together with a message from President Kennedy transmitting the treaty to the Senate on August 8 and a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State which accompanied the President's message.*

## THE SIGNING AT MOSCOW

### Remarks by Secretary Rusk

Our three Governments have today taken what all mankind must hope will be a first step on the road to a secure and peaceful world. The treaty we have signed today is a good first

<sup>1</sup> For text of the treaty, initialed at Moscow on July 25, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

step—a step for which the United States has long and devoutly hoped. But it is only a first step. It does not end the threat of nuclear war. It does not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it does not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it does not restrict their use in time of war.

It is therefore not possible for us to guarantee now what the significance of this act will be. History will eventually record how we deal with the unfinished business of peace. But each of our Governments can and will play an important role in determining what future historians will report.

For it will be our individual policies, attitudes, and actions by which this step in the arms control field can be made the first and only one, or the first of many. If collectively we and other nations pursue a course to insure that the forward momentum of this agreement is maintained by further steps, man's long, hopeful quest for peace will cease to be only a dream and will begin to acquire solid reality.

So today the President of the United States directed me to sign this treaty, which I have done with great satisfaction, preparatory to its

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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submission to our Senate for its consideration under our constitutional system. In a broader sense, the signature of this treaty represents the readiness of the United States to join with the two other original signatories, and with other nations, in a determined and sustained effort to find practical means by which tensions can be reduced and the burdens of the arms race lifted from the shoulders of our peoples. For this reason, we are particularly pleased that Secretary-General U Thant has accepted our invitation to be here for this occasion.

### **Text of Communiqué**

Press release 404 dated August 5

On August 5 in Moscow in the Grand Kremlin Palace A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and Lord Home, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, signed a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, who had been invited by the three signatory Governments, was present at the signing of the Treaty.

The signing ceremony was attended on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., A. P. Kirilenko, L. N. Efremov, Yu. V. Andropov, L. F. Ilichev, B. N. Ponomarev, V. N. Titov, A. N. Shelepin, D. F. Ustinov, V. Ye. Dymshits, M. A. Lesechko, P. F. Lomako, I. T. Novikov, K. N. Rudnev, L. V. Smirnov, R. Ya. Malinovski, E. P. Slavski, A. M. Petrosyants, V. V. Kuznetsov, V. A. Zorin, A. A. Sobolev, A. A. Grochko, S. K. Tsarapkin, A. F. Dobrynin, A. A. Soldatov, and the following Chiefs of Sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.: M. N. Smirnovski, G. I. Tunkin, L. M. Zamyatin, F. F. Molochkov, Z. V. Mironova; on behalf of the United States of America by Honorable Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Senator Aiken, Senator Fulbright, Senator Saltonstall, Senator Humphrey,

## **Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Open for Signing**

*Statement by Acting Secretary Ball<sup>1</sup>*

The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water is open for signing today in three capitals of the world. Nations representing every continent and every political system will sign the treaty in this room today. Many more have made clear that they intend to accede, and we look forward to the time when almost every nation in the world will subscribe to the treaty's obligations.

This agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union was the solemn act of the three major nuclear powers, resolved to begin the business of trying to arrest and control the nuclear arms race—a race that is devouring our resources at an increasing rate, a race that prepares us for a war no sane man can want, and in which there can be no "victory."

Yet, in today's world, none of the nuclear powers can stop or even slow that race alone. Only by the joint action of nations willing to move forward together can we make progress.

No one can predict what this treaty will bring. We may hope, however, that it will lead to the further and broader measures that the world so sorely needs to secure a just and lasting peace.

<sup>1</sup> Made at the signing ceremony at Washington on Aug. 8 (press release 408). The treaty was also open for signature at London and Moscow on the same date.

Senator Pastore, Honorable William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Honorable Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Honorable Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador at Large, Honorable Arthur Dean, Consultant to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Honorable Foy D. Kohler, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; on behalf of the United Kingdom by The Right Honorable Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Peter Thomas, Minister of State, Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow.

The Treaty, in three original and identical texts in the Russian and English languages, was signed simultaneously by A. A. Gromyko, Mr.

Rusk and Lord Home. The signers and the Secretary General of the U.N. made brief speeches which are published separately.

The three Governments which signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water have agreed that this Treaty is an important initial step towards the lessening of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and have expressed their hope that further progress will be achieved towards that end.

The three Governments have expressed the hope that other States will accede to the Treaty. They will themselves take the necessary measures for the prompt ratification of the Treaty in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

It was agreed that the Treaty would be open for signature in all three capitals beginning on August 8.

The signing of the Treaty was attended by numerous representatives of the Soviet and foreign press, radio and television.

## TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE<sup>1</sup>

### The President's Message

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 8, 1963

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This treaty is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race. There is hope that it may lead to further measures to arrest and control the dangerous competition for increasingly destructive weapons.

The provisions of the treaty are explained in the report of the Acting Secretary of State, transmitted herewith. Essentially it prohibits

only those nuclear tests that we ourselves can police. It permits nuclear tests and explosions underground so long as all fallout is contained within the country where the test or explosion is conducted.

In the weeks before and after the test ban negotiations, the hopes of the world have been focused on this treaty. Especially in America, where nuclear energy was first unlocked, where the danger of nuclear war and the meaning of radioactive fallout are so clearly recognized, there has been understanding and support for this effort. Now the treaty comes before the Senate, for that careful study which is the constitutional obligation of the members of that body. As that study begins I wish to urge that the following considerations be kept clearly in mind:

First: This treaty is the whole agreement. U.S. negotiators in Moscow were instructed not to make this agreement conditioned upon any other understanding; and they made none. The treaty speaks for itself.

Second: This treaty advances, though it does not assure, world peace; and it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms race.

While it does not prohibit the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the testing in which both nations would otherwise engage.

While it will not halt the production or reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is a first step toward limiting the nuclear arms race.

While it will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, it can reduce world tensions, open a way to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of war.

While it cannot wholly prevent the spread of nuclear arms to nations not now possessing them, it prohibits assistance to testing in these environments by others; it will be signed by many other potential testers; and it is thus an important opening wedge in our effort to "get the genie back in the bottle."

Third: The treaty will curb the pollution of our atmosphere. While it does not assure the

<sup>1</sup> S. Ex. M, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

world that it will be forever free from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests, it will greatly reduce the numbers and dangers of such tests.

Fourth: This treaty protects our rights in the future. It cannot be amended without the consent of the United States, including the consent of the Senate; and any party to the treaty has the right to withdraw, upon 3 months' notice, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Fifth: This treaty does not alter the status of unrecogized regimes. The provisions relating to ratification by others, and the precedents of international law, make it clear that our adherence to this treaty, and the adherence of any other party, can in no way accord or even imply recognition by the United States or any other nation of any regime which is not now accorded such recognition.

Sixth: This treaty does not halt American nuclear progress. The United States has more experience in underground testing than any other nation; and we intend to use this capacity to maintain the adequacy of our arsenal. Our atomic laboratories will maintain an active development program, including underground testing, and we will be ready to resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary. Continued research on developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be possible through underground testing.

Seventh: This treaty is not a substitute for, and does not diminish the need for, continued Western and American military strength to meet all contingencies. It will not prevent us from building all the strength that we need; and it is not a justification for unilaterally cutting our defensive strength at this time. Our choice is not between a limited treaty and effective strategic strength—we need and can have both. The continuous buildup in the power and invulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent years has been an important factor in persuading others that the time for a limitation has arrived.

Eighth: This treaty will assure the security of the United States better than continued unlimited testing on both sides. According to a

comprehensive report prepared by the responsible agencies of Government for the National Security Council, the tests conducted by both the Soviet Union and the United States since President Eisenhower first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 have not resulted in any substantial alteration in the strategic balance. In 1959 our relative nuclear position was strong enough to make a limited test ban desirable, and it remains so today. Under this treaty any gains in nuclear strength and knowledge which could be made by the tests of any other power—including not only underground tests but even any illegal tests which might escape detection—could not be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland. We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the nuclear strength that we need. On the other hand, unrestricted testing—by which other powers could develop all kinds of weapons through atmospheric tests more cheaply and quickly than they could underground—might well lead to a weakening of our security. It is true that the United States would be able to make further progress if atmospheric tests were continued—but so would the Soviet Union and, indeed, so could other nations. It should be remembered that only one atomic test was required to complete the development of the Hiroshima bomb. Clearly the security of the United States—the security of all mankind—is increased if such tests are prohibited.

Ninth: The risks in clandestine violations under this treaty are far smaller than the risks in unlimited testing. Underground tests will still be available for weapons development; and other tests, to be significant, must run substantial risks of detection. No nation tempted to violate the treaty can be certain that an attempted violation will go undetected, given the many means of detecting nuclear explosions. The risks of detection outweigh the potential gains from violation, and the risk to the United States from such violation is outweighed by the risk of a continued unlimited nuclear arms race. There is further assurance against clandestine testing in our ability to develop and deploy additional means of detection, in our determina-

tion to maintain our own arsenal through underground tests, and in our readiness to resume atmospheric testing if the actions of others so require.

Tenth: This treaty is the product of the steady effort of the U.S. Government in two administrations, and its principles have had the explicit support of both great political parties. It grows out of the proposal made by President Eisenhower in 1959 and the resolution passed by the Senate in that same year; and it carries out the explicit pledges contained in the platforms of both parties in 1960. Nothing has happened since then to alter its importance to our security. It is also consistent with the proposals this administration put forward in 1961 and 1962—and with the resolution introduced in the Senate, with wide bipartisan support, in May of 1963.

This treaty is in our national interest. While experience teaches us to be cautious in our expectations and ever vigilant in our preparations, there is no reason to oppose this hopeful step. It is rarely possible to recapture missed opportunities to achieve a more secure and peaceful world. To govern is to choose; and it is my judgment that the United States should move swiftly to make the most of the present opportunity and approve the pending treaty. I strongly recommend that the Senate of the United States advise and consent to its ratification.

#### Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, August 8, 1963.

THE PRESIDENT,  
The White House:

I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

On October 31, 1958, the United States and the United Kingdom began negotiations with the Soviet Union at Geneva for an effectively controlled nuclear test cessation agreement. As you are aware, continued studies and assessments of the technical, political, mili-

<sup>1</sup> Also released as Department of State press release 409 dated Aug. 8.

tary, and other aspects of this subject have been conducted since that time in connection with the negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

The Senate has followed the test ban negotiations with close attention, holding many hearings and enacting a resolution in support of the efforts of the executive branch (S. Res. 96, 86th Cong., 1st sess.). Congressional advisers have attended the negotiations at Geneva at various times since 1958.

The first proposal for a limited test ban treaty was advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom on April 13, 1959. On that date, supported by Prime Minister Macmillan, President Eisenhower proposed in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev<sup>5</sup> a ban on tests above ground and up to 50 kilometers. On September 3, 1961, you and Prime Minister Macmillan proposed to Chairman Khrushchev that the three Governments agree immediately not to conduct "nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout".<sup>6</sup>

On August 27, 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.<sup>7</sup> Both proposals have been renewed by the United States and the United Kingdom at various times since then.

On May 27, 1963, Senators Dodd and Humphrey introduced in the Senate a resolution (S. Res. 148, 88th Cong., 1st sess.). This resolution, cosponsored by 32 other Senators, urged negotiation of a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere and the oceans.

On June 10, 1963, in a speech at American University,<sup>8</sup> you announced further negotiations with the Soviet Union for a nuclear test ban and a suspension of United States tests in the atmosphere so long as other nations did not conduct them.

On July 2, 1963, Chairman Khrushchev expressed the willingness of the Soviet Government "to conclude an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water."

Commencing July 15, 1963, negotiations were held in Moscow between W. Averell Harriman, representing the United States, Lord Hailsham, representing the United Kingdom, and A. A. Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union, looking toward the possibility of concluding a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments, but not underground. On July 25, 1963, these negotiations resulted in an agreed draft initiated by the representatives of each of the parties.<sup>9</sup> On

<sup>4</sup> For an article by William J. Gehron on the history of political and technical developments of the negotiations from Oct. 31, 1958, to Aug. 22, 1960, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1960, p. 482.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

<sup>8</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> For an address to the Nation on July 26 by President Kennedy, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

August 5, 1963, the treaty was signed in Moscow by Secretary Rusk on behalf of the United States, by A. A. Gromyko on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and by Lord Home on behalf of the United Kingdom.

The treaty consists of a preamble and five articles.

The preamble indicates the relationship of this treaty to the much broader aim of achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, as well as to the more specific aims of eventually preventing nuclear weapons tests in all environments, meanwhile stopping the contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive fallout.

Article I contains the principal substantive obligations of the parties. Under its first paragraph the parties undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, at any place under their jurisdiction or control, nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water. In the context of provisions devoted to obtaining a complete, verifiable ban on tests in these three environments, the treaty language relates "any nuclear weapon test explosion" to "any other nuclear explosion," thus preventing evasion based on the contention that a particular detonation was not a weapon test but the explosion of an already tested device. The phrase "any other nuclear explosion" includes explosions for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are prohibited by the treaty because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional controls. The article does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Underground nuclear explosions are not prohibited so long as they do not cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions are conducted. Thus, so long as adequate precautions are taken to prevent such spread of radioactive debris, the treaty will not prohibit the United States from conducting underground nuclear weapons tests or underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The second paragraph of article I contains an undertaking by the parties to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of the prohibited tests and explosions anywhere by anyone. This provision prevents a party from doing indirectly what it has agreed to refrain from doing directly.

Article II contains a procedure for amending the treaty. Any party may propose an amendment, and a conference to consider such an amendment must be called if requested by one-third or more of the parties

although a conference would not be necessary for the adoption of an amendment. To be effective, an amendment must be approved and ratified by a majority of all the parties which must include the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Thus, no amendment can become effective without the advice and consent of the Senate.

Article III provides that the treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all three original parties and specifies how other states may become parties. It designates the three original parties as Depositary Governments and contains other provisions of a formal nature relating to ratification, accession, and registration with the United Nations.

An increasing number of countries have indicated their intention of becoming parties to the treaty and of thus broadening its effectiveness. The provisions for signature and accession have been designed to permit the widest possible application of the treaty. At the same time adherence to the treaty will in no way imply recognition or change in status of regimes the United States does not now recognize. Nor will it in any way result in according recognition or change in status to any regime not now recognized by any other party.

Article IV provides that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It also creates a special right of withdrawal, upon 3 months' notice, if a party finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article V provides that the English and Russian texts of the treaty are equally authoritative and makes provision for the deposit of the original treaty instruments and the transmittal of certified copies to signatory and acceding states.

There is transmitted for your information, and for that of the Senate, the agreed communique issued by the representatives of the original parties on July 25, 1963, at the conclusion of the Conference in Moscow at which the treaty was formulated.

I believe that the signing of this treaty is a significant achievement. Its ratification by the three original parties and by such other states as may sign or accede to it will be an important and hopeful step toward the reduction of international tensions, alleviation of the fears and dangers caused by radioactive fallout, and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons capability. I believe it will promote the security of the United States and the entire free world.

In view of these advantages, and of the hopes and expectations of virtually every nation in the world, it is my sincere hope that the United States will promptly ratify this treaty.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE W. BALL

## Human Rights—Some Next Steps

### CONVENTIONS ON SLAVERY, FORCED LABOR, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN

More than 150 years ago, Thomas Jefferson predicted that from this country the "fire of freedom and human rights" would "be lighted up in other regions of the earth." Today this fire glows brightly: Men of many races, nations, and creeds—some only lately awakened to their birthright of equality—are now demanding their full measure of freedom.

In the struggle against repression the front is everywhere. No nation is so remote or so familiar, so tiny or so large, so poor or so wealthy, so backward or so advanced, as to stand apart. In less than two decades the number of independent nations has doubled. Today barely 2 percent of the world's peoples live in non-self-governing territories. With national independence so nearly secure, the arena of action has broadened from the nation to the individual. The contest will not be won until men, like nations, determine their own destinies.

With the Declaration of Independence, the United States dedicated itself to preserving and enlarging individual human rights. In the intervening years it built upon this foundation a series of specific guarantees, among which the Bill of Rights, the Emancipation Proclamation, the 13th and 19th amendments, the Child Labor Act, the minimum wage laws, and the 1954 Supreme Court decision are only the more familiar.

Small wonder, then, that many of the emerg-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Rotary Club of Ypsilanti, Ypsilanti, Mich., on Aug. 5 (press release 403 dated Aug. 3; as-delivered text). Mr. Gardner is Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

#### ADDRESS BY RICHARD N. GARDNER<sup>1</sup>

ing nations shaped their constitutional doctrines after the same concepts which molded our own. Nor is it surprising that these same nations look to the United States for support in world affairs when fundamental human rights are at stake.

I submit that the real significance of Little Rock and Birmingham and Cambridge is not that the United States is making *no* progress in civil rights but precisely that we *are* making progress. Certainly we are far from perfect. But it is gratifying that so many other countries have observed recent events in our country with sympathy and understanding because they are aware that we are sincerely trying to do something about our shortcomings.

The United Nations, like the United States, was built on a foundation of respect for individual freedom. In article 56 of the charter the members of the U.N. "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55"<sup>2</sup>—which include "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

In accordance with these provisions, the General Assembly and other U.N. organs have considered questions of racial discrimination and other violations of human rights where they are members' official policy and are inconsistent with the obligations in articles 55 and 56, as is the case with the *apartheid* policy of the Union of South Africa.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See p. 333.

Beyond these charter provisions, the General Assembly in 1948 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without a single negative vote and with the abstention only of the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. While this document does not have the binding force of an international agreement, it does represent an historic effort to define "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Following its adoption, the members of the U.N. turned to the drafting of binding legal instruments on specific human rights on which a widespread consensus existed and which appeared appropriate for embodiment in convention form.

Just over 2 weeks ago, President Kennedy sent three of these conventions—those on forced labor, slavery, and the political rights of women—to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.<sup>3</sup> Although the legal standards established by these conventions are already reflected in our Constitution and statutes, and have long been deeply rooted in our legal and moral heritage, the United States has so far not ratified them, or any other human rights convention drafted under U.N. auspices—a fact which many of our friends find hard to understand.

Just what do these conventions provide?

The supplementary convention on slavery, thus far ratified by 49 countries, supplements the 1926 slavery convention, to which the United States is a party, by dealing with conditions akin to slavery. It requires states parties to take all practicable and necessary measures to bring about as soon as possible the complete abolition of such practices as debt bondage, serfdom, involuntary marriage or transfer of women for payment, transfer of widows as inherited property, and exploitation of children. It provides that states parties shall make participation in the slave trade a criminal offense and that any slave who takes refuge on board any vessel of a party shall *ipso facto* be free. It provides that the states parties shall make the mutilation, branding, or marking of a slave

or person of servile status and the act of enslaving or inducing another person into slavery criminal offenses.

The convention concerning the abolition of forced labor, already ratified by 60 countries, provides that each ratifying member undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labor

—as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social, or economic system;

—as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development;

—as a means of labor discipline;

—as a punishment for having participated in strikes; or

—as a means of racial, social, national, or religious discrimination.

The convention on the political rights of women, ratified by 40 countries, provides that, on equal terms with men and without discrimination, women shall: *first*, be entitled to vote in all elections; *second*, be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies established by national law; and *third*, be entitled to hold public office and exercise all public functions established by national law.

It is worth repeating that each of these conventions deals with an important human right already guaranteed by our Federal Constitution and by existing Federal law. Consequently, no change in our domestic legislation would be required.

But what, exactly, is the practical benefit of ratifying these conventions?

Their ratification can play a modest but still significant part in building an international environment congenial to American interests. We have learned from hard experience of the intimate interdependence between human rights and our national security. Nazi Germany should have taught everyone the lesson that internal suppression is often the handmaiden of external aggression—that the destruction of freedom at home can quickly lead to the destruction of freedom abroad.

President Kennedy summed up this relation-

<sup>3</sup> See p. 322.

ship eloquently in his speech at American University in June<sup>4</sup> when he asked, "And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights . . . ?" Worldwide progress in the vindication of human rights and fundamental freedoms will also be progress toward creating a peaceful and stable world order.

Obviously, words on paper are not enough. Nobody believes that the signing of a human rights convention in and of itself brings automatic improvement in the condition of people around the world. But U.S. participation in the great effort under U.N. auspices to define and clarify basic human rights of the kind embodied in these three conventions can make a practical contribution to our national interest in promoting human rights in at least three ways:

*First*, these conventions have an influence on the constitutions and laws of the countries which are parties to the conventions and thus may be implemented in practice within their societies. This is particularly true of many of the newly independent countries which consciously take the U.N. conventions as a model. United States ratification will attract wide attention and encourage similar commitments by others.

*Second*, the adherence of the United States to these conventions will put us in a position, as a contracting party, to blow the whistle on countries that have ratified the conventions but have failed to implement them in practice. Our failure to accept these conventions ourselves makes it more difficult for us to work for the improvement of human rights within other countries.

*Third*, U.S. ratification of these conventions is our entrance fee to influence in the future drafting of legal norms in the human rights field. If we continue to fail to ratify any human rights conventions, other countries may come to discount our views when such basic issues are discussed.

It is essential that the United States demonstrate its continuing adherence to fundamental concepts which have motivated our country since its birth. Our power in the world derives not just from our position as an arsenal of

weapons or as a storehouse of commodities but as a society which seeks the universal realization of the dignity of man.

With a growing number of human rights issues competing for world attention, the United States is under challenge by friend and foe alike to maintain its leadership in this field. Other nations may measure our sincerity in terms of the commitments we share with them, and we should not hesitate to make those commitments which accord with our own constitutional guarantees.

Our adherence to these conventions will affirm anew our faith in basic freedoms throughout the world. It is this belief in the importance and worth of every individual, a belief which motivates our efforts for social and economic progress, that distinguishes us from the totalitarians of the left and of the right.

As the President said in his letter to the President of the Senate at the time he transmitted the conventions to the Senate:

The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for support of the very fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all forms of tyranny.

Let us assure that no nation can accuse us of extinguishing Jefferson's "fire of human rights" or of obscuring its light from the earth.

#### **PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATE**

*Following is a letter from President Kennedy to Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the Senate, transmitting the conventions on slavery, forced labor, and the political rights of women.*

White House press release dated July 22

JULY 22, 1963

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have today transmitted to the Senate three conventions with a view to receiving advice and consent to ratification. These are:

1. The Supplementary Convention to the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery;<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> S. Ex. L, 88th Cong., 1st sess.

prepared under the direction of the United Nations in 1956, to which 49 nations are now parties.

2. The Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor,<sup>6</sup> adopted by the International Labor Organization in 1957, to which 60 nations are now parties.

3. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women,<sup>7</sup> opened for signature by the United Nations in 1953, to which 39 [40] nations are now parties.

United States law is, of course, already in conformity with these conventions, and ratification would not require any change in our domestic legislation. However, the fact that our Constitution already assures us of these rights does not entitle us to stand aloof from documents which project our own heritage on an international scale. The day-to-day unfolding of events makes it ever clearer that our own welfare is interrelated with the rights and freedoms assured the peoples of other nations.

These conventions deal with human rights which may not yet be secure in other countries; they have provided models for the drafters of constitutions and laws in newly independent nations; and they have influenced the policies of governments preparing to accede to them. Thus, they involve current problems in many countries.

They will stand as a sharp reminder of world opinion to all who may seek to violate the human rights they define. They also serve as a continuous commitment to respect these rights. There is no society so advanced that it no longer needs periodic recommitment to human rights.

The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for support of the very fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all forms of tyranny. Accordingly, I desire, with the constitutional consent of the Senate, to ratify these Conventions for the United States of America.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

<sup>6</sup> S. Ex. K.

<sup>7</sup> S. Ex. J.

## TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS

### Convention on Abolition of Slavery

#### SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, THE SLAVE TRADE, AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY<sup>1</sup>

##### PREAMBLE

*The States Parties to the present Convention*

*Considering that freedom is the birthright of every human being;*

*Mindful that the peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed in the Charter their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person;*

*Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and that slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms;*

*Recognizing that, since the conclusion of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926,<sup>2</sup> which was designed to secure the abolition of slavery and of the slave trade, further progress has been made towards this end;*

*Having regard to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and to subsequent action by the International Labour Organisation in regard to forced or compulsory labour;*

*Being aware, however, that slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery have not yet been eliminated in all parts of the world;*

*Having decided, therefore, that the Convention of 1926, which remains operative, should now be augmented by the conclusion of a supplementary convention designed to intensify national as well as international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery;*

*Have agreed as follows:*

<sup>1</sup> Opened for signature at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956; entered into force Apr. 30, 1957. As of July 1, 1963, the following countries had become parties to the supplementary convention through ratification or accession: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tanganyika, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

<sup>2</sup> 46 Stat. 2183 and Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3532.

## SECTION I

### INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY

#### ARTICLE 1

Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926:

(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined;

(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;

(c) Any institution or practice whereby:

(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or

(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or

(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person;

(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.

#### ARTICLE 2

With a view to bringing to an end the institutions and practices mentioned in article 1 (c) of this Convention, the States Parties undertake to prescribe, where appropriate, suitable minimum ages of marriage, to encourage the use of facilities whereby the consent of both parties to a marriage may be freely expressed in the presence of a competent civil or religious authority, and to encourage the registration of marriages.

## SECTION II

### THE SLAVE TRADE

#### ARTICLE 3

1. The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties

to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties.

2. (a) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to prevent ships and aircraft authorized to fly their flags from conveying slaves and to punish persons guilty of such acts or of using national flags for that purpose.

(b) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to ensure that their ports, airfields and coasts are not used for the conveyance of slaves.

3. The States Parties to this Convention shall exchange information in order to ensure the practical co-ordination of the measures taken by them in combating the slave trade and shall inform each other of every case of the slave trade, and of every attempt to commit this criminal offence, which comes to their notice.

#### ARTICLE 4

Any slave who takes refuge on board any vessel of a State Party to this Convention shall *ipso facto* be free.

## SECTION III

### SLAVERY AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY

#### ARTICLE 5

In a country where the abolition or abandonment of slavery, or of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1 of this Convention, is not yet complete, the act of mutilating, branding or otherwise marking a slave or a person of servile status in order to indicate his status, or as a punishment, or for any other reason, or of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.

#### ARTICLE 6

1. The act of enslaving another person or of inducing another person to give himself or a person dependent upon him into slavery, or of attempting these acts, or being accessory thereto, or being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts, shall be a criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable to punishment.

2. Subject to the provisions of the introductory paragraph of article 1 of this Convention, the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present article shall also apply to the act of inducing another person to place himself or a person dependent upon him into the servile status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1, to any attempt to perform such acts, to bring [being] accessory thereto, and to being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts.

## SECTION IV

### DEFINITIONS

#### ARTICLE 7

For the purposes of the present Convention:

(a) "Slavery" means, as defined in the Slavery Con-

vention of 1926, the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, and "slave" means a person in such condition or status;

(b) "A person of servile status" means a person in the condition or status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1 of this Convention;

(c) "Slave trade" means and includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.

## SECTION V

### CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES PARTIES AND COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION

#### ARTICLE 8

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to co-operate with each other and with the United Nations to give effect to the foregoing provisions.

2. The Parties undertake to communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations copies of any laws, regulations and administrative measures enacted or put into effect to implement the provisions of this Convention.

3. The Secretary-General shall communicate the information received under paragraph 2 of this article to the other Parties and to the Economic and Social Council as part of the documentation for any discussion which the Council might undertake with a view to making further recommendations for the abolition of slavery, the slave trade or the institutions and practices which are the subject of this Convention.

## SECTION VI

### FINAL CLAUSES

#### ARTICLE 9

No reservations may be made to this Convention.

#### ARTICLE 10

Any dispute between States Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which is not settled by negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.

#### ARTICLE 11

1. This Convention shall be open until 1 July 1957 for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or of a specialized agency. It shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform each signatory and acceding State.

2. After 1 July 1957 this Convention shall be open for accession by any State Member of the United

Nations or of a specialized agency, or by any other State to which an invitation to accede has been addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of a formal instrument with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform each signatory and acceding State.

#### ARTICLE 12

1. This Convention shall apply to all non-self-governing, trust, colonial and other non-metropolitan territories for the international relations of which any State Party is responsible; the Party concerned shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, at the time of signature, ratification or accession declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories to which the Convention shall apply *ipso facto* as a result of such signature, ratification or accession.

2. In any case in which the previous consent of a non-metropolitan territory is required by the constitutional laws or practices of the Party or of the non-metropolitan territory, the Party concerned shall endeavor to secure the needed consent of the non-metropolitan territory within the period of twelve months from the date of signature of the Convention by the metropolitan State, and when such consent has been obtained the Party shall notify the Secretary-General. This Convention shall apply to the territory or territories named in such notification from the date of its receipt by the Secretary-General.

3. After the expiry of the twelve month period mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the States Parties concerned shall inform the Secretary-General of the results of the consultations with those non-metropolitan territories for whose international relations they are responsible and whose consent to the application of this Convention may have been withheld.

#### ARTICLE 13

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the date on which two States have become Parties thereto.

2. It shall thereafter enter into force with respect to each State and territory on the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession of that State or notification of application to that territory.

#### ARTICLE 14

1. The application of this Convention shall be divided into successive periods of three years, of which the first shall begin on the date of entry into force of the Convention in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 13.

2. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by a notice addressed by that State to the Secretary-General not less than six months before the expiration of the current three-year period. The Secretary-General shall notify all other Parties of each such notice and the date of the receipt thereof.

3. Denunciations shall take effect at the expiration of the current three-year period.

4. In cases where, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, this Convention has become applicable to a non-metropolitan territory of a Party, that Party may

at any time thereafter, with the consent of the territory concerned, give notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations denouncing this Convention separately in respect of that territory. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of the receipt of such notice by the Secretary-General, who shall notify all other Parties of such notice and the date of the receipt thereof.

#### ARTICLE 15

This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat. The Secretary-General shall prepare a certified copy thereof for communication to States Parties to this Convention, as well as to all other States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention on the date appearing opposite their respective signatures.

DONE at the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva, this seventh day of September one thousand nine hundred and fifty six.

### Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor

#### CONVENTION 105

### CONVENTION CONCERNING THE ABOLITION OF FORCED LABOUR<sup>10</sup>

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,

Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having met in its Fortieth Session on 5 June 1957, and

Having considered the question of forced labour, which is the fourth item on the agenda of the session, and

Having noted the provisions of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, and

Having noted that the Slavery Convention, 1926,

<sup>10</sup> Adopted at the 40th session of the General Conference of the International Labor Organization at Geneva June 25, 1957. As of July 1, 1963, the following countries had become parties to the convention through ratification or accession: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Malaya, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Small Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, and United Kingdom.

provides that all necessary measures shall be taken to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery and that the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956, provides for the complete abolition of debt bondage and serfdom, and

Having noted that the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949, provides that wages shall be paid regularly and prohibits methods of payment which deprive the worker of a genuine possibility of terminating his employment, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to the abolition of certain forms of forced or compulsory labour constituting a violation of the rights of man referred to in the Charter of the United Nations and enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international Convention, adopts this twenty-fifth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven the following Convention, which may be cited as the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957:

#### ARTICLE 1

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labour—

(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system;

(b) as a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development;

(c) as a means of labour discipline;

(d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes;

(e) as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.

#### ARTICLE 2

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour as specified in Article 1 of this Convention.

#### ARTICLE 3

The formal ratifications of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration.

#### ARTICLE 4

1. This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the International Labour Organisation whose ratifications have been registered with the Director-General.

2. It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of two Members have

been registered with the Director-General.

3. Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months after the date on which its ratification has been registered.

#### ARTICLE 5

1. A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour Office for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered.

2. Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which does not, within the year following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be bound for another period of ten years and, thereafter, may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each period of ten years under the terms provided for in this Article.

#### ARTICLE 6

1. The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall notify all Members of the International Labour Organisation of the registration of all ratifications and denunciations communicated to him by the Members of the Organisation.

2. When notifying the Members of the Organisation of the registration of the second ratification communicated to him, the Director-General shall draw the attention of the Members of the Organisation to the date upon which the Convention will come into force.

#### ARTICLE 7

The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations full particulars of all ratifications and acts of denunciation registered by him in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles.

#### ARTICLE 8

At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International Labour Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention and shall examine the desirability of placing on the agenda of the Conference the question of its revision in whole or in part.

#### ARTICLE 9

1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or in part, then, unless the new Convention otherwise provides—

(a) the ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall *ipso jure* involve the immediate denunciation of this Convention, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 5 above, if and when the new revising Convention shall have come into force;

(b) as from the date when the new revising Convention comes into force this Convention shall

cease to be open to ratification by the Members.

2. This Convention shall in any case remain in force in its actual form and content for those Members which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising Convention.

#### ARTICLE 10

The English and French versions of the text of this Convention are equally authoritative.

The foregoing is the authentic text of the Convention duly adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation during its Fortieth Session which was held at Geneva and declared closed the twenty-seventh day of June 1957.

IN FAITH WHEREOF we have appended our signatures this fourth day of July 1957.

*The President of the Conference,*

HAROLD HOLT.

*The Director-General of the International Labour Office,*

DAVID A. MORSE.

The text of the Convention as here presented is a true copy of the text authenticated by the signatures of the President of the International Labour Conference and of the Director-General of the International Labour Office.

Certified true and complete copy.

*For the Director-General of the International Labour Office:*

FRANCIS WOLF,

*Legal Adviser of the International Labour Office.*

### Convention on Political Rights of Women

#### CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN<sup>21</sup>

*The Contracting Parties,*

*Desiring* to implement the principle of equality of rights for men and women contained in the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recognizing* that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives, and has the right to equal access to public service in his country, and desiring to equalize the status of men and women in the

<sup>21</sup> Opened for signature at New York March 31, 1953; entered into force July 7, 1954. As of July 1, 1963, the following countries had become parties to the convention through ratification or accession (asterisk indicates ratification or accession with reservation): Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada\*, Central African Republic, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark\*, Dominican Republic, Ecuador\*, Finland\*, France, Greece, Guatemala\*, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India\*, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan\*, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Senegal\*, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia.

enjoyment and exercise of political rights, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

*Having resolved* to conclude a Convention for this purpose,

*Hereby agree* as hereinafter provided :

#### ARTICLE I

Women shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

#### ARTICLE II

Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

#### ARTICLE III

Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and also on behalf of any other State to which an invitation has been addressed by the General Assembly.

2. This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE V

1. This Convention shall be open for accession to all States referred to in paragraph 1 of article IV.

2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE VI

1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

#### ARTICLE VII

In the event that any State submits a reservation to any of the articles of this Convention at the time of signature, ratification or accession, the Secretary-General shall communicate the text of the reservation to all States which are or may become parties to this Convention. Any State which objects to the reservation may, within a period of ninety days from the date of the said communication (or upon the date of its becoming a party to the Convention), notify the Secretary-General that it does not accept it. In such case, the Convention shall not enter into force as between such State and the State making the reservation.

#### ARTICLE VIII

1. Any State may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.

2. This Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date when the denunciation which reduces the number of parties to less than six becomes effective.

#### ARTICLE IX

Any dispute which may arise between any two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation, shall at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless they agree to another mode of settlement.

#### ARTICLE X

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in paragraph 1 of article IV of this Convention of the following:

(a) Signatures and instruments of ratification received in accordance with article IV;

(b) Instruments of accession received in accordance with article V;

(c) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in accordance with article VI;

(d) Communications and notifications received in accordance with article VII;

(e) Notifications of denunciation received in accordance with paragraph 1 of article VIII;

(f) Abrogation in accordance with paragraph 2 of article VIII.

#### ARTICLE XI

1. This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts shall be equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in paragraph 1 of article IV.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention, opened for signature at New York, on the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three.

## Department Closes Thirteen Posts

The Department of State announced on July 29 (press release 396) that, in a long-planned move to modernize its consular operations abroad, it is in the process of closing 13 con-

sular posts between now and September 1.

The decision to close the 13 consulates results from a series of management surveys conducted over the past 30 months. William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, said:

By direction of Secretary Rusk, the reviews will continue. They may lead to additional consular post closings.

More effective administration of overseas operations is the primary reason for the action announced today. It does not reflect any change whatsoever in United States relationships with the countries or areas in which the posts are to be closed.

The closing of these posts will result in an estimated saving in excess of \$300,000 in the current fiscal year and more than \$500,000 annually thereafter. A reduction of overseas expenditures will also contribute to balance-of-payments savings.

The management surveys are designed to lead to the most effective use of trained personnel and to provide the most efficient Foreign Service possible within available resources. Modernization and improvements in communications, travel, and methods of handling consular work are some of the factors that make it feasible to close some consular posts.

The consular posts to be closed are those at Salzburg, Austria; Santos, Brazil; Edmonton, Canada; Manchester, England; Le Havre, France; Cork, Ireland; Haifa, Israel; Venice, Italy; Penang, Malaya; Piedras Negras, Mexico; Basel, Switzerland; Cardiff, Wales; and Sarajevo, Yugoslavia.

In addition, consular work of the consulate general at Geneva will be transferred to the Embassy at Bern, but officers of the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations at Geneva will be available to provide certain services. Most of the activities of the consulate general at Yokohama will be transferred to the Embassy at Tokyo, but a small staff will be retained in Yokohama.

Consular agents will be appointed at Cork, Ireland, and Haifa, Israel, to provide essential consular services at these locations, and consideration will be given to the appointment of consular agents at other locations where warranted.

As of July 1 there were 166 U.S. consulates throughout the world. In their local fields they deal with visa services; citizenship and passport services; protection and welfare services

for American citizens, property, and interests; notariats; services for ships, seamen, and airmen; and special services for other Federal and State agencies.

## Revised Tariff Schedules To Be Effective August 31

Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, announced on July 25 that the revised tariff schedules of the United States are slated to become effective on August 31. The tariff schedules will take effect 10 days after a Presidential proclamation of the new nomenclature and rates contained in them. This proclamation will be issued in accordance with the authority of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962.

The Tariff Classification Act of 1962 authorizes the President, upon the completion of certain procedures, to proclaim new U.S. tariff schedules based upon studies and recommendations of the Tariff Commission. The Commission's work was initiated under the authority of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954.

The new tariff schedules will simplify the determination and application of U.S. import duties. They will thus benefit domestic producers, who will have more dependable knowledge of the rates of duty applying to the types of products they sell and the materials they buy. They will also benefit importers and consumers.

Entry into force of the new schedules has been approved by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by the countries with which the U.S. still maintains bilateral trade agreements.

The schedules, annotated for statistical purposes, will be on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The annotated schedules became available on August 1 at a subscription price of \$5.00 (\$1.25 additional for foreign mailing). The subscription price includes supplementary material for an indefinite period.

# Public Hearings Pertaining to Trade Agreements

## REGULATIONS OF TRADE INFORMATION COMMITTEE<sup>1</sup>

*Following is the text of regulations of the Trade Information Committee, Part 211 of Chapter II (Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.*

In Chapter II of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations a new Part 211 is added to read as follows:

### Sec.

- 211.1 Office, mailing address, and hours.
- 211.2 Notices of public hearings.
- 211.3 Requests for public hearings under section 252(d).
- 211.4 Submission of written briefs.
- 211.5 Presentation of oral testimony at public hearings.
- 211.6 Presentation of oral testimony at informal conferences.
- 211.7 Information open to public inspection.
- 211.8 Information exempt from public inspection.
- 211.9 Information available to United States Government agencies.

AUTHORITY: §§ 211.1 to 211.9 issued under sec. 202.3(b) of this chapter. Secs. 211.2 to 211.6 also issued under secs. 223, 252(d), 76 Stat. 875, 880; 19 U.S.C. 1843, 1882(d).

### § 211.1 Office, mailing address, and hours.

(a) The office of the Trade Information Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) is in the Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., 20506.

(b) All communications to the Committee should be addressed to the "Executive Secretary, Trade Information Committee, Executive Office Building, 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., 20506".

(c) The regular hours of the office of the Committee are from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on each business day, Monday through Friday.

### § 211.2 Notices of public hearings.

The Committee shall publish in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of a proposed public hearing, the subject matter of the proposed public hearing, the period during which written briefs may be submitted, the period during which requests may be submitted to present oral testimony, and the time and place of the proposed public hearing, in the following instances—

(a) Upon publication of a list of articles by the President under section 221(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as a result of which public hearings are required to be held by section 223 of the Act with respect to any matter relevant to a proposed trade agreement,

(b) Upon the granting by the Committee of a request, made by an interested party in accordance with § 211.3, for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act with respect to a foreign import restriction,

(c) Upon request by the Trade Executive Committee, or

(d) Upon the Committee's own motion.

### § 211.3 Requests for public hearings under section 252(d).

(a) A request by an interested party for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act may be submitted in writing at any time. Such request will be granted only if it identifies with particularity the foreign import restriction complained of, states the reasons why the restriction is believed to be of the kind covered by section 252 of the Act, and describes concisely the effect of the restriction upon United States exports.

(b) A request for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act shall be submitted in not less than fifteen (15) copies, which shall be legibly typed, printed, or duplicated, and of which at least one copy shall be made under oath or affirmation.

(c) After receipt and consideration of a request for a public hearing under section 252(d) of the Act, the Committee will notify the applicant whether the request is granted, and if so, will take action under § 211.2, and if not, will give the reasons for the denial.

### § 211.4 Submission of written briefs.

(a) Participation by an interested party in a public hearing announced under § 211.2 shall require the submission of a written brief before the close of the period announced in the public notice for its submission. Such brief may be, but need not be, supplemented by the presentation of oral testimony in accordance with § 211.5.

(b) A written brief by an interested party concerning any aspect of the trade agreements program or any related matter not subject to paragraph (a) of this section and submitted pursuant to a public notice shall be submitted before the close of the period announced in the public notice for its submission.

(c) A written brief by an interested party concerning any aspect of the trade agreements program or any related matter not subject to paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this section may be submitted at any time.

(d) A written brief shall state clearly the position taken and shall describe with particularity the evidence supporting such position. It shall be submitted in not less than fifteen (15) copies which shall be legibly typed, printed, or duplicated, and of which at least one copy shall be made under oath or affirmation.

### § 211.5 Presentation of oral testimony at public hearings.

(a) A request by an interested party to present oral testimony at a public hearing shall be submitted in writing before the close of the period announced in the

<sup>1</sup> 28 Fed. Reg. 7047.

public notice for its submission, and shall state briefly the interest of the applicant and the position to be taken by the applicant. Such request will be granted only if a written brief has been prepared and submitted in accordance with § 211.4.

(b) After receipt and consideration of a request to present oral testimony at a public hearing, the Committee will notify the applicant whether the request is granted, and if so, the time and place for his appearance and the amount of time allotted for his oral testimony, and if not, the reasons for the denial.

(c) Oral testimony presented at a public hearing shall be made under oath or affirmation. The interested party may briefly summarize and should supplement the information contained in the written brief, and should be prepared to answer questions relating to such information.

(d) A stenographic record shall be made of every public hearing.

#### § 211.6 Presentation of oral testimony at informal conferences.

(a) A request by an interested party to present oral testimony to the Committee concerning any aspect of the trade agreements program or any related matter at an informal conference may be submitted in writing at any time. Such request will be granted only if it is accompanied by a written brief prepared in accordance with § 211.4(d).

(b) After receipt and consideration of a request to present oral testimony to the Committee at an informal conference, the Committee will notify the applicant whether the request is granted, and if so, the time and place for his appearance and the amount of time allotted for his oral testimony, and if not, the reasons for the denial.

(c) At an informal conference the interested party may briefly summarize and should supplement the information contained in the written brief, and should be prepared to answer questions relating to such information.

(d) A stenographic record shall be made of every informal conference.

(e) A request to present oral testimony to the Committee at an informal conference will not be granted if the Committee determines that the subject matter of the proposed oral testimony comes within the subject matter of a contemporaneous public hearing as announced by a public notice.

#### § 211.7 Information open to public inspection.

With the exception of information covered by § 211.9, an interested party may, upon request to the Executive Secretary, inspect at the office of the Committee—

(a) Any written request, brief, or similar submission of information,

(b) Any stenographic record of a public hearing or an informal conference, and

(c) Other public written information concerning the trade agreements program and related matters.

#### § 211.8 Information exempt from public inspection.

(a) The Committee shall exempt from public inspection business information submitted by an interested party if the Committee determines that such information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association, the disclosure of which is not authorized by law or by the interested party furnishing such information.

(b) A party requesting that the Committee exempt from public inspection business information submitted in writing shall clearly mark each page "For Official Use Only" at the top. A party requesting that the Committee exempt from public inspection business information submitted orally at an informal conference shall ask that such information be marked "For Official Use Only" on the stenographic record.

(c) The Committee may deny a request that it exempt from public inspection any particular business information if it determines that such information is not entitled to exemption. In the event of such denial, the party submitting the particular business information will be notified of the reasons for the denial and will be permitted to withdraw his submission.

#### § 211.9 Information available to United States Government agencies.

All information received by the Committee shall be available to the agencies of the United States Government represented on the Committee, and to such other agencies of the United States Government as the Committee may designate.

*Effective date.* This part shall become effective on the date of its publication in the Federal Register.

By the Committee.

BERNARD NORWOOD,  
*Chairman.*

AUGUST 2, 1963.

#### NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING<sup>2</sup>

##### PUBLIC HEARING CONCERNING PROPOSED INCREASES IN RATES OF DUTY ON CERTAIN ARTICLES

1. *Notice of public hearing.* Pursuant to its regulations, and in particular § 211.2(d) of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 F.R. 7947) the Trade Information Committee in the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations has ordered a public hearing with respect to proposed increases in rates of duty on articles to be selected from those listed in Annex A below.

2. *Subject matter of public hearing.* The purpose of the public hearing will be to receive information and views concerning the economic effects of an increase in

<sup>2</sup> 28 Fed. Reg. 8066.

the rate of duty on any article identified in Annex A below.

The purpose of such increases in rates of duty would be to redress the imbalance of tariff concessions between the United States and the European Economic Community arising out of the withdrawal of a German tariff concession on poultry which has been followed by the imposition by the European Economic Community of unreasonable import restrictions upon United States exports of frozen poultry. Such increases in rates of duty as are finally decided upon would be proclaimed by the President pursuant to section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

3. *Time and place of public hearing.* The public hearing will be held beginning at 10:00 a.m., e.d.s.t. on Wednesday, September 4, 1963, in the Hearing Room of the Tariff Commission, 8th and E Streets NW., Washington, D.C. (3d Floor, F Street side).

4. *Presentation of oral testimony.* A request to present oral testimony shall be submitted in writing to the Executive Secretary of the Committee on or before Wednesday, August 21, 1963, and in accordance with the applicable provisions of this notice and the Committee's regulations (Part 211 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 F.R. 7947)).

Any such request shall include the name, address, telephone number, and organization of the party submitting the request, a brief statement of the party's interest in the subject matter of the public hearing, a brief statement of the position to be taken, and the name of the person who will present oral testimony.

Each party submitting a request will be notified whether the request is granted, and if so, the date on which he is scheduled to appear and the amount of time allotted for his testimony, and, if not, the reasons for the denial.

5. *Submission of written briefs.* In order to ensure due consideration, written briefs shall be submitted as early as possible, and in no case later than Tuesday, September 3, 1963. Written briefs shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the applicable provisions of this notice and the Committee's regulations (Part 211 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 F.R. 7947)).

6. *Limitation on presentation of views.* Oral testimony and written briefs shall be limited to a consideration of the probable economic effects of an increase in a rate of duty on any article identified in Annex A of this notice. Consideration will not be given to oral testimony or written briefs dealing with any article not identified in Annex A.

All communications regarding this notice should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, Trade Information Committee, Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C., 20506.

BERNARD NORWOOD,  
Chairman.

AUGUST 6, 1963.

ANNEX A		
Tariff Schedule of the United States (New Item No.)	Articles	United States Tariff Schedules (existing) Par. No.
117. 45- 50	Roquefort cheese-----	710
125. 30	Bulbs, roots, rootstocks, clumps, corms, tubers, and herbaceous perennials: Other, imported for horticultural purposes.	753
132. 50	Potato starch-----	83
167. 30	Still wines produced from grapes, containing not over 14 percent of alcohol by volume, in containers each holding not over 1 gallon.	804
168. 20- 22	Brandy-----	802
252. 35	Cigarette paper, whether or not cut to size or shape, cigarette books, and cigarette bookcovers.	1552
254. 25		
256. 10		
310. 01- 02	Singles yarns, wholly of continuous man-made fibers (multifilament yarns), with twist but not over 20 turns per inch.	1301
437. 02	Caffeine-----	15
437. 18	Theobromine-----	15
455. 16- 20	Edible gelatin-----	41
455. 22- 24	Photographic gelatin-----	41
455. 40	Inedible gelatin and animal glue, valued under 40 cents per pound.	41
493. 30	Dextrine and soluble or chemically treated starches.	84
609. 22	Flat wire, of iron or steel other than alloy iron or steel, not coated or plated with metal, over 0.05 inch in thickness.	316(a)
642. 74	Cloth, gauze, fabric, screen, netting, and fencing, all the foregoing, of stainless steel, whether in rolls, in endless bands, or in lengths, but not cut to shape, if woven (of simple warp and weft construction), with meshes finer than 90 wires to the lineal inch in warp or filling.	318
650. 91	Scissors and shears, and blades therefor, all the foregoing valued over \$1.75 per dozen.	357
683. 50	Shavers and scissors, with self-contained electric motors, and parts thereof.	353
692. 05	Automobile trucks valued at \$1,000 or more, and motor buses.	369
723. 10	Motion-picture film, 1 inch or more in width, sensitized but not exposed.	1551
723. 15	Photographic film other than motion-picture film, sensitized but not exposed.	1551
723. 30	Silver halide photographic papers, sensitized but not exposed.	1405

## Security Council Calls for Ban on Sale of Arms to South Africa

*Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representatives Adlai E. Stevenson and Charles W. Yost, during debate on the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on August 7.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, AUGUST 2

U.S./U.N. press release 4233

All of us sitting here today know the melancholy truth about the racial policies of the Government of South Africa. Our task now is to consider what further steps we can take to induce that Government to remove the evil business of *apartheid*, not only from our agenda but from the continent of Africa.

The policy of *apartheid* denies the worth and the dignity of the human person. And for this very reason we must try to express our feelings, we believe, with as much restraint as we can muster. Self-righteousness is no substitute for practical results.

It is all too true that there is scarcely a society of the world that is not touched by some form of discrimination. Who among us can cast the first stone or boast that we are free of any semblance of discrimination, by color or religion or in some other form?

I take the liberty of quoting to you a few lines from a speech I made in Geneva a couple of weeks ago.<sup>1</sup> I said that:

... in my country too many of our Negro citizens still do not enjoy their full civil rights—because ancient attitudes stubbornly resist change in spite of the vigorous official policy of the Government. But such indignities are an anachronism that no progressive society can tolerate, and the last vestiges must be

abolished with all possible speed. Actually in the past few years we have made more progress in achieving full equality of rights and opportunities for all of our citizens than during any comparable period since Abraham Lincoln's Proclamation of Emancipation freed our Republic and our national conscience from a heavy burden 100 years ago.

The very struggles which now call worldwide attention to our shame are themselves signs of a progress that will be increasingly visible in the months ahead. The sound and fury about racial equality that fill our press and airwaves are the sounds of the great thaw; the logjam of the past is breaking up.

I wanted to repeat what I said in Geneva to leave no doubt that the United States position is not one of self-righteousness, self-satisfaction.

The question before us, however, is how and when the logjam of racial discrimination will be loosened and brought into the mainstream of the United Nations Charter. If we all suffer from the disease of discrimination in various forms, at least most of us recognize the disease for what it is—a disfiguring blight.

The whole point is that in many countries governmental policies are dedicated to rooting out this dread syndrome of prejudice and discrimination, while in South Africa we see the anachronistic spectacle of the Government of a great people which persists in seeing the disease as the remedy, prescribing for the malady of racism the bitter toxic of *apartheid*.

Mr. President, just as my country is determined to wipe out discrimination in our society, it will support efforts to bring about a change in South Africa. It is in the United States' interest to do this; it is in the interest of South Africa; it is in the interest of a world which has suffered enough from bigotry and prejudice and hatred.

### Present Situation Offers Little Hope

The past two decades have seen an explosion of nationhood unequalled in history. Certainly the pace of decolonization in Africa has been

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 265.

nothing less than phenomenal, and it offers a record of progress far beyond what the most optimistic among us could have expected in 1945. The new states of Africa are gaining strength, resolutely fighting to build prosperous, dynamic societies and to do this in cooperation with other African states.

But as this meeting of the Security Council so graphically emphasizes, the full potential of this new era cannot be realized because of South Africa's self-chosen isolation. Worse yet, progress in Africa is overshadowed by the racial bitterness and resentment caused by the policies of the South African Government. And it is the duty of this Council to do what it can to insure that this situation does not deteriorate further and that the injustice of *apartheid* comes to an end—not in bloodshed and bondage but in peace and freedom.

What we see and hear, however, offers us at present little hope. Indeed, the situation is worse than it was 3 years ago when this Council first met on the question of *apartheid*.<sup>2</sup> Speakers before me have reviewed the record of previous discussions of *apartheid* by this Council and of the General Assembly. As they have pointed out, we have called repeatedly upon the Government of South Africa to consider world opinion, to cooperate with the United Nations, and to set in motion some meaningful steps toward ending discrimination and policies and practices that would offend the whole world wherever they were pursued.

Outside of this organization, many members—not the least of which is my own Government—have attempted repeatedly to persuade the South African Government to begin moving along the lines of these resolutions. I myself, Mr. President, have had something emphatic to say on this score on two occasions in the Republic of South Africa—things that had grieved me to have to say after enjoying so much courtesy and hospitality from the friendly and the gracious people of that lovely land.

But it is only stating a fact of life to say that the visible result of all of these discussions and resolutions here in the United Nations and all diplomatic activity so far is zero.

It is only stating the obvious to say that up

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 25, 1960, p. 607.

until this time our efforts have yielded no tangible results.

It is only calling things by their right name to say that we are confronted for the moment with a deadlock between the overwhelming majority of mankind and the Republic of South Africa.

There has been no forward motion; indeed, there has been retrogression—calculated retrogression.

Need I read the bill of particulars?

For the past 15 years the Government of South Africa has built a barrier between the races—piling new restrictions upon old restrictions.

All South Africans must carry identification cards indicating racial ancestry.

Segregation in religion, education, and public accommodation is total.

Freedom of employment is limited; wage rates for the same work and the same responsibility are different according to the color of your skin.

Freedom of movement is inhibited.

Strikes by Africans in South Africa are illegal.

Africans in South Africa are prohibited from residing, from doing business or acquiring real property in most cities, and in large areas of the countryside.

Voters are registered on separate rolls according to race, and since 1958 non-European voters have had no representation whatever—even by Europeans—in the legislature.

This is not the whole story. But the point is that these and other measures of discrimination—aimed at the total separation of races into privileged and unprivileged segments of society—do not represent inherited social defects for which remedies are being sought but injustices deliberately and systematically imposed in the recent past.

#### Summary of Basic Principles

Mr. President, we are all agreed and we have proclaimed again and again in this body and in the General Assembly, and in many other forums of the United Nations, certain basic views about the issue before us. However, we must restate them again and again so that we can

sum up where we stand and deliberate with clarity and candor on how to move forward.

First, we have affirmed and reaffirmed that *apartheid* is abhorrent. Our belief in the self-evident truths about human equality is enshrined in the charter. *Apartheid* and racism—despite all of the tortured rationalizations we have heard from the apologists—are incompatible with the moral, the social, and the constitutional foundations of our societies.

A second basic principle on which we are agreed is that all members of the organization have pledged themselves to take action, in cooperation with the organization, to promote observance of human rights without distinction as to race.

Thirdly, we continue to believe that this matter is of proper and legitimate concern to the United Nations. We have often stated in the General Assembly our belief that the Assembly can properly consider questions of racial discrimination and other violations of human rights where they are a member's official policy and are inconsistent with the obligations of that member under articles 55 and 56 of the charter to promote observance of human rights without distinction as to race. Moreover, the *apartheid* policy of South Africa has clearly led to a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security.

#### Measures U.S. Has Taken

We also believe that all members, in the words of the resolution<sup>3</sup> passed almost unanimously by the 16th General Assembly should take such separate and collective action to bring about an abandonment of *apartheid* as is open to them in conformity with the charter. The United States supported that resolution and has complied with it.

I should like to take this occasion to bring up to date the record of the measures the United States has taken to carry out this purpose.

First, we have continued and, indeed, have accelerated our official representations to the Government of South Africa on all aspects of *apartheid* in that country. We have done this through public words and private diplomacy, expressing our earnest hope that the South

African Government would take steps to reconsider and to revise its racial policies and to extend the full range of civic rights and opportunities to nonwhites in the life of their country. And we have observed to the South African Government that, in the absence of an indication of change, the United States would not cooperate in matters which would lend support to South Africa's present racial policies.

We have utilized our diplomatic and consular establishments in South Africa to demonstrate by words and by deeds our official disapproval of *apartheid*.

And as the United States representative informed the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 19, 1962,<sup>4</sup> the United States has adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding the sale to the South African Government of arms and military equipment, whether from Government or commercial sources, which could be used by that Government to enforce *apartheid* either in South Africa or in the administration of South-West Africa. We have carefully screened both Government and commercial shipments of military equipment to make sure that this policy is rigorously enforced.

But I am now authorized to inform the Security Council of still another important step which my Government is prepared to take.

We expect to bring to an end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this calendar year in order further to contribute to a peaceful solution and to avoid any steps which might at this point directly contribute to international friction in the area. There are existing contracts which provide for limited quantities of strategic equipment for defense against external threats, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines. We must honor these contracts.

The Council should be aware that, in announcing this policy, the United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the pro-

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1663 (XVI).

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1962, p. 791.

vision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and the intent of this resolve.

Now, Mr. President, we are taking this further step to indicate the deep concern which the Government of the United States feels at the failure of the Republic of South Africa to abandon its policy of *apartheid*.

In pursuing this policy, the Republic of South Africa, as we have so often said, is failing to discharge its obligations under articles 55 and 56 of the charter, whereby members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of, among other things, universal respect for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Stopping the sale of arms to South Africa emphasizes our hope that the Republic of South Africa will now reassess its attitude toward *apartheid* in the light of the constantly growing international concern at its failure to heed the numerous appeals made to it by various organs of the United Nations, as well as appeals of member states, such as my Government.

#### Question of Sanctions

As to the action of this Council in this proceeding, we are prepared to consult with other members and with the African foreign ministers present at the table, and we will have some suggestions to make. It is clear to my delegation that the application of sanctions under chapter VII in the situation now before us would be both bad law and bad policy.

It would be bad law because the extreme measures provided in chapter VII were never intended and cannot reasonably be interpreted to apply to situations of this kind. The founders of the United Nations were very careful to reserve the right of the organization to employ mandatory coercive measures to situations where there was an actuality of international violence—or such a clear and present threat to the peace as to leave no reasonable alternative but resort to coercion. We do not have that kind of a situation here. Fortunately for all of us, there is still time to work out a solution through

measures of pacific settlement, and any solution adopted by this Council must be reasonably calculated to promote such settlement.

It is bad policy because the application of sanctions in this situation is not likely to bring about the practical result that we seek, that is, the abandonment of *apartheid*. Far from encouraging the beginning of a dialog between the Government of South Africa and its African population, punitive measures would only provoke intransigence and harden the existing situation.

Furthermore, the result of the adoption of such measures, particularly if compliance is not widespread and sincere, would create doubts about the validity of and diminish respect for the authority of the United Nations and the efficacy of the sanction process envisioned in the charter. Also on this matter, views differ so widely that we cannot hope to agree on the necessary consensus to make such action effective even if it were legitimate and appropriate.

And as for suggestions of diplomatic isolation, persuasion cannot be exercised in a vacuum; conflicting views cannot be reconciled *in absentia*.

Instead, we believe still further attempts should be made to build a bridge of communication, discussion, and persuasion. If the human race is going to survive on this earth, wisdom, reason, and right must prevail. And let us not forget that there are many wise and influential people in that great country who share our views.

It is regrettable accomplishments in so many fields of human endeavor in South Africa are being obscured by a racial policy repugnant to Africa and to the world. Certainly one ultimate goal for all of us is to assist South Africa to rejoin the African Continent and to assist in the development of all the peoples of Africa.

And this, Mr. President, is why my Government has looked with such favor on the idea of appointing special representatives of the Security Council who can work energetically and persistently and be free to exercise their own ingenuity and to pursue every prospect and every hint of a useful opening.

We cannot accept the proposition that the only alternative to *apartheid* is bloodshed.

We cannot accept the conclusion that there is no way out—no direction to go except the present collision course toward ultimate disaster in South Africa.

Certainly there are alternatives, and they must be identified and they must be explored before it is too late.

It is a matter of considerable regret to my delegation that the Government of South Africa has chosen to absent itself from these proceedings. But regrets to the side, Mr. President, it is exceedingly difficult in this shrunken and interdependent world to live in self-ostracism from international society; in this world of instant communication, it is progressively more hazardous to fly in the face of world opinion. And certainly the obligation to talk about dangerous disputes is too solemn to be ignored by even the most stubborn of leaders today.

Mr. President, there is nothing inherently immutable in any impasse in human affairs. Many a seemingly hopeless cause has prevailed in the course of history. I had occasion just last week to recall here that negotiations over the testing of nuclear weapons looked hopeless for five long, dreary, and frustrating years—until the impasse was broken suddenly, to the vast relief of an anxious world. And as I said, the stalemate was broken because men refused to give up hope, because men declined to give in to despair, because men worked consistently and doggedly to break the deadlock. Manifestly this treaty does not solve all of the problems in connection with nuclear armaments; but every long journey begins with a single step and this is a beginning.

So I should like to suggest very emphatically that we approach the problem of *apartheid* in South Africa as a similar challenge to ingenuity, to the instinct for survival of humankind. As President Kennedy said with reference to the atomic treaty, we must not be afraid to test our hopes.<sup>5</sup>

It is in the spirit of testing our hopes that this sad episode will end in reason and not in flame that I on behalf of my Government solemnly, earnestly, appeal to the Government of South Africa to change course and embark on

a policy of national reconciliation and emancipation.

#### STATEMENT BY MR. YOST, AUGUST 7, IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE

U.S./U.N. press release 4235

My Government is able to support this resolution because it reflects the attitude of the United States toward the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa. We particularly appreciate the cooperation of the sponsors of the resolution which has facilitated our desire to vote in favor of it.

We have over a period of years expressed our strong disapproval of the policy of racial discrimination being pursued in South Africa contrary to the obligations of the Republic Government under articles 55 and 56 of the charter. Thus we wholeheartedly endorse the appeal to South Africa to abandon these policies and to liberate those persons who have been imprisoned, interned, or subjected to other restrictions merely because they are opposed to the policy of *apartheid*.

My delegation also supports the request that all member states cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms and military vehicles. As you will recall, Ambassador Stevenson announced in this chamber on August 2 that the United States Government had taken another important step demonstrating its concern at the continued lack of progress in ending racial discrimination in South Africa by voluntarily deciding to end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this year.

Mr. President, the Council will also recall that at the time the United States representative announced this new policy he explained that our decision not to sell armaments after the end of this year to South Africa was without prejudice to the completion of delivery of certain strategic equipment, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes on which contracts had already been signed. In addition, it will be recalled that we naturally reserved the right to interpret this policy in light of any future requirements for the common defense effort in assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

Mr. President, having commented on the principal operative portions of the resolution, may I also mention two preambular paragraphs and related aspects of the text.

With respect to the seventh preambular paragraph of the resolution, I wish to emphasize that the United States is most gratified that the sponsors have seen fit to change their original formulation from "is seriously endangering international peace and security" to "is seriously disturbing international peace and security." In making this change they clearly recognize that a number of Council members are not prepared to agree that the situation in South Africa is one which now calls for the kind of action appropriate in cases of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. As members of the Council are aware, chapter VII does not speak in terms of disturbances to the peace, even serious ones, but only of actual threats to the peace, or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.

The resolution's preambular reference to disturbing the peace thus refers to those underlying elements of this certainly serious situation which, if continued, are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This is quite different from finding a fully matured threat to or breach of the peace in the present situation. There are in this troubled world many disturbances to international peace and security. But even in those parts of the world where there is now sporadic fighting on international frontiers, this organization has wisely been cautious about invoking the powers of the Security Council under chapter VII.

The change in wording to which I have referred has been of the greatest importance in determining the decision of the United States to vote for this resolution; in fact, it was a decisive factor.

I might add that the fact that operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution as adopted "call upon" member states to take certain action does not, of course, give these paragraphs a mandatory character. The words "call upon" are found in chapter VI as well as chapter VII of the charter; they have been repeatedly employed

by the General Assembly as well as the Security Council; and in the customary practice of the United Nations they do not carry mandatory force.

May I make one further point, Mr. President, about preambular paragraph 6, which reads: "Regretting that some States are indirectly providing encouragement in various ways to the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, by force, its policy of *apartheid*." In our view, the allegation that some member states are indirectly providing support of this kind is of questionable accuracy and propriety. In fact, we have seen no evidence that any state is encouraging the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, whether by force or otherwise, its policy of *apartheid*, which we all condemn. For this reason, we would have preferred to have this paragraph omitted.

With these explanations of our attitude toward certain paragraphs of the resolution, we were most happy to join with other members of the Council in voting for it. We profoundly hope that the Government of South Africa will take to heart this solemn warning from the highest body of the United Nations and will promptly take steps to abandon the indefensible and dangerous racial policy which it is now pursuing.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>6</sup>

##### *The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, as submitted by the thirty-two African Member States,<sup>7</sup>

*Recalling* Security Council resolution S/4300 of 1 April 1960,

*Taking into account* that world public opinion has

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. S/5386; adopted by the Council on Aug. 7 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (France, U.K.). In an earlier vote, operative paragraph 3 of the original draft resolution failed of adoption by a vote of 5 (Ghana, Morocco, Philippines, U.S.S.R., Venezuela) to 0, with 6 absentions (Brazil, China, France, Norway, U.K., U.S.). It read as follows: "Calls upon all States to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting to South Africa strategic materials of direct military value."

<sup>7</sup> U.N. doc. S/5348.

been reflected in General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and particularly in its paragraphs 4 and 8.

*Noting with appreciation* the two interim reports of the Special Committee on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa contained in documents S/5310 of 9 May 1963 and S/5353 of 17 July 1963,

*Noting with concern* the recent arms build-up by the Government of South Africa, some of which arms are being used in furtherance of that Government's racial policies,

*Regretting* that some States are indirectly providing encouragement in various ways to the Government of South Africa to perpetuate, by force, its policy of *apartheid*,

*Regretting* the failure of the Government of South Africa to accept the invitation of the Security Council to delegate a representative to appear before it,

*Being convinced* that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security,

1. *Strongly deprecates* the policies of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and contrary to its obligations as a Member State of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of *apartheid* and discrimination as called for in the previous Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960, and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of *apartheid*;

3. *Solemnly calls upon* all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the situation in South Africa under observation and to report to the Security Council by 30 October 1963.

## **World Bank Issues Financial Statement for Fiscal Year 1963**

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported on August 6 additions of \$114 million to its reserves during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, raising its total reserves to \$813 million.

Additions during the year were made up of net earnings of \$82.7 million and loan commissions of \$31.3 million. The earnings were placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees, and the loan commissions were credited to the special reserve. These figures compare to net earnings of \$70.3 million and loan commissions of \$30 million in the fiscal year 1962. On June 30, 1963, the supplemental

reserve totaled \$558.1 million and the special reserve was \$254.9 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$203.9 million, compared with \$188.3 million in the preceding year. Expenses, which included \$103.7 million for interest on Bank borrowing and other financial expenses, totaled \$121.2 million, compared with \$118 million last year.

During the year the Bank made 28 loans totaling the equivalent of \$448.7 million, compared with a total of \$882.3 million last year. The loans were made in Colombia (3 loans), Cyprus, El Salvador, Finland, India, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan (3 loans), Panama, Peru, Philippines (2 loans), Singapore, Swaziland, Thailand (4 loans), Uruguay, and Yugoslavia (2 loans). This brought the gross total of loan commitments at June 30 to \$7,121.5 million. By June 30, as a result of cancellations, repayments, sales of loans, and exchange adjustments, the portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$4,712.3 million.

Disbursements were \$620.4 million, compared with \$485.4 million in the preceding year. Cumulative disbursements amounted to \$5,425.5 million on June 30, 1963.

During the year the Bank sold or agreed to sell \$273.3 million principal amount of loans. On June 30 the total sales of loans amounted to \$1,605.3 million, of which all except \$69 million was without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank during the year amounted to \$112.9 million, and repayments to purchasers of parts of loans amounted to \$130.6 million. This brought total principal repayments to \$1,318.9 million on June 30, consisting of \$655.4 million repaid to the Bank and \$663.5 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

The outstanding funded debt of the Bank amounted to \$2,519.2 million on June 30, 1963, reflecting a net decrease of \$1.6 million in the past year. During the year there was a gross increase in borrowings of \$124 million. This consisted of a Netherlands guilder public bond issue in the amount of f.40 million (US\$11 million equivalent); a public offering of \$5 million

of U.S. dollar bonds in Austria, and a placement of \$5 million of U.S. dollar notes with the central bank of Austria; the private placement of an issue of \$100 million of U.S. dollar bonds; and the delivery of \$3 million of bonds which had been subject to delayed delivery arrangements. The funded debt was decreased by \$125.6 million as a result of the maturing of the equivalent of \$107.8 million of bonds and of sinking fund and purchase fund transactions amounting to \$17.8 million.

**TREATY INFORMATION**

**United States and India Sign  
Atomic Energy Agreement**

Press release 411 dated August 9

*An agreement for cooperation which provides the legal basis for installing and operating a 380-megawatt nuclear power station of United States design at Tarapur, India,<sup>1</sup> was signed on August 8, 1963, at the Department of State by Indian Ambassador Braj Kumar Nehru, Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot, and Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. In compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the agreement has been placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for a period of 30 days. Following is the text of the agreement.*

**AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
CONCERNING THE CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC  
ENERGY**

Whereas the peaceful uses of atomic energy hold great promise for all mankind;

Whereas the Government of India has decided to construct and operate a civil atomic

power station near Tarapur in Maharashtra State as hereinafter specified;

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India desire to cooperate with respect to the construction and operation of the aforesaid civil atomic powerstation;

Now therefore the Parties hereto agree as follows:

*Article I*

Unclassified information shall be exchanged between the Parties hereto with respect to the development, design, construction, operation, and use of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, including research and development related thereto and problems of health and safety connected therewith.

*Article II*

A. During the period of this Agreement the United States Commission will sell to the Government of India and the Government of India will purchase from the United States Commission, as needed, all requirements of the Government of India for enriched uranium for use as fuel at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, it being understood that the Tarapur Atomic Power Station shall be operated on no other special nuclear material than that made available by the United States Commission and special nuclear material produced therefrom. The enriched uranium, which shall contain no more than twenty per cent (20%) U-235, will be made available in accordance with the terms, conditions and delivery schedules set forth in a contract to be made between the Parties; provided, however, that the net amount of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium sold hereunder shall not exceed 14,500 kilograms. The net amount of U-235 shall be the gross quantity of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium sold to the Government of India hereunder less the quantity of U-235 contained in recoverable uranium resold or otherwise returned to the Government of the United States of America or transferred to any other nation or group of nations or international organization with the approval of the Government of the United States of America.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 143.

B. The net amount of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium to be sold pursuant to Paragraph A of this Article has been agreed upon by the Parties on the basis of estimated requirements for fueling the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. If the construction of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is not begun by June 30, 1965, the United States shall not be required, unless it is otherwise agreed, to sell enriched uranium for fueling the Tarapur Station under this Agreement.

C. Within the limitations contained in Paragraph A of this Article the quantity of enriched uranium sold by the United States Commission under this Article and held by the Government of India pursuant to this Agreement shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity necessary for the full loading of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Parties, is necessary to permit the efficient and continuous operation of the Station.

D. The Government of India will retain title to any enriched uranium purchased from the United States Commission.

E. It is agreed that when any special nuclear material utilized in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station requires reprocessing, and recourse is not taken by the Government of India to the provisions of Article VI C of this Agreement, such reprocessing may be performed in Indian facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions of Article VI of this Agreement may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed. It is understood, except as may be otherwise agreed, that the form and content of any irradiated fuel elements removed from the reactors shall not be altered before delivery to any such reprocessing facility.

F. With respect to any special nuclear material produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station which is in excess of the need of the Government of India for such material in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Government of the United States of America shall have the first option to purchase such special nuclear material at the fuel value price of the United States Commission which may be in effect domestically at such time as it may exercise its option. If such option is not exer-

cised, the Government of India may with the approval of the Government of the United States of America transfer such excess special nuclear material to any other nation or group of nations or international organization.

G. Some atomic energy materials which the Government of India may request the United States Commission to provide in accordance with this Agreement are harmful to persons and property unless handled and used carefully. After delivery of such materials to the Government of India, the Government of India shall bear all responsibility, insofar as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, for the safe handling and use of such materials.

#### *Article III*

Materials needed for use at or in connection with the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, other than source materials or the special nuclear materials required for fueling the reactors, will, when such materials are not available commercially, be transferred by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of India on such terms and conditions and in such amounts as may be mutually agreed; provided, however, that special nuclear material transfers will be confined to limited quantities.

#### *Article IV*

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred under this Agreement, shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information, materials, equipment and devices for any particular use or application.

#### *Article V*

It is agreed that the Government of the United States of America will permit persons under its jurisdiction to transfer and export materials, equipment and devices, other than source or special nuclear materials, to, and perform services for, the Government of India and such persons under its jurisdiction as are au-

thorized by the Government of India to receive and possess such materials, equipment and devices, and utilize such services for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, subject to applicable laws, regulations and license requirements of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India.

#### *Article VI*

A. The Parties to this Agreement emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or device made available to the Government of India for use in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, or in connection therewith, pursuant to this Agreement shall be used solely for peaceful purposes. The Government of India emphasizes, in contrast to the position of the United States, that its agreement to the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement has been accorded in consideration of the fact that, as provided in this Agreement, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material than that furnished by the Government of the United States of America and special nuclear material produced therefrom, in consequence of which the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices in any case ensue from the safeguards on fuel.

B. The following arrangements shall be applicable between the Parties:

1. The Parties have reviewed the design of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and may review any significant modification in this design for the sole purpose of determining that the arrangements provided in this Article can be effectively applied. For the same purpose, the Parties may review the design of other facilities which will use, fabricate or process any special nuclear material made available pursuant to this Agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Such a review of the design of these other facilities will not be required if the Government of India, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, has placed an agreed equivalent amount of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

2. The Parties have agreed that a system of

records and reports shall be established to assure the complete accountability of any special nuclear material which is made available to the Government of India pursuant to this Agreement or which is produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. This system of records and reports shall be as described in the schedule annexed hereto and marked Annexure "A".

3. Any special nuclear material made available pursuant to this Agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, which is surplus to the current needs of the fuel cycle for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and which is not transferred by the Government of India pursuant to this Agreement, shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, be stored at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

4. There will be consultations and periodic exchanges of visits between the Parties to give assurance that the objectives set forth in paragraph A of this Article and the provisions of this Agreement concerning transfers are being observed. To the extent relevant to the accomplishment thereof, personnel designated by the Government of the United States of America, following consultation with the Government of India, upon request of the Government of the United States of America, and personnel designated by the Government of India shall have full access to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and to conversion, fabrication and chemical processing facilities in India at such time as special nuclear material transferred to the Government of India for, or received from, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is located at such facilities, and at such other times as may be relevant to the accomplishment of the above-noted objectives. Personnel so designated shall also be afforded access to other places and data, and to persons, to the extent relevant to the accomplishment of those objectives. The personnel designated by either Party, accompanied by personnel of the other Party if the latter so requests, may make such independent measurements as either Party considers necessary; and nothing in this Agreement is intended to impede the ability of either Party to have prompt access to data, places and persons to the extent relevant to accomplish the above-noted objectives. The Government of the United States of America

will keep such access to a minimum consistent with the need for effective verification that those objectives are being observed.

C. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement the Government of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this Agreement quantities of special nuclear material provided it has, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed agreed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

D. In the event of noncompliance with the guarantees or with the provisions of this Article, and the subsequent failure of the Government of India to fulfill such guarantees and provisions within a reasonable time, the Government of the United States of America shall have the right to suspend or terminate this Agreement and require the return of any equipment and devices transferred under this Agreement and any special nuclear material safeguarded pursuant to this Article.

#### *Article VII*

A. The Government of India guarantees that the safeguards in Article VI shall be maintained and that:

1. No material, equipment or device transferred to the Government of India or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement, by sale, lease or otherwise, will be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose, and

2. That no such material, equipment or device will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of India except as may be agreed to by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India, and then only if in the opinion of the United States Commission such transfer falls within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations or international organization.

B. The Government of the United States of

America guarantees that no special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and acquired by it, or an equivalent amount of the same type substituted therefor, shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose.

#### *Article VIII*

A. Recognizing the desirability of making use of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Parties agree in principle that, at a suitable time, the Agency will be requested to enter into a trilateral agreement for the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Article VI, in accordance with the following paragraphs. In addition, in accordance with the objectives set forth in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the United States of America is prepared, in principle, to include appropriate provisions in the aforementioned trilateral agreement, for the application of Agency safeguards to such special nuclear material produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station as may be received in the United States, or to equivalent material substituted therefor.

B. After the Agency has adopted a system of safeguards for the reactors of the size of those of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and at a reasonable time to be mutually agreed upon, the Parties will consult with each other to determine whether the system so adopted is generally consistent with the safeguards provisions contained in Article VI. If the system is generally consistent with these provisions, the Parties will request the Agency to enter into a trilateral agreement as referred to in the preceding paragraph. While the Parties recognize that the trilateral agreement should be implemented as soon as practicable, it is agreed, in order to avoid any dislocation or uncertainty during the period of early operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, that the Government of India may specify that the agreement shall not be implemented until the Station has reached reliable full-power operation.

C. In the event the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arrangement envisaged in this Ar-

ticle, paragraph A, either Party may, by notification, terminate this bilateral agreement. Before either Party takes steps to terminate, the Parties will carefully consider the economic effect of any such termination. Neither Party will invoke its termination rights until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of India, if it is the other Party, for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment by the Government of the United States of America, if it is the other Party, of production schedules. The Government of the United States of America will not invoke its termination rights unless there has been widespread acceptance, by those nations with whom it has bilateral agreements, of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency or of provisions similar to those contained in this Agreement. In the event of termination by either Party, the Government of India shall, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, return to the Government of the United States of America all special nuclear materials received pursuant to this Agreement and in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The Government of the United States of America will compensate the Government of India for such returned material at the current schedule of prices then in effect domestically.

#### *Article IX*

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) "United States Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

(b) "Tarapur Atomic Power Station" means an electrical generating power plant consisting of two boiling water reactors and associated equipment with a combined net output of approximately 380 MWe, to be located near Tarapur, Maharashtra State, India.

(c) "Equipment and devices" and "equipment or device" means any instrument, apparatus, or facility and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof.

(d) "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government

agency, or government corporation, but does not include the Parties to this Agreement.

(e) "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium.

(f) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(g) "Special nuclear material" means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 and any other material which the United States Commission pursuant to the United States Atomic Energy Act determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

(h) "Source material" means (1) uranium, thorium or any other material which is determined by either Party to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials in such concentration as either Party may determine from time to time.

(i) "Parties" means the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India, including the United States Commission on behalf of the Government of the United States of America. "Party" means one of the above-mentioned "Parties".

(j) "Reliable full power operation" shall be deemed to have been reached one year after the Tarapur Atomic Power Station has first operated continuously for one hundred hours at full power. In computing this one-year period, periods during which either reactor is not in operation for more than four consecutive weeks will be excluded.

#### *Article X*

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which both Governments have notified each other of compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force of such Agreement and shall remain in force for a period of thirty (30) years.

The Parties have agreed that the system of records and reports for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will consist of the following elements:

A. With respect to records, information covering the following will be included:

1. receipts of all nuclear materials<sup>2</sup>,
2. internal movements of all nuclear materials,
3. any removal of nuclear materials, including shipments, known losses, and unaccounted for quantities,
4. inventories of all nuclear materials on hand at the end of each accounting period, showing form, quantity, and location, and
5. reactor-operating data necessary for determining and reporting on the production and consumption of any nuclear materials and the use of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

B. With respect to reports, information covering the following will be included:

1. all receipts and removals of nuclear materials,
2. any production and consumption of nuclear materials,
3. any known losses and unaccounted-for nuclear materials,
4. all inventories of nuclear materials, and
5. the operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, including unusual incidents; and significant modifications made or to be made in the plant or in the fueling program.

Routine reports covering the foregoing elements shall be submitted to the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India on a monthly basis. Any losses of nuclear materials, however, or any unusual incidents or major changes in the fueling program will be reported as soon as the loss has been discovered or the change has been scheduled.

The Parties further agree that if any special nuclear material which is made available to India pursuant to this Agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is placed, in accordance with this Agreement, in any facilities in India other than the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, then the principles of the agreed-upon system referred to in Paragraph B.2 of Article VI of this Agreement and set forth in this Annexure will be applied to such a situation.

The records and reports will include such details as may be relevant to the achievement of the objectives of Article VI and may be modified by mutual agreement.

In the event of unusual incidents, special reports may be requested, including such amplifications and elucidations as each party considers relevant to the achievement of the objectives of Article VI.

<sup>2</sup>The term "nuclear material" as used in this Annexure means both source materials and special nuclear materials as they are defined in Article IX of this Agreement. [Footnote in original.]

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures affixed at Washington:* Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, August 8, 1963; Congo (Léopoldville), Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Netherlands, Norway, Sudan, Turkey, August 9, 1963.

#### Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202. *Ratification deposited:* Colombia April 5, 1963.

### BILATERAL

#### Belgium

Amendment to agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3301, 3738, 4317), concerning the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

#### India

Agreement for cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 8, 1963. Enters into force on the date on which both Governments have notified each other of compliance with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

#### Ireland

Amendment to the agreement of March 16, 1956, as amended (TIAS 4053, 4090), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

#### Japan

Protocol amending the agreement of June 16, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4133, 4172), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

#### Philippines

Amendment to agreement of July 27, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3316, 4515), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each Government

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

receives from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

### **Viet-Nam**

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 21, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5250). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon July 24, 1963. Entered into force July 24, 1963.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

### **Recent Releases**

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20540. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.*

**Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1963.** Compiled by the Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State. Pub. 7481. 336 pp. \$1.75.

**Foreign Affairs—Excerpt From the State of the Union Message, January 14, 1963.** Address of the President delivered before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Pub. 7487. General Foreign Policy Series 185. 19 pp. Limited distribution.

**Red China and the U.S.S.R.** A transcript of the television program "State Department Briefing: Red China and the U.S.S.R." in which four top Department officers participated. Pub. 7497. General Foreign Policy Series 186. 35 pp. 25¢.

**Sample Questions From the Junior Foreign Service Officer Examination (Revised).** Pamphlet of interest to candidates seeking a career in the Foreign Service of the United States. Pub. 7500. Department and Foreign Service Series 111. 39 pp. Limited distribution.

**Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere. Foreign Affairs Outlines—No. 2.** Address by Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Pub. 7509. Inter-American Series 85. 19 pp. 15¢.

**The United States and Europe: Policy in Evolution. Foreign Affairs Outlines—No. 3.** Leaflet based on a letter of February 15, 1963, from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball to Senator Paul Douglas, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, concerning the breakdown in negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community. Pub. 7518. European and British Commonwealth Series 65. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1962.** 15th annual report to the United Nations on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1961—June 30, 1962. Pub. 7521. International Organization and Conference Series 39. 281 pp. 75¢.

**Department of State 1963—A Report to the Citizen.** An illustrated report describing the functions and policies of the Department and some examples of the problems and hazards routinely encountered in the day-to-day administration of foreign affairs at home and abroad. Pub. 7530. General Foreign Policy Series 187. 150 pp. \$1.50.

**Telecommunication—Coordination and Use of Radio Frequencies Above 30 Megacycles per Second.** Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa October 24, 1962. Entered into force October 24, 1962. TIAS 5205. 31 pp. 15¢.

**Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council.** Agreement with Other Governments, as amended at the Ninth Session of the Council, Karachi, January 6-23, 1961. Entered into force November 23, 1961. An amendment adopted December 17, 1958, by the Council at the Eighth Session, Colombo. Entered into force December 17, 1958. TIAS 5218. 17 pp. 10¢.

**Army Mission to Panama.** Agreement with Panama, extending the agreement of July 7, 1942, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Panamá March 26 and July 6, 1962. Entered into force July 6, 1962. And amending agreement. Exchange of notes—Signed at Panamá September 20 and October 8, 1962. Entered into force October 8, 1962. TIAS 5226. 7 pp. 10¢.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4 of the Agreement of October 30, 1947.** Agreement with Other Governments. Done at Geneva November 19, 1960. Entered into force with respect to the United States November 14, 1962. TIAS 5227. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of October 14, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi December 3, 1962. Entered into force December 3, 1962. TIAS 5228. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Amendments to the Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, as Amended.** Adopted at the Eleventh Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, October 30—November 24, 1961. TIAS 5229. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Argentina, amending the agreements of April 25, 1955, as amended, and December 21, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires September 19 and November 26, 1962. TIAS 5230. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by Means of Balloons.** Agreement with Australia, extending the agreement of May 9, 1961. Exchange of notes—Dated at Canberra September 11 and October 30, 1962. TIAS 5231. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Disposition of Equipment and Materials.** Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of May 26, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara August 10, 1962. Entered into force August 10, 1962. TIAS 5232. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz December 6, 1962. TIAS 5233. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Administrative Expenditures.** Agreement with Belgium, amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels October 29 and November 20, 1962. Entered into force November 20, 1962. TIAS 5234. 3 pp. 5¢.

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*407	8/7	Delegation to inauguration of President of Paraguay.
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†410	8/8	Foreign policy briefing at Boston.
411	8/9	Atomic energy agreement with India.
*412	8/9	Diplomatic passports for retired FSO's.
†413	8/9	Gardner: "Outer Space: Problems of Law and Power" (revised).

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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Treaties in Force . . . January 1, 1963

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

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THE  
DEPARTMENT  
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**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1262*



*September 2, 1963*

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Boston Public Library  
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SEP 12 1963

DEPOSIT

*For index see inside back cover*

# The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Symbol of a New Course

*Statement by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

I appear here this morning to support the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.<sup>2</sup> Last week in Moscow the treaty was signed on behalf of the United States and the other original parties—the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. The Senate of the United States now has the constitutional responsibility to examine this treaty with care so that it may give the President its advice and, I earnestly hope, its consent to a prompt ratification.

The President has given the treaty before you this morning an apt characterization. It is, he has said,<sup>3</sup> “not the millennium. . . . But it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from

war.” Since 1789 the Senate has given its consent without reservation to the ratification of 943 treaties. I believe this may well prove one of the most significant occasions for the exercise of that constitutional prerogative.

## U.S. Efforts for International Controls

The United States, as the first nation to unleash the power of the atom, recognized from the beginning its awesome potentialities for good and evil. In the less than two decades since the first use of a nuclear weapon, the United States has worked continuously to achieve effective international controls so that the power of the atom might be committed to the improvement, rather than the destruction, of mankind. Disarmament and the control of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, have been concerns of the highest priority for the three administrations that have borne responsibility for the great issues of peace and war during the atomic era.

Less than a year after the explosions at Hiro-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Aug. 12 (press release 418). Representatives of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Committee also attended the hearing.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1262 PUBLICATION 7592 SEPTEMBER 2, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

shima and Nagasaki the United States presented its first comprehensive proposal for international control of the atom. As offered by Bernard Baruch at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946,<sup>4</sup> the plan called for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority with responsibility for control of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to our security, with the power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities, and with the duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

During the remainder of the Truman administration the United States continued to press these proposals in the United Nations and elsewhere. Though the great majority of the countries accepted the basic principles of the plan, the Soviet Union, unfortunately, did not.

President Eisenhower was in office less than 3 months when he renewed the United States offer for "international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons."<sup>5</sup> Two years later at the summit meeting in Geneva he personally launched the "open skies" proposal.<sup>6</sup> Throughout the ensuing years, no matter what the temperature of the cold war, the United States has pursued in every available forum its search for peace through effective and verified disarmament.

These efforts disclosed a wide gap between the approach of this country and that of the Soviet Union to disarmament problems, mainly on the question of inspection and control. In the middle 1950's, therefore, the United States undertook to explore more limited measures. The most promising of these was control of nuclear weapons testing. There were good reasons for this. All mankind had what might even be described as an instinctive impulse to end the pollution of the air and earth that was a consequence of unrestricted testing. And, while arrangements banning bomb tests could not be wholly self-enforcing, the problem of detection and control seemed manageable. An

agreement to stop testing—or not to begin—would not strip a nation of its defenses or carry it too far into the unknown. Here, many felt, was a good point from which to start.

The first Western proposal for control of nuclear tests was submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations General Assembly on August 21, 1957.<sup>7</sup> Sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, it called for a comprehensive 12-month ban on testing. This proposal, however, again encountered the reluctance of Communist states, with closed societies, to accept the international inspection and control required for effective enforcement of a comprehensive ban. On April 13, 1959, after months of inconclusive debate on this issue of inspection and control, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan advanced a proposal for a ban on tests in the atmosphere up to an altitude of 50 kilometers.<sup>8</sup> This proposal did not require on-site inspection since significant tests of this kind could be detected and identified by national systems. Even this, however, was not accepted by the Soviet Union.

When the present administration assumed office, President Kennedy immediately undertook further explorations of the possibility of banning nuclear weapons tests. In 1961 President Kennedy, again with Prime Minister Macmillan, proposed a ban on tests in the atmosphere that would produce radioactive fallout.<sup>9</sup> It was rejected by the U.S.S.R. The full text of a treaty embodying a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was tabled by the United States and United Kingdom delegations at Geneva on August 27, 1962.<sup>10</sup> At the same time they tabled the text of a comprehensive treaty which provided for on-site inspections for detecting and identifying underground tests.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

<sup>8</sup> For text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Premier Khrushchev on Apr. 13 and the latter's reply, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704.

<sup>9</sup> For text of a joint statement, see *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1961, p. 476.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1962, p. 415.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 411.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

Before these texts were tabled there were consultations both with appropriate committees of Congress and with our allies and associates. For the past year the text of a three-environment test ban has been before the world for comment and discussion. The treaty we have just signed in Moscow and which is now before you is based in its essential elements on the draft tabled in Geneva a year ago. Throughout this period, the concept has remained the same—to take a first step toward the control of nuclear weapons by prohibiting testing in those environments where our national systems are capable of detecting significant violations, leaving for subsequent steps the elimination of those tests that can be detected and identified only with an adequate system of inspection.

### **Limiting the Risk of Nuclear War**

Some may ask why three administrations representing both of our great political parties have devoted so much effort in attempting to make progress toward disarmament and, in particular, toward a ban on nuclear tests when those same administrations were also building a nuclear arsenal of increasing and massive destructive power. The answer lies at the heart of the dilemma which troubles our world.

The values that are the heritage of a free society have been menaced by a Communist bloc armed with the most modern weapons and intent on world domination.

For our nation this poses a special problem. We must, for our own security and as the leader of the free world, maintain a mastery of the most advanced weapons while technology moves forward at a breathtaking pace. At the same time we must use all our resources of will and intellect in an effort to halt the burdensome and dangerous competition in weapons that is the somber characteristic of the present world situation.

I recall the comment of a fellow officer in 1945, when we heard about the explosion of the first atom bomb. "War," he said, "has devoured itself." Today the United States has operational weapons in its arsenal hundreds of times as destructive as that first atom bomb. The Polaris and Minuteman missiles are armed with warheads tens of times as powerful. The

Soviets also have weapons of great destructive power.

The hard fact is that a full-scale nuclear exchange could erase all that man has built over the centuries. War has devoured itself because it can devour the world.

If our nation is to survive today, we must be able at all times in the absence of the far-reaching disarmament which still eludes us to endure a nuclear attack and deliver counterblows of vast devastation. As Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara will make clear tomorrow, we have the ability to do so. We intend to keep it that way, lest others be tempted by ambition to abandon reason.

Yet the facts must be faced. No one can realistically think of "victory" in a full-scale nuclear exchange. Last October during the Cuban crisis, men confronted decisions that might have moved to a nuclear war. That experience has been sobering for all.

No responsible man will deny that we live in a world of vast and incalculable risks. Where decisions may be required in minutes, we must be constantly on guard against the accident or miscalculation that can lead where no one wants to go. A local conflict anywhere around the globe in which the interests of the great powers are engaged might suddenly pose the prospect of nuclear war.

Nor can any responsible person say that we can improve our security by an unlimited arms race extending without relief into the future. On the contrary, great as the risks now are, they would rapidly increase. Arsenals will grow larger, weapons more destructive, the frustrations of stalemate and fear more intense. The risks will increase unpredictably as nuclear weapons become available to more and more countries.

It is against this prospect, which the world must frankly face, that the Senate is asked to consider the present treaty. If there may be marginal risks in it, they are far less in my opinion than the risks that will result if we accept the thought that rational man must pursue an unlimited competition in nuclear weapons.

All three of our Presidents who have borne supreme responsibility for our national security during the nuclear age have found the risks of

an unlimited nuclear race far greater than those inherent in safeguarded progress toward arms control.

### Provisions of the Treaty

Let me review with you the provisions of this treaty.

The treaty before you is a self-contained document, and it embodies the whole of the agreement. As the President said in his message of transmittal,<sup>12</sup> there are no side arrangements, understandings, or conditions of any kind.

The fundamental obligation is set forth in *article I*. That article prohibits nuclear weapon tests as well as all other nuclear explosions in peacetime in three environments: the atmosphere, under water, and outer space. Underground explosions are permitted so long as the radioactive debris remains within the country where the explosion takes place. Each party also undertakes not to assist any other country, whether or not a party, in conducting nuclear explosions of a kind prohibited under the treaty.

This treaty does not affect the use of nuclear weapons in war. It has to do with nuclear weapon testing in time of peace. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are, however, subject to the same limitations as nuclear weapons tests. This restriction is necessary because it is difficult to distinguish between the two without on-site inspection. It will not mean the end of our Plowshare program. Many of the peaceful experiments and uses in which we are interested can be conducted underground within the limits of the treaty. Dr. Seaborg [Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission] will discuss this with you in detail.

*Article II* provides a procedure for amending the treaty. Amendments may be proposed by any party and are approved by a majority vote. The majority must include the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Amendments do not enter into force until instruments of ratification have been deposited by a majority of the parties, "including the instruments of ratification of all the Original

Parties." Thus no amendment to the treaty can enter into force until it has been considered and approved by the Senate.

It has been said that this amendment process involves a veto. It does. I regard such a veto as essential to the security interests of the United States. Without it, the ban could be extended on terms and conditions that would be unacceptable—as, for example, to underground testing without on-site inspection.

*Article II* also provides that, if one-third of the parties so desires, a conference may be called to consider amendments, but a conference is not a necessary part of the amending process.

*Article III* prescribes the procedures for ratification and accession. We hope the treaty will have the widest possible application.

It has been suggested that, by the act of subscribing to the treaty, a regime might gain recognition by parties to the treaty that do not now recognize it. No such effect can occur. In international law the governing criterion of recognition is intent. We do not recognize, and we do not intend to recognize, the Soviet occupation zone of East Germany as a state or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, or to recognize the local authorities as a government. Those authorities cannot alter these facts by the act of subscribing to the test ban treaty. The President made this clear in his press conference of August 1. On August 2 the Department of State issued a formal statement to the same effect. Copies of both should be a part of the record of this hearing.

All this would necessarily follow from the general rule of international law that participation in a multilateral treaty does not affect the recognition status of any authority or regime. But this treaty contains additional safeguards. Treaties typically provide for a single depositary. *Article III*, however, provides that each of the three original parties will be a depositary of the treaty. No depositary need accept a signature or an instrument of accession from authorities in a territory it does not recognize as a state.

The East German authorities will subscribe to the treaty in Moscow. The Soviet Union may notify us of that act. We are under no obligation to accept that notification, and we

<sup>12</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 316.

## **U.S. Policy on East Germany Not Affected by Test Ban Treaty**

*At his August 1st news conference President Kennedy was asked whether the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty by the East German regime would amount to tacit recognition of East Germany. Following is the President's reply.*

That is not correct. This matter was discussed and the position of the United States and Britain was made very clear to the Soviet Union, and as a matter of fact the Soviet Union mentioned a regime which it did not recognize and did not wish to recognize. So that a procedure was developed whereby a regime which is not recognized by one of the other parties to the treaty can file its assent with one of the three parties.

This act would not constitute recognition by the remaining signatories. The fact of the matter is that we signed a part of a multilateral treaty on Laos which the Red Chinese also signed, but we do not recognize the Red Chinese regime. This is a matter of intent. Diplomatic procedure, custom, and law provide that recognition is a matter of intent. We do not intend to recognize the East German regime, and therefore the language which is in the treaty was part of the treaty when it was tabled more than a year ago, and it has been before us for a year and it does not provide for recognition of East Germany and we will not recognize it, and we believe strongly in the reunification of Germany as a free, democratic country. That is our policy in the past and our present policy and our future policy and would not be affected by this test ban agreement.

I do think that it is important that we have as great a participation in this nuclear test ban agreement as possible. We have received no encouragement, but we would like the Red Chinese to come into the agreement. It looks like they will not, but it would obviously be in the interest of world peace. But that does not constitute recognition.

have no intention of doing so, but the East German regime would have committed itself to abide by the provisions of the treaty.

By this arrangement we not only assure that no implication of recognition may arise, but we reserve our right to object if later the East German regime should seek to assert privileges under the treaty such as voting or participating in a conference called under article II.

*Article IV* gives any party the right to withdraw from the treaty "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." A party must give 3 months' notice of its decision to withdraw. This provision is in our interest. If and when events occur that make testing in any of the three environments necessary for the security of the United States, we will be able to resume. Under the treaty we alone will decide whether extraordinary events have occurred and whether they jeopardize our supreme national interests. We need answer to no tribunal and to no authority other than our own conscience and requirements. We hope that the treaty will last and will grow in strength, but certainly no President of the United States would hesitate to exercise the right of withdrawal if the national security interest requires it.

If the Soviet Union itself were to test in violation of the treaty, the fundamental obligation that is the consideration for our adherence would disappear. In that case the United States could, if it chose, consider itself released from its reciprocal obligation and could resume testing without delay.

## **U.S. Security Maintained**

Under this treaty the national security of the United States can and will be fully maintained.

This country has learned much from the experience of the last 18 years. We do not propose to forget those lessons. We have no basis yet for assuming a fundamental change in Soviet objectives. We are still engaged in a contest between free choice and coercion. The President made this clear, and I want to reiterate it here today.

But there is nothing inconsistent between this treaty, or other effectively enforceable arms control agreements, and a policy of vigilance. The same three administrations that have sought disarmament over the past 18 years have effectively met Communist threats of aggression—in Iran, in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Western Europe, in Korea, in Southeast Asia, in Cuba. But whatever may be the funda-

mental antagonisms between us and the Soviet Union, we have a mutual interest in avoiding mutual destruction.

We shall remain ready to meet further challenges. The treaty permits underground testing. The policy of the United States is to continue to test underground as necessary to our security. Moreover, although we hope for compliance, we cannot discount the possibility that the Soviet Union may violate the treaty. We shall be on the alert for any violations, and we have a high degree of confidence in our ability to detect them. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will discuss this capability in detail. But I am confident that, if significant testing in violation of the treaty takes place, we will know about it. And we will be ready at all times to resume testing in all environments, and promptly, if that should become necessary. Dr. Seaborg will be prepared to deal with these matters in detail.

#### **Concrete Gains of the Treaty**

This is a limited treaty. The President listed the things it does not do, and we must keep them in mind in judging its significance. At the same time, if—as seems likely—most of the nations of the world adhere to the treaty, and if they observe its obligations, this will in itself bring concrete gains.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union already have enough nuclear power to inflict enormous destruction on each other. Still, the search for bigger, more destructive weapons goes on. Each generation of major weapons has been more expensive than the last. Each has involved an increasing burden, an increasing diversion of resources from the great unfinished business of mankind. Yet greater armament has not demonstrably brought greater security. The treaty, if observed, should slow this spiral, without damage to our relative strength.

Second, the treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons. Most of the countries with the capacity and the incentive to develop nuclear weapons over the next decade

#### **Department States Views on Status of East German Regime**

##### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

We understand the Federal Republic's concern that this treaty should work no recognition or change in status for East Germany. This question is one of great importance for the Federal Republic, and it is entirely right and proper that they should study the matter carefully and satisfy themselves fully on it.

Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman and his advisers had this problem very much in mind during the negotiation of the treaty.

Now, it is a well-established proposition of international law that recognition is not accorded to an unrecognized regime when that regime acts to become a party to a multilateral treaty along with states that do not recognize it. Similarly, such action by an unrecognized regime does not result in any recognition or acknowledgment of the existence of the state which the regime purports to govern.

Diplomatic recognition of a government and also recognition or acknowledgment of the existence of a state is a matter of intention. No government is held to recognize unless it intends to do so.

The United States does not recognize that East Germany constitutes a state.

Now, you will recall that the United States signed the Lao agreements together with Communist China and North Viet-Nam. We have always maintained that this does not affect recognition status of the other signatories.

We are fully satisfied that the recognition problems have been effectively handled and the East German regime cannot change its status or achieve recognition from us or any other state which does not now recognize it merely by adhering to the treaty.

We are confident that, when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany completes its study of the international law and practice on this question, it will reach the same conclusion.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by a Department spokesman on Aug. 2.

or so have already announced that they will accept the self-denying ordinance of the treaty. While this does not guarantee that they will never become nuclear powers, their renunciation of atmospheric testing will act as a deterrent by making it much more difficult and ex-

pensive for them to develop nuclear weapons.

Third, the treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet. The increased radioactivity from nuclear testing has thus far stayed within tolerable limits, in a statistical sense. But as the President said, "this is not a natural health hazard, and it is not a statistical issue." Moreover, if testing were not restricted, more and more countries would conduct tests. Many of them would lack either the incentive or the means to minimize the fallout. We have a high obligation to safeguard life and health and the genetic integrity of the human race. Today no one can say for certain how much fallout is too much. But if this treaty is observed it will go a long way to assure that we do not transgress the limits.

#### **"A Choice Between the Quick and the Dead"**

For 18 years we have held the Communist drive in check largely by the deterrent force of our massive military strength. We shall maintain that overwhelming strength until we are certain that freedom can be assured by other means.

But throughout we have known that a lasting peace could not be founded upon armed might alone. It can be secured only by durable international institutions and by a respect for law and its procedures. The problem has been to convince the Communist world that its interest also lay in that direction.

The most important thing about the treaty is, therefore, what it may symbolize and what new paths it may open. That, no one can now foretell.

But as the Senate undertakes its appraisal of this treaty it is well to recall the vivid statement that Bernard Baruch made to the United Nations when the nuclear age was first upon us:<sup>13</sup>

We are here [he said] to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . .

Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear.

For 17 years all men have lived in that

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

shadow of that fear. But if the promise of this treaty can be realized, if we can now take even this one step along a new course, then frail and fearful mankind may find another step and another until confidence replaces terror and hope takes over from despair.

## **Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 16**

Press release 425 dated August 16

*Secretary Rusk:* I understand that the leadership of the House of Representatives is planning to bring the Foreign Assistance Act to the floor next Tuesday [August 20]. This legislation authorizes our programs of military and economic aid.<sup>1</sup> The appropriation stage will of course come later.

Foreign aid is today, and has been since World War II, a key tool of American foreign policy. The basic objective of our foreign aid programs has not changed since the beginning of the Marshall Plan. The programs are designed to assist other countries to maintain their independence and to develop into self-supporting nations.

The record of accomplishment over these years has been very good indeed. We have already been able to terminate economic aid programs in 17 countries, and another 6 countries should be able to join this list in the near future. Of the 49 nations to gain independence since 1943, not one has chosen a Communist form of government.

The foreign aid program makes a positive contribution and a vital contribution to the decent world order which is a central aim of our foreign policy. I hope very much that the House will pass the legislation, and without crippling amendments, and that the requested funds will then be provided in full measure. This is not the time for us to relax our effort in the present world situation.

<sup>1</sup> For statements made by Secretary Rusk before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Apr. 5 and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 11, see BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1963, p. 664, and July 1, 1963, p. 19.

Now I am ready for your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you assess the Chinese Communist charge that the Soviets agreed and then decided not to provide them with atomic weapons?*

A. It has been our impression that there was a period during which the Soviet Union extended very considerable technical assistance to the Chinese, and that some of this was in the nuclear field, but that in 1959 or early 1960 much of this technical assistance was withdrawn. I would think that what Peiping said on this subject in general conforms to our own information. But I think I would not want to speculate too broadly upon what this might have meant.

I do think that nuclear powers, particularly the two largest nuclear powers, are both concerned about the problem of proliferation. I suppose that, as difficulties developed and tensions developed between Moscow and Peiping, this question of cooperation in the nuclear field was one of the victims of that tension.

#### **Proposal on Static Control Posts**

*Q. Mr. Secretary.*

A. Yes.

*Q. On another topic, is there any substance to the reports that the United States is ready to accept the Soviet offer to station ground inspectors in East and West?*

A. Well, I think that if you will look at the full statement—actually I have not myself seen the actual full statement made in Geneva in the last day or so—but this is simply an indication that we are prepared to look further into this point of static control posts as a measure against surprise attack—control posts at key ports and railway stations, highway centers, and airfields. You will recall that Mr. Khrushchev referred to that earlier in the summer as one of the steps.

Now, one of the problems of course will be whether this is something that can be taken up specifically as a precise move with respect to surprise attack or whether it is going to be related to other and more difficult questions, such as levels of forces or nuclear-free zones or questions of that sort.

Back in 1958 this was a proposal which was part of a complex—a complex which I think would not be a basis for agreement at this point. But I would think that, both from what Mr. Stelle said and what Mr. Tsarapkin said,<sup>2</sup> this is a subject which can be discussed further, but at the moment I don't see clearly that there will be a rapid agreement on this point.

*Q. In that connection—*

A. Yes.

*Q. There is a report out of Bonn that the U.S. is considering reducing its forces in West Germany by 10 percent. Would this have anything to do with our negotiations in Geneva?*

A. No. I don't understand this particular report. As you know, there has been a report of very broad reorganizations in the structure of our Armed Forces, particularly in the Army, but I have no basis for that particular report.

*Q. So you reject that?*

A. I say I don't have any information that would lead me to think that that report is accurate. We are not planning those reductions.

#### **Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the nuclear test ban hearings, Senator [Wayne] Morse has called for a statement from you on whether we intend to give—to share—American nuclear secrets with France in view of the fact that the administration now considers it a nuclear power. He says any such move would be a hypocritical act and would cause him to vote against the treaty. Could you clarify this for us?*

A. Well, I expect to return to the Senate before these hearings are over for discussion of particular points that might be left dangling during the discussions thus far.<sup>3</sup> I would call your attention to the treaty itself,<sup>4</sup> article I,

<sup>2</sup> Charles C. Stelle, U.S. representative to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which reconvened at Geneva on July 30, and Semyon Tsarapkin, Soviet representative.

<sup>3</sup> For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 12, see p. 350.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

paragraph 2, which provides that each of the parties undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the prohibited environments.

We would consider ourselves of course bound by that paragraph, and this would be a ruling consideration in any assistance that we might give or will be asked to give to any country that is involved in this nuclear field.

I also call your attention to the fact that recently in his press conference President de Gaulle referred to this question as a hypothetical question. I think I might just leave it with those two comments.

*Q. Mr. Secretary.*

A. Yes.

*Q. Senator Morse of course referred to elements other than the three prohibited environments. He referred of course to nuclear assistance in any respect which would involve the spread of nuclear weaponry.*

A. Well, I would have to study what he has said, and I will have a chance to go into that fully when I go back down to the Senate.

#### **Possibility of Additional Steps**

*Q. Mr. Secretary.*

A. Yes.

*Q. Before you went to Moscow there was some question expressed here as to just what were Soviet intentions in reaching a test ban agreement, whether Khrushchev was interested in a very broad solution on East-West problems, or simply limited solutions, a kind of breathing spell. After your trip there, have you any clearer views as to just what are Soviet intentions?*

A. Well, it is always a little dangerous to try to enter fully into the mind of someone else on a matter of this sort. I got the impression—or had the impression during these past few weeks—that we are not involved in a comprehensive discussion of the full range of East-West relations looking toward some negotiated *détente* across the board. I do have the im-

pression that it is worth exploring particular points—for example, some of these measures in the surprise-attack field would be a good example—to see whether there might not be other points of agreement.

You will have observed, both from what was said by Lord Home [British Foreign Secretary] and me and by Chairman Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko, that references were made to the test ban treaty as a possible first step, and expressions of the hope that other steps might be found. Well, we have not yet found those other steps, but I think there will be further contact and discussion in the weeks and months ahead to see whether some additional steps could not be taken. I think that this surprise-attack field is one that we might be able to build further on.

I do believe that the Soviet Union has some real interests in this test ban treaty and in exploring these matters further. I think the argument between Moscow and Peiping about the role of thermonuclear war in the modern world is a serious argument.

I believe that the Soviet Union does have, as all of us have, some great unfinished tasks for its own people in which it would like to make substantially large investments. There are considerations which, looked at objectively and without regard to ideological differences—there are considerations which would indicate that the Soviet Union may be ready to take up some of these particular points and see what might be done with them. But this is speculative. One can be wrong by tomorrow morning. We just have to keep working at it and see what can happen.

But we do not have—I want to emphasize—we do not have undisclosed agreements on points that surrounded or had anything to do with this test ban discussion. The agreement is fully known, fully public: there are no strings or reservations, anything of that sort, connected with it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, at his last press conference, General de Gaulle made a proposal for a four-power disarmament conference. Have you been able to obtain any details of the proposal? And is it now under active consideration at all?*

A. No. We have had nothing further on that.

*Q. There was a similar proposal, Mr. Secretary—well, not in numbers—from Chinese Communist leadership calling for some sort of worldwide disarmament conference. I believe that was delivered officially to the U.S. Government. Have you studied it? Do you expect to reply to it?*

A. Well, I wouldn't quite call that a similar proposal. President de Gaulle was talking about a four-power consultation; and the Chinese have talked about a large worldwide chief-of-government party to look at nuclear disarmament.

We have had what the Chinese have made public on those proposals, and they were repeated when our Ambassador saw the Chinese representative in Warsaw the other day, but I don't see in those proposals any opportunity to move forward on what is a very far-reaching, complex matter. I think the manner of the proposal and the character of the proposal from Peiping has not added very much to the situation.

#### **Situation in South Viet-Nam**

*Q. Sir, the religious situation in South Viet-Nam appears to be worsening. Would this be likely to have any effect on our attitude toward the Diem government?*

A. Well, I think it is obvious that we are deeply distressed by the dissensions that have occurred in South Viet-Nam, arising out of religious differences, and these internal matters with which you are familiar. We are especially distressed because we regret anything which seems to create disunity at a time when things were moving in a favorable direction, in the security field, and moving toward a position where the South Vietnamese could be finally safe and independent in their own activities.

The numbers of incidents have been dropping rapidly from last year. Such elements as sabotage, propaganda incidents, the larger sized attacks, those were dropping. Additional areas of the country were coming under Government control. The strategic-hamlet program had been moving forward. I think it is still moving forward.

So that we would hope very much that the

Government, President Diem, and the Buddhist leaders—based upon what has been said by both sides in recent days—would find a way to resolve these differences among themselves so that everyone could return to the central task of the country, which is to insure its safety and its freedom. We will do what we can in this regard. These are complex and difficult issues. We hope very much that the Government out there will take a strong lead now to bring about a greater degree of peace and serenity within the country itself.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, since the President on August 1<sup>5</sup> indicated an interest in giving France some nuclear help, has there been any movement on this proposal, or is it still as it was on August 1?*

A. I think there has been no change. My comments made today would cover that point, I think.

#### **Trade With Yugoslavia and Poland**

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes.

*Q. Coming back to the Foreign Assistance Act, what is the present position of the Department of State on the most-favored-nation clause in regard to Yugoslavia and Poland? And what do you think the chances are for the Congress to reverse its original position on that point?*

A. Well, I think the attitude of the Department of State is, and has been, that we believe that the President, the Executive, ought to have flexibility in dealing with this question of trade with Yugoslavia and Poland. We regret very much the amendment to the bill last year, which barred the most-favored-nation treatment, which would cause us to interrupt our trade relationships. We would hope very much that the Congress this year would give us the amendment that we have sought.

I think that it is perhaps not for me to try to predict what the result will be. I would hope, however, that we could get the flexibility that we need in a matter of that sort.

<sup>5</sup> At a news conference.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is delaying the Chiang Kai-shek government's signature to the partial test ban treaty?*

A. I, frankly, don't know just what the status of their consideration of that matter is.

As you may know, 63 have signed the treaty thus far. There will be 3 more today, bringing the total to 66. There will be a considerable number of others who will sign. I don't have precise information about what might be the situation with regard to Nationalist China.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the subject of the surprise attack, do you have any indications that we may have French cooperation in that?*

A. Of course, anything that involves our NATO allies would have to be discussed fully with our NATO allies. We could not, for example, make arrangements ourselves, nor even could the four NATO members now sitting at Geneva be able to make arrangements, on control posts throughout the NATO alliance without fullest consideration in NATO. So I am sure that, if this appears to be moving toward serious discussions, France would, necessarily, have to be consulted and have to consider what its own attitude would be.

*Q. But you haven't had any indication from them?*

A. Well, these matters have been before NATO, and they have been informed of the discussions thus far. But they haven't reached a point of—what shall we say—maturity, where the precise attitudes of the NATO countries have been worked out, because we don't really know what propositions are possible, and what linkages the other side might attempt to inject into these conversations, and what the framework is. So that there is still a good deal of work to be done on that.

Yes.

*Q. The White House has said you have been directed to consider the possible negotiation of an international agreement on wool textiles. Do you feel there is any possibility of obtaining such an agreement?*

A. Well, quite frankly, I am not really well briefed on that this morning. I would like to pass that one, because that is very complicated and, shall I say, a delicate matter. And I think that anything I might say could well be wrong at the moment. So I will pass that one, if you don't mind.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, during your talks with Mr. Gromyko, it was understood that the issue of Cuba was raised. And, if so, could you tell us what his response was to the status of Soviet troops on the island?*

A. Well, I did, while I was in Moscow, express our continuing concern about the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. And also our well-known concern about the attempts of Castro to interfere in other countries in this hemisphere. But I don't think that I should today go into that in any detail, nor to say what Mr. Gromyko's reply was.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes.

*Q. Reports from Geneva this morning say that one of the linkages which Russia appears to be injecting into these surprise-attack talks is a reduction of forces in the two Germanies and the placing of inspectors in the two Germanies. Is this the kind of linkage that would be acceptable?*

A. Yes. I would think that what we ought to try to do is to find out whether there are other precise steps, as precise as the "hot line," as precise as the test ban in three environments, as precise as, say, static control posts, on which we can move. The more things are linked into other matters, the more difficult they become. And I don't see myself that linking static control posts into mutual reduction of forces is likely to lead to an early agreement. I think that makes it a very, very unpromising prospect.

#### **Portuguese Territories in Africa**

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes, sir, back here.

*Q. What is your view, sir, on Spain's decision in the past few days to grant some degree of self-rule to its African territories, and also*

on the Portuguese Premier's speech in the past few days regarding Portuguese African territories, particularly his criticism of American policy toward those territories?

A. Well, we can't be expected to like some of the things that Dr. [António de Oliveira] Salazar said about U.S. policies in his statement—what seems to us to be a distortion of our aims in a situation of this sort, or that we are somehow trying to exercise, extend some sort of sphere of influence, as far as the United States is concerned.

It's well known that the people of this country really do attach importance to the simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed and that what the people of a particular territory think about their circumstance or situation is an important question.

Now, this is not just a question of, shall we say, high principle. It's a very practical notion in the modern world that political arrangements are stable and promising when they clearly rest upon the consent of those directly involved. And so we would hope that this factor could be taken fully into account and that the European relationship to Africa or the Portuguese presence in Africa could be sustained by the demonstrated consent of the people. But it's for the people themselves to clarify that point.

And so we will continue to work at this and counsel on it, as far as our responsibilities to the United Nations are concerned.

I think that perhaps that is about all that I would say at this point on that issue.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a little while ago you were talking of the questions you might explore with Soviet Russia in the wake of the test ban. And among them you mentioned Peiping-Moscow relations. Have you or your diplomats had frank exchange of views on this point with Soviet Russia?*

A. No. I might have misled someone if I indicated that Moscow-Peiping relations was a subject for exploration with Moscow. That has not been a subject of conversation between us.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some people who*

*say that in a nuclear age any agreement between East and West to station inspectors on each other's soil to watch military movements on the ground and potentially in the water—that this wouldn't really be much of a step to ease tensions. What is your view on this, and how do you regard it as potentially significant?*

A. Well, I wouldn't think that conventional forces are unimportant simply because there are nuclear weapons in the background. I think there could be some advantages. Obviously, such a step would not solve all the problems. But I should think there could be some advantages in people knowing whether or not there are significant changes in the deployment or concentration of conventional forces.

After all, it is entirely possible that if there is a crisis, or if there is a prospect of war, it might well start or be precipitated in the conventional side first. But it would be a limited step. But the fact that it is limited doesn't necessarily mean that it would not be worth while.

#### **Question of Soviet Troops in Cuba**

*Q. Mr. Secretary.*

A. Yes.

*Q. Without going into what Mr. Gromyko told you on the question of Soviet troops in Cuba, do you have the feeling or impression—or, what impression do you have about the possibilities of an early Soviet troop withdrawal from Cuba?*

A. I just wouldn't be able to speculate on that, and I certainly don't want to get into that famous numbers game here today. I don't have any information that would lead me to be able to make a responsible comment on that point.

*Q. Do you feel that the troop withdrawal might greatly help in facilitating the settlement of some of these other points that you mentioned?*

A. Oh, I think there would be no question about the complete withdrawal of Soviet military personnel in Cuba making a very helpful contribution to the general state of relations. I think that would be very apparent. Any—

## Safeguards in Relation to Test Ban

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes, sir.

*Q. The question has been raised in the test ban hearings on Capitol Hill as to whether a delay in providing specifics about the safeguards which would accompany a treaty would delay ratification. Do you anticipate any delay in providing details to the Congress about the required safeguards, sir?*

A. No, I would think not. I mean, the safeguards of the sort we are talking about have been matters of policy in the executive branch straight through. And I think each of the witnesses has emphasized the importance of these safeguards, such things as the continuation of underground testing, such things as the maintenance of our laboratories in full operational capability, such things as the preparation for prompt resumption of testing in these three prohibited environments, if violation should occur, and we ourselves had to resume testing.

Questions of that sort have been up, of course, and it is our strong view in the executive branch that these safeguards must be in hand.

That will require support from the Congress—appropriations. It will require a good deal of advanced planning on the part of our own nuclear establishment. But I think they are of great importance.

I don't believe that this is an issue on which there is any real difference of view between the executive and legislative branches. Therefore I don't see why it should delay the hearings.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when Governor Harriman got back from Moscow, some of us got the impression that the Soviets would not agree to any further accord on any subject unless they first got something along nonaggression declaration lines. Is that still your impression here, or does the discussion about the static posts indicate that they will yield on that point?*

A. Well, I don't believe there was any categorical position on that particular point. As you know, during the Hailsham-Harriman discussions in Moscow,<sup>6</sup> the Soviets did press rather hard on this nonaggression idea. We

agreed that it would be discussed with the NATO alliance. Those discussions have not been completed, although NATO has taken note of the nonaggression proposal which the Soviets introduced at Geneva quite some months ago.

No, those discussions will go forward in NATO at the appropriate time. But it is not my impression that resolution of this question is a prerequisite to discussing any other question. In other words, it's not a condition. It's not a *sine qua non* of taking up other points. As you have observed, Mr. Tsarapkin today did enter into a discussion of the control posts problem at Geneva.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the case in Cuba again where American planes watched while a kidnaping was conducted by Castro's troops in British waters, do you think there is room for an agreement where instantaneous action could be taken by either the British or the United States in defense of that area?*

A. Well, I think there were several problems there. I personally believe that our own military people conducted themselves correctly in that situation. It is not, I think, for us to go into British territory in a situation of that sort. The British were promptly informed. But also remember, it is not a very suitable mission for an aircraft to take on the job of trying to rescue refugees who are in the hands of somebody else and where firing from the air will endanger the refugees as much as those who are doing something with the refugees. In other words, the means available were limited basically to observation. And this is something, of course, we are discussing with the British. But I think that our men there acted correctly in that situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in what sense do you mean it is being talked about with the British?*

A. Well, we are discussing with them this particular problem, and this, of course, raises the question of what the situation could be or might be if this sort of thing were repeated and how one can give protection to refugees who might come out under these circumstances.

*Q. On the question of control posts, do you think that stationary control posts are sufficient*

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

*enough to watch and prevent surprise attacks, or does the United States think in the shape of mobile control posts in the respective area?*

A. Well, how mobile, I think, would be a question to be taken up in discussions. But the idea of this particular static control post proposal would be that at a given airfield, at a given port or railway center, these observers would be able to determine whether there were substantial troop movements through those centers.

Now, obviously, it would have to be mobile enough at the port to be able to know what was happening at the port. But I doubt that would mean they would be rambling around the countryside. My guess is that there will be no problem about the degree of mobility required in the immediate location to carry out the mission that they have in that immediate location.

But my further guess is that the Soviet Union is not prepared at this point to accept roving observers with any degree of radius from their assigned position.

#### **Position on Comprehensive Test Ban**

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes, sir?

*Q. It has been disclosed now on the Hill that sometime back, before the partial test ban came into negotiation, final negotiation, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took a negative position on the comprehensive treaty proposal of the United States. Could you tell us whether that position, taken at that time, led the State Department to alter its position? Or were you prepared to go ahead regardless of the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposition?*

A. Well, that poses what has turned out to be a hypothetical question. I don't know that there is much profit in going back on an "as if" basis.

*Q. I asked the question—*

A. We have had, as General Taylor [Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] pointed out, regular consultations, frequent consultations with the Joint Chiefs on these disarmament questions. They have been sitting regularly with the so-called Committee

of Principles at Cabinet level, and they have sat in on discussions at the White House with the President about these disarmament questions. I think the principal obstacle to a comprehensive treaty has been the attitude of the Soviet Union toward inspections.

*Q. I asked the question because I believe the testimony has been that, despite the fact we have only a limited test ban treaty, this Government wants a total test ban treaty. And, in fact, Mr. Harriman raised that point at Moscow. Is that not correct?*

A. The policy of the United States is, as expressed among other places in the preamble of this limited treaty itself, to seek a comprehensive test ban. But that will require a fully adequate assurance, inspection arrangements, so that we would know that there would not be any significant cheating that could affect our security.

*Q. But it is a fact—*

A. It remains our policy. The present prospect is that that question is not likely to move very fast in the near future.

*Q. But it is a fact that there is now an unresolved difference in this Government on that comprehensive treaty, is it not?*

A. Well, I don't—I'm not sure that I would call such a difference unresolved. After all, the executive branch is headed by the President of the United States. (Laughter.)

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes?

*Q. Is this country free under the test ban treaty to offer nuclear assistance to France if that assistance is intended to avoid future French testing?*

A. Well, I think the treaty itself makes clear that assistance in carrying out prohibited explosions is prohibited by the treaty. Now, I don't want to get into what might be permitted under the treaty itself. I think that if all countries sign the treaty and there were clearly to be no prohibited explosions, then these issues would move over into another field in terms of nuclear policy, alliance policy, and the rest of it. But I can't get into that today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

A. Yes?

*Q. Do you foresee any important changes in our relationship with Eastern Europe following the situation that exists around Berlin?*

A. I think one has had the impression that the countries of Eastern Europe have been interested in increasing their trade relations and exchange relations with Western Europe, and there have been some signs they would like to do that also with the United States.

I don't think it is possible to generalize completely on that, or to draw too many conclusions from it, but we have sensed that they have been interested in finding ways to increase their trade. I think that, for example, a country like Czechoslovakia lives as much on trade as any other country in Europe. And it has expanded its trade with Western Europe.

As you know, there is a very large trade going on between Western Europe and the Socialist bloc to the East, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, now more than \$5½ billion in both directions each year. I think that the Eastern European countries have been looking for ways to improve their relations with the West. But it's a little early yet, I think, to categorize that in great detail or to draw long-range conclusions from it.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

A. All right.

## **U.S. Agrees to Extradition of Ex-President of Venezuela**

### **DEPARTMENT STATEMENT**

Press release 417 dated August 12

The Secretary of State on August 12 informed the Ambassador of Venezuela that the United States has agreed to the request of the Government of Venezuela for the extradition of Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

The request was made in August 1959 under the extradition treaty of 1922 between the United States and Venezuela<sup>1</sup> in which the two

countries bind themselves, on a reciprocal basis, to extradite persons charged with committing any of the crimes enumerated in the treaty. At the conclusion of the extradition hearing on the Venezuelan request, United States District Judge George W. Whitehurst, sitting as extradition magistrate, found that the evidence presented by Venezuela showed probable cause to believe Marcos Pérez Jiménez guilty of the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, breach of trust, and receiving money unlawfully obtained; that there was no legal impediment to his extradition; and that, therefore, the requirements of the treaty had been met. Thus, under United States law, the Secretary of State was authorized to extradite Marcos Pérez Jiménez for trial on only the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, breach of trust, and receiving money unlawfully obtained, and, under the treaty, Venezuela could try him only for those offenses were he to be extradited.

In habeas corpus proceedings, brought by Marcos Pérez Jiménez to challenge the decision of the extradition magistrate, the decision of the magistrate was upheld by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The habeas corpus proceedings were finally terminated when, on June 17, 1963, the Supreme Court denied a petition for rehearing of a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In addition to the record of the extradition hearing and the habeas corpus proceedings, the Secretary has had before him written submissions from the attorneys for Marcos Pérez Jiménez and from the Government of Venezuela. The Secretary also met with attorneys for Marcos Pérez Jiménez at their request, at which time they presented arguments in opposition to extradition. Finally, the Government of Venezuela presented a note giving assurances that should Pérez Jiménez be returned to Venezuela careful security measures would be taken to insure his physical safety, that he would be given a fair trial and given all the rights

<sup>1</sup> 43 Stat. 1698.

accorded an accused under the laws of Venezuela, including the right to full and effective defense and including the right to be defended by counsel of his own choosing, and that, in accordance with article XIV of the treaty, he would be tried only for those offenses for which extradition was granted.

## TEXTS OF NOTES

### Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Tejera-Paris

AUGUST 12, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to note No. 320, dated August 5, 1961,<sup>2</sup> in which the Government of Venezuela formally requested the extradition of Marcos Perez Jimenez for the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, receiving money or valuable securities knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained, and fraud or breach of trust, as specified in paragraphs 14, 18 and 20 of Article II of the Extradition Treaty of 1922, between our two countries.

As you are aware, an extradition hearing was held pursuant to the provisions of Section 3184, Title 18, United States Code, at the conclusion of which the Honorable George W. Whitehurst, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting as extradition magistrate, found that the evidence presented by your Government showed probable cause to believe Marcos Perez Jimenez guilty of the above-mentioned crimes, but that insufficient evidence had been presented to warrant his extradition on the charges of complicity in murder with which he was also charged in Venezuela. Habeas corpus proceedings brought to challenge the decision of the extradition magistrate resulted in his decision being upheld by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On June 17, 1963, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition of Marcos Perez Jimenez for a rehearing on that Court's denial of his petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I have taken note of your Government's assurances, contained in your note No. 1396, dated July 22, 1963, that careful security arrangements have been made by your Government to eliminate any risk of physical harm to Marcos Perez Jimenez should he be extradited, that he would be tried only for those offenses for which his extradition is granted, that he would be given all the rights accorded an accused under the laws of your country, including the right to full and effective defense, and that he would have the right to adequate legal counsel of his own choice.

Accordingly, there is enclosed my warrant<sup>2</sup> directing the United States Marshal for the Southern District of Florida or any other public officer or person having charge or custody of Marcos Perez Jimenez to

surrender and deliver him up to such person or persons as may be duly authorized by your Government to receive him in order that he may be returned to Venezuela for trial for the crimes of embezzlement or criminal malversation, receiving money or valuable securities knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained, and fraud or breach of trust. The specific offenses which are considered, in this case, to be encompassed by the crimes and those for which extradition is granted are those charges set forth in paragraphs 15. B, 15. C and 15. D(3) of the Second Amended Complaint for Extradition filed March 8, 1960, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, by Manuel Aristeguieta in case No. 9425-M-Civil entitled *Manuel Aristeguieta, Consul General of the Republic of Venezuela, Plaintiff, v. Marcos Perez Jimenez, Defendant*.

Inasmuch as the extradition magistrate found sufficient evidence of criminality of Marcos Perez Jimenez only with respect to these crimes, his extradition is granted on the condition, specified in Article XIV of the Extradition Treaty of 1922, that he shall be tried only for those crimes.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DEAN RUSK

His Excellency Dr. ENRIQUE TEJERA-PARIS,  
*Ambassador of Venezuela.*

### Ambassador Tejera-Paris to Secretary Rusk

EMBAJADA DE VENEZUELA  
*Washington, D.C., July 22, 1963*

1396

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's note of July 19, 1963,<sup>2</sup> in which Your Excellency invites my comments on certain contentions made to Your Excellency by attorneys for Marcos Perez Jimenez in connection with his extradition.

The contentions are groundless.

The attorney's suggestion that the accused would be subject to the danger of physical harm is quite unwarranted. As has already been indicated to the Department of State, the careful security arrangements that have been made by my Government for the custody of the accused eliminate any risk of such harm. I am quite prepared to submit the details of such arrangements to Your Excellency. Your Excellency will understand that my Government has a far greater interest even than Your Excellency in assuring against any such danger. I am sure also that Your Excellency is fully aware that my Government inflicts no harm on prisoners such as had been resorted to in my country prior to January 1958.

The attorney's suggestion that the accused would

<sup>2</sup> Not printed here.

likely be tried for offenses other than those for which Your Excellency will grant extradition is irresponsible. I invite Your Excellency's attention to the clear guarantee contained in the treaty of extradition itself that an extradited accused can be tried only on the charges for which extradition is granted. I need hardly remind Your Excellency of my Government's meticulous adherence to its international obligations, repeatedly demonstrated. Moreover, Your Excellency will find, upon examination of the requisition for surrender and its attachments presented to Your Excellency on behalf of my Government, that the charges for which surrender is requisitioned—to which the trial will be confined—are stated with unusual particularity by the Supreme Court of Justice of my country and coincide precisely with those which have been sustained by the courts of Your Excellency's country in the extradition proceedings against the accused. Hence neither Your Excellency's Government nor the accused will have the slightest difficulty in confirming that there is strict compliance at the trial with the limitations of the requisition for surrender and with the treaty guarantee. Moreover, the very exhaustive opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sustaining the determination of the lower court in the extradition proceedings, reviews in detail the evidence found by that Court to sustain the charges in extradition; the very detail of that Court's review of the facts provides most effective assurance that the trial of the accused will be kept within the bounds prescribed by the treaty. I believe there is no other case in any country where such assurance has been so complete.

The attorney's suggestion that the accused would not receive a fair trial betrays unfamiliarity with the legal process provided by the Constitution and procedural code of my country, which includes the right to habeas corpus that had been taken away by the government in office prior to January 1958. The Supreme Court of Justice of my country has plainly decreed that, upon the accused's return, it will determine the court of proper jurisdiction for the trial and this will be done in accordance with established procedure applicable to the specific charges for which extradition is granted. Trial will occur in the regular civil courts in all respects in the regular manner. I am sure that Your Excellency is familiar with the criminal procedure in my country which protects the rights of an accused to a degree that, in important respects, is greater than is true in many other great democracies. Nor is there the least reason to believe that the legal process in my country will take any such extraordinary length of time as has been consumed by the extradition process thus far in this case unless the accused himself prolongs the process by persistent interlocutory appeals and other dilatory measures as defendants in all countries sometimes succeed in doing.

The attorneys' suggestion that the accused would not be able to retain adequate legal assistance in his defense is false. The law of my country assures an

accused the right to counsel of his own choice. It is well known that eminent members of the bar of Venezuela have indicated their willingness to act in the defense of the accused; certain steps to that end, indeed, seem already to have been taken. This is in entire accord with the high tradition of the Venezuelan bar as stated by the former Minister of Justice in an address to the Bar Association in Caracas on January 11, 1963, when he emphasized that it was inconceivable that lawyers should be dissuaded "from lending their professional services in the defense of an accused, whatever may be the nature of the crime or the personality of the accused."

The determination of my Government to protect the right of an accused to full and effective defense is illustrated by an incident involving one of the United States attorneys for the accused in this case. That attorney was permitted to go to my country to investigate the case and was given the privilege of interviewing persons in prison. Unfortunately he exceeded permissible bounds by taking depositions otherwise than in the lawful manner which, in my country as in many others, is a serious offense. It seems that he also made certain provocative statements to the press. As a result an individual member of my country's Congress made a very critical and highly emotional speech in that Congress. But a committee of that Congress, upon investigation of the incident, not only refused to join in the sentiments expressed in the individual's speech but file a report which said:

"The freedom of expression of thought and the right of defense of every accused that the Venezuelan laws guarantee to foreigners and citizens permits statements to be made without any other limit than those established by law.

"The aforesaid statements in the press, attributed to the United States citizen Mr. Moore in his capacity as defense attorney of the extradition defendant, Marcos Perez Jimenez, do not exceed the right of a foreigner to freedom of expression and exercise of the rights of an accused insofar as they express an opinion respecting a judicial proceeding against his client."

I may also point out that Your Excellency is aware of the very effective means at Your Excellency's disposal after the surrender of the accused to assure yourself that he is treated with entire propriety and in strict accordance with the requirements of the treaty and the pertinent inter-governmental obligations.

May I express the hope that Your Excellency will now determine to carry out your Government's treaty obligation in response to my Government's requisition for surrender duly presented two years ago. The courts of Your Excellency's country have pronounced the evidence presented by my Government against the accused to be overwhelming. Nor has the accused attempted even the slightest exculpatory explanation of this evidence at any time, despite the fact that important items of such evidence consisted of his own handwritten memoranda. I feel sure that Your Excellency will find no cause for any further delay in

acting favorably on my Government's requisition as required by the treaty.

It has been a source of great satisfaction to my Government to observe that the courts of Your Excellency's country have firmly rejected the effort made on behalf of the accused to introduce into extradition doctrine some novel and special immunity for one who has held high governmental office. Those courts properly have insisted that no man is above the law. It is solely in vindication of that great principle that my Government has pursued this case in the face of such discouraging procedural obstacles as thus far have been thrown in its way. I am confident that Your Excellency, no less

than the courts of Your Excellency's country, appreciates the vital importance of vindicating that principle and will not permit the foregoing baseless contentions of the accused's attorneys to obscure a principle that must be maintained faithfully if the governments of this hemisphere are to enjoy mutual confidence and their peoples mutual respect.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.

E. TEJERA P.

*Ambassador of Venezuela*

## Outer Space: Problems of Law and Power

*by Richard N. Gardner*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

At 12 noon on April 22, 1889, President Harrison threw open several million square miles of Government land for settlement in the Oklahoma Territory. Some eager "sooners" sneaked into the territory too soon, but the vast majority crowded along the border. Long lines of trains nosed right up to the starting line. Detachments of cavalry held back the mob until the blast of a bugle at noon sent a wild stampede into the new territory. One train rider—the trains, by the way, had to run at a set speed so their occupants didn't obtain an unfair advantage—described the scene:

I saw excited men jump from the windows of crowded coaches even before the train stopped and rush off to stake out claims in a cornfield that by noon the next day was a busy tent city of 10,000 people.

As one historian quipped: "Within a few hours virtually every tract had one claimant, and most had three or four."

Seventy-four years after this event we find

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Section on International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association at Chicago, Ill., on Aug. 10 (press release 413 dated Aug. 9, revised).

ourselves on the borders of space. We are now in Year Six of the Space Age, and each month brings more astounding progress in the conquest of outer space. Six years ago an orange-sized object in orbit filled the headlines. Today men live in orbit for days in spacecraft weighing thousands of pounds. Six years ago a vehicle launched hundreds of miles into space was a sensation. In 1962 the United States sent a vehicle to Venus to find out what the planet was like. After 110 days of flight at 15,000 miles per hour the vehicle sent radio impulses 36 million miles back to earth with the following message:

Venus is hot, 800 degrees Fahrenheit. There is heavy cloud cover; it is impossible to see the landscape. The atmosphere contains no oxygen or water. Life as we know it is generally impossible.

Clearly our scientific capacity is permitting us to rush into space with impressive speed. Is our capacity for law and organization in space equal to the challenge? The first sooners, as it were, are already in outer space. Can we avoid a space "stampede" and achieve orderly progress?

Lest anyone take this analogy too literally, I hasten to add that I do not envision a flood of settlers leaving shortly for outer space. Washington is uncomfortable this time of year, but Venus appears to be even more so.

The question of concern to lawyers and diplomats is whether nations as they increase their activities and interests in outer space can develop adequate ground rules to prevent conflicting claims and international violence. These ground rules may be embodied in articulated legal principles. But, especially in the beginning, much of the law of outer space may grow quietly out of the mutual restraints and reciprocal concessions which nations accept tacitly out of enlightened self-interest. Law will also grow out of specific projects of functional cooperation.

#### Development of Law for Outer Space

When the question is approached from this broad perspective, one sees considerable progress in developing law for outer space:

—General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI)<sup>2</sup> affirmed that international law, including the U.N. Charter, applies to outer space and celestial bodies and that outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all states and are not subject to national appropriation.

—The members of the U.N., responding to another part of this same resolution, have started an ambitious program of worldwide weather forecasting and research, making use of satellites as well as earth-based instrumentation.<sup>3</sup>

—U.N. members have also begun, through the International Telecommunication Union, to tackle the technical problems involved in using outer space for telephone, radio, and television communication. Following creation of the U.S. Communications Satellite Corporation, we have begun discussions on the creation of a single global satellite communication system, with wide participation in ownership

and management, and operated so as to realize economic and political benefits to all nations.

—The United States and the Soviet Union have concluded a bilateral agreement<sup>4</sup> calling for the coordinated launching of weather satellites and the exchange of weather information, the coordinated launching of satellites to map the earth's magnetic field, and cooperative experiments with communication satellites.

This record hardly confirms the view that no law is being made to govern the relations of states in outer space. And yet it is true that the efforts in the U.N. to reach agreement on specific legal principles beyond those contained in Resolution 1721 have so far been in vain.

What has been the cause of the difficulty? Is there any way it can be resolved?

As most of you know, the Soviet Union insists that there can be no further agreement on any legal questions unless and until there is agreement on a comprehensive code of space law along the lines of the Soviet declaration of basic principles.<sup>5</sup> Thus the drafting of agreements on specific questions such as liability for space vehicle accidents and assistance to and return of space vehicles and their personnel—matters on which a broad consensus already exists—is being held up by the Soviets pending agreement on more controversial political issues.

Until recently the Soviet Union adopted a similar attitude in the test ban negotiations. It refused to consider an agreement to ban tests above ground until a comprehensive ban was achieved embracing underground testing as well. Happily it has now changed its position, and a treaty banning tests above ground has been signed.<sup>6</sup> The Soviet Union could do much to defrost the cold war if it dropped its all-or-nothing attitude in other fields as well. Cooperation in framing legal principles for outer space would be one good place to start.

The United States would like to conclude international agreements at an early date on both liability and assistance and return. We would also welcome a General Assembly resolution covering the general principles of law

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> For background and text of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 14, 1962, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1963, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 963.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see U.N. doc. A/5181 (Annex III, A).

<sup>6</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 231, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

which should govern the activities of states in outer space. If there is a willingness on all sides to concentrate on the principles which unite rather than divide us, we can speedily get unanimous agreement for a resolution on general principles at the next General Assembly.

Such a resolution could contain the following elements on which a consensus already exists:

—the freedom of outer space for exploration and use by all states;

—the unavailability of celestial bodies for national appropriation;

—the applicability of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, to relations among states in outer space;

—the retention by the launching authority of jurisdiction over the ownership of space vehicles;

—assistance to astronauts in distress and return of space vehicles and their personnel; and

—liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicle accidents.

#### **Controversial Principles in Soviet Declaration**

So much for the principles on which there is general agreement. Let me turn now to the four principles included in the Soviet declaration which cause problems for us and most other members of the United Nations.

*First*, there is the Soviet principle which would prohibit the use of outer space for "propagating war, national or racial hatred or enmity between nations." The United States is understandably skeptical about discussing this subject in view of the fact that the Soviet Union, after initiating lengthy negotiations on war propaganda in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, refused at the last minute to sign the declaration which had been unanimously agreed upon. We cannot believe the Soviets would let the question of war propaganda stand in the way of agreement if other questions could be resolved.

*Second*, there is the Soviet principle that space activities shall be carried out "solely and exclusively by States." This provision, which would bar private enterprise from space activities, is an attempt to impose socialist principles on an important sector of human activity and is

an obvious attack on Telstar and our communication satellite legislation. The United States sees no reason why private enterprise should be prevented from flying in space any more than it is from sailing on international waters.

On the other hand, we can certainly reaffirm our view that a state bears international responsibility for its activities in space and for the activities of its nationals. We can also reaffirm that space operations carried on by private parties require government authorization and supervision. A principle phrased along these lines meets the problem of liability and prevents any irresponsible use of outer space by private parties.

*Third*, there is the Soviet principle that prior discussion and agreement must take place on any measures to be undertaken by a state which "might in any way hinder the exploration or use of outer space for peaceful purposes by other countries." While this provision might appear innocent enough at first glance, it would effectively extend the veto into space.

One can imagine the difficulties that would result from a multilateral clearance system. Space exploration could be slowed down or halted entirely by red tape or political obstructionism. We cannot accept a Soviet veto over anything we do in space.

The partial test ban has eliminated testing in outer space from the list of issues to which this Soviet principle is addressed. On the potentially harmful effects of other space experiments some agreement may be possible. We are prepared to support the principle that a state should undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with a space activity if it has reason to believe that its activity may create a significant risk of harm.

Such a principle would be in accord with existing U.S. practice, as reflected in the handling of our West Ford experiment.<sup>7</sup> Project West Ford placed a large number of tiny filaments in a short-lived orbital belt around the earth. The purpose was to determine the feasi-

<sup>7</sup> For text of a letter dated June 6, 1963, from Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson to the U.N. Secretary-General regarding Project West Ford, see *ibid.*, July 15, 1963, p. 104.

bility of using such filaments as passive reflectors to relay communications.

Project West Ford was carefully considered in advance by both the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences. The full details of the experiment were made known well in advance to all interested scientists from other countries. While some expressed concern, there was no serious scientific objection to the experiment on the grounds that it would impede radio astronomy or other scientific research.

West Ford is now almost 3 months old, and to date there has not been a single report of interference or damage to space activities and experiments. The results of the West Ford experiment will be distributed for the information and use of the international scientific community.

*Fourth*, there is the Soviet principle that the collection of intelligence from space is "incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest of outer space." The fact is, of course, that observation and photography from outer space are consistent with international law and the U.N. Charter, as are observation and photography from the high seas. Moreover, space observation can contribute to the reduction of the risk of war by accident or miscalculation inherent in dealings with a closed society. Observation from space may some day help the United Nations to monitor an armistice or patrol a border. It may play a part in the verification of a disarmament agreement. Even Premier Khrushchev, according to C. L. Sulzberger in the *New York Times* of July 15, admits that satellites can be used for disarmament inspection.

Quite apart from the undesirability of banning observation from space for military purposes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make meaningful distinctions on this subject. Major Gordon Cooper believed he could distinguish roads, fires, and even his own home while he was in orbit. Equipped with a spy-glass and a Brownie camera, could Major Cooper be classified as a reconnaissance satellite? What about the Soviet astronauts who were members of the Red Air Force and carried

cameras when they passed over U.S. territory? What about satellites for mapping and weather observation?

Clearly all these forms of observation from space are legally permissible and socially desirable. We cannot agree to any principle which casts doubt on this proposition.

### **Military Uses of Outer Space**

This brings me naturally to some concluding remarks about the military uses of outer space. It should be obvious that the attempt to build peaceful space cooperation and a regime of law for outer space does not eliminate the need for military space programs to maintain the security of the United States and the entire free world. There is no inconsistency in moving simultaneously on both fronts. For the foreseeable future, we need military space programs to help keep the peace and civilian space programs to help us live better in peace.

The test of the legitimacy of a particular use of outer space is not whether it is military or nonmilitary but whether it is peaceful or aggressive. Russian cosmonauts are members of the Soviet Air Force, but this is no reason to challenge their activities. There is, in any event, no workable dividing line between military and nonmilitary uses of space. A navigational satellite in outer space can guide a submarine as well as a merchant ship. Thus the United States has military space programs, but all of our space activities will continue to be for peaceful, i.e. nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.

Space is not a new subject—only a new place where all the old subjects come up. Whether we are speaking of meteorology, communications, or military uses, the things that take place in space are inextricably bound up with the things that take place on the surface of the earth. Those people are living in a dream world who think that space can be wrapped up in a nice new sanitary package and insulated from terrestrial reality.

In the interest of the security of the free world the United States cannot refrain unilaterally from all military activities in space until military activities on earth have been regulated by disarmament agreements. When the mili-

tary problems on earth are solved, the military problems in space will be solved: They are part of the same problem.

### **Avoiding an Arms Race in Space**

This does not mean that nothing can be done to save outer space from the arms race on earth with all its dangerous features. On the contrary, if we cannot insulate space completely from earthly tensions, we may at least be able to prevent a stampede of space weapons into orbit.

Today both the United States and the Soviet Union have the capacity to place thermonuclear weapons in orbit. But, according to the best military advice available, there is now no rational military purpose in doing so. To put it another way, any purely military advantage that might be gained by either side from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit could now be achieved with less cost through alternative weapons systems—hardened ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] or missile-firing submarines.

To be sure, the deployment of a thermonuclear weapon in orbit would have a serious political and psychological effect. If international tensions are to be reduced and world peace assured, it is necessary that countries refrain from making use of terror weapons of this kind.

The United States, for all these reasons, has no intention of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit unless compelled to do so by actions of the Soviet Union. We earnestly hope that the Soviet Union will likewise refrain from taking steps that will extend the arms race into outer space.

Some critics have charged that statements to this effect by American leaders are tantamount to unilateral disarmament in outer space. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Such critics have failed to distinguish between preparation and deployment. What we are saying is that we hope to avoid an arms race in space and will not precipitate one ourselves. We are not saying that we are neglecting preparations in the event that our hopes are disappointed. On the contrary, the United States is taking measures to insure that we will

be in a position, if need be, to deal with threats to our security from outer space.

For the record you might like to know that the budget for fiscal year 1962 included \$1.1 billion for military space projects. For the fiscal year just ended, this amount was raised 36 percent to \$1.5 billion. These figures do not include expenditures on fundamental research done by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In addition to these amounts, a considerable portion of the Pentagon's research and development budget—a proposed 20 percent for this fiscal year—is devoted to the military uses of outer space.

In outer space, as on earth, the conduct of American diplomacy requires the coordinated use of law and power. Those who emphasize the one without the other do no service to the national security of the United States.

## **Air Transport Agreement With Mexico Extended**

### *Joint Statement*

Press release 424 dated August 14

Delegations of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States have now concluded the negotiations which began in Mexico City on July 22, 1963,<sup>1</sup> to consider the air transport agreement<sup>2</sup> which was signed in 1960 and which is due to expire on August 14, 1963.

Following a thorough study of actual experience under the agreement, the two Governments, by an exchange of notes, have extended the agreement for 1 year.

The talks which have resulted in the understanding mentioned herein were conducted in the same spirit of friendship and desire for close cooperation which have marked previous discussions between the two Governments on civil aviation matters of mutual interest.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of May 27, 1963, p. 840.

<sup>2</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675.

## EEC: A Federation in the Making

by *Andreas F. Lowenfeld*  
*Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

That the whole is equal to the sum of its parts may be an acceptable maxim for the mathematician. Not so for the lawyer, economist, or political scientist. The European Economic Community exists to fashion from six separate states and economies something more than the sum of its parts. Whether the goal is quite so ambitious as to the American version of the maxim *e pluribus unum*, we cannot yet tell. But the goal—a single economic area governed by a single set of rules—is an ambitious one. Its achievement depends ultimately upon the political, social, and economic currents at work in Europe today, and upon the extent to which these currents can overcome the conflicting traditions not faced by our own founding fathers.

There are three European communities, the European Economic Community, EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community), and the European Coal and Steel Community. The three are part of a single historical progression. They share, in part, common institutions. Although I will focus today on the organizational structure of the EEC, that structure can only be understood as part of a broader institutional framework.

In 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made his now-famous proposal to place French and German coal and steel under a common authority. This proposal led to the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951, which set up a European Coal and Steel Community. The

builders of a united Europe received a setback when the European Defense Community, modeled in large part on the Coal and Steel Community, failed of ratification. But economic integration had proved its value, and it was on the momentum of the Coal and Steel Community that the builders of a united Europe were able to proceed. In 1957, 6 years after the Treaty of Paris and 3 years after the EDC had been rejected, the Rome treaties were signed. By article 1 of the treaty, "the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Economic Community."

### Organizational Structure of the Community

Following in general the organizational structure of the Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome creates four organs for the management and governance of Europe's economic activity—the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliamentary Assembly, and the Court of Justice. Under the treaty, and a related convention, the parliament and the Court of Justice of the EEC supersede those of the Coal and Steel Community and serve all three communities.

Thus, although the EEC, EURATOM, and the Coal and Steel Community are created and governed by separate charters and have separate executive organs, they share in common a parliament and a court. In addition, they have joint legal, statistical, and press and information services.

Executive authority for the EEC is lodged in the Commission and the Council of Ministers. This authority is of great importance and illustrates the supranational character of the

<sup>1</sup> Address made before a joint session of the Sections on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law and International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association at Chicago, Ill., on Aug. 12 (press release 414).

Community. Decisions of the Commission or the Council are directly binding in the territory of member states and do not need to be implemented by national legislation. The Community can issue regulations and orders directed to private persons and firms, its investigators and inspectors have direct access to the books of private firms, and it may impose fines for infringement of its regulations.

The Commission consists of nine persons appointed for 4-year terms by the governments of the member states "acting in common agreement." By the terms of the charter they are required to be of "indisputable independence" and to perform their duties as servants of the Community. States are obligated to respect this independence.

While the Rome Treaty is silent on the organization of the Commission, in fact each of the Commissioners is assigned certain responsibilities, somewhat like a cabinet minister. Thus one Commissioner is charged with agricultural policy, another with competition, another with external trade, and so on. Each major area has a directorate-general headed by a senior civil servant, who in turn supervises the work of a number of directors and their staffs. The Commissioners themselves, while independent of their national governments and servants of the Community, are clearly political, as contrasted with civil service, officers.

The Commission has two major tasks. First, it initiates actions and draws up proposals for the Council of Ministers, much as our executive branch does. Second, the Commission is charged with insuring the proper execution of the treaty and of decisions taken by organs of the Community. It can issue regulations and directives addressed to private businesses and individuals as well as to governments. And it can call both governments and individuals to account for failing to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

The second branch of the executive is the Council of Ministers, comprised of one minister from each member state. It is the only organ of the Community whose members represent governments. The primary function of the Council is to pass on proposals of the Commission. It does so in most cases by weighted voting, France, Germany, and Italy having

four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two each, and Luxembourg one vote. Proposals of the Commission can in general be accepted or rejected by a qualified majority, normally 12 of the 17 votes assigned, but they can be modified only by unanimous vote. This gives the Commission considerable leverage in getting its proposals accepted since the Council is often faced with the alternatives of accepting them or leaving the problems unsolved. In practice the Commission often serves as mediator between member states in the Council, modifying its own proposals until it can secure a qualified majority for accepting them. On the other hand, as the recent poultry negotiations with the United States have shown,<sup>2</sup> the Commission may consider that its authority in a particular matter is limited and may go to the Council of Ministers for authorization to take certain actions.

Many fundamental matters require a unanimous vote in the Council, although the treaty provides for the progressive elimination of the veto. For example, article 101 directs the Commission to consult with member states whenever a disparity between their legislative or administrative provisions "distorts the conditions of competition." If the consultations fail to resolve the problem the Council is empowered to issue directives to the states concerned. The exercise of this power required unanimous vote during the first of the three transition stages but now requires only a qualified majority.

This brief description necessarily oversimplifies the relationship between the Commission and the Council. By the terms of the charter, neither is subordinate to the other and they jointly dispose of the decisionmaking power of the Community. The treaty leaves vague the details of their collaboration, providing only that it shall be settled "by mutual agreement."

#### **European Parliamentary Assembly**

The third organ is the European Parliamentary Assembly, composed of 142 parliamentarians, 36 each from Germany, France, and

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 996.

Italy, 14 each from Belgium and the Netherlands, and 6 from Luxembourg. The parliamentarians are now elected by, and from the membership of, national parliaments, but eventually they will be elected by direct universal suffrage. The parliament has already drawn up a draft agreement of 23 articles providing for European elections, but this agreement has yet to receive the unanimous approval of member states.

Even though they are now appointed by and from national legislatures, the parliamentarians are not national representatives. The treaty refers to them as "representatives of the peoples of the States united within the Community." They arrange themselves along party and political lines, rather than in national groups. And the rules of procedure of the parliament provide for the formation of supranational political parties. These parties, of which there are several, have permanent secretariats, are financed in part by Community funds, and correspond to the major political parties in Europe.

On paper the parliament has only one significant power. It can, by a two-thirds vote, censure the Commission and oust its members. In a variety of ways, however, the parliament has made itself a more important body than the treaty suggests. It has, for example, an elaborately developed committee structure, with 13 standing committees. And it has put to good use its right to propose oral and written questions to the Commission and the Council. In part the significance of the parliament lies simply in the fact it exists and that some day it may form a significant element of a Europe unified politically as well as economically.

#### **Court of Justice**

The importance of the fourth institution—the Court of Justice—will not surprise the American lawyer, though it seems to have surprised some European observers not so familiar with the problems of federalism and economic regulation by a central organization. The Court is composed of seven judges appointed for 6-year terms, again "by the Governments of Member States acting in common agreement." The judges must be qualified for the

highest judicial office in their respective countries or be jurists of recognized competence. The statute of the Court, which is a protocol to the Rome Treaty, provides that the Court's deliberations "shall be and shall remain secret." Following the continental legal tradition, this has been interpreted as precluding dissenting opinions. Hearings of the Court are public, and the judgments of the Court must be supported by a statement of reasons and must be read in open court.

Two advocates-general assist the Court. Their function is to act as a friend of the court, that is to present reasoned opinions to the Court on all issues of law raised by a case, whether or not these issues have been argued by the parties. The advocates-general participate in proceedings before the Court but not in its deliberations. The Court is, of course, free to disregard the conclusions of the advocates-general.

In contrast to the International Court of Justice, the Community court exercises compulsory jurisdiction. Its writ extends to member states, to organs of the Community, and to individuals. Judgments of the Court are enforceable against member states, and judgments and orders against individuals are to be enforced with the aid of instrumentalities of the member states.

The Commission can summon a member state before the Court for failing to fulfill its obligations under the treaty. So can another member state. Under article 171 of the Rome Treaty,

If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil any of its obligations under this Treaty, such State shall take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment of the Court.

On the other hand, an organ of the Community, or any natural or legal person with an interest in an action or decision of the Council or the Commission (including a failure to act), can secure judicial review of such actions by the Commission or Council. The Court's jurisdiction also extends to civil actions for damages against the Community, to arbitration in which the Community is a party, and to disputes concerning employees of the Community.

Finally, the Court has a federal-question jurisdiction similar to that of our Supreme

Court, although it is exercised in a somewhat different manner. In addition to its original jurisdiction over questions concerning the interpretation of the treaty, the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, and the interpretation of statutes of any bodies established by the Council, the Court may render preliminary decisions for use in municipal proceedings when any such question is raised. Under article 177 lower national courts may refer such questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary decision. But any domestic court or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under domestic law must refer such questions to the Court, prior to the rendering of its own final judgment. Thus the procedure is the reverse of ours, presumably to avoid the embarrassment of appeal from the highest court of a sovereign state. But the function is the same. The Community court sees to it that the treaties are applied in a uniform manner.

#### **How the Common Market Works**

In this assembly of lawyers it seems appropriate to discuss in some detail at least one case, which has been the subject of much comment and which sheds a good deal of light on the way the Common Market works.

Bosch, the well-known German automotive and appliance manufacturer, had since 1903 had an agreement with a Dutch company, van Rijn, whereby van Rijn had exclusive rights to sell all of Bosch's products in the Netherlands. In order to safeguard this right and similar arrangements with other countries, Bosch had agreed to include in every sales contract within Germany a condition that the product sold could not be directly or indirectly exported without the written consent of Bosch.

In the years 1959 and 1960—i.e. after the effective date of the Rome Treaty but before the regulations under the antitrust articles had been issued—defendant imported Bosch refrigerators into the Netherlands, apparently from a firm in Germany selling the refrigerators in violation of its contract with Bosch. Bosch and van Rijn thereupon brought suit in Holland against the Dutch importer, seeking, in effect, damages and an injunction. Defendant admitted the essential facts but said that the

action was based on a contract contrary to the Common Market treaty, in particular to article 85 prohibiting any agreements "which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market." Under article 85(2) "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and void." Therefore, said the defendant, no action can lie against him based on the contract made by Bosch with van Rijn or with the German purchaser.

The District Court in Rotterdam found for plaintiffs, on the grounds that articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty were not self-executing—i.e. they could not have the effect of annulling a contract between private parties without the promulgation of rules by the Commission. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals in The Hague ruled that the question should be referred to the Community court. Plaintiffs petitioned to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands to quash the judgment of referral and then argued to the Community court that it could not decide the question because the judgment of the Hague court was not final. Briefs were submitted by the parties and also by the EEC Commission and the Governments of France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The Community court held first that it did have jurisdiction. Article 177, as it said, was designed precisely for questions referred by a domestic court prior to final judgment. The Court also rejected a contention by the French Government that it had no jurisdiction since the regulations under article 87 had not yet been issued and therefore the Commission still had exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of the competition articles.

On the merits the Court decided (contrary, incidentally, to the argument of the advocate-general) that articles 85 and 86 were not directly effective in the absence of the issuance of the Commission's regulations and proceedings thereunder. The Court said that the treaty contemplated restrictive arrangements which would be permissible and that a contrary ruling would have the intolerable consequence that an arrangement that had been annulled could subsequently be declared valid. As to the question

of whether the particular arrangements would be in violation of article 85, which the Netherlands court had also asked, the Court of Justice said only that it would not exclude the possibility but would not now rule on the question.

I do not propose here to discuss the correctness of the decision or what, if anything, it portends for the implementation of antitrust law in the Community. I think the case is interesting, however, not only for what it shows about the relation between the Court and the Community but for what it shows about the role of the Commission and about the problems of applying general principles of economic regulation to specific cases.

### **Barriers to Trade**

In discussing the Common Market in this country we think generally of common external tariffs and internal tariff reductions. But tariffs are only the first step. If the aim of the Common Market is to avoid the distorting effects of national boundaries and to "promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities" (article 2), it is evident that a great many other matters besides tariffs become subjects of common concern. Cartel policy, of course, has been the subject of much Community activity, particularly in the area of coal and steel, and we are told this will increase steadily. But once these obvious forms of distorting factors have been dealt with, other factors of economic life emerge as significant barriers to international trade.

Freight rates, for example, can distort competitive patterns. In at least one instance the Community was seriously concerned over a situation in which rates for coal from the Ruhr to steel manufacturing plants in Germany were lower than the comparable rates from the Ruhr to steel plants in France. Varying national taxes, particularly the turnover or value-added taxes of which the Europeans are so fond, could distort competitive positions resulting from the removal of tariff barriers. Tax policy in turn cannot rationally be formulated without some attention to monetary and fiscal policy. All of these matters are under study by the Commission and by working parties throughout the six countries.

It is difficult to know where this trend will end. For example, as goods, capital, and credit can move freely among the six countries, what about the movement of labor? Speculation about the extent of this development is both beyond my competence and beyond the scope of this discussion. I do want to point out, however, that the above examples suggest an inevitable interaction of economic and political consequences and a gradual narrowing of the field of choice for the member states. If, for instance, not only tariffs but tax rates and policies, interest rates, and economic growth in general are governed by Community decisions, what will be the issues in elections in the member states? I do not, of course, suggest that there will be no issues. But it seems not too farfetched to suggest that something like the diminution of the area of control experienced by our own States vis-a-vis the Federal Government will be experienced by the members of the Community.

With this development, the Court, as arbiter of the state-Community relationship, is bound to assume increasing importance. Our own case law under the commerce clause demonstrates that economic and political problems are not easily detached from the mainstream of political and social life. While the analogous provisions to our own commerce clause are at once more limited and more detailed, it is interesting to note that the Rome Treaty has its own "necessary and proper" clause. Article 235 says:

If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote in a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions.

We can expect, I think, that the importance of the Supreme Court in our country, which always surprises continental observers, will surprise them less and less. Already they are beginning to see that a decision agreed to by the Community and, through the Council, by all of the member countries may hurt individuals whose own government will not provide them with a remedy. But the Community's Court

of Justice will hear their cases and may provide direct relief.

In recent months the Common Market has not enjoyed quite the glamor and elation which we had witnessed in the past few years. The primary reason, of course, was the French veto last January of British membership in the Community. Aside from this rather blunt act, and perhaps not unconnected with it, the Market has seen uncertainty in the movement toward a common agricultural policy, problems with harmonization of transportation rules, and in general a leveling in the growth rate both in economic production and in institutional development.

But since 1959, trade among the member states has increased 73 percent, trade between the Common Market and the rest of the world has increased 27 percent, and the gross national product of the Community has increased by 24 percent. We have already seen in the preliminary skirmishes prior to the "Kennedy Round" of tariff negotiations that the Six are a powerful bargaining unit and can wield an influence comparable only to our own. The Community is already too intertwined to be unraveled even if the members wished to do so, and there is no reasonable expectation that they will.

Perhaps I have strayed somewhat from the stated topic, which was the organization of the Community. But even in its short life, it seems to me, the Community has achieved its own dynamism, and its organization cannot be discussed meaningfully without saying something of its movement and direction. In closing, I can do no better than to quote the description of the European Community given by the Chairman of the EEC Commission in a recent speech at Columbia. "The European Community," in the words of Professor [Walter] Hallstein, "is not just a new power bloc or a new coalition. It is not . . . just the magnification of 19th-century nationalism to a more than national scale. It is the embodiment of a new method and a new approach to the relations between states. . . . While it is not some brand of 'Instant Federalism,' it is an attempt to build on a federal pattern a democratically constituted Europe. Essentially, the Community may be described as a federation in the making."

## Foreign Policy Conference To Be Held at Boston

The Department of State announced on August 8 (press release 410) that it will hold its next regional foreign policy conference at Boston on September 11 with the cooperation of the Boston World Affairs Council. Representatives of the press, radio, television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy, and community and business leaders from the six New England States are being invited to participate.

This will be the eleventh in the series of regional conferences which began in July 1961 at San Francisco and Denver. The purpose of these regional meetings is to provide an opportunity for senior Government officials who carry responsibility for foreign policy to meet with community leaders, media representatives, and other interested persons to explore in depth and exchange views on matters of current import in world affairs.

Officials of the Government participating in the conference will be W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International Development; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Mrs. Katie Louchheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; and Mose L. Harvey, a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State.

## Letters of Credence

### *Pakistan*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Pakistan, Ghulam Ahmed, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on August 13. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 419 dated August 13.

## Conference on Export Expansion Called by President

The White House announced on August 15 that a national conference on export expansion will be held at Washington September 17 and 18 to spur the sales of American goods abroad. President Kennedy will address the opening session on September 17.

Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges will preside. Vice chairmen of the conference will be Neil C. Hurley, Jr., chairman, National Export Expansion Council, and chairman of the board and president, Thor Power Tool Company; Fred C. Foy, honorary chairman, National Export Expansion Council, and chairman

of the board, Koppers Company, Inc.; and Thomas J. Watson, Jr., chairman of the board, International Business Machines. Over 200 business leaders have been invited to participate. A Federal interagency committee under the direction of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce, is organizing the conference.

Other speakers include Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, Ambassador Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and Senator Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee.

### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

### Scheduled September Through November 1963

U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Tungsten: Working Group . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 2-
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 14th Session . . . . .	Port Moresby, Papua . . . . .	Sept. 5-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 9-
GATT Action Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 9-
FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 5th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Sept. 9-
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 9-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Extraordinary Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Sept. 10-
U.N. Human Rights Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Sept. 10-
52d Conference of the Interparliamentary Union . . . . .	Belgrade . . . . .	Sept. 12-
GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 16-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 8th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 16-
5th FAO Conference on Wood Technology . . . . .	Madison, Wis . . . . .	Sept. 16-
IMCO Council: 9th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Sept. 16-
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Sept. 16-

<sup>1</sup>Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 13, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Sept. 17-
ICAO Limited Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 17-
12th Pan American Child Congress . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Sept. 23-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Development Association: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 23-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 23-
IAEA General Conference: 7th Regular Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Sept. 23-
ITU CCITT Working Parties of Study Group IV . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 24-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: Symposium on the Measurement of Abundance of Fish Stocks.	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 25-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 10th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 9th Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Sept. 30-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 51st Statutory Meeting.	Madrid . . . . .	Sept. 30-
ILO Technical Conference on Employment Policy . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 30-
Caribbean Organization Council: 4th Meeting . . . . .	San Juan . . . . .	September
PAHO Executive Committee: 49th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	September
GATT Negotiations on U.S. Tariff Reclassification . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
U.N. Conference on Cocoa . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	September
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 3d Session.	Paris . . . . .	September
OECD Ministers of Science . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ICEM Executive Committee: 22d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payment, Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference To Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radiocommunication Purposes.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-
ICEM Council: 20th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-
IMCO Assembly: 3d Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 16-
11th Pan American Railway Congress . . . . .	México, D.F . . . . .	Oct. 18-
U.N. ECE Committee on Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
BIRPI: Committee of Experts on Problems of Less Developed Countries in Field of Industrial Property.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECA Conference on African Electric Power Problems . . . . .	Addis Ababa . . . . .	Oct. 21-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-
UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Management Council.	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 28-
ICAO Air Traffic Control Automation Panel: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 28-
ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 28-
IMCO Council: 10th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 29-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 15th Meeting.	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 31-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October
South Pacific Commission: 25th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	October
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 4th Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	October
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Expert Level.	São Paulo . . . . .	October
IA-ECOSOC: 2d Regular Annual Meeting at the Ministerial Level.	São Paulo . . . . .	October
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Growth).	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 4-
U.N./FAO Intergovernmental Committee on the World Food Program: 4th Session.	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 4-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 4-
ILO Governing Body: 157th Session (and its committees) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 4-
ITU CCITT Working Party of Study Groups V and XV . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 6-
FAO Council: 41st Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 11-
U.N. ECE Iron and Steel Symposium . . . . .	Prague . . . . .	Nov. 11-
ITU CCITT Study Group V (Protection) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 11-
ITU CCITT Working Party of Study Group XV (Transmission Systems).	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 11-
FAO Conference: 12th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 16-
IMCO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement . . . . .	London . . . . .	Nov. 18-
ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 5th Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Nov. 18-
WHO/FAO/IAEA Seminar on the Protection of the Public in the Event of Radiation Accidents.	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 18-
OECD Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 19-
ICAO Meteorology/Operation Division . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 19-
GATT Contracting Parties: 21st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 21-
ITU CCIR/CCITT Plan Committee for the Development of the International Network.	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 25-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Montreal or Paris . . . . .	November
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 10th Meeting.	Vancouver . . . . .	November

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

Letter dated July 9, 1963, from the representative of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding the situation in northern Iraq, S/5345, July 9, 1963, 2 pp., and S/5345/Corr. 1, July 10, 1963, 1 p.; letter dated July 10, 1963, from the representative of Iraq in reply, S/5346, July 10, 1963, 2 pp.

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Security Council the report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands covering the period from July 17, 1962 to June 26, 1963. S/5310. July 11, 1963. 62 pp.

Letter dated July 19, 1963, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitting the Committee's report on territories under Portuguese administration (A/5446/Add.1). S/5356. July 19, 1963. 89 pp.

Letter dated July 23, 1963, from the deputy representative of Spain addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding an assertion made by the representative of the U.S.S.R. concerning the presence of Spanish troops in Portuguese territory, S/5369, July 24, 1963, 1 p.; and letter dated July 25 from the deputy representative of the U.S.S.R. in reply, S/5371, July 25, 1963, 1 p.

Letter dated July 1, 1963, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting a copy of a memorandum from the Haitian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States regarding a report of the OAS committee responsible for studying the dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. S/5374. July 26, 1963. 14 pp.

### General Assembly

United Nations Conference on Consular Relations. Guide to the Draft Articles on Consular Relations adopted by the International Law Commission. A/CN.4/25/5. January 8, 1963. 170 pp.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories. Summaries of information transmitted to the Secretary-General for 1961 on African and adjacent territories. A/5401. March 12, 1963. 254 pp.

International Law Commission:  
Digest of Decisions of National Courts Relating to Succession of States and Governments. A/CN.4/157. April 18, 1963. 140 pp.

Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock. A/CN.4/156/Add.2, April 30, 1963, 23 pp., and A/CN.4/156/Add.3, June 5, 1963, 4 pp.

Question of Extended Participation in General Multilateral Treaties Concluded Under the Auspices of the League of Nations. Report by Sir Humphrey Waldock. A/CN.4/162. June 25, 1963. 14 pp.

Addendum to First Report on Relations Between States and Intergovernmental Organizations by Abdullah El-Erian. A/CN.4/161/Add.1. June 28, 1963. 4 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letter dated June 6, 1963, from the U.S. representative addressed to the Secretary-General regarding Project West Ford. A/AC/105/15. June 7, 1963. 7 pp.

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Letters addressed to the Secretary-General from representatives of various countries regarding General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII): Byelorussian S.S.R., A/5427, June 7, 1963, 2 pp.; Cameroon, A/5449, July 19, 1963, 3 pp.; Costa Rica, A/5425, June 6, 1963, 2 pp.; Czechoslovakia (note verbale), A/5451, July 19, 1963, 2 pp.; India (note verbale), A/5452, July 19, 1963, 6 pp.; Poland, A/5439, July 16, 1963, 2 pp.; Ukrainian S.S.R. (note verbale), A/5424, June 6, 1963, 2 pp.

Second Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. A/5453. July 19, 1963. 53 pp.

Views on payment of arrears in financial contributions. Letter dated June 10, 1963, from the representative of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5431, June 11, 1963, 3 pp.; note verbale dated June 17, 1963 from the representative of Czechoslovakia addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5433, June 20, 1963, 3 pp.

Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to the Political Rights of Women. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/5456. July 24, 1963. 47 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Venezuela, July 10, 1963.

#### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures affixed at Washington:* Iceland, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, August 12, 1963; Costa Rica, Iraq, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, August 13, 1963; Algeria, Burma, Japan, Pakistan, August 14, 1963; Paraguay, August 15, 1963; Colombia, Libya, Venezuela, August 16, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## Patents

Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of invention relating to defense and for which applications for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.

*Ratification deposited:* Greece, August 15, 1963.

## Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

*Acceptance deposited:* Nigeria, July 3, 1963.

## Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.

*Accession deposited:* Liechtenstein, July 25, 1963.

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952, with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

*Notification of approval:* Liberia, May 20, 1963.

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the international telecommunication convention, 1959. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4893.

*Notifications of approval:* Liberia, May 20, 1963; Mali, April 26, 1963.

## Trade

Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963.

*Acceptance:* Spain, July 30, 1963.

*Enters into force:* August 29, 1963.

## Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Done at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Paraguay, August 5, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Dominican Republic

Agricultural commodity agreement. Signed at Washington August 13, 1963. Entered into force August 13, 1963.

### Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending the agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended (TIAS 3464, 4062, 4490, 4854), relating to the lease of air navigation equipment. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn July 1 and 24, 1963. Entered into force July 24, 1963.

### Viet-Nam

Agreement supplementing the agreement of November 5, 1957 (TIAS 3932), so as to provide for additional investment guaranties authorized by new U.S. legislation. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon August 8, 1963. Entered into force August 8, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

## Appointments

M. Carl Walske as scientific attaché to the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris, effective August 12. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 421 dated August 13.)

## PUBLICATIONS

## Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.*

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Turkey, amending the agreement of July 29, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara November 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962. TIAS 5235. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with Nigeria. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lagos August 28 and December 24, 1962. Entered into force December 24, 1962. TIAS 5237. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Greece—Signed at Athens October 22, 1962. Entered into force October 22, 1962. With related letter. TIAS 5238. 7 pp. 10¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with the Ivory Coast. Exchange of notes—Signed at Abidjan December 1, 1961. Entered into force December 1, 1961. TIAS 5242. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Technical Cooperation.** Agreement with Afghanistan, amending and extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul September 25 and November 7, 1962. Entered into force November 7, 1962. TIAS 5243. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Aviation—Continued Application of Certain Agreements to Scheduled Services Between the United States and Jamaica.** Agreement with Jamaica. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kingston October 25 and November 29, 1962. Entered into force November 29, 1962. TIAS 5244. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi November 13 and 21, 1962. Entered into force November 21, 1962. Operative retroactively December 20, 1961. TIAS 5247. 4 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol for the accession of Portugal to the agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force with respect to the United States July 1, 1962. TIAS 5248. 67 pp. 25¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol for the accession of Israel to the agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962. Entered into force with respect to the United States and Israel July 5, 1962. TIAS 5249. 68 pp. 25¢.

Indian Ocean Expedition—International Meteorological Centre. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Dated at New Delhi September 28 and October 5 and 9, 1962. Entered into force October 9, 1962. Operative retroactively October 1, 1962. TIAS 5262. 3 pp. 5¢.

Reciprocal Trade. Agreement with Switzerland, modifying Schedule I of the agreement of January 9, 1936, as modified. Exchanges of notes—Signed at Geneva and Bern January 18 and December 20 and 28, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5264. 6 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Furnishing of Articles and Services. Agreement with Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima December 17 and 20, 1962. Entered into force December 20, 1962. TIAS 5265. 4 pp. 5¢.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procès-Verbal extending the Declaration on the Provisional Accession of Argentina to the agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force for the United States January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade—United States Compensatory Concessions Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Agreement with Japan. Signed at Geneva December 31, 1962. Entered into force December 31, 1962. TIAS 5267. 4 pp. 5¢.

Trade—United States Compensatory Concessions Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Agreement with United Kingdom. Signed at Geneva December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 10, 1962. TIAS 5268. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade. Interim agreement with Spain, relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Geneva December 31, 1962. Entered into force December 31, 1962. TIAS 5269. 21 pp. 15¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Jamaica. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kingston December 11, 1962 and January 4, 1963. Entered into force January 4, 1963. TIAS 5270. 5 pp. 5¢.

Visas—Waiver of Fingerprinting Requirements for Nonimmigrant Visas. Agreement with Cyprus. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nicosia July 11, 1962 and January 11, 1963. TIAS 5271. 2 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Extension of Loan of Vessel. Agreement with Norway. Exchange of notes—Signed at Oslo November 8, 1962 and January 14, 1963. Entered into force January 14, 1963. TIAS 5272. 2 pp. 5¢.

Narcotic Drugs—Limitation and Regulation of Poppy Plant Cultivation and Production of, Trade in, and Use of Opium. Protocol with other Governments. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273. 89 pp. 30¢.

Antarctica—Measures in Furtherance of Principles and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Recommendations adopted at the second consultative meeting under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, at Buenos Aires, July 28, 1962. Effective January 11, 1963. TIAS 5274. 5 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Loan of Vessel. Agreement with Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi January 15 and 16, 1963. Entered into force January 16, 1963. TIAS 5275. 5 pp. 5¢.

Meteorological Research—Projects in Barbados. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bridgetown January 7 and 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5276. 3 pp. 5¢.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention—Signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the fourteenth meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London, July 6, 1962. Entered into force October 9, 1962. TIAS 5277. 1 p. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-of-Spain January 8 and 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5278. 5 pp. 5¢.

Visas—Waiver of Visa Fees for Performing Artists and Groups. Agreement with Poland. Exchange of notes—Dated at Warsaw December 17, 1962 and January 21, 1963. Entered into force January 21, 1963. TIAS 5279. 2 pp. 5¢.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to August 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 410 of August 8 and 413 of August 9.

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414	8/12	Lowenfeld: American Bar Association.
*415	8/12	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*416	8/12	Loeb sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea (biographic details).
417	8/12	Extradition of Pérez Jiménez to Venezuela.
418	8/12	Rusk: nuclear test ban treaty.
419	8/13	Pakistan credentials (rewrite).
*420	8/13	Itinerary for visit of King and Queen of Afghanistan.
*421	8/13	Walske appointed scientific attaché, USRO (biographic details).
*422	8/14	Lodge sworn in as Ambassador to Viet-Nam (biographic details).
*423	8/14	Bowlder designated Deputy Coordinator for Cuban Affairs (biographic details).
424	8/14	Air talks with Mexico.
425	8/16	Rusk: news conference.
*426	8/15	Ross sworn in as Ambassador to Central African Republic (biographic details).
*427	8/16	Century of Negro Progress Exposition.
*428	8/16	Cultural exchange (Cambodia).

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Treaties in Force . . . January 1, 1963

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of states which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citation to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

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**BULLETIN**

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DEPOSITORY

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# United States Policy in the Pacific

by Roger Hilsman  
*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to have been invited to speak before this 16th annual meeting of the National Legislative Conference in Hawaii. The locale you have chosen for your meeting—these lovely islands in the midst of the Pacific—is symbolic. For Hawaii is not merely our westernmost State but our easternmost. It recalls that for us the so-called Far East is in fact our “Near West” and the United States is as much a country of the Pacific as the Atlantic.

Let us talk, then, of the stake that America has in Pacific affairs.

It is a large one. Along the Asian shores of the Pacific live 1 billion of the world's population. If you include the adjacent Indian Ocean, you must add another half billion people. And if you include as well the millions who live on the North and South American shores of the

Pacific, the total is nearly two-thirds of the world's population.

Let there be no mistake about the meaning of these figures: The Pacific is not a barrier but a highway—a great link that unites us, facilitating close trade relations and encouraging the free and friendly contacts that are basic to a peaceful world.

There is a rich diversity in the cultures of the peoples living along the Pacific shores. Many of the civilizations here have ancient and proud traditions. Some are highly industrialized. Others are on the threshold of a self-generating economic growth. And many are barely emerging from eons of a “village” economy.

But all these people share common goals. They want peace. They want a better life—a doctor for their children, a school, a new cash crop, an all-weather road. And in the deepest sense, they want their freedom. They want an opportunity to develop their full potential as

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the National Legislative Conference at Honolulu, Hawaii, on Aug. 20 (press release 429).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1263 PUBLICATION 7594 SEPTEMBER 9, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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individuals and nations. They want—intensely—to modernize. But they want modernization that preserves the essence of their own cultures.

In this context it seems to me that the great tasks of United States foreign policy in this Pacific community are twofold:

First—and most dramatic in terms of daily news headlines—we Americans must help to deter aggression and to maintain peace. We must be ready and willing to respond to crises that demand the use of our military power in the pursuit of peace—the present and continuing threats to the independence of free nations.

But second, and of decisive importance in the long span of history, we must assist the peoples of the Pacific in their process of nation building. For free-world military power is a means, not an end. Free-world military power holds the ring, but it is what goes on inside the ring, behind the headlines, that builds the future. For progress is not military but political, economic, and cultural.

Let us look, then, at the problems we face and the efforts we are making on both these fronts: in the struggle for peace and independence and in the struggle for national development.

### **Communist China, a Source of Danger**

I turn, first, to the chief sources of danger in the Pacific community: the Communist countries and, in particular, Communist China.

Since 1949 the 700 million people of mainland China have been denied the opportunity of friendly and open interchange with the rest of the Pacific community. Their Stalinist leaders have shut the Chinese people in on themselves and ordered them to regard their neighbors with suspicion and even hate. The enormous numbers of the Chinese, their remarkable human qualities, and the glories of their ancient culture and civilization only accentuate this tragedy—the tragedy of a revolution that lost its way.

The facade of Communist China is bold and dangerous looking. The Chinese Communist leaders are addicted to reckless words. Turned to creative tasks, in cooperating with the broad

mass of humanity, the numbers, energy, ability, and culture of the Chinese could be a powerful force for good in the world. But set in opposition to the rest of humanity, harnessed to the aggressive designs of a tiny, self-serving leadership, the power of China dwindles. For power is relative. The power of China when combined with the power of the rest of humanity in pursuit of common goals is quite different from the power of China in opposition to the rest of humanity and in pursuit of the selfish goals of a narrow leadership.

From one point of view the large population of Communist China may appear to be an important power asset. But from another point of view it is a grave source of weakness. The pressure of this very large population on a relatively small amount of arable land creates a most serious dilemma for the Peiping regime.

The problem is that the Chinese Communists can find a genuine solution for their agricultural problem, for example, only through methods that contradict Communist ideology and objectives. It can do so only by increasing incentives to farmers and by a major redirection of national resources away from development of industry and into agriculture. The Peiping regime moved a little way in those directions in the past year and, as a result, achieved some improvement in agriculture output. But the effort appears to be far short of the massive infusion of resources that is required. And the temporary relaxation of controls and increase in individual incentives have led the farmer to concentrate on private production and to neglect public plots. Consequently the regime recently has begun to revert to repressive practices. It is caught between irreconcilable pressures: the Government's demand for total control and the economic need for freedom.

Meanwhile, Communist China's industrial development has dwindled and many of its factories are idle or working only part time. Its overall trade has shrunk immensely, and a very large fraction of its limited foreign exchange has been used to buy food.

It seems very unlikely that the Communist Chinese can resume industrial growth on a major scale in the visible future without the kinds of controls on farm activity that have the

effect of decreasing productivity and without large-scale aid from the outside. The Soviet Union closed out its major aid program 3 years ago and is showing no interest in reviving it.

The Communist Chinese leadership itself has admitted that status as an industrial power—which in 1958 was envisaged as being just around the corner—is now perhaps 30 or 40 years away. And the Chinese Communist foreign minister has predicted that the standard of living of the Chinese people cannot be expected to rise significantly for 100 years.

What kind of model is this for the world? Who in his right mind would wish to copy such an example—especially when there are other examples in Asia of much greater success in dealing with the problems of economic development and of agricultural productivity specifically?

Let me be clear on this point: We do not gloat over the unhappy condition and dismal prospects of the people of mainland China. They are a great people, with whom we have had historic ties of friendship. In the ordeal they are suffering they have our sympathy, and their sorrow is our sorrow.

#### **Effects of Division in Communist World**

Most people realize by now that a large population can be a source of economic weakness as well as a source of economic strength. There may still be, however, a tendency to equate a large population with military strength. In the Korean war we Americans saw the Chinese Communists employing tactics involving large masses of men, with little or no regard for casualties. But let us not forget that in that war North Korea and Communist China had immense help in equipment and material from the Soviet Union. And even today the ability of the Chinese Communists to manufacture arms is limited to relatively simple weapons.

So it is pertinent to consider the possible military effects of the great division that has taken place in the Communist world—the schisms dramatized by the meetings in Moscow last month. It is now 3 years since the Soviet Union withdrew its military, as well as its non-military, technicians and drastically curtailed its shipments of military supplies and equip-

ment to Communist China. Consequently, to take one example, the Chinese Communist air force, which is substantial in size and was relatively modern a few years ago, is in a state of rapid obsolescence. Moreover, it is not believed that Communist China is any longer obtaining spare parts for existing Soviet-supplied equipment of any sort. If this situation continues for long, Communist China's ability to mount major military operations, especially outside its borders, will deteriorate. At the same time, basic economic problems have limited severely Communist China's ability to develop its own modern armaments industry and even its present capacity to sustain for a long period large-scale military operations.

We must take care not to overstate the point. Compared to any of its Asian neighbors except the Soviet Union, Communist China is a strong military power. It has a very large army. The leaders of Communist China care little or nothing for human life. And, although up to now they have behaved more circumspectly than they advised Chairman Khrushchev to behave, they may venture reckless, even desperate, actions. At the same time we cannot rule out the possibility that at some future time Peiping and Moscow will draw together again.

The free nations of Asia are by no means out of danger. Communist China is still capable of grave and costly mischief. But it is not a formidable military power in terms of modern technology. And it lacks the heavy industry, the economic margin—and the outside aid, which the Soviet Union had during the Second World War—for building a formidable military machine. It cannot become a major modern military power, overall, in the foreseeable future.

The Peiping regime does appear to be concentrating a good deal of scientific and technological effort on a nuclear program. We hope that it will change its mind and decide to adhere to the recently negotiated test ban treaty.<sup>2</sup> But if it doesn't, we can anticipate that one of these days it will explode a nuclear device. What would be the meaning of that?

It should be understood, first of all, that there is a vast difference between a first test device

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

and an ability to deliver nuclear weapons on foreign targets. As Governor Harriman has reported, Chairman Khrushchev thinks it would take quite a few years for the Chinese Communists to develop a significant nuclear force. But even if it had such a force, Peiping would be unable to calculate that the initiation of nuclear warfare would be to its advantage. For it would be within reach of main U.S. and other free-world power, while the centers of free-world power would be well beyond the reach of Communist China.

Why then is Communist China, although floundering in an economic morass, spending so much effort on trying to make nuclear weapons? One can only speculate about this. Perhaps it hopes that a nuclear capability will restore some of the prestige the regime has lost both at home and abroad. It may hope to add nuclear intimidation to the pressures it can bring to bear on its Asian neighbors.

Objectively analyzed, the effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear explosion in the measurable future would be psychological rather than military. And the psychological results—outside mainland China, at least—would be negligible if we and the free nations of Asia understand the facts about nuclear weapons that we have just discussed. The free world has the power to deter or meet aggression; it has the power to support nations under attack, as in Viet-Nam, and to help maintain their freedom; it has the determination to use this power should that be necessary; and it has the will to maintain that power at full strength for as long as it is needed.

Turning to the other Communist countries in Asia, we find in microcosm the same range of problems that we find in Communist China. North Viet-Nam and North Korea are both small rural countries laboring under the delusion, spawned by Communist theory, that the best route to economic development is a policy of autarky and of emphasizing the building of a heavy industrial base, including an advanced steel industry. Both suffer from high costs of industrial production, growing populations, low per capita output, and continuing difficulties with food supplies.

At the same time, North Viet-Nam, with

other Communist support, has been able to mount campaigns of organized terrorism and other low-level military operations in Laos and South Viet-Nam. These assaults threaten the independence of Laos and South Viet-Nam. The free world must not and will not let these aggressions succeed.

I don't want to minimize the effort it takes to eliminate terrorist aggression based on an adjoining country. But I would suggest that meeting this challenge is less directly connected with Chinese or other Communist military power or with the attraction of Communist example than with a particular politicomilitary technique for exploiting weaknesses that are typical of most new and developing countries. The free world has learned a good deal about this technique in the course of dealing with it successfully in Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya. I am optimistic about the ability of the free world to deal with it not only in Laos and Viet-Nam but wherever it may occur.

#### **American Commitments in the Pacific Community**

So much for the chief threats to the peace in the Pacific community. They are threats that have produced a resolute American commitment to the defense of those nations under Communist assault. That commitment has been tested in Korea, in the Taiwan Straits, and in Laos. It is now facing a long-term test in Viet-Nam. We may be sure that it will be tested elsewhere from time to time.

Whatever the provocation, we will stand by our defense commitments. We will do so in any case, but we will also do so in the hope that, if strength is met with strength, those who guide the policies of Asian Communist states will in time move toward more rational, peaceful relationships with their Pacific neighbors.

Such commitments have meaning, however, only where the people of a region are themselves dedicated to their own independence. To the good fortune of the free world, the dedication of Asian nations has been amply demonstrated. The Republic of Korea, with the help of United Nations forces, repelled a major Communist aggression. Malaya, the Philippines, and other nations of the area have defended themselves successfully against lesser

Communist efforts. Recently we have seen India rise to the defense of its soil against the Chinese Communists. Both Laos and South Viet-Nam are now under active Communist assault. But they—and we—are determined that they shall not lose their independence.

In free Asia generally there is a keener understanding than there was a decade ago of Communist purposes and Communist techniques. And there is a wider realization that communism is not only brutal but inefficient.

#### **Economic Achievements in Free Asia**

Let us turn now to the free peoples of the Pacific and their progress in the great task of nation building.

Despite the problems that have beset them, their experience in the postwar period contrasts very favorably with the experience of the Communist nations. Although it is difficult to generalize about the varying experiences of a large number of different countries, I would like to try to do so under three broad headings: first, economic achievements; secondly, political progress; and thirdly, success in defending their independence and finding satisfying and honorable roles in the world.

Beneath the surface of apparent difficulties in free Asia there has been major economic progress. The supreme example is Japan. While Communist China has moved from one disaster to another and has failed to raise the standards of life of its people, Japan has advanced to successive new heights of production and per capita income. It has the highest rate of investment and of growth in the world.

In agricultural production, also, the contrast between Communist China and Japan is extraordinary. Japan has only one-third as much cultivated land per person as Communist China. But while food production in Communist China has actually declined, Japan has raised its degree of self-sufficiency in food from 80 to 85 percent—despite a 10-percent increase in population. Japanese rice yields are nearly twice Communist China's.

Japan has achieved these results by precisely the kind of prescription Communist China finds it hard, or impossible, to accept—by increasing incentives to farmers and devoting major re-

sources to the support of agriculture. The incentives come from the private ownership of land, a fair return to the tiller, and the availability of a wide range of consumer goods. Japanese industry also provides agricultural equipment in substantial quantity. And perhaps the most striking indication of the extent to which Japan devotes industrial resources to agriculture is the fact that Japan uses as much commercial fertilizer on 13 million acres of cultivated land as all the other Far Eastern countries use on 822 million acres.

It may be objected that it's not quite fair to compare Communist China with Japan because, although Japan had to recover from the destruction of war and did, indeed, effect a major revolution in agriculture, it already had a major industrial base. Very well then—let's look at what the Republic of China has accomplished on the island of Taiwan. In 10 years—from 1952 to 1962—it increased its agricultural production by 50 percent in value, trebled its industrial output, and doubled its real national income. Even with a high population increase—of 3.4 percent annually—it has increased per capita income by an average of 3.7 percent a year. Its per capita income today is among the highest in the Far East, after Japan, and is at least double Communist China's.

The remarkable advance of agriculture on Taiwan stems from a major redistribution of land into small, privately owned holdings, similar to that effected in Japan, and the application of significant resources, better seeds, and modern technology, along with the stimulation of local initiative. In the gratifying progress of Taiwan a key role has been played by a unique institution, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, in which we participate. That Commission and its broad program of rural development—economic, social, and political—on Taiwan are models which some other nations might profitably emulate.

Last year Taiwan's exports reached an all-time high of \$218 million. They included such new export lines as cement, canned mushrooms, polyvinyl chloride, and fluorescent lamps. In the past few years the private sector of Taiwan's industry has greatly expanded.

Likewise Malaya, Thailand, and the Philip-

ines have scored significant economic gains in recent years. In each of them agricultural production has risen on the order of 40 percent or more. In each the manufacturing sector and foreign trade have grown appreciably. In each the economic advantages of private initiative, of the free way of life, are being strikingly demonstrated.

It may be contended that it is unfair to compare these countries with Communist China because they are relatively small and not densely populated. Very well then—let's look at India. Like China it has a large and growing population on a limited supply of arable land, a limited industrial base, and a low per capita income. In the past decade the population of India increased by more than 21 percent. But its agricultural production expanded by more than 41 percent, its industrial production doubled, its national income increased by 43 percent, and its per capita income by 17 percent.

India has a mixed economy. And it still faces grave economic problems. But it has moved ahead in the same period that per capita income and agricultural production in Communist China declined. All men who love freedom have a deep interest in the success of India, the most populous democracy in the world.

Pakistan also is advancing economically, despite serious problems. We have a deep interest in her progress, as well as in her security.

Indonesia, which has had many serious troubles since independence, now seems to be grappling seriously with its economic problems.

Not all the free nations of East and South Asia have made much economic headway. But most of them have done strikingly better than Communist China.

Among the great assets of the Pacific are, of course, Australia and New Zealand, to both of which we are bound by indissoluble ties. They have attained living standards among the highest in the world. New Zealand is the world's lowest cost producer of agricultural exports. Australia not only produces farm staples and minerals but has become a modern industrial nation. Last year the contribution of manufactures to Australia's gross national product was nearly double that of agriculture and mining. We rejoice in the achievements of New

Zealand and Australia and are confident that they both will continue to thrive.

### Encouraging Signs of Political Progress

Some of the new nations of South and East Asia have experienced political difficulties, and in several instances these have been severely aggravated, if not caused, by the Communists. But beneath a somewhat disordered surface are both a basic stability and encouraging signs of the growth of deeper roots for democratic institutions.

One of the weakest political and administrative links in many Asian societies, as in most other developing countries, is the connection between city and village, between the central government and the countryside. Communism seeks to exploit the weakness of these links and, in doing so, forces the central government to pay more attention to them. In several Asian countries, actions taken to cope with terrorist warfare inspired by the Communists have led directly to a strengthening of democracy at the grassroots. That happened in Malaya and the Philippines. Somewhat the same process is going on today in South Viet-Nam, where the strategic-hamlet program is establishing local self-government and strengthening the administrative and political links between the rural people and their national government. This program is not only helping South Viet-Nam to defeat the Communists but will help it to advance politically and economically and socially after the Communist guerrillas have been completely eliminated. South Viet-Nam has the resources—not least the character of its people—for a quite brilliant future. Actually, its progress from the end of the Indochinese war in 1954 until 1959 was one of the most remarkable in Asia. Probably it was that striking success, especially when contrasted with the failure of the vaunted Communist "paradise" in North Viet-Nam, which prompted the latter to resume its assault of organized terrorism on South Viet-Nam in 1959.

India's large-scale community development program has, from its beginning, combined the stimulation of democratic roots with social and economic progress. Pakistan likewise has been strengthening the village roots of democracy.

Some of the new and reborn nations of Asia have not yet achieved fully functioning, stable democracies. But nearly all have democracy as their goal. A few are operating democratic institutions with creditable success. And Japan has illustrated how a democratic system can provide effective leadership that can overcome, in a single generation, the mistakes of the past and lay the social and economic, as well as the political, base for continuing democracy and freedom.

Democracy will develop in free Asia, provided that the free Asian peoples preserve their independence. And generally they have proved themselves to be thoroughly determined to preserve their independence.

We see also in free Asia some encouraging trends toward closer cooperation. Japan and Australia are undertaking larger roles in promoting the development and stability of the Pacific area. The Philippines are manifesting increasing leadership.

Recent weeks have provided striking new evidence that Asian statesmen are deeply conscious of their responsibilities to their neighbors as well as to internal development. The leaders of the Philippines, Indonesia, and the new state of Malaysia have announced their intention to bring their nations together in a "Maphilindo" confederation. They have done this despite difficult disagreements because of their clear sense that regional cooperation is the only path to regional security and prosperity.

Meanwhile, Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines have formed the Association for South-east Asia. The cooperative activities of existing regional organizations, such as the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), have grown apace, and new organizations, such as the Asian Productivity Organization, have been created to respond to new needs as these have been recognized by the countries of the area. SEATO and ANZUS continue as important symbols of joint commitment to the independence of the countries of the area as well as important foci of cooperative activity to deal with the Communist threat. While relatively weak and relatively limited in scope and character, these cooperative activities among the nations of Asia and the Pacific reflect important long-term impulses.

In the light of long-term trends in Communist and free Asia let me now review the elements of U.S. strategy and policy. Our policy in the Far East can be summed up in these four points:

1. to stand firmly behind our commitments to the defense of independent nations and to turn back any aggressive thrust from communism;

2. to contribute as we are able to the prosperity and development of nations which request our assistance as the surest way of helping to build a system of free, viable, and strong nations in Asia;

3. to recognize the value of initiatives by the Pacific nations themselves to develop their own modes of cooperation and communication, and to stand ready to assist when called upon to do so;

4. to work patiently for the realization of a Pacific community of nations so prosperous and progressive that its attraction will prove, in the long run, irresistible to those peoples now kept by their rulers from participation in it.

#### **The Chinese Communists and the Test Ban**

The nuclear test ban treaty is a recent development of considerable importance in man's continuing search for lasting peace. While it is no more than a beginning step toward the general and complete disarmament for which all people yearn, it is a significant contribution. An immediate advantage of this treaty to the welfare of men, women, and children everywhere is the promise it holds for reduction of the radioactive pollution of the air we breathe. The Chinese Communist reaction to the treaty has been to condemn it as a "dirty fraud." They claim, in expressing this apparent indifference to the interests of humanity, that they speak for all peace-loving peoples of the world. It is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of the people of the world have acclaimed the nuclear test ban treaty and that the Chinese Communist leaders are in a position of isolation. We hope that an awareness of the clear benefits to all mankind of the nuclear test ban treaty will eventually bring the Chinese Communists to reconsider their stand.

Perhaps at some point in the future the Chinese Communist leadership may come to realize that their policy of hostility and isolation is a barren course, perilous to them and to the whole world. Possibly the influence of time and experience will eventually persuade the leadership in Peiping to change their approach and their attitude.

Finally, I want to recall some words from President Kennedy's address "Toward a Strategy of Peace" made on June 10 at American University:<sup>3</sup>

We must . . . persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace.

There would not appear to be any immediate

likelihood of those "constructive changes," of which President Kennedy spoke, appearing on the mainland of China. But the separation between the people in mainland China and the free peoples of the Pacific is such an apparent tragedy of the modern world that it seems reasonable to hope that it is only a temporary phenomenon. The American people surely look forward to the time when all of the Chinese people are reunited with the peoples of the Pacific and the world in friendship, cooperation, and freedom.

I am confident that the lasting values we seek, for ourselves and for the peoples of the Pacific, will prevail over the dogmas of war and struggle. To do our part to build a world of peace remains our highest aim. That is our great purpose and our strategy.

## The Viet-Nam Situation

by Theodore J. C. Heavner

Deputy Director, Viet-Nam Working Group<sup>1</sup>

I feel very honored to have the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. The Veterans of Foreign Wars organization has played a distinguished role in American life, and it is composed individually of Americans who have served their country under the most difficult and dangerous of all circumstances. As a former serviceman, as a public servant, and as an American, I am very proud to be with you.

I have been asked to discuss the Viet-Nam situation. We could begin, in the usual way, with some vital statistics about Viet-Nam. It may be of some passing interest that South

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the National Security and Legislative Committees at the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Seattle, Wash., on Aug. 25.

Viet-Nam has a population of more than 14 million, an area of about 66,000 square miles—somewhat smaller than the State of Oklahoma—and that its principal products are rice and rubber. But I think the most important thing to know about Viet-Nam, or indeed any country, is its people.

The Vietnamese are an ancient people, with more than 2,000 years of history behind them. They have passed through two colonial periods; one, under the Chinese, which lasted more than 1,000 years, and, more recently, a second colonial period of about 80 years under the French. Between the Chinese and the French colonial periods, the Vietnamese enjoyed almost 1,000 years of independence—a period marked, however, by frequent struggles to maintain that treasured independence.

The struggle to get and keep their independence is something very near the heart of the Vietnamese. Every Vietnamese schoolboy is intensely proud, for example, of the fact that in 1284, and again in 1287, the Mongol hordes of Kublai Khan were defeated by the Vietnamese under Marshal Tran Hung Dao. There is a wonderful story about this victory.

Faced with what appeared to be overwhelming odds—the Mongol army outnumbered the Vietnamese forces by at least five to two—Marshal Tran Hung Dao summoned representatives of all the Vietnamese villages and provinces to a great meeting at Dien Hong. He told the Vietnamese leaders there assembled what they faced, what the odds were against them, and what they stood to lose if they fought and lost. He asked for their advice: Should they sue for peace or should they fight?

According to the ancient chronicles—and knowing the Vietnamese, I certainly believe this is true—the council called with one voice for war against the foreign invader.

#### **Vietnamese "Compulsion for Freedom"**

These are the same people that poured out of the Communist north nearly a million strong in 1954 and 1955 to avoid living under an alien regime. Perhaps some of you had the experience of seeing this exodus—one of the great population movements of all time—and certainly one of the most convincing rejections of communism which the world has ever seen. I am sure that all of you know Dr. [Tom] Dooley's account of that event. Of these people Dooley said: "Americans never fail to like the Vietnamese when they get to know them. It is impossible not to respect their driving compulsion for freedom. . . ."

If I may interject a personal note, I would like to say that I feel I know firsthand that the Vietnamese who are fighting Communist aggression today are very much the sons of Marshal Tran Hung Dao. Last November I was in Moc Hoa, a very small provincial capital in Kien Tuong Province, in the Plain of Reeds. I speak Vietnamese, and one hot evening, sitting on the banks of the Vai Co River, I fell into conversation with a young Vietnamese Civil Guardsman. Kien Tuong is one of the provinces most

seriously menaced by Communist guerrilla forces, and hearing small-arms fire across the river, we both assumed that someone out there in the dark was fighting the Viet Cong. It seemed natural for me to ask if he himself had encountered the Viet Cong in battle.

He pulled a decoration out of his pocket, a Vietnamese medal carefully encased in a small box and wrapped in a silk handkerchief. It was a decoration for bravery in combat. I of course asked how he had earned it. It was a simple but very significant story.

He told me that one night he and a group of Civil Guardsmen were attacked by the Viet Cong and that two corners of their position were overrun, their officer and a number of their men killed. They withdrew to their last strong-point, and there, together with their wives and children, they were waiting for the final Viet Cong assault.

The Viet Cong called to them, urged them to surrender, to turn over their weapons, and promised that they would not be hurt if they gave up. The remaining defenders held a quick council of war, quite unlike the great ceremonial council of Dien Hong in appearance, you may be sure, but in spirit very much the same.

The young guardsman whom I had met urged his companions to continue their resistance, and, to bolster their spirits, his wife picked up the weapon of one of the dead and took her place resolutely beside her husband in the defense of the position. They held off the attack successfully until dawn, when they were relieved by Government forces.

What I am trying to say is that the Vietnamese people not only have a long and proud history of fighting to maintain their independence, but they are still fiercely determined to maintain it in the face of Communist attack. This is perhaps the most significant fact about the Vietnamese people today.

It is not an easy struggle for them. In their hot war against Communist aggression they suffer from grave handicaps. Like Germany and Korea, Viet-Nam is a divided country, with all that means in human suffering. Viet-Nam is a country with an underdeveloped economy, an economy ravaged moreover by intermittent warfare ever since 1945. Viet-Nam is under con-

stant pressure from what is probably the most effective Communist subversive apparatus in Asia, if not in the world. And although it has a history of 1,000 years of independence before the French came, the modern state of South Viet-Nam has been in existence only 9 short years.

For these reasons the Vietnamese need help if they are to retain their treasured independence. The United States has been giving them that help.

### The Buddhist Dispute

Before I turn to the Viet-Nam war, and the American role in it, I want to touch briefly on another aspect of the Vietnamese situation which has been very much in the news recently. This is the Buddhist dispute.

Let me say emphatically that this is certainly a very serious matter, and we have made our concern abundantly clear. The United States stands firmly for religious freedom, both in our domestic life and in our foreign policy. We are concerned about the Buddhist dispute in South Viet-Nam, not only because of our own deals but also because this controversy can only help the Communist Viet Cong.

We had hoped that this issue could be promptly and justly resolved. It now appears, however, that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has instituted repressive measures against Vietnamese Buddhist leaders. This action represents a direct violation by the Vietnamese Government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists. The United States can only deplore repressive actions of this nature.

While this is a matter which the Vietnamese must resolve themselves, we as Americans cannot fail to express our dedication not only to the freedom of all men in the political sense but also to their spiritual freedom. We are hopeful that this dispute can be promptly and justly resolved so that the Vietnamese people can go forward with one mind in the business of defending their nation against Communist aggression and building a better future for their children.

One of the most frequent questions about the Viet-Nam situation is the deceptively sim-

ple query: "How is the war going; who is winning?" I suppose people were asking this question in 1863 and in 1943, too, and it is as hard to answer now as it was then. In this case it is especially hard, because in a guerrilla war you can't show frontlines moving backward or forward on the map.

### The Guerrilla War in Viet-Nam

To understand why President Kennedy said in his state of the Union message that "The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam,"<sup>2</sup> we need to consider the situation in the fall of 1961 and early 1962. The Vietnamese were quite plainly losing their fight against the Communist guerrillas then.

The Communist guerrillas, 1,500 strong, took and held overnight a provincial capital in September of 1961, and, to underline the fact, they publicly beheaded the Chief of Province there. The flow of rice into Saigon, normally a rice export center, was choked off by the guerrillas to the point where the United States sent P.L. 480 rice to Saigon in early 1962. Enemy attacks in January of last year were running at the rate of more than 120 per week. We even feared that the Communist Viet Cong might soon be able to declare "a liberated area" somewhere in the highlands.

Faced with this deteriorating situation, President Diem in December of 1961 sent a letter to President Kennedy in which he outlined the nature of the attack on his government and asked for increased American assistance.<sup>3</sup> The United States considered this request very carefully. Vice President Johnson had visited Viet-Nam in May of 1961,<sup>4</sup> and President Kennedy had sent General [Maxwell D.] Taylor to Viet-Nam again in the fall of that year. So we were very clear about the nature of the threat.

We knew that the Viet Cong attack was caused, led, and directed by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. This was a case of Communist aggression, although the Communists made great efforts to conceal the fact, aggression against a friendly people with whom

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> For texts of President Diem's letter and President Kennedy's reply, see *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> For text of a joint communique, see *ibid.*, June 19, 1961, p. 956.

the United States had strong ties. There could be little question about our decision. We promptly agreed to step up our military and economic assistance.

When we increased our assistance to Viet-Nam we issued a study of the evidence of Communist infiltration into South Viet-Nam and Communist direction of the war against the Government of South Viet-Nam.<sup>5</sup> This was necessary, not just out of a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind," but because of the great and continuing Communist effort to portray the Viet Cong as an indigenous and legitimate popular movement against a repressive government. I think it is worth noting in this connection that the international body specifically established in 1954 at the Geneva conference to oversee and keep the peace in Viet-Nam—the International Control Commission, composed of India, Canada, and Poland—has confirmed the fact that Communist North Viet-Nam is engaged in an attempt to overthrow by violence the Government of South Viet-Nam. After sifting the evidence for almost a year, the International Control Commission in June of 1962 issued a special report which makes it clear that the Viet Cong are the instruments of Hanoi's deliberate attack on South Viet-Nam.<sup>6</sup>

If we were losing the war in the fall of 1961 and early 1962, where are we today? I think it is fair to say that the tide has now turned and that the Government of Viet-Nam is with our help slowly overcoming the Communist guerrillas. No more provincial capitals have been taken, the Communists have not "liberated" any part of South Viet-Nam, and Saigon is once again exporting rice. In fact we anticipate that Saigon will export 300,000 tons of rice this year.

Comparing Communist military activity in the first half of 1962 with the first half of this year, we see again reason for believing the Communist threat has been stopped and is begin-

ning to be rolled back. In the first half of 1962 there were 10,270 Viet Cong incidents, including more than 3,000 armed attacks. In the first 6 months of this year incidents dropped by one-third, to a little less than 7,000, while armed attacks were reduced by 36 percent. The scale of the attacks also declined. In the first half of 1962 there were 35 battalion-sized attacks and 118 company-sized attacks. This year, during the same period, there were only 7 battalion-sized attacks and 65 company-sized attacks.

### **The Strategic-Hamlet Program**

An even more important indicator of progress against the Communists is the number of people who enjoy protection against Viet Cong terror and extortion. This is always difficult to measure, but our people in Viet-Nam estimate that in the past year nearly 1 million Vietnamese who were formerly subject to sporadic Communist incursions, or even outright Communist control, are now covered by effective Government administration and protection. This has been achieved largely through the strategic-hamlet program. This program is the heart of the war effort in Viet-Nam. It is a coordinated, across-the-board political, economic, and military response to the Communist threat.

There has been some misunderstanding about this program in the United States. The Communist charge that the strategic hamlets are "concentration camps" has even gained some currency. Let me tell you how the Vietnamese make a hamlet "strategic."

The first step in the setting up of a strategic hamlet is essentially military; a defense perimeter is established, more or less elaborate as the local security situation demands, and a hamlet militia is trained and armed.

The second step, which takes place immediately after or even at the same time as the first, is purely political. This is the election of a strategic-hamlet council. This is the first time in Vietnamese history that hamlet councils have been elected. It is also the first time in Vietnamese history that the national Government has been effectively "plugged in" to hamlet-level society.

<sup>5</sup> A two-part report entitled *A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam* (Department of State publication 7308). Parts I and II are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for 25 cents and 55 cents, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> For a Department statement regarding the report, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1962, p. 109.

The third step is economic and social in nature. Schools, dispensaries, maternity clinics, agricultural extension work, and cheap agricultural credit are provided. Materials and technical advice to enable the villages to undertake their own "self-help," such as access roads and irrigation works, also come from the Government.

In short, the population of the hamlet is given the means to defend themselves, plus an economic and political stake which they will want to defend. I think you will agree that this is a strange description for a concentration camp.

Mao Tse-tung has said that the guerrilla fighter must live among the people as the fish lives in the water. The strategic hamlet is the net to get the Viet Cong fish out of water. By giving the whole population the means—and the will—to defend themselves against Communist demands for food and recruits, the basic strategy of the Communist "war of national liberation" is being met and defeated.

#### **The American Role in South Viet-Nam**

The United States is spending a great deal of money in South Viet-Nam. Far more important, more than 50 American lives have been lost there as a direct result of Communist attacks or incidents. Of these Americans, President Kennedy has said:<sup>7</sup>

They are among the many who in this century, far from home, have died for our country. Our task now, and the task of all Americans, is to live up to their commitments.

Why did the President say this? The American role in South Viet-Nam is a difficult and relatively new one for us. It is not well understood, and I think it is worth while to dwell for a moment on how those American lives were lost and why. I would like to emphasize here just as much as I possibly can that this is a Vietnamese war. They are fighting it. They are directing it. Our role is strictly confined to what we call advisory, logistic, and technical assistance.

The question is sometimes raised as to why this should be so. If we are suffering casualties, why not direct the war effort in South Viet-

Nam? Why not put American officers in command of Vietnamese units, or even deploy regular American combat units to "clean up the mess" and get it over?

The fact is that only the Vietnamese can win this war. It is a struggle for the loyalty of a whole people, the Vietnamese people, and the main thrust of Communist propaganda is that the guerrillas are fighting for independence against an American neocolonial regime. They say that Diem is an American puppet and that the Vietnamese people must drive the Americans out in order to be free. If they are able to convince the Vietnamese people that this is true, we will have lost the struggle in South Viet-Nam. We can help the Vietnamese, but we can't do their fighting for them. And let me assure you that they don't want us to. They took 4,400 killed in action last year, and they are quite prepared to go on doing the fighting. All they ask from us is the tools and the expertise which they lack.

We have therefore given the Vietnamese American advisers and American equipment to help them improve the effectiveness of their military organization. To be good advisers, our men must frequently be at or near the scene of combat. Moreover, in a guerrilla war there are no real rear and front areas, and the Communists have made a special target of our people. These are the basic reasons that we have suffered American casualties in South Viet-Nam.

I should add here that this does not mean our people are helpless targets for the Viet Cong. American advisers are armed, and they have orders to defend themselves if threatened. I have met a great many of our advisers at their posts all over South Viet-Nam. Let me assure you that they know how to take care of themselves. They are doing a new and difficult job for America and doing it very well. We should all be very proud of them.

Besides advice in military tactics, we provide the Vietnamese with the technical skills and equipment which they lack. This has meant such things as electronics equipment and technicians, helicopters and helicopter pilots. We are training the Vietnamese as rapidly as possible so that they can fill these technical slots themselves, but it takes a long time to turn out

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1963, p. 159.

an electronics specialist or a helicopter pilot. The Viet Cong will not wait.

### **The "Why" of Our Involvement**

I have described the American role in the Vietnamese war—the "how" of our involvement. I would like to close by indicating something of the "why."

You can think of Viet-Nam as a piece of strategic real estate. It is on the corner of mainland Asia, across the east-west trade routes, and in a position that would make it an excellent base for further Communist aggression against the rest of free Asia.

You can think of our involvement in South Viet-Nam in terms of a moral commitment. The Vietnamese, on the frontier of the free world, are fighting not just for themselves but for all men who wish to remain free. I believe the 300–500 casualties they suffer each week is a precious contribution to the security of the whole free world.

You can think of the American role in South Viet-Nam in terms of our SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] commitment. You can regard it as a fulfillment of the implied obligation which we as a nation undertook when we said at the Geneva Conference in 1954 that we would regard any renewal of aggression in violation of the Geneva Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

You can think of South Viet-Nam as a test case; there is good reason to believe that this is the view of the Communist bloc. In Viet-Nam we are determining whether or not the free world can help a nation defend itself against the subversion and guerrilla warfare which make up the "war of national liberation" tactics. I think it is fair to say that we have largely stopped the Communist thrust all around the world in conventional and nuclear terms. We are now confronted by a new kind of threat, and we have to a degree invented a new kind of response to meet it. All of the underdeveloped nations of the world are watching the event. If South Viet-Nam falls, their will to resist this kind of aggression will be weakened and the whole fabric of free-world strength and determination damaged thereby.

Perhaps, in more human terms, you may want to think of our support to Viet-Nam as American help to the nearly 1 million Vietnamese refugees who fled North Viet-Nam in 1954 and 1955 to avoid living under a Communist regime.

These are some of the reasons for our support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle to defend their independence against Communist attack. I think they are all good reasons. Taken together, they seem to me to be compelling.

## **United States Assessing Reports on Conditions in Viet-Nam**

### **Department Statement of August 21**

On the basis of information from Saigon, it appears that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has instituted serious repressive measures against Vietnamese Buddhist leaders. The action represents a direct violation by the Vietnamese Government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists. The United States deplores repressive actions of this nature.

### **Department Statement of August 23<sup>1</sup>**

On the assessment of the situation on the military side, we have taken note of the statements by commanders in the field, the military administrators of the martial law, and broadcasts over the radio of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to the effect that the war against the Viet Cong will be vigorously pursued, and we have no reports from our own sources which would indicate any diminution of this effort in the field. There has been no change in our basic policy of assisting Viet-Nam in its prosecution of the war against the Communist Viet Cong.

On the political side we are continuing the process of assessing the situation on the basis of the Embassy's reports. It is too early obviously to reach any final conclusions. It is clear that the military is in physical control in that it has

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Aug. 23 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

assumed administrative responsibilities in enforcing martial law. Under such conditions, the functions of civil administrators, such as those of the Interior Ministry, are being supervised by the military. Contact between the Embassy and civilian officials continues.

## **Administration Urges Congress To Support \$4.1 Billion Aid Bill**

### **STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY<sup>1</sup>**

The House of Representatives begins this week consideration of legislation vital to the security and well-being of the United States and the free world, the mutual defense assistance bill of 1964. I hope the House will give full support to the authorization recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Our foreign aid program is essential to the continued strength of the free world. It gives us increased military security at a cost far lower than if we had to carry the entire burden alone. It gives protection against Communist internal takeover to free people who are yet not able to build solidly without outside help. It provides essential assurances to the new nations of the world that they can count on us in their effort to build a free society. Only with this assurance can they continue to maintain against the pressures that are brought upon them.

This does not represent an impossible burden for the United States; indeed, it is only half as heavy as it was during the Marshall Plan. Then about 2 percent of our gross national product was allocated to foreign assistance. The program today costs only seven-tenths of 1 percent. The bill before the House has already been cut \$850 million from our original estimate last January.<sup>2</sup> Fortunately, the bill now has bipartisan political support. More than half of the Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee are in favor of the

\$4.1 billion authorization now before the House. This program is not an abstract set of numbers, but a set of concrete and continued actions in support of our national security.

No party or group should call for a dynamic foreign policy and then seek to cripple this program. One wonders which concrete actions critics would like to stop. Should we scrap the Alliance for Progress, which is our best answer to the threat of communism in this hemisphere? Should we deny help to India, the largest free power in Asia, as she seeks to strengthen herself against Communist China? Do we wish to dismantle our joint defenses in Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Greece, countries along the very rim of Communist power? Do we want to weaken our friends in Southeast Asia?

This is no time to slacken our efforts. This fight is by no means over. The struggle is not finished. Therefore, as has been said on many occasions before, however tired we may get of this program, our adversaries are not tired. I don't think this country is tired, and the cause of freedom should certainly not be fatigued. Therefore I think it is necessary that we continue to make this effort. I hope the House will support it. Eighty percent of these funds are spent in the United States, and I think it is necessary and essential, as the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, General Clay, and others, that the House figure be passed.

Experience shows us that the appropriation traditionally has been less. I think it is incumbent upon us to support the action of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I hope the House of Representatives will.

### **LETTER TO MEMBERS OF HOUSE**

*Following is the text of a joint letter from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to Members of the House of Representatives.*

Press release 432 dated August 19

AUGUST 17, 1963

DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN: The House of Representatives takes up this week a keystone of United States foreign policy: the Foreign As-

<sup>1</sup> Made at the opening of the President's news conference on Aug. 20.

<sup>2</sup> For excerpts from the President's budget message, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1963, p. 224.

sistance Act of 1963.<sup>3</sup> The action taken on this important legislation will have a far-reaching effect upon the U.S. position, now and in the future, in the great struggle for freedom.

The President originally requested \$4,945 million for this program. He subsequently reduced this request by \$420 million.<sup>4</sup> The Committee on Foreign Affairs has further reduced the request by \$438 million. Thus, the original request has been reduced by \$858 million since January. This reduction is so deep that the bill before you is already less than last year's *final appropriation*, taking into account the previous two year appropriation for the Social Progress Trust Fund.

We wish to emphasize that we know of no reason to assume that our total military and foreign policy requirements are less than those of fiscal year 1963. In fact, as we view our evolving relationship with the Soviet Union, the insistent expansionist aims of Communist China, the continuing crises in Laos and Vietnam, and the unfinished business in Latin America and in Africa, we believe we cannot now afford to retreat in our foreign assistance efforts.

Three authorizations directly involve United States' security interests: Supporting Assistance (primarily for several countries confronting the Sino-Soviet Bloc), Military Assistance, and the President's Contingency Fund. The total authorization recommended for these purposes is already \$165 million less than was appropriated last year. Although we have made reductions in these programs as rapidly as possible (over \$1 billion in three years), we believe that any further reductions here would seriously restrict the President's ability to respond effectively to major challenges to Free World security, including our own.

Any reduction in the existing yearly \$600 million Alliance for Progress authorization would give credence to those who claim that the United States lacks the will and staying power to make

good on its promise of long-term assistance to Latin America. Further reductions in any of the other authorizations would seriously undercut the ability of the United States to carry out its foreign policy objective of assisting independent countries to attain self-supporting status.

But adequate funds alone will not support an effective foreign policy—we must have the necessary flexibility to carry out our common objectives. A number of restrictive amendments have been proposed to cut off or drastically reduce aid to some countries or organizations whose actions disturb us. We believe that these amendments stem from an inadequate appraisal of the long-term objectives of United States foreign and military policy. Attempts to place the conduct of our foreign policy under rigid legislative restrictions will prevent us from acting in support of American interests in a rapidly changing international scene.

We strongly urge you to lend your unqualified support to this bill without further restriction or reduction.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK  
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

#### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK<sup>5</sup>

Today's action by the House of Representatives cutting almost \$600 million from the foreign aid bill follows earlier cuts of close to \$900 million. This slices into the very muscle of our foreign policy. For almost a decade and a half we Americans have been helping the less fortunate countries to move toward strength and stability. At the moment when steady effort is being vindicated by progress this congressional action threatens our power to maintain the necessary momentum. The cut would impair our national security, weaken the Alliance for Progress, and restrict our ability to respond to new demands or crises in the world struggle for freedom. When events are working in favor of our world of freedom we Americans should not retreat. We must not quit.

<sup>3</sup> For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Apr. 5, see *ibid.*, Apr. 29, 1963, p. 664; for a statement by the Secretary before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 11, see *ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the President's message to Congress on foreign aid, see *ibid.*, Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

<sup>5</sup> Released at Washington on Aug. 23.

## The Alliance for Progress Marks Second Anniversary

### REMARKS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY<sup>1</sup>

Today, on the second anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, I am heartened by the advances that have been made in a short space of time. A peaceful revolution is under way in Latin America, and this gives promise of bringing a better life to millions of our fellow Americans in this hemisphere.

The advances made in the first 2 years are only a start, but they are impressive. Some 140,000 new housing units have been constructed; slum clearance projects have begun; there are 8,200 new classrooms; more than 700 new water systems have been built where there had been danger of widespread disease from contamination; land-reform and tax-reform measures have been adopted by many countries; more than 160,000 agriculture credit loans have been made and more than 4 million schoolbooks have been distributed; two common-market agreements are gaining new impetus; a revolutionary step has been taken to stabilize the price of coffee in world markets; more than 9 million children are being fed in 18 countries in a Food for Peace program; road construction, especially in some agricultural areas, is proceeding ahead rapidly.

All this is a beginning, but only a beginning. We have to do a good deal more if this is going to be the sixties, a great Decade of Development. This is a cooperative effort by all of us who live in this hemisphere, north and south—an attempt to provide a better life for our people, a better chance for children to live, a better chance for them to be educated, a better chance for them to hold jobs, better housing for them, a chance to live their older age in peace and in dignity.

These are the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. These objectives must be realized. This program must be a success. The first 2 years is only a beginning. But it is my hope that the people of my own country, the people of other countries of this hemisphere, will con-

tinue to join together in a great international effort to make this continent, to make this hemisphere, a source of credit to all of us who live here and an inspiration to all the world. We still have a good deal more to do.

It is my hope that the governments of this hemisphere, including the Government of the United States, and those who enjoy the advantages—the people who enjoy the advantages in this hemisphere, including the people of my own country—that all of us will continue to work closely together to provide a better life for all of our people. That is what the Alliance for Progress means—to provide progress, revolutionary progress through peaceful, democratic means. I think it can be done. I think we have set out on an important journey. I think it is a journey that must be finished. To the completion of that journey, I pledge the people of the United States.

### STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON<sup>2</sup>

On this proud occasion I have come at the request of the President of the United States to extend his warm personal greetings to each of you and to express his confident good wishes for the continuing success of your many labors together in this vital organization. This second anniversary of the Alliance for Progress which we observe today is no written milestone. It is an anniversary which some feared and others hoped the alliance would never attain. Today it is convincing evidence that both the doubtful in our own countries and the hostile in other countries have underestimated the capacity for unity and the will among Americans.

We have lived together as neighbors for nearly 350 years.

We have worked together in the Alliance for Progress structure for only 2 years.

But we can believe that in the long reach of history what has begun in these 2 years will have far more meaning to the lives of all who shall call themselves Americans than what has gone on during the centuries before.

Survival of the alliance is no longer a real question. Henceforth we shall observe future

<sup>1</sup>Made in the Cabinet Room at the White House on Aug. 17 (White House press release).

<sup>2</sup>Made before the Council of the Organization of American States on Aug. 20.

anniversaries as milestones of success—genuine and growing success—which we shall achieve together.

To be optimistic about the future of the alliance is not to be unrealistic. Optimism is the only realism for men who are free and who retain the prerogative and privilege of determining their own destiny.

We of the Americas are free.

We are privileged to determine our own destinies.

We are bound together by both common heritage and common hope. We share together a heritage of hatred for oppression, love of liberty, respect for the individual, and a desire for social justice in progress. We likewise aspire together for homes, for work and land, for health and schools. This century has taught us an indelible lesson that the rich can know no peace so long as there is no hope for those long oppressed by poverty, by hunger, by ill health, by illiteracy, by landlessness.

There must be a new hope—an opportunity for a new start.

We do not minimize how long is the road before us nor how steep the grade we must climb.

We acknowledge our obstacles now where we were reluctant to acknowledge any of them before. Some have been overcome. Others most certainly will arise. All obstacles may assume any dimensions under new conditions. But we are bringing our collective talents, energies, and resources to bear upon them, and this is progress of the most important order.

But it is true that from a firm foundation we have made a good beginning. A year ago we had relatively little to show in physical accomplishments of the alliance. This year there is much—8,200 classrooms, 700 well and water supply systems, 900 hospitals and health centers, 140,000 homes, 160,000 agricultural credit loans. The funds which the United States has committed over the past 2 years increasingly are being transformed into bricks and into knowledge. New programs like young trees start slowly. Our 2-year-old tree is already bearing rich fruit. Next year and in succeeding years we expect its harvest to be even heavier. The task before us, however, is not one of 2 years nor, perhaps, even of 10. For

some of our nations this task may not be completed within this generation. But together we will continue with it. Together we will succeed.

Planning groups have been created or strengthened in every nation. Seven national plans have been submitted. Fourteen nations have made reforms in their tax policy or administration. Half our nations have made or begun study of land-reform measures.

On a broader scale, we see the fruit of the growing spirit of alliance. But we do not deceive ourselves. We know there is no easy road to development. We know that enduring progress is not quickly assured. We know that such progress must be accompanied by the support of many needed changes. These are lessons we have learned—and will apply.

Most important of these lessons is the fact that, for the job before us, our resources are not comfortably abundant. What we have to work with is enough only if we carefully and wisely use it to create the growth now which will free the growth of the future.

If we are to honor the generosity of our hearts, we must heed the prudence of our heads. It would be an empty and foolish exchange to substitute mere fleeting gifts of money for the enduring gift of realistic hope—and it is the richest of hope with which we seek to endow the lives of those forgotten Americans. If identifiable needs among us seem inexhaustible, we know that measurable resources are exhaustible. Our needs must be carefully gaged against the total resources and against the efforts of each nation and each people to move toward the goal of the alliance. This may require us to perfect still further the machinery we have designed to implement the alliance. That is only a detail, not the cause for doubt or despair, when we consider that the cause before us is not one of 2 years, not even of 10. Together, as mature, stable, purposeful allies, we shall carry the alliance forward resisting distraction, rejecting revisions, resolving differences.

Above all other considerations, we recognize that the alliance can succeed only in a climate of freedom. We cannot move toward our new future by turning back toward an old task.

Progress without freedom is bread without salt.

We know dictatorial regimes are incompatible with our hemisphere's future. We know that totalitarianism is unacceptable and intolerable in our midst. If we are to keep our hemisphere moving forward, our first and foremost task together is to keep it free and in peace. This we shall do.

The Alliance for Progress is based upon the concept that we have an urgent necessity and the moral obligation to work together for the mutual advantage of all our people, and the desires of the people of the Western Hemisphere can be summed up in the trinity of freedom, peace, and progress.

There are—and there will be—alien forces which seek to disrupt our essential unity. There are—and there will be—alien voices which seek to divide us by sowing doubts as to our mutual good faith.

But I believe that the people of the Americas have the good sense to judge the sources of dissension. And I believe even more strongly that we have the capacity to live together in mutual respect and understanding and assist each other in providing freedom, peace, and progress for our countries.

By working together, we present all humanity with inspiration for the future.

These first years of the alliance are the testing years.

We can say on this second anniversary occasion that great tests have been presented to us. We have met them well: with courage, with resourcefulness, above all with unity.

We shall be tested again and again—from within, from without. But after centuries of slumber the great giant of the Western Hemisphere—unity for progress—is awakening and in that awakening a powerful new force is arising to stand on the side of freedom, peace, and justice for all the world.

## **Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo Visits U.S.**

Press release 433 dated August 20

At the invitation of the Department of State, General Chiang Ching-kuo, Minister Without Portfolio in the Government of the Republic

of China, will visit the United States from September 6 to 17. The purpose of his trip is to visit points of interest in the United States. While in Washington, General Chiang will meet with U.S. Government officials. General Chiang last visited the United States in 1953.

## **Food for Peace Ships \$1.5 Billion in Commodities in Fiscal 1963**

The White House announced on August 21 that President Kennedy had on that day sent to the Congress a report showing that \$1.5 billion of America's farm commodities were shipped overseas during fiscal year 1963 under this nation's massive Food for Peace program. Food for Peace shipments in the last 6 months of the fiscal year (January-June 1963) totaled \$904 million, compared with \$622 million shipped in the first 6 months of the fiscal year.

The 18th semiannual report on Public Law 480 activities revealed that total U.S. farm exports in the fiscal year 1963 were at the record level of over \$5 billion established the previous year. Total shipments under the foreign-currency and dollar-credit P.L. 480 sales programs were at an alltime high. Shipments under P.L. 480 donation programs remained at the same level, while barter transactions declined sharply. At the same time, commercial exports of U.S. agricultural commodities continued to expand: The fiscal year 1963 total of \$3.5 billion was nearly \$60 million greater than in 1962.

In submitting the report, the President's Special Assistant for Food for Peace, Richard W. Reuter, told the President that he is impressed by "the contribution of U.S. agricultural abundance to this country's total foreign assistance effort." Mr. Reuter observed that in addition to donating supplemental food to a record total of 100 million undernourished people, "Food for Peace is also providing significant stimulus to the economic development of many nations." "Food for Peace continues to be an increasingly important tool of American foreign policy," Mr. Reuter assured the President.

## U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Implementation of Cooperative Space Program

### NASA ANNOUNCEMENT

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration announced on August 16 that NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. have given final approval to a Memorandum of Understanding which provides for implementing a cooperative space agreement reached in Geneva in June 1962.<sup>1</sup>

The memorandum outlines procedures to be followed for carrying out a coordinated weather satellite program, joint experiments with communications using a passive reflector satellite (Echo II), and joint contributions of satellite data to the World Magnetic Survey to be conducted in 1965.

Basic to the coordinated meteorological satellite program is the scheduled establishment by early 1964 of a full-time telecommunications link between Washington and Moscow for the transmission of cloud photographs and other data from experimental meteorological satellites operated by each country. The memorandum provides that other countries may receive such information from this link on a cost-sharing basis. Ultimately, this program is to involve coordinated launchings of operational meteorological satellites.

The experiments with the Echo II passive communications satellite will involve transmissions between the Zemenki Observatory of the Gorky State University in the Soviet Union and the Jodrell Bank Observatory of the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom at frequencies of 162 megacycles/second. Scheduled for early 1964, these experiments will include transmissions from the United States to the

Soviet Union, using conventional facilities for that part of the link between the United States and England.

In the magnetic field survey each country will launch a specialized satellite equipped to measure the earth's magnetic field. This effort will supplement the various ground, sea, and aerial measurements undertaken internationally during the World Magnetic Survey. Results will be exchanged and compared in order to obtain the most authoritative expression of the geomagnetic field.

The bilateral space program stems from an exchange of views between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on cooperation in space activities following the successful orbital flight of American Astronaut John H. Glenn in February 1962.<sup>2</sup>

The principal scientific negotiators have been Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, and Anatoly A. Blagonravov, Chairman of the Commission on Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

The Memorandum of Understanding was drafted at meetings between American and Soviet scientists at Rome in March and at Geneva in May of this year, subject to review by NASA and the Soviet Academy.

In response to a letter of July 8 from Dr. Dryden, Academician Blagonravov on August 1, indicated Soviet readiness to proceed with implementation of the three coordinated programs in accordance with the provisions of the memorandum, which is considered to have entered into force as of that date.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1962, p. 963.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411.

## EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

### Academician Blagonravov to Dr. Dryden

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR  
COMMISSION ON EXPLORATION AND  
UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE  
Moscow, August 1, 1963

No. 119-642-0

DEAR DR. DRYDEN: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR has instructed me to inform you of its consent to the recommendations on the questions of implementing the bilateral agreement on outer space between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which were presented during the Soviet-American talks on the peaceful exploration of outer space on March 20, 1963 in Rome, taking into account Section IV of the text of recommendations (magnetic survey with the aid of artificial satellites), which were prepared on May 24, 1963 at Geneva.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR expresses its hope that the agreement on peaceful exploration and utilization of outer space which has been reached, will promote further cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in this worthy cause in the name of scientific progress and the strengthening of peace on Earth.

Respectfully,

A. A. BLAGONRAVOV,  
*Chairman of the Commission,  
Academician*

To Dr. HUGH L. DRYDEN,  
*Deputy Administrator of the National  
Aeronautics and Space Administration,  
Washington 25, D.C.*

### Dr. Dryden to Academician Blagonravov

JULY 8, 1963

Academician A. A. BLAGONRAVOV  
*Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.  
Leninski Prospekt 14  
Moscow, U.S.S.R.*

DEAR ACADEMICIAN BLAGONRAVOV: In my letter of May 7, 1963,<sup>1</sup> I indicated that NASA had no changes to propose concerning the text of the "First Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1963 between the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the U.S." agreed to by us in Rome on March 20 of this year. It is now my pleasure to inform you similarly with regard to the text of the mutual understandings reached by us in Geneva on May 24 concerning the new Section IV, "Magnetic Field Survey Through the Use of Artificial Satellites."

I propose, therefore, that the First Memorandum

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

of Understanding, incorporating the new Section IV, and the changes to Section IV also agreed to by us in Geneva on May 24, become effective as of the date of your response to this letter, confirming approval by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. I hope that by this time your Academy has already approved both the original Rome document and the subsequent Geneva text, and I shall look forward to hearing from you in this regard.

Sincerely yours,

HUGH L. DRYDEN  
*Deputy Administrator*

## MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

FIRST MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
TO IMPLEMENT THE BILATERAL SPACE  
AGREEMENT  
OF JUNE 8, 1962  
BETWEEN THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
OF THE USSR AND  
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE US

### I—PREAMBLE

The purpose of the present Memorandum of Understanding is to begin the implementation of the sections of the bilateral space agreement of June 8, 1962 dealing with a coordinated meteorological satellite program, world magnetic survey using satellites, and a passive communication satellite experiment. It also provides for future discussions by the scientists of both countries of scientific results obtained from deep space probes (Mariner II and Mars I).

### II—COORDINATED METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM

#### A. Exchange of Meteorological Satellite Data

The bilateral space agreement of June 8, 1962 provided that the exchange of meteorological satellite data between Moscow and Washington be of approximately equivalent interest to the two countries.

The following sections describe the data to be exchanged. It is agreed that, in general, the data exchange is to be completed within six hours of the observation time so that it will be useful in weather analysis and forecasting.

In all of the joint activities relating to meteorological satellites and exchange of meteorological data, the pertinent recommendations of the World Meteorological Organization shall be given due consideration.

#### 1. Cloud Photographs

##### a. Selection of Photographs

Cloud photographs will be exchanged; the selection of those to be transmitted will be based on the following criteria:

1. Areas of the earth having few conventional observations.
2. Pictures along active international air routes, particularly oceanic.

3. Pictures containing patterns of meteorological significance such as fronts, vortices, cloud bands and streets.

b. Accuracy of Location

1. Positions of identifiable cloud elements in the pictures will be located with an accuracy of about 200 km. Where landmarks are available, this accuracy should be about 100 km. It is expected that this accuracy will be improved later.
2. The pictures will include latitude and longitude grids at 2° intervals.

c. Brightness Levels

1. At the satellite receiving stations, six to ten brightness (gray) levels<sup>4</sup> will be contained in the pictures.
2. The pictures as received at the end of the communications link will contain five to six brightness levels, if possible.
3. To aid in the interpretation of cloud images, copies of some of the original pictures transmitted over the link will be mailed to the other country.

d. Resolution

1. The ground resolution provided by the pictures initially will be about 2.5 km and are expected to improve to about 1 km.

e. Field of View

1. The minimum field of view, on the earth's surface, of each picture will be about 1000 km on a side.

2. Nephanalyses

- a. Nephanalyses will be transmitted for all pictures received by the meteorological satellites.
- b. Wherever possible, format, representation, and map projections will follow World Meteorological Organization recommendations.
- c. Polar stereographic projection will be used, except in equatorial areas where Mercator projection will be used.
- d. A map scale of 1:20,000,000 or 1:15,000,000 will be used as convenient to the transmitting country.

3. Other Satellite Observations

As satellite observation techniques are developed to the point where they provide new useful information for weather forecasting, the data obtained will be considered for inclusion in this exchange program.

*B. Exchange of Techniques and Results of Scientific Research*

To assist in making maximum use of the satellite data in weather analysis and forecasting, there will be an exchange, on a basis of mutual interest, of techniques of interpretation and analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Brightness levels should be clearly distinguishable by eye, such as the ratio of the intensities of adjacent steps being equal to the square root of two. [Footnote in original.]

It is also desirable to exchange scientific literature and data for research purposes, and to organize cooperative symposia.

*C. Exchange of Conventional Meteorological Data*

The establishment of a facsimile quality communications link between Washington and Moscow for the exchange of satellite data provides an opportunity, when it is not being used for the transmission of satellite data, for the exchange of related data obtained by conventional means of observations, and related maps, which will allow for improved correlation between satellite and conventional observations. Each country will indicate which of these data, available in the other, it wishes to receive and determine the priority of transmission. Some details of the exchange of the conventional data are given in an appendix and others are expected to be clarified, as they arise, by an appropriate working group.

*D. Establishment of Communication Link*

With the understanding that the regular exchange of meteorological data obtained from meteorological satellites will commence in the beginning of the second half of 1964, NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR consider it desirable, in the beginning of the first half of 1964, to start the occasional exchange of conventional meteorological data and experimental satellite data and for this purpose to establish the communication link between Moscow and Washington provided in the agreement of June 8, 1962.

1. Characteristics of the Communication Link

The communication link shall be arranged on a four-wire basis, for full-time use, allowing simultaneous transmission of facsimile telegraphy information in both directions. Technical parameters of the communication link shall conform to the CCITT [Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique] series T recommendations.

The link shall be equipped for non-simultaneous voice use to allow technical and meteorological coordination as necessary.

2. Characteristics of Terminal Equipment

Terminal equipment used for transmission of weather maps and charts shall conform with WMO recommendation 10.6.17/I—"Standardization of International Meteorological Transmissions by Facsimile—Equipment Characteristics." The preferred index of cooperation will be 576. The drum speed shall be 60, 90, or 120 rpm, depending upon the results of the technical tests.

Additional requirements for the terminal equipment for transmitting information obtained from meteorological satellites shall be determined during 1963. Each party shall provide and operate its own terminal equipment.

3. Routing of Communication Link

The circuit for the link shall be routed Washington—New York—London or Paris—Berlin—Poland—Moscow, assuming first that ade-

quate facilities (circuits) are available over this route and second, that tests prove this routing to be technically acceptable to both NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Technical arrangements for those sections of the link from Washington to Berlin shall be made by NASA. Technical arrangements for those sections of the link from Berlin to Moscow shall be made by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Joint technical tests of the communication link along the selected route shall be conducted during January 1964, and after this the communication link will be put into regular operation.

#### 4. Cost of the Communication Link

NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall, within one month, agree upon a suitable mechanism for the handling of charges over the entire link in such a way as to provide for equal sharing of cost of the whole line by the two parties.

#### 5. Reception of Meteorological Data by Weather Services of Other Countries

The desire of Weather Services of other countries to bridge the line on a receive-only basis in order to obtain meteorological data for their own use will be welcomed with the condition that each such Weather Service will make a proportional contribution to the total expenses of the communication link.

#### 6. Coordination

NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall, within 60 days, designate representatives for continuing direct technical coordination of details concerning this link.

### E. Coordinated Launchings of Weather Satellites

The Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1962, provided, among other things, for the coordinated launching of operational weather satellites. It is considered desirable to initiate coordinated launchings of weather satellites towards the end of the experimental period in order to gain experience with such coordination and to provide for more frequent receipt and exchange of data of both experimental and operational value.

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR and NASA therefore agree to convene a suitable Joint Working Group by the end of 1963, so that arrangements may be made, consistent with the provisions of the June 8, 1962 agreement, for mutually agreeable launching schedules.

### III—ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSIVE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE EXPERIMENTS

#### A. General

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR agree to participate jointly in passive communications experiments using a large reflector satellite, Echo II, (referred to as Echo A-12" in the agreement of June 8, 1962),

which NASA is expected to launch prior to the middle of 1964.

#### B. Satellite Characteristics

The satellite to be used in these experiments shall be approximately 44 meters in diameter and shall be constructed of a material having a radio wave reflectivity of 98%. It will carry two telemetry transmitters (approximately 136 mc/s) to be used as tracking aids. The intended orbit will be inclined about 82° to the equator and will be roughly circular at an altitude of 1290 km.

#### C. Frequencies and Route

Communications experiments shall be carried out at frequencies of approximately 162 mc/s between the USSR (Zemenki Observatory, Gorky State University) and the United Kingdom (Jodrell Bank Observatory, University of Manchester).

In view of the technical desirability of carrying out communication experiments with a passive satellite using higher frequencies, NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall consider, within three months following the date of this agreement, the possibility of extending these tests into the microwave region of the radio frequency spectrum. The possibility of arranging radar and optical observations of the Echo II satellite sphere during the period of its inflation and thereafter shall be considered within the same period.

#### D. Arrangements

The Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall make necessary arrangements for use of the Gorky State University facilities. NASA shall make necessary arrangements for the use of the facilities of the University of Manchester at Jodrell Bank. Within sixty days NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall appoint representatives to begin and carry on continuing technical coordination with respect to the experiments at approximately 162 mc/s. NASA will request the appointment of a corresponding technical representative of the University of Manchester.

In case the question of using higher frequencies for carrying out the passive satellite experiments is settled positively, NASA shall arrange, through the General Post Office of the United Kingdom, for the use of the Goonhilly Downs Station and shall request that technical representatives also be appointed by the General Post Office. The technical representatives for NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also serve to carry on continuing technical coordination for these experiments or other representatives may be named for this purpose.

It is understood that there will be no mutual money reimbursements between NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for the use of any facilities.

#### E. Orbital Information

NASA shall provide a prediction of the expected initial orbital elements at least two months prior to

launching of the satellite. Actual orbital elements based on tracking information will be supplied for the duration of the experimental period, at intervals of approximately once per week, or as necessary for adequate pointing of the communication antennas. The Academy of Sciences of the USSR shall provide tracking data on orbits that are visible in the USSR but not in the USA in a form to be mutually agreed on by the technical representatives.

#### F. Planned Types of Transmission

The passive Echo II satellite experiments shall basically consist of measurements of the quality of transmission over the circuit between the USSR and the UK for the following kinds of transmissions:

- (a) Unmodulated carrier
- (b) Single frequency modulation
- (c) Telegraphy
- (d) Facsimile and voice if feasible.

It shall also be an objective of these experiments to test the feasibility of direct communication between the US and the USSR using the Echo II satellite as a part of the link. For this purpose NASA will arrange for the part of the link from the US to the UK.

#### G. Exchange of Observational Data

The results of the experiments and observations shall be promptly exchanged between NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and be made generally available to the scientific and technical community. Information about the equipment used for the experiments shall be exchanged to the extent necessary for the interpretation of these data.

#### H. Future Plans

NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR will continue experimental research with active communications satellites under their national programs; after the completion of preliminary national tests, negotiations will be continued to discuss the possibility of joint experiments of mutual interest with active communications satellites.

### IV—MAGNETIC FIELD SURVEY THROUGH THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES

#### 1. Objectives

It shall be the aim of the cooperative effort at this stage to produce a mapping of the earth's magnetic field by using US and USSR Satellites flown during the International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY).

#### 2. Satellite Orbits

The forms of orbits, their altitudes and inclination to the equator will be selected by the satellite-launching country, in accordance with the objective of the experiment. It is agreed that the accuracy of determining space and time coordinates for the separate magnetic measurements on the satellite be such that after necessary processing by the satellite-launching country the magnetic data would not contain errors greater than plus or minus 10 gammas.

#### 3. Times of Satellite Launchings

The times of satellite launchings will be determined by the satellite-launching country and will take place during the IQSY. It is recommended that launchings take place in 1965 since one may expect, in 1965, that the ground-based magnetic observatory programs of all countries participating in the IQSY will be in full operation.

#### 4. Lifetime of Satellites

It is agreed that the lifetime of each satellite be such that the minimum density of magnetic measurements from each satellite correspond to no less than one per 200 kilometer square on the earth's surface.

#### 5. Satellite Apparatus

It is agreed that absolute magnetometers of various types be used, such as optical pumping and proton precession magnetometers. It is recommended that the sensitive elements of magnetometers be located on the satellites in such a way as to minimize the effects of magnetic fields from the spacecraft.

#### 6. Time Variation Corrections

With a view towards the desirability of working out a common method of introducing time variation corrections into the results of observations from satellites, it is agreed that each side conduct research in this direction and exchange results with the other side. The following possibilities should be considered:

- a. Comparison of satellite magnetic measurements taken at different times but corresponding to the same region of space within a diameter of 10-20 kilometers;
- b. Comparison between experimental data obtained from satellites with those from ground-based magnetic observatories.

For the compilation of a magnetic map it is agreed that the results of satellite measurements made on magnetically quiet days be utilized.

In connection with the above, an exchange is recommended between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the NASA of the USA, namely: microfilm copies of magnetograms and tables of hourly averages of magnetic elements. In addition, copies of magnetograms shall be accompanied by data on the preliminary base line values, scale values, temperature coefficients, and types of instruments.

It is agreed that these data be exchanged no later than three months after the month of observation from the following observatories:

USSR	USA
Yakutsk	Sitka
Sverdlovsk	College [Alaska]
Irkutsk	Fredericksburg
Odessa	Tucson
Tashkent	San Juan
	Guam

It is agreed that the final base line values be exchanged on a quarterly basis.

### 7. Exchange of Satellite Magnetic Measurements

It is agreed to exchange results of magnetic measurements from satellites in the form of scientific articles or reports containing information on the satellite equipment, the data, its accuracy, methods of processing, introduced corrections, and estimates of the accuracy achieved judged necessary by the authors of the experiment.

It is agreed that each side if necessary will furnish by mail to the other side any additional data which may help to clarify the questions which arise in the use of the data received by exchange to remove the difficulties in utilization of those data.

### 8. Exchange of Data from Magnetic Surveys of Other Types

It is agreed to exchange comparable amounts of data from magnetic surveys which may be necessary for the compilation of a magnetic map and which are made without using satellites (ground, sea, aerial surveys) in the form of maps or of reports with attachments giving the results of surveys in tabular form, indicating coordinates and the times to which these data refer.

### 9. International Cooperation

It is agreed that appropriate organizations under the International Council of Scientific Unions, including the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics and COSPAR, concerned with the World Magnetic Survey be kept informed of the proposed joint US-USSR contributions to the World Magnetic Survey and of analysis of the results. Scientific data resulting from this work which is suitable for storage and dissemination through the World Data Centers will be supplied in a timely way.

#### V—OTHER QUESTIONS OF COOPERATION

Representatives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and NASA consider it to be useful for further progress in the space sciences to exchange scientific data received as a result of the launching in the USSR of an automatic space station towards the planet of Mars and the launching in the USA of a space station towards the planet of Venus. For this purpose it is desirable to conduct meetings of scientists of the two countries to discuss the results of those experiments in outer space. The preliminary discussion of these questions will be held during the next meeting of COSPAR in June 1963 in Warsaw. Additional meetings may be arranged at a later date, dependent on progress in analyzing the data received from "Mars I" and "Mariner II" by the scientists of both countries.

#### VI—EFFECTIVE DATE

The recommendations proposed in the present document have a preliminary character and will be presented by both parties to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the US for final consideration. If

either of the two parties finds it necessary to make any corrections, additions, or deletions in the text of the prepared documents, then all of these changes should be made in the shortest possible time after the conclusion of discussions concerning the conduct of a world magnetic survey by means of artificial satellites, by correspondence, which will be sent to the following address in Moscow:

Academy of Sciences of the USSR:  
Leninski Prospekt 14  
Moscow  
USSR

and to the following address in Washington:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
Attention: Dr. Hugh L. Dryden  
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.  
Washington 25, D.C.  
U.S.A.

If in this final consideration there is failure to agree on any of the three major areas, the recommendations in the other major areas will continue in effect.

ROME, ITALY AND GENEVA, SWITZERLAND  
March 20 and May 24, 1963

#### APPENDIX

##### EXCHANGE OF CONVENTIONAL METEOROLOGICAL DATA

##### A. Types of Conventional Data

##### 1. Computer Processed and Checked Upper Air Data

a. It is not anticipated that all conventional data would be processed and transmitted but rather the data for a few selected upper air levels that are particularly significant for analysis and forecasting. Criteria for the extent of this kind of data exchange would be based on the following:

1. Limited to these stations from which the original upper air reports are received within three to four hours at Moscow or Washington. (This amounts to a "Regional" collection.)
2. Original reports will be subjected to rapid computer processing in order to eliminate and/or correct erroneous reports and to arrange the data in a convenient and systematic form for transmission.
3. The upper air levels useful for numerical weather prediction are 1000 mb, 850 mb, 700 mb, 500 mb, 300 mb, and 200 mb.
4. At the levels indicated above, the following data will be transmitted: temperature, geopotential height, dew point and wind.
5. The areas and network of stations for which the data are to be transmitted will be determined later.

##### 2. Conventional Weather Charts

Charts prepared by objective numerical techniques in graphical form should receive priority for exchange

on the communications link. The types of charts that would contribute to improved world weather analyses and predictions are:

- a. Northern Hemispheric analyses of the 1000 mb and several upper air levels such as the 500 mb, 300 mb, and 200 mb levels.
- b. Northern Hemispheric predictions for 24 hours with the possibility of extending the period of forecast to 72 hours in the future, for 500, 300, and 200 mb.
- c. It is desirable in the future to exchange extended period forecasts of five days or longer and a selection of the important working charts or diagrams that may be used in generating these forecasts.
- d. In order to coordinate satellite and conventional observations associated with important weather developments, available detailed analyses and satellite photographs for specific areas will be transmitted on request as soon as possible.

### 3. *Timing and Frequency of Exchanges*

To be of maximum operational value, all information should be submitted as early as practical. Suggested items are:

- a. Processed upper air data within 4-5 hours of observation (twice per day).
- b. Analyses within six hours of observation (twice per day).
- c. Prognoses within 6-9 hours of observation (twice per day).

### 4. *Map Scales and Projections*

- a. Polar stereographic projections will be used for all chart exchanges.
- b. Analysis and prognostic charts having a scale of 1:30 million or 1:40 million will be used.
- c. Special charts exchanged on request would be on scales most convenient for the transmitting country.

## U.S. Signs Exchange Agreements With Afghanistan and Argentina

### Afghanistan

Press release 437 dated August 24

Afghanistan and the United States on August 20 signed an educational exchange agreement under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act).

The agreement was signed at Kabul by Ali Ahmad Popal, Minister of Education, and by John M. Steeves, American Ambassador. Under the terms of the agreement \$500,000 in U.S.-

owned foreign currency will be used for exchanges over the next 5 years.

### Argentina

Press release 438 dated August 24

The Governments of Argentina and the United States on August 21 signed at Buenos Aires a new agreement putting into operation a broader program of educational exchanges under the Fulbright-Hays Act. This agreement will enlarge the scope of exchange activities between the two countries initiated under the Fulbright Act in November 1956.<sup>1</sup>

Under this program, administered in Argentina by the binational Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Argentina, approximately 25 U.S. citizens and 78 Argentine nationals—professors, research scholars, teachers, and students—received grants in 1963. The grantees were in such fields as economics, American and Argentine studies, teacher education, and the physical and natural sciences. During the period 1957-63 a total of 275 Argentine nationals and 101 Americans were awarded grants under this binational educational exchange program.

While this program dates only from 1956, the two Governments have cooperated in educational exchange programs since 1940. Almost a century ago President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento of Argentina, a friend and former student of Horace Mann, inaugurated one of the first cultural exchanges with Latin America when he invited American teachers to Argentina to assist in the establishment there of normal schools for teacher training.

## Letters of Credence

### *Afghanistan*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Afghanistan, Abdul Majid, presented his credentials to President Kennedy on August 21. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 434 dated August 21.

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3657.

## Education: Passkey to the Future

*Statement by Lucius D. Battle*

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

It is a great pleasure to me personally, as well as a high privilege and honor on behalf of my delegation, to participate in this meeting of ministers of education of the member nations of the Organization of American States.

We are here for a time of accounting, of stock-taking, and of looking ahead. We have reached a stage which the conferees at Punta del Este wisely envisaged when they asked that this meeting follow the one at Santiago.<sup>2</sup>

Our combined and cooperative efforts in the education, science, and culture sector of the Alliance for Progress have already produced forward movement. We can approach the second anniversary of Punta del Este later this month with a measured optimism on the course our joint endeavor is taking.

Both the meetings at Punta del Este and at Santiago provided historic statements of our common aims and purposes in educational development and of our common commitments to target goals for this decade. But we now need to know in more detailed terms what we have done so far to move this sector of our *Alianza* forward and what concrete action steps we feel can now be taken to accelerate our progress toward our goals.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Third Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education of the Organization of American States at Bogotá, Colombia, on Aug. 4. Mr. Battle was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting held at Bogotá Aug. 4-10.

<sup>2</sup> Conference on Education and Economic and Social Development in Latin America, held in March 1962 at Santiago, Chile.

This approach will lead us at Bogotá to deliberations directed primarily to what needs to be done. For my delegation let me say that we welcome this context for these deliberations. In this way only can we focus our efforts more sharply toward the great ends we all seek.

I would like now to turn to our own review of the 2 years since Punta del Este.

This presentation is in two parts. One is what we have done as a partner in the alliance toward fulfillment of the goals outlined at Santiago. The second part presents some highlights of our own domestic educational effort, which is not without its own problems and difficulties.

### Priority of Educational Development

First, let me speak briefly of the general context—the Alliance for Progress—in which our presentation is made. On March 13, 1961, President Kennedy, speaking at the White House before Latin American diplomats, Members of Congress, and their wives, proposed a vast cooperative undertaking by the nations of the Americas for a decade of democratic development.<sup>3</sup> Twenty of the 21 American Republics joined together at Punta del Este to make possible this great endeavor.<sup>4</sup>

Education, science, and culture were given a high place in the earliest concept of the alliance.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

<sup>4</sup> For background and text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

## President Sends Message to Bogota Meeting of Ministers of Education

*Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy to the Third Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education of the Organization of American States, held at Bogota, Colombia, August 4-10. The President's message was read at the inaugural session by the chairman of the conference, Pedro Gómez Valderrama, Minister of Education of Colombia.*

White House press release dated August 5

On behalf of the Government and the people of the United States, and on my own personal behalf, I have great pleasure in sending greetings and good wishes to the delegates to the Third Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education, assembled at Bogotá.

Your meeting represents yet another step along the road of inter-American development that began with the Act of Bogotá in 1960 and received further impetus at Punta del Este in 1961 and Santiago in 1962. In meetings such as these positive measures can be taken to advance the great goals of our common commitment in the Alliance for Progress. Education and the development of human resources are of the utmost importance in attaining these goals, for they lie at the base of economic and social development and, accordingly, at the base of the alliance itself.

Today, more than ever before, education is a prerequisite for progress and it is the passkey to the future. We therefore applaud and encourage the increasing emphasis on education to which you are committed and your efforts to translate into concrete form the goal of wider educational opportunities for all.

With you I share the determination that before this decade comes to a close the Americas will have entered upon a new era, where the progress of the *Alianza* will truly reflect the great spiritual and cultural heritage of this hemisphere.

In your deliberations and high endeavors, I wish you every success.

Five of the ten points of the President's proposal made specific reference to education, to science and science teaching, and to cultural exchange and development. Their central place in the *Alianza* has become increasingly evident through the meetings at Punta del Este and at Santiago. There has been a widening realization in all our countries that education lies at the base of economic and social development.

Accordingly my Government has given highest priority attention to educational development in the alliance. This has not always been translatable into dollars; nor do the totals of authorized dollars for educational projects normally equal those going into programs with higher basic costs, such as major construction projects. But the totals themselves already give substantial evidence of the forward movement we see developing.

Let us now look at the record. First, briefly, for the alliance as a whole.

In each of the 2 fiscal years since July 1, 1961, the United States has authorized over \$1 billion toward the objectives of the alliance. In the first year the Latin American countries provided nearly \$8 billion. In 1963 U.S. authorizations are being increasingly translated into such terms as classrooms, books, and assistance to school nutrition programs.

Let us now look at the rate of U.S. educational, scientific, and cultural investment in the alliance. The U.S. Government made available \$120 million in loans and grants in the fiscal year just concluded, many times the total of such assistance in previous years and considerably higher than the \$83 million made available in the immediately preceding year. The \$120 million total includes exchange programs, book programs, school nutrition programs, and other activities of such agencies as the Peace Corps, National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation, among others.

### Highlights of U.S. Aid Program

In more detailed terms, let me present now some highlights of our work, in cooperation with Latin American governments and institutions, in the light of the commitments made by the U.S. delegation at Santiago in March 1962.

Last year we sponsored participants from 14 countries and two professors from the United States for the first program in Latin American educational planning, at the ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America] Institute in Santiago. On July 8 a second course was inaugurated in Santiago, with 38 students from 16 countries, 25 of them under our sponsorship. We have given greatly increased attention to manpower planning within our \$2 million an-

nual program, which now supports general planning and training activities in various Latin American countries. In order to provide more and better prepared public administrators, our Government is also giving assistance to university-level public administration institutions in five countries and to inservice public administration training efforts in seven countries. At the same time it is offering wider fellowship opportunities for administrators on the U.S. mainland and in Puerto Rico. This has all been in response to the first and perhaps most critical problem area—relating to educational planning and administration—as seen by the U.S. delegation at Santiago.

We have also sought to give significant support to the acceleration of school construction programs. Since July 1961, the United States Government has helped finance the construction of more than 8,000 primary schoolrooms in Latin America and has made available funds to finance an additional 10,000 under a total loan and grant program which has exceeded \$50 million. We are cooperating with UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], the Government of Mexico, and others in regard to a proposed regional school building center.

A third important program relates to expanding and strengthening teacher training, to which we have devoted \$2.5 million in nine countries during the past fiscal year as well as \$500,000 for training more than 100 Latin American teachers at bilingual centers in five U.S. universities.

In order to assist the development of university centers of excellence we are supporting a \$30 million university-to-university program linking more than 50 U.S. universities and 60 Latin American institutions. Efforts are concentrated upon building outstanding faculties in the critical developmental fields, such as engineering, agriculture, science and education, and administration. For example, we are working with the Higher Education Council in Central America (CSUCA) for this purpose and have under active consideration, together with other multilateral agencies and U.S. foundations, important programs to strengthen leading agricultural centers at Chapingo, Mexico, and La Molina, Peru.

In science teaching our efforts include support of 10 contracts at the university level exclusively in this field and several more which are related. These efforts are directed toward improving both university-level and secondary teaching. A new program to be coordinated by the National Science Foundation has just been launched at a cost of \$900,000 to train secondary teachers, to provide teaching materials, and strengthen curricula in science and mathematics throughout Latin America. This program supplements an earlier effort in Central America.

In a major joint effort under the alliance, our Food for Peace program is now bringing nutritional benefits to one out of four school children in Latin America. Within not too many months it is hoped that almost half the Latin American school population can be reached with this program. Other assistance to students has included local secondary and university scholarship programs in several countries.

In terms of people served, perhaps the most dramatic of the enlarged efforts of the U.S. Government in support of Latin American educational development has been that of providing textbooks. Eight hundred and fifty thousand first and second grade readers have been distributed to Central American school children within the past few months. Work is under way to make possible the preparation of a core series of materials which will be available for the full six grades in Central America, with the expectation that 1,500,000 copies will be in the hands of Central American students by June of next year. A center to provide similar services to several South American countries is being planned for inauguration next year in Lima.

Through a \$1 million annual program, increased numbers of Spanish- and Portuguese-language textbooks and technical publications subsidized by the Agency for International Development (AID) are being published now in Mexico and soon will be in Buenos Aires. We have supported the production of science books and the distribution of scholarly journals in fields of technical interest. Free books are available to member libraries of the U.S. Book Exchange, and the U.S. Information Agency is providing thousands of books in Spanish and Portuguese translation to libraries throughout

Latin America in a program involving \$1.4 million annually.

Experimental and far-reaching programs of rural and urban education have received more than \$21 million in support from the U.S. Government in the past 2 years, including literacy and fundamental education efforts, experimental use of radio and TV, and vocational education projects, among other activities.

In the field of educational and cultural interchange under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, the Department of State has increased the level of exchange and other programs to \$8 million annually. More than 2,500 persons from both Latin America and the United States participated in these programs this past year. Forty-two community-sponsored binational schools in Latin America are also receiving support.

Projects and interests related to the alliance, including the exchange of professors, teachers, and students, have received priority in this general program. Through the AID participant training program, 1,600 Latin Americans had project-related visits to the continental United States and to Puerto Rico, and an additional number received grants to go to so-called third countries for similar observation and study. For the first 6 months of the past fiscal year, there were 1,200 such AID participants, indicating expansion in this activity. During the next year the cultural presentations program will bring to Latin America performing arts groups such as the Robert Shaw Chorale, the University of Illinois Symphony Orchestra, and the Roger Wagner Chorale.

These are only highlights of a more detailed summary which we have prepared and which I am asking the secretariat to distribute as an annex to this statement.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Educational Challenges and Problems in U.S.**

The second part of our presentation is a highlight summary of the status of our own domestic educational establishment, of the educational challenges and problems we face at home. As you can appreciate, our domestic requirements have a direct bearing on our overseas capabilities.

First of all, let me trace briefly the history

<sup>5</sup> Not printed here.

and character of our educational system. From the earliest founding days, the people of the United States have reflected a deep faith in education. Within the framework of our Federal system, this has led to both State and national functions and, arising from our form of society, to a general system marked by a pluralism or diversity of types of institutions and sources of support. The power to provide a system of education is, however, one of the powers reserved under our Constitution to the individual States. Because of the nature of our Federal system, States and local communities have therefore over the years become our principal planning units. We have not, however, hesitated to recognize at the Federal level the need for assistance to national educational planning desired by countries at early or evolving stages of national growth.

With all our concern for more than two centuries with our own educational development and with the introduction of new techniques, we find much in the system in the United States which today needs strengthening and improving—much which needs revision and reform. One specific area, as you know, is racial discrimination as it affects equal educational opportunity, a problem on which we are making a steady attack.

Major areas where Federal action on general education problems is urgently needed are set forth in detail in the President's message to our Congress earlier this year. Anyone studying this document and the report of the OAS [Organization of American States] Task Force on Educational Needs in Latin America<sup>6</sup> will be struck at once by the number of problems all of us share. They may be formulated somewhat differently, they may vary in scale or be seen from different standpoints, but they present many common characteristics.

We are therefore aware of your problems because we have such problems too. We are also seeking ways of meeting these problems.

<sup>6</sup> Final Report of the Special Commission for the Programming and Development of Education, Science and Culture in Latin America (OAS Doc. 6 (English)). Requests for copies may be addressed to Documentation Service, Division of Education, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 20006.

### **Shortage of Teachers**

Let us take, for example, the matter of teachers—a problem we clearly have in common. We, too, have a shortage of teachers and are seeking in every way possible to encourage a greater flow of qualified persons into this profession. We have a need in the United States for more and better qualified teachers if we are to raise the quality of elementary and secondary education. The Congress is now considering a proposal which we believe will make it possible to attract to the teaching profession, and retain, teachers of the highest ability.

Basic to the proposal would be measures to raise the quality of instruction in teacher education programs, both preservice and inservice, by improving the standards, intellectual content, and organization of courses and curricula. These measures would be accompanied by others to raise teacher salary scales in order to bring them into line with those prevailing in other professions requiring a similar length of preparation. Attracting and holding the ablest teachers also points to the need to reduce class size and relieve teaching overload.

### **Adult and Vocational Education**

Another educational problem we share has to do with adult education and vocational education.

In a world of rapid technological, social, and economic change the need for the whole citizenry to be literate is very great. Even though we have one of the highest educational levels of any country, it is of real concern to us in the United States that out of a total population of nearly 200 million we still have some 23 million persons 18 years and older who have completed less than 8 years of schooling, and 8 million adults aged 25 and older who have completed less than 5 years of schooling. Without a basic foundation of reading, writing, and arithmetic it is becoming increasingly difficult in today's world to be self-sustaining. Studies have been undertaken which show that it is among these millions of undereducated that the greatest percentage of unemployment is to be found—and consequently the largest number of persons supported by public welfare funds. To avoid de-

pendency, adults with limited education must work, but in many instances their basic preparation is so meager that on-the-job training in many fields becomes itself a problem.

The adult basic education bill which is presently before our Congress would make possible better instruction and increased research in adult learning processes, as well as demonstrations and pilot projects from which other programs may take inspiration. There is a close link between the efforts to provide basic education to adults and to extend opportunities for vocational education. Technological advances, shifts in market demands, and other economic changes have altered patterns of employment and thrown many individuals out of work. Increasingly, job opportunities are to be found in work requiring good educational background and specialized skills.

We recognize the need to strengthen vocational education programs, for vocational education has as its purpose the training of people to earn a living. It interweaves with general basic education a specialized education that permits individuals to be self-supporting, contributing members of their communities. Strong vocational programs related to manpower needs can do much to reduce long-term unemployment and the danger of delinquency among out-of-school youth. Success of such programs depends in no small degree upon acceptance by the academic community of vocational education as a vital part of education—as that part, in fact, which may have the greatest potential for relieving some of the social and economic burdens which confront our communities today.

Another common need we share is wider access to books and information.

These are only a small number of the educational areas in which we are all seeking improvement and greater strength.

To cope with these and other areas of education which require improvement or expansion in the United States, the Federal Government has proposed a variety of assistance through loans, grants, and scholarships. In many cases the assistance from Federal funds is only a small portion of the total sums required. Federal financing of education in the United States is about 4½ percent of the total expended, while

the States provide 39 percent, and local sources 56½ percent. Thus the aid from the Federal Government serves as a catalytic agent only, and the major responsibility and authority do, as I indicated earlier, rest with the States and local education bodies.

The status of education in the United States was the subject of recent testimony by U.S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, a member of this delegation. He told a Senate committee in June, at hearings on the National Education Improvement Act of 1963, that:

The challenges that confront us today are the results of rapid changes that have taken place . . . in the last few decades, and even the last few months. The need for more and better education grows increasingly apparent with every fresh breakthrough in research and technology, with every social and economic change, with every new international development. As a result, our progress in education has become a matter of deep concern . . . to every State, community and crossroads in America.

#### **Report of OAS Task Force**

The new requirements and opportunities of a changing world have put the problems of education high on the agenda for us all.

These problems take form in the OAS task force's particularized statement of educational needs, over an entire continent, and in the consultations and commitments already undertaken both through governments and through non-governmental sources of external aid. Guided by the excellent report of the task force, we come now to a consideration of the next steps we should take.

The task force report provides us with abundant and detailed data illustrative of needs and of potentials. In this way the report encourages a healthy confrontation of potential and performance. It encourages us to get into the *specifics* of our problem.

We must, I believe, talk in specific terms if we are to meet the opportunities this conference provides. We need to be specific about what we have done, what we feel we can do, what we want to do, and how we feel we can best do it. I have long been persuaded that real progress in such meetings cannot be made without a close concern for the concrete facts of the matters we are discussing.

We will all have questions to ask—stimulat-

ing ones, I am sure—looking both to the past and to the present. Although we are not met here to negotiate agreements, we are met to consult freely. In this broad consultative framework we can usefully advance the progress of the alliance at this stage.

Our purposes, then, are to take stock of what we have done and to find ways to get on with the job. In more expanded terms, we anticipate valuable results from discussions of such priority subjects as the need for national development planning, with educational development planning as a central component; of new educational techniques that can be put into the service of national and regional plans; of new steps to improve the administrative organization of educational staffs, and their capacity to deal effectively with new programs.

Educational planning as a component of national development planning is relatively new, not only in Latin America but in other parts of the world as well. As a matter of fact, the economic theory underlying our present concepts of human resource development—that value is added by investment in education—has opened a relatively new academic field.

#### **Plotting the Forward Course**

Let me say a few words as to where we may expect to go from here. Only the OAS member states can decide this course—by their individual actions. The key decisions that will plot the forward course for the total effort will be made in your legislative and executive chambers, and progress will be most marked where educational planning programs are adopted and instituted; where educational administrative machinery is reviewed and improved in the light of new and larger demands upon it; where larger proportions of internal resources are budgeted for educational development; and where well-supported plans are put forward to enlist external aid from any of the multiple sources, public and private.

These are the kinds of forces that assure forward movement. In this connection a review of the record of accomplishment with respect to the 25 immediate action projects as outlined in the task force report will reveal that a great deal has already been done. Here

we have a group of projects, largely regional ones, on which valuable consultative and cooperative experience has already been obtained by a number of states.

But there is much more to be done. And, as the task force report states, "Nothing can replace the continuous, methodical, and effectively channeled efforts that each country will have to make to achieve its objectives."

I will refer only briefly to our strong belief that the existing OAS structure for educational matters should be adapted to meet the growing demands and opportunities of the alliance. It is our view that the Inter-American Cultural Council should henceforth meet at the ministerial level, biennially rather than annually, to review and evaluate developments in the *Alianza* in this field and to prepare a report for the consideration of IA-ECOSOC [Inter-American Economic and Social Council]. With this report IA-ECOSOC would have the views of the competent technical organ of OAS in the annual review of the economic and social progress of the hemisphere assigned to IA-ECOSOC by the Charter of Punta del Este.

Further, we would favor IACC's assigning wider review and evaluation functions to a reconstituted and revitalized Cultural Action Committee composed of outstanding figures in education, science, and culture. A strengthening of the OAS secretariat to assist such matters would also seem to fall within the scope of the improved institutional machinery we now need.

We can all take satisfaction, I think, in the scope and magnitude of the concepts of educational development in Latin America which were affirmed at Punta del Este and at Santiago. Historians can only say, I believe, that ours was no timid generation that saw in the decade of the 1960's opportunity for a truly historic Decade of Development. This opportunity has been seen and acted upon, to be sure, in wider zones than Latin America alone. The United Nations has proclaimed the 1960's a Decade of Development. A revolution of rising expectations now reaches around the world—a revolution which has, we may note, spiritual antecedents of a century and more ago in both the Americas. Perhaps I need only mention that

Simón Bolívar and Thomas Jefferson were contemporaries in time and colleagues in spirit.

The name of Bolívar, so honored in this city and this continent, suggests a brief historical footnote I would like to add. As you may know, the Liberator's nephew and adopted son, Fernando Simón Bolívar, attended the University of Virginia in my country—with full parental consent—as a result of his deep admiration for its founder, Thomas Jefferson.

I cite this brief note because it suggests the unique way in which educational and cultural relations so often enable us to see the strong and enduring ties of spirit between nations and between peoples.

These ties with Latin America are multiplied today through exchanges and other activities which provide a two-way street, enabling us to know more about the peoples of your countries and the cultural values they have created.

These are values our *Alianza* seeks to preserve and enhance. In our educational, scientific, and cultural activities we move not only toward greater economic and social development. But through it, and beyond it, we seek greater opportunity for men to share in the fulfillment of their most deeply felt human needs—for cultural self-expression, for spiritual creativeness, for full participation in the great democratic freedoms open to all men. These great goals, too, are on the agenda of our alliance.

It is most appropriate that we should be meeting for these purposes in Bogotá, which has been the site of so many high endeavors and undertakings in the development of the inter-American system. I should like to recall that the Charter of the OAS itself was signed here, just a little more than 15 years ago, in the *Quinta de Bolívar*.

In closing, may I express the simple hope that we may come at the end of these deliberations to a declaration of substance and of meaning and in consonance with the spirit of those of Punta del Este and Santiago. In it we will have the opportunity to affirm, by forward-looking actions taken, that education is, indeed, as President Kennedy has said, the "passkey to the future" we all want for our countries and for their oncoming generations.

## Thomas McGinty To Head OECD Food and Agriculture Information

The appointment of Thomas F. McGinty, information officer in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to head the Food and Agriculture Technical Information Service of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was announced jointly on August 23 by the Department of State (press release 435) and the Department of Agriculture.

Mr. McGinty will have general responsibility for agricultural information activities, including eight language editions of the *FATIS Review*, the OECD journal of international agriculture and food.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

*Ratification deposited:* Lebanon, August 1, 1963.

#### Narcotics

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5273

*Ratification deposited:* Turkey, July 15, 1963.

#### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures affixed at Washington:* Federal Republic of Germany, Somali Republic, August 19, 1963; Kuwait, August 20, 1963; El Salvador, August 21, 1963; Ceylon, August 22, 1963; China, Indonesia, Mal, Peru, August 23, 1963.

#### Trade

Tenth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Japan and New Zealand). Done at Geneva January 28, 1963.

*Signatures:* Japan, New Zealand, July 29, 1963.  
*Entered into force:* August 15, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

### BILATERAL

#### Colombia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of June 23, 1955, April 16, 1957, as amended, and March 14, 1958, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 14, 1963. Entered into force August 14, 1963.

#### Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5208, 5375, 5388). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul August 16, 1963. Entered into force August 16, 1963.

#### Mexico

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of August 15, 1960 (TIAS 4675). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico August 14, 1963. Entered into force provisionally August 15, 1963, and definitively upon receipt by the United States of notification from Mexico that it has been approved by the Senate of the Republic.

#### Switzerland

Agreement relating to the effectiveness of United States schedules to the trade agreement of January 9, 1936, and supplementary trade agreement of June 8, 1955. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern July 10 and 11, 1963. Entered into force July 11, 1963.

#### United Arab Republic

Agreement providing for the abolition of nonimmigrant visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 3 and August 1, 1963. Entered into force August 1, 1963.

### PUBLICATIONS

#### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.*

**Arbitration—Air Transport Services.** Compromise with France, relating to the agreement of March 27, 1946, as amended—Signed at Paris January 22, 1963. Entered into force January 22, 1963. TIAS 5280. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Deposit of Philippine Pesos.** Agreement with the Philippines, relating to the agreement of November 24, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila August 14 and September 5, 1962. Entered into force September 5, 1962. TIAS 5281. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with China, amending the agreement of August 31, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei January 15, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5282. 2 pp. 5¢.

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*430	8/19	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†431	8/19	Rostov: "Economic Development: Some Lessons of a Common Experience."
432	8/19	Rusk and McNamara: letter to Members of House on foreign aid.
433	8/20	Visit of Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo of China.
434	8/21	Afghanistan credentials (rewrite).
435	8/23	McGinty appointed to OECD's Food and Agriculture Technical Information Service (rewrite).
†436	8/23	Williams: AMVETS, Detroit.
437	8/24	Exchange agreement with Afghanistan.
438	8/24	Exchange agreement with Argentina.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*, by Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest* published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of Volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relationship to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments, and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information as to origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE  
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**BULLETIN**



*Vol. XLIX, No. 1264*



*September 16, 1963*

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## Economic Development: Some Lessons of a Common Experience

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council<sup>1</sup>*

The problem of economic development is sometimes discussed in the modern world as a question of the relationship between rich and poor nations. It is true that there is an enormous gap between average levels of income among the nations which share life on this small planet—a gap ranging from \$50 per head per year to almost \$3,000 measured in terms of gross national product. It is also true that the richer nations have a duty of enlightened self-interest, combined with basic impulses of religion, ethics, and humanity, to help the less advanced peoples.

But there are three things wrong with posing the question of economic development as a matter of the rich and the poor:

First, the most critical difference among nations is not whether they are rich or poor but

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the annual meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce at México, D.F., on Aug. 19 (press release 431).

whether they are regularly growing or stagnant. The critical phase in the life of a nation which wishes to modernize its society is the stage in which it so adjusts its system of education, its social organization, political life, and commonly accepted aspirations as to develop the capacity to produce each year at a substantially higher rate than its increase in population. Regular growth is the first and critical operational objective. Historically, once regular growth begins, it has taken about three generations for a nation to absorb and diffuse to the bulk of its people what modern science and technology could provide. Compound interest—that is, a steady geometric increase in output per head—is a mighty force. Compared with the centuries of fluctuating but essentially stagnant levels of life in traditional societies, 60 years is not long; and, in any case, the relatively rich in the world are not so rich and so numerous as to be able to elevate significantly the level of life of the

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1264 PUBLICATION 7596 SEPTEMBER 16, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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poor simply by income redistribution. The task of development for us all—whatever our citizenship—is to help aspiring nations to learn how to grow and then to make growth as regular a phenomenon as possible.

The second thing wrong with posing the question as a matter of the rich and the poor is that within most of the major nations, whatever their average level of income, there are rich and poor areas. One of the reasons that we in the United States of this generation have a reasonably good understanding of the economic development process is that we have seen an important part of the American South move into what I would call the takeoff during the last 30 years. It was not so long ago, you will recall, that Franklin Roosevelt referred to this problem (one-third of the Nation, as he called it) as the greatest single problem in the domestic life of the United States. What is true of the United States is true of most of what we regard as the more advanced nations. Italy and France, for example, still have special problems of underdevelopment in their southern regions. And in Latin America, as I shall have occasion to suggest later, many of the most critical problems of development cannot be perceived by looking at the overall statistics of growth but are, in their essence, regional; for example, the problem of the northeast in Brazil. In short, the critical problems of difference in level of income and of growth rate may not lie as between different nations but within developing nations themselves.

My third objection to the rich-poor nation formula is that there are rich citizens and poor citizens in all our societies, including societies with low average levels of income; and one of the critical problems for all of those who enjoy the benefits of high levels of income is to play a part appropriate to their advantages in the common development of their societies. This is a problem of equity and social responsibility in all nations—rich and poor alike. One of the most interesting and promising aspects of our Peace Corps, for example, is that it is inducing the organization of counterpart units in some of the developing nations, within which the educated and technically trained youth can go out to work in the villages to help lift the stand-

ard of life of their less advantaged fellow citizens. Similarly, those American firms abroad which carry out the same kinds of welfare programs as they do at home are not merely strengthening their ties to the society of which they are a part; they are also teaching one of the major lessons of our own private enterprise system: that, in the long run, good profits and good citizenship go together.

### **No Single Prescription for Development**

What this comes to, then, is that we are all, whatever our nation's stage of growth and average level of per capita income, caught up in the development business.

The purpose of my talk to you here, in a country with a remarkable history of development, is to set down a few general lessons that I believe can be drawn from the record of the common experience, both during the postwar years and from the longer past.

Some limited generalization is possible—and some lessons can be drawn—because the development of nations is a little like the development of human beings. Each human being, in growing up, faces a fairly uniform sequence of problems. It is possible to specify in broad terms the kinds of problems which, inevitably, must be confronted by an infant of 9 months, a child of 5, an adolescent of 14, a young man of 21. The study of economic development, to the extent that it can be a science, consists primarily in identifying the sequence of problems to be overcome and the kinds of efforts to solve them which have succeeded or failed at different times in different nations.

But there the science of economic development—like the science of human development—must stop short. For each nation—like each individual—is and must be unique. As I say, there is a common sequence of problems which had to be faced, at similar stages, by, for example, Great Britain and Japan: by the United States and Mexico; by Russia and Egypt and India. But the form in which those problems arose and the solutions which were tried, succeeded, or failed could only be determined by the peoples involved. Differences of history and culture, of resources and available tech-

nology, and of political and social aspirations which inevitably affect the contours of economic development have varied and will always vary. There is no single correct prescription for economic development; there are, as in all human enterprises, only problems, some limited guidance from the experience of others, and hard, lonely choices to be made.

Against the background of these general observations, I should like to consider briefly with you today five lessons of the common experience of economic development which appear to me particularly appropriate as we look about us in the contemporary world and look forward over the next critical decade.

My first proposition—which flows directly from what I have just said—is that aid from outside a country can only be helpful to its development to the extent that the government and people of a nation organize their own resources. Economic growth is primarily a national enterprise. The amount of resources made available from outside can be a critically helpful margin; but it is a margin which will have its effect only to the extent that those receiving aid are effectively committed to the development process as they wish to see it and are effectively mobilizing their human and material resources to do the job.

It is sometimes said that the Alliance for Progress is an enterprise of the United States Government and not a cooperative venture within the hemisphere. For the simple and basic reason I have just cited, this cannot be so. The Alliance for Progress is a partnership, or it will fail. It can only work if what we organize in the United States by way of aid—and what our friends in Western Europe and Japan contribute—is merged in an orderly way with massive efforts at self-help within the nations of Latin America.

And I might add that I am personally confident about the fate of the Alliance for Progress because I feel that the forces within Latin America looking toward economic development and social equity are gathering strength. The Alliance for Progress is truly an alliance, not because we are contributing money to Latin America but because the policy of the United States is committed to work with those in Latin

America who would develop their economic and social life along lines of their own choice and make of their nations the kind of modern states they wish their children to enjoy in the light of their culture, values, and aspirations.

The Alliance for Progress is, therefore, a partnership in both resources and in political commitment.

### **National Programing**

My second proposition concerns national planning or, perhaps better, national programing. We believe national programing of the development process is required as a basis both for the domestic mobilization of resources and effective foreign aid. National programs are needed because, as Adam Smith noted long ago—when prescribing for underdeveloped Britain of the 18th century—governments must help create the basic framework within which a modern economy can develop. It is the government which must organize and finance the educational system and reshape it to the nation's changing needs. It is the government which must lay out and, in most cases, finance the fundamental social overhead projects—highways, irrigation projects, and the like—on which private agricultural and industrial development depends. It is the government which must solve problems of land tenure and create the framework within which agricultural productivity can be improved by the individual peasant. It is the government which must assure that the savings of the community are effectively mobilized by equitable taxation so that social overhead projects can be financed without inflation and on terms the people will regard as fair. It is the government which must devise policies which insure that the foreign accounts are kept in balance and that the development effort is not frustrated by a foreign exchange crisis.

These minimal functions were performed by governments even in nations most deeply committed to private enterprise, blessed with ample land and an old tradition of private entrepreneurship—like Canada and the United States.

It may seem strange that we in the United States, who are so deeply attached to the virtues of private enterprise, should be the advocates

of national programing in the underdeveloped areas. There is, in fact, no incompatibility between a belief that national programing is essential in the early stages of development and a belief in the wisdom of relying on private enterprise to conduct a wide and expanding range of economic activities. How wide that range is each country will, of course, decide for itself in the light of its own problems and possibilities. But the framework within which a modern private enterprise system can develop must, in large part, be created initially by the effort and initiative of governments. It is this perception which has drained away much of the fervor from the argument about government versus private enterprise in the development process—an argument which, even a few years ago, seemed to be central to the whole business. As nations have acquired practical experience in economic development, as they have assumed responsibility for the real tasks of growth, it is becoming increasingly clear that each of the two sectors has a job to do and that the jobs are supplementary and mutually reinforcing.

#### **Role of Private Enterprise**

Third, I should like to say something quite directly about our view of the role of private enterprise in the development process. What I am about to say not only conforms to the policy of my Government but fits what I have been able to learn, as an historian and social scientist, about the development business.

It is clear that, especially in the very early stages of development, different nations, out of their history, differ in their capacity to mount effective private enterprise systems. We in the United States, for example, had a lively private enterprise system in commerce and small-scale manufactures long before our first major surge of industrialization. The transition into a competitive private enterprise industrial system was relatively easy for us, although some of our first ventures failed. But some other nations—for example, Japan—began their industrialization with no one about to assume initial responsibility for industrial development but civil servants and military men. The first industrial plants were managed by the Government; and the first generation of private businessmen emerging in

the 1880's was drawn largely from the old warrior class—the samurai.

And so it has been with many other nations in first stages of development.

But when self-sustained and regular growth was attained—and even in the process of attaining that stage—the natural course of events appeared to be for the private sector to expand rapidly. The development of private enterprise over the past decade in India and Pakistan is, for example, illuminating. The most immediate reason for this evolution is that efficiency in producing many diverse products is hard for a government bureaucracy to attain; and besides there are not all that many competent bureaucratic managers.

The lesson of history is that the interests of an advancing society are best served when the bulk of industry and agriculture is managed by individuals or firms forced by competition to maximum efficiency, their accounts reflecting true costs, and their output responsive to the changing tastes of the people. We have learned, both in the less developed and more developed nations, when such competitive private sectors have emerged, that their emergence in no way need divert resources away from the objectives laid down in a national plan. In India, for example, the vitality of the private enterprise sector and the direction of its development are essential ingredients in current national planning. In the United States, Western Europe, and Japan we have found that there are ample indirect means for insuring that a massive private enterprise sector can keep within the bounds of the common interest and, in fact, be an essential reinforcement to it.

It is interesting to observe within the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe how the difficulties compound in attempting to manage by central state ownership and control an increasingly complex industrial system. The disciplines of competition, of honest prices and interest rates, and of the consumer's right of choice are beginning to be recognized as missing; and the gap is being discussed in the technical literature—this quite aside from the gross inefficiency of collectivized agriculture.

Let me emphasize that it is not the policy of the United States to attempt to tell other na-

tions what the appropriate relative role of private and public enterprise should be. This is, evidently, one of the most sensitive matters for national decision. But we are convinced, from the evidence of both history and the contemporary world, that the natural, if not inevitable, evolution of developing societies is to permit a large part of the process to go forward by competitive private means: and we are certain, from our own experience and that of others, that the existence of a substantial private enterprise sector is consistent with and can greatly reinforce the large objectives of a national development program.

Put another way, we are convinced that the old debate which focused on government versus private enterprise is an old-fashioned, out-of-date way to put the problem in the contemporary world. In both developing societies and in more advanced societies the most natural and fruitful relationship between public and private enterprise is one of partnership toward larger national purposes.

#### **Agriculture in the Development Process**

A fourth lesson I would draw, with particular reference to the decade ahead, concerns the role of agricultural and rural development in the growth process. In the course of our review for the presentation of the foreign aid bill to the Congress this year we discovered, somewhat to our surprise, this interesting fact: that something like 70 percent of the population of the developing areas is already living in societies which have either demonstrated quite definitely a capacity to grow regularly or, with some political stability and luck, they ought to be emerging into that category in the years ahead. While many nations are further back down the line in terms of stages of growth—notably the new African nations—the fact is that growth itself, in the form of a demonstrated capacity to produce a rate of increase in total output substantially greater than the rate of increase of population, is becoming the normal condition of a good part of the developing world.

In Latin America, for example, the statistics show that the overall rate of growth in GNP

for 1961 was over 5 percent. This is within shooting distance of the Alliance for Progress goal of an annual increase in per capita income of 2½ percent. Although there were special difficulties in Brazil and Argentina in 1962, the figure for that year is not likely to prove substantially lower, due to acceleration in Mexico and Venezuela.

On the other hand, we all know that there are many enormously difficult problems still to be confronted and solved in Latin America and in other developing nations. The great tasks of the Alliance for Progress still lie ahead. What, then, is wrong? Why is it that the measurement of growth in terms of increases in average national income per capita does not identify what our problems really are?

I would suggest that the central problem that we confront and shall confront increasingly in the developing nations is not merely the problem of developing and sustaining a sufficient overall rate of investment to produce a regular rise in average income per capita; it is the lack of regional and sectoral balance in the growth process. With a very few exceptions, what we see in the developing nations is that growth has taken hold in certain regions and certain sectors, with a marked lag in the development of the rural areas.

The takeoff has begun in many parts of the world, but it is concentrated excessively in the cities. Our common task is to diffuse this narrowly channeled momentum out over the face of the developing nations.

It is not accidental that rural development should have been generally slighted in the first phase of growth, even when development began, as it did in Mexico, with an agrarian revolution designed to give the peasant a piece of land he could call his own. There are two basic reasons for this phenomenon. First, serious modernization of rural life depends on the prior existence of an initial industrial base and an urban administrative apparatus of some competence. Second, typically—but not universally—the modernizing governments are urban coalitions of professional men, soldiers, politicians, civil servants. This has been the case in many parts of the Middle East, Asia,

Africa, and Latin America. As urban men, reacting against the traditional rural society—or removed from its old orbit—motivated strongly by a desire to see their nations assume a dignified, modern stance on the world scene, their first thoughts have turned to the more glamorous symbols of industrialization, whether they be modern weapons or steel mills. Moreover, as politicians, it is natural that their minds should turn in the first instance to their constituency, which has been primarily urban; and from this loyalty have tended to come subsidized services of various kinds, beyond the capacity of their economies and their national budgets easily to bear, and a certain neglect of rural development.

I emphasize again that the story of Mexico has special features due, in part, to the rural origins of its revolutionary thrust toward modernization. But if one attempts to generalize the situation in most of the developing countries, one can see quite remarkable enclaves of industrial and modern urban activity coincident with stagnation or very slow progress in the countryside.

Rural development is proving, however, not merely a social duty to the less advantaged portions of the population but a fundamental condition for the maintenance of a high rate of development for the society as a whole, including especially its industrial development. There are, in fact, three distinct major roles that agriculture must play in the early stages of the development process. First, obviously, agriculture must supply the food necessary to meet the inevitable rise in population, without yielding either starvation or a depletion of foreign exchange to buy food at the expense of purposes essential to industrial growth. This requirement is heightened by the typically disproportionate rise in urban populations which demand either an increased transfer of food from the countryside or the acquisition of food from abroad. Second, agricultural expansion is required as working capital for nonagricultural development: to generate raw materials for industry or to earn foreign exchange. Finally, a rise in agricultural incomes can provide important direct stimulus to other aspects of development: It can provide expanded mar-

kets for chemical fertilizers, agricultural equipment, and manufactured consumers goods, and it can provide a critically important source of increased tax revenues.

The world about us offers a number of illustrations of what happens to societies when these dynamic interactions between industrial and agricultural development are ignored or inadequately respected.

The most remarkable example is, of course, the situation inside Communist China. There a regime committed itself to a program of heavy industrialization, linked explicitly to the modernization of its military establishment. It was prepared to substitute for peasant incentives the massive power of its control system and substitute for an adequate level of agricultural investment—notably investment in chemical fertilizers—only labor-intensive investment, carried out substantially by forced labor. The upshot, carried to a rare extreme by a purposeful and unified group of wrongheaded men, was this: first, a breakdown in agricultural supplies, such that the whole vast Chinese nation is living at a substandard diet and half of its foreign exchange—about \$500 million—must now be allocated to buy food for the coastal cities; second, a breakdown in its capacity to supply industrial materials from agriculture to its industry and in its capacity to earn foreign exchange from its agricultural sector; third, a reduction in total resources available for the industrialization process itself. Industrial output in Communist China radically declined between 1959 and 1962, by at least 30 percent, and its heavy industry program is now virtually abandoned.

The measures taken to correct this gross distortion in the Chinese Communist development process have not succeeded in producing anything like a sustained industrial revival, although disintegration has been halted. Many plants are idle or working under capacity; and millions of men and women have been thrust out of the cities to fend, as best they can, back in rural areas where, with private incentives only partially and uncertainly restored, the Chinese peasantry are struggling to keep their heads barely above water.

There has been no failure in the free world quite as dramatic as that of Communist China, but one can see a pattern of severe structural distortion in a good many countries. In parts of Latin America, for example, industrialization is damped because of a lack of a sufficiently wide popular market. An excessive amount of industry is producing goods for the relatively small urban middle class; consequently industry works with idle capacity, prices and tariffs are excessively high, profits are not plowed back into industry, and they are sometimes even withdrawn and sent abroad to the society's cost. At the same time the potentialities of modern technology in agriculture are not being rapidly diffused, and many rural regions have not moved away from the fatalism and low productivity methods of traditional life.

With a melodramatic gap between rural and urban life, the more enterprising flock from the countryside to the bright lights and cinemas of the cities, where the rate of industrial growth is not sufficient to absorb them fully in regular employment, while they impose on the public authorities heavy claims for social overhead capital (housing, schools, et cetera) which inadequate budgets cannot fully meet, in part because tax systems are ineffective, in part because income is not rising fast enough.

Further, since the potentialities of modern agriculture are not being applied, some of these countries are unnecessarily sliding into dependence on imported food and they are not exploiting the possibilities of agricultural products as a source of commercial crops for industry or for export.

Finally, the lack of industry working to a mass market limits industrial productivity and prevents the development of manufactured or processed export products which can compete in international markets and relieve the dependence on exports of traditional products with a limited future in world trade. It is no accident that the classic initial manufactured product of a developing area, capable of marketing abroad, has been cotton textiles, where generally a mass domestic market can be developed and industrial efficiency attained at an early stage.

In the broadest sense, what I am asserting is that the present state of a good part of the

underdeveloped world requires that we take seriously two of the oldest propositions in economics. One of these propositions is that agricultural output is, in the widest sense, the basic working capital of a nation in its early stages of growth. The other proposition is that industrialization depends for its momentum on a progressive widening of the market, with the specialization and efficiency that widening permits.

There is an important impulse in Latin America and in other parts of the world to widen the market by bringing nations into closer economic cooperation and reducing or eliminating the tariff barriers between them. This makes good sense, and my Government has encouraged the development of common-market arrangements in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. It is essential, if industry is to become efficient, that it face the winds of international, as well as domestic, competition. But what I would suggest is that the most critical market to be developed in most modernizing nations is the domestic market.

It struck me some time ago that in certain of the developing areas it might be helpful to encourage a purposeful effort to manufacture locally and to market in the rural areas on a more effective basis both cheap agricultural equipment and the kinds of consumers goods likely to constitute, at rural levels of income, an incentive to accept and to apply modern methods of agricultural productivity.

This kind of effort could make a contribution to all four of the structural weaknesses to be found in many developing nations which I have described.

It could put the private industrial sector into the production and marketing of goods on a mass market basis, even in poor countries. I have in mind not merely textiles but canvas shoes, flashlights, household equipment, transistor radios, and the classic first-phase durable consumers goods—bicycles and sewing machines, as well as pails, hand tools, fertilizers, and other basic agricultural equipment.

Second, these goods, if cheaply and effectively brought into the rural areas, could provide an important incentive to rural families to increase output as well as to a part of the means to do so.

(The revolutionary public-private partnership in the rural life of the United States was the partnership between the knowledge imparted to the farmer by the Department of Agriculture county agent and the stimulus to effort imparted by the mail-order catalog.)

Third, by bringing something of modern life to the countryside and permitting rural areas to share at least some of the fruits of the more modern sectors of a developing society, we might help damp the excessive flow from the countryside to the urban slums.

And, finally, by developing efficient production on the basis of mass markets of goods of this kind, additional items for export could be generated.

My basic point is, then, that the time is past, if it ever existed, when we can afford to regard industrial and agricultural development as simply competing for scarce capital resources. In many parts of the developing world the initial basis for takeoff has been established in industry and in urban areas, but the maintenance of that momentum requires that the diffusion of modern technology, with all that it carries with it, be extended on a national basis and especially to the lagging rural areas, which are, at once, a relatively untapped source of food, industrial working capital, foreign exchange earning capacity, industrial markets, and taxes.

### **Combining Development and Human Freedom**

My final point about the development process concerns this question: Is it possible, given the tremendous revolutionary changes required for modernization and the effort demanded of a relatively poor country in mobilizing a high rate of investment, to combine human freedom with the development process itself?

In one sense, standing here in Mexico City, I need not argue the case very hard. Mexico has found its way through a set of revolutionary changes affecting every dimension of its society into sustained growth; and it has done so while maintaining and enlarging the basic elements of human freedom to which it was committed out of its history and culture. There are few developing nations which better demonstrate the harmony of economic growth

and human freedom. But the question is still being asked in many parts of the world, and I think we are in a better position to answer it than we were even a few years ago.

As we look at the test cases presented by the Communist nations, it is perfectly clear that the attempt to grow food by police-state methods leads not merely to inhumanity but to gross inefficiency. There appears to be no way of developing an efficient agriculture unless that effort is rooted in the incentives of the peasant and his family. There are simply not enough policemen in the world to follow the peasant around in his long and complex daily round of life to insure that he does the things that he must do to make things grow. In underdeveloped nations the proportion of the population in rural life is often 75 percent or more. And so it becomes a technical essential to leave large areas of human freedom to the farmer if economic development in an underdeveloped area is to proceed successfully or if development in more advanced countries is not to be dragged down—as it is in the Soviet Union and in those countries of Eastern Europe which still maintain collectivized agriculture.

But this is not all. Economic development depends on engaging the energies, the talents, and the personal commitments of millions of human beings. A friend of mine who holds a high post in a developing country of the Middle East spoke recently of the major lesson he had learned from his period of responsibility: It was that, no matter how powerful a revolutionary government they created, the government could not do the job of development itself. Its major task was to provide the framework and then to stimulate and educate the people themselves to take the necessary initiatives.

It is true that a powerful police system, combined with a disciplined single party, can get many things done—especially things which relate directly to the maintenance and the extension of the system's power; but, as we watch the evolution of the developing nations of the free world and the course of events in the nations run by Communist governments and as we look back on the lessons of our own experience, there is increasing reason to believe that systems of society committed to the maintenance of individual freedom—and its essential counter-

part, individual responsibility—have proved more efficient as well as more humane than those which seek by forced draft and the power of the state to drive development forward by totalitarian methods.

Only a few years back it was common to believe that, whatever their demerits, Communist societies had the capacity to sustain much higher rates of growth than societies based on human freedom. This is a proposition which can no longer be scientifically maintained. Leaving aside Communist China, which has gone through a radical decline in its economic fortunes, here are some current growth rate figures for recent years: In 1962 the rate of growth in GNP for the nations under Communist governments was 3.6 percent. For the NATO nations the figure was 4.8 percent. The figure for the Soviet Union itself was somewhat under 4 percent; for the United States, recovering from recession, a higher than average 5.4 percent.

These data may vary over the years. But the fact is that the economic gap between the free world and the Communist bloc has widened, and the same is true, of course, in the grand historical competition between the development of Communist China and the two great nations of the Indian subcontinent, which, against great difficulties, continue to make regular progress with societies rooted in the principle of consent.

I cite these figures not because rates of growth are the decisive measures of a society's worth. Our values begin with the integrity of the individual and his equality under God and the law. They extend to the right of nations to shape their lives in the light of their own history, culture, and aspirations, protected by the principle of self-determination.

As we look about the world scene—and at the trends of the past several years—two things are clear. We face great problems ahead in the Alliance for Progress and other enterprises designed to demonstrate the compatibility of human freedom and economic development. But equally, we can go forward with the greatest underlying confidence. The underlying forces of history are clearly on the side of the great humanistic tradition of which Mexico and the United States are both a part, if we have the wit and the will, the faith and the persistence to work with them.

## Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Endorsed by Science Advisory Committee

*President Kennedy made public on August 24 (White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.)) the following statement on the nuclear test ban treaty by the President's Science Advisory Committee.*

The members of the President's Science Advisory Committee wish to record their strong support for the test ban treaty now before the United States Senate for ratification.<sup>1</sup> Public discussion of the treaty raises many important questions other than those of a technical nature. However, the questions raised with regard to the potential effects of the treaty on the future military capabilities of this country relative to the Soviet Union are primarily technical, and it is to these questions that this statement is principally addressed.

The Science Advisory Committee, drawing upon the assistance of outstanding scientists and engineers throughout the United States, has long been engaged in independent detailed examination of military technology as it affects our national security in its broad aspects. The Committee believes that the continued unrestricted development and exploitation of military technology by both the Soviet Union and the United States would in time lead to a net decrease in our real security.

With regard to the technical aspects of the proposed treaty, it is our judgment that:

(1) Detection technology can make it extremely difficult to carry out significant clandestine nuclear tests in violation of the treaty, posing an exceedingly high risk of detection.

(2) Sufficient nuclear-weapons-effects information exists to permit design of effective U.S. ballistic missile systems, including hardened launch sites, with acceptable capability of survival.

(3) The most difficult problems of the antiballistic missile system are nonnuclear in nature and are being aggressively explored. The treaty itself will have only a minor effect on the possibility that an effective antiballistic missile system could be successfully developed by any nation.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

(4) Weapons of very large yield are in our stockpile. Weapons of still larger yield could have been produced in the past and can be produced without further testing if a military need develops.

In addition to these considerations, it is clear that further improvement in nuclear warheads is no longer the dominant factor in advancing military technology. The central questions relate to the design of integrated weapons systems for both offensive and defensive purposes. Further refinements of nuclear technology are but one aspect of a series of interrelated considerations which include: size and composition of military forces, intelligence, military doctrine, progress in other elements of military weapon systems, and the Nation's military-industrial base.

It is also important to realize that weapons systems development, production, and full deployment now require long lead time. Together with our strong industrial capabilities, this circumstance makes it extremely unlikely that a new development—such as a particular antiballistic missile or large weapons in space—can be deployed so rapidly as to upset the strategic situation. We believe that the United States would be able to detect the development and deployment of such new systems early enough to permit timely and adequate countermeasures.

It is our judgment that the present advanced state of U.S. nuclear technology and associated weapon systems makes it possible to accept the restrictions of this treaty with confidence in our continuing security. Although certain technical possibilities will have to be foreclosed, these limitations also apply to other nations. In fact, more extensive limitations under a comprehensive treaty with adequate safeguards could provide even greater confidence in our continuing welfare and security.

The treaty would provide relief from radioactive fallout and contribute significantly to

the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, thus constituting an important step toward a safe and secure peace in the world.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>The following are members of the President's Science Advisory Committee:

- Harvey Brooks, dean, division of engineering and applied physics, Harvard University  
Melvin Calvin, professor of chemistry, University of California  
Paul M. Doty, professor of chemistry, Harvard University  
Richard L. Garwin, Watson Research Laboratory, Columbia University-International Business Machines Corp.  
Edwin R. Gilliland, professor of chemical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Donald F. Hornig, professor of chemistry, Princeton University  
George B. Kistiakowsky, professor of chemistry, Harvard University  
Colin M. MacLeod, School of Medicine, New York University  
William D. McElroy, chairman, department of biology, The Johns Hopkins University  
Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University  
John R. Pierce, executive director, research, Communications Principles Division, Bell Telephone Laboratories  
Frank Press, director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology  
Edward M. Purcell, professor of physics, Harvard University  
Frederick Seitz, president, National Academy of Sciences  
Johu W. Tukey, professor of mathematics, Princeton University  
Jerrold R. Zacharias, professor of physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- In addition the following consultants-at-large to the PSAC have associated themselves with the statement:
- Detlev W. Bronk, president, The Rockefeller Institute  
James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories  
James R. Killian, Jr., chairman of the corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Edwin H. Land, president, Polaroid Corp.  
Emanuel R. Piore, vice president for research and engineering, International Business Machines Corp.  
Isidor I. Rabi, professor of physics, Columbia University

## Africa and the World: Problems of Today and Tomorrow

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Eighteen years ago, a hitherto little-known Japanese city—Hiroshima—became an international symbol.

Six weeks before Hiroshima, in San Francisco, some 50 nations had signed the Charter of the United Nations. Under the charter nations administering the affairs of non-self-governing peoples agreed to insure their just treatment and to develop self-government.

Two months after Hiroshima, on October 11, 1945, the AMVETS held their first national convention in Chicago.

Tonight I will try to relate these seemingly unrelated events of 18 years ago to the present and to each other.

For several years after Hiroshima, this nation had a monopoly on nuclear power. With this monopoly, a Hitler or a Stalin would have terrorized the world. This nation, the only one at that time which knew the full implications of nuclear power and what it would mean when the monopoly was broken, tried to keep the peace and to place the monopoly under international control. Bernard Baruch, one of our wisest men, went before the United Nations with the plan.

"We are here," he said, "to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . . Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the national convention of the American Veterans of World War II and Korea at Detroit, Mich., on Aug. 24 (press release 436 dated Aug. 23).

our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear."<sup>2</sup>

That plan foundered on Soviet obstructionism, as did numerous other proposals and attempts to arrive at some form of rational control over nuclear weaponry during the long years that followed. In time, the Soviet Union, too, became a nuclear power; and we learned—all of us, large nation and small—to live with fear.

This nation saw to its defenses. Having, at war's end, precipitously demolished the mightiest fighting force the world had ever seen, the United States was soon forced to rebuild its own military forces and to take a leading role in organizing the defenses of the free world.

But even as we developed our own capacity to overmatch Soviet destructiveness, we did not stop our efforts to pursue in every available forum our search for peace through controlled disarmament. As it became increasingly clear that the approach of the Soviet Union and of the United States to the problem of inspection and control were irreconcilable, we undertook to explore more limited measures.

One of these was the limitation of nuclear weapons testing. There were some powerful arguments for this—arguments of the type that make ideological differences irrelevant. All men breathe. All men want children—and they want their children to be genetically sound. The meaning of strontium 90 is known and disliked around the world. Ideology is no defense

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

against ionizing radiation. Yet despite these powerful motives, at times it seemed as if even these least efforts at arms limitation were doomed to failure.

Four weeks ago what Mr. Khrushchev called a "breakthrough" occurred. In Moscow the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was signed.<sup>3</sup> Already more than 78 nations of the world have signed or indicated their intention to sign it. Our own United States Senate is appraising it prior to deciding whether or not to advise and consent to its ratification.

Before developing some of the meanings that this treaty may have for us I should like to speak of AMVETS' part in making this treaty possible. For nearly 18 years all our efforts to make even a dent in the problem had failed. There was no lack of impatient rash voices to counsel against further attempts. AMVETS was not one of these.

In 1961 AMVETS International Affairs Council and Foreign Relations Committee submitted a report which was unanimously adopted by the AMVETS 17th national convention. It contained a statement of AMVETS support for a "continuing search by our government for means to promote international agreements to reduce armaments through the UN and other available means." The same report contained another statement of AMVETS support for "the proposed establishment of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to centralize in our government technical planning and research for arms control."

Last year the chances of agreement seemed nil. The Soviet Union had unilaterally broken a voluntary test ban with a 58-megaton blast. Yet AMVETS National Executive Committee resolved that "the U.S. delegation should remain at Geneva and continue its efforts to find agreement on a workable test ban treaty in the interests of all mankind so long as the faintest glimmering of hope remains alive."

Let me say that it is the support of farsighted and patriotic groups such as AMVETS that makes it possible for the difficult first steps to

be taken at all. This is why I am especially heartened by the resolution of this convention concerning the test ban treaty.

### Meaning of the Test Ban Treaty

What does the test ban treaty mean? Or perhaps we should ask, what does it not mean? For one thing, the treaty will not automatically remove the shadow of the fear that we have lived with for so long. All that it does is to eliminate testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under the water. It does not prevent nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. It does not prevent an arms race.

As President Kennedy has said:<sup>4</sup>

This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forgo their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from war.

Indeed, it is not unreasonable to believe that there are powerful forces motivating the Soviet Union to seek a *détente* with the West, a relaxing of almost unbearable tensions. For one thing, the Soviet people have as much, if not more, reason than you and I to hate war. For they have seen a great deal of it and have suffered much, having had their cities and countryside devastated and having lost some 20 million people during World War II. Upon his return from Moscow, Under Secretary Harriman reported that within the Soviet Union this agreement has been hailed as a great event and that the Russian people long for a relief from the tensions and fear of war.

This, to my mind, is a very significant fact. Particularly since there is ample evidence that what the Soviet people want is increasingly important to their leaders. Furthermore, there is good evidence that the Russian people, even as the people of the rest of the world, are anxious to improve their standard of living. It is possible that Khrushchev may feel it easier to satisfy this desire if he can save some of the expense of testing.

What the future will bring no one can pre-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

dict. We certainly should not expect a sudden dramatic "leap forward" into disarmament and peace. But there has been a change of direction and a step in the right direction. In the test ban there is something which both sides have found to be in their self-interest. There may be other steps which both sides can find mutually beneficial. The U.S. is prepared and determined that the search for these progressive steps shall go on.

But, however much we may desire peace, however much we move toward peace, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the Soviets are changing their ideological beliefs or their aims at world domination. The most we can expect is that the future will convince the Soviets that the only way to a world worth living in—be it Communist or otherwise—is through peaceful competition.

This is the kind of competition we should welcome.

In signing the test ban treaty Khrushchev put the world on notice. The Russians had no intention of abandoning their efforts to communize the world. He still threatens to make our grandchildren Communists. For our part, the United States continues to strive to build a world of free choice, to give Khrushchev's grandchildren the option of freedom or communism—and we have no doubt what their free choice will be. The Communist must say, "The Communist way is the only way." (Although it would now appear that there is more than one Communist way—that of Moscow and that of Peiping.) We are not so hampered. We can—and do—say to the nations of the world: "Be independent. Be free. Develop your own society in your own way, with the consent of the governed. For we know if you seek your own free, independent destinies you will help build the kind of world in which we all can live in peace and honor."

This, of course, has been the guiding principle of our Government's policy toward the newly independent and emerging nations of the world since the end of the war—really since the Declaration of Independence. The basic objectives of our diplomacy and of our foreign aid programs are to assist other countries to

maintain their independence and to develop into self-supporting nations.

The record of accomplishment over these years has been very good. Of the 49 nations to gain independence since 1943, not one has chosen a Communist form of government.

But we cannot sit back and content ourselves with the record of yesterday. It is about today and tomorrow that we must think.

#### **The Paramount Problem in Africa**

In Africa the paramount problem of today and tomorrow is that there are still millions of people denied the right of self-determination and of adequate means of achieving that right. This problem is still acute over the entire southern portion of the continent, an area larger than two-thirds of the United States—or 35 times larger than our New England States or four times the size of Alaska—with a population of 38 million people. More than 34 million of these people (more than the combined populations of New York and California) have little or no voice in their own government.

Within this area, the situation in the Portuguese territories and the situation of the non-whites in the Republic of South Africa present particularly urgent problems.

Your AMVETS position has never been ambiguous on these questions. The basic foreign policy statement of your national conventions of 1953 and again of 1961 urged the United States Government to "encourage the independence movement in Africa and to use our strongest influence on the nations who have the responsibility for administration of the territories to prepare these territories for self-government."

Your conventions also "deplored and condemned the continued actions of the current government in South Africa against the native population."

Between your resolutions of 1953 and of 1961 no less than 23 African nations were born. Since August 1961 five more have achieved full independence. Two more, Kenya and Zanzibar, will achieve full independence this winter. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are expected to achieve full internal self-government within a matter of months.

The attainment of self-government and independence on the part of so many states in so short a time makes the situation of southern Africa more of an anomaly. The recent moves toward African unity on the part of most of the independent states of Africa are impressive. One of the focal points around which they can unite is this matter of self-determination for the African peoples who still do not enjoy this right. At Addis Ababa, last June, the African nations organized a nine-member Committee of Liberation. That Committee has been quite active in formulating its plans for the future.

In the meantime, the unrest in the Portuguese territories continues, to the point where a large percentage of the Portuguese armed forces is tied down in Africa.

Further south, the Republic of South Africa continues in its policy of *apartheid*, seemingly blind to the abyss ahead.

### **Self-Determination and Apartheid**

Our positions on both of these subjects are matters of record. With regard to the Portuguese territories we have for some years urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and give it practical effect for the peoples in its territories. With regard to *apartheid*, this is what our Ambassador to the United Nations said before the Security Council just a few weeks ago:<sup>5</sup>

All of us sitting here today know the melancholy truth about the racial policies of the Government of South Africa. Our task now is to consider what further steps we can take to induce that Government to remove the evil business of *apartheid*, not only from our agenda but from the continent of Africa.

What are we doing about it? What can we do about it? Our practical position is perhaps best exemplified by our voting on the two recent Security Council resolutions this summer. On the resolution deprecating the policies of the Portuguese in their territories, we abstained.<sup>6</sup> In abstaining, we explained that we could agree with much of the substance of the resolution, but we could not agree that its language and

wording were suited to encourage the dialog which is so vitally needed between the Portuguese and the Africans.

We voted "Yes" to the Security Council resolution condemning the policy of *apartheid* and calling upon all states to stop the sale and equipment of arms, ammunition of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa. In voting affirmatively we stated that we had already adopted a policy of terminating the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this year. We also reserved the right to interpret this policy in the light of any future requirements for the common defense effort in assuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

In adopting these positions we have been in the middle. We have, admittedly, pleased neither side. But we have a more important purpose to serve than to please—namely, to work toward a peaceful solution.

In the cases of South Africa and the Portuguese territories in Africa there appear to be irreconcilable positions, yet in recent history we have seen many similar irreconcilable positions become manageable.

Such a stalemate was the nuclear testing issue. This stalemate was broken because men refused to give up—and continued to work patiently and imaginatively even when it seemed hopeless.

So, in Africa—as in the rest of the world—we will continue to work patiently and, we hope, imaginatively toward the building of a world where the differences between men and nations can be solved and the rights of men can be attained in a peaceful manner.

In dwelling at such length upon the more urgent political problems that face Africa—especially the politicians of Africa, I may have unwittingly painted a false picture of that vast continent and its people.

There are, indeed, dangerous tensions in Africa. But for the ordinary Africans, for the millions who are engaged in trying to get along and improve their own lot a little, there is more hope than ever before. We are happy to have some part in helping these Africans help themselves build a more stable and peaceful continent. The principal thrust of our integrated

<sup>5</sup> For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

<sup>6</sup> For background and text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1963, p. 303.

economic assistance program operated by the Agency for International Development lies in economic and technical cooperation, in education, and in the development of human resources.

A most significant contribution to African development is being made by the Peace Corps. Nearly 1,500 trained and dedicated American men and women are giving a part of their lives to help build better societies in Africa and to give Africans a glimpse of American idealism in action.

#### **Role of Private Organizations**

These governmental activities are supplemented by a variety of African programs sponsored or operated by private U.S. organizations. At last count—in 1961—there were nearly 600 American organizations—colleges and universities, foundations, religious and missionary organizations, business groups, and organizations concerned with African culture, education, and training—conducting activities relating to Africa.

Here at home there is a role for organizations such as the AMVETS. Keep informed, study all facets of the problems, and make your views known. Above all, do not look for quick and easy solutions. And do not despair if peaceful solutions are not even in sight. In the 18 years since your first national convention many changes have taken place. The pace of decolonization, for instance, has been phenomenal. At the time you held your first convention, roughly a third of the world's people were living in territories whose laws were made elsewhere, without the consent of the governed. Today, barely 2 percent of the world's people live in non-self-governing or dependent territories. The vast majority of these people saw independence come *without* violence.

But when we talk of the fundamental rights of man, we cannot allow ourselves to be bemused by percentage points. It is small comfort for men seeking to attain some measure of control over their own destinies to know that there are only a few of their kind left. They must not, they will not, be forgotten.

Neither must we forget that we still have some unfinished business here at home. America's

race relations, for instance, clearly have an effect on the forcefulness of United States influence abroad. These problems are American problems that must be solved satisfactorily and permanently by the efforts of our Government and by our own efforts. Africa especially has been watching with great interest the progress of our civil rights program. Its success or its failure in the months and years ahead will mean more than all the diplomacy, all the aid, all the technical assistance we can offer. Africans know what our moral ideals are. They have long heard them from our missionaries. They have read them in our Declaration of Independence and in our history. Knowing what we say we believe, they are interested in seeing these beliefs translated into action. That part of the job is up to you and your fellow citizens.

## **World Affairs Conference To Be Held at Albany**

Press release 446 dated August 29, for release August 30

The Department of State, with the cooperation of the World Affairs Council of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy and *The Knickerbocker News*, will hold a World Affairs Conference at Albany on September 30.

Invitations will be extended throughout New York State, with the exception of the New York City metropolitan area, to members of the press, radio, television, and nongovernmental organizations concerned with foreign policy and to business and community leaders.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together citizen leaders and media representatives with Government officials responsible for formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials participating in the conference will be McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Clare H. Timberlake, Chairman, Disarmament Advisory Staff, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and William S. Gaud, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development.

## Netherlands Compensation Program for Nazi Victims Broadened

Press release 449 dated August 29

The Department of State has been informed that the Netherlands compensation program for Nazi victims, previously announced,<sup>1</sup> became effective on August 1, 1963, when the financial treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed on April 8, 1960, and providing, *inter alia*, for payment of compensation to Netherlands victims of Nazi persecution, entered into force.

The program has been broadened to include not only persecutees who were Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time the persecution commenced but also persecutees who were residents of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on May 10, 1940, or at the time persecution commenced and were not Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time persecution commenced. However, persecutees qualifying by virtue of residence must possess Netherlands nationality at the time of filing their claims for compensation.

The program's original requirement of Netherlands nationality at the start of persecution for both persecutee and heir has also been broadened. Heirs who were not themselves Netherlands nationals at the start of persecution but who are at the present time may also qualify if the persecutee was a Netherlands national at the time persecution commenced or if the persecutee was an alien or a stateless person at the time persecution commenced and was a resident of the Kingdom of the Netherlands either then or on May 10, 1940.

In cases where the claimants were not Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the start of the persecution, no compensation is given in respect of persecution suffered prior to May 10, 1940.

Compensation may not be claimed if the persecutee or heir lost Netherlands nationality by entering the civil or military service of another country without the consent of the Queen of the Netherlands for purposes other than op-

position to a National Socialist, Fascist, or similar regime.

The prerequisite of current Netherlands nationality does not apply to persecutees who were actually Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the time the persecution commenced and who have subsequently obtained another nationality. Neither is current Netherlands nationality required of the heir if both he and the deceased persecutee were Netherlands nationals or Netherlands-protected subjects at the start of persecution.

Persons qualifying for compensation who are domiciled outside the Netherlands must file their claims before December 1, 1963.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 88th Congress, 1st Session

- Staffing Procedures and Problems in the Soviet Union. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Government Operations Committee. May 15, 1963. 62 pp. [Committee print.]
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 5490, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes. Part V, May 15-16, 1963, 179 pp.; Part VI, May 20-23, 1963, 160 pp.; Part VII, May 27-29, 1963, 207 pp.; Part VIII, June 3-5, 1963, 187 pp.; Part IX and Appendix, June 6-10, 1963, 150 pp.
- Export Controls. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. June 5, 1963. 36 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1276. June 11-26 and July 11, 1963. 764 pp.
- Administration of National Security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 2. June 14 and 17, 1963. 69 pp.
- Exclusion of Communist Political Propaganda From the U.S. Mails. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postal Operations of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. June 19 and 20, 1963. 64 pp.
- Foreign Service Buildings—Philippine War Damage Claims. Conference report to accompany H.R. 5207. H. Rept. 497. July 1, 1963. 5 pp.
- U.S. Representatives to the United Nations. Report to accompany H.R. 6283. H. Rept. 498. July 2, 1963. 26 pp.
- Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 168. S. Rept. 342. July 2, 1963. 2 pp.
- Amending the Joint Resolution Providing for U.S. Participation in the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 64. S. Rept. 343. July 2, 1963. 6 pp.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 142.

Senate Delegation to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (Kuala Lumpur, Malaya). Report to accompany S. Res. 168. S. Rept. 353. July 10, 1963. 1 p.

Questions and Answers on Arms Control and Disarmament. July 11, 1963. 9 pp. [Committee print.]

The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. July 15, 1963. 159 pp. [Committee print.]

Contribution to the Expenses of the International Commission for Supervision and Control of Laos. Report to accompany S. 1627. S. Rept. 357. July 15, 1963. 18 pp.

Authorizing One Additional Assistant Secretary of State, and for Other Purposes. Report to accompany S. 1512. S. Rept. 358. July 15, 1963. 12 pp.

Prohibiting the Location of Chaneries or Other Business Offices of Foreign Governments in Certain Residential Areas in the District of Columbia. Report to accompany S. 646. S. Rept. 360. July 16, 1963. 4 pp.

Special Message on the Balance of Payments. Message from the President of the United States. H. Doc. 141. July 18, 1963. 12 pp.

Expropriation of American-Owned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth Century. Report prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 19, 1963. 41 pp. [Committee print.]

Extension of Mexican Farm Labor Program. Report, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1703. S. Rept. 372. July 22, 1963. 10 pp.

Supplementary Slavery Convention. Message from the President transmitting the supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery, signed at Geneva September 7, 1956. S. Ex. L. July 22, 1963. 12 pp.

Convention on the Political Rights of Women. Message from the President transmitting the convention on the political rights of women, signed at New York March 31, 1953. S. Ex. J. July 22, 1963. 10 pp.

## Members Named to Arts Advisory Committee and Drama Panel

### ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE ARTS

The Department of State announced on August 30 (press release 450) that the Advisory Committee on the Arts, which gives guidance to the Department of State in conducting its program of sending cultural presentations to other countries, has been completed with the appointments of John Brownlee, director of the Manhattan School of Music and former Metropolitan Opera Company singer, and Oliver Rea, administrative director of the Tyrone Guthrie Theater in Minneapolis.

Membership of the Committee, which is au-

thorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (the Fulbright-Hays Act), is limited to 10. The other members are:

Roy E. Larsen (*chairman*), chairman of the executive committee, Time, Inc., and vice chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Lew Christensen, director of the San Francisco Ballet

Warner Lawson, dean of music, Howard University

Peter Mennin, composer and president of the Juilliard School of Music

Theodore Roszak, sculptor

George Seaton, motion picture writer, producer, and director

George Szell, musical director of the Cleveland Orchestra

Nina Vance, managing director of the Alley Theater, Houston, Texas

The Committee and the Department are assisted by several panels of experts, each concerned with a particular field of the performing arts and each evaluating and recommending performers within its field.

With this assistance the Committee (1) provides guidance and assistance to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department on types of attractions that would be most effective in meeting specific objectives of the cultural presentations program in various areas of the world, and (2) provides guidance and counsel on other governmental international activities concerned with the arts.

### AD HOC DRAMA PANEL

The Department of State announced on August 31 (press release 451 dated August 30) that a special drama panel composed of 15 persons associated with the stage—in producing, directing, writing, staging, lighting, and other capacities—has been appointed to study problems of presenting theatrical attractions abroad under the Department of State's cultural presentations program. The *ad hoc* panel will function under the Advisory Committee on the Arts.

The program has suspended for the current season the sending abroad of dramatic or other theatrical productions until the expert advice of members of the *ad hoc* panel can be obtained. Their advice is being sought on problems of cost relating to production, scenery, lighting, and

transportation and on innovations and economies that may be possible through advance planning. The committee will also be asked to suggest criteria for determining play content that will be effective abroad even though not performed in the local language. By such a review at this time it is hoped the dramatic medium can be used with maximum effectiveness in the presentations program.

Miss Nan Martin, actress, New York, has been appointed chairman, and Robert Whitehead, producer, New York, vice chairman. Other members are:

Richard L. Coe, drama critic, *Washington Post*  
 Robert Dowling, chairman of the board of directors,  
 American National Theater and Academy (ANTA),  
 New York  
 Hal Holbrook, actor, New York  
 Edward Kook, lighting expert, New York  
 Jerome Lawrence, writer, Malibu, Calif.  
 E. G. Marshall, actor, New York  
 Kevin McCarthy, actor, Beverly Hills, Calif.  
 Joseph Mielziner, stage designer, New York  
 Dick Moore, actor and editor of *Equity*, New York  
 Chester Morris, actor, New York  
 Donald Oenslager, scene designer, New York  
 Alan Schneider, stage director, New York  
 Miss Peggy Wood, actress and president of ANTA, New  
 York

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings <sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During August 1963

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 36th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 2-Aug. 2
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Industrial Development and Financing of the Private Sector: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 26-Aug. 3
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Health, Housing, and Com- munity Development: 2d Session.	San José . . . . .	July 26-Aug. 3
U.N. ECA Conference of African Finance Ministers for the Establish- ment of an African Development Bank.	Khartoum, Sudan . . . . .	July 26-Aug. 9
International Coffee Council: 1st Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 29-Aug. 24
GATT Trade Negotiations Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 31-Aug. 1
Inter-American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Bogotá . . . . .	Aug. 4-10
IA-ECOSOC Special Committee on Basic Products . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Aug. 5-9
UNESCO BIRPI African Study Meeting on Copyright . . . . .	Brazzaville . . . . .	Aug. 5-10
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Geochemical Prospecting Methods and Techniques.	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 5-14
U.N. Seminar on the Rights of the Child . . . . .	Warsaw . . . . .	Aug. 6-19
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 8th Session . . . . .	Athens . . . . .	Aug. 19-24
OECD Ministers of Science: Advisory Panels on Agenda Items 1 and 2.	Paris . . . . .	Aug. 22-23

#### In Session as of September 1, 1963

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 14, 1962-
17th International Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 18, 1963-
ICAO International Conference on Air Law . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Aug. 20-
U.N. Conference on Travel and Tourism . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Aug. 21-
24th International Feature Film Festival . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 24-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Cardiff, Wales . . . . .	Aug. 26-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 23, 1963. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

## United States and Japan Conclude Arrangement for Cotton Textile Trade, 1963-65

Press release 441 dated August 26, for release August 27

### JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and Japan on August 27 announced the conclusion of a bilateral arrangement covering trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States for the period 1963 through 1965. The purpose of this arrangement is to provide for the orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States. The notes effecting the arrangement, which was negotiated under article 4 of the Geneva Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles of February 9, 1962,<sup>1</sup> were exchanged on August 27 by Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson. Representatives of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor participated in the negotiations with the Embassy of Japan and with other representatives of the Japanese Government. Principal features of the bilateral arrangement are as follows:

1. For calendar year 1963 the level of Japanese exports of cotton textiles to the United States, as listed in annex A to the arrangement, is 287.5 million square yards equivalent. Within this aggregate limit, limits or ceilings are also provided for particular categories and groups of textiles.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

2. The overall limit, and the limits or ceilings on groups and categories, will be increased by 3 percent for calendar year 1964, and these levels will be increased by 5 percent for calendar year 1965.

3. The two Governments will exchange such statistical data on cotton textiles as are required for the effective implementation of the arrangement. A set of conversion factors is specified in annex C of the arrangement to express various categories of cotton textiles in terms of a square yard equivalent.

4. The two Governments agree on procedures that would be applied in the event that an excessive concentration of Japanese exports of any particular product of cotton textiles, for which no limit or ceiling is specified, or of end items made from a particular type of fabric, should cause or threaten to cause disruption of the United States market.

5. The two Governments also agree on procedures which would be applied in the event that questions should arise concerning certain items not included in annex A of the arrangement.

6. The two Governments also agree to consult on any problem that may arise during the term of the arrangement.

Except as otherwise provided by the arrangement, the terms and provisions of the Long-Term Arrangements will continue to be applicable to the trade between Japan and the United States in cotton textiles.

## EXCHANGE OF NOTES EFFECTING THE ARRANGEMENT

### Japanese Note

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Washington by the representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and to confirm, on behalf of the Government of Japan, the understandings reached between the two Governments that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the Long-Term Arrangements"), permitting "mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement", and with a view to providing for orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, the bilateral arrangement attached hereto will be applied by the two Governments for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963 subject to the provisions thereof.

I have further the honor to request you to be good enough to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

His Excellency

DEAN RUSK,

Secretary of State

of the United States of America.

### ATTACHMENT

#### ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING TRADE IN COTTON TEXTILES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangements, permitting "mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement", the following Arrangement will be applied by the two Governments for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963 subject to the provisions herein.

1. The purpose of this Arrangement is to provide for orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States. To achieve this purpose:

a. The United States Government shall cooperate with the Japanese Government in promoting orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and

b. The Japanese Government will maintain, for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963, an annual aggregate limit for exports of cotton textiles to the United States, and annual limits for major groups and annual limits or ceilings for certain products within those groups, subject to the provisions of this Arrangement.

2. The annual aggregate limit for 1963 shall be 287.5 million square yards. This limit shall be subdivided into four major groups as follows:

	<i>Million square yards</i>
Group I—Cotton cloth	125.5
II—Made up goods, usually included in U.S. cotton broad woven goods production	41
III—Apparel	111
IV—Miscellaneous cotton textiles	10
TOTAL	287.5

Within these major groups, annual limits or ceilings for specific products are set forth in Annex A. Within the annual aggregate limit, the limits for Groups I, II, III and IV may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent, provided that this provision for "flexibility" shall permit an increase only in the "Other" categories referred to in each group in Annex A.

Each group set forth above shall be deemed to contain the following Categories which are defined in Annex B:

Group I, Categories 5 through 27.

Group II, Categories 28 through 36, and part of Category 64.

Group III, Categories 39 through 62, and part of Category 63.

Group IV, Categories 1 through 4, 37, 38, and part of Categories 63 and 64.

3. The aggregate limit for 1964 shall be increased by 3 percent over the limit for 1963. The aggregate limit for 1965 shall be increased by 5 percent over the limit for 1964. These increases for 1964 and 1965 shall be applied to each limit for the groups and to each limit or ceiling within the groups.

4. Wherever it is necessary for the purposes of this Arrangement to convert units other than square yards (e.g., dozens, pieces, pounds, etc.) into square yard equivalents, the conversion into equivalent square yards shall be at the rates specified in Annex C.

5. a. The two Governments undertake to consult whenever there is any question arising from the implementation of this Arrangement.

b. If instances of excessive concentration of Japanese exports in any products within the scope of this Arrangement, except those included in categories for which limits or ceilings are specified in Annex A, or if instances of excessive concentration of Japanese exports of end products made from a particular type of fabric should cause or threaten to cause disruption

of the United States domestic market, the United States Government may request in writing consultations with the Japanese Government to determine an appropriate course of action. Such a request shall be accompanied by a detailed, factual statement of the reasons and justification for the request, including relevant data on imports from third countries. During the course of such consultations, the Japanese Government will maintain exports in the products in question on a quarterly basis at annual levels not in excess of 105 percent of the exports of such products during the first 12 months of the 15 month period prior to the month in which consultations are requested or at annual levels not in excess of 90 percent of the exports of such products during the 12 months prior to the month in which consultations are requested, whichever is higher.

c. The provisions in sub-paragraph b above should only be resorted to sparingly. In the event that the Japanese Government considers that the substance of Annex A would be seriously affected due to the consultations in sub-paragraph b, the Japanese Government may request that the consultations include a discussion of possible modifications of Annex A.

6. The two Governments recognize that the successful implementation of this Arrangement depends in large part upon mutual cooperation on statistical questions. Accordingly, each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other Government. In particular, the United States Government shall supply the Japanese Government with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles from Japan as well as from third countries, and the Japanese Government shall supply the United States Government with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United States.

7. As regards products in any category under specific limits or ceilings specified in this Arrangement, the United States Government shall keep under review the effect of this Arrangement with a view to orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and shall furnish the Japanese Government once a year with available statistics and other relevant data on imports, production and consumption of such products such as would clarify the impact of imports on the industry concerned.

8. If the Japanese Government considers that as a result of limits and ceilings specified in this Arrangement Japan is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country, the Japanese Government may request consultations with the United States Government with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as a reasonable modification of this Arrangement.

9. The two Governments understand that the terms and conditions of the Long-Term Arrangements shall be applicable to trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States except as provided in this Arrangement. The United States Government agrees that insofar as the exports from Japan of the products

falling within the scope of Annex A of this Arrangement are conducted within the framework thereof the United States Government shall not invoke Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements with respect to such products.

10. a. This Arrangement shall continue in force through December 31, 1965, provided that either Government may terminate this Arrangement prior thereto effective at the beginning of a calendar year by giving sixty days' written notice to the other Government.

b. Each Government may at any time propose modification of this Arrangement. The other Government shall give sympathetic consideration to such proposal.

#### ANNEX A

1. a. The following specific limits shall apply within the total annual limit of 125.5 million square yards for *Group I—"Cotton cloth"*:

	<i>Thousand Square Yards</i>
(1) Gingham (Categories 5 and 6)	46,200
(2) Velveteens (Category 7)	2,750
(3) Typewriter ribbon cloth (Category 17)	987
(4) All Other Fabrics (Categories 8 through 16 and 18 through 27)	75,563

b. Within the specific limit for "Ginghams", the export of "Ginghams, combed" (Category 6) shall not exceed 75 percent of the above specific limit.

c. Within "All Other Fabrics", the following specific ceilings shall not be exceeded:

	<i>Thousand Square Yards</i>
(1) Sheeting (Categories 9 and 10)	30,000
(2) Poplin and broadcloth (Categories 15 and 16)	30,000
(3) Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded yarn (Category 18)	20,000
(4) Other shirting (Categories 19, 20 and 21)	32,000
(5) Twill and sateen (Categories 22 and 23)	39,000
(6) Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s. (Categories 24 and 25 and part of Category 32)	29,000
(7) Duck (Part of Categories 26 and 27)	1,750

d. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1), (2) and (3) of paragraph 1 a may be transferred to (4)—"All Other Fabrics".

e. Within "All Other Fabrics" total exports of fabrics made from combed warp and filling shall not exceed 34.65 million square yards.

f. Within "Yarn-dyed fabrics", total exports of handkerchief cloth shall not exceed 2.25 million square yards.

2. a. The following specific limits shall apply within the total annual limit of 41 million square yards for *Group II—"Made-up goods, usually included in U.S. cotton broad woven goods production"*:

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
(1) Pillowcases, plain (Categories 28 and 29)	1000 nos.	5,400
(2) Dish towels (Category 30)	1000 nos.	7,200

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
(3) Handkerchiefs, except for dedicated handkerchief cloth (Part of Category 32)	1000 doz.	1,260
(4) Table damask and manufactures (Category 33)	1000 lbs.	3,100
(5) Sheets (Categories 34 and 35)	1000 nos.	2,940
(6) All Other Made-Up Goods (Categories 31, 36 and part of Category 64 as specified in paragraph 5, below)	1000 syd. equiv.	2,494

b. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of paragraph 2 a may be transferred to (6)—“All Other Made-Up Goods”.

3. a. The following specific limits shall apply within the total annual limit of 111 million square yards for Group III—“Apparel”:

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
(1) Gloves and mittens (Category 39)	1,000 doz.	472.5
(2) T-Shirts, knit (Categories 41 and 42)	1,000 doz.	535
(3) Knit shirts, except in T and Sweatshirts (Category 43)	1,000 doz.	809
(4) Men's and boys' dress shirts, not knit (Category 45)	1,000 doz.	382
(5) Sportshirts, whether or not in sets, not knit (Category 46)	1,000 doz.	717.5
(6) Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or over (Category 48)	1,000 doz.	60
(7) All other coats (Category 49)	1,000 doz.	120
(8) Trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit (Categories 50 and 51)	1,000 doz.	1,500
(9) Blouses, whether or not in sets (Category 52)	1,000 doz.	1,775
(10) Dresses, not knit (Category 53)	1,000 doz.	45
(11) Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, rompers, creepers, etc. (Category 54)	1,000 doz.	180
(12) Nightwear and pajamas (Category 60)	1,000 doz.	120
(13) All other Apparel (Categories 40, 44, 47, 55 through 59, and 61, 62 and part of Category 63 as specified in paragraph 5, below)	1,000 syd. equiv.	1,428

b. Any shortfall below the limits specified in (1) through (12) of paragraph 3a may be transferred to (13)—“All Other Apparel”.

c. Within the specific limit of 1.5 million dozen for “Trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit”, the following specific ceilings shall not be exceeded:

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
(1) Men's and boys' (Category 50)	1000 doz.	500
(2) Women's, misses' and children's (Category 51)	1000 doz.	1,162.5

d. The aggregate volume of exports of the following apparel items manufactured of corduroy, where the chief weight of the item is corduroy, shall be limited to 21.35 million square yards equivalent based upon the conversion factors for the items in question which appear in Annex C.

<i>Category No.</i>	<i>Description</i>
46	Sport shirts
48	Raincoats
49	All other coats
50-51	Trousers
54	Playsuits

4. a. The following specific limits shall apply within the total annual limit of 10 million square yards for Group IV—“Miscellaneous cotton textiles”:

	<i>Unit</i>	<i>No.</i>
(1) Zipper tapes, n.e.s. (U.S. “Schedule A” No. 3230 273)	1000 lbs.	810
(2) Other (Categories 1 through 4, 37, 38, and parts of Categories 63 and 64 as specified in paragraph 5, below)	1000 syd. equiv.	6,274

b. Any shortfall below the limit specified in (1) in paragraph 4a may be transferred to (2)—“Other”.

5. With regard to Categories 63 and 64 referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, the following items or products as identified by present U.S. “Schedule A” numbers or parts thereof shall be included:

CATEGORY 63 (To be included in Group III except as noted otherwise)

3113	000 <sup>1</sup>	3114	165
3113	362	3114	175
3113	365	3114	180
3113	958 <sup>1</sup>	3114	225
3113	962 <sup>1</sup>	3114	235
3113	965	3114	240
3113	969	3114	245
3113	970	3114	255
3113	971	3114	715 <sup>1</sup>
3113	972	3114	720 <sup>1</sup>
3113	973	3114	895
3113	974	3114	900
3113	975	3114	905
3113	995	3114	925
3114	001	3114	950
3114	155	3114	955

PART OF:

3113	997 <sup>3</sup>
3113	998 <sup>3</sup>
3114	260 <sup>3</sup>
3114	960 <sup>3</sup>
3114	965 <sup>3</sup>

[See footnotes, p. 444.]

I.E.	Pullovers	Diaper sets		
	Aprons	Scarves		
	Altar cassocks	Dress shields <sup>1</sup>		
	Beach wear sets	Sash belts <sup>1</sup>		
	Swim wear	Apparel with bib		
	Baseball uniforms	Bibs <sup>1</sup>		
	Sleeping bags for infants	Belts for apparel, <sup>1</sup> and		
	Halters	Shoulder straps for		
	Men's and boy's coveralls and overalls	brassieres <sup>1</sup>		

CATEGORY 64 (To be included in Group IV except as noted otherwise)

3030	000	3159	020 <sup>2</sup>	3220	202 <sup>2</sup>
3030	100	3159	120 <sup>2</sup>	3220	205 <sup>2</sup>
3081	510	3163	001	3220	207 <sup>2</sup>
3081	530	3163	002	3220	212 <sup>2</sup>
3081	600	3163	003	3220	862
3081	710 <sup>2</sup>	3163	004	3220	865
3081	730 <sup>2</sup>	3163	005	3220	868
3081	812 <sup>2</sup>	3163	006	3224	000
3081	815 <sup>2</sup>	3163	580 <sup>2</sup>	3224	050
3081	818	3163	600 <sup>2</sup>	3224	100
3081	852 <sup>2</sup>	3163	690 <sup>2</sup>	3224	150
3081	855 <sup>2</sup>	3166	000	3224	200
3081	858	3166	200	3224	300
3081	912 <sup>2</sup>	3166	300	3224	500
3081	915 <sup>2</sup>	3166	692	3230	240
3081	918 <sup>2</sup>	3166	695	3230	273
3083	500 <sup>2</sup>	3168	001	3230	350
3083	700 <sup>2</sup>	3168	002	3230	401
3083	900 <sup>2</sup>	3168	003	3230	410
3084	112 <sup>2</sup>	3168	004	3230	431
3084	400 <sup>2</sup>	3168	005	3230	500 <sup>2</sup>
3086	600 <sup>2</sup>	3168	006	3230	682 <sup>2</sup>
3086	730	3168	007	3230	685 <sup>2</sup>
3118	200 <sup>2</sup>	3168	008	3230	688 <sup>2</sup>
3124	200 <sup>2</sup>	3168	009	3903	300
3134	200 <sup>2</sup>	3168	010	3969	010
3144	200 <sup>2</sup>	3200	012 <sup>2</sup>	3230	232
3154	200 <sup>2</sup>	3200	015 <sup>2</sup>	3230	235
3158	020 <sup>2</sup>	3200	400 <sup>2</sup>	3230	278
3158	120 <sup>2</sup>	3220	130 <sup>2</sup>	9439	950 (excluding in sets)

ANNEX B

Definition of Cotton Textile Categories

List of Categories Unit

1. Cotton yarn, singles, carded, not ornamented, etc.	lbs.
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<sup>1</sup> These items or products shall be included in Group IV. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>2</sup> These items shall be included in Group II. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>3</sup> The two Governments shall consult as to whether or not any product other than the seventeen products enumerated below the footnote items may be classified as an addition to these items. Such consultations shall not cover shoe uppers, Japan items, belts (other than sash belts and belts for apparel), suspenders and braces. [Footnote in original.]

<i>List of Categories</i>	<i>Unit</i>
2. Cotton yarn, plied, carded, not ornamented, etc.	lbs.
3. Cotton yarn, singles, combed, not ornamented, etc.	"
4. Cotton yarn, plied, combed, not ornamented, etc.	"
5. Ginghams, carded yarn	sq. yds.
6. Ginghams, combed yarn	"
7. Velvetens	"
8. Corduroy	"
9. Sheeting, carded yarn	"
10. Sheeting, combed yarn	"
11. Lawns, carded yarn	"
12. Lawns, combed yarn	"
13. Voiles, carded yarn	"
14. Voiles, combed yarn	"
15. Poplin and broadcloth, carded yarn	"
16. Poplin and broadcloth, combed yarn	"
17. Typewriter ribbon cloth	"
18. Print cloth, shirting type, 80x80 type, carded yarn	"
19. Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80x80 type, carded yarn	"
20. Shirting, carded yarn	"
21. Shirting, combed yarn	"
22. Twill and sateen, carded yarn	"
23. Twill and sateen, combed yarn	"
24. Yarn-dyed fabrics, n. e. s., carded yarn	"
25. Yarn-dyed fabrics, n. e. s., combed yarn	"
26. Fabrics, n. e. s., carded yarn	"
27. Fabrics, n. e. s., combed yarn	"
28. Pillowcases, plain, carded yarn	numbers
29. Pillowcases, plain, combed yarn	"
30. Dish towels	"
31. Towels, other than dish towels	"
32. Handkerchiefs	doz.
33. Table damasks and manufactures	lbs.
34. Sheets, carded yarn	numbers
35. Sheets, combed yarn	"
36. Bedspreads, including quilts	"
37. Braided and woven elastics	lbs.
38. Fishing nets	"
39. Gloves and mittens	doz.
40. Hose and half hose	doz. prs.
41. Men's and boys' all white T. shirts, knit or crocheted	doz.
42. Other T. shirts	"
43. Knitshirts, other than T. shirts and Sweatshirts (including infants)	"
44. Sweaters and cardigans	"
45. Men's and boys' shirts, dress, not knit or crocheted	"
46. Men's and boys' shirts, sport, not knit or crocheted	"
47. Men's and boys' shirts, work, not knit or crocheted	"
48. Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or over	"
49. All other coats	"

<i>List of Categories</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Category Number</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Conversion Factor</i>
50. Men's and boys' trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit or crocheted	doz.	46	doz.	24.457
		47	"	22.186
		48	"	50.0
51. Women's, misses' and children's trousers, slacks and shorts, outer, whether or not in sets, not knit or crocheted	"	49	"	32.5
		50	"	17.797
		51	"	17.797
		52	"	14.53
52. Blouses, whether or not in sets	"	53	"	45.3
		54	"	25.0
53. Women's, misses', children's and infants' dresses (including nurses' and other uniform dresses), not knit or crocheted	"	55	"	51.0
		56	"	9.2
		57	"	11.25
54. Playsuits, sunsuits, washsuits, creepers, rompers, etc. (except blouses and shorts; blouses and trousers; or blouses, shorts and skirt sets)	"	58	"	5.0
		59	"	16.0
		60	"	51.96
		61	"	4.75
55. Dressing gowns, including bathrobes and beachrobes, lounging gowns, dusters and housecoats, not knit or crocheted	"	62	lb.	4.6
		63	"	4.6
		64 <sup>1</sup>	"	4.6

### United States Note

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, August 27, 1963

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date and the bilateral arrangement attached thereto concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States which reads as follows:

"EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions held in Washington by the representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, and to confirm on behalf of the Government of Japan, the understandings reached between the two Governments that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Long-Term Arrangements'), permitting 'mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsistent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement', and with a view to providing for orderly development of trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States, the bilateral arrangement attached hereto will be applied by the two Governments for the period of three years beginning January 1, 1963 subject to the provisions thereof.

"I have further the honor to request you to be good enough to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration."

I have further the honor to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

<sup>1</sup> Floor coverings shall be measured by actual square yardage. [Footnote in original.]

### ANNEX C

#### Conversion Factors

<i>Category Number</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Conversion Factor</i>
1	lb.	4.6
2	"	4.6
3	"	4.6
4	"	4.6
28	no.	1.084
29	"	1.084
30	"	.348
31	"	.348
32	doz.	1.66
33	lb.	3.17
34	no.	6.2
35	"	6.2
36	"	6.9
37	lb.	4.6
38	"	4.6
39	doz.	3.527
40	"	4.6
41	"	7.234
42	"	7.234
43	"	7.234
44	"	36.8
45	"	22.186

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:  
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

Enclosure:  
Arrangement.

His Excellency  
RYUJI TAKEUCHI,  
Ambassador of Japan.

## EXCHANGES OF LETTERS

### United States Letter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to Annex A of the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected by the Exchange of Notes today, I wish to state the understandings of my Government that if any problem arises regarding the classification in the implementation of the Arrangement, the two Governments shall consult each other with a view to finding an appropriate solution. Particularly, when questions arise whether certain products fall within the scope of Annex A, the two Governments shall study such questions taking into account, *inter alia*, such international standards as B.T.N. and S.I.T.C.

In view of the fact that Category definitions may be affected as a result of possible future changes in the United States "Schedule A", I hereby wish to state further our understandings that such changes shall be promptly notified to the Japanese Government, and that consultations shall be held to make such adjustments in the Arrangement as may become necessary as a result of the changes.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.  
Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

### Japanese Reply

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963 which reads as follows:

[Text of United States letter.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

## United States Letter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: On the occasion of the Exchange of Notes with the Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected thereby, I wish to state that there are certain items not included in Annex A of the Arrangement but which are classified as "cotton textiles" by the United States Government. A list of these items, identified by the United States "Schedule A" numbers, is attached to this letter. It is the understanding of the United States Government that the Japanese Government does not consider some of the products within the first 22 items to be cotton textiles and does not consider any of the last 7 items to be cotton textiles.

Nevertheless, in the event imports from Japan in any of the items or products enumerated in the attached list should cause or threaten to cause disruption of the United States domestic market, the United States Government may request consultations with the Japanese Government for the purpose of finding an appropriate course of action.

The consultations shall be conducted in the manner provided in paragraph 5 of the Arrangement if the item or product in question is considered a cotton textile by the Japanese Government, or in any other manner agreeable to both Governments if the item or product in question is not considered a cotton textile by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government shall promptly notify the United States Government whether or not it considers the item or product in question to be a cotton textile.

While the United States Government agrees and prefers to seek a mutually satisfactory solution through the means mentioned above, it reserves its right, if such a settlement cannot be reached expeditiously, to invoke Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962, concerning the items or products enumerated in the attached list.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

### ATTACHMENT

(1)	2061	400	(6)	3230	238	(11)	3230	712
(2)	3224	800	(7)	3230	275	(12)	3970	010
(3)	3224	900	(8)	3230	277	(13)	3971	010
(4)	3226	110	(9)	3230	352	(14)	3971	020
(5)	3226	300	(10)	3230	451	(15)	3971	110

(16) 3971 210 (21) 3114 960<sup>1</sup> (26) 3224 700  
 (17) 3971 430 (22) 3114 965<sup>1</sup> (27) 3230 461  
 (18) 3113 997<sup>1</sup> (23) 2061 000 (28) 3230 670  
 (19) 3113 998<sup>1</sup> (24) 2067 610 (29) 9439 950  
 (20) 3114 260<sup>1</sup> (25) 2067 710 (in sets only)

Government with a view to finding the appropriate classification of the products in question within Annex A of the Arrangement.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

**Japanese Reply**

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963 which reads as follows:

[Text of United States letter.]

With regard to the above stated understandings of the United States Government, I wish to confirm, on behalf of my Government, that these are also the understandings of the Government of Japan with the following reservation.

In the event the United States Government exercises its right to invoke Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements, the Japanese Government may exercise its rights as an exporting country in accordance with the various relevant provisions of the Long-Term Arrangements, including the right to bring questions of interpretation or application of the Long-Term Arrangements to the GATT Cotton Textiles Committee in accordance with Article 8 of the Long-Term Arrangements.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

**Japanese Letter**

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: With reference to Annex A of the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected by the Exchange of Notes today, I wish to state our understanding that the exports of uniquely Japanese products called "Japan Items" shall not be included in Annex A of the Arrangement. The attachment to this letter provides for the definition of "Japan Items" and enumerates those products which have been and are likely to be exported to the United States as "Japan Items". Additional items may be added to the above attachment through agreement after consultations as may become necessary in the future.

It is further understood that the exports of "Japan Items" shall be made with certification by the Japanese Government. In the event that the United States Government finds that any particular products imported from Japan as "Japan Items" should not be properly classified as such, the United States Government may request consultations with the Japanese

<sup>1</sup> Part of these items included, i.e. shoe uppers, belts (other than sash belts and belts for apparel), suspenders and braces. [Footnote in original.]

**ATTACHMENT**

1. Definition of "Japan Items"

"Japan Items" to be kept outside Annex A of the said Arrangement are the items which are uniquely Japanese products. Whether a particular product should be considered as "Japan Items" or not will be determined on the basis of the following criterion.

Designed for the use in the traditional Japanese way of life, wearing "Kimono", living in "Tatami" rooms, decorating for traditional Japanese ceremonies or festivals, playing Japanese sports etc. In other words, not in use in the regular western way of life except for hobbies or special likings.

2. List of "Japan Items"

The names of the items which have been and are likely to be exported as "Japan Items" are as follows:

(a) Cloth

- |            |  |
|------------|--|
| Kimono     | Traditional Japanese style dress.  |
| Yukata     | A type of Kimono, summer-wear made of Yukata-Ji (Plain-woven light fabrics printed in simple colors).  |
| Juban      | Underwear for Kimono, fundamentally same style as Kimono.  |
| Haori      | Overcoat for Kimono, usually less than ¾ length.   |
| Wafukukoto | Raincoat or duster coat to be worn over Kimono, basically same style as Kimono, different from Haori in not being open in front and longer than ¾ length.        |
| Hiappi     | Workers' overcoat, similar style with Haori but not dressy.  |
| Judogi     | Kimono-style sports wear for Judo, usually accompanied by slim and ¾ length trousers and by belts.   |
| Kendogi    | Kimono-style sports wear for Kendo, usually accompanied by Hakama (men's skirts, full length). Different from Judogi in being lighter, tighter and half-sleeves. |
| Kappogi    | Apron to be worn over Kimono with broad sleeves, chest and shoulders covered.  |
| Momohiki   | Carpenters' or Rikishamen's trousers, often cover-alls to be worn in combination with Hiappi. Different from western style trousers                              |

In being extremely light and small in lower ends, usually black in color. Combination sets of Happi and Momohiki are often traded as "Carpenter Apparel".

Sashiko Quilted coat which is almost like Happi, typically used by firemen.

(b) *Clothing accessories*

Obi (1) Wide thick belts for Kimono, usually a few inches wide or more. (2) Wide, thin belts for mens' Kimono or Yukata, both longer than western style belts by a few times. (3) Judo belts, narrow but approximately twice as wide and longer than western style belts, no buckles.

Obishime Woven decorative belt to be used on top of the Obi (1) above.

Tabi Socks to be worn when one wears "kimono" made of woven fabrics, tightly in the form of foot, having a separate division for the big toe. Reaches just above the ankle and is fastened at the back by means of an overlap having metal hook tabs.

Koshihimo Narrow, soft belt to be used between Obi and Kimono, or Kimono and Juban.

Erisugata A length of stiff cotton cloth to be sewn inside "Eri" collar to give a form or shape.

Sodeguchi Extra broad sleeves which are based on the short sleeves of Juban.

Homaekake Men's working apron, thick and heavy. Big in size, usually simple in color.

(c) *Household goods*

Futon Japanese style bedding, mattress and thick, large blankets. Mattress different from western style in the stuffing much softer and the covering cloth lighter. Blankets are as thick as an inch or more, also with soft stuffing.

Futon-Cover Cover for "Futon". Different from sheets as it covers the stuffing directly, also different in sizes as it is made to contain voluminous stuffing, usually printed or dyed.

Zabuton Cushion to sit on in Japanese "Tatami" rooms. Approximately a yard square, a few inches thick with soft stuffing.

Furoshiki Wrapping cloth of about one and a half yard square. Different from scarf in the thickness of the fabric.

Kobanori Artificial carp to fly on top of a long pole on the occasion of "Boys'

Festival" in the Japanese custom. Shop curtain to hang at the entrance of shops, short, with vertical cuts in several parts.

Tenugui Oblong towel, woven, usually with Japanese decorative design.

**United States Reply**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963, which reads as follows:

[Text of Japanese letter.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

**United States Letter**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, August 27, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to paragraph 5b of the Arrangement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning trade in cotton textiles between Japan and the United States effected by the Exchange of Notes today, I wish to inform you of the views and intentions of the United States Government:

The United States Government recognizes that exports of the end products containing fabrics potentially falling under the so-called concentration clause are themselves subject to limits established in Annex A of the Arrangement. It further recognizes that changing demands in the United States market may, from time to time, lead to changes in the types of fabric appearing in imports into the United States. Considering these and other circumstances, the United States Government does not intend to invoke paragraph 5b on any type of fabric except in the case of a sharp and substantial increase from present levels in imports from Japan of that fabric in the form of end items. It is to be understood that a sharp and substantial increase would be considered to apply only in those cases where present levels of imports from Japan of the fabric concerned in the form of end items already are in substantial volume in relation to total consumption in the United States.

In any event, the United States Government would give the Japanese Government advance notice prior to any invocation of the clause under discussion.

I should be grateful if you would acknowledge on behalf of your Government the receipt of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

## Japanese Reply

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I acknowledge, on behalf of my Government, receipt of your letter of August 27, 1963 which reads as follows:

[Text of United States letter.]

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

## U.S. and Japan Agree on Exports of Zipper Chain From Japan

Press release 447 dated August 28

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Government announced on August 28 the conclusion of an agreement with the Government of Japan on the export of zipper chain from Japan to the United States.

Zipper chain is the long strip of fabric and metal which goes into the making of zipper. Under the terms of the agreement the Government of Japan agrees to limit exports to the United States of zipper chain chief value of cotton to 85,000 pounds for calendar year 1964. The Government of Japan also agrees that there will be no further shipments of zipper chain chief value of cotton during the remainder of this year. The last shipments occurred in early August. For its part the United States Government agrees to admit shipments now en route to the United States.

The exchange of letters between Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs G. Griffith Johnson effecting this agreement follows.

### EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

#### Japanese Letter

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1963.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: With reference to the recent discussions held in Washington between representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America with regard to the export of zipper chain from Japan to the United States, I wish to state the understandings of my Government:

With regard to the shipment of approximately 54,000 lbs. of zipper chain in chief value of cotton now in transit to the United States and fully described in the attached shipping schedule, it is agreed that the United States Government shall use every available means to facilitate customs clearance of such shipments.

On its part, the Japanese Government confirms that there are no valid export licenses for the export to the United States of zipper chain in chief value of cotton now outstanding. In addition, the Japanese Government will suspend issuance of export licenses on the exports of zipper chain in chief value of cotton to the United States, from the present date to the end of 1963.

For the year 1964, the total amount of exports from Japan to the United States of zipper chain in chief value of cotton will be limited to 85,000 lbs.

If either Government considers it appropriate to make any arrangement concerning the product in question for the year 1965, the two Governments shall consult on the matter.

I should be grateful if you would confirm these understandings if they are acceptable to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

RYUJI TAKEUCHI

The Honorable G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON,  
Assistant Secretary of State  
for Economic Affairs,  
Department of State.

### ATTACHMENT

SHIPPING SCHEDULE OF ZIPPER CHAIN			
Name of Vessel	Port	Date	Quantity
Brooklyn	Yokohama	August 3, 1963	13,485 lbs.
Maru	New York	August 29, 1963	
Mizukawa	Yokohama	August 7, 1963	6,950 lbs.
Maru	Los Angeles	August 21, 1963	
President	Yokohama	August 10, 1963	33,098 lbs.
Taylor	Los Angeles	August 21, 1963	
TOTAL			53,533 lbs.

### United States Reply

AUGUST 28, 1963

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 28, 1963, which reads as follows:

[Text of Japanese letter.]

I wish to confirm on behalf of my Government the understandings set forth in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

His Excellency  
RYUJI TAKEUCHI,  
Ambassador of Japan,  
Embassy of Japan.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI, A, 3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at Vienna October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, August 22, 1963.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.<sup>1</sup>  
*Accession deposited:* Malagasy Republic, July 31, 1963.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.<sup>1</sup>  
*Accession deposited:* Malagasy Republic, July 31, 1963.

#### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.<sup>1</sup>  
*Signatures affixed at Washington:* Chad, Switzerland, August 26, 1963; Cameroon, Dahomey, Morocco, August 27, 1963; Uganda, August 29, 1963; Korea, Nepal, Upper Volta, August 30, 1963.

#### Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.  
*Accessions deposited:* Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, August 2, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, for the protection of industrial property revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, and at London June 2, 1934. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1935. 53 Stat. 1748.  
*Notification that it considers itself bound:* Congo (Brazzaville), June 26, 1963.

#### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.  
*Ratification deposited:* Poland, July 8, 1963.

### BILATERAL

#### Afghanistan

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Kabul August 20, 1963. Entered into force August 20, 1963.

#### Argentina

Agreement relating to the effectiveness of United States schedules to the trade agreement of October 14, 1941 (56 Stat. 1685). Effected by exchange

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

of notes at Buenos Aires July 24, 1963. Entered into force July 24, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Buenos Aires August 21, 1963. Entered into force August 21, 1963.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Buenos Aires November 5, 1956. Entered into force November 5, 1956. TIAS 3687.  
*Terminated:* August 21, 1963 (superseded by agreement of August 21, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5, 1956 (TIAS 3687), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes. Signed at Buenos Aires February 26 and December 27, 1957. Entered into force December 27, 1957. TIAS 3992.

*Terminated:* August 21, 1963 (superseded by agreement of August 21, 1963, *supra*).

Agreement amending the agreement of November 5, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3687, 3992), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires May 8 and 17, 1961. Entered into force May 17, 1961. TIAS 4769.  
*Terminated:* August 21, 1963 (superseded by agreement of August 21, 1963, *supra*).

### EURATOM

Amendment to the additional agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy of June 11, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4650, 5104). Signed at Brussels and at Washington August 22 and 27, 1963. Enters into force on the day on which each party shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

### Iraq

Cultural agreement. Signed at Baghdad January 23, 1961.  
*Entered into force:* August 13, 1963.

### Japan

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 27, 1963. Entered into force August 27, 1963.

### Mexico

Convention for the solution of the problem of the Chamizal. Signed at México August 29, 1963. Enters into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification at México.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Consulate at Durban Raised to Consulate General

The Department of State announced on August 21 (Department notice) that on August 19 the American consulate at Durban, Republic of South Africa, was elevated to the rank of consulate general. Francis O. Allen, the principal officer, has been appointed consul general.

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No.	Date	Subject
*439	8/26	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*440	8/26	Harriman: Central Committee of the World Council of Churches (excerpts).
441	8/26	Textile arrangement with Japan.
*441-A	8/27	Descriptions of "schedule A" numbers in U.S.-Japan textile arrangement.
†442	8/27	Manning: "Foreign Policy: Building Amid Turbulence."
*443	8/27	Itinerary for visit of King and Queen of Afghanistan.
*444	8/27	Cultural exchange.
†445	8/29	Vice President Johnson's visit to north European countries (rewrite).
446	8/29	World Affairs Conference, Albany, N.Y.
447	8/28	Agreement with Japan on zipper chain.
†448	8/29	Convention with Mexico on Chamizal.
449	8/29	Netherlands compensation program for Nazi victims broadened.
450	8/30	Appointments to Advisory Committee on Arts (rewrite).
451	8/30	Drama panel to study problems of presenting theater abroad (rewrite).
*454	8/30	U.S. participation in international conferences.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## Digest of International Law Volume I

The Department of State has released the first volume of a new *Digest of International Law*, by Dr. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser. The *Digest* is a successor to the Hackworth *Digest* published in 1940.

The new *Digest* is in the nature of a reference book, containing materials, official and unofficial, intended to inform the user as to the status of developments regarding particular aspects of international law.

Chapter I of Volume I treats of theories of international law, its subjects and sources, its relationship to local law, and efforts toward its codification.

Chapter II deals with the legal status of present-day states, territories, and governments, and their classification. Included are listings and groupings of states and governments, with information as to origin, changes, official names, etc. Recent evolutions in the structure of the British Commonwealth and of the French Community are among the topics discussed.

Volume I of the *Digest of International Law* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4.25.

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THE  
DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE  
**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1265*



*September 23, 1963*

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# Foreign Policy: Building Amid Turbulence

by Robert J. Manning  
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>

The transfer from the world of journalism to the world of government, particularly in the field of foreign affairs, requires less transformation than some might suspect. I made this transfer less than 2 years ago and have found that there are numberless similarities between the journalistic job of trying to make foreign policy intelligible and the governmental job of trying to make it work. Of the many similar problems, one of the most exasperating and—when the chips are down—most perilous is the problem of arriving at a sufficient state of certainty about what is going on and what it all means.

In both government and journalism the temptation is always strong to wait for more of the facts, more of the returns, before committing the front page to a headline or a national government to a deed. For journalism, the temptation is arbitrarily removed by the arrival of

the deadline. For government, except in instances of the most decisive international events, the temptation to wait is not so clearly or so easily erased. The germs of procrastination sit in the system of even the most active government activist. Obviously there are many perils in the process of making decisions or launching policies before all the facts fit into a neat computation that says, "This is precisely how it is," and "This is precisely what we must do." But there are perils, too, in putting off action in the hope that another day or another week will produce information that makes the decision more obvious. The newspaper must meet its deadline. The government must act before it is too late to forestall adversity or to seize opportunity. What is more, the procrastination frequently proves to be profitless.

Perhaps I may illustrate this with a seemingly frivolous anecdote. Once, on a news reporting visit to an East African country, I met an American who had taken up residence there some 2 months before. He complained of the difficulty

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Hospital Association, at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 27 (press release 442).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1265 PUBLICATION 7599 SEPTEMBER 23, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic \$8.50, foreign \$12.25; single copy, 25 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

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of clearly understanding the thinking of many of the officials he was required to deal with. "The more specifically and deliberately one of them speaks or writes, the less meaning you should attach to it," he decided. "It is when he gets vague that you should look for meaning." As an example he told of discovering one morning that a new cafe had opened not far from his roominghouse. A sign proclaimed its name: "The Open and Closed Cafe." Puzzling over what had inspired the proprietor to use that particular name, he was relieved one day to see a sign painter at work, obviously altering the cafe's sign. He thought that at last there might be some clarification. When he went to examine the results, he saw that the sign had indeed been altered. It now read: "The Open and Closed Cafe—100%." The American was, of course, even more puzzled than before.

This prolog must serve as a caveat for this occasion. In our time of fast-multiplying and swiftly moving international events no man can stand before you and review such events—and the policies that are fitted to them—with the certainty that all the assessments of the moment will look the same in tomorrow's sunrise. But the odds are that tomorrow's new information will leave the situation still as imprecise and still as demanding of the calculated risks and visceral decisionmaking that is a necessity of modern-day foreign policy. With that in the background, I should like today to discuss some of the overriding themes of American foreign policy in the 1960's and some precise cases of that policy in action.

#### **American Involvement Throughout the World**

The phrase "Building Amid Turbulence" implies what is both most difficult and most ambitious about this country's foreign policy. It would be difficult enough were this country faced only by the job of coping with and containing the turbulence that engulfs the world today. The task far surpasses that. The job, which we have in part inherited and in part assumed by our assumption of what human existence is—or ought to be—about, is not only to maintain the peace, to protect and promote narrow national interests, and to keep the tur-

bulence at bay. That might be a description of the America of the past, when we tried to turn our backs on the world, tend our own gardens, and hum "River stay 'way from my door." We have found since the war that the achievement of these relatively limited aims is not enough; that our true security and our true guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of what passes for happiness lie in a far more ambitious involvement throughout the world—an involvement that engages us as leader of the struggle of the world of choice against the world of coercion; an involvement that requires us to build, or help others to build, new economic and social institutions, to build new channels through which the riches of the world can be more widely distributed and injustices erased, to transform a climate of fear into an atmosphere of trust and stability.

No corps of engineers sets out to build a huge dam without first diverting the course of the river so that strong foundations may first be laid. Yet those who would build the better and safer world must do their building amid the very torrent of events.

That is why foreign policy reaches today into every American home. That is why our overseas economic commitments are such that we require a favorable gap of more than \$5 billion between our exports and our imports merely to stay even on the books. That is why 600,000 Americans in uniform now serve overseas and the largest defense establishment in all history stands behind them. That is why throughout the world, wherever the torrents of change and of trouble run high, there can be found an interest, an impulse, a danger, or an involvement that has a direct pertinence to American interests. The torrents of today on every continent are torrents of change; the direction in which that change takes the many nations and peoples involved has a direct bearing on our own lives and our own nation's future. If the direction is toward the world of coercion, this basic interest is directly threatened. Where else, then, can we or should we be but in the middle of the torrents?

There may be many differences of opinion in this country about when, where, and how the building ought to be done. We have been seeing in recent days in the Congress one serious mani-

festation of that difference of opinion. I refer to the unfortunate aberration in the House of Representatives last week when deep cuts were made in the United States overseas aid program.<sup>2</sup> Unless restored, those cuts will undermine one of the Government's most basic means of furthering the national interest. I am aware that this association does not have to be convinced of the importance of a healthy foreign aid program. And I cannot believe there is any deep-down doubt in most American minds that our massive involvement in nation building and institution building is a necessity. The simple fact is that if we don't try, others will keep trying anyway—to the detriment not merely of American ideals but, to repeat, also to the detriment of American interest.

In spite of the manifestations in the current fight over AID appropriations it is evident that the big essentials, the gut interests of today's foreign policy, still rest on a very broad bipartisan acceptance of the realities of the day and of the national objectives. It would be of little value merely to list a rollcall of those realities, as they appear to Washington, and the infinite variety of individual policies and objectives. Instead, I might more usefully single out three or four of the major foreign policy matters that currently preoccupy the country. First and foremost, of course, is the basic conflict between communism and the non-Communist world.

### **Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

The cold war has become intensely more complex and subtle in recent years. But let us face the most important reality first: It is still very much with us and will be for a long time to come. The limited nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow and considered for consent to ratification before the United States Senate<sup>3</sup> represents a significant sunbeam in a long and cloudy siege of deadlock and crises. Its culmination repre-

sents an acceptance in the big-power capitals of an assumption that has underlaid the disarmament efforts of all three of our Presidents in the nuclear age: the beliefs of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy that the risks of an unlimited nuclear arms race are eminently greater than those inherent in a careful, safeguarded progress toward arms control. There are understandable concerns and reservations about the limited test prohibition. You may hear some of them from your next speaker today. But it is inconceivable to me that any should find cause for fear or for mourning in the fact that man may have taken the first slight step away from the mechanism by which he can demolish himself and his planet. Obviously, once the limited treaty goes into effect, this country must take all the steps needed to protect our present nuclear position and to avoid being trapped into disadvantage by sudden violations.

The meticulous scrutiny which the Senate is devoting to the nuclear test ban treaty gives every American an opportunity to assay what it provides and what it does not provide. Admittedly, with such powers as Communist China and France thus far refusing to go along, the treaty will not in itself halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the existence of such a treaty signed by perhaps as many as 90 governments will surely have an inhibiting effect on the indiscriminate spread of nuclear power. It is significant in this regard that in one of the most volatile parts of the world, both the Israelis and the Arabs are signing the treaty.

Perhaps the mutual interest that has brought Moscow around to the limited test ban can lead to other steps that slow down or, one hopes, actually reverse the deadly spiral of nuclear armament. In concert with its NATO allies the United States will explore any means that can carry the cold-war antagonists further into that little-explored, thinly populated geography known as the area of accommodation. But this limited first step has required years of patient willingness on the part of the West to refuse to take no for an answer. If there is to be further progress in the near future, it will be limited at best, revolving chiefly around those particularly dangerous postures and confronta-

<sup>2</sup> See p. 476.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314; for a statement by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, see *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

tions that pose for each side the risk of incidents that could lead to unwanted war.

We must resist groundless optimism about early prospects for further important advances in East-West relations. As President Kennedy made clear in his American University address of June 10,<sup>4</sup> the United States will stubbornly pursue all possible roads to a safe and workable accommodation with the Soviet Union. This country will keep working to solve or at least de-fuse those problems between the great powers that are dangerous and could lead to war. In the case of the limited test ban it is obvious that all the negotiating parties—Moscow, Washington, and London—were motivated by the belief that a cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space furthers their individual national interests. As Secretary of State Rusk said to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Khrushchev shares with us “a mutual interest in avoiding mutual destruction.”

It will be at best a long time before the fundamental differences between the Communist and free worlds disappear. This basic fact should temper all rejoicing at the limited progress achieved last month in Moscow. The deep ideological conflict remains. The Russians still believe in and seek a world that will be all Communist. We believe in a pluralistic society, a world in which choice is free, in which the tyranny of one is precluded by the tolerance of many. As recently as January, Mikhail Suslov, one of Mr. Khrushchev's most authoritative dogmatists, reaffirmed communism's enmity to peaceful coexistence in the realm of ideology. Coexistence with democratic social systems was possible, he said, but coexistence with democratic ideas was “impossible and unthinkable.” This, as Arthur Schlesinger remarked recently, is “an authorized characterization of the impotence of communism before non-Communist ideas.” More than that, it is fair warning that the Moscow goal, like the Peiping goal, remains a monolithic world, a world made over to the image of communism's dogmatic ideology. Russian leaders and the Russian press still talk of continued ideological, economic, and political

struggle and they still support, as we know from Viet-Nam, from Cuba, and elsewhere, the violence and infiltration which Mr. Khrushchev attempts to enoble by equating them with “national liberation.”

#### Healthy Debate in Western Alliance

One great factor in the ability and willingness of the West to prevail in the long ideological conflict that still lies ahead will be the outcome of the ferment now under way within our own alliance family. Though you may hear many versions, the fact is that this ferment is both healthy and inevitable. It is important to distinguish between what is deeply and basically agreed among the North American and European allies and what is currently being debated and negotiated among us. What is deepest and most basic is the unanimous agreement on the necessity for the alliance, its military security and its mechanisms for enhancing the political and economic cooperation of its members. What is also agreed is that NATO's concerns and responsibilities extend far beyond the geography of its members. What is also agreed is that the circumstances that attended NATO's birth 14 years ago have radically changed with the rise of Western Europe from destruction to a prosperity and an economic strength that equals our own. Out of this have arisen issues and questions that preoccupy the NATO governments. These are not questions about the value or the advisability of maintaining the alliance; they are questions about where we go from here, about how we build and conduct the alliance for the business that lies ahead. In short, the questioning and the debate are about *how* we continue to work together in close military, economic, and political concert, not *whether* we so continue.

It is important to keep this distinction in mind as in the months and years to come we discuss and negotiate with the Western European governments the important trade, monetary, and military questions that are posed by Europe's rise to prosperity and by its accompanying increase of rights and responsibilities. Short term, the most pressing issues within the alliance are those concerned with trade, with

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

deficiencies and imbalance in the shares of the load borne by individual allies, and with adjustments made necessary by the failure of Britain thus far to gain entry to the Common Market. In the trade negotiations that are to develop in earnest next year this country has, of course, a heavy stake. The negotiations are not going to be easy. Some will result in arrangements that will cause some pain and require some adjustments here at home. Some may induce considerably more stress and strain within the alliance. It is probably fair to say, however, that all the NATO countries see a mutual stake in expanding trade to the maximum. This is important not only for its benefit to the countries. It is also essential if the rich and productive nations are going to tackle—as they must—the inequable division of the things of life on this planet.

A longer term issue within the alliance is the perplexing problem of nuclear management. As the West European allies have gained in strength, they have also come to desire a greater role in the supervision of their primary military power, the West's nuclear arsenal. Almost all of the nuclear strength available to NATO sits in the United States arsenal. In response to the Allies' desires this country has taken steps to bring the NATO governments into closer participation in the supervising and targeting of this arsenal as it relates to the security of Europe. This Government also has offered to consider with the Allies more specific measures to assure outright alliance participation in the control of nuclear power. Thus far, some general American ideas for solving this control problem through a seaborne multilateral nuclear force have elicited interest in several Allied capitals. Their experts are now meeting regularly in Washington to plot details of the proposed force. It seems to me that one certainty dictates that a solution will be achieved: That is the fact that by the very nature of the alliance and of the nuclear age the West's nuclear deterrent is indivisible. It is inconceivable that there could be an alliance in which separate national nuclear establishments would plan nuclear strategy or employ nuclear weapons independently of the strategies and actions of other Allied governments.

Progress on this question need not be speedy. The West's nuclear position is excellent, and Western Europe's security is assured by the existence and the deployment of U.S. nuclear strength. So we have time to thrash out the many complexities of this issue, and I believe we can be confident that in the long term a workable arrangement will evolve.

### **Complexities of Vietnamese Situation**

In that vast portion of the world where new nations are rising, new institutions are being shaped, and choices of social systems and ideologies are being made, one could talk at length of the dangers and problems that are posed for us.

Time does not permit this, but it is not possible to range over U.S. foreign policy today without some mention of the situation in Viet-Nam. My expertise on this subject is flimsy indeed, but I did have the opportunity to visit Viet-Nam recently, as the trouble there was building up to crisis proportions.

In spite of the martial law and censorship that now prevail the newspapers are keeping you well up to date on the steps the Vietnamese Government has taken against Buddhist and other anti-Government demonstrators in that country. The United States deplores the Vietnamese Government's acts of violence and suppression and has made that plain.<sup>5</sup> What happens next in that unhappy situation is obviously of the most serious concern to this country, for here, in a way that is of the most complex and trying variety, United States policy is deeply involved.

First, let us examine the nature of this American involvement. The United States is spending a great deal of money in South Viet-Nam—to help the Vietnamese fight to save their country from communism. Several thousand American military men are stationed in Viet-Nam to advise and guide the Vietnamese in that war. It is a war of the dirtiest, trickiest kind, in which Communist guerrillas, supplied and directed from outside, mingle combat with terrorism against civilians and depredation of the countryside. It is a war for the loyalty of a whole people. Our role is difficult, quite unlike

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 398.

ny we have played elsewhere. The war is a Vietnamese war. They are fighting it; they are directing it. Our role is confined to advisory, logistic, and technical assistance. Admittedly some of this is of the most intimate kind—so intimate that more than 50 Americans have given their lives.

But it is only the Vietnamese who can fight this war. We can help the Vietnamese, but we cannot do the job for them. Nor do they ask us to; the Vietnamese took 4,400 dead last year, and they have shown that they are prepared to go on doing the fighting.

The Vietnamese war can be looked at through many angles of a prism. The country is an important piece of strategic real estate, potentially an excellent base for further Communist aggression against the rest of free Asia should the Communists win it. It represents a moral commitment with the Vietnamese, on the outskirts of the free world, fighting not just for themselves but in behalf of all free men. Our part in it can be looked upon variously as a part of our commitment to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; as a fulfillment of an obligation we acquired at the Geneva Conference of 1954 that we would regard any renewal of aggression as a violation of the Geneva Agreement; as a human commitment to help the nearly 1 million Vietnamese who have fled from the north to avoid living under communism; as an important test case of whether the free world can and will help a nation defend its freedom. No matter through which prism you look, you see clearly and undeniably that all the many elements of American policy and American interest that I have tried to describe earlier are represented in the one fierce and demanding microcosm of Viet-Nam.

Obviously, any development that distracts or discourages the people of Viet-Nam from continuing their brave fight must be viewed with alarm. Such is the development that has taken place in the last 3½ months in the Government's dispute with the Vietnamese Buddhists. Though its origin lay in certain religious grievances felt by some Buddhist leaders, the protest plainly had expanded into major political unrest by the time that the government of President Diem moved to crack down.

Especially ironic is that stability within Viet-Nam should be so disturbed at a time when the military and political experts had concluded that the tide had turned in Viet-Nam. Through 1961 and much of 1962 the Communists were gaining and the Vietnamese people were losing. Beginning last year, the trend turned the other way. No more provincial capitals have been taken by the Viet Cong guerrillas. Saigon is once again exporting rice, where before production was cut and delivery prevented by Viet Cong strength in the rural areas. Communist military activity in the first half of 1962 compared with that in the first half of this year provides other evidence of progress. In the first half of 1962 there were 10,270 Viet Cong incidents, including more than 3,000 armed attacks. In the first 6 months of this year incidents dropped by one-third, while armed attacks were down by 36 percent. The scale of attacks also declined. More important—because this is not just a fighting war but also a struggle to build up the security and living standards of the population—it is estimated that in the past year the Government of Viet-Nam added nearly 1 million people to the number of its citizens which it effectively protects from the Viet Cong. This has been done chiefly through the so-called strategic-hamlet program, which is an across-the-board political, economic, and military response to the Communist threat.

There are disturbing spots in the picture, and in some parts of the country the fighting and the hamlet program are not moving as effectively as in other areas. But the point is that through the long ordeal freedom has been gaining in Viet-Nam and the evidence is strong that the Vietnamese can win their war and save their nation.

Will the current troubles in Viet-Nam undo this progress and enhance the opportunities of the Communists? One can well ask, but one cannot wisely offer a very precise answer at this juncture. It seems evident, however, that, with a stake so great as that I have tried to describe and with the possibilities of victory so demonstrable, we must exert every effort to see that it does not happen. Plainly this is no easy task. The United States does not run the sovereign Government of Viet-Nam. It cannot lightly

## General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1963

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

abandon the main fight out of anger at policies that it deplors. There is no easy formula whereby the current situation can be righted quickly, but we must hope that the Vietnamese leaders will find the means to a peaceable settlement before the dispute undermines Viet-Nam's more fundamental need—to win the war.

For the United States, obviously the consideration must be that Viet-Nam maintains a real will to keep fighting the Viet Cong.

In any event, one who attempts, as I have attempted here, to demonstrate some of the perplexities and complexities of foreign policy could not ask for a more dramatic example than the one offered by the Vietnamese situation.

It should be neither surprising nor dismaying that we find ourselves involved in such perplexities. If we are not yet accustomed to it, we must learn to be. In the years ahead we will face such choices and such demands many times over, for these are the unavoidable trials of a people that chooses to lead the fight for freedom. I think we are showing as a nation that the task is not too great for us, that we have the will and resources to help make real a belief once movingly stated by the late William Faulkner: "I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure. . . . I believe that man will not merely endure; he will prevail. . . ."

It has become customary in this day of nuclear hazard to punctuate that credo with a question mark. It is an intolerable doubt, and we should experience elation as we pursue policies designed to exorcise that doubt in ways that lead mankind not only to prevail but to prevail with the freedom of consent, the freedom of action, and the freedom of mind that are the reasons why prevailing is worth the battle. That is what I think foreign policy is all about.

WHEREAS, as we work toward political, social, and economic freedom for all nations everywhere, we remember the time when we ourselves were not free; and

WHEREAS we recall with gratitude the gallant efforts of men of other nations who helped us to win our own independence; and


WHEREAS a leader among those men was Casimir Pulaski, who opposed foreign interference in his native Poland, who joined the cause of American independence by volunteering in the Continental Army, and who served that cause brilliantly until his death on October 11, 1779, from a wound incurred during a cavalry charge in the city of Savannah; and

WHEREAS, in remembering General Pulaski's contribution to our past, we are reminded of our debt to the future to further the cause of universal freedom;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Friday, October 11, 1963—the one hundred and eighty-fourth anniversary of his death—as General Pulaski's Memorial Day; and call upon officials of the Government to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings on that day. I also invite the people of the United States to observe the day with appropriate ceremonies in recognition of General Pulaski's dedication to liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 27th day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-three and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:  
DEAN RUSK,  
Secretary of State.

<sup>1</sup> No. 3550; 28 Fed. Reg. 9559.

## The Uses of Diversity

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The Secretary-General, who honors us by his presence here this morning, will welcome you to the United Nations. My pleasure is to welcome you to the State of New York and to the United States of America.

You are meeting, as well you know, in the world's most antique democracy. I think you will find it also one of the world's liveliest. Ever since our forefathers got carried away with some heady ideas about human dignity and personal freedom and equal rights for all men we have been having a lively time trying to make good on their promises. Right now we are busy trying to correct the worst and the oldest gap between promise and performance. You will have to pardon us if we sometimes seem to be too busy arguing among ourselves to argue with our visitors.

Perhaps, Mr. Secretary-General, you will recall some words spoken several years ago about the nature of this democracy of ours. You might recall them because they were spoken in this city by a former Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, with whom you were associated before you left your national launching pad, as Dag Hammarskjöld used to say, and went into orbit as servant to the international community.

U Nu had spent several days in a hospital on the East River, and he spoke at a luncheon in his honor of the amazing sights and the overpowering size of this metropolis. Then he said:

One night I sat up on the terrace roof well past my bedtime and gazed out on the city. I was away from

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the World Federation of United Nations Associations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 9 (press release 460, revised).

the noise and distraction. Here I seemed to sense the great pulse that beats under the surface of your city. And I thought that the power of New York lies not in any of these massive physical characteristics. . . . It seemed to me that the greatest thing of all was the living lesson that New York offers the world: that peoples from many lands, many races, many cultures, many religions can live together and work together; not only can they co-exist, but all of them seem to draw at least some little something from each other that makes them more complete and that adds vigor and endurance to their lives. . . .

Perhaps out of this kind of ferment, out of this kind of contact between peoples of such varied backgrounds, out of this kind of diversity can come the new ideas and the new way of looking at things that are so badly needed in our world. . . .

Those words were well received here, because we glory in the description of our society as the "great melting pot." It is, of course, nothing of the sort.

The racial and ethnic and national groups that came here, and read a sign in the harbor saying, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me . . .," didn't fly apart after they became Americans. They clove to each other; they huddled together for protection against the other groups that had already come, and against those further waves of strangers that kept rolling in past the Statue of Liberty and populating a continent with a nation of foreigners.

No, the relevant cliché is not the melting pot but U Nu's word: "diversity." The newer Americans and the older Americans learned in time to tolerate each other. They rubbed up against each other, and they discovered not that all men are brothers—that is an early, easier lesson—but that all brothers are different, which is a later, harder lesson because it means learning about the value of difference.

You who visit us for a few weeks may find us in consequence a little confusing. Some of you come from societies which can describe their goals and define their "system" with well-honed words from ancient texts or modern manifestoes. Don't ask us for our manifesto—all you will get will be a blank stare.

For we don't have a "system." We have, if anything, a protected plurality of systems. The Englishman, Edmund Burke, in his famous speech about how to get along with those wild men across the Atlantic, said in despair that our religion is "the dissidence of dissent." Americans, he thought, were "a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood." What makes it so hard for our own historians to capture and record the American way of life is precisely that our way of life is a living denial of the dogma that any one man's view of society, or any one group's view of society, is the correct, approved version.

The one essential thing about American democracy is this: that no individual or group ever gains the exclusive right to say authoritatively what American democracy is.

#### **U.N., a Citadel of Diversity**

You are meeting today in the very citadel of diversity, the seat of an organization with the misleading name United Nations. United we certainly are not. We are gloriously, irretrievably diverse—diverse in social organization, in economic theories, in political ideas; diverse in attitudes and alliances, in wealth and power; diverse, too, in the stages of development.

Because we are diverse, our United Nations is an intensely practical organization. For what makes diversity work, as we have found here at home, is not men's ability to agree on philosophy or broad principles but the fact that they can agree on what to do next, while continuing to disagree about why they are doing it.

Some may agree to take the "next step" because they see their interests served thereby; others may see a mandate for the same "next step" in some religious text or economics textbook; still others may go along because they don't want to offend those who are proposing

the step be taken. The reasons for common action can be mutually inconsistent—in any large organization I think they often are, and in the United Nations almost always so.

If we had to wait around until two-thirds of the delegates who meet in this place could agree as to why they were agreeing, no resolution would ever be passed and the United Nations would not today be spending more than half a billion dollars a year for peacekeeping and nation building.

What unites this diversity, then, is not so much a paper agreement on philosophy as a practical consensus on procedure, a pragmatic agreement on how decisions will be made and who will carry them into action. It is no accident that the Charter of the United Nations contains 4 pages of philosophy followed by 40 pages of procedure.

A marvelously practical system it is; if we sat down in this place to write the charter again, it is highly improbable that we would do as well.

As the U.N. has grown in maturity, in strength, and in relevance to the major issues of the day, it has collected enemies in every nation as well as friends. Your United Nations Associations in every land bear the brunt of defending the organization against political attack; so there is no need to remind you of the gloomy forecasts that have regularly been made about it.

The onset of the cold war, the crisis in Korea, the chronic warring in the Middle East, the chaotic ordeal in the Congo, the growing gap between the rich countries and the poor countries—each test of international cooperation has produced its crop of doomsayers. The detractors of the forties were certain the organization would die of anemia; the latter-day detractors are more inclined to predict the organization's demise from overindulgence.

But they share a common characteristic: They are wrong.

The U.N.'s capacity to act—which is its most precious asset—has grown from year to year. It has outlived a succession of threats to its existence—each time, like Ulysses, emerging stronger from the trial. As Adlai Stevenson has said, the United Nations was built for trouble and thrives on it.

## Today's U.N. Machinery Inadequate

No organization can double in membership in less than two decades without putting an enormous strain on the original machinery. The machinery devised to serve the 51-member organization of 1945 is plainly inadequate for the 111-member organization of today.

For example:

—The General Assembly is cumbersome—it is, for example, the only parliamentary body in the world which still tries to do most of its work through committees of the whole.

—Some of the councils and commissions are too small to include voices from all parts of the newly independent world.

—The Office of the Secretary-General is still handling an extraordinary range of peacemaking tasks by putting an impossible burden on a handful of overworked men.

—The United Nations has now undertaken 10 peacekeeping operations, but the Secretariat needs more of the military planning skills that the next emergency, and the one after that, will require.

—There is no doubt that technical aid and preinvestment work—the development of projects that make sense and the training of people who can make them work—is now the main bottleneck in the whole development process. The U.N., which teaches public administration all over the world, still has administrative improvements to make in unifying the contribution to this process of all the U.N. agencies.

## The Rules of the Game

But the biggest question about the United Nations today is not whether it will be more or less efficient. The biggest question is whether its members will stay on the course they have laid out for themselves in the charter.

In every country today voices are raised to ask: Do we really want an international organization with a significant capacity to keep the peace?

In all of the big countries this question is asked to justify a growing resistance to paying for international peacekeeping. A new slogan—"our way or no pay"—is today the official policy of several member governments, includ-

ing two of the permanent members of the Security Council.

But the rest of us can hardly claim an unsullied virtue in the matter. Our debates on U.N. financing reveal strong minority opinions to the same effect: If we are paying part of the piper, shouldn't we be calling all of the tune?

The doubts about international peacekeeping also show up among those who advocate change at any price, and those who think keeping the peace means keeping things just as they are.

In Africa today the U.N. and most of its members are in the middle—determined to bring self-determination to all peoples but anxious, and obligated under the charter, to pursue this goal by peaceful means. In every society we have citizens who in their pursuit of laudable goals are quite prepared to take the law into their own hands, convinced in their own minds that a little bloodshed will lubricate the machinery for change. The U.N. would be endangered if any of its members came to think that way.

The magnificent record of decolonization gives hope that we can yet devise in the U.N. the methods of peaceful change which will enable all the people of the southern part of Africa to exercise the rights to which the charter and their own natural dignity entitle them. But if the United Nations is going to play a central part in this process, as most of us believe it should, all parties are going to have to be willing to talk and do something about change—while maintaining the peace.

Let me say it again: A world of diversity will only work if there are some agreed rules; and rules have to be taken most seriously at moments of maximum annoyance and frustration. If a car in front of you at the stoplight fails to move when the light turns green, it is permissible to blow your horn or even to call in the proper authorities to help induce the other driver to move. It is not permissible to express your sense of outrage by ramming his car from the rear, nor can that be done without getting hurt yourself.

A related threat to the organization has developed from this same frustration about the persistence of colonial rule and racial discrim-

ination in the southern third of Africa. In several conferences this summer one group of U.N. members has tried to eject other members from the meetings. On several occasions the resulting clamor has brought important work to a standstill—and has brought disrepute to the United Nations.

There is no doubt that if a large caucus of member states is unified and determined, and is willing to ignore legal rulings and the chairman's gavel, they can succeed in making a shambles of any parliamentary body. There are plenty of instances, in the tortured history of democratic institutions, of frustrated minorities becoming so incensed that they took their frustration out on the rules of the game of democracy itself.

The claim in these instances has always been the same—that the end justified the means, that if democratic procedures frustrate purposes of obvious nobility, then democratic procedures must be cast aside. The boomerang effect of such an attitude is perhaps the clearest and most obvious lesson in all the history of freedom. All of us who owe our freedom, and our national independence, to the presence in the world of democratic procedures should think long and carefully before we cast them aside as an obstacle to the early achievement of our own immediate aims.

The specific remedy for all the viruses that currently afflict the United Nations—financial delinquency, the tension between peace and change, and the temptation to set aside the democratic rules of the charter—is simple. It is for all of us to remember, and repeat with our prayers, that what keeps a world of diversity from blowing itself into eternity is a consensus on how decisions will be made—lawyers would prefer to call it law—and a willingness to talk at tedious length with people whose principles you hate.

#### **Importance of "Next Steps"**

The creation of the U.N. did not end the competition for power among nations. It did broaden that competition, bringing in peoples and leaders from all around the globe. It did provide a place to contain the struggle—an

arena for diversity. And it may in time civilize the settlement of disputes among nations.

If we are going to have an arena, we are going to have to have rules of the game, the deadly serious game, we play there. Without them, or when they are violated at will, the civilizing game disintegrates into a free-for-all. A free-for-all is bad enough in a sports arena. In the United Nations it is a formula for nuclear-powered jungle war.

The future of these Nations United in diversity does not hang on their ability to meld their differences into the dull and unstable amalgam of resolutions on general principles. It hangs on the "next steps" we can take together in this place, to make this a world as safe as it is exciting to live in.

The action we take together had better contain the peril we share, for we all have to be brothers whether we like it or not.

## **Ninth Anniversary of SEATO**

*Statement by Secretary Rusk*

Press release 456 dated September 6, for release September 7

September 8 marks another anniversary of the signing in Manila of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.<sup>1</sup> For 9 years now SEATO has served the cause of peace and progress in the treaty area through the principle of collective security.

The application of collective security is based on strength and in unity of purpose. Our combined strength is ample to meet the menace of Communist power threatening the area from the north. The persistence of Communist attempts to undermine SEATO offers continuing evidence of our alliance's value as an obstacle to the achievement of Communist objectives.

This anniversary provides me the opportunity to reaffirm that the United States remains firm in its resolve to meet its SEATO obligations so that, in cooperation with the efforts of other members, SEATO's influence on behalf of peace and security in the troubled area of Southeast Asia will be maintained.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

# The International Monetary Fund: Its Work and Its Future

by Mortimer D. Goldstein

The Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund will hold its 18th annual meeting at Washington, D.C., from September 30 through October 4, 1963. It is likely that this meeting will attract an unusual degree of public attention in the United States. As a result of their growing consciousness of the U.S. balance-of-payments problem and of the measures taken to solve it, Americans are becoming more interested in international finance. Interest in the Fund, in particular, has been stimulated by the President's recent announcement that the United States had made arrangements to draw on the Fund's resources for the first time.<sup>1</sup>

This article has been prepared in response to the heightened interest in the International Monetary Fund. It provides basic information on the Fund—why it was established, what its policies are, how it operates—and explains the ways in which its work is of direct concern to the United States. Also reviewed are some of the current proposals for modifying the Fund in order to strengthen the international monetary system. Ideas of this kind may well receive further attention at the Governors' meeting.

## Establishment and Purpose of the Fund

In July 1944, responding to the deep-seated desire to organize the peace even while fighting the war, 44 nations met at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, N.H., to consider how they might establish postwar financial conditions conducive

<sup>1</sup> For the President's special message to the Congress on July 18, 1963, on the balance of payments, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

to international economic harmony, stability, and growth. The main achievements of the conference were embodied in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The central purpose of the Fund, in the words of the Articles, is:

To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.

The Articles also enumerate various purposes that support the central objective: to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly foreign exchange arrangements, to avoid competitive depreciation of exchange rates, and to assist in establishing a multilateral system of international payments for current transactions and in eliminating foreign exchange restrictions. Finally, the Articles state that the Fund is designed:

To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.

The Fund, in short, was created out of the recognition of the interdependence of the na-

• *Mr. Goldstein is Deputy Director of the Office of International Finance and Economic Analysis.*

tional economies of the world. The Fund's charter reflects the conviction that, by establishing a code of conduct for international monetary affairs, by providing the machinery for continuing consultation and cooperation on financial matters, and by assuring reasonable access to financial resources to meet national foreign exchange stringencies, the countries of the world will find it possible to avoid the overpowering financial movements of the interwar years and put an end to the aggressive, self-centered, and internationally irresponsible financial policies that characterized much of that period.

### Membership, Quotas, and Structure

The Fund's membership now includes more than 90 countries, encompassing every economically advanced country in the free world, except Switzerland, and nearly all of the less developed countries.<sup>2</sup> Each member country is assigned a quota determined after consultation between the Fund and country in the light of the size of the country's economy (volume of trade, gross national product, etc.). Fund quotas, which now total some \$15 billion, as shown in the accompanying table, are important in that each member must pay a subscription to the Fund equal to its quota, partly in gold (normally 25 percent) and the remainder in its own currency. Each member's voting power is weighted according to its quota, and, as explained below, the amount that a member may borrow from the Fund is directly linked to the size of its quota. The United States has a quota of \$4,125 million, the largest in the Fund, and one-fourth of the voting power.

The Fund deals only with the treasuries and central banks of members and not with the general public. Its day-to-day business is done at its Washington headquarters by a board of Executive Directors and a staff of international civil servants. Each of the five members having the largest quotas is entitled to appoint one Executive Director;<sup>3</sup> 13 Executive Directors are elected by the other members. The Executive

Directors select a chairman, an international civil servant, who also is the Managing Director<sup>4</sup> and directs the staff of the Fund.

A Board of Governors, which comprises one Governor and an alternate designated by each member country, holds the final power in the Fund.<sup>5</sup> It meets annually to review the work of the Fund and the state of the international economy.

Membership in the Fund signifies the acceptance of important commitments that give meaning to the concepts of cooperation and fair play in monetary affairs. By joining the Fund a member commits itself to provide regular information on its financial position, to maintain orderly rates in its exchange markets within 1 percent of a fixed par value established with the Fund, and to change the exchange rates or par value for its currency only after prescribed discussions with the Fund. Members are also committed to maintain the gold value of the Fund's assets. Thus, when a member devalues its currency, for example, it is obliged to make a payment to the Fund equal to the reduction in the gold value of the Fund's holdings of its currency.

The obligation of members with regard to currency convertibility is expressed in the general rule that, without the Fund's approval, a member may not impose restrictions for making payments for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices.

An important exception to this rule allows members temporarily to maintain exchange restrictions as a transitional matter, subject to annual consultation with the Fund. When a member surrenders its resort to this exception and becomes bound by the general rule on convertibility, its currency is regarded as convertible under the Articles. Twenty-four currencies, which finance the bulk of world trade and are issued by members with about two-thirds of the total quotas in the Fund, have thus far been

<sup>4</sup>The Managing Director is Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, of France, who recently succeeded the late Per Jacobsson, of Sweden. His deputy is Frank A. Southard, Jr., of the United States.

<sup>5</sup>The Governor for the United States is the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon. His alternate is George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup>Membership in the Fund is a precondition for membership in the International Bank and its affiliates.

<sup>3</sup>The Executive Director for the United States is William B. Dale; his alternate is John S. Hooker.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: QUOTAS AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES, JUNE 30, 1963  
(Millions of U.S. dollars, equivalent)

	Quota in IMF	IMF currency holdings <sup>1</sup>		Commitment to lend to IMF <sup>2</sup>
		Amount	Percent of quota	
All members.....	\$15,260.1	\$11,696.4	-----	\$6,000
Members with convertible currencies, <sup>3</sup> total.....	9,957.1	6,851.1	-----	5,750
United States.....	4,125.0	3,016.3	73	2,000
United Kingdom.....	1,950.0	1,455.5	75	1,000
France.....	787.5	351.9	45	550
Germany, Federal Republic of.....	787.5	267.9	34	1,000
Canada.....	550.0	688.2	125	200
Netherlands.....	412.5	214.9	52	200
Belgium.....	337.5	211.1	63	150
Italy.....	270.0	67.3	25	550
Mexico.....	180.0	135.0	75	-----
Sweden.....	150.0	102.5	68	100
Others <sup>5</sup> .....	407.1	340.5	-----	-----
Other members, total.....	5,303.0	4,845.3	-----	250
India.....	600.0	794.8	133	-----
China.....	550.0	-----	-----	-----
Japan.....	500.0	320.0	64	250
Australia.....	400.0	300.0	75	-----
Argentina.....	280.0	440.0	157	-----
Brazil.....	280.0	377.0	135	-----
Indonesia.....	165.0	206.2	125	-----
Pakistan.....	150.0	146.5	98	-----
South Africa.....	150.0	112.5	75	-----
Spain.....	150.0	105.0	70	-----
Venezuela.....	150.0	112.5	75	-----
Others <sup>5</sup> .....	1,928.0	1,930.8	-----	-----

<sup>1</sup> The Fund also held \$2,244 million in gold and \$800 million in its gold investment account.

<sup>2</sup> Commitment to lend to the Fund under the general borrowing arrangements of 1962; lending commitments are expressed in national currencies.

<sup>3</sup> As defined in the Fund Articles.

<sup>4</sup> Canada has not yet notified the Fund of its adherence to the general borrowing arrangements.

<sup>5</sup> Members with quotas of less than \$150 million.

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, August 1963.

made convertible in this sense. Though these members are not obliged to consult annually with the Fund, they are doing so in order that the Fund may keep fully informed on their financial policies.

The extent of the establishment of currency convertibility is a notable accomplishment of the Fund and its members. The maintenance of the Fund's regime of convertibility will go a long way to insure that the worst features of prewar international economic relations will not reappear.

#### Use of the Fund's Resources

A country that experiences balance-of-payments deficits may have open to it a variety of measures to rectify its position, but it is often true that the quick-acting measures will be harmful nationally or internationally, or both,

and that the more desirable, slow-acting measures will require more foreign exchange than the country can comfortably afford to spend out of its reserves. It is specially important to note that in the postwar world governmental commitments to the maintenance of full employment have made it practically impossible to counter a payments deficit by deflationary policies. One of the main functions of the Fund therefore is to tide a member over temporarily while it adjusts its policies to deal with a strain in its balance of payments. The Articles include various rules on the amount of money the Fund may provide, the charges members must pay, and other conditions for using the Fund's resources; and the Fund has enunciated certain policies to supplement the provisions of the Articles. Before exploring this area, however, it would be useful to review the processes of borrowing from and repaying the Fund.

The Fund holds large amounts of member currencies initially received as subscriptions (ordinarily 75 percent of quota). When the Fund makes a loan, it provides foreign currencies from its holdings to the borrower, and the borrower pays the Fund an equivalent amount of its own currency. Thus a loan—more properly called a drawing—represents a purchase by a member of a foreign currency with its own currency; a repayment represents a repurchase by the member of its own currency with another currency (or gold).

A member's position in the Fund, then, is reflected by the amount of its currency held by the Fund. If the United States, for example, draws (borrows) from the Fund, its debt will show up as an *increase* in the Fund's holdings of dollars. When the United States pays its debt, its improved position with the Fund will show up as a *decrease* in the Fund's holdings of dollars. Similarly, when, say, Mexico draws dollars from the Fund, the position of the United States is improved. And when Mexico repurchases its own currency from the Fund by paying dollars, the position of the United States in the Fund is affected as though the United States had itself put dollars in the Fund in exchange for a foreign currency.

To sum up, the position of a country in the Fund is represented by the Fund's holdings of its currency in relation to its quota, the "normal" position being represented by holdings equal to 75 percent of quota. A decline in that percentage means an improvement in the member's position (credit) on the Fund's books; an increase in that percentage, of course, has the opposite significance.

The Fund Articles provide that a member may not, without a waiver by the Executive Directors, draw more than the equivalent of 25 percent (net) of its quota in a period of 12 months, nor may it draw beyond the point at which the Fund's holdings of its currency equal 200 percent of its quota.<sup>6</sup> The 25-percent limitation has frequently been waived by the Fund; the 200-percent limitation has not yet been waived.

<sup>6</sup>The 200-percent limitation means, in effect, that, starting with a currency subscription of 75 percent, a member may not make net drawings in excess of 125 percent of its quota without a waiver.

## Policies on Drawings

In deciding on a member's request to draw, the Fund observes the following policies:

1. For a drawing that does not raise the Fund's holdings of the member's currency above 100 percent of its quota, the member will receive the overwhelming benefit of the doubt. This policy means that a member has virtually automatic access to Fund assistance in an amount equal to its initial gold subscription, adjusted by any Fund operations in its currency.

2. For a drawing that does not raise the Fund's holdings above 125 percent of quota, the Fund will approve if the member shows that it is making reasonable efforts to deal with its financial problems.

3. For a drawing beyond this point, the Fund requires a substantial justification: a showing that the member has set up a sound program aimed at establishing or maintaining the enduring stability of its currency at a realistic rate of exchange. Such programs of currency stabilization are often worked out by members in consultation with the Fund, and the main commitments of a stabilization program may be formally embodied in the terms on which the Fund approves the member's request to draw.

It is possible for a member that perceives the likelihood of a need to draw on the Fund in the near-term future, rather than immediately, to enter into a standby arrangement with the Fund. Under such an arrangement, which normally runs for a year, the member is assured of access to the Fund's resources up to an agreed amount, ordinarily without further Fund action. In some instances drawings under a standby arrangement are contingent on the maintenance of economic policies agreed to between the member and the Fund.

The criteria followed by the Fund in approving standby arrangements—permissible amounts, terms and conditions, etc.—are the same as those that are applied to immediate drawings. The standby technique has proved to be a highly useful creation of the Fund; more often than not in recent years drawings have been made pursuant to, rather than in absence of, a standby arrangement.

As a general rule a member that draws from the Fund undertakes to repay within a maxi-

num period of 3 to 5 years. Earlier repurchases are often made, either voluntarily or according to a requirement that a member make a repurchase if its monetary reserves increase sufficiently. Of course, a member's repurchase obligation is reduced to the extent that other members draw its currency from the Fund. Repurchases must be made in gold or in a convertible currency that is below the 75-percent level in the Fund.

Drawings and repurchase operations of the Fund affect the position of both the country engaging in them and the country whose currency is used. A country in balance-of-payments difficulties of its own, for example, might find its problems complicated by drawings in its currency, though it would probably welcome repurchases made in its currency. It is therefore the policy of the Fund, following consultation with interested members, to use its influence to guide drawings and repurchases into specific currencies in the light of the balance-of-payments and reserve positions of the members and of the size of the Fund holdings of various currencies.

From the time the Fund began operations in 1947 until June 30, 1963, the members have drawn close to the equivalent of \$7 billion. In the period 1947-55 the Fund's operations were quite small; drawings averaged less than \$150 million a year. The level of activity of the Fund turned up sharply after 1955, and in the period 1956-62 drawings averaged almost \$800 million a year. Though two large drawings by the United Kingdom were important factors in raising the average, drawings by the smaller countries, particularly the less developed countries, greatly increased in number. For example, leaving aside the United Kingdom, 21 members drew the equivalent of almost \$1 billion in 1961; 15 members had standby facilities in force with the Fund at the end of the year.

The increase in the Fund's activity in recent years can be attributed in considerable part to a greater awareness in the Fund of the problems of the less developed countries and a greater awareness in those countries of the ways in which the Fund can help in the solution of their problems. A new feature of the Fund's policy on drawings that has special

relevance for the less developed countries is discussed below.

### Recent Developments in the Fund

The tempo of the development of the Fund's activities and policies has picked up markedly in response to changes in the status of the currencies of the industrialized countries and the increased attention that the world is giving to the problems of the less developed areas. The restoration of the external convertibility of the main Western European currencies at the end of 1958 may be marked as a critical point in the evolution of postwar monetary affairs.

At about the same time the Fund decided to go forward with a study of the desirability of an expansion in the size of member quotas to meet prospective needs for international liquidity. This study was promptly followed by positive action; Fund quotas were increased from about \$9 billion in 1958 to \$14 billion in 1959 and to over \$15 billion a year later. Quotas were generally raised by 50 percent, with the quotas of certain countries in a position to provide an extra measure of support to the Fund—Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan—raised by an even greater percentage. Special increases were also made available to members with small quotas. By this forehanded action the Fund was equipped to deal with the new problems that arose for the monetary system when, following the restoration of convertibility, traders and investors began to move funds internationally on a large scale.

The monetary system was put to repeated tests of its resiliency after 1959. In 1960, for example, the United States suffered its largest annual payments deficit and an exceptionally heavy gold outflow that was accompanied in the autumn of the year by an extraordinary rise in the price of gold in the free market in London. In the spring of 1961 sterling experienced severe pressures; and, in the spring of 1962, the Canadian dollar was hard-pressed. Though all of these disturbances were successfully dealt with—in some instances with the assistance of drawings on the Fund—it became clear by 1961 that additional measures were needed to assure that the Fund could play its

proper role in absorbing shocks to the monetary system and, by its manifest strength, discourage speculative forays against the currencies that play a significant role in the system.

After extensive negotiations within the Fund and with the countries particularly interested, the Fund in January 1962 formulated arrangements with 10 member countries<sup>7</sup> whereby it could borrow up to the equivalent of \$6 billion, including \$2 billion from the United States, when it needed supplementary resources to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international monetary system in the new conditions of widespread convertibility, including greater freedom for short-term capital movements.

These general borrowing arrangements do not provide for enlarged quotas for the members; however, by establishing the Fund's access to additional resources, they provide assurance that the Fund will be able to meet its needs for usable currencies to honor fully the drawing rights under existing quotas. This assurance is of paramount importance to the United States in view of the size of its quota, which is more than double the second largest quota in the Fund.

#### **Compensatory Financing**

The recent progress of the Fund has not been confined to matters of mere size. In the past few years its framework of policy and procedure has been improved and elaborated in a number of important respects in response to the requirements of the evolving world economy. One of the innovations is of special interest to the less developed countries. In March of this year, following detailed studies in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Fund itself, the Fund created new compensatory financing arrangements supplementary to its policies on drawings described above, designed to broaden its balance-of-payments support to member countries that rely heavily on the export of primary products.

Under its established practices the Fund has in the past financed deficits resulting from declines in export earnings, and frequent drawings have been made for this purpose. The new

facility, which would not normally exceed 25 percent of a member's quota, would be available when the Fund is satisfied that a member is experiencing a temporary export shortfall attributable largely to circumstances beyond its control. The Fund must also be satisfied that the member will cooperate with the Fund in an effort to find, where required, appropriate solutions to its payments difficulties. The Fund is prepared to authorize a drawing under the new facility even if it should require a waiver of the 200-percent limitation described above.

#### **United States Interest in the Fund**

The United States has had a deep and continuing interest in the International Monetary Fund from the first days of its planning. The U.S. Government saw in the nationalistic and aggressive economic policies that characterized much of the interwar period the breeding ground of international discord and even war, or at best a source of economic weakness and instability. The United States believed that its own interest in a peaceful and prosperous world could be served only by an international system that, by and large, was based on the decentralized competition of the marketplace pursued according to general rules of nondiscrimination and fair play. This was the concept at the heart of Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade agreements program; broadly applied in post-war financial planning, it shaped the fundamental character of the Fund.

If this were the only link between the United States and the Fund, the relationship between the two would nevertheless be strong, but there are, of course, many other factors of significance to be considered. As the Fund member with the largest quota, the United States has held a leading position in the Fund's affairs. This position has been enhanced by the profoundly important fact that until 1961 the U.S. dollar was the only major currency that was convertible under the Fund Articles. (About 2 years elapsed between the restoration of the external convertibility of Western European currencies, in practice, and the establishment of their broader convertibility in the sense of the Fund Articles.) This meant that the business of the Fund was done mainly in U.S. dollars.

<sup>7</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.

With only a few exceptions, drawings were made in dollars as a matter of choice; repurchases were made in dollars as a matter of law since, under the Articles, repurchases may not be made with an inconvertible currency.

### J.S. Standby Arrangement

Over the years drawings in U.S. dollars (net of repayments and other transactions) had the effect of reducing the Fund's dollar holdings by 1959 to about \$800 million or about 30 percent of the U.S. quota at the time. This provided the United States with a large creditor position in the Fund, usable as a cushion against market pressure later on. In the period 1960-62 the Fund received about \$1,000 million (net) through heavy transfers of dollars to the Fund in repurchase operations. These transfers meant that there were fewer dollars owned by other holders who might offer them for sale in the exchange markets, adding to pressure on the dollar, or use them to acquire gold from the U.S. Treasury.

By the beginning of 1963, however, this form of relief to the dollar ended as the Fund's holdings of dollars approached 75 percent of the United States quota. As indicated earlier, the Fund may not accept a currency in a repurchase operation when the 75-percent level has been reached. In these circumstances a member holding U.S. dollars could not use them to make a repurchase from the Fund. To obtain the means to pay the Fund, the member would have to sell its dollars in the market for another convertible currency, perhaps at a discount from par, or present them to the U.S. Treasury in exchange for gold. To avoid this inconvenience to other countries and the potential, unnecessary drain on the U.S. gold stock, the United States in July 1963 requested and received approval for a standby arrangement with the Fund under which the United States may draw up to \$500 million in foreign currencies over the ensuing 12 months.<sup>8</sup>

Drawings under the standby arrangement are to be made primarily to obtain other convertible currencies that will be sold at par for dollars to other countries to make repurchases of their own currencies from the Fund. These countries

will then be able to make their repurchases with the currencies bought from the United States. In this way the dollar will continue to be readily available to carry out one of its functions as a key currency.

The standby arrangement is of considerable interest technically; but of far greater significance is its opening up of a new, fundamental aspect of United States relations with the Fund. It is now an established fact that the United States is prepared and able to call upon the Fund's resources in appropriate circumstances.

The standby arrangement of the United States with the Fund, even if wholly utilized, will cover only about 10 percent of the U.S. drawing rights within the 200-percent limitation described above. As the result of the strengthening of the Fund through the general borrowing arrangements of last year, the Fund is in a position to organize the resources for a much larger drawing than the United States may make under the standby or would expect to request otherwise. The existence of this reserve of strength for the Fund adds confidence in the ability of the international monetary system in general, and the U.S. dollar in particular, to withstand the pressures that arise from time to time in the exchange markets whether because of speculation, international differences in interest rates, or other factors.

Various gold transactions of the Fund have been of special interest to the United States. The United States has paid to the Fund more than \$1 billion in gold as part of its subscription. In the other direction the Fund has sold gold amounting to \$750 million to the United States to replenish its dollar holdings. The Fund has also utilized \$800 million of its gold holdings to invest in U.S. Treasury bills in order to augment its income and build up its reserve account under an arrangement which permits the Fund to reacquire the same amount of gold as it invested. At the moment, however, the gold so invested is part of the gold stock of the United States.

The Fund has exercised an influence on trade and financial policy that has been of substantial value to traders and business firms around the world and, in some ways, of exceptional sig-

<sup>8</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 258.

nificance to United States firms. As indicated earlier, it is the purpose of the Fund to facilitate the expansion of world trade and to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments and the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions. The Fund has had a great deal of success in the furtherance of these objectives.

Until a few years ago the U.S. dollar was virtually the only important currency that was convertible. The United States therefore was not only adversely affected by the trade and currency restrictions of other countries but suffered the sharper edge of the sword when such restrictions were applied in a discriminatory manner. Thus, though the Fund's success in promoting freer trade and payments benefited the free world in general, it had certain extra, incidental benefits for the United States and for the other countries of the so-called dollar area in helping to rid their trade and financial relations of the discriminatory barriers imposed by other countries.

#### **Help to Less Developed Countries**

The Fund's work has also been of interest to the United States in the way it has contributed to the solution of difficulties experienced by countries to which the United States has provided economic development assistance. Although for temporary periods economic development and currency stability may appear to be competing objectives in a particular country, in the longer run they are partners in the sense that sustained economic growth is deterred rather than stimulated when a country's money no longer commands the respect of the saver and the entrepreneur at home and the investor abroad.

The Fund, through its technical missions and its periodic consultations with members, has provided guidance on financial policy and training in financial techniques that have supported the formulation and maintenance of responsible fiscal programs and monetary standards. It is not uncommon to find serious political and administrative barriers in the way of maintaining moderate financial policies, and the existence of a disinterested body like the Fund, willing to assume the responsibility for giving difficult

advice, has been of crucial importance to the officials of many countries. In addition, in its provision of standby arrangements and drawings of foreign exchange, the Fund has assisted a number of the less developed countries in balance-of-payments difficulties to avoid interruptions in their economic development programs that might otherwise have been virtually inevitable.

In these respects the work of the Fund has helped to reinforce programs of economic assistance financed by the United States and other industrialized nations. In some countries, in fact, financial stabilization programs have been jointly financed by the country concerned and the Fund, along with governmental bodies and commercial banks in Western Europe and the United States.

#### **The Future of the Fund**

The 18 years since the war have witnessed profound changes in the political and economic environment in which the Fund must function. This period has been marked by the emergence of dozens of new sovereign nations as colonial structures have been dismantled. Political independence has brought with it a deep desire for rapid economic development, often accompanied by a strong sense of economic nationalism. At the same time, the world has witnessed the remarkable recovery of the economies of Western Europe and the unprecedented movement toward their integration. And the world has been experiencing the phenomenon of a large and prolonged deficit in the United States balance of payments which, along with the measures that are being employed to reduce the deficit, has necessarily had important repercussions outside the United States.

These developments have made their mark on the international monetary system—on the policies of the Fund and other international institutions; on the forms and scope of monetary cooperation; on the strength and convertibility of national currencies and, in particular, on the position of the main reserve currencies, the dollar and the pound sterling; on the functioning of the foreign exchange and gold markets; and on the conceptions of what is and what is not appropriate, sound, and timely in national and

international financial policy. Though we can perceive that far-ranging changes in the monetary system have already been produced by the underlying political and economic forces of the postwar period, there is no reason to believe that the transformation of the system is finished. A significant lag between cause and necessary effect is a norm in human affairs; finance, a conservative discipline, is more likely to follow the norm than to be an exception to it. It is therefore reasonable to expect the continuation of significant change in the financial system even after the pace of political and economic change slows down.

The character of the international monetary system is fundamentally affected by the way in which countries maintain their monetary reserves. In the postwar period, with a slow growth in the reserves of monetary gold and with the dollar commonly used for private international business transactions outside the sterling area, banks, business firms, and official financial institutions have depended heavily on the accumulation of dollars to meet their needs for reserves and working balances. The dollars acquired for these purposes have come from, or have contributed to, the deficits in the U.S. balance of payments which continued throughout the 1950's (with the exception of 1957) even when the world was talking about the "dollar shortage."

The restoration of the external convertibility of sterling and the other currencies of Western Europe at the end of 1958 produced a basic change in the significance of the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. The European countries, by their joint actions, acknowledged that they had achieved a major, if not the central, objective in the recovery and reconstruction of their finances that they had sought since the start of the Marshall Plan. From this point, the U.S. payments deficit began to change from a boon—at least for the countries eager for additional liquidity—to a problem. When the United States recognized that this stage of postwar economic progress had been reached, it became necessary to devote deliberate attention to the reduction and elimination of the deficit.

The United States' determination to achieve

payments equilibrium, though generally welcomed as necessary and desirable and though still short of fulfillment, has given rise to a new concern: the possibility—some would say certainty—that the world's needs for additional liquidity may run ahead of the liquidity provided by gold (new supplies from free-world gold production, sales by the Soviet Union, and dishoarding). As a consequence, in the absence of the liquidity in the form of dollars provided by U.S. payments deficits, the growth of the world's production and trade would be seriously inhibited, to the detriment of both the industrialized and the less developed countries. Yet it is recognized that, in time, continued U.S. deficits would so increase liquid foreign claims against the dollar as to undermine confidence in its strength and stability. Thus is the liquidity dilemma posed and debated by financial specialists in and outside governments.

#### **Proposals for Solving Liquidity Problem**

Although the general debate seems to be producing a consensus on some questions, many deep-seated differences of opinion are evident, particularly among the nongovernmental experts. There is an apparent consensus that the world does not suffer from a general shortage of international liquidity at present and is not likely to in the immediate future. And there is a growing sense of uncertainty whether the international monetary system as currently constituted can avoid a shortage of international liquidity over the long term. Though there is no consensus on the probability or timing of the emergence of such a shortage, a general sense of uncertainty or unease where assurance would be highly desirable can prove to be a forceful stimulus to action.

On the other hand, there has been no crystallization of expert opinion on the best way to act, or to be prepared to act, in advance of the emergence of a liquidity problem. A wide range of contradictory proposals has been presented on this question, mainly by experts outside of official circles. A few that have attracted public interest will be briefly described here.

Some of the experts are not so much concerned with institutional arrangements as they

are about other aspects of the monetary system. In this area proposals have been made to increase international liquidity by raising the price of gold to a new, fixed level. A step of this kind, which would constitute a general devaluation of currencies in terms of gold, is designed both to stretch existing gold supplies and to stimulate gold production. Some of its proponents see such action as a prerequisite for a return to the gold standard, which they desire; others, however, do not regard that objective as realistic or desirable.

Pointing in quite a different direction, proposals have been made for abandoning fixed currency values and operating the monetary system with flexible exchange rates. Under such a system, it is argued, the need for official reserves would be largely eliminated since pressures on a country's payments position would rapidly become dissipated through their effect on the exchange rate for the country's currency. A system of flexible rates is, of course, inconsistent with one of the basic principles of the Fund's charter, and its introduction would imply a fundamental transformation of the operations of the exchange system as we know it today.

Perhaps the most widely debated of the proposals that look toward changes in the institutional framework of the monetary system are those of Professor Robert Triffin of Yale University. His early writings on the liquidity dilemma did much to precipitate the discussions of the past several years. He would transform the International Monetary Fund by empowering it to create international credit (liquidity) in amounts determined by international agreement. Countries would no longer hold dollars, sterling, or other currencies in their reserves but would deposit them, including the large holdings already in existence, in the Fund where they would not constitute a threat to the stability of the exchange markets. A part of a country's gold reserves would also be deposited with the Fund. Thus, under the Triffin proposals, the Fund would become a "central bank of central banks," standing in relation to the central banks of member countries roughly in the way the Federal Reserve banks stand in relation to the commercial banks in the United

States. The assignment of such power to an international institution is one of the most controversial features of the Triffin proposals.

A different approach to the modification of the Fund has been presented by Edward M. Bernstein, formerly director of the Research Department at the Fund. Mr. Bernstein would strengthen the monetary system by providing for a "reserve settlement account" in the Fund to be used to offset the effects of capital movements and by incorporating into the monetary reserves of members their rights to draw on the Fund. The reserve settlement account would be financed by borrowing from the members (i.e. selling them Fund debentures); the integration of drawing rights into national reserves would follow from the establishment of much greater automaticity in the Fund's lending operations than exists today.

Another suggestion of special interest was presented at last year's meeting of the Board of Governors of the Fund by Reginald Maudling, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Governor of the Fund for the United Kingdom. He proposed that study could usefully be given to the development of a system of cooperation among the leading trading countries in the form of a mutual currency account in the Fund. He indicated that he had in mind a multilateral arrangement under which a country enjoying a payments surplus could deposit its net receipts of foreign currencies in a special Fund account, thereby acquiring claims which it could use when its own payments position turned adverse. The Chancellor made clear that his suggestions were not intended to represent the final views of his Government or to preclude the development or consideration of other ideas. It seems possible, therefore, that the British Government may present new or additional conceptions as its study of these questions progresses.

#### **U.S. Position on Long-Term Liquidity**

The position of the United States on long-term liquidity issues has been stated most comprehensively by the President in his message of July 18, 1963,<sup>9</sup> as follows:

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250.

Our efforts to strengthen these defenses [i.e. the defenses of the international monetary system against raids on a major currency] will continue. While this process is taking place, the United States will continue to study and discuss with other countries measures which might be taken for a further strengthening of the international monetary system over the longer run. The U.S. interest in the continuing evolution of the system inaugurated at the time of Bretton Woods is not a result of our current payments deficit—rather it reflects our concern that adequate provision be made for the growth of international liquidity to finance expanding world trade over the years ahead. Indeed, one of the reasons that new sources of liquidity may well be needed is that, as we close our payments gap, we will cut down our provision of dollars to the rest of the world.

As yet, this Government is not prepared to recommend any specific prescription for long-term improvement of the international monetary system. But we are studying the matter closely; we shall be discussing possible improvements with our friends abroad; and our minds will be open to their initiatives. We share their view that the problem of improving the payments mechanism is one that demands careful joint deliberation. At the same time, we do not pretend that talk of long-range reform of the system is any substitute for the actions that we ourselves must take now.

The defenses mentioned by the President have been developed over the past 2 years by the United States in cooperation with a number of other countries. They include the \$6 billion borrowing arrangement for the Fund as well as techniques of more limited scope. For example, the United States and other countries have been effectively carrying out joint operations through the Bank of England to maintain stability in the London gold market. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting for the Federal Reserve System and for the Treasury, now actively intervenes in dollar exchange markets, forward and spot, in order to resist speculative disturbances and promote orderly market conditions. The Federal Reserve System has established a network of swap arrangements with most of the major foreign central banks which provide ready access, on a reciprocal basis, to specified amounts of short-term credit in foreign currencies aggregating more than \$1.5 billion. And the Treasury has introduced, on an experimental but nevertheless substantial scale, new forms of U.S. Government securities—including nonmarketable medium-term certificates denominated in for-

eign currencies—that have been tailored to meet the needs of foreign central banks and have thus proved useful in reducing the possibility of calls on the U.S. gold stock.

The United States includes in its international reserves the convertible foreign currencies acquired by these and other means. To the extent that the acquisition of such currencies may properly be enlarged when the present payments deficit is ended, the United States could avoid curtailing the supply of international liquidity now provided by the deficit. This approach to meeting the liquidity needs of an expanding world economy was indicated by the Federal Open Market Committee in its authorization of February 1962 for the foreign exchange operations of the Federal Reserve System. The practical exploration of its potential scope will necessarily await a reversal in the U.S. payments position.

Although, aside from the long-term aspects of the foregoing measures, the United States has not made any proposals for the reform of the monetary system over the long run, U.S. officials have made it plain that they regard certain proposals to be unacceptable. In a current statement, for example, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Robert V. Roosa, has explained once again why the U.S. Government is convinced that neither a change in the price of gold nor the adoption of a system of flexible exchange rates would contribute to a strengthening of the monetary system.<sup>10</sup> In the conclusion of this statement Mr. Roosa has summarized the main lines of probable inquiry for future governmental study of the reform of the international monetary system. There is one common feature of the several alternatives for reform that he enumerates, namely, an enlargement of the resources or of the powers of the International Monetary Fund.

As Mr. Roosa indicates, it is too early to judge whether the international monetary system will be able to meet the requirements of the world through the ordinary evolution of its present principles and institutions or whether

<sup>10</sup> See "Reforming the International Monetary System," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 1, Oct. 1963, pp. 107-122.

governments will eventually conclude that a more decisive reshaping of the system is needed. But whatever the outcome, the world—both the industrialized and the less developed countries—will surely require more rather than less monetary cooperation and will probably need, in time, enlarged access to a centralized source of international liquidity. To follow the logic of the argument is to conclude that the world will place increasing responsibility on the Fund over the years and that, important as the Fund has been in influencing the economic welfare of the free world in the past, it is likely to be even more important in the future.

## President Kennedy and General Clay Urge Restoration of Aid Funds

*Following is a transcript of remarks made by President Kennedy and Gen. Lucius D. Clay, chairman of the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World, at a news conference held at Squaw Island, Hyannis Port, Mass., on August 30.*

White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated August 30

*President Kennedy:* Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. General Clay and Mr. [David E.] Bell, the Director of the mutual security program, and I have met this morning to consider what actions we could take to strengthen the mutual security program to be sure that they are adequately financed and to make every possible effort to assure that the security of the United States and the effectiveness of its foreign policy will be maintained in the coming months.

This matter is now before the Congress<sup>1</sup> but, in a very real sense, it is before all of the American people.

This program of mutual security has helped protect the independence of dozens of countries since 1945. Most importantly, it has protected

the security and the best interests of the United States. This effort is by no means over. We are going to have a difficult struggle in the 1960's. The peaceful coexistence which is frequently talked about will be very intense in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America. This struggle is going on every day, and I think that the United States has a part in it, as do other countries, and I am confident the American people will recognize this effort involves their security, the maintenance of freedom, and our peace.

I am particularly glad General Clay came up this morning, as he studied this program very carefully and he continues to be head of the committee which oversees the aid program and advises with us on it.<sup>2</sup> He might have a word to say on the matter.

*General Clay:* We are, of course, fully aware of the action that has been taken with respect to the foreign aid bill. We on the committee are greatly concerned in two fields particularly—it has endangered the whole program—and that is in the reduction of the funds available for our military aid and, further, in the reductions in the Alliance for Progress. We think these reductions in the authorization have gone too far and that they could seriously endanger these programs.

We are certainly most anxious that these programs continue; that there be sufficient authorization for the appropriations to permit the jobs to be done. Above all, we hope that they will be considered as in the best interests of the American people on a nonpartisan basis. It is to this end that certainly we on the committee are going to work, Mr. President.

*President Kennedy:* Thank you very much, General.

*The Press:* Mr. President, what strategy are you going to try to use to get the total amount increased now?

*President Kennedy:* It is not a question of strategy. We are trying to point out very clearly how significant these programs are.

General Clay has already pointed out the effect of these cuts on Latin America, which is

<sup>1</sup> For a statement made by President Kennedy at his news conference on Aug. 20, together with the text of a letter to Members of the House of Representatives from Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Aug. 23 following action by the House on the foreign aid bill, see BULLETIN of Sept. 9, 1963, p. 399.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1962, p. 1007; Mar. 4, 1963, p. 329; Mar. 25, 1963, p. 431; and Apr. 15, 1963, p. 574.

perhaps the most critical area in the world today, the effects on our military assistance programs in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Viet-Nam, Thailand, South Korea.

I think that it is important that the American people understand that this is a matter which involves the security and the balance of power all over the world. So we are going to continue to work with the Congress.

General Clay and his committee will continue to make an effort to bring this home to the American people as well as to the Members of Congress.

This is a matter which involves very greatly the security of our country. This is the same view that was held by President Eisenhower, the same view that was held by President Truman, and it is no accident that three Presidents in a row, sitting where they do and bearing particular constitutional responsibilities for foreign policy, should all feel that this program is most important, most effective, most essential, and we hope that the American people will come to share that view.

*The Press:* Mr. President, do you feel there has been a significant swing in the public's move away from support for foreign aid?

*President Kennedy:* I don't think people enjoy carrying this burden. I never thought they did. I always thought in the forties and the fifties and the sixties that there were reservations about it. I think that is quite obvious, but I think in the final analysis most of them realize that it is as essential a part of our effort as the appropriations for national defense. This money is spent, nearly all of it, in the United States, and it helps keep the freedom of this country of ours. It represents much less of a percentage of our wealth than it did during the Marshall Plan days. I think the American people realize that freedom does not come cheaply or easily.

*The Press:* Mr. President, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not completed its action on the authorization bill. Is there any possibility of getting a higher figure and then out of conference getting a fairly reasonable floor?

*President Kennedy:* We hope so.

*The Press:* Mr. President, are you going to

seek the restoration of the entire amount cut by the House from the Senate, or is there some new figure that you gentlemen have agreed upon?

*President Kennedy:* No, we are going to try to get a figure as close to the recommendations. Obviously, we won't get all the recommendations but as close to the recommendations as we can in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the Senate. Then there must be a conference. After that, there must be consideration by the Appropriations Committee. So I think it is important that the Senate give us as much help as it can in this program.

*The Press:* Mr. President, does this program look differently to you now that you are in the White House than it did when you were in Congress?

*President Kennedy:* No. I supported it very strongly in the Congress as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Obviously, a President has a particular responsibility in the field of foreign policy, as I have said, constitutionally. Therefore, as I see very clearly how vital this program is in all of the countries of Latin America—you can see it week in and week out—as well as in these other countries, I perhaps feel it more strongly in the same sense that General Eisenhower did. But I supported this program in the Senate, and I think it is essential. I think it is essential. I think, as I say, I put it right alongside of our defense appropriation.

*The Press:* Mr. President, in your meeting this morning was there any discussion of re-vamping the program in terms of what the House has done?

*President Kennedy:* No. This program we set up. Then General Clay and his group, which included Mr. Eugene Black of the World Bank, Mr. [Robert A.] Lovett, and others, looked at it. They made some proposals.<sup>3</sup> We reduced our request of the authorization after their report came in. They recommended a

<sup>3</sup> *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs: Report to the President of the United States from The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March 20, 1963; available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (price 15 cents).*

figure of over \$4 billion. This figure now, of course, in the House is almost \$600 million less than that.

As I say, we have not even gone through the appropriating procedure, which is usually less than the authorization. This will mean, as Mr. Bell pointed out, that the United States will not fulfill its commitments under the Alliance for Progress and we are going to say to the Latin American people that we are not going to do what we said we were going to do. It will mean that we will have to cut back on our military assistance to countries which are right on the firing line, and it will mean that a good many of these programs in countries of long-term development loans will come to an end. I think it will limit very much our ability to influence events in these areas. That is why I am very anxious to see the program restored.

*The Press:* Thank you, Mr. President.

## United States Tariff Schedules Made Effective by President

### A P R O C L A M A T I O N <sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS I have caused the Tariff Schedules of the United States to be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER <sup>2</sup> in conformity with Section 101(d) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72);

WHEREAS I have taken such action as I deem necessary to bring the United States schedules annexed to foreign trade agreements into conformity with the Tariff Schedules of the United States as provided for in Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, as amended (P.L. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72, as amended by

<sup>1</sup> No. 3548; 28 Fed. Reg. 9279.

<sup>2</sup> Part II, F.R. of Aug. 17, 1963, 28 F.R. 8599, as corrected by F.R. of Aug. 20, 1963, 28 F.R. 9131. [Footnote in original.] The schedules, annotated for statistical purposes, are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at a subscription price of \$5.00 (\$1.25 additional for foreign mailing). The subscription price includes supplementary material for an indefinite period.

Section 257(g) of P.L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 882); and

WHEREAS I have determined that the rates and provisions proclaimed in paragraph 1 of this proclamation are required or appropriate to carry out foreign trade agreements to which the United States is a party:

NOW, THEREFORE, I JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority of the Constitution and statutes, including Section 102 of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, as amended do proclaim:

1. The rates of duty in column numbered 1 of Schedules 1 to 8, inclusive (except the rates for the items listed in Annex A<sup>3</sup> which is attached and made a part of this proclamation), and the other provisions of the Tariff Schedules of the United States which relate thereto;

2. The temporary modifications set forth in Part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States;

3. The additional import restrictions set forth in Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States; and


4. The nations or areas and countries set forth in general headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (relating to the treatment of products of certain Communist-dominated nations or areas).

The Tariff Schedules of the United States shall become effective as to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after August 31, 1963.

As to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after August 31, 1963, the provisions of all prior proclamations which provide for customs treatment inconsistent with the Tariff Schedules of the United States are hereby superseded.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-first day of August in the year of our Lord nine-  
[SEAL] teen hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:  
GEORGE W. BALL,  
*Acting Secretary of State.*

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here; for text, see 28 Fed. Reg. 9280.

## Vice President Johnson Visits Five North European Countries

The Department of State announced on August 31 (press release 445 dated August 29) that Vice President Johnson would leave Washington on September 2 to pay state visits to north European countries.

The Vice President will represent President Kennedy and the Nation on a 15,000-mile mission to Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. He will also visit Thule Air Force Base in Greenland and will return to Washington about September 19.

The Vice President will hold private talks with the prime ministers and other high-ranking officials of the five nations. Discussions are expected to center primarily around the effect that new world trade patterns will have on Scandinavia.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

Letter dated July 18, 1963, from the Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, transmitting an OAS Council resolution on the situation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. S/5373. July 26, 1963. 65 pp.

Cable dated July 28, 1963 from the President of the Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States addressed to the President of the Security Council in support of Afro-Asian draft resolution on liberation of still dependent African territories. S/5376. July 29, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated July 31, 1963, from the representative of the Republic of South Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting a message from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding that Government's decision not to participate in the Council's discussion of South African policy. S/5381. July 31, 1963. 3 pp.

Letter dated August 2, 1963, from the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. S/5382. August 5, 1963. 9 pp.

Telegram dated August 5, 1963, from the Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in the Caribbean, S/5383 and Corr. 1 and 2,

August 6-7, 1963, 5 pp.; letter dated August 8, 1963, from the representative of Haiti addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/5391, August 12, 1963, 2 pp.

### General Assembly

The Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Note by the Secretary-General enclosing an International Labor Organization document concerning South African participation in ILO. A/5454. July 23, 1963. 44 pp.

Note verbale dated July 24, 1963, from the representative of Nepal addressed to the Secretary-General. A/5457. July 25, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated July 25, 1963, from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General. A/5458. July 26, 1963. 2 pp.

Comments received from governments and international organizations and institutions regarding the technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law. A/5455. July 25, 1963. 65 pp.

Reports of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. South West Africa, A/5446/Add.2, July 26, 1963. 72 pp.; Southern Rhodesia, A/5446/Add.3, July 30, 1963, and Corr. 1, August 3, 1963, 114 pp.

Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Notes by the Secretary-General. A/5459, July 29, 1963, 6 pp.; A/5460, July 29, 1963, 2 pp.

Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5461. July 29, 1963. 1 p.

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5462. July 29, 1963. 3 pp.

Measures To Accelerate the Promotion of Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Report of the Economic and Social Council. Note by the Secretary-General. A/5463. July 30, 1963. 2 pp.

### Economic and Social Council

Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament.

Reply of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, E/3736/Add. 4, June 4, 1963, 2 pp.; reply of the Government of France, E/3736/Add. 7, June 25, 1963, 1 p.; reply of the Government of Yugoslavia, E/3736/Add.8, 3 pp.

World Economic Trends: Economic Projections and Development Planning. Progress report by the Secretary-General including a work programme for the Economic Projections and Programming Centre of the Bureau of General Economic Research and Policies. E/3764. June 5, 1963. 29 pp.

Proposals for a Priority Programme of Co-ordinated Action in the Field of Water Resources Within the Framework of the United Nations Development Decade. Report of the United Nations Water Resources Development Centre. E/3760. June 6, 1963. 25 pp.

Decentralization of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations and Strengthening of the Regional Economic Commissions. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3786. June 10, 1963. 28 pp.

United Nations Conference on International Travel and Tourism:

Facilitation of Governmental Formalities Regarding Travel. Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization, giving an account of the perti-

nent conclusions reached at the sixth session of its Facilitation Division, Mexico City, March 19-April 3, 1963. E/CONF.47/10. June 10, 1963. 37 pp.

Reports prepared by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. E/CONF.47/11. June 11, 1963. 36 pp.

Definition of "Tourist" or "Temporary Visitor." Report submitted by the International Union of Official Travel Organisations. E/CONF.47/12. June 12, 1963. 32 pp.

Financing of Economic Development: United Nations Capital Development Fund. Report of the Secretary-General regarding views expressed by various governments. E/3790. June 14, 1963. 24 pp.

World Economic Survey, 1962, Part II: Current Economic Developments. Introduction, E/3761, June 20, 1963, 14 pp.; chapter 1, Recent Trends in Industrial Countries, E/3761/Add.1, May 27, 1963, 63 pp.; chapter 3, Recent Trends in the Centrally Planned Economies, E/3761/Add.3, June 7, 1963, 71 pp.

Committee for Industrial Development: Questionnaire on Industrial Planning and Development. Reply of the Government of Portugal. E/C.5/24/Add.35. July 15, 1963. 62 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S. and Mexico Sign Convention Settling Chamizal Boundary

Press release 448 dated August 29

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

A Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal was concluded at Mexico City on August 29. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann signed for the United States, and the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Manuel Tello, signed for Mexico. A copy of the English version of the convention is attached.

This convention comprises essentially the proposed terms of settlement announced by the Department of State and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations on July 18 and approved by the Presidents of the two countries.<sup>1</sup>

The convention will now be submitted to the respective Senates of the two countries for ad-

vice and consent to ratification. If it meets with the approval of the two Senates, the Department will seek enabling legislation and appropriations from the United States Congress to provide for execution of its terms so far as the United States is concerned. Thereafter, in accordance with the convention, the United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission would proceed to acquire the lands and structures to be transferred to Mexico, and when the lands have been evacuated, and the structures passing intact to Mexico have been paid for by a Mexican banking institution, these lands and structures would be transferred to Mexico. The Mexican Government would at the same time transfer to the United States approximately one-half of Cordova Island, a Mexican enclave north of the present channel of the Rio Grande. The International Commission would then relocate the Rio Grande at El Paso so that all Mexican territory in that area would be south of the new river channel.

This is the first bilateral treaty concluded with the Government of Mexico since 1949 and the first major boundary agreement reached since 1933. The Department of State looks upon the Chamizal convention as a notable achievement in inter-American relations and as a major contribution in the peaceful settlement of boundary disputes.

#### TEXT OF CONVENTION

##### CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAMIZAL

The United States of America and the United Mexican States:

Animated by the spirit of good-neighborliness which has made possible the amicable solution of various problems which have arisen between them;

Desiring to arrive at a complete solution of the problem concerning El Chamizal, an area of land situated to the north of the Rio Grande, in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region;

Considering that the recommendations of the Department of State of the United States and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Mexico of July 17, 1963, have been approved by the Presidents of the two Republics;

Desiring to give effect to the 1911 arbitration award

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1963, p. 199.

in today's circumstances and in keeping with the joint communique of the Presidents of the United States and of Mexico issued on June 30, 1962;<sup>2</sup> and

Convinced of the need for continuing the program of rectification and stabilization of the Rio Grande which has been carried out under the terms of the Convention of February 1, 1933,<sup>3</sup> by improving the channel in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region,

Have resolved to conclude a Convention and for this purpose have named as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America, Thomas C. Mann, Ambassador of the United States of America to Mexico, and

The President of the United Mexican States, Manuel Tello, Secretary for Foreign Relations,

Who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

In the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez sector, the Rio Grande shall be relocated into a new channel in accordance with the engineering plan recommended in Minute No. 214 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. Authentic copies of the Minute and of the map<sup>4</sup> attached thereto, on which the new channel is shown, are annexed to this Convention and made a part hereof.

#### Article 2

The river channel shall be relocated so as to transfer from the north to the south of the Rio Grande a tract of 823.50 acres composed of 366.00 acres in the Chamizal tract, 193.16 acres in the southern part of Cordova Island, and 264.34 acres to the east of Cordova Island. A tract of 193.16 acres in the northern part of Cordova Island will remain to the north of the river.

#### Article 3

The center line of the new river channel shall be the international boundary. The lands that, as a result of the relocation of the river channel, shall be to the north of the center line of the new channel shall be the territory of the United States of America and the lands that shall be to the south of the center line of the new channel shall be the territory of the United Mexican States.

#### Article 4

No payments will be made, as between the two Governments, for the value of the lands that pass from one country to the other as a result of the relocation of the

international boundary. The lands that, upon relocation of the international boundary, pass from one country to the other shall pass to the respective Governments in absolute ownership, free of any private titles or encumbrances of any kind.

#### Article 5

The Government of Mexico shall convey to the Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A., titles to the properties comprised of the structures which pass intact to Mexico and the lands on which they stand. The Bank shall pay the Government of Mexico for the value of the lands on which such structures are situated and the Government of the United States for the estimated value to Mexico of the said structures.

#### Article 6

After this Convention has entered into force and the necessary legislation has been enacted for carrying it out, the two Governments shall, on the basis of a recommendation by the International Boundary and Water Commission, determine the period of time appropriate for the Government of the United States to complete the following:

(a) The acquisition, in conformity with its laws, of the lands to be transferred to Mexico and for the rights of way for that portion of the new river channel in the territory of the United States;

(b) The orderly evacuation of the occupants of the lands referred to in paragraph (a).

#### Article 7

As soon as the operations provided in the preceding article have been completed, and the payment made by the Banco Nacional Hipotecario Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A., to the Government of the United States as provided in Article 5, the Government of the United States shall so inform the Government of Mexico. The International Boundary and Water Commission shall then proceed to demarcate the new international boundary, recording the demarcation in a Minute. The relocation of the international boundary and the transfer of lands provided for in this Convention shall take place upon express approval of that Minute by both Governments in accordance with the procedure established in the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Treaty of February 3, 1944.<sup>5</sup>

#### Article 8

The costs of constructing the new river channel shall be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. However, each Government shall bear the costs of compensation for the value of the structures or improvements which must be destroyed, within the territory under its jurisdiction prior to the relocation of the international boundary, in the process of constructing the new channel.

<sup>5</sup> 59 Stat. 1219.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, July 23, 1962, p. 135.

<sup>3</sup> 48 Stat. 1621.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed here.

The International Boundary and Water Commission is charged with the relocation of the river channel, the construction of the bridges herein provided for, and the maintenance, preservation and improvement of the new channel. The Commission's jurisdiction and responsibilities, set forth in Article XI of the 1933 Convention for the maintenance and preservation of the Rio Grande Rectification Project, are extended upstream from that part of the river included in the Project to the point where the Rio Grande meets the land boundary between the two countries.

## Article 10

The six existing bridges shall, as a part of the relocation of the river channel, be replaced by new bridges. The cost of constructing the new bridges shall be borne in equal parts by the two Governments. The bridges which replace those on Stanton-Lerdo and Santa Fe-Juarez streets shall be located on the same streets. The location of the bridge or bridges which replace the two Cordova Island bridges shall be determined by the International Boundary and Water Commission. The agreements now in force which relate to the four existing bridges between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez shall apply to the new international bridges which replace them. The international bridge or bridges which replace the two Cordova Island bridges shall be toll free unless both Governments agree to the contrary.

## Article 11

The relocation of the international boundary and the transfer of portions of territory resulting therefrom shall not affect in any way:

(a) The legal status, with respect to citizenship laws, of those persons who are present or former residents of the portions of territory transferred;

(b) The jurisdiction over legal proceedings of either a civil or criminal character which are pending at the time of, or which were decided prior to, such relocation;

(c) The jurisdiction over acts or omissions occurring within or with respect to the said portions of territory prior to their transfer;

(d) The law or laws applicable to the acts or omissions referred to in paragraph (c).

## Article 12

The present Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Mexico City as soon as possible.

The present Convention shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

DONE at Mexico City the twenty-ninth day of August, nineteen sixty three, in the English and Spanish languages, each text being equally authentic.

For the Government  
of the United States  
of America,  
THOMAS C. MANN

For the Government  
of the United  
Mexican States,  
MANUEL TELLO

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER  
COMMISSION

## UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

CIUDAD JUÁREZ, CHIHUAHUA,

August 28, 1963.

MINUTE NO. 214

ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO RELOCA-  
TION OF THE RIO GRANDE AT EL PASO, TEXAS, AND  
CIUDAD JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA.

The Commission met at the Offices of the Mexican Section, at Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, on August 28, 1963 at 10:00 a.m., to consider the engineering criteria and plans required to put into effect the joint recommendations for relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, referred to in the Memoranda of July 17, 1963 entitled "Recommendations to the Presidents of the United States and of Mexico by the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Relations for a Complete Solution of the Chamizal Problem".<sup>6</sup>

The Commissioners reviewed the engineering aspects of the new channel of the river recommended in the Memoranda under reference, and the studies and computations which, under instructions from their respective Governments, they made of those aspects during the preparation of the Memoranda. They reviewed the "Preliminary Plan, Relocation of Rio Grande, El Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua", which is attached to this Minute as an Exhibit<sup>7</sup> and forms part hereof, as well as the engineering studies and criteria on which it is based and the preliminary cost estimates of the new channel and of the bridges which are to replace those presently in service.

They noted that the centerline of the proposed new channel would diverge from the centerline of the present channel at point "A" shown on the Exhibit. Beginning at that point, the centerline is described as follows, with distances approximate: It would be aligned easterly along a curve of 2,300-foot radius and 0.44 mile in length, and a tangent of 0.62 mile, approximately parallel to the present channel and from 600 to 900 feet to the north of it; thence northeasterly along a curve of 1,640-foot radius and 0.32 mile in length, and a tangent of 0.22 mile; thence easterly along a curve 2,080 feet in radius and 0.35 mile in length and a tangent of 0.62 mile, crossing the west boundary of Cordova Island at a point 200 feet to the south of Monument No. 3 and approximately 1,000 feet to the south of the north boundary of said Island and 3,500 feet to the north of the present channel of the river; the line would continue to the southeast along a curve 1,910 feet in radius and 0.38 mile in length, which would cross the east boundary of Cordova Island 330 feet to the east of Monument No. 13 and thence also southeasterly along a tangent 0.82

<sup>6</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1963, p. 201.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed here.

mile; thence easterly along a curve of 5,730 feet in radius and 0.53 mile in length to connect with the present channel. The total length of the new channel would be approximately 4.3 miles.

The Commissioners found that the hydrologic studies, together with the consideration that the business districts of the two cities require a high degree of flood protection, support the criterion that the new river channel should be designed to carry a flood of 18,000 cubic feet per second with 3.3 feet of freeboard, as shown on the preliminary plan. They found that the proposed alignment of the new concrete-lined channel would be free of abrupt turns which might cause a significant rise in flood stages; that notwithstanding the fact that the new channel would have a greater length and curvature than the present channel, water elevations for the design flood would be lower in the new channel because of reduction in friction losses due to its concrete lining; that the lined channel requires considerably less width of right-of-way through the high-cost urban areas, with substantial savings in costs of land and improvements for right-of-way and in construction of new bridges; and that the preliminary plan also provides for inlet works to allow entrance of storm drainage, and for check structures in the new channel to be able to provide a water depth of six feet or more.

The two Commissioners noted that the relocation of the Rio Grande at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez requires approval of a Convention by the two Governments.

The Commission then adopted the following resolution, subject to the approval of the two Governments:

A. The Commission finds engineeringly sound the new location of the river at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez as recommended, and as shown on the Exhibit, and approves the preliminary plan and cost estimates shown thereon, subject to such modifications as the Commission may agree upon in final design and construction.

B. The Commission specifically approves the following findings of the preliminary plan:

1) The precise areas which would be affected by relocation of the river, which in the aforementioned Memoranda and the maps attached thereto are given approximately to the nearest acre and hectare, are as follows: South of the centerline of the relocated channel and north of the present channel of the Rio Grande there would be a tract of 823.50 acres comprised of 366.00 acres in the Chamizal Tract, 193.16 acres in the southerly part of Cordova Island, and 264.34 acres to the east of the Island. North of the centerline of the relocated channel would be a tract of 193.16 acres which presently is the northerly part of Cordova Island.

2) The new channel of the Rio Grande as shown on the Exhibit would be concrete-lined, with cross-section as narrow as compatible with the capacity required to carry the design flood.

3) The new channel would provide a high degree of flood protection and a stable channel which could be properly operated and maintained by the two Governments through their respective Sections of the Commis-

sion. The new lined channel would provide a stable international boundary, would permit more effective sanitary control of the river, and would contribute to improvement and beautification of the border between the two countries at El Paso-Ciudad Juárez.

C. The Commission recommends the following joint measures by the two Governments to implement the plan:

1) That when the Convention relating to the relocation of the river comes into force, the International Boundary and Water Commission:

a) Make the necessary topographic surveys for demarcation of the new boundary.

b) Prepare detail plans and perform all other engineering work preliminary to and preparatory for relocation of the river as may be required by the Convention.

c) Undertake, at the earliest practicable date, the construction of the new bridges required to replace the six existing bridges and such portions of the new river channel as might be feasible and desirable as determined by the Commission. The bridge or bridges required to replace the two existing Cordova Island bridges shall be located as determined by the Commission, and each Section of the Commission shall assume responsibility for operation and maintenance of the portion of such bridge or bridges in its country, with the understanding that each Section may make arrangements if deemed necessary or desirable with local authorities of its country for operation and maintenance of its part of such bridge or bridges or for repayment of costs of said operation and maintenance.

2) That when such prerequisite measures as are set forth in the Convention have been effected:

a) Each Government, in the territory under its jurisdiction, remove all structures from the right-of-way for the new channel as delineated by the Commission.

b) The Commission demarcate the new boundary line.

c) The Commission, after the two Governments have approved the new boundary line, proceed to complete the relocation of the river channel and all related engineering operations.

D. The Commission recommends that the equal division between the two countries of total costs of constructing the new channel and bridges, as recommended in the Memoranda of July 17, 1963, be effected by each Government performing, through its Section of the Commission, a portion of the construction work corresponding to one-half of the total cost.

E. The Commission recommends that in carrying out the construction of works allotted to it, each Section of the Commission may make use of any competent public or private agencies in accordance with the laws of its country.

F. It is recommended that each Section of the Commission observe, in the works which it may have to

execute in the other country, the laws of that country, with the exemptions and facilities hereinafter stated:

1) All materials, implements, equipment and repair parts intended for the construction, operation and maintenance of such works shall be exempt from taxes relating to imports and exports. For this purpose, each Section of the Commission shall furnish verification certificates covering all materials, implements, equipment and repair parts intended for such works.

2) The personnel employed either directly or indirectly on the construction, operation or maintenance of such works shall be permitted to pass freely from one country to the other for the purpose of going to and from the place of location of the works, without any immigration restrictions, passports, or labor requirements. For this purpose, each Section of the Commission shall furnish adequate means of identification to the personnel employed by it on the aforesaid works.

G. The Commission recommends that construction of the works built in pursuance of the provisions of the Convention not confer upon either of the two countries any rights either of property or of jurisdiction over any part whatsoever of the territory of the other, and that the jurisdiction of each country be limited by the International boundary, which would be marked on the works.

H. The Commission recommends that to effectuate the provisions of the Convention each Government through its respective Section of the Commission obtain and retain direct ownership, control and jurisdiction over the part of the new channel of the river and the right-of-way in its own territory as shown on the Exhibit, the structures and improvements located therein except for the new bridges to replace the four that presently exist between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, as well as over such other rights-of-way as each Government may require in its territory.

The meeting then adjourned.

J. F. FRIEDKIN

*Commissioner of the United States*

D. HERRERA

*Commissioner of Mexico*

J. D. WALSTROM

*Secretary of the United States Section*

FERNANDO RIVAS S.

*Secretary of the Mexican Section*

## Ratifications of FEN Treaty Exchanged With Belgium

Press release 452 dated September 3

Instruments of ratification of the treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of

Belgium were exchanged on September 3. The exchange was made by Secretary Rusk and the Belgian Ambassador, Louis Scheyven, at a brief formal ceremony. This action completes the procedures required for bringing the treaty into force. By its terms the treaty will enter into force on October 3, 1 month after the day of the exchange of ratifications.

The treaty, which was signed at Brussels on February 21, 1961, has been approved by the U.S. Senate and the Belgian Parliament. It will supersede upon its entry into force a brief-er and less detailed treaty entered into in 1875.

The new treaty is one of a series of more than 20 similar treaties that have been negotiated by the United States in recent years. Its principal purpose is to provide a comprehensive legal basis, framed in modern terms and responsive to modern conditions, for the further development of general economic and other relations between the two countries.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures affixed at Washington:* Ivory Coast, September 5, 1963; Luxembourg, September 3, 1963; Nigeria, September 4, 1963; Western Samoa, Yemen Arab Republic, September 6, 1963.

#### Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Liberia, August 21, 1963.

#### Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Cuba, August 22, 1963.

#### Trade

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered into force for the United States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253. *Acceptance deposited:* Tanganyika, July 1, 1963.

Procs-verbal extending the period of validity of the declaration on provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960. Done at Geneva November 7, 1962. Entered into force January 1, 1963. TIAS 5266.

*Signatures:* Brazil, July 8, 1963; Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

Protocol for the accession of Spain to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 30, 1963. Entered into force August 29, 1963.  
*Signatures:* Austria,<sup>2</sup> July 29, 1963; Canada, August 22, 1963; Denmark, July 19, 1963; Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>2</sup> July 16, 1963; Italy,<sup>2</sup> August 23, 1963; Sweden, July 30, 1963; Switzerland, July 26, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Belgium

Treaty of friendship, establishment and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Brussels February 21, 1961.  
*Ratifications exchanged:* September 3, 1963.  
*Enters into force:* October 3, 1963.

### Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of January 11, 1958, as amended (TIAS 3982, 4635), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo August 23, 1963. Entered into force August 23, 1963.

Understandings with regard to export of zipper chain from Japan to the United States. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington August 28, 1963. Entered into force August 28, 1963.

### Paraguay

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Asunción August 20, 1963. Enters into force on the date of notification from the Government of Paraguay that the agreement has been ratified in accordance with its constitutional processes.

### Spain

Agreement amending the agreement of January 21, 1952 (TIAS 2471), relating to the reciprocal waiver of visa fees for nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid May 11 and July 5, 1963. Entered into force July 5, 1963.

### United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of May 10 and 13, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3843, 4156, 4895), relating to the disposition of equipment and materials to include machine tools. Effected by exchange of notes at London August 28, 1963. Entered into force August 28, 1963.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Consulate at Calgary Raised to Consulate General

Department notice dated August 22

Effective August 21 the American consulate at Calgary, Alberta, Canada, was elevated to the rank of

<sup>2</sup> Subject to ratification.

consulate general. Consul general William H. Christensen will continue in charge at Calgary.

On the closing of the consulate at Edmonton, Alberta, Canada,<sup>1</sup> the Edmonton consular district will be transferred to Calgary, effective September 7. The new district for the consulate general at Calgary will be the Province of Alberta and the District of Mackenzie (Northwest Territories).

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20540. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.*

**Weather Stations—Amendment to Annex II-A of the North Atlantic Ocean Stations Agreement of February 25, 1954.** Recommendation approved by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization at the forty-seventh session, at Montreal, December 14, 1962. Entered into force December 14, 1962. TIAS 5283. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Atomic Energy.** Amendment to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Approved at Vienna by the General Conference of the Agency at the fifth regular session, October 4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963. TIAS 5284. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with China, amending the agreement of November 19, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei January 24, 1963. Entered into force January 24, 1963. TIAS 5285. 7 pp. 10¢.

**Education—Establishment of Commission and Financing of Exchange Programs.** Agreement with Malaya. Signed at Kuala Lumpur January 28, 1963. Entered into force January 28, 1963. TIAS 5286. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Mapping—Cooperative Program.** Agreement with Ethiopia. Signed at Addis Ababa January 25, 1963. Entered into force January 25, 1963. TIAS 5287. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Atomic Energy—Radiation Medicine Centre.** Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Dated at New Delhi January 4 and February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5288. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Defense—Relinquishment of United States Naval Radio Transmitting Facility at Bagobantay, Quezon City.** Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 31, 1962, and January 11, 1963. Entered into force January 15, 1963. TIAS 5289. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Aviation—Certificates of Airworthiness.** Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washing-

<sup>1</sup> For an announcement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 328.

ton February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5290. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Tracking Stations.** Agreement with Australia, amending the agreement of February 26, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra January 9 and February 11, 1963. Entered into force February 11, 1963. TIAS 5291. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with Bolivia. Signed at La Paz February 4, 1963. Entered into force February 4, 1963. TIAS 5292. 8 pp. 10¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima January 25, 1962. Entered into force January 25, 1962. TIAS 5293. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Economic, Technical and Related Assistance.** Agreement with the Central African Republic. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangui February 10, 1963. Entered into force February 10, 1963. TIAS 5294. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik February 6, 1963. Entered into force February 6, 1963. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5295. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of May 3, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 26 and February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5296. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Economic Assistance—Settlement of Postwar Economic Assistance.** Agreement with Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo February 19, 1963. Entered into force February 19, 1963. TIAS 5297. 7 pp. 10¢.

**Defense—Loan of Additional Vessels.** Agreement with the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul December 14, 1962 and February 11, 1963. Entered into force February 11, 1963. TIAS 5298. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Surplus Property—Waiver of Restriction in Paragraph 4 of Memorandum of Interpretation and Understanding to the Agreement of October 1, 1959.** Exchange of notes with Korea—Signed at Seoul February 1, 1963. Entered into force February 1, 1963. TIAS 5299. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Iran. Signed at Tehran October 15, 1962. Entered into force October 15, 1962. Exchanges of notes—Dated at Tehran October 15, December 30, 1962, and February 3, 1963. TIAS 5300. 11 pp. 5¢.

**Boundary Waters—Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River.** Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of May 5, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 23, 1962 and February 21, 1963. Entered into force February 21, 1963. Operative retroactively October 15, 1962. TIAS 5301. 7 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Turkey. Signed at Ankara February 21, 1963. Entered into force February 21, 1963. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5303. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with Chile, amending the agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago February 14, 1963. Entered into force February 14, 1963. TIAS 5304. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of December 27, 1961. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon March 8, 1963. Entered into force March 8, 1963. TIAS 5305. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Friendship, Establishment and Navigation.** Treaty and protocol with Luxembourg. Signed at Luxem-

bourg February 23, 1962. Entered into force March 28, 1963. TIAS 5306. 29 pp. 15¢.

**Peace Corps Program.** Agreement with Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala December 28 and 29, 1962. Entered into force December 29, 1962. TIAS 5307. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with the Republic of the Congo. Exchange of notes—Signed at Léopoldville October 25 and November 17, 1962. Entered into force November 17, 1962. TIAS 5308. 7 pp. 10¢.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.** Declaration on Provisional Accession of the United Arab Republic to agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force with respect to the United States and the United Arab Republic May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309. 9 pp. 10¢.

**Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV.** Agreement with the Ryukyu Islands. Signed at Naha, Okinawa, January 22, and at Washington February 6, 1963. Entered into force February 6, 1963. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5310. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Migratory Workers—Mexican Agricultural Workers.** Agreement with Mexico, amending the agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at México January 10 and February 25, 1963. Entered into force February 25, 1963. TIAS 5311. 4 pp. 5¢.

**Statutes of the International Bureau of Education.** Adopted at Geneva July 25, 1929. Entered into force with respect to the United States July 12, 1958. TIAS 5312. 10 pp. 10¢.

**Defense—Polaris Sales.** Agreement with the United Kingdom. Signed at Washington April 6, 1963. Entered into force April 6, 1963. TIAS 5313. 11 pp. 10¢.

**Highways—Termination of Development of Transportation Facilities Agreement of January 2 and 6, 1958.** Agreement with Nepal, and India. Signed at Kathmandu January 10, 1963. Entered into force January 10, 1963. TIAS 5314. 2 pp. 5¢.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to September 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 442 of August 27 and 445 and 448 of August 29.

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*453	9/3	Anderson sworn in as Ambassador to Portugal (biographic details).
*455	9/5	Harrinian: Economic Club, Detroit (excerpts).
456	9/6	Rusk: ninth anniversary of SEATO.
†457	9/5	Office of Special Representative Services established (rewrite).

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE  
DEPARTMENT  
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**BULLETIN**

*Vol. XLIX, No. 1266*



*September 30, 1963*

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DEPOSITORY

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# Unfinished Business

*Address by Secretary Rusk<sup>1</sup>*

Tonight I want to talk about some unfinished business of vital importance to the security of the United States. For the security of the United States is a central concern of the Department of State. The old notion that the diplomats handled affairs in time of peace and the military took over in time of war is incompatible with the harsh realities of the world struggle in which we are now engaged. Today the military men and the diplomats work together in the closest cooperation to protect the safety and the vital interests of the American people.

Incidentally, I wore the uniform of the United States Army for 25 years, including more than 5 years of active duty. As for the striped pants, I wore them on Inauguration Day—and I can't recall that I have worn them since. We are long past the day when most of our diplomats and Foreign Service officers and

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Legion Convention at Miami Beach, Fla., on Sept. 10 (press release 464; as-delivered text).

State Department officials were well-heeled socialites—with or without degrees from exclusive colleges. Today they come from all parts of the United States and all walks of life. In fact, of the three highest ranking career officers now on duty in the Department, one was born in Colorado and two were born in rural Kansas. One graduated from the University of Colorado, one from Occidental College in California, and one from the University of Nebraska.

Appointments to our Foreign Service are on the basis of severe competition, and promotion is for demonstrated competence and hard work.

We have a great many war veterans in the Department of State and in our Foreign Service. And we have a vigorous Legion Post, of which I am proud and glad to be a member. We have our full share of dedicated men and women serving with gallantry in many a far-off and disagreeable and, often these days, a dangerous post.

I understand that some of your posts have

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XLIX, NO. 1266 PUBLICATION 7602 SEPTEMBER 30, 1963

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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proposed resolutions asking for congressional investigation of the Department of State. It's not a bad idea. In fact, it's such a good idea that at least a half a dozen committees and sub-committees of Congress are looking us over all the time and in great detail. Therefore I think I have a better idea for the American Legion, which I shall propose to your National Commander. Come and look at us yourself. Come and do this job yourself. Let the appropriate persons representing the Legion come in and look us over in great detail, just as much as you have interest in, or time for, because I am quite sure that both of us could benefit by becoming better acquainted.

We have some real problems. We're dealing with 112 countries. Did you know that in this calendar year there will be changes of government—most of them scheduled, some of them not scheduled—in perhaps 40 of those 112 countries? And of course we have some real security problems, as every foreign office of every great power throughout the world has, because we are the targets of attempts to penetrate us all the time. And the vigilance is never-ending in order to resist this attempt to penetrate the Government of the United States.

#### **Need for Powerful Military Defenses**

As advocates of powerful military defenses, we in the Department of State are second to none—and the record since World War II will prove it. It is essential that we maintain strategic deterrents so strong that sane men would never dare attack us or, if insanity prevails, to insure the destruction of the aggressor. It is equally essential, of course, that our adversaries know that we have the will to use these forces in defense of the vital interests of the free world. It is also important that, with our allies, we have powerful and flexible and mobile conventional forces. And it is important to continue to increase the capabilities of the free world to deal with guerrilla warfare.

President Kennedy, in recognition of the harsh situation in which we find ourselves in this modern world, with the full support of the Congress, has, as the Legion knows, substantially increased our defense forces: a 20-percent increase in the defense budget—making it pos-

sible to add 100 percent to the warheads and the strategic nuclear alert force, a 60-percent increase in the tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe alone, and a 200-percent increase in our counterinsurgency forces.

But it is impossible to enhance or even to preserve the security of the United States by military means alone. Indeed, there is no security for anyone in an unlimited arms race.

Since 1947 the defense budget of the United States has necessarily increased by more than four times. And yet we cannot truthfully say that we are safer today than we were at that time, however necessary those increases were. And therefore we must find a way, if possible, to preserve the peace and protect our vital interests by means short of war.

#### **Two Recent Agreements With Soviet Union**

Recently we have reached two agreements with the Soviet Union. One was on the so-called "hot line"—a direct line between the Kremlin and the White House, for use in emergency.<sup>2</sup> The need for reliable and direct and rapid contact was underscored during the crisis over Cuba last fall, when events began to outrun the ability of our two Governments to communicate by ordinary means. We hope there will be no crisis requiring the "hot line," but in a fast-moving and dangerous situation it might prevent miscalculation or a fateful misunderstanding.

The second agreement is, of course, the treaty banning atomic tests in the air, in space, and under water. The hearings on it conducted under the leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explored thoroughly every relevant question. And yesterday the Senate as a whole took up that debate.<sup>3</sup>

I am convinced myself that this treaty safeguards fully the security of the United States. This conviction is supported by the great weight of testimony of our scientific and military leaders, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the military risks in the treaty are acceptable.

We know that we hold in this country an overall superiority in nuclear weapons, that the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 496.

formidable military power represented by these and other weapons is ever-increasing, and that we have and will maintain the strongest military arsenal in the world.

We know that since 1945 the danger of a nuclear holocaust has increased. With this increase in danger there has been an increase in the destructive power of modern weapons. For almost two decades, beginning with the moment of the use of the first bomb, we have diligently searched for an alternative to the nuclear arms race. Now within our grasp lies at least a small opportunity to begin a reversal if possible of the trend of the race itself.

We are confident in the adequacy of our nuclear forces to deter a Soviet attack and to inflict a devastating damage against anyone who might attack us or our allies. Given our present nuclear capabilities, now is an appropriate time to restrict further nuclear testing, at least in those environments in which we may assure ourselves that the Soviet Union is doing likewise.

We know the effect this treaty can have on potential nuclear powers. A dozen nations have the capability of developing nuclear weapons within the next decade. Yet all but one, Red China, are among the some 90 signatories not yet nuclear powers who have signed the agreement. In the absence of a treaty most of them probably would feel obliged to elect another course for themselves.

We will continue a testing program under ground. More than 90 underground tests have provided the most significant information. The treaty is self-policing. Our own detection system will monitor the ban. As additional insurance, our testing facilities affected by the treaty will be maintained on an alert standby basis. And if the interests of our country are jeopardized, we can withdraw from the treaty—promptly if need be. These are safeguards based on practical requirements. And I want to emphasize that this treaty does not rest upon trust and confidence.

We must consider also the consequences of a rejection of the treaty. In my judgment they would be extremely grave, both for our position in the world and for the prospects for peace. The possibility of exercising any control over

armaments would almost certainly vanish. The possibility of settling dangerous political problems would be greatly reduced.

Our rejection would lend weight to the Chinese Communist contention that peaceful coexistence with the West is impossible. It would cost us the confidence of many countries in the free world— allies and nonaligned alike.

The limited nuclear test ban treaty has been aptly characterized by President Kennedy as a step toward peace and away from war.<sup>4</sup> This is a step which I believe that we should take, for rejection of the treaty would lead to more intensive rounds of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, an upward surge in the arms race spiral, further pollution of the air, increased tensions and distrust, and increased prospects of a war of which Khrushchev said to the Chinese the survivors would envy the dead.

#### **Other Possible Agreements**

Realistically, what do we hope to accomplish through any further discussions with the Soviet Union?

There can be no assured and lasting peace until Communist leaders abandon their goal of a world revolution. They are quite frank in declaring that they don't intend to do that.

After the test ban treaty was signed, Chairman Khrushchev said again that there can be "no coexistence in ideology—that conflict," he says, "goes on." His proclaimed objective still is to "bury" all non-Communist societies. He used this phrase again in a speech on June 21 of this year. He made it plain that he was not speaking just of an alleged historical inevitability.

Thus the Soviet Communists, as well as the Chinese Communists, remain committed to Communist domination of the world. Indeed, they have indicated that they will try to intensify the struggle, at least in its nonmilitary aspects, and the present quarrel between them started over an argument about how best to accomplish this result.

But we think the Soviet leaders realize that it would be disastrous for them to try to "bury"

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

us by military means. Nor do we ourselves want war, nor need it to insure success for the cause of freedom. We believe that the Soviet Union and the United States therefore have a mutual interest in avoiding a war of total devastation. And we think that the Soviet leaders are beginning to recognize this.

So we hope that it will be possible to reach agreements on possible other safeguards against war by accident, or miscalculation, or surprise attack—limited steps—as yet no agreement in sight. We favor also, though this will be more difficult to achieve, some possible slowing down of arms production and reductions in level of armaments—with fully adequate safeguards and inspection. We and our allies are of course interested in eliminating or reducing the crisis potential of Berlin and other points of friction. And we think the Soviet Union could serve its larger interests, as well as ours, by joining us in the peacemaking activities of the United Nations.

We are prepared to explore the possibilities of a freer flow of both information and peoples between the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European countries generally, and the United States. We would like to expand existing exchange agreements. And we would hope that more people and information might move back and forth in a natural and normal way, because opening up the doors of that society can be in the most profound interests of freedom. In this connection, we have noted with satisfaction that during the last 3 months the Soviets have not jammed broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. by the Voice of America or by the BBC.

We would also join with the U.S.S.R. in undertakings to serve our own and all other peoples in the unending battle against disease and other hazards of nature, against poverty and ignorance. We believe that good can come from pooling efforts on various frontiers of science including the peaceful potentialities of space and nuclear energy.

These are not bilateral issues between us and the Soviet Union; they involve our allies and the uncommitted countries as well. These other countries must play, and they do play, a large part in such discussions—in the United Nations, in NATO, at Geneva, and in other forums.

## Communist World Ambitions

In seeking understandings with the Soviet Union along the several lines I have indicated, we do not expect to effect a miraculous change in Soviet intentions toward us. Our aim is to keep the conflict within tolerable bounds—to defend and build freedom if possible without a thermonuclear war.

However, it must be an object of policy to move the Communist world by all available means to abandon their program of world domination. It is evident that Communist ambitions entail severe costs and risks for the Soviet Government and people. Even now we see some suggestive signs of restiveness about the burdens and risks of their commitments to the world Communist movement—which, incidentally, no single government can now fully control.

Herein lies, perhaps, the greatest significance of the schism between the Soviet and Chinese Communists. I have repeatedly emphasized that we should not take cheap comfort from that historic break. It eliminates none of the dangers that hang over us and makes none of our immediate tasks appreciably easier. But the Chinese Communists have brought emphatically to the attention of the Soviet Government and people the sharp conflict that exists between the requirements of the Communist world revolution and Soviet national interests. The Chinese Communists insist that Communist world ambitions, as interpreted by themselves, must come first, no matter what the cost, including the destruction of the present Soviet leadership—and even the thermonuclear devastation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders have drawn back from the abyss the Chinese Communists have prepared for them. We would hope that they would go on from there, by putting aside the illusion of that eventual Communist triumph.

There is reason to believe that the Soviet people are more interested in improving their living standards than in Communist world ambitions. And in the Soviet Union, as well as in other Communist states of Eastern Europe, we see the stirrings of desire for more individual freedom. Processes of evolution are at work.

In the long run they favor the great ideas of freedom, of government by consent of the governed, of individual rights and dignity.

But we must be careful not to confuse what we hope will happen with the actual situation now before us. For nothing has happened yet to justify us in relaxing even in the slightest. We must carry on energetically with all of our unfinished business: such as building and improving the Atlantic partnership and all that this entails in going forward with trade negotiations, and with political and military cooperation, including the proposed multilateral nuclear force; with helping the newly independent and other less developed countries to find firm political and economic footing; and we must maintain unflinchingly, with our allies, the means to defend the free world against aggression by whatever means are required.

### **The Cuban Problem**

One of the items of unfinished business about which all of us are especially concerned is Cuba. The emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime has been unanimously rejected by the nations of this hemisphere. When the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba directly threatened our security, President Kennedy moved promptly to remove that threat. But Cuba remains a major obstacle to normal relations between us and the Soviet Union because, as has been repeatedly said, the political or military intrusion of Moscow into this hemisphere and the continued ambition of Castro to interfere in the affairs of other nations in the hemisphere are neither acceptable nor negotiable.

A series of actions have been taken to support this policy. Our Armed Forces have been given missions to insure that Cuba not become a military threat to us or to any other of its neighbors. We have been working successfully with the other countries of the hemisphere on measures to block the movement of Castro subversives. Cuba's economic and political links with the Western World have been dramatically reduced, and it is increasingly clear that the present regime in Cuba is a growing burden for the Cuban people as well as for those elsewhere who try to sustain it in power.

Disillusionment with the Castro regime continues to spread both within Cuba and among Castro's former admirers in other countries. The example of Castro's Cuba is not one which any sane person who wishes a better life for his own people can any longer think of imitating. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the brave and talented people who inhabit Cuba will long endure this subjection into which they have been betrayed by a fanatical minority.

There are some who have urged that the Cuban problem be solved quickly by acts of war against that island. If such proposals are made with a readiness to accept the total consequences—in Cuba, here, throughout the rest of the world—of such actions, the proposal has at least the virtue of consistency. But if the proposal is made on the assumption that the other side would simply collapse, the proposal has no roots in reality. Those who carry the full responsibility must determine the nature of any such threat and take the measures appropriate to the threat itself. We saw last year in Cuba a threat which required us to face the immediate prospect of war. The elimination of that threat gives us a chance to pursue by other means the unanimous determination of the hemisphere that a free Cuban people will take their place again in the family of this Western Hemisphere.

### **Foreign Aid**

Perhaps the most serious weakness in our national security at the present time is the lack of understanding of our stake in the developing countries of the rest of the world. We have tended, I think, too long and too much to think of our help to these countries as largess, or "moral responsibility," or do-goodism, or dispensable waste. The blunt truth is that our own security is directly involved in the success of these countries in preserving their independence, which in turn requires economic and social progress as well as the will to remain independent. Our assistance—military, economic, and technical—to these countries in many cases is indispensable to their very survival. The Kremlin understands this. Some years ago it paid us the high compliment of

trying to imitate our foreign aid programs—and in some instances on a much larger scale. One of the main features of the Communist design for world domination is the separation and alienation of the developing countries from the West, and particularly from the United States.

An undeviating Communist objective in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Europe can be summed up in three words: "Yanks, go home."

Why the Communists want us to come home is perfectly obvious. But why Americans want us to come home, surrendering the field to the Communists, taxes my understanding. Yet that is what those who advocate deep cuts in our foreign aid would have us do.

In the kind of world in which we live, we can defend the United States itself only if we prevent the absorption of one free country after another by a movement dedicated to our destruction.

Since President Truman's special message to Congress in March 1947,<sup>5</sup> it has been the bipartisan policy of this country to prevent Communist expansion by assisting free peoples who are trying to preserve their independence. We saved Greece and Turkey without fighting a major war. And then, through the Marshall Plan and related programs, we and the West Europeans went on to win one of the greatest and most decisive victories in history. It was also one of the least costly, for, even in dollars, it cost only a tiny fraction of what we spent to liberate Europe in the Second World War. And it was a bloodless victory.

We stand to win or lose an equally important victory through the Alliance for Progress. If we have the good sense to carry on with this undertaking, not for just a year or two but for whatever time it takes, we will guarantee freedom in this hemisphere more surely than we could through military efforts alone.

Would the Americans who want to abandon the Alliance for Progress, or starve it out of existence, favor our standing aside if, for example, Venezuela were invaded by Communist forces? It is cheaper in dollars—and infinitely

cheaper in lives—to save countries by helping them to develop the strength to maintain their independence.

A considerable part of our foreign aid goes to build and maintain the defenses of countries on the frontlines of the free world. Secretary of Defense McNamara has testified that a \$225 million cut in military assistance would be a more serious blow to our national security than a comparable cut in our defense budget. Do the advocates of heavy cuts want us to abandon or weaken Korea, in which we have so heavy an investment in blood and treasure? Or Formosa? Or Southeast Asia? Or Pakistan or India?

Our security is intimately involved in the political stability—hence in the economic and social progress—of many underdeveloped countries which are not immediately threatened around the rim of the Communist world. But we can't say to the Communists: "Yes, you can have the world, so long as you do not win it by military means." Yet that would be the effect of deep cuts in our economic and technical assistance programs.

There has been talk about waste in our foreign aid. Undoubtedly there has been some. I must confess that the battle against waste is real—and must never end. But you can't expect every dollar to be spent frugally in a country that is defending itself against Communist aggression—that is struggling with Communist guerrillas—or especially if it is a country with relatively few experienced administrators and technicians. And at the end of the trail, if we do not succeed, is the frightful waste of war itself.

There is talk about ingratitude. But we do not seek gratitude. We seek security for the United States, which requires that other countries be able to maintain their independence.

Experience has taught us a great deal about the effective planning and execution of foreign aid. And the program is in the hands of men who are both highly competent and mindful of the value of a dollar. The amount recommended by the President was close to rock-bottom to meet essential needs. A deep cut in the total would, it seems to me, be a reckless act

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

of unilateral disarmament on our part—a great victory for the Communists, one of their most important victories in many years.

#### **"The Consent of the Governed"**

I would like to comment very simply in conclusion on two or three additional matters. About one out of every seven Americans is a veteran. This brings foreign policy into every home in the country. We have about a million men in uniform, perhaps slightly less, outside the continental United States, in every continent, carrying their share of this great struggle for freedom. Those men deserve our backing and support. And that backing and support is more than defense budgets, more than volunteer contributions to USO and Red Cross, however important those are; it includes also the resources we need to get the job done if possible without committing those men to combat. This is where foreign aid comes in.

I would also like to remind you that a simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is still the most explosive political force in the world today, making itself felt in every country and regardless of political system—making itself felt behind the Iron Curtain, in the uncommitted world, and, of course, in the great free world with which we are allied. This notion is one to which we ourselves are deeply attached. It is a notion that gives us kinsmen among the ordinary men and women throughout the earth, who wish us well and who at times of crisis are not half so neutral as you might suppose, because they feel that common dedication to a notion that is as self-evident as that a human being, a child of God, simply does not want to be pushed around too much.

Now this central political idea which we share with so many others is as strong as our nuclear forces, as our economic might, and gives us allies in every country. Therefore I would urge every citizen and every organization, when considering an attitude toward any of our great public issues involving our foreign relations, to try to ask themselves a relatively simple question: Does my attitude on this subject strengthen and support and promote the great struggle of freedom, which is the motion of history for

the past several centuries? Is what I am doing helping in that struggle in the world in which we live, or does my attitude mean that I am ready to quit?

Now these are the issues which we must face today. Are we ready to stay with it at a time when we are on the forward edge of great events—when there is great change in the years ahead of us, behind the bloc, in the free world, in the direction of freedom? This is a question we must ask ourselves because we dare not lose this struggle. We are not losing this struggle—and the peoples of the earth do not wish to see this struggle lost. This is not the time to quit. This is a time to stay with it, and, staying with it, we and our children can walk the earth in confidence and courage and live up to the great tradition to which the Legion itself has contributed so much.

## **President Urges Senate Approval of Test Ban Treaty**

### **LETTER TO SENATE LEADERS**

White House press release dated September 11

SEPTEMBER 11, 1963.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD AND SENATOR DIRKSEN: I am deeply appreciative of the suggestion which you made to me on Monday morning that it would be helpful to have a further clarifying statement about the policy of this Administration toward certain aspects of our nuclear weapons defenses, under the proposed test ban treaty now before the Senate.<sup>1</sup> I share your view that it is desirable to dispel any fears or concerns in the minds of Senators or of the people of our country on these matters. And while I believe that fully adequate statements have been made on these matters before the various committees of the Senate by the Secretary of State,<sup>2</sup> the Secretary of De-

<sup>1</sup> For background and text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234; for the President's message transmitting the treaty to the Senate, see *ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, see *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

fense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless I am happy to accept your judgment that it would be helpful if I restated what has already been said so that there may be no misapprehension.

In confidence that the Congress will share and support the policies of the Administration in this field, I am happy to give these unqualified and unequivocal assurances to the members of the Senate, to the entire Congress, and to the country:

1. Underground nuclear testing, which is permitted under the treaty, will be vigorously and diligently carried forward, and the equipment, facilities, personnel and funds necessary for that purpose will be provided. As the Senate knows, such testing is now going on. While we must all hope that at some future time a more comprehensive treaty may become possible by changes in the policies of other nations, until that time our underground testing program will continue.

2. The United States will maintain a posture of readiness to resume testing in the environments prohibited by the present treaty, and it will take all the necessary steps to safeguard our national security in the event that there should be an abrogation or violation of any treaty provision. In particular, the United States retains the right to resume atmospheric testing forthwith if the Soviet Union should conduct tests in violation of the treaty.

3. Our facilities for the detection of possible violations of this treaty will be expanded and improved as required to increase our assurance against clandestine violation by others.

4. In response to the suggestion made by President Eisenhower to the Foreign Relations Committee on August 23, 1963, and in conformity with the opinion of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, set forth in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations,<sup>3</sup> I am glad to emphasize again that the treaty in no way limits the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States and its allies, if a situation

should develop requiring such a grave decision. Any decision to use such weapons would be made by the United States in accordance with its Constitutional processes and would in no way be affected by the terms of the nuclear test ban treaty.

5. While the abnormal and dangerous presence of Soviet military personnel in the neighboring island of Cuba is not a matter which can be dealt with through the instrumentality of this treaty, I am able to assure the Senate that if that unhappy island should be used either directly or indirectly to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the United States will take all necessary action in response.

6. The treaty in no way changes the status of the authorities in East Germany. As the Secretary of State has made clear, "We do not recognize, and we do not intend to recognize, the Soviet occupation zone of East Germany as a state or as an entity possessing national sovereignty, or to recognize the local authorities as a government. Those authorities cannot alter these facts by the act of subscribing to the test ban treaty."<sup>4</sup>

7. This Government will maintain strong weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons development, in order to ensure that the United States will continue to have in the future a strength fully adequate for an effective national defense. In particular, as the Secretary of Defense has made clear, we will maintain strategic forces fully ensuring that this nation will continue to be in a position to destroy any aggressor, even after absorbing a first strike by a surprise attack.

8. The United States will diligently pursue its programs for the further development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by underground tests within the terms of the treaty, and as and when such developments make possible constructive uses of atmospheric nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the United States will seek international agreement under the treaty to permit such explosions.

I trust that these assurances may be helpful in dispelling any concern or misgivings which any member of the Senate or any citizen may

<sup>3</sup> *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Aug. 12-27, 1963*, p. 76.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 2, 1963, p. 350.

have as to our determination to maintain the interests and security of the United States. It is not only safe but necessary, in the interest of this country and the interest of mankind, that this treaty should now be approved, and the hope for peace which it offers firmly sustained, by the Senate of the United States.

Once more, let me express my appreciation to you both for your visit and for your suggestions.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The Honorable MIKE MANSFIELD  
The Honorable EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN  
*United States Senate*  
*Washington, D.C.*

#### NEWS CONFERENCE STATEMENT \*

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to stress again how important it is that the United States Senate approve the pending nuclear test ban treaty. It has already been signed by more than 90 governments, and it is clearer now than ever that this small step toward peace will have significant gains, and I want to commend to the American people the two distinguished and outstanding speeches by Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen, the majority and minority leaders, who in the great tradition of American bipartisanship and national interest I think put the case most effectively.

This treaty will enable all of us who inhabit the earth, our children and children's children, to breathe easier, free from the fear of nuclear test fallout. It will curb the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, thereby holding out hope for a more peaceful and stable world. It will slow down the nuclear arms race without impairing the adequacy of this nation's arsenal or security, and it will offer a small but important foundation on which a world of law can be built.

The Senate hearings and debate have been intensive and valuable, but they have not raised an argument in opposition which was not thor-

oughly considered by our military, scientific, legal, and foreign policy leaders before the treaty was signed. This nation has sought to bring nuclear weapons under international control since 1946. This particular kind of treaty has been sought by us since 1959. If we are to give it now only grudging support, if this small, clearly beneficial step cannot be approved by the widest possible margin in the Senate, then the Nation cannot offer much leadership or hope for the future.

But if the American people and the American Senate can demonstrate that we are as determined to achieve a peace and a just peace as we are to defend our freedom, I think future generations will honor the action that we took.

#### President Discusses Viet-Nam on CBS and NBC News Programs

*President Kennedy was interviewed on September 2 by Walter Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting System and on September 9 by David Brinkley and Chet Huntley of the National Broadcasting Company. Following are transcripts of portions of each program in which the President discussed the situation in Viet-Nam.*

#### CBS INTERVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2

White House press release dated September 2

*Mr. Cronkite:* Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties there, quite obviously.

*President Kennedy:* I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people

\* Made by President Kennedy at the opening of his regular news conference on Sept. 12.

support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repression against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

*Mr Cronkite:* Do you think this Government has time to regain the support of the people?

*President Kennedy:* I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

*Mr Cronkite:* Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

*President Kennedy:* If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been crowded out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in our final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

#### RFK INTERVIEW, SEPTEMBER 9

White House press release dated September 9

*Mr. Huntley:* Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that

our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?


*The President:* Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet Nam we have been dealing with a government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may prove so. We are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government here. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

*Mr. Huntley:* Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

*The President:* I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Wrongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became incapable of controlling events. We don't want that.

*Mr. Brinkley:* Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?

*The President:* No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, comes so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.



*Mr. Brinkley:* In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment or it

*The President:* No.

*Mr. Hensley:* Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

*The President:* No, that's the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

*Mr. Brinkley:* With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

*The President:* We have some influence. We have some influence, and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interests, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everybody in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle their quarrels. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans

will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

### **Soviet Charge on Introduction of Aircraft into Laos Rejected**

#### *Department Statement:*

A Soviet charge released by Tass September 6, that the United States has violated the Geneva Accords<sup>1</sup> by introducing aircraft into Laos illegally, is false. The Royal Lao Government itself issued a communique on August 30 branding the charge, which had already been made by the Pathet Lao faction, as "pure propaganda."<sup>2</sup>

The United States has provided the Government of Laos, at the request of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, six T-28 aircraft as replacements for six T-6 aircraft of the Royal Lao Air Force which had become worn out. These T-28 aircraft are propeller-driven. This military equipment was furnished to the Royal Lao Government in full accordance with article 6 of the Geneva Protocol.<sup>3</sup>

It is ironic that the Soviet Government has chosen to publicize, in its capacity as co-chairman of the Geneva conference, a charge made by the leader of the Pathet Lao faction. On June 20 Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in a message to the cochairmen specifically charged that North Vietnamese troops were present in Laos and military supplies to support Pathet Lao forces were being received from North Viet-Nam. The Soviet Union has been conspicuously silent on this matter.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Sept. 6 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of AUG. 13, 1967, p. 239.

<sup>3</sup> *IMJ*, p. 231.



## The 18th General Assembly: A Testing Ground of Hopes and Opportunities

by Richard N. Gardner

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The 18th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens next week. It is the first Assembly since the conclusion of the partial test ban agreement. Men and women around the world are looking to their representatives at the United Nations to consolidate and extend this hopeful beginning: to defrost the frozen issues on the world's agenda, to settle irritating and peace-threatening disputes, to exploit opportunities for international cooperation, and to accelerate the orderly modernization and development of the less developed areas of the world.

The United States will do its best to vindicate these hopes. It is in our national interest to sustain the momentum of the test ban agreement, to demonstrate that despite their differences all U.N. members share common interests in peace and welfare, and to increase the incentives on the Soviet leadership to pursue a policy of genuine peaceful coexistence.

This is the spirit in which we approach next week's General Assembly. But—and this is a sobering “but”—none of us really knows whether the slightly warmed atmosphere will bring us nearer to solutions of the chronic problems and whether during the next 3 months at the U.N. we will find it possible to take quantum jumps toward realistic and acceptable solutions of the big problems. This, frankly, still remains to be tested.

Moreover, we must recognize that the job of following up the test ban is largely one for

quiet diplomacy. The Assembly will probably be more important this year as a center of communication—as a place where quiet talks can take place between foreign ministers—than as an instrument where significant substantive actions are taken.

So perhaps the best way to approach next week's General Assembly is in a pragmatic mood: in the mood of political exploration.

Today I should like briefly to review with you in candid and realistic terms the issues and problems that we will face next week and for the next 3 months at the U.N. General Assembly. I believe there are opportunities, but there is no certainty that we can make great headway.

Some enthusiasts for the U.N. think of U.N. issues and of the people who handle them as somehow purer and more open to reason than hard-shell diplomats. Some people like to believe that foreign policy issues somehow are transmuted in the U.N. atmosphere, that they are purified of nationalist pressures and prejudices. If we are really to make progress on these subjects, I cannot emphasize strongly enough what should be a truism but is often overlooked: that the foreign policy “stuff” that Under Secretary Harriman and my other colleagues have just described to you is the self-same “stuff” that we deal with in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. We are not a sanitized and morally superior enclave in the Department of State that concerns itself with lifting up these issues to a more sublimated sphere. We are concerned with what contribution the international organizations, especially the U.N., can make to the achievement of the

<sup>1</sup> Address made before a regional foreign policy conference held by the Department of State in cooperation with the World Affairs Council of Boston at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 11 (press release 465 dated Sept. 10).

purposes of our foreign policy—which I regard as uplifting enough.

The U.N., and specifically the General Assembly, is an arena of practical politics. If it were not, very few people would pay attention to it. The U.N. offers us a repertory of instrumentalities for influencing world opinion, for mediation and quiet diplomacy, for putting a "third man" into the middle of contentious issues, for helping along the orderly process of transferring political power in dependent areas, for channeling skills and resources into nations that badly need them.

The U.N. is not a substitute for the exercise of national power; it is only a new arena in which that power is exercised. It is not a substitute for national interest; it is a place where nations work together to promote their national interests on those matters where they cannot get adequate results by acting alone.

The U.N. has no mysterious power of its own that transforms issues—whether these are East-West issues or North-South issues—and what it produces is the end result of the input of its members.

If nothing else, the financial crisis in the U.N. should bring home to us the immutable fact: The U.N. machine is not self-propelling. It must be fueled by the political and financial commitments of its members.

With these sobering thoughts in mind, we can regard this forthcoming Assembly as a testing ground of hopes and opportunities. And that is how we propose to use it—honestly and realistically.

We will be testing to see whether the Soviet Union is ready to depart from previous rigid positions and commit itself to constructive courses of action which will concretely advance the settlement of problems to our mutual advantage.

We will be watching for the moments when members in arrears reach for the checkbook as well as the script of their speeches.

We will, above all, test progress by whether the Assembly concentrates on the rhetoric of ringing resolutions which try to outdo each other in defining Utopia or on the commitment of practical steps toward disarmament and decolonization and development and the enlargement of fundamental freedoms.

Now let us look at the issues and items on the agenda.

An academic friend of mine, who has been closely observing the doings of the General Assembly since its creation, recently remarked that he could not recall a single item that had ever been removed from the agenda. This is a slight exaggeration, but it is true as a general proposition that most chronic issues remain and new ones are added each year. The General Assembly has been enlarging its scope of interest and will be debating this year an amazing number and variety of subjects. Last year the General Assembly passed 124 resolutions, which ranged from an appointment to fill a vacancy on the Board of Auditors to a four-part resolution on peaceful uses of outer space. This year there are already inscribed about 100 items and the plate is not yet out of the kitchen. Let us see if we can discern some order in this collection and at the same time try to preview what United States foreign policy will face in wrestling with it.

The business of the 18th General Assembly can be analyzed in terms of seven big issues.

#### **Disarmament and Nuclear Issues**

*First, this Assembly will be discussing disarmament and nuclear issues in a more promising atmosphere than has prevailed for a number of years.*

Installation of the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow<sup>2</sup> and the conclusion of the partial test ban agreement<sup>3</sup> has set the stage for a new look at old issues.

The United States will continue to seek the goal of general and complete disarmament, containing appropriate safeguards and secured by international institutions capable of preserving the peace, as contained in the United States outline of a disarmament treaty.<sup>4</sup> But in view of recent Soviet statements and recent discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference the focus of attention will be next steps after the partial test ban that could help turn down the arms race and reduce the risks of war.

<sup>2</sup> For text of agreement, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

On these matters the General Assembly can serve most usefully as a forum to encourage understanding of basic issues. It can guide and endorse, but it is primarily the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference which is the workshop for negotiation.

### **Peacekeeping**

*Second, the General Assembly will inevitably be concerned with measures to improve the United Nations' peacekeeping role.*

The link between disarmament and peacekeeping is obvious: The fact is that nations will never be willing to eliminate their arms until they have some substitute means of protecting their territorial integrity and vital interests.

The United States outline of a disarmament treaty recognizes the inescapable relationship between peacekeeping and disarmament when it states at the outset that the objective of the treaty is to insure that disarmament is accompanied "by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

The outline goes on to specify a number of measures for the development of the U.N.'s peacekeeping role—among them, the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the improvement of nonjudicial methods of peaceful settlement, the establishment of a U.N. peace observation corps for information and factfinding, and the build-up by the end of the disarmament process of a U.N. peace force with "sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it."

It is an unhappy fact of life that the Soviet Union has never accepted this concept of a disarmed world under law. A highly publicized difference between ourselves and the Soviets has been on the subject of inspection. But our difference on the peacekeeping role of the United Nations has been no less wide and no less fundamental.

Recently Chairman Khrushchev stated that he "passionately wishes the U.N. to . . . develop as an instrument of strengthening peace

and organizing cooperation between states." In the months ahead we will be watching to see whether these words are matched by deeds. The real long-term interests of the Soviet Union, as well as of the United States, would be served by a stronger U.N. which could help promote great-power disengagement from dangerous confrontations and prevent brush-fire conflicts from triggering a thermonuclear war.

In an age when the Soviet Union and the United States have in their arsenals weapons each of which has the destructive power of all the bombs dropped in the Second World War, in an age when no matter how many weapons one side may build neither side can escape unimaginable destruction in a nuclear holocaust, in an age when the danger of war by accident or miscalculation grows with the increasing complexity of weapons systems—in such an age there is no rational alternative for both sides but to develop a civilized system of peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations.

In the coming months the United States will seek support for a number of specific measures to strengthen the U.N. as a peacekeeping institution: enhancement of the political and mediatory role of the Secretary-General, appointment of conciliators in contentious cases, greater use of U.N. observers, broadened recourse to the International Court of Justice in both advisory and adversary proceedings. The Congo experience also underlines the need to improve the U.N.'s policing resources: The Secretary-General needs an enlarged and more diversified military staff, and we would hope to see more countries follow the example of the Scandinavians, who are taking steps to earmark and train national forces to be available for U.N. service on a standby basis.

The U.N. is now fielding three major peacekeeping operations—in the Congo, on the Israel-U.A.R. border and demarcation line, and in Yemen. On the first two of these the General Assembly will take action. The U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC) is scheduled to continue to the end of the year. The Government of the Congo, supported by many of its neighbors, has asked that the U.N. Force remain, perhaps in reduced numbers, for an additional 6 months or so. The problem is to find

the necessary political and financial support in the General Assembly to approve the extension of the U.N. Force and to provide for an acceptable formula of financing.

The continuation of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East will require an Assembly resolution assessing UNEF's anticipated costs for 1964, which may go as high as \$20 million. There is a general consensus that this Force, which polices the line between Israel and Egypt, is performing an effective job and that it should be retained.

The 200-man U.N. observation mission in Yemen, which is observing the disengagement agreement between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia, has not been a matter of formal concern of the General Assembly since its costs are being met by the parties concerned. But as a major peacekeeping operation of the U.N., the success of the mission in facilitating the disengagement agreement will be watched with close attention. While the United Nations Secretary-General has reported that the progress of this operation has not been encouraging, he has also stated that both parties have expressed a willingness to cooperate in good faith with the United Nations mission and that, on the whole, they have done so. Recently, they have agreed to pay for the costs of the mission for 2 more months. Since the U.N.'s role has been limited to observing and not policing the disengagement agreement, the responsibility for a successful outcome rests squarely on the parties concerned.

#### **The Financial Crisis**

*Third, the General Assembly can hardly fail to be concerned with the U.N.'s financial crisis.*

The refusal of some members to pay their assessments for meeting the costs of the expensive peacekeeping operations is at the core of the difficulty. The International Court has ruled that these assessments are binding upon members as "expenses of the organization," and the General Assembly last year "accepted" this ruling by an overwhelming vote.<sup>5</sup> The fourth special session of the General Assembly this past June called for collection of arrears and assessed members for the costs of the two main

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan 7, 1963, p. 30.

peacekeeping operations for the last 6 months of 1963.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, some \$100 million in peacekeeping assessments remain to be paid. Let the members vote with their pocketbooks on what kind of U.N. they want, in the choices so dramatically defined by Dag Hammarskjold in his last report: a static conference machinery serving solely as the instrument for discussion, or as a dynamic organism with the capacity to take executive action in peacekeeping and nation building.

The United States position on this point is crystal clear. We believe the legality of these assessments has been established beyond question. We believe further that, apart from legalities, the organization cannot thrive or even operate at a satisfactory level of horsepower unless all members (and the Soviet bloc is not the only culprit in this respect) accept the obligation of collective financial responsibility. Members cannot order from the menu offered by the U.N. and turn away when the check is presented. We also believe that there is no question about the automatic application of article 19, which deprives a member more than 2 years in arrears of its vote in the General Assembly. Application of article 19 to a number of countries, including those in the Soviet bloc, comes up next year, unless payments are made on arrears, and the issue is bound to hover over this year's session.

#### **Colonial and Racial Issues**

*The fourth principal focus of the Assembly's concern embraces colonial and racial issues, although the two should be clearly distinguished.*

Since the end of World War II some 50 nations have achieved their independence. For the most part, this independence has been gained without large-scale violence, and not one of these new nations has succumbed to Communist totalitarianism. The existence of the United Nations has helped fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of old colonial regimes and has assisted orderly progress toward independence and responsible self-government. While the record has been far from

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 178.

perfect, it is undoubtedly a good deal better than it would have been had the United Nations never existed.

With all but 2 percent of its population now freed from Western colonial rule, the world finds itself confronted with the last "hard core" colonial problems. The drive to liquidate the remnants of dependency, particularly in Africa, animates the leaders of recently formed African states. The most proximate target is the Portuguese territories.

Just 6 weeks ago the frictions generated by this problem produced heated discussions in the Security Council and culminated in a resolution which deprecated the continued refusal of Portugal to implement previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for self-determination in Portugal's African territories, determined that the situation in the territories seriously disturbed the peace and security of Africa, called on Portugal to take measures to bring about self-determination "with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected," and requested all states to refrain from assisting Portugal in its repression and to prevent the sale of arms and military equipment for this purpose.<sup>7</sup> If the Secretary-General is unable to report progress in the implementation of these provisions by October 31, the deadline set by the resolution, it is certain that the issue, further inflamed, will engage the attention of the General Assembly.

What is the United States view? We believe these territories are non-self-governing within the meaning of the charter. We have also come out clearly for the application of the right of self-determination to these territories and for accelerated political, economic, and social advancement of their inhabitants. We believe that the U.N. has a vital role to play in facilitating a meaningful dialog between Portugal and appropriate African leaders. Moreover, the U.S. has been following a policy of providing no arms to Portugal for use in these territories.

At the same time, the U.S. has emphasized that change in this situation must be brought about peacefully, in accordance with principles and processes defined in the charter, and that

we must relentlessly strive for a solution to this problem through the creative paths of peace, difficult though these paths may often seem.

Another intractable issue in this area, of course, is that of South African racial policies. Here the General Assembly debate is likely to be even more heated should the Secretary-General on October 30 report no progress on implementing the Security Council's resolution of last month.<sup>8</sup> This resolution, which we supported, strongly deplored the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles of the charter and contrary to obligations of member states and called on all states to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition, and all types of military vehicles to South Africa.

The United States view on this issue is clear and consistent, as Ambassador Stevenson noted in the Security Council last month. We have often affirmed our belief that *apartheid* is abhorrent and incompatible with the constitutional and moral foundations of our society. We believe this matter is of proper and legitimate concern to the U.N. We believe that the General Assembly can properly consider questions of human rights which are a member's official policy and are inconsistent with obligations of that member under articles 55 and 56 of the charter. Moreover, as we stated in the Security Council, that *apartheid* policy has led to a situation the continuation of which is likely to endanger international peace and security. At the same time, we have made repeated representation to the Government of South Africa to take steps to reconsider and revise its racial policies. We have appealed to the Government to change course and embark on a policy of national reconciliation and emancipation. We repeat the hope that the Government of South Africa will have a change of heart so that this agonizing problem can be solved through the ways of peaceful change.

#### Human Rights

*Fifth, the General Assembly will be involved in fundamental issues of human rights.*

The issues of decolonization and *apartheid* are not only political. They are better appre-

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1963, p. 303.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

ciated as aspects of the politico-moral realm, of those human relationships which constitute the bedrock of all free societies and which in the U.N. go under the rubric of "human rights and fundamental freedoms." These are often dismissed as marginal concerns in the nuclear age. But President Kennedy summed up the operative link between these relationships and the primary concern of the world of the charter in his American University speech last June when he asked, "And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights. . . ?"<sup>9</sup>

Although "human rights" is formally entered on the General Assembly agenda in just a few items, the issue of human rights may be a cardinal concern of the Assembly. It will pervade the deliberations of every committee. Our own struggle here at home to enlarge the area of freedom for all our citizens and to make emancipation real will be followed by every delegate. The charter makes the advancement of human rights one of the main purposes of the organization, and in articles 55 and 56 members specifically assume the obligation to take action to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion. But beyond this, members have come to recognize that the denial of human rights tends to spill over borders and, if not remedied, to disturb international peace and security.

Quite apart from specific human rights problems, the General Assembly will have before it a proposed draft declaration on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. This declaration condemns all forms of discrimination; calls on states to revise governmental practices which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination; declares the right of every person to take part in the government of his country and to participate in elections; and declares that the U.N. and the specialized agencies should do all in their power to insure the elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race, color, or ethnic origin. We expect to support this declaration with minor modifications to make it a more appropriate international instrument.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, July 1, 1963, p. 2.

The United States Government has embarked on a new policy of considering U.N. human rights conventions on their merits. The President recently submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification three U.N. conventions dealing with forced labor, practices akin to slavery, and political rights of women.<sup>10</sup> Each of these deals with an important human right already guaranteed by our Federal Constitution and by existing Federal law. We believe their ratification can play a significant part in cultivating an international environment congenial to American interests.

The U.N. cannot replace national codes and national commitments to human rights with international codes and international pressures. Obviously only rules that are internalized in each society can evoke meaningful practices. But the U.N. can play a vital role in defining standards, in clarifying experiences, in exposing to the conscience of the world denials of those rights that should be the heritage of all human beings. The U.N. can also help the newly developing countries in building their constitutions to serve and extend human rights.

#### Cooperation in Outer Space

*A sixth area in which we can realistically test our hopes is that of cooperation in outer space.*

During the past year we can record both progress and stalemate. In bilateral talks we have agreed with the U.S.S.R. to cooperate in the coordinated launching of weather satellites, a geomagnetic survey, and space communications experiments.<sup>11</sup> Following creation of the United States Communications Satellite Corporation, we discussed with European nations the project for a global satellite communication system with broad sharing of ownership and management. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) inaugurated an international weather research and forecasting program.<sup>12</sup>

Contrasted with such progress in the scientific and technical field is the lean record of accomplishment by the U.N. Committee on Outer Space in the development of space law.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 320.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1963, p. 404.

<sup>12</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, May 13, 1963, p. 740.

The Committee has been frustrated by the "all or nothing" attitude of the Soviet Union—the insistence that agreement on such questions as liability for space accidents and assistance to astronauts must be held up pending agreement on controversial political questions. If we are indeed in a new political climate, we should now find it possible to move beyond the resolution adopted by the 16th General Assembly,<sup>13</sup> which affirmed that international law applies to outer space and that outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all and not subject to national appropriation.

### **Economic and Technical Programs**

*Seventh, the Assembly will be concerned with extending the U.N.'s economic and technical programs.*

We are entering the third year in that imaginative complex of technical and economic and social programs which we inspired two Assemblies ago under the name of the United Nations Development Decade. U Thant well summed up the importance of this work by characterizing it as "second only to safeguarding peace itself." Most of the energies of the U.N. and the bulk of its employees are engaged in the economic, social, and technical work of the U.N. itself and of its specialized agencies.

The General Assembly will be talking about the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development scheduled for next spring<sup>14</sup> and about U.N. technical aid and preinvestment programs in nearly 100 countries throughout the world. Let me say a word about the promise that lies in each of these.

No new action is required by the General Assembly in preparation for the Trade and Development Conference, but the eyes of many delegates will be focused on it. The developing countries seek growing markets and improved and stable prices for their exports. We believe the U.N. can play a more effective role in helping these countries deal with the internal and external obstacles to expanding their export trade.

<sup>13</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/1721 (XVI) ; for text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

<sup>14</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, July 29, 1963, p. 173.

U.N. assistance to economic development has grown steadily. The U.N. system is spending some \$300 million a year in feeding the hungry, healing the sick, teaching the illiterate, training key personnel, and helping countries draw up rational development plans. And the U.N. financial institutions are lending over \$1 billion a year for productive development projects.

These activities of the U.N. are a useful supplement to our bilateral assistance program: They secure financial contributions from other countries and facilitate recruitment of foreign experts who may be more suited to the needs of developing countries. And in certain situations aid and advice may have a greater impact on the recipient if it comes under the auspices of the United Nations.

Yet despite impressive achievements, much remains to be done in improving the U.N. assistance programs. The combined \$150 million target set 2 years ago for the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund remains unfulfilled. OPEX—the program to supply operational and executive personnel to developing countries—badly needs to be expanded. The activities of the U.N. and specialized agencies need to be better coordinated and focused on the most urgent requirements of the developing countries. The forthcoming Assembly can make itself heard on these and other practical questions in the implementation of the Development Decade.

If these seven subjects on the Assembly's agenda which I have just previewed sound a bit mundane and workaday, if they seem to promise little drama or the kind of antics which so delighted the Sunday supplements in previous years, this is all to the good. If the U.N. has grown up to its 18th birthday, it will prove its maturity by dealing with these matters in a serious and businesslike manner.

The United States will not be displeased if the Assembly produces no juicy quotes or sensational headlines. We would rather it produced a record of accomplishment—of resolve to undertake practical disarmament measures, of the strengthening of peacekeeping operations, of commitments to financial responsibility, of peaceful change in dependent terri-

tories, of the enlargement of the frontiers of human rights and fundamental freedoms, of the launching of new legal principles for outer space, and of cooperative endeavors in aid to developing nations.

We on our part are prepared to approach the 18th General Assembly in this spirit. We do not underestimate the difficulties. But we welcome the opportunity to test man's hopes and opportunities.

## The International Aviation Policy of the United States

*by G. Griffith Johnson*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

In asking me to talk to you about our international aviation policy, Mr. Wilburn [Raymond Wilburn, executive director, Bureau of Conferences and Institutions, New York University] was kind enough to give me some latitude to decide upon what particulars I should focus. As you know, we do have a more or less formal exposition of governmental aviation policy set forth in a statement by the President on April 24.<sup>2</sup> You have all read the President's statement, and I do not see any reason why I should dwell in detail on every aspect of it. With your permission, I would like this morning to devote myself, first, to the background of the policy statement and next to talk about the organization within the Federal Government for carrying out the President's policy. Then, finally, I wish to talk with you about routes, rates, and capacity.

### Background of Policy Statement

From its beginnings and by its very nature, international aviation has been bound up with fundamental issues of national sovereignty and with international relationships generally. During and immediately after World War II there was established a framework of internationally accepted principles within which gov-

ernments and airlines were to operate. The Chicago Convention,<sup>3</sup> and the Bermuda Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom,<sup>4</sup> laid down a basic pattern of understandings and guidelines which for the most part still obtains.

In retrospect, we must agree that the framers of Chicago and Bermuda were gifted with unusual wisdom and foresight. The principles they established have been flexible enough to allow the international industry to expand rapidly and precise enough to permit governments to negotiate within them. Even so, no amount of human wisdom could have devised the means to reconcile all of the forces that play upon international aviation. For one thing, although the industry is worldwide, one market, the United States, is overwhelmingly important. Our large population and our relatively high income levels make it inevitable that we will provide more passengers and more cargo than any other national unit. But we are sovereign only over our own airspace. If we wish to fly elsewhere in the world, then we must get permission from other sovereign states. Typically, the other sovereigns consider that rights to enter their airspaces should be exchangeable for reciprocal rights into the United States.

Even this requirement for the exchange of rights between basically unequal trading partners might have been fully adjusted to, had the

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the New York University Air Transport Conference at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 10 (press release 462 dated Sept. 9).

<sup>2</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of May 20, 1963, p. 784.

<sup>3</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1591.

<sup>4</sup> TIAS 1507, 1640, 1714, 3338, 3675, 3719.

industry's technology stood still. In fact, however, aviation has been characterized by so dynamic a technology that it has never been possible for the adjustment processes to be worked out in full.

In large part because of rapid technological change, particularly the introduction of jets, governmental operations and policymaking in international aviation were in serious trouble in the late 1950's. By the end of the decade, our carriers were unhappy—perhaps that is an understatement—with what they considered unwise governmental actions, other governments were unhappy with us and with one another, and our own policymaking and operating agencies were unhappy with other governments and with one another. In this situation, forward movement on the governmental front was virtually impossible. Bilateral issues were piled up, negotiations were stalemated, and tempers rose, in many cases, to dangerously high levels.

Against this background, the new administration in 1961 decided we had better take a new look at international aviation. This was done with considerable care and thoroughness. A private contractor was engaged to undertake a basic study of policy issues and policy alternatives. He turned in a report of two very substantial volumes. Then an interagency committee, representing the several departments and agencies concerned with aviation policy, set out to frame recommendations for the President, using the contractor's report as a part of its background material. The steering committee was in session over a period of 7 or 8 months. Its internal deliberations were supplemented by consultations with industry and labor. After an immense amount of discussion and argumentation, it agreed on the recommendations which the President accepted and restated in his April 24 statement.

I believe that the policy statement has helped greatly to clear the air and to permit us to go forward again with governmental business in the field of international aviation. Strictly speaking, the statement does not strike out in new or revolutionary directions. It accepts the reality that international aviation will not be allowed to operate in a wholly unregulated environment, but it rejects the proposition that

we should therefore adopt a system of thoroughgoing governmental restriction and control. In fact it is fair to interpret the policy statement as falling strongly on the side of giving competitive forces freedom to operate.

After looking at the alternatives, in effect, the statement harks back to Bermuda and to Chicago and finds the policymakers of those days were in the main on the right track. It restates the basic objectives of the United States policy in terms that the negotiators at Bermuda would, I am sure, have found acceptable. That restatement is as follows: "to develop and maintain an expanding, economically and technologically efficient international air transport system best adapted to the growing needs of the Free World, and to assure air carriers of the United States a fair and equal opportunity to compete in world aviation markets so as to maintain and further develop an economically viable service network wherever a substantial need for air transportation develops."

#### **Interagency Relationships**

Let me turn now to the question of organization and interagency relationships in this area.

As you know, the President has written to Secretary of State Rusk directing him, in the President's words, "to provide . . . a focus of leadership for this vital area of foreign policy."<sup>5</sup> The President's directive to the Secretary expressed his wish that the Secretary take the lead within the executive branch in identifying emerging aviation problems, in advising the President about them, in giving continuing attention to international aviation policy, and in assuring necessary followup actions.

In making clear the responsibilities of the Secretary in this field, the President made it equally clear that the Department of State would be expected to consult with and work in collaboration with the other agencies concerned. He mentioned by name the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

<sup>5</sup> For text of a letter of June 22, 1963, from President Kennedy to Secretary Rusk, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1963, p. 160.

There has been established, pursuant to the President's directive, a new interagency committee on international aviation policy. Secretary Rusk has made Under Secretary Harri- man the chairman of this committee, while Najeeb Halaby of the Federal Aviation Agency serves as its vice chairman.

Within the Department we have made some organizational changes, the most important of which has been to establish the Office of International Aviation as a separate unit within the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Mr. Allen Ferguson has come in from the Rand Corporation to head the new office, and we are in the process of a modest expansion of staff.

All of these I would characterize as tidying-up and clarifying actions. The place of the Secretary of State in international aviation policy derives directly from his role as the President's chief foreign policy adviser. International aviation is a piece of our foreign relations, and the Secretary must have a close concern for it if he is to discharge his general responsibilities to the President.

At the same time, we in the Department fully recognize that international aviation affairs should not be and cannot be an exclusive foreign policy preserve. Other agencies, and in particular the Civil Aeronautics Board, are obliged by statute to participate intimately in the development and conduct of international aviation policy. Even where there are no statutory requirements, we are very much aware that other agencies have capabilities and interests that bring them into the field of international aviation policy. The task the President has laid on the Secretary of State is to lead, not to preempt. We intend to operate according to the spirit and the letter of the President's directive.

### **Routes, Rates, and Capacity**

Let me take up now some of the substance of policy, in the way of routes, rates, and capacity.

The existing structure of air routes around the world has been built up, sometimes painfully, mainly through the negotiation of bilateral air agreements. The United States has been a leader in creating the existing route structure. On the whole we have succeeded

fairly well in establishing our own flag lines on the main traffic arteries of the world.

I am aware that our industry, or parts of the industry, have not always been enthusiastic about the route exchanges that have been negotiated. I have heard it asserted that we have bargained badly, in the first place, and, moreover, that the United States Government often has given up valuable traffic rights in order to advance other international policies. During the reexamination of our policy, this subject was given very close scrutiny. We found precious little to support the proposition that we had been outbargained or that your Government had been in the habit of giving away aviation interests to achieve other objectives.

Our conclusion was rather that American negotiators had done a reasonably satisfactory job of placing our carriers on the routes that we needed to build an adequate system of international civil air communications. Obviously, as I have already said, the United States has always bargained from a position of being the largest single source of traffic in the world. If we had insisted on absolute economic equivalence in all of our bilateral agreements, we would have had very few agreements, or routes. What we set out to get, and what we did get, is a network of rights for our flag carriers which makes it possible for an American traveler to go by air in an American-owned and -operated aircraft to most of the places in the world that he is likely to wish to visit.

Now, in any event, we have this rather fully developed system of routes. The statement of aviation policy says that we should go cautiously in expanding it. In particular, the statement warns against adding more carriers to the North Atlantic route and against proliferating the number of carriers over thin routes.

The guidance of the policy statement is unexceptionable in principle. In practice, it is easy to foresee that we are going to have a very difficult time ahead. Even though the principal route network is fairly well developed, we have some unfinished business so far as our own carriers are concerned. We also have left over, from the past, route exchanges in which rights

have been accorded but not exercised. These are commitments of the United States, and we are going to have to honor them if we are called upon to do so.

In the case-by-case operation of route policy, we are going to be faced with hard choices. In working within the policy guidelines laid down, we will not have an easy time obtaining traffic rights that American carriers would like to have and that we would like to get for them. One can predict that there are going to be instances where carriers and government negotiators are going to be pulled in one direction by our broad policy interests and in another by the immediate desires and interests of our flag lines. I hope that we can find imaginative and successful solutions to the tough cases. But I have been around long enough to expect that there will be occasions when we will have to make decisions on routes that will not please our industry.

Next for rates.

I want to say, first of all, that the Department of State does not intend to become a ratemaking agency. We do not have a statutory mandate to substitute for the CAB, nor do we have the staff or the expertise to do the Board's job. We do have an interest in rates, however, not only because they bear on the health of the industry but also because international air rates bear upon relations with other governments. I need only recall to your mind the fare dispute of last spring to make the point that the Secretary of State can come to have a lively concern indeed with the way in which fares on international air carriers are established or not established.

Now, the Department agreed with the Civil Aeronautics Board last spring that the Chandler fares<sup>6</sup> were unnecessarily high. We participated with the Board in subsequent inter-governmental talks about the Chandler rate decisions. We have joined with the Board in supporting legislation that would give the CAB power to control international air rates. We believe that the legislation requested by the administration is a necessity if your Government is to be able to operate with full effective-

<sup>6</sup>The International Air Transport Association reached a rate agreement at Chandler, Ariz., in 1962.

ness in this area of international relations.

So far as the immediate future is concerned, we accept the Civil Aeronautics Board's judgment that lower fares, especially on the North Atlantic, are justified in the light of cost considerations and in terms of market development. It seems to us also that experiments with lower fares on the North Atlantic will move the capacity problem to a solution faster than anything else. From the point of view of our balance of payments, we would be interested in a fare structure that would contribute to an increasing flow of tourists to the United States. With the New York World's Fair just around the corner, now would be an especially apt time for designing promotional fares that would facilitate tourism into this country.

The President's policy statement deals with the rate question. It accepts the IATA mechanism as the most practical means available for developing rate proposals. But it stresses that our Government in accepting the IATA mechanism is not prepared to abdicate its responsibilities for assuring reasonable rates for the air traveler and the shipper of air cargo. We have told other governments that we interpret the President's guidance to mean that the United States Government will take an active and even an aggressive part in seeking to assure that rates are in fact reasonable.

Since our own carriers have made clear that they stand for lower international fares, there should be no difference between industry and Government on the rate issue. I take it that we both hope and wish that the decisions taken in Salzburg<sup>7</sup> will be ones that the CAB can readily approve. A number of European governments have expressed approval of the philosophy of lower fares, and this is a heartening sign. If our hopes are disappointed, however, then you may be justified in expecting that your Government will be consulting urgently with other aviation powers to see what can be done about getting a more acceptable answer.

This brings me to the capacity question.

In our policy review, we looked most carefully at possible alternatives to the capacity

<sup>7</sup>The International Air Transport Association Conference convened at Salzburg on Sept. 9.

guidelines laid down in the basic Bermuda Agreement. We considered at great length, also, the possibility of suggesting that legislation be submitted to the Congress to permit the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate the capacity offerings of foreign carriers serving United States gateways. In the end, we recommended to the President that the United States should continue to base its policies on the Bermuda capacity principles. We did *not* recommend legislation to give the CAB authority control over foreign air carrier capacity.

I believe that we were right. The Bermuda rules, with all their ambiguities and all the room they leave for differing interpretations, still provide a set of principles compatible with the objective of an expanding international aviation industry. As for capacity legislation, I think that it would be a most unfortunate mistake for the United States to provide an example which could be taken to justify restrictionism by other national governments.

Much of the argument on capacity has been over the kinds of capacity being offered by international carriers. There has been a vast amount of discussion about fifth-freedom capacity and, as a further refinement, sixth-freedom capacity. Disputes over fifth- and sixth-freedom questions no doubt will continue to arise, even though the jet airplane has altered greatly the condition under which at least the sixth-freedom question came into being. At the same time, the more difficult and the more persistent capacity problem of the remaining years of the subsonic jet age is likely to involve allegations of disproportionately large capacity offerings, without regard for the freedom classification of the traffic.

It has always been our governmental policy, and it continues to be our policy, to insist that carriers should be given a maximum amount of management freedom to decide in the first instance their own capacity offerings. It has been our position that if a carrier considers that a substantial increase in its capacity will help earnings, either on a short- or long-term basis, then the carrier should be permitted to make its own decision, subject to intergovernmental review after an appropriate period of operating

experience. We have argued—and I think correctly—that added capacity tends to bring added demand and that, in any case, governments should not substitute their judgments for those of management about what traffic may be available.

It would be an exaggeration to say that our philosophy has been fully accepted around the world, even though our practice has generally been allowed. The future, however, is likely to bring more strenuous challenges to our position. There is an important body of opinion in parts of the international aviation community that favors arrangements for market sharing and for advance agreement on capacity increases. I do not expect that this point of view will disappear. Rather, I anticipate that some lively discussions will be arising from it.

So far as our policy is concerned, the President's statement gives no color of support for the division of markets or for intercarrier or intergovernmental arrangements to control capacity offerings in advance. Our writ, of course, does not run beyond our own carriers and our own bilateral agreements. If foreign carriers and foreign governments choose to experiment with market sharing beyond the arrangements already in being, we probably will normally have only an onlooker's interest. But we are not prepared to become an active participant in a system which we believe would have the effect of dampening down the very dynamic qualities that have made international civil aviation the burgeoning industry that it has been.

#### **The Air Transport Industry and the Government**

Let me close with a word about the relationships between your industry and Government.

I suppose that nobody nowadays would argue seriously that there should be no governmental interest in a public utility operating in an international environment. There is a constitutional requirement that the executive branch be concerned with the agreements under which air carriers conduct their business abroad. There is an obvious element of public interest in an industry in which only a limited number of carriers can be allowed to carry on the business of international air transportation.

The case for the intervention of the Government thus is perfectly clear. On the other hand, it is implicit in our system that the decisionmaking role of the Government ought to be circumscribed. Government officials need constantly to remind themselves that even industries touched heavily with a public interest have managements and stockholders who have responsibilities and interests too.

Unhappily these generalizations do not provide much guidance in particular cases. When we negotiate a bilateral air agreement, we inevitably touch on the basic concerns of the people who manage and own our carriers. Governmental decisions need to reflect these concerns as well as considerations of international policy and domestic welfare. For this, there is no substitute for close communication between industry and government.

Traditionally, our carriers have been kept well informed about the progress of the Government's business in international aviation. In our negotiations, a carrier representative has customarily been at hand to advise the Government negotiators. I see no reason for change in this respect. We are not always going to agree with one another. Probably it would not even be desirable for us to aim at constant agreement. But we do need to know pretty fully what the other party to the relationship is doing or thinking and why. I can speak for the Department of State—and I think for the whole of the executive branch—when I say that we intend for our part to keep the lines of communication with the industry open.

## **U.S. To Conduct Inspection in Antarctica**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 469 dated September 13

The United States will conduct an inspection in Antarctica during the 1963-1964 austral summer season (November-March). Planning for the conduct of such an inspection has been under way for some time, and the United States has advised the other signatory powers of its intention to inspect.

The inspection is in keeping with provisions of the 12-power Antarctic Treaty, signed on December 1, 1959,<sup>1</sup> which was subsequently ratified by the 12 powers and entered into force on June 23, 1961. The treaty stipulates that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only." Article VII provides for inspection "to promote the objectives and ensure the observance" of the treaty.

This inspection is not based on any anticipation that there have been treaty violations by any signatory power. Indeed, the United States believes that any inspection conducted under the treaty, whether by the U.S. or any other signatory power, will in fact reinforce the basis of mutual confidence that prevails in Antarctica. In this respect the United States has informed the other signatory powers that it will welcome inspection of its stations.

The 12 powers to the treaty are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

## **Mr. Cleveland Discusses U.N. Affairs at NATO Session**

The Department of State announced on September 9 (press release 463) that Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, would take part in special consultations of the North Atlantic Council at Paris on September 10 and 11.

Consultations will cover a wide range of United Nations matters. This NATO session is another part of the broad process through which the United States consults with other U.N. members about the agenda of the upcoming United Nations General Assembly, which opens at New York on September 17.

Mr. Cleveland will be accompanied by Elmore Jackson, Special Assistant for Policy Planning in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

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<sup>1</sup> For background and text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911.

## Some Perspectives on the Current Debates on Aid

by Frank M. Coffin

Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International Development<sup>1</sup>

In addressing this distinguished foreign policy conference I shall not try, in 15 minutes, to say everything that should be said on the subject of aid. I recognize that all of you possess more than an ordinary interest in foreign policy, or you would not be here. I therefore view my role as that of adding some perspectives to the current debates on aid.

Perspective is perhaps most difficult to achieve when we are, as at present, in the throes of our annual decision. It is all the more difficult when such issues as the test ban treaty and civil rights claim the interest and passions of the Nation.

But it is precisely because perspective may be squeezed out of major policy determinations that it is important for groups such as this to maintain the ability to look through passing events, moods, and personalities to some underlying and dominant facts and purposes. After all, the words "look through" are the root words of "perspective."

Let us, therefore, pause to look through some of the realities of the day.

The first, and most obvious, is that aid "is in trouble" in Congress.

To say this does not require such access to inside information as to qualify one as a legislative expert. But there are one or two things which can appropriately be said to such a conference as this about the kind of trouble we face.

First, since most of us obtain most of our knowledge about the aid debates from the news-

papers, radio, or TV, it is useful to go to the primary source and look at some of the sentiments one hears expressed. The vigor of these remarks underscores the intensity of feeling about aid.

A scanning of the *Congressional Record* reveals these opinions from the Senate, which I quote exactly:

—Why should this country, which stood so firmly against the nationalization of industries, now pour out money for the aid of a government which has declared itself bent upon going further into the nationalization of industries?

—We have no basic international policy, having definitely ignored the 125-year-old Monroe Doctrine. . . . In its place has been substituted a hodge-podge of executive orders and gifts of large sums of money to foreign nations, founded upon no principle at all. . . .

—It is the road to bankruptcy, and not a very long road at that.

—If I believed the expenditure of this amount of money would stop the spread of communism, I would support it. . . . But in the light of history, in the light of facts, how can any Senator rise on this floor and say it will stop communism. . . .?

Even stronger statements have been voiced in the House of Representatives where these statements have been made:

—They are deliberately selling America short. . . . Our Uncle (Sam) in his flirtations has become the easy prey of foreign and domestic grafters, vampires, and gold diggers.

—In place of governing ourselves, in place of looking after our own people, we are now trying to bribe and govern the world.

—Congress is lost in the dismal swamps of foreign intrigue.

Yes, one does not have to be a prophet to say there is rough sledding ahead. Now there is one other fact you should know about these remarks

<sup>1</sup>Address made before a regional foreign policy conference held by the Department of State in cooperation with the World Affairs Council of Boston at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 11.

I have quoted from the *Congressional Record*.

The remarks in the Senate were not made in 1963. They were made in 1948, during the Marshall Plan debate, by former Senators [George W.] Malone and [Chapman] Revercomb. The House quotes were taken from Congressman [William] Lemke's remarks in the 1950 debate on Point 4.

The lesson is plain. Aid has always been "in trouble" in the sense that not even the programs which today are acknowledged as overwhelming successes have escaped the hot crucible of prolonged and acrimonious debate.

The fact of controversy is dangerous only if we forget the past and assume that it is a new phenomenon, a sea change of American opinion. It is healthy to remember the arguments of the past. It is reassuring to recall how wrong they were. And it is pertinent, for the same arguments parade the parapets today. No one is a better witness to the lineage of today's arguments than your luncheon speaker, Under Secretary [W. Averell] Harriman. For he not only chaired the committee which prepared the case for the Marshall Plan, but he was its key official abroad in its critical years.

#### **The Aid Program Today**

There is another perspective to add to the current controversy. While we assume that controversy is new, when it is not, we also approach aid today as if it had not changed, when it has.

How often have we read the sage comment of a columnist that, while he agrees with the basic policy of aid, the basic problem is how it is administered. He predictably concludes that what is needed is a massive reappraisal. The last time I came across this wisdom was last week. As for Congress, it wearily assumes that it is dealing with the same program it has reviewed for 15 years.

The fact is that aid today is not what it was 10 years ago, or even 5 years ago. There is no function of government which has been so studied and reorganized. It has passed through seven structural changes and no fewer than eight Presidential committees. These committees, headed by such men as Gordon Gray, Nelson Rockefeller, Clarence Randall, Benjamin Fairless, the late Eric Johnston, William

Draper, and—most recently—General [Lucius D.] Clay, have not essentially differed on the why, what, when, and how of aid. They have laid the basis for a national consensus on aid: one integrated organization with overall responsibility, development based on programs tailored to each country, emphasis on loans over grants, increased procurement of goods and services in the United States, meaningful concentration among countries, aid geared to self-help, a broader role for private enterprise, and termination of aid when countries become able to maintain their own momentum.

Here is the record. Aid is now planned and largely administered through the Agency for International Development. The reorganization of 1961 is now completed. Planning is now done on a country rather than a project-by-project basis. Loans have increased from 10 percent to 60 percent of economic aid. Loan terms, now all repayable in dollars, have hardened for a number of countries. U.S. procurement has increased from about 40 percent to over 80 percent, with aid-financed exports tripling from \$600 million in 1962 to \$2 billion in 1964. Military and supporting assistance have decreased by one-half.

As for concentration, 80 percent of economic assistance goes to 20 countries; 80 percent of military assistance goes to 10 countries. Projects and programs are increasingly tied to self-help. Investment guaranty agreements have been signed with almost 20 additional countries in the past 2 years, with guaranties themselves running at three times the rate of 2 years ago. A number of missions in the field have been consolidated with embassies. Procedures are being updated and simplified. At least half the missions have had an infusion of new executive leadership. Increasing use is being made of land-grant colleges, cooperatives, savings and loan associations. Instead of helping European countries, these same countries are now furnishing 40 percent of free-world aid.

The irony is that at the very time when the planning and execution of aid is better than ever before, the general view is that nothing has changed in 10 years. The historic fact is that U.S. aid has steadily evolved through the past decade and a half, acquiring new tools,

finishing the job in many countries, moving to new areas of concern to the United States, and developing new principles. It is now ready, given steady support from the people and the Congress, to play a major foreign policy role in the formative years of the uncommitted one-third of the globe.

#### **Development Assistance**

The timing could not have been better. Development assistance will play an even more important part in terms of our leadership, respect, and influence should there be a genuine lessening of world tensions. In this we shall not be alone. The nations of Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and Oceania have also moved into this field, almost equaling our capital aid and maintaining 14 times as many technicians abroad as we do. Their increasing participation depends on our steady support of what is becoming truly a free-world aid movement.

The field will not be uncontested. Already the Sino-Soviet bloc has over 10,000 nationals abroad in aid work in over 30 countries. Even more to the point are the new efforts and incentive of Red China, which has shown its determination to extend its influence, not only from Korea westerly to India and Pakistan but even in Africa and Latin America.

At the same time, we can point to a concrete record of achievement in every part of the world where development assistance has been made available in any substantial amount.

Politically, we can cite two kinds of achievements. Either by generating rapid economic growth from within or by resisting aggression from without, we helped to bring about the rebirth of Europe, the survival of Greece and Turkey, the emergence of a free and prosperous Japan, the rapid building of Taiwan and Israel, and continued, if contested, independence throughout the Far East. There has been a second kind of achievement, less precise but no less real. By offering, through assistance, an alternative to either the extreme right or left, we have exerted a continuing and growing influence on development. In Africa it can be seen in the rejection of reliance on Communist economic ideology by the very nations which have experimented with it. In Latin America

we can point with hope to the dramatic reduction of juntas and dictators which has taken place over the past decade. In view of the worldwide confrontation of ways of life, it is remarkable that of the 46 nations that have won their independence since World War II, not one has elected to become a bloc satellite.

#### **The Record on Economic Development**

What about economic development? There are some who would say aid should frankly be used only for short-run political purposes, because real development is a hopeless task. Let's look at the record.

Of the 41 major aid-receiving countries we have helped since 1945, these are the results:

—Fourteen—Western Europe, Japan, Spain, and Lebanon—have not only reached a satisfactory growth rate of at least 1.5 percent for 5 successive years but are no longer dependent on aid.

—Ten more have reached this record of growth, have made progress in limiting dependence on aid; and several, such as Israel, Greece, and Taiwan, will soon be independent of external aid.

—Nine more countries have attained a satisfactory growth rate but will continue to depend on substantial aid.

—Only eight cannot be said to have reached a satisfactory rate of growth. Seven of these are in Latin America, where aid in substantial amounts has only just begun.

What about social and political progress in these countries? Does aid help or hinder? In virtually all of the 24 countries in the first two groups democratic institutions have been strengthened or less democratic regimes have been liberalized.

We should not claim too much. The development of nations with free institutions, with the capacity to manage effectively, is a long and arduous process, with many unpredictable turns in the road. But it is clear that United States aid has already built a record of significant achievement.

We can look forward with satisfaction to the graduation to self-sufficiency of at least half a dozen countries. The transition from dependence on aid has started with loan terms being

such as to make the element of U.S. subsidy minimal. These same nations are already beginning to assist others.

The international coordination of aid is becoming increasingly effective through the Development Assistance Committee in Paris, the World Bank and the International Development Association, and the consortia arrangements for such countries as Pakistan, India, Greece, and Turkey.

This very moment of time, therefore, is characterized on the one hand by the evolving competence of the U.S. aid effort, the increased efforts of our allies, and a record of demonstrable achievement, while, on the other hand, we see a renewed interest in the economic arena with a release of tensions, a focusing of efforts on development by the Soviet Union and its satellites, and stepped-up probings, economic and military, by Red China.

### **This Year's Congressional Action**

This is the backdrop against which to measure the implications of congressional action this year. If not substantially modified, the cuts already made will be tantamount to a policy of withdrawal at the very moment in history when we have so much to gain by a posture of steadiness.

Let me rehearse what has happened in Congress this year. The pattern of other years was varied this year in a significant way. After President Kennedy reviewed the findings of the Clay Committee, he voluntarily reduced his request of Congress by over \$400 million.<sup>2</sup> The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which for the past 4 years has averaged a cut of only \$200 million, made a further cut of \$438 million—*notwithstanding* the President's earlier action. At this point the aid request had been slashed four times as much as at the same stage in an average year.

The House of Representatives then proceeded to debate the bill. On Thursday, August 22, it debated and voted until late at night, having more teller votes than any aid bill has

seen in recent history. All cuts were fought off by separate votes after separate debates. On what is already being called Black Friday, major policy was made by the simple device of adding up all of the amounts of cuts which had been defeated, except one, and making, in effect, a motion to cut it by that total figure. The motion carried, for a further cut of \$585 million. The bill had been pared by almost \$1.5 billion, or nearly 30 percent—including the President's reduction—and all this before the Appropriations Committees had acted.<sup>3</sup> When one reflects that the average cut made over the past 4 years by the House Committee on Appropriations has been an additional \$1.1 billion, the significance of this surgery becomes apparent.

What was the policy that was made by the catchall motion to cut? Bear in mind that these were cuts that went beyond the judgment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and had been individually turned down by the House of Representatives itself.

The policy implicit in the cuts—whether recognized or not—was just as clear as if the House had said four things:

First, by bringing the authorized level for military assistance down to about 70 percent of the President's request and 75 percent of what was actually appropriated last year, the House was really saying that conventional defensive strength along the Sino-Soviet border from Greece to Korea should be diminished by as much as one-third in a number of key countries.

Second, by bringing the contingency fund down to one-half the request of \$300 million, and 60 percent of what was actually appropriated last year—the lowest since it was established as a separate fund in 1959—the House was adopting a policy of much more sharply limited Presidential flexibility to deal with the political and economic crises of a fast-changing and unpredictable world.

Third, by cutting Alliance for Progress lending authority 25 percent, to a level \$75 million below what was actually appropriated a year ago, the House signaled a curtailing of incentive at the very time when many of the Latin

<sup>2</sup> For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1963, p. 591.

<sup>3</sup> For remarks by President Kennedy and General Clay at a news conference on Aug. 30, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 476.

American countries had readied themselves to comply with the alliance requirements of planning and self-help and when Peru and Argentina have placed themselves in a position to make dynamic progress.

Fourth, by reducing the authorization of development loans for the rest of the world by 15 percent, to \$900 million, the House was saying in effect: Fulfill our lending commitments to India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, and Tunisia, but do little or nothing more. The cut of \$160 million is equivalent to all of the loans made last year to all of Africa and the Far East.

Can it be argued that these implicit policy determinations strengthen the forces of freedom—or are we to assume that there is such a thaw in the cold war that we can unilaterally lead the way?

Is this consistent with the concern being manifested by opponents of the test ban treaty?

Does this improve or hinder our chances of seeing the developing world grow in freedom?

Does anyone think that this will reinforce the will of our allies to enlarge their efforts?

Would anyone contend that this will increase the deterrence to Communist Chinese expansionism?

If we are still concerned about Latin America, can one seriously claim that this increases our chance of success?

Obviously all of these questions are rhetorical. The answer to all is no. If this is so, what would be achieved by this set of Black Friday policies?

Will it help our balance of payments? Perhaps many voted on the assumption that it would. But new military assistance and development lending, accounting for over 90 percent of the cut, are almost completely tied to U.S. procurement. As AID Administrator David E. Bell has pointed out, the particular cuts made would have almost no effect on the balance of payments.

But U.S. exports would be reduced by almost the total amount of the cut, over half a billion dollars. Where lies the U.S. interest in this kind of action, if it strengthens us neither at home nor abroad?

The answer, I think, lies in an attitude of frustration that the countries we are helping do not do everything we would like to see them

do—and immediately. It stems from an exaggerated expectation of the power of aid, which in most cases is between 1 percent and 3 percent of a country's gross national product. Yet this is the lever which is expected to bring about, overnight, in each developing country, a solution to border disputes, the abandonment of a posture of nonalignment, a full range of sophisticated monetary, fiscal, and social policies, the institution of full-fledged democracy, favorable votes in the United Nations, and a host of other equally desirable objectives.

### **The Basic Purpose of Foreign Aid**

Just because of our frustrations, perspective is most critically needed to keep our eye on our basic purpose. Aid is a limited but important instrument of our foreign policy. It accounts for seven-tenths of 1 percent of our gross product, and one-twelfth of our budget for defense and security. It is far less, both absolutely and proportionately, than what we were willing to commit in the days of the Marshall Plan, when we were less than half as rich as we are today.

But it is an important instrument of security and freedom. In the world in which we live there are no guarantees for either. But one thing is sure. So long as we remain in the contest, so long as we are involved, there is the chance of success with which history has rewarded our perseverance in the past. Equally certain is it that when we withdraw from any area of the world, when we furl the banner of freedom and retreat, we have foreclosed the chance for victory. We have made an irreversible decision. We may save some money for the time being, but we will have paid a price.

It is this facing of alternatives that is the highest task of diplomacy today. One seldom hears it discussed by the ardent foes of aid. But there have been eloquent voices raised. Let us hear them now. They were not partisan voices. One was that of a Democrat, the other a Republican.

One voice said:

The United States—the richest and most powerful of all peoples, a nation committed to the independence of nations and to a better life for all peoples—can no more stand aside in this climactic age of decision than we can withdraw from the community of free nations.

The other voice said :

The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership. We must choose. There are not blueprints to guarantee results. We are entirely surrounded by calculated risks . . . those who disagree . . . have not escaped to safety by rejecting or subverting this plan. They have simply fled to other risks, and I fear far greater ones.

The first voice was that of President Kennedy in April 1963. The second was that of Senator [Arthur H.] Vandenberg as he closed debate on the Marshall Plan in the spring of 1948.

These statements reflect the makings of a consensus. But they are statements separated by a decade and a half. Can we, in 1963, synchronize the voice of the past with the voice of the present? Can Congress today pursue with steadiness a program which faith initiated, history has vindicated, and the times now so urgently require?

## North Pacific Fishery Conference Held at Tokyo

*Statement by President Kennedy*

White House press release dated September 10

Ambassador Benjamin A. Smith II will lead a delegation being sent to Japan to discuss with Japan and Canada international arrangements for the conservation and use of fishing resources in the North Pacific Ocean. The discussions, which are scheduled to begin on September 16, represent the second attempt to reach agreement on the questions raised by Japan about the restrictions upon its rights under an existing convention relating to fishing in the North Pacific.<sup>1</sup> The first attempt was made last June.<sup>2</sup>

The abstention principle, which calls for the fishing restrictions when certain criteria occur,

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786 and 4902.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 10, 1963, p. 914.

will be the central issue in the new discussions. I believe this principle is sound and reasonable. Without restraints of this nature the nations of the world would run serious risks of depleting fisheries. We have already seen Atlantic halibut fisheries decline from 13,500,000 pounds to 300,000 pounds. In Bristol Bay, the record catch of 24.7 million salmon in 1938 has fallen to a level of 2.8 million. On the other hand, research and careful regulation have restored depleted Pacific halibut fisheries from a low of 40 million pounds in 1923 to an annual average of 70 million pounds.

It is obvious that unless international conservation agreements are strictly enforced there is grave danger of permanent injury to our ocean resources. I hope that it is possible to implement Senate Resolution 392, which called for an international fishery conference so that such damage can be avoided.

In dealing with the North Pacific fisheries problems we shall be mindful of our responsibility for the preservation of vital fishing resources. When the convention criteria called for the removal of Bering Sea halibut from abstention, this was done despite the disadvantage to American fishermen.<sup>3</sup> We shall hope for the same understanding from other nations—to retain the abstention principle when appropriate—for only in this way will it be possible to reach agreement in the common world interest.

## William Matson Roth Confirmed Deputy for Trade Negotiations

The Senate on September 9 confirmed the nomination of William Matson Roth to be a Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador. For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 30.

<sup>3</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 15, 1963, p. 574.

## Soviet Union Vetoes U.S.-U.K. Resolution in Security Council on Israel and Syrian Complaints

*Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representatives Adlai E. Stevenson and Charles W. Yost, together with the text of a draft resolution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. STEVENSON, AUGUST 28

U.S./U.N. press release 4237

The first order of business for us today is to consider Israel's complaint<sup>1</sup> regarding the wanton murder of two of its citizens. The picture of two innocent farmers, murdered in cold blood by a raiding party which struck them down at work in their own fields, must distress us all.

We can sympathize with the sense of outrage felt by the people of Israel, especially since this slaughter follows so close upon the Syrian abduction of three Israeli subjects, including two young girls, who were boating on Lake Tiberias. The United States deeply deplores these incidents.

The evidence cited in the report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization<sup>2</sup> is admittedly circumstantial, but its implications are clear enough. The testimony of the survivor of the attack who saw the uniformed men shooting down his companions; the tracks which the United Nations officials found leading to the scene of the crime and continuing in the direction of Syria; the spent bullets, cartridge cases,

and grenade fragments found in the vicinity of the attack; and the departure afterward in the same direction, all add up to a clear picture which permits objective observers to draw the same conclusions about the origin of the attack.

Also we have before us a Syrian countercomplaint<sup>3</sup> about incidents of August 19, 1963, which the U.N. investigation has not corroborated.

As the Security Council is well aware, these incidents are the latest in a long history of unrest and bloodshed on these frontiers.

Difficulties on the Syrian-Israeli frontiers have broken out periodically ever since the signing of the General Armistice Agreement back in 1948. Indeed this Council has devoted nearly 200 sessions—one-fifth of all its meetings—to this subject. The nature of the alleged violations of the agreement varies somewhat from time to time, but the fundamental cause of the difficulties remains the same; it springs from the failure of the two parties to live in peaceful—if armed—truce in accordance with the armistice agreement. This failure is at the cost—now as in the past—of human lives lost and continuing threats to peace. Although we find ourselves back in session again on the same general issue, I would like to emphasize that the United States does not consider either past or present efforts of this Council to be vain. Above all, we wish to state that we consider any other remedy for these difficulties than resort to the United Nations to be dangerous to peace and intolerable to the international community.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. docs. S/5394 and S/5396.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. docs. S/5401 and Adds. 1-4.

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. S/5395.

In the present connection we believe there are some hopeful signs. During the debate in the Security Council on the Tiberias incident in the spring of 1962,<sup>4</sup> the United States representative stressed repeatedly the necessity for shunning direct unilateral action in the face of provocation and for appealing to this body to cope with threats to the peace. We are gratified to note that these new complaints have been brought to the Security Council. Of course, we also continue to believe that fuller recourse should be had to United Nations machinery provided locally for dealing with such complaints.

Now that the Council has been summoned to act, it must accept its responsibilities and act with courage and wisdom in the light of the best evidence available to it. For us the course which this body should follow is clear. In all justice and in the interests of law and order in international affairs, we believe this reprehensible act of murder on August 19 deserves the strongest condemnation. Only then can it be made clear that outrages of this kind cannot pass without the stern disapproval of the international community.

In our consideration of this case we are fortunate to have before us the report submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. We all here owe a debt of gratitude to the new Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Lieutenant General Odd Bull, and to other United Nations officials, for the excellent work they are doing in this area. General Bull's skill and tact in obtaining the agreement of both parties to observe a cease-fire and to permit visits by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to both the demilitarized zone and defensive areas are highly commendable.

This brings me to what we regard as the heart of the troubles which have erupted so often on the Israel-Syrian frontier. It is evident that, largely as a result of the conflicting interests of the two parties and the varying interpretations which they have chosen to place upon the

meaning of the General Armistice Agreement, the United Nations peacekeeping machinery is unable to function as effectively as was originally intended and expected. This problem came to the attention of the Security Council during its meetings on this subject in April of 1962, and you will recall that the resolution of April 9, 1962,<sup>5</sup> endorsed the measures recommended by the then Chief of Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring the peace and detecting and deterring future incidents and called upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the Chief of Staff in their early implementation. Unfortunately no notable progress resulted from that section of the resolution.

We now have before us some recommendations which General Bull has in mind for the strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization machinery. These recommendations have been proposed by General Bull in the light of his 3 months' study of the problem. We believe the proposals are wise ones and have been advanced in full appreciation of the special points of view of the two sides. We believe that one element in his proposals is absolutely vital. Without it none of the others is likely to be very meaningful. I refer to paragraph 41 in the report. In it General Bull calls for the parties to "comply fully with the order contained in the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949 to observe an unconditional cease-fire and should also abstain from any acts of hostility as provided in the General Armistice Agreement." General Bull adds (and we fully endorse his statement): "I cannot therefore subscribe to any policy by the parties based on the use of force, nor can I condone any firing for whatever purpose across the Armistice Demarcation Line."

We believe details of the plan for strengthening the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization should be worked out by the Chief of Staff in consultation with the Governments of Israel and Syria. What is vital is the full and willing cooperation, without reservation, of the two sides with the Chief of Staff in what he

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1962, p. 735.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 737.

is trying to accomplish. He will be able to strengthen the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization only if the two sides are willing to cooperate with him in his efforts. Ultimately the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization can only be as useful as the two sides want it to be.

Our belief is that the United Nations peace-keeping organization, strengthened by such measures as the Chief of Staff proposes, could prevent many of the kinds of incidents which both sides in this controversy are complaining about to the Security Council today. And if these incidents can be avoided, surely the tension which has gripped the frontiers of Syria and Israel can be relaxed and the danger of raids and retaliation significantly reduced. This would be in the interests of both Israel and Syria and in the interests of peace in the Near East.

We do not believe that anybody can lightly refuse to extend his full cooperation. The peace and well-being of the people of the area depend too much upon it. The judgment of the United Nations and the world community is based upon it. In the interests of all we bespeak that cooperation vital to the success of our efforts here today in behalf of international peace.

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. YOST, SEPTEMBER 3**

U.S./U.N. press release 4239

I have asked for the floor to explain briefly the United States position on the amendments submitted by the distinguished delegate of Morocco [Dey Ould Sidi Baba] contained in document S/5410 to the resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and my own delegation. We understand the spirit which has prompted the Moroccan delegation in putting forward these amendments, and we have given the most careful consideration to them. However, our conclusion is that we cannot support them.

The first two amendments in our view significantly change the meaning and the balance of our resolution. We consider that they fail to take into account the evidence surrounding the incident at Almagor as presented to the

Council in the Secretary-General's report, and by this omission, if adopted, would cause the resolution to fail to deal with the first complaint which the Council is meeting to consider.

The distinguished representative of Morocco has given us today a rather detailed interpretation of the events at Almagor. Frankly, we have not felt justified in engaging in an interpretation of these events but have felt it wise for the Council simply to limit itself to the facts as set forth in the Secretary-General's report. That is what we have attempted to do in paragraphs 1 and 2 of our resolution. The proposed revisions of these paragraphs would, in our opinion, simply leave this whole incident pending in the air. We do not believe, therefore, that these amendments would be compatible with our resolution.

We cannot support the third amendment suggested by the representative from Morocco. My delegation certainly regrets any infringement of the General Armistice Agreement, but we believe the more useful and significant action for the Council to take in this connection is, as proposed in paragraph 3 of the United Kingdom and United States draft, to note that, while there was an exchange of fire on August 20, there was not a substantial and menacing show of force in the demilitarized zone as had been claimed.

With regard to the fourth amendment proposed, the United States had repeatedly expressed its regret that the Armistice Commission has not functioned as envisaged in the General Armistice Agreement. However, in this case, the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization proposed a number of measures which, in his estimation, could lead to the alleviation of tension and restoration of tranquillity in the area. We do believe it important for the Security Council to support the Chief of Staff in his efforts, but we would not consider it helpful to him if the Council were to single out for special emphasis only one aspect of his suggestions—suggestions which he made as a whole to the parties concerned and which depend for implementation on the parties concerned. We believe the most effective approach for the Council is to support the need

for measures such as those proposed by the Chief of Staff, to call upon the parties to cooperate with the Chief of Staff, but at the same time to allow him full discretion in his consultations with the parties concerned. This we feel is the better way to achieve progress rather than attempting to prejudge which issue or issues should receive the most or the first attention.

For these reasons, Mr. President, the United States will abstain on the amendments submitted in document S/5410.<sup>6</sup>

## TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION <sup>7</sup>

### *The Security Council,*

*Having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic,*

*Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General dated 24 August 1963,*

1. *Condemns* the wanton murder at Almagor in Israel territory of two Israel citizens on 19 August 1963;
2. *Calls* the attention of the Syrian Arab Republic to evidence in the Secretary-General's report to the effect that those responsible for the killings appear to have been an armed group who entered Israel territory from the direction of the Jordan River and afterwards left in the same direction;

3. *Notes* with satisfaction that the report of the Secretary-General indicates that, although there was an exchange of fire, there was no substantial show of force in the demilitarized zone on 20 August 1963;

4. *Appeals* to the parties to co-operate in the early exchange of prisoners in accordance with the suggestion contained in paragraph 49 of the Secretary-General's report;

5. *Notes* from the report of the Secretary-General that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has proposed to the parties concerned certain measures to alleviate tension and restore tranquillity in the area;

6. *Calls upon* the parties to offer to the Chief of Staff all possible co-operation in the pursuit of this end in conformity with the General Armistice Agreement;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by 31 December 1963 on the progress made in regard to the measures proposed by the Chief of Staff.

<sup>6</sup> The Moroccan amendments were defeated on Sept. 3 by a vote of 2 to 0, with 9 abstentions.

<sup>7</sup> U.N. doc. S/5407; not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. The vote on Sept. 3 was 8 to 2 (Morocco, U.S.S.R.), with 1 abstention (Venezuela).

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Micrographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.*

### Security Council

Telegram dated August 21, 1963, from the Secretary General of the Organization of American States addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General concerning OAS action taken with regard to Haiti situation. S/5398. August 21, 1963. 1 p.; letter dated August 16, 1963, from the Secretary General of the OAS addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N. transmitting a copy of the resolution approved by the OAS in connection with situation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, S/5399, August 23, 1963, 2 pp.

Syria-Israel dispute:

Letter dated August 20, 1963, from the acting permanent representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5394. August 21, 1963. 2 pp.

Letter dated August 21, 1963, from the permanent representative of Syria addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5395. August 21, 1963. 1 p.

Letter dated August 21, 1963, from the permanent representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5396. August 22, 1963. 6 pp.

Report by the Secretary-General concerning recent incidents in and near the demilitarized zone created by article V, paragraph 5, of the Israel-Syria armistice agreement, S/5401, August 24, 1963, 47 pp.; Add. 1 and Corr. 1, August 26, 1963, 11 pp.; Add. 2, August 26, 1963, 13 pp.; Add. 3, August 27, 1963, 12 pp.; Add. 4, August 27, 1963, 4 pp.

### General Assembly

Letters dated July 29 and 30, 1963, from the alternate representative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-General regarding Mexico's intention to sign the limited nuclear test ban treaty. A/5469. July 31, 1963. 2 pp.

Comments received from governments regarding consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. A/5470, August 7, 1963, 47 pp., and Add. 1, September 6, 1963, 5 pp.

Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. Letter dated August 2, 1963, from the representative of Guinea addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5472, August 2, 1963, 2 pp.; letter dated July 25, 1963, from the representative of Mali addressed to the Secretary-General, A/5474, August 8, 1963, 2 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on manifestations of racial prejudice and national and religious intolerance. A/5473. August 9, 1963. 77 pp.

Note verbale dated August 7, 1963, from the permanent mission of Bulgaria addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the limited nuclear test ban treaty. A/5475. August 9, 1963. 4 pp.

Note verbale dated August 5, 1963, from the representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General concern-

ing cessation of nuclear weapon tests. A/5476. August 12, 1963. 5 pp.

## Economic and Social Council

United Nations conference on trade and development. Report of the group of experts, E/3756, June 27, 1963, 107 pp.; report of the preparatory committee on its second session, E/3769, July 5, 1963, 131 pp., and Corr. 1, July 11, 1963, 5 pp.; statement of financial implications submitted by the Secretary-General, E/3815, July 17, 1963, 14 pp.

Report of the Commission on Human Rights. E/3806. July 8, 1963. 10 pp.

Communication from the head of the Soviet delegation addressed to the President of the Economic and Social Council requesting inclusion in the agenda of the 36th session an item entitled "The policy of genocide which is being pursued by the Government of the Republic of Iraq against the Kurdish people." E/3896. July 9, 1963. 5 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annex. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1963.

*Notifications received of undertaking to seek ratification or acceptance:* Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, July 25, 1963; Federal Republic of Germany, July 19, 1963; Haiti, July 25, 1963; Spain, July 9, 1963; Switzerland, July 25, 1963; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, July 26, 1963.

#### Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Ratification deposited:* Peru, July 16, 1963.

#### Cultural

Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials, and Protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Ivory Coast, July 19, 1963.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signatures:* Gabon, Mauritania, September 10, 1963.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signatures:* Gabon, Mauritania, September 10, 1963.

## Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures affixed at Washington:* Gabon, September 10, 1963; Austria, Sierra Leone, September 11, 1963; Mauritania, September 13, 1963.

## Oil Pollution

Amendments to the International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIA: 4569). Done at London April 11, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* United Kingdom, August 25, 1963.

## Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389.

*Extension to:* Swaziland, July 12, 1963.

## Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Argentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. Entered into force October 14, 1962.

*Signature:* Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), August 6, 1963.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. Entered into force April 27, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Austria (subject to ratification), June 20, 1963; Brazil, July 8, 1963; Tanganyika, July 1, 1963; United Arab Republic, June 24, 1963.

## Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for part II. TIAS 5115.

*Accessions deposited:* Brazil, September 6, 1963; Guatemala, August 29, 1963; Iceland, September 10, 1963.

## BILATERAL

### Brazil

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 15, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5061 and 5333). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro August 22, 1963. Entered into force August 22, 1963.

### India

Agreement relating to the exemption of United States military aircraft from landing and housing fees. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi March 5 and July 22, 1963. Entered into force July 22, 1963.

### Iraq

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Baghdad August 27, 1963. Entered into force August 27, 1963.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

**Confirmations**

The Senate on September 9 confirmed the following nominations:

Henry A. Byroade to be Ambassador to the Union of Burma. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 470 dated September 13.)

William O. Hall to be Assistant Administrator for Administration, Agency for International Development. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated August 20.)

Graham A. Martin to be Ambassador to Thailand. For biographic details, see Department of State press release 477 dated September 17.)

Gen. Herbert B. Powell, U.S. Army, retired, to be Ambassador to New Zealand. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 466 dated September 11.)

**Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet**

The Department of State announced on September 1 (press release 468) that the 1963 Foreign Service Officer Selection Boards had convened on that day to consider promotions for Foreign Service officer and Foreign Service Reserve officer personnel.

Some 4,000 officers whose performance files will be reviewed staff the more than 300 embassies, legations, and consulates located in over a hundred countries with whom the United States conducts foreign relations. In addition these officers serve in Washington in the Department of State and other executive agencies, including AID, ACDA, Commerce, Defense, Labor, Treasury, and USA.

The Boards are expected to complete their review within 2 months.

Members of the eight Selection Boards include Foreign Service officers, public members drawn from private life, and members and observers from other executive agencies which have significant foreign affairs interests.

In recognition of the purpose and importance of the selection system the Department has called on a number of ambassadors to serve on the Boards. Among the Boards' chairmen are John O. Bell, Ambassador to Guatemala; Wymberley DeR. Coerr, Ambassador to Uruguay; Thomas S. Estes, Ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta; Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador to Turkey; Robinson McIlvaine, Ambassador to Dahomey; Murat W. Williams, Ambassador to El Salva-

dor; Bernard A. Guffer, former Ambassador to Finland; and Thomas W. McElhiney, Deputy Chief of Mission, Khartoum.

Also serving on the Boards are David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Philip M. Kaiser, Ambassador to Senegal and Mauritania; Philip Bonsal, former Ambassador to Morocco; and Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs and former Ambassador to Liberia.

The public members are Charles N. Hall, industrial engineer, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO; William Figy, insurance executive, Denver, Colo.; Jerome Keithley, City Manager of Palo Alto, Calif.; Russell M. Stephens, president, American Federation of Technical Engineers; and Harold F. Wendell, department store executive, Portland, Ore.

Voting members from other executive agencies are Oliver Bongard, director, Exhibits Participation Division, Department of Commerce; G. Huntington Damon, public affairs officer, USA, Seoul, Korea; George Day, foreign agricultural marketing specialist, Department of Agriculture; Kenneth Douty, European area specialist, Labor Department; and Harold Heck, director, International Trade Analysis Division, Department of Commerce.

Observers serving on the Boards are Herbert J. Cummings, director, Performance Evaluation Division, Department of Commerce; Edwin H. Bryant, Consultant to the director, Office of Commercial Services, Department of Commerce; Lowell B. Kilgore, business analyst, Department of Commerce; William R. Hayden, chief, Program and Facilities Evaluation Section, Department of Commerce; Edward Sylvester, deputy bureau administrator, Department of Labor; James D. Hoover, Far Eastern area specialist, Department of Labor; Patrick S. Cooney, chief, Overseas Service Branch, Department of Labor; and Mary Cannon, international relations officer, Department of Labor.

**Department Sets Up Office for Special Representational Services**

The Department of State announced on September 5 (press release 457) the establishment of the Office for Special Representational Services and the abolition of the Special Protocol Services Section. The new office, directed by Pedro A. Sanjuan, will perform virtually the same functions formerly discharged by the abolished section—also headed by Mr. Sanjuan. In the organizational change, the new office will report directly to William J. Crockett, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

The change reflects the Department's need to provide many special services to the Washington diplomatic community, which has expanded rapidly during the past few years. A new responsibility given the new office is the development of guidelines on civil rights for use in the Department and at overseas posts.

Other responsibilities of the Office of Special Representative Services will include:

- providing assistance to diplomatic missions in Washington regarding such matters as orientation in the United States, housing and schooling, and travel;
- handling matters relating to the establishment, expansion, or relocation of diplomatic missions in Washington, including questions of zoning;
- handling complaints and incidents involving foreign government representatives, whether received directly or referred by the Office of Protocol or regional bureaus, including those which might result from racial discrimination;
- helping coordinate arrangements for travel for foreign dignitaries and for foreign visitors who come to the United States under Federal sponsorship.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20540. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State.*

**Health and Sanitation—Cooperative Program.** Agreement with El Salvador, extending the Program Agreement of February 29, 1944, as extended and supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador June 17 and 27, 1960. Entered into force June 27, 1960. TIAS 5315. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Investment Guaranties.** Agreement with Israel relating to the agreement of August 7 and 8, 1952, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem February 5 and 20, 1963. Entered into force February 20, 1963. TIAS 5316. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with India amending the agreement of November 26, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi April 1, 1963. Entered into force April 1, 1963. TIAS 5317. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Claims—Settlement of Certain Claims Against Members of United States Armed Forces (Including Dependents) Insured by Brandaris Insurance Company in Germany.** Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn February 28 and March 14, 1963. Entered into force March 14, 1963. TIAS 5318. 5 pp. 5¢.

**Naval Matters—Furnishing of Certain Supplies and Services to Naval Vessels.** Agreement with Australia, amending the agreement of December 19 and 31, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra March 28, 1963. Entered into force March 28, 1963. TIAS 5319. 2 pp. 5¢.

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Bolivia amending the agreement of February 12, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz March 29, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. TIAS 5320. 3 pp. 5¢.

**Education—Educational Foundation and Financing of Exchange Programs.** Agreement with the Philippine Islands. Signed at Manila March 23, 1963. Entered into force March 23, 1963. TIAS 5321. 6 pp. 5¢.

**Trade.** Agreement with Paraguay, postponing the termination of the agreement of September 12, 1946, as postponed and brought up to date. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción February 27 and March 2, 1963. Entered into force March 29, 1963. TIAS 5322. 3 pp. 5¢.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to September 9 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 457 of September 5.

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*458	9/9	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*459	9/9	Delegation to U.N. General Assembly (biographic details).
460	9/9	Cleveland: "The Uses of Diversity" (revised); see BULLETIN of Sept. 23.
†461	9/9	Deadline for claims under Austrian persecutee fund.
462	9/9	G. Griffith Johnson: "The International Aviation Policy of the United States."
463	9/9	Cleveland participating in NATO consultations (rewrite).
464	9/10	Rusk: "Unfinished Business" (as-delivered text).
465	9/10	Gardner: "The 18th General Assembly: A Testing Ground of Hopes and Opportunities."
*466	9/11	Powell sworn in as Ambassador to New Zealand (biographic details).
*467	9/11	Harriman: regional foreign policy conference, Boston (excerpts).
468	9/11	Foreign Service Officer Selection Boards (rewrite).
469	9/13	Decision to conduct Antarctica inspection.
*470	9/13	Byroade sworn in as Ambassador to Burma (biographic details).
†471	9/14	G. Griffith Johnson: "The Climate of World Trade and United States-Canadian Trade Relations."
†472	9/14	Cleveland: "The 18th General Assembly: Fair and a Little Warmer, With Scattered Thunderbolts."

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

## the UN . . . action agency for peace and progress

In this new leaflet, released August 1963, the following subjects are briefly discussed:

The United States and the United Nations: Where *We* Stand  
The Structure of the United Nations  
Education, Culture and Science  
Financing the U.N.  
Keeping the Peace  
Increasing World Food Supplies  
Working for Health  
Decade of Development  
The New Nations  
Toward a World of Law

A list of the member nations, as of June 1963, is included.

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